How We Think
{"WorkMasterId":6303,"WpPageId":281290,"ParentWpPageId":193822,"Slug":"how-we-think","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/john-dewey/how-we-think/","RelativeUrl":"theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/john-dewey/how-we-think/","HasFullText":true,"RawHtmlLength":543437,"CleanHtmlLength":487327,"Kicker":"Philosophy Work","Title":"How We Think","Deck":"Dewey analyzes reflective thought as inquiry that moves from felt difficulty through hypothesis, testing, judgment, and warranted conclusion.","BackLink":{"Text":"Back to John Dewey","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/john-dewey/"},"AuthorCard":{"Label":"Author","Title":"John Dewey","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/john-dewey/","MediaHref":"","ImageSrc":"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/john-dewey-01-portrait-by-underwood-underwood.jpg","ImageAlt":"Underwood and Underwood portrait of John Dewey","FilterTerra":"North America","ClickText":"John Dewey","ClickHref":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/john-dewey/","Copies":["1859 CE – 1952 CE","Burlington, Vermont","American pragmatist philosopher of instrumentalism, democratic experimentalism, progressive education, inquiry, experience, logic, ethics, aesthetics, public life, science, and naturalistic religion."]},"ContextCards":[{"Label":"Period","Key":"Period:4","Title":"Modern History","DateText":"1800 CE – 1944 CE","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/eras-of-thought/philosophers-of-modern-history/"},{"Label":"Era","Key":"Era:11","Title":"Long 19th Century","DateText":"1870 CE – 1913 CE","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/eras-of-thought/philosophers-of-modern-history/philosophers-of-the-long-19th-century/"},{"Label":"Composition","Title":"1910 CE","Url":"","DateText":""}],"DateNote":"Displayed as 1910 CE for the first edition of How We Think.","GeoCards":[{"Label":"Region","Key":"Region:1"},{"Label":"Terra Avita","Key":"TerraAvita:6"},{"Label":"Terra Avita Region","Key":"TerraAvitaRegion:25"},{"Label":"Modern Country","Key":"Country:USA:6"}],"OriginalTitle":"How We Think","Language":"English","DisciplineCards":[{"Label":"Primary Discipline","Key":"Discipline:logic"},{"Label":"Secondary Discipline","Key":"Discipline:epistemology"}],"Tradition":"American pragmatism; instrumentalism; pragmatic naturalism; democratic experimentalism; progressive education","FullText":{"Title":"Full Text","Copy":"Public-domain full text from Project Gutenberg eBook #37423 .","Url":"","Label":"","Kicker":"","Cards":[]},"CoreThesis":["Dewey analyzes reflective thought as inquiry that moves from felt difficulty through hypothesis, testing, judgment, and warranted conclusion."],"Classification":{"AlternateTitles":"Reflective Thought","KeyConcepts":"thinking; reflection; inquiry; judgment; hypothesis; education; logic","Methodology":"Direct Dewey work-cluster record based on SEP, IEP, Britannica, Center for Dewey Studies, Dewey scholarship, catalog records, and public edition evidence. 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Hegel, Darwinian naturalism, experimental science, Jane Addams and social reform, American democratic institutions, and educational practice.","InfluenceOn":""},"Significance":["Accepted as a direct Dewey work via Wikisource, Gutenberg, catalog, and scholarship evidence.","Dewey remains central for inquiry, democratic life, public problem-solving, education, experience, habits, art, values, religion as human faith, and experimental social intelligence."],"EvidenceNote":["Accepted as a direct Dewey work via Wikisource, Gutenberg, catalog, and scholarship evidence."],"MainSections":[{"Kind":"RawSection","Title":"Full Versions","BodyHtml":"\u003cdiv class=\"dz-philo__full-version-grid\"\u003e\n \u003carticle class=\"dz-philo__full-version-card\"\u003e\n \u003cp class=\"dz-philo__full-version-provider\"\u003eProject Gutenberg\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003ch3 class=\"dz-philo__full-version-title\"\u003eProject Gutenberg eBook #37423\u003c/h3\u003e\n \u003cp class=\"dz-philo__full-version-meta\"\u003eHtmlText · Imported\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003ca class=\"dz-philo__full-version-link\" href=\"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/37423\"\u003eOpen full version\u003c/a\u003e\n \u003c/article\u003e\n \u003c/div\u003e"},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Core Thesis","Paragraphs":["Dewey analyzes reflective thought as inquiry that moves from felt difficulty through hypothesis, testing, judgment, and warranted conclusion."]},{"Kind":"FieldSection","Title":"Classification","Fields":[{"Label":"Alternate Titles","Value":"Reflective Thought"},{"Label":"Key Concepts","Value":"thinking; reflection; inquiry; judgment; hypothesis; education; logic"},{"Label":"Methodology","Value":"Direct Dewey work-cluster record based on SEP, IEP, Britannica, Center for Dewey Studies, Dewey scholarship, catalog records, and public edition evidence. No full text is imported."},{"Label":"Structure","Value":"One work-cluster page with explicit integer display year, date note, evidence note, discipline mapping, and public source evidence."}]},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Arguments","Paragraphs":["Dewey analyzes reflective thought as inquiry that moves from felt difficulty through hypothesis, testing, judgment, and warranted conclusion."]},{"Kind":"FieldSection","Title":"Influence","Fields":[{"Label":"Influenced By","Value":"William James, Charles Sanders Peirce, G. W. F. Hegel, Darwinian naturalism, experimental science, Jane Addams and social reform, American democratic institutions, and educational practice."},{"Label":"Influence On","Value":"Pragmatism, analytic and continental social philosophy, democratic theory, progressive education, inquiry theory, aesthetics, public philosophy, deliberative democracy, philosophy of science, and American philosophy."}]},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Significance","Paragraphs":["Accepted as a direct Dewey work via Wikisource, Gutenberg, catalog, and scholarship evidence.","Dewey remains central for inquiry, democratic life, public problem-solving, education, experience, habits, art, values, religion as human faith, and experimental social intelligence."]},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Evidence Note","Paragraphs":["Accepted as a direct Dewey work via Wikisource, Gutenberg, catalog, and scholarship evidence."]},{"Kind":"RawSection","Title":"Full Text","BodyHtml":"\u003cp class=\"dz-philo__section-copy dz-philo__full-text-source\"\u003ePublic-domain full text from \u003ca href=\"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/37423\"\u003eProject Gutenberg eBook #37423\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003carticle class=\"dz-philo__full-text-body\"\u003e\n\u003ch1\u003eHOW WE THINK\u003c/h1\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"center\"\u003e\r\nBY\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch2\u003eJOHN DEWEY\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"center\"\u003e\r\n\u003csmall\u003ePROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY\u003c/small\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figcenter\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-how-we-think-001.jpg\" alt=\"001\" /\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"center\"\u003e\r\n\u003cbig\u003eD. C. HEATH \u0026amp; CO., PUBLISHERS\u003c/big\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nBOSTON \u0026nbsp; NEW YORK \u0026nbsp; CHICAGO\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr style=\"width: 35%;\" /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"center\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003e\u003csmall\u003eCopyright, 1910,\u003c/small\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nBy D. C. Heath \u0026amp; Co.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"center\"\u003e\u003csmall\u003e2 F 8\u003c/small\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"center\"\u003e\u003csmall\u003ePrinted in U. S. A.\u003c/small\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr style=\"width: 35%;\" /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003ePREFACE\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOur schools are troubled with a multiplication of\r\nstudies, each in turn having its own multiplication of\r\nmaterials and principles. Our teachers find their tasks\r\nmade heavier in that they have come to deal with\r\npupils individually and not merely in mass. Unless\r\nthese steps in advance are to end in distraction, some\r\nclew of unity, some principle that makes for simplification,\r\nmust be found. This book represents the conviction\r\nthat the needed steadying and centralizing factor\r\nis found in adopting as the end of endeavor that attitude\r\nof mind, that habit of thought, which we call\r\nscientific. This scientific attitude of mind might, conceivably,\r\nbe quite irrelevant to teaching children and\r\nyouth. But this book also represents the conviction\r\nthat such is not the case; that the native and unspoiled\r\nattitude of childhood, marked by ardent curiosity, fertile\r\nimagination, and love of experimental inquiry, is near,\r\nvery near, to the attitude of the scientific mind. If\r\nthese pages assist any to appreciate this kinship and to\r\nconsider seriously how its recognition in educational\r\npractice would make for individual happiness and the\r\nreduction of social waste, the book will amply have\r\nserved its purpose.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is hardly necessary to enumerate the authors to\r\nwhom I am indebted. My fundamental indebtedness\r\nis to my wife, by whom the ideas of this book were\r\ninspired, and through whose work in connection with\r\nthe Laboratory School, existing in Chicago between\r\n1896 and 1903, the ideas attained such concreteness\r\nas comes from embodiment and testing in practice. It\r\nis a pleasure, also, to acknowledge indebtedness to the\r\nintelligence and sympathy of those who coöperated as\r\nteachers and supervisors in the conduct of that school,\r\nand especially to Mrs. Ella Flagg Young, then a colleague\r\nin the University, and now Superintendent of\r\nthe Schools of Chicago.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eNew York City\u003c/span\u003e, December, 1909.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003chr style=\"width: 65%;\" /\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003eCONTENTS\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ctable summary=\"CONTENTS\"\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tdr\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"center\"\u003e\u003cbig\u003ePART I\u003c/big\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tdr\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tdr\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"center\"\u003e\u003cbig\u003eTHE PROBLEM OF TRAINING THOUGHT\u003c/big\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tdr\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tdl\"\u003e\u003csmall\u003eCHAPTER\u003c/small\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tdl\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tdr\"\u003e\u003csmall\u003ePAGE\u003c/small\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tdr\"\u003eI.\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tdl\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_ONE\"\u003eWhat is Thought?\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tdr\"\u003e1\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tdr\"\u003eII.\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tdl\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_TWO\"\u003eThe Need for Training Thought\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tdr\"\u003e14\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tdr\"\u003eIII.\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tdl\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_THREE\"\u003eNatural Resources in the Training of Thought\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tdr\"\u003e29\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tdr\"\u003eIV.\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tdl\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_FOUR\"\u003eSchool Conditions and the Training of Thought\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tdr\"\u003e45\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tdr\"\u003eV.\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tdl\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_FIVE\"\u003eThe Means and End of Mental Training: the\r\nPsychological and the Logical\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tdr\"\u003e56\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tdr\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"center\"\u003e\u003cbig\u003ePART II\u003c/big\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tdr\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tdr\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"center\"\u003e\u003cbig\u003eLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS\u003c/big\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tdr\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tdr\"\u003eVI.\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tdl\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_SIX\"\u003eThe Analysis of a Complete Act of Thought\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e \u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tdr\"\u003e68\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tdr\"\u003eVII.\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tdl\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_SEVEN\"\u003eSystematic Inference: Induction and Deduction\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tdr\"\u003e79\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tdr\"\u003eVIII.\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tdl\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_EIGHT\"\u003eJudgment: The Interpretation of Facts\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tdr\"\u003e101\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tdr\"\u003eIX.\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tdl\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_NINE\"\u003eMeaning: or Conceptions and Understanding\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tdr\"\u003e116\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tdr\"\u003eX.\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tdl\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_TEN\"\u003eConcrete and Abstract Thinking\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tdr\"\u003e135\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tdr\"\u003eXI.