Critique of Pure Reason
{"WorkMasterId":6056,"WpPageId":277742,"ParentWpPageId":189326,"Slug":"critique-of-pure-reason","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/immanuel-kant/critique-of-pure-reason/","RelativeUrl":"theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/immanuel-kant/critique-of-pure-reason/","HasFullText":true,"RawHtmlLength":1405437,"CleanHtmlLength":1349327,"Kicker":"Philosophy Work","Title":"Critique of Pure Reason","Deck":"Kant argues that objects of experience conform to the a priori forms of intuition and categories, setting limits to metaphysics through transcendental critique.","BackLink":{"Text":"Back to Immanuel Kant","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/immanuel-kant/"},"AuthorCard":{"Label":"Author","Title":"Immanuel Kant","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/immanuel-kant/","MediaHref":"","ImageSrc":"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/kant-01-becker-portrait-1768-4.jpg","ImageAlt":"Johann Gottlieb Becker portrait of Immanuel Kant","FilterTerra":"Western Europe","ClickText":"Immanuel Kant","ClickHref":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/immanuel-kant/","Copies":["1724 CE – 1804 CE","Königsberg, Prussia","Prussian Enlightenment philosopher whose critical philosophy of transcendental idealism, autonomy, public reason, aesthetic judgment, natural science, religion, and right reshaped modern metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, politics, and aesthetics."]},"ContextCards":[{"Label":"Period","Key":"Period:3","Title":"Early Modern History","DateText":"1500 CE – 1799 CE","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/eras-of-thought/philosophers-of-early-modern-history/"},{"Label":"Era","Key":"Era:9","Title":"Enlightenment and Proto-Industrial","DateText":"1700 CE – 1799 CE","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/eras-of-thought/philosophers-of-early-modern-history/philosophers-of-the-enlightenment-and-proto-industrial/"},{"Label":"Composition","Title":"1781 CE","Url":"","DateText":""}],"DateNote":"Displayed as 1781 CE for the first edition; the 1787 second edition is documented in notes and evidence.","GeoCards":[{"Label":"Region","Key":"Region:1"},{"Label":"Terra Avita","Key":"TerraAvita:1"},{"Label":"Terra Avita Region","Key":"TerraAvitaRegion:3"},{"Label":"Modern Country","Key":"Country:RUS:1"}],"OriginalTitle":"Kritik der reinen Vernunft","Language":"German or Latin, with major German critical editions and later English translations","DisciplineCards":[{"Label":"Primary Discipline","Key":"Discipline:epistemology"},{"Label":"Secondary Discipline","Key":"Discipline:metaphysics"}],"Tradition":"Prussian Enlightenment critical philosophy; transcendental idealism; Kantian ethics; critical metaphysics","FullText":{"Title":"Full Text","Copy":"Public-domain full text from Project Gutenberg eBook #4280 .","Url":"","Label":"","Kicker":"","Cards":[]},"CoreThesis":["Kant argues that objects of experience conform to the a priori forms of intuition and categories, setting limits to metaphysics through transcendental critique."],"Classification":{"AlternateTitles":"First Critique; Critique of Pure Reason; Kritik der reinen Vernunft, A edition 1781 and B edition 1787","KeyConcepts":"transcendental idealism; synthetic a priori; space; time; categories; apperception; phenomena; noumena; critique","Methodology":"Direct work-cluster record based on SEP, IEP, Britannica, Akademieausgabe, Bonner Kant-Korpus, public text indexes, catalog records, and modern scholarship. 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M. D. Meiklejohn\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr \u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\r\nContents\r\n\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\u003ctable style=\";\"\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"toc\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#chap01\"\u003e \u003cspan style=\"font-size: larger\"\u003e\u003cb\u003ePreface to the First Edition (1781)\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#chap02\"\u003e \u003cspan style=\"font-size: larger\"\u003e\u003cb\u003ePreface to the Second Edition (1787)\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#chap03\"\u003e \u003cspan style=\"font-size: larger\"\u003e\u003cb\u003eIntroduction\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/span\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"toc2\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#chap04\"\u003e I. Of the difference between Pure and Empirical Knowledge \u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#chap05\"\u003e II. The Human Intellect, even in an Unphilosophical State, is in\r\nPossession of Certain Cognitions \u0026ldquo;à priori\u0026rdquo;. \u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#chap06\"\u003e III. Philosophy stands in need of a Science which shall Determine\r\nthe Possibility, Principles, and Extent of Human Knowledge \u0026ldquo;à priori\u0026rdquo; \u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#chap07\"\u003e IV. Of the Difference Between Analytical and Synthetical Judgements.\r\n\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#chap08\"\u003e V. In all Theoretical Sciences of Reason, Synthetical Judgements\r\n\u0026ldquo;à priori\u0026rdquo; are contained as Principles. \u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#chap09\"\u003e VI. The Universal Problem of Pure Reason. \u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#chap10\"\u003e VII. Idea and Division of a Particular Science, under the Name of\r\na Critique of Pure Reason. \u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#chap11\"\u003e \u003cspan style=\"font-size: larger\"\u003e\u003cb\u003eI. Transcendental Doctrine of Elements\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"toc2\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#chap12\"\u003e First Part\u0026mdash;TRANSCENDENTAL ÆSTHETIC \u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"toc3\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#chap13\"\u003e § 1. Introductory \u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"toc4\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#chap14\"\u003e SECTION I. OF SPACE \u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"toc3\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#chap15\"\u003e § 2. Metaphysical Exposition of this Conception. \u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#chap16\"\u003e § 3. Transcendental Exposition of the Conception of Space. \u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#chap17\"\u003e § 4. Conclusions from the foregoing Conceptions. \u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"toc4\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#chap18\"\u003e SECTION II. OF TIME \u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"toc3\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#chap19\"\u003e § 5. Metaphysical Exposition of this Conception. \u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#chap20\"\u003e § 6. Transcendental Exposition of the Conception of Time. \u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#chap21\"\u003e § 7. Conclusions from the above Conceptions. \u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#chap22\"\u003e § 8. Elucidation. \u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#chap23\"\u003e § 9. General Remarks on Transcendental Æsthetic. \u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#chap24\"\u003e § 10. Conclusion of the Transcendental Æsthetic. \u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#chap25\"\u003e Second Part\u0026mdash;TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC \u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"toc3\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#chap26\"\u003e Introduction. Idea of a Transcendental Logic \u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"toc4\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#chap27\"\u003e I. Of Logic in General \u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#chap28\"\u003e II. Of Transcendental Logic \u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#chap29\"\u003e III. Of the Division of General Logic into Analytic and\r\nDialectic\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#chap30\"\u003e IV. Of the Division of Transcendental Logic into Transcendental\r\nAnalytic and Dialectic \u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#chap31\"\u003e FIRST DIVISION\u0026mdash;TRANSCENDENTAL ANALYTIC \u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"toc4\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#chap32\"\u003e BOOK I. Analytic of Conceptions. § 2\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"toc5\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#chap33\"\u003e Chapter I. Of the Transcendental Clue to the Discovery of all Pure\r\nConceptions of the Understanding \u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"toc6\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#chap34\"\u003e Introductory § 3\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#chap35\"\u003e Section I. Of the Logical Use of the Understanding in General.\r\n§ 4\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#chap36\"\u003e Section II. Of the Logical Function of the Understanding in\r\nJudgements. § 5\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#chap37\"\u003e Section III. Of the Pure Conceptions of the Understanding, or\r\nCategories. § 6\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#chap38\"\u003e Chapter II. Of the Deduction of the Pure Conception of the\r\nUnderstanding\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"toc6\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#chap39\"\u003e Section I. Of the Principles of a Transcendental Deduction in\r\ngeneral § 9\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#chap40\"\u003e Transition to the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories.\r\n§ 10\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#chap41\"\u003e Section II Transcendental Deduction of the pure Conceptions of\r\nthe Understanding.\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#chap42\"\u003e Of the Possibility of a Conjunction of the manifold representations\r\ngiven by Sense. § 11.\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#chap43\"\u003e Of the Originally Synthetical Unity of Apperception. § 12\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#chap44\"\u003e The Principle of the Synthetical Unity of Apperception is the highest\r\nPrinciple of all exercise of the Understanding. § 13\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#chap45\"\u003e What Objective Unity of Self-consciousness is. § 14\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#chap46\"\u003e The Logical Form of all Judgements consists in the Objective Unity\r\nof Apperception of the Conceptions contained therein. § 15\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#chap47\"\u003e All Sensuous Intuitions are subject to the Categories, as Conditions\r\nunder which alone the manifold Content of them can be united in one Consciousness.\r\n§ 16\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#chap48\"\u003e Observation. § 17\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#chap49\"\u003e In Cognition, its Application to Objects of Experience is the only\r\nlegitimate use of the Category. § 18\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#chap50\"\u003e Of the Application of the Categories to Objects of the Senses in\r\ngeneral. § 20\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#chap51\"\u003e Transcendental Deduction of the universally possible employment\r\nin experience of the Pure Conceptions of the Understanding. § 22\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#chap52\"\u003e Result of this Deduction of the Conceptions of the Understanding.\r\n§ 23\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#chap53\"\u003e BOOK II. Analytic of Principles \u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"toc5\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#chap54\"\u003e INTRODUCTION. Of the Transcendental Faculty of judgement in\r\nGeneral.\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#chap55\"\u003e TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF THE FACULTY OF JUDGEMENT OR, ANALYTIC\r\nOF PRINCIPLES.\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#chap56\"\u003e Chapter I. Of the Schematism at of the Pure Conceptions of the\r\nUnderstanding.\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#chap57\"\u003e Chapter II. System of all Principles of the Pure\r\nUnderstanding.\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"toc6\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#chap58\"\u003e Section I. Of the Supreme Principle of all Analytical\r\nJudgements.\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#chap59\"\u003e Section II. Of the Supreme Principle of all Synthetical\r\nJudgements.\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#chap60\"\u003e Section III. Systematic Representation of all Synthetical\r\nPrinciples of the Pure Understanding.\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#chap61\"\u003e Chapter III Of the Ground of the Division of all Objects into\r\nPhenomena and Noumena.\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#chap62\"\u003e APPENDIX.\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#chap63\"\u003e SECOND DIVISION\u0026mdash;TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC \u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"toc4\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#chap64\"\u003e TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. INTRODUCTION. \u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"toc5\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#chap65\"\u003e I. Of Transcendental Illusory Appearance.\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#chap66\"\u003e II. Of Pure Reason as the Seat of Transcendental Illusory\r\nAppearance.\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#chap67\"\u003e TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC\u0026mdash;BOOK I\u0026mdash;OF THE CONCEPTIONS\r\nOF PURE REASON.\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"toc5\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#chap68\"\u003e Section I—Of Ideas in General.\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#chap69\"\u003e Section II. Of Transcendental Ideas.\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#chap70\"\u003e Section III. System of Transcendental Ideas.\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#chap71\"\u003e TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC\u0026mdash;BOOK II\u0026mdash;OF THE DIALECTICAL\r\nPROCEDURE OF PURE REASON.\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"toc5\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#chap72\"\u003e Chapter I. Of the Paralogisms of Pure Reason.\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#chap73\"\u003e Chapter II. The Antinomy of Pure Reason.\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"toc6\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#chap74\"\u003e Section I. System of Cosmological Ideas.\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#chap75\"\u003e Section II. Antithetic of Pure Reason.\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#chap76\"\u003e Section III. Of the Interest of Reason in these\r\nSelf-contradictions.\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#chap77\"\u003e Section IV. Of the necessity imposed upon Pure Reason of\r\npresenting a Solution of its Transcendental Problems.\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#chap78\"\u003e Section V. Sceptical Exposition of the Cosmological Problems\r\npresented in the four Transcendental Ideas.\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#chap79\"\u003e Section VI. Transcendental Idealism as the Key to the Solution\r\nof Pure Cosmological Dialectic.\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#chap80\"\u003e Section VII. Critical Solution of the Cosmological Problem.\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#chap81\"\u003e Section VIII. Regulative Principle of Pure Reason in relation\r\nto the Cosmological Ideas.\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#chap82\"\u003e Section IX. Of the Empirical Use of the Regulative Principle\r\nof Reason with regard to the Cosmological Ideas.\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"toc7\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#chap83\"\u003e I. Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality of the\r\nComposition of Phenomena in the Universe.\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#chap84\"\u003e II. Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality of the\r\nDivision of a Whole given in Intuition.\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#chap85\"\u003e III. Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality of the\r\nDeduction of Cosmical Events from their Causes.\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#chap86\"\u003e IV. Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality of the\r\nDependence of Phenomenal Existences.\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#chap87\"\u003e Chapter III. The Ideal of Pure Reason.\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"toc6\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#chap88\"\u003e Section I. Of the Ideal in General.\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#chap89\"\u003e Section II. Of the Transcendental Ideal (Prototypon\r\nTrancendentale).\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#chap90\"\u003e Section III. Of the Arguments employed by Speculative Reason\r\nin Proof of the Existence of a Supreme Being.\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#chap91\"\u003e Section IV. Of the Impossibility of an Ontological Proof of\r\nthe Existence of God.\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#chap92\"\u003e Section V. Of the Impossibility of a Cosmological Proof of\r\nthe Existence of God.\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#chap93\"\u003e Section VI. Of the Impossibility of a Physico-Theological\r\nProof.\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#chap94\"\u003e Section VII. Critique of all Theology based upon Speculative\r\nPrinciples of Reason.\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#chap95\"\u003e Appendix. Of the Regulative Employment of the Ideas of Pure\r\nReason.\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#chap96\"\u003e \u003cspan style=\"font-size: larger\"\u003e\u003cb\u003eII. Transcendental Doctrine of Method\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"toc2\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#chap97\"\u003e Chapter I. The Discipline of Pure Reason.\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"toc3\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#chap98\"\u003e Section I. The Discipline of Pure Reason in the Sphere of\r\nDogmatism.\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#chap99\"\u003e Section II. The Discipline of Pure Reason in Polemics.\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#chap100\"\u003e Section III. The Discipline of Pure Reason in\r\nHypothesis.\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#chap101\"\u003e Section IV. The Discipline of Pure Reason in Relation to\r\nProofs.\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#chap102\"\u003e Chapter II. The Canon of Pure Reason.\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"toc3\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#chap103\"\u003e Section I. Of the Ultimate End of the Pure Use of Reason.\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#chap104\"\u003e Section II. Of the Ideal of the Summum Bonum as a Determining\r\nGround of the Ultimate End of Pure Reason.\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#chap105\"\u003e Section III. Of Opinion, Knowledge, and Belief.\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#chap106\"\u003e Chapter III. The Architectonic of Pure Reason.\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#chap107\"\u003e Chapter IV. The History of Pure Reason.\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003c/table\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr \u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca id=\"chap01\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003ePREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION 1781\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHuman reason, in one sphere of its cognition, is called upon to consider\r\nquestions, which it cannot decline, as they are presented by its own nature,\r\nbut which it cannot answer, as they transcend every faculty of the mind.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIt falls into this difficulty without any fault of its own. It begins with\r\nprinciples, which cannot be dispensed with in the field of experience, and the\r\ntruth and sufficiency of which are, at the same time, insured by experience.\r\nWith these principles it rises, in obedience to the laws of its own nature, to\r\never higher and more remote conditions. But it quickly discovers that, in this\r\nway, its labours must remain ever incomplete, because new questions never cease\r\nto present themselves; and thus it finds itself compelled to have recourse to\r\nprinciples which transcend the region of experience, while they are regarded by\r\ncommon sense without distrust. It thus falls into confusion and contradictions,\r\nfrom which it conjectures the presence of latent errors, which, however, it is\r\nunable to discover, because the principles it employs, transcending the limits\r\nof experience, cannot be tested by that criterion. The arena of these endless\r\ncontests is called \u003ci\u003eMetaphysic\u003c/i\u003e.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nTime was, when she was the \u003ci\u003equeen\u003c/i\u003e of all the sciences; and, if we take\r\nthe will for the deed, she certainly deserves, so far as regards the high\r\nimportance of her object-matter, this title of honour. Now, it is the fashion\r\nof the time to heap contempt and scorn upon her; and the matron mourns, forlorn\r\nand forsaken, like Hecuba:\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"poem\"\u003e\r\nModo maxima rerum,\u003cbr\u003e\r\nTot generis, natisque potens…\u003cbr\u003e\r\nNunc trahor exul, inops.\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u0026mdash;Ovid, Metamorphoses. xiii\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAt first, her government, under the administration of the \u003ci\u003edogmatists\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nwas an absolute \u003ci\u003edespotism\u003c/i\u003e. But, as the legislative continued to show\r\ntraces of the ancient barbaric rule, her empire gradually broke up, and\r\nintestine wars introduced the reign of \u003ci\u003eanarchy;\u003c/i\u003e while the\r\n\u003ci\u003esceptics\u003c/i\u003e, like nomadic tribes, who hate a permanent habitation and\r\nsettled mode of living, attacked from time to time those who had organized\r\nthemselves into civil communities. But their number was, very happily, small;\r\nand thus they could not entirely put a stop to the exertions of those who\r\npersisted in raising new edifices, although on no settled or uniform plan. In\r\nrecent times the hope dawned upon us of seeing those disputes settled, and the\r\nlegitimacy of her claims established by a kind of \u003ci\u003ephysiology\u003c/i\u003e of the\r\nhuman understanding\u0026mdash;that of the celebrated Locke. But it was found\r\nthat\u0026mdash;although it was affirmed that this so-called queen could not refer\r\nher descent to any higher source than that of common experience, a circumstance\r\nwhich necessarily brought suspicion on her claims\u0026mdash;as this\r\n\u003ci\u003egenealogy\u003c/i\u003e was incorrect, she persisted in the advancement of her claims\r\nto sovereignty. Thus metaphysics necessarily fell back into the antiquated and\r\nrotten constitution of \u003ci\u003edogmatism\u003c/i\u003e, and again became obnoxious to the\r\ncontempt from which efforts had been made to save it. At present, as all\r\nmethods, according to the general persuasion, have been tried in vain, there\r\nreigns nought but weariness and complete \u003ci\u003eindifferentism\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;the mother\r\nof chaos and night in the scientific world, but at the same time the source of,\r\nor at least the prelude to, the re-creation and reinstallation of a science,\r\nwhen it has fallen into confusion, obscurity, and disuse from ill directed\r\neffort.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nFor it is in reality vain to profess \u003ci\u003eindifference\u003c/i\u003e in regard to such\r\ninquiries, the object of which cannot be indifferent to humanity. Besides,\r\nthese pretended \u003ci\u003eindifferentists\u003c/i\u003e, however much they may try to disguise\r\nthemselves by the assumption of a popular style and by changes on the language\r\nof the schools, unavoidably fall into metaphysical declarations and\r\npropositions, which they profess to regard with so much contempt. At the same\r\ntime, this indifference, which has arisen in the world of science, and which\r\nrelates to that kind of knowledge which we should wish to see destroyed the\r\nlast, is a phenomenon that well deserves our attention and reflection. It is\r\nplainly not the effect of the levity, but of the matured \u003ci\u003ejudgement\u003c/i\u003e\u003ca\r\nhref=\"#linknote-1\" id=\"linknoteref-1\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[1]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nof the age, which refuses to be any longer entertained with illusory knowledge,\r\nIt is, in fact, a call to reason, again to undertake the most laborious of all\r\ntasks\u0026mdash;that of self-examination, and to establish a tribunal, which may\r\nsecure it in its well-grounded claims, while it pronounces against all baseless\r\nassumptions and pretensions, not in an arbitrary manner, but according to its\r\nown eternal and unchangeable laws. This tribunal is nothing less than the\r\n\u003ci\u003eCritical Investigation of Pure Reason\u003c/i\u003e.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"linknote-1\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#linknoteref-1\"\u003e[1]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nWe very often hear complaints of the shallowness of the present age, and of the\r\ndecay of profound science. But I do not think that those which rest upon a\r\nsecure foundation, such as mathematics, physical science, etc., in the least\r\ndeserve this reproach, but that they rather maintain their ancient fame, and in\r\nthe latter case, indeed, far surpass it. The same would be the case with the\r\nother kinds of cognition, if their principles were but firmly established. In\r\nthe absence of this security, indifference, doubt, and finally, severe\r\ncriticism are rather signs of a profound habit of thought. Our age is the age\r\nof criticism, to which everything must be subjected. The sacredness of\r\nreligion, and the authority of legislation, are by many regarded as grounds of\r\nexemption from the examination of this tribunal. But, if they are exempted,\r\nthey become the subjects of just suspicion, and cannot lay claim to sincere\r\nrespect, which reason accords only to that which has stood the test of a free\r\nand public examination.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nI do not mean by this a criticism of books and systems, but a critical inquiry\r\ninto the faculty of reason, with reference to the cognitions to which it\r\nstrives to attain \u003ci\u003ewithout the aid of experience;\u003c/i\u003e in other words, the\r\nsolution of the question regarding the possibility or impossibility of\r\nmetaphysics, and the determination of the origin, as well as of the extent and\r\nlimits of this science. All this must be done on the basis of principles.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThis path\u0026mdash;the only one now remaining\u0026mdash;has been entered upon by me;\r\nand I flatter myself that I have, in this way, discovered the cause\r\nof\u0026mdash;and consequently the mode of removing\u0026mdash;all the errors which have\r\nhitherto set reason at variance with itself, in the sphere of non-empirical\r\nthought. I have not returned an evasive answer to the questions of reason, by\r\nalleging the inability and limitation of the faculties of the mind; I have, on\r\nthe contrary, examined them completely in the light of principles, and, after\r\nhaving discovered the cause of the doubts and contradictions into which reason\r\nfell, have solved them to its perfect satisfaction. It is true, these questions\r\nhave not been solved as dogmatism, in its vain fancies and desires, had\r\nexpected; for it can only be satisfied by the exercise of magical arts, and of\r\nthese I have no knowledge. But neither do these come within the compass of our\r\nmental powers; and it was the duty of philosophy to destroy the illusions which\r\nhad their origin in misconceptions, whatever darling hopes and valued\r\nexpectations may be ruined by its explanations. My chief aim in this work has\r\nbeen thoroughness; and I make bold to say that there is not a single\r\nmetaphysical problem that does not find its solution, or at least the key to\r\nits solution, here. Pure reason is a perfect unity; and therefore, if the\r\nprinciple presented by it prove to be insufficient for the solution of even a\r\nsingle one of those questions to which the very nature of reason gives birth,\r\nwe must reject it, as we could not be perfectly certain of its sufficiency in\r\nthe case of the others.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWhile I say this, I think I see upon the countenance of the reader signs of\r\ndissatisfaction mingled with contempt, when he hears declarations which sound\r\nso boastful and extravagant; and yet they are beyond comparison more moderate\r\nthan those advanced by the commonest author of the commonest philosophical\r\nprogramme, in which the dogmatist professes to demonstrate the simple nature of\r\nthe soul, or the necessity of a primal being. Such a dogmatist promises to\r\nextend human knowledge beyond the limits of possible experience; while I humbly\r\nconfess that this is completely beyond my power. Instead of any such attempt, I\r\nconfine myself to the examination of reason alone and its pure thought; and I\r\ndo not need to seek far for the sum-total of its cognition, because it has its\r\nseat in my own mind. Besides, common logic presents me with a complete and\r\nsystematic catalogue of all the simple operations of reason; and it is my task\r\nto answer the question how far reason can go, without the material presented\r\nand the aid furnished by experience.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSo much for the completeness and thoroughness necessary in the execution of the\r\npresent task. The aims set before us are not arbitrarily proposed, but are\r\nimposed upon us by the nature of cognition itself.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe above remarks relate to the \u003ci\u003ematter\u003c/i\u003e of our critical inquiry. As\r\nregards the \u003ci\u003eform\u003c/i\u003e, there are two indispensable conditions, which any one\r\nwho undertakes so difficult a task as that of a critique of pure reason, is\r\nbound to fulfil. These conditions are \u003ci\u003ecertitude\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003eclearness\u003c/i\u003e.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAs regards \u003ci\u003ecertitude\u003c/i\u003e, I have fully convinced myself that, in this sphere\r\nof thought, \u003ci\u003eopinion\u003c/i\u003e is perfectly inadmissible, and that everything which\r\nbears the least semblance of an hypothesis must be excluded, as of no value in\r\nsuch discussions. For it is a necessary condition of every cognition that is to\r\nbe established upon \u003ci\u003eà priori\u003c/i\u003e grounds that it shall be held to be\r\nabsolutely necessary; much more is this the case with an attempt to determine\r\nall pure \u003ci\u003eà priori\u003c/i\u003e cognition, and to furnish the standard\u0026mdash;and\r\nconsequently an example\u0026mdash;of all apodeictic (philosophical) certitude.\r\nWhether I have succeeded in what I professed to do, it is for the reader to\r\ndetermine; it is the author\u0026rsquo;s business merely to adduce grounds and\r\nreasons, without determining what influence these ought to have on the mind of\r\nhis judges. But, lest anything he may have said may become the innocent cause\r\nof doubt in their minds, or tend to weaken the effect which his arguments might\r\notherwise produce\u0026mdash;he may be allowed to point out those passages which may\r\noccasion mistrust or difficulty, although these do not concern the main purpose\r\nof the present work. He does this solely with the view of removing from the\r\nmind of the reader any doubts which might affect his judgement of the work as a\r\nwhole, and in regard to its ultimate aim.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nI know no investigations more necessary for a full insight into the nature of\r\nthe faculty which we call \u003ci\u003eunderstanding\u003c/i\u003e, and at the same time for the\r\ndetermination of the rules and limits of its use, than those undertaken in the\r\nsecond chapter of the \u0026ldquo;Transcendental Analytic,\u0026rdquo; under the title of\r\n\u003ci\u003eDeduction of the Pure Conceptions of the Understanding;\u003c/i\u003e and they have\r\nalso cost me by far the greatest labour\u0026mdash;labour which, I hope, will not\r\nremain uncompensated. The view there taken, which goes somewhat deeply into the\r\nsubject, has two sides. The one relates to the objects of the pure\r\nunderstanding, and is intended to demonstrate and to render comprehensible the\r\nobjective validity of its \u003ci\u003eà priori\u003c/i\u003e conceptions; and it forms for this\r\nreason an essential part of the Critique. The other considers the pure\r\nunderstanding itself, its possibility and its powers of cognition\u0026mdash;that\r\nis, from a subjective point of view; and, although this exposition is of great\r\nimportance, it does not belong essentially to the main purpose of the work,\r\nbecause the grand question is what and how much can reason and understanding,\r\napart from experience, cognize, and not, how is the \u003ci\u003efaculty of thought\u003c/i\u003e\r\nitself possible? As the latter is an inquiry into the cause of a given effect,\r\nand has thus in it some semblance of an hypothesis (although, as I shall show\r\non another occasion, this is really not the fact), it would seem that, in the\r\npresent instance, I had allowed myself to enounce a mere \u003ci\u003eopinion\u003c/i\u003e, and\r\nthat the reader must therefore be at liberty to hold a different\r\n\u003ci\u003eopinion\u003c/i\u003e. But I beg to remind him that, if my subjective deduction does\r\nnot produce in his mind the conviction of its certitude at which I aimed, the\r\nobjective deduction, with which alone the present work is properly concerned,\r\nis in every respect satisfactory.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAs regards \u003ci\u003eclearness\u003c/i\u003e, the reader has a right to demand, in the first\r\nplace, \u003ci\u003ediscursive\u003c/i\u003e or logical clearness, that is, on the basis of\r\nconceptions, and, secondly, \u003ci\u003eintuitive\u003c/i\u003e or æsthetic clearness, by means of\r\nintuitions, that is, by examples or other modes of illustration \u003ci\u003ein\r\nconcreto\u003c/i\u003e. I have done what I could for the first kind of intelligibility.\r\nThis was essential to my purpose; and it thus became the accidental cause of my\r\ninability to do complete justice to the second requirement. I have been almost\r\nalways at a loss, during the progress of this work, how to settle this\r\nquestion. Examples and illustrations always appeared to me necessary, and, in\r\nthe first sketch of the Critique, naturally fell into their proper places. But\r\nI very soon became aware of the magnitude of my task, and the numerous problems\r\nwith which I should be engaged; and, as I perceived that this critical\r\ninvestigation would, even if delivered in the driest \u003ci\u003escholastic\u003c/i\u003e manner,\r\nbe far from being brief, I found it unadvisable to enlarge it still more with\r\nexamples and explanations, which are necessary only from a \u003ci\u003epopular\u003c/i\u003e point\r\nof view. I was induced to take this course from the consideration also that the\r\npresent work is not intended for popular use, that those devoted to science do\r\nnot require such helps, although they are always acceptable, and that they\r\nwould have materially interfered with my present purpose. Abbé Terrasson\r\nremarks with great justice that, if we estimate the size of a work, not from\r\nthe number of its pages, but from the time which we require to make ourselves\r\nmaster of it, it may be said of many a book\u0026mdash;\u003ci\u003ethat it would be much\r\nshorter, if it were not so short\u003c/i\u003e. On the other hand, as regards the\r\ncomprehensibility of a system of speculative cognition, connected under a\r\nsingle principle, we may say with equal justice: many a book would have been\r\nmuch clearer, if it had not been intended to be so very clear. For explanations\r\nand examples, and other helps to intelligibility, aid us in the comprehension\r\nof \u003ci\u003eparts\u003c/i\u003e, but they distract the attention, dissipate the mental power of\r\nthe reader, and stand in the way of his forming a clear conception of the\r\n\u003ci\u003ewhole;\u003c/i\u003e as he cannot attain soon enough to a survey of the system, and\r\nthe colouring and embellishments bestowed upon it prevent his observing its\r\narticulation or organization\u0026mdash;which is the most important consideration\r\nwith him, when he comes to judge of its unity and stability.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe reader must naturally have a strong inducement to co-operate with the\r\npresent author, if he has formed the intention of erecting a complete and solid\r\nedifice of metaphysical science, according to the plan now laid before him.\r\nMetaphysics, as here represented, is the only science which admits of\r\ncompletion\u0026mdash;and with little labour, if it is united, in a short time; so\r\nthat nothing will be left to future generations except the task of illustrating\r\nand applying it \u003ci\u003edidactically\u003c/i\u003e. For this science is nothing more than the\r\ninventory of all that is given us by \u003ci\u003epure reason\u003c/i\u003e, systematically\r\narranged. Nothing can escape our notice; for what reason produces from itself\r\ncannot lie concealed, but must be brought to the light by reason itself, so\r\nsoon as we have discovered the common principle of the ideas we seek. The\r\nperfect unity of this kind of cognitions, which are based upon pure\r\nconceptions, and uninfluenced by any empirical element, or any peculiar\r\nintuition leading to determinate experience, renders this completeness not only\r\npracticable, but also necessary.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"poem\"\u003e\r\nTecum habita, et nôris quam sit tibi curta supellex.\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u0026mdash;Persius. Satirae iv. 52.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSuch a system of pure speculative reason I hope to be able to publish under the\r\ntitle of \u003ci\u003eMetaphysic of Nature\u003c/i\u003e\u003ca href=\"#linknote-2\" id=\"linknoteref-2\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[2]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e. The content of this work (which will not\r\nbe half so long) will be very much richer than that of the present Critique,\r\nwhich has to discover the sources of this cognition and expose the conditions\r\nof its possibility, and at the same time to clear and level a fit foundation\r\nfor the scientific edifice. In the present work, I look for the patient hearing\r\nand the impartiality of a \u003ci\u003ejudge;\u003c/i\u003e in the other, for the good-will and\r\nassistance of a \u003ci\u003eco-labourer\u003c/i\u003e. For, however complete the list of\r\n\u003ci\u003eprinciples\u003c/i\u003e for this system may be in the Critique, the correctness of\r\nthe system requires that no \u003ci\u003ededuced\u003c/i\u003e conceptions should be absent. These\r\ncannot be presented \u003ci\u003eà priori\u003c/i\u003e, but must be gradually discovered; and,\r\nwhile the \u003ci\u003esynthesis\u003c/i\u003e of conceptions has been fully exhausted in the\r\nCritique, it is necessary that, in the proposed work, the same should be the\r\ncase with their \u003ci\u003eanalysis\u003c/i\u003e. But this will be rather an amusement than a\r\nlabour.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"linknote-2\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#linknoteref-2\"\u003e[2]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nIn contradistinction to the Metaphysic of Ethics. This work was never\r\npublished.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003c!–end chapter–\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca id=\"chap02\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003ePREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION 1787\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWhether the treatment of that portion of our knowledge which lies within the\r\nprovince of pure reason advances with that undeviating certainty which\r\ncharacterizes the progress of \u003ci\u003escience\u003c/i\u003e, we shall be at no loss to\r\ndetermine. If we find those who are engaged in metaphysical pursuits, unable to\r\ncome to an understanding as to the method which they ought to follow; if we\r\nfind them, after the most elaborate preparations, invariably brought to a stand\r\nbefore the goal is reached, and compelled to retrace their steps and strike\r\ninto fresh paths, we may then feel quite sure that they are far from having\r\nattained to the certainty of scientific progress and may rather be said to be\r\nmerely groping about in the dark. In these circumstances we shall render an\r\nimportant service to reason if we succeed in simply indicating the path along\r\nwhich it must travel, in order to arrive at any results\u0026mdash;even if it should\r\nbe found necessary to abandon many of those aims which, without reflection,\r\nhave been proposed for its attainment.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThat \u003ci\u003eLogic\u003c/i\u003e has advanced in this sure course, even from the earliest\r\ntimes, is apparent from the fact that, since Aristotle, it has been unable to\r\nadvance a step and, thus, to all appearance has reached its completion. For, if\r\nsome of the moderns have thought to enlarge its domain by introducing\r\n\u003ci\u003epsychological\u003c/i\u003e discussions on the mental faculties, such as imagination\r\nand wit, \u003ci\u003emetaphysical\u003c/i\u003e, discussions on the origin of knowledge and the\r\ndifferent kinds of certitude, according to the difference of the objects\r\n(idealism, scepticism, and so on), or \u003ci\u003eanthropological\u003c/i\u003e discussions on\r\nprejudices, their causes and remedies: this attempt, on the part of these\r\nauthors, only shows their ignorance of the peculiar nature of logical science.\r\nWe do not enlarge but disfigure the sciences when we lose sight of their\r\nrespective limits and allow them to run into one another. Now logic is enclosed\r\nwithin limits which admit of perfectly clear definition; it is a science which\r\nhas for its object nothing but the exposition and proof of the \u003ci\u003eformal\u003c/i\u003e\r\nlaws of all thought, whether it be \u003ci\u003eà priori\u003c/i\u003e or empirical, whatever be\r\nits origin or its object, and whatever the difficulties\u0026mdash;natural or\r\naccidental\u0026mdash;which it encounters in the human mind.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe early success of logic must be attributed exclusively to the narrowness of\r\nits field, in which abstraction may, or rather must, be made of all the objects\r\nof cognition with their characteristic distinctions, and in which the\r\nunderstanding has only to deal with itself and with its own forms. It is,\r\nobviously, a much more difficult task for reason to strike into the sure path\r\nof science, where it has to deal not simply with itself, but with objects\r\nexternal to itself. Hence, logic is properly only a\r\n\u003ci\u003epropædeutic\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;forms, as it were, the vestibule of the sciences; and\r\nwhile it is necessary to enable us to form a correct judgement with regard to\r\nthe various branches of knowledge, still the acquisition of real, substantive\r\nknowledge is to be sought only in the sciences properly so called, that is, in\r\nthe objective sciences.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nNow these sciences, if they can be termed rational at all, must contain\r\nelements of \u003ci\u003eà priori\u003c/i\u003e cognition, and this cognition may stand in a\r\ntwofold relation to its object. Either it may have to \u003ci\u003edetermine\u003c/i\u003e the\r\nconception of the object\u0026mdash;which must be supplied extraneously, or it may\r\nhave to \u003ci\u003eestablish its reality\u003c/i\u003e. The former is \u003ci\u003etheoretical\u003c/i\u003e, the\r\nlatter \u003ci\u003epractical\u003c/i\u003e, rational cognition. In both, the \u003ci\u003epure\u003c/i\u003e or \u003ci\u003eà\r\npriori\u003c/i\u003e element must be treated first, and must be carefully distinguished\r\nfrom that which is supplied from other sources. Any other method can only lead\r\nto irremediable confusion.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n\u003ci\u003eMathematics\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003ephysics\u003c/i\u003e are the two theoretical sciences which\r\nhave to determine their objects \u003ci\u003eà priori\u003c/i\u003e. The former is purely \u003ci\u003eà\r\npriori\u003c/i\u003e, the latter is partially so, but is also dependent on other sources\r\nof cognition.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIn the earliest times of which history affords us any record,\r\n\u003ci\u003emathematics\u003c/i\u003e had already entered on the sure course of science, among\r\nthat wonderful nation, the Greeks. Still it is not to be supposed that it was\r\nas easy for this science to strike into, or rather to construct for itself,\r\nthat royal road, as it was for logic, in which reason has only to deal with\r\nitself. On the contrary, I believe that it must have remained\r\nlong\u0026mdash;chiefly among the Egyptians\u0026mdash;in the stage of blind groping\r\nafter its true aims and destination, and that it was revolutionized by the\r\nhappy idea of one man, who struck out and determined for all time the path\r\nwhich this science must follow, and which admits of an indefinite advancement.\r\nThe history of this intellectual revolution\u0026mdash;much more important in its\r\nresults than the discovery of the passage round the celebrated Cape of Good\r\nHope\u0026mdash;and of its author, has not been preserved. But Diogenes Laertius, in\r\nnaming the supposed discoverer of some of the simplest elements of geometrical\r\ndemonstration\u0026mdash;elements which, according to the ordinary opinion, do not\r\neven require to be proved\u0026mdash;makes it apparent that the change introduced by\r\nthe first indication of this new path, must have seemed of the utmost\r\nimportance to the mathematicians of that age, and it has thus been secured\r\nagainst the chance of oblivion. A new light must have flashed on the mind of\r\nthe first man (\u003ci\u003eThales\u003c/i\u003e, or whatever may have been his name) who\r\ndemonstrated the properties of the \u003ci\u003eisosceles\u003c/i\u003e triangle. For he found that\r\nit was not sufficient to meditate on the figure, as it lay before his eyes, or\r\nthe conception of it, as it existed in his mind, and thus endeavour to get at\r\nthe knowledge of its properties, but that it was necessary to produce these\r\nproperties, as it were, by a positive \u003ci\u003eà priori construction;\u003c/i\u003e and that,\r\nin order to arrive with certainty at \u003ci\u003eà priori\u003c/i\u003e cognition, he must not\r\nattribute to the object any other properties than those which necessarily\r\nfollowed from that which he had himself, in accordance with his conception,\r\nplaced in the object.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nA much longer period elapsed before \u003ci\u003ePhysics\u003c/i\u003e entered on the highway of\r\nscience. For it is only about a century and a half since the wise\r\nB\u003csmall\u003eACON\u003c/small\u003e gave a new direction to physical studies, or\r\nrather\u0026mdash;as others were already on the right track\u0026mdash;imparted fresh\r\nvigour to the pursuit of this new direction. Here, too, as in the case of\r\nmathematics, we find evidence of a rapid intellectual revolution. In the\r\nremarks which follow I shall confine myself to the \u003ci\u003eempirical\u003c/i\u003e side of\r\nnatural science.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWhen G\u003csmall\u003eALILEI\u003c/small\u003e experimented with balls of a definite weight on the\r\ninclined plane, when T\u003csmall\u003eORRICELLI\u003c/small\u003e caused the air to sustain a\r\nweight which he had calculated beforehand to be equal to that of a definite\r\ncolumn of water, or when S\u003csmall\u003eTAHL\u003c/small\u003e, at a later period, converted\r\nmetals into lime, and reconverted lime into metal, by the addition and\r\nsubtraction of certain elements;\u003ca href=\"#linknote-3\" id=\"linknoteref-3\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[3]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e a light broke upon all natural\r\nphilosophers. They learned that reason only perceives that which it produces\r\nafter its own design; that it must not be content to follow, as it were, in the\r\nleading-strings of nature, but must proceed in advance with principles of\r\njudgement according to unvarying laws, and compel nature to reply its\r\nquestions. For accidental observations, made according to no preconceived plan,\r\ncannot be united under a necessary law. But it is this that reason seeks for\r\nand requires. It is only the principles of reason which can give to concordant\r\nphenomena the validity of laws, and it is only when experiment is directed by\r\nthese rational principles that it can have any real utility. Reason must\r\napproach nature with the view, indeed, of receiving information from it, not,\r\nhowever, in the character of a pupil, who listens to all that his master\r\nchooses to tell him, but in that of a judge, who compels the witnesses to reply\r\nto those questions which he himself thinks fit to propose. To this single idea\r\nmust the revolution be ascribed, by which, after groping in the dark for so\r\nmany centuries, natural science was at length conducted into the path of\r\ncertain progress.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"linknote-3\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#linknoteref-3\"\u003e[3]\u003c/a\u003e I do\r\nnot here follow with exactness the history of the experimental method, of\r\nwhich, indeed, the first steps are involved in some obscurity.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWe come now to \u003ci\u003emetaphysics\u003c/i\u003e, a purely speculative science, which occupies\r\na completely isolated position and is entirely independent of the teachings of\r\nexperience. It deals with mere conceptions\u0026mdash;not, like mathematics, with\r\nconceptions applied to intuition\u0026mdash;and in it, reason is the pupil of itself\r\nalone. It is the oldest of the sciences, and would still survive, even if all\r\nthe rest were swallowed up in the abyss of an all-destroying barbarism. But it\r\nhas not yet had the good fortune to attain to the sure scientific method. This\r\nwill be apparent; if we apply the tests which we proposed at the outset. We\r\nfind that reason perpetually comes to a stand, when it attempts to gain \u003ci\u003eà\r\npriori\u003c/i\u003e the perception even of those laws which the most common experience\r\nconfirms. We find it compelled to retrace its steps in innumerable instances,\r\nand to abandon the path on which it had entered, because this does not lead to\r\nthe desired result. We find, too, that those who are engaged in metaphysical\r\npursuits are far from being able to agree among themselves, but that, on the\r\ncontrary, this science appears to furnish an arena specially adapted for the\r\ndisplay of skill or the exercise of strength in mock-contests\u0026mdash;a field in\r\nwhich no combatant ever yet succeeded in gaining an inch of ground, in which,\r\nat least, no victory was ever yet crowned with permanent possession.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThis leads us to inquire why it is that, in metaphysics, the sure path of\r\nscience has not hitherto been found. Shall we suppose that it is impossible to\r\ndiscover it? Why then should nature have visited our reason with restless\r\naspirations after it, as if it were one of our weightiest concerns? Nay, more,\r\nhow little cause should we have to place confidence in our reason, if it\r\nabandons us in a matter about which, most of all, we desire to know the\r\ntruth\u0026mdash;and not only so, but even allures us to the pursuit of vain\r\nphantoms, only to betray us in the end? Or, if the path has only hitherto been\r\nmissed, what indications do we possess to guide us in a renewed investigation,\r\nand to enable us to hope for greater success than has fallen to the lot of our\r\npredecessors?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIt appears to me that the examples of mathematics and natural philosophy,\r\nwhich, as we have seen, were brought into their present condition by a sudden\r\nrevolution, are sufficiently remarkable to fix our attention on the essential\r\ncircumstances of the change which has proved so advantageous to them, and to\r\ninduce us to make the experiment of imitating them, so far as the analogy\r\nwhich, as rational sciences, they bear to metaphysics may permit. It has\r\nhitherto been assumed that our cognition must conform to the objects; but all\r\nattempts to ascertain anything about these objects \u003ci\u003eà priori\u003c/i\u003e, by means of\r\nconceptions, and thus to extend the range of our knowledge, have been rendered\r\nabortive by this assumption. Let us then make the experiment whether we may not\r\nbe more successful in metaphysics, if we assume that the objects must conform\r\nto our cognition. This appears, at all events, to accord better with the\r\n\u003ci\u003epossibility\u003c/i\u003e of our gaining the end we have in view, that is to say, of\r\narriving at the cognition of objects \u003ci\u003eà priori\u003c/i\u003e, of determining something\r\nwith respect to these objects, before they are given to us. We here propose to\r\ndo just what C\u003csmall\u003eOPERNICUS\u003c/small\u003e did in attempting to explain the\r\ncelestial movements. When he found that he could make no progress by assuming\r\nthat all the heavenly bodies revolved round the spectator, he reversed the\r\nprocess, and tried the experiment of assuming that the spectator revolved,\r\nwhile the stars remained at rest. We may make the same experiment with regard\r\nto the intuition of objects. If the intuition must conform to the nature of the\r\nobjects, I do not see how we can know anything of them \u003ci\u003eà priori\u003c/i\u003e. If, on\r\nthe other hand, the object conforms to the nature of our faculty of intuition,\r\nI can then easily conceive the possibility of such an \u003ci\u003eà priori\u003c/i\u003e\r\nknowledge. Now as I cannot rest in the mere intuitions, but\u0026mdash;if they are\r\nto become cognitions\u0026mdash;must refer them, as \u003ci\u003erepresentations\u003c/i\u003e, to\r\nsomething, as \u003ci\u003eobject\u003c/i\u003e, and must determine the latter by means of the\r\nformer, here again there are two courses open to me. \u003ci\u003eEither\u003c/i\u003e, first, I\r\nmay assume that the conceptions, by which I effect this determination, conform\r\nto the object\u0026mdash;and in this case I am reduced to the same perplexity as\r\nbefore; \u003ci\u003eor\u003c/i\u003e secondly, I may assume that the objects, or, which is the\r\nsame thing, that \u003ci\u003eexperience\u003c/i\u003e, in which alone as given objects they are\r\ncognized, conform to my conceptions\u0026mdash;and then I am at no loss how to\r\nproceed. For experience itself is a mode of cognition which requires\r\nunderstanding. Before objects, are given to me, that is, \u003ci\u003eà priori\u003c/i\u003e, I\r\nmust presuppose in myself laws of the understanding which are expressed in\r\nconceptions \u003ci\u003eà priori\u003c/i\u003e. To these conceptions, then, all the objects of\r\nexperience must necessarily conform. Now there are objects which reason\r\n\u003ci\u003ethinks\u003c/i\u003e, and that necessarily, but which cannot be given in experience,\r\nor, at least, cannot be given \u003ci\u003eso\u003c/i\u003e as reason thinks them. The attempt to\r\nthink these objects will hereafter furnish an excellent test of the new method\r\nof thought which we have adopted, and which is based on the principle that we\r\nonly cognize in things \u003ci\u003eà priori\u003c/i\u003e that which we ourselves place in them.\u003ca\r\nhref=\"#linknote-4\" id=\"linknoteref-4\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[4]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"linknote-4\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#linknoteref-4\"\u003e[4]\u003c/a\u003e This\r\nmethod, accordingly, which we have borrowed from the natural philosopher,\r\nconsists in seeking for the elements of pure reason in that \u003ci\u003ewhich admits of\r\nconfirmation or refutation by experiment\u003c/i\u003e. Now the propositions of pure\r\nreason, especially when they transcend the limits of possible experience, do\r\nnot admit of our making any experiment with their \u003ci\u003eobjects\u003c/i\u003e, as in natural\r\nscience. Hence, with regard to those \u003ci\u003econceptions\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003eprinciples\u003c/i\u003e\r\nwhich we assume \u003ci\u003eà priori\u003c/i\u003e, our only course will be to view them from two\r\ndifferent sides. We must regard one and the same conception, \u003ci\u003eon the one\r\nhand\u003c/i\u003e, in relation to experience as an object of the senses and of the\r\nunderstanding, \u003ci\u003eon the other hand\u003c/i\u003e, in relation to reason, isolated and\r\ntranscending the limits of experience, as an object of mere thought. Now if we\r\nfind that, when we regard things from this double point of view, the result is\r\nin harmony with the principle of pure reason, but that, when we regard them\r\nfrom a single point of view, reason is involved in self-contradiction, then the\r\nexperiment will establish the correctness of this distinction.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThis attempt succeeds as well as we could desire, and promises to metaphysics,\r\nin its first part\u0026mdash;that is, where it is occupied with conceptions \u003ci\u003eà\r\npriori\u003c/i\u003e, of which the corresponding objects may be given in\r\nexperience\u0026mdash;the certain course of science. For by this new method we are\r\nenabled perfectly to explain the possibility of \u003ci\u003eà priori\u003c/i\u003e cognition, and,\r\nwhat is more, to demonstrate satisfactorily the laws which lie \u003ci\u003eà priori\u003c/i\u003e\r\nat the foundation of nature, as the sum of the objects of\r\nexperience\u0026mdash;neither of which was possible according to the procedure\r\nhitherto followed. But from this deduction of the faculty of \u003ci\u003eà priori\u003c/i\u003e\r\ncognition in the first part of metaphysics, we derive a surprising result, and\r\none which, to all appearance, militates against the great end of metaphysics,\r\nas treated in the second part. For we come to the conclusion that our faculty\r\nof cognition is unable to transcend the limits of possible experience; and yet\r\nthis is precisely the most essential object of this science. The estimate of\r\nour rational cognition \u003ci\u003eà priori\u003c/i\u003e at which we arrive is that it has only\r\nto do with phenomena, and that things in themselves, while possessing a real\r\nexistence, lie beyond its sphere. Here we are enabled to put the justice of\r\nthis estimate to the test. For that which of necessity impels us to transcend\r\nthe limits of experience and of all phenomena is the \u003ci\u003eunconditioned\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nwhich reason absolutely requires in things as they are in themselves, in order\r\nto complete the series of conditions. Now, if it appears that when, on the one\r\nhand, we assume that our cognition conforms to its objects as things in\r\nthemselves, \u003ci\u003ethe unconditioned cannot be thought without contradiction\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nand that when, on the other hand, we assume that our representation of things\r\nas they are given to us, does not conform to these things as they are in\r\nthemselves, but that these objects, as phenomena, conform to our mode of\r\nrepresentation, \u003ci\u003ethe contradiction disappears:\u003c/i\u003e we shall then be convinced\r\nof the truth of that which we began by assuming for the sake of experiment; we\r\nmay look upon it as established that the unconditioned does not lie in things\r\nas we know them, or as they are given to us, but in things as they are in\r\nthemselves, beyond the range of our cognition.\u003ca href=\"#linknote-5\" id=\"linknoteref-5\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[5]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"linknote-5\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#linknoteref-5\"\u003e[5]\u003c/a\u003e This\r\nexperiment of pure reason has a great similarity to that of the\r\n\u003ci\u003eChemists\u003c/i\u003e, which they term the experiment of \u003ci\u003ereduction\u003c/i\u003e, or, more\r\nusually, the \u003ci\u003esynthetic\u003c/i\u003e process. The \u003ci\u003eanalysis\u003c/i\u003e of the metaphysician\r\nseparates pure cognition \u003ci\u003eà priori\u003c/i\u003e into two heterogeneous elements, viz.,\r\nthe cognition of things as phenomena, and of things in themselves.\r\n\u003ci\u003eDialectic\u003c/i\u003e combines these again into harmony with the necessary rational\r\nidea of the unconditioned, and finds that this harmony never results except\r\nthrough the above distinction, which is, therefore, concluded to be just.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut, after we have thus denied the power of speculative reason to make any\r\nprogress in the sphere of the supersensible, it still remains for our\r\nconsideration whether data do not exist in \u003ci\u003epractical\u003c/i\u003e cognition which may\r\nenable us to determine the transcendent conception of the unconditioned, to\r\nrise beyond the limits of all possible experience from a \u003ci\u003epractical\u003c/i\u003e point\r\nof view, and thus to satisfy the great ends of metaphysics. Speculative reason\r\nhas thus, at least, made room for such an extension of our knowledge: and, if\r\nit must leave this space vacant, still it does not rob us of the liberty to\r\nfill it up, if we can, by means of practical data\u0026mdash;nay, it even challenges\r\nus to make the attempt.\u003ca href=\"#linknote-6\" id=\"linknoteref-6\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[6]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"linknote-6\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#linknoteref-6\"\u003e[6]\u003c/a\u003e So\r\nthe central laws of the movements of the heavenly bodies established the truth\r\nof that which Copernicus, first, assumed only as a hypothesis, and, at the same\r\ntime, brought to light that invisible force (Newtonian attraction) which holds\r\nthe universe together. The latter would have remained forever undiscovered, if\r\nCopernicus had not ventured on the experiment\u0026mdash;contrary to the senses but\r\nstill just\u0026mdash;of looking for the observed movements not in the heavenly\r\nbodies, but in the spectator. In this Preface I treat the new metaphysical\r\nmethod as a hypothesis with the view of rendering apparent the first attempts\r\nat such a change of method, which are always hypothetical. But in the Critique\r\nitself it will be demonstrated, not hypothetically, but apodeictically, from\r\nthe nature of our representations of space and time, and from the elementary\r\nconceptions of the understanding.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThis attempt to introduce a complete revolution in the procedure of\r\nmetaphysics, after the \u003ci\u003eexample\u003c/i\u003e of the geometricians and natural\r\nphilosophers, constitutes the aim of the Critique of Pure Speculative Reason.\r\nIt is a treatise on the method to be followed, not a system of the science\r\nitself. But, at the same time, it marks out and defines both the external\r\nboundaries and the internal structure of this science. For pure speculative\r\nreason has this peculiarity, that, in choosing the various objects of thought,\r\nit is able to define the limits of its own faculties, and even to give a\r\ncomplete enumeration of the possible modes of proposing problems to itself, and\r\nthus to sketch out the entire system of metaphysics. For, on the one hand, in\r\ncognition \u003ci\u003eà priori\u003c/i\u003e, nothing must be attributed to the objects but what\r\nthe thinking subject derives from itself; and, on the other hand, reason is, in\r\nregard to the principles of cognition, a perfectly distinct, independent unity,\r\nin which, as in an organized body, every member exists for the sake of the\r\nothers, and all for the sake of each, so that no principle can be viewed, with\r\nsafety, in one relationship, unless it is, at the same time, viewed in relation\r\nto the total use of pure reason. Hence, too, metaphysics has this singular\r\nadvantage\u0026mdash;an advantage which falls to the lot of no other science which\r\nhas to do with \u003ci\u003eobjects\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;that, if once it is conducted into the sure\r\npath of science, by means of this criticism, it can then take in the whole\r\nsphere of its cognitions, and can thus complete its work, and leave it for the\r\nuse of posterity, as a capital which can never receive fresh accessions. For\r\nmetaphysics has to deal only with principles and with the limitations of its\r\nown employment as determined by these principles. To this perfection it is,\r\ntherefore, bound, as the fundamental science, to attain, and to it the maxim\r\nmay justly be applied:\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"poem\"\u003e Nil actum reputans, si quid superesset agendum.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut, it will be asked, what kind of a treasure is this that we propose to\r\nbequeath to posterity? What is the real value of this system of metaphysics,\r\npurified by criticism, and thereby reduced to a permanent condition? A cursory\r\nview of the present work will lead to the supposition that its use is merely\r\n\u003ci\u003enegative\u003c/i\u003e, that it only serves to warn us against venturing, with\r\nspeculative reason, beyond the limits of experience. This is, in fact, its\r\nprimary use. But this, at once, assumes a \u003ci\u003epositive\u003c/i\u003e value, when we\r\nobserve that the principles with which speculative reason endeavours to\r\ntranscend its limits lead inevitably, not to the \u003ci\u003eextension\u003c/i\u003e, but to the\r\n\u003ci\u003econtraction\u003c/i\u003e of the use of reason, inasmuch as they threaten to extend\r\nthe limits of sensibility, which is their proper sphere, over the entire realm\r\nof thought and, thus, to supplant the pure (practical) use of reason. So far,\r\nthen, as this criticism is occupied in confining speculative reason within its\r\nproper bounds, it is only negative; but, inasmuch as it thereby, at the same\r\ntime, removes an obstacle which impedes and even threatens to destroy the use\r\nof practical reason, it possesses a positive and very important value. In order\r\nto admit this, we have only to be convinced that there is an absolutely\r\nnecessary use of pure reason\u0026mdash;the moral use\u0026mdash;in which it inevitably\r\ntranscends the limits of sensibility, without the aid of speculation, requiring\r\nonly to be insured against the effects of a speculation which would involve it\r\nin contradiction with itself. To deny the positive advantage of the service\r\nwhich this criticism renders us would be as absurd as to maintain that the\r\nsystem of police is productive of no positive benefit, since its main business\r\nis to prevent the violence which citizen has to apprehend from citizen, that so\r\neach may pursue his vocation in peace and security. That space and time are\r\nonly forms of sensible intuition, and hence are only conditions of the\r\nexistence of things as phenomena; that, moreover, we have no conceptions of the\r\nunderstanding, and, consequently, no elements for the cognition of things,\r\nexcept in so far as a corresponding intuition can be given to these\r\nconceptions; that, accordingly, we can have no cognition of an object, as a\r\nthing in itself, but only as an object of sensible intuition, that is, as\r\nphenomenon\u0026mdash;all this is proved in the analytical part of the Critique; and\r\nfrom this the limitation of all possible speculative cognition to the mere\r\nobjects of \u003ci\u003eexperience\u003c/i\u003e, follows as a necessary result. At the same time,\r\nit must be carefully borne in mind that, while we surrender the power of\r\n\u003ci\u003ecognizing\u003c/i\u003e, we still reserve the power of \u003ci\u003ethinking\u003c/i\u003e objects, as\r\nthings in themselves.\u003ca href=\"#linknote-7\" id=\"linknoteref-7\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[7]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e For, otherwise, we should require to\r\naffirm the existence of an appearance, without something that\r\nappears\u0026mdash;which would be absurd. Now let us suppose, for a moment, that we\r\nhad not undertaken this criticism and, accordingly, had not drawn the necessary\r\ndistinction between things as objects of experience and things as they are in\r\nthemselves. The principle of causality, and, by consequence, the mechanism of\r\nnature as determined by causality, would then have absolute validity in\r\nrelation to all things as efficient causes. I should then be unable to assert,\r\nwith regard to one and the same being, e.g., the human soul, that its will is\r\n\u003ci\u003efree\u003c/i\u003e, and yet, at the same time, subject to natural necessity, that is,\r\n\u003ci\u003enot free\u003c/i\u003e, without falling into a palpable contradiction, for in both\r\npropositions I should take the soul in \u003ci\u003ethe same signification\u003c/i\u003e, as a\r\nthing in general, as a thing in itself\u0026mdash;as, without previous criticism, I\r\ncould not but take it. Suppose now, on the other hand, that we \u003ci\u003ehave\u003c/i\u003e\r\nundertaken this criticism, and have learnt that an object may be taken in\r\n\u003ci\u003etwo senses\u003c/i\u003e, first, as a phenomenon, secondly, as a thing in itself; and\r\nthat, according to the deduction of the conceptions of the understanding, the\r\nprinciple of causality has reference only to things in the first sense. We then\r\nsee how it does not involve any contradiction to assert, on the one hand, that\r\nthe will, in the phenomenal sphere\u0026mdash;in visible action\u0026mdash;is necessarily\r\nobedient to the law of nature, and, in so far, \u003ci\u003enot free;\u003c/i\u003e and, on the\r\nother hand, that, as belonging to a thing in itself, it is not subject to that\r\nlaw, and, accordingly, is \u003ci\u003efree\u003c/i\u003e. Now, it is true that I cannot, by means\r\nof speculative reason, and still less by empirical observation, \u003ci\u003ecognize\u003c/i\u003e\r\nmy soul as a thing in itself and consequently, cannot cognize liberty as the\r\nproperty of a being to which I ascribe effects in the world of sense. For, to\r\ndo so, I must cognize this being as existing, and yet not in time,\r\nwhich\u0026mdash;since I cannot support my conception by any intuition\u0026mdash;is\r\nimpossible. At the same time, while I cannot \u003ci\u003ecognize\u003c/i\u003e, I can quite well\r\n\u003ci\u003ethink\u003c/i\u003e freedom, that is to say, my representation of it involves at least\r\nno contradiction, if we bear in mind the critical distinction of the two modes\r\nof representation (the sensible and the intellectual) and the consequent\r\nlimitation of the conceptions of the pure understanding and of the principles\r\nwhich flow from them. Suppose now that morality necessarily presupposed\r\nliberty, in the strictest sense, as a property of our will; suppose that reason\r\ncontained certain practical, original principles \u003ci\u003eà priori\u003c/i\u003e, which were\r\nabsolutely impossible without this presupposition; and suppose, at the same\r\ntime, that speculative reason had proved that liberty was incapable of being\r\nthought at all. It would then follow that the moral presupposition must give\r\nway to the speculative affirmation, the opposite of which involves an obvious\r\ncontradiction, and that \u003ci\u003eliberty\u003c/i\u003e and, with it, morality must yield to the\r\n\u003ci\u003emechanism of nature;\u003c/i\u003e for the negation of morality involves no\r\ncontradiction, except on the presupposition of liberty. Now morality does not\r\nrequire the speculative cognition of liberty; it is enough that I can think it,\r\nthat its conception involves no contradiction, that it does not interfere with\r\nthe mechanism of nature. But even this requirement we could not satisfy, if we\r\nhad not learnt the twofold sense in which things may be taken; and it is only\r\nin this way that the doctrine of morality and the doctrine of nature are\r\nconfined within their proper limits. For this result, then, we are indebted to\r\na criticism which warns us of our unavoidable ignorance with regard to things\r\nin themselves, and establishes the necessary limitation of our theoretical\r\n\u003ci\u003ecognition\u003c/i\u003e to mere phenomena.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"linknote-7\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#linknoteref-7\"\u003e[7]\u003c/a\u003e In\r\norder to \u003ci\u003ecognize\u003c/i\u003e an object, I must be able to prove its possibility,\r\neither from its reality as attested by experience, or \u003ci\u003eà priori\u003c/i\u003e, by means\r\nof reason. But I can \u003ci\u003ethink\u003c/i\u003e what I please, provided only I do not\r\ncontradict myself; that is, provided my conception is a possible thought,\r\nthough I may be unable to answer for the existence of a corresponding object in\r\nthe sum of possibilities. But something more is required before I can attribute\r\nto such a conception objective validity, that is real possibility\u0026mdash;the\r\nother possibility being merely logical. We are not, however, confined to\r\ntheoretical sources of cognition for the means of satisfying this additional\r\nrequirement, but may derive them from practical sources.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe positive value of the critical principles of pure reason in relation to the\r\nconception of \u003ci\u003eGod\u003c/i\u003e and of the \u003ci\u003esimple nature\u003c/i\u003e of the \u003ci\u003esoul\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nadmits of a similar exemplification; but on this point I shall not dwell. I\r\ncannot even make the assumption\u0026mdash;as the practical interests of morality\r\nrequire\u0026mdash;of God, freedom, and immortality, if I do not deprive speculative\r\nreason of its pretensions to transcendent insight. For to arrive at these, it\r\nmust make use of principles which, in fact, extend only to the objects of\r\npossible experience, and which cannot be applied to objects beyond this sphere\r\nwithout converting them into phenomena, and thus rendering the \u003ci\u003epractical\r\nextension\u003c/i\u003e of pure reason impossible. I must, therefore, abolish\r\n\u003ci\u003eknowledge\u003c/i\u003e, to make room for \u003ci\u003ebelief\u003c/i\u003e. The dogmatism of metaphysics,\r\nthat is, the presumption that it is possible to advance in metaphysics without\r\nprevious criticism, is the true source of the unbelief (always dogmatic) which\r\nmilitates against morality.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThus, while it may be no very difficult task to bequeath a legacy to posterity,\r\nin the shape of a system of metaphysics constructed in accordance with the\r\nCritique of Pure Reason, still the value of such a bequest is not to be\r\ndepreciated. It will render an important service to reason, by substituting the\r\ncertainty of scientific method for that random groping after results without\r\nthe guidance of principles, which has hitherto characterized the pursuit of\r\nmetaphysical studies. It will render an important service to the inquiring mind\r\nof youth, by leading the student to apply his powers to the cultivation of\r\ngenuine science, instead of wasting them, as at present, on speculations which\r\ncan never lead to any result, or on the idle attempt to invent new ideas and\r\nopinions. But, above all, it will confer an inestimable benefit on morality and\r\nreligion, by showing that all the objections urged against them may be silenced\r\nfor ever by the \u003ci\u003eSocratic\u003c/i\u003e method, that is to say, by proving the\r\nignorance of the objector. For, as the world has never been, and, no doubt,\r\nnever will be without a system of metaphysics of one kind or another, it is the\r\nhighest and weightiest concern of philosophy to render it powerless for harm,\r\nby closing up the sources of error.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThis important change in the field of the sciences, this loss of its fancied\r\npossessions, to which speculative reason must submit, does not prove in any way\r\ndetrimental to the general interests of humanity. The advantages which the\r\nworld has derived from the teachings of pure reason are not at all impaired.\r\nThe loss falls, in its whole extent, on the \u003ci\u003emonopoly of the schools\u003c/i\u003e, but\r\ndoes not in the slightest degree touch the \u003ci\u003einterests of mankind\u003c/i\u003e. I\r\nappeal to the most obstinate dogmatist, whether the proof of the continued\r\nexistence of the soul after death, derived from the simplicity of its\r\nsubstance; of the freedom of the will in opposition to the general mechanism of\r\nnature, drawn from the subtle but impotent distinction of subjective and\r\nobjective practical necessity; or of the existence of God, deduced from the\r\nconception of an \u003ci\u003eens realissimum\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;the contingency of the\r\nchangeable, and the necessity of a prime mover, has ever been able to pass\r\nbeyond the limits of the schools, to penetrate the public mind, or to exercise\r\nthe slightest influence on its convictions. It must be admitted that this has\r\nnot been the case and that, owing to the unfitness of the common understanding\r\nfor such subtle speculations, it can never be expected to take place. On the\r\ncontrary, it is plain that \u003ci\u003ethe hope of a future life\u003c/i\u003e arises from the\r\nfeeling, which exists in the breast of every man, that the temporal is\r\ninadequate to meet and satisfy the demands of his nature. In like manner, it\r\ncannot be doubted that the clear exhibition of duties in opposition to all the\r\nclaims of inclination, gives rise to the consciousness of \u003ci\u003efreedom\u003c/i\u003e, and\r\nthat the glorious order, beauty, and providential care, everywhere displayed in\r\nnature, give rise to the belief in a wise and great Author of the Universe.\r\nSuch is the genesis of these general convictions of mankind, so far as they\r\ndepend on rational grounds; and this public property not only remains\r\nundisturbed, but is even raised to greater importance, by the doctrine that the\r\nschools have no right to arrogate to themselves a more profound insight into a\r\nmatter of general human concernment than that to which the great mass of men,\r\never held by us in the highest estimation, can without difficulty attain, and\r\nthat the schools should, therefore, confine themselves to the elaboration of\r\nthese universally comprehensible and, from a moral point of view, amply\r\nsatisfactory proofs. The change, therefore, affects only the arrogant\r\npretensions of the schools, which would gladly retain, in their own exclusive\r\npossession, the key to the truths which they impart to the public.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"poem\"\u003e Quod mecum nescit, solus vult scire videri.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAt the same time it does not deprive the speculative philosopher of his just\r\ntitle to be the sole depositor of a science which benefits the public without\r\nits knowledge\u0026mdash;I mean, the Critique of Pure Reason. This can never become\r\npopular and, indeed, has no occasion to be so; for finespun arguments in favour\r\nof useful truths make just as little impression on the public mind as the\r\nequally subtle objections brought against these truths. On the other hand,\r\nsince both inevitably force themselves on every man who rises to the height of\r\nspeculation, it becomes the manifest duty of the schools to enter upon a\r\nthorough investigation of the rights of speculative reason and, thus, to\r\nprevent the scandal which metaphysical controversies are sure, sooner or later,\r\nto cause even to the masses. It is only by criticism that metaphysicians (and,\r\nas such, theologians too) can be saved from these controversies and from the\r\nconsequent perversion of their doctrines. Criticism alone can strike a blow at\r\nthe root of materialism, fatalism, atheism, free-thinking, fanaticism, and\r\nsuperstition, which are universally injurious\u0026mdash;as well as of idealism and\r\nscepticism, which are dangerous to the schools, but can scarcely pass over to\r\nthe public. If governments think proper to interfere with the affairs of the\r\nlearned, it would be more consistent with a wise regard for the interests of\r\nscience, as well as for those of society, to favour a criticism of this kind,\r\nby which alone the labours of reason can be established on a firm basis, than\r\nto support the ridiculous despotism of the schools, which raise a loud cry of\r\ndanger to the public over the destruction of cobwebs, of which the public has\r\nnever taken any notice, and the loss of which, therefore, it can never feel.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThis critical science is not opposed to the \u003ci\u003edogmatic procedure\u003c/i\u003e of reason\r\nin pure cognition; for pure cognition must always be dogmatic, that is, must\r\nrest on strict demonstration from sure principles \u003ci\u003eà priori\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;but to\r\n\u003ci\u003edogmatism\u003c/i\u003e, that is, to the presumption that it is possible to make any\r\nprogress with a pure cognition, derived from (philosophical) conceptions,\r\naccording to the principles which reason has long been in the habit of\r\nemploying\u0026mdash;without first inquiring in what way and by what right reason\r\nhas come into the possession of these principles. Dogmatism is thus the\r\ndogmatic procedure of pure reason \u003ci\u003ewithout previous criticism of its own\r\npowers\u003c/i\u003e, and in opposing this procedure, we must not be supposed to lend any\r\ncountenance to that loquacious shallowness which arrogates to itself the name\r\nof popularity, nor yet to scepticism, which makes short work with the whole\r\nscience of metaphysics. On the contrary, our criticism is the necessary\r\npreparation for a thoroughly scientific system of metaphysics which must\r\nperform its task entirely \u003ci\u003eà priori\u003c/i\u003e, to the complete satisfaction of\r\nspeculative reason, and must, therefore, be treated, not popularly, but\r\nscholastically. In carrying out the plan which the Critique prescribes, that\r\nis, in the future system of metaphysics, we must have recourse to the strict\r\nmethod of the celebrated W\u003csmall\u003eOLF\u003c/small\u003e, the greatest of all dogmatic\r\nphilosophers. He was the first to point out the necessity of establishing fixed\r\nprinciples, of clearly defining our conceptions, and of subjecting our\r\ndemonstrations to the most severe scrutiny, instead of rashly jumping at\r\nconclusions. The example which he set served to awaken that spirit of profound\r\nand thorough investigation which is not yet extinct in Germany. He would have\r\nbeen peculiarly well fitted to give a truly scientific character to\r\nmetaphysical studies, had it occurred to him to prepare the field by a\r\ncriticism of the \u003ci\u003eorganum\u003c/i\u003e, that is, of pure reason itself. That he failed\r\nto perceive the necessity of such a procedure must be ascribed to the dogmatic\r\nmode of thought which characterized his age, and on this point the philosophers\r\nof his time, as well as of all previous times, have nothing to reproach each\r\nother with. Those who reject at once the method of Wolf, and of the Critique of\r\nPure Reason, can have no other aim but to shake off the fetters of\r\n\u003ci\u003escience\u003c/i\u003e, to change labour into sport, certainty into opinion, and\r\nphilosophy into philodoxy.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIn this \u003ci\u003esecond edition\u003c/i\u003e, I have endeavoured, as far as possible, to\r\nremove the difficulties and obscurity which, without fault of mine perhaps,\r\nhave given rise to many misconceptions even among acute thinkers. In the\r\npropositions themselves, and in the demonstrations by which they are supported,\r\nas well as in the form and the entire plan of the work, I have found nothing to\r\nalter; which must be attributed partly to the long examination to which I had\r\nsubjected the whole before offering it to the public and partly to the nature\r\nof the case. For pure speculative reason is an organic structure in which there\r\nis nothing isolated or independent, but every Single part is essential to all\r\nthe rest; and hence, the slightest imperfection, whether defect or positive\r\nerror, could not fail to betray itself in use. I venture, further, to hope,\r\nthat this system will maintain the same unalterable character for the future. I\r\nam led to entertain this confidence, not by vanity, but by the evidence which\r\nthe equality of the result affords, when we proceed, first, from the simplest\r\nelements up to the complete whole of pure reason and, and then, backwards from\r\nthe whole to each part. We find that the attempt to make the slightest\r\nalteration, in any part, leads inevitably to contradictions, not merely in this\r\nsystem, but in human reason itself. At the same time, there is still much room\r\nfor improvement in the \u003ci\u003eexposition\u003c/i\u003e of the doctrines contained in this\r\nwork. In the present edition, I have endeavoured to remove misapprehensions of\r\nthe æsthetical part, especially with regard to the conception of time; to clear\r\naway the obscurity which has been found in the deduction of the conceptions of\r\nthe understanding; to supply the supposed want of sufficient evidence in the\r\ndemonstration of the principles of the pure understanding; and, lastly, to\r\nobviate the misunderstanding of the paralogisms which immediately precede the\r\nRational Psychology. Beyond this point\u0026mdash;the end of the second main\r\ndivision of the \u0026ldquo;Transcendental Dialectic\u0026rdquo;\u0026mdash;I have not\r\nextended my alterations,\u003ca href=\"#linknote-8\" id=\"linknoteref-8\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[8]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e partly from want of time, and partly\r\nbecause I am not aware that any portion of the remainder has given rise to\r\nmisconceptions among intelligent and impartial critics, whom I do not here\r\nmention with that praise which is their due, but who will find that their\r\nsuggestions have been attended to in the work itself.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"linknote-8\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#linknoteref-8\"\u003e[8]\u003c/a\u003e The\r\nonly addition, properly so called\u0026mdash;and that only in the method of\r\nproof\u0026mdash;which I have made in the present edition, consists of a new\r\nrefutation of psychological \u003ci\u003eIdealism\u003c/i\u003e, and a strict\r\ndemonstration\u0026mdash;the only one possible, as I believe\u0026mdash;of the objective\r\nreality of external intuition. However harmless idealism may be\r\nconsidered\u0026mdash;although in reality it is not so\u0026mdash;in regard to the\r\nessential ends of metaphysics, it must still remain a scandal to philosophy and\r\nto the general human reason to be obliged to assume, as an article of mere\r\nbelief, the existence of things external to ourselves (from which, yet, we\r\nderive the whole material of cognition for the internal sense), and not to be\r\nable to oppose a satisfactory proof to any one who may call it in question. As\r\nthere is some obscurity of expression in the demonstration as it stands in the\r\ntext, I propose to alter the passage in question as follows: \u0026ldquo;But this\r\npermanent cannot be an intuition in me. For all the determining grounds of my\r\nexistence which can be found in me are representations and, as such, do\r\nthemselves require a permanent, distinct from them, which may determine my\r\nexistence in relation to their changes, that is, my existence in time, wherein\r\nthey change.\u0026rdquo; It may, probably, be urged in opposition to this proof\r\nthat, after all, I am only conscious immediately of that which is in me, that\r\nis, of my \u003ci\u003erepresentation\u003c/i\u003e of external things, and that, consequently, it\r\nmust always remain uncertain whether anything corresponding to this\r\nrepresentation does or does not exist externally to me. But I am conscious,\r\nthrough internal \u003ci\u003eexperience\u003c/i\u003e, of my \u003ci\u003eexistence in time\u003c/i\u003e\r\n(consequently, also, of the determinability of the former in the latter), and\r\nthat is more than the simple consciousness of my representation. It is, in\r\nfact, the same as the \u003ci\u003eempirical consciousness of my existence\u003c/i\u003e, which can\r\nonly be determined in relation to something, which, while connected with my\r\nexistence, is \u003ci\u003eexternal to me\u003c/i\u003e. This consciousness of my existence in time\r\nis, therefore, identical with the consciousness of a relation to something\r\nexternal to me, and it is, therefore, experience, not fiction, sense, not\r\nimagination, which inseparably connects the external with my internal sense.\r\nFor the external sense is, in itself, the relation of intuition to something\r\nreal, external to me; and the reality of this something, as opposed to the mere\r\nimagination of it, rests solely on its inseparable connection with internal\r\nexperience as the condition of its possibility. If with the \u003ci\u003eintellectual\r\nconsciousness\u003c/i\u003e of my existence, in the representation: \u003ci\u003eI am\u003c/i\u003e, which\r\naccompanies all my judgements, and all the operations of my understanding, I\r\ncould, at the same time, connect a determination of my existence by\r\n\u003ci\u003eintellectual intuition\u003c/i\u003e, then the consciousness of a relation to\r\nsomething external to me would not be necessary. But the internal intuition in\r\nwhich alone my existence can be determined, though preceded by that purely\r\nintellectual consciousness, is itself sensible and attached to the condition of\r\ntime. Hence this determination of my existence, and consequently my internal\r\nexperience itself, must depend on something permanent which is not in me, which\r\ncan be, therefore, only in something external to me, to which I must look upon\r\nmyself as being related. Thus the reality of the external sense is necessarily\r\nconnected with that of the internal, in order to the possibility of experience\r\nin general; that is, I am just as certainly conscious that there are things\r\nexternal to me related to my sense as I am that I myself exist as determined in\r\ntime. But in order to ascertain to what given intuitions objects, external me,\r\nreally correspond, in other words, what intuitions belong to the external sense\r\nand not to imagination, I must have recourse, in every particular case, to\r\nthose rules according to which experience in general (even internal experience)\r\nis distinguished from imagination, and which are always based on the\r\nproposition that there really is an external experience.\u0026mdash;We may add the\r\nremark that the representation of something \u003ci\u003epermanent\u003c/i\u003e in existence, is\r\nnot the same thing as the \u003ci\u003epermanent representation;\u003c/i\u003e for a representation\r\nmay be very variable and changing\u0026mdash;as all our representations, even that\r\nof matter, are\u0026mdash;and yet refer to something permanent, which must,\r\ntherefore, be distinct from all my representations and external to me, the\r\nexistence of which is necessarily included in the determination of my own\r\nexistence, and with it constitutes \u003ci\u003eone\u003c/i\u003e experience\u0026mdash;an experience\r\nwhich would not even be possible internally, if it were not also at the same\r\ntime, in part, external. To the question \u003ci\u003eHow?\u003c/i\u003e we are no more able to\r\nreply, than we are, in general, to think the stationary in time, the\r\ncoexistence of which with the variable, produces the conception of change.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIn attempting to render the exposition of my views as intelligible as possible,\r\nI have been compelled to leave out or abridge various passages which were not\r\nessential to the completeness of the work, but which many readers might\r\nconsider useful in other respects, and might be unwilling to miss. This\r\ntrifling loss, which could not be avoided without swelling the book beyond due\r\nlimits, may be supplied, at the pleasure of the reader, by a comparison with\r\nthe first edition, and will, I hope, be more than compensated for by the\r\ngreater clearness of the exposition as it now stands.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nI have observed, with pleasure and thankfulness, in the pages of various\r\nreviews and treatises, that the spirit of profound and thorough investigation\r\nis not extinct in Germany, though it may have been overborne and silenced for a\r\ntime by the fashionable tone of a licence in thinking, which gives itself the\r\nairs of genius, and that the difficulties which beset the paths of criticism\r\nhave not prevented energetic and acute thinkers from making themselves masters\r\nof the science of pure reason to which these paths conduct\u0026mdash;a science\r\nwhich is not popular, but scholastic in its character, and which alone can hope\r\nfor a lasting existence or possess an abiding value. To these deserving men,\r\nwho so happily combine profundity of view with a talent for lucid\r\nexposition\u0026mdash;a talent which I myself am not conscious of possessing\u0026mdash;I\r\nleave the task of removing any obscurity which may still adhere to the\r\nstatement of my doctrines. For, in this case, the danger is not that of being\r\nrefuted, but of being misunderstood. For my own part, I must henceforward\r\nabstain from controversy, although I shall carefully attend to all suggestions,\r\nwhether from friends or adversaries, which may be of use in the future\r\nelaboration of the system of this Propædeutic. As, during these labours, I have\r\nadvanced pretty far in years this month I reach my sixty-fourth year\u0026mdash;it\r\nwill be necessary for me to economize time, if I am to carry out my plan of\r\nelaborating the metaphysics of nature as well as of morals, in confirmation of\r\nthe correctness of the principles established in this Critique of Pure Reason,\r\nboth speculative and practical; and I must, therefore, leave the task of\r\nclearing up the obscurities of the present work\u0026mdash;inevitable, perhaps, at\r\nthe outset\u0026mdash;as well as, the defence of the whole, to those deserving men,\r\nwho have made my system their own. A philosophical system cannot come forward\r\narmed at all points like a mathematical treatise, and hence it may be quite\r\npossible to take objection to particular passages, while the organic structure\r\nof the system, considered as a unity, has no danger to apprehend. But few\r\npossess the ability, and still fewer the inclination, to take a comprehensive\r\nview of a new system. By confining the view to particular passages, taking\r\nthese out of their connection and comparing them with one another, it is easy\r\nto pick out apparent contradictions, especially in a work written with any\r\nfreedom of style. These contradictions place the work in an unfavourable light\r\nin the eyes of those who rely on the judgement of others, but are easily\r\nreconciled by those who have mastered the idea of the whole. If a theory\r\npossesses stability in itself, the action and reaction which seemed at first to\r\nthreaten its existence serve only, in the course of time, to smooth down any\r\nsuperficial roughness or inequality, and\u0026mdash;if men of insight, impartiality,\r\nand truly popular gifts, turn their attention to it\u0026mdash;to secure to it, in a\r\nshort time, the requisite elegance also.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nK\u003csmall\u003eÖNIGSBERG\u003c/small\u003e, \u003ci\u003eApril\u003c/i\u003e 1787.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003c!–end chapter–\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca id=\"chap03\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eIntroduction\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003ca id=\"chap04\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eI. Of the difference between Pure and Empirical\r\nKnowledge\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThat all our knowledge begins with experience there can be no doubt. For how is\r\nit possible that the faculty of cognition should be awakened into exercise\r\notherwise than by means of objects which affect our senses, and partly of\r\nthemselves produce representations, partly rouse our powers of understanding\r\ninto activity, to compare to connect, or to separate these, and so to convert\r\nthe raw material of our sensuous impressions into a knowledge of objects, which\r\nis called experience? In respect of time, therefore, no knowledge of ours is\r\nantecedent to experience, but begins with it.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut, though all our knowledge begins with experience, it by no means follows\r\nthat all arises out of experience. For, on the contrary, it is quite possible\r\nthat our empirical knowledge is a compound of that which we receive through\r\nimpressions, and that which the faculty of cognition supplies from itself\r\n(sensuous impressions giving merely the occasion), an addition which we cannot\r\ndistinguish from the original element given by sense, till long practice has\r\nmade us attentive to, and skilful in separating it. It is, therefore, a\r\nquestion which requires close investigation, and not to be answered at first\r\nsight, whether there exists a knowledge altogether independent of experience,\r\nand even of all sensuous impressions? Knowledge of this kind is called à\r\npriori, in contradistinction to empirical knowledge, which has its sources à\r\nposteriori, that is, in experience.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut the expression, \u0026ldquo;à priori,\u0026rdquo; is not as yet definite enough\r\nadequately to indicate the whole meaning of the question above started. For, in\r\nspeaking of knowledge which has its sources in experience, we are wont to say,\r\nthat this or that may be known à priori, because we do not derive this\r\nknowledge immediately from experience, but from a general rule, which, however,\r\nwe have itself borrowed from experience. Thus, if a man undermined his house,\r\nwe say, \u0026ldquo;he might know à priori that it would have fallen;\u0026rdquo; that\r\nis, he needed not to have waited for the experience that it did actually fall.\r\nBut still, à priori, he could not know even this much. For, that bodies are\r\nheavy, and, consequently, that they fall when their supports are taken away,\r\nmust have been known to him previously, by means of experience.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBy the term \u0026ldquo;knowledge à priori,\u0026rdquo; therefore, we shall in the sequel\r\nunderstand, not such as is independent of this or that kind of experience, but\r\nsuch as is absolutely so of all experience. Opposed to this is empirical\r\nknowledge, or that which is possible only à posteriori, that is, through\r\nexperience. Knowledge à priori is either pure or impure. Pure knowledge à\r\npriori is that with which no empirical element is mixed up. For example, the\r\nproposition, \u0026ldquo;Every change has a cause,\u0026rdquo; is a proposition à priori,\r\nbut impure, because change is a conception which can only be derived from\r\nexperience.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003ca id=\"chap05\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eII. The Human Intellect, even in an Unphilosophical\r\nState, is in Possession of Certain Cognitions \u0026ldquo;à priori\u0026rdquo;.\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe question now is as to a criterion, by which we may securely distinguish a\r\npure from an empirical cognition. Experience no doubt teaches us that this or\r\nthat object is constituted in such and such a manner, but not that it could not\r\npossibly exist otherwise. Now, in the first place, if we have a proposition\r\nwhich contains the idea of necessity in its very conception, it is priori. If,\r\nmoreover, it is not derived from any other proposition, unless from one equally\r\ninvolving the idea of necessity, it is absolutely priori. Secondly, an\r\nempirical judgement never exhibits strict and absolute, but only assumed and\r\ncomparative universality (by induction); therefore, the most we can say\r\nis\u0026mdash;so far as we have hitherto observed, there is no exception to this or\r\nthat rule. If, on the other hand, a judgement carries with it strict and\r\nabsolute universality, that is, admits of no possible exception, it is not\r\nderived from experience, but is valid absolutely à priori.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nEmpirical universality is, therefore, only an arbitrary extension of validity,\r\nfrom that which may be predicated of a proposition valid in most cases, to that\r\nwhich is asserted of a proposition which holds good in all; as, for example, in\r\nthe affirmation, \u0026ldquo;All bodies are heavy.\u0026rdquo; When, on the contrary,\r\nstrict universality characterizes a judgement, it necessarily indicates another\r\npeculiar source of knowledge, namely, a faculty of cognition à priori.\r\nNecessity and strict universality, therefore, are infallible tests for\r\ndistinguishing pure from empirical knowledge, and are inseparably connected\r\nwith each other. But as in the use of these criteria the empirical limitation\r\nis sometimes more easily detected than the contingency of the judgement, or the\r\nunlimited universality which we attach to a judgement is often a more\r\nconvincing proof than its necessity, it may be advisable to use the criteria\r\nseparately, each being by itself infallible.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nNow, that in the sphere of human cognition we have judgements which are\r\nnecessary, and in the strictest sense universal, consequently pure à priori, it\r\nwill be an easy matter to show. If we desire an example from the sciences, we\r\nneed only take any proposition in mathematics. If we cast our eyes upon the\r\ncommonest operations of the understanding, the proposition, \u0026ldquo;Every change\r\nmust have a cause,\u0026rdquo; will amply serve our purpose. In the latter case,\r\nindeed, the conception of a cause so plainly involves the conception of a\r\nnecessity of connection with an effect, and of a strict universality of the\r\nlaw, that the very notion of a cause would entirely disappear, were we to\r\nderive it, like Hume, from a frequent association of what happens with that\r\nwhich precedes; and the habit thence originating of connecting\r\nrepresentations\u0026mdash;the necessity inherent in the judgement being therefore\r\nmerely subjective. Besides, without seeking for such examples of principles\r\nexisting à priori in cognition, we might easily show that such principles are\r\nthe indispensable basis of the possibility of experience itself, and\r\nconsequently prove their existence à priori. For whence could our experience\r\nitself acquire certainty, if all the rules on which it depends were themselves\r\nempirical, and consequently fortuitous? No one, therefore, can admit the\r\nvalidity of the use of such rules as first principles. But, for the present, we\r\nmay content ourselves with having established the fact, that we do possess and\r\nexercise a faculty of pure à priori cognition; and, secondly, with having\r\npointed out the proper tests of such cognition, namely, universality and\r\nnecessity.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nNot only in judgements, however, but even in conceptions, is an à priori origin\r\nmanifest. For example, if we take away by degrees from our conceptions of a\r\nbody all that can be referred to mere sensuous experience\u0026mdash;colour,\r\nhardness or softness, weight, even impenetrability\u0026mdash;the body will then\r\nvanish; but the space which it occupied still remains, and this it is utterly\r\nimpossible to annihilate in thought. Again, if we take away, in like manner,\r\nfrom our empirical conception of any object, corporeal or incorporeal, all\r\nproperties which mere experience has taught us to connect with it, still we\r\ncannot think away those through which we cogitate it as substance, or adhering\r\nto substance, although our conception of substance is more determined than that\r\nof an object. Compelled, therefore, by that necessity with which the conception\r\nof substance forces itself upon us, we must confess that it has its seat in our\r\nfaculty of cognition à priori.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003ca id=\"chap06\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eIII. Philosophy stands in need of a Science which\r\nshall Determine the Possibility, Principles, and Extent of Human Knowledge\r\n\u0026ldquo;à priori\u0026rdquo;\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nOf far more importance than all that has been above said, is the consideration\r\nthat certain of our cognitions rise completely above the sphere of all possible\r\nexperience, and by means of conceptions, to which there exists in the whole\r\nextent of experience no corresponding object, seem to extend the range of our\r\njudgements beyond its bounds. And just in this transcendental or supersensible\r\nsphere, where experience affords us neither instruction nor guidance, lie the\r\ninvestigations of reason, which, on account of their importance, we consider\r\nfar preferable to, and as having a far more elevated aim than, all that the\r\nunderstanding can achieve within the sphere of sensuous phenomena. So high a\r\nvalue do we set upon these investigations, that even at the risk of error, we\r\npersist in following them out, and permit neither doubt nor disregard nor\r\nindifference to restrain us from the pursuit. These unavoidable problems of\r\nmere pure reason are God, freedom (of will), and immortality. The science\r\nwhich, with all its preliminaries, has for its especial object the solution of\r\nthese problems is named metaphysics\u0026mdash;a science which is at the very outset\r\ndogmatical, that is, it confidently takes upon itself the execution of this\r\ntask without any previous investigation of the ability or inability of reason\r\nfor such an undertaking.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nNow the safe ground of experience being thus abandoned, it seems nevertheless\r\nnatural that we should hesitate to erect a building with the cognitions we\r\npossess, without knowing whence they come, and on the strength of principles,\r\nthe origin of which is undiscovered. Instead of thus trying to build without a\r\nfoundation, it is rather to be expected that we should long ago have put the\r\nquestion, how the understanding can arrive at these à priori cognitions, and\r\nwhat is the extent, validity, and worth which they may possess? We say,\r\n\u0026ldquo;This is natural enough,\u0026rdquo; meaning by the word natural, that which\r\nis consistent with a just and reasonable way of thinking; but if we understand\r\nby the term, that which usually happens, nothing indeed could be more natural\r\nand more comprehensible than that this investigation should be left long\r\nunattempted. For one part of our pure knowledge, the science of mathematics,\r\nhas been long firmly established, and thus leads us to form flattering\r\nexpectations with regard to others, though these may be of quite a different\r\nnature. Besides, when we get beyond the bounds of experience, we are of course\r\nsafe from opposition in that quarter; and the charm of widening the range of\r\nour knowledge is so great that, unless we are brought to a standstill by some\r\nevident contradiction, we hurry on undoubtingly in our course. This, however,\r\nmay be avoided, if we are sufficiently cautious in the construction of our\r\nfictions, which are not the less fictions on that account.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nMathematical science affords us a brilliant example, how far, independently of\r\nall experience, we may carry our à priori knowledge. It is true that the\r\nmathematician occupies himself with objects and cognitions only in so far as\r\nthey can be represented by means of intuition. But this circumstance is easily\r\noverlooked, because the said intuition can itself be given à priori, and\r\ntherefore is hardly to be distinguished from a mere pure conception. Deceived\r\nby such a proof of the power of reason, we can perceive no limits to the\r\nextension of our knowledge. The light dove cleaving in free flight the thin\r\nair, whose resistance it feels, might imagine that her movements would be far\r\nmore free and rapid in airless space. Just in the same way did Plato,\r\nabandoning the world of sense because of the narrow limits it sets to the\r\nunderstanding, venture upon the wings of ideas beyond it, into the void space\r\nof pure intellect. He did not reflect that he made no real progress by all his\r\nefforts; for he met with no resistance which might serve him for a support, as\r\nit were, whereon to rest, and on which he might apply his powers, in order to\r\nlet the intellect acquire momentum for its progress. It is, indeed, the common\r\nfate of human reason in speculation, to finish the imposing edifice of thought\r\nas rapidly as possible, and then for the first time to begin to examine whether\r\nthe foundation is a solid one or no. Arrived at this point, all sorts of\r\nexcuses are sought after, in order to console us for its want of stability, or\r\nrather, indeed, to enable Us to dispense altogether with so late and dangerous\r\nan investigation. But what frees us during the process of building from all\r\napprehension or suspicion, and flatters us into the belief of its solidity, is\r\nthis. A great part, perhaps the greatest part, of the business of our reason\r\nconsists in the analysation of the conceptions which we already possess of\r\nobjects. By this means we gain a multitude of cognitions, which although really\r\nnothing more than elucidations or explanations of that which (though in a\r\nconfused manner) was already thought in our conceptions, are, at least in\r\nrespect of their form, prized as new introspections; whilst, so far as regards\r\ntheir matter or content, we have really made no addition to our conceptions,\r\nbut only disinvolved them. But as this process does furnish a real priori\r\nknowledge, which has a sure progress and useful results, reason, deceived by\r\nthis, slips in, without being itself aware of it, assertions of a quite\r\ndifferent kind; in which, to given conceptions it adds others, à priori indeed,\r\nbut entirely foreign to them, without our knowing how it arrives at these, and,\r\nindeed, without such a question ever suggesting itself. I shall therefore at\r\nonce proceed to examine the difference between these two modes of knowledge.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003ca id=\"chap07\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eIV. Of the Difference Between Analytical and\r\nSynthetical Judgements.\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIn all judgements wherein the relation of a subject to the predicate is\r\ncogitated (I mention affirmative judgements only here; the application to\r\nnegative will be very easy), this relation is possible in two different ways.\r\nEither the predicate B belongs to the subject A, as somewhat which is contained\r\n(though covertly) in the conception A; or the predicate B lies completely out\r\nof the conception A, although it stands in connection with it. In the first\r\ninstance, I term the judgement analytical, in the second, synthetical.\r\nAnalytical judgements (affirmative) are therefore those in which the connection\r\nof the predicate with the subject is cogitated through identity; those in which\r\nthis connection is cogitated without identity, are called synthetical\r\njudgements. The former may be called explicative, the latter augmentative\r\njudgements; because the former add in the predicate nothing to the conception\r\nof the subject, but only analyse it into its constituent conceptions, which\r\nwere thought already in the subject, although in a confused manner; the latter\r\nadd to our conceptions of the subject a predicate which was not contained in\r\nit, and which no analysis could ever have discovered therein. For example, when\r\nI say, \u0026ldquo;All bodies are extended,\u0026rdquo; this is an analytical judgement.\r\nFor I need not go beyond the conception of body in order to find extension\r\nconnected with it, but merely analyse the conception, that is, become conscious\r\nof the manifold properties which I think in that conception, in order to\r\ndiscover this predicate in it: it is therefore an analytical judgement. On the\r\nother hand, when I say, \u0026ldquo;All bodies are heavy,\u0026rdquo; the predicate is\r\nsomething totally different from that which I think in the mere conception of a\r\nbody. By the addition of such a predicate, therefore, it becomes a synthetical\r\njudgement.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nJudgements of experience, as such, are always synthetical. For it would be\r\nabsurd to think of grounding an analytical judgement on experience, because in\r\nforming such a judgement I need not go out of the sphere of my conceptions, and\r\ntherefore recourse to the testimony of experience is quite unnecessary. That\r\n\u0026ldquo;bodies are extended\u0026rdquo; is not an empirical judgement, but a\r\nproposition which stands firm à priori. For before addressing myself to\r\nexperience, I already have in my conception all the requisite conditions for\r\nthe judgement, and I have only to extract the predicate from the conception,\r\naccording to the principle of contradiction, and thereby at the same time\r\nbecome conscious of the necessity of the judgement, a necessity which I could\r\nnever learn from experience. On the other hand, though at first I do not at all\r\ninclude the predicate of weight in my conception of body in general, that\r\nconception still indicates an object of experience, a part of the totality of\r\nexperience, to which I can still add other parts; and this I do when I\r\nrecognize by observation that bodies are heavy. I can cognize beforehand by\r\nanalysis the conception of body through the characteristics of extension,\r\nimpenetrability, shape, etc., all which are cogitated in this conception. But\r\nnow I extend my knowledge, and looking back on experience from which I had\r\nderived this conception of body, I find weight at all times connected with the\r\nabove characteristics, and therefore I synthetically add to my conceptions this\r\nas a predicate, and say, \u0026ldquo;All bodies are heavy.\u0026rdquo; Thus it is\r\nexperience upon which rests the possibility of the synthesis of the predicate\r\nof weight with the conception of body, because both conceptions, although the\r\none is not contained in the other, still belong to one another (only\r\ncontingently, however), as parts of a whole, namely, of experience, which is\r\nitself a synthesis of intuitions.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut to synthetical judgements à priori, such aid is entirely wanting. If I go\r\nout of and beyond the conception A, in order to recognize another B as\r\nconnected with it, what foundation have I to rest on, whereby to render the\r\nsynthesis possible? I have here no longer the advantage of looking out in the\r\nsphere of experience for what I want. Let us take, for example, the\r\nproposition, \u0026ldquo;Everything that happens has a cause.\u0026rdquo; In the\r\nconception of \u0026ldquo;something that happens,\u0026rdquo; I indeed think an existence\r\nwhich a certain time antecedes, and from this I can derive analytical\r\njudgements. But the conception of a cause lies quite out of the above\r\nconception, and indicates something entirely different from \u0026ldquo;that which\r\nhappens,\u0026rdquo; and is consequently not contained in that conception. How then\r\nam I able to assert concerning the general conception\u0026mdash;\u0026ldquo;that which\r\nhappens\u0026rdquo;\u0026mdash;something entirely different from that conception, and to\r\nrecognize the conception of cause although not contained in it, yet as\r\nbelonging to it, and even necessarily? what is here the unknown = X, upon which\r\nthe understanding rests when it believes it has found, out of the conception A\r\na foreign predicate B, which it nevertheless considers to be connected with it?\r\nIt cannot be experience, because the principle adduced annexes the two\r\nrepresentations, cause and effect, to the representation existence, not only\r\nwith universality, which experience cannot give, but also with the expression\r\nof necessity, therefore completely à priori and from pure conceptions. Upon\r\nsuch synthetical, that is augmentative propositions, depends the whole aim of\r\nour speculative knowledge à priori; for although analytical judgements are\r\nindeed highly important and necessary, they are so, only to arrive at that\r\nclearness of conceptions which is requisite for a sure and extended synthesis,\r\nand this alone is a real acquisition.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003ca id=\"chap08\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eV. In all Theoretical Sciences of Reason, Synthetical\r\nJudgements \u0026ldquo;à priori\u0026rdquo; are contained as Principles.\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n1. Mathematical judgements are always synthetical. Hitherto this fact, though\r\nincontestably true and very important in its consequences, seems to have\r\nescaped the analysts of the human mind, nay, to be in complete opposition to\r\nall their conjectures. For as it was found that mathematical conclusions all\r\nproceed according to the principle of contradiction (which the nature of every\r\napodeictic certainty requires), people became persuaded that the fundamental\r\nprinciples of the science also were recognized and admitted in the same way.\r\nBut the notion is fallacious; for although a synthetical proposition can\r\ncertainly be discerned by means of the principle of contradiction, this is\r\npossible only when another synthetical proposition precedes, from which the\r\nlatter is deduced, but never of itself.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBefore all, be it observed, that proper mathematical propositions are always\r\njudgements à priori, and not empirical, because they carry along with them the\r\nconception of necessity, which cannot be given by experience. If this be\r\ndemurred to, it matters not; I will then limit my assertion to pure\r\nmathematics, the very conception of which implies that it consists of knowledge\r\naltogether non-empirical and à priori.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWe might, indeed at first suppose that the proposition 7 + 5 = 12 is a merely\r\nanalytical proposition, following (according to the principle of contradiction)\r\nfrom the conception of a sum of seven and five. But if we regard it more\r\nnarrowly, we find that our conception of the sum of seven and five contains\r\nnothing more than the uniting of both sums into one, whereby it cannot at all\r\nbe cogitated what this single number is which embraces both. The conception of\r\ntwelve is by no means obtained by merely cogitating the union of seven and\r\nfive; and we may analyse our conception of such a possible sum as long as we\r\nwill, still we shall never discover in it the notion of twelve. We must go\r\nbeyond these conceptions, and have recourse to an intuition which corresponds\r\nto one of the two\u0026mdash;our five fingers, for example, or like Segner in his\r\nArithmetic five points, and so by degrees, add the units contained in the five\r\ngiven in the intuition, to the conception of seven. For I first take the number\r\n7, and, for the conception of 5 calling in the aid of the fingers of my hand as\r\nobjects of intuition, I add the units, which I before took together to make up\r\nthe number 5, gradually now by means of the material image my hand, to the\r\nnumber 7, and by this process, I at length see the number 12 arise. That 7\r\nshould be added to 5, I have certainly cogitated in my conception of a sum = 7\r\n+ 5, but not that this sum was equal to 12. Arithmetical propositions are\r\ntherefore always synthetical, of which we may become more clearly convinced by\r\ntrying large numbers. For it will thus become quite evident that, turn and\r\ntwist our conceptions as we may, it is impossible, without having recourse to\r\nintuition, to arrive at the sum total or product by means of the mere analysis\r\nof our conceptions. Just as little is any principle of pure geometry\r\nanalytical. \u0026ldquo;A straight line between two points is the shortest,\u0026rdquo;\r\nis a synthetical proposition. For my conception of straight contains no notion\r\nof quantity, but is merely qualitative. The conception of the shortest is\r\ntherefore fore wholly an addition, and by no analysis can it be extracted from\r\nour conception of a straight line. Intuition must therefore here lend its aid,\r\nby means of which, and thus only, our synthesis is possible.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSome few principles preposited by geometricians are, indeed, really analytical,\r\nand depend on the principle of contradiction. They serve, however, like\r\nidentical propositions, as links in the chain of method, not as\r\nprinciples\u0026mdash;for example, a = a, the whole is equal to itself, or (a+b)\r\n\u0026mdash;\u003e a, the whole is greater than its part. And yet even these principles\r\nthemselves, though they derive their validity from pure conceptions, are only\r\nadmitted in mathematics because they can be presented in intuition. What causes\r\nus here commonly to believe that the predicate of such apodeictic judgements is\r\nalready contained in our conception, and that the judgement is therefore\r\nanalytical, is merely the equivocal nature of the expression. We must join in\r\nthought a certain predicate to a given conception, and this necessity cleaves\r\nalready to the conception. But the question is, not what we must join in\r\nthought to the given conception, but what we really think therein, though only\r\nobscurely, and then it becomes manifest that the predicate pertains to these\r\nconceptions, necessarily indeed, yet not as thought in the conception itself,\r\nbut by virtue of an intuition, which must be added to the conception.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n2. The science of natural philosophy (physics) contains in itself synthetical\r\njudgements à priori, as principles. I shall adduce two propositions. For\r\ninstance, the proposition, \u0026ldquo;In all changes of the material world, the\r\nquantity of matter remains unchanged\u0026rdquo;; or, that, \u0026ldquo;In all\r\ncommunication of motion, action and reaction must always be equal.\u0026rdquo; In\r\nboth of these, not only is the necessity, and therefore their origin à priori\r\nclear, but also that they are synthetical propositions. For in the conception\r\nof matter, I do not cogitate its permanency, but merely its presence in space,\r\nwhich it fills. I therefore really go out of and beyond the conception of\r\nmatter, in order to think on to it something à priori, which I did not think in\r\nit. The proposition is therefore not analytical, but synthetical, and\r\nnevertheless conceived à priori; and so it is with regard to the other\r\npropositions of the pure part of natural philosophy.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n3. As to metaphysics, even if we look upon it merely as an attempted science,\r\nyet, from the nature of human reason, an indispensable one, we find that it\r\nmust contain synthetical propositions à priori. It is not merely the duty of\r\nmetaphysics to dissect, and thereby analytically to illustrate the conceptions\r\nwhich we form à priori of things; but we seek to widen the range of our à\r\npriori knowledge. For this purpose, we must avail ourselves of such principles\r\nas add something to the original conception\u0026mdash;something not identical with,\r\nnor contained in it, and by means of synthetical judgements à priori, leave far\r\nbehind us the limits of experience; for example, in the proposition, \u0026ldquo;the\r\nworld must have a beginning,\u0026rdquo; and such like. Thus metaphysics, according\r\nto the proper aim of the science, consists merely of synthetical propositions à\r\npriori.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003ca id=\"chap09\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eVI. The Universal Problem of Pure Reason.\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIt is extremely advantageous to be able to bring a number of investigations\r\nunder the formula of a single problem. For in this manner, we not only\r\nfacilitate our own labour, inasmuch as we define it clearly to ourselves, but\r\nalso render it more easy for others to decide whether we have done justice to\r\nour undertaking. The proper problem of pure reason, then, is contained in the\r\nquestion: \u0026ldquo;How are synthetical judgements à priori possible?\u0026rdquo;\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThat metaphysical science has hitherto remained in so vacillating a state of\r\nuncertainty and contradiction, is only to be attributed to the fact that this\r\ngreat problem, and perhaps even the difference between analytical and\r\nsynthetical judgements, did not sooner suggest itself to philosophers. Upon the\r\nsolution of this problem, or upon sufficient proof of the impossibility of\r\nsynthetical knowledge à priori, depends the existence or downfall of the\r\nscience of metaphysics. Among philosophers, David Hume came the nearest of all\r\nto this problem; yet it never acquired in his mind sufficient precision, nor\r\ndid he regard the question in its universality. On the contrary, he stopped\r\nshort at the synthetical proposition of the connection of an effect with its\r\ncause (principium causalitatis), insisting that such proposition à priori was\r\nimpossible. According to his conclusions, then, all that we term metaphysical\r\nscience is a mere delusion, arising from the fancied insight of reason into\r\nthat which is in truth borrowed from experience, and to which habit has given\r\nthe appearance of necessity. Against this assertion, destructive to all pure\r\nphilosophy, he would have been guarded, had he had our problem before his eyes\r\nin its universality. For he would then have perceived that, according to his\r\nown argument, there likewise could not be any pure mathematical science, which\r\nassuredly cannot exist without synthetical propositions à priori\u0026mdash;an\r\nabsurdity from which his good understanding must have saved him.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIn the solution of the above problem is at the same time comprehended the\r\npossibility of the use of pure reason in the foundation and construction of all\r\nsciences which contain theoretical knowledge à priori of objects, that is to\r\nsay, the answer to the following questions:\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHow is pure mathematical science possible?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHow is pure natural science possible?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nRespecting these sciences, as they do certainly exist, it may with propriety be\r\nasked, how they are possible?\u0026mdash;for that they must be possible is shown by\r\nthe fact of their really existing.\u003ca href=\"#linknote-9\" id=\"linknoteref-9\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[9]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e But as to metaphysics, the miserable\r\nprogress it has hitherto made, and the fact that of no one system yet brought\r\nforward, far as regards its true aim, can it be said that this science really\r\nexists, leaves any one at liberty to doubt with reason the very possibility of\r\nits existence.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"linknote-9\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#linknoteref-9\"\u003e[9]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nAs to the existence of pure natural science, or physics, perhaps many may still\r\nexpress doubts. But we have only to look at the different propositions which\r\nare commonly treated of at the commencement of proper (empirical) physical\r\nscience\u0026mdash;those, for example, relating to the permanence of the same\r\nquantity of matter, the vis inertiae, the equality of action and reaction,\r\netc.\u0026mdash;to be soon convinced that they form a science of pure physics\r\n(physica pura, or rationalis), which well deserves to be separately exposed as\r\na special science, in its whole extent, whether that be great or confined.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nYet, in a certain sense, this kind of knowledge must unquestionably be looked\r\nupon as given; in other words, metaphysics must be considered as really\r\nexisting, if not as a science, nevertheless as a natural disposition of the\r\nhuman mind (metaphysica naturalis). For human reason, without any instigations\r\nimputable to the mere vanity of great knowledge, unceasingly progresses, urged\r\non by its own feeling of need, towards such questions as cannot be answered by\r\nany empirical application of reason, or principles derived therefrom; and so\r\nthere has ever really existed in every man some system of metaphysics. It will\r\nalways exist, so soon as reason awakes to the exercise of its power of\r\nspeculation. And now the question arises: \u0026ldquo;How is metaphysics, as a\r\nnatural disposition, possible?\u0026rdquo; In other words, how, from the nature of\r\nuniversal human reason, do those questions arise which pure reason proposes to\r\nitself, and which it is impelled by its own feeling of need to answer as well\r\nas it can?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut as in all the attempts hitherto made to answer the questions which reason\r\nis prompted by its very nature to propose to itself, for example, whether the\r\nworld had a beginning, or has existed from eternity, it has always met with\r\nunavoidable contradictions, we must not rest satisfied with the mere natural\r\ndisposition of the mind to metaphysics, that is, with the existence of the\r\nfaculty of pure reason, whence, indeed, some sort of metaphysical system always\r\narises; but it must be possible to arrive at certainty in regard to the\r\nquestion whether we know or do not know the things of which metaphysics treats.\r\nWe must be able to arrive at a decision on the subjects of its questions, or on\r\nthe ability or inability of reason to form any judgement respecting them; and\r\ntherefore either to extend with confidence the bounds of our pure reason, or to\r\nset strictly defined and safe limits to its action. This last question, which\r\narises out of the above universal problem, would properly run thus: \u0026ldquo;How\r\nis metaphysics possible as a science?\u0026rdquo;\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThus, the critique of reason leads at last, naturally and necessarily, to\r\nscience; and, on the other hand, the dogmatical use of reason without criticism\r\nleads to groundless assertions, against which others equally specious can\r\nalways be set, thus ending unavoidably in scepticism.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBesides, this science cannot be of great and formidable prolixity, because it\r\nhas not to do with objects of reason, the variety of which is inexhaustible,\r\nbut merely with Reason herself and her problems; problems which arise out of\r\nher own bosom, and are not proposed to her by the nature of outward things, but\r\nby her own nature. And when once Reason has previously become able completely\r\nto understand her own power in regard to objects which she meets with in\r\nexperience, it will be easy to determine securely the extent and limits of her\r\nattempted application to objects beyond the confines of experience.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWe may and must, therefore, regard the attempts hitherto made to establish\r\nmetaphysical science dogmatically as non-existent. For what of analysis, that\r\nis, mere dissection of conceptions, is contained in one or other, is not the\r\naim of, but only a preparation for metaphysics proper, which has for its object\r\nthe extension, by means of synthesis, of our à priori knowledge. And for this\r\npurpose, mere analysis is of course useless, because it only shows what is\r\ncontained in these conceptions, but not how we arrive, à priori, at them; and\r\nthis it is her duty to show, in order to be able afterwards to determine their\r\nvalid use in regard to all objects of experience, to all knowledge in general.\r\nBut little self-denial, indeed, is needed to give up these pretensions, seeing\r\nthe undeniable, and in the dogmatic mode of procedure, inevitable\r\ncontradictions of Reason with herself, have long since ruined the reputation of\r\nevery system of metaphysics that has appeared up to this time. It will require\r\nmore firmness to remain undeterred by difficulty from within, and opposition\r\nfrom without, from endeavouring, by a method quite opposed to all those\r\nhitherto followed, to further the growth and fruitfulness of a science\r\nindispensable to human reason\u0026mdash;a science from which every branch it has\r\nborne may be cut away, but whose roots remain indestructible.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003ca id=\"chap10\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eVII. Idea and Division of a Particular Science, under\r\nthe Name of a Critique of Pure Reason.\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nFrom all that has been said, there results the idea of a particular science,\r\nwhich may be called the Critique of Pure Reason. For reason is the faculty\r\nwhich furnishes us with the principles of knowledge à priori. Hence, pure\r\nreason is the faculty which contains the principles of cognizing anything\r\nabsolutely à priori. An organon of pure reason would be a compendium of those\r\nprinciples according to which alone all pure cognitions à priori can be\r\nobtained. The completely extended application of such an organon would afford\r\nus a system of pure reason. As this, however, is demanding a great deal, and it\r\nis yet doubtful whether any extension of our knowledge be here possible, or, if\r\nso, in what cases; we can regard a science of the mere criticism of pure\r\nreason, its sources and limits, as the propædeutic to a system of pure reason.\r\nSuch a science must not be called a doctrine, but only a critique of pure\r\nreason; and its use, in regard to speculation, would be only negative, not to\r\nenlarge the bounds of, but to purify, our reason, and to shield it against\r\nerror\u0026mdash;which alone is no little gain. I apply the term transcendental to\r\nall knowledge which is not so much occupied with objects as with the mode of\r\nour cognition of these objects, so far as this mode of cognition is possible à\r\npriori. A system of such conceptions would be called transcendental philosophy.\r\nBut this, again, is still beyond the bounds of our present essay. For as such a\r\nscience must contain a complete exposition not only of our synthetical à\r\npriori, but of our analytical à priori knowledge, it is of too wide a range for\r\nour present purpose, because we do not require to carry our analysis any\r\nfarther than is necessary to understand, in their full extent, the principles\r\nof synthesis à priori, with which alone we have to do. This investigation,\r\nwhich we cannot properly call a doctrine, but only a transcendental critique,\r\nbecause it aims not at the enlargement, but at the correction and guidance, of\r\nour knowledge, and is to serve as a touchstone of the worth or worthlessness of\r\nall knowledge à priori, is the sole object of our present essay. Such a\r\ncritique is consequently, as far as possible, a preparation for an organon; and\r\nif this new organon should be found to fail, at least for a canon of pure\r\nreason, according to which the complete system of the philosophy of pure\r\nreason, whether it extend or limit the bounds of that reason, might one day be\r\nset forth both analytically and synthetically. For that this is possible, nay,\r\nthat such a system is not of so great extent as to preclude the hope of its\r\never being completed, is evident. For we have not here to do with the nature of\r\noutward objects, which is infinite, but solely with the mind, which judges of\r\nthe nature of objects, and, again, with the mind only in respect of its\r\ncognition à priori. And the object of our investigations, as it is not to be\r\nsought without, but, altogether within, ourselves, cannot remain concealed, and\r\nin all probability is limited enough to be completely surveyed and fairly\r\nestimated, according to its worth or worthlessness. Still less let the reader\r\nhere expect a critique of books and systems of pure reason; our present object\r\nis exclusively a critique of the faculty of pure reason itself. Only when we\r\nmake this critique our foundation, do we possess a pure touchstone for\r\nestimating the philosophical value of ancient and modern writings on this\r\nsubject; and without this criterion, the incompetent historian or judge decides\r\nupon and corrects the groundless assertions of others with his own, which have\r\nthemselves just as little foundation.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nTranscendental philosophy is the idea of a science, for which the Critique of\r\nPure Reason must sketch the whole plan architectonically, that is, from\r\nprinciples, with a full guarantee for the validity and stability of all the\r\nparts which enter into the building. It is the system of all the principles of\r\npure reason. If this Critique itself does not assume the title of\r\ntranscendental philosophy, it is only because, to be a complete system, it\r\nought to contain a full analysis of all human knowledge à priori. Our critique\r\nmust, indeed, lay before us a complete enumeration of all the radical\r\nconceptions which constitute the said pure knowledge. But from the complete\r\nanalysis of these conceptions themselves, as also from a complete investigation\r\nof those derived from them, it abstains with reason; partly because it would be\r\ndeviating from the end in view to occupy itself with this analysis, since this\r\nprocess is not attended with the difficulty and insecurity to be found in the\r\nsynthesis, to which our critique is entirely devoted, and partly because it\r\nwould be inconsistent with the unity of our plan to burden this essay with the\r\nvindication of the completeness of such an analysis and deduction, with which,\r\nafter all, we have at present nothing to do. This completeness of the analysis\r\nof these radical conceptions, as well as of the deduction from the conceptions\r\nà priori which may be given by the analysis, we can, however, easily attain,\r\nprovided only that we are in possession of all these radical conceptions, which\r\nare to serve as principles of the synthesis, and that in respect of this main\r\npurpose nothing is wanting.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nTo the Critique of Pure Reason, therefore, belongs all that constitutes\r\ntranscendental philosophy; and it is the complete idea of transcendental\r\nphilosophy, but still not the science itself; because it only proceeds so far\r\nwith the analysis as is necessary to the power of judging completely of our\r\nsynthetical knowledge à priori.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe principal thing we must attend to, in the division of the parts of a\r\nscience like this, is that no conceptions must enter it which contain aught\r\nempirical; in other words, that the knowledge à priori must be completely pure.\r\nHence, although the highest principles and fundamental conceptions of morality\r\nare certainly cognitions à priori, yet they do not belong to transcendental\r\nphilosophy; because, though they certainly do not lay the conceptions of pain,\r\npleasure, desires, inclinations, etc. (which are all of empirical origin), at\r\nthe foundation of its precepts, yet still into the conception of duty\u0026mdash;as\r\nan obstacle to be overcome, or as an incitement which should not be made into a\r\nmotive\u0026mdash;these empirical conceptions must necessarily enter, in the\r\nconstruction of a system of pure morality. Transcendental philosophy is\r\nconsequently a philosophy of the pure and merely speculative reason. For all\r\nthat is practical, so far as it contains motives, relates to feelings, and\r\nthese belong to empirical sources of cognition.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIf we wish to divide this science from the universal point of view of a science\r\nin general, it ought to comprehend, first, a Doctrine of the Elements, and,\r\nsecondly, a Doctrine of the Method of pure reason. Each of these main divisions\r\nwill have its subdivisions, the separate reasons for which we cannot here\r\nparticularize. Only so much seems necessary, by way of introduction of\r\npremonition, that there are two sources of human knowledge (which probably\r\nspring from a common, but to us unknown root), namely, sense and understanding.\r\nBy the former, objects are given to us; by the latter, thought. So far as the\r\nfaculty of sense may contain representations à priori, which form the\r\nconditions under which objects are given, in so far it belongs to\r\ntranscendental philosophy. The transcendental doctrine of sense must form the\r\nfirst part of our science of elements, because the conditions under which alone\r\nthe objects of human knowledge are given must precede those under which they\r\nare thought.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003c!–end chapter–\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca id=\"chap11\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eI. TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF ELEMENTS.\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003ca id=\"chap12\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eFIRST PART. TRANSCENDENTAL ÆSTHETIC.\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003ca id=\"chap13\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e§ I. Introductory.\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIn whatsoever mode, or by whatsoever means, our knowledge may relate to\r\nobjects, it is at least quite clear that the only manner in which it\r\nimmediately relates to them is by means of an intuition. To this as the\r\nindispensable groundwork, all thought points. But an intuition can take place\r\nonly in so far as the object is given to us. This, again, is only possible, to\r\nman at least, on condition that the object affect the mind in a certain manner.\r\nThe capacity for receiving representations (receptivity) through the mode in\r\nwhich we are affected by objects, objects, is called sensibility. By means of\r\nsensibility, therefore, objects are given to us, and it alone furnishes us with\r\nintuitions; by the understanding they are thought, and from it arise\r\nconceptions. But an thought must directly, or indirectly, by means of certain\r\nsigns, relate ultimately to intuitions; consequently, with us, to sensibility,\r\nbecause in no other way can an object be given to us.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe effect of an object upon the faculty of representation, so far as we are\r\naffected by the said object, is sensation. That sort of intuition which relates\r\nto an object by means of sensation is called an empirical intuition. The\r\nundetermined object of an empirical intuition is called phenomenon. That which\r\nin the phenomenon corresponds to the sensation, I term its matter; but that\r\nwhich effects that the content of the phenomenon can be arranged under certain\r\nrelations, I call its form. But that in which our sensations are merely\r\narranged, and by which they are susceptible of assuming a certain form, cannot\r\nbe itself sensation. It is, then, the matter of all phenomena that is given to\r\nus à posteriori; the form must lie ready à priori for them in the mind, and\r\nconsequently can be regarded separately from all sensation.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nI call all representations pure, in the transcendental meaning of the word,\r\nwherein nothing is met with that belongs to sensation. And accordingly we find\r\nexisting in the mind à priori, the pure form of sensuous intuitions in general,\r\nin which all the manifold content of the phenomenal world is arranged and\r\nviewed under certain relations. This pure form of sensibility I shall call pure\r\nintuition. Thus, if I take away from our representation of a body all that the\r\nunderstanding thinks as belonging to it, as substance, force, divisibility,\r\netc., and also whatever belongs to sensation, as impenetrability, hardness,\r\ncolour, etc.; yet there is still something left us from this empirical\r\nintuition, namely, extension and shape. These belong to pure intuition, which\r\nexists à priori in the mind, as a mere form of sensibility, and without any\r\nreal object of the senses or any sensation.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe science of all the principles of sensibility à priori, I call\r\ntranscendental æsthetic.\u003ca href=\"#linknote-10\" id=\"linknoteref-10\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[10]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e There must, then, be such a science\r\nforming the first part of the transcendental doctrine of elements, in\r\ncontradistinction to that part which contains the principles of pure thought,\r\nand which is called transcendental logic.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"linknote-10\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#linknoteref-10\"\u003e[10]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nThe Germans are the only people who at present use this word to indicate what\r\nothers call the critique of taste. At the foundation of this term lies the\r\ndisappointed hope, which the eminent analyst, Baumgarten, conceived, of\r\nsubjecting the criticism of the beautiful to principles of reason, and so of\r\nelevating its rules into a science. But his endeavours were vain. For the said\r\nrules or criteria are, in respect to their chief sources, merely empirical,\r\nconsequently never can serve as determinate laws à priori, by which our\r\njudgement in matters of taste is to be directed. It is rather our judgement\r\nwhich forms the proper test as to the correctness of the principles. On this\r\naccount it is advisable to give up the use of the term as designating the\r\ncritique of taste, and to apply it solely to that doctrine, which is true\r\nscience\u0026mdash;the science of the laws of sensibility\u0026mdash;and thus come nearer\r\nto the language and the sense of the ancients in their well-known division of\r\nthe objects of cognition into aiotheta kai noeta, or to share it with\r\nspeculative philosophy, and employ it partly in a transcendental, partly in a\r\npsychological signification.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIn the science of transcendental æsthetic accordingly, we shall first isolate\r\nsensibility or the sensuous faculty, by separating from it all that is annexed\r\nto its perceptions by the conceptions of understanding, so that nothing be left\r\nbut empirical intuition. In the next place we shall take away from this\r\nintuition all that belongs to sensation, so that nothing may remain but pure\r\nintuition, and the mere form of phenomena, which is all that the sensibility\r\ncan afford à priori. From this investigation it will be found that there are\r\ntwo pure forms of sensuous intuition, as principles of knowledge à priori,\r\nnamely, space and time. To the consideration of these we shall now proceed.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003ca id=\"chap14\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eSECTION I. Of Space.\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003ca id=\"chap15\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e§ 2. Metaphysical Exposition of this Conception.\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBy means of the external sense (a property of the mind), we represent to\r\nourselves objects as without us, and these all in space. Herein alone are their\r\nshape, dimensions, and relations to each other determined or determinable. The\r\ninternal sense, by means of which the mind contemplates itself or its internal\r\nstate, gives, indeed, no intuition of the soul as an object; yet there is\r\nnevertheless a determinate form, under which alone the contemplation of our\r\ninternal state is possible, so that all which relates to the inward\r\ndeterminations of the mind is represented in relations of time. Of time we\r\ncannot have any external intuition, any more than we can have an internal\r\nintuition of space. What then are time and space? Are they real existences? Or,\r\nare they merely relations or determinations of things, such, however, as would\r\nequally belong to these things in themselves, though they should never become\r\nobjects of intuition; or, are they such as belong only to the form of\r\nintuition, and consequently to the subjective constitution of the mind, without\r\nwhich these predicates of time and space could not be attached to any object?\r\nIn order to become informed on these points, we shall first give an exposition\r\nof the conception of space. By exposition, I mean the clear, though not\r\ndetailed, representation of that which belongs to a conception; and an\r\nexposition is metaphysical when it contains that which represents the\r\nconception as given à priori.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n1. Space is not a conception which has been derived from outward experiences.\r\nFor, in order that certain sensations may relate to something without me (that\r\nis, to something which occupies a different part of space from that in which I\r\nam); in like manner, in order that I may represent them not merely as without,\r\nof, and near to each other, but also in separate places, the representation of\r\nspace must already exist as a foundation. Consequently, the representation of\r\nspace cannot be borrowed from the relations of external phenomena through\r\nexperience; but, on the contrary, this external experience is itself only\r\npossible through the said antecedent representation.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n2. Space then is a necessary representation à priori, which serves for the\r\nfoundation of all external intuitions. We never can imagine or make a\r\nrepresentation to ourselves of the non-existence of space, though we may easily\r\nenough think that no objects are found in it. It must, therefore, be considered\r\nas the condition of the possibility of phenomena, and by no means as a\r\ndetermination dependent on them, and is a representation à priori, which\r\nnecessarily supplies the basis for external phenomena.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n3. Space is no discursive, or as we say, general conception of the relations of\r\nthings, but a pure intuition. For, in the first place, we can only represent to\r\nourselves one space, and, when we talk of divers spaces, we mean only parts of\r\none and the same space. Moreover, these parts cannot antecede this one\r\nall-embracing space, as the component parts from which the aggregate can be\r\nmade up, but can be cogitated only as existing in it. Space is essentially one,\r\nand multiplicity in it, consequently the general notion of spaces, of this or\r\nthat space, depends solely upon limitations. Hence it follows that an à priori\r\nintuition (which is not empirical) lies at the root of all our conceptions of\r\nspace. Thus, moreover, the principles of geometry\u0026mdash;for example, that\r\n\u0026ldquo;in a triangle, two sides together are greater than the third,\u0026rdquo; are\r\nnever deduced from general conceptions of line and triangle, but from\r\nintuition, and this à priori, with apodeictic certainty.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n4. Space is represented as an infinite given quantity. Now every conception\r\nmust indeed be considered as a representation which is contained in an infinite\r\nmultitude of different possible representations, which, therefore, comprises\r\nthese under itself; but no conception, as such, can be so conceived, as if it\r\ncontained within itself an infinite multitude of representations. Nevertheless,\r\nspace is so conceived of, for all parts of space are equally capable of being\r\nproduced to infinity. Consequently, the original representation of space is an\r\nintuition à priori, and not a conception.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003ca id=\"chap16\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e§ 3. Transcendental Exposition of the Conception of\r\nSpace.\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBy a transcendental exposition, I mean the explanation of a conception, as a\r\nprinciple, whence can be discerned the possibility of other synthetical à\r\npriori cognitions. For this purpose, it is requisite, firstly, that such\r\ncognitions do really flow from the given conception; and, secondly, that the\r\nsaid cognitions are only possible under the presupposition of a given mode of\r\nexplaining this conception.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGeometry is a science which determines the properties of space synthetically,\r\nand yet à priori. What, then, must be our representation of space, in order\r\nthat such a cognition of it may be possible? It must be originally intuition,\r\nfor from a mere conception, no propositions can be deduced which go out beyond\r\nthe conception, and yet this happens in geometry. (Introd. V.) But this\r\nintuition must be found in the mind à priori, that is, before any perception of\r\nobjects, consequently must be pure, not empirical, intuition. For geometrical\r\nprinciples are always apodeictic, that is, united with the consciousness of\r\ntheir necessity, as: \u0026ldquo;Space has only three dimensions.\u0026rdquo; But\r\npropositions of this kind cannot be empirical judgements, nor conclusions from\r\nthem. (Introd. II.) Now, how can an external intuition anterior to objects\r\nthemselves, and in which our conception of objects can be determined à priori,\r\nexist in the human mind? Obviously not otherwise than in so far as it has its\r\nseat in the subject only, as the formal capacity of the subject\u0026rsquo;s being\r\naffected by objects, and thereby of obtaining immediate representation, that\r\nis, intuition; consequently, only as the form of the external sense in general.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThus it is only by means of our explanation that the possibility of geometry,\r\nas a synthetical science à priori, becomes comprehensible. Every mode of\r\nexplanation which does not show us this possibility, although in appearance it\r\nmay be similar to ours, can with the utmost certainty be distinguished from it\r\nby these marks.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003ca id=\"chap17\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e§ 4. Conclusions from the foregoing Conceptions.\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n(a) Space does not represent any property of objects as things in themselves,\r\nnor does it represent them in their relations to each other; in other words,\r\nspace does not represent to us any determination of objects such as attaches to\r\nthe objects themselves, and would remain, even though all subjective conditions\r\nof the intuition were abstracted. For neither absolute nor relative\r\ndeterminations of objects can be intuited prior to the existence of the things\r\nto which they belong, and therefore not à priori.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n(b) Space is nothing else than the form of all phenomena of the external sense,\r\nthat is, the subjective condition of the sensibility, under which alone\r\nexternal intuition is possible. Now, because the receptivity or capacity of the\r\nsubject to be affected by objects necessarily antecedes all intuitions of these\r\nobjects, it is easily understood how the form of all phenomena can be given in\r\nthe mind previous to all actual perceptions, therefore à priori, and how it, as\r\na pure intuition, in which all objects must be determined, can contain\r\nprinciples of the relations of these objects prior to all experience.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIt is therefore from the human point of view only that we can speak of space,\r\nextended objects, etc. If we depart from the subjective condition, under which\r\nalone we can obtain external intuition, or, in other words, by means of which\r\nwe are affected by objects, the representation of space has no meaning\r\nwhatsoever. This predicate is only applicable to things in so far as they\r\nappear to us, that is, are objects of sensibility. The constant form of this\r\nreceptivity, which we call sensibility, is a necessary condition of all\r\nrelations in which objects can be intuited as existing without us, and when\r\nabstraction of these objects is made, is a pure intuition, to which we give the\r\nname of space. It is clear that we cannot make the special conditions of\r\nsensibility into conditions of the possibility of things, but only of the\r\npossibility of their existence as far as they are phenomena. And so we may\r\ncorrectly say that space contains all which can appear to us externally, but\r\nnot all things considered as things in themselves, be they intuited or not, or\r\nby whatsoever subject one will. As to the intuitions of other thinking beings,\r\nwe cannot judge whether they are or are not bound by the same conditions which\r\nlimit our own intuition, and which for us are universally valid. If we join the\r\nlimitation of a judgement to the conception of the subject, then the judgement\r\nwill possess unconditioned validity. For example, the proposition, \u0026ldquo;All\r\nobjects are beside each other in space,\u0026rdquo; is valid only under the\r\nlimitation that these things are taken as objects of our sensuous intuition.\r\nBut if I join the condition to the conception and say, \u0026ldquo;All things, as\r\nexternal phenomena, are beside each other in space,\u0026rdquo; then the rule is\r\nvalid universally, and without any limitation. Our expositions, consequently,\r\nteach the reality (i.e., the objective validity) of space in regard of all\r\nwhich can be presented to us externally as object, and at the same time also\r\nthe ideality of space in regard to objects when they are considered by means of\r\nreason as things in themselves, that is, without reference to the constitution\r\nof our sensibility. We maintain, therefore, the empirical reality of space in\r\nregard to all possible external experience, although we must admit its\r\ntranscendental ideality; in other words, that it is nothing, so soon as we\r\nwithdraw the condition upon which the possibility of all experience depends and\r\nlook upon space as something that belongs to things in themselves.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut, with the exception of space, there is no representation, subjective and\r\nreferring to something external to us, which could be called objective à\r\npriori. For there are no other subjective representations from which we can\r\ndeduce synthetical propositions à priori, as we can from the intuition of\r\nspace. (See § 3.) Therefore, to speak accurately, no ideality whatever belongs\r\nto these, although they agree in this respect with the representation of space,\r\nthat they belong merely to the subjective nature of the mode of sensuous\r\nperception; such a mode, for example, as that of sight, of hearing, and of\r\nfeeling, by means of the sensations of colour, sound, and heat, but which,\r\nbecause they are only sensations and not intuitions, do not of themselves give\r\nus the cognition of any object, least of all, an à priori cognition. My\r\npurpose, in the above remark, is merely this: to guard any one against\r\nillustrating the asserted ideality of space by examples quite insufficient, for\r\nexample, by colour, taste, etc.; for these must be contemplated not as\r\nproperties of things, but only as changes in the subject, changes which may be\r\ndifferent in different men. For, in such a case, that which is originally a\r\nmere phenomenon, a rose, for example, is taken by the empirical understanding\r\nfor a thing in itself, though to every different eye, in respect of its colour,\r\nit may appear different. On the contrary, the transcendental conception of\r\nphenomena in space is a critical admonition, that, in general, nothing which is\r\nintuited in space is a thing in itself, and that space is not a form which\r\nbelongs as a property to things; but that objects are quite unknown to us in\r\nthemselves, and what we call outward objects, are nothing else but mere\r\nrepresentations of our sensibility, whose form is space, but whose real\r\ncorrelate, the thing in itself, is not known by means of these representations,\r\nnor ever can be, but respecting which, in experience, no inquiry is ever made.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003ca id=\"chap18\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eSECTION II. Of Time.\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003ca id=\"chap19\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e§ 5. Metaphysical Exposition of this Conception.\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n1. Time is not an empirical conception. For neither coexistence nor succession\r\nwould be perceived by us, if the representation of time did not exist as a\r\nfoundation à priori. Without this presupposition we could not represent to\r\nourselves that things exist together at one and the same time, or at different\r\ntimes, that is, contemporaneously, or in succession.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n2. Time is a necessary representation, lying at the foundation of all our\r\nintuitions. With regard to phenomena in general, we cannot think away time from\r\nthem, and represent them to ourselves as out of and unconnected with time, but\r\nwe can quite well represent to ourselves time void of phenomena. Time is\r\ntherefore given à priori. In it alone is all reality of phenomena possible.\r\nThese may all be annihilated in thought, but time itself, as the universal\r\ncondition of their possibility, cannot be so annulled.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n3. On this necessity à priori is also founded the possibility of apodeictic\r\nprinciples of the relations of time, or axioms of time in general, such as:\r\n\u0026ldquo;Time has only one dimension,\u0026rdquo; \u0026ldquo;Different times are not\r\ncoexistent but successive\u0026rdquo; (as different spaces are not successive but\r\ncoexistent). These principles cannot be derived from experience, for it would\r\ngive neither strict universality, nor apodeictic certainty. We should only be\r\nable to say, \u0026ldquo;so common experience teaches us,\u0026rdquo; but not \u0026ldquo;it\r\nmust be so.\u0026rdquo; They are valid as rules, through which, in general,\r\nexperience is possible; and they instruct us respecting experience, and not by\r\nmeans of it.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n4. Time is not a discursive, or as it is called, general conception, but a pure\r\nform of the sensuous intuition. Different times are merely parts of one and the\r\nsame time. But the representation which can only be given by a single object is\r\nan intuition. Besides, the proposition that different times cannot be\r\ncoexistent could not be derived from a general conception. For this proposition\r\nis synthetical, and therefore cannot spring out of conceptions alone. It is\r\ntherefore contained immediately in the intuition and representation of time.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n5. The infinity of time signifies nothing more than that every determined\r\nquantity of time is possible only through limitations of one time lying at the\r\nfoundation. Consequently, the original representation, time, must be given as\r\nunlimited. But as the determinate representation of the parts of time and of\r\nevery quantity of an object can only be obtained by limitation, the complete\r\nrepresentation of time must not be furnished by means of conceptions, for these\r\ncontain only partial representations. Conceptions, on the contrary, must have\r\nimmediate intuition for their basis.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003ca id=\"chap20\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e§ 6 Transcendental Exposition of the Conception of\r\nTime.\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nI may here refer to what is said above (§ 5, 3), where, for or sake of brevity,\r\nI have placed under the head of metaphysical exposition, that which is properly\r\ntranscendental. Here I shall add that the conception of change, and with it the\r\nconception of motion, as change of place, is possible only through and in the\r\nrepresentation of time; that if this representation were not an intuition\r\n(internal) à priori, no conception, of whatever kind, could render\r\ncomprehensible the possibility of change, in other words, of a conjunction of\r\ncontradictorily opposed predicates in one and the same object, for example, the\r\npresence of a thing in a place and the non-presence of the same thing in the\r\nsame place. It is only in time that it is possible to meet with two\r\ncontradictorily opposed determinations in one thing, that is, after each other.\r\nThus our conception of time explains the possibility of so much synthetical\r\nknowledge à priori, as is exhibited in the general doctrine of motion, which is\r\nnot a little fruitful.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003ca id=\"chap21\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e§ 7. Conclusions from the above Conceptions.\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n(a) Time is not something which subsists of itself, or which inheres in things\r\nas an objective determination, and therefore remains, when abstraction is made\r\nof the subjective conditions of the intuition of things. For in the former\r\ncase, it would be something real, yet without presenting to any power of\r\nperception any real object. In the latter case, as an order or determination\r\ninherent in things themselves, it could not be antecedent to things, as their\r\ncondition, nor discerned or intuited by means of synthetical propositions à\r\npriori. But all this is quite possible when we regard time as merely the\r\nsubjective condition under which all our intuitions take place. For in that\r\ncase, this form of the inward intuition can be represented prior to the\r\nobjects, and consequently à priori.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n(b) Time is nothing else than the form of the internal sense, that is, of the\r\nintuitions of self and of our internal state. For time cannot be any\r\ndetermination of outward phenomena. It has to do neither with shape nor\r\nposition; on the contrary, it determines the relation of representations in our\r\ninternal state. And precisely because this internal intuition presents to us no\r\nshape or form, we endeavour to supply this want by analogies, and represent the\r\ncourse of time by a line progressing to infinity, the content of which\r\nconstitutes a series which is only of one dimension; and we conclude from the\r\nproperties of this line as to all the properties of time, with this single\r\nexception, that the parts of the line are coexistent, whilst those of time are\r\nsuccessive. From this it is clear also that the representation of time is\r\nitself an intuition, because all its relations can be expressed in an external\r\nintuition.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n(c) Time is the formal condition à priori of all phenomena whatsoever. Space,\r\nas the pure form of external intuition, is limited as a condition à priori to\r\nexternal phenomena alone. On the other hand, because all representations,\r\nwhether they have or have not external things for their objects, still in\r\nthemselves, as determinations of the mind, belong to our internal state; and\r\nbecause this internal state is subject to the formal condition of the internal\r\nintuition, that is, to time\u0026mdash;time is a condition à priori of all phenomena\r\nwhatsoever\u0026mdash;the immediate condition of all internal, and thereby the\r\nmediate condition of all external phenomena. If I can say à priori, \u0026ldquo;All\r\noutward phenomena are in space, and determined à priori according to the\r\nrelations of space,\u0026rdquo; I can also, from the principle of the internal\r\nsense, affirm universally, \u0026ldquo;All phenomena in general, that is, all\r\nobjects of the senses, are in time and stand necessarily in relations of\r\ntime.\u0026rdquo;\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIf we abstract our internal intuition of ourselves and all external intuitions,\r\npossible only by virtue of this internal intuition and presented to us by our\r\nfaculty of representation, and consequently take objects as they are in\r\nthemselves, then time is nothing. It is only of objective validity in regard to\r\nphenomena, because these are things which we regard as objects of our senses.\r\nIt no longer objective we, make abstraction of the sensuousness of our\r\nintuition, in other words, of that mode of representation which is peculiar to\r\nus, and speak of things in general. Time is therefore merely a subjective\r\ncondition of our (human) intuition (which is always sensuous, that is, so far\r\nas we are affected by objects), and in itself, independently of the mind or\r\nsubject, is nothing. Nevertheless, in respect of all phenomena, consequently of\r\nall things which come within the sphere of our experience, it is necessarily\r\nobjective. We cannot say, \u0026ldquo;All things are in time,\u0026rdquo; because in this\r\nconception of things in general, we abstract and make no mention of any sort of\r\nintuition of things. But this is the proper condition under which time belongs\r\nto our representation of objects. If we add the condition to the conception,\r\nand say, \u0026ldquo;All things, as phenomena, that is, objects of sensuous\r\nintuition, are in time,\u0026rdquo; then the proposition has its sound objective\r\nvalidity and universality à priori.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWhat we have now set forth teaches, therefore, the empirical reality of time;\r\nthat is, its objective validity in reference to all objects which can ever be\r\npresented to our senses. And as our intuition is always sensuous, no object\r\never can be presented to us in experience, which does not come under the\r\nconditions of time. On the other hand, we deny to time all claim to absolute\r\nreality; that is, we deny that it, without having regard to the form of our\r\nsensuous intuition, absolutely inheres in things as a condition or property.\r\nSuch properties as belong to objects as things in themselves never can be\r\npresented to us through the medium of the senses. Herein consists, therefore,\r\nthe transcendental ideality of time, according to which, if we abstract the\r\nsubjective conditions of sensuous intuition, it is nothing, and cannot be\r\nreckoned as subsisting or inhering in objects as things in themselves,\r\nindependently of its relation to our intuition. This ideality, like that of\r\nspace, is not to be proved or illustrated by fallacious analogies with\r\nsensations, for this reason\u0026mdash;that in such arguments or illustrations, we\r\nmake the presupposition that the phenomenon, in which such and such predicates\r\ninhere, has objective reality, while in this case we can only find such an\r\nobjective reality as is itself empirical, that is, regards the object as a mere\r\nphenomenon. In reference to this subject, see the remark in Section I (§ 4)\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003ca id=\"chap22\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e§ 8. Elucidation.\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAgainst this theory, which grants empirical reality to time, but denies to it\r\nabsolute and transcendental reality, I have heard from intelligent men an\r\nobjection so unanimously urged that I conclude that it must naturally present\r\nitself to every reader to whom these considerations are novel. It runs thus:\r\n\u0026ldquo;Changes are real\u0026rdquo; (this the continual change in our own\r\nrepresentations demonstrates, even though the existence of all external\r\nphenomena, together with their changes, is denied). Now, changes are only\r\npossible in time, and therefore time must be something real. But there is no\r\ndifficulty in answering this. I grant the whole argument. Time, no doubt, is\r\nsomething real, that is, it is the real form of our internal intuition. It\r\ntherefore has subjective reality, in reference to our internal experience, that\r\nis, I have really the representation of time and of my determinations therein.\r\nTime, therefore, is not to be regarded as an object, but as the mode of\r\nrepresentation of myself as an object. But if I could intuite myself, or be\r\nintuited by another being, without this condition of sensibility, then those\r\nvery determinations which we now represent to ourselves as changes, would\r\npresent to us a knowledge in which the representation of time, and consequently\r\nof change, would not appear. The empirical reality of time, therefore, remains,\r\nas the condition of all our experience. But absolute reality, according to what\r\nhas been said above, cannot be granted it. Time is nothing but the form of our\r\ninternal intuition.\u003ca href=\"#linknote-11\" id=\"linknoteref-11\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[11]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e If we take away from it the special\r\ncondition of our sensibility, the conception of time also vanishes; and it\r\ninheres not in the objects themselves, but solely in the subject (or mind)\r\nwhich intuites them.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"linknote-11\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#linknoteref-11\"\u003e[11]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nI can indeed say \u0026ldquo;my representations follow one another, or are\r\nsuccessive\u0026rdquo;; but this means only that we are conscious of them as in a\r\nsuccession, that is, according to the form of the internal sense. Time,\r\ntherefore, is not a thing in itself, nor is it any objective determination\r\npertaining to, or inherent in things.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut the reason why this objection is so unanimously brought against our\r\ndoctrine of time, and that too by disputants who cannot start any intelligible\r\narguments against the doctrine of the ideality of space, is this\u0026mdash;they\r\nhave no hope of demonstrating apodeictically the absolute reality of space,\r\nbecause the doctrine of idealism is against them, according to which the\r\nreality of external objects is not capable of any strict proof. On the other\r\nhand, the reality of the object of our internal sense (that is, myself and my\r\ninternal state) is clear immediately through consciousness. The\r\nformer\u0026mdash;external objects in space\u0026mdash;might be a mere delusion, but the\r\nlatter\u0026mdash;the object of my internal perception\u0026mdash;is undeniably real.\r\nThey do not, however, reflect that both, without question of their reality as\r\nrepresentations, belong only to the genus phenomenon, which has always two\r\naspects, the one, the object considered as a thing in itself, without regard to\r\nthe mode of intuiting it, and the nature of which remains for this very reason\r\nproblematical, the other, the form of our intuition of the object, which must\r\nbe sought not in the object as a thing in itself, but in the subject to which\r\nit appears\u0026mdash;which form of intuition nevertheless belongs really and\r\nnecessarily to the phenomenal object.