\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tdl\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_ELEVEN\"\u003eEmpirical and Scientific Thinking\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tdr\"\u003e145\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tdr\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"center\"\u003e\u003cbig\u003ePART III\u003c/big\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tdr\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tdr\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"center\"\u003e\u003cbig\u003eTHE TRAINING OF THOUGHT\u003c/big\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tdr\"\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tdr\"\u003eXII.\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tdl\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_TWELVE\"\u003eActivity and the Training of Thought\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tdr\"\u003e157\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tdr\"\u003eXIII.\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tdl\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_THIRTEEN\"\u003eLanguage and the Training of Thought\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tdr\"\u003e170\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tdr\"\u003eXIV.\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tdl\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_FOURTEEN\"\u003eObservation and Information in the Training\r\nof Mind\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tdr\"\u003e188\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tdr\"\u003eXV.\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tdl\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_FIFTEEN\"\u003eThe Recitation and the Training of Thought\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tdr\"\u003e201\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tdr\"\u003eXVI.\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tdl\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_SIXTEEN\"\u003eSome General Conclusions\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tdr\"\u003e214\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003c/table\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_1\" id=\"Page_1\"\u003e[Pg 1]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003chr style=\"width: 65%;\" /\u003e\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"HOW_WE_THINK\" id=\"HOW_WE_THINK\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eHOW WE THINK\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003chr style=\"width: 65%;\" /\u003e\r\n\u003ch2\u003ePART ONE: THE PROBLEM OF\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nTRAINING THOUGHT\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\u003chr style=\"width: 65%;\" /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"CHAPTER_ONE\" id=\"CHAPTER_ONE\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eCHAPTER ONE\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eWHAT IS THOUGHT?\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e§ 1. \u003ci\u003eVaried Senses of the Term\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eFour senses\r\nof thought,\r\nfrom the\r\nwider to the\r\nlimited\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNo words are oftener on our lips than \u003ci\u003ethinking\u003c/i\u003e and\r\n\u003ci\u003ethought\u003c/i\u003e. So profuse and varied, indeed, is our use of\r\nthese words that it is not easy to define just what we\r\nmean by them. The aim of this chapter is to find a\r\nsingle consistent meaning. Assistance may be had by\r\nconsidering some typical ways in which the terms are\r\nemployed. In the first place \u003ci\u003ethought\u003c/i\u003e is used broadly,\r\nnot to say loosely. Everything that comes to mind,\r\nthat \"goes through our heads,\" is called a thought. To\r\nthink of a thing is just to be conscious of it in any way\r\nwhatsoever. Second, the term is restricted by excluding\r\nwhatever is directly presented; we think (or think of)\r\nonly such things as we do not directly see, hear, smell,\r\nor taste. Then, third, the meaning is further limited to\r\nbeliefs that rest upon some kind of evidence or testimony.\r\nOf this third type, two kinds\u0026mdash;or, rather, two degrees\u0026mdash;must\r\nbe discriminated. In some cases, a belief\r\nis accepted with slight or almost no attempt to state\r\nthe grounds that support it. In other cases, the ground\r\nor basis for a belief is deliberately sought and its\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_2\" id=\"Page_2\"\u003e[Pg 2]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nadequacy to support the belief examined. This process\r\nis called reflective thought; it alone is truly educative in\r\nvalue, and it forms, accordingly, the principal subject of\r\nthis volume. We shall now briefly describe each of\r\nthe four senses.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eChance and\r\nidle thinking\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eI. In its loosest sense, thinking signifies everything\r\nthat, as we say, is \"in our heads\" or that \"goes through\r\nour minds.\" He who offers \"a penny for your thoughts\"\r\ndoes not expect to drive any great bargain. In calling\r\nthe objects of his demand \u003ci\u003ethoughts\u003c/i\u003e, he does not intend\r\nto ascribe to them dignity, consecutiveness, or truth.\r\nAny idle fancy, trivial recollection, or flitting impression\r\nwill satisfy his demand. Daydreaming, building of\r\ncastles in the air, that loose flux of casual and disconnected\r\nmaterial that floats through our minds in relaxed\r\nmoments are, in this random sense, \u003ci\u003ethinking\u003c/i\u003e. More of\r\nour waking life than we should care to admit, even to\r\nourselves, is likely to be whiled away in this inconsequential\r\ntrifling with idle fancy and unsubstantial hope.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eReflective\r\nthought is\r\nconsecutive,\r\nnot merely\r\na sequence\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn this sense, silly folk and dullards \u003ci\u003ethink\u003c/i\u003e. The story\r\nis told of a man in slight repute for intelligence, who,\r\ndesiring to be chosen selectman in his New England\r\ntown, addressed a knot of neighbors in this wise: \"I\r\nhear you don\u0027t believe I know enough to hold office. I\r\nwish you to understand that I am thinking about something\r\nor other most of the time.\" Now reflective\r\nthought is like this random coursing of things through\r\nthe mind in that it consists of a succession of things\r\nthought of; but it is unlike, in that the mere chance\r\noccurrence of any chance \"something or other\" in\r\nan irregular sequence does not suffice. Reflection\r\ninvolves not simply a sequence of ideas, but a \u003ci\u003econ\u003c/i\u003esequence\u0026mdash;a\r\nconsecutive ordering in such a way that\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_3\" id=\"Page_3\"\u003e[Pg 3]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\neach determines the next as its proper outcome, while\r\neach in turn leans back on its predecessors. The successive\r\nportions of the reflective thought grow out of\r\none another and support one another; they do not come\r\nand go in a medley. Each phase is a step from something\r\nto something\u0026mdash;technically speaking, it is a term\r\nof thought. Each term leaves a deposit which is utilized\r\nin the next term. The stream or flow becomes a train,\r\nchain, or thread.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eThe restriction\r\nof\r\n\u003ci\u003ethinking\u003c/i\u003e to\r\nwhat goes\r\nbeyond\r\ndirect observation\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eReflective\r\nthought\r\naims, however,\r\nat belief\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eII. Even when thinking is used in a broad sense, it is\r\nusually restricted to matters not directly perceived: to\r\nwhat we do not see, smell, hear, or touch. We ask the\r\nman telling a story if he saw a certain incident happen,\r\nand his reply may be, \"No, I only thought of it.\" A\r\nnote of invention, as distinct from faithful record of\r\nobservation, is present. Most important in this class\r\nare successions of imaginative incidents and episodes\r\nwhich, having a certain coherence, hanging together on\r\na continuous thread, lie between kaleidoscopic flights of\r\nfancy and considerations deliberately employed to establish\r\na conclusion. The imaginative stories poured forth\r\nby children possess all degrees of internal congruity;\r\nsome are disjointed, some are articulated. When connected,\r\nthey simulate reflective thought; indeed, they\r\nusually occur in minds of logical capacity.\r\nThese\r\nimaginative enterprises often precede thinking of the\r\nclose-knit type and prepare the way for it.\r\n\r\n\r\nBut \u003ci\u003ethey\r\ndo not aim at knowledge, at belief about facts or in truths\u003c/i\u003e;\r\nand thereby they are marked off from reflective thought\r\neven when they most resemble it. Those who express\r\nsuch thoughts do not expect credence, but rather credit\r\nfor a well-constructed plot or a well-arranged climax.\r\nThey produce good stories, not\u0026mdash;unless by chance\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_4\" id=\"Page_4\"\u003e[Pg 4]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u0026mdash;knowledge.\r\nSuch thoughts are an efflorescence of\r\nfeeling; the enhancement of a mood or sentiment is\r\ntheir aim; congruity of emotion, their binding tie.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eThought\r\ninduces\r\nbelief in\r\ntwo ways\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIII. In its next sense, thought denotes belief resting\r\nupon some basis, that is, real or supposed knowledge\r\ngoing beyond what is directly present. It is marked\r\nby \u003ci\u003eacceptance or rejection of something as reasonably probable\r\nor improbable\u003c/i\u003e. This phase of thought, however,\r\nincludes two such distinct types of belief that, even\r\nthough their difference is strictly one of degree, not\r\nof kind, it becomes practically important to consider\r\nthem separately. Some beliefs are accepted when\r\ntheir grounds have not themselves been considered,\r\nothers are accepted because their grounds have been\r\nexamined.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhen we say, \"Men used to think the world was flat,\"\r\nor, \"I thought you went by the house,\" we express belief:\r\nsomething is accepted, held to, acquiesced in, or\r\naffirmed. But such thoughts may mean a supposition\r\naccepted without reference to its real grounds. These\r\nmay be adequate, they may not; but their value with\r\nreference to the support they afford the belief has not\r\nbeen considered.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSuch thoughts grow up unconsciously and without\r\nreference to the attainment of correct belief. They are\r\npicked up\u0026mdash;we know not how. From obscure sources\r\nand by unnoticed channels they insinuate themselves\r\ninto acceptance and become unconsciously a part of\r\nour mental furniture. Tradition, instruction, imitation\u0026mdash;all\r\nof which depend upon authority in some form,\r\nor appeal to our own advantage, or fall in with a\r\nstrong passion\u0026mdash;are responsible for them. Such\r\nthoughts are prejudices, that is, prejudgments, not\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_5\" id=\"Page_5\"\u003e[Pg 5]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\njudgments proper that rest upon a survey of evidence.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_1_1\" id=\"FNanchor_1_1\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_1_1\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[1]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eThinking\r\nin its best\r\nsense is that\r\nwhich considers\r\nthe\r\nbasis and\r\nconsequences\r\nof beliefs\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIV. Thoughts that result in belief have an importance\r\nattached to them which leads to reflective thought,\r\nto conscious inquiry into the nature, conditions, and\r\nbearings of the belief. To \u003ci\u003ethink\u003c/i\u003e of whales and camels\r\nin the clouds is to entertain ourselves with fancies,\r\nterminable at our pleasure, which do not lead to any\r\nbelief in particular. But to think of the world as flat is\r\nto ascribe a quality to a real thing as its real property.\r\nThis conclusion denotes a connection among things and\r\nhence is not, like imaginative thought, plastic to our\r\nmood. Belief in the world\u0027s flatness commits him who\r\nholds it to thinking in certain specific ways of other\r\nobjects, such as the heavenly bodies, antipodes, the possibility\r\nof navigation. It prescribes to him actions in accordance\r\nwith his conception of these objects.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe consequences of a belief upon other beliefs and\r\nupon behavior may be so important, then, that men are\r\nforced to consider the grounds or reasons of their belief\r\nand its logical consequences. This means reflective\r\nthought\u0026mdash;thought in its eulogistic and emphatic sense.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eReflective\r\nthought\r\ndefined\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eMen \u003ci\u003ethought\u003c/i\u003e the world was flat until Columbus \u003ci\u003ethought\u003c/i\u003e\r\nit to be round. The earlier thought was a belief held\r\nbecause men had not the energy or the courage to question\r\nwhat those about them accepted and taught,\r\nespecially as it was suggested and seemingly confirmed\r\nby obvious sensible facts. The thought of Columbus\r\nwas a \u003ci\u003ereasoned conclusion\u003c/i\u003e. It marked the close of study\r\ninto facts, of scrutiny and revision of evidence, of working\r\nout the implications of various hypotheses, and of\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_6\" id=\"Page_6\"\u003e[Pg 6]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ncomparing these theoretical results with one another and\r\nwith known facts. Because Columbus did not accept\r\nunhesitatingly the current traditional theory, because he\r\ndoubted and inquired, he arrived at his thought. Skeptical\r\nof what, from long habit, seemed most certain, and\r\ncredulous of what seemed impossible, he went on thinking\r\nuntil he could produce evidence for both his confidence\r\nand his disbelief. Even if his conclusion had finally\r\nturned out wrong, it would have been a different sort of\r\nbelief from those it antagonized, because it was reached\r\nby a different method. \u003ci\u003eActive, persistent, and careful consideration\r\nof any belief or supposed form of knowledge in\r\nthe light of the grounds that support it, and the further conclusions\r\nto which it tends\u003c/i\u003e, constitutes reflective thought.