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nTime and space are, therefore, two sources of knowledge, from which, à priori,\r\nvarious synthetical cognitions can be drawn. Of this we find a striking example\r\nin the cognitions of space and its relations, which form the foundation of pure\r\nmathematics. They are the two pure forms of all intuitions, and thereby make\r\nsynthetical propositions à priori possible. But these sources of knowledge\r\nbeing merely conditions of our sensibility, do therefore, and as such, strictly\r\ndetermine their own range and purpose, in that they do not and cannot present\r\nobjects as things in themselves, but are applicable to them solely in so far as\r\nthey are considered as sensuous phenomena. The sphere of phenomena is the only\r\nsphere of their validity, and if we venture out of this, no further objective\r\nuse can be made of them. For the rest, this formal reality of time and space\r\nleaves the validity of our empirical knowledge unshaken; for our certainty in\r\nthat respect is equally firm, whether these forms necessarily inhere in the\r\nthings themselves, or only in our intuitions of them. On the other hand, those\r\nwho maintain the absolute reality of time and space, whether as essentially\r\nsubsisting, or only inhering, as modifications, in things, must find themselves\r\nat utter variance with the principles of experience itself. For, if they decide\r\nfor the first view, and make space and time into substances, this being the\r\nside taken by mathematical natural philosophers, they must admit two\r\nself-subsisting nonentities, infinite and eternal, which exist (yet without\r\nthere being anything real) for the purpose of containing in themselves\r\neverything that is real. If they adopt the second view of inherence, which is\r\npreferred by some metaphysical natural philosophers, and regard space and time\r\nas relations (contiguity in space or succession in time), abstracted from\r\nexperience, though represented confusedly in this state of separation, they\r\nfind themselves in that case necessitated to deny the validity of mathematical\r\ndoctrines à priori in reference to real things (for example, in space)\u0026mdash;at\r\nall events their apodeictic certainty. For such certainty cannot be found in an\r\nà posteriori proposition; and the conceptions à priori of space and time are,\r\naccording to this opinion, mere creations of the imagination, having their\r\nsource really in experience, inasmuch as, out of relations abstracted from\r\nexperience, imagination has made up something which contains, indeed, general\r\nstatements of these relations, yet of which no application can be made without\r\nthe restrictions attached thereto by nature. The former of these parties gains\r\nthis advantage, that they keep the sphere of phenomena free for mathematical\r\nscience. On the other hand, these very conditions (space and time) embarrass\r\nthem greatly, when the understanding endeavours to pass the limits of that\r\nsphere. The latter has, indeed, this advantage, that the representations of\r\nspace and time do not come in their way when they wish to judge of objects, not\r\nas phenomena, but merely in their relation to the understanding. Devoid,\r\nhowever, of a true and objectively valid à priori intuition, they can neither\r\nfurnish any basis for the possibility of mathematical cognitions à priori, nor\r\nbring the propositions of experience into necessary accordance with those of\r\nmathematics. In our theory of the true nature of these two original forms of\r\nthe sensibility, both difficulties are surmounted.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIn conclusion, that transcendental æsthetic cannot contain any more than these\r\ntwo elements\u0026mdash;space and time, is sufficiently obvious from the fact that\r\nall other conceptions appertaining to sensibility, even that of motion, which\r\nunites in itself both elements, presuppose something empirical. Motion, for\r\nexample, presupposes the perception of something movable. But space considered\r\nin itself contains nothing movable, consequently motion must be something which\r\nis found in space only through experience\u0026mdash;in other words, an empirical\r\ndatum. In like manner, transcendental æsthetic cannot number the conception of\r\nchange among its data à priori; for time itself does not change, but only\r\nsomething which is in time. To acquire the conception of change, therefore, the\r\nperception of some existing object and of the succession of its determinations,\r\nin one word, experience, is necessary.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003ca id=\"chap23\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e§ 9. General Remarks on Transcendental Æsthetic.\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nI. In order to prevent any misunderstanding, it will be requisite, in the first\r\nplace, to recapitulate, as clearly as possible, what our opinion is with\r\nrespect to the fundamental nature of our sensuous cognition in general. We have\r\nintended, then, to say that all our intuition is nothing but the representation\r\nof phenomena; that the things which we intuite, are not in themselves the same\r\nas our representations of them in intuition, nor are their relations in\r\nthemselves so constituted as they appear to us; and that if we take away the\r\nsubject, or even only the subjective constitution of our senses in general,\r\nthen not only the nature and relations of objects in space and time, but even\r\nspace and time themselves disappear; and that these, as phenomena, cannot exist\r\nin themselves, but only in us. What may be the nature of objects considered as\r\nthings in themselves and without reference to the receptivity of our\r\nsensibility is quite unknown to us. We know nothing more than our mode of\r\nperceiving them, which is peculiar to us, and which, though not of necessity\r\npertaining to every animated being, is so to the whole human race. With this\r\nalone we have to do. Space and time are the pure forms thereof; sensation the\r\nmatter. The former alone can we cognize à priori, that is, antecedent to all\r\nactual perception; and for this reason such cognition is called pure intuition.\r\nThe latter is that in our cognition which is called cognition à posteriori,\r\nthat is, empirical intuition. The former appertain absolutely and necessarily\r\nto our sensibility, of whatsoever kind our sensations may be; the latter may be\r\nof very diversified character. Supposing that we should carry our empirical\r\nintuition even to the very highest degree of clearness, we should not thereby\r\nadvance one step nearer to a knowledge of the constitution of objects as things\r\nin themselves. For we could only, at best, arrive at a complete cognition of\r\nour own mode of intuition, that is of our sensibility, and this always under\r\nthe conditions originally attaching to the subject, namely, the conditions of\r\nspace and time; while the question: \u0026ldquo;What are objects considered as\r\nthings in themselves?\u0026rdquo; remains unanswerable even after the most thorough\r\nexamination of the phenomenal world.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nTo say, then, that all our sensibility is nothing but the confused\r\nrepresentation of things containing exclusively that which belongs to them as\r\nthings in themselves, and this under an accumulation of characteristic marks\r\nand partial representations which we cannot distinguish in consciousness, is a\r\nfalsification of the conception of sensibility and phenomenization, which\r\nrenders our whole doctrine thereof empty and useless. The difference between a\r\nconfused and a clear representation is merely logical and has nothing to do\r\nwith content. No doubt the conception of right, as employed by a sound\r\nunderstanding, contains all that the most subtle investigation could unfold\r\nfrom it, although, in the ordinary practical use of the word, we are not\r\nconscious of the manifold representations comprised in the conception. But we\r\ncannot for this reason assert that the ordinary conception is a sensuous one,\r\ncontaining a mere phenomenon, for right cannot appear as a phenomenon; but the\r\nconception of it lies in the understanding, and represents a property (the\r\nmoral property) of actions, which belongs to them in themselves. On the other\r\nhand, the representation in intuition of a body contains nothing which could\r\nbelong to an object considered as a thing in itself, but merely the phenomenon\r\nor appearance of something, and the mode in which we are affected by that\r\nappearance; and this receptivity of our faculty of cognition is called\r\nsensibility, and remains toto caelo different from the cognition of an object\r\nin itself, even though we should examine the content of the phenomenon to the\r\nvery bottom.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIt must be admitted that the Leibnitz-Wolfian philosophy has assigned an\r\nentirely erroneous point of view to all investigations into the nature and\r\norigin of our cognitions, inasmuch as it regards the distinction between the\r\nsensuous and the intellectual as merely logical, whereas it is plainly\r\ntranscendental, and concerns not merely the clearness or obscurity, but the\r\ncontent and origin of both. For the faculty of sensibility not only does not\r\npresent us with an indistinct and confused cognition of objects as things in\r\nthemselves, but, in fact, gives us no knowledge of these at all. On the\r\ncontrary, so soon as we abstract in thought our own subjective nature, the\r\nobject represented, with the properties ascribed to it by sensuous intuition,\r\nentirely disappears, because it was only this subjective nature that determined\r\nthe form of the object as a phenomenon.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIn phenomena, we commonly, indeed, distinguish that which essentially belongs\r\nto the intuition of them, and is valid for the sensuous faculty of every human\r\nbeing, from that which belongs to the same intuition accidentally, as valid not\r\nfor the sensuous faculty in general, but for a particular state or organization\r\nof this or that sense. Accordingly, we are accustomed to say that the former is\r\na cognition which represents the object itself, whilst the latter presents only\r\na particular appearance or phenomenon thereof. This distinction, however, is\r\nonly empirical. If we stop here (as is usual), and do not regard the empirical\r\nintuition as itself a mere phenomenon (as we ought to do), in which nothing\r\nthat can appertain to a thing in itself is to be found, our transcendental\r\ndistinction is lost, and we believe that we cognize objects as things in\r\nthemselves, although in the whole range of the sensuous world, investigate the\r\nnature of its objects as profoundly as we may, we have to do with nothing but\r\nphenomena. Thus, we call the rainbow a mere appearance of phenomenon in a sunny\r\nshower, and the rain, the reality or thing in itself; and this is right enough,\r\nif we understand the latter conception in a merely physical sense, that is, as\r\nthat which in universal experience, and under whatever conditions of sensuous\r\nperception, is known in intuition to be so and so determined, and not\r\notherwise. But if we consider this empirical datum generally, and inquire,\r\nwithout reference to its accordance with all our senses, whether there can be\r\ndiscovered in it aught which represents an object as a thing in itself (the\r\nraindrops of course are not such, for they are, as phenomena, empirical\r\nobjects), the question of the relation of the representation to the object is\r\ntranscendental; and not only are the raindrops mere phenomena, but even their\r\ncircular form, nay, the space itself through which they fall, is nothing in\r\nitself, but both are mere modifications or fundamental dispositions of our\r\nsensuous intuition, whilst the transcendental object remains for us utterly\r\nunknown.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe second important concern of our æsthetic is that it does not obtain favour\r\nmerely as a plausible hypothesis, but possess as undoubted a character of\r\ncertainty as can be demanded of any theory which is to serve for an organon. In\r\norder fully to convince the reader of this certainty, we shall select a case\r\nwhich will serve to make its validity apparent, and also to illustrate what has\r\nbeen said in § 3.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSuppose, then, that space and time are in themselves objective, and conditions\r\nof the\u0026mdash;possibility of objects as things in themselves. In the first\r\nplace, it is evident that both present us, with very many apodeictic and\r\nsynthetic propositions à priori, but especially space\u0026mdash;and for this reason\r\nwe shall prefer it for investigation at present. As the propositions of\r\ngeometry are cognized synthetically à priori, and with apodeictic certainty, I\r\ninquire: Whence do you obtain propositions of this kind, and on what basis does\r\nthe understanding rest, in order to arrive at such absolutely necessary and\r\nuniversally valid truths?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThere is no other way than through intuitions or conceptions, as such; and\r\nthese are given either à priori or à posteriori. The latter, namely, empirical\r\nconceptions, together with the empirical intuition on which they are founded,\r\ncannot afford any synthetical proposition, except such as is itself also\r\nempirical, that is, a proposition of experience. But an empirical proposition\r\ncannot possess the qualities of necessity and absolute universality, which,\r\nnevertheless, are the characteristics of all geometrical propositions. As to\r\nthe first and only means to arrive at such cognitions, namely, through mere\r\nconceptions or intuitions à priori, it is quite clear that from mere\r\nconceptions no synthetical cognitions, but only analytical ones, can be\r\nobtained. Take, for example, the proposition: \u0026ldquo;Two straight lines cannot\r\nenclose a space, and with these alone no figure is possible,\u0026rdquo; and try to\r\ndeduce it from the conception of a straight line and the number two; or take\r\nthe proposition: \u0026ldquo;It is possible to construct a figure with three\r\nstraight lines,\u0026rdquo; and endeavour, in like manner, to deduce it from the\r\nmere conception of a straight line and the number three. All your endeavours\r\nare in vain, and you find yourself forced to have recourse to intuition, as, in\r\nfact, geometry always does. You therefore give yourself an object in intuition.\r\nBut of what kind is this intuition? Is it a pure à priori, or is it an\r\nempirical intuition? If the latter, then neither an universally valid, much\r\nless an apodeictic proposition can arise from it, for experience never can give\r\nus any such proposition. You must, therefore, give yourself an object à priori\r\nin intuition, and upon that ground your synthetical proposition. Now if there\r\ndid not exist within you a faculty of intuition à priori; if this subjective\r\ncondition were not in respect to its form also the universal condition à priori\r\nunder which alone the object of this external intuition is itself possible; if\r\nthe object (that is, the triangle) were something in itself, without relation\r\nto you the subject; how could you affirm that that which lies necessarily in\r\nyour subjective conditions in order to construct a triangle, must also\r\nnecessarily belong to the triangle in itself? For to your conceptions of three\r\nlines, you could not add anything new (that is, the figure); which, therefore,\r\nmust necessarily be found in the object, because the object is given before\r\nyour cognition, and not by means of it. If, therefore, space (and time also)\r\nwere not a mere form of your intuition, which contains conditions à priori,\r\nunder which alone things can become external objects for you, and without which\r\nsubjective conditions the objects are in themselves nothing, you could not\r\nconstruct any synthetical proposition whatsoever regarding external objects. It\r\nis therefore not merely possible or probable, but indubitably certain, that\r\nspace and time, as the necessary conditions of all our external and internal\r\nexperience, are merely subjective conditions of all our intuitions, in relation\r\nto which all objects are therefore mere phenomena, and not things in\r\nthemselves, presented to us in this particular manner. And for this reason, in\r\nrespect to the form of phenomena, much may be said à priori, whilst of the\r\nthing in itself, which may lie at the foundation of these phenomena, it is\r\nimpossible to say anything.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nII. In confirmation of this theory of the ideality of the external as well as\r\ninternal sense, consequently of all objects of sense, as mere phenomena, we may\r\nespecially remark that all in our cognition that belongs to intuition contains\r\nnothing more than mere relations. (The feelings of pain and pleasure, and the\r\nwill, which are not cognitions, are excepted.) The relations, to wit, of place\r\nin an intuition (extension), change of place (motion), and laws according to\r\nwhich this change is determined (moving forces). That, however, which is\r\npresent in this or that place, or any operation going on, or result taking\r\nplace in the things themselves, with the exception of change of place, is not\r\ngiven to us by intuition. Now by means of mere relations, a thing cannot be\r\nknown in itself; and it may therefore be fairly concluded, that, as through the\r\nexternal sense nothing but mere representations of relations are given us, the\r\nsaid external sense in its representation can contain only the relation of the\r\nobject to the subject, but not the essential nature of the object as a thing in\r\nitself.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe same is the case with the internal intuition, not only because, in the\r\ninternal intuition, the representation of the external senses constitutes the\r\nmaterial with which the mind is occupied; but because time, in which we place,\r\nand which itself antecedes the consciousness of, these representations in\r\nexperience, and which, as the formal condition of the mode according to which\r\nobjects are placed in the mind, lies at the foundation of them, contains\r\nrelations of the successive, the coexistent, and of that which always must be\r\ncoexistent with succession, the permanent. Now that which, as representation,\r\ncan antecede every exercise of thought (of an object), is intuition; and when\r\nit contains nothing but relations, it is the form of the intuition, which, as\r\nit presents us with no representation, except in so far as something is placed\r\nin the mind, can be nothing else than the mode in which the mind is affected by\r\nits own activity, to wit\u0026mdash;its presenting to itself representations,\r\nconsequently the mode in which the mind is affected by itself; that is, it can\r\nbe nothing but an internal sense in respect to its form. Everything that is\r\nrepresented through the medium of sense is so far phenomenal; consequently, we\r\nmust either refuse altogether to admit an internal sense, or the subject, which\r\nis the object of that sense, could only be represented by it as phenomenon, and\r\nnot as it would judge of itself, if its intuition were pure spontaneous\r\nactivity, that is, were intellectual. The difficulty here lies wholly in the\r\nquestion: How can the subject have an internal intuition of itself? But this\r\ndifficulty is common to every theory. The consciousness of self (apperception)\r\nis the simple representation of the \u0026ldquo;ego\u0026rdquo;; and if by means of that\r\nrepresentation alone, all the manifold representations in the subject were\r\nspontaneously given, then our internal intuition would be intellectual. This\r\nconsciousness in man requires an internal perception of the manifold\r\nrepresentations which are previously given in the subject; and the manner in\r\nwhich these representations are given in the mind without spontaneity, must, on\r\naccount of this difference (the want of spontaneity), be called sensibility. If\r\nthe faculty of self-consciousness is to apprehend what lies in the mind, it\r\nmust all act that and can in this way alone produce an intuition of self. But\r\nthe form of this intuition, which lies in the original constitution of the\r\nmind, determines, in the representation of time, the manner in which the\r\nmanifold representations are to combine themselves in the mind; since the\r\nsubject intuites itself, not as it would represent itself immediately and\r\nspontaneously, but according to the manner in which the mind is internally\r\naffected, consequently, as it appears, and not as it is.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIII. When we say that the intuition of external objects, and also the\r\nself-intuition of the subject, represent both, objects and subject, in space\r\nand time, as they affect our senses, that is, as they appear\u0026mdash;this is by\r\nno means equivalent to asserting that these objects are mere illusory\r\nappearances. For when we speak of things as phenomena, the objects, nay, even\r\nthe properties which we ascribe to them, are looked upon as really given; only\r\nthat, in so far as this or that property depends upon the mode of intuition of\r\nthe subject, in the relation of the given object to the subject, the object as\r\nphenomenon is to be distinguished from the object as a thing in itself. Thus I\r\ndo not say that bodies seem or appear to be external to me, or that my soul\r\nseems merely to be given in my self-consciousness, although I maintain that the\r\nproperties of space and time, in conformity to which I set both, as the\r\ncondition of their existence, abide in my mode of intuition, and not in the\r\nobjects in themselves. It would be my own fault, if out of that which I should\r\nreckon as phenomenon, I made mere illusory appearance.\u003ca href=\"#linknote-12\" id=\"linknoteref-12\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[12]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e But this will not\r\nhappen, because of our principle of the ideality of all sensuous intuitions. On\r\nthe contrary, if we ascribe objective reality to these forms of representation,\r\nit becomes impossible to avoid changing everything into mere appearance. For if\r\nwe regard space and time as properties, which must be found in objects as\r\nthings in themselves, as sine quibus non of the possibility of their existence,\r\nand reflect on the absurdities in which we then find ourselves involved,\r\ninasmuch as we are compelled to admit the existence of two infinite things,\r\nwhich are nevertheless not substances, nor anything really inhering in\r\nsubstances, nay, to admit that they are the necessary conditions of the\r\nexistence of all things, and moreover, that they must continue to exist,\r\nalthough all existing things were annihilated\u0026mdash;we cannot blame the good\r\nBerkeley for degrading bodies to mere illusory appearances. Nay, even our own\r\nexistence, which would in this case depend upon the self-existent reality of\r\nsuch a mere nonentity as time, would necessarily be changed with it into mere\r\nappearance\u0026mdash;an absurdity which no one has as yet been guilty of.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"linknote-12\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#linknoteref-12\"\u003e[12]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nThe predicates of the phenomenon can be affixed to the object itself in\r\nrelation to our sensuous faculty; for example, the red colour or the perfume to\r\nthe rose. But (illusory) appearance never can be attributed as a predicate to\r\nan object, for this very reason, that it attributes to this object in itself\r\nthat which belongs to it only in relation to our sensuous faculty, or to the\r\nsubject in general, e.g., the two handles which were formerly ascribed to\r\nSaturn. That which is never to be found in the object itself, but always in the\r\nrelation of the object to the subject, and which moreover is inseparable from\r\nour representation of the object, we denominate phenomenon. Thus the predicates\r\nof space and time are rightly attributed to objects of the senses as such, and\r\nin this there is no illusion. On the contrary, if I ascribe redness of the rose\r\nas a thing in itself, or to Saturn his handles, or extension to all external\r\nobjects, considered as things in themselves, without regarding the determinate\r\nrelation of these objects to the subject, and without limiting my judgement to\r\nthat relation\u0026mdash;then, and then only, arises illusion.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIV. In natural theology, where we think of an object\u0026mdash;God\u0026mdash;which\r\nnever can be an object of intuition to us, and even to himself can never be an\r\nobject of sensuous intuition, we carefully avoid attributing to his intuition\r\nthe conditions of space and time\u0026mdash;and intuition all his cognition must be,\r\nand not thought, which always includes limitation. But with what right can we\r\ndo this if we make them forms of objects as things in themselves, and such,\r\nmoreover, as would continue to exist as à priori conditions of the existence of\r\nthings, even though the things themselves were annihilated? For as conditions\r\nof all existence in general, space and time must be conditions of the existence\r\nof the Supreme Being also. But if we do not thus make them objective forms of\r\nall things, there is no other way left than to make them subjective forms of\r\nour mode of intuition\u0026mdash;external and internal; which is called sensuous,\r\nbecause it is not primitive, that is, is not such as gives in itself the\r\nexistence of the object of the intuition (a mode of intuition which, so far as\r\nwe can judge, can belong only to the Creator), but is dependent on the\r\nexistence of the object, is possible, therefore, only on condition that the\r\nrepresentative faculty of the subject is affected by the object.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIt is, moreover, not necessary that we should limit the mode of intuition in\r\nspace and time to the sensuous faculty of man. It may well be that all finite\r\nthinking beings must necessarily in this respect agree with man (though as to\r\nthis we cannot decide), but sensibility does not on account of this\r\nuniversality cease to be sensibility, for this very reason, that it is a\r\ndeduced (intuitus derivativus), and not an original (intuitus originarius),\r\nconsequently not an intellectual intuition, and this intuition, as such, for\r\nreasons above mentioned, seems to belong solely to the Supreme Being, but never\r\nto a being dependent, quoad its existence, as well as its intuition (which its\r\nexistence determines and limits relatively to given objects). This latter\r\nremark, however, must be taken only as an illustration, and not as any proof of\r\nthe truth of our æsthetical theory.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003ca id=\"chap24\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e§ 10. Conclusion of the Transcendental Æsthetic.\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWe have now completely before us one part of the solution of the grand general\r\nproblem of transcendental philosophy, namely, the question: \u0026ldquo;How are\r\nsynthetical propositions à priori possible?\u0026rdquo; That is to say, we have\r\nshown that we are in possession of pure à priori intuitions, namely, space and\r\ntime, in which we find, when in a judgement à priori we pass out beyond the\r\ngiven conception, something which is not discoverable in that conception, but\r\nis certainly found à priori in the intuition which corresponds to the\r\nconception, and can be united synthetically with it. But the judgements which\r\nthese pure intuitions enable us to make, never reach farther than to objects of\r\nthe senses, and are valid only for objects of possible experience.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003ca id=\"chap25\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eSecond Part\u0026mdash;TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003ca id=\"chap26\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eINTRODUCTION. Idea of a Transcendental Logic.\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003ca id=\"chap27\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eI. Of Logic in General.\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nOur knowledge springs from two main sources in the mind, first of which is the\r\nfaculty or power of receiving representations (receptivity for impressions);\r\nthe second is the power of cognizing by means of these representations\r\n(spontaneity in the production of conceptions). Through the first an object is\r\ngiven to us; through the second, it is, in relation to the representation\r\n(which is a mere determination of the mind), thought. Intuition and conceptions\r\nconstitute, therefore, the elements of all our knowledge, so that neither\r\nconceptions without an intuition in some way corresponding to them, nor\r\nintuition without conceptions, can afford us a cognition. Both are either pure\r\nor empirical. They are empirical, when sensation (which presupposes the actual\r\npresence of the object) is contained in them; and pure, when no sensation is\r\nmixed with the representation. Sensations we may call the matter of sensuous\r\ncognition. Pure intuition consequently contains merely the form under which\r\nsomething is intuited, and pure conception only the form of the thought of an\r\nobject. Only pure intuitions and pure conceptions are possible à priori; the\r\nempirical only à posteriori.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWe apply the term sensibility to the receptivity of the mind for impressions,\r\nin so far as it is in some way affected; and, on the other hand, we call the\r\nfaculty of spontaneously producing representations, or the spontaneity of\r\ncognition, understanding. Our nature is so constituted that intuition with us\r\nnever can be other than sensuous, that is, it contains only the mode in which\r\nwe are affected by objects. On the other hand, the faculty of thinking the\r\nobject of sensuous intuition is the understanding. Neither of these faculties\r\nhas a preference over the other. Without the sensuous faculty no object would\r\nbe given to us, and without the understanding no object would be thought.\r\nThoughts without content are void; intuitions without conceptions, blind. Hence\r\nit is as necessary for the mind to make its conceptions sensuous (that is, to\r\njoin to them the object in intuition), as to make its intuitions intelligible\r\n(that is, to bring them under conceptions). Neither of these faculties can\r\nexchange its proper function. Understanding cannot intuite, and the sensuous\r\nfaculty cannot think. In no other way than from the united operation of both,\r\ncan knowledge arise. But no one ought, on this account, to overlook the\r\ndifference of the elements contributed by each; we have rather great reason\r\ncarefully to separate and distinguish them. We therefore distinguish the\r\nscience of the laws of sensibility, that is, æsthetic, from the science of the\r\nlaws of the understanding, that is, logic.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nNow, logic in its turn may be considered as twofold\u0026mdash;namely, as logic of\r\nthe general, or of the particular use of the understanding. The first contains\r\nthe absolutely necessary laws of thought, without which no use whatsoever of\r\nthe understanding is possible, and gives laws therefore to the understanding,\r\nwithout regard to the difference of objects on which it may be employed. The\r\nlogic of the particular use of the understanding contains the laws of correct\r\nthinking upon a particular class of objects. The former may be called elemental\r\nlogic\u0026mdash;the latter, the organon of this or that particular science. The\r\nlatter is for the most part employed in the schools, as a propædeutic to the\r\nsciences, although, indeed, according to the course of human reason, it is the\r\nlast thing we arrive at, when the science has been already matured, and needs\r\nonly the finishing touches towards its correction and completion; for our\r\nknowledge of the objects of our attempted science must be tolerably extensive\r\nand complete before we can indicate the laws by which a science of these\r\nobjects can be established.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGeneral logic is again either pure or applied. In the former, we abstract all\r\nthe empirical conditions under which the understanding is exercised; for\r\nexample, the influence of the senses, the play of the fantasy or imagination,\r\nthe laws of the memory, the force of habit, of inclination, etc., consequently\r\nalso, the sources of prejudice\u0026mdash;in a word, we abstract all causes from\r\nwhich particular cognitions arise, because these causes regard the\r\nunderstanding under certain circumstances of its application, and, to the\r\nknowledge of them experience is required. Pure general logic has to do,\r\ntherefore, merely with pure à priori principles, and is a canon of\r\nunderstanding and reason, but only in respect of the formal part of their use,\r\nbe the content what it may, empirical or transcendental. General logic is\r\ncalled applied, when it is directed to the laws of the use of the\r\nunderstanding, under the subjective empirical conditions which psychology\r\nteaches us. It has therefore empirical principles, although, at the same time,\r\nit is in so far general, that it applies to the exercise of the understanding,\r\nwithout regard to the difference of objects. On this account, moreover, it is\r\nneither a canon of the understanding in general, nor an organon of a particular\r\nscience, but merely a cathartic of the human understanding.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIn general logic, therefore, that part which constitutes pure logic must be\r\ncarefully distinguished from that which constitutes applied (though still\r\ngeneral) logic. The former alone is properly science, although short and dry,\r\nas the methodical exposition of an elemental doctrine of the understanding\r\nought to be. In this, therefore, logicians must always bear in mind two rules:\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n1. As general logic, it makes abstraction of all content of the cognition of\r\nthe understanding, and of the difference of objects, and has to do with nothing\r\nbut the mere form of thought.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n2. As pure logic, it has no empirical principles, and consequently draws\r\nnothing (contrary to the common persuasion) from psychology, which therefore\r\nhas no influence on the canon of the understanding. It is a demonstrated\r\ndoctrine, and everything in it must be certain completely à priori.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWhat I called applied logic (contrary to the common acceptation of this term,\r\naccording to which it should contain certain exercises for the scholar, for\r\nwhich pure logic gives the rules), is a representation of the understanding,\r\nand of the rules of its necessary employment in concreto, that is to say, under\r\nthe accidental conditions of the subject, which may either hinder or promote\r\nthis employment, and which are all given only empirically. Thus applied logic\r\ntreats of attention, its impediments and consequences, of the origin of error,\r\nof the state of doubt, hesitation, conviction, etc., and to it is related pure\r\ngeneral logic in the same way that pure morality, which contains only the\r\nnecessary moral laws of a free will, is related to practical ethics, which\r\nconsiders these laws under all the impediments of feelings, inclinations, and\r\npassions to which men are more or less subjected, and which never can furnish\r\nus with a true and demonstrated science, because it, as well as applied logic,\r\nrequires empirical and psychological principles.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003ca id=\"chap28\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eII. Of Transcendental Logic.\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGeneral logic, as we have seen, makes abstraction of all content of cognition,\r\nthat is, of all relation of cognition to its object, and regards only the\r\nlogical form in the relation of cognitions to each other, that is, the form of\r\nthought in general. But as we have both pure and empirical intuitions (as\r\ntranscendental æsthetic proves), in like manner a distinction might be drawn\r\nbetween pure and empirical thought (of objects). In this case, there would\r\nexist a kind of logic, in which we should not make abstraction of all content\r\nof cognition; for or logic which should comprise merely the laws of pure\r\nthought (of an object), would of course exclude all those cognitions which were\r\nof empirical content. This kind of logic would also examine the origin of our\r\ncognitions of objects, so far as that origin cannot be ascribed to the objects\r\nthemselves; while, on the contrary, general logic has nothing to do with the\r\norigin of our cognitions, but contemplates our representations, be they given\r\nprimitively à priori in ourselves, or be they only of empirical origin, solely\r\naccording to the laws which the understanding observes in employing them in the\r\nprocess of thought, in relation to each other. Consequently, general logic\r\ntreats of the form of the understanding only, which can be applied to\r\nrepresentations, from whatever source they may have arisen.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAnd here I shall make a remark, which the reader must bear well in mind in the\r\ncourse of the following considerations, to wit, that not every cognition à\r\npriori, but only those through which we cognize that and how certain\r\nrepresentations (intuitions or conceptions) are applied or are possible only à\r\npriori; that is to say, the à priori possibility of cognition and the à priori\r\nuse of it are transcendental. Therefore neither is space, nor any à priori\r\ngeometrical determination of space, a transcendental Representation, but only\r\nthe knowledge that such a representation is not of empirical origin, and the\r\npossibility of its relating to objects of experience, although itself à priori,\r\ncan be called transcendental. So also, the application of space to objects in\r\ngeneral would be transcendental; but if it be limited to objects of sense it is\r\nempirical. Thus, the distinction of the transcendental and empirical belongs\r\nonly to the critique of cognitions, and does not concern the relation of these\r\nto their object.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAccordingly, in the expectation that there may perhaps be conceptions which\r\nrelate à priori to objects, not as pure or sensuous intuitions, but merely as\r\nacts of pure thought (which are therefore conceptions, but neither of empirical\r\nnor æsthetical origin)\u0026mdash;in this expectation, I say, we form to ourselves,\r\nby anticipation, the idea of a science of pure understanding and rational\r\ncognition, by means of which we may cogitate objects entirely à priori. A\r\nscience of this kind, which should determine the origin, the extent, and the\r\nobjective validity of such cognitions, must be called transcendental logic,\r\nbecause it has not, like general logic, to do with the laws of understanding\r\nand reason in relation to empirical as well as pure rational cognitions without\r\ndistinction, but concerns itself with these only in an à priori relation to\r\nobjects.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003ca id=\"chap29\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eIII. Of the Division of General Logic into Analytic\r\nand Dialectic.\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe old question with which people sought to push logicians into a corner, so\r\nthat they must either have recourse to pitiful sophisms or confess their\r\nignorance, and consequently the vanity of their whole art, is this: \u0026ldquo;What\r\nis truth?\u0026rdquo; The definition of the word truth, to wit, \u0026ldquo;the\r\naccordance of the cognition with its object,\u0026rdquo; is presupposed in the\r\nquestion; but we desire to be told, in the answer to it, what is the universal\r\nand secure criterion of the truth of every cognition.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nTo know what questions we may reasonably propose is in itself a strong evidence\r\nof sagacity and intelligence. For if a question be in itself absurd and\r\nunsusceptible of a rational answer, it is attended with the danger\u0026mdash;not to\r\nmention the shame that falls upon the person who proposes it\u0026mdash;of seducing\r\nthe unguarded listener into making absurd answers, and we are presented with\r\nthe ridiculous spectacle of one (as the ancients said) \u0026ldquo;milking the\r\nhe-goat, and the other holding a sieve.\u0026rdquo;\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIf truth consists in the accordance of a cognition with its object, this object\r\nmust be, ipso facto, distinguished from all others; for a cognition is false if\r\nit does not accord with the object to which it relates, although it contains\r\nsomething which may be affirmed of other objects. Now an universal criterion of\r\ntruth would be that which is valid for all cognitions, without distinction of\r\ntheir objects. But it is evident that since, in the case of such a criterion,\r\nwe make abstraction of all the content of a cognition (that is, of all relation\r\nto its object), and truth relates precisely to this content, it must be utterly\r\nabsurd to ask for a mark of the truth of this content of cognition; and that,\r\naccordingly, a sufficient, and at the same time universal, test of truth cannot\r\npossibly be found. As we have already termed the content of a cognition its\r\nmatter, we shall say: \u0026ldquo;Of the truth of our cognitions in respect of their\r\nmatter, no universal test can be demanded, because such a demand is\r\nself-contradictory.\u0026rdquo;\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nOn the other hand, with regard to our cognition in respect of its mere form\r\n(excluding all content), it is equally manifest that logic, in so far as it\r\nexhibits the universal and necessary laws of the understanding, must in these\r\nvery laws present us with criteria of truth. Whatever contradicts these rules\r\nis false, because thereby the understanding is made to contradict its own\r\nuniversal laws of thought; that is, to contradict itself. These criteria,\r\nhowever, apply solely to the form of truth, that is, of thought in general, and\r\nin so far they are perfectly accurate, yet not sufficient. For although a\r\ncognition may be perfectly accurate as to logical form, that is, not\r\nself-contradictory, it is notwithstanding quite possible that it may not stand\r\nin agreement with its object. Consequently, the merely logical criterion of\r\ntruth, namely, the accordance of a cognition with the universal and formal laws\r\nof understanding and reason, is nothing more than the conditio sine qua non, or\r\nnegative condition of all truth. Farther than this logic cannot go, and the\r\nerror which depends not on the form, but on the content of the cognition, it\r\nhas no test to discover.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGeneral logic, then, resolves the whole formal business of understanding and\r\nreason into its elements, and exhibits them as principles of all logical\r\njudging of our cognitions. This part of logic may, therefore, be called\r\nanalytic, and is at least the negative test of truth, because all cognitions\r\nmust first of an be estimated and tried according to these laws before we\r\nproceed to investigate them in respect of their content, in order to discover\r\nwhether they contain positive truth in regard to their object. Because,\r\nhowever, the mere form of a cognition, accurately as it may accord with logical\r\nlaws, is insufficient to supply us with material (objective) truth, no one, by\r\nmeans of logic alone, can venture to predicate anything of or decide concerning\r\nobjects, unless he has obtained, independently of logic, well-grounded\r\ninformation about them, in order afterwards to examine, according to logical\r\nlaws, into the use and connection, in a cohering whole, of that information,\r\nor, what is still better, merely to test it by them. Notwithstanding, there\r\nlies so seductive a charm in the possession of a specious art like\r\nthis\u0026mdash;an art which gives to all our cognitions the form of the\r\nunderstanding, although with respect to the content thereof we may be sadly\r\ndeficient\u0026mdash;that general logic, which is merely a canon of judgement, has\r\nbeen employed as an organon for the actual production, or rather for the\r\nsemblance of production, of objective assertions, and has thus been grossly\r\nmisapplied. Now general logic, in its assumed character of organon, is called\r\ndialectic.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nDifferent as are the significations in which the ancients used this term for a\r\nscience or an art, we may safely infer, from their actual employment of it,\r\nthat with them it was nothing else than a logic of illusion\u0026mdash;a sophistical\r\nart for giving ignorance, nay, even intentional sophistries, the colouring of\r\ntruth, in which the thoroughness of procedure which logic requires was\r\nimitated, and their topic employed to cloak the empty pretensions. Now it may\r\nbe taken as a safe and useful warning, that general logic, considered as an\r\norganon, must always be a logic of illusion, that is, be dialectical, for, as\r\nit teaches us nothing whatever respecting the content of our cognitions, but\r\nmerely the formal conditions of their accordance with the understanding, which\r\ndo not relate to and are quite indifferent in respect of objects, any attempt\r\nto employ it as an instrument (organon) in order to extend and enlarge the\r\nrange of our knowledge must end in mere prating; any one being able to maintain\r\nor oppose, with some appearance of truth, any single assertion whatever.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSuch instruction is quite unbecoming the dignity of philosophy. For these\r\nreasons we have chosen to denominate this part of logic dialectic, in the sense\r\nof a critique of dialectical illusion, and we wish the term to be so understood\r\nin this place.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003ca id=\"chap30\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eIV. Of the Division of Transcendental Logic into\r\nTranscendental Analytic and Dialectic.\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIn transcendental logic we isolate the understanding (as in transcendental\r\næsthetic the sensibility) and select from our cognition merely that part of\r\nthought which has its origin in the understanding alone. The exercise of this\r\npure cognition, however, depends upon this as its condition, that objects to\r\nwhich it may be applied be given to us in intuition, for without intuition the\r\nwhole of our cognition is without objects, and is therefore quite void. That\r\npart of transcendental logic, then, which treats of the elements of pure\r\ncognition of the understanding, and of the principles without which no object\r\nat all can be thought, is transcendental analytic, and at the same time a logic\r\nof truth. For no cognition can contradict it, without losing at the same time\r\nall content, that is, losing all reference to an object, and therefore all\r\ntruth. But because we are very easily seduced into employing these pure\r\ncognitions and principles of the understanding by themselves, and that even\r\nbeyond the boundaries of experience, which yet is the only source whence we can\r\nobtain matter (objects) on which those pure conceptions may be\r\nemployed\u0026mdash;understanding runs the risk of making, by means of empty\r\nsophisms, a material and objective use of the mere formal principles of the\r\npure understanding, and of passing judgements on objects without\r\ndistinction\u0026mdash;objects which are not given to us, nay, perhaps cannot be\r\ngiven to us in any way. Now, as it ought properly to be only a canon for\r\njudging of the empirical use of the understanding, this kind of logic is\r\nmisused when we seek to employ it as an organon of the universal and unlimited\r\nexercise of the understanding, and attempt with the pure understanding alone to\r\njudge synthetically, affirm, and determine respecting objects in general. In\r\nthis case the exercise of the pure understanding becomes dialectical. The\r\nsecond part of our transcendental logic must therefore be a critique of\r\ndialectical illusion, and this critique we shall term transcendental\r\ndialectic\u0026mdash;not meaning it as an art of producing dogmatically such\r\nillusion (an art which is unfortunately too current among the practitioners of\r\nmetaphysical juggling), but as a critique of understanding and reason in regard\r\nto their hyperphysical use. This critique will expose the groundless nature of\r\nthe pretensions of these two faculties, and invalidate their claims to the\r\ndiscovery and enlargement of our cognitions merely by means of transcendental\r\nprinciples, and show that the proper employment of these faculties is to test\r\nthe judgements made by the pure understanding, and to guard it from sophistical\r\ndelusion.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003ca id=\"chap31\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eFIRST DIVISION. TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC. TRANSCENDENTAL\r\nANALYTIC. § 1\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nTranscendental analytic is the dissection of the whole of our à priori\r\nknowledge into the elements of the pure cognition of the understanding. In\r\norder to effect our purpose, it is necessary: (1) That the conceptions be pure\r\nand not empirical; (2) That they belong not to intuition and sensibility, but\r\nto thought and understanding; (3) That they be elementary conceptions, and as\r\nsuch, quite different from deduced or compound conceptions; (4) That our table\r\nof these elementary conceptions be complete, and fill up the whole sphere of\r\nthe pure understanding. Now this completeness of a science cannot be accepted\r\nwith confidence on the guarantee of a mere estimate of its existence in an\r\naggregate formed only by means of repeated experiments and attempts. The\r\ncompleteness which we require is possible only by means of an idea of the\r\ntotality of the à priori cognition of the understanding, and through the\r\nthereby determined division of the conceptions which form the said whole;\r\nconsequently, only by means of their connection in a system. Pure understanding\r\ndistinguishes itself not merely from everything empirical, but also completely\r\nfrom all sensibility. It is a unity self-subsistent, self-sufficient, and not\r\nto be enlarged by any additions from without. Hence the sum of its cognition\r\nconstitutes a system to be determined by and comprised under an idea; and the\r\ncompleteness and articulation of this system can at the same time serve as a\r\ntest of the correctness and genuineness of all the parts of cognition that\r\nbelong to it. The whole of this part of transcendental logic consists of two\r\nbooks, of which the one contains the conceptions, and the other the principles\r\nof pure understanding.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003ca id=\"chap32\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eBOOK I. Analytic of Conceptions. § 2\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBy the term Analytic of Conceptions, I do not understand the analysis of these,\r\nor the usual process in philosophical investigations of dissecting the\r\nconceptions which present themselves, according to their content, and so making\r\nthem clear; but I mean the hitherto little attempted dissection of the faculty\r\nof understanding itself, in order to investigate the possibility of conceptions\r\nà priori, by looking for them in the understanding alone, as their birthplace,\r\nand analysing the pure use of this faculty. For this is the proper duty of a\r\ntranscendental philosophy; what remains is the logical treatment of the\r\nconceptions in philosophy in general. We shall therefore follow up the pure\r\nconceptions even to their germs and beginnings in the human understanding, in\r\nwhich they lie, until they are developed on occasions presented by experience,\r\nand, freed by the same understanding from the empirical conditions attaching to\r\nthem, are set forth in their unalloyed purity.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003ca id=\"chap33\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eChapter I. Of the Transcendental Clue to the Discovery\r\nof all Pure Conceptions of the Understanding\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003ca id=\"chap34\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eIntroductory § 3\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWhen we call into play a faculty of cognition, different conceptions manifest\r\nthemselves according to the different circumstances, and make known this\r\nfaculty, and assemble themselves into a more or less extensive collection,\r\naccording to the time or penetration that has been applied to the consideration\r\nof them. Where this process, conducted as it is mechanically, so to speak, will\r\nend, cannot be determined with certainty. Besides, the conceptions which we\r\ndiscover in this haphazard manner present themselves by no means in order and\r\nsystematic unity, but are at last coupled together only according to\r\nresemblances to each other, and arranged in series, according to the quantity\r\nof their content, from the simpler to the more complex\u0026mdash;series which are\r\nanything but systematic, though not altogether without a certain kind of method\r\nin their construction.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nTranscendental philosophy has the advantage, and moreover the duty, of\r\nsearching for its conceptions according to a principle; because these\r\nconceptions spring pure and unmixed out of the understanding as an absolute\r\nunity, and therefore must be connected with each other according to one\r\nconception or idea. A connection of this kind, however, furnishes us with a\r\nready prepared rule, by which its proper place may be assigned to every pure\r\nconception of the understanding, and the completeness of the system of all be\r\ndetermined à priori\u0026mdash;both which would otherwise have been dependent on\r\nmere choice or chance.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003ca id=\"chap35\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eSection I. Of the Logical Use of the Understanding in\r\nGeneral § 4\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe understanding was defined above only negatively, as a non-sensuous faculty\r\nof cognition. Now, independently of sensibility, we cannot possibly have any\r\nintuition; consequently, the understanding is no faculty of intuition. But\r\nbesides intuition there is no other mode of cognition, except through\r\nconceptions; consequently, the cognition of every, at least of every human,\r\nunderstanding is a cognition through conceptions\u0026mdash;not intuitive, but\r\ndiscursive. All intuitions, as sensuous, depend on affections; conceptions,\r\ntherefore, upon functions. By the word function I understand the unity of the\r\nact of arranging diverse representations under one common representation.\r\nConceptions, then, are based on the spontaneity of thought, as sensuous\r\nintuitions are on the receptivity of impressions. Now, the understanding cannot\r\nmake any other use of these conceptions than to judge by means of them. As no\r\nrepresentation, except an intuition, relates immediately to its object, a\r\nconception never relates immediately to an object, but only to some other\r\nrepresentation thereof, be that an intuition or itself a conception. A\r\njudgement, therefore, is the mediate cognition of an object, consequently the\r\nrepresentation of a representation of it. In every judgement there is a\r\nconception which applies to, and is valid for many other conceptions, and which\r\namong these comprehends also a given representation, this last being\r\nimmediately connected with an object. For example, in the\r\njudgement\u0026mdash;\u0026ldquo;All bodies are divisible,\u0026rdquo; our conception of\r\ndivisible applies to various other conceptions; among these, however, it is\r\nhere particularly applied to the conception of body, and this conception of\r\nbody relates to certain phenomena which occur to us. These objects, therefore,\r\nare mediately represented by the conception of divisibility. All judgements,\r\naccordingly, are functions of unity in our representations, inasmuch as,\r\ninstead of an immediate, a higher representation, which comprises this and\r\nvarious others, is used for our cognition of the object, and thereby many\r\npossible cognitions are collected into one. But we can reduce all acts of the\r\nunderstanding to judgements, so that understanding may be represented as the\r\nfaculty of judging. For it is, according to what has been said above, a faculty\r\nof thought. Now thought is cognition by means of conceptions. But conceptions,\r\nas predicates of possible judgements, relate to some representation of a yet\r\nundetermined object. Thus the conception of body indicates something\u0026mdash;for\r\nexample, metal\u0026mdash;which can be cognized by means of that conception. It is\r\ntherefore a conception, for the reason alone that other representations are\r\ncontained under it, by means of which it can relate to objects. It is therefore\r\nthe predicate to a possible judgement; for example: \u0026ldquo;Every metal is a\r\nbody.\u0026rdquo; All the functions of the understanding therefore can be\r\ndiscovered, when we can completely exhibit the functions of unity in\r\njudgements. And that this may be effected very easily, the following section\r\nwill show.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003ca id=\"chap36\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eSection II. Of the Logical Function of the\r\nUnderstanding in Judgements § 5\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIf we abstract all the content of a judgement, and consider only the\r\nintellectual form thereof, we find that the function of thought in a judgement\r\ncan be brought under four heads, of which each contains three momenta. These\r\nmay be conveniently represented in the following table:\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cpre\u003e\r\n 1\r\n \u003ci\u003eQuantity of judgements\u003c/i\u003e\r\n Universal\r\n Particular\r\n Singular\r\n\r\n 2 3\r\n \u003ci\u003eQuality Relation\u003c/i\u003e\r\n Affirmative Categorical\r\n Negative Hypothetical\r\n Infinite Disjunctive\r\n\r\n 4\r\n \u003ci\u003eModality\u003c/i\u003e\r\n Problematical\r\n Assertorical\r\n Apodeictical\r\n\u003c/pre\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAs this division appears to differ in some, though not essential points, from\r\nthe usual technique of logicians, the following observations, for the\r\nprevention of otherwise possible misunderstanding, will not be without their\r\nuse.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n1. Logicians say, with justice, that in the use of judgements in syllogisms,\r\nsingular judgements may be treated like universal ones. For, precisely because\r\na singular judgement has no extent at all, its predicate cannot refer to a part\r\nof that which is contained in the conception of the subject and be excluded\r\nfrom the rest. The predicate is valid for the whole conception just as if it\r\nwere a general conception, and had extent, to the whole of which the predicate\r\napplied. On the other hand, let us compare a singular with a general judgement,\r\nmerely as a cognition, in regard to quantity. The singular judgement relates to\r\nthe general one, as unity to infinity, and is therefore in itself essentially\r\ndifferent. Thus, if we estimate a singular judgement (\u003ci\u003ejudicium\r\nsingulare\u003c/i\u003e) not merely according to its intrinsic validity as a judgement,\r\nbut also as a cognition generally, according to its quantity in comparison with\r\nthat of other cognitions, it is then entirely different from a general\r\njudgement (\u003ci\u003ejudicium commune\u003c/i\u003e), and in a complete table of the momenta of\r\nthought deserves a separate place\u0026mdash;though, indeed, this would not be\r\nnecessary in a logic limited merely to the consideration of the use of\r\njudgements in reference to each other.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n2. In like manner, in transcendental logic, infinite must be distinguished from\r\naffirmative judgements, although in general logic they are rightly enough\r\nclassed under affirmative. General logic abstracts all content of the predicate\r\n(though it be negative), and only considers whether the said predicate be\r\naffirmed or denied of the subject. But transcendental logic considers also the\r\nworth or content of this logical affirmation\u0026mdash;an affirmation by means of a\r\nmerely negative predicate, and inquires how much the sum total of our cognition\r\ngains by this affirmation. For example, if I say of the soul, \u0026ldquo;It is not\r\nmortal\u0026rdquo;\u0026mdash;by this negative judgement I should at least ward off\r\nerror. Now, by the proposition, \u0026ldquo;The soul is not mortal,\u0026rdquo; I have,\r\nin respect of the logical form, really affirmed, inasmuch as I thereby place\r\nthe soul in the unlimited sphere of immortal beings. Now, because of the whole\r\nsphere of possible existences, the mortal occupies one part, and the immortal\r\nthe other, neither more nor less is affirmed by the proposition than that the\r\nsoul is one among the infinite multitude of things which remain over, when I\r\ntake away the whole mortal part. But by this proceeding we accomplish only this\r\nmuch, that the infinite sphere of all possible existences is in so far limited\r\nthat the mortal is excluded from it, and the soul is placed in the remaining\r\npart of the extent of this sphere. But this part remains, notwithstanding this\r\nexception, infinite, and more and more parts may be taken away from the whole\r\nsphere, without in the slightest degree thereby augmenting or affirmatively\r\ndetermining our conception of the soul. These judgements, therefore, infinite\r\nin respect of their logical extent, are, in respect of the content of their\r\ncognition, merely limitative; and are consequently entitled to a place in our\r\ntranscendental table of all the momenta of thought in judgements, because the\r\nfunction of the understanding exercised by them may perhaps be of importance in\r\nthe field of its pure à priori cognition.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n3. All relations of thought in judgements are those (a) of the predicate to the\r\nsubject; (b) of the principle to its consequence; (c) of the divided cognition\r\nand all the members of the division to each other. In the first of these three\r\nclasses, we consider only two conceptions; in the second, two judgements; in\r\nthe third, several judgements in relation to each other. The hypothetical\r\nproposition, \u0026ldquo;If perfect justice exists, the obstinately wicked are\r\npunished,\u0026rdquo; contains properly the relation to each other of two\r\npropositions, namely, \u0026ldquo;Perfect justice exists,\u0026rdquo; and \u0026ldquo;The\r\nobstinately wicked are punished.\u0026rdquo; Whether these propositions are in\r\nthemselves true is a question not here decided. Nothing is cogitated by means\r\nof this judgement except a certain consequence. Finally, the disjunctive\r\njudgement contains a relation of two or more propositions to each other\u0026mdash;a\r\nrelation not of consequence, but of logical opposition, in so far as the sphere\r\nof the one proposition excludes that of the other. But it contains at the same\r\ntime a relation of community, in so far as all the propositions taken together\r\nfill up the sphere of the cognition. The disjunctive judgement contains,\r\ntherefore, the relation of the parts of the whole sphere of a cognition, since\r\nthe sphere of each part is a complemental part of the sphere of the other, each\r\ncontributing to form the sum total of the divided cognition. Take, for example,\r\nthe proposition, \u0026ldquo;The world exists either through blind chance, or\r\nthrough internal necessity, or through an external cause.\u0026rdquo; Each of these\r\npropositions embraces a part of the sphere of our possible cognition as to the\r\nexistence of a world; all of them taken together, the whole sphere. To take the\r\ncognition out of one of these spheres, is equivalent to placing it in one of\r\nthe others; and, on the other hand, to place it in one sphere is equivalent to\r\ntaking it out of the rest. There is, therefore, in a disjunctive judgement a\r\ncertain community of cognitions, which consists in this, that they mutually\r\nexclude each other, yet thereby determine, as a whole, the true cognition,\r\ninasmuch as, taken together, they make up the complete content of a particular\r\ngiven cognition. And this is all that I find necessary, for the sake of what\r\nfollows, to remark in this place.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n4. The modality of judgements is a quite peculiar function, with this\r\ndistinguishing characteristic, that it contributes nothing to the content of a\r\njudgement (for besides quantity, quality, and relation, there is nothing more\r\nthat constitutes the content of a judgement), but concerns itself only with the\r\nvalue of the copula in relation to thought in general. Problematical judgements\r\nare those in which the affirmation or negation is accepted as merely possible\r\n(ad libitum). In the assertorical, we regard the proposition as real (true); in\r\nthe apodeictical, we look on it as necessary.\u003ca href=\"#linknote-13\" id=\"linknoteref-13\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[13]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Thus the two\r\njudgements (antecedens et consequens), the relation of which constitutes a\r\nhypothetical judgement, likewise those (the members of the division) in whose\r\nreciprocity the disjunctive consists, are only problematical. In the example\r\nabove given the proposition, \u0026ldquo;There exists perfect justice,\u0026rdquo; is not\r\nstated assertorically, but as an ad libitum judgement, which someone may choose\r\nto adopt, and the consequence alone is assertorical. Hence such judgements may\r\nbe obviously false, and yet, taken problematically, be conditions of our\r\ncognition of the truth. Thus the proposition, \u0026ldquo;The world exists only by\r\nblind chance,\u0026rdquo; is in the disjunctive judgement of problematical import\r\nonly: that is to say, one may accept it for the moment, and it helps us (like\r\nthe indication of the wrong road among all the roads that one can take) to find\r\nout the true proposition. The problematical proposition is, therefore, that\r\nwhich expresses only logical possibility (which is not objective); that is, it\r\nexpresses a free choice to admit the validity of such a proposition\u0026mdash;a\r\nmerely arbitrary reception of it into the understanding. The assertorical\r\nspeaks of logical reality or truth; as, for example, in a hypothetical\r\nsyllogism, the antecedens presents itself in a problematical form in the major,\r\nin an assertorical form in the minor, and it shows that the proposition is in\r\nharmony with the laws of the understanding. The apodeictical proposition\r\ncogitates the assertorical as determined by these very laws of the\r\nunderstanding, consequently as affirming à priori, and in this manner it\r\nexpresses logical necessity. Now because all is here gradually incorporated\r\nwith the understanding\u0026mdash;inasmuch as in the first place we judge\r\nproblematically; then accept assertorically our judgement as true; lastly,\r\naffirm it as inseparably united with the understanding, that is, as necessary\r\nand apodeictical\u0026mdash;we may safely reckon these three functions of modality\r\nas so many momenta of thought.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"linknote-13\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#linknoteref-13\"\u003e[13]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nJust as if thought were in the first instance a function of the understanding;\r\nin the second, of judgement; in the third, of reason. A remark which will be\r\nexplained in the sequel.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003ca id=\"chap37\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eSection III. Of the Pure Conceptions of the\r\nUnderstanding, or Categories § 6\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGeneral logic, as has been repeatedly said, makes abstraction of all content of\r\ncognition, and expects to receive representations from some other quarter, in\r\norder, by means of analysis, to convert them into conceptions. On the contrary,\r\ntranscendental logic has lying before it the manifold content of à priori\r\nsensibility, which transcendental æsthetic presents to it in order to give\r\nmatter to the pure conceptions of the understanding, without which\r\ntranscendental logic would have no content, and be therefore utterly void. Now\r\nspace and time contain an infinite diversity of determinations of pure à priori\r\nintuition, but are nevertheless the condition of the mind\u0026rsquo;s receptivity,\r\nunder which alone it can obtain representations of objects, and which,\r\nconsequently, must always affect the conception of these objects. But the\r\nspontaneity of thought requires that this diversity be examined after a certain\r\nmanner, received into the mind, and connected, in order afterwards to form a\r\ncognition out of it. This Process I call synthesis.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBy the word synthesis, in its most general signification, I understand the\r\nprocess of joining different representations to each other and of comprehending\r\ntheir diversity in one cognition. This synthesis is pure when the diversity is\r\nnot given empirically but à priori (as that in space and time). Our\r\nrepresentations must be given previously to any analysis of them; and no\r\nconceptions can arise, quoad their content, analytically. But the synthesis of\r\na diversity (be it given à priori or empirically) is the first requisite for\r\nthe production of a cognition, which in its beginning, indeed, may be crude and\r\nconfused, and therefore in need of analysis\u0026mdash;still, synthesis is that by\r\nwhich alone the elements of our cognitions are collected and united into a\r\ncertain content, consequently it is the first thing on which we must fix our\r\nattention, if we wish to investigate the origin of our knowledge.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSynthesis, generally speaking, is, as we shall afterwards see, the mere\r\noperation of the imagination\u0026mdash;a blind but indispensable function of the\r\nsoul, without which we should have no cognition whatever, but of the working of\r\nwhich we are seldom even conscious. But to reduce this synthesis to conceptions\r\nis a function of the understanding, by means of which we attain to cognition,\r\nin the proper meaning of the term.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPure synthesis, represented generally, gives us the pure conception of the\r\nunderstanding. But by this pure synthesis, I mean that which rests upon a basis\r\nof à priori synthetical unity. Thus, our numeration (and this is more\r\nobservable in large numbers) is a synthesis according to conceptions, because\r\nit takes place according to a common basis of unity (for example, the decade).\r\nBy means of this conception, therefore, the unity in the synthesis of the\r\nmanifold becomes necessary.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBy means of analysis different representations are brought under one\r\nconception\u0026mdash;an operation of which general logic treats. On the other hand,\r\nthe duty of transcendental logic is to reduce to conceptions, not\r\nrepresentations, but the pure synthesis of representations. The first thing\r\nwhich must be given to us for the sake of the à priori cognition of all\r\nobjects, is the diversity of the pure intuition; the synthesis of this\r\ndiversity by means of the imagination is the second; but this gives, as yet, no\r\ncognition. The conceptions which give unity to this pure synthesis, and which\r\nconsist solely in the representation of this necessary synthetical unity,\r\nfurnish the third requisite for the cognition of an object, and these\r\nconceptions are given by the understanding.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe same function which gives unity to the different representation in a\r\njudgement, gives also unity to the mere synthesis of different representations\r\nin an intuition; and this unity we call the pure conception of the\r\nunderstanding. Thus, the same understanding, and by the same operations,\r\nwhereby in conceptions, by means of analytical unity, it produced the logical\r\nform of a judgement, introduces, by means of the synthetical unity of the\r\nmanifold in intuition, a transcendental content into its representations, on\r\nwhich account they are called pure conceptions of the understanding, and they\r\napply à priori to objects, a result not within the power of general logic.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIn this manner, there arise exactly so many pure conceptions of the\r\nunderstanding, applying à priori to objects of intuition in general, as there\r\nare logical functions in all possible judgements. For there is no other\r\nfunction or faculty existing in the understanding besides those enumerated in\r\nthat table. These conceptions we shall, with Aristotle, call categories, our\r\npurpose being originally identical with his, notwithstanding the great\r\ndifference in the execution.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cpre\u003e\r\n TABLE OF THE CATEGORIES\r\n\r\n 1 2\r\n\r\n \u003ci\u003eOf Quantity Of Quality\u003c/i\u003e\r\n Unity Reality\r\n Plurality Negation\r\n Totality Limitation\r\n\r\n 3\r\n \u003ci\u003eOf Relation\u003c/i\u003e\r\n Of Inherence and Subsistence (substantia et accidens)\r\n Of Causality and Dependence (cause and effect)\r\n Of Community (reciprocity between the agent and patient)\r\n\r\n 4\r\n \u003ci\u003eOf Modality\u003c/i\u003e\r\n Possibility\u0026mdash;Impossibility\r\n Existence\u0026mdash;Non-existence\r\n Necessity\u0026mdash;Contingence\r\n\u003c/pre\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThis, then, is a catalogue of all the originally pure conceptions of the\r\nsynthesis which the understanding contains à priori, and these conceptions\r\nalone entitle it to be called a pure understanding; inasmuch as only by them it\r\ncan render the manifold of intuition conceivable, in other words, think an\r\nobject of intuition. This division is made systematically from a common\r\nprinciple, namely the faculty of judgement (which is just the same as the power\r\nof thought), and has not arisen rhapsodically from a search at haphazard after\r\npure conceptions, respecting the full number of which we never could be\r\ncertain, inasmuch as we employ induction alone in our search, without\r\nconsidering that in this way we can never understand wherefore precisely these\r\nconceptions, and none others, abide in the pure understanding. It was a design\r\nworthy of an acute thinker like Aristotle, to search for these fundamental\r\nconceptions. Destitute, however, of any guiding principle, he picked them up\r\njust as they occurred to him, and at first hunted out ten, which he called\r\ncategories (predicaments). Afterwards be believed that he had discovered five\r\nothers, which were added under the name of post predicaments. But his catalogue\r\nstill remained defective. Besides, there are to be found among them some of the\r\nmodes of pure sensibility (quando, ubi, situs, also prius, simul), and likewise\r\nan empirical conception (motus)\u0026mdash;which can by no means belong to this\r\ngenealogical register of the pure understanding. Moreover, there are deduced\r\nconceptions (actio, passio) enumerated among the original conceptions, and, of\r\nthe latter, some are entirely wanting.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWith regard to these, it is to be remarked, that the categories, as the true\r\nprimitive conceptions of the pure understanding, have also their pure deduced\r\nconceptions, which, in a complete system of transcendental philosophy, must by\r\nno means be passed over; though in a merely critical essay we must be contented\r\nwith the simple mention of the fact.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nLet it be allowed me to call these pure, but deduced conceptions of the\r\nunderstanding, the predicables of the pure understanding, in contradistinction\r\nto predicaments. If we are in possession of the original and primitive, the\r\ndeduced and subsidiary conceptions can easily be added, and the genealogical\r\ntree of the understanding completely delineated. As my present aim is not to\r\nset forth a complete system, but merely the principles of one, I reserve this\r\ntask for another time. It may be easily executed by any one who will refer to\r\nthe ontological manuals, and subordinate to the category of causality, for\r\nexample, the predicables of force, action, passion; to that of community, those\r\nof presence and resistance; to the categories of modality, those of\r\norigination, extinction, change; and so with the rest. The categories combined\r\nwith the modes of pure sensibility, or with one another, afford a great number\r\nof deduced à priori conceptions; a complete enumeration of which would be a\r\nuseful and not unpleasant, but in this place a perfectly dispensable,\r\noccupation.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nI purposely omit the definitions of the categories in this treatise. I shall\r\nanalyse these conceptions only so far as is necessary for the doctrine of\r\nmethod, which is to form a part of this critique. In a system of pure reason,\r\ndefinitions of them would be with justice demanded of me, but to give them here\r\nwould only bide from our view the main aim of our investigation, at the same\r\ntime raising doubts and objections, the consideration of which, without\r\ninjustice to our main purpose, may be very well postponed till another\r\nopportunity. Meanwhile, it ought to be sufficiently clear, from the little we\r\nhave already said on this subject, that the formation of a complete vocabulary\r\nof pure conceptions, accompanied by all the requisite explanations, is not only\r\na possible, but an easy undertaking. The compartments already exist; it is only\r\nnecessary to fill them up; and a systematic topic like the present, indicates\r\nwith perfect precision the proper place to which each conception belongs, while\r\nit readily points out any that have not yet been filled up.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"center\"\u003e\r\n§ 7\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nOur table of the categories suggests considerations of some importance, which\r\nmay perhaps have significant results in regard to the scientific form of all\r\nrational cognitions. For, that this table is useful in the theoretical part of\r\nphilosophy, nay, indispensable for the sketching of the complete plan of a\r\nscience, so far as that science rests upon conceptions à priori, and for\r\ndividing it mathematically, according to fixed principles, is most manifest\r\nfrom the fact that it contains all the elementary conceptions of the\r\nunderstanding, nay, even the form of a system of these in the understanding\r\nitself, and consequently indicates all the momenta, and also the internal\r\narrangement of a projected speculative science, as I have elsewhere shown.\u003ca\r\nhref=\"#linknote-14\" id=\"linknoteref-14\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[14]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Here follow some of these observations.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"linknote-14\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#linknoteref-14\"\u003e[14]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nIn the \u0026ldquo;Metaphysical Principles of Natural Science.\u0026rdquo;\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nI. This table, which contains four classes of conceptions of the understanding,\r\nmay, in the first instance, be divided into two classes, the first of which\r\nrelates to objects of intuition\u0026mdash;pure as well as empirical; the second, to\r\nthe existence of these objects, either in relation to one another, or to the\r\nunderstanding.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe former of these classes of categories I would entitle the mathematical, and\r\nthe latter the dynamical categories. The former, as we see, has no correlates;\r\nthese are only to be found in the second class. This difference must have a\r\nground in the nature of the human understanding.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nII. The number of the categories in each class is always the same, namely,\r\nthree\u0026mdash;a fact which also demands some consideration, because in all other\r\ncases division à priori through conceptions is necessarily dichotomy. It is to\r\nbe added, that the third category in each triad always arises from the\r\ncombination of the second with the first.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThus totality is nothing else but plurality contemplated as unity; limitation\r\nis merely reality conjoined with negation; community is the causality of a\r\nsubstance, reciprocally determining, and determined by other substances; and\r\nfinally, necessity is nothing but existence, which is given through the\r\npossibility itself. Let it not be supposed, however, that the third category is\r\nmerely a deduced, and not a primitive conception of the pure understanding. For\r\nthe conjunction of the first and second, in order to produce the third\r\nconception, requires a particular function of the understanding, which is by no\r\nmeans identical with those which are exercised in the first and second. Thus,\r\nthe conception of a number (which belongs to the category of totality) is not\r\nalways possible, where the conceptions of multitude and unity exist (for\r\nexample, in the representation of the infinite). Or, if I conjoin the\r\nconception of a cause with that of a substance, it does not follow that the\r\nconception of influence, that is, how one substance can be the cause of\r\nsomething in another substance, will be understood from that. Thus it is\r\nevident that a particular act of the understanding is here necessary; and so in\r\nthe other instances.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIII. With respect to one category, namely, that of community, which is found in\r\nthe third class, it is not so easy as with the others to detect its accordance\r\nwith the form of the disjunctive judgement which corresponds to it in the table\r\nof the logical functions.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIn order to assure ourselves of this accordance, we must observe that in every\r\ndisjunctive judgement, the sphere of the judgement (that is, the complex of all\r\nthat is contained in it) is represented as a whole divided into parts; and,\r\nsince one part cannot be contained in the other, they are cogitated as\r\nco-ordinated with, not subordinated to each other, so that they do not\r\ndetermine each other unilaterally, as in a linear series, but reciprocally, as\r\nin an aggregate\u0026mdash;(if one member of the division is posited, all the rest\r\nare excluded; and conversely).\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nNow a like connection is cogitated in a whole of things; for one thing is not\r\nsubordinated, as effect, to another as cause of its existence, but, on the\r\ncontrary, is co-ordinated contemporaneously and reciprocally, as a cause in\r\nrelation to the determination of the others (for example, in a body\u0026mdash;the\r\nparts of which mutually attract and repel each other). And this is an entirely\r\ndifferent kind of connection from that which we find in the mere relation of\r\nthe cause to the effect (the principle to the consequence), for in such a\r\nconnection the consequence does not in its turn determine the principle, and\r\ntherefore does not constitute, with the latter, a whole\u0026mdash;just as the\r\nCreator does not with the world make up a whole. The process of understanding\r\nby which it represents to itself the sphere of a divided conception, is\r\nemployed also when we think of a thing as divisible; and in the same manner as\r\nthe members of the division in the former exclude one another, and yet are\r\nconnected in one sphere, so the understanding represents to itself the parts of\r\nthe latter, as having\u0026mdash;each of them\u0026mdash;an existence (as substances),\r\nindependently of the others, and yet as united in one whole.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"center\"\u003e\r\n§ 8\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIn the transcendental philosophy of the ancients there exists one more leading\r\ndivision, which contains pure conceptions of the understanding, and which,\r\nalthough not numbered among the categories, ought, according to them, as\r\nconceptions à priori, to be valid of objects. But in this case they would\r\naugment the number of the categories; which cannot be. These are set forth in\r\nthe proposition, so renowned among the schoolmen\u0026mdash;\u0026lsquo;\u003ci\u003eQuodlibet ens\r\nest UNUM, VERUM, BONUM\u003c/i\u003e.\u0026rsquo; Now, though the inferences from this\r\nprinciple were mere tautological propositions, and though it is allowed only by\r\ncourtesy to retain a place in modern metaphysics, yet a thought which\r\nmaintained itself for such a length of time, however empty it seems to be,\r\ndeserves an investigation of its origin, and justifies the conjecture that it\r\nmust be grounded in some law of the understanding, which, as is often the case,\r\nhas only been erroneously interpreted. These pretended transcendental\r\npredicates are, in fact, nothing but logical requisites and criteria of all\r\ncognition of objects, and they employ, as the basis for this cognition, the\r\ncategories of quantity, namely, unity, plurality, and totality. But these,\r\nwhich must be taken as material conditions, that is, as belonging to the\r\npossibility of things themselves, they employed merely in a formal\r\nsignification, as belonging to the logical requisites of all cognition, and yet\r\nmost unguardedly changed these criteria of thought into properties of objects,\r\nas things in themselves. Now, in every cognition of an object, there is unity\r\nof conception, which may be called qualitative unity, so far as by this term we\r\nunderstand only the unity in our connection of the manifold; for example, unity\r\nof the theme in a play, an oration, or a story. Secondly, there is truth in\r\nrespect of the deductions from it. The more true deductions we have from a\r\ngiven conception, the more criteria of its objective reality. This we might\r\ncall the qualitative plurality of characteristic marks, which belong to a\r\nconception as to a common foundation, but are not cogitated as a quantity in\r\nit. Thirdly, there is perfection\u0026mdash;which consists in this, that the\r\nplurality falls back upon the unity of the conception, and accords completely\r\nwith that conception and with no other. This we may denominate qualitative\r\ncompleteness. Hence it is evident that these logical criteria of the\r\npossibility of cognition are merely the three categories of quantity modified\r\nand transformed to suit an unauthorized manner of applying them. That is to\r\nsay, the three categories, in which the unity in the production of the quantum\r\nmust be homogeneous throughout, are transformed solely with a view to the\r\nconnection of heterogeneous parts of cognition in one act of consciousness, by\r\nmeans of the quality of the cognition, which is the principle of that\r\nconnection. Thus the criterion of the possibility of a conception (not of its\r\nobject) is the definition of it, in which the unity of the conception, the\r\ntruth of all that may be immediately deduced from it, and finally, the\r\ncompleteness of what has been thus deduced, constitute the requisites for the\r\nreproduction of the whole conception. Thus also, the criterion or test of an\r\nhypothesis is the intelligibility of the received principle of explanation, or\r\nits unity (without help from any subsidiary hypothesis)\u0026mdash;the truth of our\r\ndeductions from it (consistency with each other and with experience)\u0026mdash;and\r\nlastly, the completeness of the principle of the explanation of these\r\ndeductions, which refer to neither more nor less than what was admitted in the\r\nhypothesis, restoring analytically and à posteriori, what was cogitated\r\nsynthetically and à priori. By the conceptions, therefore, of unity, truth, and\r\nperfection, we have made no addition to the transcendental table of the\r\ncategories, which is complete without them. We have, on the contrary, merely\r\nemployed the three categories of quantity, setting aside their application to\r\nobjects of experience, as general logical laws of the consistency of cognition\r\nwith itself.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003ca id=\"chap38\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eChapter II. Of the Deduction of the Pure Conceptions\r\nof the Understanding\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003ca id=\"chap39\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eSection I. Of the Principles of a Transcendental\r\nDeduction in general § 9\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nTeachers of jurisprudence, when speaking of rights and claims, distinguish in a\r\ncause the question of right (quid juris) from the question of fact (quid\r\nfacti), and while they demand proof of both, they give to the proof of the\r\nformer, which goes to establish right or claim in law, the name of deduction.\r\nNow we make use of a great number of empirical conceptions, without opposition\r\nfrom any one; and consider ourselves, even without any attempt at deduction,\r\njustified in attaching to them a sense, and a supposititious signification,\r\nbecause we have always experience at hand to demonstrate their objective\r\nreality. There exist also, however, usurped conceptions, such as fortune, fate,\r\nwhich circulate with almost universal indulgence, and yet are occasionally\r\nchallenged by the question, \u0026ldquo;quid juris?\u0026rdquo; In such cases, we have\r\ngreat difficulty in discovering any deduction for these terms, inasmuch as we\r\ncannot produce any manifest ground of right, either from experience or from\r\nreason, on which the claim to employ them can be founded.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAmong the many conceptions, which make up the very variegated web of human\r\ncognition, some are destined for pure use à priori, independent of all\r\nexperience; and their title to be so employed always requires a deduction,\r\ninasmuch as, to justify such use of them, proofs from experience are not\r\nsufficient; but it is necessary to know how these conceptions can apply to\r\nobjects without being derived from experience. I term, therefore, an\r\nexamination of the manner in which conceptions can apply à priori to objects,\r\nthe transcendental deduction of conceptions, and I distinguish it from the\r\nempirical deduction, which indicates the mode in which conception is obtained\r\nthrough experience and reflection thereon; consequently, does not concern\r\nitself with the right, but only with the fact of our obtaining conceptions in\r\nsuch and such a manner. We have already seen that we are in possession of two\r\nperfectly different kinds of conceptions, which nevertheless agree with each\r\nother in this, that they both apply to objects completely à priori. These are\r\nthe conceptions of space and time as forms of sensibility, and the categories\r\nas pure conceptions of the understanding. To attempt an empirical deduction of\r\neither of these classes would be labour in vain, because the distinguishing\r\ncharacteristic of their nature consists in this, that they apply to their\r\nobjects, without having borrowed anything from experience towards the\r\nrepresentation of them. Consequently, if a deduction of these conceptions is\r\nnecessary, it must always be transcendental.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nMeanwhile, with respect to these conceptions, as with respect to all our\r\ncognition, we certainly may discover in experience, if not the principle of\r\ntheir possibility, yet the occasioning causes of their production. It will be\r\nfound that the impressions of sense give the first occasion for bringing into\r\naction the whole faculty of cognition, and for the production of experience,\r\nwhich contains two very dissimilar elements, namely, a matter for cognition,\r\ngiven by the senses, and a certain form for the arrangement of this matter,\r\narising out of the inner fountain of pure intuition and thought; and these, on\r\noccasion given by sensuous impressions, are called into exercise and produce\r\nconceptions. Such an investigation into the first efforts of our faculty of\r\ncognition to mount from particular perceptions to general conceptions is\r\nundoubtedly of great utility; and we have to thank the celebrated Locke for\r\nhaving first opened the way for this inquiry. But a deduction of the pure à\r\npriori conceptions of course never can be made in this way, seeing that, in\r\nregard to their future employment, which must be entirely independent of\r\nexperience, they must have a far different certificate of birth to show from\r\nthat of a descent from experience. This attempted physiological derivation,\r\nwhich cannot properly be called deduction, because it relates merely to a\r\nquaestio facti, I shall entitle an explanation of the possession of a pure\r\ncognition. It is therefore manifest that there can only be a transcendental\r\ndeduction of these conceptions and by no means an empirical one; also, that all\r\nattempts at an empirical deduction, in regard to pure à priori conceptions, are\r\nvain, and can only be made by one who does not understand the altogether\r\npeculiar nature of these cognitions.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut although it is admitted that the only possible deduction of pure à priori\r\ncognition is a transcendental deduction, it is not, for that reason, perfectly\r\nmanifest that such a deduction is absolutely necessary. We have already traced\r\nto their sources the conceptions of space and time, by means of a\r\ntranscendental deduction, and we have explained and determined their objective\r\nvalidity à priori. Geometry, nevertheless, advances steadily and securely in\r\nthe province of pure à priori cognitions, without needing to ask from\r\nphilosophy any certificate as to the pure and legitimate origin of its\r\nfundamental conception of space. But the use of the conception in this science\r\nextends only to the external world of sense, the pure form of the intuition of\r\nwhich is space; and in this world, therefore, all geometrical cognition,\r\nbecause it is founded upon à priori intuition, possesses immediate evidence,\r\nand the objects of this cognition are given à priori (as regards their form) in\r\nintuition by and through the cognition itself. With the pure conceptions of\r\nunderstanding, on the contrary, commences the absolute necessity of seeking a\r\ntranscendental deduction, not only of these conceptions themselves, but\r\nlikewise of space, because, inasmuch as they make affirmations concerning\r\nobjects not by means of the predicates of intuition and sensibility, but of\r\npure thought à priori, they apply to objects without any of the conditions of\r\nsensibility. Besides, not being founded on experience, they are not presented\r\nwith any object in à priori intuition upon which, antecedently to experience,\r\nthey might base their synthesis. Hence results, not only doubt as to the\r\nobjective validity and proper limits of their use, but that even our conception\r\nof space is rendered equivocal; inasmuch as we are very ready with the aid of\r\nthe categories, to carry the use of this conception beyond the conditions of\r\nsensuous intuition\u0026mdash;and, for this reason, we have already found a\r\ntranscendental deduction of it needful. The reader, then, must be quite\r\nconvinced of the absolute necessity of a transcendental deduction, before\r\ntaking a single step in the field of pure reason; because otherwise he goes to\r\nwork blindly, and after he has wondered about in all directions, returns to the\r\nstate of utter ignorance from which he started. He ought, moreover, clearly to\r\nrecognize beforehand the unavoidable difficulties in his undertaking, so that\r\nhe may not afterwards complain of the obscurity in which the subject itself is\r\ndeeply involved, or become too soon impatient of the obstacles in his path;\r\nbecause we have a choice of only two things\u0026mdash;either at once to give up all\r\npretensions to knowledge beyond the limits of possible experience, or to bring\r\nthis critical investigation to completion.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWe have been able, with very little trouble, to make it comprehensible how the\r\nconceptions of space and time, although à priori cognitions, must necessarily\r\napply to external objects, and render a synthetical cognition of these\r\npossible, independently of all experience. For inasmuch as only by means of\r\nsuch pure form of sensibility an object can appear to us, that is, be an object\r\nof empirical intuition, space and time are pure intuitions, which contain à\r\npriori the condition of the possibility of objects as phenomena, and an à\r\npriori synthesis in these intuitions possesses objective validity.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nOn the other hand, the categories of the understanding do not represent the\r\nconditions under which objects are given to us in intuition; objects can\r\nconsequently appear to us without necessarily connecting themselves with these,\r\nand consequently without any necessity binding on the understanding to contain\r\nà priori the conditions of these objects. Thus we find ourselves involved in a\r\ndifficulty which did not present itself in the sphere of sensibility, that is\r\nto say, we cannot discover how the subjective conditions of thought can have\r\nobjective validity, in other words, can become conditions of the possibility of\r\nall cognition of objects; for phenomena may certainly be given to us in\r\nintuition without any help from the functions of the understanding. Let us\r\ntake, for example, the conception of cause, which indicates a peculiar kind of\r\nsynthesis, namely, that with something, A, something entirely different, B, is\r\nconnected according to a law. It is not à priori manifest why phenomena should\r\ncontain anything of this kind (we are of course debarred from appealing for\r\nproof to experience, for the objective validity of this conception must be\r\ndemonstrated à priori), and it hence remains doubtful à priori, whether such a\r\nconception be not quite void and without any corresponding object among\r\nphenomena. For that objects of sensuous intuition must correspond to the formal\r\nconditions of sensibility existing à priori in the mind is quite evident, from\r\nthe fact that without these they could not be objects for us; but that they\r\nmust also correspond to the conditions which understanding requires for the\r\nsynthetical unity of thought is an assertion, the grounds for which are not so\r\neasily to be discovered. For phenomena might be so constituted as not to\r\ncorrespond to the conditions of the unity of thought; and all things might lie\r\nin such confusion that, for example, nothing could be met with in the sphere of\r\nphenomena to suggest a law of synthesis, and so correspond to the conception of\r\ncause and effect; so that this conception would be quite void, null, and\r\nwithout significance. Phenomena would nevertheless continue to present objects\r\nto our intuition; for mere intuition does not in any respect stand in need of\r\nthe functions of thought.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIf we thought to free ourselves from the labour of these investigations by\r\nsaying: \u0026ldquo;Experience is constantly offering us examples of the relation of\r\ncause and effect in phenomena, and presents us with abundant opportunity of\r\nabstracting the conception of cause, and so at the same time of corroborating\r\nthe objective validity of this conception\u0026rdquo;; we should in this case be\r\noverlooking the fact, that the conception of cause cannot arise in this way at\r\nall; that, on the contrary, it must either have an à priori basis in the\r\nunderstanding, or be rejected as a mere chimera. For this conception demands\r\nthat something, A, should be of such a nature that something else, B, should\r\nfollow from it necessarily, and according to an absolutely universal law. We\r\nmay certainly collect from phenomena a law, according to which this or that\r\nusually happens, but the element of necessity is not to be found in it. Hence\r\nit is evident that to the synthesis of cause and effect belongs a dignity,\r\nwhich is utterly wanting in any empirical synthesis; for it is no mere\r\nmechanical synthesis, by means of addition, but a dynamical one; that is to\r\nsay, the effect is not to be cogitated as merely annexed to the cause, but as\r\nposited by and through the cause, and resulting from it. The strict\r\nuniversality of this law never can be a characteristic of empirical laws, which\r\nobtain through induction only a comparative universality, that is, an extended\r\nrange of practical application. But the pure conceptions of the understanding\r\nwould entirely lose all their peculiar character, if we treated them merely as\r\nthe productions of experience.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003ca id=\"chap40\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eTransition to the Transcendental Deduction of the\r\nCategories § 10\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThere are only two possible ways in which synthetical representation and its\r\nobjects can coincide with and relate necessarily to each other, and, as it\r\nwere, meet together. Either the object alone makes the representation possible,\r\nor the representation alone makes the object possible. In the former case, the\r\nrelation between them is only empirical, and an à priori representation is\r\nimpossible. And this is the case with phenomena, as regards that in them which\r\nis referable to mere sensation. In the latter case\u0026mdash;although\r\nrepresentation alone (for of its causality, by means of the will, we do not\r\nhere speak) does not produce the object as to its existence, it must\r\nnevertheless be à priori determinative in regard to the object, if it is only\r\nby means of the representation that we can cognize anything as an object. Now\r\nthere are only two conditions of the possibility of a cognition of objects;\r\nfirstly, intuition, by means of which the object, though only as phenomenon, is\r\ngiven; secondly, conception, by means of which the object which corresponds to\r\nthis intuition is thought. But it is evident from what has been said on\r\næsthetic that the first condition, under which alone objects can be intuited,\r\nmust in fact exist, as a formal basis for them, à priori in the mind. With this\r\nformal condition of sensibility, therefore, all phenomena necessarily\r\ncorrespond, because it is only through it that they can be phenomena at all;\r\nthat is, can be empirically intuited and given. Now the question is whether\r\nthere do not exist, à priori in the mind, conceptions of understanding also, as\r\nconditions under which alone something, if not intuited, is yet thought as\r\nobject. If this question be answered in the affirmative, it follows that all\r\nempirical cognition of objects is necessarily conformable to such conceptions,\r\nsince, if they are not presupposed, it is impossible that anything can be an\r\nobject of experience. Now all experience contains, besides the intuition of the\r\nsenses through which an object is given, a conception also of an object that is\r\ngiven in intuition. Accordingly, conceptions of objects in general must lie as\r\nà priori conditions at the foundation of all empirical cognition; and\r\nconsequently, the objective validity of the categories, as à priori\r\nconceptions, will rest upon this, that experience (as far as regards the form\r\nof thought) is possible only by their means. For in that case they apply\r\nnecessarily and à priori to objects of experience, because only through them\r\ncan an object of experience be thought.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe whole aim of the transcendental deduction of all à priori conceptions is to\r\nshow that these conceptions are à priori conditions of the possibility of all\r\nexperience. Conceptions which afford us the objective foundation of the\r\npossibility of experience are for that very reason necessary. But the analysis\r\nof the experiences in which they are met with is not deduction, but only an\r\nillustration of them, because from experience they could never derive the\r\nattribute of necessity. Without their original applicability and relation to\r\nall possible experience, in which all objects of cognition present themselves,\r\nthe relation of the categories to objects, of whatever nature, would be quite\r\nincomprehensible.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe celebrated Locke, for want of due reflection on these points, and because\r\nhe met with pure conceptions of the understanding in experience, sought also to\r\ndeduce them from experience, and yet proceeded so inconsequently as to attempt,\r\nwith their aid, to arrive it cognitions which lie far beyond the limits of all\r\nexperience. David Hume perceived that, to render this possible, it was\r\nnecessary that the conceptions should have an à priori origin. But as he could\r\nnot explain how it was possible that conceptions which are not connected with\r\neach other in the understanding must nevertheless be thought as necessarily\r\nconnected in the object\u0026mdash;and it never occurred to him that the\r\nunderstanding itself might, perhaps, by means of these conceptions, be the\r\nauthor of the experience in which its objects were presented to it\u0026mdash;he was\r\nforced to drive these conceptions from experience, that is, from a subjective\r\nnecessity arising from repeated association of experiences erroneously\r\nconsidered to be objective\u0026mdash;in one word, from habit. But he proceeded with\r\nperfect consequence and declared it to be impossible, with such conceptions and\r\nthe principles arising from them, to overstep the limits of experience. The\r\nempirical derivation, however, which both of these philosophers attributed to\r\nthese conceptions, cannot possibly be reconciled with the fact that we do\r\npossess scientific à priori cognitions, namely, those of pure mathematics and\r\ngeneral physics.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe former of these two celebrated men opened a wide door to\r\nextravagance\u0026mdash;(for if reason has once undoubted right on its side, it will\r\nnot allow itself to be confined to set limits, by vague recommendations of\r\nmoderation); the latter gave himself up entirely to scepticism\u0026mdash;a natural\r\nconsequence, after having discovered, as he thought, that the faculty of\r\ncognition was not trustworthy. We now intend to make a trial whether it be not\r\npossible safely to conduct reason between these two rocks, to assign her\r\ndeterminate limits, and yet leave open for her the entire sphere of her\r\nlegitimate activity.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nI shall merely premise an explanation of what the categories are. They are\r\nconceptions of an object in general, by means of which its intuition is\r\ncontemplated as determined in relation to one of the logical functions of\r\njudgement. The following will make this plain. The function of the categorical\r\njudgement is that of the relation of subject to predicate; for example, in the\r\nproposition: \u0026ldquo;All bodies are divisible.\u0026rdquo; But in regard to the\r\nmerely logical use of the understanding, it still remains undetermined to which\r\nOf these two conceptions belongs the function Of subject and to which that of\r\npredicate. For we could also say: \u0026ldquo;Some divisible is a body.\u0026rdquo; But\r\nthe category of substance, when the conception of a body is brought under it,\r\ndetermines that; and its empirical intuition in experience must be contemplated\r\nalways as subject and never as mere predicate. And so with all the other\r\ncategories.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003ca id=\"chap41\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eSection II Transcendental Deduction of the pure\r\nConceptions of the Understanding\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003ca id=\"chap42\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eOf the Possibility of a Conjunction of the manifold\r\nrepresentations given by Sense § 11.\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe manifold content in our representations can be given in an intuition which\r\nis merely sensuous\u0026mdash;in other words, is nothing but susceptibility; and the\r\nform of this intuition can exist à priori in our faculty of representation,\r\nwithout being anything else but the mode in which the subject is affected. But\r\nthe conjunction (conjunctio) of a manifold in intuition never can be given us\r\nby the senses; it cannot therefore be contained in the pure form of sensuous\r\nintuition, for it is a spontaneous act of the faculty of representation. And as\r\nwe must, to distinguish it from sensibility, entitle this faculty\r\nunderstanding; so all conjunction whether conscious or unconscious, be it of\r\nthe manifold in intuition, sensuous or non-sensuous, or of several\r\nconceptions\u0026mdash;is an act of the understanding. To this act we shall give the\r\ngeneral appellation of synthesis, thereby to indicate, at the same time, that\r\nwe cannot represent anything as conjoined in the object without having\r\npreviously conjoined it ourselves. Of all mental notions, that of conjunction\r\nis the only one which cannot be given through objects, but can be originated\r\nonly by the subject itself, because it is an act of its purely spontaneous\r\nactivity. The reader will easily enough perceive that the possibility of\r\nconjunction must be grounded in the very nature of this act, and that it must\r\nbe equally valid for all conjunction, and that analysis, which appears to be\r\nits contrary, must, nevertheless, always presuppose it; for where the\r\nunderstanding has not previously conjoined, it cannot dissect or analyse,\r\nbecause only as conjoined by it, must that which is to be analysed have been\r\ngiven to our faculty of representation.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut the conception of conjunction includes, besides the conception of the\r\nmanifold and of the synthesis of it, that of the unity of it also. Conjunction\r\nis the representation of the synthetical unity of the manifold.\u003ca\r\nhref=\"#linknote-15\" id=\"linknoteref-15\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[15]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e This idea of unity, therefore, cannot\r\narise out of that of conjunction; much rather does that idea, by combining\r\nitself with the representation of the manifold, render the conception of\r\nconjunction possible. This unity, which à priori precedes all conceptions of\r\nconjunction, is not the category of unity (§ 6); for all the categories are\r\nbased upon logical functions of judgement, and in these functions we already\r\nhave conjunction, and consequently unity of given conceptions. It is therefore\r\nevident that the category of unity presupposes conjunction. We must therefore\r\nlook still higher for this unity (as qualitative, § 8), in that, namely, which\r\ncontains the ground of the unity of diverse conceptions in judgements, the\r\nground, consequently, of the possibility of the existence of the understanding,\r\neven in regard to its logical use.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"linknote-15\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#linknoteref-15\"\u003e[15]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nWhether the representations are in themselves identical, and consequently\r\nwhether one can be thought analytically by means of and through the other, is a\r\nquestion which we need not at present consider. Our Consciousness of the one,\r\nwhen we speak of the manifold, is always distinguishable from our consciousness\r\nof the other; and it is only respecting the synthesis of this (possible)\r\nconsciousness that we here treat.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003ca id=\"chap43\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eOf the Originally Synthetical Unity of Apperception §\r\n12\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe \u0026ldquo;I think\u0026rdquo; must accompany all my representations, for otherwise\r\nsomething would be represented in me which could not be thought; in other\r\nwords, the representation would either be impossible, or at least be, in\r\nrelation to me, nothing. That representation which can be given previously to\r\nall thought is called intuition. All the diversity or manifold content of\r\nintuition, has, therefore, a necessary relation to the \u0026ldquo;I think,\u0026rdquo;\r\nin the subject in which this diversity is found. But this representation,\r\n\u0026ldquo;I think,\u0026rdquo; is an act of spontaneity; that is to say, it cannot be\r\nregarded as belonging to mere sensibility. I call it pure apperception, in\r\norder to distinguish it from empirical; or primitive apperception, because it\r\nis self-consciousness which, whilst it gives birth to the representation\r\n\u0026ldquo;I think,\u0026rdquo; must necessarily be capable of accompanying all our\r\nrepresentations. It is in all acts of consciousness one and the same, and\r\nunaccompanied by it, no representation can exist for me. The unity of this\r\napperception I call the transcendental unity of self-consciousness, in order to\r\nindicate the possibility of à priori cognition arising from it. For the\r\nmanifold representations which are given in an intuition would not all of them\r\nbe my representations, if they did not all belong to one self-consciousness,\r\nthat is, as my representations (even although I am not conscious of them as\r\nsuch), they must conform to the condition under which alone they can exist\r\ntogether in a common self-consciousness, because otherwise they would not all\r\nwithout exception belong to me. From this primitive conjunction follow many\r\nimportant results.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nFor example, this universal identity of the apperception of the manifold given\r\nin intuition contains a synthesis of representations and is possible only by\r\nmeans of the consciousness of this synthesis. For the empirical consciousness\r\nwhich accompanies different representations is in itself fragmentary and\r\ndisunited, and without relation to the identity of the subject. This relation,\r\nthen, does not exist because I accompany every representation with\r\nconsciousness, but because I join one representation to another, and am\r\nconscious of the synthesis of them. Consequently, only because I can connect a\r\nvariety of given representations in one consciousness, is it possible that I\r\ncan represent to myself the identity of consciousness in these representations;\r\nin other words, the analytical unity of apperception is possible only under the\r\npresupposition of a synthetical unity.\u003ca href=\"#linknote-16\" id=\"linknoteref-16\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[16]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The thought,\r\n\u0026ldquo;These representations given in intuition belong all of them to\r\nme,\u0026rdquo; is accordingly just the same as, \u0026ldquo;I unite them in one\r\nself-consciousness, or can at least so unite them\u0026rdquo;; and although this\r\nthought is not itself the consciousness of the synthesis of representations, it\r\npresupposes the possibility of it; that is to say, for the reason alone that I\r\ncan comprehend the variety of my representations in one consciousness, do I\r\ncall them my representations, for otherwise I must have as many-coloured and\r\nvarious a self as are the representations of which I am conscious. Synthetical\r\nunity of the manifold in intuitions, as given à priori, is therefore the\r\nfoundation of the identity of apperception itself, which antecedes à priori all\r\ndeterminate thought. But the conjunction of representations into a conception\r\nis not to be found in objects themselves, nor can it be, as it were, borrowed\r\nfrom them and taken up into the understanding by perception, but it is on the\r\ncontrary an operation of the understanding itself, which is nothing more than\r\nthe faculty of conjoining à priori and of bringing the variety of given\r\nrepresentations under the unity of apperception. This principle is the highest\r\nin all human cognition.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"linknote-16\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#linknoteref-16\"\u003e[16]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nAll general conceptions\u0026mdash;as such\u0026mdash;depend, for their existence, on the\r\nanalytical unity of consciousness. For example, when I think of red in general,\r\nI thereby think to myself a property which (as a characteristic mark) can be\r\ndiscovered somewhere, or can be united with other representations;\r\nconsequently, it is only by means of a forethought possible synthetical unity\r\nthat I can think to myself the analytical. A representation which is cogitated\r\nas common to different representations, is regarded as belonging to such as,\r\nbesides this common representation, contain something different; consequently\r\nit must be previously thought in synthetical unity with other although only\r\npossible representations, before I can think in it the analytical unity of\r\nconsciousness which makes it a conceptas communis. And thus the synthetical\r\nunity of apperception is the highest point with which we must connect every\r\noperation of the understanding, even the whole of logic, and after it our\r\ntranscendental philosophy; indeed, this faculty is the understanding itself.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThis fundamental principle of the necessary unity of apperception is indeed an\r\nidentical, and therefore analytical, proposition; but it nevertheless explains\r\nthe necessity for a synthesis of the manifold given in an intuition, without\r\nwhich the identity of self-consciousness would be incogitable. For the ego, as\r\na simple representation, presents us with no manifold content; only in\r\nintuition, which is quite different from the representation ego, can it be\r\ngiven us, and by means of conjunction it is cogitated in one\r\nself-consciousness. An understanding, in which all the manifold should be given\r\nby means of consciousness itself, would be intuitive; our understanding can\r\nonly think and must look for its intuition to sense. I am, therefore, conscious\r\nof my identical self, in relation to all the variety of representations given\r\nto me in an intuition, because I call all of them my representations. In other\r\nwords, I am conscious myself of a necessary à priori synthesis of my\r\nrepresentations, which is called the original synthetical unity of\r\napperception, under which rank all the representations presented to me, but\r\nthat only by means of a synthesis.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003ca id=\"chap44\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eThe Principle of the Synthetical Unity of Apperception\r\nis the highest Principle of all exercise of the Understanding § 13\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe supreme principle of the possibility of all intuition in relation to\r\nsensibility was, according to our transcendental æsthetic, that all the\r\nmanifold in intuition be subject to the formal conditions of space and time.\r\nThe supreme principle of the possibility of it in relation to the understanding\r\nis that all the manifold in it be subject to conditions of the originally\r\nsynthetical unity or apperception.\u003ca href=\"#linknote-17\" id=\"linknoteref-17\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[17]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e To the former of these two principles\r\nare subject all the various representations of intuition, in so far as they are\r\ngiven to us; to the latter, in so far as they must be capable of conjunction in\r\none consciousness; for without this nothing can be thought or cognized, because\r\nthe given representations would not have in common the act Of the apperception\r\n\u0026ldquo;I think\u0026rdquo; and therefore could not be connected in one\r\nself-consciousness.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"linknote-17\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#linknoteref-17\"\u003e[17]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nSpace and time, and all portions thereof, are intuitions; consequently are,\r\nwith a manifold for their content, single representations. (See the\r\nTranscendental Æsthetic.) Consequently, they are not pure conceptions, by means\r\nof which the same consciousness is found in a great number of representations;\r\nbut, on the contrary, they are many representations contained in one, the\r\nconsciousness of which is, so to speak, compounded. The unity of consciousness\r\nis nevertheless synthetical and, therefore, primitive. From this peculiar\r\ncharacter of consciousness follow many important consequences. (See § 21.)\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nUnderstanding is, to speak generally, the faculty Of cognitions. These consist\r\nin the determined relation of given representation to an object. But an object\r\nis that, in the conception of which the manifold in a given intuition is\r\nunited. Now all union of representations requires unity of consciousness in the\r\nsynthesis of them. Consequently, it is the unity of consciousness alone that\r\nconstitutes the possibility of representations relating to an object, and\r\ntherefore of their objective validity, and of their becoming cognitions, and\r\nconsequently, the possibility of the existence of the understanding itself.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe first pure cognition of understanding, then, upon which is founded all its\r\nother exercise, and which is at the same time perfectly independent of all\r\nconditions of mere sensuous intuition, is the principle of the original\r\nsynthetical unity of apperception. Thus the mere form of external sensuous\r\nintuition, namely, space, affords us, per se, no cognition; it merely\r\ncontributes the manifold in à priori intuition to a possible cognition. But, in\r\norder to cognize something in space (for example, a line), I must draw it, and\r\nthus produce synthetically a determined conjunction of the given manifold, so\r\nthat the unity of this act is at the same time the unity of consciousness (in\r\nthe conception of a line), and by this means alone is an object (a determinate\r\nspace) cognized. The synthetical unity of consciousness is, therefore, an\r\nobjective condition of all cognition, which I do not merely require in order to\r\ncognize an object, but to which every intuition must necessarily be subject, in\r\norder to become an object for me; because in any other way, and without this\r\nsynthesis, the manifold in intuition could not be united in one consciousness.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThis proposition is, as already said, itself analytical, although it\r\nconstitutes the synthetical unity, the condition of all thought; for it states\r\nnothing more than that all my representations in any given intuition must be\r\nsubject to the condition which alone enables me to connect them, as my\r\nrepresentation with the identical self, and so to unite them synthetically in\r\none apperception, by means of the general expression, \u0026ldquo;I think.\u0026rdquo;\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut this principle is not to be regarded as a principle for every possible\r\nunderstanding, but only for the understanding by means of whose pure\r\napperception in the thought I am, no manifold content is given. The\r\nunderstanding or mind which contained the manifold in intuition, in and through\r\nthe act itself of its own self-consciousness, in other words, an understanding\r\nby and in the representation of which the objects of the representation should\r\nat the same time exist, would not require a special act of synthesis of the\r\nmanifold as the condition of the unity of its consciousness, an act of which\r\nthe human understanding, which thinks only and cannot intuite, has absolute\r\nneed. But this principle is the first principle of all the operations of our\r\nunderstanding, so that we cannot form the least conception of any other\r\npossible understanding, either of one such as should be itself intuition, or\r\npossess a sensuous intuition, but with forms different from those of space and\r\ntime.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003ca id=\"chap45\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eWhat Objective Unity of Self-consciousness is §\r\n14\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIt is by means of the transcendental unity of apperception that all the\r\nmanifold, given in an intuition is united into a conception of the object. On\r\nthis account it is called objective, and must be distinguished from the\r\nsubjective unity of consciousness, which is a determination of the internal\r\nsense, by means of which the said manifold in intuition is given empirically to\r\nbe so united. Whether I can be empirically conscious of the manifold as\r\ncoexistent or as successive, depends upon circumstances, or empirical\r\nconditions. Hence the empirical unity of consciousness by means of association\r\nof representations, itself relates to a phenomenal world and is wholly\r\ncontingent. On the contrary, the pure form of intuition in time, merely as an\r\nintuition, which contains a given manifold, is subject to the original unity of\r\nconsciousness, and that solely by means of the necessary relation of the\r\nmanifold in intuition to the \u0026ldquo;I think,\u0026rdquo; consequently by means of\r\nthe pure synthesis of the understanding, which lies à priori at the foundation\r\nof all empirical synthesis. The transcendental unity of apperception is alone\r\nobjectively valid; the empirical which we do not consider in this essay, and\r\nwhich is merely a unity deduced from the former under given conditions in\r\nconcreto, possesses only subjective validity. One person connects the notion\r\nconveyed in a word with one thing, another with another thing; and the unity of\r\nconsciousness in that which is empirical, is, in relation to that which is\r\ngiven by experience, not necessarily and universally valid.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003ca id=\"chap46\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eThe Logical Form of all Judgements consists in the\r\nObjective Unity of Apperception of the Conceptions contained therein § 15\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nI could never satisfy myself with the definition which logicians give of a\r\njudgement. It is, according to them, the representation of a relation between\r\ntwo conceptions. I shall not dwell here on the faultiness of this definition,\r\nin that it suits only for categorical and not for hypothetical or disjunctive\r\njudgements, these latter containing a relation not of conceptions but of\r\njudgements themselves\u0026mdash;a blunder from which many evil results have\r\nfollowed.\u003ca href=\"#linknote-18\" id=\"linknoteref-18\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[18]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e It is more important for our present\r\npurpose to observe, that this definition does not determine in what the said\r\nrelation consists.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"linknote-18\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#linknoteref-18\"\u003e[18]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nThe tedious doctrine of the four syllogistic figures concerns only categorical\r\nsyllogisms; and although it is nothing more than an artifice by surreptitiously\r\nintroducing immediate conclusions (consequentiae immediatae) among the premises\r\nof a pure syllogism, to give rise to an appearance of more modes of\r\ndrawing a conclusion than that in the first figure, the artifice would not have\r\nhad much success, had not its authors succeeded in bringing categorical\r\njudgements into exclusive respect, as those to which all others must be\r\nreferred\u0026mdash;a doctrine, however, which, according to § 5, is utterly false.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut if I investigate more closely the relation of given cognitions in every\r\njudgement, and distinguish it, as belonging to the understanding, from the\r\nrelation which is produced according to laws of the reproductive imagination\r\n(which has only subjective validity), I find that judgement is nothing but the\r\nmode of bringing given cognitions under the objective unit of apperception.\r\nThis is plain from our use of the term of relation is in judgements, in order\r\nto distinguish the objective unity of given representations from the subjective\r\nunity. For this term indicates the relation of these representations to the\r\noriginal apperception, and also their necessary unity, even although the\r\njudgement is empirical, therefore contingent, as in the judgement: \u0026ldquo;All\r\nbodies are heavy.\u0026rdquo; I do not mean by this, that these representations do\r\nnecessarily belong to each other in empirical intuition, but that by means of\r\nthe necessary unity of appreciation they belong to each other in the synthesis\r\nof intuitions, that is to say, they belong to each other according to\r\nprinciples of the objective determination of all our representations, in so far\r\nas cognition can arise from them, these principles being all deduced from the\r\nmain principle of the transcendental unity of apperception. In this way alone\r\ncan there arise from this relation a judgement, that is, a relation which has\r\nobjective validity, and is perfectly distinct from that relation of the very\r\nsame representations which has only subjective validity\u0026mdash;a relation, to\r\nwit, which is produced according to laws of association. According to these\r\nlaws, I could only say: \u0026ldquo;When I hold in my hand or carry a body, I feel\r\nan impression of weight\u0026rdquo;; but I could not say: \u0026ldquo;It, the body, is\r\nheavy\u0026rdquo;; for this is tantamount to saying both these representations are\r\nconjoined in the object, that is, without distinction as to the condition of\r\nthe subject, and do not merely stand together in my perception, however\r\nfrequently the perceptive act may be repeated.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003ca id=\"chap47\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eAll Sensuous Intuitions are subject to the Categories,\r\nas Conditions under which alone the manifold Content of them can be united in\r\none Consciousness § 16\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe manifold content given in a sensuous intuition comes necessarily under the\r\noriginal synthetical unity of apperception, because thereby alone is the unity\r\nof intuition possible (§ 13). But that act of the understanding, by which the\r\nmanifold content of given representations (whether intuitions or conceptions)\r\nis brought under one apperception, is the logical function of judgements (§\r\n15). All the manifold, therefore, in so far as it is given in one empirical\r\nintuition, is determined in relation to one of the logical functions of\r\njudgement, by means of which it is brought into union in one consciousness. Now\r\nthe categories are nothing else than these functions of judgement so far as the\r\nmanifold in a given intuition is determined in relation to them (§ 9).\r\nConsequently, the manifold in a given intuition is necessarily subject to the\r\ncategories of the understanding.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003ca id=\"chap48\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eObservation § 17\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe manifold in an intuition, which I call mine, is represented by means of the\r\nsynthesis of the understanding, as belonging to the necessary unity of\r\nself-consciousness, and this takes place by means of the category.\u003ca\r\nhref=\"#linknote-19\" id=\"linknoteref-19\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[19]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The category indicates accordingly that\r\nthe empirical consciousness of a given manifold in an intuition is subject to a\r\npure self-consciousness à priori, in the same manner as an empirical intuition\r\nis subject to a pure sensuous intuition, which is also à priori. In the above\r\nproposition, then, lies the beginning of a deduction of the pure conceptions of\r\nthe understanding. Now, as the categories have their origin in the\r\nunderstanding alone, independently of sensibility, I must in my deduction make\r\nabstraction of the mode in which the manifold of an empirical intuition is\r\ngiven, in order to fix my attention exclusively on the unity which is brought\r\nby the understanding into the intuition by means of the category. In what\r\nfollows (§ 22), it will be shown, from the mode in which the empirical\r\nintuition is given in the faculty of sensibility, that the unity which belongs\r\nto it is no other than that which the category (according to § 16) imposes on\r\nthe manifold in a given intuition, and thus, its à priori validity in regard to\r\nall objects of sense being established, the purpose of our deduction will be\r\nfully attained.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"linknote-19\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#linknoteref-19\"\u003e[19]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nThe proof of this rests on the represented unity of intuition, by means of\r\nwhich an object is given, and which always includes in itself a synthesis of\r\nthe manifold to be intuited, and also the relation of this latter to unity of\r\napperception.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut there is one thing in the above demonstration of which I could not make\r\nabstraction, namely, that the manifold to be intuited must be given previously\r\nto the synthesis of the understanding, and independently of it. How this takes\r\nplace remains here undetermined. For if I cogitate an understanding which was\r\nitself intuitive (as, for example, a divine understanding which should not\r\nrepresent given objects, but by whose representation the objects themselves\r\nshould be given or produced), the categories would possess no significance in\r\nrelation to such a faculty of cognition. They are merely rules for an\r\nunderstanding, whose whole power consists in thought, that is, in the act of\r\nsubmitting the synthesis of the manifold which is presented to it in intuition\r\nfrom a very different quarter, to the unity of apperception; a faculty,\r\ntherefore, which cognizes nothing per se, but only connects and arranges the\r\nmaterial of cognition, the intuition, namely, which must be presented to it by\r\nmeans of the object. But to show reasons for this peculiar character of our\r\nunderstandings, that it produces unity of apperception à priori only by means\r\nof categories, and a certain kind and number thereof, is as impossible as to\r\nexplain why we are endowed with precisely so many functions of judgement and no\r\nmore, or why time and space are the only forms of our intuition.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003ca id=\"chap49\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eIn Cognition, its Application to Objects of Experience\r\nis the only legitimate use of the Category § 18\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nTo think an object and to cognize an object are by no means the same thing. In\r\ncognition there are two elements: firstly, the conception, whereby an object is\r\ncogitated (the category); and, secondly, the intuition, whereby the object is\r\ngiven. For supposing that to the conception a corresponding intuition could not\r\nbe given, it would still be a thought as regards its form, but without any\r\nobject, and no cognition of anything would be possible by means of it, inasmuch\r\nas, so far as I knew, there existed and could exist nothing to which my thought\r\ncould be applied. Now all intuition possible to us is sensuous; consequently,\r\nour thought of an object by means of a pure conception of the understanding,\r\ncan become cognition for us only in so far as this conception is applied to\r\nobjects of the senses. Sensuous intuition is either pure intuition (space and\r\ntime) or empirical intuition\u0026mdash;of that which is immediately represented in\r\nspace and time by means of sensation as real. Through the determination of pure\r\nintuition we obtain à priori cognitions of objects, as in mathematics, but only\r\nas regards their form as phenomena; whether there can exist things which must\r\nbe intuited in this form is not thereby established. All mathematical\r\nconceptions, therefore, are not per se cognition, except in so far as we\r\npresuppose that there exist things which can only be represented conformably to\r\nthe form of our pure sensuous intuition. But things in space and time are given\r\nonly in so far as they are perceptions (representations accompanied with\r\nsensation), therefore only by empirical representation. Consequently the pure\r\nconceptions of the understanding, even when they are applied to intuitions à\r\npriori (as in mathematics), produce cognition only in so far as these (and\r\ntherefore the conceptions of the understanding by means of them) can be applied\r\nto empirical intuitions. Consequently the categories do not, even by means of\r\npure intuition afford us any cognition of things; they can only do so in so far\r\nas they can be applied to empirical intuition. That is to say, the categories\r\nserve only to render empirical cognition possible. But this is what we call\r\nexperience. Consequently, in cognition, their application to objects of\r\nexperience is the only legitimate use of the categories.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"center\"\u003e\r\n§ 19\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe foregoing proposition is of the utmost importance, for it determines the\r\nlimits of the exercise of the pure conceptions of the understanding in regard\r\nto objects, just as transcendental æsthetic determined the limits of the\r\nexercise of the pure form of our sensuous intuition. Space and time, as\r\nconditions of the possibility of the presentation of objects to us, are valid\r\nno further than for objects of sense, consequently, only for experience. Beyond\r\nthese limits they represent to us nothing, for they belong only to sense, and\r\nhave no reality apart from it. The pure conceptions of the understanding are\r\nfree from this limitation, and extend to objects of intuition in general, be\r\nthe intuition like or unlike to ours, provided only it be sensuous, and not\r\nintellectual. But this extension of conceptions beyond the range of our\r\nintuition is of no advantage; for they are then mere empty conceptions of\r\nobjects, as to the possibility or impossibility of the existence of which they\r\nfurnish us with no means of discovery. They are mere forms of thought, without\r\nobjective reality, because we have no intuition to which the synthetical unity\r\nof apperception, which alone the categories contain, could be applied, for the\r\npurpose of determining an object. Our sensuous and empirical intuition can\r\nalone give them significance and meaning.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIf, then, we suppose an object of a non-sensuous intuition to be given we can\r\nin that case represent it by all those predicates which are implied in the\r\npresupposition that nothing appertaining to sensuous intuition belongs to it;\r\nfor example, that it is not extended, or in space; that its duration is not\r\ntime; that in it no change (the effect of the determinations in time) is to be\r\nmet with, and so on. But it is no proper knowledge if I merely indicate what\r\nthe intuition of the object is not, without being able to say what is contained\r\nin it, for I have not shown the possibility of an object to which my pure\r\nconception of understanding could be applicable, because I have not been able\r\nto furnish any intuition corresponding to it, but am only able to say that our\r\nintuition is not valid for it. But the most important point is this, that to a\r\nsomething of this kind not one category can be found applicable. Take, for\r\nexample, the conception of substance, that is, something that can exist as\r\nsubject, but never as mere predicate; in regard to this conception I am quite\r\nignorant whether there can really be anything to correspond to such a\r\ndetermination of thought, if empirical intuition did not afford me the occasion\r\nfor its application. But of this more in the sequel.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003ca id=\"chap50\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eOf the Application of the Categories to Objects of the\r\nSenses in general § 20\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe pure conceptions of the understanding apply to objects of intuition in\r\ngeneral, through the understanding alone, whether the intuition be our own or\r\nsome other, provided only it be sensuous, but are, for this very reason, mere\r\nforms of thought, by means of which alone no determined object can be cognized.\r\nThe synthesis or conjunction of the manifold in these conceptions relates, we\r\nhave said, only to the unity of apperception, and is for this reason the ground\r\nof the possibility of à priori cognition, in so far as this cognition is\r\ndependent on the understanding. This synthesis is, therefore, not merely\r\ntranscendental, but also purely intellectual. But because a certain form of\r\nsensuous intuition exists in the mind à priori which rests on the receptivity\r\nof the representative faculty (sensibility), the understanding, as a\r\nspontaneity, is able to determine the internal sense by means of the diversity\r\nof given representations, conformably to the synthetical unity of apperception,\r\nand thus to cogitate the synthetical unity of the apperception of the manifold\r\nof sensuous intuition à priori, as the condition to which must necessarily be\r\nsubmitted all objects of human intuition. And in this manner the categories as\r\nmere forms of thought receive objective reality, that is, application to\r\nobjects which are given to us in intuition, but that only as phenomena, for it\r\nis only of phenomena that we are capable of à priori intuition.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThis synthesis of the manifold of sensuous intuition, which is possible and\r\nnecessary à priori, may be called figurative (synthesis speciosa), in\r\ncontradistinction to that which is cogitated in the mere category in regard to\r\nthe manifold of an intuition in general, and is called connection or\r\nconjunction of the understanding (synthesis intellectualis). Both are\r\ntranscendental, not merely because they themselves precede à priori all\r\nexperience, but also because they form the basis for the possibility of other\r\ncognition à priori.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut the figurative synthesis, when it has relation only to the originally\r\nsynthetical unity of apperception, that is to the transcendental unity\r\ncogitated in the categories, must, to be distinguished from the purely\r\nintellectual conjunction, be entitled the transcendental synthesis of\r\nimagination. Imagination is the faculty of representing an object even without\r\nits presence in intuition. Now, as all our intuition is sensuous, imagination,\r\nby reason of the subjective condition under which alone it can give a\r\ncorresponding intuition to the conceptions of the understanding, belongs to\r\nsensibility. But in so far as the synthesis of the imagination is an act of\r\nspontaneity, which is determinative, and not, like sense, merely determinable,\r\nand which is consequently able to determine sense à priori, according to its\r\nform, conformably to the unity of apperception, in so far is the imagination a\r\nfaculty of determining sensibility à priori, and its synthesis of intuitions\r\naccording to the categories must be the transcendental synthesis of the\r\nimagination. It is an operation of the understanding on sensibility, and the\r\nfirst application of the understanding to objects of possible intuition, and at\r\nthe same time the basis for the exercise of the other functions of that\r\nfaculty. As figurative, it is distinguished from the merely intellectual\r\nsynthesis, which is produced by the understanding alone, without the aid of\r\nimagination. Now, in so far as imagination is spontaneity, I sometimes call it\r\nalso the productive imagination, and distinguish it from the reproductive, the\r\nsynthesis of which is subject entirely to empirical laws, those of association,\r\nnamely, and which, therefore, contributes nothing to the explanation of the\r\npossibility of à priori cognition, and for this reason belongs not to\r\ntranscendental philosophy, but to psychology.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWe have now arrived at the proper place for explaining the paradox which must\r\nhave struck every one in our exposition of the internal sense (§ 6),\r\nnamely\u0026mdash;how this sense represents us to our own consciousness, only as we\r\nappear to ourselves, not as we are in ourselves, because, to wit, we intuite\r\nourselves only as we are inwardly affected. Now this appears to be\r\ncontradictory, inasmuch as we thus stand in a passive relation to ourselves;\r\nand therefore in the systems of psychology, the internal sense is commonly held\r\nto be one with the faculty of apperception, while we, on the contrary,\r\ncarefully distinguish them.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThat which determines the internal sense is the understanding, and its original\r\npower of conjoining the manifold of intuition, that is, of bringing this under\r\nan apperception (upon which rests the possibility of the understanding itself).\r\nNow, as the human understanding is not in itself a faculty of intuition, and is\r\nunable to exercise such a power, in order to conjoin, as it were, the manifold\r\nof its own intuition, the synthesis of understanding is, considered per se,\r\nnothing but the unity of action, of which, as such, it is self-conscious, even\r\napart from sensibility, by which, moreover, it is able to determine our\r\ninternal sense in respect of the manifold which may be presented to it\r\naccording to the form of sensuous intuition. Thus, under the name of a\r\ntranscendental synthesis of imagination, the understanding exercises an\r\nactivity upon the passive subject, whose faculty it is; and so we are right in\r\nsaying that the internal sense is affected thereby. Apperception and its\r\nsynthetical unity are by no means one and the same with the internal sense. The\r\nformer, as the source of all our synthetical conjunction, applies, under the\r\nname of the categories, to the manifold of intuition in general, prior to all\r\nsensuous intuition of objects. The internal sense, on the contrary, contains\r\nmerely the form of intuition, but without any synthetical conjunction of the\r\nmanifold therein, and consequently does not contain any determined intuition,\r\nwhich is possible only through consciousness of the determination of the\r\nmanifold by the transcendental act of the imagination (synthetical influence of\r\nthe understanding on the internal sense), which I have named figurative\r\nsynthesis.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThis we can indeed always perceive in ourselves. We cannot cogitate a\r\ngeometrical line without drawing it in thought, nor a circle without describing\r\nit, nor represent the three dimensions of space without drawing three lines\r\nfrom the same point perpendicular to one another. We cannot even cogitate time,\r\nunless, in drawing a straight line (which is to serve as the external\r\nfigurative representation of time), we fix our attention on the act of the\r\nsynthesis of the manifold, whereby we determine successively the internal\r\nsense, and thus attend also to the succession of this determination. Motion as\r\nan act of the subject (not as a determination of an object),\u003ca\r\nhref=\"#linknote-20\" id=\"linknoteref-20\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[20]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e consequently the synthesis of the\r\nmanifold in space, if we make abstraction of space and attend merely to the act\r\nby which we determine the internal sense according to its form, is that which\r\nproduces the conception of succession. The understanding, therefore, does by no\r\nmeans find in the internal sense any such synthesis of the manifold, but\r\nproduces it, in that it affects this sense. At the same time, how \u0026ldquo;I who\r\nthink\u0026rdquo; is distinct from the \u0026ldquo;i\u0026rdquo; which intuites itself (other\r\nmodes of intuition being cogitable as at least possible), and yet one and the\r\nsame with this latter as the same subject; how, therefore, I am able to say:\r\n\u0026ldquo;I, as an intelligence and thinking subject, cognize myself as an object\r\nthought, so far as I am, moreover, given to myself in intuition\u0026mdash;only,\r\nlike other phenomena, not as I am in myself, and as considered by the\r\nunderstanding, but merely as I appear\u0026rdquo;\u0026mdash;is a question that has in it\r\nneither more nor less difficulty than the question\u0026mdash;\u0026ldquo;How can I be an\r\nobject to myself?\u0026rdquo; or this\u0026mdash;\u0026ldquo;How I can be an object of my own\r\nintuition and internal perceptions?\u0026rdquo; But that such must be the fact, if\r\nwe admit that space is merely a pure form of the phenomena of external sense,\r\ncan be clearly proved by the consideration that we cannot represent time, which\r\nis not an object of external intuition, in any other way than under the image\r\nof a line, which we draw in thought, a mode of representation without which we\r\ncould not cognize the unity of its dimension, and also that we are necessitated\r\nto take our determination of periods of time, or of points of time, for all our\r\ninternal perceptions from the changes which we perceive in outward things. It\r\nfollows that we must arrange the determinations of the internal sense, as\r\nphenomena in time, exactly in the same manner as we arrange those of the\r\nexternal senses in space. And consequently, if we grant, respecting this\r\nlatter, that by means of them we know objects only in so far as we are affected\r\nexternally, we must also confess, with regard to the internal sense, that by\r\nmeans of it we intuite ourselves only as we are internally affected by\r\nourselves; in other words, as regards internal intuition, we cognize our own\r\nsubject only as phenomenon, and not as it is in itself.\u003ca href=\"#linknote-21\" id=\"linknoteref-21\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[21]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"linknote-20\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#linknoteref-20\"\u003e[20]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nMotion of an object in space does not belong to a pure science, consequently\r\nnot to geometry; because, that a thing is movable cannot be known à priori, but\r\nonly from experience. But motion, considered as the description of a space, is\r\na pure act of the successive synthesis of the manifold in external intuition by\r\nmeans of productive imagination, and belongs not only to geometry, but even to\r\ntranscendental philosophy.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"linknote-21\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#linknoteref-21\"\u003e[21]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nI do not see why so much difficulty should be found in admitting that our\r\ninternal sense is affected by ourselves. Every act of attention exemplifies it.\r\nIn such an act the understanding determines the internal sense by the\r\nsynthetical conjunction which it cogitates, conformably to the internal\r\nintuition which corresponds to the manifold in the synthesis of the\r\nunderstanding. How much the mind is usually affected thereby every one will be\r\nable to perceive in himself.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"center\"\u003e\r\n§ 21\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nOn the other hand, in the transcendental synthesis of the manifold content of\r\nrepresentations, consequently in the synthetical unity of apperception, I am\r\nconscious of myself, not as I appear to myself, nor as I am in myself, but only\r\nthat \u0026ldquo;I am.\u0026rdquo; This representation is a thought, not an intuition.\r\nNow, as in order to cognize ourselves, in addition to the act of thinking,\r\nwhich subjects the manifold of every possible intuition to the unity of\r\napperception, there is necessary a determinate mode of intuition, whereby this\r\nmanifold is given; although my own existence is certainly not mere phenomenon\r\n(much less mere illusion), the determination of my existence\u003ca\r\nhref=\"#linknote-22\" id=\"linknoteref-22\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[22]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Can only take place conformably to the\r\nform of the internal sense, according to the particular mode in which the\r\nmanifold which I conjoin is given in internal intuition, and I have therefore\r\nno knowledge of myself as I am, but merely as I appear to myself. The\r\nconsciousness of self is thus very far from a knowledge of self, in which I do\r\nnot use the categories, whereby I cogitate an object, by means of the\r\nconjunction of the manifold in one apperception. In the same way as I require,\r\nfor the sake of the cognition of an object distinct from myself, not only the\r\nthought of an object in general (in the category), but also an intuition by\r\nwhich to determine that general conception, in the same way do I require, in\r\norder to the cognition of myself, not only the consciousness of myself or the\r\nthought that I think myself, but in addition an intuition of the manifold in\r\nmyself, by which to determine this thought. It is true that I exist as an\r\nintelligence which is conscious only of its faculty of conjunction or\r\nsynthesis, but subjected in relation to the manifold which this intelligence\r\nhas to conjoin to a limitative conjunction called the internal sense. My\r\nintelligence (that is, I) can render that conjunction or synthesis perceptible\r\nonly according to the relations of time, which are quite beyond the proper\r\nsphere of the conceptions of the understanding and consequently cognize itself\r\nin respect to an intuition (which cannot possibly be intellectual, nor given by\r\nthe understanding), only as it appears to itself, and not as it would cognize\r\nitself, if its intuition were intellectual.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"linknote-22\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#linknoteref-22\"\u003e[22]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nThe \u0026ldquo;I think\u0026rdquo; expresses the act of determining my own existence. My\r\nexistence is thus already given by the act of consciousness; but the mode in\r\nwhich I must determine my existence, that is, the mode in which I must place\r\nthe manifold belonging to my existence, is not thereby given. For this purpose\r\nintuition of self is required, and this intuition possesses a form given à\r\npriori, namely, time, which is sensuous, and belongs to our receptivity of the\r\ndeterminable. Now, as I do not possess another intuition of self which gives\r\nthe determining in me (of the spontaneity of which I am conscious), prior to\r\nthe act of determination, in the same manner as time gives the determinable, it\r\nis clear that I am unable to determine my own existence as that of a\r\nspontaneous being, but I am only able to represent to myself the spontaneity of\r\nmy thought, that is, of my determination, and my existence remains ever\r\ndeterminable in a purely sensuous manner, that is to say, like the existence of\r\na phenomenon. But it is because of this spontaneity that I call myself an\r\nintelligence.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003ca id=\"chap51\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eTranscendental Deduction of the universally possible\r\nemployment in experience of the Pure Conceptions of the Understanding § 22\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIn the metaphysical deduction, the à priori origin of categories was proved by\r\ntheir complete accordance with the general logical of thought; in the\r\ntranscendental deduction was exhibited the possibility of the categories as à\r\npriori cognitions of objects of an intuition in general (§ 16 and 17).At\r\npresent we are about to explain the possibility of cognizing, à priori, by\r\nmeans of the categories, all objects which can possibly be presented to our\r\nsenses, not, indeed, according to the form of their intuition, but according to\r\nthe laws of their conjunction or synthesis, and thus, as it were, of\r\nprescribing laws to nature and even of rendering nature possible. For if the\r\ncategories were inadequate to this task, it would not be evident to us why\r\neverything that is presented to our senses must be subject to those laws which\r\nhave an à priori origin in the understanding itself.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nI premise that by the term synthesis of apprehension I understand the\r\ncombination of the manifold in an empirical intuition, whereby perception, that\r\nis, empirical consciousness of the intuition (as phenomenon), is possible.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWe have à priori forms of the external and internal sensuous intuition in the\r\nrepresentations of space and time, and to these must the synthesis of\r\napprehension of the manifold in a phenomenon be always comformable, because the\r\nsynthesis itself can only take place according to these forms. But space and\r\ntime are not merely forms of sensuous intuition, but intuitions themselves\r\n(which contain a manifold), and therefore contain à priori the determination of\r\nthe unity of this manifold.\u003ca href=\"#linknote-23\" id=\"linknoteref-23\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[23]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e (See the Transcendent Æsthetic.)\r\nTherefore is unity of the synthesis of the manifold without or within us,\r\nconsequently also a conjunction to which all that is to be represented as\r\ndetermined in space or time must correspond, given à priori along with (not in)\r\nthese intuitions, as the condition of the synthesis of all apprehension of\r\nthem. But this synthetical unity can be no other than that of the conjunction\r\nof the manifold of a given intuition in general, in a primitive act of\r\nconsciousness, according to the categories, but applied to our sensuous\r\nintuition. Consequently all synthesis, whereby alone is even perception\r\npossible, is subject to the categories. And, as experience is cognition by\r\nmeans of conjoined perceptions, the categories are conditions of the\r\npossibility of experience and are therefore valid à priori for all objects of\r\nexperience.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"linknote-23\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#linknoteref-23\"\u003e[23]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nSpace represented as an object (as geometry really requires it to be) contains\r\nmore than the mere form of the intuition; namely, a combination of the manifold\r\ngiven according to the form of sensibility into a representation that can be\r\nintuited; so that the form of the intuition gives us merely the manifold, but\r\nthe formal intuition gives unity of representation. In the æsthetic, I regarded\r\nthis unity as belonging entirely to sensibility, for the purpose of indicating\r\nthat it antecedes all conceptions, although it presupposes a synthesis which\r\ndoes not belong to sense, through which alone, however, all our conceptions of\r\nspace and time are possible. For as by means of this unity alone (the\r\nunderstanding determining the sensibility) space and time are given as\r\nintuitions, it follows that the unity of this intuition à priori belongs to\r\nspace and time, and not to the conception of the understanding (§ 20).\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWhen, then, for example, I make the empirical intuition of a house by\r\napprehension of the manifold contained therein into a perception, the necessary\r\nunity of space and of my external sensuous intuition lies at the foundation of\r\nthis act, and I, as it were, draw the form of the house conformably to this\r\nsynthetical unity of the manifold in space. But this very synthetical unity\r\nremains, even when I abstract the form of space, and has its seat in the\r\nunderstanding, and is in fact the category of the synthesis of the homogeneous\r\nin an intuition; that is to say, the category of quantity, to which the\r\naforesaid synthesis of apprehension, that is, the perception, must be\r\ncompletely conformable.\u003ca href=\"#linknote-24\" id=\"linknoteref-24\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[24]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"linknote-24\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#linknoteref-24\"\u003e[24]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nIn this manner it is proved, that the synthesis of apprehension, which is\r\nempirical, must necessarily be conformable to the synthesis of apperception,\r\nwhich is intellectual, and contained à priori in the category. It is one and\r\nthe same spontaneity which at one time, under the name of imagination, at\r\nanother under that of understanding, produces conjunction in the manifold of\r\nintuition.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nTo take another example, when I perceive the freezing of water, I apprehend two\r\nstates (fluidity and solidity), which, as such, stand toward each other\r\nmutually in a relation of time. But in the time, which I place as an internal\r\nintuition, at the foundation of this phenomenon, I represent to myself\r\nsynthetical unity of the manifold, without which the aforesaid relation could\r\nnot be given in an intuition as determined (in regard to the succession of\r\ntime). Now this synthetical unity, as the à priori condition under which I\r\nconjoin the manifold of an intuition, is, if I make abstraction of the\r\npermanent form of my internal intuition (that is to say, of time), the category\r\nof cause, by means of which, when applied to my sensibility, I determine\r\neverything that occurs according to relations of time. Consequently\r\napprehension in such an event, and the event itself, as far as regards the\r\npossibility of its perception, stands under the conception of the relation of\r\ncause and effect: and so in all other cases.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCategories are conceptions which prescribe laws à priori to phenomena,\r\nconsequently to nature as the complex of all phenomena (natura materialiter\r\nspectata). And now the question arises\u0026mdash;inasmuch as these categories are\r\nnot derived from nature, and do not regulate themselves according to her as\r\ntheir model (for in that case they would be empirical)\u0026mdash;how it is\r\nconceivable that nature must regulate herself according to them, in other\r\nwords, how the categories can determine à priori the synthesis of the manifold\r\nof nature, and yet not derive their origin from her. The following is the\r\nsolution of this enigma.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIt is not in the least more difficult to conceive how the laws of the phenomena\r\nof nature must harmonize with the understanding and with its à priori\r\nform\u0026mdash;that is, its faculty of conjoining the manifold\u0026mdash;than it is to\r\nunderstand how the phenomena themselves must correspond with the à priori form\r\nof our sensuous intuition. For laws do not exist in the phenomena any more than\r\nthe phenomena exist as things in themselves. Laws do not exist except by\r\nrelation to the subject in which the phenomena inhere, in so far as it\r\npossesses understanding, just as phenomena have no existence except by relation\r\nto the same existing subject in so far as it has senses. To things as things in\r\nthemselves, conformability to law must necessarily belong independently of an\r\nunderstanding to cognize them. But phenomena are only representations of things\r\nwhich are utterly unknown in respect to what they are in themselves. But as\r\nmere representations, they stand under no law of conjunction except that which\r\nthe conjoining faculty prescribes. Now that which conjoins the manifold of\r\nsensuous intuition is imagination, a mental act to which understanding\r\ncontributes unity of intellectual synthesis, and sensibility, manifoldness of\r\napprehension. Now as all possible perception depends on the synthesis of\r\napprehension, and this empirical synthesis itself on the transcendental,\r\nconsequently on the categories, it is evident that all possible perceptions,\r\nand therefore everything that can attain to empirical consciousness, that is,\r\nall phenomena of nature, must, as regards their conjunction, be subject to the\r\ncategories. And nature (considered merely as nature in general) is dependent on\r\nthem, as the original ground of her necessary conformability to law (as natura\r\nformaliter spectata). But the pure faculty (of the understanding) of\r\nprescribing laws à priori to phenomena by means of mere categories, is not\r\ncompetent to enounce other or more laws than those on which a nature in\r\ngeneral, as a conformability to law of phenomena of space and time, depends.\r\nParticular laws, inasmuch as they concern empirically determined phenomena,\r\ncannot be entirely deduced from pure laws, although they all stand under them.\r\nExperience must be superadded in order to know these particular laws; but in\r\nregard to experience in general, and everything that can be cognized as an\r\nobject thereof, these à priori laws are our only rule and guide.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003ca id=\"chap52\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eResult of this Deduction of the Conceptions of the\r\nUnderstanding § 23\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWe cannot think any object except by means of the categories; we cannot cognize\r\nany thought except by means of intuitions corresponding to these conceptions.\r\nNow all our intuitions are sensuous, and our cognition, in so far as the object\r\nof it is given, is empirical. But empirical cognition is experience;\r\nconsequently no à priori cognition is possible for us, except of objects of\r\npossible experience.\u003ca href=\"#linknote-25\" id=\"linknoteref-25\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[25]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"linknote-25\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#linknoteref-25\"\u003e[25]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nLest my readers should stumble at this assertion, and the conclusions that may\r\nbe too rashly drawn from it, I must remind them that the categories in the act\r\nof thought are by no means limited by the conditions of our sensuous intuition,\r\nbut have an unbounded sphere of action. It is only the cognition of the object\r\nof thought, the determining of the object, which requires intuition. In the\r\nabsence of intuition, our thought of an object may still have true and useful\r\nconsequences in regard to the exercise of reason by the subject. But as this\r\nexercise of reason is not always directed on the determination of the object,\r\nin other words, on cognition thereof, but also on the determination of the\r\nsubject and its volition, I do not intend to treat of it in this place.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut this cognition, which is limited to objects of experience, is not for that\r\nreason derived entirely, from, experience, but\u0026mdash;and this is asserted of\r\nthe pure intuitions and the pure conceptions of the understanding\u0026mdash;there\r\nare, unquestionably, elements of cognition, which exist in the mind à priori.\r\nNow there are only two ways in which a necessary harmony of experience with the\r\nconceptions of its objects can be cogitated. Either experience makes these\r\nconceptions possible, or the conceptions make experience possible. The former\r\nof these statements will not hold good with respect to the categories (nor in\r\nregard to pure sensuous intuition), for they are à priori conceptions, and\r\ntherefore independent of experience. The assertion of an empirical origin would\r\nattribute to them a sort of generatio aequivoca. Consequently, nothing remains\r\nbut to adopt the second alternative (which presents us with a system, as it\r\nwere, of the epigenesis of pure reason), namely, that on the part of the\r\nunderstanding the categories do contain the grounds of the possibility of all\r\nexperience. But with respect to the questions how they make experience\r\npossible, and what are the principles of the possibility thereof with which\r\nthey present us in their application to phenomena, the following section on the\r\ntranscendental exercise of the faculty of judgement will inform the reader.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIt is quite possible that someone may propose a species of preformation-system\r\nof pure reason\u0026mdash;a middle way between the two\u0026mdash;to wit, that the\r\ncategories are neither innate and first à priori principles of cognition, nor\r\nderived from experience, but are merely subjective aptitudes for thought\r\nimplanted in us contemporaneously with our existence, which were so ordered and\r\ndisposed by our Creator, that their exercise perfectly harmonizes with the laws\r\nof nature which regulate experience. Now, not to mention that with such an\r\nhypothesis it is impossible to say at what point we must stop in the employment\r\nof predetermined aptitudes, the fact that the categories would in this case\r\nentirely lose that character of necessity which is essentially involved in the\r\nvery conception of them, is a conclusive objection to it. The conception of\r\ncause, for example, which expresses the necessity of an effect under a\r\npresupposed condition, would be false, if it rested only upon such an arbitrary\r\nsubjective necessity of uniting certain empirical representations according to\r\nsuch a rule of relation. I could not then say\u0026mdash;\u0026ldquo;The effect is\r\nconnected with its cause in the object (that is, necessarily),\u0026rdquo; but only,\r\n\u0026ldquo;I am so constituted that I can think this representation as so\r\nconnected, and not otherwise.\u0026rdquo; Now this is just what the sceptic wants.\r\nFor in this case, all our knowledge, depending on the supposed objective\r\nvalidity of our judgement, is nothing but mere illusion; nor would there be\r\nwanting people who would deny any such subjective necessity in respect to\r\nthemselves, though they must feel it. At all events, we could not dispute with\r\nany one on that which merely depends on the manner in which his subject is\r\norganized.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nShort view of the above Deduction.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe foregoing deduction is an exposition of the pure conceptions of the\r\nunderstanding (and with them of all theoretical à priori cognition), as\r\nprinciples of the possibility of experience, but of experience as the\r\ndetermination of all phenomena in space and time in general\u0026mdash;of\r\nexperience, finally, from the principle of the original synthetical unity of\r\napperception, as the form of the understanding in relation to time and space as\r\noriginal forms of sensibility.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nI consider the division by paragraphs to be necessary only up to this point,\r\nbecause we had to treat of the elementary conceptions. As we now proceed to the\r\nexposition of the employment of these, I shall not designate the chapters in\r\nthis manner any further.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003ca id=\"chap53\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eBOOK II. Analytic of Principles\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGeneral logic is constructed upon a plan which coincides exactly with the\r\ndivision of the higher faculties of cognition. These are, understanding,\r\njudgement, and reason. This science, accordingly, treats in its analytic of\r\nconceptions, judgements, and conclusions in exact correspondence with the\r\nfunctions and order of those mental powers which we include generally under the\r\ngeneric denomination of understanding.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAs this merely formal logic makes abstraction of all content of cognition,\r\nwhether pure or empirical, and occupies itself with the mere form of thought\r\n(discursive cognition), it must contain in its analytic a canon for reason. For\r\nthe form of reason has its law, which, without taking into consideration the\r\nparticular nature of the cognition about which it is employed, can be\r\ndiscovered à priori, by the simple analysis of the action of reason into its\r\nmomenta.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nTranscendental logic, limited as it is to a determinate content, that of pure à\r\npriori cognitions, to wit, cannot imitate general logic in this division. For\r\nit is evident that the transcendental employment of reason is not objectively\r\nvalid, and therefore does not belong to the logic of truth (that is, to\r\nanalytic), but as a logic of illusion, occupies a particular department in the\r\nscholastic system under the name of transcendental dialectic.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nUnderstanding and judgement accordingly possess in transcendental logic a canon\r\nof objectively valid, and therefore true exercise, and are comprehended in the\r\nanalytical department of that logic. But reason, in her endeavours to arrive by\r\nà priori means at some true statement concerning objects and to extend\r\ncognition beyond the bounds of possible experience, is altogether dialectic,\r\nand her illusory assertions cannot be constructed into a canon such as an\r\nanalytic ought to contain.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAccordingly, the analytic of principles will be merely a canon for the faculty\r\nof judgement, for the instruction of this faculty in its application to\r\nphenomena of the pure conceptions of the understanding, which contain the\r\nnecessary condition for the establishment of à priori laws. On this account,\r\nalthough the subject of the following chapters is the especial principles of\r\nunderstanding, I shall make use of the term Doctrine of the faculty of\r\njudgement, in order to define more particularly my present purpose.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003ca id=\"chap54\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eINTRODUCTION. Of the Transcendental Faculty of\r\njudgement in General\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIf understanding in general be defined as the faculty of laws or rules, the\r\nfaculty of judgement may be termed the faculty of subsumption under these\r\nrules; that is, of distinguishing whether this or that does or does not stand\r\nunder a given rule (casus datae legis). General logic contains no directions or\r\nprecepts for the faculty of judgement, nor can it contain any such. For as it\r\nmakes abstraction of all content of cognition, no duty is left for it, except\r\nthat of exposing analytically the mere form of cognition in conceptions,\r\njudgements, and conclusions, and of thereby establishing formal rules for all\r\nexercise of the understanding. Now if this logic wished to give some general\r\ndirection how we should subsume under these rules, that is, how we should\r\ndistinguish whether this or that did or did not stand under them, this again\r\ncould not be done otherwise than by means of a rule. But this rule, precisely\r\nbecause it is a rule, requires for itself direction from the faculty of\r\njudgement. Thus, it is evident that the understanding is capable of being\r\ninstructed by rules, but that the judgement is a peculiar talent, which does\r\nnot, and cannot require tuition, but only exercise. This faculty is therefore\r\nthe specific quality of the so-called mother wit, the want of which no\r\nscholastic discipline can compensate.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nFor although education may furnish, and, as it were, engraft upon a limited\r\nunderstanding rules borrowed from other minds, yet the power of employing these\r\nrules correctly must belong to the pupil himself; and no rule which we can\r\nprescribe to him with this purpose is, in the absence or deficiency of this\r\ngift of nature, secure from misuse.