\r\nAny one of the first three kinds of thought may elicit\r\nthis type; but once begun, it is a conscious and voluntary\r\neffort to establish belief upon a firm basis of reasons.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e§ 2. \u003ci\u003eThe Central Factor in Thinking\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eThere is a\r\ncommon element\r\nin all\r\ntypes of\r\nthought:\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThere are, however, no sharp lines of demarcation\r\nbetween the various operations just outlined. The\r\nproblem of attaining correct habits of reflection would\r\nbe much easier than it is, did not the different modes of\r\nthinking blend insensibly into one another. So far, we\r\nhave considered rather extreme instances of each kind\r\nin order to get the field clearly before us. Let us now\r\nreverse this operation; let us consider a rudimentary\r\ncase of thinking, lying between careful examination of\r\nevidence and a mere irresponsible stream of fancies. A\r\nman is walking on a warm day. The sky was clear the\r\nlast time he observed it; but presently he notes, while\r\noccupied primarily with other things, that the air is\r\ncooler. It occurs to him that it is probably going to\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_7\" id=\"Page_7\"\u003e[Pg 7]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nrain; looking up, he sees a dark cloud between him and\r\nthe sun, and he then quickens his steps. What, if anything,\r\nin such a situation can be called thought? Neither\r\nthe act of walking nor the noting of the cold is a thought.\r\nWalking is one direction of activity; looking and noting\r\nare other modes of activity. The likelihood that it will\r\nrain is, however, something \u003ci\u003esuggested\u003c/i\u003e. The pedestrian\r\n\u003ci\u003efeels\u003c/i\u003e the cold; he \u003ci\u003ethinks of\u003c/i\u003e clouds and a coming\r\nshower.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003e\u003ci\u003eviz.\u003c/i\u003e suggestion\r\nof something\r\nnot\r\nobserved\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eBut reflection\r\ninvolves\r\nalso the\r\nrelation of\r\n\u003ci\u003esignifying\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSo far there is the same sort of situation as when one\r\nlooking at a cloud is reminded of a human figure and\r\nface. Thinking in both of these cases (the cases of belief\r\nand of fancy) involves a noted or perceived fact,\r\nfollowed by something else which is not observed but\r\nwhich is brought to mind, suggested by the thing seen.\r\nOne reminds us, as we say, of the other. Side by side,\r\nhowever, with this factor of agreement in the two cases\r\nof suggestion is a factor of marked disagreement. We\r\ndo not \u003ci\u003ebelieve\u003c/i\u003e in the face suggested by the cloud; we do\r\nnot consider at all the probability of its being a fact.\r\nThere is no \u003ci\u003ereflective\u003c/i\u003e thought.\r\nThe danger of rain, on\r\nthe contrary, presents itself to us as a genuine possibility\u0026mdash;as\r\na possible fact of the same nature as the observed\r\ncoolness. Put differently, we do not regard the\r\ncloud as meaning or indicating a face, but merely as\r\nsuggesting it, while we do consider that the coolness may\r\nmean rain. In the first case, seeing an object, we just\r\nhappen, as we say, to think of something else; in the\r\nsecond, we consider the \u003ci\u003epossibility and nature of the connection\r\nbetween the object seen and the object suggested\u003c/i\u003e.\r\nThe seen thing is regarded as in some way \u003ci\u003ethe ground or\r\nbasis of belief\u003c/i\u003e in the suggested thing; it possesses the\r\nquality of \u003ci\u003eevidence\u003c/i\u003e.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_8\" id=\"Page_8\"\u003e[Pg 8]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eVarious\r\nsynonymous\r\nexpressions\r\nfor the\r\nfunction of\r\nsignifying\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis function by which one thing signifies or indicates\r\nanother, and thereby leads us to consider how far\r\none may be regarded as warrant for belief in the other,\r\nis, then, the central factor in all reflective or distinctively\r\nintellectual thinking. By calling up various situations to\r\nwhich such terms as \u003ci\u003esignifies\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003eindicates\u003c/i\u003e apply, the student\r\nwill best realize for himself the actual facts denoted\r\nby the words \u003ci\u003ereflective thought\u003c/i\u003e. Synonyms for these\r\nterms are: points to, tells of, betokens, prognosticates,\r\nrepresents, stands for, implies.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_2_2\" id=\"FNanchor_2_2\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_2_2\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[2]\u003c/a\u003e We also say one thing\r\nportends another; is ominous of another, or a symptom\r\nof it, or a key to it, or (if the connection is quite obscure)\r\nthat it gives a hint, clue, or intimation.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eReflection\r\nand belief\r\non evidence\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eReflection thus implies that something is believed in\r\n(or disbelieved in), not on its own direct account, but\r\nthrough something else which stands as witness, evidence,\r\nproof, voucher, warrant; that is, as \u003ci\u003eground of belief\u003c/i\u003e.\r\nAt one time, rain is actually felt or directly experienced;\r\nat another time, we infer that it has rained\r\nfrom the looks of the grass and trees, or that it is going\r\nto rain because of the condition of the air or the state of\r\nthe barometer. At one time, we see a man (or suppose\r\nwe do) without any intermediary fact; at another time,\r\nwe are not quite sure what we see, and hunt for accompanying\r\nfacts that will serve as signs, indications, tokens\r\nof what is to be believed.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThinking, for the purposes of this inquiry, is defined\r\naccordingly as \u003ci\u003ethat operation in which present facts suggest\r\nother facts (or truths) in such a way as to induce be\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_9\" id=\"Page_9\"\u003e[Pg 9]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003elief\r\nin the latter upon the ground or warrant of the\r\nformer\u003c/i\u003e. We do not put beliefs that rest simply on\r\ninference on the surest level of assurance. To say\r\n\"I think so\" implies that I do not as yet \u003ci\u003eknow\u003c/i\u003e so. The\r\ninferential belief may later be confirmed and come to\r\nstand as sure, but in itself it always has a certain element\r\nof supposition.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e§ 3. \u003ci\u003eElements in Reflective Thinking\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSo much for the description of the more external and\r\nobvious aspects of the fact called \u003ci\u003ethinking\u003c/i\u003e. Further\r\nconsideration at once reveals certain subprocesses which\r\nare involved in every reflective operation. These are:\r\n(\u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e) a state of perplexity, hesitation, doubt; and (\u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e) an\r\nact of search or investigation directed toward bringing\r\nto light further facts which serve to corroborate or to\r\nnullify the suggested belief.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eThe importance\r\nof\r\nuncertainty\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(\u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e) In our illustration, the shock of coolness generated\r\nconfusion and suspended belief, at least momentarily.\r\nBecause it was unexpected, it was a shock or an interruption\r\nneeding to be accounted for, identified, or placed.\r\nTo say that the abrupt occurrence of the change of temperature\r\nconstitutes a problem may sound forced and\r\nartificial; but if we are willing to extend the meaning\r\nof the word \u003ci\u003eproblem\u003c/i\u003e to whatever\u0026mdash;no matter how slight\r\nand commonplace in character\u0026mdash;perplexes and challenges\r\nthe mind so that it makes belief at all uncertain,\r\nthere is a genuine problem or question involved in this\r\nexperience of sudden change.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eand of\r\ninquiry\r\nin order\r\nto test\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(\u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e) The turning of the head, the lifting of the eyes,\r\nthe scanning of the heavens, are activities adapted to\r\nbring to recognition facts that will answer the question\r\npresented by the sudden coolness. The facts as they\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_10\" id=\"Page_10\"\u003e[Pg 10]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nfirst presented themselves were perplexing; they suggested,\r\nhowever, clouds. The act of looking was an act\r\nto discover if this suggested explanation held good. It\r\nmay again seem forced to speak of this looking, almost\r\nautomatic, as an act of research or inquiry. But once\r\nmore, if we are willing to generalize our conceptions\r\nof our mental operations to include the trivial and\r\nordinary as well as the technical and recondite, there\r\nis no good reason for refusing to give such a title to\r\nthe act of looking. The purport of this act of inquiry\r\nis to confirm or to refute the suggested belief. New\r\nfacts are brought to perception, which either corroborate\r\nthe idea that a change of weather is imminent, or\r\nnegate it.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eFinding\r\none\u0027s way\r\nan illustration\r\nof\r\nreflection\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAnother instance, commonplace also, yet not quite so\r\ntrivial, may enforce this lesson. A man traveling in an\r\nunfamiliar region comes to a branching of the roads.\r\nHaving no sure knowledge to fall back upon, he is\r\nbrought to a standstill of hesitation and suspense.\r\nWhich road is right? And how shall perplexity be\r\nresolved? There are but two alternatives: he must\r\neither blindly and arbitrarily take his course, trusting to\r\nluck for the outcome, or he must discover grounds for\r\nthe conclusion that a given road is right. Any attempt\r\nto decide the matter by thinking will involve inquiry\r\ninto other facts, whether brought out by memory or by\r\nfurther observation, or by both. The perplexed wayfarer\r\nmust carefully scrutinize what is before him and\r\nhe must cudgel his memory. He looks for evidence\r\nthat will support belief in favor of either of the roads\u0026mdash;for\r\nevidence that will weight down one suggestion.\r\nHe may climb a tree; he may go first in this direction,\r\nthen in that, looking, in either case, for signs, clues,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_11\" id=\"Page_11\"\u003e[Pg 11]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nindications. He wants something in the nature of a\r\nsignboard or a map, and \u003ci\u003ehis reflection is aimed at the\r\ndiscovery of facts that will serve this purpose\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003ePossible,\r\nyet incompatible,\r\nsuggestions\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe above illustration may be generalized. Thinking\r\nbegins in what may fairly enough be called a \u003ci\u003eforked-road\u003c/i\u003e\r\nsituation, a situation which is ambiguous, which\r\npresents a dilemma, which proposes alternatives. As\r\nlong as our activity glides smoothly along from one\r\nthing to another, or as long as we permit our imagination\r\nto entertain fancies at pleasure, there is no call for\r\nreflection. Difficulty or obstruction in the way of\r\nreaching a belief brings us, however, to a pause. In\r\nthe suspense of uncertainty, we metaphorically climb a\r\ntree; we try to find some standpoint from which we\r\nmay survey additional facts and, getting a more commanding\r\nview of the situation, may decide how the facts\r\nstand related to one another.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eRegulation\r\nof thinking\r\nby its\r\npurpose\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003eDemand for the solution of a perplexity is the steadying\r\nand guiding factor in the entire process of reflection.\u003c/i\u003e\r\nWhere there is no question of a problem to be solved\r\nor a difficulty to be surmounted, the course of suggestions\r\nflows on at random; we have the first type of thought\r\ndescribed. If the stream of suggestions is controlled\r\nsimply by their emotional congruity, their fitting agreeably\r\ninto a single picture or story, we have the second\r\ntype. But a question to be answered, an ambiguity to\r\nbe resolved, sets up an end and holds the current of\r\nideas to a definite channel. Every suggested conclusion\r\nis tested by its reference to this regulating end, by its\r\npertinence to the problem in hand. This need of\r\nstraightening out a perplexity also controls the kind of\r\ninquiry undertaken. A traveler whose end is the most\r\nbeautiful path will look for other considerations and\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_12\" id=\"Page_12\"\u003e[Pg 12]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwill test suggestions occurring to him on another principle\r\nthan if he wishes to discover the way to a given\r\ncity. \u003ci\u003eThe problem fixes the end of thought\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003ethe end\r\ncontrols the process of thinking\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e§ 4. \u003ci\u003eSummary\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eOrigin and\r\nstimulus\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe may recapitulate by saying that the origin of\r\nthinking is some perplexity, confusion, or doubt. Thinking\r\nis not a case of spontaneous combustion; it does\r\nnot occur just on \"general principles.\" There is something\r\nspecific which occasions and evokes it. General\r\nappeals to a child (or to a grown-up) to think, irrespective\r\nof the existence in his own experience of some\r\ndifficulty that troubles him and disturbs his equilibrium,\r\nare as futile as advice to lift himself by his boot-straps.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eSuggestions\r\nand past\r\nexperience\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eGiven a difficulty, the next step is suggestion of\r\nsome way out\u0026mdash;the formation of some tentative plan\r\nor project, the entertaining of some theory which will\r\naccount for the peculiarities in question, the consideration\r\nof some solution for the problem. The data at\r\nhand cannot supply the solution; they can only suggest\r\nit. What, then, are the sources of the suggestion?\r\nClearly past experience and prior knowledge. If the\r\nperson has had some acquaintance with similar situations,\r\nif he has dealt with material of the same sort before,\r\nsuggestions more or less apt and helpful are likely to arise.\r\nBut unless there has been experience in some degree\r\nanalogous, which may now be represented in imagination,\r\nconfusion remains mere confusion. There is nothing\r\nupon which to draw in order to clarify it. Even when\r\na child (or a grown-up) has a problem, to urge him to\r\nthink when he has no prior experiences involving some\r\nof the same conditions, is wholly futile.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_13\" id=\"Page_13\"\u003e[Pg 13]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eExploration\r\nand testing\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf the suggestion that occurs is at once accepted, we\r\nhave uncritical thinking, the minimum of reflection. To\r\nturn the thing over in mind, to reflect, means to hunt\r\nfor additional evidence, for new data, that will develop\r\nthe suggestion, and will either, as we say, bear it\r\nout or else make obvious its absurdity and irrelevance.\r\nGiven a genuine difficulty and a reasonable amount of\r\nanalogous experience to draw upon, the difference, \u003ci\u003epar\r\nexcellence\u003c/i\u003e, between good and bad thinking is found at\r\nthis point. The easiest way is to accept any suggestion\r\nthat seems plausible and thereby bring to an end the\r\ncondition of mental uneasiness. Reflective thinking is\r\nalways more or less troublesome because it involves\r\novercoming the inertia that inclines one to accept suggestions\r\nat their face value; it involves willingness to\r\nendure a condition of mental unrest and disturbance.\r\nReflective thinking, in short, means judgment suspended\r\nduring further inquiry; and suspense is likely to be\r\nsomewhat painful. As we shall see later, the most important\r\nfactor in the training of good mental habits\r\nconsists in acquiring the attitude of suspended conclusion,\r\nand in mastering the various methods of searching\r\nfor new materials to corroborate or to refute the first\r\nsuggestions that occur. To maintain the state of doubt\r\nand to carry on systematic and protracted inquiry\u0026mdash;these\r\nare the essentials of thinking.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_14\" id=\"Page_14\"\u003e[Pg 14]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003chr style=\"width: 65%;\" /\u003e\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"CHAPTER_TWO\" id=\"CHAPTER_TWO\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eCHAPTER TWO\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eTHE NEED FOR TRAINING THOUGHT\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eMan the\r\nanimal that\r\nthinks\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eTo expatiate upon the importance of thought would\r\nbe absurd. The traditional definition of man as \"the\r\nthinking animal\" fixes thought as the essential difference\r\nbetween man and the brutes,\u0026mdash;surely an important matter.\r\nMore relevant to our purpose is the question how\r\nthought is important, for an answer to this question\r\nwill throw light upon the kind of training thought requires\r\nif it is to subserve its end.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e§ 1. \u003ci\u003eThe Values of Thought\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eThe possibility\r\nof\r\ndeliberate\r\nand intentional\r\nactivity\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eI. Thought affords the sole method of escape from\r\npurely impulsive or purely routine action. A being\r\nwithout capacity for thought is moved only by instincts\r\nand appetites, as these are called forth by outward conditions\r\nand by the inner state of the organism. A being\r\nthus moved is, as it were, pushed from behind. This\r\nis what we mean by the blind nature of brute actions.\r\nThe agent does not see or foresee the end for which he\r\nis acting, nor the results produced by his behaving in one\r\nway rather than in another. He does not \"know what\r\nhe is about.\" Where there is thought, things present\r\nact as signs or tokens of things not yet experienced. A\r\nthinking being can, accordingly, \u003ci\u003eact on the basis of the\r\nabsent and the future\u003c/i\u003e. Instead of being pushed into a\r\nmode of action by the sheer urgency of forces, whether\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_15\" id=\"Page_15\"\u003e[Pg 15]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ninstincts or habits, of which he is not aware, a reflective\r\nagent is drawn (to some extent at least) to action by\r\nsome remoter object of which he is indirectly aware.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eNatural\r\nevents come\r\nto be a\r\nlanguage\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAn animal without thought may go into its hole when\r\nrain threatens, because of some immediate stimulus to\r\nits organism. A thinking agent will perceive that certain\r\ngiven facts are probable signs of a future rain, and\r\nwill take steps in the light of this anticipated future.\r\nTo plant seeds, to cultivate the soil, to harvest grain,\r\nare intentional acts, possible only to a being who has\r\nlearned to subordinate the immediately felt elements of\r\nan experience to those values which these hint at and\r\nprophesy. Philosophers have made much of the phrases\r\n\"book of nature,\" \"language of nature.\" Well, it is in\r\nvirtue of the capacity of thought that given things are\r\nsignificant of absent things, and that nature speaks a\r\nlanguage which may be interpreted. To a being who\r\nthinks, things are records of their past, as fossils tell\r\nof the prior history of the earth, and are prophetic of\r\ntheir future, as from the present positions of heavenly\r\nbodies remote eclipses are foretold. Shakespeare\u0027s\r\n\"tongues in trees, books in the running brooks,\" expresses\r\nliterally enough the power superadded to existences\r\nwhen they appeal to a thinking being. Upon\r\nthe function of signification depend all foresight, all intelligent\r\nplanning, deliberation, and calculation.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eThe possibility\r\nof systematized\r\nforesight\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eII. By thought man also develops and arranges artificial\r\nsigns to remind him in advance of consequences,\r\nand of ways of securing and avoiding them. As the trait\r\njust mentioned makes the difference between savage man\r\nand brute, so this trait makes the difference between\r\ncivilized man and savage. A savage who has been\r\nshipwrecked in a river may note certain things which\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_16\" id=\"Page_16\"\u003e[Pg 16]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nserve him as signs of danger in the future. But civilized\r\nman deliberately \u003ci\u003emakes\u003c/i\u003e such signs; he sets up in advance\r\nof wreckage warning buoys, and builds lighthouses\r\nwhere he sees signs that such events may occur.\r\nA savage reads weather signs with great expertness;\r\ncivilized man institutes a weather service by which signs\r\nare artificially secured and information is distributed in\r\nadvance of the appearance of any signs that could be\r\ndetected without special methods. A savage finds his\r\nway skillfully through a wilderness by reading certain\r\nobscure indications; civilized man builds a highway\r\nwhich shows the road to all. The savage learns to\r\ndetect the signs of fire and thereby to invent methods\r\nof producing flame; civilized man invents permanent\r\nconditions for producing light and heat whenever they\r\nare needed. The very essence of civilized culture is\r\nthat we deliberately erect monuments and memorials,\r\nlest we forget; and deliberately institute, in advance of\r\nthe happening of various contingencies and emergencies\r\nof life, devices for detecting their approach and registering\r\ntheir nature, for warding off what is unfavorable,\r\nor at least for protecting ourselves from its full impact\r\nand for making more secure and extensive what is favorable.\r\nAll forms of artificial apparatus are intentionally\r\ndesigned modifications of natural things in order that\r\nthey may serve better than in their natural estate to indicate\r\nthe hidden, the absent, and the remote.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eThe possibility\r\nof\r\nobjects rich\r\nin quality\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIII. Finally, thought confers upon physical events\r\nand objects a very different status and value from that\r\nwhich they possess to a being that does not reflect.\r\nThese words are mere scratches, curious variations of\r\nlight and shade, to one to whom they are not linguistic\r\nsigns. To him for whom they are signs of other things,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_17\" id=\"Page_17\"\u003e[Pg 17]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\neach has a definite individuality of its own, according to\r\nthe meaning that it is used to convey. \u003ci\u003eExactly the same\r\nholds of natural objects.\u003c/i\u003e A chair is a different object\r\nto a being to whom it consciously suggests an opportunity\r\nfor sitting down, repose, or sociable converse, from\r\nwhat it is to one to whom it presents itself merely as a\r\nthing to be smelled, or gnawed, or jumped over; a\r\nstone is different to one who knows something of its\r\npast history and its future use from what it is to one\r\nwho only feels it directly through his senses. It is only\r\nby courtesy, indeed, that we can say that an unthinking\r\nanimal experiences an \u003ci\u003eobject\u003c/i\u003e at all\u0026mdash;so largely is anything\r\nthat presents itself to us as an object made up\r\nby the qualities it possesses as a sign of other things.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eThe nature\r\nof the objects\r\nan animal\r\nperceives\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAn English logician (Mr. Venn) has remarked that it\r\nmay be questioned whether a dog \u003ci\u003esees\u003c/i\u003e a rainbow any\r\nmore than he apprehends the political constitution of\r\nthe country in which he lives. The same principle applies\r\nto the kennel in which he sleeps and the meat that\r\nhe eats. When he is sleepy, he goes to the kennel;\r\nwhen he is hungry, he is excited by the smell and color of\r\nmeat; beyond this, in what sense does he see an \u003ci\u003eobject\u003c/i\u003e?\r\nCertainly he does not see a house\u0026mdash;\u003ci\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e a thing with all\r\nthe properties and relations of a permanent residence,\r\n\u003ci\u003eunless\u003c/i\u003e he is capable of making what is present a uniform\r\nsign of what is absent\u0026mdash;unless he is capable of thought.\r\nNor does he see what he eats \u003ci\u003eas\u003c/i\u003e meat unless it suggests\r\nthe absent properties by virtue of which it is a certain\r\njoint of some animal, and is known to afford nourishment.\r\nJust what is left of an \u003ci\u003eobject\u003c/i\u003e stripped of all\r\nsuch qualities of meaning, we cannot well say; but\r\nwe can be sure that the object is then a very different\r\nsort of thing from the objects that we perceive. There\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_18\" id=\"Page_18\"\u003e[Pg 18]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nis moreover no particular limit to the possibilities of\r\ngrowth in the fusion of a thing as it is to sense and as it\r\nis to thought, or as a sign of other things. The child today\r\nsoon regards as constituent parts of objects qualities\r\nthat once it required the intelligence of a Copernicus or\r\na Newton to apprehend.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eMill on the\r\nbusiness of\r\nlife and the\r\noccupation\r\nof mind\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThese various values of the power of thought may be\r\nsummed up in the following quotation from John Stuart\r\nMill. \"To draw inferences,\" he says, \"has been said\r\nto be the great business of life. Every one has daily,\r\nhourly, and momentary need of ascertaining facts which\r\nhe has not directly observed: not from any general purpose\r\nof adding to his stock of knowledge, but because\r\nthe facts themselves are of importance to his interests\r\nor to his occupations. The business of the magistrate,\r\nof the military commander, of the navigator, of the\r\nphysician, of the agriculturist, \u003ci\u003eis merely to judge of\r\nevidence and to act accordingly\u003c/i\u003e…. As they do this\r\nwell or ill, so they discharge well or ill the duties of\r\ntheir several callings. \u003ci\u003eIt is the only occupation in which\r\nthe mind never ceases to be engaged.\u003c/i\u003e\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_3_3\" id=\"FNanchor_3_3\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_3_3\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[3]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e§ 2. \u003ci\u003eImportance of Direction in order to Realize these\r\nValues\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eThinking\r\ngoes astray\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhat a person has not only daily and hourly, but\r\nmomentary need of performing, is not a technical and\r\nabstruse matter; nor, on the other hand, is it trivial and\r\nnegligible. Such a function must be congenial to the\r\nmind, and must be performed, in an unspoiled mind,\r\nupon every fitting occasion. Just because, however, it\r\nis an operation of drawing inferences, of basing conclusions\r\nupon evidence, of reaching belief \u003ci\u003eindirectly\u003c/i\u003e, it is\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_19\" id=\"Page_19\"\u003e[Pg 19]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nan operation that may go wrong as well as right, and\r\nhence is one that needs safeguarding and training. The\r\ngreater its importance the greater are the evils when it\r\nis ill-exercised.