\u003ca href=\"#linknote-26\" id=\"linknoteref-26\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[26]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e A physician therefore, a judge or a\r\nstatesman, may have in his head many admirable pathological, juridical, or\r\npolitical rules, in a degree that may enable him to be a profound teacher in\r\nhis particular science, and yet in the application of these rules he may very\r\npossibly blunder\u0026mdash;either because he is wanting in natural judgement\r\n(though not in understanding) and, whilst he can comprehend the general in\r\nabstracto, cannot distinguish whether a particular case in concreto ought to\r\nrank under the former; or because his faculty of judgement has not been\r\nsufficiently exercised by examples and real practice. Indeed, the grand and\r\nonly use of examples, is to sharpen the judgement. For as regards the\r\ncorrectness and precision of the insight of the understanding, examples are\r\ncommonly injurious rather than otherwise, because, as casus in terminis they\r\nseldom adequately fulfil the conditions of the rule. Besides, they often weaken\r\nthe power of our understanding to apprehend rules or laws in their\r\nuniversality, independently of particular circumstances of experience; and\r\nhence, accustom us to employ them more as formulae than as principles. Examples\r\nare thus the go-cart of the judgement, which he who is naturally deficient in\r\nthat faculty cannot afford to dispense with.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"linknote-26\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#linknoteref-26\"\u003e[26]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nDeficiency in judgement is properly that which is called stupidity; and for\r\nsuch a failing we know no remedy. A dull or narrow-minded person, to whom\r\nnothing is wanting but a proper degree of understanding, may be improved by\r\ntuition, even so far as to deserve the epithet of learned. But as such persons\r\nfrequently labour under a deficiency in the faculty of judgement, it is not\r\nuncommon to find men extremely learned who in the application of their science\r\nbetray a lamentable degree this irremediable want.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut although general logic cannot give directions to the faculty of judgement,\r\nthe case is very different as regards transcendental logic, insomuch that it\r\nappears to be the especial duty of the latter to secure and direct, by means of\r\ndeterminate rules, the faculty of judgement in the employment of the pure\r\nunderstanding. For, as a doctrine, that is, as an endeavour to enlarge the\r\nsphere of the understanding in regard to pure à priori cognitions, philosophy\r\nis worse than useless, since from all the attempts hitherto made, little or no\r\nground has been gained. But, as a critique, in order to guard against the\r\nmistakes of the faculty of judgement (lapsus judicii) in the employment of the\r\nfew pure conceptions of the understanding which we possess, although its use is\r\nin this case purely negative, philosophy is called upon to apply all its\r\nacuteness and penetration.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut transcendental philosophy has this peculiarity, that besides indicating the\r\nrule, or rather the general condition for rules, which is given in the pure\r\nconception of the understanding, it can, at the same time, indicate à priori\r\nthe case to which the rule must be applied. The cause of the superiority which,\r\nin this respect, transcendental philosophy possesses above all other sciences\r\nexcept mathematics, lies in this: it treats of conceptions which must relate à\r\npriori to their objects, whose objective validity consequently cannot be\r\ndemonstrated à posteriori, and is, at the same time, under the obligation of\r\npresenting in general but sufficient tests, the conditions under which objects\r\ncan be given in harmony with those conceptions; otherwise they would be mere\r\nlogical forms, without content, and not pure conceptions of the understanding.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nOur transcendental doctrine of the faculty of judgement will contain two\r\nchapters. The first will treat of the sensuous condition under which alone pure\r\nconceptions of the understanding can be employed\u0026mdash;that is, of the\r\nschematism of the pure understanding. The second will treat of those\r\nsynthetical judgements which are derived à priori from pure conceptions of the\r\nunderstanding under those conditions, and which lie à priori at the foundation\r\nof all other cognitions, that is to say, it will treat of the principles of the\r\npure understanding.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003ca id=\"chap55\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eTRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF THE FACULTY OF JUDGEMENT\r\nOR, ANALYTIC OF PRINCIPLES\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003ca id=\"chap56\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eChapter I. Of the Schematism at of the Pure\r\nConceptions of the Understanding\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIn all subsumptions of an object under a conception, the representation of the\r\nobject must be homogeneous with the conception; in other words, the conception\r\nmust contain that which is represented in the object to be subsumed under it.\r\nFor this is the meaning of the expression: \u0026ldquo;An object is contained under\r\na conception.\u0026rdquo; Thus the empirical conception of a plate is homogeneous\r\nwith the pure geometrical conception of a circle, inasmuch as the roundness\r\nwhich is cogitated in the former is intuited in the latter.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut pure conceptions of the understanding, when compared with empirical\r\nintuitions, or even with sensuous intuitions in general, are quite\r\nheterogeneous, and never can be discovered in any intuition. How then is the\r\nsubsumption of the latter under the former, and consequently the application of\r\nthe categories to phenomena, possible?\u0026mdash;For it is impossible to say, for\r\nexample: \u0026ldquo;Causality can be intuited through the senses and is contained\r\nin the phenomenon.\u0026rdquo;\u0026mdash;This natural and important question forms the\r\nreal cause of the necessity of a transcendental doctrine of the faculty of\r\njudgement, with the purpose, to wit, of showing how pure conceptions of the\r\nunderstanding can be applied to phenomena. In all other sciences, where the\r\nconceptions by which the object is thought in the general are not so different\r\nand heterogeneous from those which represent the object in concreto\u0026mdash;as it\r\nis given, it is quite unnecessary to institute any special inquiries concerning\r\nthe application of the former to the latter.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nNow it is quite clear that there must be some third thing, which on the one\r\nside is homogeneous with the category, and with the phenomenon on the other,\r\nand so makes the application of the former to the latter possible. This\r\nmediating representation must be pure (without any empirical content), and yet\r\nmust on the one side be intellectual, on the other sensuous. Such a\r\nrepresentation is the transcendental schema.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe conception of the understanding contains pure synthetical unity of the\r\nmanifold in general. Time, as the formal condition of the manifold of the\r\ninternal sense, consequently of the conjunction of all representations,\r\ncontains à priori a manifold in the pure intuition. Now a transcendental\r\ndetermination of time is so far homogeneous with the category, which\r\nconstitutes the unity thereof, that it is universal and rests upon a rule à\r\npriori. On the other hand, it is so far homogeneous with the phenomenon,\r\ninasmuch as time is contained in every empirical representation of the\r\nmanifold. Thus an application of the category to phenomena becomes possible, by\r\nmeans of the transcendental determination of time, which, as the schema of the\r\nconceptions of the understanding, mediates the subsumption of the latter under\r\nthe former.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAfter what has been proved in our deduction of the categories, no one, it is to\r\nbe hoped, can hesitate as to the proper decision of the question, whether the\r\nemployment of these pure conceptions of the understanding ought to be merely\r\nempirical or also transcendental; in other words, whether the categories, as\r\nconditions of a possible experience, relate à priori solely to phenomena, or\r\nwhether, as conditions of the possibility of things in general, their\r\napplication can be extended to objects as things in themselves. For we have\r\nthere seen that conceptions are quite impossible, and utterly without\r\nsignification, unless either to them, or at least to the elements of which they\r\nconsist, an object be given; and that, consequently, they cannot possibly apply\r\nto objects as things in themselves without regard to the question whether and\r\nhow these may be given to us; and, further, that the only manner in which\r\nobjects can be given to us is by means of the modification of our sensibility;\r\nand, finally, that pure à priori conceptions, in addition to the function of\r\nthe understanding in the category, must contain à priori formal conditions of\r\nsensibility (of the internal sense, namely), which again contain the general\r\ncondition under which alone the category can be applied to any object. This\r\nformal and pure condition of sensibility, to which the conception of the\r\nunderstanding is restricted in its employment, we shall name the schema of the\r\nconception of the understanding, and the procedure of the understanding with\r\nthese schemata we shall call the schematism of the pure understanding.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe schema is, in itself, always a mere product of the imagination. But, as the\r\nsynthesis of imagination has for its aim no single intuition, but merely unity\r\nin the determination of sensibility, the schema is clearly distinguishable from\r\nthe image. Thus, if I place five points one after another…. this is an image\r\nof the number five. On the other hand, if I only think a number in general,\r\nwhich may be either five or a hundred, this thought is rather the\r\nrepresentation of a method of representing in an image a sum (e.g., a thousand)\r\nin conformity with a conception, than the image itself, an image which I should\r\nfind some little difficulty in reviewing, and comparing with the conception.\r\nNow this representation of a general procedure of the imagination to present\r\nits image to a conception, I call the schema of this conception.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIn truth, it is not images of objects, but schemata, which lie at the\r\nfoundation of our pure sensuous conceptions. No image could ever be adequate to\r\nour conception of a triangle in general. For the generalness of the conception\r\nit never could attain to, as this includes under itself all triangles, whether\r\nright-angled, acute-angled, etc., whilst the image would always be limited to a\r\nsingle part of this sphere. The schema of the triangle can exist nowhere else\r\nthan in thought, and it indicates a rule of the synthesis of the imagination in\r\nregard to pure figures in space. Still less is an object of experience, or an\r\nimage of the object, ever to the empirical conception. On the contrary, the\r\nconception always relates immediately to the schema of the imagination, as a\r\nrule for the determination of our intuition, in conformity with a certain\r\ngeneral conception. The conception of a dog indicates a rule, according to\r\nwhich my imagination can delineate the figure of a four-footed animal in\r\ngeneral, without being limited to any particular individual form which\r\nexperience presents to me, or indeed to any possible image that I can represent\r\nto myself in concreto. This schematism of our understanding in regard to\r\nphenomena and their mere form, is an art, hidden in the depths of the human\r\nsoul, whose true modes of action we shall only with difficulty discover and\r\nunveil. Thus much only can we say: \u0026ldquo;The image is a product of the\r\nempirical faculty of the productive imagination\u0026mdash;the schema of sensuous\r\nconceptions (of figures in space, for example) is a product, and, as it were, a\r\nmonogram of the pure imagination à priori, whereby and according to which\r\nimages first become possible, which, however, can be connected with the\r\nconception only mediately by means of the schema which they indicate, and are\r\nin themselves never fully adequate to it.\u0026rdquo; On the other hand, the schema\r\nof a pure conception of the understanding is something that cannot be reduced\r\ninto any image\u0026mdash;it is nothing else than the pure synthesis expressed by\r\nthe category, conformably, to a rule of unity according to conceptions. It is a\r\ntranscendental product of the imagination, a product which concerns the\r\ndetermination of the internal sense, according to conditions of its form (time)\r\nin respect to all representations, in so far as these representations must be\r\nconjoined à priori in one conception, conformably to the unity of apperception.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWithout entering upon a dry and tedious analysis of the essential requisites of\r\ntranscendental schemata of the pure conceptions of the understanding, we shall\r\nrather proceed at once to give an explanation of them according to the order of\r\nthe categories, and in connection therewith.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nFor the external sense the pure image of all quantities (quantorum) is space;\r\nthe pure image of all objects of sense in general, is time. But the pure schema\r\nof quantity (quantitatis) as a conception of the understanding, is number, a\r\nrepresentation which comprehends the successive addition of one to one\r\n(homogeneous quantities). Thus, number is nothing else than the unity of the\r\nsynthesis of the manifold in a homogeneous intuition, by means of my generating\r\ntime itself in my apprehension of the intuition.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nReality, in the pure conception of the understanding, is that which corresponds\r\nto a sensation in general; that, consequently, the conception of which\r\nindicates a being (in time). Negation is that the conception of which\r\nrepresents a not-being (in time). The opposition of these two consists\r\ntherefore in the difference of one and the same time, as a time filled or a\r\ntime empty. Now as time is only the form of intuition, consequently of objects\r\nas phenomena, that which in objects corresponds to sensation is the\r\ntranscendental matter of all objects as things in themselves (Sachheit,\r\nreality). Now every sensation has a degree or quantity by which it can fill\r\ntime, that is to say, the internal sense in respect of the representation of an\r\nobject, more or less, until it vanishes into nothing (= 0 = negatio). Thus\r\nthere is a relation and connection between reality and negation, or rather a\r\ntransition from the former to the latter, which makes every reality\r\nrepresentable to us as a quantum; and the schema of a reality as the quantity\r\nof something in so far as it fills time, is exactly this continuous and uniform\r\ngeneration of the reality in time, as we descend in time from the sensation\r\nwhich has a certain degree, down to the vanishing thereof, or gradually ascend\r\nfrom negation to the quantity thereof.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe schema of substance is the permanence of the real in time; that is, the\r\nrepresentation of it as a substratum of the empirical determination of time; a\r\nsubstratum which therefore remains, whilst all else changes. (Time passes not,\r\nbut in it passes the existence of the changeable. To time, therefore, which is\r\nitself unchangeable and permanent, corresponds that which in the phenomenon is\r\nunchangeable in existence, that is, substance, and it is only by it that the\r\nsuccession and coexistence of phenomena can be determined in regard to time.)\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe schema of cause and of the causality of a thing is the real which, when\r\nposited, is always followed by something else. It consists, therefore, in the\r\nsuccession of the manifold, in so far as that succession is subjected to a\r\nrule.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe schema of community (reciprocity of action and reaction), or the reciprocal\r\ncausality of substances in respect of their accidents, is the coexistence of\r\nthe determinations of the one with those of the other, according to a general\r\nrule.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe schema of possibility is the accordance of the synthesis of different\r\nrepresentations with the conditions of time in general (as, for example,\r\nopposites cannot exist together at the same time in the same thing, but only\r\nafter each other), and is therefore the determination of the representation of\r\na thing at any time.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe schema of reality is existence in a determined time.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe schema of necessity is the existence of an object in all time.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIt is clear, from all this, that the schema of the category of quantity\r\ncontains and represents the generation (synthesis) of time itself, in the\r\nsuccessive apprehension of an object; the schema of quality the synthesis of\r\nsensation with the representation of time, or the filling up of time; the\r\nschema of relation the relation of perceptions to each other in all time (that\r\nis, according to a rule of the determination of time): and finally, the schema\r\nof modality and its categories, time itself, as the correlative of the\r\ndetermination of an object\u0026mdash;whether it does belong to time, and how. The\r\nschemata, therefore, are nothing but à priori determinations of time according\r\nto rules, and these, in regard to all possible objects, following the\r\narrangement of the categories, relate to the series in time, the content in\r\ntime, the order in time, and finally, to the complex or totality in time.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHence it is apparent that the schematism of the understanding, by means of the\r\ntranscendental synthesis of the imagination, amounts to nothing else than the\r\nunity of the manifold of intuition in the internal sense, and thus indirectly\r\nto the unity of apperception, as a function corresponding to the internal sense\r\n(a receptivity). Thus, the schemata of the pure conceptions of the\r\nunderstanding are the true and only conditions whereby our understanding\r\nreceives an application to objects, and consequently significance. Finally,\r\ntherefore, the categories are only capable of empirical use, inasmuch as they\r\nserve merely to subject phenomena to the universal rules of synthesis, by means\r\nof an à priori necessary unity (on account of the necessary union of all\r\nconsciousness in one original apperception); and so to render them susceptible\r\nof a complete connection in one experience. But within this whole of possible\r\nexperience lie all our cognitions, and in the universal relation to this\r\nexperience consists transcendental truth, which antecedes all empirical truth,\r\nand renders the latter possible.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIt is, however, evident at first sight, that although the schemata of\r\nsensibility are the sole agents in realizing the categories, they do,\r\nnevertheless, also restrict them, that is, they limit the categories by\r\nconditions which lie beyond the sphere of understanding\u0026mdash;namely, in\r\nsensibility. Hence the schema is properly only the phenomenon, or the sensuous\r\nconception of an object in harmony with the category. (Numerus est quantitas\r\nphaenomenon\u0026mdash;sensatio realitas phaenomenon; constans et perdurabile rerum\r\nsubstantia phaenomenon\u0026mdash;aeternitas, necessitas, phaenomena, etc.) Now, if\r\nwe remove a restrictive condition, we thereby amplify, it appears, the formerly\r\nlimited conception. In this way, the categories in their pure signification,\r\nfree from all conditions of sensibility, ought to be valid of things as they\r\nare, and not, as the schemata represent them, merely as they appear; and\r\nconsequently the categories must have a significance far more extended, and\r\nwholly independent of all schemata. In truth, there does always remain to the\r\npure conceptions of the understanding, after abstracting every sensuous\r\ncondition, a value and significance, which is, however, merely logical. But in\r\nthis case, no object is given them, and therefore they have no meaning\r\nsufficient to afford us a conception of an object. The notion of substance, for\r\nexample, if we leave out the sensuous determination of permanence, would mean\r\nnothing more than a something which can be cogitated as subject, without the\r\npossibility of becoming a predicate to anything else. Of this representation I\r\ncan make nothing, inasmuch as it does not indicate to me what determinations\r\nthe thing possesses which must thus be valid as premier subject. Consequently,\r\nthe categories, without schemata are merely functions of the understanding for\r\nthe production of conceptions, but do not represent any object. This\r\nsignificance they derive from sensibility, which at the same time realizes the\r\nunderstanding and restricts it.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003ca id=\"chap57\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eChapter II. System of all Principles of the Pure\r\nUnderstanding\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIn the foregoing chapter we have merely considered the general conditions under\r\nwhich alone the transcendental faculty of judgement is justified in using the\r\npure conceptions of the understanding for synthetical judgements. Our duty at\r\npresent is to exhibit in systematic connection those judgements which the\r\nunderstanding really produces à priori. For this purpose, our table of the\r\ncategories will certainly afford us the natural and safe guidance. For it is\r\nprecisely the categories whose application to possible experience must\r\nconstitute all pure à priori cognition of the understanding; and the relation\r\nof which to sensibility will, on that very account, present us with a complete\r\nand systematic catalogue of all the transcendental principles of the use of the\r\nunderstanding.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPrinciples à priori are so called, not merely because they contain in\r\nthemselves the grounds of other judgements, but also because they themselves\r\nare not grounded in higher and more general cognitions. This peculiarity,\r\nhowever, does not raise them altogether above the need of a proof. For although\r\nthere could be found no higher cognition, and therefore no objective proof, and\r\nalthough such a principle rather serves as the foundation for all cognition of\r\nthe object, this by no means hinders us from drawing a proof from the\r\nsubjective sources of the possibility of the cognition of an object. Such a\r\nproof is necessary, moreover, because without it the principle might be liable\r\nto the imputation of being a mere gratuitous assertion.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIn the second place, we shall limit our investigations to those principles\r\nwhich relate to the categories. For as to the principles of transcendental\r\næsthetic, according to which space and time are the conditions of the\r\npossibility of things as phenomena, as also the restriction of these\r\nprinciples, namely, that they cannot be applied to objects as things in\r\nthemselves\u0026mdash;these, of course, do not fall within the scope of our present\r\ninquiry. In like manner, the principles of mathematical science form no part of\r\nthis system, because they are all drawn from intuition, and not from the pure\r\nconception of the understanding. The possibility of these principles, however,\r\nwill necessarily be considered here, inasmuch as they are synthetical\r\njudgements à priori, not indeed for the purpose of proving their accuracy and\r\napodeictic certainty, which is unnecessary, but merely to render conceivable\r\nand deduce the possibility of such evident à priori cognitions.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut we shall have also to speak of the principle of analytical judgements, in\r\nopposition to synthetical judgements, which is the proper subject of our\r\ninquiries, because this very opposition will free the theory of the latter from\r\nall ambiguity, and place it clearly before our eyes in its true nature.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"center\"\u003e\r\n\r\nSYSTEM OF THE PRINCIPLES OF THE PURE UNDERSTANDING\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003ca id=\"chap58\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eSection I. Of the Supreme Principle of all Analytical\r\nJudgements\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWhatever may be the content of our cognition, and in whatever manner our\r\ncognition may be related to its object, the universal, although only negative\r\nconditions of all our judgements is that they do not contradict themselves;\r\notherwise these judgements are in themselves (even without respect to the\r\nobject) nothing. But although there may exist no contradiction in our\r\njudgement, it may nevertheless connect conceptions in such a manner that they\r\ndo not correspond to the object, or without any grounds either à priori or à\r\nposteriori for arriving at such a judgement, and thus, without being\r\nself-contradictory, a judgement may nevertheless be either false or groundless.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nNow, the proposition: \u0026ldquo;No subject can have a predicate that contradicts\r\nit,\u0026rdquo; is called the principle of contradiction, and is a universal but\r\npurely negative criterion of all truth. But it belongs to logic alone, because\r\nit is valid of cognitions, merely as cognitions and without respect to their\r\ncontent, and declares that the contradiction entirely nullifies them. We can\r\nalso, however, make a positive use of this principle, that is, not merely to\r\nbanish falsehood and error (in so far as it rests upon contradiction), but also\r\nfor the cognition of truth. For if the judgement is analytical, be it\r\naffirmative or negative, its truth must always be recognizable by means of the\r\nprinciple of contradiction. For the contrary of that which lies and is\r\ncogitated as conception in the cognition of the object will be always properly\r\nnegatived, but the conception itself must always be affirmed of the object,\r\ninasmuch as the contrary thereof would be in contradiction to the object.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWe must therefore hold the principle of contradiction to be the universal and\r\nfully sufficient Principle of all analytical cognition. But as a sufficient\r\ncriterion of truth, it has no further utility or authority. For the fact that\r\nno cognition can be at variance with this principle without nullifying itself,\r\nconstitutes this principle the sine qua non, but not the determining ground of\r\nthe truth of our cognition. As our business at present is properly with the\r\nsynthetical part of our knowledge only, we shall always be on our guard not to\r\ntransgress this inviolable principle; but at the same time not to expect from\r\nit any direct assistance in the establishment of the truth of any synthetical\r\nproposition.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThere exists, however, a formula of this celebrated principle\u0026mdash;a principle\r\nmerely formal and entirely without content\u0026mdash;which contains a synthesis\r\nthat has been inadvertently and quite unnecessarily mixed up with it. It is\r\nthis: \u0026ldquo;It is impossible for a thing to be and not to be at the same\r\ntime.\u0026rdquo; Not to mention the superfluousness of the addition of the word\r\nimpossible to indicate the apodeictic certainty, which ought to be self-evident\r\nfrom the proposition itself, the proposition is affected by the condition of\r\ntime, and as it were says: \u0026ldquo;A thing = A, which is something = B, cannot\r\nat the same time be non-B.\u0026rdquo; But both, B as well as non-B, may quite well\r\nexist in succession. For example, a man who is young cannot at the same time be\r\nold; but the same man can very well be at one time young, and at another not\r\nyoung, that is, old. Now the principle of contradiction as a merely logical\r\nproposition must not by any means limit its application merely to relations of\r\ntime, and consequently a formula like the preceding is quite foreign to its\r\ntrue purpose. The misunderstanding arises in this way. We first of all separate\r\na predicate of a thing from the conception of the thing, and afterwards connect\r\nwith this predicate its opposite, and hence do not establish any contradiction\r\nwith the subject, but only with its predicate, which has been conjoined with\r\nthe subject synthetically\u0026mdash;a contradiction, moreover, which obtains only\r\nwhen the first and second predicate are affirmed in the same time. If I say:\r\n\u0026ldquo;A man who is ignorant is not learned,\u0026rdquo; the condition \u0026ldquo;at the\r\nsame time\u0026rdquo; must be added, for he who is at one time ignorant, may at\r\nanother be learned. But if I say: \u0026ldquo;No ignorant man is a learned\r\nman,\u0026rdquo; the proposition is analytical, because the characteristic ignorance\r\nis now a constituent part of the conception of the subject; and in this case\r\nthe negative proposition is evident immediately from the proposition of\r\ncontradiction, without the necessity of adding the condition \u0026ldquo;the same\r\ntime.\u0026rdquo; This is the reason why I have altered the formula of this\r\nprinciple\u0026mdash;an alteration which shows very clearly the nature of an\r\nanalytical proposition.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003ca id=\"chap59\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eSection II. Of the Supreme Principle of all\r\nSynthetical Judgements\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe explanation of the possibility of synthetical judgements is a task with\r\nwhich general logic has nothing to do; indeed she needs not even be acquainted\r\nwith its name. But in transcendental logic it is the most important matter to\r\nbe dealt with\u0026mdash;indeed the only one, if the question is of the possibility\r\nof synthetical judgements à priori, the conditions and extent of their\r\nvalidity. For when this question is fully decided, it can reach its aim with\r\nperfect ease, the determination, to wit, of the extent and limits of the pure\r\nunderstanding.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIn an analytical judgement I do not go beyond the given conception, in order to\r\narrive at some decision respecting it. If the judgement is affirmative, I\r\npredicate of the conception only that which was already cogitated in it; if\r\nnegative, I merely exclude from the conception its contrary. But in synthetical\r\njudgements, I must go beyond the given conception, in order to cogitate, in\r\nrelation with it, something quite different from that which was cogitated in\r\nit, a relation which is consequently never one either of identity or\r\ncontradiction, and by means of which the truth or error of the judgement cannot\r\nbe discerned merely from the judgement itself.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGranted, then, that we must go out beyond a given conception, in order to\r\ncompare it synthetically with another, a third thing is necessary, in which\r\nalone the synthesis of two conceptions can originate. Now what is this tertium\r\nquid that is to be the medium of all synthetical judgements? It is only a\r\ncomplex in which all our representations are contained, the internal sense to\r\nwit, and its form à priori, time.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe synthesis of our representations rests upon the imagination; their\r\nsynthetical unity (which is requisite to a judgement), upon the unity of\r\napperception. In this, therefore, is to be sought the possibility of\r\nsynthetical judgements, and as all three contain the sources of à priori\r\nrepresentations, the possibility of pure synthetical judgements also; nay, they\r\nare necessary upon these grounds, if we are to possess a knowledge of objects,\r\nwhich rests solely upon the synthesis of representations.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIf a cognition is to have objective reality, that is, to relate to an object,\r\nand possess sense and meaning in respect to it, it is necessary that the object\r\nbe given in some way or another. Without this, our conceptions are empty, and\r\nwe may indeed have thought by means of them, but by such thinking we have not,\r\nin fact, cognized anything, we have merely played with representation. To give\r\nan object, if this expression be understood in the sense of \u0026ldquo;to\r\npresent\u0026rdquo; the object, not mediately but immediately in intuition, means\r\nnothing else than to apply the representation of it to experience, be that\r\nexperience real or only possible. Space and time themselves, pure as these\r\nconceptions are from all that is empirical, and certain as it is that they are\r\nrepresented fully à priori in the mind, would be completely without objective\r\nvalidity, and without sense and significance, if their necessary use in the\r\nobjects of experience were not shown. Nay, the representation of them is a mere\r\nschema, that always relates to the reproductive imagination, which calls up the\r\nobjects of experience, without which they have no meaning. And so it is with\r\nall conceptions without distinction.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe possibility of experience is, then, that which gives objective reality to\r\nall our à priori cognitions. Now experience depends upon the synthetical unity\r\nof phenomena, that is, upon a synthesis according to conceptions of the object\r\nof phenomena in general, a synthesis without which experience never could\r\nbecome knowledge, but would be merely a rhapsody of perceptions, never fitting\r\ntogether into any connected text, according to rules of a thoroughly united\r\n(possible) consciousness, and therefore never subjected to the transcendental\r\nand necessary unity of apperception. Experience has therefore for a foundation,\r\nà priori principles of its form, that is to say, general rules of unity in the\r\nsynthesis of phenomena, the objective reality of which rules, as necessary\r\nconditions even of the possibility of experience can which rules, as necessary\r\nconditions\u0026mdash;even of the possibility of experience\u0026mdash;can always be\r\nshown in experience. But apart from this relation, à priori synthetical\r\npropositions are absolutely impossible, because they have no third term, that\r\nis, no pure object, in which the synthetical unity can exhibit the objective\r\nreality of its conceptions.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAlthough, then, respecting space, or the forms which productive imagination\r\ndescribes therein, we do cognize much à priori in synthetical judgements, and\r\nare really in no need of experience for this purpose, such knowledge would\r\nnevertheless amount to nothing but a busy trifling with a mere chimera, were\r\nnot space to be considered as the condition of the phenomena which constitute\r\nthe material of external experience. Hence those pure synthetical judgements do\r\nrelate, though but mediately, to possible experience, or rather to the\r\npossibility of experience, and upon that alone is founded the objective\r\nvalidity of their synthesis.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWhile then, on the one hand, experience, as empirical synthesis, is the only\r\npossible mode of cognition which gives reality to all other synthesis; on the\r\nother hand, this latter synthesis, as cognition à priori, possesses truth, that\r\nis, accordance with its object, only in so far as it contains nothing more than\r\nwhat is necessary to the synthetical unity of experience.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAccordingly, the supreme principle of all synthetical judgements is:\r\n\u0026ldquo;Every object is subject to the necessary conditions of the synthetical\r\nunity of the manifold of intuition in a possible experience.\u0026rdquo;\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nÀ priori synthetical judgements are possible when we apply the formal\r\nconditions of the à priori intuition, the synthesis of the imagination, and the\r\nnecessary unity of that synthesis in a transcendental apperception, to a\r\npossible cognition of experience, and say: \u0026ldquo;The conditions of the\r\npossibility of experience in general are at the same time conditions of the\r\npossibility of the objects of experience, and have, for that reason, objective\r\nvalidity in an à priori synthetical judgement.\u0026rdquo;\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003ca id=\"chap60\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eSection III. Systematic Representation of all\r\nSynthetical Principles of the Pure Understanding\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThat principles exist at all is to be ascribed solely to the pure\r\nunderstanding, which is not only the faculty of rules in regard to that which\r\nhappens, but is even the source of principles according to which everything\r\nthat can be presented to us as an object is necessarily subject to rules,\r\nbecause without such rules we never could attain to cognition of an object.\r\nEven the laws of nature, if they are contemplated as principles of the\r\nempirical use of the understanding, possess also a characteristic of necessity,\r\nand we may therefore at least expect them to be determined upon grounds which\r\nare valid à priori and antecedent to all experience. But all laws of nature,\r\nwithout distinction, are subject to higher principles of the understanding,\r\ninasmuch as the former are merely applications of the latter to particular\r\ncases of experience. These higher principles alone therefore give the\r\nconception, which contains the necessary condition, and, as it were, the\r\nexponent of a rule; experience, on the other hand, gives the case which comes\r\nunder the rule.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThere is no danger of our mistaking merely empirical principles for principles\r\nof the pure understanding, or conversely; for the character of necessity,\r\naccording to conceptions which distinguish the latter, and the absence of this\r\nin every empirical proposition, how extensively valid soever it may be, is a\r\nperfect safeguard against confounding them. There are, however, pure principles\r\nà priori, which nevertheless I should not ascribe to the pure\r\nunderstanding\u0026mdash;for this reason, that they are not derived from pure\r\nconceptions, but (although by the mediation of the understanding) from pure\r\nintuitions. But understanding is the faculty of conceptions. Such principles\r\nmathematical science possesses, but their application to experience,\r\nconsequently their objective validity, nay the possibility of such à priori\r\nsynthetical cognitions (the deduction thereof) rests entirely upon the pure\r\nunderstanding.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nOn this account, I shall not reckon among my principles those of mathematics;\r\nthough I shall include those upon the possibility and objective validity à\r\npriori, of principles of the mathematical science, which, consequently, are to\r\nbe looked upon as the principle of these, and which proceed from conceptions to\r\nintuition, and not from intuition to conceptions.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIn the application of the pure conceptions of the understanding to possible\r\nexperience, the employment of their synthesis is either mathematical or\r\ndynamical, for it is directed partly on the intuition alone, partly on the\r\nexistence of a phenomenon. But the à priori conditions of intuition are in\r\nrelation to a possible experience absolutely necessary, those of the existence\r\nof objects of a possible empirical intuition are in themselves contingent.\r\nHence the principles of the mathematical use of the categories will possess a\r\ncharacter of absolute necessity, that is, will be apodeictic; those, on the\r\nother hand, of the dynamical use, the character of an à priori necessity\r\nindeed, but only under the condition of empirical thought in an experience,\r\ntherefore only mediately and indirectly. Consequently they will not possess\r\nthat immediate evidence which is peculiar to the former, although their\r\napplication to experience does not, for that reason, lose its truth and\r\ncertitude. But of this point we shall be better able to judge at the conclusion\r\nof this system of principles.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe table of the categories is naturally our guide to the table of principles,\r\nbecause these are nothing else than rules for the objective employment of the\r\nformer. Accordingly, all principles of the pure understanding are:\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cpre\u003e\r\n 1\r\n Axioms\r\n of Intuition\r\n\r\n 2 3\r\n Anticipations Analogies\r\n of Perception of Experience\r\n 4\r\n Postulates of\r\n Empirical Thought\r\n in general\r\n\u003c/pre\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThese appellations I have chosen advisedly, in order that we might not lose\r\nsight of the distinctions in respect of the evidence and the employment of\r\nthese principles. It will, however, soon appear that\u0026mdash;a fact which\r\nconcerns both the evidence of these principles, and the à priori determination\r\nof phenomena\u0026mdash;according to the categories of quantity and quality (if we\r\nattend merely to the form of these), the principles of these categories are\r\ndistinguishable from those of the two others, in as much as the former are\r\npossessed of an intuitive, but the latter of a merely discursive, though in\r\nboth instances a complete, certitude. I shall therefore call the former\r\nmathematical, and the latter dynamical principles.\u003ca href=\"#linknote-27\" id=\"linknoteref-27\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[27]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e It must be\r\nobserved, however, that by these terms I mean just as little in the one case\r\nthe principles of mathematics as those of general (physical) dynamics in the\r\nother. I have here in view merely the principles of the pure understanding, in\r\ntheir application to the internal sense (without distinction of the\r\nrepresentations given therein), by means of which the sciences of mathematics\r\nand dynamics become possible. Accordingly, I have named these principles rather\r\nwith reference to their application than their content; and I shall now proceed\r\nto consider them in the order in which they stand in the table.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"linknote-27\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#linknoteref-27\"\u003e[27]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nAll combination (conjunctio) is either composition (compositio) or connection\r\n(nexus). The former is the synthesis of a manifold, the parts of which do not\r\nnecessarily belong to each other. For example, the two triangles into which a\r\nsquare is divided by a diagonal, do not necessarily belong to each other, and\r\nof this kind is the synthesis of the homogeneous in everything that can be\r\nmathematically considered. This synthesis can be divided into those of\r\naggregation and coalition, the former of which is applied to extensive, the\r\nlatter to intensive quantities. The second sort of combination (nexus) is the\r\nsynthesis of a manifold, in so far as its parts do belong necessarily to each\r\nother; for example, the accident to a substance, or the effect to the cause.\r\nConsequently it is a synthesis of that which though heterogeneous, is\r\nrepresented as connected à priori. This combination\u0026mdash;not an arbitrary\r\none\u0026mdash;I entitle dynamical because it concerns the connection of the\r\nexistence of the manifold. This, again, may be divided into the physical\r\nsynthesis, of the phenomena divided among each other, and the metaphysical\r\nsynthesis, or the connection of phenomena à priori in the faculty of cognition.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n1. AXIOMS OF INTUITION.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe principle of these is: All Intuitions are Extensive Quantities.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPROOF.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAll phenomena contain, as regards their form, an intuition in space and time,\r\nwhich lies à priori at the foundation of all without exception. Phenomena,\r\ntherefore, cannot be apprehended, that is, received into empirical\r\nconsciousness otherwise than through the synthesis of a manifold, through which\r\nthe representations of a determinate space or time are generated; that is to\r\nsay, through the composition of the homogeneous and the consciousness of the\r\nsynthetical unity of this manifold (homogeneous). Now the consciousness of a\r\nhomogeneous manifold in intuition, in so far as thereby the representation of\r\nan object is rendered possible, is the conception of a quantity (quanti).\r\nConsequently, even the perception of an object as phenomenon is possible only\r\nthrough the same synthetical unity of the manifold of the given sensuous\r\nintuition, through which the unity of the composition of the homogeneous\r\nmanifold in the conception of a quantity is cogitated; that is to say, all\r\nphenomena are quantities, and extensive quantities, because as intuitions in\r\nspace or time they must be represented by means of the same synthesis through\r\nwhich space and time themselves are determined.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAn extensive quantity I call that wherein the representation of the parts\r\nrenders possible (and therefore necessarily antecedes) the representation of\r\nthe whole. I cannot represent to myself any line, however small, without\r\ndrawing it in thought, that is, without generating from a point all its parts\r\none after another, and in this way alone producing this intuition. Precisely\r\nthe same is the case with every, even the smallest, portion of time. I cogitate\r\ntherein only the successive progress from one moment to another, and hence, by\r\nmeans of the different portions of time and the addition of them, a determinate\r\nquantity of time is produced. As the pure intuition in all phenomena is either\r\ntime or space, so is every phenomenon in its character of intuition an\r\nextensive quantity, inasmuch as it can only be cognized in our apprehension by\r\nsuccessive synthesis (from part to part). All phenomena are, accordingly, to be\r\nconsidered as aggregates, that is, as a collection of previously given parts;\r\nwhich is not the case with every sort of quantities, but only with those which\r\nare represented and apprehended by us as extensive.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nOn this successive synthesis of the productive imagination, in the generation\r\nof figures, is founded the mathematics of extension, or geometry, with its\r\naxioms, which express the conditions of sensuous intuition à priori, under\r\nwhich alone the schema of a pure conception of external intuition can exist;\r\nfor example, \u0026ldquo;be tween two points only one straight line is\r\npossible,\u0026rdquo; \u0026ldquo;two straight lines cannot enclose a space,\u0026rdquo; etc.\r\nThese are the axioms which properly relate only to quantities (quanta) as such.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut, as regards the quantity of a thing (quantitas), that is to say, the answer\r\nto the question: \u0026ldquo;How large is this or that object?\u0026rdquo; although, in\r\nrespect to this question, we have various propositions synthetical and\r\nimmediately certain (indemonstrabilia); we have, in the proper sense of the\r\nterm, no axioms. For example, the propositions: \u0026ldquo;If equals be added to\r\nequals, the wholes are equal\u0026rdquo;; \u0026ldquo;If equals be taken from equals, the\r\nremainders are equal\u0026rdquo;; are analytical, because I am immediately conscious\r\nof the identity of the production of the one quantity with the production of\r\nthe other; whereas axioms must be à priori synthetical propositions. On the\r\nother hand, the self-evident propositions as to the relation of numbers, are\r\ncertainly synthetical but not universal, like those of geometry, and for this\r\nreason cannot be called axioms, but numerical formulae. That 7 + 5 = 12 is not\r\nan analytical proposition. For neither in the representation of seven, nor of\r\nfive, nor of the composition of the two numbers, do I cogitate the number\r\ntwelve. (Whether I cogitate the number in the addition of both, is not at\r\npresent the question; for in the case of an analytical proposition, the only\r\npoint is whether I really cogitate the predicate in the representation of the\r\nsubject.) But although the proposition is synthetical, it is nevertheless only\r\na singular proposition. In so far as regard is here had merely to the synthesis\r\nof the homogeneous (the units), it cannot take place except in one manner,\r\nalthough our use of these numbers is afterwards general. If I say: \u0026ldquo;A\r\ntriangle can be constructed with three lines, any two of which taken together\r\nare greater than the third,\u0026rdquo; I exercise merely the pure function of the\r\nproductive imagination, which may draw the lines longer or shorter and\r\nconstruct the angles at its pleasure. On the contrary, the number seven is\r\npossible only in one manner, and so is likewise the number twelve, which\r\nresults from the synthesis of seven and five. Such propositions, then, cannot\r\nbe termed axioms (for in that case we should have an infinity of these), but\r\nnumerical formulae.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThis transcendental principle of the mathematics of phenomena greatly enlarges\r\nour à priori cognition. For it is by this principle alone that pure mathematics\r\nis rendered applicable in all its precision to objects of experience, and\r\nwithout it the validity of this application would not be so self-evident; on\r\nthe contrary, contradictions and confusions have often arisen on this very\r\npoint. Phenomena are not things in themselves. Empirical intuition is possible\r\nonly through pure intuition (of space and time); consequently, what geometry\r\naffirms of the latter, is indisputably valid of the former. All evasions, such\r\nas the statement that objects of sense do not conform to the rules of\r\nconstruction in space (for example, to the rule of the infinite divisibility of\r\nlines or angles), must fall to the ground. For, if these objections hold good,\r\nwe deny to space, and with it to all mathematics, objective validity, and no\r\nlonger know wherefore, and how far, mathematics can be applied to phenomena.\r\nThe synthesis of spaces and times as the essential form of all intuition, is\r\nthat which renders possible the apprehension of a phenomenon, and therefore\r\nevery external experience, consequently all cognition of the objects of\r\nexperience; and whatever mathematics in its pure use proves of the former, must\r\nnecessarily hold good of the latter. All objections are but the chicaneries of\r\nan ill-instructed reason, which erroneously thinks to liberate the objects of\r\nsense from the formal conditions of our sensibility, and represents these,\r\nalthough mere phenomena, as things in themselves, presented as such to our\r\nunderstanding. But in this case, no à priori synthetical cognition of them\r\ncould be possible, consequently not through pure conceptions of space and the\r\nscience which determines these conceptions, that is to say, geometry, would\r\nitself be impossible.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n2. ANTICIPATIONS OF PERCEPTION.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe principle of these is: In all phenomena the Real, that which is an object\r\nof sensation, has Intensive Quantity, that is, has a Degree.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPROOF.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPerception is empirical consciousness, that is to say, a consciousness which\r\ncontains an element of sensation. Phenomena as objects of perception are not\r\npure, that is, merely formal intuitions, like space and time, for they cannot\r\nbe perceived in themselves.\u003ca href=\"#linknote-28\" id=\"linknoteref-28\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[28]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e They contain, then, over and above the\r\nintuition, the materials for an object (through which is represented something\r\nexisting in space or time), that is to say, they contain the real of sensation,\r\nas a representation merely subjective, which gives us merely the consciousness\r\nthat the subject is affected, and which we refer to some external object. Now,\r\na gradual transition from empirical consciousness to pure consciousness is\r\npossible, inasmuch as the real in this consciousness entirely vanishes, and\r\nthere remains a merely formal consciousness (à priori) of the manifold in time\r\nand space; consequently there is possible a synthesis also of the production of\r\nthe quantity of a sensation from its commencement, that is, from the pure\r\nintuition = 0 onwards up to a certain quantity of the sensation. Now as\r\nsensation in itself is not an objective representation, and in it is to be\r\nfound neither the intuition of space nor of time, it cannot possess any\r\nextensive quantity, and yet there does belong to it a quantity (and that by\r\nmeans of its apprehension, in which empirical consciousness can within a\r\ncertain time rise from nothing = 0 up to its given amount), consequently an\r\nintensive quantity. And thus we must ascribe intensive quantity, that is, a\r\ndegree of influence on sense to all objects of perception, in so far as this\r\nperception contains sensation.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"linknote-28\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#linknoteref-28\"\u003e[28]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nThey can be perceived only as phenomena, and some part of them must always\r\nbelong to the non-ego; whereas pure intuitions are entirely the products of the\r\nmind itself, and as such are cognized \u003ci\u003ein themselves.\u0026mdash;Tr\u003c/i\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAll cognition, by means of which I am enabled to cognize and determine à priori\r\nwhat belongs to empirical cognition, may be called an anticipation; and without\r\ndoubt this is the sense in which Epicurus employed his expression prholepsis.\r\nBut as there is in phenomena something which is never cognized à priori, which\r\non this account constitutes the proper difference between pure and empirical\r\ncognition, that is to say, sensation (as the matter of perception), it follows,\r\nthat sensation is just that element in cognition which cannot be at all\r\nanticipated. On the other hand, we might very well term the pure determinations\r\nin space and time, as well in regard to figure as to quantity, anticipations of\r\nphenomena, because they represent à priori that which may always be given à\r\nposteriori in experience. But suppose that in every sensation, as sensation in\r\ngeneral, without any particular sensation being thought of, there existed\r\nsomething which could be cognized à priori, this would deserve to be called\r\nanticipation in a special sense\u0026mdash;special, because it may seem surprising\r\nto forestall experience, in that which concerns the matter of experience, and\r\nwhich we can only derive from itself. Yet such really is the case here.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nApprehension\u003ca href=\"#linknote-29\" id=\"linknoteref-29\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[29]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e, by means of sensation alone, fills\r\nonly one moment, that is, if I do not take into consideration a succession of\r\nmany sensations. As that in the phenomenon, the apprehension of which is not a\r\nsuccessive synthesis advancing from parts to an entire representation,\r\nsensation has therefore no extensive quantity; the want of sensation in a\r\nmoment of time would represent it as empty, consequently = 0. That which in the\r\nempirical intuition corresponds to sensation is reality (realitas phaenomenon);\r\nthat which corresponds to the absence of it, negation = 0. Now every sensation\r\nis capable of a diminution, so that it can decrease, and thus gradually\r\ndisappear. Therefore, between reality in a phenomenon and negation, there\r\nexists a continuous concatenation of many possible intermediate sensations, the\r\ndifference of which from each other is always smaller than that between the\r\ngiven sensation and zero, or complete negation. That is to say, the real in a\r\nphenomenon has always a quantity, which however is not discoverable in\r\napprehension, inasmuch as apprehension take place by means of mere sensation in\r\none instant, and not by the successive synthesis of many sensations, and\r\ntherefore does not progress from parts to the whole. Consequently, it has a\r\nquantity, but not an extensive quantity.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"linknote-29\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#linknoteref-29\"\u003e[29]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nApprehension is the Kantian word for preception, in the largest sense in which\r\nwe employ that term. It is the genus which includes under i, as species,\r\nperception proper and sensation proper\u0026mdash;Tr\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nNow that quantity which is apprehended only as unity, and in which plurality\r\ncan be represented only by approximation to negation = 0, I term intensive\r\nquantity. Consequently, reality in a phenomenon has intensive quantity, that\r\nis, a degree. If we consider this reality as cause (be it of sensation or of\r\nanother reality in the phenomenon, for example, a change), we call the degree\r\nof reality in its character of cause a momentum, for example, the momentum of\r\nweight; and for this reason, that the degree only indicates that quantity the\r\napprehension of which is not successive, but instantaneous. This, however, I\r\ntouch upon only in passing, for with causality I have at present nothing to do.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAccordingly, every sensation, consequently every reality in phenomena, however\r\nsmall it may be, has a degree, that is, an intensive quantity, which may always\r\nbe lessened, and between reality and negation there exists a continuous\r\nconnection of possible realities, and possible smaller perceptions. Every\r\ncolour\u0026mdash;for example, red\u0026mdash;has a degree, which, be it ever so small,\r\nis never the smallest, and so is it always with heat, the momentum of weight,\r\netc.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThis property of quantities, according to which no part of them is the smallest\r\npossible (no part simple), is called their continuity. Space and time are\r\nquanta continua, because no part of them can be given, without enclosing it\r\nwithin boundaries (points and moments), consequently, this given part is itself\r\na space or a time. Space, therefore, consists only of spaces, and time of\r\ntimes. Points and moments are only boundaries, that is, the mere places or\r\npositions of their limitation. But places always presuppose intuitions which\r\nare to limit or determine them; and we cannot conceive either space or time\r\ncomposed of constituent parts which are given before space or time. Such\r\nquantities may also be called flowing, because synthesis (of the productive\r\nimagination) in the production of these quantities is a progression in time,\r\nthe continuity of which we are accustomed to indicate by the expression\r\nflowing.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAll phenomena, then, are continuous quantities, in respect both to intuition\r\nand mere perception (sensation, and with it reality). In the former case they\r\nare extensive quantities; in the latter, intensive. When the synthesis of the\r\nmanifold of a phenomenon is interrupted, there results merely an aggregate of\r\nseveral phenomena, and not properly a phenomenon as a quantity, which is not\r\nproduced by the mere continuation of the productive synthesis of a certain\r\nkind, but by the repetition of a synthesis always ceasing. For example, if I\r\ncall thirteen dollars a sum or quantity of money, I employ the term quite\r\ncorrectly, inasmuch as I understand by thirteen dollars the value of a mark in\r\nstandard silver, which is, to be sure, a continuous quantity, in which no part\r\nis the smallest, but every part might constitute a piece of money, which would\r\ncontain material for still smaller pieces. If, however, by the words thirteen\r\ndollars I understand so many coins (be their value in silver what it may), it\r\nwould be quite erroneous to use the expression a quantity of dollars; on the\r\ncontrary, I must call them aggregate, that is, a number of coins. And as in\r\nevery number we must have unity as the foundation, so a phenomenon taken as\r\nunity is a quantity, and as such always a continuous quantity (quantum\r\ncontinuum).\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nNow, seeing all phenomena, whether considered as extensive or intensive, are\r\ncontinuous quantities, the proposition: \u0026ldquo;All change (transition of a\r\nthing from one state into another) is continuous,\u0026rdquo; might be proved here\r\neasily, and with mathematical evidence, were it not that the causality of a\r\nchange lies, entirely beyond the bounds of a transcendental philosophy, and\r\npresupposes empirical principles. For of the possibility of a cause which\r\nchanges the condition of things, that is, which determines them to the contrary\r\nto a certain given state, the understanding gives us à priori no knowledge; not\r\nmerely because it has no insight into the possibility of it (for such insight\r\nis absent in several à priori cognitions), but because the notion of change\r\nconcerns only certain determinations of phenomena, which experience alone can\r\nacquaint us with, while their cause lies in the unchangeable. But seeing that\r\nwe have nothing which we could here employ but the pure fundamental conceptions\r\nof all possible experience, among which of course nothing empirical can be\r\nadmitted, we dare not, without injuring the unity of our system, anticipate\r\ngeneral physical science, which is built upon certain fundamental experiences.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nNevertheless, we are in no want of proofs of the great influence which the\r\nprinciple above developed exercises in the anticipation of perceptions, and\r\neven in supplying the want of them, so far as to shield us against the false\r\nconclusions which otherwise we might rashly draw.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIf all reality in perception has a degree, between which and negation there is\r\nan endless sequence of ever smaller degrees, and if, nevertheless, every sense\r\nmust have a determinate degree of receptivity for sensations; no perception,\r\nand consequently no experience is possible, which can prove, either immediately\r\nor mediately, an entire absence of all reality in a phenomenon; in other words,\r\nit is impossible ever to draw from experience a proof of the existence of empty\r\nspace or of empty time. For in the first place, an entire absence of reality in\r\na sensuous intuition cannot of course be an object of perception; secondly,\r\nsuch absence cannot be deduced from the contemplation of any single phenomenon,\r\nand the difference of the degrees in its reality; nor ought it ever to be\r\nadmitted in explanation of any phenomenon. For if even the complete intuition\r\nof a determinate space or time is thoroughly real, that is, if no part thereof\r\nis empty, yet because every reality has its degree, which, with the extensive\r\nquantity of the phenomenon unchanged, can diminish through endless gradations\r\ndown to nothing (the void), there must be infinitely graduated degrees, with\r\nwhich space or time is filled, and the intensive quantity in different\r\nphenomena may be smaller or greater, although the extensive quantity of the\r\nintuition remains equal and unaltered.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWe shall give an example of this. Almost all natural philosophers, remarking a\r\ngreat difference in the quantity of the matter of different kinds in bodies\r\nwith the same volume (partly on account of the momentum of gravity or weight,\r\npartly on account of the momentum of resistance to other bodies in motion),\r\nconclude unanimously that this volume (extensive quantity of the phenomenon)\r\nmust be void in all bodies, although in different proportion. But who would\r\nsuspect that these for the most part mathematical and mechanical inquirers into\r\nnature should ground this conclusion solely on a metaphysical\r\nhypothesis\u0026mdash;a sort of hypothesis which they profess to disparage and\r\navoid? Yet this they do, in assuming that the real in space (I must not here\r\ncall it impenetrability or weight, because these are empirical conceptions) is\r\nalways identical, and can only be distinguished according to its extensive\r\nquantity, that is, multiplicity. Now to this presupposition, for which they can\r\nhave no ground in experience, and which consequently is merely metaphysical, I\r\noppose a transcendental demonstration, which it is true will not explain the\r\ndifference in the filling up of spaces, but which nevertheless completely does\r\naway with the supposed necessity of the above-mentioned presupposition that we\r\ncannot explain the said difference otherwise than by the hypothesis of empty\r\nspaces. This demonstration, moreover, has the merit of setting the\r\nunderstanding at liberty to conceive this distinction in a different manner, if\r\nthe explanation of the fact requires any such hypothesis. For we perceive that\r\nalthough two equal spaces may be completely filled by matters altogether\r\ndifferent, so that in neither of them is there left a single point wherein\r\nmatter is not present, nevertheless, every reality has its degree (of\r\nresistance or of weight), which, without diminution of the extensive quantity,\r\ncan become less and less ad infinitum, before it passes into nothingness and\r\ndisappears. Thus an expansion which fills a space\u0026mdash;for example, caloric,\r\nor any other reality in the phenomenal world\u0026mdash;can decrease in its degrees\r\nto infinity, yet without leaving the smallest part of the space empty; on the\r\ncontrary, filling it with those lesser degrees as completely as another\r\nphenomenon could with greater. My intention here is by no means to maintain\r\nthat this is really the case with the difference of matters, in regard to their\r\nspecific gravity; I wish only to prove, from a principle of the pure\r\nunderstanding, that the nature of our perceptions makes such a mode of\r\nexplanation possible, and that it is erroneous to regard the real in a\r\nphenomenon as equal quoad its degree, and different only quoad its aggregation\r\nand extensive quantity, and this, too, on the pretended authority of an à\r\npriori principle of the understanding.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nNevertheless, this principle of the anticipation of perception must somewhat\r\nstartle an inquirer whom initiation into transcendental philosophy has rendered\r\ncautious. We must naturally entertain some doubt whether or not the\r\nunderstanding can enounce any such synthetical proposition as that respecting\r\nthe degree of all reality in phenomena, and consequently the possibility of the\r\ninternal difference of sensation itself\u0026mdash;abstraction being made of its\r\nempirical quality. Thus it is a question not unworthy of solution: \u0026ldquo;How\r\nthe understanding can pronounce synthetically and à priori respecting\r\nphenomena, and thus anticipate these, even in that which is peculiarly and\r\nmerely empirical, that, namely, which concerns sensation itself?\u0026rdquo;\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe quality of sensation is in all cases merely empirical, and cannot be\r\nrepresented à priori (for example, colours, taste, etc.). But the\r\nreal\u0026mdash;that which corresponds to sensation\u0026mdash;in opposition to negation\r\n= 0, only represents something the conception of which in itself contains a\r\nbeing (ein seyn), and signifies nothing but the synthesis in an empirical\r\nconsciousness. That is to say, the empirical consciousness in the internal\r\nsense can be raised from 0 to every higher degree, so that the very same\r\nextensive quantity of intuition, an illuminated surface, for example, excites\r\nas great a sensation as an aggregate of many other surfaces less illuminated.\r\nWe can therefore make complete abstraction of the extensive quantity of a\r\nphenomenon, and represent to ourselves in the mere sensation in a certain\r\nmomentum, a synthesis of homogeneous ascension from 0 up to the given empirical\r\nconsciousness, All sensations therefore as such are given only à posteriori,\r\nbut this property thereof, namely, that they have a degree, can be known à\r\npriori. It is worthy of remark, that in respect to quantities in general, we\r\ncan cognize à priori only a single quality, namely, continuity; but in respect\r\nto all quality (the real in phenomena), we cannot cognize à priori anything\r\nmore than the intensive quantity thereof, namely, that they have a degree. All\r\nelse is left to experience.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n3. ANALOGIES OF EXPERIENCE.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe principle of these is: Experience is possible only through the\r\nrepresentation of a necessary connection of Perceptions.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPROOF.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nExperience is an empirical cognition; that is to say, a cognition which\r\ndetermines an object by means of perceptions. It is therefore a synthesis of\r\nperceptions, a synthesis which is not itself contained in perception, but which\r\ncontains the synthetical unity of the manifold of perception in a\r\nconsciousness; and this unity constitutes the essential of our cognition of\r\nobjects of the senses, that is, of experience (not merely of intuition or\r\nsensation). Now in experience our perceptions come together contingently, so\r\nthat no character of necessity in their connection appears, or can appear from\r\nthe perceptions themselves, because apprehension is only a placing together of\r\nthe manifold of empirical intuition, and no representation of a necessity in\r\nthe connected existence of the phenomena which apprehension brings together, is\r\nto be discovered therein. But as experience is a cognition of objects by means\r\nof perceptions, it follows that the relation of the existence of the existence\r\nof the manifold must be represented in experience not as it is put together in\r\ntime, but as it is objectively in time. And as time itself cannot be perceived,\r\nthe determination of the existence of objects in time can only take place by\r\nmeans of their connection in time in general, consequently only by means of à\r\npriori connecting conceptions. Now as these conceptions always possess the\r\ncharacter of necessity, experience is possible only by means of a\r\nrepresentation of the necessary connection of perception.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe three modi of time are permanence, succession, and coexistence.\r\nAccordingly, there are three rules of all relations of time in phenomena,\r\naccording to which the existence of every phenomenon is determined in respect\r\nof the unity of all time, and these antecede all experience and render it\r\npossible.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe general principle of all three analogies rests on the necessary unity of\r\napperception in relation to all possible empirical consciousness (perception)\r\nat every time, consequently, as this unity lies à priori at the foundation of\r\nall mental operations, the principle rests on the synthetical unity of all\r\nphenomena according to their relation in time. For the original apperception\r\nrelates to our internal sense (the complex of all representations), and indeed\r\nrelates à priori to its form, that is to say, the relation of the manifold\r\nempirical consciousness in time. Now this manifold must be combined in original\r\napperception according to relations of time\u0026mdash;a necessity imposed by the à\r\npriori transcendental unity of apperception, to which is subjected all that can\r\nbelong to my (i.e., my own) cognition, and therefore all that can become an\r\nobject for me. This synthetical and à priori determined unity in relation of\r\nperceptions in time is therefore the rule: \u0026ldquo;All empirical determinations\r\nof time must be subject to rules of the general determination of time\u0026rdquo;;\r\nand the analogies of experience, of which we are now about to treat, must be\r\nrules of this nature.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThese principles have this peculiarity, that they do not concern phenomena, and\r\nthe synthesis of the empirical intuition thereof, but merely the existence of\r\nphenomena and their relation to each other in regard to this existence. Now the\r\nmode in which we apprehend a thing in a phenomenon can be determined à priori\r\nin such a manner that the rule of its synthesis can give, that is to say, can\r\nproduce this à priori intuition in every empirical example. But the existence\r\nof phenomena cannot be known à priori, and although we could arrive by this\r\npath at a conclusion of the fact of some existence, we could not cognize that\r\nexistence determinately, that is to say, we should be incapable of anticipating\r\nin what respect the empirical intuition of it would be distinguishable from\r\nthat of others.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe two principles above mentioned, which I called mathematical, in\r\nconsideration of the fact of their authorizing the application of mathematic\r\nphenomena, relate to these phenomena only in regard to their possibility, and\r\ninstruct us how phenomena, as far as regards their intuition or the real in\r\ntheir perception, can be generated according to the rules of a mathematical\r\nsynthesis. Consequently, numerical quantities, and with them the determination\r\nof a phenomenon as a quantity, can be employed in the one case as well as in\r\nthe other. Thus, for example, out of 200,000 illuminations by the moon, I might\r\ncompose and give à priori, that is construct, the degree of our sensations of\r\nthe sun-light.\u003ca href=\"#linknote-30\" id=\"linknoteref-30\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[30]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e We may therefore entitle these two\r\nprinciples constitutive.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"linknote-30\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#linknoteref-30\"\u003e[30]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nKant\u0026rsquo;s meaning is: The two principles enunciated under the heads of\r\n\u0026ldquo;Axioms of Intuition,\u0026rdquo; and \u0026ldquo;Anticipations of\r\nPerception,\u0026rdquo; authorize the application to phenomena of determinations of\r\nsize and number, that is of mathematic. For example, I may compute the light of\r\nthe sun, and say that its quantity is a certain number of times greater than\r\nthat of the moon. In the same way, heat is measured by the comparison of its\r\ndifferent effects on water, \u0026amp;c., and on mercury in a thermometer.\u0026mdash;Tr\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe case is very different with those principles whose province it is to\r\nsubject the existence of phenomena to rules à priori. For as existence does not\r\nadmit of being constructed, it is clear that they must only concern the\r\nrelations of existence and be merely regulative principles. In this case,\r\ntherefore, neither axioms nor anticipations are to be thought of. Thus, if a\r\nperception is given us, in a certain relation of time to other (although\r\nundetermined) perceptions, we cannot then say à priori, what and how great (in\r\nquantity) the other perception necessarily connected with the former is, but\r\nonly how it is connected, quoad its existence, in this given modus of time.\r\nAnalogies in philosophy mean something very different from that which they\r\nrepresent in mathematics. In the latter they are formulae, which enounce the\r\nequality of two relations of quantity, and are always constitutive, so that if\r\ntwo terms of the proportion are given, the third is also given, that is, can be\r\nconstructed by the aid of these formulae. But in philosophy, analogy is not the\r\nequality of two quantitative but of two qualitative relations. In this case,\r\nfrom three given terms, I can give à priori and cognize the relation to a\r\nfourth member, but not this fourth term itself, although I certainly possess a\r\nrule to guide me in the search for this fourth term in experience, and a mark\r\nto assist me in discovering it. An analogy of experience is therefore only a\r\nrule according to which unity of experience must arise out of perceptions in\r\nrespect to objects (phenomena) not as a constitutive, but merely as a\r\nregulative principle. The same holds good also of the postulates of empirical\r\nthought in general, which relate to the synthesis of mere intuition (which\r\nconcerns the form of phenomena), the synthesis of perception (which concerns\r\nthe matter of phenomena), and the synthesis of experience (which concerns the\r\nrelation of these perceptions). For they are only regulative principles, and\r\nclearly distinguishable from the mathematical, which are constitutive, not\r\nindeed in regard to the certainty which both possess à priori, but in the mode\r\nof evidence thereof, consequently also in the manner of demonstration.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut what has been observed of all synthetical propositions, and must be\r\nparticularly remarked in this place, is this, that these analogies possess\r\nsignificance and validity, not as principles of the transcendental, but only as\r\nprinciples of the empirical use of the understanding, and their truth can\r\ntherefore be proved only as such, and that consequently the phenomena must not\r\nbe subjoined directly under the categories, but only under their schemata. For\r\nif the objects to which those principles must be applied were things in\r\nthemselves, it would be quite impossible to cognize aught concerning them\r\nsynthetically à priori. But they are nothing but phenomena; a complete\r\nknowledge of which\u0026mdash;a knowledge to which all principles à priori must at\r\nlast relate\u0026mdash;is the only possible experience. It follows that these\r\nprinciples can have nothing else for their aim than the conditions of the\r\nempirical cognition in the unity of synthesis of phenomena. But this synthesis\r\nis cogitated only in the schema of the pure conception of the understanding, of\r\nwhose unity, as that of a synthesis in general, the category contains the\r\nfunction unrestricted by any sensuous condition. These principles will\r\ntherefore authorize us to connect phenomena according to an analogy, with the\r\nlogical and universal unity of conceptions, and consequently to employ the\r\ncategories in the principles themselves; but in the application of them to\r\nexperience, we shall use only their schemata, as the key to their proper\r\napplication, instead of the categories, or rather the latter as restricting\r\nconditions, under the title of \u0026ldquo;formulae\u0026rdquo; of the former.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nA. FIRST ANALOGY.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPrinciple of the Permanence of Substance.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIn all changes of phenomena, substance is permanent, and the quantum thereof in\r\nnature is neither increased nor diminished.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPROOF.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAll phenomena exist in time, wherein alone as substratum, that is, as the\r\npermanent form of the internal intuition, coexistence and succession can be\r\nrepresented. Consequently time, in which all changes of phenomena must be\r\ncogitated, remains and changes not, because it is that in which succession and\r\ncoexistence can be represented only as determinations thereof. Now, time in\r\nitself cannot be an object of perception. It follows that in objects of\r\nperception, that is, in phenomena, there must be found a substratum which\r\nrepresents time in general, and in which all change or coexistence can be\r\nperceived by means of the relation of phenomena to it. But the substratum of\r\nall reality, that is, of all that pertains to the existence of things, is\r\nsubstance; all that pertains to existence can be cogitated only as a\r\ndetermination of substance. Consequently, the permanent, in relation to which\r\nalone can all relations of time in phenomena be determined, is substance in the\r\nworld of phenomena, that is, the real in phenomena, that which, as the\r\nsubstratum of all change, remains ever the same. Accordingly, as this cannot\r\nchange in existence, its quantity in nature can neither be increased nor\r\ndiminished.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nOur apprehension of the manifold in a phenomenon is always successive, is\r\nConsequently always changing. By it alone we could, therefore, never determine\r\nwhether this manifold, as an object of experience, is coexistent or successive,\r\nunless it had for a foundation something fixed and permanent, of the existence\r\nof which all succession and coexistence are nothing but so many modes (modi of\r\ntime). Only in the permanent, then, are relations of time possible (for\r\nsimultaneity and succession are the only relations in time); that is to say,\r\nthe permanent is the substratum of our empirical representation of time itself,\r\nin which alone all determination of time is possible. Permanence is, in fact,\r\njust another expression for time, as the abiding correlate of all existence of\r\nphenomena, and of all change, and of all coexistence. For change does not\r\naffect time itself, but only the phenomena in time (just as coexistence cannot\r\nbe regarded as a modus of time itself, seeing that in time no parts are\r\ncoexistent, but all successive). If we were to attribute succession to time\r\nitself, we should be obliged to cogitate another time, in which this succession\r\nwould be possible. It is only by means of the permanent that existence in\r\ndifferent parts of the successive series of time receives a quantity, which we\r\nentitle duration. For in mere succession, existence is perpetually vanishing\r\nand recommencing, and therefore never has even the least quantity. Without the\r\npermanent, then, no relation in time is possible. Now, time in itself is not an\r\nobject of perception; consequently the permanent in phenomena must be regarded\r\nas the substratum of all determination of time, and consequently also as the\r\ncondition of the possibility of all synthetical unity of perceptions, that is,\r\nof experience; and all existence and all change in time can only be regarded as\r\na mode in the existence of that which abides unchangeably. Therefore, in all\r\nphenomena, the permanent is the object in itself, that is, the substance\r\n(phenomenon); but all that changes or can change belongs only to the mode of\r\nthe existence of this substance or substances, consequently to its\r\ndeterminations.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nI find that in all ages not only the philosopher, but even the common\r\nunderstanding, has preposited this permanence as a substratum of all change in\r\nphenomena; indeed, I am compelled to believe that they will always accept this\r\nas an indubitable fact. Only the philosopher expresses himself in a more\r\nprecise and definite manner, when he says: \u0026ldquo;In all changes in the world,\r\nthe substance remains, and the accidents alone are changeable.\u0026rdquo; But of\r\nthis decidedly synthetical proposition, I nowhere meet with even an attempt at\r\nproof; nay, it very rarely has the good fortune to stand, as it deserves to do,\r\nat the head of the pure and entirely à priori laws of nature. In truth, the\r\nstatement that substance is permanent, is tautological. For this very\r\npermanence is the ground on which we apply the category of substance to the\r\nphenomenon; and we should have been obliged to prove that in all phenomena\r\nthere is something permanent, of the existence of which the changeable is\r\nnothing but a determination. But because a proof of this nature cannot be\r\ndogmatical, that is, cannot be drawn from conceptions, inasmuch as it concerns\r\na synthetical proposition à priori, and as philosophers never reflected that\r\nsuch propositions are valid only in relation to possible experience, and\r\ntherefore cannot be proved except by means of a deduction of the possibility of\r\nexperience, it is no wonder that while it has served as the foundation of all\r\nexperience (for we feel the need of it in empirical cognition), it has never\r\nbeen supported by proof.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nA philosopher was asked: \u0026ldquo;What is the weight of smoke?\u0026rdquo; He\r\nanswered: \u0026ldquo;Subtract from the weight of the burnt wood the weight of the\r\nremaining ashes, and you will have the weight of the smoke.\u0026rdquo; Thus he\r\npresumed it to be incontrovertible that even in fire the matter (substance)\r\ndoes not perish, but that only the form of it undergoes a change. In like\r\nmanner was the saying: \u0026ldquo;From nothing comes nothing,\u0026rdquo; only another\r\ninference from the principle or permanence, or rather of the ever-abiding\r\nexistence of the true subject in phenomena. For if that in the phenomenon which\r\nwe call substance is to be the proper substratum of all determination of time,\r\nit follows that all existence in past as well as in future time, must be\r\ndeterminable by means of it alone. Hence we are entitled to apply the term\r\nsubstance to a phenomenon, only because we suppose its existence in all time, a\r\nnotion which the word permanence does not fully express, as it seems rather to\r\nbe referable to future time. However, the internal necessity perpetually to be,\r\nis inseparably connected with the necessity always to have been, and so the\r\nexpression may stand as it is. \u0026ldquo;Gigni de nihilo nihil; in nihilum nil\r\nposse reverti,\u0026rdquo;\u003ca href=\"#linknote-31\" id=\"linknoteref-31\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[31]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e are two propositions which the ancients\r\nnever parted, and which people nowadays sometimes mistakenly disjoin, because\r\nthey imagine that the propositions apply to objects as things in themselves,\r\nand that the former might be inimical to the dependence (even in respect of its\r\nsubstance also) of the world upon a supreme cause. But this apprehension is\r\nentirely needless, for the question in this case is only of phenomena in the\r\nsphere of experience, the unity of which never could be possible, if we\r\nadmitted the possibility that new things (in respect of their substance) should\r\narise. For in that case, we should lose altogether that which alone can\r\nrepresent the unity of time, to wit, the identity of the substratum, as that\r\nthrough which alone all change possesses complete and thorough unity. This\r\npermanence is, however, nothing but the manner in which we represent to\r\nourselves the existence of things in the phenomenal world.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"linknote-31\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#linknoteref-31\"\u003e[31]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nPersius, Satirae, iii.83-84.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe determinations of a substance, which are only particular modes of its\r\nexistence, are called accidents. They are always real, because they concern the\r\nexistence of substance (negations are only determinations, which express the\r\nnon-existence of something in the substance). Now, if to this real in the\r\nsubstance we ascribe a particular existence (for example, to motion as an\r\naccident of matter), this existence is called inherence, in contradistinction\r\nto the existence of substance, which we call subsistence. But hence arise many\r\nmisconceptions, and it would be a more accurate and just mode of expression to\r\ndesignate the accident only as the mode in which the existence of a substance\r\nis positively determined. Meanwhile, by reason of the conditions of the logical\r\nexercise of our understanding, it is impossible to avoid separating, as it\r\nwere, that which in the existence of a substance is subject to change, whilst\r\nthe substance remains, and regarding it in relation to that which is properly\r\npermanent and radical. On this account, this category of substance stands under\r\nthe title of relation, rather because it is the condition thereof than because\r\nit contains in itself any relation.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nNow, upon this notion of permanence rests the proper notion of the conception\r\nchange. Origin and extinction are not changes of that which originates or\r\nbecomes extinct. Change is but a mode of existence, which follows on another\r\nmode of existence of the same object; hence all that changes is permanent, and\r\nonly the condition thereof changes. Now since this mutation affects only\r\ndeterminations, which can have a beginning or an end, we may say, employing an\r\nexpression which seems somewhat paradoxical: \u0026ldquo;Only the permanent\r\n(substance) is subject to change; the mutable suffers no change, but rather\r\nalternation, that is, when certain determinations cease, others begin.\u0026rdquo;\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nChange, when, cannot be perceived by us except in substances, and origin or\r\nextinction in an absolute sense, that does not concern merely a determination\r\nof the permanent, cannot be a possible perception, for it is this very notion\r\nof the permanent which renders possible the representation of a transition from\r\none state into another, and from non-being to being, which, consequently, can\r\nbe empirically cognized only as alternating determinations of that which is\r\npermanent. Grant that a thing absolutely begins to be; we must then have a\r\npoint of time in which it was not. But how and by what can we fix and determine\r\nthis point of time, unless by that which already exists? For a void\r\ntime\u0026mdash;preceding\u0026mdash;is not an object of perception; but if we connect\r\nthis beginning with objects which existed previously, and which continue to\r\nexist till the object in question in question begins to be, then the latter can\r\nonly be a determination of the former as the permanent. The same holds good of\r\nthe notion of extinction, for this presupposes the empirical representation of\r\na time, in which a phenomenon no longer exists.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSubstances (in the world of phenomena) are the substratum of all determinations\r\nof time. The beginning of some, and the ceasing to be of other substances,\r\nwould utterly do away with the only condition of the empirical unity of time;\r\nand in that case phenomena would relate to two different times, in which, side\r\nby side, existence would pass; which is absurd. For there is only one time in\r\nwhich all different times must be placed, not as coexistent, but as successive.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAccordingly, permanence is a necessary condition under which alone phenomena,\r\nas things or objects, are determinable in a possible experience. But as regards\r\nthe empirical criterion of this necessary permanence, and with it of the\r\nsubstantiality of phenomena, we shall find sufficient opportunity to speak in\r\nthe sequel.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nB. SECOND ANALOGY.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPrinciple of the Succession of Time According to the Law of Causality. All\r\nchanges take place according to the law of the connection of Cause and Effect.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPROOF.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n(That all phenomena in the succession of time are only changes, that is, a\r\nsuccessive being and non-being of the determinations of substance, which is\r\npermanent; consequently that a being of substance itself which follows on the\r\nnon-being thereof, or a non-being of substance which follows on the being\r\nthereof, in other words, that the origin or extinction of substance itself, is\r\nimpossible\u0026mdash;all this has been fully established in treating of the\r\nforegoing principle. This principle might have been expressed as follows:\r\n\u0026ldquo;All alteration (succession) of phenomena is merely change\u0026rdquo;; for\r\nthe changes of substance are not origin or extinction, because the conception\r\nof change presupposes the same subject as existing with two opposite\r\ndeterminations, and consequently as permanent. After this premonition, we shall\r\nproceed to the proof.)\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nI perceive that phenomena succeed one another, that is to say, a state of\r\nthings exists at one time, the opposite of which existed in a former state. In\r\nthis case, then, I really connect together two perceptions in time. Now\r\nconnection is not an operation of mere sense and intuition, but is the product\r\nof a synthetical faculty of imagination, which determines the internal sense in\r\nrespect of a relation of time. But imagination can connect these two states in\r\ntwo ways, so that either the one or the other may antecede in time; for time in\r\nitself cannot be an object of perception, and what in an object precedes and\r\nwhat follows cannot be empirically determined in relation to it. I am only\r\nconscious, then, that my imagination places one state before and the other\r\nafter; not that the one state antecedes the other in the object. In other\r\nwords, the objective relation of the successive phenomena remains quite\r\nundetermined by means of mere perception. Now in order that this relation may\r\nbe cognized as determined, the relation between the two states must be so\r\ncogitated that it is thereby determined as necessary, which of them must be\r\nplaced before and which after, and not conversely. But the conception which\r\ncarries with it a necessity of synthetical unity, can be none other than a pure\r\nconception of the understanding which does not lie in mere perception; and in\r\nthis case it is the conception of \u0026ldquo;the relation of cause and\r\neffect,\u0026rdquo; the former of which determines the latter in time, as its\r\nnecessary consequence, and not as something which might possibly antecede (or\r\nwhich might in some cases not be perceived to follow). It follows that it is\r\nonly because we subject the sequence of phenomena, and consequently all change,\r\nto the law of causality, that experience itself, that is, empirical cognition\r\nof phenomena, becomes possible; and consequently, that phenomena themselves, as\r\nobjects of experience, are possible only by virtue of this law.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nOur apprehension of the manifold of phenomena is always successive. The\r\nrepresentations of parts succeed one another. Whether they succeed one another\r\nin the object also, is a second point for reflection, which was not contained\r\nin the former. Now we may certainly give the name of object to everything, even\r\nto every representation, so far as we are conscious thereof; but what this word\r\nmay mean in the case of phenomena, not merely in so far as they (as\r\nrepresentations) are objects, but only in so far as they indicate an object, is\r\na question requiring deeper consideration. In so far as they, regarded merely\r\nas representations, are at the same time objects of consciousness, they are not\r\nto be distinguished from apprehension, that is, reception into the synthesis of\r\nimagination, and we must therefore say: \u0026ldquo;The manifold of phenomena is\r\nalways produced successively in the mind.\u0026rdquo; If phenomena were things in\r\nthemselves, no man would be able to conjecture from the succession of our\r\nrepresentations how this manifold is connected in the object; for we have to do\r\nonly with our representations. How things may be in themselves, without regard\r\nto the representations through which they affect us, is utterly beyond the\r\nsphere of our cognition. Now although phenomena are not things in themselves,\r\nand are nevertheless the only thing given to us to be cognized, it is my duty\r\nto show what sort of connection in time belongs to the manifold in phenomena\r\nthemselves, while the representation of this manifold in apprehension is always\r\nsuccessive. For example, the apprehension of the manifold in the phenomenon of\r\na house which stands before me, is successive. Now comes the question whether\r\nthe manifold of this house is in itself successive\u0026mdash;which no one will be\r\nat all willing to grant. But, so soon as I raise my conception of an object to\r\nthe transcendental signification thereof, I find that the house is not a thing\r\nin itself, but only a phenomenon, that is, a representation, the transcendental\r\nobject of which remains utterly unknown. What then am I to understand by the\r\nquestion: \u0026ldquo;How can the manifold be connected in the phenomenon\r\nitself\u0026mdash;not considered as a thing in itself, but merely as a\r\nphenomenon?\u0026rdquo; Here that which lies in my successive apprehension is\r\nregarded as representation, whilst the phenomenon which is given me,\r\nnotwithstanding that it is nothing more than a complex of these\r\nrepresentations, is regarded as the object thereof, with which my conception,\r\ndrawn from the representations of apprehension, must harmonize. It is very soon\r\nseen that, as accordance of the cognition with its object constitutes truth,\r\nthe question now before us can only relate to the formal conditions of\r\nempirical truth; and that the phenomenon, in opposition to the representations\r\nof apprehension, can only be distinguished therefrom as the object of them, if\r\nit is subject to a rule which distinguishes it from every other apprehension,\r\nand which renders necessary a mode of connection of the manifold. That in the\r\nphenomenon which contains the condition of this necessary rule of apprehension,\r\nis the object.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nLet us now proceed to our task. That something happens, that is to say, that\r\nsomething or some state exists which before was not, cannot be empirically\r\nperceived, unless a phenomenon precedes, which does not contain in itself this\r\nstate. For a reality which should follow upon a void time, in other words, a\r\nbeginning, which no state of things precedes, can just as little be apprehended\r\nas the void time itself. Every apprehension of an event is therefore a\r\nperception which follows upon another perception. But as this is the case with\r\nall synthesis of apprehension, as I have shown above in the example of a house,\r\nmy apprehension of an event is not yet sufficiently distinguished from other\r\napprehensions. But I remark also that if in a phenomenon which contains an\r\noccurrence, I call the antecedent state of my perception, A, and the following\r\nstate, B, the perception B can only follow A in apprehension, and the\r\nperception A cannot follow B, but only precede it. For example, I see a ship\r\nfloat down the stream of a river. My perception of its place lower down follows\r\nupon my perception of its place higher up the course of the river, and it is\r\nimpossible that, in the apprehension of this phenomenon, the vessel should be\r\nperceived first below and afterwards higher up the stream. Here, therefore, the\r\norder in the sequence of perceptions in apprehension is determined; and by this\r\norder apprehension is regulated. In the former example, my perceptions in the\r\napprehension of a house might begin at the roof and end at the foundation, or\r\nvice versa; or I might apprehend the manifold in this empirical intuition, by\r\ngoing from left to right, and from right to left. Accordingly, in the series of\r\nthese perceptions, there was no determined order, which necessitated my\r\nbeginning at a certain point, in order empirically to connect the manifold. But\r\nthis rule is always to be met with in the perception of that which happens, and\r\nit makes the order of the successive perceptions in the apprehension of such a\r\nphenomenon necessary.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nI must, therefore, in the present case, deduce the subjective sequence of\r\napprehension from the objective sequence of phenomena, for otherwise the former\r\nis quite undetermined, and one phenomenon is not distinguishable from another.\r\nThe former alone proves nothing as to the connection of the manifold in an\r\nobject, for it is quite arbitrary. The latter must consist in the order of the\r\nmanifold in a phenomenon, according to which order the apprehension of one\r\nthing (that which happens) follows that of another thing (which precedes), in\r\nconformity with a rule. In this way alone can I be authorized to say of the\r\nphenomenon itself, and not merely of my own apprehension, that a certain order\r\nor sequence is to be found therein. That is, in other words, I cannot arrange\r\nmy apprehension otherwise than in this order.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIn conformity with this rule, then, it is necessary that in that which\r\nantecedes an event there be found the condition of a rule, according to which\r\nin this event follows always and necessarily; but I cannot reverse this and go\r\nback from the event, and determine (by apprehension) that which antecedes it.\r\nFor no phenomenon goes back from the succeeding point of time to the preceding\r\npoint, although it does certainly relate to a preceding point of time; from a\r\ngiven time, on the other hand, there is always a necessary progression to the\r\ndetermined succeeding time. Therefore, because there certainly is something\r\nthat follows, I must of necessity connect it with something else, which\r\nantecedes, and upon which it follows, in conformity with a rule, that is\r\nnecessarily, so that the event, as conditioned, affords certain indication of a\r\ncondition, and this condition determines the event.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nLet us suppose that nothing precedes an event, upon which this event must\r\nfollow in conformity with a rule. All sequence of perception would then exist\r\nonly in apprehension, that is to say, would be merely subjective, and it could\r\nnot thereby be objectively determined what thing ought to precede, and what\r\nought to follow in perception. In such a case, we should have nothing but a\r\nplay of representations, which would possess no application to any object. That\r\nis to say, it would not be possible through perception to distinguish one\r\nphenomenon from another, as regards relations of time; because the succession\r\nin the act of apprehension would always be of the same sort, and therefore\r\nthere would be nothing in the phenomenon to determine the succession, and to\r\nrender a certain sequence objectively necessary. And, in this case, I cannot\r\nsay that two states in a phenomenon follow one upon the other, but only that\r\none apprehension follows upon another. But this is merely subjective, and does\r\nnot determine an object, and consequently cannot be held to be cognition of an\r\nobject\u0026mdash;not even in the phenomenal world.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAccordingly, when we know in experience that something happens, we always\r\npresuppose that something precedes, whereupon it follows in conformity with a\r\nrule. For otherwise I could not say of the object that it follows; because the\r\nmere succession in my apprehension, if it be not determined by a rule in\r\nrelation to something preceding, does not authorize succession in the object.\r\nOnly, therefore, in reference to a rule, according to which phenomena are\r\ndetermined in their sequence, that is, as they happen, by the preceding state,\r\ncan I make my subjective synthesis (of apprehension) objective, and it is only\r\nunder this presupposition that even the experience of an event is possible.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nNo doubt it appears as if this were in thorough contradiction to all the\r\nnotions which people have hitherto entertained in regard to the procedure of\r\nthe human understanding. According to these opinions, it is by means of the\r\nperception and comparison of similar consequences following upon certain\r\nantecedent phenomena that the understanding is led to the discovery of a rule,\r\naccording to which certain events always follow certain phenomena, and it is\r\nonly by this process that we attain to the conception of cause. Upon such a\r\nbasis, it is clear that this conception must be merely empirical, and the rule\r\nwhich it furnishes us with\u0026mdash;\u0026ldquo;Everything that happens must have a\r\ncause\u0026rdquo;\u0026mdash;would be just as contingent as experience itself. The\r\nuniversality and necessity of the rule or law would be perfectly spurious\r\nattributes of it. Indeed, it could not possess universal validity, inasmuch as\r\nit would not in this case be à priori, but founded on deduction. But the same\r\nis the case with this law as with other pure à priori representations (e.g.,\r\nspace and time), which we can draw in perfect clearness and completeness from\r\nexperience, only because we had already placed them therein, and by that means,\r\nand by that alone, had rendered experience possible. Indeed, the logical\r\nclearness of this representation of a rule, determining the series of events,\r\nis possible only when we have made use thereof in experience. Nevertheless, the\r\nrecognition of this rule, as a condition of the synthetical unity of phenomena\r\nin time, was the ground of experience itself and consequently preceded it à\r\npriori.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIt is now our duty to show by an example that we never, even in experience,\r\nattribute to an object the notion of succession or effect (of an\r\nevent\u0026mdash;that is, the happening of something that did not exist before), and\r\ndistinguish it from the subjective succession of apprehension, unless when a\r\nrule lies at the foundation, which compels us to observe this order of\r\nperception in preference to any other, and that, indeed, it is this necessity\r\nwhich first renders possible the representation of a succession in the object.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWe have representations within us, of which also we can be conscious. But,\r\nhowever widely extended, however accurate and thoroughgoing this consciousness\r\nmay be, these representations are still nothing more than representations, that\r\nis, internal determinations of the mind in this or that relation of time. Now\r\nhow happens it that to these representations we should set an object, or that,\r\nin addition to their subjective reality, as modifications, we should still\r\nfurther attribute to them a certain unknown objective reality? It is clear that\r\nobjective significancy cannot consist in a relation to another representation\r\n(of that which we desire to term object), for in that case the question again\r\narises: \u0026ldquo;How does this other representation go out of itself, and obtain\r\nobjective significancy over and above the subjective, which is proper to it, as\r\na determination of a state of mind?\u0026rdquo; If we try to discover what sort of\r\nnew property the relation to an object gives to our subjective representations,\r\nand what new importance they thereby receive, we shall find that this relation\r\nhas no other effect than that of rendering necessary the connection of our\r\nrepresentations in a certain manner, and of subjecting them to a rule; and that\r\nconversely, it is only because a certain order is necessary in the relations of\r\ntime of our representations, that objective significancy is ascribed to them.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIn the synthesis of phenomena, the manifold of our representations is always\r\nsuccessive. Now hereby is not represented an object, for by means of this\r\nsuccession, which is common to all apprehension, no one thing is distinguished\r\nfrom another. But so soon as I perceive or assume that in this succession there\r\nis a relation to a state antecedent, from which the representation follows in\r\naccordance with a rule, so soon do I represent something as an event, or as a\r\nthing that happens; in other words, I cognize an object to which I must assign\r\na certain determinate position in time, which cannot be altered, because of the\r\npreceding state in the object. When, therefore, I perceive that something\r\nhappens, there is contained in this representation, in the first place, the\r\nfact, that something antecedes; because, it is only in relation to this that\r\nthe phenomenon obtains its proper relation of time, in other words, exists\r\nafter an antecedent time, in which it did not exist. But it can receive its\r\ndetermined place in time only by the presupposition that something existed in\r\nthe foregoing state, upon which it follows inevitably and always, that is, in\r\nconformity with a rule. From all this it is evident that, in the first place, I\r\ncannot reverse the order of succession, and make that which happens precede\r\nthat upon which it follows; and that, in the second place, if the antecedent\r\nstate be posited, a certain determinate event inevitably and necessarily\r\nfollows. Hence it follows that there exists a certain order in our\r\nrepresentations, whereby the present gives a sure indication of some previously\r\nexisting state, as a correlate, though still undetermined, of the existing\r\nevent which is given\u0026mdash;a correlate which itself relates to the event as its\r\nconsequence, conditions it, and connects it necessarily with itself in the\r\nseries of time.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIf then it be admitted as a necessary law of sensibility, and consequently a\r\nformal condition of all perception, that the preceding necessarily determines\r\nthe succeeding time (inasmuch as I cannot arrive at the succeeding except\r\nthrough the preceding), it must likewise be an indispensable law of empirical\r\nrepresentation of the series of time that the phenomena of the past determine\r\nall phenomena in the succeeding time, and that the latter, as events, cannot\r\ntake place, except in so far as the former determine their existence in time,\r\nthat is to say, establish it according to a rule. For it is of course only in\r\nphenomena that we can empirically cognize this continuity in the connection of\r\ntimes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nFor all experience and for the possibility of experience, understanding is\r\nindispensable, and the first step which it takes in this sphere is not to\r\nrender the representation of objects clear, but to render the representation of\r\nan object in general, possible. It does this by applying the order of time to\r\nphenomena, and their existence. In other words, it assigns to each phenomenon,\r\nas a consequence, a place in relation to preceding phenomena, determined à\r\npriori in time, without which it could not harmonize with time itself, which\r\ndetermines a place à priori to all its parts. This determination of place\r\ncannot be derived from the relation of phenomena to absolute time (for it is\r\nnot an object of perception); but, on the contrary, phenomena must reciprocally\r\ndetermine the places in time of one another, and render these necessary in the\r\norder of time. In other words, whatever follows or happens, must follow in\r\nconformity with a universal rule upon that which was contained in the foregoing\r\nstate. Hence arises a series of phenomena, which, by means of the\r\nunderstanding, produces and renders necessary exactly the same order and\r\ncontinuous connection in the series of our possible perceptions, as is found à\r\npriori in the form of internal intuition (time), in which all our perceptions\r\nmust have place.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThat something happens, then, is a perception which belongs to a possible\r\nexperience, which becomes real only because I look upon the phenomenon as\r\ndetermined in regard to its place in time, consequently as an object, which can\r\nalways be found by means of a rule in the connected series of my perceptions.\r\nBut this rule of the determination of a thing according to succession in time\r\nis as follows: \u0026ldquo;In what precedes may be found the condition, under which\r\nan event always (that is, necessarily) follows.\u0026rdquo; From all this it is\r\nobvious that the principle of cause and effect is the principle of possible\r\nexperience, that is, of objective cognition of phenomena, in regard to their\r\nrelations in the succession of time.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe proof of this fundamental proposition rests entirely on the following\r\nmomenta of argument. To all empirical cognition belongs the synthesis of the\r\nmanifold by the imagination, a synthesis which is always successive, that is,\r\nin which the representations therein always follow one another. But the order\r\nof succession in imagination is not determined, and the series of successive\r\nrepresentations may be taken retrogressively as well as progressively. But if\r\nthis synthesis is a synthesis of apprehension (of the manifold of a given\r\nphenomenon), then the order is determined in the object, or to speak more\r\naccurately, there is therein an order of successive synthesis which determines\r\nan object, and according to which something necessarily precedes, and when this\r\nis posited, something else necessarily follows. If, then, my perception is to\r\ncontain the cognition of an event, that is, of something which really happens,\r\nit must be an empirical judgement, wherein we think that the succession is\r\ndetermined; that is, it presupposes another phenomenon, upon which this event\r\nfollows necessarily, or in conformity with a rule. If, on the contrary, when I\r\nposited the antecedent, the event did not necessarily follow, I should be\r\nobliged to consider it merely as a subjective play of my imagination, and if in\r\nthis I represented to myself anything as objective, I must look upon it as a\r\nmere dream. Thus, the relation of phenomena (as possible perceptions),\r\naccording to which that which happens is, as to its existence, necessarily\r\ndetermined in time by something which antecedes, in conformity with a\r\nrule\u0026mdash;in other words, the relation of cause and effect\u0026mdash;is the\r\ncondition of the objective validity of our empirical judgements in regard to\r\nthe sequence of perceptions, consequently of their empirical truth, and\r\ntherefore of experience. The principle of the relation of causality in the\r\nsuccession of phenomena is therefore valid for all objects of experience,\r\nbecause it is itself the ground of the possibility of experience.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHere, however, a difficulty arises, which must be resolved. The principle of\r\nthe connection of causality among phenomena is limited in our formula to the\r\nsuccession thereof, although in practice we find that the principle applies\r\nalso when the phenomena exist together in the same time, and that cause and\r\neffect may be simultaneous. For example, there is heat in a room, which does\r\nnot exist in the open air. I look about for the cause, and find it to be the\r\nfire, Now the fire as the cause is simultaneous with its effect, the heat of\r\nthe room. In this case, then, there is no succession as regards time, between\r\ncause and effect, but they are simultaneous; and still the law holds good. The\r\ngreater part of operating causes in nature are simultaneous with their effects,\r\nand the succession in time of the latter is produced only because the cause\r\ncannot achieve the total of its effect in one moment. But at the moment when\r\nthe effect first arises, it is always simultaneous with the causality of its\r\ncause, because, if the cause had but a moment before ceased to be, the effect\r\ncould not have arisen. Here it must be specially remembered that we must\r\nconsider the order of time and not the lapse thereof. The relation remains,\r\neven though no time has elapsed. The time between the causality of the cause\r\nand its immediate effect may entirely vanish, and the cause and effect be thus\r\nsimultaneous, but the relation of the one to the other remains always\r\ndeterminable according to time. If, for example, I consider a leaden ball,\r\nwhich lies upon a cushion and makes a hollow in it, as a cause, then it is\r\nsimultaneous with the effect. But I distinguish the two through the relation of\r\ntime of the dynamical connection of both. For if I lay the ball upon the\r\ncushion, then the hollow follows upon the before smooth surface; but supposing\r\nthe cushion has, from some cause or another, a hollow, there does not thereupon\r\nfollow a leaden ball.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThus, the law of succession of time is in all instances the only empirical\r\ncriterion of effect in relation to the causality of the antecedent cause. The\r\nglass is the cause of the rising of the water above its horizontal surface,\r\nalthough the two phenomena are contemporaneous. For, as soon as I draw some\r\nwater with the glass from a larger vessel, an effect follows thereupon, namely,\r\nthe change of the horizontal state which the water had in the large vessel into\r\na concave, which it assumes in the glass.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThis conception of causality leads us to the conception of action; that of\r\naction, to the conception of force; and through it, to the conception of\r\nsubstance. As I do not wish this critical essay, the sole purpose of which is\r\nto treat of the sources of our synthetical cognition à priori, to be crowded\r\nwith analyses which merely explain, but do not enlarge the sphere of our\r\nconceptions, I reserve the detailed explanation of the above conceptions for a\r\nfuture system of pure reason. Such an analysis, indeed, executed with great\r\nparticularity, may already be found in well-known works on this subject. But I\r\ncannot at present refrain from making a few remarks on the empirical criterion\r\nof a substance, in so far as it seems to be more evident and more easily\r\nrecognized through the conception of action than through that of the permanence\r\nof a phenomenon.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWhere action (consequently activity and force) exists, substance also must\r\nexist, and in it alone must be sought the seat of that fruitful source of\r\nphenomena. Very well. But if we are called upon to explain what we mean by\r\nsubstance, and wish to avoid the vice of reasoning in a circle, the answer is\r\nby no means so easy. How shall we conclude immediately from the action to the\r\npermanence of that which acts, this being nevertheless an essential and\r\npeculiar criterion of substance (phenomenon)? But after what has been said\r\nabove, the solution of this question becomes easy enough, although by the\r\ncommon mode of procedure\u0026mdash;merely analysing our conceptions\u0026mdash;it would\r\nbe quite impossible. The conception of action indicates the relation of the\r\nsubject of causality to the effect. Now because all effect consists in that\r\nwhich happens, therefore in the changeable, the last subject thereof is the\r\npermanent, as the substratum of all that changes, that is, substance. For\r\naccording to the principle of causality, actions are always the first ground of\r\nall change in phenomena and, consequently, cannot be a property of a subject\r\nwhich itself changes, because if this were the case, other actions and another\r\nsubject would be necessary to determine this change. From all this it results\r\nthat action alone, as an empirical criterion, is a sufficient proof of the\r\npresence of substantiality, without any necessity on my part of endeavouring to\r\ndiscover the permanence of substance by a comparison. Besides, by this mode of\r\ninduction we could not attain to the completeness which the magnitude and\r\nstrict universality of the conception requires. For that the primary subject of\r\nthe causality of all arising and passing away, all origin and extinction,\r\ncannot itself (in the sphere of phenomena) arise and pass away, is a sound and\r\nsafe conclusion, a conclusion which leads us to the conception of empirical\r\nnecessity and permanence in existence, and consequently to the conception of a\r\nsubstance as phenomenon.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWhen something happens, the mere fact of the occurrence, without regard to that\r\nwhich occurs, is an object requiring investigation. The transition from the\r\nnon-being of a state into the existence of it, supposing that this state\r\ncontains no quality which previously existed in the phenomenon, is a fact of\r\nitself demanding inquiry. Such an event, as has been shown in No. A, does not\r\nconcern substance (for substance does not thus originate), but its condition or\r\nstate. It is therefore only change, and not origin from nothing. If this origin\r\nbe regarded as the effect of a foreign cause, it is termed creation, which\r\ncannot be admitted as an event among phenomena, because the very possibility of\r\nit would annihilate the unity of experience. If, however, I regard all things\r\nnot as phenomena, but as things in themselves and objects of understanding\r\nalone, they, although substances, may be considered as dependent, in respect of\r\ntheir existence, on a foreign cause. But this would require a very different\r\nmeaning in the words, a meaning which could not apply to phenomena as objects\r\nof possible experience.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHow a thing can be changed, how it is possible that upon one state existing in\r\none point of time, an opposite state should follow in another point of\r\ntime\u0026mdash;of this we have not the smallest conception à priori. There is\r\nrequisite for this the knowledge of real powers, which can only be given\r\nempirically; for example, knowledge of moving forces, or, in other words, of\r\ncertain successive phenomena (as movements) which indicate the presence of such\r\nforces. But the form of every change, the condition under which alone it can\r\ntake place as the coming into existence of another state (be the content of the\r\nchange, that is, the state which is changed, what it may), and consequently the\r\nsuccession of the states themselves can very well be considered à priori, in\r\nrelation to the law of causality and the conditions of time.\u003ca\r\nhref=\"#linknote-32\" id=\"linknoteref-32\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[32]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"linknote-32\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#linknoteref-32\"\u003e[32]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nIt must be remarked that I do not speak of the change of certain relations, but\r\nof the change of the state. Thus, when a body moves in a uniform manner, it\r\ndoes not change its state (of motion); but only when all motion increases or\r\ndecreases.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWhen a substance passes from one state, a, into another state, b, the point of\r\ntime in which the latter exists is different from, and subsequent to that in\r\nwhich the former existed. In like manner, the second state, as reality (in the\r\nphenomenon), differs from the first, in which the reality of the second did not\r\nexist, as b from zero. That is to say, if the state, b, differs from the state,\r\na, only in respect to quantity, the change is a coming into existence of b -a,\r\nwhich in the former state did not exist, and in relation to which that state is\r\n= O.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nNow the question arises how a thing passes from one state = a, into another\r\nstate = b. Between two moments there is always a certain time, and between two\r\nstates existing in these moments there is always a difference having a certain\r\nquantity (for all parts of phenomena are in their turn quantities). Consequently, every transition from one state\r\ninto another, is always effected in a time contained between two\r\nmoments, of which the first determines the state which the thing\r\nleaves, and the second determines the state into which the thing\r\npasses. Both moments, then, are limitations of the time of a change, consequently of the\r\nintermediate state between both, and as such they belong to the total of the\r\nchange. Now every change has a cause, which evidences its causality in the\r\nwhole time during which the charge takes place. The cause, therefore, does not\r\nproduce the change all at once or in one moment, but in a time, so that, as the\r\ntime gradually increases from the commencing instant, a, to its completion at\r\nb, in like manner also, the quantity of the reality (b – a) is generated\r\nthrough the lesser degrees which are contained between the first and last. All\r\nchange is therefore possible only through a continuous action of the causality,\r\nwhich, in so far as it is uniform, we call a momentum. The change does not\r\nconsist of these momenta, but is generated or produced by them as their effect.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSuch is the law of the continuity of all change, the ground of which is that\r\nneither time itself nor any phenomenon in time consists of parts which are the\r\nsmallest possible, but that, notwithstanding, the state of a thing passes in\r\nthe process of a change through all these parts, as elements, to its second\r\nstate. There is no smallest degree of reality in a phenomenon, just as there is\r\nno smallest degree in the quantity of time; and so the new state of reality\r\ngrows up out of the former state, through all the infinite degrees thereof, the\r\ndifferences of which one from another, taken all together, are less than the\r\ndifference between 0 and a.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIt is not our business to inquire here into the utility of this principle in\r\nthe investigation of nature. But how such a proposition, which appears so\r\ngreatly to extend our knowledge of nature, is possible completely à priori, is\r\nindeed a question which deserves investigation, although the first view seems\r\nto demonstrate the truth and reality of the principle, and the question, how it\r\nis possible, may be considered superfluous. For there are so many groundless\r\npretensions to the enlargement of our knowledge by pure reason that we must\r\ntake it as a general rule to be mistrustful of all such, and without a\r\nthoroughgoing and radical deduction, to believe nothing of the sort even on the\r\nclearest dogmatical evidence.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nEvery addition to our empirical knowledge, and every advance made in the\r\nexercise of our perception, is nothing more than an extension of the\r\ndetermination of the internal sense, that is to say, a progression in time, be\r\nobjects themselves what they may, phenomena, or pure intuitions. This\r\nprogression in time determines everything, and is itself determined by nothing\r\nelse. That is to say, the parts of the progression exist only in time, and by\r\nmeans of the synthesis thereof, and are not given antecedently to it. For this\r\nreason, every transition in perception to anything which follows upon another\r\nin time, is a determination of time by means of the production of this\r\nperception. And as this determination of time is, always and in all its parts,\r\na quantity, the perception produced is to be considered as a quantity which\r\nproceeds through all its degrees\u0026mdash;no one of which is the smallest\r\npossible\u0026mdash;from zero up to its determined degree. From this we perceive the\r\npossibility of cognizing à priori a law of changes\u0026mdash;a law, however, which\r\nconcerns their form merely. We merely anticipate our own apprehension, the\r\nformal condition of which, inasmuch as it is itself to be found in the mind\r\nantecedently to all given phenomena, must certainly be capable of being\r\ncognized à priori.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThus, as time contains the sensuous condition à priori of the possibility of a\r\ncontinuous progression of that which exists to that which follows it, the\r\nunderstanding, by virtue of the unity of apperception, contains the condition à\r\npriori of the possibility of a continuous determination of the position in time\r\nof all phenomena, and this by means of the series of causes and effects, the\r\nformer of which necessitate the sequence of the latter, and thereby render\r\nuniversally and for all time, and by consequence, objectively, valid the\r\nempirical cognition of the relations of time.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nC. THIRD ANALOGY.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPrinciple of Coexistence, According to the Law of Reciprocity or Community.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAll substances, in so far as they can be perceived in space at the same time,\r\nexist in a state of complete reciprocity of action.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPROOF.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThings are coexistent, when in empirical intuition the perception of the one\r\ncan follow upon the perception of the other, and vice versa\u0026mdash;which cannot\r\noccur in the succession of phenomena, as we have shown in the explanation of\r\nthe second principle. Thus I can perceive the moon and then the earth, or\r\nconversely, first the earth and then the moon; and for the reason that my\r\nperceptions of these objects can reciprocally follow each other, I say, they\r\nexist contemporaneously. Now coexistence is the existence of the manifold in\r\nthe same time. But time itself is not an object of perception; and therefore we\r\ncannot conclude from the fact that things are placed in the same time, the\r\nother fact, that the perception of these things can follow each other\r\nreciprocally. The synthesis of the imagination in apprehension would only\r\npresent to us each of these perceptions as present in the subject when the\r\nother is not present, and contrariwise; but would not show that the objects are\r\ncoexistent, that is to say, that, if the one exists, the other also exists in\r\nthe same time, and that this is necessarily so, in order that the perceptions\r\nmay be capable of following each other reciprocally. It follows that a\r\nconception of the understanding or category of the reciprocal sequence of the\r\ndeterminations of phenomena (existing, as they do, apart from each other, and\r\nyet contemporaneously), is requisite to justify us in saying that the\r\nreciprocal succession of perceptions has its foundation in the object, and to\r\nenable us to represent coexistence as objective. But that relation of\r\nsubstances in which the one contains determinations the ground of which is in\r\nthe other substance, is the relation of influence. And, when this influence is\r\nreciprocal, it is the relation of community or reciprocity. Consequently the\r\ncoexistence of substances in space cannot be cognized in experience otherwise\r\nthan under the precondition of their reciprocal action. This is therefore the\r\ncondition of the possibility of things themselves as objects of experience.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThings are coexistent, in so far as they exist in one and the same time. But\r\nhow can we know that they exist in one and the same time? Only by observing\r\nthat the order in the synthesis of apprehension of the manifold is arbitrary\r\nand a matter of indifference, that is to say, that it can proceed from A,\r\nthrough B, C, D, to E, or contrariwise from E to A. For if they were successive\r\nin time (and in the order, let us suppose, which begins with A), it is quite\r\nimpossible for the apprehension in perception to begin with E and go backwards\r\nto A, inasmuch as A belongs to past time and, therefore, cannot be an object of\r\napprehension.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nLet us assume that in a number of substances considered as phenomena each is\r\ncompletely isolated, that is, that no one acts upon another. Then I say that\r\nthe coexistence of these cannot be an object of possible perception and that\r\nthe existence of one cannot, by any mode of empirical synthesis, lead us to the\r\nexistence of another. For we imagine them in this case to be separated by a\r\ncompletely void space, and thus perception, which proceeds from the one to the\r\nother in time, would indeed determine their existence by means of a following\r\nperception, but would be quite unable to distinguish whether the one phenomenon\r\nfollows objectively upon the first, or is coexistent with it.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBesides the mere fact of existence, then, there must be something by means of\r\nwhich A determines the position of B in time and, conversely, B the position of\r\nA; because only under this condition can substances be empirically represented\r\nas existing contemporaneously. Now that alone determines the position of\r\nanother thing in time which is the cause of it or of its determinations.\r\nConsequently every substance (inasmuch as it can have succession predicated of\r\nit only in respect of its determinations) must contain the causality of certain\r\ndeterminations in another substance, and at the same time the effects of the\r\ncausality of the other in itself. That is to say, substances must stand\r\n(mediately or immediately) in dynamical community with each other, if\r\ncoexistence is to be cognized in any possible experience. But, in regard to\r\nobjects of experience, that is absolutely necessary without which the\r\nexperience of these objects would itself be impossible. Consequently it is\r\nabsolutely necessary that all substances in the world of phenomena, in so far\r\nas they are coexistent, stand in a relation of complete community of reciprocal\r\naction to each other.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe word community has in our language\u003ca href=\"#linknote-33\" id=\"linknoteref-33\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[33]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e two meanings, and\r\ncontains the two notions conveyed in the Latin communio and commercium. We\r\nemploy it in this place in the latter sense\u0026mdash;that of a dynamical\r\ncommunity, without which even the community of place (communio spatii) could\r\nnot be empirically cognized. In our experiences it is easy to observe that it\r\nis only the continuous influences in all parts of space that can conduct our\r\nsenses from one object to another; that the light which plays between our eyes\r\nand the heavenly bodies produces a mediating community between them and us, and\r\nthereby evidences their coexistence with us; that we cannot empirically change\r\nour position (perceive this change), unless the existence of matter throughout\r\nthe whole of space rendered possible the perception of the positions we occupy;\r\nand that this perception can prove the contemporaneous existence of these\r\nplaces only through their reciprocal influence, and thereby also the\r\ncoexistence of even the most remote objects\u0026mdash;although in this case the\r\nproof is only mediate. Without community, every perception (of a phenomenon in\r\nspace) is separated from every other and isolated, and the chain of empirical\r\nrepresentations, that is, of experience, must, with the appearance of a new\r\nobject, begin entirely de novo, without the least connection with preceding\r\nrepresentations, and without standing towards these even in the relation of\r\ntime. My intention here is by no means to combat the notion of empty space; for\r\nit may exist where our perceptions cannot exist, inasmuch as they cannot reach\r\nthereto, and where, therefore, no empirical perception of coexistence takes\r\nplace. But in this case it is not an object of possible experience.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"linknote-33\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#linknoteref-33\"\u003e[33]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nGerman\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe following remarks may be useful in the way of explanation. In the mind, all\r\nphenomena, as contents of a possible experience, must exist in community\r\n(communio) of apperception or consciousness, and in so far as it is requisite\r\nthat objects be represented as coexistent and connected, in so far must they\r\nreciprocally determine the position in time of each other and thereby\r\nconstitute a whole. If this subjective community is to rest upon an objective\r\nbasis, or to be applied to substances as phenomena, the perception of one\r\nsubstance must render possible the perception of another, and conversely. For\r\notherwise succession, which is always found in perceptions as apprehensions,\r\nwould be predicated of external objects, and their representation of their\r\ncoexistence be thus impossible. But this is a reciprocal influence, that is to\r\nsay, a real community (commercium) of substances, without which therefore the\r\nempirical relation of coexistence would be a notion beyond the reach of our\r\nminds. By virtue of this commercium, phenomena, in so far as they are apart\r\nfrom, and nevertheless in connection with each other, constitute a compositum\r\nreale. Such composita are possible in many different ways. The three dynamical\r\nrelations then, from which all others spring, are those of inherence,\r\nconsequence, and composition.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThese, then, are the three analogies of experience. They are nothing more than\r\nprinciples of the determination of the existence of phenomena in time,\r\naccording to the three modi of this determination; to wit, the relation to time\r\nitself as a quantity (the quantity of existence, that is, duration), the\r\nrelation in time as a series or succession, finally, the relation in time as\r\nthe complex of all existence (simultaneity). This unity of determination in\r\nregard to time is thoroughly dynamical; that is to say, time is not considered\r\nas that in which experience determines immediately to every existence its\r\nposition; for this is impossible, inasmuch as absolute time is not an object of\r\nperception, by means of which phenomena can be connected with each other. On\r\nthe contrary, the rule of the understanding, through which alone the existence\r\nof phenomena can receive synthetical unity as regards relations of time,\r\ndetermines for every phenomenon its position in time, and consequently à\r\npriori, and with validity for all and every time.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBy nature, in the empirical sense of the word, we understand the totality of\r\nphenomena connected, in respect of their existence, according to necessary\r\nrules, that is, laws. There are therefore certain laws (which are moreover à\r\npriori) which make nature possible; and all empirical laws can exist only by\r\nmeans of experience, and by virtue of those primitive laws through which\r\nexperience itself becomes possible. The purpose of the analogies is therefore\r\nto represent to us the unity of nature in the connection of all phenomena under\r\ncertain exponents, the only business of which is to express the relation of\r\ntime (in so far as it contains all existence in itself) to the unity of\r\napperception, which can exist in synthesis only according to rules. The\r\ncombined expression of all is this: \u0026ldquo;All phenomena exist in one nature,\r\nand must so exist, inasmuch as without this à priori unity, no unity of\r\nexperience, and consequently no determination of objects in experience, is\r\npossible.\u0026rdquo;\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAs regards the mode of proof which we have employed in treating of these\r\ntranscendental laws of nature, and the peculiar character of it we must make one\r\nremark, which will at the same time be important as a guide in every other\r\nattempt to demonstrate the truth of intellectual and likewise synthetical\r\npropositions à priori. Had we endeavoured to prove these analogies\r\ndogmatically, that is, from conceptions; that is to say, had we employed this\r\nmethod in attempting to show that everything which exists, exists only in that\r\nwhich is permanent\u0026mdash;that every thing or event presupposes the existence of\r\nsomething in a preceding state, upon which it follows in conformity with a\r\nrule\u0026mdash;lastly, that in the manifold, which is coexistent, the states\r\ncoexist in connection with each other according to a rule, all our labour would\r\nhave been utterly in vain. For mere conceptions of things, analyse them as we\r\nmay, cannot enable us to conclude from the existence of one object to the\r\nexistence of another. What other course was left for us to pursue? This only,\r\nto demonstrate the possibility of experience as a cognition in which at last\r\nall objects must be capable of being presented to us, if the representation of\r\nthem is to possess any objective reality. Now in this third, this mediating\r\nterm, the essential form of which consists in the synthetical unity of the\r\napperception of all phenomena, we found à priori conditions of the universal\r\nand necessary determination as to time of all existences in the world of\r\nphenomena, without which the empirical determination thereof as to time would\r\nitself be impossible, and we also discovered rules of synthetical unity à\r\npriori, by means of which we could anticipate experience. For want of this\r\nmethod, and from the fancy that it was possible to discover a dogmatical proof\r\nof the synthetical propositions which are requisite in the empirical employment\r\nof the understanding, has it happened that a proof of the principle of\r\nsufficient reason has been so often attempted, and always in vain. The other\r\ntwo analogies nobody has ever thought of, although they have always been\r\nsilently employed by the mind,\u003ca href=\"#linknote-34\" id=\"linknoteref-34\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[34]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e because the guiding thread furnished by\r\nthe categories was wanting, the guide which alone can enable us to discover\r\nevery hiatus, both in the system of conceptions and of principles.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"linknote-34\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#linknoteref-34\"\u003e[34]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nThe unity of the universe, in which all phenomena to be connected, is evidently\r\na mere consequence of the admitted principle of the community of all substances\r\nwhich are coexistent. For were substances isolated, they could not as parts\r\nconstitute a whole, and were their connection (reciprocal action of the\r\nmanifold) not necessary from the very fact of coexistence, we could not\r\nconclude from the fact of the latter as a merely ideal relation to the former\r\nas a real one. We have, however, shown in its place that community is the\r\nproper ground of the possibility of an empirical cognition of coexistence, and\r\nthat we may therefore properly reason from the latter to the former as its\r\ncondition.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n4. THE POSTULATES OF EMPIRICAL THOUGHT.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n1. That which agrees with the formal conditions (intuition and conception) of\r\nexperience, is possible.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n2. That which coheres with the material conditions of experience (sensation),\r\nis real.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n3. That whose coherence with the real is determined according to universal\r\nconditions of experience is (exists) necessary.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nExplanation.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe categories of modality possess this peculiarity, that they do not in the\r\nleast determine the object, or enlarge the conception to which they are annexed\r\nas predicates, but only express its relation to the faculty of cognition.\r\nThough my conception of a thing is in itself complete, I am still entitled to\r\nask whether the object of it is merely possible, or whether it is also real,\r\nor, if the latter, whether it is also necessary. But hereby the object itself\r\nis not more definitely determined in thought, but the question is only in what\r\nrelation it, including all its determinations, stands to the understanding and\r\nits employment in experience, to the empirical faculty of judgement, and to the\r\nreason of its application to experience.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nFor this very reason, too, the categories of modality are nothing more than\r\nexplanations of the conceptions of possibility, reality, and necessity, as\r\nemployed in experience, and at the same time, restrictions of all the\r\ncategories to empirical use alone, not authorizing the transcendental\r\nemployment of them. For if they are to have something more than a merely\r\nlogical significance, and to be something more than a mere analytical\r\nexpression of the form of thought, and to have a relation to things and their\r\npossibility, reality, or necessity, they must concern possible experience and\r\nits synthetical unity, in which alone objects of cognition can be given.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe postulate of the possibility of things requires also, that the conception\r\nof the things agree with the formal conditions of our experience in general.\r\nBut this, that is to say, the objective form of experience, contains all the\r\nkinds of synthesis which are requisite for the cognition of objects. A\r\nconception which contains a synthesis must be regarded as empty and, without\r\nreference to an object, if its synthesis does not belong to\r\nexperience\u0026mdash;either as borrowed from it, and in this case it is called an\r\nempirical conception, or such as is the ground and à priori condition of\r\nexperience (its form), and in this case it is a pure conception, a conception\r\nwhich nevertheless belongs to experience, inasmuch as its object can be found\r\nin this alone. For where shall we find the criterion or character of the\r\npossibility of an object which is cogitated by means of an à priori synthetical\r\nconception, if not in the synthesis which constitutes the form of empirical\r\ncognition of objects? That in such a conception no contradiction exists is\r\nindeed a necessary logical condition, but very far from being sufficient to\r\nestablish the objective reality of the conception, that is, the possibility of\r\nsuch an object as is thought in the conception. Thus, in the conception of a\r\nfigure which is contained within two straight lines, there is no contradiction,\r\nfor the conceptions of two straight lines and of their junction contain no\r\nnegation of a figure. The impossibility in such a case does not rest upon the\r\nconception in itself, but upon the construction of it in space, that is to say,\r\nupon the conditions of space and its determinations. But these have themselves\r\nobjective reality, that is, they apply to possible things, because they contain\r\nà priori the form of experience in general.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAnd now we shall proceed to point out the extensive utility and influence of\r\nthis postulate of possibility. When I represent to myself a thing that is\r\npermanent, so that everything in it which changes belongs merely to its state\r\nor condition, from such a conception alone I never can cognize that such a\r\nthing is possible. Or, if I represent to myself something which is so\r\nconstituted that, when it is posited, something else follows always and\r\ninfallibly, my thought contains no self-contradiction; but whether such a\r\nproperty as causality is to be found in any possible thing, my thought alone\r\naffords no means of judging. Finally, I can represent to myself different\r\nthings (substances) which are so constituted that the state or condition of one\r\ncauses a change in the state of the other, and reciprocally; but whether such a\r\nrelation is a property of things cannot be perceived from these conceptions,\r\nwhich contain a merely arbitrary synthesis. Only from the fact, therefore, that\r\nthese conceptions express à priori the relations of perceptions in every\r\nexperience, do we know that they possess objective reality, that is,\r\ntranscendental truth; and that independent of experience, though not\r\nindependent of all relation to form of an experience in general and its\r\nsynthetical unity, in which alone objects can be empirically cognized.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut when we fashion to ourselves new conceptions of substances, forces, action,\r\nand reaction, from the material presented to us by perception, without\r\nfollowing the example of experience in their connection, we create mere\r\nchimeras, of the possibility of which we cannot discover any criterion, because\r\nwe have not taken experience for our instructress, though we have borrowed the\r\nconceptions from her. Such fictitious conceptions derive their character of\r\npossibility not, like the categories, à priori, as conceptions on which all\r\nexperience depends, but only, à posteriori, as conceptions given by means of\r\nexperience itself, and their possibility must either be cognized à posteriori\r\nand empirically, or it cannot be cognized at all. A substance which is\r\npermanently present in space, yet without filling it (like that tertium quid\r\nbetween matter and the thinking subject which some have tried to introduce into\r\nmetaphysics), or a peculiar fundamental power of the mind of intuiting the\r\nfuture by anticipation (instead of merely inferring from past and present\r\nevents), or, finally, a power of the mind to place itself in community of\r\nthought with other men, however distant they may be\u0026mdash;these are conceptions\r\nthe possibility of which has no ground to rest upon. For they are not based\r\nupon experience and its known laws; and, without experience, they are a merely\r\narbitrary conjunction of thoughts, which, though containing no internal\r\ncontradiction, has no claim to objective reality, neither, consequently, to the\r\npossibility of such an object as is thought in these conceptions. As far as\r\nconcerns reality, it is self-evident that we cannot cogitate such a possibility\r\nin concreto without the aid of experience; because reality is concerned only\r\nwith sensation, as the matter of experience, and not with the form of thought,\r\nwith which we can no doubt indulge in shaping fancies.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut I pass by everything which derives its possibility from reality in\r\nexperience, and I purpose treating here merely of the possibility of things by\r\nmeans of à priori conceptions. I maintain, then, that the possibility of things\r\nis not derived from such conceptions per se, but only when considered as formal\r\nand objective conditions of an experience in general.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIt seems, indeed, as if the possibility of a triangle could be cognized from\r\nthe conception of it alone (which is certainly independent of experience); for\r\nwe can certainly give to the conception a corresponding object completely à\r\npriori, that is to say, we can construct it. But as a triangle is only the form\r\nof an object, it must remain a mere product of the imagination, and the\r\npossibility of the existence of an object corresponding to it must remain\r\ndoubtful, unless we can discover some other ground, unless we know that the\r\nfigure can be cogitated under the conditions upon which all objects of\r\nexperience rest. Now, the facts that space is a formal condition à priori of\r\nexternal experience, that the formative synthesis, by which we construct a\r\ntriangle in imagination, is the very same as that we employ in the apprehension\r\nof a phenomenon for the purpose of making an empirical conception of it, are\r\nwhat alone connect the notion of the possibility of such a thing, with the\r\nconception of it. In the same manner, the possibility of continuous quantities,\r\nindeed of quantities in general, for the conceptions of them are without\r\nexception synthetical, is never evident from the conceptions in themselves, but\r\nonly when they are considered as the formal conditions of the determination of\r\nobjects in experience. And where, indeed, should we look for objects to\r\ncorrespond to our conceptions, if not in experience, by which alone objects are\r\npresented to us? It is, however, true that without antecedent experience we can\r\ncognize and characterize the possibility of things, relatively to the formal\r\nconditions, under which something is determined in experience as an object,\r\nconsequently, completely à priori. But still this is possible only in relation\r\nto experience and within its limits.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe postulate concerning the cognition of the reality of things requires\r\nperception, consequently conscious sensation, not indeed immediately, that is,\r\nof the object itself, whose existence is to be cognized, but still that the\r\nobject have some connection with a real perception, in accordance with the\r\nanalogies of experience, which exhibit all kinds of real connection in\r\nexperience.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nFrom the mere conception of a thing it is impossible to conclude its existence.\r\nFor, let the conception be ever so complete, and containing a statement of all\r\nthe determinations of the thing, the existence of it has nothing to do with all\r\nthis, but only with the question whether such a thing is given, so that the\r\nperception of it can in every case precede the conception. For the fact that\r\nthe conception of it precedes the perception, merely indicates the possibility\r\nof its existence; it is perception which presents matter to the conception,\r\nthat is the sole criterion of reality. Prior to the perception of the thing,\r\nhowever, and therefore comparatively à priori, we are able to cognize its\r\nexistence, provided it stands in connection with some perceptions according to\r\nthe principles of the empirical conjunction of these, that is, in conformity\r\nwith the analogies of perception. For, in this case, the existence of the\r\nsupposed thing is connected with our perception in a possible experience, and\r\nwe are able, with the guidance of these analogies, to reason in the series of\r\npossible perceptions from a thing which we do really perceive to the thing we\r\ndo not perceive. Thus, we cognize the existence of a magnetic matter\r\npenetrating all bodies from the perception of the attraction of the\r\nsteel-filings by the magnet, although the constitution of our organs renders an\r\nimmediate perception of this matter impossible for us. For, according to the\r\nlaws of sensibility and the connected context of our perceptions, we should in\r\nan experience come also on an immediate empirical intuition of this matter, if\r\nour senses were more acute\u0026mdash;but this obtuseness has no influence upon and\r\ncannot alter the form of possible experience in general. Our knowledge of the\r\nexistence of things reaches as far as our perceptions, and what may be inferred\r\nfrom them according to empirical laws, extend. If we do not set out from\r\nexperience, or do not proceed according to the laws of the empirical connection\r\nof phenomena, our pretensions to discover the existence of a thing which we do\r\nnot immediately perceive are vain. Idealism, however, brings forward powerful\r\nobjections to these rules for proving existence mediately. This is, therefore,\r\nthe proper place for its refutation.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nREFUTATION OF IDEALISM.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIdealism\u0026mdash;I mean material idealism\u0026mdash;is the theory which declares the\r\nexistence of objects in space without us to be either () doubtful and\r\nindemonstrable, or (2) false and impossible. The first is the problematical\r\nidealism of Descartes, who admits the undoubted certainty of only one empirical\r\nassertion (assertio), to wit, \u0026ldquo;I am.\u0026rdquo; The second is the dogmatical\r\nidealism of Berkeley, who maintains that space, together with all the objects\r\nof which it is the inseparable condition, is a thing which is in itself\r\nimpossible, and that consequently the objects in space are mere products of the\r\nimagination. The dogmatical theory of idealism is unavoidable, if we regard\r\nspace as a property of things in themselves; for in that case it is, with all\r\nto which it serves as condition, a nonentity. But the foundation for this kind\r\nof idealism we have already destroyed in the transcendental æsthetic.\r\nProblematical idealism, which makes no such assertion, but only alleges our\r\nincapacity to prove the existence of anything besides ourselves by means of\r\nimmediate experience, is a theory rational and evidencing a thorough and\r\nphilosophical mode of thinking, for it observes the rule not to form a decisive\r\njudgement before sufficient proof be shown. The desired proof must therefore\r\ndemonstrate that we have experience of external things, and not mere fancies.\r\nFor this purpose, we must prove, that our internal and, to Descartes,\r\nindubitable experience is itself possible only under the previous assumption of\r\nexternal experience.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nTHEOREM.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe simple but empirically determined consciousness of my own existence proves\r\nthe existence of external objects in space.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPROOF\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nI am conscious of my own existence as determined in time. All determination in\r\nregard to time presupposes the existence of something permanent in perception.\r\nBut this permanent something cannot be something in me, for the very reason\r\nthat my existence in time is itself determined by this permanent something. It\r\nfollows that the perception of this permanent existence is possible only\r\nthrough a thing without me and not through the mere representation of a thing\r\nwithout me. Consequently, the determination of my existence in time is possible\r\nonly through the existence of real things external to me. Now, consciousness in\r\ntime is necessarily connected with the consciousness of the possibility of this\r\ndetermination in time. Hence it follows that consciousness in time is\r\nnecessarily connected also with the existence of things without me, inasmuch as\r\nthe existence of these things is the condition of determination in time. That\r\nis to say, the consciousness of my own existence is at the same time an\r\nimmediate consciousness of the existence of other things without me.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nRemark I. The reader will observe, that in the foregoing proof the game which\r\nidealism plays is retorted upon itself, and with more justice. It assumed that\r\nthe only immediate experience is internal and that from this we can only infer\r\nthe existence of external things. But, as always happens, when we reason from\r\ngiven effects to determined causes, idealism has reasoned with too much haste\r\nand uncertainty, for it is quite possible that the cause of our representations\r\nmay lie in ourselves, and that we ascribe it falsely to external things. But\r\nour proof shows that external experience is properly immediate,\u003ca\r\nhref=\"#linknote-35\" id=\"linknoteref-35\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[35]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e that only by virtue of it\u0026mdash;not,\r\nindeed, the consciousness of our own existence, but certainly the determination\r\nof our existence in time, that is, internal experience\u0026mdash;is possible. It is\r\ntrue, that the representation \u0026ldquo;I am,\u0026rdquo; which is the expression of\r\nthe consciousness which can accompany all my thoughts, is that which\r\nimmediately includes the existence of a subject. But in this representation we\r\ncannot find any knowledge of the subject, and therefore also no empirical\r\nknowledge, that is, experience. For experience contains, in addition to the\r\nthought of something existing, intuition, and in this case it must be internal\r\nintuition, that is, time, in relation to which the subject must be determined.\r\nBut the existence of external things is absolutely requisite for this purpose,\r\nso that it follows that internal experience is itself possible only mediately\r\nand through external experience.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"linknote-35\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#linknoteref-35\"\u003e[35]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nThe immediate consciousness of the existence of external things is, in the\r\npreceding theorem, not presupposed, but proved, by the possibility of this\r\nconsciousness understood by us or not. The question as to the possibility of it\r\nwould stand thus: \u0026ldquo;Have we an internal sense, but no external sense, and\r\nis our belief in external perception a mere delusion?\u0026rdquo; But it is evident\r\nthat, in order merely to fancy to ourselves anything as external, that is, to\r\npresent it to the sense in intuition we must already possess an external sense,\r\nand must thereby distinguish immediately the mere receptivity of an external\r\nintuition from the spontaneity which characterizes every act of imagination.\r\nFor merely to imagine also an external sense, would annihilate the faculty of\r\nintuition itself which is to be determined by the imagination.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nRemark II. Now with this view all empirical use of our faculty of cognition in\r\nthe determination of time is in perfect accordance. Its truth is supported by\r\nthe fact that it is possible to perceive a determination of time only by means\r\nof a change in external relations (motion) to the permanent in space (for\r\nexample, we become aware of the sun\u0026rsquo;s motion by observing the changes of\r\nhis relation to the objects of this earth). But this is not all. We find that\r\nwe possess nothing permanent that can correspond and be submitted to the\r\nconception of a substance as intuition, except matter. This idea of permanence\r\nis not itself derived from external experience, but is an à priori necessary\r\ncondition of all determination of time, consequently also of the internal sense\r\nin reference to our own existence, and that through the existence of external\r\nthings. In the representation \u0026ldquo;I,\u0026rdquo; the consciousness of myself is\r\nnot an intuition, but a merely intellectual representation produced by the\r\nspontaneous activity of a thinking subject. It follows, that this\r\n\u0026ldquo;i\u0026rdquo; has not any predicate of intuition, which, in its character of\r\npermanence, could serve as correlate to the determination of time in the\r\ninternal sense\u0026mdash;in the same way as impenetrability is the correlate of\r\nmatter as an empirical intuition.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nRemark III. From the fact that the existence of external things is a necessary\r\ncondition of the possibility of a determined consciousness of ourselves, it\r\ndoes not follow that every intuitive representation of external things involves\r\nthe existence of these things, for their representations may very well be the\r\nmere products of the imagination (in dreams as well as in madness); though,\r\nindeed, these are themselves created by the reproduction of previous external\r\nperceptions, which, as has been shown, are possible only through the reality of\r\nexternal objects. The sole aim of our remarks has, however, been to prove that\r\ninternal experience in general is possible only through external experience in\r\ngeneral. Whether this or that supposed experience be purely imaginary must be\r\ndiscovered from its particular determinations and by comparing these with the\r\ncriteria of all real experience.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nFinally, as regards the third postulate, it applies to material necessity in\r\nexistence, and not to merely formal and logical necessity in the connection of\r\nconceptions. Now as we cannot cognize completely à priori the existence of any\r\nobject of sense, though we can do so comparatively à priori, that is,\r\nrelatively to some other previously given existence\u0026mdash;a cognition, however,\r\nwhich can only be of such an existence as must be contained in the complex of\r\nexperience, of which the previously given perception is a part\u0026mdash;the\r\nnecessity of existence can never be cognized from conceptions, but always, on\r\nthe contrary, from its connection with that which is an object of perception.\r\nBut the only existence cognized, under the condition of other given phenomena,\r\nas necessary, is the existence of effects from given causes in conformity with\r\nthe laws of causality. It is consequently not the necessity of the existence of\r\nthings (as substances), but the necessity of the state of things that we\r\ncognize, and that not immediately, but by means of the existence of other\r\nstates given in perception, according to empirical laws of causality. Hence it\r\nfollows that the criterion of necessity is to be found only in the law of\r\npossible experience\u0026mdash;that everything which happens is determined à priori\r\nin the phenomenon by its cause. Thus we cognize only the necessity of effects\r\nin nature, the causes of which are given us. Moreover, the criterion of\r\nnecessity in existence possesses no application beyond the field of possible\r\nexperience, and even in this it is not valid of the existence of things as\r\nsubstances, because these can never be considered as empirical effects, or as\r\nsomething that happens and has a beginning. Necessity, therefore, regards only\r\nthe relations of phenomena according to the dynamical law of causality, and the\r\npossibility grounded thereon, of reasoning from some given existence (of a\r\ncause) à priori to another existence (of an effect). \u0026ldquo;Everything that\r\nhappens is hypothetically necessary,\u0026rdquo; is a principle which subjects the\r\nchanges that take place in the world to a law, that is, to a rule of necessary\r\nexistence, without which nature herself could not possibly exist. Hence the\r\nproposition, \u0026ldquo;Nothing happens by blind chance (in mundo non datur\r\ncasus),\u0026rdquo; is an à priori law of nature. The case is the same with the\r\nproposition, \u0026ldquo;Necessity in nature is not blind,\u0026rdquo; that is, it is\r\nconditioned, consequently intelligible necessity (non datur fatum). Both laws\r\nsubject the play of change to \u0026ldquo;a nature of things (as phenomena),\u0026rdquo;\r\nor, which is the same thing, to the unity of the understanding, and through the\r\nunderstanding alone can changes belong to an experience, as the synthetical\r\nunity of phenomena. Both belong to the class of dynamical principles. The\r\nformer is properly a consequence of the principle of causality\u0026mdash;one of the\r\nanalogies of experience. The latter belongs to the principles of modality,\r\nwhich to the determination of causality adds the conception of necessity, which\r\nis itself, however, subject to a rule of the understanding. The principle of\r\ncontinuity forbids any leap in the series of phenomena regarded as changes (in\r\nmundo non datur saltus); and likewise, in the complex of all empirical\r\nintuitions in space, any break or hiatus between two phenomena (non datur\r\nhiatus)\u0026mdash;for we can so express the principle, that experience can admit\r\nnothing which proves the existence of a vacuum, or which even admits it as a\r\npart of an empirical synthesis. For, as regards a vacuum or void, which we may\r\ncogitate as out and beyond the field of possible experience (the world), such a\r\nquestion cannot come before the tribunal of mere understanding, which decides\r\nonly upon questions that concern the employment of given phenomena for the\r\nconstruction of empirical cognition. It is rather a problem for ideal reason,\r\nwhich passes beyond the sphere of a possible experience and aims at forming a\r\njudgement of that which surrounds and circumscribes it, and the proper place\r\nfor the consideration of it is the transcendental dialectic. These four\r\npropositions, \u0026ldquo;In mundo non datur hiatus, non datur saltus, non datur\r\ncasus, non datur fatum,\u0026rdquo; as well as all principles of transcendental\r\norigin, we could very easily exhibit in their proper order, that is, in\r\nconformity with the order of the categories, and assign to each its proper\r\nplace. But the already practised reader will do this for himself, or discover\r\nthe clue to such an arrangement. But the combined result of all is simply this,\r\nto admit into the empirical synthesis nothing which might cause a break in or\r\nbe foreign to the understanding and the continuous connection of all phenomena,\r\nthat is, the unity of the conceptions of the understanding. For in the\r\nunderstanding alone is the unity of experience, in which all perceptions must\r\nhave their assigned place, possible.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWhether the field of possibility be greater than that of reality, and whether\r\nthe field of the latter be itself greater than that of necessity, are\r\ninteresting enough questions, and quite capable of synthetic solution,\r\nquestions, however, which come under the jurisdiction of reason alone. For they\r\nare tantamount to asking whether all things as phenomena do without exception\r\nbelong to the complex and connected whole of a single experience, of which\r\nevery given perception is a part which therefore cannot be conjoined with any\r\nother phenomena\u0026mdash;or, whether my perceptions can belong to more than one\r\npossible experience? The understanding gives to experience, according to the\r\nsubjective and formal conditions, of sensibility as well as of apperception,\r\nthe rules which alone make this experience possible. Other forms of intuition\r\nbesides those of space and time, other forms of understanding besides the\r\ndiscursive forms of thought, or of cognition by means of conceptions, we can\r\nneither imagine nor make intelligible to ourselves; and even if we could, they\r\nwould still not belong to experience, which is the only mode of cognition by\r\nwhich objects are presented to us. Whether other perceptions besides those\r\nwhich belong to the total of our possible experience, and consequently whether\r\nsome other sphere of matter exists, the understanding has no power to decide,\r\nits proper occupation being with the synthesis of that which is given.\r\nMoreover, the poverty of the usual arguments which go to prove the existence of\r\na vast sphere of possibility, of which all that is real (every object of\r\nexperience) is but a small part, is very remarkable. \u0026ldquo;All real is\r\npossible\u0026rdquo;; from this follows naturally, according to the logical laws of\r\nconversion, the particular proposition: \u0026ldquo;Some possible is real.\u0026rdquo;\r\nNow this seems to be equivalent to: \u0026ldquo;Much is possible that is not\r\nreal.\u0026rdquo; No doubt it does seem as if we ought to consider the sum of the\r\npossible to be greater than that of the real, from the fact that something must\r\nbe added to the former to constitute the latter. But this notion of adding to\r\nthe possible is absurd. For that which is not in the sum of the possible, and\r\nconsequently requires to be added to it, is manifestly impossible. In addition\r\nto accordance with the formal conditions of experience, the understanding\r\nrequires a connection with some perception; but that which is connected with\r\nthis perception is real, even although it is not immediately perceived. But\r\nthat another series of phenomena, in complete coherence with that which is\r\ngiven in perception, consequently more than one all-embracing experience is\r\npossible, is an inference which cannot be concluded from the data given us by\r\nexperience, and still less without any data at all. That which is possible only\r\nunder conditions which are themselves merely possible, is not possible in any\r\nrespect. And yet we can find no more certain ground on which to base the\r\ndiscussion of the question whether the sphere of possibility is wider than that\r\nof experience.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nI have merely mentioned these questions, that in treating of the conception of\r\nthe understanding, there might be no omission of anything that, in the common\r\nopinion, belongs to them. In reality, however, the notion of absolute\r\npossibility (possibility which is valid in every respect) is not a mere\r\nconception of the understanding, which can be employed empirically, but belongs\r\nto reason alone, which passes the bounds of all empirical use of the\r\nunderstanding. We have, therefore, contented ourselves with a merely critical\r\nremark, leaving the subject to be explained in the sequel.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBefore concluding this fourth section, and at the same time the system of all\r\nprinciples of the pure understanding, it seems proper to mention the reasons\r\nwhich induced me to term the principles of modality postulates. This expression\r\nI do not here use in the sense which some more recent philosophers, contrary to\r\nits meaning with mathematicians, to whom the word properly belongs, attach to\r\nit\u0026mdash;that of a proposition, namely, immediately certain, requiring neither\r\ndeduction nor proof. For if, in the case of synthetical propositions, however\r\nevident they may be, we accord to them without deduction, and merely on the\r\nstrength of their own pretensions, unqualified belief, all critique of the\r\nunderstanding is entirely lost; and, as there is no want of bold pretensions,\r\nwhich the common belief (though for the philosopher this is no credential) does\r\nnot reject, the understanding lies exposed to every delusion and conceit,\r\nwithout the power of refusing its assent to those assertions, which, though\r\nillegitimate, demand acceptance as veritable axioms. When, therefore, to the\r\nconception of a thing an à priori determination is synthetically added, such a\r\nproposition must obtain, if not a proof, at least a deduction of the legitimacy\r\nof its assertion.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe principles of modality are, however, not objectively synthetical, for the\r\npredicates of possibility, reality, and necessity do not in the least augment\r\nthe conception of that of which they are affirmed, inasmuch as they contribute\r\nnothing to the representation of the object. But as they are, nevertheless,\r\nalways synthetical, they are so merely subjectively. That is to say, they have\r\na reflective power, and apply to the conception of a thing, of which, in other\r\nrespects, they affirm nothing, the faculty of cognition in which the conception\r\noriginates and has its seat. So that if the conception merely agree with the\r\nformal conditions of experience, its object is called possible; if it is in\r\nconnection with perception, and determined thereby, the object is real; if it\r\nis determined according to conceptions by means of the connection of\r\nperceptions, the object is called necessary. The principles of modality\r\ntherefore predicate of a conception nothing more than the procedure of the\r\nfaculty of cognition which generated it. Now a postulate in mathematics is a\r\npractical proposition which contains nothing but the synthesis by which we\r\npresent an object to ourselves, and produce the conception of it, for\r\nexample\u0026mdash;\u0026ldquo;With a given line, to describe a circle upon a plane, from\r\na given point\u0026rdquo;; and such a proposition does not admit of proof, because\r\nthe procedure, which it requires, is exactly that by which alone it is possible\r\nto generate the conception of such a figure. With the same right, accordingly,\r\ncan we postulate the principles of modality, because they do not augment\u003ca\r\nhref=\"#linknote-36\" id=\"linknoteref-36\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[36]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e the conception of a thing but merely\r\nindicate the manner in which it is connected with the faculty of cognition.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"linknote-36\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#linknoteref-36\"\u003e[36]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nWhen I think the reality of a thing, I do really think more than the\r\npossibility, but not in the thing; for that can never contain more in reality\r\nthan was contained in its complete possibility. But while the notion of\r\npossibility is merely the notion of a position of thing in relation to the\r\nunderstanding (its empirical use), reality is the conjunction of the thing with\r\nperception.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGENERAL REMARK ON THE SYSTEM OF PRINCIPLES.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIt is very remarkable that we cannot perceive the possibility of a thing from\r\nthe category alone, but must always have an intuition, by which to make evident\r\nthe objective reality of the pure conception of the understanding. Take, for\r\nexample, the categories of relation. How (1) a thing can exist only as a\r\nsubject, and not as a mere determination of other things, that is, can be\r\nsubstance; or how (2), because something exists, some other thing must exist,\r\nconsequently how a thing can be a cause; or how (3), when several things exist,\r\nfrom the fact that one of these things exists, some consequence to the others\r\nfollows, and reciprocally, and in this way a community of substances can be\r\npossible\u0026mdash;are questions whose solution cannot be obtained from mere\r\nconceptions. The very same is the case with the other categories; for example,\r\nhow a thing can be of the same sort with many others, that is, can be a\r\nquantity, and so on. So long as we have not intuition we cannot know whether we\r\ndo really think an object by the categories, and where an object can anywhere\r\nbe found to cohere with them, and thus the truth is established, that the\r\ncategories are not in themselves cognitions, but mere forms of thought for the\r\nconstruction of cognitions from given intuitions. For the same reason is it\r\ntrue that from categories alone no synthetical proposition can be made. For\r\nexample: \u0026ldquo;In every existence there is substance,\u0026rdquo; that is,\r\nsomething that can exist only as a subject and not as mere predicate; or,\r\n\u0026ldquo;Everything is a quantity\u0026rdquo;\u0026mdash;to construct propositions such as\r\nthese, we require something to enable us to go out beyond the given conception\r\nand connect another with it. For the same reason the attempt to prove a\r\nsynthetical proposition by means of mere conceptions, for example:\r\n\u0026ldquo;Everything that exists contingently has a cause,\u0026rdquo; has never\r\nsucceeded. We could never get further than proving that, without this relation\r\nto conceptions, we could not conceive the existence of the contingent, that is,\r\ncould not à priori through the understanding cognize the existence of such a\r\nthing; but it does not hence follow that this is also the condition of the\r\npossibility of the thing itself that is said to be contingent. If, accordingly;\r\nwe look back to our proof of the principle of causality, we shall find that we\r\nwere able to prove it as valid only of objects of possible experience, and,\r\nindeed, only as itself the principle of the possibility of experience,\r\nConsequently of the cognition of an object given in empirical intuition, and\r\nnot from mere conceptions. That, however, the proposition: \u0026ldquo;Everything\r\nthat is contingent must have a cause,\u0026rdquo; is evident to every one merely\r\nfrom conceptions, is not to be denied. But in this case the conception of the\r\ncontingent is cogitated as involving not the category of modality (as that the\r\nnon-existence of which can be conceived) but that of relation (as that which\r\ncan exist only as the consequence of something else), and so it is really an\r\nidentical proposition: \u0026ldquo;That which can exist only as a consequence, has a\r\ncause.\u0026rdquo; In fact, when we have to give examples of contingent existence,\r\nwe always refer to changes, and not merely to the possibility of conceiving the\r\nopposite.\u003ca href=\"#linknote-37\" id=\"linknoteref-37\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[37]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e But change is an event, which, as such,\r\nis possible only through a cause, and considered per se its non-existence is\r\ntherefore possible, and we become cognizant of its contingency from the fact\r\nthat it can exist only as the effect of a cause. Hence, if a thing is assumed\r\nto be contingent, it is an analytical proposition to say, it has a cause.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"linknote-37\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#linknoteref-37\"\u003e[37]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nWe can easily conceive the non-existence of matter; but the ancients did not\r\nthence infer its contingency. But even the alternation of the existence and\r\nnon-existence of a given state in a thing, in which all change consists, by no\r\nmeans proves the contingency of that state\u0026mdash;the ground of proof being the\r\nreality of its opposite. For example, a body is in a state of rest after\r\nmotion, but we cannot infer the contingency of the motion from the fact that\r\nthe former is the opposite of the latter. For this opposite is merely a logical\r\nand not a real opposite to the other. If we wish to demonstrate the contingency\r\nof the motion, what we ought to prove is that, instead of the motion which took\r\nplace in the preceding point of time, it was possible for the body to have been\r\nthen in rest, not, that it is afterwards in rest; for in this case, both\r\nopposites are perfectly consistent with each other.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut it is still more remarkable that, to understand the possibility of things\r\naccording to the categories and thus to demonstrate the objective reality of\r\nthe latter, we require not merely intuitions, but external intuitions. If, for\r\nexample, we take the pure conceptions of relation, we find that (1) for the\r\npurpose of presenting to the conception of substance something permanent in\r\nintuition corresponding thereto and thus of demonstrating the objective reality\r\nof this conception, we require an intuition (of matter) in space, because space\r\nalone is permanent and determines things as such, while time, and with it all\r\nthat is in the internal sense, is in a state of continual flow; (2) in order to\r\nrepresent change as the intuition corresponding to the conception of causality,\r\nwe require the representation of motion as change in space; in fact, it is\r\nthrough it alone that changes, the possibility of which no pure understanding\r\ncan perceive, are capable of being intuited. Change is the connection of\r\ndeterminations contradictorily opposed to each other in the existence of one\r\nand the same thing. Now, how it is possible that out of a given state one quite\r\nopposite to it in the same thing should follow, reason without an example can\r\nnot only not conceive, but cannot even make intelligible without intuition; and\r\nthis intuition is the motion of a point in space; the existence of which in\r\ndifferent spaces (as a consequence of opposite determinations) alone makes the\r\nintuition of change possible. For, in order to make even internal change\r\ncognitable, we require to represent time, as the form of the internal sense,\r\nfiguratively by a line, and the internal change by the drawing of that line\r\n(motion), and consequently are obliged to employ external intuition to be able\r\nto represent the successive existence of ourselves in different states. The\r\nproper ground of this fact is that all change to be perceived as change\r\npresupposes something permanent in intuition, while in the internal sense no\r\npermanent intuition is to be found. Lastly, the objective possibility of the\r\ncategory of community cannot be conceived by mere reason, and consequently its\r\nobjective reality cannot be demonstrated without an intuition, and that\r\nexternal in space. For how can we conceive the possibility of community, that\r\nis, when several substances exist, that some effect on the existence of the one\r\nfollows from the existence of the other, and reciprocally, and therefore that,\r\nbecause something exists in the latter, something else must exist in the\r\nformer, which could not be understood from its own existence alone? For this is\r\nthe very essence of community\u0026mdash;which is inconceivable as a property of\r\nthings which are perfectly isolated. Hence, Leibnitz, in attributing to the\r\nsubstances of the world\u0026mdash;as cogitated by the understanding alone\u0026mdash;a\r\ncommunity, required the mediating aid of a divinity; for, from their existence,\r\nsuch a property seemed to him with justice inconceivable. But we can very\r\neasily conceive the possibility of community (of substances as phenomena) if we\r\nrepresent them to ourselves as in space, consequently in external intuition.\r\nFor external intuition contains in itself à priori formal external relations,\r\nas the conditions of the possibility of the real relations of action and\r\nreaction, and therefore of the possibility of community. With the same ease can\r\nit be demonstrated, that the possibility of things as quantities, and\r\nconsequently the objective reality of the category of quantity, can be grounded\r\nonly in external intuition, and that by its means alone is the notion of\r\nquantity appropriated by the internal sense. But I must avoid prolixity, and\r\nleave the task of illustrating this by examples to the reader\u0026rsquo;s own\r\nreflection.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe above remarks are of the greatest importance, not only for the confirmation\r\nof our previous confutation of idealism, but still more when the subject of\r\nself-cognition by mere internal consciousness and the determination of our own\r\nnature without the aid of external empirical intuitions is under discussion,\r\nfor the indication of the grounds of the possibility of such a cognition.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe result of the whole of this part of the analytic of principles is,\r\ntherefore: \u0026ldquo;All principles of the pure understanding are nothing more\r\nthan à priori principles of the possibility of experience, and to experience\r\nalone do all à priori synthetical propositions apply and relate\u0026rdquo;; indeed,\r\ntheir possibility itself rests entirely on this relation.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003ca id=\"chap61\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eChapter III Of the Ground of the Division of all\r\nObjects into Phenomena and Noumena\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWe have now not only traversed the region of the pure understanding and\r\ncarefully surveyed every part of it, but we have also measured it, and assigned\r\nto everything therein its proper place. But this land is an island, and\r\nenclosed by nature herself within unchangeable limits. It is the land of truth\r\n(an attractive word), surrounded by a wide and stormy ocean, the region of\r\nillusion, where many a fog-bank, many an iceberg, seems to the mariner, on his\r\nvoyage of discovery, a new country, and, while constantly deluding him with\r\nvain hopes, engages him in dangerous adventures, from which he never can\r\ndesist, and which yet he never can bring to a termination. But before venturing\r\nupon this sea, in order to explore it in its whole extent, and to arrive at a\r\ncertainty whether anything is to be discovered there, it will not be without\r\nadvantage if we cast our eyes upon the chart of the land that we are about to\r\nleave, and to ask ourselves, firstly, whether we cannot rest perfectly\r\ncontented with what it contains, or whether we must not of necessity be\r\ncontented with it, if we can find nowhere else a solid foundation to build\r\nupon; and, secondly, by what title we possess this land itself, and how we hold\r\nit secure against all hostile claims? Although, in the course of our analytic,\r\nwe have already given sufficient answers to these questions, yet a summary\r\nrecapitulation of these solutions may be useful in strengthening our\r\nconviction, by uniting in one point the momenta of the arguments.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWe have seen that everything which the understanding draws from itself, without\r\nborrowing from experience, it nevertheless possesses only for the behoof and\r\nuse of experience. The principles of the pure understanding, whether\r\nconstitutive à priori (as the mathematical principles), or merely regulative\r\n(as the dynamical), contain nothing but the pure schema, as it were, of\r\npossible experience. For experience possesses its unity from the synthetical\r\nunity which the understanding, originally and from itself, imparts to the\r\nsynthesis of the imagination in relation to apperception, and in à priori\r\nrelation to and agreement with which phenomena, as data for a possible\r\ncognition, must stand. But although these rules of the understanding are not\r\nonly à priori true, but the very source of all truth, that is, of the\r\naccordance of our cognition with objects, and on this ground, that they contain\r\nthe basis of the possibility of experience, as the ensemble of all cognition,\r\nit seems to us not enough to propound what is true\u0026mdash;we desire also to be\r\ntold what we want to know. If, then, we learn nothing more by this critical\r\nexamination than what we should have practised in the merely empirical use of\r\nthe understanding, without any such subtle inquiry, the presumption is that the\r\nadvantage we reap from it is not worth the labour bestowed upon it. It may\r\ncertainly be answered that no rash curiosity is more prejudicial to the\r\nenlargement of our knowledge than that which must know beforehand the utility\r\nof this or that piece of information which we seek, before we have entered on\r\nthe needful investigations, and before one could form the least conception of\r\nits utility, even though it were placed before our eyes. But there is one\r\nadvantage in such transcendental inquiries which can be made comprehensible to\r\nthe dullest and most reluctant learner\u0026mdash;this, namely, that the\r\nunderstanding which is occupied merely with empirical exercise, and does not\r\nreflect on the sources of its own cognition, may exercise its functions very\r\nwell and very successfully, but is quite unable to do one thing, and that of\r\nvery great importance, to determine, namely, the bounds that limit its\r\nemployment, and to know what lies within or without its own sphere. This\r\npurpose can be obtained only by such profound investigations as we have\r\ninstituted. But if it cannot distinguish whether certain questions lie within\r\nits horizon or not, it can never be sure either as to its claims or\r\npossessions, but must lay its account with many humiliating corrections, when\r\nit transgresses, as it unavoidably will, the limits of its own territory, and\r\nloses itself in fanciful opinions and blinding illusions.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThat the understanding, therefore, cannot make of its à priori principles, or\r\neven of its conceptions, other than an empirical use, is a proposition which\r\nleads to the most important results. A transcendental use is made of a\r\nconception in a fundamental proposition or principle, when it is referred to\r\nthings in general and considered as things in themselves; an empirical use,\r\nwhen it is referred merely to phenomena, that is, to objects of a possible\r\nexperience. That the latter use of a conception is the only admissible one is\r\nevident from the reasons following. For every conception are requisite,\r\nfirstly, the logical form of a conception (of thought) general; and, secondly,\r\nthe possibility of presenting to this an object to which it may apply. Failing\r\nthis latter, it has no sense, and utterly void of content, although it may\r\ncontain the logical function for constructing a conception from certain data.\r\nNow, object cannot be given to a conception otherwise than by intuition, and,\r\neven if a pure intuition antecedent to the object is à priori possible, this\r\npure intuition can itself obtain objective validity only from empirical\r\nintuition, of which it is itself but the form. All conceptions, therefore, and\r\nwith them all principles, however high the degree of their à priori\r\npossibility, relate to empirical intuitions, that is, to data towards a\r\npossible experience. Without this they possess no objective validity, but are\r\nmere play of imagination or of understanding with images or notions. Let us\r\ntake, for example, the conceptions of mathematics, and first in its pure\r\nintuitions. \u0026ldquo;Space has three dimensions\u0026rdquo;\u0026mdash;\u0026ldquo;Between two\r\npoints there can be only one straight line,\u0026rdquo; etc. Although all these\r\nprinciples, and the representation of the object with which this science\r\noccupies itself, are generated in the mind entirely à priori, they would\r\nnevertheless have no significance if we were not always able to exhibit their\r\nsignificance in and by means of phenomena (empirical objects). Hence it is\r\nrequisite that an abstract conception be made sensuous, that is, that an object\r\ncorresponding to it in intuition be forthcoming, otherwise the conception\r\nremains, as we say, without sense, that is, without meaning. Mathematics\r\nfulfils this requirement by the construction of the figure, which is a\r\nphenomenon evident to the senses. The same science finds support and\r\nsignificance in number; this in its turn finds it in the fingers, or in\r\ncounters, or in lines and points. The conception itself is always produced à\r\npriori, together with the synthetical principles or formulas from such\r\nconceptions; but the proper employment of them, and their application to\r\nobjects, can exist nowhere but in experience, the possibility of which, as\r\nregards its form, they contain à priori.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThat this is also the case with all of the categories and the principles based\r\nupon them is evident from the fact that we cannot render intelligible the\r\npossibility of an object corresponding to them without having recourse to the\r\nconditions of sensibility, consequently, to the form of phenomena, to which, as\r\ntheir only proper objects, their use must therefore be confined, inasmuch as,\r\nif this condition is removed, all significance, that is, all relation to an\r\nobject, disappears, and no example can be found to make it comprehensible what\r\nsort of things we ought to think under such conceptions.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe conception of quantity cannot be explained except by saying that it is the\r\ndetermination of a thing whereby it can be cogitated how many times one is\r\nplaced in it. But this \u0026ldquo;how many times\u0026rdquo; is based upon successive\r\nrepetition, consequently upon time and the synthesis of the homogeneous\r\ntherein. Reality, in contradistinction to negation, can be explained only by\r\ncogitating a time which is either filled therewith or is void. If I leave out\r\nthe notion of permanence (which is existence in all time), there remains in the\r\nconception of substance nothing but the logical notion of subject, a notion of\r\nwhich I endeavour to realize by representing to myself something that can exist\r\nonly as a subject. But not only am I perfectly ignorant of any conditions under\r\nwhich this logical prerogative can belong to a thing, I can make nothing out of\r\nthe notion, and draw no inference from it, because no object to which to apply\r\nthe conception is determined, and we consequently do not know whether it has\r\nany meaning at all. In like manner, if I leave out the notion of time, in which\r\nsomething follows upon some other thing in conformity with a rule, I can find\r\nnothing in the pure category, except that there is a something of such a sort\r\nthat from it a conclusion may be drawn as to the existence of some other thing.\r\nBut in this case it would not only be impossible to distinguish between a cause\r\nand an effect, but, as this power to draw conclusions requires conditions of\r\nwhich I am quite ignorant, the conception is not determined as to the mode in\r\nwhich it ought to apply to an object. The so-called principle:\r\n\u0026ldquo;Everything that is contingent has a cause,\u0026rdquo; comes with a gravity\r\nand self-assumed authority that seems to require no support from without. But,\r\nI ask, what is meant by contingent? The answer is that the non-existence of\r\nwhich is possible. But I should like very well to know by what means this\r\npossibility of non-existence is to be cognized, if we do not represent to\r\nourselves a succession in the series of phenomena, and in this succession an\r\nexistence which follows a non-existence, or conversely, consequently, change.\r\nFor to say, that the non-existence of a thing is not self-contradictory is a\r\nlame appeal to a logical condition, which is no doubt a necessary condition of\r\nthe existence of the conception, but is far from being sufficient for the real\r\nobjective possibility of non-existence. I can annihilate in thought every\r\nexisting substance without self-contradiction, but I cannot infer from this\r\ntheir objective contingency in existence, that is to say, the possibility of\r\ntheir non-existence in itself. As regards the category of community, it may\r\neasily be inferred that, as the pure categories of substance and causality are\r\nincapable of a definition and explanation sufficient to determine their object\r\nwithout the aid of intuition, the category of reciprocal causality in the\r\nrelation of substances to each other (commercium) is just as little susceptible\r\nthereof. Possibility, existence, and necessity nobody has ever yet been able to\r\nexplain without being guilty of manifest tautology, when the definition has\r\nbeen drawn entirely from the pure understanding. For the substitution of the\r\nlogical possibility of the conception\u0026mdash;the condition of which is that it\r\nbe not self-contradictory, for the transcendental possibility of\r\nthings\u0026mdash;the condition of which is that there be an object corresponding to\r\nthe conception, is a trick which can only deceive the inexperienced.\u003ca\r\nhref=\"#linknote-38\" id=\"linknoteref-38\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[38]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"linknote-38\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#linknoteref-38\"\u003e[38]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nIn one word, to none of these conceptions belongs a corresponding object, and\r\nconsequently their real possibility cannot be demonstrated, if we take away\r\nsensuous intuition\u0026mdash;the only intuition which we possess\u0026mdash;and there\r\nthen remains nothing but the logical possibility, that is, the fact that the\r\nconception or thought is possible\u0026mdash;which, however, is not the question;\r\nwhat we want to know being, whether it relates to an object and thus possesses\r\nany meaning.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIt follows incontestably, that the pure conceptions of the understanding are\r\nincapable of transcendental, and must always be of empirical use alone, and\r\nthat the principles of the pure understanding relate only to the general\r\nconditions of a possible experience, to objects of the senses, and never to\r\nthings in general, apart from the mode in which we intuite them.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nTranscendental analytic has accordingly this important result, to wit, that the\r\nunderstanding is competent effect nothing à priori, except the anticipation of\r\nthe form of a possible experience in general, and that, as that which is not\r\nphenomenon cannot be an object of experience, it can never overstep the limits\r\nof sensibility, within which alone objects are presented to us. Its principles\r\nare merely principles of the exposition of phenomena, and the proud name of an\r\nontology, which professes to present synthetical cognitions à priori of things\r\nin general in a systematic doctrine, must give place to the modest title of\r\nanalytic of the pure understanding.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThought is the act of referring a given intuition to an object. If the mode of\r\nthis intuition is unknown to us, the object is merely transcendental, and the\r\nconception of the understanding is employed only transcendentally, that is, to\r\nproduce unity in the thought of a manifold in general. Now a pure category, in\r\nwhich all conditions of sensuous intuition\u0026mdash;as the only intuition we\r\npossess\u0026mdash;are abstracted, does not determine an object, but merely\r\nexpresses the thought of an object in general, according to different modes.\r\nNow, to employ a conception, the function of judgement is required, by which an\r\nobject is subsumed under the conception, consequently the at least formal\r\ncondition, under which something can be given in intuition. Failing this\r\ncondition of judgement (schema), subsumption is impossible; for there is in\r\nsuch a case nothing given, which may be subsumed under the conception. The\r\nmerely transcendental use of the categories is therefore, in fact, no use at\r\nall and has no determined, or even, as regards its form, determinable object.\r\nHence it follows that the pure category is incompetent to establish a\r\nsynthetical à priori principle, and that the principles of the pure\r\nunderstanding are only of empirical and never of transcendental use, and that\r\nbeyond the sphere of possible experience no synthetical à priori principles are\r\npossible.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIt may be advisable, therefore, to express ourselves thus. The pure categories,\r\napart from the formal conditions of sensibility, have a merely transcendental\r\nmeaning, but are nevertheless not of transcendental use, because this is in\r\nitself impossible, inasmuch as all the conditions of any employment or use of\r\nthem (in judgements) are absent, to wit, the formal conditions of the\r\nsubsumption of an object under these conceptions. As, therefore, in the\r\ncharacter of pure categories, they must be employed empirically, and cannot be\r\nemployed transcendentally, they are of no use at all, when separated from\r\nsensibility, that is, they cannot be applied to an object. They are merely the\r\npure form of the employment of the understanding in respect of objects in\r\ngeneral and of thought, without its being at the same time possible to think or\r\nto determine any object by their means. But there lurks at the foundation of\r\nthis subject an illusion which it is very difficult to avoid. The categories\r\nare not based, as regards their origin, upon sensibility, like the forms of\r\nintuition, space, and time; they seem, therefore, to be capable of an\r\napplication beyond the sphere of sensuous objects. But this is not the case.\r\nThey are nothing but mere forms of thought, which contain only the logical\r\nfaculty of uniting à priori in consciousness the manifold given in intuition.\r\nApart, then, from the only intuition possible for us, they have still less\r\nmeaning than the pure sensuous forms, space and time, for through them an\r\nobject is at least given, while a mode of connection of the manifold, when the\r\nintuition which alone gives the manifold is wanting, has no meaning at all. At\r\nthe same time, when we designate certain objects as phenomena or sensuous\r\nexistences, thus distinguishing our mode of intuiting them from their own\r\nnature as things in themselves, it is evident that by this very distinction we\r\nas it were place the latter, considered in this their own nature, although we\r\ndo not so intuite them, in opposition to the former, or, on the other hand, we\r\ndo so place other possible things, which are not objects of our senses, but are\r\ncogitated by the understanding alone, and call them intelligible existences\r\n(noumena). Now the question arises whether the pure conceptions of our\r\nunderstanding do possess significance in respect of these latter, and may\r\npossibly be a mode of cognizing them.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut we are met at the very commencement with an ambiguity, which may easily\r\noccasion great misapprehension. The understanding, when it terms an object in a\r\ncertain relation phenomenon, at the same time forms out of this relation a\r\nrepresentation or notion of an object in itself, and hence believes that it can\r\nform also conceptions of such objects. Now as the understanding possesses no\r\nother fundamental conceptions besides the categories, it takes for granted that\r\nan object considered as a thing in itself must be capable of being thought by\r\nmeans of these pure conceptions, and is thereby led to hold the perfectly\r\nundetermined conception of an intelligible existence, a something out of the\r\nsphere of our sensibility, for a determinate conception of an existence which\r\nwe can cognize in some way or other by means of the understanding.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIf, by the term noumenon, we understand a thing so far as it is not an object\r\nof our sensuous intuition, thus making abstraction of our mode of intuiting it,\r\nthis is a noumenon in the negative sense of the word. But if we understand by\r\nit an object of a non-sensuous intuition, we in this case assume a peculiar\r\nmode of intuition, an intellectual intuition, to wit, which does not, however,\r\nbelong to us, of the very possibility of which we have no notion\u0026mdash;and this\r\nis a noumenon in the positive sense.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe doctrine of sensibility is also the doctrine of noumena in the negative\r\nsense, that is, of things which the understanding is obliged to cogitate apart\r\nfrom any relation to our mode of intuition, consequently not as mere phenomena,\r\nbut as things in themselves. But the understanding at the same time comprehends\r\nthat it cannot employ its categories for the consideration of things in\r\nthemselves, because these possess significance only in relation to the unity of\r\nintuitions in space and time, and that they are competent to determine this\r\nunity by means of general à priori connecting conceptions only on account of\r\nthe pure ideality of space and time. Where this unity of time is not to be met\r\nwith, as is the case with noumena, the whole use, indeed the whole meaning of\r\nthe categories is entirely lost, for even the possibility of things to\r\ncorrespond to the categories is in this case incomprehensible. On this point, I\r\nneed only refer the reader to what I have said at the commencement of the\r\nGeneral Remark appended to the foregoing chapter. Now, the possibility of a\r\nthing can never be proved from the fact that the conception of it is not\r\nself-contradictory, but only by means of an intuition corresponding to the\r\nconception. If, therefore, we wish to apply the categories to objects which\r\ncannot be regarded as phenomena, we must have an intuition different from the\r\nsensuous, and in this case the objects would be a noumena in the positive sense\r\nof the word. Now, as such an intuition, that is, an intellectual intuition, is\r\nno part of our faculty of cognition, it is absolutely impossible for the\r\ncategories to possess any application beyond the limits of experience. It may\r\nbe true that there are intelligible existences to which our faculty of sensuous\r\nintuition has no relation, and cannot be applied, but our conceptions of the\r\nunderstanding, as mere forms of thought for our sensuous intuition, do not\r\nextend to these. What, therefore, we call noumenon must be understood by us as\r\nsuch in a negative sense.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIf I take away from an empirical intuition all thought (by means of the\r\ncategories), there remains no cognition of any object; for by means of mere\r\nintuition nothing is cogitated, and, from the existence of such or such an\r\naffection of sensibility in me, it does not follow that this affection or\r\nrepresentation has any relation to an object without me. But if I take away all\r\nintuition, there still remains the form of thought, that is, the mode of\r\ndetermining an object for the manifold of a possible intuition. Thus the\r\ncategories do in some measure really extend further than sensuous intuition,\r\ninasmuch as they think objects in general, without regard to the mode (of\r\nsensibility) in which these objects are given. But they do not for this reason\r\napply to and determine a wider sphere of objects, because we cannot assume that\r\nsuch can be given, without presupposing the possibility of another than the\r\nsensuous mode of intuition, a supposition we are not justified in making.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nI call a conception problematical which contains in itself no contradiction,\r\nand which is connected with other cognitions as a limitation of given\r\nconceptions, but whose objective reality cannot be cognized in any manner. The\r\nconception of a noumenon, that is, of a thing which must be cogitated not as an\r\nobject of sense, but as a thing in itself (solely through the pure\r\nunderstanding), is not self-contradictory, for we are not entitled to maintain\r\nthat sensibility is the only possible mode of intuition. Nay, further, this\r\nconception is necessary to restrain sensuous intuition within the bounds of\r\nphenomena, and thus to limit the objective validity of sensuous cognition; for\r\nthings in themselves, which lie beyond its province, are called noumena for the\r\nvery purpose of indicating that this cognition does not extend its application\r\nto all that the understanding thinks. But, after all, the possibility of such\r\nnoumena is quite incomprehensible, and beyond the sphere of phenomena, all is\r\nfor us a mere void; that is to say, we possess an understanding whose province\r\ndoes problematically extend beyond this sphere, but we do not possess an\r\nintuition, indeed, not even the conception of a possible intuition, by means of\r\nwhich objects beyond the region of sensibility could be given us, and in\r\nreference to which the understanding might be employed assertorically. The\r\nconception of a noumenon is therefore merely a limitative conception and\r\ntherefore only of negative use. But it is not an arbitrary or fictitious\r\nnotion, but is connected with the limitation of sensibility, without, however,\r\nbeing capable of presenting us with any positive datum beyond this sphere.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe division of objects into phenomena and noumena, and of the world into a\r\nmundus sensibilis and intelligibilis is therefore quite inadmissible in a\r\npositive sense, although conceptions do certainly admit of such a division; for\r\nthe class of noumena have no determinate object corresponding to them, and\r\ncannot therefore possess objective validity. If we abandon the senses, how can\r\nit be made conceivable that the categories (which are the only conceptions that\r\ncould serve as conceptions for noumena) have any sense or meaning at all,\r\ninasmuch as something more than the mere unity of thought, namely, a possible\r\nintuition, is requisite for their application to an object? The conception of a\r\nnoumenon, considered as merely problematical, is, however, not only admissible,\r\nbut, as a limitative conception of sensibility, absolutely necessary. But, in\r\nthis case, a noumenon is not a particular intelligible object for our\r\nunderstanding; on the contrary, the kind of understanding to which it could\r\nbelong is itself a problem, for we cannot form the most distant conception of\r\nthe possibility of an understanding which should cognize an object, not\r\ndiscursively by means of categories, but intuitively in a non-sensuous\r\nintuition. Our understanding attains in this way a sort of negative extension.\r\nThat is to say, it is not limited by, but rather limits, sensibility, by giving\r\nthe name of noumena to things, not considered as phenomena, but as things in\r\nthemselves. But it at the same time prescribes limits to itself, for it\r\nconfesses itself unable to cognize these by means of the categories, and hence\r\nis compelled to cogitate them merely as an unknown something.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nI find, however, in the writings of modern authors, an entirely different use\r\nof the expressions, mundus sensibilis and intelligibilis, which quite departs\r\nfrom the meaning of the ancients\u0026mdash;an acceptation in which, indeed, there\r\nis to be found no difficulty, but which at the same time depends on mere verbal\r\nquibbling. According to this meaning, some have chosen to call the complex of\r\nphenomena, in so far as it is intuited, mundus sensibilis, but in so far as the\r\nconnection thereof is cogitated according to general laws of thought, mundus\r\nintelligibilis. Astronomy, in so far as we mean by the word the mere\r\nobservation of the starry heaven, may represent the former; a system of\r\nastronomy, such as the Copernican or Newtonian, the latter. But such twisting\r\nof words is a mere sophistical subterfuge, to avoid a difficult question, by\r\nmodifying its meaning to suit our own convenience. To be sure, understanding\r\nand reason are employed in the cognition of phenomena; but the question is,\r\nwhether these can be applied when the object is not a phenomenon and in this\r\nsense we regard it if it is cogitated as given to the understanding alone, and\r\nnot to the senses. The question therefore is whether, over and above the\r\nempirical use of the understanding, a transcendental use is possible, which\r\napplies to the noumenon as an object. This question we have answered in the\r\nnegative.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWhen therefore we say, the senses represent objects as they appear, the\r\nunderstanding as they are, the latter statement must not be understood in a\r\ntranscendental, but only in an empirical signification, that is, as they must\r\nbe represented in the complete connection of phenomena, and not according to\r\nwhat they may be, apart from their relation to possible experience,\r\nconsequently not as objects of the pure understanding. For this must ever\r\nremain unknown to us. Nay, it is also quite unknown to us whether any such\r\ntranscendental or extraordinary cognition is possible under any circumstances,\r\nat least, whether it is possible by means of our categories. Understanding and\r\nsensibility, with us, can determine objects only in conjunction. If we separate\r\nthem, we have intuitions without conceptions, or conceptions without\r\nintuitions; in both cases, representations, which we cannot apply to any\r\ndeterminate object.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIf, after all our inquiries and explanations, any one still hesitates to\r\nabandon the mere transcendental use of the categories, let him attempt to\r\nconstruct with them a synthetical proposition. It would, of course, be\r\nunnecessary for this purpose to construct an analytical proposition, for that\r\ndoes not extend the sphere of the understanding, but, being concerned only\r\nabout what is cogitated in the conception itself, it leaves it quite undecided\r\nwhether the conception has any relation to objects, or merely indicates the\r\nunity of thought\u0026mdash;complete abstraction being made of the modi in which an\r\nobject may be given: in such a proposition, it is sufficient for the\r\nunderstanding to know what lies in the conception\u0026mdash;to what it applies is\r\nto it indifferent. The attempt must therefore be made with a synthetical and\r\nso-called transcendental principle, for example: \u0026ldquo;Everything that exists,\r\nexists as substance,\u0026rdquo; or, \u0026ldquo;Everything that is contingent exists as\r\nan effect of some other thing, viz., of its cause.\u0026rdquo; Now I ask, whence can\r\nthe understanding draw these synthetical propositions, when the conceptions\r\ncontained therein do not relate to possible experience but to things in\r\nthemselves (noumena)? Where is to be found the third term, which is always\r\nrequisite PURE site in a synthetical proposition, which may connect in the same\r\nproposition conceptions which have no logical (analytical) connection with each\r\nother? The proposition never will be demonstrated, nay, more, the possibility\r\nof any such pure assertion never can be shown, without making reference to the\r\nempirical use of the understanding, and thus, ipso facto, completely renouncing\r\npure and non-sensuous judgement. Thus the conception of pure and merely\r\nintelligible objects is completely void of all principles of its application,\r\nbecause we cannot imagine any mode in which they might be given, and the\r\nproblematical thought which leaves a place open for them serves only, like a\r\nvoid space, to limit the use of empirical principles, without containing at the\r\nsame time any other object of cognition beyond their sphere.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003ca id=\"chap62\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eAPPENDIX\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nOf the Equivocal Nature or Amphiboly of the Conceptions of Reflection from the\r\nConfusion of the Transcendental with the Empirical use of the Understanding.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nReflection (reflexio) is not occupied about objects themselves, for the purpose\r\nof directly obtaining conceptions of them, but is that state of the mind in\r\nwhich we set ourselves to discover the subjective conditions under which we\r\nobtain conceptions. It is the consciousness of the relation of given\r\nrepresentations to the different sources or faculties of cognition, by which\r\nalone their relation to each other can be rightly determined. The first\r\nquestion which occurs in considering our representations is to what faculty of\r\ncognition do they belong? To the understanding or to the senses? Many\r\njudgements are admitted to be true from mere habit or inclination; but, because\r\nreflection neither precedes nor follows, it is held to be a judgement that has\r\nits origin in the understanding. All judgements do not require examination,\r\nthat is, investigation into the grounds of their truth. For, when they are\r\nimmediately certain (for example: \u0026ldquo;Between two points there can be only\r\none straight line\u0026rdquo;), no better or less mediate test of their truth can be\r\nfound than that which they themselves contain and express. But all judgement,\r\nnay, all comparisons require reflection, that is, a distinction of the faculty\r\nof cognition to which the given conceptions belong. The act whereby I compare\r\nmy representations with the faculty of cognition which originates them, and\r\nwhereby I distinguish whether they are compared with each other as belonging to\r\nthe pure understanding or to sensuous intuition, I term transcendental\r\nreflection. Now, the relations in which conceptions can stand to each other are\r\nthose of identity and difference, agreement and opposition, of the internal and\r\nexternal, finally, of the determinable and the determining (matter and form).\r\nThe proper determination of these relations rests on the question, to what\r\nfaculty of cognition they subjectively belong, whether to sensibility or\r\nunderstanding? For, on the manner in which we solve this question depends the\r\nmanner in which we must cogitate these relations.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBefore constructing any objective judgement, we compare the conceptions that\r\nare to be placed in the judgement, and observe whether there exists identity\r\n(of many representations in one conception), if a general judgement is to be\r\nconstructed, or difference, if a particular; whether there is agreement when\r\naffirmative; and opposition when negative judgements are to be constructed, and\r\nso on. For this reason we ought to call these conceptions, conceptions of\r\ncomparison (conceptus comparationis). But as, when the question is not as to\r\nthe logical form, but as to the content of conceptions, that is to say, whether\r\nthe things themselves are identical or different, in agreement or opposition,\r\nand so on, the things can have a twofold relation to our faculty of cognition,\r\nto wit, a relation either to sensibility or to the understanding, and as on\r\nthis relation depends their relation to each other, transcendental reflection,\r\nthat is, the relation of given representations to one or the other faculty of\r\ncognition, can alone determine this latter relation. Thus we shall not be able\r\nto discover whether the things are identical or different, in agreement or\r\nopposition, etc., from the mere conception of the things by means of comparison\r\n(comparatio), but only by distinguishing the mode of cognition to which they\r\nbelong, in other words, by means of transcendental reflection. We may,\r\ntherefore, with justice say, that logical reflection is mere comparison, for in\r\nit no account is taken of the faculty of cognition to which the given\r\nconceptions belong, and they are consequently, as far as regards their origin,\r\nto be treated as homogeneous; while transcendental reflection (which applies to\r\nthe objects themselves) contains the ground of the possibility of objective\r\ncomparison of representations with each other, and is therefore very different\r\nfrom the former, because the faculties of cognition to which they belong are\r\nnot even the same. Transcendental reflection is a duty which no one can neglect\r\nwho wishes to establish an à priori judgement upon things. We shall now proceed\r\nto fulfil this duty, and thereby throw not a little light on the question as to\r\nthe determination of the proper business of the understanding.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n1. Identity and Difference. When an object is presented to us several times,\r\nbut always with the same internal determinations (qualitas et quantitas), it,\r\nif an object of pure understanding, is always the same, not several things, but\r\nonly one thing (numerica identitas); but if a phenomenon, we do not concern\r\nourselves with comparing the conception of the thing with the conception of\r\nsome other, but, although they may be in this respect perfectly the same, the\r\ndifference of place at the same time is a sufficient ground for asserting the\r\nnumerical difference of these objects (of sense). Thus, in the case of two\r\ndrops of water, we may make complete abstraction of all internal difference\r\n(quality and quantity), and, the fact that they are intuited at the same time\r\nin different places, is sufficient to justify us in holding them to be\r\nnumerically different. Leibnitz regarded phenomena as things in themselves,\r\nconsequently as intelligibilia, that is, objects of pure understanding\r\n(although, on account of the confused nature of their representations, he gave\r\nthem the name of phenomena), and in this case his principle of the\r\nindiscernible (principium identatis indiscernibilium) is not to be impugned.\r\nBut, as phenomena are objects of sensibility, and, as the understanding, in\r\nrespect of them, must be employed empirically and not purely or\r\ntranscendentally, plurality and numerical difference are given by space itself\r\nas the condition of external phenomena. For one part of space, although it may\r\nbe perfectly similar and equal to another part, is still without it, and for\r\nthis reason alone is different from the latter, which is added to it in order\r\nto make up a greater space. It follows that this must hold good of all things\r\nthat are in the different parts of space at the same time, however similar and\r\nequal one may be to another.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n2. Agreement and Opposition. When reality is represented by the pure\r\nunderstanding (realitas noumenon), opposition between realities is\r\nincogitable\u0026mdash;such a relation, that is, that when these realities are\r\nconnected in one subject, they annihilate the effects of each other and may be\r\nrepresented in the formula 3 -3 = 0. On the other hand, the real in a\r\nphenomenon (realitas phaenomenon) may very well be in mutual opposition, and,\r\nwhen united in the same subject, the one may completely or in part annihilate\r\nthe effect or consequence of the other; as in the case of two moving forces in\r\nthe same straight line drawing or impelling a point in opposite directions, or\r\nin the case of a pleasure counterbalancing a certain amount of pain.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n3. The Internal and External. In an object of the pure understanding, only that\r\nis internal which has no relation (as regards its existence) to anything\r\ndifferent from itself. On the other hand, the internal determinations of a\r\nsubstantia phaenomenon in space are nothing but relations, and it is itself\r\nnothing more than a complex of mere relations. Substance in space we are\r\ncognizant of only through forces operative in it, either drawing others towards\r\nitself (attraction), or preventing others from forcing into itself (repulsion\r\nand impenetrability). We know no other properties that make up the conception\r\nof substance phenomenal in space, and which we term matter. On the other hand,\r\nas an object of the pure understanding, every substance must have internal\r\ndetermination and forces. But what other internal attributes of such an object\r\ncan I think than those which my internal sense presents to me? That, to wit,\r\nwhich in either itself thought, or something analogous to it. Hence Leibnitz,\r\nwho looked upon things as noumena, after denying them everything like external\r\nrelation, and therefore also composition or combination, declared that all\r\nsubstances, even the component parts of matter, were simple substances with\r\npowers of representation, in one word, monads.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n4. Matter and Form. These two conceptions lie at the foundation of all other\r\nreflection, so inseparably are they connected with every mode of exercising the\r\nunderstanding. The former denotes the determinable in general, the second its\r\ndetermination, both in a transcendental sense, abstraction being made of every\r\ndifference in that which is given, and of the mode in which it is determined.\r\nLogicians formerly termed the universal, matter, the specific difference of\r\nthis or that part of the universal, form. In a judgement one may call the given\r\nconceptions logical matter (for the judgement), the relation of these to each\r\nother (by means of the copula), the form of the judgement. In an object, the\r\ncomposite parts thereof (essentialia) are the matter; the mode in which they\r\nare connected in the object, the form. In respect to things in general,\r\nunlimited reality was regarded as the matter of all possibility, the limitation\r\nthereof (negation) as the form, by which one thing is distinguished from\r\nanother according to transcendental conceptions. The understanding demands that\r\nsomething be given (at least in the conception), in order to be able to\r\ndetermine it in a certain manner. Hence, in a conception of the pure\r\nunderstanding, the matter precedes the form, and for this reason Leibnitz first\r\nassumed the existence of things (monads) and of an internal power of\r\nrepresentation in them, in order to found upon this their external relation and\r\nthe community their state (that is, of their representations). Hence, with him,\r\nspace and time were possible\u0026mdash;the former through the relation of\r\nsubstances, the latter through the connection of their determinations with each\r\nother, as causes and effects. And so would it really be, if the pure\r\nunderstanding were capable of an immediate application to objects, and if space\r\nand time were determinations of things in themselves. But being merely sensuous\r\nintuitions, in which we determine all objects solely as phenomena, the form of\r\nintuition (as a subjective property of sensibility) must antecede all matter\r\n(sensations), consequently space and time must antecede all phenomena and all\r\ndata of experience, and rather make experience itself possible. But the\r\nintellectual philosopher could not endure that the form should precede the\r\nthings themselves and determine their possibility; an objection perfectly\r\ncorrect, if we assume that we intuite things as they are, although with\r\nconfused representation. But as sensuous intuition is a peculiar subjective\r\ncondition, which is à priori at the foundation of all perception, and the form\r\nof which is primitive, the form must be given per se, and so far from matter\r\n(or the things themselves which appear) lying at the foundation of experience\r\n(as we must conclude, if we judge by mere conceptions), the very possibility of\r\nitself presupposes, on the contrary, a given formal intuition (space and time).\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nREMARK ON THE AMPHIBOLY OF THE CONCEPTIONS OF REFLECTION.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nLet me be allowed to term the position which we assign to a conception either\r\nin the sensibility or in the pure understanding, the transcendental place. In\r\nthis manner, the appointment of the position which must be taken by each\r\nconception according to the difference in its use, and the directions for\r\ndetermining this place to all conceptions according to rules, would be a\r\ntranscendental topic, a doctrine which would thoroughly shield us from the\r\nsurreptitious devices of the pure understanding and the delusions which thence\r\narise, as it would always distinguish to what faculty of cognition each\r\nconception properly belonged. Every conception, every title, under which many\r\ncognitions rank together, may be called a logical place. Upon this is based the\r\nlogical topic of Aristotle, of which teachers and rhetoricians could avail\r\nthemselves, in order, under certain titles of thought, to observe what would\r\nbest suit the matter they had to treat, and thus enable themselves to quibble\r\nand talk with fluency and an appearance of profundity.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nTranscendental topic, on the contrary, contains nothing more than the\r\nabove-mentioned four titles of all comparison and distinction, which differ\r\nfrom categories in this respect, that they do not represent the object\r\naccording to that which constitutes its conception (quantity, reality), but set\r\nforth merely the comparison of representations, which precedes our conceptions\r\nof things. But this comparison requires a previous reflection, that is, a\r\ndetermination of the place to which the representations of the things which are\r\ncompared belong, whether, to wit, they are cogitated by the pure understanding,\r\nor given by sensibility.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nConceptions may be logically compared without the trouble of inquiring to what\r\nfaculty their objects belong, whether as noumena, to the understanding, or as\r\nphenomena, to sensibility. If, however, we wish to employ these conceptions in\r\nrespect of objects, previous transcendental reflection is necessary. Without\r\nthis reflection I should make a very unsafe use of these conceptions, and\r\nconstruct pretended synthetical propositions which critical reason cannot\r\nacknowledge and which are based solely upon a transcendental amphiboly, that\r\nis, upon a substitution of an object of pure understanding for a phenomenon.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nFor want of this doctrine of transcendental topic, and consequently deceived by\r\nthe amphiboly of the conceptions of reflection, the celebrated Leibnitz\r\nconstructed an intellectual system of the world, or rather, believed himself\r\ncompetent to cognize the internal nature of things, by comparing all objects\r\nmerely with the understanding and the abstract formal conceptions of thought.\r\nOur table of the conceptions of reflection gives us the unexpected advantage of\r\nbeing able to exhibit the distinctive peculiarities of his system in all its\r\nparts, and at the same time of exposing the fundamental principle of this\r\npeculiar mode of thought, which rested upon naught but a misconception. He\r\ncompared all things with each other merely by means of conceptions, and\r\nnaturally found no other differences than those by which the understanding\r\ndistinguishes its pure conceptions one from another. The conditions of sensuous\r\nintuition, which contain in themselves their own means of distinction, he did\r\nnot look upon as primitive, because sensibility was to him but a confused mode\r\nof representation and not any particular source of representations. A\r\nphenomenon was for him the representation of the thing in itself, although\r\ndistinguished from cognition by the understanding only in respect of the\r\nlogical form\u0026mdash;the former with its usual want of analysis containing,\r\naccording to him, a certain mixture of collateral representations in its\r\nconception of a thing, which it is the duty of the understanding to separate\r\nand distinguish. In one word, Leibnitz intellectualized phenomena, just as\r\nLocke, in his system of noogony (if I may be allowed to make use of such\r\nexpressions), sensualized the conceptions of the understanding, that is to say,\r\ndeclared them to be nothing more than empirical or abstract conceptions of\r\nreflection. Instead of seeking in the understanding and sensibility two\r\ndifferent sources of representations, which, however, can present us with\r\nobjective judgements of things only in conjunction, each of these great men\r\nrecognized but one of these faculties, which, in their opinion, applied\r\nimmediately to things in themselves, the other having no duty but that of\r\nconfusing or arranging the representations of the former.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAccordingly, the objects of sense were compared by Leibnitz as things in\r\ngeneral merely in the understanding.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n1st. He compares them in regard to their identity or difference\u0026mdash;as judged\r\nby the understanding. As, therefore, he considered merely the conceptions of\r\nobjects, and not their position in intuition, in which alone objects can be\r\ngiven, and left quite out of sight the transcendental locale of these\r\nconceptions\u0026mdash;whether, that is, their object ought to be classed among\r\nphenomena, or among things in themselves, it was to be expected that he should\r\nextend the application of the principle of indiscernibles, which is valid\r\nsolely of conceptions of things in general, to objects of sense (mundus\r\nphaenomenon), and that he should believe that he had thereby contributed in no\r\nsmall degree to extend our knowledge of nature. In truth, if I cognize in all\r\nits inner determinations a drop of water as a thing in itself, I cannot look\r\nupon one drop as different from another, if the conception of the one is\r\ncompletely identical with that of the other. But if it is a phenomenon in\r\nspace, it has a place not merely in the understanding (among conceptions), but\r\nalso in sensuous external intuition (in space), and in this case, the physical\r\nlocale is a matter of indifference in regard to the internal determinations of\r\nthings, and one place, B, may contain a thing which is perfectly similar and\r\nequal to another in a place, A, just as well as if the two things were in every\r\nrespect different from each other. Difference of place without any other\r\nconditions, makes the plurality and distinction of objects as phenomena, not\r\nonly possible in itself, but even necessary. Consequently, the above so-called\r\nlaw is not a law of nature. It is merely an analytical rule for the comparison\r\nof things by means of mere conceptions.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n2nd. The principle: \u0026ldquo;Realities (as simple affirmations) never logically\r\ncontradict each other,\u0026rdquo; is a proposition perfectly true respecting the\r\nrelation of conceptions, but, whether as regards nature, or things in\r\nthemselves (of which we have not the slightest conception), is without any the\r\nleast meaning. For real opposition, in which A -B is = 0, exists everywhere, an\r\nopposition, that is, in which one reality united with another in the same\r\nsubject annihilates the effects of the other\u0026mdash;a fact which is constantly\r\nbrought before our eyes by the different antagonistic actions and operations in\r\nnature, which, nevertheless, as depending on real forces, must be called\r\nrealitates phaenomena. General mechanics can even present us with the empirical\r\ncondition of this opposition in an à priori rule, as it directs its attention\r\nto the opposition in the direction of forces\u0026mdash;a condition of which the\r\ntranscendental conception of reality can tell us nothing. Although M. Leibnitz\r\ndid not announce this proposition with precisely the pomp of a new principle,\r\nhe yet employed it for the establishment of new propositions, and his followers\r\nintroduced it into their Leibnitzio-Wolfian system of philosophy. According to\r\nthis principle, for example, all evils are but consequences of the limited\r\nnature of created beings, that is, negations, because these are the only\r\nopposite of reality. (In the mere conception of a thing in general this is\r\nreally the case, but not in things as phenomena.) In like manner, the upholders\r\nof this system deem it not only possible, but natural also, to connect and\r\nunite all reality in one being, because they acknowledge no other sort of\r\nopposition than that of contradiction (by which the conception itself of a\r\nthing is annihilated), and find themselves unable to conceive an opposition of\r\nreciprocal destruction, so to speak, in which one real cause destroys the\r\neffect of another, and the conditions of whose representation we meet with only\r\nin sensibility.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n3rd. The Leibnitzian monadology has really no better foundation than on this\r\nphilosopher\u0026rsquo;s mode of falsely representing the difference of the internal\r\nand external solely in relation to the understanding. Substances, in general,\r\nmust have something inward, which is therefore free from external relations,\r\nconsequently from that of composition also. The simple\u0026mdash;that which can be\r\nrepresented by a unit\u0026mdash;is therefore the foundation of that which is\r\ninternal in things in themselves. The internal state of substances cannot\r\ntherefore consist in place, shape, contact, or motion, determinations which are\r\nall external relations, and we can ascribe to them no other than that whereby\r\nwe internally determine our faculty of sense itself, that is to say, the state\r\nof representation. Thus, then, were constructed the monads, which were to form\r\nthe elements of the universe, the active force of which consists in\r\nrepresentation, the effects of this force being thus entirely confined to\r\nthemselves.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nFor the same reason, his view of the possible community of substances could not\r\nrepresent it but as a predetermined harmony, and by no means as a physical\r\ninfluence. For inasmuch as everything is occupied only internally, that is,\r\nwith its own representations, the state of the representations of one substance\r\ncould not stand in active and living connection with that of another, but some\r\nthird cause operating on all without exception was necessary to make the\r\ndifferent states correspond with one another. And this did not happen by means\r\nof assistance applied in each particular case (systema assistentiae), but\r\nthrough the unity of the idea of a cause occupied and connected with all\r\nsubstances, in which they necessarily receive, according to the Leibnitzian\r\nschool, their existence and permanence, consequently also reciprocal\r\ncorrespondence, according to universal laws.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n4th. This philosopher\u0026rsquo;s celebrated doctrine of space and time, in which\r\nhe intellectualized these forms of sensibility, originated in the same delusion\r\nof transcendental reflection. If I attempt to represent by the mere\r\nunderstanding, the external relations of things, I can do so only by employing\r\nthe conception of their reciprocal action, and if I wish to connect one state\r\nof the same thing with another state, I must avail myself of the notion of the\r\norder of cause and effect. And thus Leibnitz regarded space as a certain order\r\nin the community of substances, and time as the dynamical sequence of their\r\nstates. That which space and time possess proper to themselves and independent\r\nof things, he ascribed to a necessary confusion in our conceptions of them,\r\nwhereby that which is a mere form of dynamical relations is held to be a\r\nself-existent intuition, antecedent even to things themselves. Thus space and\r\ntime were the intelligible form of the connection of things (substances and\r\ntheir states) in themselves. But things were intelligible substances\r\n(substantiae noumena). At the same time, he made these conceptions valid of\r\nphenomena, because he did not allow to sensibility a peculiar mode of\r\nintuition, but sought all, even the empirical representation of objects, in the\r\nunderstanding, and left to sense naught but the despicable task of confusing\r\nand disarranging the representations of the former.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut even if we could frame any synthetical proposition concerning things in\r\nthemselves by means of the pure understanding (which is impossible), it could\r\nnot apply to phenomena, which do not represent things in themselves. In such a\r\ncase I should be obliged in transcendental reflection to compare my conceptions\r\nonly under the conditions of sensibility, and so space and time would not be\r\ndeterminations of things in themselves, but of phenomena. What things may be in\r\nthemselves, I know not and need not know, because a thing is never presented to\r\nme otherwise than as a phenomenon.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nI must adopt the same mode of procedure with the other conceptions of\r\nreflection. Matter is substantia phaenomenon. That in it which is internal I\r\nseek to discover in all parts of space which it occupies, and in all the\r\nfunctions and operations it performs, and which are indeed never anything but\r\nphenomena of the external sense. I cannot therefore find anything that is\r\nabsolutely, but only what is comparatively internal, and which itself consists\r\nof external relations. The absolutely internal in matter, and as it should be\r\naccording to the pure understanding, is a mere chimera, for matter is not an\r\nobject for the pure understanding. But the transcendental object, which is the\r\nfoundation of the phenomenon which we call matter, is a mere nescio quid, the\r\nnature of which we could not understand, even though someone were found able to\r\ntell us. For we can understand nothing that does not bring with it something in\r\nintuition corresponding to the expressions employed. If, by the complaint of\r\nbeing unable to perceive the internal nature of things, it is meant that we do\r\nnot comprehend by the pure understanding what the things which appear to us may\r\nbe in themselves, it is a silly and unreasonable complaint; for those who talk\r\nthus really desire that we should be able to cognize, consequently to intuite,\r\nthings without senses, and therefore wish that we possessed a faculty of\r\ncognition perfectly different from the human faculty, not merely in degree, but\r\neven as regards intuition and the mode thereof, so that thus we should not be\r\nmen, but belong to a class of beings, the possibility of whose existence, much\r\nless their nature and constitution, we have no means of cognizing. By\r\nobservation and analysis of phenomena we penetrate into the interior of nature,\r\nand no one can say what progress this knowledge may make in time. But those\r\ntranscendental questions which pass beyond the limits of nature, we could never\r\nanswer, even although all nature were laid open to us, because we have not the\r\npower of observing our own mind with any other intuition than that of our\r\ninternal sense. For herein lies the mystery of the origin and source of our\r\nfaculty of sensibility. Its application to an object, and the transcendental\r\nground of this unity of subjective and objective, lie too deeply concealed for\r\nus, who cognize ourselves only through the internal sense, consequently as\r\nphenomena, to be able to discover in our existence anything but phenomena, the\r\nnon-sensuous cause of which we at the same time earnestly desire to penetrate\r\nto.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe great utility of this critique of conclusions arrived at by the processes\r\nof mere reflection consists in its clear demonstration of the nullity of all\r\nconclusions respecting objects which are compared with each other in the\r\nunderstanding alone, while it at the same time confirms what we particularly\r\ninsisted on, namely, that, although phenomena are not included as things in\r\nthemselves among the objects of the pure understanding, they are nevertheless\r\nthe only things by which our cognition can possess objective reality, that is\r\nto say, which give us intuitions to correspond with our conceptions.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWhen we reflect in a purely logical manner, we do nothing more than compare\r\nconceptions in our understanding, to discover whether both have the same\r\ncontent, whether they are self-contradictory or not, whether anything is\r\ncontained in either conception, which of the two is given, and which is merely\r\na mode of thinking that given. But if I apply these conceptions to an object in\r\ngeneral (in the transcendental sense), without first determining whether it is\r\nan object of sensuous or intellectual intuition, certain limitations present\r\nthemselves, which forbid us to pass beyond the conceptions and render all\r\nempirical use of them impossible. And thus these limitations prove that the\r\nrepresentation of an object as a thing in general is not only insufficient,\r\nbut, without sensuous determination and independently of empirical conditions,\r\nself-contradictory; that we must therefore make abstraction of all objects, as\r\nin logic, or, admitting them, must think them under conditions of sensuous\r\nintuition; that, consequently, the intelligible requires an altogether peculiar\r\nintuition, which we do not possess, and in the absence of which it is for us\r\nnothing; while, on the other hand phenomena cannot be objects in themselves.\r\nFor, when I merely think things in general, the difference in their external\r\nrelations cannot constitute a difference in the things themselves; on the\r\ncontrary, the former presupposes the latter, and if the conception of one of\r\ntwo things is not internally different from that of the other, I am merely\r\nthinking the same thing in different relations. Further, by the addition of one\r\naffirmation (reality) to the other, the positive therein is really augmented,\r\nand nothing is abstracted or withdrawn from it; hence the real in things cannot\r\nbe in contradiction with or opposition to itself\u0026mdash;and so on.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe true use of the conceptions of reflection in the employment of the\r\nunderstanding has, as we have shown, been so misconceived by Leibnitz, one of\r\nthe most acute philosophers of either ancient or modern times, that he has been\r\nmisled into the construction of a baseless system of intellectual cognition,\r\nwhich professes to determine its objects without the intervention of the\r\nsenses. For this reason, the exposition of the cause of the amphiboly of these\r\nconceptions, as the origin of these false principles, is of great utility in\r\ndetermining with certainty the proper limits of the understanding.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIt is right to say whatever is affirmed or denied of the whole of a conception\r\ncan be affirmed or denied of any part of it (dictum de omni et nullo); but it\r\nwould be absurd so to alter this logical proposition as to say whatever is not\r\ncontained in a general conception is likewise not contained in the particular\r\nconceptions which rank under it; for the latter are particular conceptions, for\r\nthe very reason that their content is greater than that which is cogitated in\r\nthe general conception. And yet the whole intellectual system of Leibnitz is\r\nbased upon this false principle, and with it must necessarily fall to the\r\nground, together with all the ambiguous principles in reference to the\r\nemployment of the understanding which have thence originated.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nLeibnitz\u0026rsquo;s principle of the identity of indiscernibles or\r\nindistinguishables is really based on the presupposition that, if in the\r\nconception of a thing a certain distinction is not to be found, it is also not\r\nto be met with in things themselves; that, consequently, all things are\r\ncompletely identical (numero eadem) which are not distinguishable from each\r\nother (as to quality or quantity) in our conceptions of them. But, as in the\r\nmere conception of anything abstraction has been made of many necessary\r\nconditions of intuition, that of which abstraction has been made is rashly held\r\nto be non-existent, and nothing is attributed to the thing but what is\r\ncontained in its conception.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe conception of a cubic foot of space, however I may think it, is in itself\r\ncompletely identical. But two cubic feet in space are nevertheless distinct\r\nfrom each other from the sole fact of their being in different places (they are\r\nnumero diversa); and these places are conditions of intuition, wherein the\r\nobject of this conception is given, and which do not belong to the conception,\r\nbut to the faculty of sensibility. In like manner, there is in the conception\r\nof a thing no contradiction when a negative is not connected with an\r\naffirmative; and merely affirmative conceptions cannot, in conjunction, produce\r\nany negation. But in sensuous intuition, wherein reality (take for example,\r\nmotion) is given, we find conditions (opposite directions)\u0026mdash;of which\r\nabstraction has been made in the conception of motion in general\u0026mdash;which\r\nrender possible a contradiction or opposition (not indeed of a logical\r\nkind)\u0026mdash;and which from pure positives produce zero = 0. We are therefore\r\nnot justified in saying that all reality is in perfect agreement and harmony,\r\nbecause no contradiction is discoverable among its conceptions.\u003ca\r\nhref=\"#linknote-39\" id=\"linknoteref-39\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[39]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e According to mere conceptions, that\r\nwhich is internal is the substratum of all relations or external\r\ndeterminations. When, therefore, I abstract all conditions of intuition, and\r\nconfine myself solely to the conception of a thing in general, I can make\r\nabstraction of all external relations, and there must nevertheless remain a\r\nconception of that which indicates no relation, but merely internal\r\ndeterminations. Now it seems to follow that in everything (substance) there is\r\nsomething which is absolutely internal and which antecedes all external\r\ndeterminations, inasmuch as it renders them possible; and that therefore this\r\nsubstratum is something which does not contain any external relations and is\r\nconsequently simple (for corporeal things are never anything but relations, at\r\nleast of their parts external to each other); and, inasmuch as we know of no\r\nother absolutely internal determinations than those of the internal sense, this\r\nsubstratum is not only simple, but also, analogously with our internal sense,\r\ndetermined through representations, that is to say, all things are properly\r\nmonads, or simple beings endowed with the power of representation. Now all this\r\nwould be perfectly correct, if the conception of a thing were the only\r\nnecessary condition of the presentation of objects of external intuition. It\r\nis, on the contrary, manifest that a permanent phenomenon in space\r\n(impenetrable extension) can contain mere relations, and nothing that is\r\nabsolutely internal, and yet be the primary substratum of all external\r\nperception. By mere conceptions I cannot think anything external, without, at\r\nthe same time, thinking something internal, for the reason that conceptions of\r\nrelations presuppose given things, and without these are impossible. But, as an\r\nintuition there is something (that is, space, which, with all it contains,\r\nconsists of purely formal, or, indeed, real relations) which is not found in\r\nthe mere conception of a thing in general, and this presents to us the\r\nsubstratum which could not be cognized through conceptions alone, I cannot say:\r\nbecause a thing cannot be represented by mere conceptions without something\r\nabsolutely internal, there is also, in the things themselves which are\r\ncontained under these conceptions, and in their intuition nothing external to\r\nwhich something absolutely internal does not serve as the foundation. For, when\r\nwe have made abstraction of all the conditions of intuition, there certainly\r\nremains in the mere conception nothing but the internal in general, through\r\nwhich alone the external is possible. But this necessity, which is grounded\r\nupon abstraction alone, does not obtain in the case of things themselves, in so\r\nfar as they are given in intuition with such determinations as express mere\r\nrelations, without having anything internal as their foundation; for they are\r\nnot things in\r\nthemselves, but only phenomena. What we cognize in matter is nothing but\r\nrelations (what we call its internal determinations are but comparatively\r\ninternal). But there are some self-subsistent and permanent, through which a\r\ndetermined object is given. That I, when abstraction is made of these\r\nrelations, have nothing more to think, does not destroy the conception of a\r\nthing as phenomenon, nor the conception of an object in abstracto, but it does\r\naway with the possibility of an object that is determinable according to mere\r\nconceptions, that is, of a noumenon. It is certainly startling to hear that a\r\nthing consists solely of relations; but this thing is simply a phenomenon, and\r\ncannot be cogitated by means of the mere categories: it does itself consist in\r\nthe mere relation of something in general to the senses. In the same way, we\r\ncannot cogitate relations of things in abstracto, if we commence with\r\nconceptions alone, in any other manner than that one is the cause of\r\ndeterminations in the other; for that is itself the conception of the\r\nunderstanding or category of relation. But, as in this case we make abstraction\r\nof all intuition, we lose altogether the mode in which the manifold determines\r\nto each of its parts its place, that is, the form of sensibility (space); and\r\nyet this mode antecedes all empirical causality.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"linknote-39\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#linknoteref-39\"\u003e[39]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nIf any one wishes here to have recourse to the usual subterfuge, and to say,\r\nthat at least realitates noumena cannot be in opposition to each other, it will\r\nbe requisite for him to adduce an example of this pure and non-sensuous\r\nreality, that it may be understood whether the notion represents something or\r\nnothing. But an example cannot be found except in experience, which never\r\npresents to us anything more than phenomena; and thus the proposition means\r\nnothing more than that the conception which contains only affirmatives does not\r\ncontain anything negative\u0026mdash;a proposition nobody ever doubted.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIf by intelligible objects we understand things which can be thought by means\r\nof the pure categories, without the need of the schemata of sensibility, such\r\nobjects are impossible. For the condition of the objective use of all our\r\nconceptions of understanding is the mode of our sensuous intuition, whereby\r\nobjects are given; and, if we make abstraction of the latter, the former can\r\nhave no relation to an object. And even if we should suppose a different kind\r\nof intuition from our own, still our functions of thought would have no use or\r\nsignification in respect thereof. But if we understand by the term, objects of\r\na non-sensuous intuition, in respect of which our categories are not valid, and\r\nof which we can accordingly have no knowledge (neither intuition nor\r\nconception), in this merely negative sense noumena must be admitted. For this\r\nis no more than saying that our mode of intuition is not applicable to all\r\nthings, but only to objects of our senses, that consequently its objective\r\nvalidity is limited, and that room is therefore left for another kind of\r\nintuition, and thus also for things that may be objects of it. But in this\r\nsense the conception of a noumenon is problematical, that is to say, it is the\r\nnotion of a thing of which we can neither say that it is possible, nor that it is impossible, inasmuch as\r\nwe do not know of any mode of intuition besides the sensuous, or of any other\r\nsort of conceptions than the categories\u0026mdash;a mode of intuition and a kind of\r\nconception neither of which is applicable to a non-sensuous object. We are on\r\nthis account incompetent to extend the sphere of our objects of thought beyond\r\nthe conditions of our sensibility, and to assume the existence of objects of\r\npure thought, that is, of noumena, inasmuch as these have no true positive\r\nsignification. For it must be confessed of the categories that they are not of\r\nthemselves sufficient for the cognition of things in themselves and, without\r\nthe data of sensibility, are mere subjective forms of the unity of the\r\nunderstanding. Thought is certainly not a product of the senses, and in so far\r\nis not limited by them, but it does not therefore follow that it may be\r\nemployed purely and without the intervention of sensibility, for it would then\r\nbe without reference to an object. And we cannot call a noumenon an object of\r\npure thought; for the representation thereof is but the problematical\r\nconception of an object for a perfectly different intuition and a perfectly\r\ndifferent understanding from ours, both of which are consequently themselves\r\nproblematical. The conception of a noumenon is therefore not the conception of\r\nan object, but merely a problematical conception inseparably connected with the\r\nlimitation of our sensibility. That is to say, this conception contains the\r\nanswer to the question: \u0026ldquo;Are there objects quite unconnected with, and\r\nindependent of, our intuition?\u0026rdquo;\u0026mdash;a question to which only an\r\nindeterminate answer can be given. That answer is: \u0026ldquo;Inasmuch as sensuous\r\nintuition does not apply to all things without distinction, there remains room\r\nfor other and different objects.\u0026rdquo; The existence of these problematical\r\nobjects is therefore not absolutely denied, in the absence of a determinate\r\nconception of them, but, as no category is valid in respect of them, neither\r\nmust they be admitted as objects for our understanding.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nUnderstanding accordingly limits sensibility, without at the same time\r\nenlarging its own field. While, moreover, it forbids sensibility to apply its\r\nforms and modes to things in themselves and restricts it to the sphere of\r\nphenomena, it cogitates an object in itself, only, however, as a transcendental\r\nobject, which is the cause of a phenomenon (consequently not itself a\r\nphenomenon), and which cannot be thought either as a quantity or as reality, or\r\nas substance (because these conceptions always require sensuous forms in which\r\nto determine an object)\u0026mdash;an object, therefore, of which we are quite\r\nunable to say whether it can be met with in ourselves or out of us, whether it\r\nwould be annihilated together with sensibility, or, if this were taken away,\r\nwould continue to exist. If we wish to call this object a noumenon, because the\r\nrepresentation of it is non-sensuous, we are at liberty to do so. But as we can\r\napply to it none of the conceptions of our understanding, the representation is\r\nfor us quite void, and is available only for the indication of the limits of\r\nour sensuous intuition, thereby leaving at the same time an empty space, which\r\nwe are competent to fill by the aid neither of possible experience, nor of the\r\npure understanding.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe critique of the pure understanding, accordingly, does not permit us to\r\ncreate for ourselves a new field of objects beyond those which are presented to\r\nus as phenomena, and to stray into intelligible worlds; nay, it does not even\r\nallow us to endeavour to form so much as a conception of them. The specious\r\nerror which leads to this\u0026mdash;and which is a perfectly excusable\r\none\u0026mdash;lies in the fact that the employment of the understanding, contrary\r\nto its proper purpose and destination, is made transcendental, and objects,\r\nthat is, possible intuitions, are made to regulate themselves according to\r\nconceptions, instead of the conceptions arranging themselves according to the\r\nintuitions, on which alone their own objective validity rests. Now the reason\r\nof this again is that apperception, and with it thought, antecedes all possible\r\ndeterminate arrangement of representations. Accordingly we think something in\r\ngeneral and determine it on the one hand sensuously, but, on the other,\r\ndistinguish the general and in abstracto represented object from this\r\nparticular mode of intuiting it. In this case there remains a mode of\r\ndetermining the object by mere thought, which is really but a logical form\r\nwithout content, which, however, seems to us to be a mode of the existence of\r\nthe object in itself (noumenon), without regard to intuition which is limited\r\nto our senses.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBefore ending this transcendental analytic, we must make an addition, which,\r\nalthough in itself of no particular importance, seems to be necessary to the\r\ncompleteness of the system. The highest conception, with which a transcendental\r\nphilosophy commonly begins, is the division into possible and impossible. But\r\nas all division presupposes a divided conception, a still higher one must\r\nexist, and this is the conception of an object in general\u0026mdash;problematically\r\nunderstood and without its being decided whether it is something or nothing. As\r\nthe categories are the only conceptions which apply to objects in general, the\r\ndistinguishing of an object, whether it is something or nothing, must proceed\r\naccording to the order and direction of the categories.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n1. To the categories of quantity, that is, the conceptions of all, many, and\r\none, the conception which annihilates all, that is, the conception of none, is\r\nopposed. And thus the object of a conception, to which no intuition can be\r\nfound to correspond, is = nothing. That is, it is a conception without an\r\nobject (ens rationis), like noumena, which cannot be considered possible in the\r\nsphere of reality, though they must not therefore be held to be\r\nimpossible\u0026mdash;or like certain new fundamental forces in matter, the\r\nexistence of which is cogitable without contradiction, though, as examples from\r\nexperience are not forthcoming, they must not be regarded as possible.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n2. Reality is something; negation is nothing, that is, a conception of the\r\nabsence of an object, as cold, a shadow (nihil privativum).\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n3. The mere form of intuition, without substance, is in itself no object, but\r\nthe merely formal condition of an object (as phenomenon), as pure space and\r\npure time. These are certainly something, as forms of intuition, but are not\r\nthemselves objects which are intuited (ens imaginarium).\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n4. The object of a conception which is self-contradictory, is nothing, because\r\nthe conception is nothing\u0026mdash;is impossible, as a figure composed of two\r\nstraight lines (nihil negativum).\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe table of this division of the conception of nothing (the corresponding\r\ndivision of the conception of something does not require special description)\r\nmust therefore be arranged as follows:\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cpre\u003e\r\n NOTHING\r\n AS\r\n\r\n 1\r\n As Empty Conception\r\n without object,\r\n \u003ci\u003eens rationis\u003c/i\u003e\r\n 2 3\r\n Empty object of Empty intuition\r\n a conception, without object,\r\n \u003ci\u003enihil privativum ens imaginarium\u003c/i\u003e\r\n 4\r\n Empty object\r\n without conception,\r\n \u003ci\u003enihil negativum\u003c/i\u003e\r\n\u003c/pre\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWe see that the ens rationis is distinguished from the nihil negativum or pure\r\nnothing by the consideration that the former must not be reckoned among\r\npossibilities, because it is a mere fiction\u0026mdash;though not\r\nself-contradictory, while the latter is completely opposed to all possibility,\r\ninasmuch as the conception annihilates itself. Both, however, are empty\r\nconceptions. On the other hand, the nihil privativum and ens imaginarium are\r\nempty data for conceptions. If light be not given to the senses, we cannot\r\nrepresent to ourselves darkness, and if extended objects are not perceived, we\r\ncannot represent space. Neither the negation, nor the mere form of intuition\r\ncan, without something real, be an object.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003ca id=\"chap63\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eSECOND DIVISION\u0026mdash;TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003ca id=\"chap64\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eTRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC.\u003cbr\u003e\r\nINTRODUCTION.\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003ca id=\"chap65\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eI. Of Transcendental Illusory Appearance\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWe termed dialectic in general a logic of appearance. This does not signify a\r\ndoctrine of probability; for probability is truth, only cognized upon\r\ninsufficient grounds, and though the information it gives us is imperfect, it\r\nis not therefore deceitful. Hence it must not be separated from the analytical\r\npart of logic. Still less must phenomenon and appearance be held to be\r\nidentical. For truth or illusory appearance does not reside in the object, in\r\nso far as it is intuited, but in the judgement upon the object, in so far as it\r\nis thought. It is, therefore, quite correct to say that the senses do not err,\r\nnot because they always judge correctly, but because they do not judge at all.\r\nHence truth and error, consequently also, illusory appearance as the cause of\r\nerror, are only to be found in a judgement, that is, in the relation of an\r\nobject to our understanding. In a cognition which completely harmonizes with\r\nthe laws of the understanding, no error can exist. In a representation of the\r\nsenses\u0026mdash;as not containing any judgement\u0026mdash;there is also no error. But\r\nno power of nature can of itself deviate from its own laws. Hence neither the\r\nunderstanding per se (without the influence of another cause), nor the senses\r\nper se, would fall into error; the former could not, because, if it acts only\r\naccording to its own laws, the effect (the judgement) must necessarily accord\r\nwith these laws. But in accordance with the laws of the understanding consists\r\nthe formal element in all truth. In the senses there is no\r\njudgement\u0026mdash;neither a true nor a false one. But, as we have no source of\r\ncognition besides these two, it follows that error is caused solely by the\r\nunobserved influence of the sensibility upon the understanding. And thus it\r\nhappens that the subjective grounds of a judgement blend and are confounded with the\r\nobjective, and cause them to deviate from their proper determination,\u003ca\r\nhref=\"#linknote-40\" id=\"linknoteref-40\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[40]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e just as a body in motion would always\r\nof itself proceed in a straight line, but if another impetus gives to it a\r\ndifferent direction, it will then start off into a curvilinear line of motion.\r\nTo distinguish the peculiar action of the understanding from the power which\r\nmingles with it, it is necessary to consider an erroneous judgement as the\r\ndiagonal between two forces, that determine the judgement in two different\r\ndirections, which, as it were, form an angle, and to resolve this composite\r\noperation into the simple ones of the understanding and the sensibility. In\r\npure à priori judgements this must be done by means of transcendental\r\nreflection, whereby, as has been already shown, each representation has its\r\nplace appointed in the corresponding faculty of cognition, and consequently the\r\ninfluence of the one faculty upon the other is made apparent.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"linknote-40\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#linknoteref-40\"\u003e[40]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nSensibility, subjected to the understanding, as the object upon which the\r\nunderstanding employs its functions, is the source of real cognitions. But, in\r\nso far as it exercises an influence upon the action of the understanding and\r\ndetermines it to judgement, sensibility is itself the cause of error.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIt is not at present our business to treat of empirical illusory appearance\r\n(for example, optical illusion), which occurs in the empirical application of\r\notherwise correct rules of the understanding, and in which the judgement is\r\nmisled by the influence of imagination. Our purpose is to speak of\r\ntranscendental illusory appearance, which influences principles\u0026mdash;that are\r\nnot even applied to experience, for in this case we should possess a sure test\r\nof their correctness\u0026mdash;but which leads us, in disregard of all the warnings\r\nof criticism, completely beyond the empirical employment of the categories and\r\ndeludes us with the chimera of an extension of the sphere of the pure\r\nunderstanding. We shall term those principles the application of which is\r\nconfined entirely within the limits of possible experience, immanent; those, on\r\nthe other hand, which transgress these limits, we shall call transcendent\r\nprinciples. But by these latter I do not understand principles of the\r\ntranscendental use or misuse of the categories, which is in reality a mere\r\nfault of the judgement when not under due restraint from criticism, and\r\ntherefore not paying sufficient attention to the limits of the sphere in which\r\nthe pure understanding is allowed to exercise its functions; but real\r\nprinciples which exhort us to break down all those barriers, and to lay claim\r\nto a perfectly new field of cognition, which recognizes no line of demarcation.\r\nThus transcendental and transcendent are not identical terms. The principles of\r\nthe pure understanding, which we have already propounded, ought to be of\r\nempirical and not of transcendental use, that is, they are not applicable to\r\nany object beyond the sphere of experience. A principle which removes these\r\nlimits, nay, which authorizes us to overstep them, is called transcendent. If\r\nour criticism can succeed in exposing the illusion in these pretended\r\nprinciples, those which are limited in their employment to the sphere of\r\nexperience may be called, in opposition to the others, immanent principles of\r\nthe pure understanding.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nLogical illusion, which consists merely in the imitation of the form of reason\r\n(the illusion in sophistical syllogisms), arises entirely from a want of due\r\nattention to logical rules. So soon as the attention is awakened to the case\r\nbefore us, this illusion totally disappears. Transcendental illusion, on the\r\ncontrary, does not cease to exist, even after it has been exposed, and its\r\nnothingness clearly perceived by means of transcendental criticism. Take, for\r\nexample, the illusion in the proposition: \u0026ldquo;The world must have a\r\nbeginning in time.\u0026rdquo; The cause of this is as follows. In our reason,\r\nsubjectively considered as a faculty of human cognition, there exist\r\nfundamental rules and maxims of its exercise, which have completely the\r\nappearance of objective principles. Now from this cause it happens that the\r\nsubjective necessity of a certain connection of our conceptions, is regarded as\r\nan objective necessity of the determination of things in themselves. This\r\nillusion it is impossible to avoid, just as we cannot avoid perceiving that the\r\nsea appears to be higher at a distance than it is near the shore, because we\r\nsee the former by means of higher rays than the latter, or, which is a still\r\nstronger case, as even the astronomer cannot prevent himself from seeing the\r\nmoon larger at its rising than some time afterwards, although he is not\r\ndeceived by this illusion.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nTranscendental dialectic will therefore content itself with exposing the\r\nillusory appearance in transcendental judgements, and guarding us against it;\r\nbut to make it, as in the case of logical illusion, entirely disappear and\r\ncease to be illusion is utterly beyond its power. For we have here to do with a\r\nnatural and unavoidable illusion, which rests upon subjective principles and\r\nimposes these upon us as objective, while logical dialectic, in the detection\r\nof sophisms, has to do merely with an error in the logical consequence of the\r\npropositions, or with an artificially constructed illusion, in imitation of the\r\nnatural error. There is, therefore, a natural and unavoidable dialectic of pure\r\nreason\u0026mdash;not that in which the bungler, from want of the requisite\r\nknowledge, involves himself, nor that which the sophist devises for the purpose\r\nof misleading, but that which is an inseparable adjunct of human reason, and\r\nwhich, even after its illusions have been exposed, does not cease to deceive,\r\nand continually to lead reason into momentary errors, which it becomes\r\nnecessary continually to remove.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003ca id=\"chap66\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eII. Of Pure Reason as the Seat of Transcendental\r\nIllusory Appearance\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nA. OF REASON IN GENERAL.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAll our knowledge begins with sense, proceeds thence to understanding, and ends\r\nwith reason, beyond which nothing higher can be discovered in the human mind\r\nfor elaborating the matter of intuition and subjecting it to the highest unity\r\nof thought. At this stage of our inquiry it is my duty to give an explanation\r\nof this, the highest faculty of cognition, and I confess I find myself here in\r\nsome difficulty. Of reason, as of the understanding, there is a merely formal,\r\nthat is, logical use, in which it makes abstraction of all content of\r\ncognition; but there is also a real use, inasmuch as it contains in itself the\r\nsource of certain conceptions and principles, which it does not borrow either\r\nfrom the senses or the understanding. The former faculty has been long defined\r\nby logicians as the faculty of mediate conclusion in contradistinction to\r\nimmediate conclusions (consequentiae immediatae); but the nature of the latter,\r\nwhich itself generates conceptions, is not to be understood from this\r\ndefinition. Now as a division of reason into a logical and a transcendental\r\nfaculty presents itself here, it becomes necessary to seek for a higher\r\nconception of this source of cognition which shall comprehend both conceptions.\r\nIn this we may expect, according to the analogy of the conceptions of the\r\nunderstanding, that the logical conception will give us the key to the\r\ntranscendental, and that the table of the functions of the former will present\r\nus with the clue to the conceptions of reason.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIn the former part of our transcendental logic, we defined the understanding to\r\nbe the faculty of rules; reason may be distinguished from understanding as the\r\nfaculty of principles.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe term principle is ambiguous, and commonly signifies merely a cognition that\r\nmay be employed as a principle, although it is not in itself, and as regards\r\nits proper origin, entitled to the distinction. Every general proposition, even\r\nif derived from experience by the process of induction, may serve as the major\r\nin a syllogism; but it is not for that reason a principle. Mathematical axioms\r\n(for example, there can be only one straight line between two points) are\r\ngeneral à priori cognitions, and are therefore rightly denominated principles,\r\nrelatively to the cases which can be subsumed under them. But I cannot for this\r\nreason say that I cognize this property of a straight line from\r\nprinciples\u0026mdash;I cognize it only in pure intuition.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCognition from principles, then, is that cognition in which I cognize the\r\nparticular in the general by means of conceptions. Thus every syllogism is a\r\nform of the deduction of a cognition from a principle. For the major always\r\ngives a conception, through which everything that is subsumed under the\r\ncondition thereof is cognized according to a principle. Now as every general\r\ncognition may serve as the major in a syllogism, and the understanding presents\r\nus with such general à priori propositions, they may be termed principles, in\r\nrespect of their possible use.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut if we consider these principles of the pure understanding in relation to\r\ntheir origin, we shall find them to be anything rather than cognitions from\r\nconceptions. For they would not even be possible à priori, if we could not rely\r\non the assistance of pure intuition (in mathematics), or on that of the\r\nconditions of a possible experience. That everything that happens has a cause,\r\ncannot be concluded from the general conception of that which happens; on the\r\ncontrary the principle of causality instructs us as to the mode of obtaining\r\nfrom that which happens a determinate empirical conception.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSynthetical cognitions from conceptions the understanding cannot supply, and\r\nthey alone are entitled to be called principles. At the same time, all general\r\npropositions may be termed comparative principles.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIt has been a long-cherished wish\u0026mdash;that (who knows how late), may one day,\r\nbe happily accomplished\u0026mdash;that the principles of the endless variety of\r\ncivil laws should be investigated and exposed; for in this way alone can we\r\nfind the secret of simplifying legislation. But in this case, laws are nothing\r\nmore than limitations of our freedom upon conditions under which it subsists in\r\nperfect harmony with itself; they consequently have for their object that which\r\nis completely our own work, and of which we ourselves may be the cause by means\r\nof these conceptions. But how objects as things in themselves\u0026mdash;how the\r\nnature of things is subordinated to principles and is to be determined,\r\naccording to conceptions, is a question which it seems well nigh impossible to\r\nanswer. Be this, however, as it may\u0026mdash;for on this point our investigation\r\nis yet to be made\u0026mdash;it is at least manifest from what we have said that\r\ncognition from principles is something very different from cognition by means\r\nof the understanding, which may indeed precede other cognitions in the form of\r\na principle, but in itself\u0026mdash;in so far as it is synthetical\u0026mdash;is\r\nneither based upon mere thought, nor contains a general proposition drawn from\r\nconceptions alone.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe understanding may be a faculty for the production of unity of phenomena by\r\nvirtue of rules; the reason is a faculty for the production of unity of rules\r\n(of the understanding) under principles. Reason, therefore, never applies\r\ndirectly to experience, or to any sensuous object; its object is, on the\r\ncontrary, the understanding, to the manifold cognition of which it gives a\r\nunity à priori by means of conceptions\u0026mdash;a unity which may be called\r\nrational unity, and which is of a nature very different from that of the unity\r\nproduced by the understanding.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe above is the general conception of the faculty of reason, in so far as it\r\nhas been possible to make it comprehensible in the absence of examples. These\r\nwill be given in the sequel.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nB. OF THE LOGICAL USE OF REASON.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nA distinction is commonly made between that which is immediately cognized and\r\nthat which is inferred or concluded. That in a figure which is bounded by three\r\nstraight lines there are three angles, is an immediate cognition; but that\r\nthese angles are together equal to two right angles, is an inference or\r\nconclusion. Now, as we are constantly employing this mode of thought and have\r\nthus become quite accustomed to it, we no longer remark the above distinction,\r\nand, as in the case of the so-called deceptions of sense, consider as\r\nimmediately perceived, what has really been inferred. In every reasoning or\r\nsyllogism, there is a fundamental proposition, afterwards a second drawn from\r\nit, and finally the conclusion, which connects the truth in the first with the\r\ntruth in the second\u0026mdash;and that infallibly. If the judgement concluded is so\r\ncontained in the first proposition that it can be deduced from it without the\r\nmeditation of a third notion, the conclusion is called immediate (consequentia\r\nimmediata); I prefer the term conclusion of the understanding. But if, in\r\naddition to the fundamental cognition, a second judgement is necessary for the\r\nproduction of the conclusion, it is called a conclusion of the reason. In the\r\nproposition: All men are mortal, are contained the propositions: Some men are\r\nmortal, Nothing that is not mortal is a man, and these are therefore immediate\r\nconclusions from the first. On the other hand, the proposition: all the learned\r\nare mortal, is not contained in the main proposition (for the conception of a\r\nlearned man does not occur in it), and it can be deduced from the main\r\nproposition only by means of a mediating judgement.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIn every syllogism I first cogitate a rule (the major) by means of the\r\nunderstanding. In the next place I subsume a cognition under the condition of\r\nthe rule (and this is the minor) by means of the judgement. And finally I\r\ndetermine my cognition by means of the predicate of the rule (this is the\r\nconclusio), consequently, I determine it à priori by means of the reason. The\r\nrelations, therefore, which the major proposition, as the rule, represents\r\nbetween a cognition and its condition, constitute the different kinds of\r\nsyllogisms. These are just threefold\u0026mdash;analogously with all judgements, in\r\nso far as they differ in the mode of expressing the relation of a cognition in\r\nthe understanding\u0026mdash;namely, categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWhen as often happens, the conclusion is a judgement which may follow from\r\nother given judgements, through which a perfectly different object is\r\ncogitated, I endeavour to discover in the understanding whether the assertion\r\nin this conclusion does not stand under certain conditions according to a\r\ngeneral rule. If I find such a condition, and if the object mentioned in the\r\nconclusion can be subsumed under the given condition, then this conclusion\r\nfollows from a rule which is also valid for other objects of cognition. From\r\nthis we see that reason endeavours to subject the great variety of the\r\ncognitions of the understanding to the smallest possible number of principles\r\n(general conditions), and thus to produce in it the highest unity.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nC. OF THE PURE USE OF REASON.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCan we isolate reason, and, if so, is it in this case a peculiar source of\r\nconceptions and judgements which spring from it alone, and through which it can\r\nbe applied to objects; or is it merely a subordinate faculty, whose duty it is\r\nto give a certain form to given cognitions\u0026mdash;a form which is called\r\nlogical, and through which the cognitions of the understanding are subordinated\r\nto each other, and lower rules to higher (those, to wit, whose condition\r\ncomprises in its sphere the condition of the others), in so far as this can be\r\ndone by comparison? This is the question which we have at present to answer.\r\nManifold variety of rules and unity of principles is a requirement of reason,\r\nfor the purpose of bringing the understanding into complete accordance with\r\nitself, just as understanding subjects the manifold content of intuition to\r\nconceptions, and thereby introduces connection into it. But this principle\r\nprescribes no law to objects, and does not contain any ground of the\r\npossibility of cognizing or of determining them as such, but is merely a\r\nsubjective law for the proper arrangement of the content of the understanding.\r\nThe purpose of this law is, by a comparison of the conceptions of the\r\nunderstanding, to reduce them to the smallest possible number, although, at the\r\nsame time, it does not justify us in demanding from objects themselves such a\r\nuniformity as might contribute to the convenience and the enlargement of the\r\nsphere of the understanding, or in expecting that it will itself thus receive\r\nfrom them objective validity. In one word, the question is: \u0026ldquo;does reason\r\nin itself, that is, does pure reason contain à priori synthetical principles\r\nand rules, and what are those principles?\u0026rdquo;\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe formal and logical procedure of reason in syllogisms gives us sufficient\r\ninformation in regard to the ground on which the transcendental principle of\r\nreason in its pure synthetical cognition will rest.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n1. Reason, as observed in the syllogistic process, is not applicable to\r\nintuitions, for the purpose of subjecting them to rules\u0026mdash;for this is the\r\nprovince of the understanding with its categories\u0026mdash;but to conceptions and\r\njudgements. If pure reason does apply to objects and the intuition of them, it\r\ndoes so not immediately, but mediately\u0026mdash;through the understanding and its\r\njudgements, which have a direct relation to the senses and their intuition, for\r\nthe purpose of determining their objects. The unity of reason is therefore not\r\nthe unity of a possible experience, but is essentially different from this\r\nunity, which is that of the understanding. That everything which happens has a\r\ncause, is not a principle cognized and prescribed by reason. This principle\r\nmakes the unity of experience possible and borrows nothing from reason, which,\r\nwithout a reference to possible experience, could never have produced by means\r\nof mere conceptions any such synthetical unity.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n2. Reason, in its logical use, endeavours to discover the general condition of\r\nits judgement (the conclusion), and a syllogism is itself nothing but a\r\njudgement by means of the subsumption of its condition under a general rule\r\n(the major). Now as this rule may itself be subjected to the same process of\r\nreason, and thus the condition of the condition be sought (by means of a\r\nprosyllogism) as long as the process can be continued, it is very manifest that\r\nthe peculiar principle of reason in its logical use is to find for the\r\nconditioned cognition of the understanding the unconditioned whereby the unity\r\nof the former is completed.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut this logical maxim cannot be a principle of pure reason, unless we admit\r\nthat, if the conditioned is given, the whole series of conditions subordinated\r\nto one another\u0026mdash;a series which is consequently itself\r\nunconditioned\u0026mdash;is also given, that is, contained in the object and its\r\nconnection.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut this principle of pure reason is evidently synthetical; for, analytically,\r\nthe conditioned certainly relates to some condition, but not to the\r\nunconditioned. From this principle also there must originate different\r\nsynthetical propositions, of which the pure understanding is perfectly\r\nignorant, for it has to do only with objects of a possible experience, the\r\ncognition and synthesis of which is always conditioned. The unconditioned, if\r\nit does really exist, must be especially considered in regard to the\r\ndeterminations which distinguish it from whatever is conditioned, and will thus\r\nafford us material for many à priori synthetical propositions.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe principles resulting from this highest principle of pure reason will,\r\nhowever, be transcendent in relation to phenomena, that is to say, it will be\r\nimpossible to make any adequate empirical use of this principle. It is\r\ntherefore completely different from all principles of the understanding, the\r\nuse made of which is entirely immanent, their object and purpose being merely\r\nthe possibility of experience. Now our duty in the transcendental dialectic is\r\nas follows. To discover whether the principle that the series of conditions (in\r\nthe synthesis of phenomena, or of thought in general) extends to the\r\nunconditioned is objectively true, or not; what consequences result therefrom\r\naffecting the empirical use of the understanding, or rather whether there\r\nexists any such objectively valid proposition of reason, and whether it is not,\r\non the contrary, a merely logical precept which directs us to ascend\r\nperpetually to still higher conditions, to approach completeness in the series\r\nof them, and thus to introduce into our cognition the highest possible unity of\r\nreason. We must ascertain, I say, whether this requirement of reason has not\r\nbeen regarded, by a misunderstanding, as a transcendental principle of pure\r\nreason, which postulates a thorough completeness in the series of conditions in\r\nobjects themselves. We must show, moreover, the misconceptions and illusions\r\nthat intrude into syllogisms, the major proposition of which pure reason has\r\nsupplied\u0026mdash;a proposition which has perhaps more of the character of a\r\npetitio than of a postulatum\u0026mdash;and that proceed from experience upwards to\r\nits conditions. The solution of these problems is our task in transcendental\r\ndialectic, which we are about to expose even at its source, that lies deep in\r\nhuman reason. We shall divide it into two parts, the first of which will treat\r\nof the transcendent conceptions of pure reason, the second of transcendent and\r\ndialectical syllogisms.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003ca id=\"chap67\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eTRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC\u0026mdash;BOOK I\u0026mdash;OF THE\r\nCONCEPTIONS OF PURE REASON.\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe conceptions of pure reason\u0026mdash;we do not here speak of the possibility of\r\nthem\u0026mdash;are not obtained by reflection, but by inference or conclusion. The\r\nconceptions of understanding are also cogitated à priori antecedently to\r\nexperience, and render it possible; but they contain nothing but the unity of\r\nreflection upon phenomena, in so far as these must necessarily belong to a\r\npossible empirical consciousness. Through them alone are cognition and the\r\ndetermination of an object possible. It is from them, accordingly, that we\r\nreceive material for reasoning, and antecedently to them we possess no à priori\r\nconceptions of objects from which they might be deduced, On the other hand, the\r\nsole basis of their objective reality consists in the necessity imposed on\r\nthem, as containing the intellectual form of all experience, of restricting\r\ntheir application and influence to the sphere of experience.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut the term, conception of reason, or rational conception, itself indicates\r\nthat it does not confine itself within the limits of experience, because its\r\nobject-matter is a cognition, of which every empirical cognition is but a\r\npart\u0026mdash;nay, the whole of possible experience may be itself but a part of\r\nit\u0026mdash;a cognition to which no actual experience ever fully attains, although\r\nit does always pertain to it. The aim of rational conceptions is the\r\ncomprehension, as that of the conceptions of understanding is the understanding\r\nof perceptions. If they contain the unconditioned, they relate to that to which\r\nall experience is subordinate, but which is never itself an object of\r\nexperience\u0026mdash;that towards which reason tends in all its conclusions from\r\nexperience, and by the standard of which it estimates the degree of their\r\nempirical use, but which is never itself an element in an empirical synthesis.\r\nIf, notwithstanding, such conceptions possess objective validity, they may be\r\ncalled conceptus ratiocinati (conceptions legitimately concluded); in cases\r\nwhere they do not, they have been admitted on account of having the appearance\r\nof being correctly concluded, and may be called conceptus ratiocinantes\r\n(sophistical conceptions). But as this can only be sufficiently demonstrated in\r\nthat part of our treatise which relates to the dialectical conclusions of\r\nreason, we shall omit any consideration of it in this place. As we called the\r\npure conceptions of the understanding categories, we shall also distinguish\r\nthose of pure reason by a new name and call them transcendental ideas. These\r\nterms, however, we must in the first place explain and justify.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003ca id=\"chap68\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eSection I\u0026mdash;Of Ideas in General\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nDespite the great wealth of words which European languages possess, the thinker\r\nfinds himself often at a loss for an expression exactly suited to his\r\nconception, for want of which he is unable to make himself intelligible either\r\nto others or to himself. To coin new words is a pretension to legislation in\r\nlanguage which is seldom successful; and, before recourse is taken to so\r\ndesperate an expedient, it is advisable to examine the dead and learned\r\nlanguages, with the hope and the probability that we may there meet with some\r\nadequate expression of the notion we have in our minds. In this case, even if\r\nthe original meaning of the word has become somewhat uncertain, from\r\ncarelessness or want of caution on the part of the authors of it, it is always\r\nbetter to adhere to and confirm its proper meaning\u0026mdash;even although it may\r\nbe doubtful whether it was formerly used in exactly this sense\u0026mdash;than to\r\nmake our labour vain by want of sufficient care to render ourselves\r\nintelligible.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nFor this reason, when it happens that there exists only a single word to\r\nexpress a certain conception, and this word, in its usual acceptation, is\r\nthoroughly adequate to the conception, the accurate distinction of which from\r\nrelated conceptions is of great importance, we ought not to employ the\r\nexpression improvidently, or, for the sake of variety and elegance of style,\r\nuse it as a synonym for other cognate words. It is our duty, on the contrary,\r\ncarefully to preserve its peculiar signification, as otherwise it easily\r\nhappens that when the attention of the reader is no longer particularly\r\nattracted to the expression, and it is lost amid the multitude of other words\r\nof very different import, the thought which it conveyed, and which it alone\r\nconveyed, is lost with it.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPlato employed the expression idea in a way that plainly showed he meant by it\r\nsomething which is never derived from the senses, but which far transcends even\r\nthe conceptions of the understanding (with which Aristotle occupied himself),\r\ninasmuch as in experience nothing perfectly corresponding to them could be\r\nfound. Ideas are, according to him, archetypes of things themselves, and not\r\nmerely keys to possible experiences, like the categories. In his view they flow\r\nfrom the highest reason, by which they have been imparted to human reason,\r\nwhich, however, exists no longer in its original state, but is obliged with\r\ngreat labour to recall by reminiscence\u0026mdash;which is called\r\nphilosophy\u0026mdash;the old but now sadly obscured ideas. I will not here enter\r\nupon any literary investigation of the sense which this sublime philosopher\r\nattached to this expression. I shall content myself with remarking that it is\r\nnothing unusual, in common conversation as well as in written works, by\r\ncomparing the thoughts which an author has delivered upon a subject, to\r\nunderstand him better than he understood himself inasmuch as he may not have\r\nsufficiently determined his conception, and thus have sometimes spoken, nay\r\neven thought, in opposition to his own opinions.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPlato perceived very clearly that our faculty of cognition has the feeling of a\r\nmuch higher vocation than that of merely spelling out phenomena according to\r\nsynthetical unity, for the purpose of being able to read them as experience,\r\nand that our reason naturally raises itself to cognitions far too elevated to\r\nadmit of the possibility of an object given by experience corresponding to\r\nthem\u0026mdash;cognitions which are nevertheless real, and are not mere phantoms of\r\nthe brain.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThis philosopher found his ideas especially in all that is practical,\u003ca\r\nhref=\"#linknote-41\" id=\"linknoteref-41\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[41]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e that is, which rests upon freedom,\r\nwhich in its turn ranks under cognitions that are the peculiar product of\r\nreason. He who would derive from experience the conceptions of virtue, who\r\nwould make (as many have really done) that, which at best can but serve as an\r\nimperfectly illustrative example, a model for or the formation of a perfectly\r\nadequate idea on the subject, would in fact transform virtue into a nonentity\r\nchangeable according to time and circumstance and utterly incapable of being\r\nemployed as a rule. On the contrary, every one is conscious that, when any one\r\nis held up to him as a model of virtue, he compares this so-called model with\r\nthe true original which he possesses in his own mind and values him according\r\nto this standard. But this standard is the idea of virtue, in relation to which\r\nall possible objects of experience are indeed serviceable as\r\nexamples\u0026mdash;proofs of the practicability in a certain degree of that which\r\nthe conception of virtue demands\u0026mdash;but certainly not as archetypes. That\r\nthe actions of man will never be in perfect accordance with all the\r\nrequirements of the pure ideas of reason, does not prove the thought to be\r\nchimerical. For only through this idea are all judgements as to moral merit or\r\ndemerit possible; it consequently lies at the foundation of every approach to\r\nmoral perfection, however far removed from it the obstacles in human\r\nnature\u0026mdash;indeterminable as to degree\u0026mdash;may keep us.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"linknote-41\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#linknoteref-41\"\u003e[41]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nHe certainly extended the application of his conception to speculative\r\ncognitions also, provided they were given pure and completely à priori, nay,\r\neven to mathematics, although this science cannot possess an object otherwhere\r\nthan in Possible experience. I cannot follow him in this, and as little can I\r\nfollow him in his mystical deduction of these ideas, or in his hypostatization\r\nof them; although, in truth, the elevated and exaggerated language which he\r\nemployed in describing them is quite capable of an interpretation more subdued\r\nand more in accordance with fact and the nature of things.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe Platonic Republic has become proverbial as an example\u0026mdash;and a striking\r\none\u0026mdash;of imaginary perfection, such as can exist only in the brain of the\r\nidle thinker; and Brucker ridicules the philosopher for maintaining that a\r\nprince can never govern well, unless he is participant in the ideas. But we\r\nshould do better to follow up this thought and, where this admirable thinker\r\nleaves us without assistance, employ new efforts to place it in clearer light,\r\nrather than carelessly fling it aside as useless, under the very miserable and\r\npernicious pretext of impracticability. A constitution of the greatest possible\r\nhuman freedom according to laws, by which the liberty of every individual can\r\nconsist with the liberty of every other (not of the greatest possible\r\nhappiness, for this follows necessarily from the former), is, to say the least,\r\na necessary idea, which must be placed at the foundation not only of the first\r\nplan of the constitution of a state, but of all its laws. And, in this, it not\r\nnecessary at the outset to take account of the obstacles which lie in our\r\nway\u0026mdash;obstacles which perhaps do not necessarily arise from the character\r\nof human nature, but rather from the previous neglect of true ideas in\r\nlegislation. For there is nothing more pernicious and more unworthy of a\r\nphilosopher, than the vulgar appeal to a so-called adverse experience, which\r\nindeed would not have existed, if those institutions had been established at\r\nthe proper time and in accordance with ideas; while, instead of this,\r\nconceptions, crude for the very reason that they have been drawn from\r\nexperience, have marred and frustrated all our better views and intentions. The\r\nmore legislation and government are in harmony with this idea, the more rare do\r\npunishments become and thus it is quite reasonable to maintain, as Plato did,\r\nthat in a perfect state no punishments at all would be necessary. Now although\r\na perfect state may never exist, the idea is not on that account the less just,\r\nwhich holds up this maximum as the archetype or standard of a constitution, in\r\norder to bring legislative government always nearer and nearer to the greatest\r\npossible perfection. For at what precise degree human nature must stop in its\r\nprogress, and how wide must be the chasm which must necessarily exist between\r\nthe idea and its realization, are problems which no one can or ought to\r\ndetermine\u0026mdash;and for this reason, that it is the destination of freedom to\r\noverstep all assigned limits between itself and the idea.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut not only in that wherein human reason is a real causal agent and where\r\nideas are operative causes (of actions and their objects), that is to say, in\r\nthe region of ethics, but also in regard to nature herself, Plato saw clear\r\nproofs of an origin from ideas. A plant, and animal, the regular order of\r\nnature\u0026mdash;probably also the disposition of the whole universe\u0026mdash;give\r\nmanifest evidence that they are possible only by means of and according to\r\nideas; that, indeed, no one creature, under the individual conditions of its\r\nexistence, perfectly harmonizes with the idea of the most perfect of its\r\nkind\u0026mdash;just as little as man with the idea of humanity, which nevertheless\r\nhe bears in his soul as the archetypal standard of his actions; that,\r\nnotwithstanding, these ideas are in the highest sense individually,\r\nunchangeably, and completely determined, and are the original causes of things;\r\nand that the totality of connected objects in the universe is alone fully\r\nadequate to that idea. Setting aside the exaggerations of expression in the\r\nwritings of this philosopher, the mental power exhibited in this ascent from\r\nthe ectypal mode of regarding the physical world to the architectonic\r\nconnection thereof according to ends, that is, ideas, is an effort which\r\ndeserves imitation and claims respect. But as regards the principles of ethics,\r\nof legislation, and of religion, spheres in which ideas alone render experience\r\npossible, although they never attain to full expression therein, he has\r\nvindicated for himself a position of peculiar merit, which is not appreciated\r\nonly because it is judged by the very empirical rules, the validity of which as\r\nprinciples is destroyed by ideas. For as regards nature, experience presents us\r\nwith rules and is the source of truth, but in relation to ethical laws\r\nexperience is the parent of illusion, and it is in the highest degree\r\nreprehensible to limit or to deduce the laws which dictate what I ought to do,\r\nfrom what is done.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWe must, however, omit the consideration of these important subjects, the\r\ndevelopment of which is in reality the peculiar duty and dignity of philosophy,\r\nand confine ourselves for the present to the more humble but not less useful\r\ntask of preparing a firm foundation for those majestic edifices of moral\r\nscience. For this foundation has been hitherto insecure from the many\r\nsubterranean passages which reason in its confident but vain search for\r\ntreasures has made in all directions. Our present duty is to make ourselves\r\nperfectly acquainted with the transcendental use made of pure reason, its\r\nprinciples and ideas, that we may be able properly to determine and value its\r\ninfluence and real worth. But before bringing these introductory remarks to a\r\nclose, I beg those who really have philosophy at heart\u0026mdash;and their number\r\nis but small\u0026mdash;if they shall find themselves convinced by the\r\nconsiderations following as well as by those above, to exert themselves to\r\npreserve to the expression idea its original signification, and to take care\r\nthat it be not lost among those other expressions by which all sorts of\r\nrepresentations are loosely designated\u0026mdash;that the interests of science may\r\nnot thereby suffer. We are in no want of words to denominate adequately every\r\nmode of representation, without the necessity of encroaching upon terms which\r\nare proper to others. The following is a graduated list of them. The genus is\r\nrepresentation in general (representatio). Under it stands representation with\r\nconsciousness (perceptio). A perception which relates solely to the subject as\r\na modification of its state, is a sensation (sensatio), an objective perception\r\nis a cognition (cognitio). A cognition is either an intuition or a conception\r\n(intuitus vel conceptus). The former has an immediate relation to the object\r\nand is singular and individual; the latter has but a mediate relation, by means\r\nof a characteristic mark which may be common to several things. A conception is\r\neither empirical or pure. A pure conception, in so far as it has its origin in\r\nthe understanding alone, and is not the conception of a pure sensuous image, is\r\ncalled notio. A conception formed from notions, which transcends the\r\npossibility of experience, is an idea, or a conception of reason. To one who\r\nhas accustomed himself to these distinctions, it must be quite intolerable to\r\nhear the representation of the colour red called an idea. It ought not even to\r\nbe called a notion or conception of understanding.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003ca id=\"chap69\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eSection II. Of Transcendental Ideas\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nTranscendental analytic showed us how the mere logical form of our cognition\r\ncan contain the origin of pure conceptions à priori, conceptions which\r\nrepresent objects antecedently to all experience, or rather, indicate the\r\nsynthetical unity which alone renders possible an empirical cognition of\r\nobjects. The form of judgements\u0026mdash;converted into a conception of the\r\nsynthesis of intuitions\u0026mdash;produced the categories which direct the\r\nemployment of the understanding in experience. This consideration warrants us\r\nto expect that the form of syllogisms, when applied to synthetical unity of\r\nintuitions, following the rule of the categories, will contain the origin of\r\nparticular à priori conceptions, which we may call pure conceptions of reason\r\nor transcendental ideas, and which will determine the use of the understanding\r\nin the totality of experience according to principles.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe function of reason in arguments consists in the universality of a cognition\r\naccording to conceptions, and the syllogism itself is a judgement which is\r\ndetermined à priori in the whole extent of its condition. The proposition:\r\n\u0026ldquo;Caius is mortal,\u0026rdquo; is one which may be obtained from experience by\r\nthe aid of the understanding alone; but my wish is to find a conception which\r\ncontains the condition under which the predicate of this judgement is\r\ngiven\u0026mdash;in this case, the conception of man\u0026mdash;and after subsuming under\r\nthis condition, taken in its whole extent (all men are mortal), I determine\r\naccording to it the cognition of the object thought, and say: \u0026ldquo;Caius is\r\nmortal.\u0026rdquo;\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHence, in the conclusion of a syllogism we restrict a predicate to a certain\r\nobject, after having thought it in the major in its whole extent under a\r\ncertain condition. This complete quantity of the extent in relation to such a\r\ncondition is called universality (universalitas). To this corresponds totality\r\n(universitas) of conditions in the synthesis of intuitions. The transcendental\r\nconception of reason is therefore nothing else than the conception of the\r\ntotality of the conditions of a given conditioned. Now as the unconditioned\r\nalone renders possible totality of conditions, and, conversely, the totality of\r\nconditions is itself always unconditioned; a pure rational conception in\r\ngeneral can be defined and explained by means of the conception of the\r\nunconditioned, in so far as it contains a basis for the synthesis of the\r\nconditioned.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nTo the number of modes of relation which the understanding cogitates by means\r\nof the categories, the number of pure rational conceptions will correspond. We\r\nmust therefore seek for, first, an unconditioned of the categorical synthesis\r\nin a subject; secondly, of the hypothetical synthesis of the members of a\r\nseries; thirdly, of the disjunctive synthesis of parts in a system.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThere are exactly the same number of modes of syllogisms, each of which\r\nproceeds through prosyllogisms to the unconditioned\u0026mdash;one to the subject\r\nwhich cannot be employed as predicate, another to the presupposition which\r\nsupposes nothing higher than itself, and the third to an aggregate of the\r\nmembers of the complete division of a conception. Hence the pure rational\r\nconceptions of totality in the synthesis of conditions have a necessary\r\nfoundation in the nature of human reason\u0026mdash;at least as modes of elevating\r\nthe unity of the understanding to the unconditioned. They may have no valid\r\napplication, corresponding to their transcendental employment, in concreto, and\r\nbe thus of no greater utility than to direct the understanding how, while\r\nextending them as widely as possible, to maintain its exercise and application\r\nin perfect consistence and harmony.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut, while speaking here of the totality of conditions and of the unconditioned\r\nas the common title of all conceptions of reason, we again light upon an\r\nexpression which we find it impossible to dispense with, and which\r\nnevertheless, owing to the ambiguity attaching to it from long abuse, we cannot\r\nemploy with safety. The word absolute is one of the few words which, in its\r\noriginal signification, was perfectly adequate to the conception it was\r\nintended to convey\u0026mdash;a conception which no other word in the same language\r\nexactly suits, and the loss\u0026mdash;or, which is the same thing, the incautious\r\nand loose employment\u0026mdash;of which must be followed by the loss of the\r\nconception itself. And, as it is a conception which occupies much of the\r\nattention of reason, its loss would be greatly to the detriment of all\r\ntranscendental philosophy. The word absolute is at present frequently used to\r\ndenote that something can be predicated of a thing considered in itself and\r\nintrinsically. In this sense absolutely possible would signify that which is\r\npossible in itself (interne)\u0026mdash;which is, in fact, the least that one can\r\npredicate of an object. On the other hand, it is sometimes employed to indicate\r\nthat a thing is valid in all respects\u0026mdash;for example, absolute sovereignty.\r\nAbsolutely possible would in this sense signify that which is possible in all\r\nrelations and in every respect; and this is the most that can be predicated of\r\nthe possibility of a thing. Now these significations do in truth frequently\r\ncoincide. Thus, for example, that which is intrinsically impossible, is also\r\nimpossible in all relations, that is, absolutely impossible. But in most cases\r\nthey differ from each other toto caelo, and I can by no means conclude that,\r\nbecause a thing is in itself possible, it is also possible in all relations,\r\nand therefore absolutely. Nay, more, I shall in the sequel show that absolute\r\nnecessity does not by any means depend on internal necessity, and that,\r\ntherefore, it must not be considered as synonymous with it. Of an opposite\r\nwhich is intrinsically impossible, we may affirm that it is in all respects\r\nimpossible, and that, consequently, the thing itself, of which this is the\r\nopposite, is absolutely necessary; but I cannot reason conversely and say, the\r\nopposite of that which is absolutely necessary is intrinsically impossible,\r\nthat is, that the absolute necessity of things is an internal necessity. For\r\nthis internal necessity is in certain cases a mere empty word with which the\r\nleast conception cannot be connected, while the conception of the necessity of\r\na thing in all relations possesses very peculiar determinations. Now as the\r\nloss of a conception of great utility in speculative science cannot be a matter\r\nof indifference to the philosopher, I trust that the proper determination and\r\ncareful preservation of the expression on which the conception depends will\r\nlikewise be not indifferent to him.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIn this enlarged signification, then, shall I employ the word absolute, in\r\nopposition to that which is valid only in some particular respect; for the\r\nlatter is restricted by conditions, the former is valid without any restriction\r\nwhatever.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nNow the transcendental conception of reason has for its object nothing else\r\nthan absolute totality in the synthesis of conditions and does not rest\r\nsatisfied till it has attained to the absolutely, that is, in all respects and\r\nrelations, unconditioned. For pure reason leaves to the understanding\r\neverything that immediately relates to the object of intuition or rather to\r\ntheir synthesis in imagination. The former restricts itself to the absolute\r\ntotality in the employment of the conceptions of the understanding and aims at\r\ncarrying out the synthetical unity which is cogitated in the category, even to\r\nthe unconditioned. This unity may hence be called the rational unity of\r\nphenomena, as the other, which the category expresses, may be termed the unity\r\nof the understanding. Reason, therefore, has an immediate relation to the use\r\nof the understanding, not indeed in so far as the latter contains the ground of\r\npossible experience (for the conception of the absolute totality of conditions\r\nis not a conception that can be employed in experience, because no experience\r\nis unconditioned), but solely for the purpose of directing it to a certain\r\nunity, of which the understanding has no conception, and the aim of which is to\r\ncollect into an absolute whole all acts of the understanding. Hence the\r\nobjective employment of the pure conceptions of reason is always transcendent,\r\nwhile that of the pure conceptions of the understanding must, according to\r\ntheir nature, be always immanent, inasmuch as they are limited to possible\r\nexperience.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nI understand by idea a necessary conception of reason, to which no\r\ncorresponding object can be discovered in the world of sense. Accordingly, the\r\npure conceptions of reason at present under consideration are transcendental\r\nideas. They are conceptions of pure reason, for they regard all empirical\r\ncognition as determined by means of an absolute totality of conditions. They\r\nare not mere fictions, but natural and necessary products of reason, and have\r\nhence a necessary relation to the whole sphere of the exercise of the\r\nunderstanding. And, finally, they are transcendent, and overstep the limits of\r\nall experiences, in which, consequently, no object can ever be presented that\r\nwould be perfectly adequate to a transcendental idea. When we use the word\r\nidea, we say, as regards its object (an object of the pure understanding), a\r\ngreat deal, but as regards its subject (that is, in respect of its reality\r\nunder conditions of experience), exceedingly little, because the idea, as the\r\nconception of a maximum, can never be completely and adequately presented in\r\nconcreto. Now, as in the merely speculative employment of reason the latter is\r\nproperly the sole aim, and as in this case the approximation to a conception,\r\nwhich is never attained in practice, is the same thing as if the conception\r\nwere non-existent\u0026mdash;it is commonly said of the conception of this kind,\r\n\u0026ldquo;it is only an idea.\u0026rdquo; So we might very well say, \u0026ldquo;the\r\nabsolute totality of all phenomena is only an idea,\u0026rdquo; for, as we never can\r\npresent an adequate representation of it, it remains for us a problem incapable\r\nof solution. On the other hand, as in the practical use of the understanding we\r\nhave only to do with action and practice according to rules, an idea of pure\r\nreason can always be given really in concreto, although only partially, nay, it\r\nis the indispensable condition of all practical employment of reason. The\r\npractice or execution of the idea is always limited and defective, but\r\nnevertheless within indeterminable boundaries, consequently always under the\r\ninfluence of the conception of an absolute perfection. And thus the practical\r\nidea is always in the highest degree fruitful, and in relation to real actions\r\nindispensably necessary. In the idea, pure reason possesses even causality and\r\nthe power of producing that which its conception contains. Hence we cannot say\r\nof wisdom, in a disparaging way, \u0026ldquo;it is only an idea.\u0026rdquo; For, for the\r\nvery reason that it is the idea of the necessary unity of all possible aims, it\r\nmust be for all practical exertions and endeavours the primitive condition and\r\nrule\u0026mdash;a rule which, if not constitutive, is at least limitative.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nNow, although we must say of the transcendental conceptions of reason,\r\n\u0026ldquo;they are only ideas,\u0026rdquo; we must not, on this account, look upon them\r\nas superfluous and nugatory. For, although no object can be determined by them,\r\nthey can be of great utility, unobserved and at the basis of the edifice of the\r\nunderstanding, as the canon for its extended and self-consistent\r\nexercise\u0026mdash;a canon which, indeed, does not enable it to cognize more in an\r\nobject than it would cognize by the help of its own conceptions, but which\r\nguides it more securely in its cognition. Not to mention that they perhaps\r\nrender possible a transition from our conceptions of nature and the non-ego to\r\nthe practical conceptions, and thus produce for even ethical ideas keeping, so\r\nto speak, and connection with the speculative cognitions of reason. The\r\nexplication of all this must be looked for in the sequel.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut setting aside, in conformity with our original purpose, the consideration\r\nof the practical ideas, we proceed to contemplate reason in its speculative use\r\nalone, nay, in a still more restricted sphere, to wit, in the transcendental\r\nuse; and here must strike into the same path which we followed in our deduction\r\nof the categories. That is to say, we shall consider the logical form of the\r\ncognition of reason, that we may see whether reason may not be thereby a source\r\nof conceptions which enables us to regard objects in themselves as determined\r\nsynthetically à priori, in relation to one or other of the functions of reason.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nReason, considered as the faculty of a certain logical form of cognition, is\r\nthe faculty of conclusion, that is, of mediate judgement\u0026mdash;by means of the\r\nsubsumption of the condition of a possible judgement under the condition of a\r\ngiven judgement. The given judgement is the general rule (major). The\r\nsubsumption of the condition of another possible judgement under the condition\r\nof the rule is the minor. The actual judgement, which enounces the assertion of\r\nthe rule in the subsumed case, is the conclusion (conclusio). The rule\r\npredicates something generally under a certain condition. The condition of the\r\nrule is satisfied in some particular case. It follows that what was valid in\r\ngeneral under that condition must also be considered as valid in the particular\r\ncase which satisfies this condition. It is very plain that reason attains to a\r\ncognition, by means of acts of the understanding which constitute a series of\r\nconditions. When I arrive at the proposition, \u0026ldquo;All bodies are\r\nchangeable,\u0026rdquo; by beginning with the more remote cognition (in which the\r\nconception of body does not appear, but which nevertheless contains the\r\ncondition of that conception), \u0026ldquo;All compound is changeable,\u0026rdquo; by\r\nproceeding from this to a less remote cognition, which stands under the\r\ncondition of the former, \u0026ldquo;Bodies are compound,\u0026rdquo; and hence to a\r\nthird, which at length connects for me the remote cognition (changeable) with\r\nthe one before me, \u0026ldquo;Consequently, bodies are changeable\u0026rdquo;\u0026mdash;I\r\nhave arrived at a cognition (conclusion) through a series of conditions\r\n(premisses). Now every series, whose exponent (of the categorical or\r\nhypothetical judgement) is given, can be continued; consequently the same\r\nprocedure of reason conducts us to the ratiocinatio polysyllogistica, which is\r\na series of syllogisms, that can be continued either on the side of the\r\nconditions (per prosyllogismos) or of the conditioned (per episyllogismos) to\r\nan indefinite extent.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut we very soon perceive that the chain or series of prosyllogisms, that is,\r\nof deduced cognitions on the side of the grounds or conditions of a given\r\ncognition, in other words, the ascending series of syllogisms must have a very\r\ndifferent relation to the faculty of reason from that of the descending series,\r\nthat is, the progressive procedure of reason on the side of the conditioned by\r\nmeans of episyllogisms. For, as in the former case the cognition (conclusio) is\r\ngiven only as conditioned, reason can attain to this cognition only under the\r\npresupposition that all the members of the series on the side of the conditions\r\nare given (totality in the series of premisses), because only under this\r\nsupposition is the judgement we may be considering possible à priori; while on\r\nthe side of the conditioned or the inferences, only an incomplete and becoming,\r\nand not a presupposed or given series, consequently only a potential\r\nprogression, is cogitated. Hence, when a cognition is contemplated as\r\nconditioned, reason is compelled to consider the series of conditions in an\r\nascending line as completed and given in their totality. But if the very same\r\ncondition is considered at the same time as the condition of other cognitions,\r\nwhich together constitute a series of inferences or consequences in a\r\ndescending line, reason may preserve a perfect indifference, as to how far this\r\nprogression may extend \u003ci\u003ea parte posteriori\u003c/i\u003e, and whether the totality of\r\nthis series is possible, because it stands in no need of such a series for the\r\npurpose of arriving at the conclusion before it, inasmuch as this conclusion is\r\nsufficiently guaranteed and determined on grounds a parte priori. It may be the\r\ncase, that upon the side of the conditions the series of premisses has a first\r\nor highest condition, or it may not possess this, and so be a parte priori\r\nunlimited; but it must, nevertheless, contain totality of conditions, even\r\nadmitting that we never could succeed in completely apprehending it; and the\r\nwhole series must be unconditionally true, if the conditioned, which is\r\nconsidered as an inference resulting from it, is to be held as true. This is a\r\nrequirement of reason, which announces its cognition as determined à priori and\r\nas necessary, either in itself\u0026mdash;and in this case it needs no grounds to\r\nrest upon\u0026mdash;or, if it is deduced, as a member of a series of grounds, which\r\nis itself unconditionally true.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003ca id=\"chap70\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eSection III. System of Transcendental Ideas\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWe are not at present engaged with a logical dialectic, which makes complete\r\nabstraction of the content of cognition and aims only at unveiling the illusory\r\nappearance in the form of syllogisms. Our subject is transcendental dialectic,\r\nwhich must contain, completely à priori, the origin of certain cognitions drawn\r\nfrom pure reason, and the origin of certain deduced conceptions, the object of\r\nwhich cannot be given empirically and which therefore lie beyond the sphere of\r\nthe faculty of understanding. We have observed, from the natural relation which\r\nthe transcendental use of our cognition, in syllogisms as well as in\r\njudgements, must have to the logical, that there are three kinds of dialectical\r\narguments, corresponding to the three modes of conclusion, by which reason\r\nattains to cognitions on principles; and that in all it is the business of\r\nreason to ascend from the conditioned synthesis, beyond which the understanding\r\nnever proceeds, to the unconditioned which the understanding never can reach.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nNow the most general relations which can exist in our representations are: 1st,\r\nthe relation to the subject; 2nd, the relation to objects, either as phenomena,\r\nor as objects of thought in general. If we connect this subdivision with the\r\nmain division, all the relations of our representations, of which we can form\r\neither a conception or an idea, are threefold: 1. The relation to the subject;\r\n2. The relation to the manifold of the object as a phenomenon; 3. The relation\r\nto all things in general.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nNow all pure conceptions have to do in general with the synthetical unity of\r\nrepresentations; conceptions of pure reason (transcendental ideas), on the\r\nother hand, with the unconditional synthetical unity of all conditions. It\r\nfollows that all transcendental ideas arrange themselves in three classes, the\r\nfirst of which contains the absolute (unconditioned) unity of the thinking\r\nsubject, the second the absolute unity of the series of the conditions of a\r\nphenomenon, the third the absolute unity of the condition of all objects of\r\nthought in general.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe thinking subject is the object-matter of Psychology; the sum total of all\r\nphenomena (the world) is the object-matter of Cosmology; and the thing which\r\ncontains the highest condition of the possibility of all that is cogitable (the\r\nbeing of all beings) is the object-matter of all Theology. Thus pure reason\r\npresents us with the idea of a transcendental doctrine of the soul (psychologia\r\nrationalis), of a transcendental science of the world (cosmologia rationalis),\r\nand finally of a transcendental doctrine of God (theologia transcendentalis).\r\nUnderstanding cannot originate even the outline of any of these sciences, even\r\nwhen connected with the highest logical use of reason, that is, all cogitable\r\nsyllogisms\u0026mdash;for the purpose of proceeding from one object (phenomenon) to\r\nall others, even to the utmost limits of the empirical synthesis. They are, on\r\nthe contrary, pure and genuine products, or problems, of pure reason.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWhat modi of the pure conceptions of reason these transcendental ideas are will\r\nbe fully exposed in the following chapter. They follow the guiding thread of\r\nthe categories. For pure reason never relates immediately to objects, but to\r\nthe conceptions of these contained in the understanding. In like manner, it\r\nwill be made manifest in the detailed explanation of these ideas\u0026mdash;how\r\nreason, merely through the synthetical use of the same function which it\r\nemploys in a categorical syllogism, necessarily attains to the conception of\r\nthe absolute unity of the thinking subject\u0026mdash;how the logical procedure in\r\nhypothetical ideas necessarily produces the idea of the absolutely\r\nunconditioned in a series of given conditions, and finally\u0026mdash;how the mere\r\nform of the disjunctive syllogism involves the highest conception of a being of\r\nall beings: a thought which at first sight seems in the highest degree\r\nparadoxical.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAn objective deduction, such as we were able to present in the case of the\r\ncategories, is impossible as regards these transcendental ideas. For they have,\r\nin truth, no relation to any object, in experience, for the very reason that\r\nthey are only ideas. But a subjective deduction of them from the nature of our\r\nreason is possible, and has been given in the present chapter.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIt is easy to perceive that the sole aim of pure reason is the absolute\r\ntotality of the synthesis on the side of the conditions, and that it does not\r\nconcern itself with the absolute completeness on the Part of the conditioned.\r\nFor of the former alone does she stand in need, in order to preposit the whole\r\nseries of conditions, and thus present them to the understanding à priori. But\r\nif we once have a completely (and unconditionally) given condition, there is no\r\nfurther necessity, in proceeding with the series, for a conception of reason;\r\nfor the understanding takes of itself every step downward, from the condition\r\nto the conditioned. Thus the transcendental ideas are available only for\r\nascending in the series of conditions, till we reach the unconditioned, that\r\nis, principles. As regards descending to the conditioned, on the other hand, we\r\nfind that there is a widely extensive logical use which reason makes of the\r\nlaws of the understanding, but that a transcendental use thereof is impossible;\r\nand that when we form an idea of the absolute totality of such a synthesis, for\r\nexample, of the whole series of all future changes in the world, this idea is a\r\nmere ens rationis, an arbitrary fiction of thought, and not a necessary\r\npresupposition of reason. For the possibility of the conditioned presupposes\r\nthe totality of its conditions, but not of its consequences. Consequently, this\r\nconception is not a transcendental idea\u0026mdash;and it is with these alone that\r\nwe are at present occupied.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nFinally, it is obvious that there exists among the transcendental ideas a\r\ncertain connection and unity, and that pure reason, by means of them, collects\r\nall its cognitions into one system. From the cognition of self to the cognition\r\nof the world, and through these to the supreme being, the progression is so\r\nnatural, that it seems to resemble the logical march of reason from the\r\npremisses to the conclusion.\u003ca href=\"#linknote-42\" id=\"linknoteref-42\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[42]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Now whether there lies unobserved at\r\nthe foundation of these ideas an analogy of the same kind as exists between the\r\nlogical and transcendental procedure of reason, is another of those questions,\r\nthe answer to which we must not expect till we arrive at a more advanced stage\r\nin our inquiries. In this cursory and preliminary view, we have, meanwhile,\r\nreached our aim. For we have dispelled the ambiguity which attached to the\r\ntranscendental conceptions of reason, from their being commonly mixed up with\r\nother conceptions in the systems of philosophers, and not properly\r\ndistinguished from the conceptions of the understanding; we have exposed their\r\norigin and, thereby, at the same time their determinate number, and presented\r\nthem in a systematic connection, and have thus marked out and enclosed a\r\ndefinite sphere for pure reason.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"linknote-42\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#linknoteref-42\"\u003e[42]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nThe science of Metaphysics has for the proper object of its inquiries only\r\nthree grand ideas: GOD, FREEDOM, and IMMORTALITY, and it aims at showing, that\r\nthe second conception, conjoined with the first, must lead to the third, as a\r\nnecessary conclusion. All the other subjects with which it occupies itself, are\r\nmerely means for the attainment and realization of these ideas. It does not\r\nrequire these ideas for the construction of a science of nature, but, on the\r\ncontrary, for the purpose of passing beyond the sphere of nature. A complete\r\ninsight into and comprehension of them would render Theology, Ethics, and,\r\nthrough the conjunction of both, Religion, solely dependent on the speculative\r\nfaculty of reason. In a systematic representation of these ideas the\r\nabove-mentioned arrangement\u0026mdash;the synthetical one\u0026mdash;would be the most\r\nsuitable; but in the investigation which must necessarily precede it, the\r\nanalytical, which reverses this arrangement, would be better adapted to our\r\npurpose, as in it we should proceed from that which experience immediately\r\npresents to us\u0026mdash;psychology, to cosmology, and thence to theology.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003ca id=\"chap71\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eTRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC\u0026mdash;BOOK II\u0026mdash;OF THE\r\nDIALECTICAL PROCEDURE OF PURE REASON\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIt may be said that the object of a merely transcendental idea is something of\r\nwhich we have no conception, although the idea may be a necessary product of\r\nreason according to its original laws. For, in fact, a conception of an object\r\nthat is adequate to the idea given by reason, is impossible. For such an object\r\nmust be capable of being presented and intuited in a Possible experience. But\r\nwe should express our meaning better, and with less risk of being\r\nmisunderstood, if we said that we can have no knowledge of an object, which\r\nperfectly corresponds to an idea, although we may possess a problematical\r\nconception thereof.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nNow the transcendental (subjective) reality at least of the pure conceptions of\r\nreason rests upon the fact that we are led to such ideas by a necessary\r\nprocedure of reason. There must therefore be syllogisms which contain no\r\nempirical premisses, and by means of which we conclude from something that we\r\ndo know, to something of which we do not even possess a conception, to which\r\nwe, nevertheless, by an unavoidable illusion, ascribe objective reality. Such\r\narguments are, as regards their result, rather to be termed sophisms than\r\nsyllogisms, although indeed, as regards their origin, they are very well\r\nentitled to the latter name, inasmuch as they are not fictions or accidental\r\nproducts of reason, but are necessitated by its very nature. They are sophisms,\r\nnot of men, but of pure reason herself, from which the Wisest cannot free\r\nhimself. After long labour he may be able to guard against the error, but he\r\ncan never be thoroughly rid of the illusion which continually mocks and\r\nmisleads him.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nOf these dialectical arguments there are three kinds, corresponding to the\r\nnumber of the ideas which their conclusions present. In the argument or\r\nsyllogism of the first class, I conclude, from the transcendental conception of\r\nthe subject which contains no manifold, the absolute unity of the subject itself, of\r\nwhich I cannot in this manner attain to a conception. This dialectical argument\r\nI shall call the transcendental paralogism. The second class of sophistical\r\narguments is occupied with the transcendental conception of the absolute\r\ntotality of the series of conditions for a given phenomenon, and I conclude,\r\nfrom the fact that I have always a self-contradictory conception of the\r\nunconditioned synthetical unity of the series upon one side, the truth of the\r\nopposite unity, of which I have nevertheless no conception. The condition of\r\nreason in these dialectical arguments, I shall term the antinomy of pure\r\nreason. Finally, according to the third kind of sophistical argument, I\r\nconclude, from the totality of the conditions of thinking objects in general,\r\nin so far as they can be given, the absolute synthetical unity of all\r\nconditions of the possibility of things in general; that is, from things which\r\nI do not know in their mere transcendental conception, I conclude a being of\r\nall beings which I know still less by means of a transcendental conception, and\r\nof whose unconditioned necessity I can form no conception whatever. This\r\ndialectical argument I shall call the ideal of pure reason.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003ca id=\"chap72\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eChapter I. Of the Paralogisms of Pure Reason\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe logical paralogism consists in the falsity of an argument in respect of its\r\nform, be the content what it may. But a transcendental paralogism has a\r\ntranscendental foundation, and concludes falsely, while the form is correct and\r\nunexceptionable. In this manner the paralogism has its foundation in the nature\r\nof human reason, and is the parent of an unavoidable, though not insoluble,\r\nmental illusion.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWe now come to a conception which was not inserted in the general list of\r\ntranscendental conceptions, and yet must be reckoned with them, but at the same\r\ntime without in the least altering, or indicating a deficiency in that table.\r\nThis is the conception, or, if the term is preferred, the judgement, \u0026ldquo;I\r\nthink.\u0026rdquo; But it is readily perceived that this thought is as it were the\r\nvehicle of all conceptions in general, and consequently of transcendental\r\nconceptions also, and that it is therefore regarded as a transcendental\r\nconception, although it can have no peculiar claim to be so ranked, inasmuch as\r\nits only use is to indicate that all thought is accompanied by consciousness.\r\nAt the same time, pure as this conception is from empirical content\r\n(impressions of the senses), it enables us to distinguish two different kinds\r\nof objects. \u0026ldquo;I,\u0026rdquo; as thinking, am an object of the internal sense,\r\nand am called soul. That which is an object of the external senses is called\r\nbody. Thus the expression, \u0026ldquo;I,\u0026rdquo; as a thinking being, designates the\r\nobject-matter of psychology, which may be called \u0026ldquo;the rational doctrine\r\nof the soul,\u0026rdquo; inasmuch as in this science I desire to know nothing of the\r\nsoul but what, independently of all experience (which determines me in\r\nconcreto), may be concluded from this conception \u0026ldquo;I,\u0026rdquo; in so far as\r\nit appears in all thought.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nNow, the rational doctrine of the soul is really an undertaking of this kind.\r\nFor if the smallest empirical element of thought, if any particular perception\r\nof my internal state, were to be introduced among the grounds of cognition of\r\nthis science, it would not be a rational, but an empirical doctrine of the\r\nsoul. We have thus before us a pretended science, raised upon the single\r\nproposition, \u0026ldquo;I think,\u0026rdquo; whose foundation or want of foundation we\r\nmay very properly, and agreeably with the nature of a transcendental\r\nphilosophy, here examine. It ought not to be objected that in this proposition,\r\nwhich expresses the perception of one\u0026rsquo;s self, an internal experience is\r\nasserted, and that consequently the rational doctrine of the soul which is\r\nfounded upon it, is not pure, but partly founded upon an empirical principle.\r\nFor this internal perception is nothing more than the mere apperception,\r\n\u0026ldquo;I think,\u0026rdquo; which in fact renders all transcendental conceptions\r\npossible, in which we say, \u0026ldquo;I think substance, cause, etc.\u0026rdquo; For\r\ninternal experience in general and its possibility, or perception in general,\r\nand its relation to other perceptions, unless some particular distinction or\r\ndetermination thereof is empirically given, cannot be regarded as empirical\r\ncognition, but as cognition of the empirical, and belongs to the investigation\r\nof the possibility of every experience, which is certainly transcendental. The\r\nsmallest object of experience (for example, only pleasure or pain), that should\r\nbe included in the general representation of self-consciousness, would\r\nimmediately change the rational into an empirical psychology.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n\u0026ldquo;I think\u0026rdquo; is therefore the only text of rational psychology, from\r\nwhich it must develop its whole system. It is manifest that this thought, when\r\napplied to an object (myself), can contain nothing but transcendental\r\npredicates thereof; because the least empirical predicate would destroy the\r\npurity of the science and its independence of all experience.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut we shall have to follow here the guidance of the categories\u0026mdash;only, as\r\nin the present case a thing, \u0026ldquo;I,\u0026rdquo; as thinking being, is at first\r\ngiven, we shall\u0026mdash;not indeed change the order of the categories as it\r\nstands in the table\u0026mdash;but begin at the category of substance, by which at\r\nthe a thing in itself is represented and proceeds backwards through the series.\r\nThe topic of the rational doctrine of the soul, from which everything else it\r\nmay contain must be deduced, is accordingly as follows:\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cpre\u003e\r\n 1 2\r\n The Soul is SUBSTANCE As regards its quality\r\n it is SIMPLE\r\n\r\n 3\r\n As regards the different\r\n times in which it exists,\r\n it is numerically identical,\r\n that is UNITY, not Plurality.\r\n\r\n 4\r\n It is in relation to possible objects in space\u003ca href=\"#linknote-43\" id=\"linknoteref-43\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[43]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/pre\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"linknote-43\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#linknoteref-43\"\u003e[43]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nThe reader, who may not so easily perceive the psychological sense of these\r\nexpressions, taken here in their transcendental abstraction, and cannot guess\r\nwhy the latter attribute of the soul belongs to the category of existence, will\r\nfind the expressions sufficiently explained and justified in the sequel. I\r\nhave, moreover, to apologize for the Latin terms which have been employed,\r\ninstead of their German synonyms, contrary to the rules of correct writing. But\r\nI judged it better to sacrifice elegance to perspicuity.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nFrom these elements originate all the conceptions of pure psychology, by\r\ncombination alone, without the aid of any other principle. This substance,\r\nmerely as an object of the internal sense, gives the conception of\r\nImmateriality; as simple substance, that of Incorruptibility; its identity, as\r\nintellectual substance, gives the conception of Personality; all these three\r\ntogether, Spirituality. Its relation to objects in space gives us the\r\nconception of connection (commercium) with bodies. Thus it represents thinking\r\nsubstance as the principle of life in matter, that is, as a soul (anima), and\r\nas the ground of Animality; and this, limited and determined by the conception\r\nof spirituality, gives us that of Immortality.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nNow to these conceptions relate four paralogisms of a transcendental\r\npsychology, which is falsely held to be a science of pure reason, touching the\r\nnature of our thinking being. We can, however, lay at the foundation of this\r\nscience nothing but the simple and in itself perfectly contentless\r\nrepresentation \u0026ldquo;i\u0026rdquo; which cannot even be called a conception, but\r\nmerely a consciousness which accompanies all conceptions. By this\r\n\u0026ldquo;I,\u0026rdquo; or \u0026ldquo;He,\u0026rdquo; or \u0026ldquo;It,\u0026rdquo; who or which thinks,\r\nnothing more is represented than a transcendental subject of thought = x, which\r\nis cognized only by means of the thoughts that are its predicates, and of\r\nwhich, apart from these, we cannot form the least conception. Hence in a\r\nperpetual circle, inasmuch as we must always employ it, in order to frame any\r\njudgement respecting it. And this inconvenience we find it impossible to rid\r\nourselves of, because consciousness in itself is not so much a representation\r\ndistinguishing a particular object, as a form of representation in general, in\r\nso far as it may be termed cognition; for in and by cognition alone do I think\r\nanything.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIt must, however, appear extraordinary at first sight that the condition under\r\nwhich I think, and which is consequently a property of my subject, should be\r\nheld to be likewise valid for every existence which thinks, and that we can\r\npresume to base upon a seemingly empirical proposition a judgement which is\r\napodeictic and universal, to wit, that everything which thinks is constituted\r\nas the voice of my consciousness declares it to be, that is, as a\r\nself-conscious being. The cause of this belief is to be found in the fact that\r\nwe necessarily attribute to things à priori all the properties which constitute\r\nconditions under which alone we can cogitate them. Now I cannot obtain the\r\nleast representation of a thinking being by means of external experience, but\r\nsolely through self-consciousness. Such objects are consequently nothing more\r\nthan the transference of this consciousness of mine to other things which can\r\nonly thus be represented as thinking beings. The proposition, \u0026ldquo;I\r\nthink,\u0026rdquo; is, in the present case, understood in a problematical sense, not\r\nin so far as it contains a perception of an existence (like the Cartesian\r\n\u0026ldquo;Cogito, ergo sum\u0026rdquo;), but in regard to its mere\r\npossibility\u0026mdash;for the purpose of discovering what properties may be\r\ninferred from so simple a proposition and predicated of the subject of it.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIf at the foundation of our pure rational cognition of thinking beings there\r\nlay more than the mere Cogito\u0026mdash;if we could likewise call in aid\r\nobservations on the play of our thoughts, and the thence derived natural laws\r\nof the thinking self, there would arise an empirical psychology which would be\r\na kind of physiology of the internal sense and might possibly be capable of\r\nexplaining the phenomena of that sense. But it could never be available for\r\ndiscovering those properties which do not belong to possible experience (such\r\nas the quality of simplicity), nor could it make any apodeictic enunciation on\r\nthe nature of thinking beings: it would therefore not be a rational psychology.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nNow, as the proposition \u0026ldquo;I think\u0026rdquo; (in the problematical sense)\r\ncontains the form of every judgement in general and is the constant\r\naccompaniment of all the categories, it is manifest that conclusions are drawn\r\nfrom it only by a transcendental employment of the understanding. This use of\r\nthe understanding excludes all empirical elements; and we cannot, as has been\r\nshown above, have any favourable conception beforehand of its procedure. We\r\nshall therefore follow with a critical eye this proposition through all the\r\npredicaments of pure psychology; but we shall, for brevity\u0026rsquo;s sake, allow\r\nthis examination to proceed in an uninterrupted connection.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBefore entering on this task, however, the following general remark may help to\r\nquicken our attention to this mode of argument. It is not merely through my\r\nthinking that I cognize an object, but only through my determining a given\r\nintuition in relation to the unity of consciousness in which all thinking\r\nconsists. It follows that I cognize myself, not through my being conscious of\r\nmyself as thinking, but only when I am conscious of the intuition of myself as\r\ndetermined in relation to the function of thought. All the modi of\r\nself-consciousness in thought are hence not conceptions of objects (conceptions\r\nof the understanding\u0026mdash;categories); they are mere logical functions, which\r\ndo not present to thought an object to be cognized, and cannot therefore\r\npresent my Self as an object. Not the consciousness of the determining, but\r\nonly that of the determinable self, that is, of my internal intuition (in so\r\nfar as the manifold contained in it can be connected conformably with the\r\ngeneral condition of the unity of apperception in thought), is the object.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n1. In all judgements I am the determining subject of that relation which\r\nconstitutes a judgement. But that the I which thinks, must be considered as in\r\nthought always a subject, and as a thing which cannot be a predicate to\r\nthought, is an apodeictic and identical proposition. But this proposition does\r\nnot signify that I, as an object, am, for myself, a self-subsistent being or\r\nsubstance. This latter statement\u0026mdash;an ambitious one\u0026mdash;requires to be\r\nsupported by data which are not to be discovered in thought; and are perhaps\r\n(in so far as I consider the thinking self merely as such) not to be discovered\r\nin the thinking self at all.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n2. That the I or Ego of apperception, and consequently in all thought, is\r\nsingular or simple, and cannot be resolved into a plurality of subjects, and\r\ntherefore indicates a logically simple subject\u0026mdash;this is self-evident from\r\nthe very conception of an Ego, and is consequently an analytical proposition.\r\nBut this is not tantamount to declaring that the thinking Ego is a simple\r\nsubstance\u0026mdash;for this would be a synthetical proposition. The conception of\r\nsubstance always relates to intuitions, which with me cannot be other than\r\nsensuous, and which consequently lie completely out of the sphere of the\r\nunderstanding and its thought: but to this sphere belongs the affirmation that\r\nthe Ego is simple in thought. It would indeed be surprising, if the conception\r\nof \u0026ldquo;substance,\u0026rdquo; which in other cases requires so much labour to\r\ndistinguish from the other elements presented by intuition\u0026mdash;so much\r\ntrouble, too, to discover whether it can be simple (as in the case of the parts\r\nof matter)\u0026mdash;should be presented immediately to me, as if by revelation, in\r\nthe poorest mental representation of all.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n3. The proposition of the identity of my Self amidst all the manifold\r\nrepresentations of which I am conscious, is likewise a proposition lying in the\r\nconceptions themselves, and is consequently analytical. But this identity of\r\nthe subject, of which I am conscious in all its representations, does not\r\nrelate to or concern the intuition of the subject, by which it is given as an\r\nobject. This proposition cannot therefore enounce the identity of the person,\r\nby which is understood the consciousness of the identity of its own substance\r\nas a thinking being in all change and variation of circumstances. To prove\r\nthis, we should require not a mere analysis of the proposition, but synthetical\r\njudgements based upon a given intuition.