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eIdeas are\r\nour rulers\u0026mdash;for\r\nbetter\r\nor for worse\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAn earlier writer than Mill, John Locke (1632-1704),\r\nbrings out the importance of thought for life and the\r\nneed of training so that its best and not its worst\r\npossibilities will be realized, in the following words:\r\n\"No man ever sets himself about anything but upon\r\nsome view or other, which serves him for a reason for\r\nwhat he does; and whatsoever faculties he employs, the\r\nunderstanding with such light as it has, well or ill informed,\r\nconstantly leads; and by that light, true or false,\r\nall his operative powers are directed…. Temples\r\nhave their sacred images, and we see what influence they\r\nhave always had over a great part of mankind. But in\r\ntruth the ideas and images in men\u0027s minds are the\r\ninvisible powers that constantly govern them, and to\r\nthese they all, universally, pay a ready submission. It\r\nis therefore of the highest concernment that great care\r\nshould be taken of the understanding, to conduct it\r\naright in the search of knowledge and in the judgments it\r\nmakes.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_4_4\" id=\"FNanchor_4_4\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_4_4\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[4]\u003c/a\u003e If upon thought hang all deliberate activities\r\nand the uses we make of all our other powers, Locke\u0027s\r\nassertion that it is of the highest concernment that care\r\nshould be taken of its conduct is a moderate statement.\r\nWhile the power of thought frees us from servile subjection\r\nto instinct, appetite, and routine, it also brings\r\nwith it the occasion and possibility of error and mistake.\r\nIn elevating us above the brute, it opens to us the possibility\r\nof failures to which the animal, limited to instinct,\r\ncannot sink.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e§ 3. \u003ci\u003eTendencies Needing Constant Regulation\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003ePhysical and\r\nsocial sanctions\r\nof correct\r\nthinking\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eUp to a certain point, the ordinary conditions of life,\r\nnatural and social, provide the conditions requisite for\r\nregulating the operations of inference. The necessities\r\nof life enforce a fundamental and persistent discipline\r\nfor which the most cunningly devised artifices would be\r\nineffective substitutes. The burnt child dreads the fire;\r\nthe painful consequence emphasizes the need of correct\r\ninference much more than would learned discourse on\r\nthe properties of heat. Social conditions also put a premium\r\non correct inferring in matters where action based\r\non valid thought is socially important. These sanctions\r\nof proper thinking may affect life itself, or at least a\r\nlife reasonably free from perpetual discomfort. The\r\nsigns of enemies, of shelter, of food, of the main social\r\nconditions, have to be correctly apprehended.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eThe serious\r\nlimitations\r\nof such\r\nsanctions\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut this disciplinary training, efficacious as it is within\r\ncertain limits, does not carry us beyond a restricted\r\nboundary. Logical attainment in one direction is no\r\nbar to extravagant conclusions in another. A savage\r\nexpert in judging signs of the movements and location\r\nof animals that he hunts, will accept and gravely narrate\r\nthe most preposterous yarns concerning the origin of\r\ntheir habits and structures. When there is no directly\r\nappreciable reaction of the inference upon the security\r\nand prosperity of life, there are no natural checks to\r\nthe acceptance of wrong beliefs. Conclusions may be\r\ngenerated by a modicum of fact merely because the suggestions\r\nare vivid and interesting; a large accumulation\r\nof data may fail to suggest a proper conclusion because\r\nexisting customs are averse to entertaining it. Independent\r\nof training, there is a \"primitive credulity\"\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_21\" id=\"Page_21\"\u003e[Pg 21]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwhich tends to make no distinction between what a\r\ntrained mind calls fancy and that which it calls a reasonable\r\nconclusion. The face in the clouds is believed\r\nin as some sort of fact, merely because it is forcibly\r\nsuggested. Natural intelligence is no barrier to the\r\npropagation of error, nor large but untrained experience\r\nto the accumulation of fixed false beliefs. Errors may\r\nsupport one another mutually and weave an ever larger\r\nand firmer fabric of misconception. Dreams, the positions\r\nof stars, the lines of the hand, may be regarded as\r\nvaluable signs, and the fall of cards as an inevitable\r\nomen, while natural events of the most crucial significance\r\ngo disregarded. Beliefs in portents of various\r\nkinds, now mere nook and cranny superstitions, were\r\nonce universal. A long discipline in exact science was\r\nrequired for their conquest.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eSuperstition\r\nas natural\r\na result\r\nas science\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn the mere function of suggestion, there is no difference\r\nbetween the power of a column of mercury to portend\r\nrain, and that of the entrails of an animal or the\r\nflight of birds to foretell the fortunes of war. For all\r\nanybody can tell in advance, the spilling of salt is as\r\nlikely to import bad luck as the bite of a mosquito to\r\nimport malaria. Only systematic regulation of the conditions\r\nunder which observations are made and severe\r\ndiscipline of the habits of entertaining suggestions can\r\nsecure a decision that one type of belief is vicious and\r\nthe other sound. The substitution of scientific for\r\nsuperstitious habits of inference has not been brought\r\nabout by any improvement in the acuteness of the\r\nsenses or in the natural workings of the function of\r\nsuggestion. It is the result of regulation \u003ci\u003eof the conditions\u003c/i\u003e\r\nunder which observation and inference take\r\nplace.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_22\" id=\"Page_22\"\u003e[Pg 22]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eGeneral\r\ncauses of\r\nbad thinking:\r\nBacon\u0027s\r\n\"idols\"\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is instructive to note some of the attempts that\r\nhave been made to classify the main sources of error in\r\nreaching beliefs. Francis Bacon, for example, at the\r\nbeginnings of modern scientific inquiry, enumerated\r\nfour such classes, under the somewhat fantastic title of\r\n\"idols\" (Gr. \u003cspan lang=\"el\" title=\"Greek: eidôla\"\u003e\u0026#949;\u0026#953;\u0026#948;\u0026#969;\u0026#955;\u0026#945;\u003c/span\u003e, images), spectral forms that allure\r\nthe mind into false paths. These he called the idols, or\r\nphantoms, of the (\u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e) tribe, (\u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e) the marketplace, (\u003ci\u003ec\u003c/i\u003e) the\r\ncave or den, and (\u003ci\u003ed\u003c/i\u003e) the theater; or, less metaphorically,\r\n(\u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e) standing erroneous methods (or at least temptations\r\nto error) that have their roots in human nature generally;\r\n(\u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e) those that come from intercourse and language;\r\n(\u003ci\u003ec\u003c/i\u003e) those that are due to causes peculiar to a specific\r\nindividual; and finally, (\u003ci\u003ed\u003c/i\u003e) those that have their sources\r\nin the fashion or general current of a period. Classifying\r\nthese causes of fallacious belief somewhat differently,\r\nwe may say that two are intrinsic and two are extrinsic.\r\nOf the intrinsic, one is common to all men alike (such\r\nas the universal tendency to notice instances that corroborate\r\na favorite belief more readily than those that\r\ncontradict it), while the other resides in the specific\r\ntemperament and habits of the given individual. Of\r\nthe extrinsic, one proceeds from generic social conditions\u0026mdash;like\r\nthe tendency to suppose that there is a\r\nfact wherever there is a word, and no fact where there\r\nis no linguistic term\u0026mdash;while the other proceeds from\r\nlocal and temporary social currents.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eLocke on the\r\ninfluence of\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eLocke\u0027s method of dealing with typical forms of\r\nwrong belief is less formal and may be more enlightening.\r\nWe can hardly do better than quote his forcible\r\nand quaint language, when, enumerating different classes\r\nof men, he shows different ways in which thought goes\r\nwrong:\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_23\" id=\"Page_23\"\u003e[Pg 23]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003e(\u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e) dependence\r\non others,\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e1. \"The first is of those who seldom reason at all,\r\nbut do and think according to the example of others,\r\nwhether parents, neighbors, ministers, or who else they\r\nare pleased to make choice of to have an implicit faith\r\nin, for the saving of themselves the pains and troubles\r\nof thinking and examining for themselves.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003e(\u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e) self-interest,\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e2. \"This kind is of those who put passion in the\r\nplace of reason, and being resolved that shall govern\r\ntheir actions and arguments, neither use their own, nor\r\nhearken to other people\u0027s reason, any farther than it\r\nsuits their humor, interest, or party.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_5_5\" id=\"FNanchor_5_5\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_5_5\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[5]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003e(\u003ci\u003ec\u003c/i\u003e) circumscribed\r\nexperience\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e3. \"The third sort is of those who readily and sincerely\r\nfollow reason, but for want of having that which\r\none may call large, sound, roundabout sense, have not\r\na full view of all that relates to the question…. They\r\nconverse but with one sort of men, they read but one\r\nsort of books, they will not come in the hearing but of\r\none sort of notions…. They have a pretty traffic\r\nwith known correspondents in some little creek …\r\nbut will not venture out into the great ocean of knowledge.\"\r\nMen of originally equal natural parts may\r\nfinally arrive at very different stores of knowledge and\r\ntruth, \"when all the odds between them has been the\r\ndifferent scope that has been given to their understandings\r\nto range in, for the gathering up of information\r\nand furnishing their heads with ideas and notions and\r\nobservations, whereon to employ their mind.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_6_6\" id=\"FNanchor_6_6\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_6_6\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[6]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_24\" id=\"Page_24\"\u003e[Pg 24]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn another portion of his writings,\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_7_7\" id=\"FNanchor_7_7\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_7_7\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[7]\u003c/a\u003e Locke states the\r\nsame ideas in slightly different form.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eEffect of\r\ndogmatic\r\nprinciples,\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e1. \"That which is inconsistent with our \u003ci\u003eprinciples\u003c/i\u003e is\r\nso far from passing for probable with us that it will\r\nnot be allowed possible. The reverence borne to these\r\nprinciples is so great, and their authority so paramount\r\nto all other, that the testimony, not only of other men,\r\nbut the evidence of our own senses are often rejected,\r\nwhen they offer to vouch anything contrary to these \u003ci\u003eestablished\r\nrules\u003c/i\u003e…. There is nothing more ordinary\r\nthan children\u0027s receiving into their minds propositions\r\n… from their parents, nurses, or those about them;\r\nwhich being insinuated in their unwary as well as unbiased\r\nunderstandings, and fastened by degrees, are at\r\nlast (and this whether true or false) riveted there by\r\nlong custom and education, beyond all possibility of\r\nbeing pulled out again. For men, when they are grown\r\nup, reflecting upon their opinions and finding those of\r\nthis sort to be as ancient in their minds as their very\r\nmemories, not having observed their early insinuation,\r\nnor by what means they got them, they are apt to reverence\r\nthem as sacred things, and not to suffer them to be\r\nprofaned, touched, or questioned.\" They take them as\r\nstandards \"to be the great and unerring deciders of\r\ntruth and falsehood, and the judges to which they are\r\nto appeal in all manner of controversies.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eof closed\r\nminds,\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e2. \"Secondly, next to these are men whose understandings\r\nare cast into a mold, and fashioned just to\r\nthe size of a received hypothesis.\" Such men, Locke\r\ngoes on to say, while not denying the existence of facts\r\nand evidence, cannot be convinced by the evidence that\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_25\" id=\"Page_25\"\u003e[Pg 25]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwould decide them if their minds were not so closed\r\nby adherence to fixed belief.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eof strong\r\npassion,\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e3. \"Predominant Passions. Thirdly, probabilities\r\nwhich cross men\u0027s appetites and prevailing passions\r\nrun the same fate. Let ever so much probability hang\r\non one side of a covetous man\u0027s reasoning, and money\r\non the other, it is easy to foresee which will outweigh.\r\nEarthly minds, like mud walls, resist the strongest\r\nbatteries.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eof dependence\r\nupon\r\nauthority\r\nof others\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e4. \"Authority. The fourth and last wrong measure\r\nof probability I shall take notice of, and which keeps in\r\nignorance or error more people than all the others\r\ntogether, is the giving up our assent to the common\r\nreceived opinions, either of our friends or party, neighborhood\r\nor country.