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n4. I distinguish my own existence, as that of a thinking being, from that of\r\nother things external to me\u0026mdash;among which my body also is reckoned. This is\r\nalso an analytical proposition, for other things are exactly those which I\r\nthink as different or distinguished from myself. But whether this consciousness\r\nof myself is possible without things external to me; and whether therefore I\r\ncan exist merely as a thinking being (without being man)\u0026mdash;cannot be known\r\nor inferred from this proposition.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThus we have gained nothing as regards the cognition of myself as object, by\r\nthe analysis of the consciousness of my Self in thought. The logical exposition\r\nof thought in general is mistaken for a metaphysical determination of the\r\nobject.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nOur Critique would be an investigation utterly superfluous, if there existed a\r\npossibility of proving à priori, that all thinking beings are in themselves\r\nsimple substances, as such, therefore, possess the inseparable attribute of\r\npersonality, and are conscious of their existence apart from and unconnected\r\nwith matter. For we should thus have taken a step beyond the world of sense,\r\nand have penetrated into the sphere of noumena; and in this case the right\r\ncould not be denied us of extending our knowledge in this sphere, of\r\nestablishing ourselves, and, under a favouring star, appropriating to ourselves\r\npossessions in it. For the proposition: \u0026ldquo;Every thinking being, as such,\r\nis simple substance,\u0026rdquo; is an à priori synthetical proposition; because in\r\nthe first place it goes beyond the conception which is the subject of it, and\r\nadds to the mere notion of a thinking being the mode of its existence, and in\r\nthe second place annexes a predicate (that of simplicity) to the latter\r\nconception\u0026mdash;a predicate which it could not have discovered in the sphere\r\nof experience. It would follow that à priori synthetical propositions are\r\npossible and legitimate, not only, as we have maintained, in relation to\r\nobjects of possible experience, and as principles of the possibility of this\r\nexperience itself, but are applicable to things in themselves\u0026mdash;an\r\ninference which makes an end of the whole of this Critique, and obliges us to\r\nfall back on the old mode of metaphysical procedure. But indeed the danger is\r\nnot so great, if we look a little closer into the question.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThere lurks in the procedure of rational Psychology a paralogism, which is\r\nrepresented in the following syllogism:\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThat which cannot be cogitated otherwise than as subject, does not exist\r\notherwise than as subject, and is therefore substance.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nA thinking being, considered merely as such, cannot be cogitated otherwise than\r\nas subject.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nTherefore it exists also as such, that is, as substance.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIn the major we speak of a being that can be cogitated generally and in every\r\nrelation, consequently as it may be given in intuition. But in the minor we\r\nspeak of the same being only in so far as it regards itself as subject,\r\nrelatively to thought and the unity of consciousness, but not in relation to\r\nintuition, by which it is presented as an object to thought. Thus the\r\nconclusion is here arrived at by a Sophisma figurae dictionis.\u003ca\r\nhref=\"#linknote-44\" id=\"linknoteref-44\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[44]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"linknote-44\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#linknoteref-44\"\u003e[44]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nThought is taken in the two premisses in two totally different senses. In the\r\nmajor it is considered as relating and applying to objects in general,\r\nconsequently to objects of intuition also. In the minor, we understand it as\r\nrelating merely to self-consciousness. In this sense, we do not cogitate an\r\nobject, but merely the relation to the self-consciousness of the subject, as\r\nthe form of thought. In the former premiss we speak of things which cannot be\r\ncogitated otherwise than as subjects. In the second, we do not speak of things,\r\nbut of thought (all objects being abstracted), in which the Ego is always the\r\nsubject of consciousness. Hence the conclusion cannot be, \u0026ldquo;I cannot exist\r\notherwise than as subject\u0026rdquo;; but only \u0026ldquo;I can, in cogitating my\r\nexistence, employ my Ego only as the subject of the judgement.\u0026rdquo; But this\r\nis an identical proposition, and throws no light on the mode of my existence.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThat this famous argument is a mere paralogism, will be plain to any one who\r\nwill consider the general remark which precedes our exposition of the\r\nprinciples of the pure understanding, and the section on noumena. For it was\r\nthere proved that the conception of a thing, which can exist per se\u0026mdash;only\r\nas a subject and never as a predicate, possesses no objective reality; that is\r\nto say, we can never know whether there exists any object to correspond to the\r\nconception; consequently, the conception is nothing more than a conception, and\r\nfrom it we derive no proper knowledge. If this conception is to indicate by the\r\nterm substance, an object that can be given, if it is to become a cognition, we\r\nmust have at the foundation of the cognition a permanent intuition, as the\r\nindispensable condition of its objective reality. For through intuition alone\r\ncan an object be given. But in internal intuition there is nothing permanent,\r\nfor the Ego is but the consciousness of my thought. If then, we appeal merely\r\nto thought, we cannot discover the necessary condition of the application of\r\nthe conception of substance\u0026mdash;that is, of a subject existing per\r\nse\u0026mdash;to the subject as a thinking being. And thus the conception of the\r\nsimple nature of substance, which is connected with the objective reality of\r\nthis conception, is shown to be also invalid, and to be, in fact, nothing more\r\nthan the logical qualitative unity of self-consciousness in thought; whilst we\r\nremain perfectly ignorant whether the subject is composite or not.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nRefutation of the Argument of Mendelssohn for the Substantiality or Permanence\r\nof the Soul.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThis acute philosopher easily perceived the insufficiency of the common\r\nargument which attempts to prove that the soul\u0026mdash;it being granted that it\r\nis a simple being\u0026mdash;cannot perish by dissolution or decomposition; he saw\r\nit is not impossible for it to cease to be by extinction, or disappearance. He\r\nendeavoured to prove in his Phaedo, that the soul cannot be annihilated, by\r\nshowing that a simple being cannot cease to exist. Inasmuch as, he said, a\r\nsimple existence cannot diminish, nor gradually lose portions of its being, and\r\nthus be by degrees reduced to nothing (for it possesses no parts, and therefore\r\nno multiplicity), between the moment in which it is, and the moment in which it\r\nis not, no time can be discovered\u0026mdash;which is impossible. But this\r\nphilosopher did not consider that, granting the soul to possess this simple\r\nnature, which contains no parts external to each other and consequently no\r\nextensive quantity, we cannot refuse to it any less than to any other being,\r\nintensive quantity, that is, a degree of reality in regard to all its\r\nfaculties, nay, to all that constitutes its existence. But this degree of\r\nreality can become less and less through an infinite series of smaller degrees.\r\nIt follows, therefore, that this supposed substance\u0026mdash;this thing, the\r\npermanence of which is not assured in any other way, may, if not by\r\ndecomposition, by gradual loss (remissio) of its powers (consequently by\r\nelanguescence, if I may employ this expression), be changed into nothing. For\r\nconsciousness itself has always a degree, which may be lessened.\u003ca\r\nhref=\"#linknote-45\" id=\"linknoteref-45\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[45]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Consequently the faculty of being\r\nconscious may be diminished; and so with all other faculties. The permanence of\r\nthe soul, therefore, as an object of the internal sense, remains\r\nundemonstrated, nay, even indemonstrable. Its permanence in life is evident,\r\nper se, inasmuch as the thinking being (as man) is to itself, at the same time,\r\nan object of the external senses. But this does not authorize the rational\r\npsychologist to affirm, from mere conceptions, its permanence beyond life.\u003ca\r\nhref=\"#linknote-46\" id=\"linknoteref-46\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[46]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"linknote-45\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#linknoteref-45\"\u003e[45]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nClearness is not, as logicians maintain, the consciousness of a representation.\r\nFor a certain degree of consciousness, which may not, however, be sufficient\r\nfor recollection, is to be met with in many dim representations. For without\r\nany consciousness at all, we should not be able to recognize any difference in\r\nthe obscure representations we connect; as we really can do with many\r\nconceptions, such as those of right and justice, and those of the musician, who\r\nstrikes at once several notes in improvising a piece of music. But a\r\nrepresentation is clear, in which our consciousness is sufficient for the\r\nconsciousness of the difference of this representation from others. If we are\r\nonly conscious that there is a difference, but are not conscious of the\r\ndifference\u0026mdash;that is, what the difference is\u0026mdash;the representation must\r\nbe termed obscure. There is, consequently, an infinite series of degrees of\r\nconsciousness down to its entire disappearance.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"linknote-46\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#linknoteref-46\"\u003e[46]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nThere are some who think they have done enough to establish a new possibility\r\nin the mode of the existence of souls, when they have shown that there is no\r\ncontradiction in their hypotheses on this subject. Such are those who affirm\r\nthe possibility of thought\u0026mdash;of which they have no other knowledge than\r\nwhat they derive from its use in connecting empirical intuitions presented in\r\nthis our human life\u0026mdash;after this life has ceased. But it is very easy to\r\nembarrass them by the introduction of counter-possibilities, which rest upon\r\nquite as good a foundation. Such, for example, is the possibility of the\r\ndivision of a simple substance into several substances; and conversely, of the\r\ncoalition of several into one simple substance. For, although divisibility\r\npresupposes composition, it does not necessarily require a composition of\r\nsubstances, but only of the degrees (of the several faculties) of one and the\r\nsame substance. Now we can cogitate all the powers and faculties of the\r\nsoul\u0026mdash;even that of consciousness\u0026mdash;as diminished by one half, the\r\nsubstance still remaining. In the same way we can represent to ourselves\r\nwithout contradiction, this obliterated half as preserved, not in the soul, but\r\nwithout it; and we can believe that, as in this case every thing that is real\r\nin the soul, and has a degree\u0026mdash;consequently its entire existence\u0026mdash;has\r\nbeen halved, a particular substance would arise out of the soul. For the\r\nmultiplicity, which has been divided, formerly existed, but not as a\r\nmultiplicity of substances, but of every reality as the quantum of existence in\r\nit; and the unity of substance was merely a mode of existence, which by this\r\ndivision alone has been transformed into a plurality of subsistence. In the\r\nsame manner several simple substances might coalesce into one, without anything\r\nbeing lost except the plurality of subsistence, inasmuch as the one substance\r\nwould contain the degree of reality of all the former substances. Perhaps,\r\nindeed, the simple substances, which appear under the form of matter, might\r\n(not indeed by a mechanical or chemical influence upon each other, but by an\r\nunknown influence, of which the former would be but the phenomenal appearance),\r\nby means of such a dynamical division of the parent-souls, as intensive\r\nquantities, produce other souls, while the former repaired the loss thus\r\nsustained with new matter of the same sort. I am far from allowing any value to\r\nsuch chimeras; and the principles of our analytic have clearly proved that no\r\nother than an empirical use of the categories\u0026mdash;that of substance, for\r\nexample\u0026mdash;is possible. But if the rationalist is bold enough to construct,\r\non the mere authority of the faculty of thought\u0026mdash;without any intuition,\r\nwhereby an object is given\u0026mdash;a self-subsistent being, merely because the\r\nunity of apperception in thought cannot allow him to believe it a composite\r\nbeing, instead of declaring, as he ought to do, that he is unable to explain\r\nthe possibility of a thinking nature; what ought to hinder the materialist,\r\nwith as complete an independence of experience, to employ the principle of the\r\nrationalist in a directly opposite manner\u0026mdash;still preserving the formal\r\nunity required by his opponent?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIf, now, we take the above propositions\u0026mdash;as they must be accepted as valid\r\nfor all thinking beings in the system of rational psychology\u0026mdash;in\r\nsynthetical connection, and proceed, from the category of relation, with the\r\nproposition: \u0026ldquo;All thinking beings are, as such, substances,\u0026rdquo;\r\nbackwards through the series, till the circle is completed; we come at last to\r\ntheir existence, of which, in this system of rational psychology, substances\r\nare held to be conscious, independently of external things; nay, it is asserted\r\nthat, in relation to the permanence which is a necessary characteristic of\r\nsubstance, they can of themselves determine external things. It follows that\r\nidealism\u0026mdash;at least problematical idealism, is perfectly unavoidable in\r\nthis rationalistic system. And, if the existence of outward things is not held\r\nto be requisite to the determination of the existence of a substance in time,\r\nthe existence of these outward things at all, is a gratuitous assumption which\r\nremains without the possibility of a proof.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut if we proceed analytically\u0026mdash;the \u0026ldquo;I think\u0026rdquo; as a proposition\r\ncontaining in itself an existence as given, consequently modality being the\r\nprinciple\u0026mdash;and dissect this proposition, in order to ascertain its\r\ncontent, and discover whether and how this Ego determines its existence in time\r\nand space without the aid of anything external; the propositions of\r\nrationalistic psychology would not begin with the conception of a thinking\r\nbeing, but with a reality, and the properties of a thinking being in general\r\nwould be deduced from the mode in which this reality is cogitated, after\r\neverything empirical had been abstracted; as is shown in the following table:\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cpre\u003e\r\n 1\r\n I think,\r\n\r\n 2 3\r\n as Subject, as simple Subject,\r\n\r\n 4\r\n as identical Subject,\r\n in every state of my thought.\r\n\u003c/pre\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nNow, inasmuch as it is not determined in this second proposition, whether I can\r\nexist and be cogitated only as subject, and not also as a predicate of another\r\nbeing, the conception of a subject is here taken in a merely logical sense; and\r\nit remains undetermined, whether substance is to be cogitated under the\r\nconception or not. But in the third proposition, the absolute unity of\r\napperception\u0026mdash;the simple Ego in the representation to which all connection\r\nand separation, which constitute thought, relate, is of itself important; even\r\nalthough it presents us with no information about the constitution or\r\nsubsistence of the subject. Apperception is something real, and the simplicity\r\nof its nature is given in the very fact of its possibility. Now in space there\r\nis nothing real that is at the same time simple; for points, which are the only\r\nsimple things in space, are merely limits, but not constituent parts of space.\r\nFrom this follows the impossibility of a definition on the basis of materialism\r\nof the constitution of my Ego as a merely thinking subject. But, because my\r\nexistence is considered in the first proposition as given, for it does not\r\nmean, \u0026ldquo;Every thinking being exists\u0026rdquo; (for this would be predicating\r\nof them absolute necessity), but only, \u0026ldquo;I exist thinking\u0026rdquo;; the\r\nproposition is quite empirical, and contains the determinability of my\r\nexistence merely in relation to my representations in time. But as I require\r\nfor this purpose something that is permanent, such as is not given in internal\r\nintuition; the mode of my existence, whether as substance or as accident,\r\ncannot be determined by means of this simple self-consciousness. Thus, if\r\nmaterialism is inadequate to explain the mode in which I exist, spiritualism is\r\nlikewise as insufficient; and the conclusion is that we are utterly unable to\r\nattain to any knowledge of the constitution of the soul, in so far as relates\r\nto the possibility of its existence apart from external objects.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAnd, indeed, how should it be possible, merely by the aid of the unity of\r\nconsciousness\u0026mdash;which we cognize only for the reason that it is\r\nindispensable to the possibility of experience\u0026mdash;to pass the bounds of\r\nexperience (our existence in this life); and to extend our cognition to the\r\nnature of all thinking beings by means of the empirical\u0026mdash;but in relation\r\nto every sort of intuition, perfectly undetermined\u0026mdash;proposition, \u0026ldquo;I\r\nthink\u0026rdquo;?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThere does not then exist any rational psychology as a doctrine furnishing any\r\naddition to our knowledge of ourselves. It is nothing more than a discipline,\r\nwhich sets impassable limits to speculative reason in this region of thought,\r\nto prevent it, on the one hand, from throwing itself into the arms of a\r\nsoulless materialism, and, on the other, from losing itself in the mazes of a\r\nbaseless spiritualism. It teaches us to consider this refusal of our reason to\r\ngive any satisfactory answer to questions which reach beyond the limits of this\r\nour human life, as a hint to abandon fruitless speculation; and to direct, to a\r\npractical use, our knowledge of ourselves\u0026mdash;which, although applicable only\r\nto objects of experience, receives its principles from a higher source, and\r\nregulates its procedure as if our destiny reached far beyond the boundaries of\r\nexperience and life.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nFrom all this it is evident that rational psychology has its origin in a mere\r\nmisunderstanding. The unity of consciousness, which lies at the basis of the\r\ncategories, is considered to be an intuition of the subject as an object; and\r\nthe category of substance is applied to the intuition. But this unity is\r\nnothing more than the unity in thought, by which no object is given; to which\r\ntherefore the category of substance\u0026mdash;which always presupposes a given\r\nintuition\u0026mdash;cannot be applied. Consequently, the subject cannot be\r\ncognized. The subject of the categories cannot, therefore, for the very reason\r\nthat it cogitates these, frame any conception of itself as an object of the\r\ncategories; for, to cogitate these, it must lay at the foundation its own pure\r\nself-consciousness\u0026mdash;the very thing that it wishes to explain and describe.\r\nIn like manner, the subject, in which the representation of time has its basis,\r\ncannot determine, for this very reason, its own existence in time. Now, if the\r\nlatter is impossible, the former, as an attempt to determine itself by means of\r\nthe categories as a thinking being in general, is no less so.\u003ca\r\nhref=\"#linknote-47\" id=\"linknoteref-47\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[47]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"linknote-47\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#linknoteref-47\"\u003e[47]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nThe \u0026ldquo;I think\u0026rdquo; is, as has been already stated, an empirical\r\nproposition, and contains the proposition, \u0026ldquo;I exist.\u0026rdquo; But I cannot\r\nsay, \u0026ldquo;Everything, which thinks, exists\u0026rdquo;; for in this case the\r\nproperty of thought would constitute all beings possessing it, necessary\r\nbeings. Hence my existence cannot be considered as an inference from the\r\nproposition, \u0026ldquo;I think,\u0026rdquo; as Descartes maintained\u0026mdash;because in\r\nthis case the major premiss, \u0026ldquo;Everything, which thinks, exists,\u0026rdquo;\r\nmust precede\u0026mdash;but the two propositions are identical. The proposition,\r\n\u0026ldquo;I think,\u0026rdquo; expresses an undetermined empirical intuition, that\r\nperception (proving consequently that sensation, which must belong to\r\nsensibility, lies at the foundation of this proposition); but it precedes\r\nexperience, whose province it is to determine an object of perception by means\r\nof the categories in relation to time; and existence in this proposition is not\r\na category, as it does not apply to an undetermined given object, but only to\r\none of which we have a conception, and about which we wish to know whether it\r\ndoes or does not exist, out of, and apart from this conception. An undetermined\r\nperception signifies here merely something real that has been given, only,\r\nhowever, to thought in general\u0026mdash;but not as a phenomenon, nor as a thing in\r\nitself (noumenon), but only as something that really exists, and is designated\r\nas such in the proposition, \u0026ldquo;I think.\u0026rdquo; For it must be remarked\r\nthat, when I call the proposition, \u0026ldquo;I think,\u0026rdquo; an empirical\r\nproposition, I do not thereby mean that the Ego in the proposition is an\r\nempirical representation; on the contrary, it is purely intellectual, because\r\nit belongs to thought in general. But without some empirical representation,\r\nwhich presents to the mind material for thought, the mental act, \u0026ldquo;I\r\nthink,\u0026rdquo; would not take place; and the empirical is only the condition of\r\nthe application or employment of the pure intellectual faculty.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThus, then, appears the vanity of the hope of establishing a cognition which is\r\nto extend its rule beyond the limits of experience\u0026mdash;a cognition which is\r\none of the highest interests of humanity; and thus is proved the futility of\r\nthe attempt of speculative philosophy in this region of thought. But, in this\r\ninterest of thought, the severity of criticism has rendered to reason a not\r\nunimportant service, by the demonstration of the impossibility of making any\r\ndogmatical affirmation concerning an object of experience beyond the boundaries\r\nof experience. She has thus fortified reason against all affirmations of the\r\ncontrary. Now, this can be accomplished in only two ways. Either our\r\nproposition must be proved apodeictically; or, if this is unsuccessful, the\r\nsources of this inability must be sought for, and, if these are discovered to\r\nexist in the natural and necessary limitation of our reason, our opponents must\r\nsubmit to the same law of renunciation and refrain from advancing claims to\r\ndogmatic assertion.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut the right, say rather the necessity to admit a future life, upon principles\r\nof the practical conjoined with the speculative use of reason, has lost nothing\r\nby this renunciation; for the merely speculative proof has never had any\r\ninfluence upon the common reason of men. It stands upon the point of a hair, so\r\nthat even the schools have been able to preserve it from falling only by\r\nincessantly discussing it and spinning it like a top; and even in their eyes it\r\nhas never been able to present any safe foundation for the erection of a\r\ntheory. The proofs which have been current among men, preserve their value\r\nundiminished; nay, rather gain in clearness and unsophisticated power, by the\r\nrejection of the dogmatical assumptions of speculative reason. For reason is\r\nthus confined within her own peculiar province\u0026mdash;the arrangement of ends or\r\naims, which is at the same time the arrangement of nature; and, as a practical\r\nfaculty, without limiting itself to the latter, it is justified in extending\r\nthe former, and with it our own existence, beyond the boundaries of experience\r\nand life. If we turn our attention to the analogy of the nature of living\r\nbeings in this world, in the consideration of which reason is obliged to accept\r\nas a principle that no organ, no faculty, no appetite is useless, and that\r\nnothing is superfluous, nothing disproportionate to its use, nothing unsuited\r\nto its end; but that, on the contrary, everything is perfectly conformed to its\r\ndestination in life\u0026mdash;we shall find that man, who alone is the final end\r\nand aim of this order, is still the only animal that seems to be excepted from\r\nit. For his natural gifts\u0026mdash;not merely as regards the talents and motives\r\nthat may incite him to employ them, but especially the moral law in\r\nhim\u0026mdash;stretch so far beyond all mere earthly utility and advantage, that he\r\nfeels himself bound to prize the mere consciousness of probity, apart from all\r\nadvantageous consequences\u0026mdash;even the shadowy gift of posthumous\r\nfame\u0026mdash;above everything; and he is conscious of an inward call to\r\nconstitute himself, by his conduct in this world\u0026mdash;without regard to mere\r\nsublunary interests\u0026mdash;the citizen of a better. This mighty, irresistible\r\nproof\u0026mdash;accompanied by an ever-increasing knowledge of the conformability\r\nto a purpose in everything we see around us, by the conviction of the boundless\r\nimmensity of creation, by the consciousness of a certain illimitableness in the\r\npossible extension of our knowledge, and by a desire commensurate\r\ntherewith\u0026mdash;remains to humanity, even after the theoretical cognition of\r\nourselves has failed to establish the necessity of an existence after\r\ndeath.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"center\"\u003e\r\nConclusion of the Solution of the Psychological Paralogism.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe dialectical illusion in rational psychology arises from our confounding an\r\nidea of reason (of a pure intelligence) with the conception\u0026mdash;in every\r\nrespect undetermined\u0026mdash;of a thinking being in general. I cogitate myself in\r\nbehalf of a possible experience, at the same time making abstraction of all\r\nactual experience; and infer therefrom that I can be conscious of myself apart\r\nfrom experience and its empirical conditions. I consequently confound the\r\npossible abstraction of my empirically determined existence with the supposed\r\nconsciousness of a possible separate existence of my thinking self; and I\r\nbelieve that I cognize what is substantial in myself as a transcendental\r\nsubject, when I have nothing more in thought than the unity of consciousness,\r\nwhich lies at the basis of all determination of cognition.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe task of explaining the community of the soul with the body does not\r\nproperly belong to the psychology of which we are here speaking; because it\r\nproposes to prove the personality of the soul apart from this communion (after\r\ndeath), and is therefore transcendent in the proper sense of the word, although\r\noccupying itself with an object of experience\u0026mdash;only in so far, however, as\r\nit ceases to be an object of experience. But a sufficient answer may be found\r\nto the question in our system. The difficulty which lies in the execution of\r\nthis task consists, as is well known, in the presupposed heterogeneity of the\r\nobject of the internal sense (the soul) and the objects of the external senses;\r\ninasmuch as the formal condition of the intuition of the one is time, and of\r\nthat of the other space also. But if we consider that both kinds of objects do\r\nnot differ internally, but only in so far as the one appears externally to the\r\nother\u0026mdash;consequently, that what lies at the basis of phenomena, as a thing\r\nin itself, may not be heterogeneous; this difficulty disappears. There then\r\nremains no other difficulty than is to be found in the question\u0026mdash;how a\r\ncommunity of substances is possible; a question which lies out of the region of\r\npsychology, and which the reader, after what in our analytic has been said of\r\nprimitive forces and faculties, will easily judge to be also beyond the region\r\nof human cognition.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGENERAL REMARK\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nOn the Transition from Rational Psychology to Cosmology.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe proposition, \u0026ldquo;I think,\u0026rdquo; or, \u0026ldquo;I exist thinking,\u0026rdquo; is\r\nan empirical proposition. But such a proposition must be based on empirical\r\nintuition, and the object cogitated as a phenomenon; and thus our theory\r\nappears to maintain that the soul, even in thought, is merely a phenomenon; and\r\nin this way our consciousness itself, in fact, abuts upon nothing.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThought, per se, is merely the purely spontaneous logical function which\r\noperates to connect the manifold of a possible intuition; and it does not\r\nrepresent the subject of consciousness as a phenomenon\u0026mdash;for this reason\r\nalone, that it pays no attention to the question whether the mode of intuiting\r\nit is sensuous or intellectual. I therefore do not represent myself in thought\r\neither as I am, or as I appear to myself; I merely cogitate myself as an object\r\nin general, of the mode of intuiting which I make abstraction. When I represent\r\nmyself as the subject of thought, or as the ground of thought, these modes of\r\nrepresentation are not related to the categories of substance or of cause; for\r\nthese are functions of thought applicable only to our sensuous intuition. The\r\napplication of these categories to the Ego would, however, be necessary, if I\r\nwished to make myself an object of knowledge. But I wish to be conscious of\r\nmyself only as thinking; in what mode my Self is given in intuition, I do not\r\nconsider, and it may be that I, who think, am a phenomenon\u0026mdash;although not\r\nin so far as I am a thinking being; but in the consciousness of myself in mere\r\nthought I am a being, though this consciousness does not present to me any\r\nproperty of this being as material for thought.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut the proposition, \u0026ldquo;I think,\u0026rdquo; in so far as it declares, \u0026ldquo;I\r\nexist thinking,\u0026rdquo; is not the mere representation of a logical function. It\r\ndetermines the subject (which is in this case an object also) in relation to\r\nexistence; and it cannot be given without the aid of the internal sense, whose\r\nintuition presents to us an object, not as a thing in itself, but always as a\r\nphenomenon. In this proposition there is therefore something more to be found\r\nthan the mere spontaneity of thought; there is also the receptivity of\r\nintuition, that is, my thought of myself applied to the empirical intuition of\r\nmyself. Now, in this intuition the thinking self must seek the conditions of\r\nthe employment of its logical functions as categories of substance, cause, and\r\nso forth; not merely for the purpose of distinguishing itself as an object in\r\nitself by means of the representation \u0026ldquo;I,\u0026rdquo; but also for the purpose\r\nof determining the mode of its existence, that is, of cognizing itself as\r\nnoumenon. But this is impossible, for the internal empirical intuition is\r\nsensuous, and presents us with nothing but phenomenal data, which do not assist\r\nthe object of pure consciousness in its attempt to cognize itself as a separate\r\nexistence, but are useful only as contributions to experience.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut, let it be granted that we could discover, not in experience, but in\r\ncertain firmly-established à priori laws of the use of pure reason\u0026mdash;laws\r\nrelating to our existence, authority to consider ourselves as legislating à\r\npriori in relation to our own existence and as determining this existence; we\r\nshould, on this supposition, find ourselves possessed of a spontaneity, by\r\nwhich our actual existence would be determinable, without the aid of the\r\nconditions of empirical intuition. We should also become aware that in the\r\nconsciousness of our existence there was an à priori content, which would serve\r\nto determine our own existence\u0026mdash;an existence only sensuously\r\ndeterminable\u0026mdash;relatively, however, to a certain internal faculty in\r\nrelation to an intelligible world.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut this would not give the least help to the attempts of rational psychology.\r\nFor this wonderful faculty, which the consciousness of the moral law in me\r\nreveals, would present me with a principle of the determination of my own\r\nexistence which is purely intellectual\u0026mdash;but by what predicates? By none\r\nother than those which are given in sensuous intuition. Thus I should find\r\nmyself in the same position in rational psychology which I formerly occupied,\r\nthat is to say, I should find myself still in need of sensuous intuitions, in\r\norder to give significance to my conceptions of substance and cause, by means\r\nof which alone I can possess a knowledge of myself: but these intuitions can\r\nnever raise me above the sphere of experience. I should be justified, however,\r\nin applying these conceptions, in regard to their practical use, which is\r\nalways directed to objects of experience\u0026mdash;in conformity with their\r\nanalogical significance when employed theoretically\u0026mdash;to freedom and its\r\nsubject. At the same time, I should understand by them merely the logical\r\nfunctions of subject and predicate, of principle and consequence, in conformity\r\nwith which all actions are so determined, that they are capable of being\r\nexplained along with the laws of nature, conformably to the categories of\r\nsubstance and cause, although they originate from a very different principle.\r\nWe have made these observations for the purpose of guarding against\r\nmisunderstanding, to which the doctrine of our intuition of self as a\r\nphenomenon is exposed. We shall have occasion to perceive their utility in the\r\nsequel.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003ca id=\"chap73\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eChapter II. The Antinomy of Pure Reason\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWe showed in the introduction to this part of our work, that all transcendental\r\nillusion of pure reason arose from dialectical arguments, the schema of which\r\nlogic gives us in its three formal species of syllogisms\u0026mdash;just as the\r\ncategories find their logical schema in the four functions of all judgements.\r\nThe first kind of these sophistical arguments related to the unconditioned\r\nunity of the subjective conditions of all representations in general (of the\r\nsubject or soul), in correspondence with the categorical syllogisms, the major\r\nof which, as the principle, enounces the relation of a predicate to a subject.\r\nThe second kind of dialectical argument will therefore be concerned, following\r\nthe analogy with hypothetical syllogisms, with the unconditioned unity of the\r\nobjective conditions in the phenomenon; and, in this way, the theme of the\r\nthird kind to be treated of in the following chapter will be the unconditioned\r\nunity of the objective conditions of the possibility of objects in general.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut it is worthy of remark that the transcendental paralogism produced in the\r\nmind only a one-third illusion, in regard to the idea of the subject of our\r\nthought; and the conceptions of reason gave no ground to maintain the contrary\r\nproposition. The advantage is completely on the side of Pneumatism; although\r\nthis theory itself passes into naught, in the crucible of pure reason.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nVery different is the case when we apply reason to the objective synthesis of\r\nphenomena. Here, certainly, reason establishes, with much plausibility, its\r\nprinciple of unconditioned unity; but it very soon falls into such\r\ncontradictions that it is compelled, in relation to cosmology, to renounce its\r\npretensions.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nFor here a new phenomenon of human reason meets us\u0026mdash;a perfectly natural\r\nantithetic, which does not require to be sought for by subtle sophistry, but\r\ninto which reason of itself unavoidably falls. It is thereby preserved, to be\r\nsure, from the slumber of a fancied conviction\u0026mdash;which a merely one-sided\r\nillusion produces; but it is at the same time compelled, either, on the one\r\nhand, to abandon itself to a despairing scepticism, or, on the other, to assume\r\na dogmatical confidence and obstinate persistence in certain assertions,\r\nwithout granting a fair hearing to the other side of the question. Either is\r\nthe death of a sound philosophy, although the former might perhaps deserve the\r\ntitle of the euthanasia of pure reason.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBefore entering this region of discord and confusion, which the conflict of the\r\nlaws of pure reason (antinomy) produces, we shall present the reader with some\r\nconsiderations, in explanation and justification of the method we intend to\r\nfollow in our treatment of this subject. I term all transcendental ideas, in so\r\nfar as they relate to the absolute totality in the synthesis of phenomena,\r\ncosmical conceptions; partly on account of this unconditioned totality, on\r\nwhich the conception of the world-whole is based\u0026mdash;a conception, which is\r\nitself an idea\u0026mdash;partly because they relate solely to the synthesis of\r\nphenomena\u0026mdash;the empirical synthesis; while, on the other hand, the absolute\r\ntotality in the synthesis of the conditions of all possible things gives rise\r\nto an ideal of pure reason, which is quite distinct from the cosmical\r\nconception, although it stands in relation with it. Hence, as the paralogisms\r\nof pure reason laid the foundation for a dialectical psychology, the antinomy\r\nof pure reason will present us with the transcendental principles of a\r\npretended pure (rational) cosmology\u0026mdash;not, however, to declare it valid and\r\nto appropriate it, but\u0026mdash;as the very term of a conflict of reason\r\nsufficiently indicates, to present it as an idea which cannot be reconciled\r\nwith phenomena and experience.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003ca id=\"chap74\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eSection I. System of Cosmological Ideas\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThat we may be able to enumerate with systematic precision these ideas\r\naccording to a principle, we must remark, in the first place, that it is from\r\nthe understanding alone that pure and transcendental conceptions take their\r\norigin; that the reason does not properly give birth to any conception, but\r\nonly frees the conception of the understanding from the unavoidable limitation\r\nof a possible experience, and thus endeavours to raise it above the empirical,\r\nthough it must still be in connection with it. This happens from the fact that,\r\nfor a given conditioned, reason demands absolute totality on the side of the\r\nconditions (to which the understanding submits all phenomena), and thus makes\r\nof the category a transcendental idea. This it does that it may be able to give\r\nabsolute completeness to the empirical synthesis, by continuing it to the\r\nunconditioned (which is not to be found in experience, but only in the idea).\r\nReason requires this according to the principle: If the conditioned is given\r\nthe whole of the conditions, and consequently the absolutely unconditioned, is\r\nalso given, whereby alone the former was possible. First, then, the\r\ntranscendental ideas are properly nothing but categories elevated to the\r\nunconditioned; and they may be arranged in a table according to the titles of\r\nthe latter. But, secondly, all the categories are not available for this\r\npurpose, but only those in which the synthesis constitutes a series\u0026mdash;of\r\nconditions subordinated to, not co-ordinated with, each other. Absolute\r\ntotality is required of reason only in so far as concerns the ascending series\r\nof the conditions of a conditioned; not, consequently, when the question\r\nrelates to the descending series of consequences, or to the aggregate of the\r\nco-ordinated conditions of these consequences. For, in relation to a given\r\nconditioned, conditions are presupposed and considered to be given along with\r\nit. On the other hand, as the consequences do not render possible their\r\nconditions, but rather presuppose them\u0026mdash;in the consideration of the\r\nprocession of consequences (or in the descent from the given condition to the\r\nconditioned), we may be quite unconcerned whether the series ceases or not; and\r\ntheir totality is not a necessary demand of reason.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThus we cogitate\u0026mdash;and necessarily\u0026mdash;a given time completely elapsed up\r\nto a given moment, although that time is not determinable by us. But as regards\r\ntime future, which is not the condition of arriving at the present, in order to\r\nconceive it; it is quite indifferent whether we consider future time as ceasing\r\nat some point, or as prolonging itself to infinity. Take, for example, the\r\nseries m, n, o, in which n is given as conditioned in relation to m, but at the\r\nsame time as the condition of o, and let the series proceed upwards from the\r\nconditioned n to m (l, k, i, etc.), and also downwards from the condition n to\r\nthe conditioned o (p, q, r, etc.)\u0026mdash;I must presuppose the former series, to\r\nbe able to consider n as given, and n is according to reason (the totality of\r\nconditions) possible only by means of that series. But its possibility does not\r\nrest on the following series o, p, q, r, which for this reason cannot be\r\nregarded as given, but only as capable of being given (dabilis).\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nI shall term the synthesis of the series on the side of the\r\nconditions\u0026mdash;from that nearest to the given phenomenon up to the more\r\nremote\u0026mdash;regressive; that which proceeds on the side of the conditioned,\r\nfrom the immediate consequence to the more remote, I shall call the progressive\r\nsynthesis. The former proceeds in antecedentia, the latter in consequentia. The\r\ncosmological ideas are therefore occupied with the totality of the regressive\r\nsynthesis, and proceed in antecedentia, not in consequentia. When the latter\r\ntakes place, it is an arbitrary and not a necessary problem of pure reason; for\r\nwe require, for the complete understanding of what is given in a phenomenon,\r\nnot the consequences which succeed, but the grounds or principles which\r\nprecede.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIn order to construct the table of ideas in correspondence with the table of\r\ncategories, we take first the two primitive quanta of all our intuitions, time\r\nand space. Time is in itself a series (and the formal condition of all series),\r\nand hence, in relation to a given present, we must distinguish à priori in it\r\nthe antecedentia as conditions (time past) from the consequentia (time future).\r\nConsequently, the transcendental idea of the absolute totality of the series of\r\nthe conditions of a given conditioned, relates merely to all past time.\r\nAccording to the idea of reason, the whole past time, as the condition of the\r\ngiven moment, is necessarily cogitated as given. But, as regards space, there\r\nexists in it no distinction between progressus and regressus; for it is an\r\naggregate and not a series\u0026mdash;its parts existing together at the same time.\r\nI can consider a given point of time in relation to past time only as\r\nconditioned, because this given moment comes into existence only through the\r\npast time rather through the passing of the preceding time. But as the parts of\r\nspace are not subordinated, but co-ordinated to each other, one part cannot be\r\nthe condition of the possibility of the other; and space is not in itself, like\r\ntime, a series. But the synthesis of the manifold parts of space\u0026mdash;(the\r\nsyntheses whereby we apprehend space)\u0026mdash;is nevertheless successive; it\r\ntakes place, therefore, in time, and contains a series. And as in this series\r\nof aggregated spaces (for example, the feet in a rood), beginning with a given\r\nportion of space, those which continue to be annexed form the condition of the\r\nlimits of the former\u0026mdash;the measurement of a space must also be regarded as\r\na synthesis of the series of the conditions of a given conditioned. It differs,\r\nhowever, in this respect from that of time, that the side of the conditioned is\r\nnot in itself distinguishable from the side of the condition; and,\r\nconsequently, regressus and progressus in space seem to be identical. But,\r\ninasmuch as one part of space is not given, but only limited, by and through\r\nanother, we must also consider every limited space as conditioned, in so far as\r\nit presupposes some other space as the condition of its limitation, and so on.\r\nAs regards limitation, therefore, our procedure in space is also a regressus,\r\nand the transcendental idea of the absolute totality of the synthesis in a\r\nseries of conditions applies to space also; and I am entitled to demand the\r\nabsolute totality of the phenomenal synthesis in space as well as in time.\r\nWhether my demand can be satisfied is a question to be answered in the sequel.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSecondly, the real in space\u0026mdash;that is, matter\u0026mdash;is conditioned. Its\r\ninternal conditions are its parts, and the parts of parts its remote\r\nconditions; so that in this case we find a regressive synthesis, the absolute\r\ntotality of which is a demand of reason. But this cannot be obtained otherwise\r\nthan by a complete division of parts, whereby the real in matter becomes either\r\nnothing or that which is not matter, that is to say, the simple. Consequently\r\nwe find here also a series of conditions and a progress to the unconditioned.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThirdly, as regards the categories of a real relation between phenomena, the\r\ncategory of substance and its accidents is not suitable for the formation of a\r\ntranscendental idea; that is to say, reason has no ground, in regard to it, to\r\nproceed regressively with conditions. For accidents (in so far as they inhere\r\nin a substance) are co-ordinated with each other, and do not constitute a\r\nseries. And, in relation to substance, they are not properly subordinated to\r\nit, but are the mode of existence of the substance itself. The conception of\r\nthe substantial might nevertheless seem to be an idea of the transcendental\r\nreason. But, as this signifies nothing more than the conception of an object in\r\ngeneral, which subsists in so far as we cogitate in it merely a transcendental\r\nsubject without any predicates; and as the question here is of an unconditioned\r\nin the series of phenomena\u0026mdash;it is clear that the substantial can form no\r\nmember thereof. The same holds good of substances in community, which are mere\r\naggregates and do not form a series. For they are not subordinated to each\r\nother as conditions of the possibility of each other; which, however, may be\r\naffirmed of spaces, the limits of which are never determined in themselves, but\r\nalways by some other space. It is, therefore, only in the category of causality\r\nthat we can find a series of causes to a given effect, and in which we ascend\r\nfrom the latter, as the conditioned, to the former as the conditions, and thus\r\nanswer the question of reason.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nFourthly, the conceptions of the possible, the actual, and the necessary do not\r\nconduct us to any series\u0026mdash;excepting only in so far as the contingent in\r\nexistence must always be regarded as conditioned, and as indicating, according\r\nto a law of the understanding, a condition, under which it is necessary to rise\r\nto a higher, till in the totality of the series, reason arrives at\r\nunconditioned necessity.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThere are, accordingly, only four cosmological ideas, corresponding with the\r\nfour titles of the categories. For we can select only such as necessarily\r\nfurnish us with a series in the synthesis of the manifold.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cpre\u003e\r\n 1\r\n The absolute Completeness\r\n of the\r\n COMPOSITION\r\n of the given totality of all phenomena.\r\n\r\n 2\r\n The absolute Completeness\r\n of the\r\n DIVISION\r\n of given totality in a phenomenon.\r\n\r\n 3\r\n The absolute Completeness\r\n of the\r\n ORIGINATION\r\n of a phenomenon.\r\n\r\n 4\r\n The absolute Completeness\r\n of the DEPENDENCE of the EXISTENCE\r\n of what is changeable in a phenomenon.\r\n\u003c/pre\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWe must here remark, in the first place, that the idea of absolute totality\r\nrelates to nothing but the exposition of phenomena, and therefore not to the\r\npure conception of a totality of things. Phenomena are here, therefore,\r\nregarded as given, and reason requires the absolute completeness of the\r\nconditions of their possibility, in so far as these conditions constitute a\r\nseries\u0026mdash;consequently an absolutely (that is, in every respect) complete\r\nsynthesis, whereby a phenomenon can be explained according to the laws of the\r\nunderstanding.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSecondly, it is properly the unconditioned alone that reason seeks in this\r\nserially and regressively conducted synthesis of conditions. It wishes, to\r\nspeak in another way, to attain to completeness in the series of premisses, so\r\nas to render it unnecessary to presuppose others. This unconditioned is always\r\ncontained in the absolute totality of the series, when we endeavour to form a\r\nrepresentation of it in thought. But this absolutely complete synthesis is\r\nitself but an idea; for it is impossible, at least before hand, to know whether\r\nany such synthesis is possible in the case of phenomena. When we represent all\r\nexistence in thought by means of pure conceptions of the understanding, without\r\nany conditions of sensuous intuition, we may say with justice that for a given\r\nconditioned the whole series of conditions subordinated to each other is also\r\ngiven; for the former is only given through the latter. But we find in the case\r\nof phenomena a particular limitation of the mode in which conditions are given,\r\nthat is, through the successive synthesis of the manifold of intuition, which\r\nmust be complete in the regress. Now whether this completeness is sensuously\r\npossible, is a problem. But the idea of it lies in the reason\u0026mdash;be it\r\npossible or impossible to connect with the idea adequate empirical conceptions.\r\nTherefore, as in the absolute totality of the regressive synthesis of the\r\nmanifold in a phenomenon (following the guidance of the categories, which\r\nrepresent it as a series of conditions to a given conditioned) the\r\nunconditioned is necessarily contained\u0026mdash;it being still left unascertained\r\nwhether and how this totality exists; reason sets out from the idea of\r\ntotality, although its proper and final aim is the unconditioned\u0026mdash;of the\r\nwhole series, or of a part thereof.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThis unconditioned may be cogitated\u0026mdash;either as existing only in the entire\r\nseries, all the members of which therefore would be without exception\r\nconditioned and only the totality absolutely unconditioned\u0026mdash;and in this\r\ncase the regressus is called infinite; or the absolutely unconditioned is only\r\na part of the series, to which the other members are subordinated, but which Is\r\nnot itself submitted to any other condition.\u003ca href=\"#linknote-48\" id=\"linknoteref-48\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[48]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e In the former\r\ncase the series is a parte priori unlimited (without beginning), that is,\r\ninfinite, and nevertheless completely given. But the regress in it is never\r\ncompleted, and can only be called potentially infinite. In the second case\r\nthere exists a first in the series. This first is called, in relation to past\r\ntime, the beginning of the world; in relation to space, the limit of the world;\r\nin relation to the parts of a given limited whole, the simple; in relation to\r\ncauses, absolute spontaneity (liberty); and in relation to the existence of\r\nchangeable things, absolute physical necessity.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"linknote-48\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#linknoteref-48\"\u003e[48]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nThe absolute totality of the series of conditions to a given conditioned is\r\nalways unconditioned; because beyond it there exist no other conditions, on\r\nwhich it might depend. But the absolute totality of such a series is only an\r\nidea, or rather a problematical conception, the possibility of which must be\r\ninvestigated\u0026mdash;particularly in relation to the mode in which the\r\nunconditioned, as the transcendental idea which is the real subject of inquiry,\r\nmay be contained therein.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWe possess two expressions, world and nature, which are generally interchanged.\r\nThe first denotes the mathematical total of all phenomena and the totality of\r\ntheir synthesis\u0026mdash;in its progress by means of composition, as well as by\r\ndivision. And the world is termed nature,\u003ca href=\"#linknote-49\" id=\"linknoteref-49\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[49]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e when it is\r\nregarded as a dynamical whole\u0026mdash;when our attention is not directed to the\r\naggregation in space and time, for the purpose of cogitating it as a quantity,\r\nbut to the unity in the existence of phenomena. In this case the condition of\r\nthat which happens is called a cause; the unconditioned causality of the cause\r\nin a phenomenon is termed liberty; the conditioned cause is called in a more\r\nlimited sense a natural cause. The conditioned in existence is termed\r\ncontingent, and the unconditioned necessary. The unconditioned necessity of\r\nphenomena may be called natural necessity.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"linknote-49\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#linknoteref-49\"\u003e[49]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nNature, understood adjective (formaliter), signifies the complex of the\r\ndeterminations of a thing, connected according to an internal principle of\r\ncausality. On the other hand, we understand by nature, substantive\r\n(materialiter), the sum total of phenomena, in so far as they, by virtue of an\r\ninternal principle of causality, are connected with each other throughout. In\r\nthe former sense we speak of the nature of liquid matter, of fire, etc., and\r\nemploy the word only adjective; while, if speaking of the objects of nature, we\r\nhave in our minds the idea of a subsisting whole.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe ideas which we are at present engaged in discussing I have called\r\ncosmological ideas; partly because by the term world is understood the entire\r\ncontent of all phenomena, and our ideas are directed solely to the\r\nunconditioned among phenomena; partly also, because world, in the\r\ntranscendental sense, signifies the absolute totality of the content of\r\nexisting things, and we are directing our attention only to the completeness of\r\nthe synthesis\u0026mdash;although, properly, only in regression. In regard to the\r\nfact that these ideas are all transcendent, and, although they do not transcend\r\nphenomena as regards their mode, but are concerned solely with the world of\r\nsense (and not with noumena), nevertheless carry their synthesis to a degree\r\nfar above all possible experience\u0026mdash;it still seems to me that we can, with\r\nperfect propriety, designate them cosmical conceptions. As regards the\r\ndistinction between the mathematically and the dynamically unconditioned which\r\nis the aim of the regression of the synthesis, I should call the two former, in\r\na more limited signification, cosmical conceptions, the remaining two\r\ntranscendent physical conceptions. This distinction does not at present seem to\r\nbe of particular importance, but we shall afterwards find it to be of some\r\nvalue.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003ca id=\"chap75\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eSection II. Antithetic of Pure Reason\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThetic is the term applied to every collection of dogmatical propositions. By\r\nantithetic I do not understand dogmatical assertions of the opposite, but the\r\nself-contradiction of seemingly dogmatical cognitions (thesis cum antithesis),\r\nin none of which we can discover any decided superiority. Antithetic is not,\r\ntherefore, occupied with one-sided statements, but is engaged in considering\r\nthe contradictory nature of the general cognitions of reason and its causes.\r\nTranscendental antithetic is an investigation into the antinomy of pure reason,\r\nits causes and result. If we employ our reason not merely in the application of\r\nthe principles of the understanding to objects of experience, but venture with\r\nit beyond these boundaries, there arise certain sophistical propositions or\r\ntheorems. These assertions have the following peculiarities: They can find\r\nneither confirmation nor confutation in experience; and each is in itself not\r\nonly self-consistent, but possesses conditions of its necessity in the very\r\nnature of reason\u0026mdash;only that, unluckily, there exist just as valid and\r\nnecessary grounds for maintaining the contrary proposition.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe questions which naturally arise in the consideration of this dialectic of\r\npure reason, are therefore: 1st. In what propositions is pure reason\r\nunavoidably subject to an antinomy? 2nd. What are the causes of this antinomy?\r\n3rd. Whether and in what way can reason free itself from this\r\nself-contradiction?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nA dialectical proposition or theorem of pure reason must, according to what has\r\nbeen said, be distinguishable from all sophistical propositions, by the fact\r\nthat it is not an answer to an arbitrary question, which may be raised at the\r\nmere pleasure of any person, but to one which human reason must necessarily\r\nencounter in its progress. In the second place, a dialectical proposition, with\r\nits opposite, does not carry the appearance of a merely artificial illusion,\r\nwhich disappears as soon as it is investigated, but a natural and unavoidable\r\nillusion, which, even when we are no longer deceived by it, continues to mock\r\nus and, although rendered harmless, can never be completely removed.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThis dialectical doctrine will not relate to the unity of understanding in\r\nempirical conceptions, but to the unity of reason in pure ideas. The conditions\r\nof this doctrine are\u0026mdash;inasmuch as it must, as a synthesis according to\r\nrules, be conformable to the understanding, and at the same time as the\r\nabsolute unity of the synthesis, to the reason\u0026mdash;that, if it is adequate to\r\nthe unity of reason, it is too great for the understanding, if according with\r\nthe understanding, it is too small for the reason. Hence arises a mutual\r\nopposition, which cannot be avoided, do what we will.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThese sophistical assertions of dialectic open, as it were, a battle-field,\r\nwhere that side obtains the victory which has been permitted to make the\r\nattack, and he is compelled to yield who has been unfortunately obliged to\r\nstand on the defensive. And hence, champions of ability, whether on the right\r\nor on the wrong side, are certain to carry away the crown of victory, if they\r\nonly take care to have the right to make the last attack, and are not obliged\r\nto sustain another onset from their opponent. We can easily believe that this\r\narena has been often trampled by the feet of combatants, that many victories\r\nhave been obtained on both sides, but that the last victory, decisive of the\r\naffair between the contending parties, was won by him who fought for the right,\r\nonly if his adversary was forbidden to continue the tourney. As impartial\r\numpires, we must lay aside entirely the consideration whether the combatants\r\nare fighting for the right or for the wrong side, for the true or for the\r\nfalse, and allow the combat to be first decided. Perhaps, after they have\r\nwearied more than injured each other, they will discover the nothingness of\r\ntheir cause of quarrel and part good friends.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThis method of watching, or rather of originating, a conflict of assertions,\r\nnot for the purpose of finally deciding in favour of either side, but to\r\ndiscover whether the object of the struggle is not a mere illusion, which each\r\nstrives in vain to reach, but which would be no gain even when\r\nreached\u0026mdash;this procedure, I say, may be termed the sceptical method. It is\r\nthoroughly distinct from scepticism\u0026mdash;the principle of a technical and\r\nscientific ignorance, which undermines the foundations of all knowledge, in\r\norder, if possible, to destroy our belief and confidence therein. For the\r\nsceptical method aims at certainty, by endeavouring to discover in a conflict\r\nof this kind, conducted honestly and intelligently on both sides, the point of\r\nmisunderstanding; just as wise legislators derive, from the embarrassment of\r\njudges in lawsuits, information in regard to the defective and ill-defined\r\nparts of their statutes. The antinomy which reveals itself in the application\r\nof laws, is for our limited wisdom the best criterion of legislation. For the\r\nattention of reason, which in abstract speculation does not easily become\r\nconscious of its errors, is thus roused to the momenta in the determination of\r\nits principles.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut this sceptical method is essentially peculiar to transcendental philosophy,\r\nand can perhaps be dispensed with in every other field of investigation. In\r\nmathematics its use would be absurd; because in it no false assertions can long\r\nremain hidden, inasmuch as its demonstrations must always proceed under the\r\nguidance of pure intuition, and by means of an always evident synthesis. In\r\nexperimental philosophy, doubt and delay may be very useful; but no\r\nmisunderstanding is possible, which cannot be easily removed; and in experience\r\nmeans of solving the difficulty and putting an end to the dissension must at\r\nlast be found, whether sooner or later. Moral philosophy can always exhibit its\r\nprinciples, with their practical consequences, in concreto\u0026mdash;at least in\r\npossible experiences, and thus escape the mistakes and ambiguities of\r\nabstraction. But transcendental propositions, which lay claim to insight beyond\r\nthe region of possible experience, cannot, on the one hand, exhibit their\r\nabstract synthesis in any à priori intuition, nor, on the other, expose a\r\nlurking error by the help of experience. Transcendental reason, therefore,\r\npresents us with no other criterion than that of an attempt to reconcile such\r\nassertions, and for this purpose to permit a free and unrestrained conflict\r\nbetween them. And this we now proceed to arrange.\u003ca href=\"#linknote-50\" id=\"linknoteref-50\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[50]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"linknote-50\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#linknoteref-50\"\u003e[50]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nThe antinomies stand in the order of the four transcendental ideas above\r\ndetailed.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nFIRST CONFLICT OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAS. THESIS.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe world has a beginning in time, and is also limited in regard to space.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPROOF.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGranted that the world has no beginning in time; up to every given moment of\r\ntime, an eternity must have elapsed, and therewith passed away an infinite\r\nseries of successive conditions or states of things in the world. Now the\r\ninfinity of a series consists in the fact that it never can be completed by\r\nmeans of a successive synthesis. It follows that an infinite series already\r\nelapsed is impossible and that, consequently, a beginning of the world is a\r\nnecessary condition of its existence. And this was the first thing to be\r\nproved.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAs regards the second, let us take the opposite for granted. In this case, the\r\nworld must be an infinite given total of coexistent things. Now we cannot\r\ncogitate the dimensions of a quantity, which is not given within certain limits\r\nof an intuition,\u003ca href=\"#linknote-51\" id=\"linknoteref-51\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[51]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e in any other way than by means of the\r\nsynthesis of its parts, and the total of such a quantity only by means of a\r\ncompleted synthesis, or the repeated addition of unity to itself. Accordingly,\r\nto cogitate the world, which fills all spaces, as a whole, the successive\r\nsynthesis of the parts of an infinite world must be looked upon as completed,\r\nthat is to say, an infinite time must be regarded as having elapsed in the\r\nenumeration of all co-existing things; which is impossible. For this reason an\r\ninfinite aggregate of actual things cannot be considered as a given whole,\r\nconsequently, not as a contemporaneously given whole. The world is\r\nconsequently, as regards extension in space, not infinite, but enclosed in\r\nlimits. And this was the second thing to be proved.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"linknote-51\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#linknoteref-51\"\u003e[51]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nWe may consider an undetermined quantity as a whole, when it is enclosed within\r\nlimits, although we cannot construct or ascertain its totality by measurement,\r\nthat is, by the successive synthesis of its parts. For its limits of themselves\r\ndetermine its completeness as a whole.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nANTITHESIS.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe world has no beginning, and no limits in space, but is, in relation both to\r\ntime and space, infinite.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPROOF.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nFor let it be granted that it has a beginning. A beginning is an existence\r\nwhich is preceded by a time in which the thing does not exist. On the above\r\nsupposition, it follows that there must have been a time in which the world did\r\nnot exist, that is, a void time. But in a void time the origination of a thing\r\nis impossible; because no part of any such time contains a distinctive\r\ncondition of being, in preference to that of non-being (whether the supposed\r\nthing originate of itself, or by means of some other cause). Consequently, many\r\nseries of things may have a beginning in the world, but the world itself cannot\r\nhave a beginning, and is, therefore, in relation to past time, infinite.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAs regards the second statement, let us first take the opposite for\r\ngranted\u0026mdash;that the world is finite and limited in space; it follows that it\r\nmust exist in a void space, which is not limited. We should therefore meet not\r\nonly with a relation of things in space, but also a relation of things to\r\nspace. Now, as the world is an absolute whole, out of and beyond which no\r\nobject of intuition, and consequently no correlate to which can be discovered,\r\nthis relation of the world to a void space is merely a relation to no object.\r\nBut such a relation, and consequently the limitation of the world by void\r\nspace, is nothing. Consequently, the world, as regards space, is not limited,\r\nthat is, it is infinite in regard to extension.\u003ca href=\"#linknote-52\" id=\"linknoteref-52\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[52]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"linknote-52\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#linknoteref-52\"\u003e[52]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nSpace is merely the form of external intuition (formal intuition), and not a\r\nreal object which can be externally perceived. Space, prior to all things which\r\ndetermine it (fill or limit it), or, rather, which present an empirical\r\nintuition conformable to it, is, under the title of absolute space, nothing but\r\nthe mere possibility of external phenomena, in so far as they either exist in\r\nthemselves, or can annex themselves to given intuitions. Empirical intuition is\r\ntherefore not a composition of phenomena and space (of perception and empty\r\nintuition). The one is not the correlate of the other in a synthesis, but they\r\nare vitally connected in the same empirical intuition, as matter and form. If\r\nwe wish to set one of these two apart from the other\u0026mdash;space from\r\nphenomena\u0026mdash;there arise all sorts of empty determinations of external\r\nintuition, which are very far from being possible perceptions. For example,\r\nmotion or rest of the world in an infinite empty space, or a determination of\r\nthe mutual relation of both, cannot possibly be perceived, and is therefore\r\nmerely the predicate of a notional entity.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nOBSERVATIONS ON THE FIRST ANTINOMY. ON THE THESIS.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIn bringing forward these conflicting arguments, I have not been on the search\r\nfor sophisms, for the purpose of availing myself of special pleading, which\r\ntakes advantage of the carelessness of the opposite party, appeals to a\r\nmisunderstood statute, and erects its unrighteous claims upon an unfair\r\ninterpretation. Both proofs originate fairly from the nature of the case, and\r\nthe advantage presented by the mistakes of the dogmatists of both parties has\r\nbeen completely set aside.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe thesis might also have been unfairly demonstrated, by the introduction of\r\nan erroneous conception of the infinity of a given quantity. A quantity is\r\ninfinite, if a greater than itself cannot possibly exist. The quantity is\r\nmeasured by the number of given units\u0026mdash;which are taken as a\r\nstandard\u0026mdash;contained in it. Now no number can be the greatest, because one\r\nor more units can always be added. It follows that an infinite given quantity,\r\nconsequently an infinite world (both as regards time and extension) is\r\nimpossible. It is, therefore, limited in both respects. In this manner I might\r\nhave conducted my proof; but the conception given in it does not agree with the\r\ntrue conception of an infinite whole. In this there is no representation of its\r\nquantity, it is not said how large it is; consequently its conception is not\r\nthe conception of a maximum. We cogitate in it merely its relation to an\r\narbitrarily assumed unit, in relation to which it is greater than any number.\r\nNow, just as the unit which is taken is greater or smaller, the infinite will\r\nbe greater or smaller; but the infinity, which consists merely in the relation\r\nto this given unit, must remain always the same, although the absolute quantity\r\nof the whole is not thereby cognized.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe true (transcendental) conception of infinity is: that the successive\r\nsynthesis of unity in the measurement of a given quantum can never be\r\ncompleted.\u003ca href=\"#linknote-53\" id=\"linknoteref-53\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[53]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Hence it follows, without possibility\r\nof mistake, that an eternity of actual successive states up to a given (the\r\npresent) moment cannot have elapsed, and that the world must therefore have a\r\nbeginning.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"linknote-53\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#linknoteref-53\"\u003e[53]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nThe quantum in this sense contains a congeries of given units, which is greater\r\nthan any number\u0026mdash;and this is the mathematical conception of the infinite.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIn regard to the second part of the thesis, the difficulty as to an infinite\r\nand yet elapsed series disappears; for the manifold of a world infinite in\r\nextension is contemporaneously given. But, in order to cogitate the total of\r\nthis manifold, as we cannot have the aid of limits constituting by themselves\r\nthis total in intuition, we are obliged to give some account of our conception,\r\nwhich in this case cannot proceed from the whole to the determined quantity of\r\nthe parts, but must demonstrate the possibility of a whole by means of a\r\nsuccessive synthesis of the parts. But as this synthesis must constitute a\r\nseries that cannot be completed, it is impossible for us to cogitate prior to\r\nit, and consequently not by means of it, a totality. For the conception of\r\ntotality itself is in the present case the representation of a completed\r\nsynthesis of the parts; and this completion, and consequently its conception,\r\nis impossible.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nON THE ANTITHESIS.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe proof in favour of the infinity of the cosmical succession and the cosmical\r\ncontent is based upon the consideration that, in the opposite case, a void time\r\nand a void space must constitute the limits of the world. Now I am not unaware,\r\nthat there are some ways of escaping this conclusion. It may, for example, be\r\nalleged, that a limit to the world, as regards both space and time, is quite\r\npossible, without at the same time holding the existence of an absolute time\r\nbefore the beginning of the world, or an absolute space extending beyond the\r\nactual world\u0026mdash;which is impossible. I am quite well satisfied with the\r\nlatter part of this opinion of the philosophers of the Leibnitzian school.\r\nSpace is merely the form of external intuition, but not a real object which can\r\nitself be externally intuited; it is not a correlate of phenomena, it is the\r\nform of phenomena itself. Space, therefore, cannot be regarded as absolutely\r\nand in itself something determinative of the existence of things, because it is\r\nnot itself an object, but only the form of possible objects. Consequently,\r\nthings, as phenomena, determine space; that is to say, they render it possible\r\nthat, of all the possible predicates of space (size and relation), certain may\r\nbelong to reality. But we cannot affirm the converse, that space, as something\r\nself-subsistent, can determine real things in regard to size or shape, for it\r\nis in itself not a real thing. Space (filled or void)\u003ca href=\"#linknote-54\" id=\"linknoteref-54\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[54]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e may therefore be\r\nlimited by phenomena, but phenomena cannot be limited by an empty space without\r\nthem. This is true of time also. All this being granted, it is nevertheless\r\nindisputable, that we must assume these two nonentities, void space without and\r\nvoid time before the world, if we assume the existence of cosmical limits,\r\nrelatively to space or time.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"linknote-54\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#linknoteref-54\"\u003e[54]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nIt is evident that what is meant here is, that empty space, in so far as it is\r\nlimited by phenomena\u0026mdash;space, that is, within the world\u0026mdash;does not at\r\nleast contradict transcendental principles, and may therefore, as regards them,\r\nbe admitted, although its possibility cannot on that account be affirmed.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nFor, as regards the subterfuge adopted by those who endeavour to evade the\r\nconsequence\u0026mdash;that, if the world is limited as to space and time, the\r\ninfinite void must determine the existence of actual things in regard to their\r\ndimensions\u0026mdash;it arises solely from the fact that instead of a sensuous\r\nworld, an intelligible world\u0026mdash;of which nothing is known\u0026mdash;is\r\ncogitated; instead of a real beginning (an existence, which is preceded by a\r\nperiod in which nothing exists), an existence which presupposes no other\r\ncondition than that of time; and, instead of limits of extension, boundaries of\r\nthe universe. But the question relates to the mundus phaenomenon, and its\r\nquantity; and in this case we cannot make abstraction of the conditions of\r\nsensibility, without doing away with the essential reality of this world\r\nitself. The world of sense, if it is limited, must necessarily lie in the\r\ninfinite void. If this, and with it space as the à priori condition of the\r\npossibility of phenomena, is left out of view, the whole world of sense\r\ndisappears. In our problem is this alone considered as given. The mundus\r\nintelligibilis is nothing but the general conception of a world, in which\r\nabstraction has been made of all conditions of intuition, and in relation to\r\nwhich no synthetical proposition\u0026mdash;either affirmative or negative\u0026mdash;is\r\npossible.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSECOND CONFLICT OF TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAS. THESIS.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nEvery composite substance in the world consists of simple parts; and there\r\nexists nothing that is not either itself simple, or composed of simple parts.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPROOF.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nFor, grant that composite substances do not consist of simple parts; in this\r\ncase, if all combination or composition were annihilated in thought, no\r\ncomposite part, and (as, by the supposition, there do not exist simple parts)\r\nno simple part would exist. Consequently, no substance; consequently, nothing\r\nwould exist. Either, then, it is impossible to annihilate composition in\r\nthought; or, after such annihilation, there must remain something that subsists\r\nwithout composition, that is, something that is simple. But in the former case\r\nthe composite could not itself consist of substances, because with substances\r\ncomposition is merely a contingent relation, apart from which they must still\r\nexist as self-subsistent beings. Now, as this case contradicts the supposition,\r\nthe second must contain the truth\u0026mdash;that the substantial composite in the\r\nworld consists of simple parts.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIt follows, as an immediate inference, that the things in the world are all,\r\nwithout exception, simple beings\u0026mdash;that composition is merely an external\r\ncondition pertaining to them\u0026mdash;and that, although we never can separate and\r\nisolate the elementary substances from the state of composition, reason must\r\ncogitate these as the primary subjects of all composition, and consequently, as\r\nprior thereto\u0026mdash;and as simple substances.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nANTITHESIS.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nNo composite thing in the world consists of simple parts; and there does not\r\nexist in the world any simple substance.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPROOF.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nLet it be supposed that a composite thing (as substance) consists of simple\r\nparts. Inasmuch as all external relation, consequently all composition of\r\nsubstances, is possible only in space; the space, occupied by that which is\r\ncomposite, must consist of the same number of parts as is contained in the\r\ncomposite. But space does not consist of simple parts, but of spaces.\r\nTherefore, every part of the composite must occupy a space. But the absolutely\r\nprimary parts of what is composite are simple. It follows that what is simple\r\noccupies a space. Now, as everything real that occupies a space, contains a\r\nmanifold the parts of which are external to each other, and is consequently\r\ncomposite\u0026mdash;and a real composite, not of accidents (for these cannot exist\r\nexternal to each other apart from substance), but of substances\u0026mdash;it\r\nfollows that the simple must be a substantial composite, which is\r\nself-contradictory.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe second proposition of the antithesis\u0026mdash;that there exists in the world\r\nnothing that is simple\u0026mdash;is here equivalent to the following: The existence\r\nof the absolutely simple cannot be demonstrated from any experience or\r\nperception either external or internal; and the absolutely simple is a mere\r\nidea, the objective reality of which cannot be demonstrated in any possible\r\nexperience; it is consequently, in the exposition of phenomena, without\r\napplication and object. For, let us take for granted that an object may be\r\nfound in experience for this transcendental idea; the empirical intuition of\r\nsuch an object must then be recognized to contain absolutely no manifold with\r\nits parts external to each other, and connected into unity. Now, as we cannot\r\nreason from the non-consciousness of such a manifold to the impossibility of\r\nits existence in the intuition of an object, and as the proof of this\r\nimpossibility is necessary for the establishment and proof of absolute\r\nsimplicity; it follows that this simplicity cannot be inferred from any\r\nperception whatever. As, therefore, an absolutely simple object cannot be given\r\nin any experience, and the world of sense must be considered as the sum total\r\nof all possible experiences: nothing simple exists in the world.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThis second proposition in the antithesis has a more extended aim than the\r\nfirst. The first merely banishes the simple from the intuition of the\r\ncomposite; while the second drives it entirely out of nature. Hence we were\r\nunable to demonstrate it from the conception of a given object of external\r\nintuition (of the composite), but we were obliged to prove it from the relation\r\nof a given object to a possible experience in general.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nOBSERVATIONS ON THE SECOND ANTINOMY. THESIS.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWhen I speak of a whole, which necessarily consists of simple parts, I\r\nunderstand thereby only a substantial whole, as the true composite; that is to\r\nsay, I understand that contingent unity of the manifold which is given as\r\nperfectly isolated (at least in thought), placed in reciprocal connection, and\r\nthus constituted a unity. Space ought not to be called a compositum but a\r\ntotum, for its parts are possible in the whole, and not the whole by means of\r\nthe parts. It might perhaps be called a compositum ideale, but not a compositum\r\nreale. But this is of no importance. As space is not a composite of substances\r\n(and not even of real accidents), if I abstract all composition\r\ntherein\u0026mdash;nothing, not even a point, remains; for a point is possible only\r\nas the limit of a space\u0026mdash;consequently of a composite. Space and time,\r\ntherefore, do not consist of simple parts. That which belongs only to the\r\ncondition or state of a substance, even although it possesses a quantity\r\n(motion or change, for example), likewise does not consist of simple parts.\r\nThat is to say, a certain degree of change does not originate from the addition\r\nof many simple changes. Our inference of the simple from the composite is valid\r\nonly of self-subsisting things. But the accidents of a state are not\r\nself-subsistent. The proof, then, for the necessity of the simple, as the\r\ncomponent part of all that is substantial and composite, may prove a failure,\r\nand the whole case of this thesis be lost, if we carry the proposition too far,\r\nand wish to make it valid of everything that is composite without\r\ndistinction\u0026mdash;as indeed has really now and then happened. Besides, I am\r\nhere speaking only of the simple, in so far as it is necessarily given in the\r\ncomposite\u0026mdash;the latter being capable of solution into the former as its\r\ncomponent parts. The proper signification of the word monas (as employed by\r\nLeibnitz) ought to relate to the simple, given immediately as simple substance\r\n(for example, in consciousness), and not as an element of the composite. As an\r\nelement, the term atomus would be more appropriate. And as I wish to prove the\r\nexistence of simple substances, only in relation to, and as the elements of,\r\nthe composite, I might term the antithesis of the second Antinomy,\r\ntranscendental Atomistic. But as this word has long been employed to designate\r\na particular theory of corporeal phenomena (moleculae), and thus presupposes a\r\nbasis of empirical conceptions, I prefer calling it the dialectical principle\r\nof Monadology.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nANTITHESIS.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAgainst the assertion of the infinite subdivisibility of matter whose ground of\r\nproof is purely mathematical, objections have been alleged by the Monadists.\r\nThese objections lay themselves open, at first sight, to suspicion, from the\r\nfact that they do not recognize the clearest mathematical proofs as\r\npropositions relating to the constitution of space, in so far as it is really\r\nthe formal condition of the possibility of all matter, but regard them merely\r\nas inferences from abstract but arbitrary conceptions, which cannot have any\r\napplication to real things. Just as if it were possible to imagine another mode\r\nof intuition than that given in the primitive intuition of space; and just as\r\nif its à priori determinations did not apply to everything, the existence of\r\nwhich is possible, from the fact alone of its filling space. If we listen to\r\nthem, we shall find ourselves required to cogitate, in addition to the\r\nmathematical point, which is simple\u0026mdash;not, however, a part, but a mere\r\nlimit of space\u0026mdash;physical points, which are indeed likewise simple, but\r\npossess the peculiar property, as parts of space, of filling it merely by their\r\naggregation. I shall not repeat here the common and clear refutations of this\r\nabsurdity, which are to be found everywhere in numbers: every one knows that it\r\nis impossible to undermine the evidence of mathematics by mere discursive\r\nconceptions; I shall only remark that, if in this case philosophy endeavours to\r\ngain an advantage over mathematics by sophistical artifices, it is because it\r\nforgets that the discussion relates solely to Phenomena and their conditions.\r\nIt is not sufficient to find the conception of the simple for the pure\r\nconception of the composite, but we must discover for the intuition of the\r\ncomposite (matter), the intuition of the simple. Now this, according to the\r\nlaws of sensibility, and consequently in the case of objects of sense, is\r\nutterly impossible. In the case of a whole composed of substances, which is\r\ncogitated solely by the pure understanding, it may be necessary to be in\r\npossession of the simple before composition is possible. But this does not hold\r\ngood of the Totum substantiale phaenomenon, which, as an empirical intuition in\r\nspace, possesses the necessary property of containing no simple part, for the\r\nvery reason that no part of space is simple. Meanwhile, the Monadists have been\r\nsubtle enough to escape from this difficulty, by presupposing intuition and the\r\ndynamical relation of substances as the condition of the possibility of space,\r\ninstead of regarding space as the condition of the possibility of the objects\r\nof external intuition, that is, of bodies. Now we have a conception of bodies\r\nonly as phenomena, and, as such, they necessarily presuppose space as the\r\ncondition of all external phenomena. The evasion is therefore in vain; as,\r\nindeed, we have sufficiently shown in our Æsthetic. If bodies were things in\r\nthemselves, the proof of the Monadists would be unexceptionable.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe second dialectical assertion possesses the peculiarity of having opposed to\r\nit a dogmatical proposition, which, among all such sophistical statements, is\r\nthe only one that undertakes to prove in the case of an object of experience,\r\nthat which is properly a transcendental idea\u0026mdash;the absolute simplicity of\r\nsubstance. The proposition is that the object of the internal sense, the\r\nthinking Ego, is an absolute simple substance. Without at present entering upon\r\nthis subject\u0026mdash;as it has been considered at length in a former\r\nchapter\u0026mdash;I shall merely remark that, if something is cogitated merely as\r\nan object, without the addition of any synthetical determination of its\r\nintuition\u0026mdash;as happens in the case of the bare representation, \u003ci\u003eI\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;it\r\nis certain that no manifold and no composition can be perceived in such a\r\nrepresentation. As, moreover, the predicates whereby I cogitate this object are\r\nmerely intuitions of the internal sense, there cannot be discovered in them\r\nanything to prove the existence of a manifold whose parts are external to each\r\nother, and, consequently, nothing to prove the existence of real composition.\r\nConsciousness, therefore, is so constituted that, inasmuch as the thinking\r\nsubject is at the same time its own object, it cannot divide\r\nitself\u0026mdash;although it can divide its inhering determinations. For every\r\nobject in relation to itself is absolute unity. Nevertheless, if the subject is\r\nregarded externally, as an object of intuition, it must, in its character of\r\nphenomenon, possess the property of composition. And it must always be regarded\r\nin this manner, if we wish to know whether there is or is not contained in it a\r\nmanifold whose parts are external to each other.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nTHIRD CONFLICT OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAS. THESIS.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCausality according to the laws of nature, is not the only causality operating\r\nto originate the phenomena of the world. A causality of freedom is also\r\nnecessary to account fully for these phenomena.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPROOF.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nLet it be supposed, that there is no other kind of causality than that\r\naccording to the laws of nature. Consequently, everything that happens\r\npresupposes a previous condition, which it follows with absolute certainty, in\r\nconformity with a rule. But this previous condition must itself be something\r\nthat has happened (that has arisen in time, as it did not exist before), for,\r\nif it has always been in existence, its consequence or effect would not thus\r\noriginate for the first time, but would likewise have always existed. The\r\ncausality, therefore, of a cause, whereby something happens, is itself a thing\r\nthat has happened. Now this again presupposes, in conformity with the law of\r\nnature, a previous condition and its causality, and this another anterior to\r\nthe former, and so on. If, then, everything happens solely in accordance with\r\nthe laws of nature, there cannot be any real first beginning of things, but\r\nonly a subaltern or comparative beginning. There cannot, therefore, be a\r\ncompleteness of series on the side of the causes which originate the one from\r\nthe other. But the law of nature is that nothing can happen without a\r\nsufficient à priori determined cause. The proposition therefore\u0026mdash;if all\r\ncausality is possible only in accordance with the laws of nature\u0026mdash;is, when\r\nstated in this unlimited and general manner, self-contradictory. It follows\r\nthat this cannot be the only kind of causality.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nFrom what has been said, it follows that a causality must be admitted, by means\r\nof which something happens, without its cause being determined according to\r\nnecessary laws by some other cause preceding. That is to say, there must exist\r\nan absolute spontaneity of cause, which of itself originates a series of\r\nphenomena which proceeds according to natural laws\u0026mdash;consequently\r\ntranscendental freedom, without which even in the course of nature the\r\nsuccession of phenomena on the side of causes is never complete.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nANTITHESIS.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThere is no such thing as freedom, but everything in the world happens solely\r\naccording to the laws of nature.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPROOF.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGranted, that there does exist freedom in the transcendental sense, as a\r\npeculiar kind of causality, operating to produce events in the world\u0026mdash;a\r\nfaculty, that is to say, of originating a state, and consequently a series of\r\nconsequences from that state. In this case, not only the series originated by\r\nthis spontaneity, but the determination of this spontaneity itself to the\r\nproduction of the series, that is to say, the causality itself must have an\r\nabsolute commencement, such that nothing can precede to determine this action\r\naccording to unvarying laws. But every beginning of action presupposes in the\r\nacting cause a state of inaction; and a dynamically primal beginning of action\r\npresupposes a state, which has no connection\u0026mdash;as regards\r\ncausality\u0026mdash;with the preceding state of the cause\u0026mdash;which does not,\r\nthat is, in any wise result from it. Transcendental freedom is therefore\r\nopposed to the natural law of cause and effect, and such a conjunction of\r\nsuccessive states in effective causes is destructive of the possibility of\r\nunity in experience and for that reason not to be found in experience\u0026mdash;is\r\nconsequently a mere fiction of thought.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWe have, therefore, nothing but nature to which we must look for connection and\r\norder in cosmical events. Freedom\u0026mdash;independence of the laws of\r\nnature\u0026mdash;is certainly a deliverance from restraint, but it is also a\r\nrelinquishing of the guidance of law and rule. For it cannot be alleged that,\r\ninstead of the laws of nature, laws of freedom may be introduced into the\r\ncausality of the course of nature. For, if freedom were determined according to\r\nlaws, it would be no longer freedom, but merely nature. Nature, therefore, and\r\ntranscendental freedom are distinguishable as conformity to law and\r\nlawlessness. The former imposes upon understanding the difficulty of seeking\r\nthe origin of events ever higher and higher in the series of causes, inasmuch\r\nas causality is always conditioned thereby; while it compensates this labour by\r\nthe guarantee of a unity complete and in conformity with law. The latter, on\r\nthe contrary, holds out to the understanding the promise of a point of rest in\r\nthe chain of causes, by conducting it to an unconditioned causality, which\r\nprofesses to have the power of spontaneous origination, but which, in its own\r\nutter blindness, deprives it of the guidance of rules, by which alone a\r\ncompletely connected experience is possible.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nOBSERVATIONS ON THE THIRD ANTINOMY. ON THE THESIS.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe transcendental idea of freedom is far from constituting the entire content\r\nof the psychological conception so termed, which is for the most part\r\nempirical. It merely presents us with the conception of spontaneity of action,\r\nas the proper ground for imputing freedom to the cause of a certain class of\r\nobjects. It is, however, the true stumbling-stone to philosophy, which meets\r\nwith unconquerable difficulties in the way of its admitting this kind of\r\nunconditioned causality. That element in the question of the freedom of the\r\nwill, which has for so long a time placed speculative reason in such\r\nperplexity, is properly only transcendental, and concerns the question, whether\r\nthere must be held to exist a faculty of spontaneous origination of a series of\r\nsuccessive things or states. How such a faculty is possible is not a necessary\r\ninquiry; for in the case of natural causality itself, we are obliged to content\r\nourselves with the à priori knowledge that such a causality must be\r\npresupposed, although we are quite incapable of comprehending how the being of\r\none thing is possible through the being of another, but must for this\r\ninformation look entirely to experience. Now we have demonstrated this\r\nnecessity of a free first beginning of a series of phenomena, only in so far as\r\nit is required for the comprehension of an origin of the world, all following\r\nstates being regarded as a succession according to laws of nature alone. But,\r\nas there has thus been proved the existence of a faculty which can of itself\r\noriginate a series in time\u0026mdash;although we are unable to explain how it can\r\nexist\u0026mdash;we feel ourselves authorized to admit, even in the midst of the\r\nnatural course of events, a beginning, as regards causality, of different\r\nsuccessions of phenomena, and at the same time to attribute to all substances a\r\nfaculty of free action. But we ought in this case not to allow ourselves to\r\nfall into a common misunderstanding, and to suppose that, because a successive\r\nseries in the world can only have a comparatively first beginning\u0026mdash;another\r\nstate or condition of things always preceding\u0026mdash;an absolutely first\r\nbeginning of a series in the course of nature is impossible. For we are not\r\nspeaking here of an absolutely first beginning in relation to time, but as\r\nregards causality alone. When, for example, I, completely of my own free will,\r\nand independently of the necessarily determinative influence of natural causes,\r\nrise from my chair, there commences with this event, including its material\r\nconsequences in infinitum, an absolutely new series; although, in relation to\r\ntime, this event is merely the continuation of a preceding series. For this\r\nresolution and act of mine do not form part of the succession of effects in\r\nnature, and are not mere continuations of it; on the contrary, the determining\r\ncauses of nature cease to operate in reference to this event, which certainly\r\nsucceeds the acts of nature, but does not proceed from them. For these reasons,\r\nthe action of a free agent must be termed, in regard to causality, if not in\r\nrelation to time, an absolutely primal beginning of a series of phenomena.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe justification of this need of reason to rest upon a free act as the first\r\nbeginning of the series of natural causes is evident from the fact, that all\r\nphilosophers of antiquity (with the exception of the Epicurean school) felt\r\nthemselves obliged, when constructing a theory of the motions of the universe,\r\nto accept a prime mover, that is, a freely acting cause, which spontaneously\r\nand prior to all other causes evolved this series of states. They always felt\r\nthe need of going beyond mere nature, for the purpose of making a first\r\nbeginning comprehensible.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nON THE ANTITHESIS.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe assertor of the all-sufficiency of nature in regard to causality\r\n(transcendental Physiocracy), in opposition to the doctrine of freedom, would\r\ndefend his view of the question somewhat in the following manner. He would say,\r\nin answer to the sophistical arguments of the opposite party: If you do not\r\naccept a mathematical first, in relation to time, you have no need to seek a\r\ndynamical first, in regard to causality. Who compelled you to imagine an\r\nabsolutely primal condition of the world, and therewith an absolute beginning\r\nof the gradually progressing successions of phenomena\u0026mdash;and, as some\r\nfoundation for this fancy of yours, to set bounds to unlimited nature? Inasmuch\r\nas the substances in the world have always existed\u0026mdash;at least the unity of\r\nexperience renders such a supposition quite necessary\u0026mdash;there is no\r\ndifficulty in believing also, that the changes in the conditions of these\r\nsubstances have always existed; and, consequently, that a first beginning,\r\nmathematical or dynamical, is by no means required. The possibility of such an\r\ninfinite derivation, without any initial member from which all the others\r\nresult, is certainly quite incomprehensible. But, if you are rash enough to\r\ndeny the enigmatical secrets of nature for this reason, you will find\r\nyourselves obliged to deny also the existence of many fundamental properties of\r\nnatural objects (such as fundamental forces), which you can just as little\r\ncomprehend; and even the possibility of so simple a conception as that of\r\nchange must present to you insuperable difficulties. For if experience did not\r\nteach you that it was real, you never could conceive à priori the possibility\r\nof this ceaseless sequence of being and non-being.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut if the existence of a transcendental faculty of freedom is granted\u0026mdash;a\r\nfaculty of originating changes in the world\u0026mdash;this faculty must at least\r\nexist out of and apart from the world; although it is certainly a bold\r\nassumption, that, over and above the complete content of all possible\r\nintuitions, there still exists an object which cannot be presented in any\r\npossible perception. But, to attribute to substances in the world itself such a\r\nfaculty, is quite inadmissible; for, in this case; the connection of phenomena\r\nreciprocally determining and determined according to general laws, which is\r\ntermed nature, and along with it the criteria of empirical truth, which enable\r\nus to distinguish experience from mere visionary dreaming, would almost\r\nentirely disappear. In proximity with such a lawless faculty of freedom, a\r\nsystem of nature is hardly cogitable; for the laws of the latter would be\r\ncontinually subject to the intrusive influences of the former, and the course\r\nof phenomena, which would otherwise proceed regularly and uniformly, would\r\nbecome thereby confused and disconnected.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nFOURTH CONFLICT OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL IDEAS. THESIS.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThere exists either in, or in connection with the world\u0026mdash;either as a part\r\nof it, or as the cause of it\u0026mdash;an absolutely necessary being.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPROOF.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe world of sense, as the sum total of all phenomena, contains a series of\r\nchanges. For, without such a series, the mental representation of the series of\r\ntime itself, as the condition of the possibility of the sensuous world, could\r\nnot be presented to us.\u003ca href=\"#linknote-55\" id=\"linknoteref-55\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[55]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e But every change stands under its\r\ncondition, which precedes it in time and renders it necessary. Now the\r\nexistence of a given condition presupposes a complete series of conditions up\r\nto the absolutely unconditioned, which alone is absolutely necessary. It\r\nfollows that something that is absolutely necessary must exist, if change\r\nexists as its consequence. But this necessary thing itself belongs to the\r\nsensuous world. For suppose it to exist out of and apart from it, the series of\r\ncosmical changes would receive from it a beginning, and yet this necessary\r\ncause would not itself belong to the world of sense. But this is impossible.\r\nFor, as the beginning of a series in time is determined only by that which\r\nprecedes it in time, the supreme condition of the beginning of a series of\r\nchanges must exist in the time in which this series itself did not exist; for a\r\nbeginning supposes a time preceding, in which the thing that begins to be was\r\nnot in existence. The causality of the necessary cause of changes, and\r\nconsequently the cause itself, must for these reasons belong to time\u0026mdash;and\r\nto phenomena, time being possible only as the form of phenomena. Consequently,\r\nit cannot be cogitated as separated from the world of sense\u0026mdash;the sum total\r\nof all phenomena. There is, therefore, contained in the world, something that\r\nis absolutely necessary\u0026mdash;whether it be the whole cosmical series itself,\r\nor only a part of it.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"linknote-55\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#linknoteref-55\"\u003e[55]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nObjectively, time, as the formal condition of the possibility of change,\r\nprecedes all changes; but subjectively, and in consciousness, the\r\nrepresentation of time, like every other, is given solely by occasion of\r\nperception.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nANTITHESIS.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAn absolutely necessary being does not exist, either in the world, or out of\r\nit\u0026mdash;as its cause.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPROOF.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGrant that either the world itself is necessary, or that there is contained in\r\nit a necessary existence. Two cases are possible. First, there must either be\r\nin the series of cosmical changes a beginning, which is unconditionally\r\nnecessary, and therefore uncaused\u0026mdash;which is at variance with the dynamical\r\nlaw of the determination of all phenomena in time; or, secondly, the series\r\nitself is without beginning, and, although contingent and conditioned in all\r\nits parts, is nevertheless absolutely necessary and unconditioned as a\r\nwhole\u0026mdash;which is self-contradictory. For the existence of an aggregate\r\ncannot be necessary, if no single part of it possesses necessary existence.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGrant, on the other hand, that an absolutely necessary cause exists out of and\r\napart from the world. This cause, as the highest member in the series of the\r\ncauses of cosmical changes, must originate or begin\u003ca href=\"#linknote-56\" id=\"linknoteref-56\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[56]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e the existence of\r\nthe latter and their series. In this case it must also begin to act, and its\r\ncausality would therefore belong to time, and consequently to the sum total of\r\nphenomena, that is, to the world. It follows that the cause cannot be out of\r\nthe world; which is contradictory to the hypothesis. Therefore, neither in the\r\nworld, nor out of it (but in causal connection with it), does there exist any\r\nabsolutely necessary being.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"linknote-56\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#linknoteref-56\"\u003e[56]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nThe word begin is taken in two senses. The first is active\u0026mdash;the cause\r\nbeing regarded as beginning a series of conditions as its effect (infit). The\r\nsecond is passive\u0026mdash;the causality in the cause itself beginning to operate\r\n(fit). I reason here from the first to the second.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nOBSERVATIONS ON THE FOURTH ANTINOMY. ON THE THESIS.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nTo demonstrate the existence of a necessary being, I cannot be permitted in\r\nthis place to employ any other than the cosmological argument, which ascends\r\nfrom the conditioned in phenomena to the unconditioned in conception\u0026mdash;the\r\nunconditioned being considered the necessary condition of the absolute totality\r\nof the series. The proof, from the mere idea of a supreme being, belongs to\r\nanother principle of reason and requires separate discussion.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe pure cosmological proof demonstrates the existence of a necessary being,\r\nbut at the same time leaves it quite unsettled, whether this being is the world\r\nitself, or quite distinct from it. To establish the truth of the latter view,\r\nprinciples are requisite, which are not cosmological and do not proceed in the\r\nseries of phenomena. We should require to introduce into our proof conceptions\r\nof contingent beings\u0026mdash;regarded merely as objects of the understanding, and\r\nalso a principle which enables us to connect these, by means of mere\r\nconceptions, with a necessary being. But the proper place for all such\r\narguments is a transcendent philosophy, which has unhappily not yet been\r\nestablished.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut, if we begin our proof cosmologically, by laying at the foundation of it\r\nthe series of phenomena, and the regress in it according to empirical laws of\r\ncausality, we are not at liberty to break off from this mode of demonstration\r\nand to pass over to something which is not itself a member of the series. The\r\ncondition must be taken in exactly the same signification as the relation of\r\nthe conditioned to its condition in the series has been taken, for the series\r\nmust conduct us in an unbroken regress to this supreme condition. But if this\r\nrelation is sensuous, and belongs to the possible empirical employment of\r\nunderstanding, the supreme condition or cause must close the regressive series\r\naccording to the laws of sensibility and consequently, must belong to the\r\nseries of time. It follows that this necessary existence must be regarded as\r\nthe highest member of the cosmical series.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCertain philosophers have, nevertheless, allowed themselves the liberty of\r\nmaking such a saltus (metabasis eis allo gonos). From the changes in the world\r\nthey have concluded their empirical contingency, that is, their dependence on\r\nempirically-determined causes, and they thus admitted an ascending series of\r\nempirical conditions: and in this they are quite right. But as they could not\r\nfind in this series any primal beginning or any highest member, they passed\r\nsuddenly from the empirical conception of contingency to the pure category,\r\nwhich presents us with a series\u0026mdash;not sensuous, but\r\nintellectual\u0026mdash;whose completeness does certainly rest upon the existence of\r\nan absolutely necessary cause. Nay, more, this intellectual series is not tied\r\nto any sensuous conditions; and is therefore free from the condition of time,\r\nwhich requires it spontaneously to begin its causality in time. But such a\r\nprocedure is perfectly inadmissible, as will be made plain from what follows.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIn the pure sense of the categories, that is contingent the contradictory\r\nopposite of which is possible. Now we cannot reason from empirical contingency\r\nto intellectual. The opposite of that which is changed\u0026mdash;the opposite of\r\nits state\u0026mdash;is actual at another time, and is therefore possible.\r\nConsequently, it is not the contradictory opposite of the former state. To be\r\nthat, it is necessary that, in the same time in which the preceding state\r\nexisted, its opposite could have existed in its place; but such a cognition is\r\nnot given us in the mere phenomenon of change. A body that was in motion = A,\r\ncomes into a state of rest = non-A. Now it cannot be concluded from the fact\r\nthat a state opposite to the state A follows it, that the contradictory\r\nopposite of A is possible; and that A is therefore contingent. To prove this,\r\nwe should require to know that the state of rest could have existed in the very\r\nsame time in which the motion took place. Now we know nothing more than that\r\nthe state of rest was actual in the time that followed the state of motion;\r\nconsequently, that it was also possible. But motion at one time, and rest at\r\nanother time, are not contradictorily opposed to each other. It follows from\r\nwhat has been said that the succession of opposite determinations, that is,\r\nchange, does not demonstrate the fact of contingency as represented in the\r\nconceptions of the pure understanding; and that it cannot, therefore, conduct\r\nus to the fact of the existence of a necessary being. Change proves merely\r\nempirical contingency, that is to say, that the new state could not have\r\nexisted without a cause, which belongs to the preceding time. This\r\ncause\u0026mdash;even although it is regarded as absolutely necessary\u0026mdash;must be\r\npresented to us in time, and must belong to the series of phenomena.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nON THE ANTITHESIS.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe difficulties which meet us, in our attempt to rise through the series of\r\nphenomena to the existence of an absolutely necessary supreme cause, must not\r\noriginate from our inability to establish the truth of our mere conceptions of\r\nthe necessary existence of a thing. That is to say, our objections not be\r\nontological, but must be directed against the causal connection with a series\r\nof phenomena of a condition which is itself unconditioned. In one word, they\r\nmust be cosmological and relate to empirical laws. We must show that the\r\nregress in the series of causes (in the world of sense) cannot conclude with an\r\nempirically unconditioned condition, and that the cosmological argument from\r\nthe contingency of the cosmical state\u0026mdash;a contingency alleged to arise from\r\nchange\u0026mdash;does not justify us in accepting a first cause, that is, a prime\r\noriginator of the cosmical series.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe reader will observe in this antinomy a very remarkable contrast. The very\r\nsame grounds of proof which established in the thesis the existence of a\r\nsupreme being, demonstrated in the antithesis\u0026mdash;and with equal\r\nstrictness\u0026mdash;the non-existence of such a being. We found, first, that a\r\nnecessary being exists, because the whole time past contains the series of all\r\nconditions, and with it, therefore, the unconditioned (the necessary);\r\nsecondly, that there does not exist any necessary being, for the same reason,\r\nthat the whole time past contains the series of all conditions\u0026mdash;which are\r\nthemselves, therefore, in the aggregate, conditioned. The cause of this seeming\r\nincongruity is as follows. We attend, in the first argument, solely to the\r\nabsolute totality of the series of conditions, the one of which determines the\r\nother in time, and thus arrive at a necessary unconditioned. In the second, we\r\nconsider, on the contrary, the contingency of everything that is determined in\r\nthe series of time\u0026mdash;for every event is preceded by a time, in which the\r\ncondition itself must be determined as conditioned\u0026mdash;and thus everything\r\nthat is unconditioned or absolutely necessary disappears. In both, the mode of\r\nproof is quite in accordance with the common procedure of human reason, which\r\noften falls into discord with itself, from considering an object from two\r\ndifferent points of view. Herr von Mairan regarded the controversy between two\r\ncelebrated astronomers, which arose from a similar difficulty as to the choice\r\nof a proper standpoint, as a phenomenon of sufficient importance to warrant a\r\nseparate treatise on the subject. The one concluded: the moon revolves on its\r\nown axis, because it constantly presents the same side to the earth; the other\r\ndeclared that the moon does not revolve on its own axis, for the same reason.\r\nBoth conclusions were perfectly correct, according to the point of view from\r\nwhich the motions of the moon were considered.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003ca id=\"chap76\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eSection III. Of the Interest of Reason in these\r\nSelf-contradictions\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWe have thus completely before us the dialectical procedure of the cosmological\r\nideas. No possible experience can present us with an object adequate to them in\r\nextent. Nay, more, reason itself cannot cogitate them as according with the\r\ngeneral laws of experience. And yet they are not arbitrary fictions of thought.\r\nOn the contrary, reason, in its uninterrupted progress in the empirical\r\nsynthesis, is necessarily conducted to them, when it endeavours to free from\r\nall conditions and to comprehend in its unconditioned totality that which can\r\nonly be determined conditionally in accordance with the laws of experience.\r\nThese dialectical propositions are so many attempts to solve four natural and\r\nunavoidable problems of reason. There are neither more, nor can there be less,\r\nthan this number, because there are no other series of synthetical hypotheses,\r\nlimiting à priori the empirical synthesis.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe brilliant claims of reason striving to extend its dominion beyond the\r\nlimits of experience, have been represented above only in dry formulae, which\r\ncontain merely the grounds of its pretensions. They have, besides, in\r\nconformity with the character of a transcendental philosophy, been freed from\r\nevery empirical element; although the full splendour of the promises they hold\r\nout, and the anticipations they excite, manifests itself only when in\r\nconnection with empirical cognitions. In the application of them, however, and\r\nin the advancing enlargement of the employment of reason, while struggling to\r\nrise from the region of experience and to soar to those sublime ideas,\r\nphilosophy discovers a value and a dignity, which, if it could but make good\r\nits assertions, would raise it far above all other departments of human\r\nknowledge\u0026mdash;professing, as it does, to present a sure foundation for our\r\nhighest hopes and the ultimate aims of all the exertions of reason. The\r\nquestions: whether the world has a beginning and a limit to its extension in\r\nspace; whether there exists anywhere, or perhaps, in my own thinking Self, an\r\nindivisible and indestructible unity\u0026mdash;or whether nothing but what is\r\ndivisible and transitory exists; whether I am a free agent, or, like other\r\nbeings, am bound in the chains of nature and fate; whether, finally, there is a\r\nsupreme cause of the world, or all our thought and speculation must end with\r\nnature and the order of external things\u0026mdash;are questions for the solution of\r\nwhich the mathematician would willingly exchange his whole science; for in it\r\nthere is no satisfaction for the highest aspirations and most ardent desires of\r\nhumanity. Nay, it may even be said that the true value of\r\nmathematics\u0026mdash;that pride of human reason\u0026mdash;consists in this: that she\r\nguides reason to the knowledge of nature\u0026mdash;in her greater as well as in her\r\nless manifestations\u0026mdash;in her beautiful order and regularity\u0026mdash;guides\r\nher, moreover, to an insight into the wonderful unity of the moving forces in\r\nthe operations of nature, far beyond the expectations of a philosophy building\r\nonly on experience; and that she thus encourages philosophy to extend the\r\nprovince of reason beyond all experience, and at the same time provides it with\r\nthe most excellent materials for supporting its investigations, in so far as\r\ntheir nature admits, by adequate and accordant intuitions.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nUnfortunately for speculation\u0026mdash;but perhaps fortunately for the practical\r\ninterests of humanity\u0026mdash;reason, in the midst of her highest anticipations,\r\nfinds herself hemmed in by a press of opposite and contradictory conclusions,\r\nfrom which neither her honour nor her safety will permit her to draw back. Nor\r\ncan she regard these conflicting trains of reasoning with indifference as mere\r\npassages at arms, still less can she command peace; for in the subject of the\r\nconflict she has a deep interest. There is no other course left open to her\r\nthan to reflect with herself upon the origin of this disunion in\r\nreason\u0026mdash;whether it may not arise from a mere misunderstanding. After such\r\nan inquiry, arrogant claims would have to be given up on both sides; but the\r\nsovereignty of reason over understanding and sense would be based upon a sure\r\nfoundation.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWe shall at present defer this radical inquiry and, in the meantime, consider\r\nfor a little what side in the controversy we should most willingly take, if we\r\nwere obliged to become partisans at all. As, in this case, we leave out of\r\nsight altogether the logical criterion of truth, and merely consult our own\r\ninterest in reference to the question, these considerations, although\r\ninadequate to settle the question of right in either party, will enable us to\r\ncomprehend how those who have taken part in the struggle, adopt the one view\r\nrather than the other\u0026mdash;no special insight into the subject, however,\r\nhaving influenced their choice. They will, at the same time, explain to us many\r\nother things by the way\u0026mdash;for example, the fiery zeal on the one side and\r\nthe cold maintenance of their cause on the other; why the one party has met\r\nwith the warmest approbations, and the other has always been repulsed by\r\nirreconcilable prejudices.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThere is one thing, however, that determines the proper point of view, from\r\nwhich alone this preliminary inquiry can be instituted and carried on with the\r\nproper completeness\u0026mdash;and that is the comparison of the principles from\r\nwhich both sides, thesis and antithesis, proceed. My readers would remark in\r\nthe propositions of the antithesis a complete uniformity in the mode of thought\r\nand a perfect unity of principle. Its principle was that of pure empiricism,\r\nnot only in the explication of the phenomena in the world, but also in the\r\nsolution of the transcendental ideas, even of that of the universe itself. The\r\naffirmations of the thesis, on the contrary, were based, in addition to the\r\nempirical mode of explanation employed in the series of phenomena, on\r\nintellectual propositions; and its principles were in so far not simple. I\r\nshall term the thesis, in view of its essential characteristic, the dogmatism\r\nof pure reason.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nOn the side of Dogmatism, or of the thesis, therefore, in the determination of\r\nthe cosmological ideas, we find:\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n1. A practical interest, which must be very dear to every right-thinking man.\r\nThat the word has a beginning\u0026mdash;that the nature of my thinking self is\r\nsimple, and therefore indestructible\u0026mdash;that I am a free agent, and raised\r\nabove the compulsion of nature and her laws\u0026mdash;and, finally, that the entire\r\norder of things, which form the world, is dependent upon a Supreme Being, from\r\nwhom the whole receives unity and connection\u0026mdash;these are so many\r\nfoundation-stones of morality and religion. The antithesis deprives us of all\r\nthese supports\u0026mdash;or, at least, seems so to deprive us.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n2. A speculative interest of reason manifests itself on this side. For, if we\r\ntake the transcendental ideas and employ them in the manner which the thesis\r\ndirects, we can exhibit completely à priori the entire chain of conditions, and\r\nunderstand the derivation of the conditioned\u0026mdash;beginning from the\r\nunconditioned. This the antithesis does not do; and for this reason does not\r\nmeet with so welcome a reception. For it can give no answer to our question\r\nrespecting the conditions of its synthesis\u0026mdash;except such as must be\r\nsupplemented by another question, and so on to infinity. According to it, we\r\nmust rise from a given beginning to one still higher; every part conducts us to\r\na still smaller one; every event is preceded by another event which is its\r\ncause; and the conditions of existence rest always upon other and still higher\r\nconditions, and find neither end nor basis in some self-subsistent thing as the\r\nprimal being.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n3. This side has also the advantage of popularity; and this constitutes no\r\nsmall part of its claim to favour. The common understanding does not find the\r\nleast difficulty in the idea of the unconditioned beginning of all\r\nsynthesis\u0026mdash;accustomed, as it is, rather to follow our consequences than to\r\nseek for a proper basis for cognition. In the conception of an absolute first,\r\nmoreover\u0026mdash;the possibility of which it does not inquire into\u0026mdash;it is\r\nhighly gratified to find a firmly-established point of departure for its\r\nattempts at theory; while in the restless and continuous ascent from the\r\nconditioned to the condition, always with one foot in the air, it can find no\r\nsatisfaction.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nOn the side of the antithesis, or Empiricism, in the determination of the\r\ncosmological ideas:\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n1. We cannot discover any such practical interest arising from pure principles\r\nof reason as morality and religion present. On the contrary, pure empiricism\r\nseems to empty them of all their power and influence. If there does not exist a\r\nSupreme Being distinct from the world\u0026mdash;if the world is without beginning,\r\nconsequently without a Creator\u0026mdash;if our wills are not free, and the soul is\r\ndivisible and subject to corruption just like matter\u0026mdash;the ideas and\r\nprinciples of morality lose all validity and fall with the transcendental ideas\r\nwhich constituted their theoretical support.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n2. But empiricism, in compensation, holds out to reason, in its speculative\r\ninterests, certain important advantages, far exceeding any that the dogmatist\r\ncan promise us. For, when employed by the empiricist, understanding is always\r\nupon its proper ground of investigation\u0026mdash;the field of possible experience,\r\nthe laws of which it can explore, and thus extend its cognition securely and\r\nwith clear intelligence without being stopped by limits in any direction. Here\r\ncan it and ought it to find and present to intuition its proper\r\nobject\u0026mdash;not only in itself, but in all its relations; or, if it employ\r\nconceptions, upon this ground it can always present the corresponding images in\r\nclear and unmistakable intuitions. It is quite unnecessary for it to renounce\r\nthe guidance of nature, to attach itself to ideas, the objects of which it\r\ncannot know; because, as mere intellectual entities, they cannot be presented\r\nin any intuition. On the contrary, it is not even permitted to abandon its\r\nproper occupation, under the pretence that it has been brought to a conclusion\r\n(for it never can be), and to pass into the region of idealizing reason and\r\ntranscendent conceptions, which it is not required to observe and explore the\r\nlaws of nature, but merely to think and to imagine\u0026mdash;secure from being\r\ncontradicted by facts, because they have not been called as witnesses, but\r\npassed by, or perhaps subordinated to the so-called higher interests and\r\nconsiderations of pure reason.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHence the empiricist will never allow himself to accept any epoch of nature for\r\nthe first\u0026mdash;the absolutely primal state; he will not believe that there can\r\nbe limits to his outlook into her wide domains, nor pass from the objects of\r\nnature, which he can satisfactorily explain by means of observation and\r\nmathematical thought\u0026mdash;which he can determine synthetically in intuition,\r\nto those which neither sense nor imagination can ever present in concreto; he\r\nwill not concede the existence of a faculty in nature, operating independently\r\nof the laws of nature\u0026mdash;a concession which would introduce uncertainty into\r\nthe procedure of the understanding, which is guided by necessary laws to the\r\nobservation of phenomena; nor, finally, will he permit himself to seek a cause\r\nbeyond nature, inasmuch as we know nothing but it, and from it alone receive an\r\nobjective basis for all our conceptions and instruction in the unvarying laws\r\nof things.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIn truth, if the empirical philosopher had no other purpose in the\r\nestablishment of his antithesis than to check the presumption of a reason which\r\nmistakes its true destination, which boasts of its insight and its knowledge,\r\njust where all insight and knowledge cease to exist, and regards that which is\r\nvalid only in relation to a practical interest, as an advancement of the\r\nspeculative interests of the mind (in order, when it is convenient for itself,\r\nto break the thread of our physical investigations, and, under pretence of\r\nextending our cognition, connect them with transcendental ideas, by means of\r\nwhich we really know only that we know nothing)\u0026mdash;if, I say, the empiricist\r\nrested satisfied with this benefit, the principle advanced by him would be a\r\nmaxim recommending moderation in the pretensions of reason and modesty in its\r\naffirmations, and at the same time would direct us to the right mode of\r\nextending the province of the understanding, by the help of the only true\r\nteacher, experience. In obedience to this advice, intellectual hypotheses and\r\nfaith would not be called in aid of our practical interests; nor should we\r\nintroduce them under the pompous titles of science and insight. For speculative\r\ncognition cannot find an objective basis any other where than in experience;\r\nand, when we overstep its limits our synthesis, which requires ever new\r\ncognitions independent of experience, has no substratum of intuition upon which\r\nto build.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut if\u0026mdash;as often happens\u0026mdash;empiricism, in relation to ideas, becomes\r\nitself dogmatic and boldly denies that which is above the sphere of its\r\nphenomenal cognition, it falls itself into the error of intemperance\u0026mdash;an\r\nerror which is here all the more reprehensible, as thereby the practical\r\ninterest of reason receives an irreparable injury.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAnd this constitutes the opposition between Epicureanism\u003ca href=\"#linknote-57\" id=\"linknoteref-57\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[57]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e and Platonism.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"linknote-57\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#linknoteref-57\"\u003e[57]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nIt is, however, still a matter of doubt whether Epicurus ever propounded these\r\nprinciples as directions for the objective employment of the understanding. If,\r\nindeed, they were nothing more than maxims for the speculative exercise of\r\nreason, he gives evidence therein a more genuine philosophic spirit than any of\r\nthe philosophers of antiquity. That, in the explanation of phenomena, we must\r\nproceed as if the field of inquiry had neither limits in space nor commencement\r\nin time; that we must be satisfied with the teaching of experience in reference\r\nto the material of which the world is posed; that we must not look for any\r\nother mode of the origination of events than that which is determined by the\r\nunalterable laws of nature; and finally, that we not employ the hypothesis of a\r\ncause distinct from the world to account for a phenomenon or for the world\r\nitself\u0026mdash;are principles for the extension of speculative philosophy, and\r\nthe discovery of the true sources of the principles of morals, which, however\r\nlittle conformed to in the present day, are undoubtedly correct. At the same\r\ntime, any one desirous of ignoring, in mere speculation, these dogmatical\r\npropositions, need not for that reason be accused of denying them.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBoth Epicurus and Plato assert more in their systems than they know. The former\r\nencourages and advances science\u0026mdash;although to the prejudice of the\r\npractical; the latter presents us with excellent principles for the\r\ninvestigation of the practical, but, in relation to everything regarding which\r\nwe can attain to speculative cognition, permits reason to append idealistic\r\nexplanations of natural phenomena, to the great injury of physical\r\ninvestigation.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n3. In regard to the third motive for the preliminary choice of a party in this\r\nwar of assertions, it seems very extraordinary that empiricism should be\r\nutterly unpopular. We should be inclined to believe that the common\r\nunderstanding would receive it with pleasure\u0026mdash;promising as it does to\r\nsatisfy it without passing the bounds of experience and its connected order;\r\nwhile transcendental dogmatism obliges it to rise to conceptions which far\r\nsurpass the intelligence and ability of the most practised thinkers. But in\r\nthis, in truth, is to be found its real motive. For the common understanding\r\nthus finds itself in a situation where not even the most learned can have the\r\nadvantage of it. If it understands little or nothing about these transcendental\r\nconceptions, no one can boast of understanding any more; and although it may\r\nnot express itself in so scholastically correct a manner as others, it can busy\r\nitself with reasoning and arguments without end, wandering among mere ideas,\r\nabout which one can always be very eloquent, because we know nothing about\r\nthem; while, in the observation and investigation of nature, it would be forced\r\nto remain dumb and to confess its utter ignorance. Thus indolence and vanity\r\nform of themselves strong recommendations of these principles. Besides,\r\nalthough it is a hard thing for a philosopher to assume a principle, of which\r\nhe can give to himself no reasonable account, and still more to employ\r\nconceptions, the objective reality of which cannot be established, nothing is\r\nmore usual with the common understanding. It wants something which will allow\r\nit to go to work with confidence. The difficulty of even comprehending a\r\nsupposition does not disquiet it, because\u0026mdash;not knowing what comprehending\r\nmeans\u0026mdash;it never even thinks of the supposition it may be adopting as a\r\nprinciple; and regards as known that with which it has become familiar from\r\nconstant use. And, at last, all speculative interests disappear before the\r\npractical interests which it holds dear; and it fancies that it understands and\r\nknows what its necessities and hopes incite it to assume or to believe. Thus\r\nthe empiricism of transcendentally idealizing reason is robbed of all\r\npopularity; and, however prejudicial it may be to the highest practical\r\nprinciples, there is no fear that it will ever pass the limits of the schools,\r\nor acquire any favour or influence in society or with the multitude.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHuman reason is by nature architectonic. That is to say, it regards all\r\ncognitions as parts of a possible system, and hence accepts only such\r\nprinciples as at least do not incapacitate a cognition to which we may have\r\nattained from being placed along with others in a general system. But the\r\npropositions of the antithesis are of a character which renders the completion\r\nof an edifice of cognitions impossible. According to these, beyond one state or\r\nepoch of the world there is always to be found one more ancient; in every part\r\nalways other parts themselves divisible; preceding every event another, the\r\norigin of which must itself be sought still higher; and everything in existence\r\nis conditioned, and still not dependent on an unconditioned and primal\r\nexistence. As, therefore, the antithesis will not concede the existence of a\r\nfirst beginning which might be available as a foundation, a complete edifice of\r\ncognition, in the presence of such hypothesis, is utterly impossible. Thus the\r\narchitectonic interest of reason, which requires a unity\u0026mdash;not empirical,\r\nbut à priori and rational\u0026mdash;forms a natural recommendation for the\r\nassertions of the thesis in our antinomy.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut if any one could free himself entirely from all considerations of interest,\r\nand weigh without partiality the assertions of reason, attending only to their\r\ncontent, irrespective of the consequences which follow from them; such a\r\nperson, on the supposition that he knew no other way out of the confusion than\r\nto settle the truth of one or other of the conflicting doctrines, would live in\r\na state of continual hesitation. Today, he would feel convinced that the human\r\nwill is free; to-morrow, considering the indissoluble chain of nature, he would\r\nlook on freedom as a mere illusion and declare nature to be all-in-all. But, if\r\nhe were called to action, the play of the merely speculative reason would\r\ndisappear like the shapes of a dream, and practical interest would dictate his\r\nchoice of principles. But, as it well befits a reflective and inquiring being\r\nto devote certain periods of time to the examination of its own reason\u0026mdash;to\r\ndivest itself of all partiality, and frankly to communicate its observations\r\nfor the judgement and opinion of others; so no one can be blamed for, much less\r\nprevented from, placing both parties on their trial, with permission to end\r\nthemselves, free from intimidation, before intimidation, before a sworn jury of\r\nequal condition with themselves\u0026mdash;the condition of weak and fallible men.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003ca id=\"chap77\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eSection IV. Of the necessity imposed upon Pure Reason\r\nof presenting a Solution of its Transcendental Problems\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nTo avow an ability to solve all problems and to answer all questions would be a\r\nprofession certain to convict any philosopher of extravagant boasting and\r\nself-conceit, and at once to destroy the confidence that might otherwise have\r\nbeen reposed in him. There are, however, sciences so constituted that every\r\nquestion arising within their sphere must necessarily be capable of receiving\r\nan answer from the knowledge already possessed, for the answer must be received\r\nfrom the same sources whence the question arose. In such sciences it is not\r\nallowable to excuse ourselves on the plea of necessary and unavoidable\r\nignorance; a solution is absolutely requisite. The rule of right and wrong must\r\nhelp us to the knowledge of what is right or wrong in all possible cases;\r\notherwise, the idea of obligation or duty would be utterly null, for we cannot\r\nhave any obligation to that which we cannot know. On the other hand, in our\r\ninvestigations of the phenomena of nature, much must remain uncertain, and many\r\nquestions continue insoluble; because what we know of nature is far from being\r\nsufficient to explain all the phenomena that are presented to our observation.\r\nNow the question is: Whether there is in transcendental philosophy any\r\nquestion, relating to an object presented to pure reason, which is unanswerable\r\nby this reason; and whether we must regard the subject of the question as quite\r\nuncertain, so far as our knowledge extends, and must give it a place among\r\nthose subjects, of which we have just so much conception as is sufficient to\r\nenable us to raise a question\u0026mdash;faculty or materials failing us, however,\r\nwhen we attempt an answer.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nNow I maintain that, among all speculative cognition, the peculiarity of\r\ntranscendental philosophy is that there is no question, relating to an object\r\npresented to pure reason, which is insoluble by this reason; and that the\r\nprofession of unavoidable ignorance\u0026mdash;the problem being alleged to be\r\nbeyond the reach of our faculties\u0026mdash;cannot free us from the obligation to\r\npresent a complete and satisfactory answer. For the very conception which\r\nenables us to raise the question must give us the power of answering it;\r\ninasmuch as the object, as in the case of right and wrong, is not to be\r\ndiscovered out of the conception.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut, in transcendental philosophy, it is only the cosmological questions to\r\nwhich we can demand a satisfactory answer in relation to the constitution of\r\ntheir object; and the philosopher is not permitted to avail himself of the\r\npretext of necessary ignorance and impenetrable obscurity. These questions\r\nrelate solely to the cosmological ideas. For the object must be given in\r\nexperience, and the question relates to the adequateness of the object to an\r\nidea. If the object is transcendental and therefore itself unknown; if the\r\nquestion, for example, is whether the object\u0026mdash;the something, the\r\nphenomenon of which (internal\u0026mdash;in ourselves) is thought\u0026mdash;that is to\r\nsay, the soul, is in itself a simple being; or whether there is a cause of all\r\nthings, which is absolutely necessary\u0026mdash;in such cases we are seeking for\r\nour idea an object, of which we may confess that it is unknown to us, though we\r\nmust not on that account assert that it is impossible.\u003ca href=\"#linknote-58\" id=\"linknoteref-58\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[58]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The cosmological\r\nideas alone posses the peculiarity that we can presuppose the object of them\r\nand the empirical synthesis requisite for the conception of that object to be\r\ngiven; and the question, which arises from these ideas, relates merely to the\r\nprogress of this synthesis, in so far as it must contain absolute\r\ntotality\u0026mdash;which, however, is not empirical, as it cannot be given in any\r\nexperience. Now, as the question here is solely in regard to a thing as the\r\nobject of a possible experience and not as a thing in itself, the answer to the\r\ntranscendental cosmological question need not be sought out of the idea, for\r\nthe question does not regard an object in itself. The question in relation to a\r\npossible experience is not, \u0026ldquo;What can be given in an experience in\r\nconcreto\u0026rdquo; but \u0026ldquo;what is contained in the idea, to which the\r\nempirical synthesis must approximate.\u0026rdquo; The question must therefore be\r\ncapable of solution from the idea alone. For the idea is a creation of reason\r\nitself, which therefore cannot disclaim the obligation to answer or refer us to\r\nthe unknown object.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"linknote-58\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#linknoteref-58\"\u003e[58]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nThe question, \u0026ldquo;What is the constitution of a transcendental\r\nobject?\u0026rdquo; is unanswerable\u0026mdash;we are unable to say what it is; but we\r\ncan perceive that the question itself is nothing; because it does not relate to\r\nany object that can be presented to us. For this reason, we must consider all\r\nthe questions raised in transcendental psychology as answerable and as really\r\nanswered; for they relate to the transcendental subject of all internal\r\nphenomena, which is not itself phenomenon and consequently not given as an\r\nobject, in which, moreover, none of the categories\u0026mdash;and it is to them that\r\nthe question is properly directed\u0026mdash;find any conditions of its application.\r\nHere, therefore, is a case where no answer is the only proper answer. For a\r\nquestion regarding the constitution of a something which cannot be cogitated by\r\nany determined predicate, being completely beyond the sphere of objects and\r\nexperience, is perfectly null and void.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIt is not so extraordinary, as it at first sight appears, that a science should\r\ndemand and expect satisfactory answers to all the questions that may arise\r\nwithin its own sphere (questiones domesticae), although, up to a certain time,\r\nthese answers may not have been discovered. There are, in addition to\r\ntranscendental philosophy, only two pure sciences of reason; the one with a\r\nspeculative, the other with a practical content\u0026mdash;pure mathematics and pure\r\nethics. Has any one ever heard it alleged that, from our complete and necessary\r\nignorance of the conditions, it is uncertain what exact relation the diameter\r\nof a circle bears to the circle in rational or irrational numbers? By the\r\nformer the sum cannot be given exactly, by the latter only approximately; and\r\ntherefore we decide that the impossibility of a solution of the question is\r\nevident. Lambert presented us with a demonstration of this. In the general\r\nprinciples of morals there can be nothing uncertain, for the propositions are\r\neither utterly without meaning, or must originate solely in our rational\r\nconceptions. On the other hand, there must be in physical science an infinite\r\nnumber of conjectures, which can never become certainties; because the\r\nphenomena of nature are not given as objects dependent on our conceptions. The\r\nkey to the solution of such questions cannot, therefore, be found in our\r\nconceptions, or in pure thought, but must lie without us and for that reason is\r\nin many cases not to be discovered; and consequently a satisfactory explanation\r\ncannot be expected. The questions of transcendental analytic, which relate to\r\nthe deduction of our pure cognition, are not to be regarded as of the same kind\r\nas those mentioned above; for we are not at present treating of the certainty\r\nof judgements in relation to the origin of our conceptions, but only of that\r\ncertainty in relation to objects.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWe cannot, therefore, escape the responsibility of at least a critical solution\r\nof the questions of reason, by complaints of the limited nature of our\r\nfaculties, and the seemingly humble confession that it is beyond the power of\r\nour reason to decide, whether the world has existed from all eternity or had a\r\nbeginning\u0026mdash;whether it is infinitely extended, or enclosed within certain\r\nlimits\u0026mdash;whether anything in the world is simple, or whether everything\r\nmust be capable of infinite divisibility\u0026mdash;whether freedom can originate\r\nphenomena, or whether everything is absolutely dependent on the laws and order\r\nof nature\u0026mdash;and, finally, whether there exists a being that is completely\r\nunconditioned and necessary, or whether the existence of everything is\r\nconditioned and consequently dependent on something external to itself, and\r\ntherefore in its own nature contingent. For all these questions relate to an\r\nobject, which can be given nowhere else than in thought. This object is the\r\nabsolutely unconditioned totality of the synthesis of phenomena. If the\r\nconceptions in our minds do not assist us to some certain result in regard to\r\nthese problems, we must not defend ourselves on the plea that the object itself\r\nremains hidden from and unknown to us. For no such thing or object can be\r\ngiven\u0026mdash;it is not to be found out of the idea in our minds. We must seek\r\nthe cause of our failure in our idea itself, which is an insoluble problem and\r\nin regard to which we obstinately assume that there exists a real object\r\ncorresponding and adequate to it. A clear explanation of the dialectic which\r\nlies in our conception, will very soon enable us to come to a satisfactory\r\ndecision in regard to such a question.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe pretext that we are unable to arrive at certainty in regard to these\r\nproblems may be met with this question, which requires at least a plain answer:\r\n\u0026ldquo;From what source do the ideas originate, the solution of which involves\r\nyou in such difficulties? Are you seeking for an explanation of certain\r\nphenomena; and do you expect these ideas to give you the principles or the\r\nrules of this explanation?\u0026rdquo; Let it be granted, that all nature was laid\r\nopen before you; that nothing was hid from your senses and your consciousness.\r\nStill, you could not cognize in concreto the object of your ideas in any\r\nexperience. For what is demanded is not only this full and complete intuition,\r\nbut also a complete synthesis and the consciousness of its absolute totality;\r\nand this is not possible by means of any empirical cognition. It follows that\r\nyour question\u0026mdash;your idea\u0026mdash;is by no means necessary for the\r\nexplanation of any phenomenon; and the idea cannot have been in any sense given\r\nby the object itself. For such an object can never be presented to us, because\r\nit cannot be given by any possible experience. Whatever perceptions you may\r\nattain to, you are still surrounded by conditions\u0026mdash;in space, or in\r\ntime\u0026mdash;and you cannot discover anything unconditioned; nor can you decide\r\nwhether this unconditioned is to be placed in an absolute beginning of the\r\nsynthesis, or in an absolute totality of the series without beginning. A whole,\r\nin the empirical signification of the term, is always merely comparative. The\r\nabsolute whole of quantity (the universe), of division, of derivation, of the\r\ncondition of existence, with the question\u0026mdash;whether it is to be produced by\r\nfinite or infinite synthesis, no possible experience can instruct us\r\nconcerning. You will not, for example, be able to explain the phenomena of a\r\nbody in the least degree better, whether you believe it to consist of simple,\r\nor of composite parts; for a simple phenomenon\u0026mdash;and just as little an\r\ninfinite series of composition\u0026mdash;can never be presented to your perception.\r\nPhenomena require and admit of explanation, only in so far as the conditions of\r\nthat explanation are given in perception; but the sum total of that which is\r\ngiven in phenomena, considered as an absolute whole, is itself a\r\nperception\u0026mdash;and we cannot therefore seek for explanations of this whole\r\nbeyond itself, in other perceptions. The explanation of this whole is the\r\nproper object of the transcendental problems of pure reason.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAlthough, therefore, the solution of these problems is unattainable through\r\nexperience, we must not permit ourselves to say that it is uncertain how the\r\nobject of our inquiries is constituted. For the object is in our own mind and\r\ncannot be discovered in experience; and we have only to take care that our\r\nthoughts are consistent with each other, and to avoid falling into the\r\namphiboly of regarding our idea as a representation of an object empirically\r\ngiven, and therefore to be cognized according to the laws of experience. A\r\ndogmatical solution is therefore not only unsatisfactory but impossible. The\r\ncritical solution, which may be a perfectly certain one, does not consider the\r\nquestion objectively, but proceeds by inquiring into the basis of the cognition\r\nupon which the question rests.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003ca id=\"chap78\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eSection V. Sceptical Exposition of the Cosmological\r\nProblems presented in the four Transcendental Ideas\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWe should be quite willing to desist from the demand of a dogmatical answer to\r\nour questions, if we understood beforehand that, be the answer what it may, it\r\nwould only serve to increase our ignorance, to throw us from one\r\nincomprehensibility into another, from one obscurity into another still\r\ngreater, and perhaps lead us into irreconcilable contradictions. If a\r\ndogmatical affirmative or negative answer is demanded, is it at all prudent to\r\nset aside the probable grounds of a solution which lie before us and to take\r\ninto consideration what advantage we shall gain, if the answer is to favour the\r\none side or the other? If it happens that in both cases the answer is mere\r\nnonsense, we have in this an irresistible summons to institute a critical\r\ninvestigation of the question, for the purpose of discovering whether it is\r\nbased on a groundless presupposition and relates to an idea, the falsity of\r\nwhich would be more easily exposed in its application and consequences than in\r\nthe mere representation of its content. This is the great utility of the\r\nsceptical mode of treating the questions addressed by pure reason to itself. By\r\nthis method we easily rid ourselves of the confusions of dogmatism, and\r\nestablish in its place a temperate criticism, which, as a genuine cathartic,\r\nwill successfully remove the presumptuous notions of philosophy and their\r\nconsequence\u0026mdash;the vain pretension to universal science.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIf, then, I could understand the nature of a cosmological idea and perceive,\r\nbefore I entered on the discussion of the subject at all, that, whatever side\r\nof the question regarding the unconditioned of the regressive synthesis of\r\nphenomena it favoured\u0026mdash;it must either be too great or too small for every\r\nconception of the understanding\u0026mdash;I would be able to comprehend how the\r\nidea, which relates to an object of experience\u0026mdash;an experience which must\r\nbe adequate to and in accordance with a possible conception of the\r\nunderstanding\u0026mdash;must be completely void and without significance, inasmuch\r\nas its object is inadequate, consider it as we may. And this is actually the\r\ncase with all cosmological conceptions, which, for the reason above mentioned,\r\ninvolve reason, so long as it remains attached to them, in an unavoidable\r\nantinomy. For suppose:\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nFirst, that the world has no beginning\u0026mdash;in this case it is too large for\r\nour conception; for this conception, which consists in a successive regress,\r\ncannot overtake the whole eternity that has elapsed. Grant that it has a\r\nbeginning, it is then too small for the conception of the understanding. For,\r\nas a beginning presupposes a time preceding, it cannot be unconditioned; and\r\nthe law of the empirical employment of the understanding imposes the necessity\r\nof looking for a higher condition of time; and the world is, therefore,\r\nevidently too small for this law.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe same is the case with the double answer to the question regarding the\r\nextent, in space, of the world. For, if it is infinite and unlimited, it must\r\nbe too large for every possible empirical conception. If it is finite and\r\nlimited, we have a right to ask: \u0026ldquo;What determines these limits?\u0026rdquo;\r\nVoid space is not a self-subsistent correlate of things, and cannot be a final\r\ncondition\u0026mdash;and still less an empirical condition, forming a part of a\r\npossible experience. For how can we have any experience or perception of an\r\nabsolute void? But the absolute totality of the empirical synthesis requires\r\nthat the unconditioned be an empirical conception. Consequently, a finite world\r\nis too small for our conception.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSecondly, if every phenomenon (matter) in space consists of an infinite number\r\nof parts, the regress of the division is always too great for our conception;\r\nand if the division of space must cease with some member of the division (the\r\nsimple), it is too small for the idea of the unconditioned. For the member at\r\nwhich we have discontinued our division still admits a regress to many more\r\nparts contained in the object.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThirdly, suppose that every event in the world happens in accordance with the\r\nlaws of nature; the causality of a cause must itself be an event and\r\nnecessitates a regress to a still higher cause, and consequently the unceasing\r\nprolongation of the series of conditions a parte priori. Operative nature is\r\ntherefore too large for every conception we can form in the synthesis of\r\ncosmical events.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIf we admit the existence of spontaneously produced events, that is, of free\r\nagency, we are driven, in our search for sufficient reasons, on an unavoidable\r\nlaw of nature and are compelled to appeal to the empirical law of causality,\r\nand we find that any such totality of connection in our synthesis is too small\r\nfor our necessary empirical conception.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nFourthly, if we assume the existence of an absolutely necessary\r\nbeing\u0026mdash;whether it be the world or something in the world, or the cause of\r\nthe world\u0026mdash;we must place it in a time at an infinite distance from any\r\ngiven moment; for, otherwise, it must be dependent on some other and higher\r\nexistence. Such an existence is, in this case, too large for our empirical\r\nconception, and unattainable by the continued regress of any synthesis.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut if we believe that everything in the world\u0026mdash;be it condition or\r\nconditioned\u0026mdash;is contingent; every given existence is too small for our\r\nconception. For in this case we are compelled to seek for some other existence\r\nupon which the former depends.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWe have said that in all these cases the cosmological idea is either too great\r\nor too small for the empirical regress in a synthesis, and consequently for\r\nevery possible conception of the understanding. Why did we not express\r\nourselves in a manner exactly the reverse of this and, instead of accusing the\r\ncosmological idea of over stepping or of falling short of its true aim,\r\npossible experience, say that, in the first case, the empirical conception is\r\nalways too small for the idea, and in the second too great, and thus attach the\r\nblame of these contradictions to the empirical regress? The reason is this.\r\nPossible experience can alone give reality to our conceptions; without it a\r\nconception is merely an idea, without truth or relation to an object. Hence a\r\npossible empirical conception must be the standard by which we are to judge\r\nwhether an idea is anything more than an idea and fiction of thought, or\r\nwhether it relates to an object in the world. If we say of a thing that in\r\nrelation to some other thing it is too large or too small, the former is\r\nconsidered as existing for the sake of the latter, and requiring to be adapted\r\nto it. Among the trivial subjects of discussion in the old schools of\r\ndialectics was this question: \u0026ldquo;If a ball cannot pass through a hole,\r\nshall we say that the ball is too large or the hole too small?\u0026rdquo; In this\r\ncase it is indifferent what expression we employ; for we do not know which\r\nexists for the sake of the other. On the other hand, we cannot say: \u0026ldquo;The\r\nman is too long for his coat\u0026rdquo;; but: \u0026ldquo;The coat is too short for the\r\nman.\u0026rdquo;\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWe are thus led to the well-founded suspicion that the cosmological ideas, and\r\nall the conflicting sophistical assertions connected with them, are based upon\r\na false and fictitious conception of the mode in which the object of these\r\nideas is presented to us; and this suspicion will probably direct us how to\r\nexpose the illusion that has so long led us astray from the truth.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003ca id=\"chap79\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eSection VI. Transcendental Idealism as the Key to\r\nthe Solution of Pure Cosmological Dialectic\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIn the transcendental æsthetic we proved that everything intuited in space and\r\ntime, all objects of a possible experience, are nothing but phenomena, that is,\r\nmere representations; and that these, as presented to us\u0026mdash;as extended\r\nbodies, or as series of changes\u0026mdash;have no self-subsistent existence apart\r\nfrom human thought. This doctrine I call Transcendental Idealism.\u003ca\r\nhref=\"#linknote-59\" id=\"linknoteref-59\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[59]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The realist in the transcendental sense\r\nregards these modifications of our sensibility, these mere representations, as\r\nthings subsisting in themselves.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"linknote-59\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#linknoteref-59\"\u003e[59]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nI have elsewhere termed this theory formal idealism, to distinguish it from\r\nmaterial idealism, which doubts or denies the existence of external things. To\r\navoid ambiguity, it seems advisable in many cases to employ this term instead\r\nof that mentioned in the text.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIt would be unjust to accuse us of holding the long-decried theory of empirical\r\nidealism, which, while admitting the reality of space, denies, or at least\r\ndoubts, the existence of bodies extended in it, and thus leaves us without a\r\nsufficient criterion of reality and illusion. The supporters of this theory\r\nfind no difficulty in admitting the reality of the phenomena of the internal\r\nsense in time; nay, they go the length of maintaining that this internal\r\nexperience is of itself a sufficient proof of the real existence of its object\r\nas a thing in itself.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nTranscendental idealism allows that the objects of external intuition\u0026mdash;as\r\nintuited in space, and all changes in time\u0026mdash;as represented by the internal\r\nsense, are real. For, as space is the form of that intuition which we call\r\nexternal, and, without objects in space, no empirical representation could be\r\ngiven us, we can and ought to regard extended bodies in it as real. The case is\r\nthe same with representations in time. But time and space, with all phenomena\r\ntherein, are not in themselves things. They are nothing but representations and\r\ncannot exist out of and apart from the mind. Nay, the sensuous internal\r\nintuition of the mind (as the object of consciousness), the determination of\r\nwhich is represented by the succession of different states in time, is not the\r\nreal, proper self, as it exists in itself\u0026mdash;not the transcendental\r\nsubject\u0026mdash;but only a phenomenon, which is presented to the sensibility of\r\nthis, to us, unknown being. This internal phenomenon cannot be admitted to be a\r\nself-subsisting thing; for its condition is time, and time cannot be the\r\ncondition of a thing in itself. But the empirical truth of phenomena in space\r\nand time is guaranteed beyond the possibility of doubt, and sufficiently\r\ndistinguished from the illusion of dreams or fancy\u0026mdash;although both have a\r\nproper and thorough connection in an experience according to empirical laws.\r\nThe objects of experience then are not things in themselves, but are given only\r\nin experience, and have no existence apart from and independently of\r\nexperience. That there may be inhabitants in the moon, although no one has ever\r\nobserved them, must certainly be admitted; but this assertion means only, that\r\nwe may in the possible progress of experience discover them at some future\r\ntime. For that which stands in connection with a perception according to the\r\nlaws of the progress of experience is real. They are therefore really existent,\r\nif they stand in empirical connection with my actual or real consciousness,\r\nalthough they are not in themselves real, that is, apart from the progress of\r\nexperience.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThere is nothing actually given\u0026mdash;we can be conscious of nothing as real,\r\nexcept a perception and the empirical progression from it to other possible\r\nperceptions. For phenomena, as mere representations, are real only in\r\nperception; and perception is, in fact, nothing but the reality of an empirical\r\nrepresentation, that is, a phenomenon. To call a phenomenon a real thing prior\r\nto perception means either that we must meet with this phenomenon in the\r\nprogress of experience, or it means nothing at all. For I can say only of a\r\nthing in itself that it exists without relation to the senses and experience.\r\nBut we are speaking here merely of phenomena in space and time, both of which\r\nare determinations of sensibility, and not of things in themselves. It follows\r\nthat phenomena are not things in themselves, but are mere representations,\r\nwhich if not given in us\u0026mdash;in perception\u0026mdash;are non-existent.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe faculty of sensuous intuition is properly a receptivity\u0026mdash;a capacity of\r\nbeing affected in a certain manner by representations, the relation of which to\r\neach other is a pure intuition of space and time\u0026mdash;the pure forms of\r\nsensibility. These representations, in so far as they are connected and\r\ndeterminable in this relation (in space and time) according to laws of the\r\nunity of experience, are called objects. The non-sensuous cause of these\r\nrepresentations is completely unknown to us and hence cannot be intuited as an\r\nobject. For such an object could not be represented either in space or in time;\r\nand without these conditions intuition or representation is impossible. We may,\r\nat the same time, term the non-sensuous cause of phenomena the transcendental\r\nobject\u0026mdash;but merely as a mental correlate to sensibility, considered as a\r\nreceptivity. To this transcendental object we may attribute the whole\r\nconnection and extent of our possible perceptions, and say that it is given and\r\nexists in itself prior to all experience. But the phenomena, corresponding to\r\nit, are not given as things in themselves, but in experience alone. For they\r\nare mere representations, receiving from perceptions alone significance and\r\nrelation to a real object, under the condition that this or that\r\nperception\u0026mdash;indicating an object\u0026mdash;is in complete connection with all\r\nothers in accordance with the rules of the unity of experience. Thus we can\r\nsay: \u0026ldquo;The things that really existed in past time are given in the\r\ntranscendental object of experience.\u0026rdquo; But these are to me real objects,\r\nonly in so far as I can represent to my own mind, that a regressive series of\r\npossible perceptions\u0026mdash;following the indications of history, or the\r\nfootsteps of cause and effect\u0026mdash;in accordance with empirical\r\nlaws\u0026mdash;that, in one word, the course of the world conducts us to an elapsed\r\nseries of time as the condition of the present time. This series in past time\r\nis represented as real, not in itself, but only in connection with a possible\r\nexperience. Thus, when I say that certain events occurred in past time, I\r\nmerely assert the possibility of prolonging the chain of experience, from the\r\npresent perception, upwards to the conditions that determine it according to\r\ntime.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIf I represent to myself all objects existing in all space and time, I do not\r\nthereby place these in space and time prior to all experience; on the contrary,\r\nsuch a representation is nothing more than the notion of a possible experience,\r\nin its absolute completeness. In experience alone are those objects, which are\r\nnothing but representations, given. But, when I say they existed prior to my\r\nexperience, this means only that I must begin with the perception present to me\r\nand follow the track indicated until I discover them in some part or region of\r\nexperience. The cause of the empirical condition of this progression\u0026mdash;and\r\nconsequently at what member therein I must stop, and at what point in the\r\nregress I am to find this member\u0026mdash;is transcendental, and hence necessarily\r\nincognizable. But with this we have not to do; our concern is only with the law\r\nof progression in experience, in which objects, that is, phenomena, are given.\r\nIt is a matter of indifference, whether I say, \u0026ldquo;I may in the progress of\r\nexperience discover stars, at a hundred times greater distance than the most\r\ndistant of those now visible,\u0026rdquo; or, \u0026ldquo;Stars at this distance may be\r\nmet in space, although no one has, or ever will discover them.\u0026rdquo; For, if\r\nthey are given as things in themselves, without any relation to possible\r\nexperience, they are for me non-existent, consequently, are not objects, for\r\nthey are not contained in the regressive series of experience. But, if these\r\nphenomena must be employed in the construction or support of the cosmological\r\nidea of an absolute whole, and when we are discussing a question that oversteps\r\nthe limits of possible experience, the proper distinction of the different\r\ntheories of the reality of sensuous objects is of great importance, in order to\r\navoid the illusion which must necessarily arise from the misinterpretation of\r\nour empirical conceptions.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003ca id=\"chap80\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eSection VII. Critical Solution of the Cosmological\r\nProblem\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe antinomy of pure reason is based upon the following dialectical argument:\r\n\u0026ldquo;If that which is conditioned is given, the whole series of its\r\nconditions is also given; but sensuous objects are given as conditioned;\r\nconsequently…\u0026rdquo; This syllogism, the major of which seems so natural and\r\nevident, introduces as many cosmological ideas as there are different kinds of\r\nconditions in the synthesis of phenomena, in so far as these conditions\r\nconstitute a series. These ideas require absolute totality in the series, and\r\nthus place reason in inextricable embarrassment. Before proceeding to expose\r\nthe fallacy in this dialectical argument, it will be necessary to have a\r\ncorrect understanding of certain conceptions that appear in it.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIn the first place, the following proposition is evident, and indubitably\r\ncertain: \u0026ldquo;If the conditioned is given, a regress in the series of all its\r\nconditions is thereby imperatively required.\u0026rdquo; For the very conception of\r\na conditioned is a conception of something related to a condition, and, if this\r\ncondition is itself conditioned, to another condition\u0026mdash;and so on through\r\nall the members of the series. This proposition is, therefore, analytical and\r\nhas nothing to fear from transcendental criticism. It is a logical postulate of\r\nreason: to pursue, as far as possible, the connection of a conception with its\r\nconditions.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIf, in the second place, both the conditioned and the condition are things in\r\nthemselves, and if the former is given, not only is the regress to the latter\r\nrequisite, but the latter is really given with the former. Now, as this is true\r\nof all the members of the series, the entire series of conditions, and with\r\nthem the unconditioned, is at the same time given in the very fact of the\r\nconditioned, the existence of which is possible only in and through that\r\nseries, being given. In this case, the synthesis of the conditioned with its\r\ncondition, is a synthesis of the understanding merely, which represents things\r\nas they are, without regarding whether and how we can cognize them. But if I\r\nhave to do with phenomena, which, in their character of mere representations,\r\nare not given, if I do not attain to a cognition of them (in other words, to\r\nthemselves, for they are nothing more than empirical cognitions), I am not\r\nentitled to say: \u0026ldquo;If the conditioned is given, all its conditions (as\r\nphenomena) are also given.\u0026rdquo; I cannot, therefore, from the fact of a\r\nconditioned being given, infer the absolute totality of the series of its\r\nconditions. For phenomena are nothing but an empirical synthesis in\r\napprehension or perception, and are therefore given only in it. Now, in\r\nspeaking of phenomena it does not follow that, if the conditioned is given, the\r\nsynthesis which constitutes its empirical condition is also thereby given and\r\npresupposed; such a synthesis can be established only by an actual regress in\r\nthe series of conditions. But we are entitled to say in this case that a\r\nregress to the conditions of a conditioned, in other words, that a continuous\r\nempirical synthesis is enjoined; that, if the conditions are not given, they\r\nare at least required; and that we are certain to discover the conditions in\r\nthis regress.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWe can now see that the major, in the above cosmological syllogism, takes the\r\nconditioned in the transcendental signification which it has in the pure\r\ncategory, while the minor speaks of it in the empirical signification which it\r\nhas in the category as applied to phenomena. There is, therefore, a dialectical\r\nfallacy in the syllogism\u0026mdash;a sophisma figurae dictionis. But this fallacy\r\nis not a consciously devised one, but a perfectly natural illusion of the\r\ncommon reason of man. For, when a thing is given as conditioned, we presuppose\r\nin the major its conditions and their series, unperceived, as it were, and\r\nunseen; because this is nothing more than the logical requirement of complete\r\nand satisfactory premisses for a given conclusion. In this case, time is\r\naltogether left out in the connection of the conditioned with the condition;\r\nthey are supposed to be given in themselves, and contemporaneously. It is,\r\nmoreover, just as natural to regard phenomena (in the minor) as things in\r\nthemselves and as objects presented to the pure understanding, as in the major,\r\nin which complete abstraction was made of all conditions of intuition. But it\r\nis under these conditions alone that objects are given. Now we overlooked a\r\nremarkable distinction between the conceptions. The synthesis of the\r\nconditioned with its condition, and the complete series of the latter (in the\r\nmajor) are not limited by time, and do not contain the conception of\r\nsuccession. On the contrary, the empirical synthesis and the series of\r\nconditions in the phenomenal world\u0026mdash;subsumed in the minor\u0026mdash;are\r\nnecessarily successive and given in time alone. It follows that I cannot\r\npresuppose in the minor, as I did in the major, the absolute totality of the\r\nsynthesis and of the series therein represented; for in the major all the\r\nmembers of the series are given as things in themselves\u0026mdash;without any\r\nlimitations or conditions of time, while in the minor they are possible only in\r\nand through a successive regress, which cannot exist, except it be actually\r\ncarried into execution in the world of phenomena.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAfter this proof of the viciousness of the argument commonly employed in\r\nmaintaining cosmological assertions, both parties may now be justly dismissed,\r\nas advancing claims without grounds or title. But the process has not been\r\nended by convincing them that one or both were in the wrong and had maintained\r\nan assertion which was without valid grounds of proof. Nothing seems to be\r\nclearer than that, if one maintains: \u0026ldquo;The world has a beginning,\u0026rdquo;\r\nand another: \u0026ldquo;The world has no beginning,\u0026rdquo; one of the two must be\r\nright. But it is likewise clear that, if the evidence on both sides is equal,\r\nit is impossible to discover on what side the truth lies; and the controversy\r\ncontinues, although the parties have been recommended to peace before the\r\ntribunal of reason. There remains, then, no other means of settling the\r\nquestion than to convince the parties, who refute each other with such\r\nconclusiveness and ability, that they are disputing about nothing, and that a\r\ntranscendental illusion has been mocking them with visions of reality where\r\nthere is none. The mode of adjusting a dispute which cannot be decided upon its\r\nown merits, we shall now proceed to lay before our readers.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr \u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nZeno of Elea, a subtle dialectician, was severely reprimanded by Plato as a\r\nsophist, who, merely from the base motive of exhibiting his skill in\r\ndiscussion, maintained and subverted the same proposition by arguments as\r\npowerful and convincing on the one side as on the other. He maintained, for\r\nexample, that God (who was probably nothing more, in his view, than the world)\r\nis neither finite nor infinite, neither in motion nor in rest, neither similar\r\nnor dissimilar to any other thing. It seemed to those philosophers who\r\ncriticized his mode of discussion that his purpose was to deny completely both\r\nof two self-contradictory propositions\u0026mdash;which is absurd. But I cannot\r\nbelieve that there is any justice in this accusation. The first of these\r\npropositions I shall presently consider in a more detailed manner. With regard\r\nto the others, if by the word of God he understood merely the Universe, his\r\nmeaning must have been\u0026mdash;that it cannot be permanently present in one\r\nplace\u0026mdash;that is, at rest\u0026mdash;nor be capable of changing its\r\nplace\u0026mdash;that is, of moving\u0026mdash;because all places are in the universe,\r\nand the universe itself is, therefore, in no place. Again, if the universe\r\ncontains in itself everything that exists, it cannot be similar or dissimilar\r\nto any other thing, because there is, in fact, no other thing with which it can\r\nbe compared. If two opposite judgements presuppose a contingent impossible, or\r\narbitrary condition, both\u0026mdash;in spite of their opposition (which is,\r\nhowever, not properly or really a contradiction)\u0026mdash;fall away; because the\r\ncondition, which ensured the validity of both, has itself disappeared.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIf we say: \u0026ldquo;Everybody has either a good or a bad smell,\u0026rdquo; we have\r\nomitted a third possible judgement\u0026mdash;it has no smell at all; and thus both\r\nconflicting statements may be false. If we say: \u0026ldquo;It is either\r\ngood-smelling or not good-smelling (vel suaveolens vel non-suaveolens),\u0026rdquo;\r\nboth judgements are contradictorily opposed; and the contradictory opposite of\r\nthe former judgement\u0026mdash;some bodies are not good-smelling\u0026mdash;embraces\r\nalso those bodies which have no smell at all. In the preceding pair of opposed\r\njudgements (per disparata), the contingent condition of the conception of body\r\n(smell) attached to both conflicting statements, instead of having been omitted\r\nin the latter, which is consequently not the contradictory opposite of the\r\nformer.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIf, accordingly, we say: \u0026ldquo;The world is either infinite in extension, or\r\nit is not infinite (non est infinitus)\u0026rdquo;; and if the former proposition is\r\nfalse, its contradictory opposite\u0026mdash;the world is not infinite\u0026mdash;must be\r\ntrue. And thus I should deny the existence of an infinite, without, however\r\naffirming the existence of a finite world. But if we construct our proposition\r\nthus: \u0026ldquo;The world is either infinite or finite (non-infinite),\u0026rdquo; both\r\nstatements may be false. For, in this case, we consider the world as per se\r\ndetermined in regard to quantity, and while, in the one judgement, we deny its\r\ninfinite and consequently, perhaps, its independent existence; in the other, we\r\nappend to the world, regarded as a thing in itself, a certain\r\ndetermination\u0026mdash;that of finitude; and the latter may be false as well as\r\nthe former, if the world is not given as a thing in itself, and thus neither as\r\nfinite nor as infinite in quantity. This kind of opposition I may be allowed to\r\nterm dialectical; that of contradictories may be called analytical opposition.\r\nThus then, of two dialectically opposed judgements both may be false, from the\r\nfact, that the one is not a mere contradictory of the other, but actually\r\nenounces more than is requisite for a full and complete contradiction.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWhen we regard the two propositions\u0026mdash;\u0026ldquo;The world is infinite in\r\nquantity,\u0026rdquo; and, \u0026ldquo;The world is finite in quantity,\u0026rdquo; as\r\ncontradictory opposites, we are assuming that the world\u0026mdash;the complete\r\nseries of phenomena\u0026mdash;is a thing in itself. For it remains as a permanent\r\nquantity, whether I deny the infinite or the finite regress in the series of\r\nits phenomena. But if we dismiss this assumption\u0026mdash;this transcendental\r\nillusion\u0026mdash;and deny that it is a thing in itself, the contradictory\r\nopposition is metamorphosed into a merely dialectical one; and the world, as\r\nnot existing in itself\u0026mdash;independently of the regressive series of my\r\nrepresentations\u0026mdash;exists in like manner neither as a whole which is\r\ninfinite nor as a whole which is finite in itself. The universe exists for me\r\nonly in the empirical regress of the series of phenomena and not per se. If,\r\nthen, it is always conditioned, it is never completely or as a whole; and it\r\nis, therefore, not an unconditioned whole and does not exist as such, either\r\nwith an infinite, or with a finite quantity.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWhat we have here said of the first cosmological idea\u0026mdash;that of the\r\nabsolute totality of quantity in phenomena\u0026mdash;applies also to the others.\r\nThe series of conditions is discoverable only in the regressive synthesis\r\nitself, and not in the phenomenon considered as a thing in itself\u0026mdash;given\r\nprior to all regress. Hence I am compelled to say: \u0026ldquo;The aggregate of\r\nparts in a given phenomenon is in itself neither finite nor infinite; and these\r\nparts are given only in the regressive synthesis of decomposition\u0026mdash;a\r\nsynthesis which is never given in absolute completeness, either as finite, or\r\nas infinite.\u0026rdquo; The same is the case with the series of subordinated\r\ncauses, or of the conditioned up to the unconditioned and necessary existence,\r\nwhich can never be regarded as in itself, and in its totality, either as finite\r\nor as infinite; because, as a series of subordinate representations, it\r\nsubsists only in the dynamical regress and cannot be regarded as existing\r\npreviously to this regress, or as a self-subsistent series of things.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThus the antinomy of pure reason in its cosmological ideas disappears. For the\r\nabove demonstration has established the fact that it is merely the product of a\r\ndialectical and illusory opposition, which arises from the application of the\r\nidea of absolute totality\u0026mdash;admissible only as a condition of things in\r\nthemselves\u0026mdash;to phenomena, which exist only in our representations,\r\nand\u0026mdash;when constituting a series\u0026mdash;in a successive regress. This\r\nantinomy of reason may, however, be really profitable to our speculative\r\ninterests, not in the way of contributing any dogmatical addition, but as\r\npresenting to us another material support in our critical investigations. For\r\nit furnishes us with an indirect proof of the transcendental ideality of\r\nphenomena, if our minds were not completely satisfied with the direct proof set\r\nforth in the Trancendental Æsthetic. The proof would proceed in the following\r\ndilemma. If the world is a whole existing in itself, it must be either finite\r\nor infinite. But it is neither finite nor infinite\u0026mdash;as has been shown, on\r\nthe one side, by the thesis, on the other, by the antithesis. Therefore the\r\nworld\u0026mdash;the content of all phenomena\u0026mdash;is not a whole existing in\r\nitself. It follows that phenomena are nothing, apart from our representations.\r\nAnd this is what we mean by transcendental ideality.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThis remark is of some importance. It enables us to see that the proofs of the\r\nfourfold antinomy are not mere sophistries\u0026mdash;are not fallacious, but\r\ngrounded on the nature of reason, and valid\u0026mdash;under the supposition that\r\nphenomena are things in themselves. The opposition of the judgements which\r\nfollow makes it evident that a fallacy lay in the initial supposition, and thus\r\nhelps us to discover the true constitution of objects of sense. This\r\ntranscendental dialectic does not favour scepticism, although it presents us\r\nwith a triumphant demonstration of the advantages of the sceptical method, the\r\ngreat utility of which is apparent in the antinomy, where the arguments of\r\nreason were allowed to confront each other in undiminished force. And although\r\nthe result of these conflicts of reason is not what we expected\u0026mdash;although\r\nwe have obtained no positive dogmatical addition to metaphysical\r\nscience\u0026mdash;we have still reaped a great advantage in the correction of our\r\njudgements on these subjects of thought.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003ca id=\"chap81\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eSection VIII. Regulative Principle of Pure Reason in\r\nrelation to the Cosmological Ideas\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe cosmological principle of totality could not give us any certain knowledge\r\nin regard to the maximum in the series of conditions in the world of sense,\r\nconsidered as a thing in itself. The actual regress in the series is the only\r\nmeans of approaching this maximum. This principle of pure reason, therefore,\r\nmay still be considered as valid\u0026mdash;not as an axiom enabling us to cogitate\r\ntotality in the object as actual, but as a problem for the understanding, which\r\nrequires it to institute and to continue, in conformity with the idea of\r\ntotality in the mind, the regress in the series of the conditions of a given\r\nconditioned. For in the world of sense, that is, in space and time, every\r\ncondition which we discover in our investigation of phenomena is itself\r\nconditioned; because sensuous objects are not things in themselves (in which\r\ncase an absolutely unconditioned might be reached in the progress of\r\ncognition), but are merely empirical representations the conditions of which\r\nmust always be found in intuition. The principle of reason is therefore\r\nproperly a mere rule\u0026mdash;prescribing a regress in the series of conditions\r\nfor given phenomena, and prohibiting any pause or rest on an absolutely\r\nunconditioned. It is, therefore, not a principle of the possibility of\r\nexperience or of the empirical cognition of sensuous objects\u0026mdash;consequently\r\nnot a principle of the understanding; for every experience is confined within\r\ncertain proper limits determined by the given intuition. Still less is it a\r\nconstitutive principle of reason authorizing us to extend our conception of the\r\nsensuous world beyond all possible experience. It is merely a principle for the\r\nenlargement and extension of experience as far as is possible for human\r\nfaculties. It forbids us to consider any empirical limits as absolute. It is,\r\nhence, a principle of reason, which, as a rule, dictates how we ought to\r\nproceed in our empirical regress, but is unable to anticipate or indicate prior\r\nto the empirical regress what is given in the object itself. I have termed it\r\nfor this reason a regulative principle of reason; while the principle of the\r\nabsolute totality of the series of conditions, as existing in itself and given\r\nin the object, is a constitutive cosmological principle. This distinction will\r\nat once demonstrate the falsehood of the constitutive principle, and prevent us\r\nfrom attributing (by a transcendental subreptio) objective reality to an idea,\r\nwhich is valid only as a rule.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIn order to understand the proper meaning of this rule of pure reason, we must\r\nnotice first that it cannot tell us what the object is, but only how the\r\nempirical regress is to be proceeded with in order to attain to the complete\r\nconception of the object. If it gave us any information in respect to the\r\nformer statement, it would be a constitutive principle\u0026mdash;a principle\r\nimpossible from the nature of pure reason. It will not therefore enable us to\r\nestablish any such conclusions as: \u0026ldquo;The series of conditions for a given\r\nconditioned is in itself finite,\u0026rdquo; or, \u0026ldquo;It is infinite.\u0026rdquo; For,\r\nin this case, we should be cogitating in the mere idea of absolute totality, an\r\nobject which is not and cannot be given in experience; inasmuch as we should be\r\nattributing a reality objective and independent of the empirical synthesis, to\r\na series of phenomena. This idea of reason cannot then be regarded as\r\nvalid\u0026mdash;except as a rule for the regressive synthesis in the series of\r\nconditions, according to which we must proceed from the conditioned, through\r\nall intermediate and subordinate conditions, up to the unconditioned; although\r\nthis goal is unattained and unattainable. For the absolutely unconditioned\r\ncannot be discovered in the sphere of experience.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWe now proceed to determine clearly our notion of a synthesis which can never\r\nbe complete. There are two terms commonly employed for this purpose. These\r\nterms are regarded as expressions of different and distinguishable notions,\r\nalthough the ground of the distinction has never been clearly exposed. The term\r\nemployed by the mathematicians is progressus in infinitum. The philosophers\r\nprefer the expression progressus in indefinitum. Without detaining the reader\r\nwith an examination of the reasons for such a distinction, or with remarks on\r\nthe right or wrong use of the terms, I shall endeavour clearly to determine\r\nthese conceptions, so far as is necessary for the purpose in this Critique.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWe may, with propriety, say of a straight line, that it may be produced to\r\ninfinity. In this case the distinction between a progressus in infinitum and a\r\nprogressus in indefinitum is a mere piece of subtlety. For, although when we\r\nsay, \u0026ldquo;Produce a straight line,\u0026rdquo; it is more correct to say in\r\nindefinitum than in infinitum; because the former means, \u0026ldquo;Produce it as\r\nfar as you please,\u0026rdquo; the second, \u0026ldquo;You must not cease to produce\r\nit\u0026rdquo;; the expression in infinitum is, when we are speaking of the power to\r\ndo it, perfectly correct, for we can always make it longer if we\r\nplease\u0026mdash;on to infinity. And this remark holds good in all cases, when we\r\nspeak of a progressus, that is, an advancement from the condition to the\r\nconditioned; this possible advancement always proceeds to infinity. We may\r\nproceed from a given pair in the descending line of generation from father to\r\nson, and cogitate a never-ending line of descendants from it. For in such a\r\ncase reason does not demand absolute totality in the series, because it does\r\nnot presuppose it as a condition and as given (datum), but merely as\r\nconditioned, and as capable of being given (dabile).\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nVery different is the case with the problem: \u0026ldquo;How far the regress, which\r\nascends from the given conditioned to the conditions, must extend\u0026rdquo;;\r\nwhether I can say: \u0026ldquo;It is a regress in infinitum,\u0026rdquo; or only\r\n\u0026ldquo;in indefinitum\u0026rdquo;; and whether, for example, setting out from the\r\nhuman beings at present alive in the world, I may ascend in the series of their\r\nancestors, in infinitum\u0026mdash;or whether all that can be said is, that so far\r\nas I have proceeded, I have discovered no empirical ground for considering the\r\nseries limited, so that I am justified, and indeed, compelled to search for\r\nancestors still further back, although I am not obliged by the idea of reason\r\nto presuppose them.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nMy answer to this question is: \u0026ldquo;If the series is given in empirical\r\nintuition as a whole, the regress in the series of its internal conditions\r\nproceeds in infinitum; but, if only one member of the series is given, from\r\nwhich the regress is to proceed to absolute totality, the regress is possible\r\nonly in indefinitum.\u0026rdquo; For example, the division of a portion of matter\r\ngiven within certain limits\u0026mdash;of a body, that is\u0026mdash;proceeds in\r\ninfinitum. For, as the condition of this whole is its part, and the condition\r\nof the part a part of the part, and so on, and as in this regress of\r\ndecomposition an unconditioned indivisible member of the series of conditions\r\nis not to be found; there are no reasons or grounds in experience for stopping\r\nin the division, but, on the contrary, the more remote members of the division\r\nare actually and empirically given prior to this division. That is to say, the\r\ndivision proceeds to infinity. On the other hand, the series of ancestors of\r\nany given human being is not given, in its absolute totality, in any\r\nexperience, and yet the regress proceeds from every genealogical member of this\r\nseries to one still higher, and does not meet with any empirical limit\r\npresenting an absolutely unconditioned member of the series. But as the members\r\nof such a series are not contained in the empirical intuition of the whole,\r\nprior to the regress, this regress does not proceed to infinity, but only in\r\nindefinitum, that is, we are called upon to discover other and higher members,\r\nwhich are themselves always conditioned.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIn neither case\u0026mdash;the regressus in infinitum, nor the regressus in\r\nindefinitum, is the series of conditions to be considered as actually infinite\r\nin the object itself. This might be true of things in themselves, but it cannot\r\nbe asserted of phenomena, which, as conditions of each other, are only given in\r\nthe empirical regress itself. Hence, the question no longer is, \u0026ldquo;What is\r\nthe quantity of this series of conditions in itself\u0026mdash;is it finite or\r\ninfinite?\u0026rdquo; for it is nothing in itself; but, \u0026ldquo;How is the empirical\r\nregress to be commenced, and how far ought we to proceed with it?\u0026rdquo; And\r\nhere a signal distinction in the application of this rule becomes apparent. If\r\nthe whole is given empirically, it is possible to recede in the series of its\r\ninternal conditions to infinity. But if the whole is not given, and can only be\r\ngiven by and through the empirical regress, I can only say: \u0026ldquo;It is\r\npossible to infinity, to proceed to still higher conditions in the\r\nseries.\u0026rdquo; In the first case, I am justified in asserting that more members\r\nare empirically given in the object than I attain to in the regress (of\r\ndecomposition). In the second case, I am justified only in saying, that I can\r\nalways proceed further in the regress, because no member of the series is given\r\nas absolutely conditioned, and thus a higher member is possible, and an inquiry\r\nwith regard to it is necessary. In the one case it is necessary to find other\r\nmembers of the series, in the other it is necessary to inquire for others,\r\ninasmuch as experience presents no absolute limitation of the regress. For,\r\neither you do not possess a perception which absolutely limits your empirical\r\nregress, and in this case the regress cannot be regarded as complete; or, you\r\ndo possess such a limitative perception, in which case it is not a part of your\r\nseries (for that which limits must be distinct from that which is limited by\r\nit), and it is incumbent on you to continue your regress up to this condition, and\r\nso on.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThese remarks will be placed in their proper light by their application in the\r\nfollowing section.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003ca id=\"chap82\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eSection IX. Of the Empirical Use of the Regulative\r\nPrinciple of Reason with regard to the Cosmological Ideas\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWe have shown that no transcendental use can be made either of the conceptions\r\nof reason or of understanding. We have shown, likewise, that the demand of\r\nabsolute totality in the series of conditions in the world of sense arises from\r\na transcendental employment of reason, resting on the opinion that phenomena\r\nare to be regarded as things in themselves. It follows that we are not required\r\nto answer the question respecting the absolute quantity of a\r\nseries\u0026mdash;whether it is in itself limited or unlimited. We are only called\r\nupon to determine how far we must proceed in the empirical regress from\r\ncondition to condition, in order to discover, in conformity with the rule of\r\nreason, a full and correct answer to the questions proposed by reason itself.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThis principle of reason is hence valid only as a rule for the extension of a\r\npossible experience\u0026mdash;its invalidity as a principle constitutive of\r\nphenomena in themselves having been sufficiently demonstrated. And thus, too,\r\nthe antinomial conflict of reason with itself is completely put an end to;\r\ninasmuch as we have not only presented a critical solution of the fallacy\r\nlurking in the opposite statements of reason, but have shown the true meaning\r\nof the ideas which gave rise to these statements. The dialectical principle of\r\nreason has, therefore, been changed into a doctrinal principle. But in fact, if\r\nthis principle, in the subjective signification which we have shown to be its\r\nonly true sense, may be guaranteed as a principle of the unceasing extension of\r\nthe employment of our understanding, its influence and value are just as great\r\nas if it were an axiom for the à priori determination of objects. For such an\r\naxiom could not exert a stronger influence on the extension and rectification\r\nof our knowledge, otherwise than by procuring for the principles of the\r\nunderstanding the most widely expanded employment in the field of experience.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003ca id=\"chap83\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eI. Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality\r\nof the Composition of Phenomena in the Universe\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHere, as well as in the case of the other cosmological problems, the ground of\r\nthe regulative principle of reason is the proposition that in our empirical\r\nregress no experience of an absolute limit, and consequently no experience of a\r\ncondition, which is itself absolutely unconditioned, is discoverable. And the\r\ntruth of this proposition itself rests upon the consideration that such an\r\nexperience must represent to us phenomena as limited by nothing or the mere\r\nvoid, on which our continued regress by means of perception must\r\nabut\u0026mdash;which is impossible.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nNow this proposition, which declares that every condition attained in the\r\nempirical regress must itself be considered empirically conditioned, contains\r\nthe rule in terminis, which requires me, to whatever extent I may have\r\nproceeded in the ascending series, always to look for some higher member in the\r\nseries\u0026mdash;whether this member is to become known to me through experience,\r\nor not.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nNothing further is necessary, then, for the solution of the first cosmological\r\nproblem, than to decide, whether, in the regress to the unconditioned quantity\r\nof the universe (as regards space and time), this never limited ascent ought to\r\nbe called a regressus in infinitum or indefinitum.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe general representation which we form in our minds of the series of all past\r\nstates or conditions of the world, or of all the things which at present exist\r\nin it, is itself nothing more than a possible empirical regress, which is\r\ncogitated\u0026mdash;although in an undetermined manner\u0026mdash;in the mind, and which\r\ngives rise to the conception of a series of conditions for a given object.\u003ca\r\nhref=\"#linknote-60\" id=\"linknoteref-60\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[60]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Now I have a conception of the\r\nuniverse, but not an intuition\u0026mdash;that is, not an intuition of it as a\r\nwhole. Thus I cannot infer the magnitude of the regress from the quantity or\r\nmagnitude of the world, and determine the former by means of the latter; on the\r\ncontrary, I must first of all form a conception of the quantity or magnitude of\r\nthe world from the magnitude of the empirical regress. But of this regress I\r\nknow nothing more than that I ought to proceed from every given member of the\r\nseries of conditions to one still higher. But the quantity of the universe is\r\nnot thereby determined, and we cannot affirm that this regress proceeds in\r\ninfinitum. Such an affirmation would anticipate the members of the series which\r\nhave not yet been reached, and represent the number of them as beyond the grasp\r\nof any empirical synthesis; it would consequently determine the cosmical\r\nquantity prior to the regress (although only in a negative manner)\u0026mdash;which\r\nis impossible. For the world is not given in its totality in any intuition:\r\nconsequently, its quantity cannot be given prior to the regress. It follows\r\nthat we are unable to make any declaration respecting the cosmical quantity in\r\nitself\u0026mdash;not even that the regress in it is a regress in infinitum; we must\r\nonly endeavour to attain to a conception of the quantity of the universe, in\r\nconformity with the rule which determines the empirical regress in it. But this\r\nrule merely requires us never to admit an absolute limit to our\r\nseries\u0026mdash;how far soever we may have proceeded in it, but always, on the\r\ncontrary, to subordinate every phenomenon to some other as its condition, and\r\nconsequently to proceed to this higher phenomenon. Such a regress is,\r\ntherefore, the regressus in indefinitum, which, as not determining a quantity\r\nin the object, is clearly distinguishable from the regressus in infinitum.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"linknote-60\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#linknoteref-60\"\u003e[60]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nThe cosmical series can neither be greater nor smaller than the possible\r\nempirical regress, upon which its conception is based. And as this regress\r\ncannot be a determinate infinite regress, still less a determinate finite\r\n(absolutely limited), it is evident that we cannot regard the world as either\r\nfinite or infinite, because the regress, which gives us the representation of\r\nthe world, is neither finite nor infinite.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIt follows from what we have said that we are not justified in declaring the\r\nworld to be infinite in space, or as regards past time. For this conception of\r\nan infinite given quantity is empirical; but we cannot apply the conception of\r\nan infinite quantity to the world as an object of the senses. I cannot say,\r\n\u0026ldquo;The regress from a given perception to everything limited either in\r\nspace or time, proceeds in infinitum,\u0026rdquo; for this presupposes an infinite\r\ncosmical quantity; neither can I say, \u0026ldquo;It is finite,\u0026rdquo; for an\r\nabsolute limit is likewise impossible in experience. It follows that I am not\r\nentitled to make any assertion at all respecting the whole object of\r\nexperience\u0026mdash;the world of sense; I must limit my declarations to the rule\r\naccording to which experience or empirical knowledge is to be attained.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nTo the question, therefore, respecting the cosmical quantity, the first and\r\nnegative answer is: \u0026ldquo;The world has no beginning in time, and no absolute\r\nlimit in space.\u0026rdquo;\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nFor, in the contrary case, it would be limited by a void time on the one hand,\r\nand by a void space on the other. Now, since the world, as a phenomenon, cannot\r\nbe thus limited in itself for a phenomenon is not a thing in itself; it must be\r\npossible for us to have a perception of this limitation by a void time and a\r\nvoid space. But such a perception\u0026mdash;such an experience is impossible;\r\nbecause it has no content. Consequently, an absolute cosmical limit is\r\nempirically, and therefore absolutely, impossible.\u003ca href=\"#linknote-61\" id=\"linknoteref-61\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[61]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"linknote-61\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#linknoteref-61\"\u003e[61]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nThe reader will remark that the proof presented above is very different from\r\nthe dogmatical demonstration given in the antithesis of the first antinomy. In\r\nthat demonstration, it was taken for granted that the world is a thing in\r\nitself\u0026mdash;given in its totality prior to all regress, and a determined\r\nposition in space and time was denied to it\u0026mdash;if it was not considered as\r\noccupying all time and all space. Hence our conclusion differed from that given\r\nabove; for we inferred in the antithesis the actual infinity of the world.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nFrom this follows the affirmative answer: \u0026ldquo;The regress in the series of\r\nphenomena\u0026mdash;as a determination of the cosmical quantity, proceeds in\r\nindefinitum.\u0026rdquo; This is equivalent to saying: \u0026ldquo;The world of sense has\r\nno absolute quantity, but the empirical regress (through which alone the world\r\nof sense is presented to us on the side of its conditions) rests upon a rule,\r\nwhich requires it to proceed from every member of the series, as conditioned,\r\nto one still more remote (whether through personal experience, or by means of\r\nhistory, or the chain of cause and effect), and not to cease at any point in\r\nthis extension of the possible empirical employment of the\r\nunderstanding.\u0026rdquo; And this is the proper and only use which reason can make\r\nof its principles.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe above rule does not prescribe an unceasing regress in one kind of\r\nphenomena. It does not, for example, forbid us, in our ascent from an\r\nindividual human being through the line of his ancestors, to expect that we\r\nshall discover at some point of the regress a primeval pair, or to admit, in\r\nthe series of heavenly bodies, a sun at the farthest possible distance from\r\nsome centre. All that it demands is a perpetual progress from phenomena to\r\nphenomena, even although an actual perception is not presented by them (as in\r\nthe case of our perceptions being so weak as that we are unable to become\r\nconscious of them), since they, nevertheless, belong to possible experience.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nEvery beginning is in time, and all limits to extension are in space. But space\r\nand time are in the world of sense. Consequently phenomena in the world are\r\nconditionally limited, but the world itself is not limited, either\r\nconditionally or unconditionally.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nFor this reason, and because neither the world nor the cosmical series of\r\nconditions to a given conditioned can be completely given, our conception of\r\nthe cosmical quantity is given only in and through the regress and not prior to\r\nit\u0026mdash;in a collective intuition. But the regress itself is really nothing\r\nmore than the determining of the cosmical quantity, and cannot therefore give\r\nus any determined conception of it\u0026mdash;still less a conception of a quantity\r\nwhich is, in relation to a certain standard, infinite. The regress does not,\r\ntherefore, proceed to infinity (an infinity given), but only to an indefinite\r\nextent, for or the of presenting to us a quantity\u0026mdash;realized only in and\r\nthrough the regress itself.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003ca id=\"chap84\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eII. Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality\r\nof the Division of a Whole given in Intuition\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWhen I divide a whole which is given in intuition, I proceed from a conditioned\r\nto its conditions. The division of the parts of the whole (subdivisio or\r\ndecompositio) is a regress in the series of these conditions. The absolute\r\ntotality of this series would be actually attained and given to the mind, if\r\nthe regress could arrive at simple parts. But if all the parts in a continuous\r\ndecomposition are themselves divisible, the division, that is to say, the\r\nregress, proceeds from the conditioned to its conditions in infinitum; because\r\nthe conditions (the parts) are themselves contained in the conditioned, and, as\r\nthe latter is given in a limited intuition, the former are all given along with\r\nit. This regress cannot, therefore, be called a regressus in indefinitum, as\r\nhappened in the case of the preceding cosmological idea, the regress in which\r\nproceeded from the conditioned to the conditions not given contemporaneously\r\nand along with it, but discoverable only through the empirical regress. We are\r\nnot, however, entitled to affirm of a whole of this kind, which is divisible in\r\ninfinitum, that it consists of an infinite number of parts. For, although all\r\nthe parts are contained in the intuition of the whole, the whole division is\r\nnot contained therein. The division is contained only in the progressing\r\ndecomposition\u0026mdash;in the regress itself, which is the condition of the\r\npossibility and actuality of the series. Now, as this regress is infinite, all\r\nthe members (parts) to which it attains must be contained in the given whole as\r\nan aggregate. But the complete series of division is not contained therein. For\r\nthis series, being infinite in succession and always incomplete, cannot\r\nrepresent an infinite number of members, and still less a composition of these\r\nmembers into a whole.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nTo apply this remark to space. Every limited part of space presented to\r\nintuition is a whole, the parts of which are always spaces\u0026mdash;to whatever\r\nextent subdivided. Every limited space is hence divisible to infinity.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nLet us again apply the remark to an external phenomenon enclosed in limits,\r\nthat is, a body. The divisibility of a body rests upon the divisibility of\r\nspace, which is the condition of the possibility of the body as an extended\r\nwhole. A body is consequently divisible to infinity, though it does not, for\r\nthat reason, consist of an infinite number of parts.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIt certainly seems that, as a body must be cogitated as substance in space, the\r\nlaw of divisibility would not be applicable to it as substance. For we may and\r\nought to grant, in the case of space, that division or decomposition, to any\r\nextent, never can utterly annihilate composition (that is to say, the smallest\r\npart of space must still consist of spaces); otherwise space would entirely\r\ncease to exist\u0026mdash;which is impossible. But, the assertion on the other hand\r\nthat when all composition in matter is annihilated in thought, nothing remains,\r\ndoes not seem to harmonize with the conception of substance, which must be\r\nproperly the subject of all composition and must remain, even after the\r\nconjunction of its attributes in space\u0026mdash;which constituted a body\u0026mdash;is\r\nannihilated in thought. But this is not the case with substance in the\r\nphenomenal world, which is not a thing in itself cogitated by the pure\r\ncategory. Phenomenal substance is not an absolute subject; it is merely a\r\npermanent sensuous image, and nothing more than an intuition, in which the\r\nunconditioned is not to be found.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut, although this rule of progress to infinity is legitimate and applicable to\r\nthe subdivision of a phenomenon, as a mere occupation or filling of space, it\r\nis not applicable to a whole consisting of a number of distinct parts and\r\nconstituting a quantum discretum\u0026mdash;that is to say, an organized body. It\r\ncannot be admitted that every part in an organized whole is itself organized,\r\nand that, in analysing it to infinity, we must always meet with organized\r\nparts; although we may allow that the parts of the matter which we decompose in\r\ninfinitum, may be organized. For the infinity of the division of a phenomenon\r\nin space rests altogether on the fact that the divisibility of a phenomenon is\r\ngiven only in and through this infinity, that is, an undetermined number of\r\nparts is given, while the parts themselves are given and determined only in and\r\nthrough the subdivision; in a word, the infinity of the division necessarily\r\npresupposes that the whole is not already divided in se. Hence our division\r\ndetermines a number of parts in the whole\u0026mdash;a number which extends just as\r\nfar as the actual regress in the division; while, on the other hand, the very\r\nnotion of a body organized to infinity represents the whole as already and in\r\nitself divided. We expect, therefore, to find in it a determinate, but at the\r\nsame time, infinite, number of parts\u0026mdash;which is self-contradictory. For we\r\nshould thus have a whole containing a series of members which could not be\r\ncompleted in any regress\u0026mdash;which is infinite, and at the same time complete\r\nin an organized composite. Infinite divisibility is applicable only to a\r\nquantum continuum, and is based entirely on the infinite divisibility of space,\r\nBut in a quantum discretum the multitude of parts or units is always\r\ndetermined, and hence always equal to some number. To what extent a body may be\r\norganized, experience alone can inform us; and although, so far as our\r\nexperience of this or that body has extended, we may not have discovered any\r\ninorganic part, such parts must exist in possible experience. But how far the\r\ntranscendental division of a phenomenon must extend, we cannot know from\r\nexperience\u0026mdash;it is a question which experience cannot answer; it is\r\nanswered only by the principle of reason which forbids us to consider the\r\nempirical regress, in the analysis of extended body, as ever absolutely\r\ncomplete.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nConcluding Remark on the Solution of the Transcendental Mathematical\r\nIdeas\u0026mdash;and Introductory to the Solution of the Dynamical Ideas.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWe presented the antinomy of pure reason in a tabular form, and we endeavoured\r\nto show the ground of this self-contradiction on the part of reason, and the\r\nonly means of bringing it to a conclusion\u0026mdash;namely, by declaring both\r\ncontradictory statements to be false. We represented in these antinomies the\r\nconditions of phenomena as belonging to the conditioned according to relations\r\nof space and time\u0026mdash;which is the usual supposition of the common\r\nunderstanding. In this respect, all dialectical representations of totality, in\r\nthe series of conditions to a given conditioned, were perfectly homogeneous.\r\nThe condition was always a member of the series along with the conditioned, and\r\nthus the homogeneity of the whole series was assured. In this case the regress\r\ncould never be cogitated as complete; or, if this was the case, a member really\r\nconditioned was falsely regarded as a primal member, consequently as\r\nunconditioned. In such an antinomy, therefore, we did not consider the object,\r\nthat is, the conditioned, but the series of conditions belonging to the object,\r\nand the magnitude of that series. And thus arose the difficulty\u0026mdash;a\r\ndifficulty not to be settled by any decision regarding the claims of the two\r\nparties, but simply by cutting the knot\u0026mdash;by declaring the series proposed\r\nby reason to be either too long or too short for the understanding, which could\r\nin neither case make its conceptions adequate with the ideas.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut we have overlooked, up to this point, an essential difference existing\r\nbetween the conceptions of the understanding which reason endeavours to raise\r\nto the rank of ideas\u0026mdash;two of these indicating a mathematical, and two a\r\ndynamical synthesis of phenomena. Hitherto, it was necessary to signalize this\r\ndistinction; for, just as in our general representation of all transcendental\r\nideas, we considered them under phenomenal conditions, so, in the two\r\nmathematical ideas, our discussion is concerned solely with an object in the\r\nworld of phenomena. But as we are now about to proceed to the consideration of\r\nthe dynamical conceptions of the understanding, and their adequateness with\r\nideas, we must not lose sight of this distinction. We shall find that it opens\r\nup to us an entirely new view of the conflict in which reason is involved. For,\r\nwhile in the first two antinomies, both parties were dismissed, on the ground\r\nof having advanced statements based upon false hypothesis; in the present case\r\nthe hope appears of discovering a hypothesis which may be consistent with the\r\ndemands of reason, and, the judge completing the statement of the grounds of\r\nclaim, which both parties had left in an unsatisfactory state, the question may\r\nbe settled on its own merits, not by dismissing the claimants, but by a\r\ncomparison of the arguments on both sides. If we consider merely their\r\nextension, and whether they are adequate with ideas, the series of conditions\r\nmay be regarded as all homogeneous. But the conception of the understanding\r\nwhich lies at the basis of these ideas, contains either a synthesis of the\r\nhomogeneous (presupposed in every quantity\u0026mdash;in its composition as well as\r\nin its division) or of the heterogeneous, which is the case in the dynamical\r\nsynthesis of cause and effect, as well as of the necessary and the contingent.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThus it happens that in the mathematical series of phenomena no other than a\r\nsensuous condition is admissible\u0026mdash;a condition which is itself a member of\r\nthe series; while the dynamical series of sensuous conditions admits a\r\nheterogeneous condition, which is not a member of the series, but, as purely\r\nintelligible, lies out of and beyond it. And thus reason is satisfied, and an\r\nunconditioned placed at the head of the series of phenomena, without\r\nintroducing confusion into or discontinuing it, contrary to the principles of\r\nthe understanding.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nNow, from the fact that the dynamical ideas admit a condition of phenomena\r\nwhich does not form a part of the series of phenomena, arises a result which we\r\nshould not have expected from an antinomy. In former cases, the result was that\r\nboth contradictory dialectical statements were declared to be false. In the\r\npresent case, we find the conditioned in the dynamical series connected with an\r\nempirically unconditioned, but non-sensuous condition; and thus satisfaction is\r\ndone to the understanding on the one hand and to the reason on the other.\u003ca\r\nhref=\"#linknote-62\" id=\"linknoteref-62\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[62]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e While, moreover, the dialectical\r\narguments for unconditioned totality in mere phenomena fall to the ground, both\r\npropositions of reason may be shown to be true in their proper signification.\r\nThis could not happen in the case of the cosmological ideas which demanded a\r\nmathematically unconditioned unity; for no condition could be placed at the\r\nhead of the series of phenomena, except one which was itself a phenomenon and\r\nconsequently a member of the series.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"linknote-62\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#linknoteref-62\"\u003e[62]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nFor the understanding cannot admit among phenomena a condition which is itself\r\nempirically unconditioned. But if it is possible to cogitate an intelligible\r\ncondition\u0026mdash;one which is not a member of the series of phenomena\u0026mdash;for\r\na conditioned phenomenon, without breaking the series of empirical conditions,\r\nsuch a condition may be admissible as empirically unconditioned, and the\r\nempirical regress continue regular, unceasing, and intact.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003ca id=\"chap85\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eIII. Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality\r\nof the Deduction of Cosmical Events from their Causes\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThere are only two modes of causality cogitable\u0026mdash;the causality of nature\r\nor of freedom. The first is the conjunction of a particular state with another\r\npreceding it in the world of sense, the former following the latter by virtue\r\nof a law. Now, as the causality of phenomena is subject to conditions of time,\r\nand the preceding state, if it had always existed, could not have produced an\r\neffect which would make its first appearance at a particular time, the\r\ncausality of a cause must itself be an effect\u0026mdash;must itself have begun to\r\nbe, and therefore, according to the principle of the understanding, itself\r\nrequires a cause.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWe must understand, on the contrary, by the term freedom, in the cosmological\r\nsense, a faculty of the spontaneous origination of a state; the causality of\r\nwhich, therefore, is not subordinated to another cause determining it in time.\r\nFreedom is in this sense a pure transcendental idea, which, in the first place,\r\ncontains no empirical element; the object of which, in the second place, cannot\r\nbe given or determined in any experience, because it is a universal law of the\r\nvery possibility of experience, that everything which happens must have a\r\ncause, that consequently the causality of a cause, being itself something that\r\nhas happened, must also have a cause. In this view of the case, the whole field\r\nof experience, how far soever it may extend, contains nothing that is not\r\nsubject to the laws of nature. But, as we cannot by this means attain to an\r\nabsolute totality of conditions in reference to the series of causes and\r\neffects, reason creates the idea of a spontaneity, which can begin to act of\r\nitself, and without any external cause determining it to action, according to\r\nthe natural law of causality.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIt is especially remarkable that the practical conception of freedom is based\r\nupon the transcendental idea, and that the question of the possibility of the\r\nformer is difficult only as it involves the consideration of the truth of the\r\nlatter. Freedom, in the practical sense, is the independence of the will of\r\ncoercion by sensuous impulses. A will is sensuous, in so far as it is\r\npathologically affected (by sensuous impulses); it is termed animal (arbitrium\r\nbrutum), when it is pathologically necessitated. The human will is certainly an\r\narbitrium sensitivum, not brutum, but liberum; because sensuousness does not\r\nnecessitate its action, a faculty existing in man of self-determination,\r\nindependently of all sensuous coercion.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIt is plain that, if all causality in the world of sense were natural\u0026mdash;and\r\nnatural only\u0026mdash;every event would be determined by another according to\r\nnecessary laws, and that, consequently, phenomena, in so far as they determine\r\nthe will, must necessitate every action as a natural effect from themselves;\r\nand thus all practical freedom would fall to the ground with the transcendental\r\nidea. For the latter presupposes that although a certain thing has not\r\nhappened, it ought to have happened, and that, consequently, its phenomenal\r\ncause was not so powerful and determinative as to exclude the causality of our\r\nwill\u0026mdash;a causality capable of producing effects independently of and even\r\nin opposition to the power of natural causes, and capable, consequently, of\r\nspontaneously originating a series of events.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHere, too, we find it to be the case, as we generally found in the\r\nself-contradictions and perplexities of a reason which strives to pass the\r\nbounds of possible experience, that the problem is properly not physiological,\r\nbut transcendental. The question of the possibility of freedom does indeed\r\nconcern psychology; but, as it rests upon dialectical arguments of pure reason,\r\nits solution must engage the attention of transcendental philosophy. Before\r\nattempting this solution, a task which transcendental philosophy cannot\r\ndecline, it will be advisable to make a remark with regard to its procedure in\r\nthe settlement of the question.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIf phenomena were things in themselves, and time and space forms of the\r\nexistence of things, condition and conditioned would always be members of the\r\nsame series; and thus would arise in the present case the antinomy common to\r\nall transcendental ideas\u0026mdash;that their series is either too great or too\r\nsmall for the understanding. The dynamical ideas, which we are about to discuss\r\nin this and the following section, possess the peculiarity of relating to an\r\nobject, not considered as a quantity, but as an existence; and thus, in the\r\ndiscussion of the present question, we may make abstraction of the quantity of\r\nthe series of conditions, and consider merely the dynamical relation of the\r\ncondition to the conditioned. The question, then, suggests itself, whether\r\nfreedom is possible; and, if it is, whether it can consist with the\r\nuniversality of the natural law of causality; and, consequently, whether we\r\nenounce a proper disjunctive proposition when we say: \u0026ldquo;Every effect must\r\nhave its origin either in nature or in freedom,\u0026rdquo; or whether both cannot\r\nexist together in the same event in different relations. The principle of an\r\nunbroken connection between all events in the phenomenal world, in accordance\r\nwith the unchangeable laws of nature, is a well-established principle of\r\ntranscendental analytic which admits of no exception. The question, therefore,\r\nis: \u0026ldquo;Whether an effect, determined according to the laws of nature, can\r\nat the same time be produced by a free agent, or whether freedom and nature\r\nmutually exclude each other?\u0026rdquo; And here, the common but fallacious\r\nhypothesis of the absolute reality of phenomena manifests its injurious\r\ninfluence in embarrassing the procedure of reason. For if phenomena are things\r\nin themselves, freedom is impossible. In this case, nature is the complete and\r\nall-sufficient cause of every event; and condition and conditioned, cause and\r\neffect are contained in the same series, and necessitated by the same law. If,\r\non the contrary, phenomena are held to be, as they are in fact, nothing more\r\nthan mere representations, connected with each other in accordance with\r\nempirical laws, they must have a ground which is not phenomenal. But the\r\ncausality of such an intelligible cause is not determined or determinable by\r\nphenomena; although its effects, as phenomena, must be determined by other\r\nphenomenal existences. This cause and its causality exist therefore out of and\r\napart from the series of phenomena; while its effects do exist and are\r\ndiscoverable in the series of empirical conditions. Such an effect may\r\ntherefore be considered to be free in relation to its intelligible cause, and\r\nnecessary in relation to the phenomena from which it is a necessary\r\nconsequence\u0026mdash;a distinction which, stated in this perfectly general and\r\nabstract manner, must appear in the highest degree subtle and obscure. The\r\nsequel will explain. It is sufficient, at present, to remark that, as the\r\ncomplete and unbroken connection of phenomena is an unalterable law of nature,\r\nfreedom is impossible\u0026mdash;on the supposition that phenomena are absolutely\r\nreal. Hence those philosophers who adhere to the common opinion on this subject\r\ncan never succeed in reconciling the ideas of nature and freedom.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"center\"\u003e\r\n\u003ci\u003ePossibility of Freedom in Harmony with the Universal Law of Natural\r\nNecessity.\u003c/i\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThat element in a sensuous object which is not itself sensuous, I may be\r\nallowed to term intelligible. If, accordingly, an object which must be regarded\r\nas a sensuous phenomenon possesses a faculty which is not an object of sensuous\r\nintuition, but by means of which it is capable of being the cause of phenomena,\r\nthe causality of an object or existence of this kind may be regarded from two\r\ndifferent points of view. It may be considered to be intelligible, as regards\r\nits action\u0026mdash;the action of a thing which is a thing in itself, and\r\nsensuous, as regards its effects\u0026mdash;the effects of a phenomenon belonging to\r\nthe sensuous world. We should accordingly, have to form both an empirical and\r\nan intellectual conception of the causality of such a faculty or\r\npower\u0026mdash;both, however, having reference to the same effect. This twofold\r\nmanner of cogitating a power residing in a sensuous object does not run counter\r\nto any of the conceptions which we ought to form of the world of phenomena or\r\nof a possible experience. Phenomena\u0026mdash;not being things in\r\nthemselves\u0026mdash;must have a transcendental object as a foundation, which\r\ndetermines them as mere representations; and there seems to be no reason why we\r\nshould not ascribe to this transcendental object, in addition to the property\r\nof self-phenomenization, a causality whose effects are to be met with in the\r\nworld of phenomena, although it is not itself a phenomenon. But every effective\r\ncause must possess a character, that is to say, a law of its causality, without\r\nwhich it would cease to be a cause. In the above case, then, every sensuous\r\nobject would possess an empirical character, which guaranteed that its actions,\r\nas phenomena, stand in complete and harmonious connection, conformably to\r\nunvarying natural laws, with all other phenomena, and can be deduced from\r\nthese, as conditions, and that they do thus, in connection with these,\r\nconstitute a series in the order of nature. This sensuous object must, in the\r\nsecond place, possess an intelligible character, which guarantees it to be the\r\ncause of those actions, as phenomena, although it is not itself a phenomenon\r\nnor subordinate to the conditions of the world of sense. The former may be\r\ntermed the character of the thing as a phenomenon, the latter the character of\r\nthe thing as a thing in itself.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nNow this active subject would, in its character of intelligible subject, be\r\nsubordinate to no conditions of time, for time is only a condition of\r\nphenomena, and not of things in themselves. No action would begin or cease to\r\nbe in this subject; it would consequently be free from the law of all\r\ndetermination of time\u0026mdash;the law of change, namely, that everything which\r\nhappens must have a cause in the phenomena of a preceding state. In one word,\r\nthe causality of the subject, in so far as it is intelligible, would not form\r\npart of the series of empirical conditions which determine and necessitate an\r\nevent in the world of sense. Again, this intelligible character of a thing\r\ncannot be immediately cognized, because we can perceive nothing but phenomena,\r\nbut it must be capable of being cogitated in harmony with the empirical\r\ncharacter; for we always find ourselves compelled to place, in thought, a\r\ntranscendental object at the basis of phenomena although we can never know what\r\nthis object is in itself.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIn virtue of its empirical character, this subject would at the same time be\r\nsubordinate to all the empirical laws of causality, and, as a phenomenon and\r\nmember of the sensuous world, its effects would have to be accounted for by a\r\nreference to preceding phenomena. Eternal phenomena must be capable of\r\ninfluencing it; and its actions, in accordance with natural laws, must explain\r\nto us how its empirical character, that is, the law of its causality, is to be\r\ncognized in and by means of experience. In a word, all requisites for a\r\ncomplete and necessary determination of these actions must be presented to us\r\nby experience.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIn virtue of its intelligible character, on the other hand (although we possess\r\nonly a general conception of this character), the subject must be regarded as\r\nfree from all sensuous influences, and from all phenomenal determination.\r\nMoreover, as nothing happens in this subject\u0026mdash;for it is a noumenon, and\r\nthere does not consequently exist in it any change, demanding the dynamical\r\ndetermination of time, and for the same reason no connection with phenomena as\r\ncauses\u0026mdash;this active existence must in its actions be free from and\r\nindependent of natural necessity, for this necessity exists only in the world\r\nof phenomena. It would be quite correct to say that it originates or begins its\r\neffects in the world of sense from itself, although the action productive of\r\nthese effects does not begin in itself. We should not be in this case affirming\r\nthat these sensuous effects began to exist of themselves, because they are\r\nalways determined by prior empirical conditions\u0026mdash;by virtue of the\r\nempirical character, which is the phenomenon of the intelligible\r\ncharacter\u0026mdash;and are possible only as constituting a continuation of the\r\nseries of natural causes. And thus nature and freedom, each in the complete and\r\nabsolute signification of these terms, can exist, without contradiction or\r\ndisagreement, in the same action.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"center\"\u003e\r\n\u003ci\u003eExposition of the Cosmological Idea of Freedom in Harmony with the Universal\r\nLaw of Natural Necessity.\u003c/i\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nI have thought it advisable to lay before the reader at first merely a sketch\r\nof the solution of this transcendental problem, in order to enable him to form\r\nwith greater ease a clear conception of the course which reason must adopt in\r\nthe solution. I shall now proceed to exhibit the several momenta of this\r\nsolution, and to consider them in their order.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe natural law that everything which happens must have a cause, that the\r\ncausality of this cause, that is, the action of the cause (which cannot always\r\nhave existed, but must be itself an event, for it precedes in time some effect\r\nwhich it has originated), must have itself a phenomenal cause, by which it is\r\ndetermined and, and, consequently, all events are empirically determined in an\r\norder of nature\u0026mdash;this law, I say, which lies at the foundation of the\r\npossibility of experience, and of a connected system of phenomena or nature is\r\na law of the understanding, from which no departure, and to which no exception,\r\ncan be admitted. For to except even a single phenomenon from its operation is\r\nto exclude it from the sphere of possible experience and thus to admit it to be\r\na mere fiction of thought or phantom of the brain.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThus we are obliged to acknowledge the existence of a chain of causes, in\r\nwhich, however, absolute totality cannot be found. But we need not detain\r\nourselves with this question, for it has already been sufficiently answered in\r\nour discussion of the antinomies into which reason falls, when it attempts to\r\nreach the unconditioned in the series of phenomena. If we permit ourselves to\r\nbe deceived by the illusion of transcendental idealism, we shall find that\r\nneither nature nor freedom exists. Now the question is: \u0026ldquo;Whether,\r\nadmitting the existence of natural necessity in the world of phenomena, it is\r\npossible to consider an effect as at the same time an effect of nature and an\r\neffect of freedom\u0026mdash;or, whether these two modes of causality are\r\ncontradictory and incompatible?\u0026rdquo;\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nNo phenomenal cause can absolutely and of itself begin a series. Every action,\r\nin so far as it is productive of an event, is itself an event or occurrence,\r\nand presupposes another preceding state, in which its cause existed. Thus\r\neverything that happens is but a continuation of a series, and an absolute\r\nbeginning is impossible in the sensuous world. The actions of natural causes\r\nare, accordingly, themselves effects, and presuppose causes preceding them in\r\ntime. A primal action which forms an absolute beginning, is beyond the causal\r\npower of phenomena.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nNow, is it absolutely necessary that, granting that all effects are phenomena,\r\nthe causality of the cause of these effects must also be a phenomenon and\r\nbelong to the empirical world? Is it not rather possible that, although every\r\neffect in the phenomenal world must be connected with an empirical cause,\r\naccording to the universal law of nature, this empirical causality may be\r\nitself the effect of a non-empirical and intelligible causality\u0026mdash;its\r\nconnection with natural causes remaining nevertheless intact? Such a causality\r\nwould be considered, in reference to phenomena, as the primal action of a\r\ncause, which is in so far, therefore, not phenomenal, but, by reason of this\r\nfaculty or power, intelligible; although it must, at the same time, as a link\r\nin the chain of nature, be regarded as belonging to the sensuous world.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nA belief in the reciprocal causality of phenomena is necessary, if we are\r\nrequired to look for and to present the natural conditions of natural events,\r\nthat is to say, their causes. This being admitted as unexceptionably valid, the\r\nrequirements of the understanding, which recognizes nothing but nature in the\r\nregion of phenomena, are satisfied, and our physical explanations of physical\r\nphenomena may proceed in their regular course, without hindrance and without\r\nopposition. But it is no stumbling-block in the way, even assuming the idea to\r\nbe a pure fiction, to admit that there are some natural causes in the\r\npossession of a faculty which is not empirical, but intelligible, inasmuch as\r\nit is not determined to action by empirical conditions, but purely and solely\r\nupon grounds brought forward by the understanding\u0026mdash;this action being\r\nstill, when the cause is phenomenized, in perfect accordance with the laws of\r\nempirical causality. Thus the acting subject, as a causal phenomenon, would\r\ncontinue to preserve a complete connection with nature and natural conditions;\r\nand the phenomenon only of the subject (with all its phenomenal causality)\r\nwould contain certain conditions, which, if we ascend from the empirical to the\r\ntranscendental object, must necessarily be regarded as intelligible. For, if we\r\nattend, in our inquiries with regard to causes in the world of phenomena, to\r\nthe directions of nature alone, we need not trouble ourselves about the\r\nrelation in which the transcendental subject, which is completely unknown to\r\nus, stands to these phenomena and their connection in nature. The intelligible\r\nground of phenomena in this subject does not concern empirical questions. It\r\nhas to do only with pure thought; and, although the effects of this thought and\r\naction of the pure understanding are discoverable in phenomena, these phenomena\r\nmust nevertheless be capable of a full and complete explanation, upon purely\r\nphysical grounds and in accordance with natural laws. And in this case we\r\nattend solely to their empirical and omit all consideration of their\r\nintelligible character (which is the transcendental cause of the former) as\r\ncompletely unknown, except in so far as it is exhibited by the latter as its\r\nempirical symbol. Now let us apply this to experience. Man is a phenomenon of\r\nthe sensuous world and, at the same time, therefore, a natural cause, the\r\ncausality of which must be regulated by empirical laws. As such, he must\r\npossess an empirical character, like all other natural phenomena. We remark\r\nthis empirical character in his actions, which reveal the presence of certain\r\npowers and faculties. If we consider inanimate or merely animal nature, we can\r\ndiscover no reason for ascribing to ourselves any other than a faculty which is\r\ndetermined in a purely sensuous manner. But man, to whom nature reveals herself\r\nonly through sense, cognizes himself not only by his senses, but also through\r\npure apperception; and this in actions and internal determinations, which he\r\ncannot regard as sensuous impressions. He is thus to himself, on the one hand,\r\na phenomenon, but on the other hand, in respect of certain faculties, a purely\r\nintelligible object\u0026mdash;intelligible, because its action cannot be ascribed\r\nto sensuous receptivity. These faculties are understanding and reason. The\r\nlatter, especially, is in a peculiar manner distinct from all\r\nempirically-conditioned faculties, for it employs ideas alone in the\r\nconsideration of its objects, and by means of these determines the\r\nunderstanding, which then proceeds to make an empirical use of its own\r\nconceptions, which, like the ideas of reason, are pure and non-empirical.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThat reason possesses the faculty of causality, or that at least we are\r\ncompelled so to represent it, is evident from the imperatives, which in the\r\nsphere of the practical we impose on many of our executive powers. The words I\r\nought express a species of necessity, and imply a connection with grounds which\r\nnature does not and cannot present to the mind of man. Understanding knows\r\nnothing in nature but that which is, or has been, or will be. It would be\r\nabsurd to say that anything in nature ought to be other than it is in the\r\nrelations of time in which it stands; indeed, the ought, when we consider\r\nmerely the course of nature, has neither application nor meaning. The question,\r\n\u0026ldquo;What ought to happen in the sphere of nature?\u0026rdquo; is just as absurd\r\nas the question, \u0026ldquo;What ought to be the properties of a circle?\u0026rdquo; All\r\nthat we are entitled to ask is, \u0026ldquo;What takes place in nature?\u0026rdquo; or,\r\nin the latter case, \u0026ldquo;What are the properties of a circle?\u0026rdquo;\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut the idea of an ought or of duty indicates a possible action, the ground of\r\nwhich is a pure conception; while the ground of a merely natural action is, on\r\nthe contrary, always a phenomenon. This action must certainly be possible under\r\nphysical conditions, if it is prescribed by the moral imperative ought; but\r\nthese physical or natural conditions do not concern the determination of the\r\nwill itself, they relate to its effects alone, and the consequences of the\r\neffect in the world of phenomena. Whatever number of motives nature may present\r\nto my will, whatever sensuous impulses\u0026mdash;the moral ought it is beyond their\r\npower to produce. They may produce a volition, which, so far from being\r\nnecessary, is always conditioned\u0026mdash;a volition to which the ought enunciated\r\nby reason, sets an aim and a standard, gives permission or prohibition. Be the\r\nobject what it may, purely sensuous\u0026mdash;as pleasure, or presented by pure\r\nreason\u0026mdash;as good, reason will not yield to grounds which have an empirical\r\norigin. Reason will not follow the order of things presented by experience,\r\nbut, with perfect spontaneity, rearranges them according to ideas, with which\r\nit compels empirical conditions to agree. It declares, in the name of these\r\nideas, certain actions to be necessary which nevertheless have not taken place\r\nand which perhaps never will take place; and yet presupposes that it possesses\r\nthe faculty of causality in relation to these actions. For, in the absence of\r\nthis supposition, it could not expect its ideas to produce certain effects in\r\nthe world of experience.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nNow, let us stop here and admit it to be at least possible that reason does\r\nstand in a really causal relation to phenomena. In this case it must\u0026mdash;pure\r\nreason as it is\u0026mdash;exhibit an empirical character. For every cause supposes\r\na rule, according to which certain phenomena follow as effects from the cause,\r\nand every rule requires uniformity in these effects; and this is the proper\r\nground of the conception of a cause\u0026mdash;as a faculty or power. Now this\r\nconception (of a cause) may be termed the empirical character of reason; and\r\nthis character is a permanent one, while the effects produced appear, in\r\nconformity with the various conditions which accompany and partly limit them,\r\nin various forms.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThus the volition of every man has an empirical character, which is nothing\r\nmore than the causality of his reason, in so far as its effects in the\r\nphenomenal world manifest the presence of a rule, according to which we are\r\nenabled to examine, in their several kinds and degrees, the actions of this\r\ncausality and the rational grounds for these actions, and in this way to decide\r\nupon the subjective principles of the volition. Now we learn what this\r\nempirical character is only from phenomenal effects, and from the rule of these\r\nwhich is presented by experience; and for this reason all the actions of man in\r\nthe world of phenomena are determined by his empirical character, and the\r\nco-operative causes of nature. If, then, we could investigate all the phenomena\r\nof human volition to their lowest foundation in the mind, there would be no\r\naction which we could not anticipate with certainty, and recognize to be\r\nabsolutely necessary from its preceding conditions. So far as relates to this\r\nempirical character, therefore, there can be no freedom; and it is only in the\r\nlight of this character that we can consider the human will, when we confine\r\nourselves to simple observation and, as is the case in anthropology, institute\r\na physiological investigation of the motive causes of human actions.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut when we consider the same actions in relation to reason\u0026mdash;not for the\r\npurpose of explaining their origin, that is, in relation to speculative reason,\r\nbut to practical reason, as the producing cause of these actions\u0026mdash;we shall\r\ndiscover a rule and an order very different from those of nature and\r\nexperience. For the declaration of this mental faculty may be that what has and\r\ncould not but take place in the course of nature, ought not to have taken\r\nplace. Sometimes, too, we discover, or believe that we discover, that the ideas\r\nof reason did actually stand in a causal relation to certain actions of man;\r\nand that these actions have taken place because they were determined, not by\r\nempirical causes, but by the act of the will upon grounds of reason.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nNow, granting that reason stands in a causal relation to phenomena; can an\r\naction of reason be called free, when we know that, sensuously, in its\r\nempirical character, it is completely determined and absolutely necessary? But\r\nthis empirical character is itself determined by the intelligible character.\r\nThe latter we cannot cognize; we can only indicate it by means of phenomena,\r\nwhich enable us to have an immediate cognition only of the empirical\r\ncharacter.\u003ca href=\"#linknote-63\" id=\"linknoteref-63\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[63]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e An action, then, in so far as it is to\r\nbe ascribed to an intelligible cause, does not result from it in accordance\r\nwith empirical laws. That is to say, not the conditions of pure reason, but\r\nonly their effects in the internal sense, precede the act. Pure reason, as a\r\npurely intelligible faculty, is not subject to the conditions of time. The\r\ncausality of reason in its intelligible character does not begin to be; it does\r\nnot make its appearance at a certain time, for the purpose of producing an\r\neffect. If this were not the case, the causality of reason would be subservient\r\nto the natural law of phenomena, which determines them according to time, and\r\nas a series of causes and effects in time; it would consequently cease to be\r\nfreedom and become a part of nature. We are therefore justified in saying:\r\n\u0026ldquo;If reason stands in a causal relation to phenomena, it is a faculty\r\nwhich originates the sensuous condition of an empirical series of\r\neffects.\u0026rdquo; For the condition, which resides in the reason, is\r\nnon-sensuous, and therefore cannot be originated, or begin to be. And thus we\r\nfind\u0026mdash;what we could not discover in any empirical series\u0026mdash;a condition\r\nof a successive series of events itself empirically unconditioned. For, in the\r\npresent case, the condition stands out of and beyond the series of\r\nphenomena\u0026mdash;it is intelligible, and it consequently cannot be subjected to\r\nany sensuous condition, or to any time-determination by a preceding cause.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"linknote-63\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#linknoteref-63\"\u003e[63]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nThe real morality of actions\u0026mdash;their merit or demerit, and even that of our\r\nown conduct, is completely unknown to us. Our estimates can relate only to\r\ntheir empirical character. How much is the result of the action of free will,\r\nhow much is to be ascribed to nature and to blameless error, or to a happy\r\nconstitution of temperament (merito fortunae), no one can discover, nor, for\r\nthis reason, determine with perfect justice.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut, in another respect, the same cause belongs also to the series of\r\nphenomena. Man is himself a phenomenon. His will has an empirical character,\r\nwhich is the empirical cause of all his actions. There is no\r\ncondition\u0026mdash;determining man and his volition in conformity with this\r\ncharacter\u0026mdash;which does not itself form part of the series of effects in\r\nnature, and is subject to their law\u0026mdash;the law according to which an\r\nempirically undetermined cause of an event in time cannot exist. For this\r\nreason no given action can have an absolute and spontaneous origination, all\r\nactions being phenomena, and belonging to the world of experience. But it\r\ncannot be said of reason, that the state in which it determines the will is\r\nalways preceded by some other state determining it. For reason is not a\r\nphenomenon, and therefore not subject to sensuous conditions; and,\r\nconsequently, even in relation to its causality, the sequence or conditions of\r\ntime do not influence reason, nor can the dynamical law of nature, which\r\ndetermines the sequence of time according to certain rules, be applied to it.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nReason is consequently the permanent condition of all actions of the human\r\nwill. Each of these is determined in the empirical character of the man, even\r\nbefore it has taken place. The intelligible character, of which the former is\r\nbut the sensuous schema, knows no before or after; and every action,\r\nirrespective of the time-relation in which it stands with other phenomena, is\r\nthe immediate effect of the intelligible character of pure reason, which,\r\nconsequently, enjoys freedom of action, and is not dynamically determined\r\neither by internal or external preceding conditions. This freedom must not be\r\ndescribed, in a merely negative manner, as independence of empirical\r\nconditions, for in this case the faculty of reason would cease to be a cause of\r\nphenomena; but it must be regarded, positively, as a faculty which can\r\nspontaneously originate a series of events. At the same time, it must not be\r\nsupposed that any beginning can take place in reason; on the contrary, reason,\r\nas the unconditioned condition of all action of the will, admits of no\r\ntime-conditions, although its effect does really begin in a series of\r\nphenomena\u0026mdash;a beginning which is not, however, absolutely primal.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nI shall illustrate this regulative principle of reason by an example, from its\r\nemployment in the world of experience; proved it cannot be by any amount of\r\nexperience, or by any number of facts, for such arguments cannot establish the\r\ntruth of transcendental propositions. Let us take a voluntary action\u0026mdash;for\r\nexample, a falsehood\u0026mdash;by means of which a man has introduced a certain\r\ndegree of confusion into the social life of humanity, which is judged according\r\nto the motives from which it originated, and the blame of which and of the evil\r\nconsequences arising from it, is imputed to the offender. We at first proceed\r\nto examine the empirical character of the offence, and for this purpose we\r\nendeavour to penetrate to the sources of that character, such as a defective\r\neducation, bad company, a shameless and wicked disposition, frivolity, and want\r\nof reflection\u0026mdash;not forgetting also the occasioning causes which prevailed\r\nat the moment of the transgression. In this the procedure is exactly the same\r\nas that pursued in the investigation of the series of causes which determine a\r\ngiven physical effect. Now, although we believe the action to have been\r\ndetermined by all these circumstances, we do not the less blame the offender.\r\nWe do not blame him for his unhappy disposition, nor for the circumstances\r\nwhich influenced him, nay, not even for his former course of life; for we\r\npresuppose that all these considerations may be set aside, that the series of\r\npreceding conditions may be regarded as having never existed, and that the\r\naction may be considered as completely unconditioned in relation to any state\r\npreceding, just as if the agent commenced with it an entirely new series of\r\neffects. Our blame of the offender is grounded upon a law of reason, which\r\nrequires us to regard this faculty as a cause, which could have and ought to\r\nhave otherwise determined the behaviour of the culprit, independently of all\r\nempirical conditions. This causality of reason we do not regard as a\r\nco-operating agency, but as complete in itself. It matters not whether the\r\nsensuous impulses favoured or opposed the action of this causality, the offence\r\nis estimated according to its intelligible character\u0026mdash;the offender is\r\ndecidedly worthy of blame, the moment he utters a falsehood. It follows that we\r\nregard reason, in spite of the empirical conditions of the act, as completely\r\nfree, and therefore, as in the present case, culpable.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe above judgement is complete evidence that we are accustomed to think that\r\nreason is not affected by sensuous conditions, that in it no change takes\r\nplace\u0026mdash;although its phenomena, in other words, the mode in which it\r\nappears in its effects, are subject to change\u0026mdash;that in it no preceding\r\nstate determines the following, and, consequently, that it does not form a\r\nmember of the series of sensuous conditions which necessitate phenomena\r\naccording to natural laws. Reason is present and the same in all human actions\r\nand at all times; but it does not itself exist in time, and therefore does not\r\nenter upon any state in which it did not formerly exist. It is, relatively to\r\nnew states or conditions, determining, but not determinable. Hence we cannot\r\nask: \u0026ldquo;Why did not reason determine itself in a different manner?\u0026rdquo;\r\nThe question ought to be thus stated: \u0026ldquo;Why did not reason employ its\r\npower of causality to determine certain phenomena in a different manner?\u0026rdquo;\r\nBut this is a question which admits of no answer. For a different intelligible\r\ncharacter would have exhibited a different empirical character; and, when we\r\nsay that, in spite of the course which his whole former life has taken, the\r\noffender could have refrained from uttering the falsehood, this means merely\r\nthat the act was subject to the power and authority\u0026mdash;permissive or\r\nprohibitive\u0026mdash;of reason. Now, reason is not subject in its causality to any\r\nconditions of phenomena or of time; and a difference in time may produce a\r\ndifference in the relation of phenomena to each other\u0026mdash;for these are not\r\nthings and therefore not causes in themselves\u0026mdash;but it cannot produce any\r\ndifference in the relation in which the action stands to the faculty of reason.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThus, then, in our investigation into free actions and the causal power which\r\nproduced them, we arrive at an intelligible cause, beyond which, however, we\r\ncannot go; although we can recognize that it is free, that is, independent of\r\nall sensuous conditions, and that, in this way, it may be the sensuously\r\nunconditioned condition of phenomena. But for what reason the intelligible\r\ncharacter generates such and such phenomena and exhibits such and such an\r\nempirical character under certain circumstances, it is beyond the power of our\r\nreason to decide. The question is as much above the power and the sphere of\r\nreason as the following would be: \u0026ldquo;Why does the transcendental object of\r\nour external sensuous intuition allow of no other form than that of intuition\r\nin space?\u0026rdquo; But the problem, which we were called upon to solve, does not\r\nrequire us to entertain any such questions. The problem was merely\r\nthis\u0026mdash;whether freedom and natural necessity can exist without opposition\r\nin the same action. To this question we have given a sufficient answer; for we\r\nhave shown that, as the former stands in a relation to a different kind of\r\ncondition from those of the latter, the law of the one does not affect the law\r\nof the other and that, consequently, both can exist together in independence of\r\nand without interference with each other.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe reader must be careful to remark that my intention in the above remarks has\r\nnot been to prove the actual existence of freedom, as a faculty in which\r\nresides the cause of certain sensuous phenomena. For, not to mention that such\r\nan argument would not have a transcendental character, nor have been limited to\r\nthe discussion of pure conceptions\u0026mdash;all attempts at inferring from\r\nexperience what cannot be cogitated in accordance with its laws, must ever be\r\nunsuccessful. Nay, more, I have not even aimed at demonstrating the possibility\r\nof freedom; for this too would have been a vain endeavour, inasmuch as it is\r\nbeyond the power of the mind to cognize the possibility of a reality or of a\r\ncausal power by the aid of mere à priori conceptions. Freedom has been\r\nconsidered in the foregoing remarks only as a transcendental idea, by means of\r\nwhich reason aims at originating a series of conditions in the world of\r\nphenomena with the help of that which is sensuously unconditioned, involving\r\nitself, however, in an antinomy with the laws which itself prescribes for the\r\nconduct of the understanding. That this antinomy is based upon a mere illusion,\r\nand that nature and freedom are at least not opposed\u0026mdash;this was the only\r\nthing in our power to prove, and the question which it was our task to solve.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003ca id=\"chap86\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eIV. Solution of the Cosmological Idea of the Totality\r\nof the Dependence of Phenomenal Existences\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIn the preceding remarks, we considered the changes in the world of sense as\r\nconstituting a dynamical series, in which each member is subordinated to\r\nanother\u0026mdash;as its cause. Our present purpose is to avail ourselves of this\r\nseries of states or conditions as a guide to an existence which may be the\r\nhighest condition of all changeable phenomena, that is, to a necessary being.\r\nOur endeavour to reach, not the unconditioned causality, but the unconditioned\r\nexistence, of substance. The series before us is therefore a series of\r\nconceptions, and not of intuitions (in which the one intuition is the condition\r\nof the other).\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut it is evident that, as all phenomena are subject to change and conditioned\r\nin their existence, the series of dependent existences cannot embrace an\r\nunconditioned member, the existence of which would be absolutely necessary. It\r\nfollows that, if phenomena were things in themselves, and\u0026mdash;as an immediate\r\nconsequence from this supposition\u0026mdash;condition and conditioned belonged to\r\nthe same series of phenomena, the existence of a necessary being, as the\r\ncondition of the existence of sensuous phenomena, would be perfectly\r\nimpossible.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAn important distinction, however, exists between the dynamical and the\r\nmathematical regress. The latter is engaged solely with the combination of\r\nparts into a whole, or with the division of a whole into its parts; and\r\ntherefore are the conditions of its series parts of the series, and to be\r\nconsequently regarded as homogeneous, and for this reason, as consisting,\r\nwithout exception, of phenomena. If the former regress, on the contrary, the\r\naim of which is not to establish the possibility of an unconditioned whole\r\nconsisting of given parts, or of an unconditioned part of a given whole, but to\r\ndemonstrate the possibility of the deduction of a certain state from its cause,\r\nor of the contingent existence of substance from that which exists necessarily,\r\nit is not requisite that the condition should form part of an empirical series\r\nalong with the conditioned.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIn the case of the apparent antinomy with which we are at present dealing,\r\nthere exists a way of escape from the difficulty; for it is not impossible that\r\nboth of the contradictory statements may be true in different relations. All\r\nsensuous phenomena may be contingent, and consequently possess only an\r\nempirically conditioned existence, and yet there may also exist a non-empirical\r\ncondition of the whole series, or, in other words, a necessary being. For this\r\nnecessary being, as an intelligible condition, would not form a\r\nmember\u0026mdash;not even the highest member\u0026mdash;of the series; the whole world\r\nof sense would be left in its empirically determined existence uninterfered\r\nwith and uninfluenced. This would also form a ground of distinction between the\r\nmodes of solution employed for the third and fourth antinomies. For, while in\r\nthe consideration of freedom in the former antinomy, the thing itself\u0026mdash;the\r\ncause (substantia phaenomenon)\u0026mdash;was regarded as belonging to the series of\r\nconditions, and only its causality to the intelligible world\u0026mdash;we are\r\nobliged in the present case to cogitate this necessary being as purely\r\nintelligible and as existing entirely apart from the world of sense (as an ens\r\nextramundanum); for otherwise it would be subject to the phenomenal law of\r\ncontingency and dependence.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIn relation to the present problem, therefore, the regulative principle of\r\nreason is that everything in the sensuous world possesses an empirically\r\nconditioned existence\u0026mdash;that no property of the sensuous world possesses\r\nunconditioned necessity\u0026mdash;that we are bound to expect, and, so far as is\r\npossible, to seek for the empirical condition of every member in the series of\r\nconditions\u0026mdash;and that there is no sufficient reason to justify us in\r\ndeducing any existence from a condition which lies out of and beyond the\r\nempirical series, or in regarding any existence as independent and\r\nself-subsistent; although this should not prevent us from recognizing the\r\npossibility of the whole series being based upon a being which is intelligible,\r\nand for this reason free from all empirical conditions.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut it has been far from my intention, in these remarks, to prove the existence\r\nof this unconditioned and necessary being, or even to evidence the possibility\r\nof a purely intelligible condition of the existence of all sensuous phenomena.\r\nAs bounds were set to reason, to prevent it from leaving the guiding thread of\r\nempirical conditions and losing itself in transcendent theories which are\r\nincapable of concrete presentation; so it was my purpose, on the other hand, to\r\nset bounds to the law of the purely empirical understanding, and to protest\r\nagainst any attempts on its part at deciding on the possibility of things, or\r\ndeclaring the existence of the intelligible to be impossible, merely on the\r\nground that it is not available for the explanation and exposition of\r\nphenomena. It has been shown, at the same time, that the contingency of all the\r\nphenomena of nature and their empirical conditions is quite consistent with the\r\narbitrary hypothesis of a necessary, although purely intelligible condition,\r\nthat no real contradiction exists between them and that, consequently, both may\r\nbe true. The existence of such an absolutely necessary being may be impossible;\r\nbut this can never be demonstrated from the universal contingency and\r\ndependence of sensuous phenomena, nor from the principle which forbids us to\r\ndiscontinue the series at some member of it, or to seek for its cause in some\r\nsphere of existence beyond the world of nature. Reason goes its way in the\r\nempirical world, and follows, too, its peculiar path in the sphere of the\r\ntranscendental.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe sensuous world contains nothing but phenomena, which are mere\r\nrepresentations, and always sensuously conditioned; things in themselves are\r\nnot, and cannot be, objects to us. It is not to be wondered at, therefore, that\r\nwe are not justified in leaping from some member of an empirical series beyond\r\nthe world of sense, as if empirical representations were things in themselves,\r\nexisting apart from their transcendental ground in the human mind, and the\r\ncause of whose existence may be sought out of the empirical series. This would\r\ncertainly be the case with contingent things; but it cannot be with mere\r\nrepresentations of things, the contingency of which is itself merely a\r\nphenomenon and can relate to no other regress than that which determines\r\nphenomena, that is, the empirical. But to cogitate an intelligible ground of\r\nphenomena, as free, moreover, from the contingency of the latter, conflicts\r\nneither with the unlimited nature of the empirical regress, nor with the\r\ncomplete contingency of phenomena. And the demonstration of this was the only\r\nthing necessary for the solution of this apparent antinomy. For if the\r\ncondition of every conditioned\u0026mdash;as regards its existence\u0026mdash;is\r\nsensuous, and for this reason a part of the same series, it must be itself\r\nconditioned, as was shown in the antithesis of the fourth antinomy. The\r\nembarrassments into which a reason, which postulates the unconditioned,\r\nnecessarily falls, must, therefore, continue to exist; or the unconditioned\r\nmust be placed in the sphere of the intelligible. In this way, its necessity\r\ndoes not require, nor does it even permit, the presence of an empirical\r\ncondition: and it is, consequently, unconditionally necessary.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe empirical employment of reason is not affected by the assumption of a\r\npurely intelligible being; it continues its operations on the principle of the\r\ncontingency of all phenomena, proceeding from empirical conditions to still\r\nhigher and higher conditions, themselves empirical. Just as little does this\r\nregulative principle exclude the assumption of an intelligible cause, when the\r\nquestion regards merely the pure employment of reason\u0026mdash;in relation to ends\r\nor aims. For, in this case, an intelligible cause signifies merely the\r\ntranscendental and to us unknown ground of the possibility of sensuous\r\nphenomena, and its existence, necessary and independent of all sensuous\r\nconditions, is not inconsistent with the contingency of phenomena, or with the\r\nunlimited possibility of regress which exists in the series of empirical\r\nconditions.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nConcluding Remarks on the Antinomy of Pure Reason.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSo long as the object of our rational conceptions is the totality of conditions\r\nin the world of phenomena, and the satisfaction, from this source, of the\r\nrequirements of reason, so long are our ideas transcendental and cosmological.\r\nBut when we set the unconditioned\u0026mdash;which is the aim of all our\r\ninquiries\u0026mdash;in a sphere which lies out of the world of sense and possible\r\nexperience, our ideas become transcendent. They are then not merely serviceable\r\ntowards the completion of the exercise of reason (which remains an idea, never\r\nexecuted, but always to be pursued); they detach themselves completely from\r\nexperience and construct for themselves objects, the material of which has not\r\nbeen presented by experience, and the objective reality of which is not based\r\nupon the completion of the empirical series, but upon pure à priori\r\nconceptions. The intelligible object of these transcendent ideas may be\r\nconceded, as a transcendental object. But we cannot cogitate it as a thing\r\ndeterminable by certain distinct predicates relating to its internal nature,\r\nfor it has no connection with empirical conceptions; nor are we justified in\r\naffirming the existence of any such object. It is, consequently, a mere product\r\nof the mind alone. Of all the cosmological ideas, however, it is that\r\noccasioning the fourth antinomy which compels us to venture upon this step. For\r\nthe existence of phenomena, always conditioned and never self-subsistent,\r\nrequires us to look for an object different from phenomena\u0026mdash;an\r\nintelligible object, with which all contingency must cease. But, as we have\r\nallowed ourselves to assume the existence of a self-subsistent reality out of\r\nthe field of experience, and are therefore obliged to regard phenomena as\r\nmerely a contingent mode of representing intelligible objects employed by\r\nbeings which are themselves intelligences\u0026mdash;no other course remains for us\r\nthan to follow analogy and employ the same mode in forming some conception of\r\nintelligible things, of which we have not the least knowledge, which nature\r\ntaught us to use in the formation of empirical conceptions. Experience made us\r\nacquainted with the contingent. But we are at present engaged in the discussion\r\nof things which are not objects of experience; and must, therefore, deduce our\r\nknowledge of them from that which is necessary absolutely and in itself, that\r\nis, from pure conceptions. Hence the first step which we take out of the world\r\nof sense obliges us to begin our system of new cognition with the investigation\r\nof a necessary being, and to deduce from our conceptions of it all our\r\nconceptions of intelligible things. This we propose to attempt in the following\r\nchapter.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003ca id=\"chap87\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eChapter III. The Ideal of Pure Reason\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003ca id=\"chap88\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eSection I. Of the Ideal in General\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWe have seen that pure conceptions do not present objects to the mind, except\r\nunder sensuous conditions; because the conditions of objective reality do not\r\nexist in these conceptions, which contain, in fact, nothing but the mere form\r\nof thought. They may, however, when applied to phenomena, be presented in\r\nconcreto; for it is phenomena that present to them the materials for the\r\nformation of empirical conceptions, which are nothing more than concrete forms\r\nof the conceptions of the understanding. But ideas are still further removed\r\nfrom objective reality than categories; for no phenomenon can ever present them\r\nto the human mind in concreto. They contain a certain perfection, attainable by\r\nno possible empirical cognition; and they give to reason a systematic unity, to\r\nwhich the unity of experience attempts to approximate, but can never completely\r\nattain.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut still further removed than the idea from objective reality is the Ideal, by\r\nwhich term I understand the idea, not in concreto, but in individuo\u0026mdash;as an\r\nindividual thing, determinable or determined by the idea alone. The idea of\r\nhumanity in its complete perfection supposes not only the advancement of all\r\nthe powers and faculties, which constitute our conception of human nature, to a\r\ncomplete attainment of their final aims, but also everything which is requisite\r\nfor the complete determination of the idea; for of all contradictory\r\npredicates, only one can conform with the idea of the perfect man. What I have\r\ntermed an ideal was in Plato\u0026rsquo;s philosophy an idea of the divine\r\nmind\u0026mdash;an individual object present to its pure intuition, the most perfect\r\nof every kind of possible beings, and the archetype of all phenomenal\r\nexistences.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWithout rising to these speculative heights, we are bound to confess that human\r\nreason contains not only ideas, but ideals, which possess, not, like those of\r\nPlato, creative, but certainly practical power\u0026mdash;as regulative principles,\r\nand form the basis of the perfectibility of certain actions. Moral conceptions\r\nare not perfectly pure conceptions of reason, because an empirical\r\nelement\u0026mdash;of pleasure or pain\u0026mdash;lies at the foundation of them. In\r\nrelation, however, to the principle, whereby reason sets bounds to a freedom\r\nwhich is in itself without law, and consequently when we attend merely to their\r\nform, they may be considered as pure conceptions of reason. Virtue and wisdom\r\nin their perfect purity are ideas. But the wise man of the Stoics is an ideal,\r\nthat is to say, a human being existing only in thought and in complete\r\nconformity with the idea of wisdom. As the idea provides a rule, so the ideal\r\nserves as an archetype for the perfect and complete determination of the copy.\r\nThus the conduct of this wise and divine man serves us as a standard of action,\r\nwith which we may compare and judge ourselves, which may help us to reform\r\nourselves, although the perfection it demands can never be attained by us.\r\nAlthough we cannot concede objective reality to these ideals, they are not to\r\nbe considered as chimeras; on the contrary, they provide reason with a\r\nstandard, which enables it to estimate, by comparison, the degree of\r\nincompleteness in the objects presented to it. But to aim at realizing the\r\nideal in an example in the world of experience\u0026mdash;to describe, for instance,\r\nthe character of the perfectly wise man in a romance\u0026mdash;is impracticable.\r\nNay more, there is something absurd in the attempt; and the result must be\r\nlittle edifying, as the natural limitations, which are continually breaking in\r\nupon the perfection and completeness of the idea, destroy the illusion in the\r\nstory and throw an air of suspicion even on what is good in the idea, which\r\nhence appears fictitious and unreal.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSuch is the constitution of the ideal of reason, which is always based upon\r\ndeterminate conceptions, and serves as a rule and a model for limitation or of\r\ncriticism. Very different is the nature of the ideals of the imagination. Of\r\nthese it is impossible to present an intelligible conception; they are a kind\r\nof monogram, drawn according to no determinate rule, and forming rather a vague\r\npicture\u0026mdash;the production of many diverse experiences\u0026mdash;than a\r\ndeterminate image. Such are the ideals which painters and physiognomists\r\nprofess to have in their minds, and which can serve neither as a model for\r\nproduction nor as a standard for appreciation. They may be termed, though\r\nimproperly, sensuous ideals, as they are declared to be models of certain\r\npossible empirical intuitions. They cannot, however, furnish rules or standards\r\nfor explanation or examination.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIn its ideals, reason aims at complete and perfect determination according to à\r\npriori rules; and hence it cogitates an object, which must be completely\r\ndeterminable in conformity with principles, although all empirical conditions\r\nare absent, and the conception of the object is on this account transcendent.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003ca id=\"chap89\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eSection II. Of the Transcendental Ideal (Prototypon\r\nTrancendentale)\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nEvery conception is, in relation to that which is not contained in it,\r\nundetermined and subject to the principle of determinability. This principle is\r\nthat, of every two contradictorily opposed predicates, only one can belong to a\r\nconception. It is a purely logical principle, itself based upon the principle\r\nof contradiction; inasmuch as it makes complete abstraction of the content and\r\nattends merely to the logical form of the cognition.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut again, everything, as regards its possibility, is also subject to the\r\nprinciple of complete determination, according to which one of all the possible\r\ncontradictory predicates of things must belong to it. This principle is not\r\nbased merely upon that of contradiction; for, in addition to the relation\r\nbetween two contradictory predicates, it regards everything as standing in a\r\nrelation to the sum of possibilities, as the sum total of all predicates of\r\nthings, and, while presupposing this sum as an à priori condition, presents to\r\nthe mind everything as receiving the possibility of its individual existence\r\nfrom the relation it bears to, and the share it possesses in, the aforesaid sum\r\nof possibilities.\u003ca href=\"#linknote-64\" id=\"linknoteref-64\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[64]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The principle of complete determination\r\nrelates the content and not to the logical form. It is the principle of the\r\nsynthesis of all the predicates which are required to constitute the complete\r\nconception of a thing, and not a mere principle analytical representation,\r\nwhich enounces that one of two contradictory predicates must belong to a\r\nconception. It contains, moreover, a transcendental presupposition\u0026mdash;that,\r\nnamely, of the material for all possibility, which must contain à priori the\r\ndata for this or that particular possibility.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"linknote-64\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#linknoteref-64\"\u003e[64]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nThus this principle declares everything to possess a relation to a common\r\ncorrelate\u0026mdash;the sum-total of possibility, which, if discovered to exist in\r\nthe idea of one individual thing, would establish the affinity of all possible\r\nthings, from the identity of the ground of their complete determination. The\r\ndeterminability of every conception is subordinate to the universality\r\n(Allgemeinheit, universalitas) of the principle of excluded middle; the\r\ndetermination of a thing to the totality (Allheit, universitas) of all possible\r\npredicates.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe proposition, everything which exists is completely determined, means not\r\nonly that one of every pair of given contradictory attributes, but that one of\r\nall possible attributes, is always predicable of the thing; in it the\r\npredicates are not merely compared logically with each other, but the thing\r\nitself is transcendentally compared with the sum-total of all possible\r\npredicates. The proposition is equivalent to saying: \u0026ldquo;To attain to a\r\ncomplete knowledge of a thing, it is necessary to possess a knowledge of\r\neverything that is possible, and to determine it thereby in a positive or\r\nnegative manner.\u0026rdquo; The conception of complete determination is\r\nconsequently a conception which cannot be presented in its totality in\r\nconcreto, and is therefore based upon an idea, which has its seat in the\r\nreason\u0026mdash;the faculty which prescribes to the understanding the laws of its\r\nharmonious and perfect exercise.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nNow, although this idea of the sum-total of all possibility, in so far as it\r\nforms the condition of the complete determination of everything, is itself\r\nundetermined in relation to the predicates which may constitute this sum-total,\r\nand we cogitate in it merely the sum-total of all possible predicates\u0026mdash;we\r\nnevertheless find, upon closer examination, that this idea, as a primitive\r\nconception of the mind, excludes a large number of predicates\u0026mdash;those\r\ndeduced and those irreconcilable with others, and that it is evolved as a\r\nconception completely determined à priori. Thus it becomes the conception of an\r\nindividual object, which is completely determined by and through the mere idea,\r\nand must consequently be termed an ideal of pure reason.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWhen we consider all possible predicates, not merely logically, but\r\ntranscendentally, that is to say, with reference to the content which may be\r\ncogitated as existing in them à priori, we shall find that some indicate a\r\nbeing, others merely a non-being. The logical negation expressed in the word\r\nnot does not properly belong to a conception, but only to the relation of one\r\nconception to another in a judgement, and is consequently quite insufficient to\r\npresent to the mind the content of a conception. The expression not mortal does\r\nnot indicate that a non-being is cogitated in the object; it does not concern\r\nthe content at all. A transcendental negation, on the contrary, indicates\r\nnon-being in itself, and is opposed to transcendental affirmation, the\r\nconception of which of itself expresses a being. Hence this affirmation\r\nindicates a reality, because in and through it objects are considered to be\r\nsomething\u0026mdash;to be things; while the opposite negation, on the other hand,\r\nindicates a mere want, or privation, or absence, and, where such negations\r\nalone are attached to a representation, the non-existence of anything\r\ncorresponding to the representation.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nNow a negation cannot be cogitated as determined, without cogitating at the\r\nsame time the opposite affirmation. The man born blind has not the least notion\r\nof darkness, because he has none of light; the vagabond knows nothing of\r\npoverty, because he has never known what it is to be in comfort;\u003ca\r\nhref=\"#linknote-65\" id=\"linknoteref-65\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[65]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e the ignorant man has no conception of\r\nhis ignorance, because he has no conception of knowledge. All conceptions of\r\nnegatives are accordingly derived or deduced conceptions; and realities contain\r\nthe data, and, so to speak, the material or transcendental content of the\r\npossibility and complete determination of all things.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"linknote-65\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#linknoteref-65\"\u003e[65]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nThe investigations and calculations of astronomers have taught us much that is\r\nwonderful; but the most important lesson we have received from them is the\r\ndiscovery of the abyss of our ignorance in relation to the universe\u0026mdash;an\r\nignorance the magnitude of which reason, without the information thus derived,\r\ncould never have conceived. This discovery of our deficiencies must produce a\r\ngreat change in the determination of the aims of human reason.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIf, therefore, a transcendental substratum lies at the foundation of the\r\ncomplete determination of things\u0026mdash;a substratum which is to form the fund\r\nfrom which all possible predicates of things are to be supplied, this\r\nsubstratum cannot be anything else than the idea of a sum-total of reality\r\n(omnitudo realitatis). In this view, negations are nothing but\r\nlimitations\u0026mdash;a term which could not, with propriety, be applied to them,\r\nif the unlimited (the all) did not form the true basis of our conception.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThis conception of a sum-total of reality is the conception of a thing in\r\nitself, regarded as completely determined; and the conception of an ens\r\nrealissimum is the conception of an individual being, inasmuch as it is\r\ndetermined by that predicate of all possible contradictory predicates, which\r\nindicates and belongs to being. It is, therefore, a transcendental ideal which\r\nforms the basis of the complete determination of everything that exists, and is\r\nthe highest material condition of its possibility\u0026mdash;a condition on which\r\nmust rest the cogitation of all objects with respect to their content. Nay,\r\nmore, this ideal is the only proper ideal of which the human mind is capable;\r\nbecause in this case alone a general conception of a thing is completely\r\ndetermined by and through itself, and cognized as the representation of an\r\nindividuum.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe logical determination of a conception is based upon a disjunctive\r\nsyllogism, the major of which contains the logical division of the extent of a\r\ngeneral conception, the minor limits this extent to a certain part, while the\r\nconclusion determines the conception by this part. The general conception of a\r\nreality cannot be divided à priori, because, without the aid of experience, we\r\ncannot know any determinate kinds of reality, standing under the former as the\r\ngenus. The transcendental principle of the complete determination of all things\r\nis therefore merely the representation of the sum-total of all reality; it is\r\nnot a conception which is the genus of all predicates under itself, but one\r\nwhich comprehends them all within itself. The complete determination of a thing\r\nis consequently based upon the limitation of this total of reality, so much\r\nbeing predicated of the thing, while all that remains over is excluded\u0026mdash;a\r\nprocedure which is in exact agreement with that of the disjunctive syllogism\r\nand the determination of the objects in the conclusion by one of the members of\r\nthe division. It follows that reason, in laying the transcendental ideal at the\r\nfoundation of its determination of all possible things, takes a course in exact\r\nanalogy with that which it pursues in disjunctive syllogisms\u0026mdash;a\r\nproposition which formed the basis of the systematic division of all\r\ntranscendental ideas, according to which they are produced in complete\r\nparallelism with the three modes of syllogistic reasoning employed by the human\r\nmind.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIt is self-evident that reason, in cogitating the necessary complete\r\ndetermination of things, does not presuppose the existence of a being\r\ncorresponding to its ideal, but merely the idea of the ideal\u0026mdash;for the\r\npurpose of deducing from the unconditional totality of complete determination,\r\nThe ideal is therefore the prototype of all things, which, as defective copies\r\n(ectypa), receive from it the material of their possibility, and approximate to\r\nit more or less, though it is impossible that they can ever attain to its\r\nperfection.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe possibility of things must therefore be regarded as derived\u0026mdash;except\r\nthat of the thing which contains in itself all reality, which must be\r\nconsidered to be primitive and original. For all negations\u0026mdash;and they are\r\nthe only predicates by means of which all other things can be distinguished\r\nfrom the ens realissimum\u0026mdash;are mere limitations of a greater and a\r\nhigher\u0026mdash;nay, the highest reality; and they consequently presuppose this\r\nreality, and are, as regards their content, derived from it. The manifold\r\nnature of things is only an infinitely various mode of limiting the conception\r\nof the highest reality, which is their common substratum; just as all figures\r\nare possible only as different modes of limiting infinite space. The object of\r\nthe ideal of reason\u0026mdash;an object existing only in reason itself\u0026mdash;is\r\nalso termed the primal being (ens originarium); as having no existence superior\r\nto him, the supreme being (ens summum); and as being the condition of all other\r\nbeings, which rank under it, the being of all beings (ens entium). But none of\r\nthese terms indicate the objective relation of an actually existing object to\r\nother things, but merely that of an idea to conceptions; and all our\r\ninvestigations into this subject still leave us in perfect uncertainty with\r\nregard to the existence of this being.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nA primal being cannot be said to consist of many other beings with an existence\r\nwhich is derivative, for the latter presuppose the former, and therefore cannot\r\nbe constitutive parts of it. It follows that the ideal of the primal being must\r\nbe cogitated as simple.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe deduction of the possibility of all other things from this primal being\r\ncannot, strictly speaking, be considered as a limitation, or as a kind of\r\ndivision of its reality; for this would be regarding the primal being as a mere\r\naggregate\u0026mdash;which has been shown to be impossible, although it was so\r\nrepresented in our first rough sketch. The highest reality must be regarded\r\nrather as the ground than as the sum-total of the possibility of all things,\r\nand the manifold nature of things be based, not upon the limitation of the\r\nprimal being itself, but upon the complete series of effects which flow from\r\nit. And thus all our powers of sense, as well as all phenomenal reality, may be\r\nwith propriety regarded as belonging to this series of effects, while they\r\ncould not have formed parts of the idea, considered as an aggregate. Pursuing\r\nthis track, and hypostatizing this idea, we shall find ourselves authorized to\r\ndetermine our notion of the Supreme Being by means of the mere conception of a\r\nhighest reality, as one, simple, all-sufficient, eternal, and so on\u0026mdash;in\r\none word, to determine it in its unconditioned completeness by the aid of every\r\npossible predicate. The conception of such a being is the conception of God in\r\nits transcendental sense, and thus the ideal of pure reason is the\r\nobject-matter of a transcendental theology.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut, by such an employment of the transcendental idea, we should be over\r\nstepping the limits of its validity and purpose. For reason placed it, as the\r\nconception of all reality, at the basis of the complete determination of\r\nthings, without requiring that this conception be regarded as the conception of\r\nan objective existence. Such an existence would be purely fictitious, and the\r\nhypostatizing of the content of the idea into an ideal, as an individual being,\r\nis a step perfectly unauthorized. Nay, more, we are not even called upon to\r\nassume the possibility of such an hypothesis, as none of the deductions drawn\r\nfrom such an ideal would affect the complete determination of things in\r\ngeneral\u0026mdash;for the sake of which alone is the idea necessary.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIt is not sufficient to circumscribe the procedure and the dialectic of reason;\r\nwe must also endeavour to discover the sources of this dialectic, that we may\r\nhave it in our power to give a rational explanation of this illusion, as a\r\nphenomenon of the human mind. For the ideal, of which we are at present\r\nspeaking, is based, not upon an arbitrary, but upon a natural, idea. The\r\nquestion hence arises: How happens it that reason regards the possibility of\r\nall things as deduced from a single possibility, that, to wit, of the highest\r\nreality, and presupposes this as existing in an individual and primal being?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe answer is ready; it is at once presented by the procedure of transcendental\r\nanalytic. The possibility of sensuous objects is a relation of these objects to\r\nthought, in which something (the empirical form) may be cogitated à priori;\r\nwhile that which constitutes the matter\u0026mdash;the reality of the phenomenon\r\n(that element which corresponds to sensation)\u0026mdash;must be given from without,\r\nas otherwise it could not even be cogitated by, nor could its possibility be\r\npresentable to the mind. Now, a sensuous object is completely determined, when\r\nit has been compared with all phenomenal predicates, and represented by means\r\nof these either positively or negatively. But, as that which constitutes the\r\nthing itself\u0026mdash;the real in a phenomenon, must be given, and that, in which\r\nthe real of all phenomena is given, is experience, one, sole, and\r\nall-embracing\u0026mdash;the material of the possibility of all sensuous objects\r\nmust be presupposed as given in a whole, and it is upon the limitation of this\r\nwhole that the possibility of all empirical objects, their distinction from\r\neach other and their complete determination, are based. Now, no other objects\r\nare presented to us besides sensuous objects, and these can be given only in\r\nconnection with a possible experience; it follows that a thing is not an object\r\nto us, unless it presupposes the whole or sum-total of empirical reality as the\r\ncondition of its possibility. Now, a natural illusion leads us to consider this\r\nprinciple, which is valid only of sensuous objects, as valid with regard to\r\nthings in general. And thus we are induced to hold the empirical principle of\r\nour conceptions of the possibility of things, as phenomena, by leaving out this\r\nlimitative condition, to be a transcendental principle of the possibility of\r\nthings in general.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWe proceed afterwards to hypostatize this idea of the sum-total of all reality,\r\nby changing the distributive unity of the empirical exercise of the\r\nunderstanding into the collective unity of an empirical whole\u0026mdash;a\r\ndialectical illusion, and by cogitating this whole or sum of experience as an\r\nindividual thing, containing in itself all empirical reality. This individual\r\nthing or being is then, by means of the above-mentioned transcendental\r\nsubreption, substituted for our notion of a thing which stands at the head of\r\nthe possibility of all things, the real conditions of whose complete\r\ndetermination it presents.\u003ca href=\"#linknote-66\" id=\"linknoteref-66\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[66]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"linknote-66\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#linknoteref-66\"\u003e[66]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nThis ideal of the ens realissimum\u0026mdash;although merely a mental\r\nrepresentation\u0026mdash;is first objectivized, that is, has an objective existence\r\nattributed to it, then hypostatized, and finally, by the natural progress of\r\nreason to the completion of unity, personified, as we shall show presently. For\r\nthe regulative unity of experience is not based upon phenomena themselves, but\r\nupon the connection of the variety of phenomena by the understanding in a\r\nconsciousness, and thus the unity of the supreme reality and the complete\r\ndeterminability of all things, seem to reside in a supreme understanding, and,\r\nconsequently, in a conscious intelligence.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003ca id=\"chap90\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eSection III. Of the Arguments employed by Speculative\r\nReason in Proof of the Existence of a Supreme Being\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nNotwithstanding the pressing necessity which reason feels, to form some\r\npresupposition that shall serve the understanding as a proper basis for the\r\ncomplete determination of its conceptions, the idealistic and factitious nature\r\nof such a presupposition is too evident to allow reason for a moment to\r\npersuade itself into a belief of the objective existence of a mere creation of\r\nits own thought. But there are other considerations which compel reason to seek\r\nout some resting place in the regress from the conditioned to the\r\nunconditioned, which is not given as an actual existence from the mere\r\nconception of it, although it alone can give completeness to the series of\r\nconditions. And this is the natural course of every human reason, even of the\r\nmost uneducated, although the path at first entered it does not always continue\r\nto follow. It does not begin from conceptions, but from common experience, and\r\nrequires a basis in actual existence. But this basis is insecure, unless it\r\nrests upon the immovable rock of the absolutely necessary. And this foundation\r\nis itself unworthy of trust, if it leave under and above it empty space, if it\r\ndo not fill all, and leave no room for a why or a wherefore, if it be not, in\r\none word, infinite in its reality.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIf we admit the existence of some one thing, whatever it may be, we must also\r\nadmit that there is something which exists necessarily. For what is contingent\r\nexists only under the condition of some other thing, which is its cause; and\r\nfrom this we must go on to conclude the existence of a cause which is not\r\ncontingent, and which consequently exists necessarily and unconditionally. Such\r\nis the argument by which reason justifies its advances towards a primal being.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nNow reason looks round for the conception of a being that may be admitted,\r\nwithout inconsistency, to be worthy of the attribute of absolute necessity, not\r\nfor the purpose of inferring à priori, from the conception of such a being, its\r\nobjective existence (for if reason allowed itself to take this course, it would\r\nnot require a basis in given and actual existence, but merely the support of\r\npure conceptions), but for the purpose of discovering, among all our\r\nconceptions of possible things, that conception which possesses no element\r\ninconsistent with the idea of absolute necessity. For that there must be some\r\nabsolutely necessary existence, it regards as a truth already established. Now,\r\nif it can remove every existence incapable of supporting the attribute of\r\nabsolute necessity, excepting one\u0026mdash;this must be the absolutely necessary\r\nbeing, whether its necessity is comprehensible by us, that is, deducible from\r\nthe conception of it alone, or not.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nNow that, the conception of which contains a therefore to every wherefore,\r\nwhich is not defective in any respect whatever, which is all-sufficient as a\r\ncondition, seems to be the being of which we can justly predicate absolute\r\nnecessity\u0026mdash;for this reason, that, possessing the conditions of all that is\r\npossible, it does not and cannot itself require any condition. And thus it\r\nsatisfies, in one respect at least, the requirements of the conception of\r\nabsolute necessity. In this view, it is superior to all other conceptions,\r\nwhich, as deficient and incomplete, do not possess the characteristic of\r\nindependence of all higher conditions. It is true that we cannot infer from\r\nthis that what does not contain in itself the supreme and complete\r\ncondition\u0026mdash;the condition of all other things\u0026mdash;must possess only a\r\nconditioned existence; but as little can we assert the contrary, for this\r\nsupposed being does not possess the only characteristic which can enable reason\r\nto cognize by means of an à priori conception the unconditioned and necessary\r\nnature of its existence.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe conception of an ens realissimum is that which best agrees with the\r\nconception of an unconditioned and necessary being. The former conception does\r\nnot satisfy all the requirements of the latter; but we have no choice, we are\r\nobliged to adhere to it, for we find that we cannot do without the existence of\r\na necessary being; and even although we admit it, we find it out of our power\r\nto discover in the whole sphere of possibility any being that can advance\r\nwell-grounded claims to such a distinction.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe following is, therefore, the natural course of human reason. It begins by\r\npersuading itself of the existence of some necessary being. In this being it\r\nrecognizes the characteristics of unconditioned existence. It then seeks the\r\nconception of that which is independent of all conditions, and finds it in that\r\nwhich is itself the sufficient condition of all other things\u0026mdash;in other\r\nwords, in that which contains all reality. But the unlimited all is an absolute\r\nunity, and is conceived by the mind as a being one and supreme; and thus reason\r\nconcludes that the Supreme Being, as the primal basis of all things, possesses\r\nan existence which is absolutely necessary.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThis conception must be regarded as in some degree satisfactory, if we admit\r\nthe existence of a necessary being, and consider that there exists a necessity\r\nfor a definite and final answer to these questions. In such a case, we cannot\r\nmake a better choice, or rather we have no choice at all, but feel ourselves\r\nobliged to declare in favour of the absolute unity of complete reality, as the\r\nhighest source of the possibility of things. But if there exists no motive for\r\ncoming to a definite conclusion, and we may leave the question unanswered till\r\nwe have fully weighed both sides\u0026mdash;in other words, when we are merely\r\ncalled upon to decide how much we happen to know about the question, and how\r\nmuch we merely flatter ourselves that we know\u0026mdash;the above conclusion does\r\nnot appear to be so great advantage, but, on the contrary, seems defective in\r\nthe grounds upon which it is supported.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nFor, admitting the truth of all that has been said, that, namely, the inference\r\nfrom a given existence (my own, for example) to the existence of an\r\nunconditioned and necessary being is valid and unassailable; that, in the\r\nsecond place, we must consider a being which contains all reality, and\r\nconsequently all the conditions of other things, to be absolutely\r\nunconditioned; and admitting too, that we have thus discovered the conception\r\nof a thing to which may be attributed, without inconsistency, absolute\r\nnecessity\u0026mdash;it does not follow from all this that the conception of a\r\nlimited being, in which the supreme reality does not reside, is therefore\r\nincompatible with the idea of absolute necessity. For, although I do not\r\ndiscover the element of the unconditioned in the conception of such a\r\nbeing\u0026mdash;an element which is manifestly existent in the sum-total of all\r\nconditions\u0026mdash;I am not entitled to conclude that its existence is therefore\r\nconditioned; just as I am not entitled to affirm, in a hypothetical syllogism,\r\nthat where a certain condition does not exist (in the present, completeness, as\r\nfar as pure conceptions are concerned), the conditioned does not exist either.\r\nOn the contrary, we are free to consider all limited beings as likewise\r\nunconditionally necessary, although we are unable to infer this from the\r\ngeneral conception which we have of them. Thus conducted, this argument is\r\nincapable of giving us the least notion of the properties of a necessary being,\r\nand must be in every respect without result.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThis argument continues, however, to possess a weight and an authority, which,\r\nin spite of its objective insufficiency, it has never been divested of. For,\r\ngranting that certain responsibilities lie upon us, which, as based on the\r\nideas of reason, deserve to be respected and submitted to, although they are\r\nincapable of a real or practical application to our nature, or, in other words,\r\nwould be responsibilities without motives, except upon the supposition of a\r\nSupreme Being to give effect and influence to the practical laws: in such a\r\ncase we should be bound to obey our conceptions, which, although objectively\r\ninsufficient, do, according to the standard of reason, preponderate over and\r\nare superior to any claims that may be advanced from any other quarter. The\r\nequilibrium of doubt would in this case be destroyed by a practical addition;\r\nindeed, Reason would be compelled to condemn herself, if she refused to comply\r\nwith the demands of the judgement, no superior to which we know\u0026mdash;however\r\ndefective her understanding of the grounds of these demands might be.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThis argument, although in fact transcendental, inasmuch as it rests upon the\r\nintrinsic insufficiency of the contingent, is so simple and natural, that the\r\ncommonest understanding can appreciate its value. We see things around us\r\nchange, arise, and pass away; they, or their condition, must therefore have a\r\ncause. The same demand must again be made of the cause itself\u0026mdash;as a datum\r\nof experience. Now it is natural that we should place the highest causality\r\njust where we place supreme causality, in that being, which contains the\r\nconditions of all possible effects, and the conception of which is so simple as\r\nthat of an all-embracing reality. This highest cause, then, we regard as\r\nabsolutely necessary, because we find it absolutely necessary to rise to it,\r\nand do not discover any reason for proceeding beyond it. Thus, among all\r\nnations, through the darkest polytheism glimmer some faint sparks of\r\nmonotheism, to which these idolaters have been led, not from reflection and\r\nprofound thought, but by the study and natural progress of the common\r\nunderstanding.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThere are only three modes of proving the existence of a Deity, on the grounds\r\nof speculative reason.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAll the paths conducting to this end begin either from determinate experience\r\nand the peculiar constitution of the world of sense, and rise, according to the\r\nlaws of causality, from it to the highest cause existing apart from the\r\nworld\u0026mdash;or from a purely indeterminate experience, that is, some empirical\r\nexistence\u0026mdash;or abstraction is made of all experience, and the existence of\r\na supreme cause is concluded from à priori conceptions alone. The first is the\r\nphysico-theological argument, the second the cosmological, the third the\r\nontological. More there are not, and more there cannot be.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nI shall show it is as unsuccessful on the one path\u0026mdash;the empirical\u0026mdash;as\r\non the other\u0026mdash;the transcendental, and that it stretches its wings in vain,\r\nto soar beyond the world of sense by the mere might of speculative thought. As\r\nregards the order in which we must discuss those arguments, it will be exactly\r\nthe reverse of that in which reason, in the progress of its development,\r\nattains to them\u0026mdash;the order in which they are placed above. For it will be\r\nmade manifest to the reader that, although experience presents the occasion and\r\nthe starting-point, it is the transcendental idea of reason which guides it in\r\nits pilgrimage and is the goal of all its struggles. I shall therefore begin\r\nwith an examination of the transcendental argument, and afterwards inquire what\r\nadditional strength has accrued to this mode of proof from the addition of the\r\nempirical element.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003ca id=\"chap91\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eSection IV. Of the Impossibility of an Ontological\r\nProof of the Existence of God\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIt is evident from what has been said that the conception of an absolutely\r\nnecessary being is a mere idea, the objective reality of which is far from\r\nbeing established by the mere fact that it is a need of reason. On the\r\ncontrary, this idea serves merely to indicate a certain unattainable\r\nperfection, and rather limits the operations than, by the presentation of new\r\nobjects, extends the sphere of the understanding. But a strange anomaly meets\r\nus at the very threshold; for the inference from a given existence in general\r\nto an absolutely necessary existence seems to be correct and unavoidable, while\r\nthe conditions of the understanding refuse to aid us in forming any conception\r\nof such a being.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPhilosophers have always talked of an absolutely necessary being, and have\r\nnevertheless declined to take the trouble of conceiving whether\u0026mdash;and\r\nhow\u0026mdash;a being of this nature is even cogitable, not to mention that its\r\nexistence is actually demonstrable. A verbal definition of the conception is\r\ncertainly easy enough: it is something the non-existence of which is\r\nimpossible. But does this definition throw any light upon the conditions which\r\nrender it impossible to cogitate the non-existence of a thing\u0026mdash;conditions\r\nwhich we wish to ascertain, that we may discover whether we think anything in\r\nthe conception of such a being or not? For the mere fact that I throw away, by\r\nmeans of the word unconditioned, all the conditions which the understanding\r\nhabitually requires in order to regard anything as necessary, is very far from\r\nmaking clear whether by means of the conception of the unconditionally\r\nnecessary I think of something, or really of nothing at all.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nNay, more, this chance-conception, now become so current, many have endeavoured\r\nto explain by examples which seemed to render any inquiries regarding its\r\nintelligibility quite needless. Every geometrical proposition\u0026mdash;a triangle\r\nhas three angles\u0026mdash;it was said, is absolutely necessary; and thus people\r\ntalked of an object which lay out of the sphere of our understanding as if it\r\nwere perfectly plain what the conception of such a being meant.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAll the examples adduced have been drawn, without exception, from judgements,\r\nand not from things. But the unconditioned necessity of a judgement does not\r\nform the absolute necessity of a thing. On the contrary, the absolute necessity\r\nof a judgement is only a conditioned necessity of a thing, or of the predicate\r\nin a judgement. The proposition above-mentioned does not enounce that three\r\nangles necessarily exist, but, upon condition that a triangle exists, three\r\nangles must necessarily exist\u0026mdash;in it. And thus this logical necessity has\r\nbeen the source of the greatest delusions. Having formed an à priori conception\r\nof a thing, the content of which was made to embrace existence, we believed\r\nourselves safe in concluding that, because existence belongs necessarily to the\r\nobject of the conception (that is, under the condition of my positing this\r\nthing as given), the existence of the thing is also posited necessarily, and\r\nthat it is therefore absolutely necessary\u0026mdash;merely because its existence\r\nhas been cogitated in the conception.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIf, in an identical judgement, I annihilate the predicate in thought, and\r\nretain the subject, a contradiction is the result; and hence I say, the former\r\nbelongs necessarily to the latter. But if I suppress both subject and predicate\r\nin thought, no contradiction arises; for there is nothing at all, and therefore\r\nno means of forming a contradiction. To suppose the existence of a triangle and\r\nnot that of its three angles, is self-contradictory; but to suppose the\r\nnon-existence of both triangle and angles is perfectly admissible. And so is it\r\nwith the conception of an absolutely necessary being. Annihilate its existence\r\nin thought, and you annihilate the thing itself with all its predicates; how\r\nthen can there be any room for contradiction? Externally, there is nothing to\r\ngive rise to a contradiction, for a thing cannot be necessary externally; nor\r\ninternally, for, by the annihilation or suppression of the thing itself, its\r\ninternal properties are also annihilated. God is omnipotent\u0026mdash;that is a\r\nnecessary judgement. His omnipotence cannot be denied, if the existence of a\r\nDeity is posited\u0026mdash;the existence, that is, of an infinite being, the two\r\nconceptions being identical. But when you say, God does not exist, neither\r\nomnipotence nor any other predicate is affirmed; they must all disappear with\r\nthe subject, and in this judgement there cannot exist the least\r\nself-contradiction.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nYou have thus seen that when the predicate of a judgement is annihilated in\r\nthought along with the subject, no internal contradiction can arise, be the\r\npredicate what it may. There is no possibility of evading the\r\nconclusion\u0026mdash;you find yourselves compelled to declare: There are certain\r\nsubjects which cannot be annihilated in thought. But this is nothing more than\r\nsaying: There exist subjects which are absolutely necessary\u0026mdash;the very\r\nhypothesis which you are called upon to establish. For I find myself unable to\r\nform the slightest conception of a thing which when annihilated in thought with\r\nall its predicates, leaves behind a contradiction; and contradiction is the\r\nonly criterion of impossibility in the sphere of pure à priori conceptions.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAgainst these general considerations, the justice of which no one can dispute,\r\none argument is adduced, which is regarded as furnishing a satisfactory\r\ndemonstration from the fact. It is affirmed that there is one and only one\r\nconception, in which the non-being or annihilation of the object is\r\nself-contradictory, and this is the conception of an ens realissimum. It\r\npossesses, you say, all reality, and you feel yourselves justified in admitting\r\nthe possibility of such a being. (This I am willing to grant for the present,\r\nalthough the existence of a conception which is not self-contradictory is far\r\nfrom being sufficient to prove the possibility of an object.)\u003ca\r\nhref=\"#linknote-67\" id=\"linknoteref-67\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[67]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Now the notion of all reality embraces\r\nin it that of existence; the notion of existence lies, therefore, in the\r\nconception of this possible thing. If this thing is annihilated in thought, the\r\ninternal possibility of the thing is also annihilated, which is\r\nself-contradictory.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"linknote-67\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#linknoteref-67\"\u003e[67]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nA conception is always possible, if it is not self-contradictory. This is the\r\nlogical criterion of possibility, distinguishing the object of such a\r\nconception from the nihil negativum. But it may be, notwithstanding, an empty\r\nconception, unless the objective reality of this synthesis, but which it is\r\ngenerated, is demonstrated; and a proof of this kind must be based upon\r\nprinciples of possible experience, and not upon the principle of analysis or\r\ncontradiction. This remark may be serviceable as a warning against concluding,\r\nfrom the possibility of a conception\u0026mdash;which is logical\u0026mdash;the\r\npossibility of a thing\u0026mdash;which is real.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nI answer: It is absurd to introduce\u0026mdash;under whatever term\r\ndisguised\u0026mdash;into the conception of a thing, which is to be cogitated solely\r\nin reference to its possibility, the conception of its existence. If this is\r\nadmitted, you will have apparently gained the day, but in reality have enounced\r\nnothing but a mere tautology. I ask, is the proposition, this or that thing\r\n(which I am admitting to be possible) exists, an analytical or a synthetical\r\nproposition? If the former, there is no addition made to the subject of your\r\nthought by the affirmation of its existence; but then the conception in your\r\nminds is identical with the thing itself, or you have supposed the existence of\r\na thing to be possible, and then inferred its existence from its internal\r\npossibility\u0026mdash;which is but a miserable tautology. The word reality in the\r\nconception of the thing, and the word existence in the conception of the\r\npredicate, will not help you out of the difficulty. For, supposing you were to\r\nterm all positing of a thing reality, you have thereby posited the thing with\r\nall its predicates in the conception of the subject and assumed its actual\r\nexistence, and this you merely repeat in the predicate. But if you confess, as\r\nevery reasonable person must, that every existential proposition is\r\nsynthetical, how can it be maintained that the predicate of existence cannot be\r\ndenied without contradiction?\u0026mdash;a property which is the characteristic of\r\nanalytical propositions, alone.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nI should have a reasonable hope of putting an end for ever to this sophistical\r\nmode of argumentation, by a strict definition of the conception of existence,\r\ndid not my own experience teach me that the illusion arising from our\r\nconfounding a logical with a real predicate (a predicate which aids in the\r\ndetermination of a thing) resists almost all the endeavours of explanation and\r\nillustration. A logical predicate may be what you please, even the subject may\r\nbe predicated of itself; for logic pays no regard to the content of a\r\njudgement. But the determination of a conception is a predicate, which adds to\r\nand enlarges the conception. It must not, therefore, be contained in the\r\nconception.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBeing is evidently not a real predicate, that is, a conception of something\r\nwhich is added to the conception of some other thing. It is merely the positing\r\nof a thing, or of certain determinations in it. Logically, it is merely the\r\ncopula of a judgement. The proposition, God is omnipotent, contains two\r\nconceptions, which have a certain object or content; the word is, is no\r\nadditional predicate\u0026mdash;it merely indicates the relation of the predicate to\r\nthe subject. Now, if I take the subject (God) with all its predicates\r\n(omnipotence being one), and say: God is, or, There is a God, I add no new\r\npredicate to the conception of God, I merely posit or affirm the existence of\r\nthe subject with all its predicates\u0026mdash;I posit the object in relation to my\r\nconception. The content of both is the same; and there is no addition made to\r\nthe conception, which expresses merely the possibility of the object, by my\r\ncogitating the object\u0026mdash;in the expression, it is\u0026mdash;as absolutely given\r\nor existing. Thus the real contains no more than the possible. A hundred real\r\ndollars contain no more than a hundred possible dollars. For, as the latter\r\nindicate the conception, and the former the object, on the supposition that the\r\ncontent of the former was greater than that of the latter, my conception would\r\nnot be an expression of the whole object, and would consequently be an\r\ninadequate conception of it. But in reckoning my wealth there may be said to be\r\nmore in a hundred real dollars than in a hundred possible dollars\u0026mdash;that\r\nis, in the mere conception of them. For the real object\u0026mdash;the\r\ndollars\u0026mdash;is not analytically contained in my conception, but forms a\r\nsynthetical addition to my conception (which is merely a determination of my\r\nmental state), although this objective reality\u0026mdash;this existence\u0026mdash;apart\r\nfrom my conceptions, does not in the least degree increase the aforesaid\r\nhundred dollars.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBy whatever and by whatever number of predicates\u0026mdash;even to the complete\r\ndetermination of it\u0026mdash;I may cogitate a thing, I do not in the least augment\r\nthe object of my conception by the addition of the statement: This thing\r\nexists. Otherwise, not exactly the same, but something more than what was\r\ncogitated in my conception, would exist, and I could not affirm that the exact\r\nobject of my conception had real existence. If I cogitate a thing as containing\r\nall modes of reality except one, the mode of reality which is absent is not\r\nadded to the conception of the thing by the affirmation that the thing exists;\r\non the contrary, the thing exists\u0026mdash;if it exist at all\u0026mdash;with the same\r\ndefect as that cogitated in its conception; otherwise not that which was\r\ncogitated, but something different, exists. Now, if I cogitate a being as the\r\nhighest reality, without defect or imperfection, the question still\r\nremains\u0026mdash;whether this being exists or not? For, although no element is\r\nwanting in the possible real content of my conception, there is a defect in its\r\nrelation to my mental state, that is, I am ignorant whether the cognition of\r\nthe object indicated by the conception is possible à posteriori. And here the\r\ncause of the present difficulty becomes apparent. If the question regarded an\r\nobject of sense merely, it would be impossible for me to confound the\r\nconception with the existence of a thing. For the conception merely enables me\r\nto cogitate an object as according with the general conditions of experience;\r\nwhile the existence of the object permits me to cogitate it as contained in the\r\nsphere of actual experience. At the same time, this connection with the world\r\nof experience does not in the least augment the conception, although a possible\r\nperception has been added to the experience of the mind. But if we cogitate\r\nexistence by the pure category alone, it is not to be wondered at, that we\r\nshould find ourselves unable to present any criterion sufficient to distinguish\r\nit from mere possibility.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWhatever be the content of our conception of an object, it is necessary to go\r\nbeyond it, if we wish to predicate existence of the object. In the case of\r\nsensuous objects, this is attained by their connection according to empirical\r\nlaws with some one of my perceptions; but there is no means of cognizing the\r\nexistence of objects of pure thought, because it must be cognized completely à\r\npriori. But all our knowledge of existence (be it immediately by perception, or\r\nby inferences connecting some object with a perception) belongs entirely to the\r\nsphere of experience\u0026mdash;which is in perfect unity with itself; and although\r\nan existence out of this sphere cannot be absolutely declared to be impossible,\r\nit is a hypothesis the truth of which we have no means of ascertaining.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe notion of a Supreme Being is in many respects a highly useful idea; but for\r\nthe very reason that it is an idea, it is incapable of enlarging our cognition\r\nwith regard to the existence of things. It is not even sufficient to instruct\r\nus as to the possibility of a being which we do not know to exist. The\r\nanalytical criterion of possibility, which consists in the absence of\r\ncontradiction in propositions, cannot be denied it. But the connection of real\r\nproperties in a thing is a synthesis of the possibility of which an à priori\r\njudgement cannot be formed, because these realities are not presented to us\r\nspecifically; and even if this were to happen, a judgement would still be\r\nimpossible, because the criterion of the possibility of synthetical cognitions\r\nmust be sought for in the world of experience, to which the object of an idea\r\ncannot belong. And thus the celebrated Leibnitz has utterly failed in his\r\nattempt to establish upon à priori grounds the possibility of this sublime\r\nideal being.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe celebrated ontological or Cartesian argument for the existence of a Supreme\r\nBeing is therefore insufficient; and we may as well hope to increase our stock\r\nof knowledge by the aid of mere ideas, as the merchant to augment his wealth by\r\nthe addition of noughts to his cash account.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003ca id=\"chap92\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eSection V. Of the Impossibility of a Cosmological\r\nProof of the Existence of God\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIt was by no means a natural course of proceeding, but, on the contrary, an\r\ninvention entirely due to the subtlety of the schools, to attempt to draw from\r\na mere idea a proof of the existence of an object corresponding to it. Such a\r\ncourse would never have been pursued, were it not for that need of reason which\r\nrequires it to suppose the existence of a necessary being as a basis for the\r\nempirical regress, and that, as this necessity must be unconditioned and à\r\npriori, reason is bound to discover a conception which shall satisfy, if\r\npossible, this requirement, and enable us to attain to the à priori cognition\r\nof such a being. This conception was thought to be found in the idea of an ens\r\nrealissimum, and thus this idea was employed for the attainment of a better\r\ndefined knowledge of a necessary being, of the existence of which we were\r\nconvinced, or persuaded, on other grounds. Thus reason was seduced from her\r\nnatural courage; and, instead of concluding with the conception of an ens\r\nrealissimum, an attempt was made to begin with it, for the purpose of inferring\r\nfrom it that idea of a necessary existence which it was in fact called in to\r\ncomplete. Thus arose that unfortunate ontological argument, which neither\r\nsatisfies the healthy common sense of humanity, nor sustains the scientific\r\nexamination of the philosopher.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe cosmological proof, which we are about to examine, retains the connection\r\nbetween absolute necessity and the highest reality; but, instead of reasoning\r\nfrom this highest reality to a necessary existence, like the preceding\r\nargument, it concludes from the given unconditioned necessity of some being its\r\nunlimited reality. The track it pursues, whether rational or sophistical, is at\r\nleast natural, and not only goes far to persuade the common understanding, but\r\nshows itself deserving of respect from the speculative intellect; while it\r\ncontains, at the same time, the outlines of all the arguments employed in\r\nnatural theology\u0026mdash;arguments which always have been, and still will be, in\r\nuse and authority. These, however adorned, and hid under whatever\r\nembellishments of rhetoric and sentiment, are at bottom identical with the\r\narguments we are at present to discuss. This proof, termed by Leibnitz the\r\nargumentum a contingentia mundi, I shall now lay before the reader, and subject\r\nto a strict examination.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIt is framed in the following manner: If something exists, an absolutely\r\nnecessary being must likewise exist. Now I, at least, exist. Consequently,\r\nthere exists an absolutely necessary being. The minor contains an experience,\r\nthe major reasons from a general experience to the existence of a necessary\r\nbeing.\u003ca href=\"#linknote-68\" id=\"linknoteref-68\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[68]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Thus this argument really begins at\r\nexperience, and is not completely à priori, or ontological. The object of all\r\npossible experience being the world, it is called the cosmological proof. It\r\ncontains no reference to any peculiar property of sensuous objects, by which\r\nthis world of sense might be distinguished from other possible worlds; and in\r\nthis respect it differs from the physico-theological proof, which is based upon\r\nthe consideration of the peculiar constitution of our sensuous world.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"linknote-68\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#linknoteref-68\"\u003e[68]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nThis inference is too well known to require more detailed discussion. It is\r\nbased upon the spurious transcendental law of causality, that everything which\r\nis contingent has a cause, which, if itself contingent, must also have a cause;\r\nand so on, till the series of subordinated causes must end with an absolutely\r\nnecessary cause, without which it would not possess completeness.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe proof proceeds thus: A necessary being can be determined only in one way,\r\nthat is, it can be determined by only one of all possible opposed predicates;\r\nconsequently, it must be completely determined in and by its conception. But\r\nthere is only a single conception of a thing possible, which completely\r\ndetermines the thing à priori: that is, the conception of the ens realissimum.\r\nIt follows that the conception of the ens realissimum is the only conception by\r\nand in which we can cogitate a necessary being. Consequently, a Supreme Being\r\nnecessarily exists.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIn this cosmological argument are assembled so many sophistical propositions\r\nthat speculative reason seems to have exerted in it all her dialectical skill\r\nto produce a transcendental illusion of the most extreme character. We shall\r\npostpone an investigation of this argument for the present, and confine\r\nourselves to exposing the stratagem by which it imposes upon us an old argument\r\nin a new dress, and appeals to the agreement of two witnesses, the one with the\r\ncredentials of pure reason, and the other with those of empiricism; while, in\r\nfact, it is only the former who has changed his dress and voice, for the\r\npurpose of passing himself off for an additional witness. That it may possess a\r\nsecure foundation, it bases its conclusions upon experience, and thus appears\r\nto be completely distinct from the ontological argument, which places its\r\nconfidence entirely in pure à priori conceptions. But this experience merely\r\naids reason in making one step\u0026mdash;to the existence of a necessary being.\r\nWhat the properties of this being are cannot be learned from experience; and\r\ntherefore reason abandons it altogether, and pursues its inquiries in the\r\nsphere of pure conception, for the purpose of discovering what the properties\r\nof an absolutely necessary being ought to be, that is, what among all possible\r\nthings contain the conditions (requisita) of absolute necessity. Reason\r\nbelieves that it has discovered these requisites in the conception of an ens\r\nrealissimum\u0026mdash;and in it alone, and hence concludes: The ens realissimum is\r\nan absolutely necessary being. But it is evident that reason has here\r\npresupposed that the conception of an ens realissimum is perfectly adequate to\r\nthe conception of a being of absolute necessity, that is, that we may infer the\r\nexistence of the latter from that of the former\u0026mdash;a proposition which\r\nformed the basis of the ontological argument, and which is now employed in the\r\nsupport of the cosmological argument, contrary to the wish and professions of\r\nits inventors. For the existence of an absolutely necessary being is given in\r\nconceptions alone. But if I say: \u0026ldquo;The conception of the ens realissimum\r\nis a conception of this kind, and in fact the only conception which is adequate\r\nto our idea of a necessary being,\u0026rdquo; I am obliged to admit, that the latter\r\nmay be inferred from the former. Thus it is properly the ontological argument\r\nwhich figures in the cosmological, and constitutes the whole strength of the\r\nlatter; while the spurious basis of experience has been of no further use than\r\nto conduct us to the conception of absolute necessity, being utterly\r\ninsufficient to demonstrate the presence of this attribute in any determinate\r\nexistence or thing. For when we propose to ourselves an aim of this character,\r\nwe must abandon the sphere of experience, and rise to that of pure conceptions,\r\nwhich we examine with the purpose of discovering whether any one contains the\r\nconditions of the possibility of an absolutely necessary being. But if the\r\npossibility of such a being is thus demonstrated, its existence is also proved;\r\nfor we may then assert that, of all possible beings there is one which\r\npossesses the attribute of necessity\u0026mdash;in other words, this being possesses\r\nan absolutely necessary existence.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAll illusions in an argument are more easily detected when they are presented\r\nin the formal manner employed by the schools, which we now proceed to do.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIf the proposition: \u0026ldquo;Every absolutely necessary being is likewise an ens\r\nrealissimum,\u0026rdquo; is correct (and it is this which constitutes the nervus\r\nprobandi of the cosmological argument), it must, like all affirmative\r\njudgements, be capable of conversion\u0026mdash;the conversio per accidens, at\r\nleast. It follows, then, that some entia realissima are absolutely necessary\r\nbeings. But no ens realissimum is in any respect different from another, and\r\nwhat is valid of some is valid of all. In this present case, therefore, I may\r\nemploy simple conversion, and say: \u0026ldquo;Every ens realissimum is a necessary\r\nbeing.\u0026rdquo; But as this proposition is determined à priori by the conceptions\r\ncontained in it, the mere conception of an ens realissimum must possess the\r\nadditional attribute of absolute necessity. But this is exactly what was\r\nmaintained in the ontological argument, and not recognized by the cosmological,\r\nalthough it formed the real ground of its disguised and illusory reasoning.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThus the second mode employed by speculative reason of demonstrating the\r\nexistence of a Supreme Being, is not only, like the first, illusory and\r\ninadequate, but possesses the additional blemish of an ignoratio\r\nelenchi\u0026mdash;professing to conduct us by a new road to the desired goal, but\r\nbringing us back, after a short circuit, to the old path which we had deserted\r\nat its call.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nI mentioned above that this cosmological argument contains a perfect nest of\r\ndialectical assumptions, which transcendental criticism does not find it\r\ndifficult to expose and to dissipate. I shall merely enumerate these, leaving\r\nit to the reader, who must by this time be well practised in such matters, to\r\ninvestigate the fallacies residing therein.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe following fallacies, for example, are discoverable in this mode of proof:\r\n1. The transcendental principle: \u0026ldquo;Everything that is contingent must have\r\na cause\u0026rdquo;\u0026mdash;a principle without significance, except in the sensuous\r\nworld. For the purely intellectual conception of the contingent cannot produce\r\nany synthetical proposition, like that of causality, which is itself without\r\nsignificance or distinguishing characteristic except in the phenomenal world.\r\nBut in the present case it is employed to help us beyond the limits of its\r\nsphere. 2. \u0026ldquo;From the impossibility of an infinite ascending series of\r\ncauses in the world of sense a first cause is inferred\u0026rdquo;; a conclusion\r\nwhich the principles of the employment of reason do not justify even in the\r\nsphere of experience, and still less when an attempt is made to pass the limits\r\nof this sphere. 3. Reason allows itself to be satisfied upon insufficient\r\ngrounds, with regard to the completion of this series. It removes all\r\nconditions (without which, however, no conception of Necessity can take place);\r\nand, as after this it is beyond our power to form any other conceptions, it\r\naccepts this as a completion of the conception it wishes to form of the series.\r\n4. The logical possibility of a conception of the total of reality (the\r\ncriterion of this possibility being the absence of contradiction) is confounded\r\nwith the transcendental, which requires a principle of the practicability of\r\nsuch a synthesis\u0026mdash;a principle which again refers us to the world of\r\nexperience. And so on.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe aim of the cosmological argument is to avoid the necessity of proving the\r\nexistence of a necessary being priori from mere conceptions\u0026mdash;a proof which\r\nmust be ontological, and of which we feel ourselves quite incapable. With this\r\npurpose, we reason from an actual existence\u0026mdash;an experience in general, to\r\nan absolutely necessary condition of that existence. It is in this case\r\nunnecessary to demonstrate its possibility. For after having proved that it\r\nexists, the question regarding its possibility is superfluous. Now, when we\r\nwish to define more strictly the nature of this necessary being, we do not look\r\nout for some being the conception of which would enable us to comprehend the\r\nnecessity of its being\u0026mdash;for if we could do this, an empirical\r\npresupposition would be unnecessary; no, we try to discover merely the negative\r\ncondition (conditio sine qua non), without which a being would not be\r\nabsolutely necessary. Now this would be perfectly admissible in every sort of\r\nreasoning, from a consequence to its principle; but in the present case it\r\nunfortunately happens that the condition of absolute necessity can be\r\ndiscovered in but a single being, the conception of which must consequently\r\ncontain all that is requisite for demonstrating the presence of absolute\r\nnecessity, and thus entitle me to infer this absolute necessity à priori. That\r\nis, it must be possible to reason conversely, and say: The thing, to which the\r\nconception of the highest reality belongs, is absolutely necessary. But if I\r\ncannot reason thus\u0026mdash;and I cannot, unless I believe in the sufficiency of\r\nthe ontological argument\u0026mdash;I find insurmountable obstacles in my new path,\r\nand am really no farther than the point from which I set out. The conception of\r\na Supreme Being satisfies all questions à priori regarding the internal\r\ndeterminations of a thing, and is for this reason an ideal without equal or\r\nparallel, the general conception of it indicating it as at the same time an ens\r\nindividuum among all possible things. But the conception does not satisfy the\r\nquestion regarding its existence\u0026mdash;which was the purpose of all our\r\ninquiries; and, although the existence of a necessary being were admitted, we\r\nshould find it impossible to answer the question: What of all things in the\r\nworld must be regarded as such?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIt is certainly allowable to admit the existence of an all-sufficient\r\nbeing\u0026mdash;a cause of all possible effects\u0026mdash;for the purpose of enabling\r\nreason to introduce unity into its mode and grounds of explanation with regard\r\nto phenomena. But to assert that such a being necessarily exists, is no longer\r\nthe modest enunciation of an admissible hypothesis, but the boldest declaration\r\nof an apodeictic certainty; for the cognition of that which is absolutely\r\nnecessary must itself possess that character.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe aim of the transcendental ideal formed by the mind is either to discover a\r\nconception which shall harmonize with the idea of absolute necessity, or a\r\nconception which shall contain that idea. If the one is possible, so is the\r\nother; for reason recognizes that alone as absolutely necessary which is\r\nnecessary from its conception. But both attempts are equally beyond our\r\npower\u0026mdash;we find it impossible to satisfy the understanding upon this point,\r\nand as impossible to induce it to remain at rest in relation to this\r\nincapacity.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nUnconditioned necessity, which, as the ultimate support and stay of all\r\nexisting things, is an indispensable requirement of the mind, is an abyss on\r\nthe verge of which human reason trembles in dismay. Even the idea of eternity,\r\nterrible and sublime as it is, as depicted by Haller, does not produce upon the\r\nmental vision such a feeling of awe and terror; for, although it measures the\r\nduration of things, it does not support them. We cannot bear, nor can we rid\r\nourselves of the thought that a being, which we regard as the greatest of all\r\npossible existences, should say to himself: I am from eternity to eternity;\r\nbeside me there is nothing, except that which exists by my will; whence then am\r\nI? Here all sinks away from under us; and the greatest, as the smallest,\r\nperfection, hovers without stay or footing in presence of the speculative\r\nreason, which finds it as easy to part with the one as with the other.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nMany physical powers, which evidence their existence by their effects, are\r\nperfectly inscrutable in their nature; they elude all our powers of\r\nobservation. The transcendental object which forms the basis of phenomena, and,\r\nin connection with it, the reason why our sensibility possesses this rather\r\nthan that particular kind of conditions, are and must ever remain hidden from\r\nour mental vision; the fact is there, the reason of the fact we cannot see. But\r\nan ideal of pure reason cannot be termed mysterious or inscrutable, because the\r\nonly credential of its reality is the need of it felt by reason, for the\r\npurpose of giving completeness to the world of synthetical unity. An ideal is\r\nnot even given as a cogitable object, and therefore cannot be inscrutable; on\r\nthe contrary, it must, as a mere idea, be based on the constitution of reason\r\nitself, and on this account must be capable of explanation and solution. For\r\nthe very essence of reason consists in its ability to give an account, of all\r\nour conceptions, opinions, and assertions\u0026mdash;upon objective, or, when they\r\nhappen to be illusory and fallacious, upon subjective grounds.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nDetection and Explanation of the Dialectical Illusion in all Transcendental\r\nArguments for the Existence of a Necessary Being.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBoth of the above arguments are transcendental; in other words, they do not\r\nproceed upon empirical principles. For, although the cosmological argument\r\nprofessed to lay a basis of experience for its edifice of reasoning, it did not\r\nground its procedure upon the peculiar constitution of experience, but upon\r\npure principles of reason\u0026mdash;in relation to an existence given by empirical\r\nconsciousness; utterly abandoning its guidance, however, for the purpose of\r\nsupporting its assertions entirely upon pure conceptions. Now what is the\r\ncause, in these transcendental arguments, of the dialectical, but natural,\r\nillusion, which connects the conceptions of necessity and supreme reality, and\r\nhypostatizes that which cannot be anything but an idea? What is the cause of\r\nthis unavoidable step on the part of reason, of admitting that some one among\r\nall existing things must be necessary, while it falls back from the assertion\r\nof the existence of such a being as from an abyss? And how does reason proceed\r\nto explain this anomaly to itself, and from the wavering condition of a timid\r\nand reluctant approbation\u0026mdash;always again withdrawn\u0026mdash;arrive at a calm\r\nand settled insight into its cause?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIt is something very remarkable that, on the supposition that something exists,\r\nI cannot avoid the inference that something exists necessarily. Upon this\r\nperfectly natural\u0026mdash;but not on that account reliable\u0026mdash;inference does\r\nthe cosmological argument rest. But, let me form any conception whatever of a\r\nthing, I find that I cannot cogitate the existence of the thing as absolutely\r\nnecessary, and that nothing prevents me\u0026mdash;be the thing or being what it\r\nmay\u0026mdash;from cogitating its non-existence. I may thus be obliged to admit\r\nthat all existing things have a necessary basis, while I cannot cogitate any\r\nsingle or individual thing as necessary. In other words, I can never complete\r\nthe regress through the conditions of existence, without admitting the\r\nexistence of a necessary being; but, on the other hand, I cannot make a\r\ncommencement from this being.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIf I must cogitate something as existing necessarily as the basis of existing\r\nthings, and yet am not permitted to cogitate any individual thing as in itself\r\nnecessary, the inevitable inference is that necessity and contingency are not\r\nproperties of things themselves\u0026mdash;otherwise an internal contradiction would\r\nresult; that consequently neither of these principles are objective, but merely\r\nsubjective principles of reason\u0026mdash;the one requiring us to seek for a\r\nnecessary ground for everything that exists, that is, to be satisfied with no\r\nother explanation than that which is complete à priori, the other forbidding us\r\never to hope for the attainment of this completeness, that is, to regard no\r\nmember of the empirical world as unconditioned. In this mode of viewing them,\r\nboth principles, in their purely heuristic and regulative character, and as\r\nconcerning merely the formal interest of reason, are quite consistent with each\r\nother. The one says: \u0026ldquo;You must philosophize upon nature,\u0026rdquo; as if\r\nthere existed a necessary primal basis of all existing things, solely for the\r\npurpose of introducing systematic unity into your knowledge, by pursuing an\r\nidea of this character\u0026mdash;a foundation which is arbitrarily admitted to be\r\nultimate; while the other warns you to consider no individual determination,\r\nconcerning the existence of things, as such an ultimate foundation, that is, as\r\nabsolutely necessary, but to keep the way always open for further progress in\r\nthe deduction, and to treat every determination as determined by some other.\r\nBut if all that we perceive must be regarded as conditionally necessary, it is\r\nimpossible that anything which is empirically given should be absolutely\r\nnecessary.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIt follows from this that you must accept the absolutely necessary as out of\r\nand beyond the world, inasmuch as it is useful only as a principle of the\r\nhighest possible unity in experience, and you cannot discover any such\r\nnecessary existence in the would, the second rule requiring you to regard all\r\nempirical causes of unity as themselves deduced.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe philosophers of antiquity regarded all the forms of nature as contingent;\r\nwhile matter was considered by them, in accordance with the judgement of the\r\ncommon reason of mankind, as primal and necessary. But if they had regarded\r\nmatter, not relatively\u0026mdash;as the substratum of phenomena, but absolutely and\r\nin itself\u0026mdash;as an independent existence, this idea of absolute necessity\r\nwould have immediately disappeared. For there is nothing absolutely connecting\r\nreason with such an existence; on the contrary, it can annihilate it in\r\nthought, always and without self-contradiction. But in thought alone lay the\r\nidea of absolute necessity. A regulative principle must, therefore, have been\r\nat the foundation of this opinion. In fact, extension and\r\nimpenetrability\u0026mdash;which together constitute our conception of\r\nmatter\u0026mdash;form the supreme empirical principle of the unity of phenomena,\r\nand this principle, in so far as it is empirically unconditioned, possesses the\r\nproperty of a regulative principle. But, as every determination of matter which\r\nconstitutes what is real in it\u0026mdash;and consequently impenetrability\u0026mdash;is\r\nan effect, which must have a cause, and is for this reason always derived, the\r\nnotion of matter cannot harmonize with the idea of a necessary being, in its\r\ncharacter of the principle of all derived unity. For every one of its real\r\nproperties, being derived, must be only conditionally necessary, and can\r\ntherefore be annihilated in thought; and thus the whole existence of matter can\r\nbe so annihilated or suppressed. If this were not the case, we should have\r\nfound in the world of phenomena the highest ground or condition of\r\nunity\u0026mdash;which is impossible, according to the second regulative principle.\r\nIt follows that matter, and, in general, all that forms part of the world of\r\nsense, cannot be a necessary primal being, nor even a principle of empirical\r\nunity, but that this being or principle must have its place assigned without\r\nthe world. And, in this way, we can proceed in perfect confidence to deduce the\r\nphenomena of the world and their existence from other phenomena, just as if\r\nthere existed no necessary being; and we can at the same time, strive without\r\nceasing towards the attainment of completeness for our deduction, just as if\r\nsuch a being\u0026mdash;the supreme condition of all existences\u0026mdash;were\r\npresupposed by the mind.