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eCauses of\r\nbad mental\r\nhabits are\r\nsocial as\r\nwell as\r\ninborn\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBoth Bacon and Locke make it evident that over and\r\nabove the sources of misbelief that reside in the natural\r\ntendencies of the individual (like those toward hasty\r\nand too far-reaching conclusions), social conditions tend\r\nto instigate and confirm wrong habits of thinking by\r\nauthority, by conscious instruction, and by the even\r\nmore insidious half-conscious influences of language,\r\nimitation, sympathy, and suggestion. Education has\r\naccordingly not only to safeguard an individual against\r\nthe besetting erroneous tendencies of his own mind\u0026mdash;its\r\nrashness, presumption, and preference of what chimes\r\nwith self-interest to objective evidence\u0026mdash;but also to\r\nundermine and destroy the accumulated and self-perpetuating\r\nprejudices of long ages. When social life\r\nin general has become more reasonable, more imbued\r\nwith rational conviction, and less moved by stiff authority\r\nand blind passion, educational agencies may be more\r\npositive and constructive than at present, for they will\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_26\" id=\"Page_26\"\u003e[Pg 26]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwork in harmony with the educative influence exercised\r\nwilly-nilly by other social surroundings upon an individual\u0027s\r\nhabits of thought and belief. At present, the\r\nwork of teaching must not only transform natural tendencies\r\ninto trained habits of thought, but must also\r\nfortify the mind against irrational tendencies current in\r\nthe social environment, and help displace erroneous\r\nhabits already produced.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e§ 4. \u003ci\u003eRegulation Transforms Inference into Proof\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eA leap is\r\ninvolved in\r\nall thinking\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThinking is important because, as we have seen, it is\r\nthat function in which given or ascertained facts stand\r\nfor or indicate others which are not directly ascertained.\r\nBut the process of reaching the absent from the present\r\nis peculiarly exposed to error; it is liable to be influenced\r\nby almost any number of unseen and unconsidered\r\ncauses,\u0026mdash;past experience, received dogmas, the\r\nstirring of self-interest, the arousing of passion, sheer\r\nmental laziness, a social environment steeped in biased\r\ntraditions or animated by false expectations, and so\r\non. The exercise of thought is, in the literal sense of\r\nthat word, \u003ci\u003einference\u003c/i\u003e; by it one thing \u003ci\u003ecarries us over\u003c/i\u003e to\r\nthe idea of, and belief in, another thing. It involves a\r\njump, a leap, a going beyond what is surely known to\r\nsomething else accepted on its warrant. Unless one\r\nis an idiot, one simply cannot help having all things\r\nand events suggest other things not actually present,\r\nnor can one help a tendency to believe in the latter\r\non the basis of the former. The very inevitableness\r\nof the jump, the leap, to something unknown, only\r\nemphasizes the necessity of attention to the conditions\r\nunder which it occurs so that the danger of a false step\r\nmay be lessened and the probability of a right landing\r\nincreased.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_27\" id=\"Page_27\"\u003e[Pg 27]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eHence, the\r\nneed of regulation\r\nwhich, when\r\nadequate,\r\nmakes proof\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSuch attention consists in regulation (1) of the conditions\r\nunder which the function of suggestion takes\r\nplace, and (2) of the conditions under which credence is\r\nyielded to the suggestions that occur. Inference controlled\r\nin these two ways (the study of which in detail\r\nconstitutes one of the chief objects of this book) forms\r\n\u003ci\u003eproof\u003c/i\u003e. To prove a thing means primarily to try, to\r\ntest it. The guest bidden to the wedding feast excused\r\nhimself because he had to \u003ci\u003eprove\u003c/i\u003e his oxen. Exceptions\r\nare said to prove a rule; \u003ci\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e they furnish instances so\r\nextreme that they try in the severest fashion its applicability;\r\nif the rule will stand such a test, there is no good\r\nreason for further doubting it. Not until a thing has\r\nbeen tried\u0026mdash;\"tried out,\" in colloquial language\u0026mdash;do\r\nwe know its true worth. Till then it may be pretense,\r\na bluff. But the thing that has come out victorious in\r\na test or trial of strength carries its credentials with it;\r\nit is approved, because it has been proved. Its value is\r\nclearly evinced, shown, \u003ci\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e demonstrated. So it is with\r\ninferences. The mere fact that inference in general is\r\nan invaluable function does not guarantee, nor does it\r\neven help out the correctness of any particular inference.\r\nAny inference may go astray; and as we have seen,\r\nthere are standing influences ever ready to assist its\r\ngoing wrong. \u003ci\u003eWhat is important, is that every inference\r\nshall be a tested inference\u003c/i\u003e; \u003ci\u003eor\u003c/i\u003e (since often this is not\r\npossible) \u003ci\u003ethat we shall discriminate between beliefs that\r\nrest upon tested evidence and those that do not, and shall\r\nbe accordingly on our guard as to the kind and degree of\r\nassent yielded\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eThe office of\r\neducation\r\nin forming\r\nskilled\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003epowers of\r\nthinking\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhile it is not the business of education to prove\r\nevery statement made, any more than to teach every\r\npossible item of information, it is its business to culti\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_28\" id=\"Page_28\"\u003e[Pg 28]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003evate\r\ndeep-seated and effective habits of discriminating\r\ntested beliefs from mere assertions, guesses, and\r\nopinions; to develop a lively, sincere, and open-minded\r\npreference for conclusions that are properly grounded,\r\nand to ingrain into the individual\u0027s working habits\r\nmethods of inquiry and reasoning appropriate to the\r\nvarious problems that present themselves.\r\nNo matter\r\nhow much an individual knows as a matter of hearsay\r\nand information, if he has not attitudes and habits of\r\nthis sort, he is not intellectually educated. He lacks the\r\nrudiments of mental discipline. And since these habits\r\nare not a gift of nature (no matter how strong the aptitude\r\nfor acquiring them); since, moreover, the casual\r\ncircumstances of the natural and social environment\r\nare not enough to compel their acquisition, the main\r\noffice of education is to supply conditions that make for\r\ntheir cultivation. The formation of these habits is the\r\nTraining of Mind.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_29\" id=\"Page_29\"\u003e[Pg 29]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003chr style=\"width: 65%;\" /\u003e\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"CHAPTER_THREE\" id=\"CHAPTER_THREE\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eCHAPTER THREE\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eNATURAL RESOURCES IN THE TRAINING OF\r\nTHOUGHT\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eOnly native\r\npowers can\r\nbe trained.\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn the last chapter we considered the need of transforming,\r\nthrough training, the natural capacities of inference\r\ninto habits of critical examination and inquiry.\r\nThe very importance of thought for life makes necessary\r\nits control by education because of its natural tendency\r\nto go astray, and because social influences exist that tend\r\nto form habits of thought leading to inadequate and\r\nerroneous beliefs. Training must, however, be itself\r\nbased upon the natural tendencies,\u0026mdash;that is, it must find\r\nits point of departure in them. A being who could not\r\nthink without training could never be trained to think;\r\none may have to learn to think \u003ci\u003ewell\u003c/i\u003e, but not to \u003ci\u003ethink\u003c/i\u003e.\r\nTraining, in short, must fall back upon the prior and\r\nindependent existence of natural powers; it is concerned\r\nwith their proper direction, not with creating\r\nthem.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eHence, the\r\none taught\r\nmust take\r\nthe initiative\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eTeaching and learning are correlative or corresponding\r\nprocesses, as much so as selling and buying. One\r\nmight as well say he has sold when no one has bought,\r\nas to say that he has taught when no one has learned.\r\nAnd in the educational transaction, the initiative lies\r\nwith the learner even more than in commerce it lies with\r\nthe buyer. If an individual can learn to think only in\r\nthe sense of learning to employ more economically and\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_30\" id=\"Page_30\"\u003e[Pg 30]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\neffectively powers he already possesses, even more truly\r\none can teach others to think only in the sense of appealing\r\nto and fostering powers already active in them.\r\nEffective appeal of this kind is impossible unless the\r\nteacher has an insight into existing habits and tendencies,\r\nthe natural resources with which he has to ally\r\nhimself.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eThree\r\nimportant\r\nnatural\r\nresources\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAny inventory of the items of this natural capital is\r\nsomewhat arbitrary because it must pass over many of\r\nthe complex details. But a statement of the factors\r\nessential to thought will put before us in outline the\r\nmain elements. Thinking involves (as we have seen)\r\nthe suggestion of a conclusion for acceptance, and also\r\nsearch or inquiry to test the value of the suggestion before\r\nfinally accepting it. This implies (\u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e) a certain fund\r\nor store of experiences and facts from which suggestions\r\nproceed; (\u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e) promptness, flexibility, and fertility\r\nof suggestions; and (\u003ci\u003ec\u003c/i\u003e) orderliness, consecutiveness,\r\nappropriateness in what is suggested. Clearly, a person\r\nmay be hampered in any of these three regards: His\r\nthinking may be irrelevant, narrow, or crude because\r\nhe has not enough actual material upon which to base\r\nconclusions; or because concrete facts and raw material,\r\neven if extensive and bulky, fail to evoke suggestions\r\neasily and richly; or finally, because, even when these\r\ntwo conditions are fulfilled, the ideas suggested are incoherent\r\nand fantastic, rather than pertinent and consistent.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e§ 1. \u003ci\u003eCuriosity\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eDesire for\r\nfullness of\r\nexperience:\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe most vital and significant factor in supplying the\r\nprimary material whence suggestion may issue is, without\r\ndoubt, curiosity. The wisest of the Greeks used to\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_31\" id=\"Page_31\"\u003e[Pg 31]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nsay that wonder is the mother of all science. An inert\r\nmind waits, as it were, for experiences to be imperiously\r\nforced upon it. The pregnant saying of Wordsworth:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"poem\"\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"stanza\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"i4\"\u003e\"The eye\u0026mdash;it cannot choose but see;\u003cbr /\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"i4\"\u003eWe cannot bid the ear be still;\u003cbr /\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"i4\"\u003eOur bodies feel, where\u0027er they be,\u003cbr /\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"i4\"\u003eAgainst or with our will\"\u0026mdash;\u003cbr /\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eholds good in the degree in which one is naturally possessed\r\nby curiosity. The curious mind is constantly\r\nalert and exploring, seeking material for thought, as a\r\nvigorous and healthy body is on the \u003ci\u003equi vive\u003c/i\u003e for\r\nnutriment. Eagerness for experience, for new and\r\nvaried contacts, is found where wonder is found. Such\r\ncuriosity is the only sure guarantee of the acquisition\r\nof the primary facts upon which inference must base\r\nitself.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003e(\u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e) physical\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(\u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e) In its first manifestations, curiosity is a vital overflow,\r\nan expression of an abundant organic energy. A\r\nphysiological uneasiness leads a child to be \"into everything,\"\u0026mdash;to\r\nbe reaching, poking, pounding, prying.\r\nObservers of animals have noted what one author calls\r\n\"their inveterate tendency to fool.\" \"Rats run about,\r\nsmell, dig, or gnaw, without real reference to the business\r\nin hand. In the same way Jack [a dog] scrabbles\r\nand jumps, the kitten wanders and picks, the otter slips\r\nabout everywhere like ground lightning, the elephant\r\nfumbles ceaselessly, the monkey pulls things about.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_8_8\" id=\"FNanchor_8_8\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_8_8\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[8]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nThe most casual notice of the activities of a young child\r\nreveals a ceaseless display of exploring and testing activity.\r\nObjects are sucked, fingered, and thumped;\r\ndrawn and pushed, handled and thrown; in short, experi\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_32\" id=\"Page_32\"\u003e[Pg 32]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003emented\r\nwith, till they cease to yield new qualities. Such\r\nactivities are hardly intellectual, and yet without them\r\nintellectual activity would be feeble and intermittent\r\nthrough lack of stuff for its operations.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003e(\u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e) social\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(\u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e) A higher stage of curiosity develops under the influence\r\nof social stimuli. When the child learns that he\r\ncan appeal to others to eke out his store of experiences,\r\nso that, if objects fail to respond interestingly to his experiments,\r\nhe may call upon persons to provide interesting\r\nmaterial, a new epoch sets in. \"What is that?\"\r\n\"Why?\" become the unfailing signs of a child\u0027s presence.\r\nAt first this questioning is hardly more than a\r\nprojection into social relations of the physical overflow\r\nwhich earlier kept the child pushing and pulling, opening\r\nand shutting. He asks in succession what holds up\r\nthe house, what holds up the soil that holds the house,\r\nwhat holds up the earth that holds the soil; but his\r\nquestions are not evidence of any genuine consciousness\r\nof rational connections. His \u003ci\u003ewhy\u003c/i\u003e is not a demand for\r\nscientific explanation; the motive behind it is simply\r\neagerness for a larger acquaintance with the mysterious\r\nworld in which he is placed. The search is not for\r\na law or principle, but only for a bigger fact. Yet\r\nthere is more than a desire to accumulate just information\r\nor heap up disconnected items, although sometimes\r\nthe interrogating habit threatens to degenerate into a\r\nmere disease of language. In the feeling, however dim,\r\nthat the facts which directly meet the senses are not\r\nthe whole story, that there is more behind them and\r\nmore to come from them, lies the germ of \u003ci\u003eintellectual\u003c/i\u003e\r\ncuriosity.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003e(\u003ci\u003ec\u003c/i\u003e) intellectual\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(\u003ci\u003ec\u003c/i\u003e) Curiosity rises above the organic and the social\r\nplanes and becomes intellectual in the degree in which\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_33\" id=\"Page_33\"\u003e[Pg 33]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nit is transformed into interest in \u003ci\u003eproblems\u003c/i\u003e provoked by\r\nthe observation of things and the accumulation of material.\r\nWhen the question is not discharged by being\r\nasked of another, when the child continues to entertain\r\nit in his own mind and to be alert for whatever will help\r\nanswer it, curiosity has become a positive intellectual\r\nforce. To the open mind, nature and social experience\r\nare full of varied and subtle challenges to look further.\r\nIf germinating powers are not used and cultivated at\r\nthe right moment, they tend to be transitory, to die out,\r\nor to wane in intensity. This general law is peculiarly\r\ntrue of sensitiveness to what is uncertain and questionable;\r\nin a few people, intellectual curiosity is so insatiable\r\nthat nothing will discourage it, but in most its edge\r\nis easily dulled and blunted. Bacon\u0027s saying that we\r\nmust become as little children in order to enter the\r\nkingdom of science is at once a reminder of the open-minded\r\nand flexible wonder of childhood and of the ease\r\nwith which this endowment is lost. Some lose it in\r\nindifference or carelessness; others in a frivolous\r\nflippancy; many escape these evils only to become incased\r\nin a hard dogmatism which is equally fatal to the\r\nspirit of wonder. Some are so taken up with routine\r\nas to be inaccessible to new facts and problems. Others\r\nretain curiosity only with reference to what concerns\r\ntheir personal advantage in their chosen career. With\r\nmany, curiosity is arrested on the plane of interest in\r\nlocal gossip and in the fortunes of their neighbors; indeed,\r\nso usual is this result that very often the first\r\nassociation with the word \u003ci\u003ecuriosity\u003c/i\u003e is a prying inquisitiveness\r\ninto other people\u0027s business. With respect then to\r\ncuriosity, the teacher has usually more to learn than to\r\nteach. Rarely can he aspire to the office of kindling or\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_34\" id=\"Page_34\"\u003e[Pg 34]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\neven increasing it. His task is rather to keep alive the\r\nsacred spark of wonder and to fan the flame that already\r\nglows. His problem is to protect the spirit of inquiry,\r\nto keep it from becoming blasé from overexcitement,\r\nwooden from routine, fossilized through dogmatic instruction,\r\nor dissipated by random exercise upon trivial\r\nthings.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e§ 2. \u003ci\u003eSuggestion\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOut of the subject-matter, whether rich or scanty, important\r\nor trivial, of present experience issue suggestions,\r\nideas, beliefs as to what is not yet given. The\r\nfunction of suggestion is not one that can be produced\r\nby teaching; while it may be modified for better or\r\nworse by conditions, it cannot be destroyed. Many a\r\nchild has tried his best to see if he could not \"stop\r\nthinking,\" but the flow of suggestions goes on in spite\r\nof our will, quite as surely as \"our bodies feel, where\u0027er\r\nthey be, against or with our will.\" Primarily, naturally,\r\nit is not we who think, in any actively responsible sense;\r\nthinking is rather something that happens in us. Only\r\nso far as one has acquired control of the method in\r\nwhich the function of suggestion occurs and has accepted\r\nresponsibility for its consequences, can one truthfully\r\nsay, \"\u003ci\u003eI\u003c/i\u003e think so and so.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eThe dimensions\r\nof\r\nsuggestion:\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003e(\u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e) ease\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe function of suggestion has a variety of aspects (or\r\ndimensions as we may term them), varying in different\r\npersons, both in themselves and in their mode of combination.\r\nThese dimensions are ease or promptness,\r\nextent or variety, and depth or persistence. (\u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e) The\r\ncommon classification of persons into the dull and the\r\nbright is made primarily on the basis of the readiness or\r\nfacility with which suggestions follow upon the presenta\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_35\" id=\"Page_35\"\u003e[Pg 35]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003etion\r\nof objects and upon the happening of events. As the\r\nmetaphor of dull and bright implies, some minds are impervious,\r\nor else they absorb passively. Everything presented\r\nis lost in a drab monotony that gives nothing\r\nback. But others reflect, or give back in varied lights,\r\nall that strikes upon them. The dull make no response;\r\nthe bright flash back the fact with a changed quality.\r\nAn inert or stupid mind requires a heavy jolt or an intense\r\nshock to move it to suggestion; the bright mind\r\nis quick, is alert to react with interpretation and suggestion\r\nof consequences to follow.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eYet the teacher is not entitled to assume stupidity or\r\neven dullness merely because of irresponsiveness to\r\nschool subjects or to a lesson as presented by text-book\r\nor teacher. The pupil labeled hopeless may react in\r\nquick and lively fashion when the thing-in-hand seems\r\nto him worth while, as some out-of-school sport or social\r\naffair. Indeed, the school subject might move him,\r\nwere it set in a different context and treated by a\r\ndifferent method. A boy dull in geometry may prove\r\nquick enough when he takes up the subject in connection\r\nwith manual training; the girl who seems inaccessible\r\nto historical facts may respond promptly when it is a\r\nquestion of judging the character and deeds of people of\r\nher acquaintance or of fiction. Barring physical defect\r\nor disease, slowness and dullness in \u003ci\u003eall\u003c/i\u003e directions are\r\ncomparatively rare.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003e(\u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e) range\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(\u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e) Irrespective of the difference in persons as to the\r\nease and promptness with which ideas respond to\r\nfacts, there is a difference in the number or range of the\r\nsuggestions that occur. We speak truly, in some cases,\r\nof the flood of suggestions; in others, there is but a\r\nslender trickle. Occasionally, slowness of outward\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_36\" id=\"Page_36\"\u003e[Pg 36]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nresponse is due to a great variety of suggestions which\r\ncheck one another and lead to hesitation and suspense;\r\nwhile a lively and prompt suggestion may take such\r\npossession of the mind as to preclude the development\r\nof others. Too few suggestions indicate a dry and\r\nmeager mental habit; when this is joined to great learning,\r\nthere results a pedant or a Gradgrind. Such a\r\nperson\u0027s mind rings hard; he is likely to bore others\r\nwith mere bulk of information. He contrasts with the\r\nperson whom we call ripe, juicy, and mellow.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eA conclusion reached after consideration of a few\r\nalternatives may be formally correct, but it will not\r\npossess the fullness and richness of meaning of one arrived\r\nat after comparison of a greater variety of alternative\r\nsuggestions. On the other hand, suggestions may\r\nbe too numerous and too varied for the best interests of\r\nmental habit. So many suggestions may rise that the\r\nperson is at a loss to select among them. He finds it\r\ndifficult to reach any definite conclusion and wanders\r\nmore or less helplessly among them. So much suggests\r\nitself \u003ci\u003epro\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003econ\u003c/i\u003e, one thing leads on to another so naturally,\r\nthat he finds it difficult to decide in practical affairs\r\nor to conclude in matters of theory. There is such a\r\nthing as too much thinking, as when action is paralyzed\r\nby the multiplicity of views suggested by a situation.\r\nOr again, the very number of suggestions may be hostile\r\nto tracing logical sequences among them, for it may\r\ntempt the mind away from the necessary but trying task\r\nof search for real connections, into the more congenial\r\noccupation of embroidering upon the given facts a\r\ntissue of agreeable fancies. The best mental habit\r\ninvolves a balance between paucity and redundancy of\r\nsuggestions.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_37\" id=\"Page_37\"\u003e[Pg 37]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003e(\u003ci\u003ec\u003c/i\u003e) profundity\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(\u003ci\u003ec\u003c/i\u003e) \u003ci\u003eDepth.\u003c/i\u003e We distinguish between people not only\r\nupon the basis of their quickness and fertility of intellectual\r\nresponse, but also with respect to the plane upon\r\nwhich it occurs\u0026mdash;the intrinsic quality of the response.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOne man\u0027s thought is profound while another\u0027s is superficial;\r\none goes to the roots of the matter, and another\r\ntouches lightly its most external aspects. This phase\r\nof thinking is perhaps the most untaught of all, and the\r\nleast amenable to external influence whether for improvement\r\nor harm. Nevertheless, the conditions of the\r\npupil\u0027s contact with subject-matter may be such that he\r\nis compelled to come to quarters with its more significant\r\nfeatures, or such that he is encouraged to deal\r\nwith it upon the basis of what is trivial. The common\r\nassumptions that, if the pupil only thinks, one thought is\r\njust as good for his mental discipline as another, and\r\nthat the end of study is the amassing of information,\r\nboth tend to foster superficial, at the expense of significant,\r\nthought. Pupils who in matters of ordinary practical\r\nexperience have a ready and acute perception of the\r\ndifference between the significant and the meaningless,\r\noften reach in school subjects a point where all things\r\nseem equally important or equally unimportant; where\r\none thing is just as likely to be true as another, and\r\nwhere intellectual effort is expended not in discriminating\r\nbetween things, but in trying to make verbal connections\r\namong words.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eBalance\r\nof mind\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSometimes slowness and depth of response are intimately\r\nconnected. Time is required in order to digest\r\nimpressions, and translate them into substantial ideas.\r\n\"Brightness\" may be but a flash in the pan. The \"slow\r\nbut sure\" person, whether man or child, is one in whom\r\nimpressions sink and accumulate, so that thinking is done\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_38\" id=\"Page_38\"\u003e[Pg 38]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nat a deeper level of value than with a slighter load.\r\nMany a child is rebuked for \"slowness,\" for not \"answering\r\npromptly,\" when his forces are taking time to\r\ngather themselves together to deal effectively with the\r\nproblem at hand. In such cases, failure to afford time\r\nand leisure conduce to habits of speedy, but snapshot\r\nand superficial, judgment. The depth to which a sense\r\nof the problem, of the difficulty, sinks, determines the\r\nquality of the thinking that follows; and any habit of\r\nteaching which encourages the pupil for the sake of a\r\nsuccessful recitation or of a display of memorized information\r\nto glide over the thin ice of genuine problems\r\nreverses the true method of mind training.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eIndividual\r\ndifferences\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is profitable to study the lives of men and women\r\nwho achieve in adult life fine things in their respective\r\ncallings, but who were called dull in their school days.\r\nSometimes the early wrong judgment was due mainly\r\nto the fact that the direction in which the child showed\r\nhis ability was not one recognized by the good old\r\nstandards in use, as in the case of Darwin\u0027s interest in\r\nbeetles, snakes, and frogs. Sometimes it was due to\r\nthe fact that the child dwelling habitually on a deeper\r\nplane of reflection than other pupils\u0026mdash;or than his\r\nteachers\u0026mdash;did not show to advantage when prompt\r\nanswers of the usual sort were expected. Sometimes it\r\nwas due to the fact that the pupil\u0027s natural mode of\r\napproach clashed habitually with that of the text or\r\nteacher, and the method of the latter was assumed as\r\nan absolute basis of estimate.