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThese remarks will have made it evident to the reader that the ideal of the\r\nSupreme Being, far from being an enouncement of the existence of a being in\r\nitself necessary, is nothing more than a regulative principle of reason,\r\nrequiring us to regard all connection existing between phenomena as if it had\r\nits origin from an all-sufficient necessary cause, and basing upon this the\r\nrule of a systematic and necessary unity in the explanation of phenomena. We\r\ncannot, at the same time, avoid regarding, by a transcendental subreptio, this\r\nformal principle as constitutive, and hypostatizing this unity. Precisely\r\nsimilar is the case with our notion of space. Space is the primal condition of\r\nall forms, which are properly just so many different limitations of it; and\r\nthus, although it is merely a principle of sensibility, we cannot help\r\nregarding it as an absolutely necessary and self-subsistent thing\u0026mdash;as an\r\nobject given à priori in itself. In the same way, it is quite natural that, as\r\nthe systematic unity of nature cannot be established as a principle for the\r\nempirical employment of reason, unless it is based upon the idea of an ens\r\nrealissimum, as the supreme cause, we should regard this idea as a real object,\r\nand this object, in its character of supreme condition, as absolutely\r\nnecessary, and that in this way a regulative should be transformed into a\r\nconstitutive principle. This interchange becomes evident when I regard this\r\nsupreme being, which, relatively to the world, was absolutely (unconditionally)\r\nnecessary, as a thing per se. In this case, I find it impossible to represent\r\nthis necessity in or by any conception, and it exists merely in my own mind, as\r\nthe formal condition of thought, but not as a material and hypostatic condition\r\nof existence.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003ca id=\"chap93\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eSection VI. Of the Impossibility of a\r\nPhysico-Theological Proof\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIf, then, neither a pure conception nor the general experience of an existing\r\nbeing can provide a sufficient basis for the proof of the existence of the\r\nDeity, we can make the attempt by the only other mode\u0026mdash;that of grounding\r\nour argument upon a determinate experience of the phenomena of the present\r\nworld, their constitution and disposition, and discover whether we can thus\r\nattain to a sound conviction of the existence of a Supreme Being. This argument\r\nwe shall term the physico-theological argument. If it is shown to be\r\ninsufficient, speculative reason cannot present us with any satisfactory proof\r\nof the existence of a being corresponding to our transcendental idea.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIt is evident from the remarks that have been made in the preceding sections,\r\nthat an answer to this question will be far from being difficult or\r\nunconvincing. For how can any experience be adequate with an idea? The very\r\nessence of an idea consists in the fact that no experience can ever be\r\ndiscovered congruent or adequate with it. The transcendental idea of a\r\nnecessary and all-sufficient being is so immeasurably great, so high above all\r\nthat is empirical, which is always conditioned, that we hope in vain to find\r\nmaterials in the sphere of experience sufficiently ample for our conception,\r\nand in vain seek the unconditioned among things that are conditioned, while\r\nexamples, nay, even guidance is denied us by the laws of empirical synthesis.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIf the Supreme Being forms a link in the chain of empirical conditions, it must\r\nbe a member of the empirical series, and, like the lower members which it\r\nprecedes, have its origin in some higher member of the series. If, on the other\r\nhand, we disengage it from the chain, and cogitate it as an intelligible being,\r\napart from the series of natural causes\u0026mdash;how shall reason bridge the abyss\r\nthat separates the latter from the former? All laws respecting the regress from\r\neffects to causes, all synthetical additions to our knowledge relate solely to\r\npossible experience and the objects of the sensuous world, and, apart from\r\nthem, are without significance.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe world around us opens before our view so magnificent a spectacle of order,\r\nvariety, beauty, and conformity to ends, that whether we pursue our\r\nobservations into the infinity of space in the one direction, or into its\r\nillimitable divisions in the other, whether we regard the world in its greatest\r\nor its least manifestations\u0026mdash;even after we have attained to the highest\r\nsummit of knowledge which our weak minds can reach, we find that language in\r\nthe presence of wonders so inconceivable has lost its force, and number its\r\npower to reckon, nay, even thought fails to conceive adequately, and our\r\nconception of the whole dissolves into an astonishment without power of\r\nexpression\u0026mdash;all the more eloquent that it is dumb. Everywhere around us we\r\nobserve a chain of causes and effects, of means and ends, of death and birth;\r\nand, as nothing has entered of itself into the condition in which we find it,\r\nwe are constantly referred to some other thing, which itself suggests the same\r\ninquiry regarding its cause, and thus the universe must sink into the abyss of\r\nnothingness, unless we admit that, besides this infinite chain of\r\ncontingencies, there exists something that is primal and\r\nself-subsistent\u0026mdash;something which, as the cause of this phenomenal world,\r\nsecures its continuance and preservation.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThis highest cause\u0026mdash;what magnitude shall we attribute to it? Of the\r\ncontent of the world we are ignorant; still less can we estimate its magnitude\r\nby comparison with the sphere of the possible. But this supreme cause being a\r\nnecessity of the human mind, what is there to prevent us from attributing to it\r\nsuch a degree of perfection as to place it above the sphere of all that is\r\npossible? This we can easily do, although only by the aid of the faint outline\r\nof an abstract conception, by representing this being to ourselves as\r\ncontaining in itself, as an individual substance, all possible\r\nperfection\u0026mdash;a conception which satisfies that requirement of reason which\r\ndemands parsimony in principles, which is free from self-contradiction, which\r\neven contributes to the extension of the employment of reason in experience, by\r\nmeans of the guidance afforded by this idea to order and system, and which in\r\nno respect conflicts with any law of experience.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThis argument always deserves to be mentioned with respect. It is the oldest,\r\nthe clearest, and that most in conformity with the common reason of humanity.\r\nIt animates the study of nature, as it itself derives its existence and draws\r\never new strength from that source. It introduces aims and ends into a sphere\r\nin which our observation could not of itself have discovered them, and extends\r\nour knowledge of nature, by directing our attention to a unity, the principle\r\nof which lies beyond nature. This knowledge of nature again reacts upon this\r\nidea\u0026mdash;its cause; and thus our belief in a divine author of the universe\r\nrises to the power of an irresistible conviction.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nFor these reasons it would be utterly hopeless to attempt to rob this argument\r\nof the authority it has always enjoyed. The mind, unceasingly elevated by these\r\nconsiderations, which, although empirical, are so remarkably powerful, and\r\ncontinually adding to their force, will not suffer itself to be depressed by\r\nthe doubts suggested by subtle speculation; it tears itself out of this state\r\nof uncertainty, the moment it casts a look upon the wondrous forms of nature\r\nand the majesty of the universe, and rises from height to height, from\r\ncondition to condition, till it has elevated itself to the supreme and\r\nunconditioned author of all.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut although we have nothing to object to the reasonableness and utility of\r\nthis procedure, but have rather to commend and encourage it, we cannot approve\r\nof the claims which this argument advances to demonstrative certainty and to a\r\nreception upon its own merits, apart from favour or support by other arguments.\r\nNor can it injure the cause of morality to endeavour to lower the tone of the\r\narrogant sophist, and to teach him that modesty and moderation which are the\r\nproperties of a belief that brings calm and content into the mind, without\r\nprescribing to it an unworthy subjection. I maintain, then, that the\r\nphysico-theological argument is insufficient of itself to prove the existence\r\nof a Supreme Being, that it must entrust this to the ontological\r\nargument\u0026mdash;to which it serves merely as an introduction, and that,\r\nconsequently, this argument contains the only possible ground of proof\r\n(possessed by speculative reason) for the existence of this being.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe chief momenta in the physico-theological argument are as follow: 1. We\r\nobserve in the world manifest signs of an arrangement full of purpose, executed\r\nwith great wisdom, and argument in whole of a content indescribably various,\r\nand of an extent without limits. 2. This arrangement of means and ends is\r\nentirely foreign to the things existing in the world\u0026mdash;it belongs to them\r\nmerely as a contingent attribute; in other words, the nature of different\r\nthings could not of itself, whatever means were employed, harmoniously tend\r\ntowards certain purposes, were they not chosen and directed for these purposes\r\nby a rational and disposing principle, in accordance with certain fundamental\r\nideas. 3. There exists, therefore, a sublime and wise cause (or several), which\r\nis not merely a blind, all-powerful nature, producing the beings and events\r\nwhich fill the world in unconscious fecundity, but a free and intelligent cause\r\nof the world. 4. The unity of this cause may be inferred from the unity of the\r\nreciprocal relation existing between the parts of the world, as portions of an\r\nartistic edifice\u0026mdash;an inference which all our observation favours, and all\r\nprinciples of analogy support.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIn the above argument, it is inferred from the analogy of certain products of\r\nnature with those of human art, when it compels Nature to bend herself to its\r\npurposes, as in the case of a house, a ship, or a watch, that the same kind of\r\ncausality\u0026mdash;namely, understanding and will\u0026mdash;resides in nature. It is\r\nalso declared that the internal possibility of this freely-acting nature (which\r\nis the source of all art, and perhaps also of human reason) is derivable from\r\nanother and superhuman art\u0026mdash;a conclusion which would perhaps be found\r\nincapable of standing the test of subtle transcendental criticism. But to\r\nneither of these opinions shall we at present object. We shall only remark that\r\nit must be confessed that, if we are to discuss the subject of cause at all, we\r\ncannot proceed more securely than with the guidance of the analogy subsisting\r\nbetween nature and such products of design\u0026mdash;these being the only products\r\nwhose causes and modes of organization are completely known to us. Reason would\r\nbe unable to satisfy her own requirements, if she passed from a causality which\r\nshe does know, to obscure and indemonstrable principles of explanation which\r\nshe does not know.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAccording to the physico-theological argument, the connection and harmony\r\nexisting in the world evidence the contingency of the form merely, but not of\r\nthe matter, that is, of the substance of the world. To establish the truth of\r\nthe latter opinion, it would be necessary to prove that all things would be in\r\nthemselves incapable of this harmony and order, unless they were, even as\r\nregards their substance, the product of a supreme wisdom. But this would\r\nrequire very different grounds of proof from those presented by the analogy\r\nwith human art. This proof can at most, therefore, demonstrate the existence of\r\nan architect of the world, whose efforts are limited by the capabilities of the\r\nmaterial with which he works, but not of a creator of the world, to whom all\r\nthings are subject. Thus this argument is utterly insufficient for the task\r\nbefore us\u0026mdash;a demonstration of the existence of an all-sufficient being. If\r\nwe wish to prove the contingency of matter, we must have recourse to a\r\ntranscendental argument, which the physico-theological was constructed\r\nexpressly to avoid.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWe infer, from the order and design visible in the universe, as a disposition\r\nof a thoroughly contingent character, the existence of a cause proportionate\r\nthereto. The conception of this cause must contain certain determinate\r\nqualities, and it must therefore be regarded as the conception of a being which\r\npossesses all power, wisdom, and so on, in one word, all perfection\u0026mdash;the\r\nconception, that is, of an all-sufficient being. For the predicates of very\r\ngreat, astonishing, or immeasurable power and excellence, give us no\r\ndeterminate conception of the thing, nor do they inform us what the thing may\r\nbe in itself. They merely indicate the relation existing between the magnitude\r\nof the object and the observer, who compares it with himself and with his own\r\npower of comprehension, and are mere expressions of praise and reverence, by\r\nwhich the object is either magnified, or the observing subject depreciated in\r\nrelation to the object. Where we have to do with the magnitude (of the\r\nperfection) of a thing, we can discover no determinate conception, except that\r\nwhich comprehends all possible perfection or completeness, and it is only the\r\ntotal (omnitudo) of reality which is completely determined in and through its\r\nconception alone.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nNow it cannot be expected that any one will be bold enough to declare that he\r\nhas a perfect insight into the relation which the magnitude of the world he\r\ncontemplates bears (in its extent as well as in its content) to omnipotence,\r\ninto that of the order and design in the world to the highest wisdom, and that\r\nof the unity of the world to the absolute unity of a Supreme Being.\r\nPhysico-theology is therefore incapable of presenting a determinate conception\r\nof a supreme cause of the world, and is therefore insufficient as a principle\r\nof theology\u0026mdash;a theology which is itself to be the basis of religion.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe attainment of absolute totality is completely impossible on the path of\r\nempiricism. And yet this is the path pursued in the physico-theological\r\nargument. What means shall we employ to bridge the abyss?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAfter elevating ourselves to admiration of the magnitude of the power, wisdom,\r\nand other attributes of the author of the world, and finding we can advance no\r\nfurther, we leave the argument on empirical grounds, and proceed to infer the\r\ncontingency of the world from the order and conformity to aims that are\r\nobservable in it. From this contingency we infer, by the help of transcendental\r\nconceptions alone, the existence of something absolutely necessary; and, still\r\nadvancing, proceed from the conception of the absolute necessity of the first\r\ncause to the completely determined or determining conception thereof\u0026mdash;the\r\nconception of an all-embracing reality. Thus the physico-theological, failing\r\nin its undertaking, recurs in its embarrassment to the cosmological argument;\r\nand, as this is merely the ontological argument in disguise, it executes its\r\ndesign solely by the aid of pure reason, although it at first professed to have\r\nno connection with this faculty and to base its entire procedure upon\r\nexperience alone.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe physico-theologians have therefore no reason to regard with such contempt\r\nthe transcendental mode of argument, and to look down upon it, with the conceit\r\nof clear-sighted observers of nature, as the brain-cobweb of obscure\r\nspeculatists. For, if they reflect upon and examine their own arguments, they\r\nwill find that, after following for some time the path of nature and\r\nexperience, and discovering themselves no nearer their object, they suddenly\r\nleave this path and pass into the region of pure possibility, where they hope\r\nto reach upon the wings of ideas what had eluded all their empirical\r\ninvestigations. Gaining, as they think, a firm footing after this immense leap,\r\nthey extend their determinate conception\u0026mdash;into the possession of which\r\nthey have come, they know not how\u0026mdash;over the whole sphere of creation, and\r\nexplain their ideal, which is entirely a product of pure reason, by\r\nillustrations drawn from experience\u0026mdash;though in a degree miserably unworthy\r\nof the grandeur of the object, while they refuse to acknowledge that they have\r\narrived at this cognition or hypothesis by a very different road from that of\r\nexperience.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThus the physico-theological is based upon the cosmological, and this upon the\r\nontological proof of the existence of a Supreme Being; and as besides these\r\nthree there is no other path open to speculative reason, the ontological proof,\r\non the ground of pure conceptions of reason, is the only possible one, if any\r\nproof of a proposition so far transcending the empirical exercise of the\r\nunderstanding is possible at all.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003ca id=\"chap94\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eSection VII. Critique of all Theology based upon\r\nSpeculative Principles of Reason\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIf by the term theology I understand the cognition of a primal being, that\r\ncognition is based either upon reason alone (theologia rationalis) or upon\r\nrevelation (theologia revelata). The former cogitates its object either by\r\nmeans of pure transcendental conceptions, as an ens originarium, realissimum,\r\nens entium, and is termed transcendental theology; or, by means of a conception\r\nderived from the nature of our own mind, as a supreme intelligence, and must\r\nthen be entitled natural theology. The person who believes in a transcendental\r\ntheology alone, is termed a deist; he who acknowledges the possibility of a\r\nnatural theology also, a theist. The former admits that we can cognize by pure\r\nreason alone the existence of a Supreme Being, but at the same time maintains\r\nthat our conception of this being is purely transcendental, and that all we can\r\nsay of it is that it possesses all reality, without being able to define it\r\nmore closely. The second asserts that reason is capable of presenting us, from\r\nthe analogy with nature, with a more definite conception of this being, and\r\nthat its operations, as the cause of all things, are the results of\r\nintelligence and free will. The former regards the Supreme Being as the cause\r\nof the world\u0026mdash;whether by the necessity of his nature, or as a free agent,\r\nis left undetermined; the latter considers this being as the author of the\r\nworld.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nTranscendental theology aims either at inferring the existence of a Supreme\r\nBeing from a general experience, without any closer reference to the world to\r\nwhich this experience belongs, and in this case it is called cosmotheology; or\r\nit endeavours to cognize the existence of such a being, through mere\r\nconceptions, without the aid of experience, and is then termed ontotheology.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nNatural theology infers the attributes and the existence of an author of the\r\nworld, from the constitution of, the order and unity observable in, the world,\r\nin which two modes of causality must be admitted to exist\u0026mdash;those of nature\r\nand freedom. Thus it rises from this world to a supreme intelligence, either as\r\nthe principle of all natural, or of all moral order and perfection. In the\r\nformer case it is termed physico-theology, in the latter, ethical or\r\nmoral-theology.\u003ca href=\"#linknote-69\" id=\"linknoteref-69\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[69]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"linknote-69\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#linknoteref-69\"\u003e[69]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nNot theological ethics; for this science contains ethical laws, which\r\npresuppose the existence of a Supreme Governor of the world; while\r\nmoral-theology, on the contrary, is the expression of a conviction of the\r\nexistence of a Supreme Being, founded upon ethical laws.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAs we are wont to understand by the term God not merely an eternal nature, the\r\noperations of which are insensate and blind, but a Supreme Being, who is the\r\nfree and intelligent author of all things, and as it is this latter view alone\r\nthat can be of interest to humanity, we might, in strict rigour, deny to the\r\ndeist any belief in God at all, and regard him merely as a maintainer of the\r\nexistence of a primal being or thing\u0026mdash;the supreme cause of all other\r\nthings. But, as no one ought to be blamed, merely because he does not feel\r\nhimself justified in maintaining a certain opinion, as if he altogether denied\r\nits truth and asserted the opposite, it is more correct\u0026mdash;as it is less\r\nharsh\u0026mdash;to say, the deist believes in a God, the theist in a living God\r\n(summa intelligentia). We shall now proceed to investigate the sources of all\r\nthese attempts of reason to establish the existence of a Supreme Being.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIt may be sufficient in this place to define theoretical knowledge or cognition\r\nas knowledge of that which is, and practical knowledge as knowledge of that\r\nwhich ought to be. In this view, the theoretical employment of reason is that\r\nby which I cognize à priori (as necessary) that something is, while the\r\npractical is that by which I cognize à priori what ought to happen. Now, if it\r\nis an indubitably certain, though at the same time an entirely conditioned\r\ntruth, that something is, or ought to happen, either a certain determinate\r\ncondition of this truth is absolutely necessary, or such a condition may be\r\narbitrarily presupposed. In the former case the condition is postulated (per\r\nthesin), in the latter supposed (per hypothesin). There are certain practical\r\nlaws\u0026mdash;those of morality\u0026mdash;which are absolutely necessary. Now, if\r\nthese laws necessarily presuppose the existence of some being, as the condition\r\nof the possibility of their obligatory power, this being must be postulated,\r\nbecause the conditioned, from which we reason to this determinate condition, is\r\nitself cognized à priori as absolutely necessary. We shall at some future time\r\nshow that the moral laws not merely presuppose the existence of a Supreme\r\nBeing, but also, as themselves absolutely necessary in a different relation,\r\ndemand or postulate it\u0026mdash;although only from a practical point of view. The\r\ndiscussion of this argument we postpone for the present.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWhen the question relates merely to that which is, not to that which ought to\r\nbe, the conditioned which is presented in experience is always cogitated as\r\ncontingent. For this reason its condition cannot be regarded as absolutely\r\nnecessary, but merely as relatively necessary, or rather as needful; the\r\ncondition is in itself and à priori a mere arbitrary presupposition in aid of\r\nthe cognition, by reason, of the conditioned. If, then, we are to possess a\r\ntheoretical cognition of the absolute necessity of a thing, we cannot attain to\r\nthis cognition otherwise than à priori by means of conceptions; while it is\r\nimpossible in this way to cognize the existence of a cause which bears any\r\nrelation to an existence given in experience.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nTheoretical cognition is speculative when it relates to an object or certain\r\nconceptions of an object which is not given and cannot be discovered by means\r\nof experience. It is opposed to the cognition of nature, which concerns only\r\nthose objects or predicates which can be presented in a possible experience.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe principle that everything which happens (the empirically contingent) must\r\nhave a cause, is a principle of the cognition of nature, but not of speculative\r\ncognition. For, if we change it into an abstract principle, and deprive it of\r\nits reference to experience and the empirical, we shall find that it cannot\r\nwith justice be regarded any longer as a synthetical proposition, and that it\r\nis impossible to discover any mode of transition from that which exists to\r\nsomething entirely different\u0026mdash;termed cause. Nay, more, the conception of a\r\ncause likewise that of the contingent\u0026mdash;loses, in this speculative mode of\r\nemploying it, all significance, for its objective reality and meaning are\r\ncomprehensible from experience alone.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWhen from the existence of the universe and the things in it the existence of a\r\ncause of the universe is inferred, reason is proceeding not in the natural, but\r\nin the speculative method. For the principle of the former enounces, not that\r\nthings themselves or substances, but only that which happens or their\r\nstates\u0026mdash;as empirically contingent, have a cause: the assertion that the\r\nexistence of substance itself is contingent is not justified by experience, it\r\nis the assertion of a reason employing its principles in a speculative manner.\r\nIf, again, I infer from the form of the universe, from the way in which all\r\nthings are connected and act and react upon each other, the existence of a\r\ncause entirely distinct from the universe\u0026mdash;this would again be a judgement\r\nof purely speculative reason; because the object in this case\u0026mdash;the\r\ncause\u0026mdash;can never be an object of possible experience. In both these cases\r\nthe principle of causality, which is valid only in the field of\r\nexperience\u0026mdash;useless and even meaningless beyond this region, would be\r\ndiverted from its proper destination.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nNow I maintain that all attempts of reason to establish a theology by the aid\r\nof speculation alone are fruitless, that the principles of reason as applied to\r\nnature do not conduct us to any theological truths, and, consequently, that a\r\nrational theology can have no existence, unless it is founded upon the laws of\r\nmorality. For all synthetical principles of the understanding are valid only as\r\nimmanent in experience; while the cognition of a Supreme Being necessitates\r\ntheir being employed transcendentally, and of this the understanding is quite\r\nincapable. If the empirical law of causality is to conduct us to a Supreme\r\nBeing, this being must belong to the chain of empirical objects\u0026mdash;in which\r\ncase it would be, like all phenomena, itself conditioned. If the possibility of\r\npassing the limits of experience be admitted, by means of the dynamical law of\r\nthe relation of an effect to its cause, what kind of conception shall we obtain\r\nby this procedure? Certainly not the conception of a Supreme Being, because\r\nexperience never presents us with the greatest of all possible effects, and it\r\nis only an effect of this character that could witness to the existence of a\r\ncorresponding cause. If, for the purpose of fully satisfying the requirements\r\nof Reason, we recognize her right to assert the existence of a perfect and\r\nabsolutely necessary being, this can be admitted only from favour, and cannot\r\nbe regarded as the result of irresistible demonstration. The\r\nphysico-theological proof may add weight to others\u0026mdash;if other proofs there\r\nare\u0026mdash;by connecting speculation with experience; but in itself it rather\r\nprepares the mind for theological cognition, and gives it a right and natural\r\ndirection, than establishes a sure foundation for theology.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIt is now perfectly evident that transcendental questions admit only of\r\ntranscendental answers\u0026mdash;those presented à priori by pure conceptions\r\nwithout the least empirical admixture. But the question in the present case is\r\nevidently synthetical\u0026mdash;it aims at the extension of our cognition beyond\r\nthe bounds of experience\u0026mdash;it requires an assurance respecting the\r\nexistence of a being corresponding with the idea in our minds, to which no\r\nexperience can ever be adequate. Now it has been abundantly proved that all à\r\npriori synthetical cognition is possible only as the expression of the formal\r\nconditions of a possible experience; and that the validity of all principles\r\ndepends upon their immanence in the field of experience, that is, their\r\nrelation to objects of empirical cognition or phenomena. Thus all\r\ntranscendental procedure in reference to speculative theology is without\r\nresult.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIf any one prefers doubting the conclusiveness of the proofs of our analytic to\r\nlosing the persuasion of the validity of these old and time honoured arguments,\r\nhe at least cannot decline answering the question\u0026mdash;how he can pass the\r\nlimits of all possible experience by the help of mere ideas. If he talks of new\r\narguments, or of improvements upon old arguments, I request him to spare me.\r\nThere is certainly no great choice in this sphere of discussion, as all\r\nspeculative arguments must at last look for support to the ontological, and I\r\nhave, therefore, very little to fear from the argumentative fecundity of the\r\ndogmatical defenders of a non-sensuous reason. Without looking upon myself as a\r\nremarkably combative person, I shall not decline the challenge to detect the\r\nfallacy and destroy the pretensions of every attempt of speculative theology.\r\nAnd yet the hope of better fortune never deserts those who are accustomed to\r\nthe dogmatical mode of procedure. I shall, therefore, restrict myself to the\r\nsimple and equitable demand that such reasoners will demonstrate, from the\r\nnature of the human mind as well as from that of the other sources of\r\nknowledge, how we are to proceed to extend our cognition completely à priori,\r\nand to carry it to that point where experience abandons us, and no means exist\r\nof guaranteeing the objective reality of our conceptions. In whatever way the\r\nunderstanding may have attained to a conception, the existence of the object of\r\nthe conception cannot be discovered in it by analysis, because the cognition of\r\nthe existence of the object depends upon the object\u0026rsquo;s being posited and\r\ngiven in itself apart from the conception. But it is utterly impossible to go\r\nbeyond our conception, without the aid of experience\u0026mdash;which presents to\r\nthe mind nothing but phenomena, or to attain by the help of mere conceptions to\r\na conviction of the existence of new kinds of objects or supernatural beings.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut although pure speculative reason is far from sufficient to demonstrate the\r\nexistence of a Supreme Being, it is of the highest utility in correcting our\r\nconception of this being\u0026mdash;on the supposition that we can attain to the\r\ncognition of it by some other means\u0026mdash;in making it consistent with itself\r\nand with all other conceptions of intelligible objects, clearing it from all\r\nthat is incompatible with the conception of an ens summun, and eliminating from\r\nit all limitations or admixtures of empirical elements.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nTranscendental theology is still therefore, notwithstanding its objective\r\ninsufficiency, of importance in a negative respect; it is useful as a test of\r\nthe procedure of reason when engaged with pure ideas, no other than a\r\ntranscendental standard being in this case admissible. For if, from a practical\r\npoint of view, the hypothesis of a Supreme and All-sufficient Being is to\r\nmaintain its validity without opposition, it must be of the highest importance\r\nto define this conception in a correct and rigorous manner\u0026mdash;as the\r\ntranscendental conception of a necessary being, to eliminate all phenomenal\r\nelements (anthropomorphism in its most extended signification), and at the same\r\ntime to overflow all contradictory assertions\u0026mdash;be they atheistic, deistic,\r\nor anthropomorphic. This is of course very easy; as the same arguments which\r\ndemonstrated the inability of human reason to affirm the existence of a Supreme\r\nBeing must be alike sufficient to prove the invalidity of its denial. For it is\r\nimpossible to gain from the pure speculation of reason demonstration that there\r\nexists no Supreme Being, as the ground of all that exists, or that this being\r\npossesses none of those properties which we regard as analogical with the\r\ndynamical qualities of a thinking being, or that, as the anthropomorphists\r\nwould have us believe, it is subject to all the limitations which sensibility\r\nimposes upon those intelligences which exist in the world of experience.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nA Supreme Being is, therefore, for the speculative reason, a mere ideal, though\r\na faultless one\u0026mdash;a conception which perfects and crowns the system of\r\nhuman cognition, but the objective reality of which can neither be proved nor\r\ndisproved by pure reason. If this defect is ever supplied by a moral theology,\r\nthe problematic transcendental theology which has preceded, will have been at\r\nleast serviceable as demonstrating the mental necessity existing for the\r\nconception, by the complete determination of it which it has furnished, and the\r\nceaseless testing of the conclusions of a reason often deceived by sense, and\r\nnot always in harmony with its own ideas. The attributes of necessity,\r\ninfinitude, unity, existence apart from the world (and not as a world soul),\r\neternity (free from conditions of time), omnipresence (free from conditions of\r\nspace), omnipotence, and others, are pure transcendental predicates; and thus\r\nthe accurate conception of a Supreme Being, which every theology requires, is\r\nfurnished by transcendental theology alone.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003ca id=\"chap95\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eAPPENDIX. Of the Regulative Employment of the Ideas of\r\nPure Reason\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe result of all the dialectical attempts of pure reason not only confirms the\r\ntruth of what we have already proved in our Transcendental Analytic, namely,\r\nthat all inferences which would lead us beyond the limits of experience are\r\nfallacious and groundless, but it at the same time teaches us this important\r\nlesson, that human reason has a natural inclination to overstep these limits,\r\nand that transcendental ideas are as much the natural property of the reason as\r\ncategories are of the understanding. There exists this difference, however,\r\nthat while the categories never mislead us, outward objects being always in\r\nperfect harmony therewith, ideas are the parents of irresistible illusions, the\r\nseverest and most subtle criticism being required to save us from the fallacies\r\nwhich they induce.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWhatever is grounded in the nature of our powers will be found to be in harmony\r\nwith the final purpose and proper employment of these powers, when once we have\r\ndiscovered their true direction and aim. We are entitled to suppose, therefore,\r\nthat there exists a mode of employing transcendental ideas which is proper and\r\nimmanent; although, when we mistake their meaning, and regard them as\r\nconceptions of actual things, their mode of application is transcendent and\r\ndelusive. For it is not the idea itself, but only the employment of the idea in\r\nrelation to possible experience, that is transcendent or immanent. An idea is\r\nemployed transcendently, when it is applied to an object falsely believed to be\r\nadequate with and to correspond to it; immanently, when it is applied solely to\r\nthe employment of the understanding in the sphere of experience. Thus all\r\nerrors of subreptio\u0026mdash;of misapplication, are to be ascribed to defects of\r\njudgement, and not to understanding or reason.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nReason never has an immediate relation to an object; it relates immediately to\r\nthe understanding alone. It is only through the understanding that it can be\r\nemployed in the field of experience. It does not form conceptions of objects,\r\nit merely arranges them and gives to them that unity which they are capable of\r\npossessing when the sphere of their application has been extended as widely as\r\npossible. Reason avails itself of the conception of the understanding for the\r\nsole purpose of producing totality in the different series. This totality the\r\nunderstanding does not concern itself with; its only occupation is the\r\nconnection of experiences, by which series of conditions in accordance with\r\nconceptions are established. The object of reason is, therefore, the\r\nunderstanding and its proper destination. As the latter brings unity into the\r\ndiversity of objects by means of its conceptions, so the former brings unity\r\ninto the diversity of conceptions by means of ideas; as it sets the final aim\r\nof a collective unity to the operations of the understanding, which without\r\nthis occupies itself with a distributive unity alone.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nI accordingly maintain that transcendental ideas can never be employed as\r\nconstitutive ideas, that they cannot be conceptions of objects, and that, when\r\nthus considered, they assume a fallacious and dialectical character. But, on\r\nthe other hand, they are capable of an admirable and indispensably necessary\r\napplication to objects\u0026mdash;as regulative ideas, directing the understanding\r\nto a certain aim, the guiding lines towards which all its laws follow, and in\r\nwhich they all meet in one point. This point\u0026mdash;though a mere idea (focus\r\nimaginarius), that is, not a point from which the conceptions of the\r\nunderstanding do really proceed, for it lies beyond the sphere of possible\r\nexperience\u0026mdash;serves, notwithstanding, to give to these conceptions the\r\ngreatest possible unity combined with the greatest possible extension. Hence\r\narises the natural illusion which induces us to believe that these lines\r\nproceed from an object which lies out of the sphere of empirical cognition,\r\njust as objects reflected in a mirror appear to be behind it. But this\r\nillusion\u0026mdash;which we may hinder from imposing upon us\u0026mdash;is necessary and\r\nunavoidable, if we desire to see, not only those objects which lie before us,\r\nbut those which are at a great distance behind us; that is to say, when, in the\r\npresent case, we direct the aims of the understanding, beyond every given\r\nexperience, towards an extension as great as can possibly be attained.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIf we review our cognitions in their entire extent, we shall find that the\r\npeculiar business of reason is to arrange them into a system, that is to say,\r\nto give them connection according to a principle. This unity presupposes an\r\nidea\u0026mdash;the idea of the form of a whole (of cognition), preceding the\r\ndeterminate cognition of the parts, and containing the conditions which\r\ndetermine à priori to every part its place and relation to the other parts of\r\nthe whole system. This idea, accordingly, demands complete unity in the\r\ncognition of the understanding\u0026mdash;not the unity of a contingent aggregate,\r\nbut that of a system connected according to necessary laws. It cannot be\r\naffirmed with propriety that this idea is a conception of an object; it is\r\nmerely a conception of the complete unity of the conceptions of objects, in so\r\nfar as this unity is available to the understanding as a rule. Such conceptions\r\nof reason are not derived from nature; on the contrary, we employ them for the\r\ninterrogation and investigation of nature, and regard our cognition as\r\ndefective so long as it is not adequate to them. We admit that such a thing as\r\npure earth, pure water, or pure air, is not to be discovered. And yet we\r\nrequire these conceptions (which have their origin in the reason, so far as\r\nregards their absolute purity and completeness) for the purpose of determining\r\nthe share which each of these natural causes has in every phenomenon. Thus the\r\ndifferent kinds of matter are all referred to earths, as mere weight; to salts\r\nand inflammable bodies, as pure force; and finally, to water and air, as the\r\nvehicula of the former, or the machines employed by them in their\r\noperations\u0026mdash;for the purpose of explaining the chemical action and reaction\r\nof bodies in accordance with the idea of a mechanism. For, although not\r\nactually so expressed, the influence of such ideas of reason is very observable\r\nin the procedure of natural philosophers.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIf reason is the faculty of deducing the particular from the general, and if\r\nthe general be certain in se and given, it is only necessary that the judgement\r\nshould subsume the particular under the general, the particular being thus\r\nnecessarily determined. I shall term this the demonstrative or apodeictic\r\nemployment of reason. If, however, the general is admitted as problematical\r\nonly, and is a mere idea, the particular case is certain, but the universality\r\nof the rule which applies to this particular case remains a problem. Several\r\nparticular cases, the certainty of which is beyond doubt, are then taken and\r\nexamined, for the purpose of discovering whether the rule is applicable to\r\nthem; and if it appears that all the particular cases which can be collected\r\nfollow from the rule, its universality is inferred, and at the same time, all\r\nthe causes which have not, or cannot be presented to our observation, are\r\nconcluded to be of the same character with those which we have observed. This I\r\nshall term the hypothetical employment of the reason.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe hypothetical exercise of reason by the aid of ideas employed as\r\nproblematical conceptions is properly not constitutive. That is to say, if we\r\nconsider the subject strictly, the truth of the rule, which has been employed\r\nas an hypothesis, does not follow from the use that is made of it by reason.\r\nFor how can we know all the possible cases that may arise? some of which may,\r\nhowever, prove exceptions to the universality of the rule. This employment of\r\nreason is merely regulative, and its sole aim is the introduction of unity into\r\nthe aggregate of our particular cognitions, and thereby the approximating of\r\nthe rule to universality.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe object of the hypothetical employment of reason is therefore the systematic\r\nunity of cognitions; and this unity is the criterion of the truth of a rule. On\r\nthe other hand, this systematic unity\u0026mdash;as a mere idea\u0026mdash;is in fact\r\nmerely a unity projected, not to be regarded as given, but only in the light of\r\na problem\u0026mdash;a problem which serves, however, as a principle for the various\r\nand particular exercise of the understanding in experience, directs it with\r\nregard to those cases which are not presented to our observation, and\r\nintroduces harmony and consistency into all its operations.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAll that we can be certain of from the above considerations is that this\r\nsystematic unity is a logical principle, whose aim is to assist the\r\nunderstanding, where it cannot of itself attain to rules, by means of ideas, to\r\nbring all these various rules under one principle, and thus to ensure the most\r\ncomplete consistency and connection that can be attained. But the assertion\r\nthat objects and the understanding by which they are cognized are so\r\nconstituted as to be determined to systematic unity, that this may be\r\npostulated à priori, without any reference to the interest of reason, and that\r\nwe are justified in declaring all possible cognitions\u0026mdash;empirical and\r\nothers\u0026mdash;to possess systematic unity, and to be subject to general\r\nprinciples from which, notwithstanding their various character, they are all\r\nderivable,\u0026mdash;such an assertion can be founded only upon a transcendental principle\r\nof reason, which would render this systematic unity not subjectively and\r\nlogically\u0026mdash;in its character of a method, but objectively necessary.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWe shall illustrate this by an example. The conceptions of the understanding\r\nmake us acquainted, among many other kinds of unity, with that of the causality\r\nof a substance, which is termed power. The different phenomenal manifestations\r\nof the same substance appear at first view to be so very dissimilar that we are\r\ninclined to assume the existence of just as many different powers as there are\r\ndifferent effects\u0026mdash;as, in the case of the human mind, we have feeling,\r\nconsciousness, imagination, memory, wit, analysis, pleasure, desire and so on.\r\nNow we are required by a logical maxim to reduce these differences to as small\r\na number as possible, by comparing them and discovering the hidden identity\r\nwhich exists. We must inquire, for example, whether or not imagination\r\n(connected with consciousness), memory, wit, and analysis are not merely\r\ndifferent forms of understanding and reason. The idea of a fundamental power,\r\nthe existence of which no effort of logic can assure us of, is the problem to\r\nbe solved, for the systematic representation of the existing variety of powers.\r\nThe logical principle of reason requires us to produce as great a unity as is\r\npossible in the system of our cognitions; and the more the phenomena of this\r\nand the other power are found to be identical, the more probable does it\r\nbecome, that they are nothing but different manifestations of one and the same\r\npower, which may be called, relatively speaking, a fundamental power. And so\r\nwith other cases.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThese relatively fundamental powers must again be compared with each other, to\r\ndiscover, if possible, the one radical and absolutely fundamental power of\r\nwhich they are but the manifestations. But this unity is purely hypothetical.\r\nIt is not maintained, that this unity does really exist, but that we must, in\r\nthe interest of reason, that is, for the establishment of principles for the\r\nvarious rules presented by experience, try to discover and introduce it, so far\r\nas is practicable, into the sphere of our cognitions.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut the transcendental employment of the understanding would lead us to believe\r\nthat this idea of a fundamental power is not problematical, but that it\r\npossesses objective reality, and thus the systematic unity of the various\r\npowers or forces in a substance is demanded by the understanding and erected\r\ninto an apodeictic or necessary principle. For, without having attempted to\r\ndiscover the unity of the various powers existing in nature, nay, even after\r\nall our attempts have failed, we notwithstanding presuppose that it does exist,\r\nand may be, sooner or later, discovered. And this reason does, not only, as in\r\nthe case above adduced, with regard to the unity of substance, but where many\r\nsubstances, although all to a certain extent homogeneous, are discoverable, as\r\nin the case of matter in general. Here also does reason presuppose the\r\nexistence of the systematic unity of various powers\u0026mdash;inasmuch as\r\nparticular laws of nature are subordinate to general laws; and parsimony in\r\nprinciples is not merely an economical principle of reason, but an essential\r\nlaw of nature.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWe cannot understand, in fact, how a logical principle of unity can of right\r\nexist, unless we presuppose a transcendental principle, by which such a\r\nsystematic unit\u0026mdash;as a property of objects themselves\u0026mdash;is regarded as\r\nnecessary à priori. For with what right can reason, in its logical exercise,\r\nrequire us to regard the variety of forces which nature displays, as in effect\r\na disguised unity, and to deduce them from one fundamental force or power, when\r\nshe is free to admit that it is just as possible that all forces should be\r\ndifferent in kind, and that a systematic unity is not conformable to the design\r\nof nature? In this view of the case, reason would be proceeding in direct\r\nopposition to her own destination, by setting as an aim an idea which entirely\r\nconflicts with the procedure and arrangement of nature. Neither can we assert\r\nthat reason has previously inferred this unity from the contingent nature of\r\nphenomena. For the law of reason which requires us to seek for this unity is a\r\nnecessary law, inasmuch as without it we should not possess a faculty of\r\nreason, nor without reason a consistent and self-accordant mode of employing\r\nthe understanding, nor, in the absence of this, any proper and sufficient\r\ncriterion of empirical truth. In relation to this criterion, therefore, we must\r\nsuppose the idea of the systematic unity of nature to possess objective\r\nvalidity and necessity.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWe find this transcendental presupposition lurking in different forms in the\r\nprinciples of philosophers, although they have neither recognized it nor\r\nconfessed to themselves its presence. That the diversities of individual things\r\ndo not exclude identity of species, that the various species must be considered\r\nas merely different determinations of a few genera, and these again as\r\ndivisions of still higher races, and so on\u0026mdash;that, accordingly, a certain\r\nsystematic unity of all possible empirical conceptions, in so far as they can\r\nbe deduced from higher and more general conceptions, must be sought for, is a\r\nscholastic maxim or logical principle, without which reason could not be\r\nemployed by us. For we can infer the particular from the general, only in so\r\nfar as general properties of things constitute the foundation upon which the\r\nparticular rest.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThat the same unity exists in nature is presupposed by philosophers in the\r\nwell-known scholastic maxim, which forbids us unnecessarily to augment the\r\nnumber of entities or principles (entia praeter necessitatem non esse\r\nmultiplicanda). This maxim asserts that nature herself assists in the\r\nestablishment of this unity of reason, and that the seemingly infinite\r\ndiversity of phenomena should not deter us from the expectation of discovering\r\nbeneath this diversity a unity of fundamental properties, of which the\r\naforesaid variety is but a more or less determined form. This unity, although a\r\nmere idea, thinkers have found it necessary rather to moderate the desire than\r\nto encourage it. It was considered a great step when chemists were able to\r\nreduce all salts to two main genera\u0026mdash;acids and alkalis; and they regard\r\nthis difference as itself a mere variety, or different manifestation of one and\r\nthe same fundamental material. The different kinds of earths (stones and even\r\nmetals) chemists have endeavoured to reduce to three, and afterwards to two;\r\nbut still, not content with this advance, they cannot but think that behind\r\nthese diversities there lurks but one genus\u0026mdash;nay, that even salts and\r\nearths have a common principle. It might be conjectured that this is merely an\r\neconomical plan of reason, for the purpose of sparing itself trouble, and an\r\nattempt of a purely hypothetical character, which, when successful, gives an\r\nappearance of probability to the principle of explanation employed by the\r\nreason. But a selfish purpose of this kind is easily to be distinguished from\r\nthe idea, according to which every one presupposes that this unity is in\r\naccordance with the laws of nature, and that reason does not in this case\r\nrequest, but requires, although we are quite unable to determine the proper\r\nlimits of this unity.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIf the diversity existing in phenomena\u0026mdash;a diversity not of form (for in\r\nthis they may be similar) but of content\u0026mdash;were so great that the subtlest\r\nhuman reason could never by comparison discover in them the least similarity\r\n(which is not impossible), in this case the logical law of genera would be\r\nwithout foundation, the conception of a genus, nay, all general conceptions\r\nwould be impossible, and the faculty of the understanding, the exercise of\r\nwhich is restricted to the world of conceptions, could not exist. The logical\r\nprinciple of genera, accordingly, if it is to be applied to nature (by which I\r\nmean objects presented to our senses), presupposes a transcendental principle.\r\nIn accordance with this principle, homogeneity is necessarily presupposed in\r\nthe variety of phenomena (although we are unable to determine à priori the\r\ndegree of this homogeneity), because without it no empirical conceptions, and\r\nconsequently no experience, would be possible.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe logical principle of genera, which demands identity in phenomena, is\r\nbalanced by another principle\u0026mdash;that of species, which requires variety and\r\ndiversity in things, notwithstanding their accordance in the same genus, and\r\ndirects the understanding to attend to the one no less than to the other. This\r\nprinciple (of the faculty of distinction) acts as a check upon the reason and\r\nreason exhibits in this respect a double and conflicting interest\u0026mdash;on the\r\none hand, the interest in the extent (the interest of generality) in relation\r\nto genera; on the other, that of the content (the interest of individuality) in\r\nrelation to the variety of species. In the former case, the understanding\r\ncogitates more under its conceptions, in the latter it cogitates more in them.\r\nThis distinction manifests itself likewise in the habits of thought peculiar to\r\nnatural philosophers, some of whom\u0026mdash;the remarkably speculative\r\nheads\u0026mdash;may be said to be hostile to heterogeneity in phenomena, and have\r\ntheir eyes always fixed on the unity of genera, while others\u0026mdash;with a\r\nstrong empirical tendency\u0026mdash;aim unceasingly at the analysis of phenomena,\r\nand almost destroy in us the hope of ever being able to estimate the character\r\nof these according to general principles.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe latter mode of thought is evidently based upon a logical principle, the aim\r\nof which is the systematic completeness of all cognitions. This principle\r\nauthorizes me, beginning at the genus, to descend to the various and diverse\r\ncontained under it; and in this way extension, as in the former case unity, is\r\nassured to the system. For if we merely examine the sphere of the conception\r\nwhich indicates a genus, we cannot discover how far it is possible to proceed\r\nin the division of that sphere; just as it is impossible, from the\r\nconsideration of the space occupied by matter, to determine how far we can\r\nproceed in the division of it. Hence every genus must contain different\r\nspecies, and these again different subspecies; and as each of the latter must\r\nitself contain a sphere (must be of a certain extent, as a conceptus communis),\r\nreason demands that no species or sub-species is to be considered as the lowest\r\npossible. For a species or sub-species, being always a conception, which\r\ncontains only what is common to a number of different things, does not\r\ncompletely determine any individual thing, or relate immediately to it, and\r\nmust consequently contain other conceptions, that is, other sub-species under\r\nit. This law of specification may be thus expressed: entium varietates non\r\ntemere sunt minuendae.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut it is easy to see that this logical law would likewise be without sense or\r\napplication, were it not based upon a transcendental law of specification,\r\nwhich certainly does not require that the differences existing in phenomena should\r\nbe infinite in number, for the logical principle, which merely maintains the\r\nindeterminateness of the logical sphere of a conception, in relation to its\r\npossible division, does not authorize this statement; while it does impose upon\r\nthe understanding the duty of searching for subspecies to every species, and\r\nminor differences in every difference. For, were there no lower conceptions,\r\nneither could there be any higher. Now the understanding cognizes only by means\r\nof conceptions; consequently, how far soever it may proceed in division, never\r\nby mere intuition, but always by lower and lower conceptions. The cognition of\r\nphenomena in their complete determination (which is possible only by means of\r\nthe understanding) requires an unceasingly continued specification of\r\nconceptions, and a progression to ever smaller differences, of which\r\nabstraction had been made in the conception of the species, and still more in\r\nthat of the genus.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThis law of specification cannot be deduced from experience; it can never\r\npresent us with a principle of so universal an application. Empirical\r\nspecification very soon stops in its distinction of diversities, and requires\r\nthe guidance of the transcendental law, as a principle of the reason\u0026mdash;a\r\nlaw which imposes on us the necessity of never ceasing in our search for\r\ndifferences, even although these may not present themselves to the senses. That\r\nabsorbent earths are of different kinds could only be discovered by obeying the\r\nanticipatory law of reason, which imposes upon the understanding the task of\r\ndiscovering the differences existing between these earths, and supposes that\r\nnature is richer in substances than our senses would indicate. The faculty of\r\nthe understanding belongs to us just as much under the presupposition of\r\ndifferences in the objects of nature, as under the condition that these objects\r\nare homogeneous, because we could not possess conceptions, nor make any use of\r\nour understanding, were not the phenomena included under these conceptions in\r\nsome respects dissimilar, as well as similar, in their character.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nReason thus prepares the sphere of the understanding for the operations of this\r\nfaculty: 1. By the principle of the homogeneity of the diverse in higher\r\ngenera; 2. By the principle of the variety of the homogeneous in lower species;\r\nand, to complete the systematic unity, it adds, 3. A law of the affinity of all\r\nconceptions which prescribes a continuous transition from one species to every\r\nother by the gradual increase of diversity. We may term these the principles of\r\nthe homogeneity, the specification, and the continuity of forms. The latter\r\nresults from the union of the two former, inasmuch as we regard the systematic\r\nconnection as complete in thought, in the ascent to higher genera, as well as\r\nin the descent to lower species. For all diversities must be related to each\r\nother, as they all spring from one highest genus, descending through the\r\ndifferent gradations of a more and more extended determination.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWe may illustrate the systematic unity produced by the three logical principles\r\nin the following manner. Every conception may be regarded as a point, which, as\r\nthe standpoint of a spectator, has a certain horizon, which may be said to\r\nenclose a number of things that may be viewed, so to speak, from that centre.\r\nWithin this horizon there must be an infinite number of other points, each of\r\nwhich has its own horizon, smaller and more circumscribed; in other words,\r\nevery species contains sub-species, according to the principle of\r\nspecification, and the logical horizon consists of smaller horizons\r\n(subspecies), but not of points (individuals), which possess no extent. But\r\ndifferent horizons or genera, which include under them so many conceptions, may\r\nhave one common horizon, from which, as from a mid-point, they may be surveyed;\r\nand we may proceed thus, till we arrive at the highest genus, or universal and\r\ntrue horizon, which is determined by the highest conception, and which contains\r\nunder itself all differences and varieties, as genera, species, and subspecies.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nTo this highest standpoint I am conducted by the law of homogeneity, as to all\r\nlower and more variously-determined conceptions by the law of specification.\r\nNow as in this way there exists no void in the whole extent of all possible\r\nconceptions, and as out of the sphere of these the mind can discover nothing,\r\nthere arises from the presupposition of the universal horizon above mentioned,\r\nand its complete division, the principle: Non datur vacuum formarum. This\r\nprinciple asserts that there are not different primitive and highest genera,\r\nwhich stand isolated, so to speak, from each other, but all the various genera\r\nare mere divisions and limitations of one highest and universal genus; and\r\nhence follows immediately the principle: Datur continuum formarum. This\r\nprinciple indicates that all differences of species limit each other, and do\r\nnot admit of transition from one to another by a saltus, but only through\r\nsmaller degrees of the difference between the one species and the other. In one\r\nword, there are no species or sub-species which (in the view of reason) are the\r\nnearest possible to each other; intermediate species or sub-species being\r\nalways possible, the difference of which from each of the former is always\r\nsmaller than the difference existing between these.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe first law, therefore, directs us to avoid the notion that there exist\r\ndifferent primal genera, and enounces the fact of perfect homogeneity; the\r\nsecond imposes a check upon this tendency to unity and prescribes the\r\ndistinction of sub-species, before proceeding to apply our general conceptions\r\nto individuals. The third unites both the former, by enouncing the fact of\r\nhomogeneity as existing even in the most various diversity, by means of the\r\ngradual transition from one species to another. Thus it indicates a\r\nrelationship between the different branches or species, in so far as they all\r\nspring from the same stem.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut this logical law of the continuum specierum (formarum logicarum)\r\npresupposes a transcendental principle (lex continui in natura), without which\r\nthe understanding might be led into error, by following the guidance of the\r\nformer, and thus perhaps pursuing a path contrary to that prescribed by nature.\r\nThis law must, consequently, be based upon pure transcendental, and not upon\r\nempirical, considerations. For, in the latter case, it would come later than\r\nthe system; whereas it is really itself the parent of all that is systematic in\r\nour cognition of nature. These principles are not mere hypotheses employed for\r\nthe purpose of experimenting upon nature; although when any such connection is\r\ndiscovered, it forms a solid ground for regarding the hypothetical unity as\r\nvalid in the sphere of nature\u0026mdash;and thus they are in this respect not\r\nwithout their use. But we go farther, and maintain that it is manifest that\r\nthese principles of parsimony in fundamental causes, variety in effects, and\r\naffinity in phenomena, are in accordance both with reason and nature, and that\r\nthey are not mere methods or plans devised for the purpose of assisting us in\r\nour observation of the external world.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut it is plain that this continuity of forms is a mere idea, to which no\r\nadequate object can be discovered in experience. And this for two reasons.\r\nFirst, because the species in nature are really divided, and hence form quanta\r\ndiscreta; and, if the gradual progression through their affinity were\r\ncontinuous, the intermediate members lying between two given species must be\r\ninfinite in number, which is impossible. Secondly, because we cannot make any\r\ndeterminate empirical use of this law, inasmuch as it does not present us with\r\nany criterion of affinity which could aid us in determining how far we ought to\r\npursue the graduation of differences: it merely contains a general indication\r\nthat it is our duty to seek for and, if possible, to discover them.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWhen we arrange these principles of systematic unity in the order conformable\r\nto their employment in experience, they will stand thus: Variety, Affinity,\r\nUnity, each of them, as ideas, being taken in the highest degree of their\r\ncompleteness. Reason presupposes the existence of cognitions of the\r\nunderstanding, which have a direct relation to experience, and aims at the\r\nideal unity of these cognitions\u0026mdash;a unity which far transcends all\r\nexperience or empirical notions. The affinity of the diverse, notwithstanding\r\nthe differences existing between its parts, has a relation to things, but a\r\nstill closer one to the mere properties and powers of things. For example,\r\nimperfect experience may represent the orbits of the planets as circular. But\r\nwe discover variations from this course, and we proceed to suppose that the\r\nplanets revolve in a path which, if not a circle, is of a character very\r\nsimilar to it. That is to say, the movements of those planets which do not form\r\na circle will approximate more or less to the properties of a circle, and\r\nprobably form an ellipse. The paths of comets exhibit still greater variations,\r\nfor, so far as our observation extends, they do not return upon their own\r\ncourse in a circle or ellipse. But we proceed to the conjecture that comets\r\ndescribe a parabola, a figure which is closely allied to the ellipse. In fact,\r\na parabola is merely an ellipse, with its longer axis produced to an indefinite\r\nextent. Thus these principles conduct us to a unity in the genera of the forms\r\nof these orbits, and, proceeding farther, to a unity as regards the cause of\r\nthe motions of the heavenly bodies\u0026mdash;that is, gravitation. But we go on\r\nextending our conquests over nature, and endeavour to explain all seeming\r\ndeviations from these rules, and even make additions to our system which no\r\nexperience can ever substantiate\u0026mdash;for example, the theory, in affinity\r\nwith that of ellipses, of hyperbolic paths of comets, pursuing which, these\r\nbodies leave our solar system and, passing from sun to sun, unite the most\r\ndistant parts of the infinite universe, which is held together by the same\r\nmoving power.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe most remarkable circumstance connected with these principles is that they\r\nseem to be transcendental, and, although only containing ideas for the guidance\r\nof the empirical exercise of reason, and although this empirical employment\r\nstands to these ideas in an asymptotic relation alone (to use a mathematical\r\nterm), that is, continually approximate, without ever being able to attain to\r\nthem, they possess, notwithstanding, as à priori synthetical propositions,\r\nobjective though undetermined validity, and are available as rules for possible\r\nexperience. In the elaboration of our experience, they may also be employed\r\nwith great advantage, as heuristic\u003ca href=\"#linknote-70\" id=\"linknoteref-70\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[70]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e principles. A transcendental deduction\r\nof them cannot be made; such a deduction being always impossible in the case of\r\nideas, as has been already shown.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"linknote-70\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#linknoteref-70\"\u003e[70]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nFrom the Greek, eurhioko.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWe distinguished, in the Transcendental Analytic, the dynamical principles of\r\nthe understanding, which are regulative principles of intuition, from the\r\nmathematical, which are constitutive principles of intuition. These dynamical\r\nlaws are, however, constitutive in relation to experience, inasmuch as they\r\nrender the conceptions without which experience could not exist possible à\r\npriori. But the principles of pure reason cannot be constitutive even in regard\r\nto empirical conceptions, because no sensuous schema corresponding to them can\r\nbe discovered, and they cannot therefore have an object in concreto. Now, if I\r\ngrant that they cannot be employed in the sphere of experience, as constitutive\r\nprinciples, how shall I secure for them employment and objective validity as\r\nregulative principles, and in what way can they be so employed?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe understanding is the object of reason, as sensibility is the object of the\r\nunderstanding. The production of systematic unity in all the empirical\r\noperations of the understanding is the proper occupation of reason; just as it\r\nis the business of the understanding to connect the various content of\r\nphenomena by means of conceptions, and subject them to empirical laws. But the\r\noperations of the understanding are, without the schemata of sensibility,\r\nundetermined; and, in the same manner, the unity of reason is perfectly\r\nundetermined as regards the conditions under which, and the extent to which,\r\nthe understanding ought to carry the systematic connection of its conceptions.\r\nBut, although it is impossible to discover in intuition a schema for the\r\ncomplete systematic unity of all the conceptions of the understanding, there\r\nmust be some analogon of this schema. This analogon is the idea of the maximum\r\nof the division and the connection of our cognition in one principle. For we\r\nmay have a determinate notion of a maximum and an absolutely perfect, all the\r\nrestrictive conditions which are connected with an indeterminate and various\r\ncontent having been abstracted. Thus the idea of reason is analogous with a\r\nsensuous schema, with this difference, that the application of the categories\r\nto the schema of reason does not present a cognition of any object (as is the\r\ncase with the application of the categories to sensuous schemata), but merely\r\nprovides us with a rule or principle for the systematic unity of the exercise\r\nof the understanding. Now, as every principle which imposes upon the exercise\r\nof the understanding à priori compliance with the rule of systematic unity also\r\nrelates, although only in an indirect manner, to an object of experience, the\r\nprinciples of pure reason will also possess objective reality and validity in\r\nrelation to experience. But they will not aim at determining our knowledge in\r\nregard to any empirical object; they will merely indicate the procedure,\r\nfollowing which the empirical and determinate exercise of the understanding may\r\nbe in complete harmony and connection with itself\u0026mdash;a result which is\r\nproduced by its being brought into harmony with the principle of systematic\r\nunity, so far as that is possible, and deduced from it.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nI term all subjective principles, which are not derived from observation of the\r\nconstitution of an object, but from the interest which Reason has in producing\r\na certain completeness in her cognition of that object, maxims of reason. Thus\r\nthere are maxims of speculative reason, which are based solely upon its\r\nspeculative interest, although they appear to be objective principles.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWhen principles which are really regulative are regarded as constitutive, and\r\nemployed as objective principles, contradictions must arise; but if they are\r\nconsidered as mere maxims, there is no room for contradictions of any kind, as\r\nthey then merely indicate the different interests of reason, which occasion\r\ndifferences in the mode of thought. In effect, Reason has only one single\r\ninterest, and the seeming contradiction existing between her maxims merely\r\nindicates a difference in, and a reciprocal limitation of, the methods by which\r\nthis interest is satisfied.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThis reasoner has at heart the interest of diversity\u0026mdash;in accordance with\r\nthe principle of specification; another, the interest of unity\u0026mdash;in\r\naccordance with the principle of aggregation. Each believes that his judgement\r\nrests upon a thorough insight into the subject he is examining, and yet it has\r\nbeen influenced solely by a greater or less degree of adherence to some one of\r\nthe two principles, neither of which are objective, but originate solely from\r\nthe interest of reason, and on this account to be termed maxims rather than\r\nprinciples. When I observe intelligent men disputing about the distinctive\r\ncharacteristics of men, animals, or plants, and even of minerals, those on the\r\none side assuming the existence of certain national characteristics, certain\r\nwell-defined and hereditary distinctions of family, race, and so on, while the\r\nother side maintain that nature has endowed all races of men with the same\r\nfaculties and dispositions, and that all differences are but the result of\r\nexternal and accidental circumstances\u0026mdash;I have only to consider for a\r\nmoment the real nature of the subject of discussion, to arrive at the\r\nconclusion that it is a subject far too deep for us to judge of, and that there\r\nis little probability of either party being able to speak from a perfect\r\ninsight into and understanding of the nature of the subject itself. Both have,\r\nin reality, been struggling for the twofold interest of reason; the one\r\nmaintaining the one interest, the other the other. But this difference between\r\nthe maxims of diversity and unity may easily be reconciled and adjusted;\r\nalthough, so long as they are regarded as objective principles, they must\r\noccasion not only contradictions and polemic, but place hinderances in the way\r\nof the advancement of truth, until some means is discovered of reconciling\r\nthese conflicting interests, and bringing reason into union and harmony with\r\nitself.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe same is the case with the so-called law discovered by Leibnitz, and\r\nsupported with remarkable ability by Bonnet\u0026mdash;the law of the continuous\r\ngradation of created beings, which is nothing more than an inference from the\r\nprinciple of affinity; for observation and study of the order of nature could\r\nnever present it to the mind as an objective truth. The steps of this ladder,\r\nas they appear in experience, are too far apart from each other, and the\r\nso-called petty differences between different kinds of animals are in nature\r\ncommonly so wide separations that no confidence can be placed in such views\r\n(particularly when we reflect on the great variety of things, and the ease with\r\nwhich we can discover resemblances), and no faith in the laws which are said to\r\nexpress the aims and purposes of nature. On the other hand, the method of\r\ninvestigating the order of nature in the light of this principle, and the maxim\r\nwhich requires us to regard this order\u0026mdash;it being still undetermined how\r\nfar it extends\u0026mdash;as really existing in nature, is beyond doubt a legitimate\r\nand excellent principle of reason\u0026mdash;a principle which extends farther than\r\nany experience or observation of ours and which, without giving us any positive\r\nknowledge of anything in the region of experience, guides us to the goal of\r\nsystematic unity.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"center\"\u003e\r\n\u003ci\u003eOf the Ultimate End of the Natural Dialectic of Human Reason.\u003c/i\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe ideas of pure reason cannot be, of themselves and in their own nature,\r\ndialectical; it is from their misemployment alone that fallacies and illusions\r\narise. For they originate in the nature of reason itself, and it is impossible\r\nthat this supreme tribunal for all the rights and claims of speculation should\r\nbe itself undeserving of confidence and promotive of error. It is to be\r\nexpected, therefore, that these ideas have a genuine and legitimate aim. It is\r\ntrue, the mob of sophists raise against reason the cry of inconsistency and\r\ncontradiction, and affect to despise the government of that faculty, because\r\nthey cannot understand its constitution, while it is to its beneficial\r\ninfluences alone that they owe the position and the intelligence which enable\r\nthem to criticize and to blame its procedure.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWe cannot employ an à priori conception with certainty, until we have made a\r\ntranscendental deduction therefore. The ideas of pure reason do not admit of\r\nthe same kind of deduction as the categories. But if they are to possess the\r\nleast objective validity, and to represent anything but mere creations of\r\nthought (entia rationis ratiocinantis), a deduction of them must be possible.\r\nThis deduction will complete the critical task imposed upon pure reason; and it\r\nis to this part Of our labours that we now proceed.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThere is a great difference between a thing\u0026rsquo;s being presented to the mind\r\nas an object in an absolute sense, or merely as an ideal object. In the former\r\ncase I employ my conceptions to determine the object; in the latter case\r\nnothing is present to the mind but a mere schema, which does not relate\r\ndirectly to an object, not even in a hypothetical sense, but which is useful\r\nonly for the purpose of representing other objects to the mind, in a mediate\r\nand indirect manner, by means of their relation to the idea in the intellect.\r\nThus I say the conception of a supreme intelligence is a mere idea; that is to\r\nsay, its objective reality does not consist in the fact that it has an\r\nimmediate relation to an object (for in this sense we have no means of\r\nestablishing its objective validity), it is merely a schema constructed\r\naccording to the necessary conditions of the unity of reason\u0026mdash;the schema\r\nof a thing in general, which is useful towards the production of the highest\r\ndegree of systematic unity in the empirical exercise of reason, in which we\r\ndeduce this or that object of experience from the imaginary object of this\r\nidea, as the ground or cause of the said object of experience. In this way, the\r\nidea is properly a heuristic, and not an ostensive, conception; it does not\r\ngive us any information respecting the constitution of an object, it merely\r\nindicates how, under the guidance of the idea, we ought to investigate the\r\nconstitution and the relations of objects in the world of experience. Now, if\r\nit can be shown that the three kinds of transcendental ideas (psychological,\r\ncosmological, and theological), although not relating directly to any object\r\nnor determining it, do nevertheless, on the supposition of the existence of an\r\nideal object, produce systematic unity in the laws of the empirical employment\r\nof the reason, and extend our empirical cognition, without ever being\r\ninconsistent or in opposition with it\u0026mdash;it must be a necessary maxim of\r\nreason to regulate its procedure according to these ideas. And this forms the\r\ntranscendental deduction of all speculative ideas, not as constitutive\r\nprinciples of the extension of our cognition beyond the limits of our\r\nexperience, but as regulative principles of the systematic unity of empirical\r\ncognition, which is by the aid of these ideas arranged and emended within its\r\nown proper limits, to an extent unattainable by the operation of the principles\r\nof the understanding alone.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nI shall make this plainer. Guided by the principles involved in these ideas, we\r\nmust, in the first place, so connect all the phenomena, actions, and feelings\r\nof the mind, as if it were a simple substance, which, endowed with personal\r\nidentity, possesses a permanent existence (in this life at least), while its\r\nstates, among which those of the body are to be included as external\r\nconditions, are in continual change. Secondly, in cosmology, we must\r\ninvestigate the conditions of all natural phenomena, internal as well as\r\nexternal, as if they belonged to a chain infinite and without any prime or\r\nsupreme member, while we do not, on this account, deny the existence of\r\nintelligible grounds of these phenomena, although we never employ them to\r\nexplain phenomena, for the simple reason that they are not objects of our\r\ncognition. Thirdly, in the sphere of theology, we must regard the whole system\r\nof possible experience as forming an absolute, but dependent and\r\nsensuously-conditioned unity, and at the same time as based upon a sole,\r\nsupreme, and all-sufficient ground existing apart from the world itself\u0026mdash;a\r\nground which is a self-subsistent, primeval and creative reason, in relation to\r\nwhich we so employ our reason in the field of experience, as if all objects\r\ndrew their origin from that archetype of all reason. In other words, we ought\r\nnot to deduce the internal phenomena of the mind from a simple thinking\r\nsubstance, but deduce them from each other under the guidance of the regulative\r\nidea of a simple being; we ought not to deduce the phenomena, order, and unity\r\nof the universe from a supreme intelligence, but merely draw from this idea of\r\na supremely wise cause the rules which must guide reason in its connection of\r\ncauses and effects.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nNow there is nothing to hinder us from admitting these ideas to possess an\r\nobjective and hyperbolic existence, except the cosmological ideas, which lead\r\nreason into an antinomy: the psychological and theological ideas are not\r\nantinomial. They contain no contradiction; and how, then, can any one dispute\r\ntheir objective reality, since he who denies it knows as little about their\r\npossibility as we who affirm? And yet, when we wish to admit the existence of a\r\nthing, it is not sufficient to convince ourselves that there is no positive\r\nobstacle in the way; for it cannot be allowable to regard mere creations of\r\nthought, which transcend, though they do not contradict, all our conceptions,\r\nas real and determinate objects, solely upon the authority of a speculative\r\nreason striving to compass its own aims. They cannot, therefore, be admitted to\r\nbe real in themselves; they can only possess a comparative reality\u0026mdash;that\r\nof a schema of the regulative principle of the systematic unity of all\r\ncognition. They are to be regarded not as actual things, but as in some measure\r\nanalogous to them. We abstract from the object of the idea all the conditions\r\nwhich limit the exercise of our understanding, but which, on the other hand,\r\nare the sole conditions of our possessing a determinate conception of any given\r\nthing. And thus we cogitate a something, of the real nature of which we have\r\nnot the least conception, but which we represent to ourselves as standing in a\r\nrelation to the whole system of phenomena, analogous to that in which phenomena\r\nstand to each other.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBy admitting these ideal beings, we do not really extend our cognitions beyond\r\nthe objects of possible experience; we extend merely the empirical unity of our\r\nexperience, by the aid of systematic unity, the schema of which is furnished by\r\nthe idea, which is therefore valid\u0026mdash;not as a constitutive, but as a\r\nregulative principle. For although we posit a thing corresponding to the\r\nidea\u0026mdash;a something, an actual existence\u0026mdash;we do not on that account aim\r\nat the extension of our cognition by means of transcendent conceptions. This\r\nexistence is purely ideal, and not objective; it is the mere expression of the\r\nsystematic unity which is to be the guide of reason in the field of experience.\r\nThere are no attempts made at deciding what the ground of this unity may be, or\r\nwhat the real nature of this imaginary being.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThus the transcendental and only determinate conception of God, which is\r\npresented to us by speculative reason, is in the strictest sense deistic. In\r\nother words, reason does not assure us of the objective validity of the\r\nconception; it merely gives us the idea of something, on which the supreme and\r\nnecessary unity of all experience is based. This something we cannot, following\r\nthe analogy of a real substance, cogitate otherwise than as the cause of all\r\nthings operating in accordance with rational laws, if we regard it as an\r\nindividual object; although we should rest contented with the idea alone as a\r\nregulative principle of reason, and make no attempt at completing the sum of\r\nthe conditions imposed by thought. This attempt is, indeed, inconsistent with\r\nthe grand aim of complete systematic unity in the sphere of cognition\u0026mdash;a\r\nunity to which no bounds are set by reason.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHence it happens that, admitting a divine being, I can have no conception of\r\nthe internal possibility of its perfection, or of the necessity of its\r\nexistence. The only advantage of this admission is that it enables me to answer\r\nall other questions relating to the contingent, and to give reason the most\r\ncomplete satisfaction as regards the unity which it aims at attaining in the\r\nworld of experience. But I cannot satisfy reason with regard to this hypothesis\r\nitself; and this proves that it is not its intelligence and insight into the\r\nsubject, but its speculative interest alone which induces it to proceed from a\r\npoint lying far beyond the sphere of our cognition, for the purpose of being\r\nable to consider all objects as parts of a systematic whole.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHere a distinction presents itself, in regard to the way in which we may\r\ncogitate a presupposition\u0026mdash;a distinction which is somewhat subtle, but of\r\ngreat importance in transcendental philosophy. I may have sufficient grounds to\r\nadmit something, or the existence of something, in a relative point of view\r\n(suppositio relativa), without being justified in admitting it in an absolute\r\nsense (suppositio absoluta). This distinction is undoubtedly requisite, in the\r\ncase of a regulative principle, the necessity of which we recognize, though we\r\nare ignorant of the source and cause of that necessity, and which we assume to\r\nbe based upon some ultimate ground, for the purpose of being able to cogitate\r\nthe universality of the principle in a more determinate way. For example, I\r\ncogitate the existence of a being corresponding to a pure transcendental idea.\r\nBut I cannot admit that this being exists absolutely and in itself, because all\r\nof the conceptions by which I can cogitate an object in a determinate manner\r\nfall short of assuring me of its existence; nay, the conditions of the\r\nobjective validity of my conceptions are excluded by the idea\u0026mdash;by the very\r\nfact of its being an idea. The conceptions of reality, substance, causality,\r\nnay, even that of necessity in existence, have no significance out of the\r\nsphere of empirical cognition, and cannot, beyond that sphere, determine any\r\nobject. They may, accordingly, be employed to explain the possibility of things\r\nin the world of sense, but they are utterly inadequate to explain the\r\npossibility of the universe itself considered as a whole; because in this case\r\nthe ground of explanation must lie out of and beyond the world, and cannot,\r\ntherefore, be an object of possible experience. Now, I may admit the existence\r\nof an incomprehensible being of this nature\u0026mdash;the object of a mere idea,\r\nrelatively to the world of sense; although I have no ground to admit its\r\nexistence absolutely and in itself. For if an idea (that of a systematic and\r\ncomplete unity, of which I shall presently speak more particularly) lies at the\r\nfoundation of the most extended empirical employment of reason, and if this\r\nidea cannot be adequately represented in concreto, although it is indispensably\r\nnecessary for the approximation of empirical unity to the highest possible\r\ndegree\u0026mdash;I am not only authorized, but compelled, to realize this idea,\r\nthat is, to posit a real object corresponding thereto. But I cannot profess to\r\nknow this object; it is to me merely a something, to which, as the ground of\r\nsystematic unity in cognition, I attribute such properties as are analogous to\r\nthe conceptions employed by the understanding in the sphere of experience.\r\nFollowing the analogy of the notions of reality, substance, causality, and\r\nnecessity, I cogitate a being, which possesses all these attributes in the\r\nhighest degree; and, as this idea is the offspring of my reason alone, I\r\ncogitate this being as self-subsistent reason, and as the cause of the universe\r\noperating by means of ideas of the greatest possible harmony and unity. Thus I\r\nabstract all conditions that would limit my idea, solely for the purpose of\r\nrendering systematic unity possible in the world of empirical diversity, and\r\nthus securing the widest possible extension for the exercise of reason in that\r\nsphere. This I am enabled to do, by regarding all connections and relations in\r\nthe world of sense, as if they were the dispositions of a supreme reason, of\r\nwhich our reason is but a faint image. I then proceed to cogitate this Supreme\r\nBeing by conceptions which have, properly, no meaning or application, except in\r\nthe world of sense. But as I am authorized to employ the transcendental\r\nhypothesis of such a being in a relative respect alone, that is, as the\r\nsubstratum of the greatest possible unity in experience\u0026mdash;I may attribute\r\nto a being which I regard as distinct from the world, such properties as belong\r\nsolely to the sphere of sense and experience. For I do not desire, and am not\r\njustified in desiring, to cognize this object of my idea, as it exists in\r\nitself; for I possess no conceptions sufficient for this task, those of\r\nreality, substance, causality, nay, even that of necessity in existence, losing\r\nall significance, and becoming merely the signs of conceptions, without content\r\nand without applicability, when I attempt to carry them beyond the limits of\r\nthe world of sense. I cogitate merely the relation of a perfectly unknown being\r\nto the greatest possible systematic unity of experience, solely for the purpose\r\nof employing it as the schema of the regulative principle which directs reason\r\nin its empirical exercise.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIt is evident, at the first view, that we cannot presuppose the reality of this\r\ntranscendental object, by means of the conceptions of reality, substance,\r\ncausality, and so on, because these conceptions cannot be applied to anything\r\nthat is distinct from the world of sense. Thus the supposition of a Supreme\r\nBeing or cause is purely relative; it is cogitated only in behalf of the\r\nsystematic unity of experience; such a being is but a something, of whose\r\nexistence in itself we have not the least conception. Thus, too, it becomes\r\nsufficiently manifest why we required the idea of a necessary being in relation\r\nto objects given by sense, although we can never have the least conception of\r\nthis being, or of its absolute necessity.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAnd now we can clearly perceive the result of our transcendental dialectic, and\r\nthe proper aim of the ideas of pure reason\u0026mdash;which become dialectical\r\nsolely from misunderstanding and inconsiderateness. Pure reason is, in fact,\r\noccupied with itself, and not with any object. Objects are not presented to it\r\nto be embraced in the unity of an empirical conception; it is only the\r\ncognitions of the understanding that are presented to it, for the purpose of\r\nreceiving the unity of a rational conception, that is, of being connected\r\naccording to a principle. The unity of reason is the unity of system; and this\r\nsystematic unity is not an objective principle, extending its dominion over\r\nobjects, but a subjective maxim, extending its authority over the empirical\r\ncognition of objects. The systematic connection which reason gives to the\r\nempirical employment of the understanding not only advances the extension of\r\nthat employment, but ensures its correctness, and thus the principle of a\r\nsystematic unity of this nature is also objective, although only in an\r\nindefinite respect (principium vagum). It is not, however, a constitutive\r\nprinciple, determining an object to which it directly relates; it is merely a\r\nregulative principle or maxim, advancing and strengthening the empirical\r\nexercise of reason, by the opening up of new paths of which the understanding\r\nis ignorant, while it never conflicts with the laws of its exercise in the\r\nsphere of experience.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut reason cannot cogitate this systematic unity, without at the same time\r\ncogitating an object of the idea\u0026mdash;an object that cannot be presented in\r\nany experience, which contains no concrete example of a complete systematic\r\nunity. This being (ens rationis ratiocinatae) is therefore a mere idea and is\r\nnot assumed to be a thing which is real absolutely and in itself. On the\r\ncontrary, it forms merely the problematical foundation of the connection which\r\nthe mind introduces among the phenomena of the sensuous world. We look upon\r\nthis connection, in the light of the above-mentioned idea, as if it drew its\r\norigin from the supposed being which corresponds to the idea. And yet all we\r\naim at is the possession of this idea as a secure foundation for the systematic\r\nunity of experience\u0026mdash;a unity indispensable to reason, advantageous to the\r\nunderstanding, and promotive of the interests of empirical cognition.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWe mistake the true meaning of this idea when we regard it as an enouncement,\r\nor even as a hypothetical declaration of the existence of a real thing, which\r\nwe are to regard as the origin or ground of a systematic constitution of the\r\nuniverse. On the contrary, it is left completely undetermined what the nature\r\nor properties of this so-called ground may be. The idea is merely to be adopted\r\nas a point of view, from which this unity, so essential to reason and so\r\nbeneficial to the understanding, may be regarded as radiating. In one word,\r\nthis transcendental thing is merely the schema of a regulative principle, by\r\nmeans of which Reason, so far as in her lies, extends the dominion of\r\nsystematic unity over the whole sphere of experience.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe first object of an idea of this kind is the ego, considered merely as a\r\nthinking nature or soul. If I wish to investigate the properties of a thinking\r\nbeing, I must interrogate experience. But I find that I can apply none of the\r\ncategories to this object, the schema of these categories, which is the\r\ncondition of their application, being given only in sensuous intuition. But I\r\ncannot thus attain to the cognition of a systematic unity of all the phenomena\r\nof the internal sense. Instead, therefore, of an empirical conception of what\r\nthe soul really is, reason takes the conception of the empirical unity of all\r\nthought, and, by cogitating this unity as unconditioned and primitive,\r\nconstructs the rational conception or idea of a simple substance which is in\r\nitself unchangeable, possessing personal identity, and in connection with other\r\nreal things external to it; in one word, it constructs the idea of a simple\r\nself-subsistent intelligence. But the real aim of reason in this procedure is\r\nthe attainment of principles of systematic unity for the explanation of the\r\nphenomena of the soul. That is, reason desires to be able to represent all the\r\ndeterminations of the internal sense as existing in one subject, all powers as\r\ndeduced from one fundamental power, all changes as mere varieties in the\r\ncondition of a being which is permanent and always the same, and all phenomena\r\nin space as entirely different in their nature from the procedure of thought.\r\nEssential simplicity (with the other attributes predicated of the ego) is\r\nregarded as the mere schema of this regulative principle; it is not assumed\r\nthat it is the actual ground of the properties of the soul. For these\r\nproperties may rest upon quite different grounds, of which we are completely\r\nignorant; just as the above predicates could not give us any knowledge of the\r\nsoul as it is in itself, even if we regarded them as valid in respect of it,\r\ninasmuch as they constitute a mere idea, which cannot be represented in\r\nconcreto. Nothing but good can result from a psychological idea of this kind,\r\nif we only take proper care not to consider it as more than an idea; that is,\r\nif we regard it as valid merely in relation to the employment of reason, in the\r\nsphere of the phenomena of the soul. Under the guidance of this idea, or\r\nprinciple, no empirical laws of corporeal phenomena are called in to explain\r\nthat which is a phenomenon of the internal sense alone; no windy hypotheses of\r\nthe generation, annihilation, and palingenesis of souls are admitted. Thus the\r\nconsideration of this object of the internal sense is kept pure, and unmixed\r\nwith heterogeneous elements; while the investigation of reason aims at reducing\r\nall the grounds of explanation employed in this sphere of knowledge to a single\r\nprinciple. All this is best effected, nay, cannot be effected otherwise than by\r\nmeans of such a schema, which requires us to regard this ideal thing as an\r\nactual existence. The psychological idea is, therefore, meaningless and\r\ninapplicable, except as the schema of a regulative conception. For, if I ask\r\nwhether the soul is not really of a spiritual nature\u0026mdash;it is a question\r\nwhich has no meaning. From such a conception has been abstracted, not merely\r\nall corporeal nature, but all nature, that is, all the predicates of a possible\r\nexperience; and consequently, all the conditions which enable us to cogitate an\r\nobject to this conception have disappeared. But, if these conditions are\r\nabsent, it is evident that the conception is meaningless.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe second regulative idea of speculative reason is the conception of the\r\nuniverse. For nature is properly the only object presented to us, in regard to\r\nwhich reason requires regulative principles. Nature is twofold\u0026mdash;thinking\r\nand corporeal nature. To cogitate the latter in regard to its internal\r\npossibility, that is, to determine the application of the categories to it, no\r\nidea is required\u0026mdash;no representation which transcends experience. In this\r\nsphere, therefore, an idea is impossible, sensuous intuition being our only\r\nguide; while, in the sphere of psychology, we require the fundamental idea (I),\r\nwhich contains à priori a certain form of thought namely, the unity of the ego.\r\nPure reason has, therefore, nothing left but nature in general, and the\r\ncompleteness of conditions in nature in accordance with some principle. The\r\nabsolute totality of the series of these conditions is an idea, which can never\r\nbe fully realized in the empirical exercise of reason, while it is serviceable\r\nas a rule for the procedure of reason in relation to that totality. It requires\r\nus, in the explanation of given phenomena (in the regress or ascent in the\r\nseries), to proceed as if the series were infinite in itself, that is, were\r\nprolonged in indefinitum; while on the other hand, where reason is regarded as\r\nitself the determining cause (in the region of freedom), we are required to\r\nproceed as if we had not before us an object of sense, but of the pure\r\nunderstanding. In this latter case, the conditions do not exist in the series\r\nof phenomena, but may be placed quite out of and beyond it, and the series of\r\nconditions may be regarded as if it had an absolute beginning from an\r\nintelligible cause. All this proves that the cosmological ideas are nothing but\r\nregulative principles, and not constitutive; and that their aim is not to\r\nrealize an actual totality in such series. The full discussion of this subject\r\nwill be found in its proper place in the chapter on the antinomy of pure\r\nreason.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe third idea of pure reason, containing the hypothesis of a being which is\r\nvalid merely as a relative hypothesis, is that of the one and all-sufficient\r\ncause of all cosmological series, in other words, the idea of God. We have not\r\nthe slightest ground absolutely to admit the existence of an object\r\ncorresponding to this idea; for what can empower or authorize us to affirm the\r\nexistence of a being of the highest perfection\u0026mdash;a being whose existence is\r\nabsolutely necessary\u0026mdash;merely because we possess the conception of such a\r\nbeing? The answer is: It is the existence of the world which renders this\r\nhypothesis necessary. But this answer makes it perfectly evident that the idea\r\nof this being, like all other speculative ideas, is essentially nothing more\r\nthan a demand upon reason that it shall regulate the connection which it and\r\nits subordinate faculties introduce into the phenomena of the world by\r\nprinciples of systematic unity and, consequently, that it shall regard all\r\nphenomena as originating from one all-embracing being, as the supreme and\r\nall-sufficient cause. From this it is plain that the only aim of reason in this\r\nprocedure is the establishment of its own formal rule for the extension of its\r\ndominion in the world of experience; that it does not aim at an extension of\r\nits cognition beyond the limits of experience; and that, consequently, this\r\nidea does not contain any constitutive principle.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe highest formal unity, which is based upon ideas alone, is the unity of all\r\nthings\u0026mdash;a unity in accordance with an aim or purpose; and the speculative\r\ninterest of reason renders it necessary to regard all order in the world as if\r\nit originated from the intention and design of a supreme reason. This principle\r\nunfolds to the view of reason in the sphere of experience new and enlarged\r\nprospects, and invites it to connect the phenomena of the world according to\r\nteleological laws, and in this way to attain to the highest possible degree of\r\nsystematic unity. The hypothesis of a supreme intelligence, as the sole cause\r\nof the universe\u0026mdash;an intelligence which has for us no more than an ideal\r\nexistence\u0026mdash;is accordingly always of the greatest service to reason. Thus,\r\nif we presuppose, in relation to the figure of the earth (which is round, but\r\nsomewhat flattened at the poles),\u003ca href=\"#linknote-71\" id=\"linknoteref-71\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[71]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e or that of mountains or seas, wise\r\ndesigns on the part of an author of the universe, we cannot fail to make, by\r\nthe light of this supposition, a great number of interesting discoveries. If we\r\nkeep to this hypothesis, as a principle which is purely regulative, even error\r\ncannot be very detrimental. For, in this case, error can have no more serious\r\nconsequences than that, where we expected to discover a teleological connection\r\n(nexus finalis), only a mechanical or physical connection appears. In such a\r\ncase, we merely fail to find the additional form of unity we expected, but we\r\ndo not lose the rational unity which the mind requires in its procedure in\r\nexperience. But even a miscarriage of this sort cannot affect the law in its\r\ngeneral and teleological relations. For although we may convict an anatomist of\r\nan error, when he connects the limb of some animal with a certain purpose, it\r\nis quite impossible to prove in a single case that any arrangement of nature,\r\nbe it what it may, is entirely without aim or design. And thus medical\r\nphysiology, by the aid of a principle presented to it by pure reason, extends\r\nits very limited empirical knowledge of the purposes of the different parts of\r\nan organized body so far that it may be asserted with the utmost confidence,\r\nand with the approbation of all reflecting men, that every organ or bodily part\r\nof an animal has its use and answers a certain design. Now, this is a\r\nsupposition which, if regarded as of a constitutive character, goes much\r\nfarther than any experience or observation of ours can justify. Hence it is\r\nevident that it is nothing more than a regulative principle of reason, which\r\naims at the highest degree of systematic unity, by the aid of the idea of a\r\ncausality according to design in a supreme cause\u0026mdash;a cause which it regards\r\nas the highest intelligence.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"linknote-71\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#linknoteref-71\"\u003e[71]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nThe advantages which a circular form, in the case of the earth, has over every\r\nother, are well known. But few are aware that the slight flattening at the\r\npoles, which gives it the figure of a spheroid, is the only cause which\r\nprevents the elevations of continents or even of mountains, perhaps thrown up\r\nby some internal convulsion, from continually altering the position of the axis\r\nof the earth\u0026mdash;and that to some considerable degree in a short time. The\r\ngreat protuberance of the earth under the Equator serves to overbalance the\r\nimpetus of all other masses of earth, and thus to preserve the axis of the\r\nearth, so far as we can observe, in its present position. And yet this wise\r\narrangement has been unthinkingly explained from the equilibrium of the\r\nformerly fluid mass.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIf, however, we neglect this restriction of the idea to a purely regulative\r\ninfluence, reason is betrayed into numerous errors. For it has then left the\r\nground of experience, in which alone are to be found the criteria of truth, and\r\nhas ventured into the region of the incomprehensible and unsearchable, on the\r\nheights of which it loses its power and collectedness, because it has\r\ncompletely severed its connection with experience.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe first error which arises from our employing the idea of a Supreme Being as\r\na constitutive (in repugnance to the very nature of an idea), and not as a\r\nregulative principle, is the error of inactive reason (ignava ratio).\u003ca\r\nhref=\"#linknote-72\" id=\"linknoteref-72\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[72]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e We may so term every principle which\r\nrequires us to regard our investigations of nature as absolutely complete, and\r\nallows reason to cease its inquiries, as if it had fully executed its task.\r\nThus the psychological idea of the ego, when employed as a constitutive\r\nprinciple for the explanation of the phenomena of the soul, and for the\r\nextension of our knowledge regarding this subject beyond the limits of\r\nexperience\u0026mdash;even to the condition of the soul after death\u0026mdash;is\r\nconvenient enough for the purposes of pure reason, but detrimental and even\r\nruinous to its interests in the sphere of nature and experience. The\r\ndogmatizing spiritualist explains the unchanging unity of our personality\r\nthrough all changes of condition from the unity of a thinking substance, the\r\ninterest which we take in things and events that can happen only after our\r\ndeath, from a consciousness of the immaterial nature of our thinking subject,\r\nand so on. Thus he dispenses with all empirical investigations into the cause\r\nof these internal phenomena, and with all possible explanations of them upon\r\npurely natural grounds; while, at the dictation of a transcendent reason, he\r\npasses by the immanent sources of cognition in experience, greatly to his own\r\nease and convenience, but to the sacrifice of all, genuine insight and\r\nintelligence. These prejudicial consequences become still more evident, in the\r\ncase of the dogmatical treatment of our idea of a Supreme Intelligence, and the\r\ntheological system of nature (physico-theology) which is falsely based upon it.\r\nFor, in this case, the aims which we observe in nature, and often those which\r\nwe merely fancy to exist, make the investigation of causes a very easy task, by\r\ndirecting us to refer such and such phenomena immediately to the unsearchable\r\nwill and counsel of the Supreme Wisdom, while we ought to investigate their\r\ncauses in the general laws of the mechanism of matter. We are thus recommended\r\nto consider the labour of reason as ended, when we have merely dispensed with\r\nits employment, which is guided surely and safely only by the order of nature\r\nand the series of changes in the world\u0026mdash;which are arranged according to\r\nimmanent and general laws. This error may be avoided, if we do not merely\r\nconsider from the view-point of final aims certain parts of nature, such as the\r\ndivision and structure of a continent, the constitution and direction of\r\ncertain mountain-chains, or even the organization existing in the vegetable and\r\nanimal kingdoms, but look upon this systematic unity of nature in a perfectly\r\ngeneral way, in relation to the idea of a Supreme Intelligence. If we pursue\r\nthis advice, we lay as a foundation for all investigation the conformity to\r\naims of all phenomena of nature in accordance with universal laws, for which no\r\nparticular arrangement of nature is exempt, but only cognized by us with more\r\nor less difficulty; and we possess a regulative principle of the systematic\r\nunity of a teleological connection, which we do not attempt to anticipate or\r\npredetermine. All that we do, and ought to do, is to follow out the\r\nphysico-mechanical connection in nature according to general laws, with the\r\nhope of discovering, sooner or later, the teleological connection also. Thus,\r\nand thus only, can the principle of final unity aid in the extension of the\r\nemployment of reason in the sphere of experience, without being in any case\r\ndetrimental to its interests.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"linknote-72\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#linknoteref-72\"\u003e[72]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nThis was the term applied by the old dialecticians to a sophistical argument,\r\nwhich ran thus: If it is your fate to die of this disease, you will die,\r\nwhether you employ a physician or not. Cicero says that this mode of reasoning\r\nhas received this appellation, because, if followed, it puts an end to the\r\nemployment of reason in the affairs of life. For a similar reason, I have\r\napplied this designation to the sophistical argument of pure reason.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe second error which arises from the misconception of the principle of\r\nsystematic unity is that of perverted reason (perversa ratio, usteron roteron\r\nrationis). The idea of systematic unity is available as a regulative principle\r\nin the connection of phenomena according to general natural laws; and, how far\r\nsoever we have to travel upon the path of experience to discover some fact or\r\nevent, this idea requires us to believe that we have approached all the more\r\nnearly to the completion of its use in the sphere of nature, although that\r\ncompletion can never be attained. But this error reverses the procedure of\r\nreason. We begin by hypostatizing the principle of systematic unity, and by\r\ngiving an anthropomorphic determination to the conception of a Supreme\r\nIntelligence, and then proceed forcibly to impose aims upon nature. Thus not\r\nonly does teleology, which ought to aid in the completion of unity in\r\naccordance with general laws, operate to the destruction of its influence, but\r\nit hinders reason from attaining its proper aim, that is, the proof, upon\r\nnatural grounds, of the existence of a supreme intelligent cause. For, if we\r\ncannot presuppose supreme finality in nature à priori, that is, as essentially\r\nbelonging to nature, how can we be directed to endeavour to discover this unity\r\nand, rising gradually through its different degrees, to approach the supreme\r\nperfection of an author of all\u0026mdash;a perfection which is absolutely\r\nnecessary, and therefore cognizable à priori? The regulative principle directs\r\nus to presuppose systematic unity absolutely and, consequently, as following\r\nfrom the essential nature of things\u0026mdash;but only as a unity of nature, not\r\nmerely cognized empirically, but presupposed à priori, although only in an\r\nindeterminate manner. But if I insist on basing nature upon the foundation of a\r\nsupreme ordaining Being, the unity of nature is in effect lost. For, in this\r\ncase, it is quite foreign and unessential to the nature of things, and cannot\r\nbe cognized from the general laws of nature. And thus arises a vicious circular\r\nargument, what ought to have been proved having been presupposed.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nTo take the regulative principle of systematic unity in nature for a\r\nconstitutive principle, and to hypostatize and make a cause out of that which\r\nis properly the ideal ground of the consistent and harmonious exercise of\r\nreason, involves reason in inextricable embarrassments. The investigation of\r\nnature pursues its own path under the guidance of the chain of natural causes,\r\nin accordance with the general laws of nature, and ever follows the light of\r\nthe idea of an author of the universe\u0026mdash;not for the purpose of deducing the\r\nfinality, which it constantly pursues, from this Supreme Being, but to attain\r\nto the cognition of his existence from the finality which it seeks in the\r\nexistence of the phenomena of nature, and, if possible, in that of all things\r\nto cognize this being, consequently, as absolutely necessary. Whether this\r\nlatter purpose succeed or not, the idea is and must always be a true one, and\r\nits employment, when merely regulative, must always be accompanied by truthful\r\nand beneficial results.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nComplete unity, in conformity with aims, constitutes absolute perfection. But\r\nif we do not find this unity in the nature of the things which go to constitute\r\nthe world of experience, that is, of objective cognition, consequently in the\r\nuniversal and necessary laws of nature, how can we infer from this unity the\r\nidea of the supreme and absolutely necessary perfection of a primal being,\r\nwhich is the origin of all causality? The greatest systematic unity, and\r\nconsequently teleological unity, constitutes the very foundation of the\r\npossibility of the most extended employment of human reason. The idea of unity\r\nis therefore essentially and indissolubly connected with the nature of our\r\nreason. This idea is a legislative one; and hence it is very natural that we\r\nshould assume the existence of a legislative reason corresponding to it, from\r\nwhich the systematic unity of nature\u0026mdash;the object of the operations of\r\nreason\u0026mdash;must be derived.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIn the course of our discussion of the antinomies, we stated that it is always\r\npossible to answer all the questions which pure reason may raise; and that the\r\nplea of the limited nature of our cognition, which is unavoidable and proper in\r\nmany questions regarding natural phenomena, cannot in this case be admitted,\r\nbecause the questions raised do not relate to the nature of things, but are\r\nnecessarily originated by the nature of reason itself, and relate to its own\r\ninternal constitution. We can now establish this assertion, which at first\r\nsight appeared so rash, in relation to the two questions in which reason takes\r\nthe greatest interest, and thus complete our discussion of the dialectic of\r\npure reason.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIf, then, the question is asked, in relation to transcendental theology,\u003ca\r\nhref=\"#linknote-73\" id=\"linknoteref-73\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[73]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e first, whether there is anything\r\ndistinct from the world, which contains the ground of cosmical order and\r\nconnection according to general laws? The answer is: Certainly. For the world\r\nis a sum of phenomena; there must, therefore, be some transcendental basis of\r\nthese phenomena, that is, a basis cogitable by the pure understanding alone.\r\nIf, secondly, the question is asked whether this being is substance, whether it\r\nis of the greatest reality, whether it is necessary, and so forth? I answer\r\nthat this question is utterly without meaning. For all the categories which aid\r\nme in forming a conception of an object cannot be employed except in the world\r\nof sense, and are without meaning when not applied to objects of actual or\r\npossible experience. Out of this sphere, they are not properly conceptions, but\r\nthe mere marks or indices of conceptions, which we may admit, although they\r\ncannot, without the help of experience, help us to understand any subject or\r\nthing. If, thirdly, the question is whether we may not cogitate this being,\r\nwhich is distinct from the world, in analogy with the objects of experience?\r\nThe answer is: Undoubtedly, but only as an ideal, and not as a real object.\r\nThat is, we must cogitate it only as an unknown substratum of the systematic\r\nunity, order, and finality of the world\u0026mdash;a unity which reason must employ\r\nas the regulative principle of its investigation of nature. Nay, more, we may\r\nadmit into the idea certain anthropomorphic elements, which are promotive of\r\nthe interests of this regulative principle. For it is no more than an idea,\r\nwhich does not relate directly to a being distinct from the world, but to the\r\nregulative principle of the systematic unity of the world, by means, however,\r\nof a schema of this unity\u0026mdash;the schema of a Supreme Intelligence, who is\r\nthe wisely-designing author of the universe. What this basis of cosmical unity\r\nmay be in itself, we know not\u0026mdash;we cannot discover from the idea; we merely\r\nknow how we ought to employ the idea of this unity, in relation to the\r\nsystematic operation of reason in the sphere of experience.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"linknote-73\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#linknoteref-73\"\u003e[73]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nAfter what has been said of the psychological idea of the ego and its proper\r\nemployment as a regulative principle of the operations of reason, I need not\r\nenter into details regarding the transcendental illusion by which the\r\nsystematic unity of all the various phenomena of the internal sense is\r\nhypostatized. The procedure is in this case very similar to that which has been\r\ndiscussed in our remarks on the theological ideal.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut, it will be asked again, can we on these grounds, admit the existence of a\r\nwise and omnipotent author of the world? Without doubt; and not only so, but we\r\nmust assume the existence of such a being. But do we thus extend the limits of\r\nour knowledge beyond the field of possible experience? By no means. For we have\r\nmerely presupposed a something, of which we have no conception, which we do not\r\nknow as it is in itself; but, in relation to the systematic disposition of the\r\nuniverse, which we must presuppose in all our observation of nature, we have\r\ncogitated this unknown being in analogy with an intelligent existence (an\r\nempirical conception), that is to say, we have endowed it with those\r\nattributes, which, judging from the nature of our own reason, may contain the\r\nground of such a systematic unity. This idea is therefore valid only relatively\r\nto the employment in experience of our reason. But if we attribute to it\r\nabsolute and objective validity, we overlook the fact that it is merely an\r\nideal being that we cogitate; and, by setting out from a basis which is not\r\ndeterminable by considerations drawn from experience, we place ourselves in a\r\nposition which incapacitates us from applying this principle to the empirical\r\nemployment of reason.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut, it will be asked further, can I make any use of this conception and\r\nhypothesis in my investigations into the world and nature? Yes, for this very\r\npurpose was the idea established by reason as a fundamental basis. But may I\r\nregard certain arrangements, which seemed to have been made in conformity with\r\nsome fixed aim, as the arrangements of design, and look upon them as proceeding\r\nfrom the divine will, with the intervention, however, of certain other\r\nparticular arrangements disposed to that end? Yes, you may do so; but at the\r\nsame time you must regard it as indifferent, whether it is asserted that divine\r\nwisdom has disposed all things in conformity with his highest aims, or that the\r\nidea of supreme wisdom is a regulative principle in the investigation of\r\nnature, and at the same time a principle of the systematic unity of nature\r\naccording to general laws, even in those cases where we are unable to discover\r\nthat unity. In other words, it must be perfectly indifferent to you whether you\r\nsay, when you have discovered this unity: God has wisely willed it so; or:\r\nNature has wisely arranged this. For it was nothing but the systematic unity,\r\nwhich reason requires as a basis for the investigation of nature, that\r\njustified you in accepting the idea of a supreme intelligence as a schema for a\r\nregulative principle; and, the farther you advance in the discovery of design\r\nand finality, the more certain the validity of your idea. But, as the whole aim\r\nof this regulative principle was the discovery of a necessary and systematic\r\nunity in nature, we have, in so far as we attain this, to attribute our success\r\nto the idea of a Supreme Being; while, at the same time, we cannot, without\r\ninvolving ourselves in contradictions, overlook the general laws of nature, as\r\nit was in reference to them alone that this idea was employed. We cannot, I\r\nsay, overlook the general laws of nature, and regard this conformity to aims\r\nobservable in nature as contingent or hyperphysical in its origin; inasmuch as\r\nthere is no ground which can justify us in the admission of a being with such\r\nproperties distinct from and above nature. All that we are authorized to assert\r\nis that this idea may be employed as a principle, and that the properties of\r\nthe being which is assumed to correspond to it may be regarded as\r\nsystematically connected in analogy with the causal determination of phenomena.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nFor the same reasons we are justified in introducing into the idea of the\r\nsupreme cause other anthropomorphic elements (for without these we could not\r\npredicate anything of it); we may regard it as allowable to cogitate this cause\r\nas a being with understanding, the feelings of pleasure and displeasure, and\r\nfaculties of desire and will corresponding to these. At the same time, we may\r\nattribute to this being infinite perfection\u0026mdash;a perfection which\r\nnecessarily transcends that which our knowledge of the order and design in the\r\nworld authorize us to predicate of it. For the regulative law of systematic\r\nunity requires us to study nature on the supposition that systematic and final\r\nunity in infinitum is everywhere discoverable, even in the highest diversity.\r\nFor, although we may discover little of this cosmical perfection, it belongs to\r\nthe legislative prerogative of reason to require us always to seek for and to\r\nexpect it; while it must always be beneficial to institute all inquiries into\r\nnature in accordance with this principle. But it is evident that, by this idea\r\nof a supreme author of all, which I place as the foundation of all inquiries\r\ninto nature, I do not mean to assert the existence of such a being, or that I\r\nhave any knowledge of its existence; and, consequently, I do not really deduce\r\nanything from the existence of this being, but merely from its idea, that is to\r\nsay, from the nature of things in this world, in accordance with this idea. A\r\ncertain dim consciousness of the true use of this idea seems to have dictated\r\nto the philosophers of all times the moderate language used by them regarding\r\nthe cause of the world. We find them employing the expressions wisdom and care\r\nof nature, and divine wisdom, as synonymous\u0026mdash;nay, in purely speculative\r\ndiscussions, preferring the former, because it does not carry the appearance of\r\ngreater pretensions than such as we are entitled to make, and at the same time\r\ndirects reason to its proper field of action\u0026mdash;nature and her phenomena.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThus, pure reason, which at first seemed to promise us nothing less than the\r\nextension of our cognition beyond the limits of experience, is found, when\r\nthoroughly examined, to contain nothing but regulative principles, the virtue\r\nand function of which is to introduce into our cognition a higher degree of\r\nunity than the understanding could of itself. These principles, by placing the\r\ngoal of all our struggles at so great a distance, realize for us the most\r\nthorough connection between the different parts of our cognition, and the\r\nhighest degree of systematic unity. But, on the other hand, if misunderstood\r\nand employed as constitutive principles of transcendent cognition, they become\r\nthe parents of illusions and contradictions, while pretending to introduce us\r\nto new regions of knowledge.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThus all human cognition begins with intuitions, proceeds from thence to\r\nconceptions, and ends with ideas. Although it possesses, in relation to all\r\nthree elements, à priori sources of cognition, which seemed to transcend the\r\nlimits of all experience, a thoroughgoing criticism demonstrates that\r\nspeculative reason can never, by the aid of these elements, pass the bounds of\r\npossible experience, and that the proper destination of this highest faculty of\r\ncognition is to employ all methods, and all the principles of these methods,\r\nfor the purpose of penetrating into the innermost secrets of nature, by the aid\r\nof the principles of unity (among all kinds of which teleological unity is the\r\nhighest), while it ought not to attempt to soar above the sphere of experience,\r\nbeyond which there lies nought for us but the void inane. The critical\r\nexamination, in our Transcendental Analytic, of all the propositions which\r\nprofessed to extend cognition beyond the sphere of experience, completely\r\ndemonstrated that they can only conduct us to a possible experience. If we were\r\nnot distrustful even of the clearest abstract theorems, if we were not allured\r\nby specious and inviting prospects to escape from the constraining power of\r\ntheir evidence, we might spare ourselves the laborious examination of all the\r\ndialectical arguments which a transcendent reason adduces in support of its\r\npretensions; for we should know with the most complete certainty that, however\r\nhonest such professions might be, they are null and valueless, because they\r\nrelate to a kind of knowledge to which no man can by any possibility attain.\r\nBut, as there is no end to discussion, if we cannot discover the true cause of\r\nthe illusions by which even the wisest are deceived, and as the analysis of all\r\nour transcendent cognition into its elements is of itself of no slight value as\r\na psychological study, while it is a duty incumbent on every\r\nphilosopher\u0026mdash;it was found necessary to investigate the dialectical\r\nprocedure of reason in its primary sources. And as the inferences of which this\r\ndialectic is the parent are not only deceitful, but naturally possess a\r\nprofound interest for humanity, it was advisable at the same time, to give a\r\nfull account of the momenta of this dialectical procedure, and to deposit it in\r\nthe archives of human reason, as a warning to all future metaphysicians to\r\navoid these causes of speculative error.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003c!–end chapter–\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca id=\"chap96\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eII. Transcendental Doctrine of Method\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIf we regard the sum of the cognition of pure speculative reason as an edifice,\r\nthe idea of which, at least, exists in the human mind, it may be said that we\r\nhave in the Transcendental Doctrine of Elements examined the materials and\r\ndetermined to what edifice these belong, and what its height and stability. We\r\nhave found, indeed, that, although we had purposed to build for ourselves a\r\ntower which should reach to Heaven, the supply of materials sufficed merely for\r\na habitation, which was spacious enough for all terrestrial purposes, and high\r\nenough to enable us to survey the level plain of experience, but that the bold\r\nundertaking designed necessarily failed for want of materials\u0026mdash;not to\r\nmention the confusion of tongues, which gave rise to endless disputes among the\r\nlabourers on the plan of the edifice, and at last scattered them over all the\r\nworld, each to erect a separate building for himself, according to his own\r\nplans and his own inclinations. Our present task relates not to the materials,\r\nbut to the plan of an edifice; and, as we have had sufficient warning not to\r\nventure blindly upon a design which may be found to transcend our natural\r\npowers, while, at the same time, we cannot give up the intention of erecting a\r\nsecure abode for the mind, we must proportion our design to the material which\r\nis presented to us, and which is, at the same time, sufficient for all our\r\nwants.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nI understand, then, by the transcendental doctrine of method, the determination\r\nof the formal conditions of a complete system of pure reason. We shall\r\naccordingly have to treat of the discipline, the canon, the architectonic, and,\r\nfinally, the history of pure reason. This part of our Critique will accomplish,\r\nfrom the transcendental point of view, what has been usually attempted, but\r\nmiserably executed, under the name of practical logic. It has been badly\r\nexecuted, I say, because general logic, not being limited to any particular\r\nkind of cognition (not even to the pure cognition of the understanding) nor to\r\nany particular objects, it cannot, without borrowing from other sciences, do\r\nmore than present merely the titles or signs of possible methods and the\r\ntechnical expressions, which are employed in the systematic parts of all\r\nsciences; and thus the pupil is made acquainted with names, the meaning and\r\napplication of which he is to learn only at some future time.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003ca id=\"chap97\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eChapter I. The Discipline of Pure Reason\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nNegative judgements\u0026mdash;those which are so not merely as regards their\r\nlogical form, but in respect of their content\u0026mdash;are not commonly held in\r\nespecial respect. They are, on the contrary, regarded as jealous enemies of our\r\ninsatiable desire for knowledge; and it almost requires an apology to induce us\r\nto tolerate, much less to prize and to respect them.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAll propositions, indeed, may be logically expressed in a negative form; but,\r\nin relation to the content of our cognition, the peculiar province of negative\r\njudgements is solely to prevent error. For this reason, too, negative\r\npropositions, which are framed for the purpose of correcting false cognitions\r\nwhere error is absolutely impossible, are undoubtedly true, but inane and\r\nsenseless; that is, they are in reality purposeless and, for this reason, often\r\nvery ridiculous. Such is the proposition of the schoolman that Alexander could\r\nnot have subdued any countries without an army.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut where the limits of our possible cognition are very much contracted, the\r\nattraction to new fields of knowledge great, the illusions to which the mind is\r\nsubject of the most deceptive character, and the evil consequences of error of\r\nno inconsiderable magnitude\u0026mdash;the negative element in knowledge, which is\r\nuseful only to guard us against error, is of far more importance than much of\r\nthat positive instruction which makes additions to the sum of our knowledge.\r\nThe restraint which is employed to repress, and finally to extirpate the\r\nconstant inclination to depart from certain rules, is termed discipline. It is\r\ndistinguished from culture, which aims at the formation of a certain degree of\r\nskill, without attempting to repress or to destroy any other mental power,\r\nalready existing. In the cultivation of a talent, which has given evidence of\r\nan impulse towards self-development, discipline takes a negative,\u003ca\r\nhref=\"#linknote-74\" id=\"linknoteref-74\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[74]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e culture and doctrine a positive, part.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"linknote-74\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#linknoteref-74\"\u003e[74]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nI am well aware that, in the language of the schools, the term discipline is\r\nusually employed as synonymous with instruction. But there are so many cases in\r\nwhich it is necessary to distinguish the notion of the former, as a course of\r\ncorrective training, from that of the latter, as the communication of\r\nknowledge, and the nature of things itself demands the appropriation of the\r\nmost suitable expressions for this distinction, that it is my desire that the\r\nformer terms should never be employed in any other than a negative\r\nsignification.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThat natural dispositions and talents (such as imagination and wit), which ask\r\na free and unlimited development, require in many respects the corrective\r\ninfluence of discipline, every one will readily grant. But it may well appear\r\nstrange that reason, whose proper duty it is to prescribe rules of discipline\r\nto all the other powers of the mind, should itself require this corrective. It\r\nhas, in fact, hitherto escaped this humiliation, only because, in presence of\r\nits magnificent pretensions and high position, no one could readily suspect it\r\nto be capable of substituting fancies for conceptions, and words for things.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nReason, when employed in the field of experience, does not stand in need of\r\ncriticism, because its principles are subjected to the continual test of\r\nempirical observations. Nor is criticism requisite in the sphere of\r\nmathematics, where the conceptions of reason must always be presented in\r\nconcreto in pure intuition, and baseless or arbitrary assertions are discovered\r\nwithout difficulty. But where reason is not held in a plain track by the\r\ninfluence of empirical or of pure intuition, that is, when it is employed in\r\nthe transcendental sphere of pure conceptions, it stands in great need of\r\ndiscipline, to restrain its propensity to overstep the limits of possible\r\nexperience and to keep it from wandering into error. In fact, the utility of\r\nthe philosophy of pure reason is entirely of this negative character.\r\nParticular errors may be corrected by particular animadversions, and the causes\r\nof these errors may be eradicated by criticism. But where we find, as in the\r\ncase of pure reason, a complete system of illusions and fallacies, closely\r\nconnected with each other and depending upon grand general principles, there\r\nseems to be required a peculiar and negative code of mental legislation, which,\r\nunder the denomination of a discipline, and founded upon the nature of reason\r\nand the objects of its exercise, shall constitute a system of thorough\r\nexamination and testing, which no fallacy will be able to withstand or escape\r\nfrom, under whatever disguise or concealment it may lurk.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut the reader must remark that, in this the second division of our\r\ntranscendental Critique the discipline of pure reason is not directed to the\r\ncontent, but to the method of the cognition of pure reason. The former task has\r\nbeen completed in the doctrine of elements. But there is so much similarity in\r\nthe mode of employing the faculty of reason, whatever be the object to which it\r\nis applied, while, at the same time, its employment in the transcendental\r\nsphere is so essentially different in kind from every other, that, without the\r\nwarning negative influence of a discipline specially directed to that end, the\r\nerrors are unavoidable which spring from the unskillful employment of the\r\nmethods which are originated by reason but which are out of place in this\r\nsphere.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003ca id=\"chap98\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eSection I. The Discipline of Pure Reason in the Sphere\r\nof Dogmatism\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe science of mathematics presents the most brilliant example of the extension\r\nof the sphere of pure reason without the aid of experience. Examples are always\r\ncontagious; and they exert an especial influence on the same faculty, which\r\nnaturally flatters itself that it will have the same good fortune in other case\r\nas fell to its lot in one fortunate instance. Hence pure reason hopes to be\r\nable to extend its empire in the transcendental sphere with equal success and\r\nsecurity, especially when it applies the same method which was attended with\r\nsuch brilliant results in the science of mathematics. It is, therefore, of the\r\nhighest importance for us to know whether the method of arriving at\r\ndemonstrative certainty, which is termed mathematical, be identical with that\r\nby which we endeavour to attain the same degree of certainty in philosophy, and\r\nwhich is termed in that science dogmatical.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPhilosophical cognition is the cognition of reason by means of conceptions;\r\nmathematical cognition is cognition by means of the construction of\r\nconceptions. The construction of a conception is the presentation à priori of\r\nthe intuition which corresponds to the conception. For this purpose a\r\nnon-empirical intuition is requisite, which, as an intuition, is an individual\r\nobject; while, as the construction of a conception (a general representation),\r\nit must be seen to be universally valid for all the possible intuitions which\r\nrank under that conception. Thus I construct a triangle, by the presentation of\r\nthe object which corresponds to this conception, either by mere imagination, in\r\npure intuition, or upon paper, in empirical intuition, in both cases completely\r\nà priori, without borrowing the type of that figure from any experience. The\r\nindividual figure drawn upon paper is empirical; but it serves,\r\nnotwithstanding, to indicate the conception, even in its universality, because\r\nin this empirical intuition we keep our eye merely on the act of the\r\nconstruction of the conception, and pay no attention to the various modes of\r\ndetermining it, for example, its size, the length of its sides, the size of its\r\nangles, these not in the least affecting the essential character of the\r\nconception.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPhilosophical cognition, accordingly, regards the particular only in the\r\ngeneral; mathematical the general in the particular, nay, in the individual.\r\nThis is done, however, entirely à priori and by means of pure reason, so that,\r\nas this individual figure is determined under certain universal conditions of\r\nconstruction, the object of the conception, to which this individual figure\r\ncorresponds as its schema, must be cogitated as universally determined.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe essential difference of these two modes of cognition consists, therefore,\r\nin this formal quality; it does not regard the difference of the matter or\r\nobjects of both. Those thinkers who aim at distinguishing philosophy from\r\nmathematics by asserting that the former has to do with quality merely, and the\r\nlatter with quantity, have mistaken the effect for the cause. The reason why\r\nmathematical cognition can relate only to quantity is to be found in its form\r\nalone. For it is the conception of quantities only that is capable of being\r\nconstructed, that is, presented à priori in intuition; while qualities cannot\r\nbe given in any other than an empirical intuition. Hence the cognition of\r\nqualities by reason is possible only through conceptions. No one can find an\r\nintuition which shall correspond to the conception of reality, except in\r\nexperience; it cannot be presented to the mind à priori and antecedently to the\r\nempirical consciousness of a reality. We can form an intuition, by means of the\r\nmere conception of it, of a cone, without the aid of experience; but the colour\r\nof the cone we cannot know except from experience. I cannot present an\r\nintuition of a cause, except in an example which experience offers to me.\r\nBesides, philosophy, as well as mathematics, treats of quantities; as, for\r\nexample, of totality, infinity, and so on. Mathematics, too, treats of the\r\ndifference of lines and surfaces\u0026mdash;as spaces of different quality, of the\r\ncontinuity of extension\u0026mdash;as a quality thereof. But, although in such cases\r\nthey have a common object, the mode in which reason considers that object is\r\nvery different in philosophy from what it is in mathematics. The former\r\nconfines itself to the general conceptions; the latter can do nothing with a\r\nmere conception, it hastens to intuition. In this intuition it regards the\r\nconception in concreto, not empirically, but in an à priori intuition, which it\r\nhas constructed; and in which, all the results which follow from the general\r\nconditions of the construction of the conception are in all cases valid for the\r\nobject of the constructed conception.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSuppose that the conception of a triangle is given to a philosopher and that he\r\nis required to discover, by the philosophical method, what relation the sum of\r\nits angles bears to a right angle. He has nothing before him but the conception\r\nof a figure enclosed within three right lines, and, consequently, with the same\r\nnumber of angles. He may analyse the conception of a right line, of an angle,\r\nor of the number three as long as he pleases, but he will not discover any\r\nproperties not contained in these conceptions. But, if this question is\r\nproposed to a geometrician, he at once begins by constructing a triangle. He\r\nknows that two right angles are equal to the sum of all the contiguous angles\r\nwhich proceed from one point in a straight line; and he goes on to produce one\r\nside of his triangle, thus forming two adjacent angles which are together equal\r\nto two right angles. He then divides the exterior of these angles, by drawing a\r\nline parallel with the opposite side of the triangle, and immediately perceives\r\nthat he has thus got an exterior adjacent angle which is equal to the interior.\r\nProceeding in this way, through a chain of inferences, and always on the ground\r\nof intuition, he arrives at a clear and universally valid solution of the\r\nquestion.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut mathematics does not confine itself to the construction of quantities\r\n(quanta), as in the case of geometry; it occupies itself with pure quantity\r\nalso (quantitas), as in the case of algebra, where complete abstraction is made\r\nof the properties of the object indicated by the conception of quantity. In\r\nalgebra, a certain method of notation by signs is adopted, and these indicate\r\nthe different possible constructions of quantities, the extraction of roots,\r\nand so on. After having thus denoted the general conception of quantities,\r\naccording to their different relations, the different operations by which\r\nquantity or number is increased or diminished are presented in intuition in\r\naccordance with general rules. Thus, when one quantity is to be divided by\r\nanother, the signs which denote both are placed in the form peculiar to the\r\noperation of division; and thus algebra, by means of a symbolical construction\r\nof quantity, just as geometry, with its ostensive or geometrical construction\r\n(a construction of the objects themselves), arrives at results which discursive\r\ncognition cannot hope to reach by the aid of mere conceptions.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nNow, what is the cause of this difference in the fortune of the philosopher and\r\nthe mathematician, the former of whom follows the path of conceptions, while\r\nthe latter pursues that of intuitions, which he represents, à priori, in\r\ncorrespondence with his conceptions? The cause is evident from what has been\r\nalready demonstrated in the introduction to this Critique. We do not, in the\r\npresent case, want to discover analytical propositions, which may be produced\r\nmerely by analysing our conceptions\u0026mdash;for in this the philosopher would\r\nhave the advantage over his rival; we aim at the discovery of synthetical\r\npropositions\u0026mdash;such synthetical propositions, moreover, as can be cognized\r\nà priori. I must not confine myself to that which I actually cogitate in my\r\nconception of a triangle, for this is nothing more than the mere definition; I\r\nmust try to go beyond that, and to arrive at properties which are not contained\r\nin, although they belong to, the conception. Now, this is impossible, unless I\r\ndetermine the object present to my mind according to the conditions, either of\r\nempirical, or of pure, intuition. In the former case, I should have an\r\nempirical proposition (arrived at by actual measurement of the angles of the\r\ntriangle), which would possess neither universality nor necessity; but that\r\nwould be of no value. In the latter, I proceed by geometrical construction, by\r\nmeans of which I collect, in a pure intuition, just as I would in an empirical\r\nintuition, all the various properties which belong to the schema of a triangle\r\nin general, and consequently to its conception, and thus construct synthetical\r\npropositions which possess the attribute of universality.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIt would be vain to philosophize upon the triangle, that is, to reflect on it\r\ndiscursively; I should get no further than the definition with which I had been\r\nobliged to set out. There are certainly transcendental synthetical propositions\r\nwhich are framed by means of pure conceptions, and which form the peculiar\r\ndistinction of philosophy; but these do not relate to any particular thing, but\r\nto a thing in general, and enounce the conditions under which the perception of\r\nit may become a part of possible experience. But the science of mathematics has\r\nnothing to do with such questions, nor with the question of existence in any\r\nfashion; it is concerned merely with the properties of objects in themselves,\r\nonly in so far as these are connected with the conception of the objects.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIn the above example, we merely attempted to show the great difference which\r\nexists between the discursive employment of reason in the sphere of\r\nconceptions, and its intuitive exercise by means of the construction of\r\nconceptions. The question naturally arises: What is the cause which\r\nnecessitates this twofold exercise of reason, and how are we to discover\r\nwhether it is the philosophical or the mathematical method which reason is\r\npursuing in an argument?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAll our knowledge relates, finally, to possible intuitions, for it is these\r\nalone that present objects to the mind. An à priori or non-empirical conception\r\ncontains either a pure intuition\u0026mdash;and in this case it can be constructed;\r\nor it contains nothing but the synthesis of possible intuitions, which are not\r\ngiven à priori. In this latter case, it may help us to form synthetical à\r\npriori judgements, but only in the discursive method, by conceptions, not in\r\nthe intuitive, by means of the construction of conceptions.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe only à priori intuition is that of the pure form of phenomena\u0026mdash;space\r\nand time. A conception of space and time as quanta may be presented à priori in\r\nintuition, that is, constructed, either alone with their quality (figure), or\r\nas pure quantity (the mere synthesis of the homogeneous), by means of number.\r\nBut the matter of phenomena, by which things are given in space and time, can\r\nbe presented only in perception, à posteriori. The only conception which\r\nrepresents à priori this empirical content of phenomena is the conception of a\r\nthing in general; and the à priori synthetical cognition of this conception can\r\ngive us nothing more than the rule for the synthesis of that which may be\r\ncontained in the corresponding à posteriori perception; it is utterly\r\ninadequate to present an à priori intuition of the real object, which must\r\nnecessarily be empirical.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSynthetical propositions, which relate to things in general, an à priori\r\nintuition of which is impossible, are transcendental. For this reason\r\ntranscendental propositions cannot be framed by means of the construction of\r\nconceptions; they are à priori, and based entirely on conceptions themselves.\r\nThey contain merely the rule, by which we are to seek in the world of\r\nperception or experience the synthetical unity of that which cannot be intuited\r\nà priori. But they are incompetent to present any of the conceptions which\r\nappear in them in an à priori intuition; these can be given only à posteriori,\r\nin experience, which, however, is itself possible only through these\r\nsynthetical principles.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIf we are to form a synthetical judgement regarding a conception, we must go\r\nbeyond it, to the intuition in which it is given. If we keep to what is\r\ncontained in the conception, the judgement is merely analytical\u0026mdash;it is\r\nmerely an explanation of what we have cogitated in the conception. But I can\r\npass from the conception to the pure or empirical intuition which corresponds\r\nto it. I can proceed to examine my conception in concreto, and to cognize,\r\neither à priori or à posteriori, what I find in the object of the conception. The\r\nformer\u0026mdash;à priori cognition\u0026mdash;is rational-mathematical cognition by\r\nmeans of the construction of the conception; the latter\u0026mdash;à posteriori\r\ncognition\u0026mdash;is purely empirical cognition, which does not possess the\r\nattributes of necessity and universality. Thus I may analyse the conception I\r\nhave of gold; but I gain no new information from this analysis, I merely\r\nenumerate the different properties which I had connected with the notion\r\nindicated by the word. My knowledge has gained in logical clearness and\r\narrangement, but no addition has been made to it. But if I take the matter\r\nwhich is indicated by this name, and submit it to the examination of my senses,\r\nI am enabled to form several synthetical\u0026mdash;although still\r\nempirical\u0026mdash;propositions. The mathematical conception of a triangle I\r\nshould construct, that is, present à priori in intuition, and in this way\r\nattain to rational-synthetical cognition. But when the transcendental\r\nconception of reality, or substance, or power is presented to my mind, I find\r\nthat it does not relate to or indicate either an empirical or pure intuition,\r\nbut that it indicates merely the synthesis of empirical intuitions, which\r\ncannot of course be given à priori. The synthesis in such a conception cannot\r\nproceed à priori\u0026mdash;without the aid of experience\u0026mdash;to the intuition\r\nwhich corresponds to the conception; and, for this reason, none of these\r\nconceptions can produce a determinative synthetical proposition, they can never\r\npresent more than a principle of the synthesis\u003ca href=\"#linknote-75\" id=\"linknoteref-75\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[75]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e of possible\r\nempirical intuitions. A transcendental proposition is, therefore, a synthetical\r\ncognition of reason by means of pure conceptions and the discursive method, and\r\nit renders possible all synthetical unity in empirical cognition, though it\r\ncannot present us with any intuition à priori.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"linknote-75\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#linknoteref-75\"\u003e[75]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nIn the case of the conception of cause, I do really go beyond the empirical\r\nconception of an event\u0026mdash;but not to the intuition which presents this\r\nconception in concreto, but only to the time-conditions, which may be found in\r\nexperience to correspond to the conception. My procedure is, therefore,\r\nstrictly according to conceptions; I cannot in a case of this kind employ the\r\nconstruction of conceptions, because the conception is merely a rule for the\r\nsynthesis of perceptions, which are not pure intuitions, and which, therefore,\r\ncannot be given à priori.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThere is thus a twofold exercise of reason. Both modes have the properties of\r\nuniversality and an à priori origin in common, but are, in their procedure, of\r\nwidely different character. The reason of this is that in the world of\r\nphenomena, in which alone objects are presented to our minds, there are two\r\nmain elements\u0026mdash;the form of intuition (space and time), which can be\r\ncognized and determined completely à priori, and the matter or\r\ncontent\u0026mdash;that which is presented in space and time, and which,\r\nconsequently, contains a something\u0026mdash;an existence corresponding to our\r\npowers of sensation. As regards the latter, which can never be given in a\r\ndeterminate mode except by experience, there are no à priori notions which\r\nrelate to it, except the undetermined conceptions of the synthesis of possible\r\nsensations, in so far as these belong (in a possible experience) to the unity\r\nof consciousness. As regards the former, we can determine our conceptions à\r\npriori in intuition, inasmuch as we are ourselves the creators of the objects\r\nof the conceptions in space and time\u0026mdash;these objects being regarded simply\r\nas quanta. In the one case, reason proceeds according to conceptions and can do\r\nnothing more than subject phenomena to these\u0026mdash;which can only be determined\r\nempirically, that is, à posteriori\u0026mdash;in conformity, however, with those\r\nconceptions as the rules of all empirical synthesis. In the other case, reason\r\nproceeds by the construction of conceptions; and, as these conceptions relate\r\nto an à priori intuition, they may be given and determined in pure intuition à\r\npriori, and without the aid of empirical data. The examination and\r\nconsideration of everything that exists in space or time\u0026mdash;whether it is a\r\nquantum or not, in how far the particular something (which fills space or time)\r\nis a primary substratum, or a mere determination of some other existence,\r\nwhether it relates to anything else\u0026mdash;either as cause or effect, whether\r\nits existence is isolated or in reciprocal connection with and dependence upon\r\nothers, the possibility of this existence, its reality and necessity or\r\nopposites\u0026mdash;all these form part of the cognition of reason on the ground of\r\nconceptions, and this cognition is termed philosophical. But to determine à\r\npriori an intuition in space (its figure), to divide time into periods, or\r\nmerely to cognize the quantity of an intuition in space and time, and to\r\ndetermine it by number\u0026mdash;all this is an operation of reason by means of the\r\nconstruction of conceptions, and is called mathematical.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe success which attends the efforts of reason in the sphere of mathematics\r\nnaturally fosters the expectation that the same good fortune will be its lot,\r\nif it applies the mathematical method in other regions of mental endeavour\r\nbesides that of quantities. Its success is thus great, because it can support\r\nall its conceptions by à priori intuitions and, in this way, make itself a\r\nmaster, as it were, over nature; while pure philosophy, with its à priori\r\ndiscursive conceptions, bungles about in the world of nature, and cannot\r\naccredit or show any à priori evidence of the reality of these conceptions.\r\nMasters in the science of mathematics are confident of the success of this\r\nmethod; indeed, it is a common persuasion that it is capable of being applied\r\nto any subject of human thought. They have hardly ever reflected or\r\nphilosophized on their favourite science\u0026mdash;a task of great difficulty; and\r\nthe specific difference between the two modes of employing the faculty of\r\nreason has never entered their thoughts. Rules current in the field of common\r\nexperience, and which common sense stamps everywhere with its approval, are\r\nregarded by them as axiomatic. From what source the conceptions of space and\r\ntime, with which (as the only primitive quanta) they have to deal, enter their\r\nminds, is a question which they do not trouble themselves to answer; and they\r\nthink it just as unnecessary to examine into the origin of the pure conceptions\r\nof the understanding and the extent of their validity. All they have to do with\r\nthem is to employ them. In all this they are perfectly right, if they do not\r\noverstep the limits of the sphere of nature. But they pass, unconsciously, from\r\nthe world of sense to the insecure ground of pure transcendental conceptions\r\n(instabilis tellus, innabilis unda), where they can neither stand nor swim, and\r\nwhere the tracks of their footsteps are obliterated by time; while the march of\r\nmathematics is pursued on a broad and magnificent highway, which the latest\r\nposterity shall frequent without fear of danger or impediment.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAs we have taken upon us the task of determining, clearly and certainly, the\r\nlimits of pure reason in the sphere of transcendentalism, and as the efforts of\r\nreason in this direction are persisted in, even after the plainest and most\r\nexpressive warnings, hope still beckoning us past the limits of experience into\r\nthe splendours of the intellectual world\u0026mdash;it becomes necessary to cut away\r\nthe last anchor of this fallacious and fantastic hope. We shall, accordingly,\r\nshow that the mathematical method is unattended in the sphere of philosophy by\r\nthe least advantage\u0026mdash;except, perhaps, that it more plainly exhibits its\r\nown inadequacy\u0026mdash;that geometry and philosophy are two quite different\r\nthings, although they go hand in hand in the field of natural science, and,\r\nconsequently, that the procedure of the one can never be imitated by the other.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe evidence of mathematics rests upon definitions, axioms, and demonstrations.\r\nI shall be satisfied with showing that none of these forms can be employed or\r\nimitated in philosophy in the sense in which they are understood by\r\nmathematicians; and that the geometrician, if he employs his method in\r\nphilosophy, will succeed only in building card-castles, while the employment of\r\nthe philosophical method in mathematics can result in nothing but mere\r\nverbiage. The essential business of philosophy, indeed, is to mark out the\r\nlimits of the science; and even the mathematician, unless his talent is\r\nnaturally circumscribed and limited to this particular department of knowledge,\r\ncannot turn a deaf ear to the warnings of philosophy, or set himself above its\r\ndirection.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nI. Of Definitions. A definition is, as the term itself indicates, the\r\nrepresentation, upon primary grounds, of the complete conception of a thing\r\nwithin its own limits.\u003ca href=\"#linknote-76\" id=\"linknoteref-76\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[76]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Accordingly, an empirical conception\r\ncannot be defined, it can only be explained. For, as there are in such a\r\nconception only a certain number of marks or signs, which denote a certain\r\nclass of sensuous objects, we can never be sure that we do not cogitate under\r\nthe word which indicates the same object, at one time a greater, at another a\r\nsmaller number of signs. Thus, one person may cogitate in his conception of\r\ngold, in addition to its properties of weight, colour, malleability, that of\r\nresisting rust, while another person may be ignorant of this quality. We employ\r\ncertain signs only so long as we require them for the sake of distinction; new\r\nobservations abstract some and add new ones, so that an empirical conception\r\nnever remains within permanent limits. It is, in fact, useless to define a\r\nconception of this kind. If, for example, we are speaking of water and its\r\nproperties, we do not stop at what we actually think by the word water, but\r\nproceed to observation and experiment; and the word, with the few signs\r\nattached to it, is more properly a designation than a conception of the thing.\r\nA definition in this case would evidently be nothing more than a determination\r\nof the word. In the second place, no à priori conception, such as those of\r\nsubstance, cause, right, fitness, and so on, can be defined. For I can never be\r\nsure, that the clear representation of a given conception (which is given in a\r\nconfused state) has been fully developed, until I know that the representation\r\nis adequate with its object. But, inasmuch as the conception, as it is\r\npresented to the mind, may contain a number of obscure representations, which\r\nwe do not observe in our analysis, although we employ them in our application\r\nof the conception, I can never be sure that my analysis is complete, while\r\nexamples may make this probable, although they can never demonstrate the fact.\r\nInstead of the word definition, I should rather employ the term\r\nexposition\u0026mdash;a more modest expression, which the critic may accept without\r\nsurrendering his doubts as to the completeness of the analysis of any such\r\nconception. As, therefore, neither empirical nor à priori conceptions are\r\ncapable of definition, we have to see whether the only other kind of\r\nconceptions\u0026mdash;arbitrary conceptions\u0026mdash;can be subjected to this mental\r\noperation. Such a conception can always be defined; for I must know thoroughly\r\nwhat I wished to cogitate in it, as it was I who created it, and it was not\r\ngiven to my mind either by the nature of my understanding or by experience. At\r\nthe same time, I cannot say that, by such a definition, I have defined a real\r\nobject. If the conception is based upon empirical conditions, if, for example,\r\nI have a conception of a clock for a ship, this arbitrary conception does not\r\nassure me of the existence or even of the possibility of the object. My\r\ndefinition of such a conception would with more propriety be termed a\r\ndeclaration of a project than a definition of an object. There are no other\r\nconceptions which can bear definition, except those which contain an arbitrary\r\nsynthesis, which can be constructed à priori. Consequently, the science of\r\nmathematics alone possesses definitions. For the object here thought is\r\npresented à priori in intuition; and thus it can never contain more or less\r\nthan the conception, because the conception of the object has been given by the\r\ndefinition\u0026mdash;and primarily, that is, without deriving the definition from\r\nany other source. Philosophical definitions are, therefore, merely expositions\r\nof given conceptions, while mathematical definitions are constructions of\r\nconceptions originally formed by the mind itself; the former are produced by\r\nanalysis, the completeness of which is never demonstratively certain, the\r\nlatter by a synthesis. In a mathematical definition the conception is formed,\r\nin a philosophical definition it is only explained. From this it follows:\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"linknote-76\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#linknoteref-76\"\u003e[76]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nThe definition must describe the conception completely that is, omit none of\r\nthe marks or signs of which it composed; within its own limits, that is, it\r\nmust be precise, and enumerate no more signs than belong to the conception; and\r\non primary grounds, that is to say, the limitations of the bounds of the\r\nconception must not be deduced from other conceptions, as in this case a proof\r\nwould be necessary, and the so-called definition would be incapable of taking\r\nits place at the head of all the judgements we have to form regarding an\r\nobject.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n(a) That we must not imitate, in philosophy, the mathematical usage of\r\ncommencing with definitions\u0026mdash;except by way of hypothesis or experiment.\r\nFor, as all so-called philosophical definitions are merely analyses of given\r\nconceptions, these conceptions, although only in a confused form, must precede\r\nthe analysis; and the incomplete exposition must precede the complete, so that\r\nwe may be able to draw certain inferences from the characteristics which an\r\nincomplete analysis has enabled us to discover, before we attain to the\r\ncomplete exposition or definition of the conception. In one word, a full and\r\nclear definition ought, in philosophy, rather to form the conclusion than the\r\ncommencement of our labours.\u003ca href=\"#linknote-77\" id=\"linknoteref-77\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[77]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e In mathematics, on the contrary, we\r\ncannot have a conception prior to the definition; it is the definition which\r\ngives us the conception, and it must for this reason form the commencement of\r\nevery chain of mathematical reasoning.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"linknote-77\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#linknoteref-77\"\u003e[77]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nPhilosophy abounds in faulty definitions, especially such as contain some of\r\nthe elements requisite to form a complete definition. If a conception could not\r\nbe employed in reasoning before it had been defined, it would fare ill with all\r\nphilosophical thought. But, as incompletely defined conceptions may always be\r\nemployed without detriment to truth, so far as our analysis of the elements\r\ncontained in them proceeds, imperfect definitions, that is, propositions which\r\nare properly not definitions, but merely approximations thereto, may be used\r\nwith great advantage. In mathematics, definition belongs ad esse, in philosophy\r\nad melius esse. It is a difficult task to construct a proper definition.\r\nJurists are still without a complete definition of the idea of right.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n(b) Mathematical definitions cannot be erroneous. For the conception is given\r\nonly in and through the definition, and thus it contains only what has been\r\ncogitated in the definition. But although a definition cannot be incorrect, as\r\nregards its content, an error may sometimes, although seldom, creep into the\r\nform. This error consists in a want of precision. Thus the common definition of\r\na circle\u0026mdash;that it is a curved line, every point in which is equally\r\ndistant from another point called the centre\u0026mdash;is faulty, from the fact\r\nthat the determination indicated by the word curved is superfluous. For there\r\nought to be a particular theorem, which may be easily proved from the\r\ndefinition, to the effect that every line, which has all its points at equal\r\ndistances from another point, must be a curved line\u0026mdash;that is, that not\r\neven the smallest part of it can be straight. Analytical definitions, on the\r\nother hand, may be erroneous in many respects, either by the introduction of\r\nsigns which do not actually exist in the conception, or by wanting in that\r\ncompleteness which forms the essential of a definition. In the latter case, the\r\ndefinition is necessarily defective, because we can never be fully certain of\r\nthe completeness of our analysis. For these reasons, the method of definition\r\nemployed in mathematics cannot be imitated in philosophy.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n2. Of Axioms. These, in so far as they are immediately certain, are à priori\r\nsynthetical principles. Now, one conception cannot be connected synthetically\r\nand yet immediately with another; because, if we wish to proceed out of and\r\nbeyond a conception, a third mediating cognition is necessary. And, as\r\nphilosophy is a cognition of reason by the aid of conceptions alone, there is\r\nto be found in it no principle which deserves to be called an axiom.\r\nMathematics, on the other hand, may possess axioms, because it can always\r\nconnect the predicates of an object à priori, and without any mediating term,\r\nby means of the construction of conceptions in intuition. Such is the case with\r\nthe proposition: Three points can always lie in a plane. On the other hand, no\r\nsynthetical principle which is based upon conceptions, can ever be immediately\r\ncertain (for example, the proposition: Everything that happens has a cause),\r\nbecause I require a mediating term to connect the two conceptions of event and\r\ncause\u0026mdash;namely, the condition of time-determination in an experience, and I\r\ncannot cognize any such principle immediately and from conceptions alone.\r\nDiscursive principles are, accordingly, very different from intuitive\r\nprinciples or axioms. The former always require deduction, which in the case of\r\nthe latter may be altogether dispensed with. Axioms are, for this reason,\r\nalways self-evident, while philosophical principles, whatever may be the degree\r\nof certainty they possess, cannot lay any claim to such a distinction. No\r\nsynthetical proposition of pure transcendental reason can be so evident, as is\r\noften rashly enough declared, as the statement, twice two are four. It is true\r\nthat in the Analytic I introduced into the list of principles of the pure\r\nunderstanding, certain axioms of intuition; but the principle there discussed\r\nwas not itself an axiom, but served merely to present the principle of the\r\npossibility of axioms in general, while it was really nothing more than a\r\nprinciple based upon conceptions. For it is one part of the duty of\r\ntranscendental philosophy to establish the possibility of mathematics itself.\r\nPhilosophy possesses, then, no axioms, and has no right to impose its à priori\r\nprinciples upon thought, until it has established their authority and validity\r\nby a thoroughgoing deduction.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n3. Of Demonstrations. Only an apodeictic proof, based upon intuition, can be\r\ntermed a demonstration. Experience teaches us what is, but it cannot convince\r\nus that it might not have been otherwise. Hence a proof upon empirical grounds\r\ncannot be apodeictic. À priori conceptions, in discursive cognition, can never\r\nproduce intuitive certainty or evidence, however certain the judgement they\r\npresent may be. Mathematics alone, therefore, contains demonstrations, because\r\nit does not deduce its cognition from conceptions, but from the construction of\r\nconceptions, that is, from intuition, which can be given à priori in accordance\r\nwith conceptions. The method of algebra, in equations, from which the correct\r\nanswer is deduced by reduction, is a kind of construction\u0026mdash;not\r\ngeometrical, but by symbols\u0026mdash;in which all conceptions, especially those of\r\nthe relations of quantities, are represented in intuition by signs; and thus\r\nthe conclusions in that science are secured from errors by the fact that every\r\nproof is submitted to ocular evidence. Philosophical cognition does not possess\r\nthis advantage, it being required to consider the general always in abstracto\r\n(by means of conceptions), while mathematics can always consider it in concreto\r\n(in an individual intuition), and at the same time by means of à priori\r\nrepresentation, whereby all errors are rendered manifest to the senses. The\r\nformer\u0026mdash;discursive proofs\u0026mdash;ought to be termed acroamatic proofs,\r\nrather than demonstrations, as only words are employed in them, while\r\ndemonstrations proper, as the term itself indicates, always require a reference\r\nto the intuition of the object.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIt follows from all these considerations that it is not consonant with the\r\nnature of philosophy, especially in the sphere of pure reason, to employ the\r\ndogmatical method, and to adorn itself with the titles and insignia of\r\nmathematical science. It does not belong to that order, and can only hope for a\r\nfraternal union with that science. Its attempts at mathematical evidence are\r\nvain pretensions, which can only keep it back from its true aim, which is to\r\ndetect the illusory procedure of reason when transgressing its proper limits,\r\nand by fully explaining and analysing our conceptions, to conduct us from the\r\ndim regions of speculation to the clear region of modest self-knowledge. Reason\r\nmust not, therefore, in its transcendental endeavours, look forward with such\r\nconfidence, as if the path it is pursuing led straight to its aim, nor reckon\r\nwith such security upon its premisses, as to consider it unnecessary to take a\r\nstep back, or to keep a strict watch for errors, which, overlooked in the\r\nprinciples, may be detected in the arguments themselves\u0026mdash;in which case it\r\nmay be requisite either to determine these principles with greater strictness,\r\nor to change them entirely.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nI divide all apodeictic propositions, whether demonstrable or immediately\r\ncertain, into dogmata and mathemata. A direct synthetical proposition, based on\r\nconceptions, is a dogma; a proposition of the same kind, based on the\r\nconstruction of conceptions, is a mathema. Analytical judgements do not teach\r\nus any more about an object than what was contained in the conception we had of\r\nit; because they do not extend our cognition beyond our conception of an\r\nobject, they merely elucidate the conception. They cannot therefore be with\r\npropriety termed dogmas. Of the two kinds of à priori synthetical propositions\r\nabove mentioned, only those which are employed in philosophy can, according to\r\nthe general mode of speech, bear this name; those of arithmetic or geometry\r\nwould not be rightly so denominated. Thus the customary mode of speaking\r\nconfirms the explanation given above, and the conclusion arrived at, that only\r\nthose judgements which are based upon conceptions, not on the construction of\r\nconceptions, can be termed dogmatical.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThus, pure reason, in the sphere of speculation, does not contain a single\r\ndirect synthetical judgement based upon conceptions. By means of ideas, it is,\r\nas we have shown, incapable of producing synthetical judgements, which are\r\nobjectively valid; by means of the conceptions of the understanding, it\r\nestablishes certain indubitable principles, not, however, directly on the basis\r\nof conceptions, but only indirectly by means of the relation of these\r\nconceptions to something of a purely contingent nature, namely, possible\r\nexperience. When experience is presupposed, these principles are apodeictically\r\ncertain, but in themselves, and directly, they cannot even be cognized à\r\npriori. Thus the given conceptions of cause and event will not be sufficient\r\nfor the demonstration of the proposition: Every event has a cause. For this\r\nreason, it is not a dogma; although from another point of view, that of\r\nexperience, it is capable of being proved to demonstration. The proper term for\r\nsuch a proposition is principle, and not theorem (although it does require to\r\nbe proved), because it possesses the remarkable peculiarity of being the\r\ncondition of the possibility of its own ground of proof, that is, experience,\r\nand of forming a necessary presupposition in all empirical observation.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIf then, in the speculative sphere of pure reason, no dogmata are to be found;\r\nall dogmatical methods, whether borrowed from mathematics, or invented by\r\nphilosophical thinkers, are alike inappropriate and inefficient. They only\r\nserve to conceal errors and fallacies, and to deceive philosophy, whose duty it\r\nis to see that reason pursues a safe and straight path. A philosophical method\r\nmay, however, be systematical. For our reason is, subjectively considered,\r\nitself a system, and, in the sphere of mere conceptions, a system of\r\ninvestigation according to principles of unity, the material being supplied by\r\nexperience alone. But this is not the proper place for discussing the peculiar\r\nmethod of transcendental philosophy, as our present task is simply to examine\r\nwhether our faculties are capable of erecting an edifice on the basis of pure\r\nreason, and how far they may proceed with the materials at their command.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003ca id=\"chap99\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eSection II. The Discipline of Pure Reason in\r\nPolemics\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nReason must be subject, in all its operations, to criticism, which must always\r\nbe permitted to exercise its functions without restraint; otherwise its\r\ninterests are imperilled and its influence obnoxious to suspicion. There is\r\nnothing, however useful, however sacred it may be, that can claim exemption\r\nfrom the searching examination of this supreme tribunal, which has no respect\r\nof persons. The very existence of reason depends upon this freedom; for the\r\nvoice of reason is not that of a dictatorial and despotic power, it is rather\r\nlike the vote of the citizens of a free state, every member of which must have\r\nthe privilege of giving free expression to his doubts, and possess even the\r\nright of veto.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut while reason can never decline to submit itself to the tribunal of\r\ncriticism, it has not always cause to dread the judgement of this court. Pure\r\nreason, however, when engaged in the sphere of dogmatism, is not so thoroughly\r\nconscious of a strict observance of its highest laws, as to appear before a\r\nhigher judicial reason with perfect confidence. On the contrary, it must\r\nrenounce its magnificent dogmatical pretensions in philosophy.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nVery different is the case when it has to defend itself, not before a judge,\r\nbut against an equal. If dogmatical assertions are advanced on the negative\r\nside, in opposition to those made by reason on the positive side, its\r\njustification kat authrhopon is complete, although the proof of its\r\npropositions is kat aletheian unsatisfactory.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBy the polemic of pure reason I mean the defence of its propositions made by\r\nreason, in opposition to the dogmatical counter-propositions advanced by other\r\nparties. The question here is not whether its own statements may not also be\r\nfalse; it merely regards the fact that reason proves that the opposite cannot\r\nbe established with demonstrative certainty, nor even asserted with a higher\r\ndegree of probability. Reason does not hold her possessions upon sufferance;\r\nfor, although she cannot show a perfectly satisfactory title to them, no one\r\ncan prove that she is not the rightful possessor.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIt is a melancholy reflection that reason, in its highest exercise, falls into\r\nan antithetic; and that the supreme tribunal for the settlement of differences\r\nshould not be at union with itself. It is true that we had to discuss the\r\nquestion of an apparent antithetic, but we found that it was based upon a\r\nmisconception. In conformity with the common prejudice, phenomena were regarded\r\nas things in themselves, and thus an absolute completeness in their synthesis\r\nwas required in the one mode or in the other (it was shown to be impossible in\r\nboth); a demand entirely out of place in regard to phenomena. There was, then,\r\nno real self-contradiction of reason in the propositions: The series of\r\nphenomena given in themselves has an absolutely first beginning; and: This\r\nseries is absolutely and in itself without beginning. The two propositions are\r\nperfectly consistent with each other, because phenomena as phenomena are in\r\nthemselves nothing, and consequently the hypothesis that they are things in\r\nthemselves must lead to self-contradictory inferences.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut there are cases in which a similar misunderstanding cannot be provided\r\nagainst, and the dispute must remain unsettled. Take, for example, the theistic\r\nproposition: There is a Supreme Being; and on the other hand, the atheistic\r\ncounter-statement: There exists no Supreme Being; or, in psychology: Everything\r\nthat thinks possesses the attribute of absolute and permanent unity, which is\r\nutterly different from the transitory unity of material phenomena; and the\r\ncounter-proposition: The soul is not an immaterial unity, and its nature is\r\ntransitory, like that of phenomena. The objects of these questions contain no\r\nheterogeneous or contradictory elements, for they relate to things in\r\nthemselves, and not to phenomena. There would arise, indeed, a real\r\ncontradiction, if reason came forward with a statement on the negative side of\r\nthese questions alone. As regards the criticism to which the grounds of proof\r\non the affirmative side must be subjected, it may be freely admitted, without\r\nnecessitating the surrender of the affirmative propositions, which have, at\r\nleast, the interest of reason in their favour\u0026mdash;an advantage which the\r\nopposite party cannot lay claim to.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nI cannot agree with the opinion of several admirable thinkers\u0026mdash;Sulzer\r\namong the rest\u0026mdash;that, in spite of the weakness of the arguments hitherto\r\nin use, we may hope, one day, to see sufficient demonstrations of the two\r\ncardinal propositions of pure reason\u0026mdash;the existence of a Supreme Being,\r\nand the immortality of the soul. I am certain, on the contrary, that this will\r\nnever be the case. For on what ground can reason base such synthetical\r\npropositions, which do not relate to the objects of experience and their\r\ninternal possibility? But it is also demonstratively certain that no one will\r\never be able to maintain the contrary with the least show of probability. For,\r\nas he can attempt such a proof solely upon the basis of pure reason, he is\r\nbound to prove that a Supreme Being, and a thinking subject in the character of\r\na pure intelligence, are impossible. But where will he find the knowledge which\r\ncan enable him to enounce synthetical judgements in regard to things which\r\ntranscend the region of experience? We may, therefore, rest assured that the\r\nopposite never will be demonstrated. We need not, then, have recourse to\r\nscholastic arguments; we may always admit the truth of those propositions which\r\nare consistent with the speculative interests of reason in the sphere of\r\nexperience, and form, moreover, the only means of uniting the speculative with\r\nthe practical interest. Our opponent, who must not be considered here as a\r\ncritic solely, we can be ready to meet with a non liquet which cannot fail to\r\ndisconcert him; while we cannot deny his right to a similar retort, as we have\r\non our side the advantage of the support of the subjective maxim of reason, and\r\ncan therefore look upon all his sophistical arguments with calm indifference.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nFrom this point of view, there is properly no antithetic of pure reason. For\r\nthe only arena for such a struggle would be upon the field of pure theology and\r\npsychology; but on this ground there can appear no combatant whom we need to\r\nfear. Ridicule and boasting can be his only weapons; and these may be laughed\r\nat, as mere child\u0026rsquo;s play. This consideration restores to Reason her\r\ncourage; for what source of confidence could be found, if she, whose vocation\r\nit is to destroy error, were at variance with herself and without any\r\nreasonable hope of ever reaching a state of permanent repose?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nEverything in nature is good for some purpose. Even poisons are serviceable;\r\nthey destroy the evil effects of other poisons generated in our system, and\r\nmust always find a place in every complete pharmacopoeia. The objections raised\r\nagainst the fallacies and sophistries of speculative reason, are objections\r\ngiven by the nature of this reason itself, and must therefore have a\r\ndestination and purpose which can only be for the good of humanity. For what\r\npurpose has Providence raised many objects, in which we have the deepest\r\ninterest, so far above us, that we vainly try to cognize them with certainty,\r\nand our powers of mental vision are rather excited than satisfied by the\r\nglimpses we may chance to seize? It is very doubtful whether it is for our\r\nbenefit to advance bold affirmations regarding subjects involved in such\r\nobscurity; perhaps it would even be detrimental to our best interests. But it\r\nis undoubtedly always beneficial to leave the investigating, as well as the\r\ncritical reason, in perfect freedom, and permit it to take charge of its own\r\ninterests, which are advanced as much by its limitation, as by its extension of\r\nits views, and which always suffer by the interference of foreign powers\r\nforcing it, against its natural tendencies, to bend to certain preconceived\r\ndesigns.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAllow your opponent to say what he thinks reasonable, and combat him only with\r\nthe weapons of reason. Have no anxiety for the practical interests of\r\nhumanity\u0026mdash;these are never imperilled in a purely speculative dispute. Such\r\na dispute serves merely to disclose the antinomy of reason, which, as it has\r\nits source in the nature of reason, ought to be thoroughly investigated. Reason\r\nis benefited by the examination of a subject on both sides, and its judgements\r\nare corrected by being limited. It is not the matter that may give occasion to\r\ndispute, but the manner. For it is perfectly permissible to employ, in the\r\npresence of reason, the language of a firmly rooted faith, even after we have\r\nbeen obliged to renounce all pretensions to knowledge.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIf we were to ask the dispassionate David Hume\u0026mdash;a philosopher endowed, in\r\na degree that few are, with a well-balanced judgement: What motive induced you\r\nto spend so much labour and thought in undermining the consoling and beneficial\r\npersuasion that reason is capable of assuring us of the existence, and\r\npresenting us with a determinate conception of a Supreme Being?\u0026mdash;his\r\nanswer would be: Nothing but the desire of teaching reason to know its own\r\npowers better, and, at the same time, a dislike of the procedure by which that\r\nfaculty was compelled to support foregone conclusions, and prevented from\r\nconfessing the internal weaknesses which it cannot but feel when it enters upon\r\na rigid self-examination. If, on the other hand, we were to ask\r\nPriestley\u0026mdash;a philosopher who had no taste for transcendental speculation,\r\nbut was entirely devoted to the principles of empiricism\u0026mdash;what his motives\r\nwere for overturning those two main pillars of religion\u0026mdash;the doctrines of\r\nthe freedom of the will and the immortality of the soul (in his view the hope\r\nof a future life is but the expectation of the miracle of\r\nresurrection)\u0026mdash;this philosopher, himself a zealous and pious teacher of\r\nreligion, could give no other answer than this: I acted in the interest of\r\nreason, which always suffers, when certain objects are explained and judged by\r\na reference to other supposed laws than those of material nature\u0026mdash;the only\r\nlaws which we know in a determinate manner. It would be unfair to decry the\r\nlatter philosopher, who endeavoured to harmonize his paradoxical opinions with\r\nthe interests of religion, and to undervalue an honest and reflecting man,\r\nbecause he finds himself at a loss the moment he has left the field of natural\r\nscience. The same grace must be accorded to Hume, a man not less well-disposed,\r\nand quite as blameless in his moral character, and who pushed his abstract\r\nspeculations to an extreme length, because, as he rightly believed, the object\r\nof them lies entirely beyond the bounds of natural science, and within the\r\nsphere of pure ideas.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWhat is to be done to provide against the danger which seems in the present\r\ncase to menace the best interests of humanity? The course to be pursued in\r\nreference to this subject is a perfectly plain and natural one. Let each\r\nthinker pursue his own path; if he shows talent, if he gives evidence of\r\nprofound thought, in one word, if he shows that he possesses the power of\r\nreasoning\u0026mdash;reason is always the gainer. If you have recourse to other\r\nmeans, if you attempt to coerce reason, if you raise the cry of treason to\r\nhumanity, if you excite the feelings of the crowd, which can neither understand\r\nnor sympathize with such subtle speculations\u0026mdash;you will only make\r\nyourselves ridiculous. For the question does not concern the advantage or\r\ndisadvantage which we are expected to reap from such inquiries; the question is\r\nmerely how far reason can advance in the field of speculation, apart from all\r\nkinds of interest, and whether we may depend upon the exertions of speculative\r\nreason, or must renounce all reliance on it. Instead of joining the combatants,\r\nit is your part to be a tranquil spectator of the struggle\u0026mdash;a laborious\r\nstruggle for the parties engaged, but attended, in its progress as well as in\r\nits result, with the most advantageous consequences for the interests of\r\nthought and knowledge. It is absurd to expect to be enlightened by Reason, and\r\nat the same time to prescribe to her what side of the question she must adopt.\r\nMoreover, reason is sufficiently held in check by its own power, the limits\r\nimposed on it by its own nature are sufficient; it is unnecessary for you to\r\nplace over it additional guards, as if its power were dangerous to the\r\nconstitution of the intellectual state. In the dialectic of reason there is no\r\nvictory gained which need in the least disturb your tranquility.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe strife of dialectic is a necessity of reason, and we cannot but wish that\r\nit had been conducted long ere this with that perfect freedom which ought to be\r\nits essential condition. In this case, we should have had at an earlier period\r\na matured and profound criticism, which must have put an end to all dialectical\r\ndisputes, by exposing the illusions and prejudices in which they originated.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThere is in human nature an unworthy propensity\u0026mdash;a propensity which, like\r\neverything that springs from nature, must in its final purpose be conducive to\r\nthe good of humanity\u0026mdash;to conceal our real sentiments, and to give\r\nexpression only to certain received opinions, which are regarded as at once\r\nsafe and promotive of the common good. It is true, this tendency, not only to\r\nconceal our real sentiments, but to profess those which may gain us favour in\r\nthe eyes of society, has not only civilized, but, in a certain measure,\r\nmoralized us; as no one can break through the outward covering of\r\nrespectability, honour, and morality, and thus the seemingly-good examples\r\nwhich we see around us form an excellent school for moral improvement, so long\r\nas our belief in their genuineness remains unshaken. But this disposition to\r\nrepresent ourselves as better than we are, and to utter opinions which are not\r\nour own, can be nothing more than a kind of provisionary arrangement of nature\r\nto lead us from the rudeness of an uncivilized state, and to teach us how to\r\nassume at least the appearance and manner of the good we see. But when true\r\nprinciples have been developed, and have obtained a sure foundation in our\r\nhabit of thought, this conventionalism must be attacked with earnest vigour,\r\notherwise it corrupts the heart, and checks the growth of good dispositions\r\nwith the mischievous weed of fair appearances.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nI am sorry to remark the same tendency to misrepresentation and hypocrisy in\r\nthe sphere of speculative discussion, where there is less temptation to\r\nrestrain the free expression of thought. For what can be more prejudicial to\r\nthe interests of intelligence than to falsify our real sentiments, to conceal\r\nthe doubts which we feel in regard to our statements, or to maintain the\r\nvalidity of grounds of proof which we well know to be insufficient? So long as\r\nmere personal vanity is the source of these unworthy artifices\u0026mdash;and this\r\nis generally the case in speculative discussions, which are mostly destitute of\r\npractical interest, and are incapable of complete demonstration\u0026mdash;the\r\nvanity of the opposite party exaggerates as much on the other side; and thus\r\nthe result is the same, although it is not brought about so soon as if the\r\ndispute had been conducted in a sincere and upright spirit. But where the mass\r\nentertains the notion that the aim of certain subtle speculators is nothing\r\nless than to shake the very foundations of public welfare and morality\u0026mdash;it\r\nseems not only prudent, but even praise worthy, to maintain the good cause by\r\nillusory arguments, rather than to give to our supposed opponents the advantage\r\nof lowering our declarations to the moderate tone of a merely practical\r\nconviction, and of compelling us to confess our inability to attain to\r\napodeictic certainty in speculative subjects. But we ought to reflect that\r\nthere is nothing, in the world more fatal to the maintenance of a good cause\r\nthan deceit, misrepresentation, and falsehood. That the strictest laws of\r\nhonesty should be observed in the discussion of a purely speculative subject is\r\nthe least requirement that can be made. If we could reckon with security even\r\nupon so little, the conflict of speculative reason regarding the important\r\nquestions of God, immortality, and freedom, would have been either decided long\r\nago, or would very soon be brought to a conclusion. But, in general, the\r\nuprightness of the defence stands in an inverse ratio to the goodness of the\r\ncause; and perhaps more honesty and fairness are shown by those who deny than\r\nby those who uphold these doctrines.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nI shall persuade myself, then, that I have readers who do not wish to see a\r\nrighteous cause defended by unfair arguments. Such will now recognize the fact\r\nthat, according to the principles of this Critique, if we consider not what is,\r\nbut what ought to be the case, there can be really no polemic of pure reason.\r\nFor how can two persons dispute about a thing, the reality of which neither can\r\npresent in actual or even in possible experience? Each adopts the plan of\r\nmeditating on his idea for the purpose of drawing from the idea, if he can,\r\nwhat is more than the idea, that is, the reality of the object which it\r\nindicates. How shall they settle the dispute, since neither is able to make his\r\nassertions directly comprehensible and certain, but must restrict himself to\r\nattacking and confuting those of his opponent? All statements enounced by pure\r\nreason transcend the conditions of possible experience, beyond the sphere of\r\nwhich we can discover no criterion of truth, while they are at the same time\r\nframed in accordance with the laws of the understanding, which are applicable\r\nonly to experience; and thus it is the fate of all such speculative discussions\r\nthat while the one party attacks the weaker side of his opponent, he infallibly\r\nlays open his own weaknesses.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe critique of pure reason may be regarded as the highest tribunal for all\r\nspeculative disputes; for it is not involved in these disputes, which have an\r\nimmediate relation to certain objects and not to the laws of the mind, but is\r\ninstituted for the purpose of determining the rights and limits of reason.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWithout the control of criticism, reason is, as it were, in a state of nature,\r\nand can only establish its claims and assertions by war. Criticism, on the\r\ncontrary, deciding all questions according to the fundamental laws of its own\r\ninstitution, secures to us the peace of law and order, and enables us to\r\ndiscuss all differences in the more tranquil manner of a legal process. In the\r\nformer case, disputes are ended by victory, which both sides may claim and\r\nwhich is followed by a hollow armistice; in the latter, by a sentence, which,\r\nas it strikes at the root of all speculative differences, ensures to all\r\nconcerned a lasting peace. The endless disputes of a dogmatizing reason compel\r\nus to look for some mode of arriving at a settled decision by a critical\r\ninvestigation of reason itself; just as Hobbes maintains that the state of\r\nnature is a state of injustice and violence, and that we must leave it and\r\nsubmit ourselves to the constraint of law, which indeed limits individual\r\nfreedom, but only that it may consist with the freedom of others and with the\r\ncommon good of all.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThis freedom will, among other things, permit of our openly stating the\r\ndifficulties and doubts which we are ourselves unable to solve, without being\r\ndecried on that account as turbulent and dangerous citizens. This privilege\r\nforms part of the native rights of human reason, which recognizes no other\r\njudge than the universal reason of humanity; and as this reason is the source\r\nof all progress and improvement, such a privilege is to be held sacred and\r\ninviolable. It is unwise, moreover, to denounce as dangerous any bold\r\nassertions against, or rash attacks upon, an opinion which is held by the\r\nlargest and most moral class of the community; for that would be giving them an\r\nimportance which they do not deserve. When I hear that the freedom of the will,\r\nthe hope of a future life, and the existence of God have been overthrown by the\r\narguments of some able writer, I feel a strong desire to read his book; for I\r\nexpect that he will add to my knowledge and impart greater clearness and\r\ndistinctness to my views by the argumentative power shown in his writings. But\r\nI am perfectly certain, even before I have opened the book, that he has not\r\nsucceeded in a single point, not because I believe I am in possession of\r\nirrefutable demonstrations of these important propositions, but because this\r\ntranscendental critique, which has disclosed to me the power and the limits of\r\npure reason, has fully convinced me that, as it is insufficient to establish\r\nthe affirmative, it is as powerless, and even more so, to assure us of the\r\ntruth of the negative answer to these questions. From what source does this\r\nfree-thinker derive his knowledge that there is, for example, no Supreme Being?\r\nThis proposition lies out of the field of possible experience, and, therefore,\r\nbeyond the limits of human cognition. But I would not read at, all the answer\r\nwhich the dogmatical maintainer of the good cause makes to his opponent,\r\nbecause I know well beforehand, that he will merely attack the fallacious\r\ngrounds of his adversary, without being able to establish his own assertions.\r\nBesides, a new illusory argument, in the construction of which talent and\r\nacuteness are shown, is suggestive of new ideas and new trains of reasoning,\r\nand in this respect the old and everyday sophistries are quite useless. Again,\r\nthe dogmatical opponent of religion gives employment to criticism, and enables\r\nus to test and correct its principles, while there is no occasion for anxiety\r\nin regard to the influence and results of his reasoning.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut, it will be said, must we not warn the youth entrusted to academical care\r\nagainst such writings, must we not preserve them from the knowledge of these\r\ndangerous assertions, until their judgement is ripened, or rather until the\r\ndoctrines which we wish to inculcate are so firmly rooted in their minds as to\r\nwithstand all attempts at instilling the contrary dogmas, from whatever quarter\r\nthey may come?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIf we are to confine ourselves to the dogmatical procedure in the sphere of\r\npure reason, and find ourselves unable to settle such disputes otherwise than\r\nby becoming a party in them, and setting counter-assertions against the\r\nstatements advanced by our opponents, there is certainly no plan more advisable\r\nfor the moment, but, at the same time, none more absurd and inefficient for the\r\nfuture, than this retaining of the youthful mind under guardianship for a time,\r\nand thus preserving it\u0026mdash;for so long at least\u0026mdash;from seduction into\r\nerror. But when, at a later period, either curiosity, or the prevalent fashion\r\nof thought places such writings in their hands, will the so-called convictions\r\nof their youth stand firm? The young thinker, who has in his armoury none but\r\ndogmatical weapons with which to resist the attacks of his opponent, and who\r\ncannot detect the latent dialectic which lies in his own opinions as well as in\r\nthose of the opposite party, sees the advance of illusory arguments and grounds\r\nof proof which have the advantage of novelty, against as illusory grounds of\r\nproof destitute of this advantage, and which, perhaps, excite the suspicion\r\nthat the natural credulity of his youth has been abused by his instructors. He\r\nthinks he can find no better means of showing that he has out grown the\r\ndiscipline of his minority than by despising those well-meant warnings, and,\r\nknowing no system of thought but that of dogmatism, he drinks deep draughts of\r\nthe poison that is to sap the principles in which his early years were trained.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nExactly the opposite of the system here recommended ought to be pursued in\r\nacademical instruction. This can only be effected, however, by a thorough\r\ntraining in the critical investigation of pure reason. For, in order to bring\r\nthe principles of this critique into exercise as soon as possible, and to\r\ndemonstrate their perfect even in the presence of the highest degree of\r\ndialectical illusion, the student ought to examine the assertions made on both\r\nsides of speculative questions step by step, and to test them by these\r\nprinciples. It cannot be a difficult task for him to show the fallacies\r\ninherent in these propositions, and thus he begins early to feel his own power\r\nof securing himself against the influence of such sophistical arguments, which\r\nmust finally lose, for him, all their illusory power. And, although the same\r\nblows which overturn the edifice of his opponent are as fatal to his own\r\nspeculative structures, if such he has wished to rear; he need not feel any\r\nsorrow in regard to this seeming misfortune, as he has now before him a fair\r\nprospect into the practical region in which he may reasonably hope to find a\r\nmore secure foundation for a rational system.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThere is, accordingly, no proper polemic in the sphere of pure reason. Both\r\nparties beat the air and fight with their own shadows, as they pass beyond the\r\nlimits of nature, and can find no tangible point of attack\u0026mdash;no firm\r\nfooting for their dogmatical conflict. Fight as vigorously as they may, the\r\nshadows which they hew down, immediately start up again, like the heroes in\r\nWalhalla, and renew the bloodless and unceasing contest.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut neither can we admit that there is any proper sceptical employment of pure\r\nreason, such as might be based upon the principle of neutrality in all\r\nspeculative disputes. To excite reason against itself, to place weapons in the\r\nhands of the party on the one side as well as in those of the other, and to\r\nremain an undisturbed and sarcastic spectator of the fierce struggle that\r\nensues, seems, from the dogmatical point of view, to be a part fitting only a\r\nmalevolent disposition. But, when the sophist evidences an invincible obstinacy\r\nand blindness, and a pride which no criticism can moderate, there is no other\r\npracticable course than to oppose to this pride and obstinacy similar feelings\r\nand pretensions on the other side, equally well or ill founded, so that reason,\r\nstaggered by the reflections thus forced upon it, finds it necessary to\r\nmoderate its confidence in such pretensions and to listen to the advice of\r\ncriticism. But we cannot stop at these doubts, much less regard the conviction\r\nof our ignorance, not only as a cure for the conceit natural to dogmatism, but\r\nas the settlement of the disputes in which reason is involved with itself. On\r\nthe contrary, scepticism is merely a means of awakening reason from its\r\ndogmatic dreams and exciting it to a more careful investigation into its own\r\npowers and pretensions. But, as scepticism appears to be the shortest road to a\r\npermanent peace in the domain of philosophy, and as it is the track pursued by\r\nthe many who aim at giving a philosophical colouring to their contemptuous\r\ndislike of all inquiries of this kind, I think it necessary to present to my\r\nreaders this mode of thought in its true light.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"center\"\u003e\r\n\u003ci\u003eScepticism not a Permanent State for Human Reason.\u003c/i\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe consciousness of ignorance\u0026mdash;unless this ignorance is recognized to be\r\nabsolutely necessary ought, instead of forming the conclusion of my inquiries,\r\nto be the strongest motive to the pursuit of them. All ignorance is either\r\nignorance of things or of the limits of knowledge. If my ignorance is\r\naccidental and not necessary, it must incite me, in the first case, to a\r\ndogmatical inquiry regarding the objects of which I am ignorant; in the second,\r\nto a critical investigation into the bounds of all possible knowledge. But that\r\nmy ignorance is absolutely necessary and unavoidable, and that it consequently\r\nabsolves from the duty of all further investigation, is a fact which cannot be\r\nmade out upon empirical grounds\u0026mdash;from observation\u0026mdash;but upon critical\r\ngrounds alone, that is, by a thoroughgoing investigation into the primary\r\nsources of cognition. It follows that the determination of the bounds of reason\r\ncan be made only on à priori grounds; while the empirical limitation of reason,\r\nwhich is merely an indeterminate cognition of an ignorance that can never be\r\ncompletely removed, can take place only à posteriori. In other words, our\r\nempirical knowledge is limited by that which yet remains for us to know. The\r\nformer cognition of our ignorance, which is possible only on a rational basis,\r\nis a science; the latter is merely a perception, and we cannot say how far the\r\ninferences drawn from it may extend. If I regard the earth, as it really\r\nappears to my senses, as a flat surface, I am ignorant how far this surface\r\nextends. But experience teaches me that, how far soever I go, I always see\r\nbefore me a space in which I can proceed farther; and thus I know the\r\nlimits\u0026mdash;merely visual\u0026mdash;of my actual knowledge of the earth, although\r\nI am ignorant of the limits of the earth itself. But if I have got so far as to\r\nknow that the earth is a sphere, and that its surface is spherical, I can\r\ncognize à priori and determine upon principles, from my knowledge of a small\r\npart of this surface\u0026mdash;say to the extent of a degree\u0026mdash;the diameter and\r\ncircumference of the earth; and although I am ignorant of the objects which\r\nthis surface contains, I have a perfect knowledge of its limits and extent.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe sum of all the possible objects of our cognition seems to us to be a level\r\nsurface, with an apparent horizon\u0026mdash;that which forms the limit of its\r\nextent, and which has been termed by us the idea of unconditioned totality. To\r\nreach this limit by empirical means is impossible, and all attempts to\r\ndetermine it à priori according to a principle, are alike in vain. But all the\r\nquestions raised by pure reason relate to that which lies beyond this horizon,\r\nor, at least, in its boundary line.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe celebrated David Hume was one of those geographers of human reason who\r\nbelieve that they have given a sufficient answer to all such questions by\r\ndeclaring them to lie beyond the horizon of our knowledge\u0026mdash;a horizon\r\nwhich, however, Hume was unable to determine. His attention especially was\r\ndirected to the principle of causality; and he remarked with perfect justice\r\nthat the truth of this principle, and even the objective validity of the\r\nconception of a cause, was not commonly based upon clear insight, that is, upon\r\nà priori cognition. Hence he concluded that this law does not derive its\r\nauthority from its universality and necessity, but merely from its general\r\napplicability in the course of experience, and a kind of subjective necessity\r\nthence arising, which he termed habit. From the inability of reason to\r\nestablish this principle as a necessary law for the acquisition of all\r\nexperience, he inferred the nullity of all the attempts of reason to pass the\r\nregion of the empirical.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThis procedure of subjecting the facta of reason to examination, and, if\r\nnecessary, to disapproval, may be termed the censura of reason. This censura\r\nmust inevitably lead us to doubts regarding all transcendent employment of\r\nprinciples. But this is only the second step in our inquiry. The first step in\r\nregard to the subjects of pure reason, and which marks the infancy of that\r\nfaculty, is that of dogmatism. The second, which we have just mentioned, is\r\nthat of scepticism, and it gives evidence that our judgement has been improved\r\nby experience. But a third step is necessary\u0026mdash;indicative of the maturity\r\nand manhood of the judgement, which now lays a firm foundation upon universal\r\nand necessary principles. This is the period of criticism, in which we do not\r\nexamine the facta of reason, but reason itself, in the whole extent of its\r\npowers, and in regard to its capability of à priori cognition; and thus we\r\ndetermine not merely the empirical and ever-shifting bounds of our knowledge,\r\nbut its necessary and eternal limits. We demonstrate from indubitable\r\nprinciples, not merely our ignorance in respect to this or that subject, but in\r\nregard to all possible questions of a certain class. Thus scepticism is a\r\nresting place for reason, in which it may reflect on its dogmatical wanderings\r\nand gain some knowledge of the region in which it happens to be, that it may\r\npursue its way with greater certainty; but it cannot be its permanent\r\ndwelling-place. It must take up its abode only in the region of complete\r\ncertitude, whether this relates to the cognition of objects themselves, or to\r\nthe limits which bound all our cognition.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nReason is not to be considered as an indefinitely extended plane, of the bounds\r\nof which we have only a general knowledge; it ought rather to be compared to a\r\nsphere, the radius of which may be found from the curvature of its\r\nsurface\u0026mdash;that is, the nature of à priori synthetical\r\npropositions\u0026mdash;and, consequently, its circumference and extent. Beyond the\r\nsphere of experience there are no objects which it can cognize; nay, even\r\nquestions regarding such supposititious objects relate only to the subjective\r\nprinciples of a complete determination of the relations which exist between the\r\nunderstanding-conceptions which lie within this sphere.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWe are actually in possession of à priori synthetical cognitions, as is proved\r\nby the existence of the principles of the understanding, which anticipate\r\nexperience. If any one cannot comprehend the possibility of these principles,\r\nhe may have some reason to doubt whether they are really à priori; but he\r\ncannot on this account declare them to be impossible, and affirm the nullity of\r\nthe steps which reason may have taken under their guidance. He can only say: If\r\nwe perceived their origin and their authenticity, we should be able to\r\ndetermine the extent and limits of reason; but, till we can do this, all\r\npropositions regarding the latter are mere random assertions. In this view, the\r\ndoubt respecting all dogmatical philosophy, which proceeds without the guidance\r\nof criticism, is well grounded; but we cannot therefore deny to reason the\r\nability to construct a sound philosophy, when the way has been prepared by a\r\nthorough critical investigation. All the conceptions produced, and all the\r\nquestions raised, by pure reason, do not lie in the sphere of experience, but\r\nin that of reason itself, and hence they must be solved, and shown to be either\r\nvalid or inadmissible, by that faculty. We have no right to decline the\r\nsolution of such problems, on the ground that the solution can be discovered\r\nonly from the nature of things, and under pretence of the limitation of human\r\nfaculties, for reason is the sole creator of all these ideas, and is therefore\r\nbound either to establish their validity or to expose their illusory nature.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe polemic of scepticism is properly directed against the dogmatist, who\r\nerects a system of philosophy without having examined the fundamental objective\r\nprinciples on which it is based, for the purpose of evidencing the futility of\r\nhis designs, and thus bringing him to a knowledge of his own powers. But, in\r\nitself, scepticism does not give us any certain information in regard to the\r\nbounds of our knowledge. All unsuccessful dogmatical attempts of reason are\r\nfacia, which it is always useful to submit to the censure of the sceptic. But\r\nthis cannot help us to any decision regarding the expectations which reason\r\ncherishes of better success in future endeavours; the investigations of\r\nscepticism cannot, therefore, settle the dispute regarding the rights and\r\npowers of human reason.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHume is perhaps the ablest and most ingenious of all sceptical philosophers,\r\nand his writings have, undoubtedly, exerted the most powerful influence in\r\nawakening reason to a thorough investigation into its own powers. It will,\r\ntherefore, well repay our labours to consider for a little the course of\r\nreasoning which he followed and the errors into which he strayed, although\r\nsetting out on the path of truth and certitude.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHume was probably aware, although he never clearly developed the notion, that\r\nwe proceed in judgements of a certain class beyond our conception of the\r\nobject. I have termed this kind of judgement synthetical. As regard the manner\r\nin which I pass beyond my conception by the aid of experience, no doubts can be\r\nentertained. Experience is itself a synthesis of perceptions; and it employs\r\nperceptions to increment the conception, which I obtain by means of another\r\nperception. But we feel persuaded that we are able to proceed beyond a\r\nconception, and to extend our cognition à priori. We attempt this in two\r\nways\u0026mdash;either, through the pure understanding, in relation to that which\r\nmay become an object of experience, or, through pure reason, in relation to\r\nsuch properties of things, or of the existence of things, as can never be\r\npresented in any experience. This sceptical philosopher did not distinguish\r\nthese two kinds of judgements, as he ought to have done, but regarded this\r\naugmentation of conceptions, and, if we may so express ourselves, the\r\nspontaneous generation of understanding and reason, independently of the\r\nimpregnation of experience, as altogether impossible. The so-called à priori\r\nprinciples of these faculties he consequently held to be invalid and imaginary,\r\nand regarded them as nothing but subjective habits of thought originating in\r\nexperience, and therefore purely empirical and contingent rules, to which we\r\nattribute a spurious necessity and universality. In support of this strange\r\nassertion, he referred us to the generally acknowledged principle of the\r\nrelation between cause and effect. No faculty of the mind can conduct us from\r\nthe conception of a thing to the existence of something else; and hence he\r\nbelieved he could infer that, without experience, we possess no source from\r\nwhich we can augment a conception, and no ground sufficient to justify us in\r\nframing a judgement that is to extend our cognition à priori. That the light of\r\nthe sun, which shines upon a piece of wax, at the same time melts it, while it\r\nhardens clay, no power of the understanding could infer from the conceptions\r\nwhich we previously possessed of these substances; much less is there any à\r\npriori law that could conduct us to such a conclusion, which experience alone\r\ncan certify. On the other hand, we have seen in our discussion of\r\ntranscendental logic, that, although we can never proceed immediately beyond\r\nthe content of the conception which is given us, we can always cognize\r\ncompletely à priori\u0026mdash;in relation, however, to a third term, namely,\r\npossible experience\u0026mdash;the law of its connection with other things. For\r\nexample, if I observe that a piece of wax melts, I can cognize à priori that\r\nthere must have been something (the sun\u0026rsquo;s heat) preceding, which this\r\nlaw; although, without the aid of experience, I could not cognize à priori and\r\nin a determinate manner either the cause from the effect, or the effect from\r\nthe cause. Hume was, therefore, wrong in inferring, from the contingency of the\r\ndetermination according to law, the contingency of the law itself; and the\r\npassing beyond the conception of a thing to possible experience (which is an à\r\npriori proceeding, constituting the objective reality of the conception), he\r\nconfounded with our synthesis of objects in actual experience, which is always,\r\nof course, empirical. Thus, too, he regarded the principle of affinity, which\r\nhas its seat in the understanding and indicates a necessary connection, as a\r\nmere rule of association, lying in the imitative faculty of imagination, which\r\ncan present only contingent, and not objective connections.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe sceptical errors of this remarkably acute thinker arose principally from a\r\ndefect, which was common to him with the dogmatists, namely, that he had never\r\nmade a systematic review of all the different kinds of à priori synthesis\r\nperformed by the understanding. Had he done so, he would have found, to take\r\none example among many, that the principle of permanence was of this character,\r\nand that it, as well as the principle of causality, anticipates experience. In\r\nthis way he might have been able to describe the determinate limits of the à\r\npriori operations of understanding and reason. But he merely declared the\r\nunderstanding to be limited, instead of showing what its limits were; he\r\ncreated a general mistrust in the power of our faculties, without giving us any\r\ndeterminate knowledge of the bounds of our necessary and unavoidable ignorance;\r\nhe examined and condemned some of the principles of the understanding, without\r\ninvestigating all its powers with the completeness necessary to criticism. He\r\ndenies, with truth, certain powers to the understanding, but he goes further,\r\nand declares it to be utterly inadequate to the à priori extension of\r\nknowledge, although he has not fully examined all the powers which reside in\r\nthe faculty; and thus the fate which always overtakes scepticism meets him too.\r\nThat is to say, his own declarations are doubted, for his objections were based\r\nupon facta, which are contingent, and not upon principles, which can alone\r\ndemonstrate the necessary invalidity of all dogmatical assertions.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAs Hume makes no distinction between the well-grounded claims of the\r\nunderstanding and the dialectical pretensions of reason, against which,\r\nhowever, his attacks are mainly directed, reason does not feel itself shut out\r\nfrom all attempts at the extension of à priori cognition, and hence it refuses,\r\nin spite of a few checks in this or that quarter, to relinquish such efforts.\r\nFor one naturally arms oneself to resist an attack, and becomes more obstinate\r\nin the resolve to establish the claims he has advanced. But a complete review\r\nof the powers of reason, and the conviction thence arising that we are in\r\npossession of a limited field of action, while we must admit the vanity of\r\nhigher claims, puts an end to all doubt and dispute, and induces reason to rest\r\nsatisfied with the undisturbed possession of its limited domain.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nTo the uncritical dogmatist, who has not surveyed the sphere of his\r\nunderstanding, nor determined, in accordance with principles, the limits of\r\npossible cognition, who, consequently, is ignorant of his own powers, and\r\nbelieves he will discover them by the attempts he makes in the field of\r\ncognition, these attacks of scepticism are not only dangerous, but destructive.\r\nFor if there is one proposition in his chain of reasoning which he cannot\r\nprove, or the fallacy in which he cannot evolve in accordance with a principle,\r\nsuspicion falls on all his statements, however plausible they may appear.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAnd thus scepticism, the bane of dogmatical philosophy, conducts us to a sound\r\ninvestigation into the understanding and the reason. When we are thus far\r\nadvanced, we need fear no further attacks; for the limits of our domain are\r\nclearly marked out, and we can make no claims nor become involved in any\r\ndisputes regarding the region that lies beyond these limits. Thus the sceptical\r\nprocedure in philosophy does not present any solution of the problems of\r\nreason, but it forms an excellent exercise for its powers, awakening its\r\ncircumspection, and indicating the means whereby it may most fully establish\r\nits claims to its legitimate possessions.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003ca id=\"chap100\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eSection III. The Discipline of Pure Reason in\r\nHypothesis\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThis critique of reason has now taught us that all its efforts to extend the\r\nbounds of knowledge, by means of pure speculation, are utterly fruitless. So\r\nmuch the wider field, it may appear, lies open to hypothesis; as, where we\r\ncannot know with certainty, we are at liberty to make guesses and to form\r\nsuppositions.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nImagination may be allowed, under the strict surveillance of reason, to invent\r\nsuppositions; but, these must be based on something that is perfectly\r\ncertain\u0026mdash;and that is the possibility of the object. If we are well assured\r\nupon this point, it is allowable to have recourse to supposition in regard to\r\nthe reality of the object; but this supposition must, unless it is utterly\r\ngroundless, be connected, as its ground of explanation, with that which is\r\nreally given and absolutely certain. Such a supposition is termed a hypothesis.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIt is beyond our power to form the least conception à priori of the possibility\r\nof dynamical connection in phenomena; and the category of the pure\r\nunderstanding will not enable us to excogitate any such connection, but merely\r\nhelps us to understand it, when we meet with it in experience. For this reason\r\nwe cannot, in accordance with the categories, imagine or invent any object or\r\nany property of an object not given, or that may not be given in experience,\r\nand employ it in a hypothesis; otherwise, we should be basing our chain of\r\nreasoning upon mere chimerical fancies, and not upon conceptions of things.\r\nThus, we have no right to assume the existence of new powers, not existing in\r\nnature\u0026mdash;for example, an understanding with a non-sensuous intuition, a\r\nforce of attraction without contact, or some new kind of substances occupying\r\nspace, and yet without the property of impenetrability\u0026mdash;and, consequently,\r\nwe cannot assume that there is any other kind of community among substances\r\nthan that observable in experience, any kind of presence than that in space, or\r\nany kind of duration than that in time. In one word, the conditions of possible\r\nexperience are for reason the only conditions of the possibility of things;\r\nreason cannot venture to form, independently of these conditions, any\r\nconceptions of things, because such conceptions, although not\r\nself-contradictory, are without object and without application.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe conceptions of reason are, as we have already shown, mere ideas, and do not\r\nrelate to any object in any kind of experience. At the same time, they do not\r\nindicate imaginary or possible objects. They are purely problematical in their\r\nnature and, as aids to the heuristic exercise of the faculties, form the basis\r\nof the regulative principles for the systematic employment of the understanding\r\nin the field of experience. If we leave this ground of experience, they become\r\nmere fictions of thought, the possibility of which is quite indemonstrable; and\r\nthey cannot, consequently, be employed as hypotheses in the explanation of real\r\nphenomena. It is quite admissible to cogitate the soul as simple, for the\r\npurpose of enabling ourselves to employ the idea of a perfect and necessary\r\nunity of all the faculties of the mind as the principle of all our inquiries\r\ninto its internal phenomena, although we cannot cognize this unity in concreto.\r\nBut to assume that the soul is a simple substance (a transcendental conception)\r\nwould be enouncing a proposition which is not only indemonstrable\u0026mdash;as many\r\nphysical hypotheses are\u0026mdash;but a proposition which is purely arbitrary, and\r\nin the highest degree rash. The simple is never presented in experience; and,\r\nif by substance is here meant the permanent object of sensuous intuition, the\r\npossibility of a simple phenomenon is perfectly inconceivable. Reason affords\r\nno good grounds for admitting the existence of intelligible beings, or of\r\nintelligible properties of sensuous things, although\u0026mdash;as we have no\r\nconception either of their possibility or of their impossibility\u0026mdash;it will\r\nalways be out of our power to affirm dogmatically that they do not exist. In\r\nthe explanation of given phenomena, no other things and no other grounds of\r\nexplanation can be employed than those which stand in connection with the given\r\nphenomena according to the known laws of experience. A transcendental\r\nhypothesis, in which a mere idea of reason is employed to explain the phenomena\r\nof nature, would not give us any better insight into a phenomenon, as we should\r\nbe trying to explain what we do not sufficiently understand from known\r\nempirical principles, by what we do not understand at all. The principles of\r\nsuch a hypothesis might conduce to the satisfaction of reason, but it would not\r\nassist the understanding in its application to objects. Order and conformity to\r\naims in the sphere of nature must be themselves explained upon natural grounds\r\nand according to natural laws; and the wildest hypotheses, if they are only\r\nphysical, are here more admissible than a hyperphysical hypothesis, such as\r\nthat of a divine author. For such a hypothesis would introduce the principle of\r\nignava ratio, which requires us to give up the search for causes that might be\r\ndiscovered in the course of experience and to rest satisfied with a mere idea.\r\nAs regards the absolute totality of the grounds of explanation in the series of\r\nthese causes, this can be no hindrance to the understanding in the case of\r\nphenomena; because, as they are to us nothing more than phenomena, we have no\r\nright to look for anything like completeness in the synthesis of the series of\r\ntheir conditions.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nTranscendental hypotheses are therefore inadmissible; and we cannot use the\r\nliberty of employing, in the absence of physical, hyperphysical grounds of\r\nexplanation. And this for two reasons; first, because such hypothesis do not\r\nadvance reason, but rather stop it in its progress; secondly, because this\r\nlicence would render fruitless all its exertions in its own proper sphere,\r\nwhich is that of experience. For, when the explanation of natural phenomena\r\nhappens to be difficult, we have constantly at hand a transcendental ground of\r\nexplanation, which lifts us above the necessity of investigating nature; and\r\nour inquiries are brought to a close, not because we have obtained all the\r\nrequisite knowledge, but because we abut upon a principle which is\r\nincomprehensible and which, indeed, is so far back in the track of thought as\r\nto contain the conception of the absolutely primal being.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe next requisite for the admissibility of a hypothesis is its sufficiency.\r\nThat is, it must determine à priori the consequences which are given in\r\nexperience and which are supposed to follow from the hypothesis itself. If we\r\nrequire to employ auxiliary hypotheses, the suspicion naturally arises that\r\nthey are mere fictions; because the necessity for each of them requires the\r\nsame justification as in the case of the original hypothesis, and thus their\r\ntestimony is invalid. If we suppose the existence of an infinitely perfect\r\ncause, we possess sufficient grounds for the explanation of the conformity to\r\naims, the order and the greatness which we observe in the universe; but we find\r\nourselves obliged, when we observe the evil in the world and the exceptions to\r\nthese laws, to employ new hypothesis in support of the original one. We employ\r\nthe idea of the simple nature of the human soul as the foundation of all the\r\ntheories we may form of its phenomena; but when we meet with difficulties in\r\nour way, when we observe in the soul phenomena similar to the changes which\r\ntake place in matter, we require to call in new auxiliary hypotheses. These\r\nmay, indeed, not be false, but we do not know them to be true, because the only\r\nwitness to their certitude is the hypothesis which they themselves have been\r\ncalled in to explain.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWe are not discussing the above-mentioned assertions regarding the immaterial\r\nunity of the soul and the existence of a Supreme Being as dogmata, which\r\ncertain philosophers profess to demonstrate à priori, but purely as hypotheses.\r\nIn the former case, the dogmatist must take care that his arguments possess the\r\napodeictic certainty of a demonstration. For the assertion that the reality of\r\nsuch ideas is probable is as absurd as a proof of the probability of a\r\nproposition in geometry. Pure abstract reason, apart from all experience, can\r\neither cognize nothing at all; and hence the judgements it enounces are never\r\nmere opinions, they are either apodeictic certainties, or declarations that\r\nnothing can be known on the subject. Opinions and probable judgements on the\r\nnature of things can only be employed to explain given phenomena, or they may\r\nrelate to the effect, in accordance with empirical laws, of an actually\r\nexisting cause. In other words, we must restrict the sphere of opinion to the\r\nworld of experience and nature. Beyond this region opinion is mere invention;\r\nunless we are groping about for the truth on a path not yet fully known, and\r\nhave some hopes of stumbling upon it by chance.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut, although hypotheses are inadmissible in answers to the questions of pure\r\nspeculative reason, they may be employed in the defence of these answers. That\r\nis to say, hypotheses are admissible in polemic, but not in the sphere of\r\ndogmatism. By the defence of statements of this character, I do not mean an\r\nattempt at discovering new grounds for their support, but merely the refutation\r\nof the arguments of opponents. All à priori synthetical propositions possess\r\nthe peculiarity that, although the philosopher who maintains the reality of the\r\nideas contained in the proposition is not in possession of sufficient knowledge\r\nto establish the certainty of his statements, his opponent is as little able to\r\nprove the truth of the opposite. This equality of fortune does not allow the\r\none party to be superior to the other in the sphere of speculative cognition;\r\nand it is this sphere, accordingly, that is the proper arena of these endless\r\nspeculative conflicts. But we shall afterwards show that, in relation to its\r\npractical exercise, Reason has the right of admitting what, in the field of\r\npure speculation, she would not be justified in supposing, except upon\r\nperfectly sufficient grounds; because all such suppositions destroy the\r\nnecessary completeness of speculation\u0026mdash;a condition which the practical\r\nreason, however, does not consider to be requisite. In this sphere, therefore,\r\nReason is mistress of a possession, her title to which she does not require to\r\nprove\u0026mdash;which, in fact, she could not do. The burden of proof accordingly\r\nrests upon the opponent. But as he has just as little knowledge regarding the\r\nsubject discussed, and is as little able to prove the non-existence of the\r\nobject of an idea, as the philosopher on the other side is to demonstrate its\r\nreality, it is evident that there is an advantage on the side of the\r\nphilosopher who maintains his proposition as a practically necessary\r\nsupposition (melior est conditio possidentis). For he is at liberty to employ,\r\nin self-defence, the same weapons as his opponent makes use of in attacking\r\nhim; that is, he has a right to use hypotheses not for the purpose of\r\nsupporting the arguments in favour of his own propositions, but to show that\r\nhis opponent knows no more than himself regarding the subject under discussion\r\nand cannot boast of any speculative advantage.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHypotheses are, therefore, admissible in the sphere of pure reason only as\r\nweapons for self-defence, and not as supports to dogmatical assertions. But the\r\nopposing party we must always seek for in ourselves. For speculative reason is,\r\nin the sphere of transcendentalism, dialectical in its own nature. The\r\ndifficulties and objections we have to fear lie in ourselves. They are like old\r\nbut never superannuated claims; and we must seek them out, and settle them once\r\nand for ever, if we are to expect a permanent peace. External tranquility is\r\nhollow and unreal. The root of these contradictions, which lies in the nature\r\nof human reason, must be destroyed; and this can only be done by giving it, in\r\nthe first instance, freedom to grow, nay, by nourishing it, that it may send\r\nout shoots, and thus betray its own existence. It is our duty, therefore, to\r\ntry to discover new objections, to put weapons in the bands of our opponent,\r\nand to grant him the most favourable position in the arena that he can wish. We\r\nhave nothing to fear from these concessions; on the contrary, we may rather\r\nhope that we shall thus make ourselves master of a possession which no one will\r\never venture to dispute.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe thinker requires, to be fully equipped, the hypotheses of pure reason,\r\nwhich, although but leaden weapons (for they have not been steeled in the\r\narmoury of experience), are as useful as any that can be employed by his\r\nopponents. If, accordingly, we have assumed, from a non-speculative point of\r\nview, the immaterial nature of the soul, and are met by the objection that\r\nexperience seems to prove that the growth and decay of our mental faculties are\r\nmere modifications of the sensuous organism\u0026mdash;we can weaken the force of\r\nthis objection by the assumption that the body is nothing but the fundamental\r\nphenomenon, to which, as a necessary condition, all sensibility, and\r\nconsequently all thought, relates in the present state of our existence; and\r\nthat the separation of soul and body forms the conclusion of the sensuous\r\nexercise of our power of cognition and the beginning of the intellectual. The\r\nbody would, in this view of the question, be regarded, not as the cause of\r\nthought, but merely as its restrictive condition, as promotive of the sensuous\r\nand animal, but as a hindrance to the pure and spiritual life; and the\r\ndependence of the animal life on the constitution of the body, would not prove\r\nthat the whole life of man was also dependent on the state of the organism. We\r\nmight go still farther, and discover new objections, or carry out to their\r\nextreme consequences those which have already been adduced.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGeneration, in the human race as well as among the irrational animals, depends\r\non so many accidents\u0026mdash;of occasion, of proper sustenance, of the laws\r\nenacted by the government of a country of vice even, that it is difficult to\r\nbelieve in the eternal existence of a being whose life has begun under\r\ncircumstances so mean and trivial, and so entirely dependent upon our own\r\ncontrol. As regards the continuance of the existence of the whole race, we need\r\nhave no difficulties, for accident in single cases is subject to general laws;\r\nbut, in the case of each individual, it would seem as if we could hardly expect\r\nso wonderful an effect from causes so insignificant. But, in answer to these\r\nobjections, we may adduce the transcendental hypothesis that all life is\r\nproperly intelligible, and not subject to changes of time, and that it neither\r\nbegan in birth, nor will end in death. We may assume that this life is nothing\r\nmore than a sensuous representation of pure spiritual life; that the whole\r\nworld of sense is but an image, hovering before the faculty of cognition which\r\nwe exercise in this sphere, and with no more objective reality than a dream;\r\nand that if we could intuite ourselves and other things as they really are, we\r\nshould see ourselves in a world of spiritual natures, our connection with which\r\ndid not begin at our birth and will not cease with the destruction of the body.\r\nAnd so on.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWe cannot be said to know what has been above asserted, nor do we seriously\r\nmaintain the truth of these assertions; and the notions therein indicated are\r\nnot even ideas of reason, they are purely fictitious conceptions. But this\r\nhypothetical procedure is in perfect conformity with the laws of reason. Our\r\nopponent mistakes the absence of empirical conditions for a proof of the\r\ncomplete impossibility of all that we have asserted; and we have to show him\r\nthat he has not exhausted the whole sphere of possibility and that he can as\r\nlittle compass that sphere by the laws of experience and nature, as we can lay\r\na secure foundation for the operations of reason beyond the region of\r\nexperience. Such hypothetical defences against the pretensions of an opponent\r\nmust not be regarded as declarations of opinion. The philosopher abandons them,\r\nso soon as the opposite party renounces its dogmatical conceit. To maintain a\r\nsimply negative position in relation to propositions which rest on an insecure\r\nfoundation, well befits the moderation of a true philosopher; but to uphold the\r\nobjections urged against an opponent as proofs of the opposite statement is a\r\nproceeding just as unwarrantable and arrogant as it is to attack the position\r\nof a philosopher who advances affirmative propositions regarding such a\r\nsubject.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIt is evident, therefore, that hypotheses, in the speculative sphere, are\r\nvalid, not as independent propositions, but only relatively to opposite\r\ntranscendent assumptions. For, to make the principles of possible experience\r\nconditions of the possibility of things in general is just as transcendent a\r\nprocedure as to maintain the objective reality of ideas which can be applied to\r\nno objects except such as lie without the limits of possible experience. The\r\njudgements enounced by pure reason must be necessary, or they must not be\r\nenounced at all. Reason cannot trouble herself with opinions. But the\r\nhypotheses we have been discussing are merely problematical judgements, which\r\ncan neither be confuted nor proved; while, therefore, they are not personal\r\nopinions, they are indispensable as answers to objections which are liable to\r\nbe raised. But we must take care to confine them to this function, and guard\r\nagainst any assumption on their part of absolute validity, a proceeding which\r\nwould involve reason in inextricable difficulties and contradictions.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003ca id=\"chap101\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eSection IV. The Discipline of Pure Reason in Relation\r\nto Proofs\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIt is a peculiarity, which distinguishes the proofs of transcendental\r\nsynthetical propositions from those of all other à priori synthetical\r\ncognitions, that reason, in the case of the former, does not apply its\r\nconceptions directly to an object, but is first obliged to prove, à priori, the\r\nobjective validity of these conceptions and the possibility of their syntheses.\r\nThis is not merely a prudential rule, it is essential to the very possibility\r\nof the proof of a transcendental proposition. If I am required to pass, à\r\npriori, beyond the conception of an object, I find that it is utterly\r\nimpossible without the guidance of something which is not contained in the\r\nconception. In mathematics, it is à priori intuition that guides my synthesis;\r\nand, in this case, all our conclusions may be drawn immediately from pure\r\nintuition. In transcendental cognition, so long as we are dealing only with\r\nconceptions of the understanding, we are guided by possible experience. That is\r\nto say, a proof in the sphere of transcendental cognition does not show that\r\nthe given conception (that of an event, for example) leads directly to another\r\nconception (that of a cause)\u0026mdash;for this would be a saltus which nothing can\r\njustify; but it shows that experience itself, and consequently the object of\r\nexperience, is impossible without the connection indicated by these\r\nconceptions. It follows that such a proof must demonstrate the possibility of\r\narriving, synthetically and à priori, at a certain knowledge of things, which\r\nwas not contained in our conceptions of these things. Unless we pay particular\r\nattention to this requirement, our proofs, instead of pursuing the straight\r\npath indicated by reason, follow the tortuous road of mere subjective\r\nassociation. The illusory conviction, which rests upon subjective causes of\r\nassociation, and which is considered as resulting from the perception of a real\r\nand objective natural affinity, is always open to doubt and suspicion. For this\r\nreason, all the attempts which have been made to prove the principle of\r\nsufficient reason, have, according to the universal admission of philosophers,\r\nbeen quite unsuccessful; and, before the appearance of transcendental\r\ncriticism, it was considered better, as this principle could not be abandoned,\r\nto appeal boldly to the common sense of mankind (a proceeding which always\r\nproves that the problem, which reason ought to solve, is one in which\r\nphilosophers find great difficulties), rather than attempt to discover new\r\ndogmatical proofs.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut, if the proposition to be proved is a proposition of pure reason, and if I\r\naim at passing beyond my empirical conceptions by the aid of mere ideas, it is\r\nnecessary that the proof should first show that such a step in synthesis is\r\npossible (which it is not), before it proceeds to prove the truth of the\r\nproposition itself. The so-called proof of the simple nature of the soul from\r\nthe unity of apperception, is a very plausible one. But it contains no answer\r\nto the objection, that, as the notion of absolute simplicity is not a\r\nconception which is directly applicable to a perception, but is an idea which\r\nmust be inferred\u0026mdash;if at all\u0026mdash;from observation, it is by no means\r\nevident how the mere fact of consciousness, which is contained in all thought,\r\nalthough in so far a simple representation, can conduct me to the consciousness\r\nand cognition of a thing which is purely a thinking substance. When I represent\r\nto my mind the power of my body as in motion, my body in this thought is so far\r\nabsolute unity, and my representation of it is a simple one; and hence I can\r\nindicate this representation by the motion of a point, because I have made\r\nabstraction of the size or volume of the body. But I cannot hence infer that,\r\ngiven merely the moving power of a body, the body may be cogitated as simple\r\nsubstance, merely because the representation in my mind takes no account of its\r\ncontent in space, and is consequently simple. The simple, in abstraction, is\r\nvery different from the objectively simple; and hence the Ego, which is simple\r\nin the first sense, may, in the second sense, as indicating the soul itself, be\r\na very complex conception, with a very various content. Thus it is evident that\r\nin all such arguments there lurks a paralogism. We guess (for without some such\r\nsurmise our suspicion would not be excited in reference to a proof of this\r\ncharacter) at the presence of the paralogism, by keeping ever before us a\r\ncriterion of the possibility of those synthetical propositions which aim at\r\nproving more than experience can teach us. This criterion is obtained from the\r\nobservation that such proofs do not lead us directly from the subject of the\r\nproposition to be proved to the required predicate, but find it necessary to\r\npresuppose the possibility of extending our cognition à priori by means of\r\nideas. We must, accordingly, always use the greatest caution; we require,\r\nbefore attempting any proof, to consider how it is possible to extend the\r\nsphere of cognition by the operations of pure reason, and from what source we\r\nare to derive knowledge, which is not obtained from the analysis of\r\nconceptions, nor relates, by anticipation, to possible experience. We shall\r\nthus spare ourselves much severe and fruitless labour, by not expecting from\r\nreason what is beyond its power, or rather by subjecting it to discipline, and\r\nteaching it to moderate its vehement desires for the extension of the sphere of\r\ncognition.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe first rule for our guidance is, therefore, not to attempt a transcendental\r\nproof, before we have considered from what source we are to derive the\r\nprinciples upon which the proof is to be based, and what right we have to\r\nexpect that our conclusions from these principles will be veracious. If they\r\nare principles of the understanding, it is vain to expect that we should attain\r\nby their means to ideas of pure reason; for these principles are valid only in\r\nregard to objects of possible experience. If they are principles of pure\r\nreason, our labour is alike in vain. For the principles of reason, if employed\r\nas objective, are without exception dialectical and possess no validity or\r\ntruth, except as regulative principles of the systematic employment of reason\r\nin experience. But when such delusive proof are presented to us, it is our duty\r\nto meet them with the non liquet of a matured judgement; and, although we are\r\nunable to expose the particular sophism upon which the proof is based, we have\r\na right to demand a deduction of the principles employed in it; and, if these\r\nprinciples have their origin in pure reason alone, such a deduction is\r\nabsolutely impossible. And thus it is unnecessary that we should trouble\r\nourselves with the exposure and confutation of every sophistical illusion; we\r\nmay, at once, bring all dialectic, which is inexhaustible in the production of\r\nfallacies, before the bar of critical reason, which tests the principles upon\r\nwhich all dialectical procedure is based. The second peculiarity of\r\ntranscendental proof is that a transcendental proposition cannot rest upon more\r\nthan a single proof. If I am drawing conclusions, not from conceptions, but\r\nfrom intuition corresponding to a conception, be it pure intuition, as in\r\nmathematics, or empirical, as in natural science, the intuition which forms the\r\nbasis of my inferences presents me with materials for many synthetical\r\npropositions, which I can connect in various modes, while, as it is allowable\r\nto proceed from different points in the intention, I can arrive by different\r\npaths at the same proposition.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut every transcendental proposition sets out from a conception, and posits the\r\nsynthetical condition of the possibility of an object according to this\r\nconception. There must, therefore, be but one ground of proof, because it is\r\nthe conception alone which determines the object; and thus the proof cannot\r\ncontain anything more than the determination of the object according to the\r\nconception. In our Transcendental Analytic, for example, we inferred the\r\nprinciple: Every event has a cause, from the only condition of the objective\r\npossibility of our conception of an event. This is that an event cannot be\r\ndetermined in time, and consequently cannot form a part of experience, unless\r\nit stands under this dynamical law. This is the only possible ground of proof;\r\nfor our conception of an event possesses objective validity, that is, is a true\r\nconception, only because the law of causality determines an object to which it\r\ncan refer. Other arguments in support of this principle have been\r\nattempted\u0026mdash;such as that from the contingent nature of a phenomenon; but\r\nwhen this argument is considered, we can discover no criterion of contingency,\r\nexcept the fact of an event\u0026mdash;of something happening, that is to say, the\r\nexistence which is preceded by the non-existence of an object, and thus we fall\r\nback on the very thing to be proved. If the proposition: \u0026ldquo;Every thinking\r\nbeing is simple,\u0026rdquo; is to be proved, we keep to the conception of the ego,\r\nwhich is simple, and to which all thought has a relation. The same is the case\r\nwith the transcendental proof of the existence of a Deity, which is based\r\nsolely upon the harmony and reciprocal fitness of the conceptions of an ens\r\nrealissimum and a necessary being, and cannot be attempted in any other manner.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThis caution serves to simplify very much the criticism of all propositions of\r\nreason. When reason employs conceptions alone, only one proof of its thesis is\r\npossible, if any. When, therefore, the dogmatist advances with ten arguments in\r\nfavour of a proposition, we may be sure that not one of them is conclusive. For\r\nif he possessed one which proved the proposition he brings forward to\r\ndemonstration\u0026mdash;as must always be the case with the propositions of pure\r\nreason\u0026mdash;what need is there for any more? His intention can only be similar\r\nto that of the advocate who had different arguments for different judges; this\r\navailing himself of the weakness of those who examine his arguments, who,\r\nwithout going into any profound investigation, adopt the view of the case which\r\nseems most probable at first sight and decide according to it.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe third rule for the guidance of pure reason in the conduct of a proof is\r\nthat all transcendental proofs must never be apagogic or indirect, but always\r\nostensive or direct. The direct or ostensive proof not only establishes the\r\ntruth of the proposition to be proved, but exposes the grounds of its truth;\r\nthe apagogic, on the other hand, may assure us of the truth of the proposition,\r\nbut it cannot enable us to comprehend the grounds of its possibility. The\r\nlatter is, accordingly, rather an auxiliary to an argument, than a strictly\r\nphilosophical and rational mode of procedure. In one respect, however, they\r\nhave an advantage over direct proofs, from the fact that the mode of arguing by\r\ncontradiction, which they employ, renders our understanding of the question\r\nmore clear, and approximates the proof to the certainty of an intuitional\r\ndemonstration.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe true reason why indirect proofs are employed in different sciences is this.\r\nWhen the grounds upon which we seek to base a cognition are too various or too\r\nprofound, we try whether or not we may not discover the truth of our cognition\r\nfrom its consequences. The modus ponens of reasoning from the truth of its\r\ninferences to the truth of a proposition would be admissible if all the\r\ninferences that can be drawn from it are known to be true; for in this case\r\nthere can be only one possible ground for these inferences, and that is the\r\ntrue one. But this is a quite impracticable procedure, as it surpasses all our\r\npowers to discover all the possible inferences that can be drawn from a\r\nproposition. But this mode of reasoning is employed, under favour, when we wish\r\nto prove the truth of an hypothesis; in which case we admit the truth of the\r\nconclusion\u0026mdash;which is supported by analogy\u0026mdash;that, if all the\r\ninferences we have drawn and examined agree with the proposition assumed, all\r\nother possible inferences will also agree with it. But, in this way, an\r\nhypothesis can never be established as a demonstrated truth. The modus tollens\r\nof reasoning from known inferences to the unknown proposition, is not only a\r\nrigorous, but a very easy mode of proof. For, if it can be shown that but one\r\ninference from a proposition is false, then the proposition must itself be\r\nfalse. Instead, then, of examining, in an ostensive argument, the whole series\r\nof the grounds on which the truth of a proposition rests, we need only take the\r\nopposite of this proposition, and if one inference from it be false, then must\r\nthe opposite be itself false; and, consequently, the proposition which we\r\nwished to prove must be true.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe apagogic method of proof is admissible only in those sciences where it is\r\nimpossible to mistake a subjective representation for an objective cognition.\r\nWhere this is possible, it is plain that the opposite of a given proposition\r\nmay contradict merely the subjective conditions of thought, and not the\r\nobjective cognition; or it may happen that both propositions contradict each\r\nother only under a subjective condition, which is incorrectly considered to be\r\nobjective, and, as the condition is itself false, both propositions may be\r\nfalse, and it will, consequently, be impossible to conclude the truth of the\r\none from the falseness of the other.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIn mathematics such subreptions are impossible; and it is in this science,\r\naccordingly, that the indirect mode of proof has its true place. In the science\r\nof nature, where all assertion is based upon empirical intuition, such\r\nsubreptions may be guarded against by the repeated comparison of observations;\r\nbut this mode of proof is of little value in this sphere of knowledge. But the\r\ntranscendental efforts of pure reason are all made in the sphere of the\r\nsubjective, which is the real medium of all dialectical illusion; and thus\r\nreason endeavours, in its premisses, to impose upon us subjective\r\nrepresentations for objective cognitions. In the transcendental sphere of pure\r\nreason, then, and in the case of synthetical propositions, it is inadmissible\r\nto support a statement by disproving the counter-statement. For only two cases\r\nare possible; either, the counter-statement is nothing but the enouncement of\r\nthe inconsistency of the opposite opinion with the subjective conditions of\r\nreason, which does not affect the real case (for example, we cannot comprehend\r\nthe unconditioned necessity of the existence of a being, and hence every\r\nspeculative proof of the existence of such a being must be opposed on\r\nsubjective grounds, while the possibility of this being in itself cannot with\r\njustice be denied); or, both propositions, being dialectical in their nature,\r\nare based upon an impossible conception. In this latter case the rule applies:\r\nnon entis nulla sunt predicata; that is to say, what we affirm and what we\r\ndeny, respecting such an object, are equally untrue, and the apagogic mode of\r\narriving at the truth is in this case impossible. If, for example, we\r\npresuppose that the world of sense is given in itself in its totality, it is\r\nfalse, either that it is infinite, or that it is finite and limited in space.\r\nBoth are false, because the hypothesis is false. For the notion of phenomena\r\n(as mere representations) which are given in themselves (as objects) is\r\nself-contradictory; and the infinitude of this imaginary whole would, indeed,\r\nbe unconditioned, but would be inconsistent (as everything in the phenomenal\r\nworld is conditioned) with the unconditioned determination and finitude of\r\nquantities which is presupposed in our conception.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe apagogic mode of proof is the true source of those illusions which have\r\nalways had so strong an attraction for the admirers of dogmatical philosophy.\r\nIt may be compared to a champion who maintains the honour and claims of the\r\nparty he has adopted by offering battle to all who doubt the validity of these\r\nclaims and the purity of that honour; while nothing can be proved in this way,\r\nexcept the respective strength of the combatants, and the advantage, in this\r\nrespect, is always on the side of the attacking party. Spectators, observing\r\nthat each party is alternately conqueror and conquered, are led to regard the\r\nsubject of dispute as beyond the power of man to decide upon. But such an\r\nopinion cannot be justified; and it is sufficient to apply to these reasoners\r\nthe remark:\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"poem\"\u003e\r\n\u003ci\u003eNon defensoribus istis\u003cbr\u003e\r\nTempus eget.\u003c/i\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nEach must try to establish his assertions by a transcendental deduction of the\r\ngrounds of proof employed in his argument, and thus enable us to see in what\r\nway the claims of reason may be supported. If an opponent bases his assertions\r\nupon subjective grounds, he may be refuted with ease; not, however to the\r\nadvantage of the dogmatist, who likewise depends upon subjective sources of\r\ncognition and is in like manner driven into a corner by his opponent. But, if\r\nparties employ the direct method of procedure, they will soon discover the\r\ndifficulty, nay, the impossibility of proving their assertions, and will be\r\nforced to appeal to prescription and precedence; or they will, by the help of\r\ncriticism, discover with ease the dogmatical illusions by which they had been\r\nmocked, and compel reason to renounce its exaggerated pretensions to\r\nspeculative insight and to confine itself within the limits of its proper\r\nsphere\u0026mdash;that of practical principles.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003ca id=\"chap102\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eChapter II. The Canon of Pure Reason\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIt is a humiliating consideration for human reason that it is incompetent to\r\ndiscover truth by means of pure speculation, but, on the contrary, stands in\r\nneed of discipline to check its deviations from the straight path and to expose\r\nthe illusions which it originates. But, on the other hand, this consideration\r\nought to elevate and to give it confidence, for this discipline is exercised by\r\nitself alone, and it is subject to the censure of no other power. The bounds,\r\nmoreover, which it is forced to set to its speculative exercise, form likewise\r\na check upon the fallacious pretensions of opponents; and thus what remains of\r\nits possessions, after these exaggerated claims have been disallowed, is secure\r\nfrom attack or usurpation. The greatest, and perhaps the only, use of all\r\nphilosophy of pure reason is, accordingly, of a purely negative character. It\r\nis not an organon for the extension, but a discipline for the determination, of\r\nthe limits of its exercise; and without laying claim to the discovery of new\r\ntruth, it has the modest merit of guarding against error.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAt the same time, there must be some source of positive cognitions which belong\r\nto the domain of pure reason and which become the causes of error only from our\r\nmistaking their true character, while they form the goal towards which reason\r\ncontinually strives. How else can we account for the inextinguishable desire in\r\nthe human mind to find a firm footing in some region beyond the limits of the\r\nworld of experience? It hopes to attain to the possession of a knowledge in\r\nwhich it has the deepest interest. It enters upon the path of pure speculation;\r\nbut in vain. We have some reason, however, to expect that, in the only other\r\nway that lies open to it\u0026mdash;the path of practical reason\u0026mdash;it may meet\r\nwith better success.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nI understand by a canon a list of the à priori principles of the proper\r\nemployment of certain faculties of cognition. Thus general logic, in its\r\nanalytical department, is a formal canon for the faculties of understanding and\r\nreason. In the same way, Transcendental Analytic was seen to be a canon of the\r\npure understanding; for it alone is competent to enounce true à priori\r\nsynthetical cognitions. But, when no proper employment of a faculty of\r\ncognition is possible, no canon can exist. But the synthetical cognition of\r\npure speculative reason is, as has been shown, completely impossible. There\r\ncannot, therefore, exist any canon for the speculative exercise of this\r\nfaculty\u0026mdash;for its speculative exercise is entirely dialectical; and,\r\nconsequently, transcendental logic, in this respect, is merely a discipline,\r\nand not a canon. If, then, there is any proper mode of employing the faculty of\r\npure reason\u0026mdash;in which case there must be a canon for this\r\nfaculty\u0026mdash;this canon will relate, not to the speculative, but to the\r\npractical use of reason. This canon we now proceed to investigate.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003ca id=\"chap103\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eSection I. Of the Ultimate End of the Pure Use of\r\nReason\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThere exists in the faculty of reason a natural desire to venture beyond the\r\nfield of experience, to attempt to reach the utmost bounds of all cognition by\r\nthe help of ideas alone, and not to rest satisfied until it has fulfilled its\r\ncourse and raised the sum of its cognitions into a self-subsistent systematic\r\nwhole. Is the motive for this endeavour to be found in its speculative, or in\r\nits practical interests alone?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSetting aside, at present, the results of the labours of pure reason in its\r\nspeculative exercise, I shall merely inquire regarding the problems the\r\nsolution of which forms its ultimate aim, whether reached or not, and in\r\nrelation to which all other aims are but partial and intermediate. These\r\nhighest aims must, from the nature of reason, possess complete unity; otherwise\r\nthe highest interest of humanity could not be successfully promoted.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe transcendental speculation of reason relates to three things: the freedom\r\nof the will, the immortality of the soul, and the existence of God. The\r\nspeculative interest which reason has in those questions is very small; and,\r\nfor its sake alone, we should not undertake the labour of transcendental\r\ninvestigation\u0026mdash;a labour full of toil and ceaseless struggle. We should be\r\nloth to undertake this labour, because the discoveries we might make would not\r\nbe of the smallest use in the sphere of concrete or physical investigation. We\r\nmay find out that the will is free, but this knowledge only relates to the\r\nintelligible cause of our volition. As regards the phenomena or expressions of\r\nthis will, that is, our actions, we are bound, in obedience to an inviolable\r\nmaxim, without which reason cannot be employed in the sphere of experience, to\r\nexplain these in the same way as we explain all the other phenomena of nature,\r\nthat is to say, according to its unchangeable laws. We may have discovered the\r\nspirituality and immortality of the soul, but we cannot employ this knowledge\r\nto explain the phenomena of this life, nor the peculiar nature of the future,\r\nbecause our conception of an incorporeal nature is purely negative and does not\r\nadd anything to our knowledge, and the only inferences to be drawn from it are\r\npurely fictitious. If, again, we prove the existence of a supreme intelligence,\r\nwe should be able from it to make the conformity to aims existing in the\r\narrangement of the world comprehensible; but we should not be justified in\r\ndeducing from it any particular arrangement or disposition, or inferring any\r\nwhere it is not perceived. For it is a necessary rule of the speculative use of\r\nreason that we must not overlook natural causes, or refuse to listen to the\r\nteaching of experience, for the sake of deducing what we know and perceive from\r\nsomething that transcends all our knowledge. In one word, these three\r\npropositions are, for the speculative reason, always transcendent, and cannot\r\nbe employed as immanent principles in relation to the objects of experience;\r\nthey are, consequently, of no use to us in this sphere, being but the valueless\r\nresults of the severe but unprofitable efforts of reason.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIf, then, the actual cognition of these three cardinal propositions is\r\nperfectly useless, while Reason uses her utmost endeavours to induce us to\r\nadmit them, it is plain that their real value and importance relate to our\r\npractical, and not to our speculative interest.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nI term all that is possible through free will, practical. But if the conditions\r\nof the exercise of free volition are empirical, reason can have only a\r\nregulative, and not a constitutive, influence upon it, and is serviceable\r\nmerely for the introduction of unity into its empirical laws. In the moral\r\nphilosophy of prudence, for example, the sole business of reason is to bring\r\nabout a union of all the ends, which are aimed at by our inclinations, into one\r\nultimate end\u0026mdash;that of happiness\u0026mdash;and to show the agreement which\r\nshould exist among the means of attaining that end. In this sphere,\r\naccordingly, reason cannot present to us any other than pragmatical laws of\r\nfree action, for our guidance towards the aims set up by the senses, and is\r\nincompetent to give us laws which are pure and determined completely à priori.\r\nOn the other hand, pure practical laws, the ends of which have been given by\r\nreason entirely à priori, and which are not empirically conditioned, but are,\r\non the contrary, absolutely imperative in their nature, would be products of\r\npure reason. Such are the moral laws; and these alone belong to the sphere of\r\nthe practical exercise of reason, and admit of a canon.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAll the powers of reason, in the sphere of what may be termed pure philosophy,\r\nare, in fact, directed to the three above-mentioned problems alone. These again\r\nhave a still higher end\u0026mdash;the answer to the question, what we ought to do,\r\nif the will is free, if there is a God and a future world. Now, as this problem\r\nrelates to our in reference to the highest aim of humanity, it is evident that\r\nthe ultimate intention of nature, in the constitution of our reason, has been\r\ndirected to the moral alone.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWe must take care, however, in turning our attention to an object which is\r\nforeign\u003ca href=\"#linknote-78\" id=\"linknoteref-78\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[78]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e to the sphere of transcendental\r\nphilosophy, not to injure the unity of our system by digressions, nor, on the\r\nother hand, to fail in clearness, by saying too little on the new subject of\r\ndiscussion. I hope to avoid both extremes, by keeping as close as possible to\r\nthe transcendental, and excluding all psychological, that is, empirical,\r\nelements.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"linknote-78\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#linknoteref-78\"\u003e[78]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nAll practical conceptions relate to objects of pleasure and pain, and\r\nconsequently\u0026mdash;in an indirect manner, at least\u0026mdash;to objects of feeling.\r\nBut as feeling is not a faculty of representation, but lies out of the sphere\r\nof our powers of cognition, the elements of our judgements, in so far as they\r\nrelate to pleasure or pain, that is, the elements of our practical judgements,\r\ndo not belong to transcendental philosophy, which has to do with pure à priori\r\ncognitions alone.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nI have to remark, in the first place, that at present I treat of the conception\r\nof freedom in the practical sense only, and set aside the corresponding\r\ntranscendental conception, which cannot be employed as a ground of explanation\r\nin the phenomenal world, but is itself a problem for pure reason. A will is\r\npurely animal (arbitrium brutum) when it is determined by sensuous impulses or\r\ninstincts only, that is, when it is determined in a pathological manner. A\r\nwill, which can be determined independently of sensuous impulses, consequently\r\nby motives presented by reason alone, is called a free will (arbitrium\r\nliberum); and everything which is connected with this free will, either as\r\nprinciple or consequence, is termed practical. The existence of practical\r\nfreedom can be proved from experience alone. For the human will is not\r\ndetermined by that alone which immediately affects the senses; on the contrary,\r\nwe have the power, by calling up the notion of what is useful or hurtful in a\r\nmore distant relation, of overcoming the immediate impressions on our sensuous\r\nfaculty of desire. But these considerations of what is desirable in relation to\r\nour whole state, that is, is in the end good and useful, are based entirely\r\nupon reason. This faculty, accordingly, enounces laws, which are imperative or\r\nobjective laws of freedom and which tell us what ought to take place, thus\r\ndistinguishing themselves from the laws of nature, which relate to that which\r\ndoes take place. The laws of freedom or of free will are hence termed practical\r\nlaws.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWhether reason is not itself, in the actual delivery of these laws, determined\r\nin its turn by other influences, and whether the action which, in relation to\r\nsensuous impulses, we call free, may not, in relation to higher and more remote\r\noperative causes, really form a part of nature\u0026mdash;these are questions which\r\ndo not here concern us. They are purely speculative questions; and all we have\r\nto do, in the practical sphere, is to inquire into the rule of conduct which\r\nreason has to present. Experience demonstrates to us the existence of practical\r\nfreedom as one of the causes which exist in nature, that is, it shows the\r\ncausal power of reason in the determination of the will. The idea of\r\ntranscendental freedom, on the contrary, requires that reason\u0026mdash;in relation\r\nto its causal power of commencing a series of phenomena\u0026mdash;should be\r\nindependent of all sensuous determining causes; and thus it seems to be in\r\nopposition to the law of nature and to all possible experience. It therefore\r\nremains a problem for the human mind. But this problem does not concern reason\r\nin its practical use; and we have, therefore, in a canon of pure reason, to do\r\nwith only two questions, which relate to the practical interest of pure reason:\r\nIs there a God? and, Is there a future life? The question of transcendental\r\nfreedom is purely speculative, and we may therefore set it entirely aside when\r\nwe come to treat of practical reason. Besides, we have already discussed this\r\nsubject in the antinomy of pure reason.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003ca id=\"chap104\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eSection II. Of the Ideal of the Summum Bonum as a\r\nDetermining Ground of the Ultimate End of Pure Reason\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nReason conducted us, in its speculative use, through the field of experience\r\nand, as it can never find complete satisfaction in that sphere, from thence to\r\nspeculative ideas\u0026mdash;which, however, in the end brought us back again to\r\nexperience, and thus fulfilled the purpose of reason, in a manner which, though\r\nuseful, was not at all in accordance with our expectations. It now remains for\r\nus to consider whether pure reason can be employed in a practical sphere, and\r\nwhether it will here conduct us to those ideas which attain the highest ends of\r\npure reason, as we have just stated them. We shall thus ascertain whether, from\r\nthe point of view of its practical interest, reason may not be able to supply\r\nus with that which, on the speculative side, it wholly denies us.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe whole interest of reason, speculative as well as practical, is centred in\r\nthe three following questions:\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"letter\"\u003e\r\n1. WHAT CAN I KNOW?\u003cbr\u003e\r\n2. WHAT OUGHT I TO DO?\u003cbr\u003e\r\n3. WHAT MAY I HOPE?\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe first question is purely speculative. We have, as I flatter myself,\r\nexhausted all the replies of which it is susceptible, and have at last found\r\nthe reply with which reason must content itself, and with which it ought to be\r\ncontent, so long as it pays no regard to the practical. But from the two great\r\nends to the attainment of which all these efforts of pure reason were in fact\r\ndirected, we remain just as far removed as if we had consulted our ease and\r\ndeclined the task at the outset. So far, then, as knowledge is concerned, thus\r\nmuch, at least, is established, that, in regard to those two problems, it lies\r\nbeyond our reach.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe second question is purely practical. As such it may indeed fall within the\r\nprovince of pure reason, but still it is not transcendental, but moral, and\r\nconsequently cannot in itself form the subject of our criticism.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe third question: If I act as I ought to do, what may I then hope?\u0026mdash;is\r\nat once practical and theoretical. The practical forms a clue to the answer of\r\nthe theoretical, and\u0026mdash;in its highest form\u0026mdash;speculative question. For\r\nall hoping has happiness for its object and stands in precisely the same\r\nrelation to the practical and the law of morality as knowing to the theoretical\r\ncognition of things and the law of nature. The former arrives finally at the\r\nconclusion that something is (which determines the ultimate end), because\r\nsomething ought to take place; the latter, that something is (which operates as\r\nthe highest cause), because something does take place.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHappiness is the satisfaction of all our desires; extensive, in regard to their\r\nmultiplicity; intensive, in regard to their degree; and protensive, in regard\r\nto their duration. The practical law based on the motive of happiness I term a\r\npragmatical law (or prudential rule); but that law, assuming such to exist,\r\nwhich has no other motive than the worthiness of being happy, I term a moral or\r\nethical law. The first tells us what we have to do, if we wish to become\r\npossessed of happiness; the second dictates how we ought to act, in order to\r\ndeserve happiness. The first is based upon empirical principles; for it is only\r\nby experience that I can learn either what inclinations exist which desire\r\nsatisfaction, or what are the natural means of satisfying them. The second\r\ntakes no account of our desires or the means of satisfying them, and regards\r\nonly the freedom of a rational being, and the necessary conditions under which\r\nalone this freedom can harmonize with the distribution of happiness according\r\nto principles. This second law may therefore rest upon mere ideas of pure\r\nreason, and may be cognized à priori.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nI assume that there are pure moral laws which determine, entirely à priori\r\n(without regard to empirical motives, that is, to happiness), the conduct of a\r\nrational being, or in other words, to use which it makes of its freedom, and\r\nthat these laws are absolutely imperative (not merely hypothetically, on the\r\nsupposition of other empirical ends), and therefore in all respects necessary.\r\nI am warranted in assuming this, not only by the arguments of the most\r\nenlightened moralists, but by the moral judgement of every man who will make\r\nthe attempt to form a distinct conception of such a law.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPure reason, then, contains, not indeed in its speculative, but in its\r\npractical, or, more strictly, its moral use, principles of the possibility of\r\nexperience, of such actions, namely, as, in accordance with ethical precepts,\r\nmight be met with in the history of man. For since reason commands that such\r\nactions should take place, it must be possible for them to take place; and\r\nhence a particular kind of systematic unity\u0026mdash;the moral\u0026mdash;must be\r\npossible. We have found, it is true, that the systematic unity of nature could\r\nnot be established according to speculative principles of reason, because,\r\nwhile reason possesses a causal power in relation to freedom, it has none in\r\nrelation to the whole sphere of nature; and, while moral principles of reason\r\ncan produce free actions, they cannot produce natural laws. It is, then, in its\r\npractical, but especially in its moral use, that the principles of pure reason\r\npossess objective reality.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nI call the world a moral world, in so far as it may be in accordance with all\r\nthe ethical laws\u0026mdash;which, by virtue of the freedom of reasonable beings, it\r\ncan be, and according to the necessary laws of morality it ought to be. But\r\nthis world must be conceived only as an intelligible world, inasmuch as\r\nabstraction is therein made of all conditions (ends), and even of all\r\nimpediments to morality (the weakness or pravity of human nature). So far,\r\nthen, it is a mere idea\u0026mdash;though still a practical idea\u0026mdash;which may\r\nhave, and ought to have, an influence on the world of sense, so as to bring it\r\nas far as possible into conformity with itself. The idea of a moral world has,\r\ntherefore, objective reality, not as referring to an object of intelligible\r\nintuition\u0026mdash;for of such an object we can form no conception\r\nwhatever\u0026mdash;but to the world of sense\u0026mdash;conceived, however, as an object\r\nof pure reason in its practical use\u0026mdash;and to a corpus mysticum of rational\r\nbeings in it, in so far as the liberum arbitrium of the individual is placed,\r\nunder and by virtue of moral laws, in complete systematic unity both with\r\nitself and with the freedom of all others.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThat is the answer to the first of the two questions of pure reason which\r\nrelate to its practical interest: Do that which will render thee worthy of\r\nhappiness. The second question is this: If I conduct myself so as not to be\r\nunworthy of happiness, may I hope thereby to obtain happiness? In order to\r\narrive at the solution of this question, we must inquire whether the principles\r\nof pure reason, which prescribe à priori the law, necessarily also connect this\r\nhope with it.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nI say, then, that just as the moral principles are necessary according to\r\nreason in its practical use, so it is equally necessary according to reason in\r\nits theoretical use to assume that every one has ground to hope for happiness\r\nin the measure in which he has made himself worthy of it in his conduct, and\r\nthat therefore the system of morality is inseparably (though only in the idea\r\nof pure reason) connected with that of happiness.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nNow in an intelligible, that is, in the moral world, in the conception of which\r\nwe make abstraction of all the impediments to morality (sensuous desires), such\r\na system of happiness, connected with and proportioned to morality, may be\r\nconceived as necessary, because freedom of volition\u0026mdash;partly incited, and\r\npartly restrained by moral laws\u0026mdash;would be itself the cause of general\r\nhappiness; and thus rational beings, under the guidance of such principles,\r\nwould be themselves the authors both of their own enduring welfare and that of\r\nothers. But such a system of self-rewarding morality is only an idea, the\r\ncarrying out of which depends upon the condition that every one acts as he\r\nought; in other words, that all actions of reasonable beings be such as they\r\nwould be if they sprung from a Supreme Will, comprehending in, or under, itself\r\nall particular wills. But since the moral law is binding on each individual in\r\nthe use of his freedom of volition, even if others should not act in conformity\r\nwith this law, neither the nature of things, nor the causality of actions and\r\ntheir relation to morality, determine how the consequences of these actions\r\nwill be related to happiness; and the necessary connection of the hope of\r\nhappiness with the unceasing endeavour to become worthy of happiness, cannot be\r\ncognized by reason, if we take nature alone for our guide. This connection can\r\nbe hoped for only on the assumption that the cause of nature is a supreme\r\nreason, which governs according to moral laws.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nI term the idea of an intelligence in which the morally most perfect will,\r\nunited with supreme blessedness, is the cause of all happiness in the world, so\r\nfar as happiness stands in strict relation to morality (as the worthiness of\r\nbeing happy), the ideal of the supreme Good. It is only, then, in the ideal of\r\nthe supreme original good, that pure reason can find the ground of the\r\npractically necessary connection of both elements of the highest derivative\r\ngood, and accordingly of an intelligible, that is, moral world. Now since we\r\nare necessitated by reason to conceive ourselves as belonging to such a world,\r\nwhile the senses present to us nothing but a world of phenomena, we must assume\r\nthe former as a consequence of our conduct in the world of sense (since the\r\nworld of sense gives us no hint of it), and therefore as future in relation to\r\nus. Thus God and a future life are two hypotheses which, according to the\r\nprinciples of pure reason, are inseparable from the obligation which this\r\nreason imposes upon us.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nMorality per se constitutes a system. But we can form no system of happiness,\r\nexcept in so far as it is dispensed in strict proportion to morality. But this\r\nis only possible in the intelligible world, under a wise author and ruler. Such\r\na ruler, together with life in such a world, which we must look upon as future,\r\nreason finds itself compelled to assume; or it must regard the moral laws as\r\nidle dreams, since the necessary consequence which this same reason connects\r\nwith them must, without this hypothesis, fall to the ground. Hence also the\r\nmoral laws are universally regarded as commands, which they could not be did\r\nthey not connect à priori adequate consequences with their dictates, and thus\r\ncarry with them promises and threats. But this, again, they could not do, did\r\nthey not reside in a necessary being, as the Supreme Good, which alone can\r\nrender such a teleological unity possible.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nLeibnitz termed the world, when viewed in relation to the rational beings which\r\nit contains, and the moral relations in which they stand to each other, under\r\nthe government of the Supreme Good, the kingdom of Grace, and distinguished it\r\nfrom the kingdom of Nature, in which these rational beings live, under moral\r\nlaws, indeed, but expect no other consequences from their actions than such as\r\nfollow according to the course of nature in the world of sense. To view\r\nourselves, therefore, as in the kingdom of grace, in which all happiness awaits\r\nus, except in so far as we ourselves limit our participation in it by actions\r\nwhich render us unworthy of happiness, is a practically necessary idea of\r\nreason.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPractical laws, in so far as they are subjective grounds of actions, that is,\r\nsubjective principles, are termed maxims. The judgements of moral according to\r\nin its purity and ultimate results are framed according ideas; the observance\r\nof its laws, according to maxims.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe whole course of our life must be subject to moral maxims; but this is\r\nimpossible, unless with the moral law, which is a mere idea, reason connects an\r\nefficient cause which ordains to all conduct which is in conformity with the\r\nmoral law an issue either in this or in another life, which is in exact\r\nconformity with our highest aims. Thus, without a God and without a world,\r\ninvisible to us now, but hoped for, the glorious ideas of morality are, indeed,\r\nobjects of approbation and of admiration, but cannot be the springs of purpose\r\nand action. For they do not satisfy all the aims which are natural to every\r\nrational being, and which are determined à priori by pure reason itself, and\r\nnecessary.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHappiness alone is, in the view of reason, far from being the complete good.\r\nReason does not approve of it (however much inclination may desire it), except\r\nas united with desert. On the other hand, morality alone, and with it, mere\r\ndesert, is likewise far from being the complete good. To make it complete, he\r\nwho conducts himself in a manner not unworthy of happiness, must be able to\r\nhope for the possession of happiness. Even reason, unbiased by private ends, or\r\ninterested considerations, cannot judge otherwise, if it puts itself in the\r\nplace of a being whose business it is to dispense all happiness to others. For\r\nin the practical idea both points are essentially combined, though in such a\r\nway that participation in happiness is rendered possible by the moral\r\ndisposition, as its condition, and not conversely, the moral disposition by the\r\nprospect of happiness. For a disposition which should require the prospect of\r\nhappiness as its necessary condition would not be moral, and hence also would\r\nnot be worthy of complete happiness\u0026mdash;a happiness which, in the view of\r\nreason, recognizes no limitation but such as arises from our own immoral\r\nconduct.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHappiness, therefore, in exact proportion with the morality of rational beings\r\n(whereby they are made worthy of happiness), constitutes alone the supreme good\r\nof a world into which we absolutely must transport ourselves according to the\r\ncommands of pure but practical reason. This world is, it is true, only an\r\nintelligible world; for of such a systematic unity of ends as it requires, the\r\nworld of sense gives us no hint. Its reality can be based on nothing else but\r\nthe hypothesis of a supreme original good. In it independent reason, equipped\r\nwith all the sufficiency of a supreme cause, founds, maintains, and fulfils the\r\nuniversal order of things, with the most perfect teleological harmony, however\r\nmuch this order may be hidden from us in the world of sense.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThis moral theology has the peculiar advantage, in contrast with speculative\r\ntheology, of leading inevitably to the conception of a sole, perfect, and\r\nrational First Cause, whereof speculative theology does not give us any\r\nindication on objective grounds, far less any convincing evidence. For we find\r\nneither in transcendental nor in natural theology, however far reason may lead\r\nus in these, any ground to warrant us in assuming the existence of one only\r\nBeing, which stands at the head of all natural causes, and on which these are\r\nentirely dependent. On the other hand, if we take our stand on moral unity as a\r\nnecessary law of the universe, and from this point of view consider what is\r\nnecessary to give this law adequate efficiency and, for us, obligatory force,\r\nwe must come to the conclusion that there is one only supreme will, which\r\ncomprehends all these laws in itself. For how, under different wills, should we\r\nfind complete unity of ends? This will must be omnipotent, that all nature and\r\nits relation to morality in the world may be subject to it; omniscient, that it\r\nmay have knowledge of the most secret feelings and their moral worth;\r\nomnipresent, that it may be at hand to supply every necessity to which the\r\nhighest weal of the world may give rise; eternal, that this harmony of nature\r\nand liberty may never fail; and so on.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut this systematic unity of ends in this world of intelligences\u0026mdash;which,\r\nas mere nature, is only a world of sense, but, as a system of freedom of\r\nvolition, may be termed an intelligible, that is, moral world (regnum\r\ngratiae)\u0026mdash;leads inevitably also to the teleological unity of all things\r\nwhich constitute this great whole, according to universal natural\r\nlaws\u0026mdash;just as the unity of the former is according to universal and\r\nnecessary moral laws\u0026mdash;and unites the practical with the speculative\r\nreason. The world must be represented as having originated from an idea, if it\r\nis to harmonize with that use of reason without which we cannot even consider\r\nourselves as worthy of reason\u0026mdash;namely, the moral use, which rests entirely\r\non the idea of the supreme good. Hence the investigation of nature receives a\r\nteleological direction, and becomes, in its widest extension, physico-theology.\r\nBut this, taking its rise in moral order as a unity founded on the essence of\r\nfreedom, and not accidentally instituted by external commands, establishes the\r\nteleological view of nature on grounds which must be inseparably connected with\r\nthe internal possibility of things. This gives rise to a transcendental\r\ntheology, which takes the ideal of the highest ontological perfection as a\r\nprinciple of systematic unity; and this principle connects all things according\r\nto universal and necessary natural laws, because all things have their origin\r\nin the absolute necessity of the one only Primal Being.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWhat use can we make of our understanding, even in respect of experience, if we\r\ndo not propose ends to ourselves? But the highest ends are those of morality,\r\nand it is only pure reason that can give us the knowledge of these. Though\r\nsupplied with these, and putting ourselves under their guidance, we can make no\r\nteleological use of the knowledge of nature, as regards cognition, unless\r\nnature itself has established teleological unity. For without this unity we\r\nshould not even possess reason, because we should have no school for reason,\r\nand no cultivation through objects which afford the materials for its\r\nconceptions. But teleological unity is a necessary unity, and founded on the\r\nessence of the individual will itself. Hence this will, which is the condition\r\nof the application of this unity in concreto, must be so likewise. In this way\r\nthe transcendental enlargement of our rational cognition would be, not the\r\ncause, but merely the effect of the practical teleology which pure reason\r\nimposes upon us.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHence, also, we find in the history of human reason that, before the moral\r\nconceptions were sufficiently purified and determined, and before men had\r\nattained to a perception of the systematic unity of ends according to these\r\nconceptions and from necessary principles, the knowledge of nature, and even a\r\nconsiderable amount of intellectual culture in many other sciences, could\r\nproduce only rude and vague conceptions of the Deity, sometimes even admitting\r\nof an astonishing indifference with regard to this question altogether. But the\r\nmore enlarged treatment of moral ideas, which was rendered necessary by the\r\nextreme pure moral law of our religion, awakened the interest, and thereby\r\nquickened the perceptions of reason in relation to this object. In this way,\r\nand without the help either of an extended acquaintance with nature, or of a\r\nreliable transcendental insight (for these have been wanting in all ages), a\r\nconception of the Divine Being was arrived at, which we now hold to be the\r\ncorrect one, not because speculative reason convinces us of its correctness,\r\nbut because it accords with the moral principles of reason. Thus it is to pure\r\nreason, but only in its practical use, that we must ascribe the merit of having\r\nconnected with our highest interest a cognition, of which mere speculation was\r\nable only to form a conjecture, but the validity of which it was unable to\r\nestablish\u0026mdash;and of having thereby rendered it, not indeed a demonstrated\r\ndogma, but a hypothesis absolutely necessary to the essential ends of reason.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut if practical reason has reached this elevation, and has attained to the\r\nconception of a sole Primal Being as the supreme good, it must not, therefore,\r\nimagine that it has transcended the empirical conditions of its application,\r\nand risen to the immediate cognition of new objects; it must not presume to\r\nstart from the conception which it has gained, and to deduce from it the moral\r\nlaws themselves. For it was these very laws, the internal practical necessity\r\nof which led us to the hypothesis of an independent cause, or of a wise ruler\r\nof the universe, who should give them effect. Hence we are not entitled to\r\nregard them as accidental and derived from the mere will of the ruler,\r\nespecially as we have no conception of such a will, except as formed in\r\naccordance with these laws. So far, then, as practical reason has the right to\r\nconduct us, we shall not look upon actions as binding on us, because they are\r\nthe commands of God, but we shall regard them as divine commands, because we\r\nare internally bound by them. We shall study freedom under the teleological\r\nunity which accords with principles of reason; we shall look upon ourselves as\r\nacting in conformity with the divine will only in so far as we hold sacred the\r\nmoral law which reason teaches us from the nature of actions themselves, and we\r\nshall believe that we can obey that will only by promoting the weal of the\r\nuniverse in ourselves and in others. Moral theology is, therefore, only of\r\nimmanent use. It teaches us to fulfil our destiny here in the world, by placing\r\nourselves in harmony with the general system of ends, and warns us against the\r\nfanaticism, nay, the crime of depriving reason of its legislative authority in\r\nthe moral conduct of life, for the purpose of directly connecting this\r\nauthority with the idea of the Supreme Being. For this would be, not an\r\nimmanent, but a transcendent use of moral theology, and, like the transcendent\r\nuse of mere speculation, would inevitably pervert and frustrate the ultimate\r\nends of reason.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003ca id=\"chap105\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eSection III. Of Opinion, Knowledge, and Belief\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe holding of a thing to be true is a phenomenon in our understanding which\r\nmay rest on objective grounds, but requires, also, subjective causes in the\r\nmind of the person judging. If a judgement is valid for every rational being,\r\nthen its ground is objectively sufficient, and it is termed a conviction. If,\r\non the other hand, it has its ground in the particular character of the\r\nsubject, it is termed a persuasion.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPersuasion is a mere illusion, the ground of the judgement, which lies solely\r\nin the subject, being regarded as objective. Hence a judgement of this kind has\r\nonly private validity\u0026mdash;is only valid for the individual who judges, and\r\nthe holding of a thing to be true in this way cannot be communicated. But truth\r\ndepends upon agreement with the object, and consequently the judgements of all\r\nunderstandings, if true, must be in agreement with each other (consentientia\r\nuni tertio consentiunt inter se). Conviction may, therefore, be distinguished,\r\nfrom an external point of view, from persuasion, by the possibility of\r\ncommunicating it and by showing its validity for the reason of every man; for\r\nin this case the presumption, at least, arises that the agreement of all\r\njudgements with each other, in spite of the different characters of\r\nindividuals, rests upon the common ground of the agreement of each with the\r\nobject, and thus the correctness of the judgement is established.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPersuasion, accordingly, cannot be subjectively distinguished from conviction,\r\nthat is, so long as the subject views its judgement simply as a phenomenon of\r\nits own mind. But if we inquire whether the grounds of our judgement, which are\r\nvalid for us, produce the same effect on the reason of others as on our own, we\r\nhave then the means, though only subjective means, not, indeed, of producing\r\nconviction, but of detecting the merely private validity of the judgement; in\r\nother words, of discovering that there is in it the element of mere persuasion.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIf we can, in addition to this, develop the subjective causes of the judgement,\r\nwhich we have taken for its objective grounds, and thus explain the deceptive\r\njudgement as a phenomenon in our mind, apart altogether from the objective\r\ncharacter of the object, we can then expose the illusion and need be no longer\r\ndeceived by it, although, if its subjective cause lies in our nature, we cannot\r\nhope altogether to escape its influence.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nI can only maintain, that is, affirm as necessarily valid for every one, that\r\nwhich produces conviction. Persuasion I may keep for myself, if it is agreeable\r\nto me; but I cannot, and ought not, to attempt to impose it as binding upon\r\nothers.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHolding for true, or the subjective validity of a judgement in relation to\r\nconviction (which is, at the same time, objectively valid), has the three\r\nfollowing degrees: opinion, belief, and knowledge. Opinion is a consciously\r\ninsufficient judgement, subjectively as well as objectively. Belief is\r\nsubjectively sufficient, but is recognized as being objectively insufficient.\r\nKnowledge is both subjectively and objectively sufficient. Subjective\r\nsufficiency is termed conviction (for myself); objective sufficiency is termed\r\ncertainty (for all). I need not dwell longer on the explanation of such simple\r\nconceptions.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nI must never venture to be of opinion, without knowing something, at least, by\r\nwhich my judgement, in itself merely problematical, is brought into connection\r\nwith the truth\u0026mdash;which connection, although not perfect, is still something\r\nmore than an arbitrary fiction. Moreover, the law of such a connection must be\r\ncertain. For if, in relation to this law, I have nothing more than opinion, my\r\njudgement is but a play of the imagination, without the least relation to\r\ntruth. In the judgements of pure reason, opinion has no place. For, as they do\r\nnot rest on empirical grounds and as the sphere of pure reason is that of\r\nnecessary truth and à priori cognition, the principle of connection in it\r\nrequires universality and necessity, and consequently perfect\r\ncertainty\u0026mdash;otherwise we should have no guide to the truth at all. Hence it\r\nis absurd to have an opinion in pure mathematics; we must know, or abstain from\r\nforming a judgement altogether. The case is the same with the maxims of\r\nmorality. For we must not hazard an action on the mere opinion that it is\r\nallowed, but we must know it to be so. In the transcendental sphere of reason,\r\non the other hand, the term opinion is too weak, while the word knowledge is\r\ntoo strong. From the merely speculative point of view, therefore, we cannot\r\nform a judgement at all. For the subjective grounds of a judgement, such as\r\nproduce belief, cannot be admitted in speculative inquiries, inasmuch as they\r\ncannot stand without empirical support and are incapable of being communicated\r\nto others in equal measure.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut it is only from the practical point of view that a theoretically\r\ninsufficient judgement can be termed belief. Now the practical reference is\r\neither to skill or to morality; to the former, when the end proposed is\r\narbitrary and accidental, to the latter, when it is absolutely necessary.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIf we propose to ourselves any end whatever, the conditions of its attainment\r\nare hypothetically necessary. The necessity is subjectively, but still only\r\ncomparatively, sufficient, if I am acquainted with no other conditions under\r\nwhich the end can be attained. On the other hand, it is sufficient, absolutely\r\nand for every one, if I know for certain that no one can be acquainted with any\r\nother conditions under which the attainment of the proposed end would be\r\npossible. In the former case my supposition\u0026mdash;my judgement with regard to\r\ncertain conditions\u0026mdash;is a merely accidental belief; in the latter it is a\r\nnecessary belief. The physician must pursue some course in the case of a\r\npatient who is in danger, but is ignorant of the nature of the disease. He\r\nobserves the symptoms, and concludes, according to the best of his judgement,\r\nthat it is a case of phthisis. His belief is, even in his own judgement, only\r\ncontingent: another man might, perhaps come nearer the truth. Such a belief,\r\ncontingent indeed, but still forming the ground of the actual use of means for\r\nthe attainment of certain ends, I term Pragmatical belief.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe usual test, whether that which any one maintains is merely his persuasion,\r\nor his subjective conviction at least, that is, his firm belief, is a bet. It\r\nfrequently happens that a man delivers his opinions with so much boldness and\r\nassurance, that he appears to be under no apprehension as to the possibility of\r\nhis being in error. The offer of a bet startles him, and makes him pause.\r\nSometimes it turns out that his persuasion may be valued at a ducat, but not at\r\nten. For he does not hesitate, perhaps, to venture a ducat, but if it is\r\nproposed to stake ten, he immediately becomes aware of the possibility of his\r\nbeing mistaken\u0026mdash;a possibility which has hitherto escaped his observation.\r\nIf we imagine to ourselves that we have to stake the happiness of our whole\r\nlife on the truth of any proposition, our judgement drops its air of triumph,\r\nwe take the alarm, and discover the actual strength of our belief. Thus\r\npragmatical belief has degrees, varying in proportion to the interests at\r\nstake.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nNow, in cases where we cannot enter upon any course of action in reference to\r\nsome object, and where, accordingly, our judgement is purely theoretical, we\r\ncan still represent to ourselves, in thought, the possibility of a course of\r\naction, for which we suppose that we have sufficient grounds, if any means\r\nexisted of ascertaining the truth of the matter. Thus we find in purely\r\ntheoretical judgements an analogon of practical judgements, to which the word\r\nbelief may properly be applied, and which we may term doctrinal belief. I\r\nshould not hesitate to stake my all on the truth of the proposition\u0026mdash;if\r\nthere were any possibility of bringing it to the test of experience\u0026mdash;that,\r\nat least, some one of the planets, which we see, is inhabited. Hence I say that\r\nI have not merely the opinion, but the strong belief, on the correctness of\r\nwhich I would stake even many of the advantages of life, that there are\r\ninhabitants in other worlds.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nNow we must admit that the doctrine of the existence of God belongs to\r\ndoctrinal belief. For, although in respect to the theoretical cognition of the\r\nuniverse I do not require to form any theory which necessarily involves this\r\nidea, as the condition of my explanation of the phenomena which the universe\r\npresents, but, on the contrary, am rather bound so to use my reason as if\r\neverything were mere nature, still teleological unity is so important a\r\ncondition of the application of my reason to nature, that it is impossible for\r\nme to ignore it\u0026mdash;especially since, in addition to these considerations,\r\nabundant examples of it are supplied by experience. But the sole condition, so\r\nfar as my knowledge extends, under which this unity can be my guide in the\r\ninvestigation of nature, is the assumption that a supreme intelligence has\r\nordered all things according to the wisest ends. Consequently, the hypothesis\r\nof a wise author of the universe is necessary for my guidance in the\r\ninvestigation of nature\u0026mdash;is the condition under which alone I can fulfil\r\nan end which is contingent indeed, but by no means unimportant. Moreover, since\r\nthe result of my attempts so frequently confirms the utility of this\r\nassumption, and since nothing decisive can be adduced against it, it follows\r\nthat it would be saying far too little to term my judgement, in this case, a\r\nmere opinion, and that, even in this theoretical connection, I may assert that\r\nI firmly believe in God. Still, if we use words strictly, this must not be\r\ncalled a practical, but a doctrinal belief, which the theology of nature\r\n(physico-theology) must also produce in my mind. In the wisdom of a Supreme\r\nBeing, and in the shortness of life, so inadequate to the development of the\r\nglorious powers of human nature, we may find equally sufficient grounds for a\r\ndoctrinal belief in the future life of the human soul.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe expression of belief is, in such cases, an expression of modesty from the\r\nobjective point of view, but, at the same time, of firm confidence, from the\r\nsubjective. If I should venture to term this merely theoretical judgement even\r\nso much as a hypothesis which I am entitled to assume; a more complete\r\nconception, with regard to another world and to the cause of the world, might\r\nthen be justly required of me than I am, in reality, able to give. For, if I\r\nassume anything, even as a mere hypothesis, I must, at least, know so much of\r\nthe properties of such a being as will enable me, not to form the conception,\r\nbut to imagine the existence of it. But the word belief refers only to the\r\nguidance which an idea gives me, and to its subjective influence on the conduct\r\nof my reason, which forces me to hold it fast, though I may not be in a\r\nposition to give a speculative account of it.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut mere doctrinal belief is, to some extent, wanting in stability. We often\r\nquit our hold of it, in consequence of the difficulties which occur in\r\nspeculation, though in the end we inevitably return to it again.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIt is quite otherwise with moral belief. For in this sphere action is\r\nabsolutely necessary, that is, I must act in obedience to the moral law in all\r\npoints. The end is here incontrovertibly established, and there is only one\r\ncondition possible, according to the best of my perception, under which this\r\nend can harmonize with all other ends, and so have practical\r\nvalidity\u0026mdash;namely, the existence of a God and of a future world. I know\r\nalso, to a certainty, that no one can be acquainted with any other conditions\r\nwhich conduct to the same unity of ends under the moral law. But since the\r\nmoral precept is, at the same time, my maxim (as reason requires that it should\r\nbe), I am irresistibly constrained to believe in the existence of God and in a\r\nfuture life; and I am sure that nothing can make me waver in this belief, since\r\nI should thereby overthrow my moral maxims, the renunciation of which would\r\nrender me hateful in my own eyes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThus, while all the ambitious attempts of reason to penetrate beyond the limits\r\nof experience end in disappointment, there is still enough left to satisfy us\r\nin a practical point of view. No one, it is true, will be able to boast that he\r\nknows that there is a God and a future life; for, if he knows this, he is just\r\nthe man whom I have long wished to find. All knowledge, regarding an object of\r\nmere reason, can be communicated; and I should thus be enabled to hope that my\r\nown knowledge would receive this wonderful extension, through the\r\ninstrumentality of his instruction. No, my conviction is not logical, but moral\r\ncertainty; and since it rests on subjective grounds (of the moral sentiment), I\r\nmust not even say: It is morally certain that there is a God, etc., but: I am\r\nmorally certain, that is, my belief in God and in another world is so\r\ninterwoven with my moral nature that I am under as little apprehension of\r\nhaving the former torn from me as of losing the latter.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe only point in this argument that may appear open to suspicion is that this\r\nrational belief presupposes the existence of moral sentiments. If we give up\r\nthis assumption, and take a man who is entirely indifferent with regard to\r\nmoral laws, the question which reason proposes, becomes then merely a problem\r\nfor speculation and may, indeed, be supported by strong grounds from analogy,\r\nbut not by such as will compel the most obstinate scepticism to give way.\u003ca\r\nhref=\"#linknote-79\" id=\"linknoteref-79\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[79]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e But in these questions no man is free\r\nfrom all interest. For though the want of good sentiments may place him beyond\r\nthe influence of moral interests, still even in this case enough may be left to\r\nmake him fear the existence of God and a future life. For he cannot pretend to\r\nany certainty of the non-existence of God and of a future life,\r\nunless\u0026mdash;since it could only be proved by mere reason, and therefore\r\napodeictically\u0026mdash;he is prepared to establish the impossibility of both,\r\nwhich certainly no reasonable man would undertake to do. This would be a\r\nnegative belief, which could not, indeed, produce morality and good sentiments,\r\nbut still could produce an analogon of these, by operating as a powerful\r\nrestraint on the outbreak of evil dispositions.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"linknote-79\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#linknoteref-79\"\u003e[79]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nThe human mind (as, I believe, every rational being must of necessity do) takes\r\na natural interest in morality, although this interest is not undivided, and\r\nmay not be practically in preponderance. If you strengthen and increase it, you\r\nwill find the reason become docile, more enlightened, and more capable of\r\nuniting the speculative interest with the practical. But if you do not take\r\ncare at the outset, or at least midway, to make men good, you will never force\r\nthem into an honest belief.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut, it will be said, is this all that pure reason can effect, in opening up\r\nprospects beyond the limits of experience? Nothing more than two articles of\r\nbelief? Common sense could have done as much as this, without taking the\r\nphilosophers to counsel in the matter!\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nI shall not here eulogize philosophy for the benefits which the laborious\r\nefforts of its criticism have conferred on human reason\u0026mdash;even granting\r\nthat its merit should turn out in the end to be only negative\u0026mdash;for on this\r\npoint something more will be said in the next section. But, I ask, do you\r\nrequire that that knowledge which concerns all men, should transcend the common\r\nunderstanding, and should only be revealed to you by philosophers? The very\r\ncircumstance which has called forth your censure, is the best confirmation of\r\nthe correctness of our previous assertions, since it discloses, what could not\r\nhave been foreseen, that Nature is not chargeable with any partial distribution\r\nof her gifts in those matters which concern all men without distinction and\r\nthat, in respect to the essential ends of human nature, we cannot advance\r\nfurther with the help of the highest philosophy, than under the guidance which\r\nnature has vouchsafed to the meanest understanding.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003ca id=\"chap106\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eChapter III. The Architectonic of Pure Reason\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBy the term architectonic I mean the art of constructing a system. Without\r\nsystematic unity, our knowledge cannot become science; it will be an aggregate,\r\nand not a system. Thus architectonic is the doctrine of the scientific in\r\ncognition, and therefore necessarily forms part of our methodology.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nReason cannot permit our knowledge to remain in an unconnected and rhapsodistic\r\nstate, but requires that the sum of our cognitions should constitute a system.\r\nIt is thus alone that they can advance the ends of reason. By a system I mean\r\nthe unity of various cognitions under one idea. This idea is the\r\nconception\u0026mdash;given by reason\u0026mdash;of the form of a whole, in so far as the\r\nconception determines à priori not only the limits of its content, but the\r\nplace which each of its parts is to occupy. The scientific idea contains,\r\ntherefore, the end and the form of the whole which is in accordance with that\r\nend. The unity of the end, to which all the parts of the system relate, and\r\nthrough which all have a relation to each other, communicates unity to the\r\nwhole system, so that the absence of any part can be immediately detected from\r\nour knowledge of the rest; and it determines à priori the limits of the system,\r\nthus excluding all contingent or arbitrary additions. The whole is thus an\r\norganism (articulatio), and not an aggregate (coacervatio); it may grow from\r\nwithin (per intussusceptionem), but it cannot increase by external additions\r\n(per appositionem). It is, thus, like an animal body, the growth of which does\r\nnot add any limb, but, without changing their proportions, makes each in its\r\nsphere stronger and more active.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWe require, for the execution of the idea of a system, a schema, that is, a\r\ncontent and an arrangement of parts determined à priori by the principle which\r\nthe aim of the system prescribes. A schema which is not projected in accordance\r\nwith an idea, that is, from the standpoint of the highest aim of reason, but\r\nmerely empirically, in accordance with accidental aims and purposes (the number\r\nof which cannot be predetermined), can give us nothing more than technical\r\nunity. But the schema which is originated from an idea (in which case reason\r\npresents us with aims à priori, and does not look for them to experience),\r\nforms the basis of architectonical unity. A science, in the proper acceptation\r\nof that term, cannot be formed technically, that is, from observation of the\r\nsimilarity existing between different objects, and the purely contingent use we\r\nmake of our knowledge in concreto with reference to all kinds of arbitrary\r\nexternal aims; its constitution must be framed on architectonical principles,\r\nthat is, its parts must be shown to possess an essential affinity, and be\r\ncapable of being deduced from one supreme and internal aim or end, which forms\r\nthe condition of the possibility of the scientific whole. The schema of a\r\nscience must give à priori the plan of it (monogramma), and the division of the\r\nwhole into parts, in conformity with the idea of the science; and it must also\r\ndistinguish this whole from all others, according to certain understood\r\nprinciples.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nNo one will attempt to construct a science, unless he have some idea to rest on\r\nas a proper basis. But, in the elaboration of the science, he finds that the\r\nschema, nay, even the definition which he at first gave of the science, rarely\r\ncorresponds with his idea; for this idea lies, like a germ, in our reason, its\r\nparts undeveloped and hid even from microscopical observation. For this reason,\r\nwe ought to explain and define sciences, not according to the description which\r\nthe originator gives of them, but according to the idea which we find based in\r\nreason itself, and which is suggested by the natural unity of the parts of the\r\nscience already accumulated. For it will often be found that the originator of\r\na science and even his latest successors remain attached to an erroneous idea,\r\nwhich they cannot render clear to themselves, and that they thus fail in\r\ndetermining the true content, the articulation or systematic unity, and the\r\nlimits of their science.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIt is unfortunate that, only after having occupied ourselves for a long time in\r\nthe collection of materials, under the guidance of an idea which lies\r\nundeveloped in the mind, but not according to any definite plan of\r\narrangement\u0026mdash;nay, only after we have spent much time and labour in the\r\ntechnical disposition of our materials, does it become possible to view the\r\nidea of a science in a clear light, and to project, according to\r\narchitectonical principles, a plan of the whole, in accordance with the aims of\r\nreason. Systems seem, like certain worms, to be formed by a kind of generatio\r\naequivoca\u0026mdash;by the mere confluence of conceptions, and to gain completeness\r\nonly with the progress of time. But the schema or germ of all lies in reason;\r\nand thus is not only every system organized according to its own idea, but all\r\nare united into one grand system of human knowledge, of which they form\r\nmembers. For this reason, it is possible to frame an architectonic of all human\r\ncognition, the formation of which, at the present time, considering the immense\r\nmaterials collected or to be found in the ruins of old systems, would not\r\nindeed be very difficult. Our purpose at present is merely to sketch the plan\r\nof the architectonic of all cognition given by pure reason; and we begin from\r\nthe point where the main root of human knowledge divides into two, one of which\r\nis reason. By reason I understand here the whole higher faculty of cognition,\r\nthe rational being placed in contradistinction to the empirical.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIf I make complete abstraction of the content of cognition, objectively\r\nconsidered, all cognition is, from a subjective point of view, either\r\nhistorical or rational. Historical cognition is cognitio ex datis, rational,\r\ncognitio ex principiis. Whatever may be the original source of a cognition, it\r\nis, in relation to the person who possesses it, merely historical, if he knows\r\nonly what has been given him from another quarter, whether that knowledge was\r\ncommunicated by direct experience or by instruction. Thus the person who has\r\nlearned a system of philosophy\u0026mdash;say the Wolfian\u0026mdash;although he has a\r\nperfect knowledge of all the principles, definitions, and arguments in that\r\nphilosophy, as well as of the divisions that have been made of the system,\r\npossesses really no more than an historical knowledge of the Wolfian system; he\r\nknows only what has been told him, his judgements are only those which he has\r\nreceived from his teachers. Dispute the validity of a definition, and he is\r\ncompletely at a loss to find another. He has formed his mind on\r\nanother\u0026rsquo;s; but the imitative faculty is not the productive. His knowledge\r\nhas not been drawn from reason; and although, objectively considered, it is\r\nrational knowledge, subjectively, it is merely historical. He has learned this\r\nor that philosophy and is merely a plaster cast of a living man. Rational\r\ncognitions which are objective, that is, which have their source in reason, can\r\nbe so termed from a subjective point of view, only when they have been drawn by\r\nthe individual himself from the sources of reason, that is, from principles;\r\nand it is in this way alone that criticism, or even the rejection of what has\r\nbeen already learned, can spring up in the mind.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAll rational cognition is, again, based either on conceptions, or on the\r\nconstruction of conceptions. The former is termed philosophical, the latter\r\nmathematical. I have already shown the essential difference of these two\r\nmethods of cognition in the first chapter. A cognition may be objectively\r\nphilosophical and subjectively historical\u0026mdash;as is the case with the\r\nmajority of scholars and those who cannot look beyond the limits of their\r\nsystem, and who remain in a state of pupilage all their lives. But it is\r\nremarkable that mathematical knowledge, when committed to memory, is valid,\r\nfrom the subjective point of view, as rational knowledge also, and that the\r\nsame distinction cannot be drawn here as in the case of philosophical\r\ncognition. The reason is that the only way of arriving at this knowledge is\r\nthrough the essential principles of reason, and thus it is always certain and\r\nindisputable; because reason is employed in concreto\u0026mdash;but at the same time\r\nà priori\u0026mdash;that is, in pure and, therefore, infallible intuition; and thus\r\nall causes of illusion and error are excluded. Of all the à priori sciences of\r\nreason, therefore, mathematics alone can be learned. Philosophy\u0026mdash;unless it\r\nbe in an historical manner\u0026mdash;cannot be learned; we can at most learn to\r\nphilosophize.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPhilosophy is the system of all philosophical cognition. We must use this term\r\nin an objective sense, if we understand by it the archetype of all attempts at\r\nphilosophizing, and the standard by which all subjective philosophies are to be\r\njudged. In this sense, philosophy is merely the idea of a possible science,\r\nwhich does not exist in concreto, but to which we endeavour in various ways to\r\napproximate, until we have discovered the right path to pursue\u0026mdash;a path\r\novergrown by the errors and illusions of sense\u0026mdash;and the image we have\r\nhitherto tried in vain to shape has become a perfect copy of the great\r\nprototype. Until that time, we cannot learn philosophy\u0026mdash;it does not exist;\r\nif it does, where is it, who possesses it, and how shall we know it? We can\r\nonly learn to philosophize; in other words, we can only exercise our powers of\r\nreasoning in accordance with general principles, retaining at the same time,\r\nthe right of investigating the sources of these principles, of testing, and\r\neven of rejecting them.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nUntil then, our conception of philosophy is only a scholastic\r\nconception\u0026mdash;a conception, that is, of a system of cognition which we are\r\ntrying to elaborate into a science; all that we at present know being the\r\nsystematic unity of this cognition, and consequently the logical completeness\r\nof the cognition for the desired end. But there is also a cosmical conception\r\n(conceptus cosmicus) of philosophy, which has always formed the true basis of\r\nthis term, especially when philosophy was personified and presented to us in\r\nthe ideal of a philosopher. In this view philosophy is the science of the\r\nrelation of all cognition to the ultimate and essential aims of human reason\r\n(teleologia rationis humanae), and the philosopher is not merely an\r\nartist\u0026mdash;who occupies himself with conceptions\u0026mdash;but a lawgiver,\r\nlegislating for human reason. In this sense of the word, it would be in the\r\nhighest degree arrogant to assume the title of philosopher, and to pretend that\r\nwe had reached the perfection of the prototype which lies in the idea alone.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe mathematician, the natural philosopher, and the logician\u0026mdash;how far\r\nsoever the first may have advanced in rational, and the two latter in\r\nphilosophical knowledge\u0026mdash;are merely artists, engaged in the arrangement\r\nand formation of conceptions; they cannot be termed philosophers. Above them\r\nall, there is the ideal teacher, who employs them as instruments for the\r\nadvancement of the essential aims of human reason. Him alone can we call\r\nphilosopher; but he nowhere exists. But the idea of his legislative power\r\nresides in the mind of every man, and it alone teaches us what kind of\r\nsystematic unity philosophy demands in view of the ultimate aims of reason.\r\nThis idea is, therefore, a cosmical conception.\u003ca href=\"#linknote-80\" id=\"linknoteref-80\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[80]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"linknote-80\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#linknoteref-80\"\u003e[80]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nBy a cosmical conception, I mean one in which all men necessarily take an\r\ninterest; the aim of a science must accordingly be determined according to\r\nscholastic conceptions, if it is regarded merely as a means to certain\r\narbitrarily proposed ends.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIn view of the complete systematic unity of reason, there can only be one\r\nultimate end of all the operations of the mind. To this all other aims are\r\nsubordinate, and nothing more than means for its attainment. This ultimate end\r\nis the destination of man, and the philosophy which relates to it is termed\r\nmoral philosophy. The superior position occupied by moral philosophy, above all\r\nother spheres for the operations of reason, sufficiently indicates the reason\r\nwhy the ancients always included the idea\u0026mdash;and in an especial\r\nmanner\u0026mdash;of moralist in that of philosopher. Even at the present day, we\r\ncall a man who appears to have the power of self-government, even although his\r\nknowledge may be very limited, by the name of philosopher.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe legislation of human reason, or philosophy, has two objects\u0026mdash;nature\r\nand freedom\u0026mdash;and thus contains not only the laws of nature, but also those\r\nof ethics, at first in two separate systems, which, finally, merge into one\r\ngrand philosophical system of cognition. The philosophy of nature relates to\r\nthat which is, that of ethics to that which ought to be.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut all philosophy is either cognition on the basis of pure reason, or the\r\ncognition of reason on the basis of empirical principles. The former is termed\r\npure, the latter empirical philosophy.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe philosophy of pure reason is either propædeutic, that is, an inquiry into\r\nthe powers of reason in regard to pure à priori cognition, and is termed\r\ncritical philosophy; or it is, secondly, the system of pure reason\u0026mdash;a\r\nscience containing the systematic presentation of the whole body of\r\nphilosophical knowledge, true as well as illusory, given by pure\r\nreason\u0026mdash;and is called metaphysic. This name may, however, be also given to\r\nthe whole system of pure philosophy, critical philosophy included, and may\r\ndesignate the investigation into the sources or possibility of à priori\r\ncognition, as well as the presentation of the à priori cognitions which form a\r\nsystem of pure philosophy\u0026mdash;excluding, at the same time, all empirical and\r\nmathematical elements.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nMetaphysic is divided into that of the speculative and that of the practical\r\nuse of pure reason, and is, accordingly, either the metaphysic of nature, or\r\nthe metaphysic of ethics. The former contains all the pure rational\r\nprinciples\u0026mdash;based upon conceptions alone (and thus excluding\r\nmathematics)\u0026mdash;of all theoretical cognition; the latter, the principles\r\nwhich determine and necessitate à priori all action. Now moral philosophy alone\r\ncontains a code of laws\u0026mdash;for the regulation of our actions\u0026mdash;which are\r\ndeduced from principles entirely à priori. Hence the metaphysic of ethics is\r\nthe only pure moral philosophy, as it is not based upon anthropological or\r\nother empirical considerations. The metaphysic of speculative reason is what is\r\ncommonly called metaphysic in the more limited sense. But as pure moral\r\nphilosophy properly forms a part of this system of cognition, we must allow it\r\nto retain the name of metaphysic, although it is not requisite that we should\r\ninsist on so terming it in our present discussion.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIt is of the highest importance to separate those cognitions which differ from\r\nothers both in kind and in origin, and to take great care that they are not\r\nconfounded with those with which they are generally found connected. What the\r\nchemist does in the analysis of substances, what the mathematician in pure\r\nmathematics, is, in a still higher degree, the duty of the philosopher, that\r\nthe value of each different kind of cognition, and the part it takes in the\r\noperations of the mind, may be clearly defined. Human reason has never wanted a\r\nmetaphysic of some kind, since it attained the power of thought, or rather of\r\nreflection; but it has never been able to keep this sphere of thought and\r\ncognition pure from all admixture of foreign elements. The idea of a science of\r\nthis kind is as old as speculation itself; and what mind does not\r\nspeculate\u0026mdash;either in the scholastic or in the popular fashion? At the same\r\ntime, it must be admitted that even thinkers by profession have been unable\r\nclearly to explain the distinction between the two elements of our\r\ncognition\u0026mdash;the one completely à priori, the other à posteriori; and hence\r\nthe proper definition of a peculiar kind of cognition, and with it the just\r\nidea of a science which has so long and so deeply engaged the attention of the\r\nhuman mind, has never been established. When it was said: \u0026ldquo;Metaphysic is\r\nthe science of the first principles of human cognition,\u0026rdquo; this definition\r\ndid not signalize a peculiarity in kind, but only a difference in degree; these\r\nfirst principles were thus declared to be more general than others, but no\r\ncriterion of distinction from empirical principles was given. Of these some are\r\nmore general, and therefore higher, than others; and\u0026mdash;as we cannot\r\ndistinguish what is completely à priori from that which is known to be à\r\nposteriori\u0026mdash;where shall we draw the line which is to separate the higher\r\nand so-called first principles, from the lower and subordinate principles of\r\ncognition? What would be said if we were asked to be satisfied with a division\r\nof the epochs of the world into the earlier centuries and those following them?\r\n\u0026ldquo;Does the fifth, or the tenth century belong to the earlier\r\ncenturies?\u0026rdquo; it would be asked. In the same way I ask: Does the conception\r\nof extension belong to metaphysics? You answer, \u0026ldquo;Yes.\u0026rdquo; Well, that\r\nof body too? \u0026ldquo;Yes.\u0026rdquo; And that of a fluid body? You stop, you are\r\nunprepared to admit this; for if you do, everything will belong to metaphysics.\r\nFrom this it is evident that the mere degree of subordination\u0026mdash;of the\r\nparticular to the general\u0026mdash;cannot determine the limits of a science; and\r\nthat, in the present case, we must expect to find a difference in the\r\nconceptions of metaphysics both in kind and in origin. The fundamental idea of\r\nmetaphysics was obscured on another side by the fact that this kind of à priori\r\ncognition showed a certain similarity in character with the science of\r\nmathematics. Both have the property in common of possessing an à priori origin;\r\nbut, in the one, our knowledge is based upon conceptions, in the other, on the\r\nconstruction of conceptions. Thus a decided dissimilarity between philosophical\r\nand mathematical cognition comes out\u0026mdash;a dissimilarity which was always\r\nfelt, but which could not be made distinct for want of an insight into the\r\ncriteria of the difference. And thus it happened that, as philosophers\r\nthemselves failed in the proper development of the idea of their science, the\r\nelaboration of the science could not proceed with a definite aim, or under\r\ntrustworthy guidance. Thus, too, philosophers, ignorant of the path they ought\r\nto pursue and always disputing with each other regarding the discoveries which\r\neach asserted he had made, brought their science into disrepute with the rest\r\nof the world, and finally, even among themselves.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAll pure à priori cognition forms, therefore, in view of the peculiar faculty\r\nwhich originates it, a peculiar and distinct unity; and metaphysic is the term\r\napplied to the philosophy which attempts to represent that cognition in this\r\nsystematic unity. The speculative part of metaphysic, which has especially\r\nappropriated this appellation\u0026mdash;that which we have called the metaphysic of\r\nnature\u0026mdash;and which considers everything, as it is (not as it ought to be),\r\nby means of à priori conceptions, is divided in the following manner.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nMetaphysic, in the more limited acceptation of the term, consists of two\r\nparts\u0026mdash;transcendental philosophy and the physiology of pure reason. The\r\nformer presents the system of all the conceptions and principles belonging to\r\nthe understanding and the reason, and which relate to objects in general, but\r\nnot to any particular given objects (Ontologia); the latter has nature for its\r\nsubject-matter, that is, the sum of given objects\u0026mdash;whether given to the\r\nsenses, or, if we will, to some other kind of intuition\u0026mdash;and is\r\naccordingly physiology, although only rationalis. But the use of the faculty of\r\nreason in this rational mode of regarding nature is either physical or\r\nhyperphysical, or, more properly speaking, immanent or transcendent. The former\r\nrelates to nature, in so far as our knowledge regarding it may be applied in\r\nexperience (in concreto); the latter to that connection of the objects of\r\nexperience, which transcends all experience. Transcendent physiology has,\r\nagain, an internal and an external connection with its object, both, however,\r\ntranscending possible experience; the former is the physiology of nature as a\r\nwhole, or transcendental cognition of the world, the latter of the connection\r\nof the whole of nature with a being above nature, or transcendental cognition\r\nof God.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nImmanent physiology, on the contrary, considers nature as the sum of all\r\nsensuous objects, consequently, as it is presented to us\u0026mdash;but still\r\naccording to à priori conditions, for it is under these alone that nature can\r\nbe presented to our minds at all. The objects of immanent physiology are of two\r\nkinds: 1. Those of the external senses, or corporeal nature; 2. The object of\r\nthe internal sense, the soul, or, in accordance with our fundamental\r\nconceptions of it, thinking nature. The metaphysics of corporeal nature is\r\ncalled physics; but, as it must contain only the principles of an à priori\r\ncognition of nature, we must term it rational physics. The metaphysics of\r\nthinking nature is called psychology, and for the same reason is to be regarded\r\nas merely the rational cognition of the soul.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThus the whole system of metaphysics consists of four principal parts: 1.\r\nOntology; 2. Rational Physiology; 3. Rational cosmology; and 4. Rational\r\ntheology. The second part\u0026mdash;that of the rational doctrine of\r\nnature\u0026mdash;may be subdivided into two, physica rationalis\u003ca\r\nhref=\"#linknote-81\" id=\"linknoteref-81\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[81]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e and psychologia rationalis.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca id=\"linknote-81\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#linknoteref-81\"\u003e[81]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nIt must not be supposed that I mean by this appellation what is generally\r\ncalled physica general is, and which is rather mathematics than a philosophy of\r\nnature. For the metaphysic of nature is completely different from mathematics,\r\nnor is it so rich in results, although it is of great importance as a critical\r\ntest of the application of pure understanding\u0026mdash;cognition to nature. For\r\nwant of its guidance, even mathematicians, adopting certain common\r\nnotions\u0026mdash;which are, in fact, metaphysical\u0026mdash;have unconsciously crowded\r\ntheir theories of nature with hypotheses, the fallacy of which becomes evident\r\nupon the application of the principles of this metaphysic, without detriment,\r\nhowever, to the employment of mathematics in this sphere of cognition.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe fundamental idea of a philosophy of pure reason of necessity dictates this\r\ndivision; it is, therefore, architectonical\u0026mdash;in accordance with the\r\nhighest aims of reason, and not merely technical, or according to certain\r\naccidentally-observed similarities existing between the different parts of the\r\nwhole science. For this reason, also, is the division immutable and of\r\nlegislative authority. But the reader may observe in it a few points to which\r\nhe ought to demur, and which may weaken his conviction of its truth and\r\nlegitimacy.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIn the first place, how can I desire an à priori cognition or metaphysic of\r\nobjects, in so far as they are given à posteriori? and how is it possible to\r\ncognize the nature of things according to à priori principles, and to attain to\r\na rational physiology? The answer is this. We take from experience nothing more\r\nthan is requisite to present us with an object (in general) of the external or\r\nof the internal sense; in the former case, by the mere conception of matter\r\n(impenetrable and inanimate extension), in the latter, by the conception of a\r\nthinking being\u0026mdash;given in the internal empirical representation, I think.\r\nAs to the rest, we must not employ in our metaphysic of these objects any\r\nempirical principles (which add to the content of our conceptions by means of\r\nexperience), for the purpose of forming by their help any judgements respecting\r\nthese objects.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSecondly, what place shall we assign to empirical psychology, which has always\r\nbeen considered a part of metaphysics, and from which in our time such\r\nimportant philosophical results have been expected, after the hope of\r\nconstructing an à priori system of knowledge had been abandoned? I answer: It\r\nmust be placed by the side of empirical physics or physics proper; that is,\r\nmust be regarded as forming a part of applied philosophy, the à priori\r\nprinciples of which are contained in pure philosophy, which is therefore\r\nconnected, although it must not be confounded, with psychology. Empirical\r\npsychology must therefore be banished from the sphere of metaphysics, and is\r\nindeed excluded by the very idea of that science. In conformity, however, with\r\nscholastic usage, we must permit it to occupy a place in metaphysics\u0026mdash;but\r\nonly as an appendix to it. We adopt this course from motives of economy; as\r\npsychology is not as yet full enough to occupy our attention as an independent\r\nstudy, while it is, at the same time, of too great importance to be entirely\r\nexcluded or placed where it has still less affinity than it has with the\r\nsubject of metaphysics. It is a stranger who has been long a guest; and we make\r\nit welcome to stay, until it can take up a more suitable abode in a complete\r\nsystem of anthropology\u0026mdash;the pendant to empirical physics.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe above is the general idea of metaphysics, which, as more was expected from\r\nit than could be looked for with justice, and as these pleasant expectations\r\nwere unfortunately never realized, fell into general disrepute. Our Critique\r\nmust have fully convinced the reader that, although metaphysics cannot form the\r\nfoundation of religion, it must always be one of its most important bulwarks,\r\nand that human reason, which naturally pursues a dialectical course, cannot do\r\nwithout this science, which checks its tendencies towards dialectic and, by\r\nelevating reason to a scientific and clear self-knowledge, prevents the ravages\r\nwhich a lawless speculative reason would infallibly commit in the sphere of\r\nmorals as well as in that of religion. We may be sure, therefore, whatever\r\ncontempt may be thrown upon metaphysics by those who judge a science not by its\r\nown nature, but according to the accidental effects it may have produced, that\r\nit can never be completely abandoned, that we must always return to it as to a\r\nbeloved one who has been for a time estranged, because the questions with which\r\nit is engaged relate to the highest aims of humanity, and reason must always\r\nlabour either to attain to settled views in regard to these, or to destroy\r\nthose which others have already established.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nMetaphysic, therefore\u0026mdash;that of nature, as well as that of ethics, but in\r\nan especial manner the criticism which forms the propædeutic to all the\r\noperations of reason\u0026mdash;forms properly that department of knowledge which\r\nmay be termed, in the truest sense of the word, philosophy. The path which it\r\npursues is that of science, which, when it has once been discovered, is never\r\nlost, and never misleads. Mathematics, natural science, the common experience\r\nof men, have a high value as means, for the most part, to accidental\r\nends\u0026mdash;but at last also, to those which are necessary and essential to the\r\nexistence of humanity. But to guide them to this high goal, they require the\r\naid of rational cognition on the basis of pure conceptions, which, be it termed\r\nas it may, is properly nothing but metaphysics.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nFor the same reason, metaphysics forms likewise the completion of the culture\r\nof human reason. In this respect, it is indispensable, setting aside altogether\r\nthe influence which it exerts as a science. For its subject-matter is the\r\nelements and highest maxims of reason, which form the basis of the possibility\r\nof some sciences and of the use of all. That, as a purely speculative science,\r\nit is more useful in preventing error than in the extension of knowledge, does\r\nnot detract from its value; on the contrary, the supreme office of censor which\r\nit occupies assures to it the highest authority and importance. This office it\r\nadministers for the purpose of securing order, harmony, and well-being to\r\nscience, and of directing its noble and fruitful labours to the highest\r\npossible aim\u0026mdash;the happiness of all mankind.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003ca id=\"chap107\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eChapter IV. The History of Pure Reason\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThis title is placed here merely for the purpose of designating a division of\r\nthe system of pure reason of which I do not intend to treat at present. I shall\r\ncontent myself with casting a cursory glance, from a purely transcendental\r\npoint of view\u0026mdash;that of the nature of pure reason\u0026mdash;on the labours of\r\nphilosophers up to the present time. They have aimed at erecting an edifice of\r\nphilosophy; but to my eye this edifice appears to be in a very ruinous\r\ncondition.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIt is very remarkable, although naturally it could not have been otherwise,\r\nthat, in the infancy of philosophy, the study of the nature of God and the\r\nconstitution of a future world formed the commencement, rather than the\r\nconclusion, as we should have it, of the speculative efforts of the human mind.\r\nHowever rude the religious conceptions generated by the remains of the old\r\nmanners and customs of a less cultivated time, the intelligent classes were not\r\nthereby prevented from devoting themselves to free inquiry into the existence\r\nand nature of God; and they easily saw that there could be no surer way of\r\npleasing the invisible ruler of the world, and of attaining to happiness in\r\nanother world at least, than a good and honest course of life in this. Thus\r\ntheology and morals formed the two chief motives, or rather the points of\r\nattraction in all abstract inquiries. But it was the former that especially\r\noccupied the attention of speculative reason, and which afterwards became so\r\ncelebrated under the name of metaphysics.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nI shall not at present indicate the periods of time at which the greatest\r\nchanges in metaphysics took place, but shall merely give a hasty sketch of the\r\ndifferent ideas which occasioned the most important revolutions in this sphere\r\nof thought. There are three different ends in relation to which these\r\nrevolutions have taken place.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n1. In relation to the object of the cognition of reason, philosophers may be\r\ndivided into sensualists and intellectualists. Epicurus may be regarded as the\r\nhead of the former, Plato of the latter. The distinction here signalized,\r\nsubtle as it is, dates from the earliest times, and was long maintained. The\r\nformer asserted that reality resides in sensuous objects alone, and that\r\neverything else is merely imaginary; the latter, that the senses are the\r\nparents of illusion and that truth is to be found in the understanding alone.\r\nThe former did not deny to the conceptions of the understanding a certain kind\r\nof reality; but with them it was merely logical, with the others it was\r\nmystical. The former admitted intellectual conceptions, but declared that\r\nsensuous objects alone possessed real existence. The latter maintained that all\r\nreal objects were intelligible, and believed that the pure understanding\r\npossessed a faculty of intuition apart from sense, which, in their opinion,\r\nserved only to confuse the ideas of the understanding.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n2. In relation to the origin of the pure cognitions of reason, we find one\r\nschool maintaining that they are derived entirely from experience, and another\r\nthat they have their origin in reason alone. Aristotle may be regarded as the\r\nhead of the empiricists, and Plato of the noologists. Locke, the follower of\r\nAristotle in modern times, and Leibnitz of Plato (although he cannot be said to\r\nhave imitated him in his mysticism), have not been able to bring this question\r\nto a settled conclusion. The procedure of Epicurus in his sensual system, in\r\nwhich he always restricted his conclusions to the sphere of experience, was\r\nmuch more consequent than that of Aristotle and Locke. The latter especially,\r\nafter having derived all the conceptions and principles of the mind from\r\nexperience, goes so far, in the employment of these conceptions and principles, as to maintain that we can prove the existence of God and the immortality of the soul—both of them objects\r\nlying beyond the limits of possible experience—with the same force of\r\ndemonstration, as any mathematical proposition.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n3. In relation to method. Method is procedure according to principles. We may\r\ndivide the methods at present employed in the field of inquiry into the\r\nnaturalistic and the scientific. The naturalist of pure reason lays it down as\r\nhis principle that common reason, without the aid of science\u0026mdash;which he\r\ncalls sound reason, or common sense\u0026mdash;can give a more satisfactory answer\r\nto the most important questions of metaphysics than speculation is able to do.\r\nHe must maintain, therefore, that we can determine the content and\r\ncircumference of the moon more certainly by the naked eye, than by the aid of\r\nmathematical reasoning. But this system is mere misology reduced to principles;\r\nand, what is the most absurd thing in this doctrine, the neglect of all\r\nscientific means is paraded as a peculiar method of extending our cognition. As\r\nregards those who are naturalists because they know no better, they are\r\ncertainly not to be blamed. They follow common sense, without parading their\r\nignorance as a method which is to teach us the wonderful secret, how we are to\r\nfind the truth which lies at the bottom of the well of Democritus.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"poem\"\u003e\r\nQuod sapio satis est mihi, non ego curo Esse quod\u003cbr\u003e\r\nArcesilas aerumnosique Solones. PERSIUS\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u0026mdash;Satirae, iii. 78-79.\u003cbr\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"noindent\"\u003e is their motto, under which they may lead a pleasant and\r\npraiseworthy life, without troubling themselves with science or troubling\r\nscience with them.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAs regards those who wish to pursue a scientific method, they have now the\r\nchoice of following either the dogmatical or the sceptical, while they are\r\nbound never to desert the systematic mode of procedure. When I mention, in\r\nrelation to the former, the celebrated Wolf, and as regards the latter, David\r\nHume, I may leave, in accordance with my present intention, all others unnamed.\r\nThe critical path alone is still open. If my reader has been kind and patient\r\nenough to accompany me on this hitherto untravelled route, he can now judge\r\nwhether, if he and others will contribute their exertions towards making this\r\nnarrow footpath a high road of thought, that which many centuries have failed\r\nto accomplish may not be executed before the close of the present\u0026mdash;namely,\r\nto bring Reason to perfect contentment in regard to that which has always, but\r\nwithout permanent results, occupied her powers and engaged her ardent desire\r\nfor knowledge.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003c!–end chapter–\u003e\r\n\u003c/article\u003e"}],"SectionSequence":["Back Link","Work Title","Deck","Author","Period","Era","Composition","Date Note","Region","Terra Avita","Terra Avita Region","Modern Country","Original Title","Language","Primary Discipline","Secondary Discipline","Tradition","Full Versions","Core Thesis","Classification","Arguments","Influence","Significance","Evidence Note","Full Text"],"Counts":{"ContextCards":3,"GeoCards":4,"DisciplineCards":2,"Links":11,"Sections":25,"Styles":3,"Scripts":1}}