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eAny subject\r\nmay be intellectual\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn any event, it is desirable that the teacher should\r\nrid himself of the notion that \"thinking\" is a single,\r\nunalterable faculty; that he should recognize that it is a\r\nterm denoting the various ways in which things acquire\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_39\" id=\"Page_39\"\u003e[Pg 39]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nsignificance. It is desirable to expel also the kindred notion\r\nthat some subjects are inherently \"intellectual,\" and\r\nhence possessed of an almost magical power to train the\r\nfaculty of thought. Thinking is specific, not a machine-like,\r\nready-made apparatus to be turned indifferently\r\nand at will upon all subjects, as a lantern may throw its\r\nlight as it happens upon horses, streets, gardens, trees,\r\nor river. Thinking is specific, in that different things\r\nsuggest their own appropriate meanings, tell their own\r\nunique stories, and in that they do this in very different\r\nways with different persons. As the growth of\r\nthe body is through the assimilation of food, so the\r\ngrowth of mind is through the logical organization\r\nof subject-matter. Thinking is not like a sausage\r\nmachine which reduces all materials indifferently to one\r\nmarketable commodity, but is a power of following up\r\nand linking together the specific suggestions that\r\nspecific things arouse. Accordingly, any subject, from\r\nGreek to cooking, and from drawing to mathematics, is\r\nintellectual, if intellectual at all, not in its fixed inner\r\nstructure, but in its function\u0026mdash;in its power to start and\r\ndirect significant inquiry and reflection. What geometry\r\ndoes for one, the manipulation of laboratory apparatus,\r\nthe mastery of a musical composition, or the conduct of\r\na business affair, may do for another.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e§ 3. \u003ci\u003eOrderliness: Its Nature\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eContinuity\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFacts, whether narrow or extensive, and conclusions\r\nsuggested by them, whether many or few, do not constitute,\r\neven when combined, reflective thought. The\r\nsuggestions must be \u003ci\u003eorganized\u003c/i\u003e; they must be arranged\r\nwith reference to one another and with reference to\r\nthe facts on which they depend for proof. When the\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_40\" id=\"Page_40\"\u003e[Pg 40]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nfactors of facility, of fertility, and of depth are properly\r\nbalanced or proportioned, we get as the outcome continuity\r\nof thought. We desire neither the slow mind nor\r\nyet the hasty. We wish neither random diffuseness\r\nnor fixed rigidity. Consecutiveness means flexibility\r\nand variety of materials, conjoined with singleness and\r\ndefiniteness of direction. It is opposed both to a mechanical\r\nroutine uniformity and to a grasshopper-like\r\nmovement. Of bright children, it is not infrequently\r\nsaid that \"they might do anything, if only they settled\r\ndown,\" so quick and apt are they in any particular response.\r\nBut, alas, they rarely settle.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOn the other hand, it is not enough \u003ci\u003enot\u003c/i\u003e to be diverted.\r\nA deadly and fanatic consistency is not our goal. Concentration\r\ndoes not mean fixity, nor a cramped arrest or\r\nparalysis of the flow of suggestion. It means variety\r\nand change of ideas combined into a \u003ci\u003esingle steady trend\r\nmoving toward a unified conclusion\u003c/i\u003e. Thoughts are concentrated\r\nnot by being kept still and quiescent, but\r\nby being kept moving toward an object, as a general\r\nconcentrates his troops for attack or defense. Holding\r\nthe mind to a subject is like holding a ship to its course;\r\nit implies constant change of place combined with unity\r\nof direction. Consistent and orderly thinking is precisely\r\nsuch a change of subject-matter. Consistency is no\r\nmore the mere absence of contradiction than concentration\r\nis the mere absence of diversion\u0026mdash;which exists in\r\ndull routine or in a person \"fast asleep.\" All kinds of\r\nvaried and incompatible suggestions may sprout and be\r\nfollowed in their growth, and yet thinking be consistent\r\nand orderly, provided each one of the suggestions is\r\nviewed in relation to the main topic.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003ePractical\r\ndemands\r\nenforce\r\nsome degree\r\nof continuity\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn the main, for most persons, the primary resource\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_41\" id=\"Page_41\"\u003e[Pg 41]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nin the development of orderly habits of thought is indirect,\r\nnot direct. Intellectual organization originates\r\nand for a time grows as an accompaniment of the organization\r\nof the acts required to realize an end, not as\r\nthe result of a direct appeal to thinking power. The\r\nneed of thinking to accomplish something beyond thinking\r\nis more potent than thinking for its own sake. All\r\npeople at the outset, and the majority of people probably\r\nall their lives, attain ordering of thought through ordering\r\nof action. Adults normally carry on some occupation,\r\nprofession, pursuit; and this furnishes the continuous\r\naxis about which their knowledge, their beliefs, and their\r\nhabits of reaching and testing conclusions are organized.\r\nObservations that have to do with the efficient performance\r\nof their calling are extended and rendered precise.\r\nInformation related to it is not merely amassed and\r\nthen left in a heap; it is classified and subdivided so as\r\nto be available as it is needed. Inferences are made by\r\nmost men not from purely speculative motives, but because\r\nthey are involved in the efficient performance\r\nof \"the duties involved in their several callings.\"\r\nThus their inferences are constantly tested by results\r\nachieved; futile and scattering methods tend to be discounted;\r\norderly arrangements have a premium put\r\nupon them. The event, the issue, stands as a constant\r\ncheck on the thinking that has led up to it; and this\r\ndiscipline by efficiency in action is the chief sanction, in\r\npractically all who are not scientific specialists, of orderliness\r\nof thought.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSuch a resource\u0026mdash;the main prop of disciplined thinking\r\nin adult life\u0026mdash;is not to be despised in training the\r\nyoung in right intellectual habits. There are, however,\r\nprofound differences between the immature and the\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_42\" id=\"Page_42\"\u003e[Pg 42]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nadult in the matter of organized activity\u0026mdash;differences\r\nwhich must be taken seriously into account in any\r\neducational use of activities: (\u003ci\u003ei\u003c/i\u003e) The external achievement\r\nresulting from activity is a more urgent necessity\r\nwith the adult, and hence is with him a more effective\r\nmeans of discipline of mind than with the child; (\u003ci\u003eii\u003c/i\u003e) The\r\nends of adult activity are more specialized than those of\r\nchild activity.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003ePeculiar\r\ndifficulty\r\nwith\r\nchildren\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(\u003ci\u003ei\u003c/i\u003e) The selection and arrangement of appropriate\r\nlines of action is a much more difficult problem as respects\r\nyouth than it is in the case of adults. With the\r\nlatter, the main lines are more or less settled by circumstances.\r\nThe social status of the adult, the fact that he\r\nis a citizen, a householder, a parent, one occupied in\r\nsome regular industrial or professional calling, prescribes\r\nthe chief features of the acts to be performed, and\r\nsecures, somewhat automatically, as it were, appropriate\r\nand related modes of thinking. But with the child there\r\nis no such fixity of status and pursuit; there is almost\r\nnothing to dictate that such and such a consecutive line\r\nof action, rather than another, should be followed, while\r\nthe will of others, his own caprice, and circumstances\r\nabout him tend to produce an isolated momentary act.\r\nThe absence of continued motivation coöperates with the\r\ninner plasticity of the immature to increase the importance\r\nof educational training and the difficulties in the way of\r\nfinding consecutive modes of activities which may do for\r\nchild and youth what serious vocations and functions do\r\nfor the adult. In the case of children, the choice is so\r\npeculiarly exposed to arbitrary factors, to mere school\r\ntraditions, to waves of pedagogical fad and fancy, to\r\nfluctuating social cross currents, that sometimes, in sheer\r\ndisgust at the inadequacy of results, a reaction occurs\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_43\" id=\"Page_43\"\u003e[Pg 43]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nto the total neglect of overt activity as an educational\r\nfactor, and a recourse to purely theoretical subjects and\r\nmethods.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003ePeculiar\r\nopportunity\r\nwith\r\nchildren\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(\u003ci\u003eii\u003c/i\u003e) This very difficulty, however, points to the fact\r\nthat the \u003ci\u003eopportunity for selecting truly educative activities\u003c/i\u003e\r\nis indefinitely greater in child life than in adult.\r\nThe factor of external pressure is so strong with most\r\nadults that the educative value of the pursuit\u0026mdash;its reflex\r\ninfluence upon intelligence and character\u0026mdash;however\r\ngenuine, is incidental, and frequently almost accidental.\r\nThe problem and the opportunity with the young is\r\nselection of orderly and continuous modes of occupation,\r\nwhich, while they lead up to and prepare for the\r\nindispensable activities of adult life, have their own\r\n\u003ci\u003esufficient justification in their present reflex influence\r\nupon the formation of habits of thought\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eAction and\r\nreaction\r\nbetween\r\nextremes\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eEducational practice shows a continual tendency to\r\noscillate between two extremes with respect to overt\r\nand exertive activities. One extreme is to neglect them\r\nalmost entirely, on the ground that they are chaotic and\r\nfluctuating, mere diversions appealing to the transitory\r\nunformed taste and caprice of immature minds; or if\r\nthey avoid this evil, are objectionable copies of the\r\nhighly specialized, and more or less commercial, activities\r\nof adult life. If activities are admitted at all into\r\nthe school, the admission is a grudging concession to\r\nthe necessity of having occasional relief from the strain\r\nof constant intellectual work, or to the clamor of outside\r\nutilitarian demands upon the school. The other extreme\r\nis an enthusiastic belief in the almost magical educative\r\nefficacy of any kind of activity, granted it is\r\nan activity and not a passive absorption of academic\r\nand theoretic material. The conceptions of play, of\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_44\" id=\"Page_44\"\u003e[Pg 44]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nself-expression, of natural growth, are appealed to almost\r\nas if they meant that opportunity for any kind of\r\nspontaneous activity inevitably secures the due training\r\nof mental power; or a mythological brain physiology is\r\nappealed to as proof that any exercise of the muscles\r\ntrains power of thought.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eLocating the\r\nproblem of\r\neducation\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhile we vibrate from one of these extremes to the\r\nother, the most serious of all problems is ignored:\r\nthe problem, namely, of discovering and arranging the\r\nforms of activity (\u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e) which are most congenial, best\r\nadapted, to the immature stage of development; (\u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e) which\r\nhave the most ulterior promise as preparation for the\r\nsocial responsibilities of adult life; and (\u003ci\u003ec\u003c/i\u003e) which, \u003ci\u003eat the\r\nsame time\u003c/i\u003e, have the maximum of influence in forming\r\nhabits of acute observation and of consecutive inference.\r\nAs curiosity is related to the acquisition of material\r\nof thought, as suggestion is related to flexibility\r\nand force of thought, so the ordering of activities, not\r\nthemselves primarily intellectual, is related to the forming\r\nof intellectual powers of consecutiveness.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_45\" id=\"Page_45\"\u003e[Pg 45]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003chr style=\"width: 65%;\" /\u003e\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"CHAPTER_FOUR\" id=\"CHAPTER_FOUR\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eCHAPTER FOUR\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eSCHOOL CONDITIONS AND THE TRAINING OF THOUGHT\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e§ 1. \u003ci\u003eIntroductory: Methods and Conditions\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eFormal\r\ndiscipline\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe so-called faculty-psychology went hand in hand\r\nwith the vogue of the formal-discipline idea in education.\r\nIf thought is a distinct piece of mental machinery,\r\nseparate from observation, memory, imagination, and\r\ncommon-sense judgments of persons and things, then\r\nthought should be trained by special exercises designed\r\nfor the purpose, as one might devise special exercises\r\nfor developing the biceps muscles. Certain subjects are\r\nthen to be regarded as intellectual or logical subjects\r\n\u003ci\u003epar excellence\u003c/i\u003e, possessed of a predestined fitness to exercise\r\nthe thought-faculty, just as certain machines are\r\nbetter than others for developing arm power. With\r\nthese three notions goes the fourth, that method consists\r\nof a set of operations by which the machinery of thought\r\nis set going and kept at work upon any subject-matter.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eversus\r\nreal\r\nthinking\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe have tried to make it clear in the previous chapters\r\nthat there is no single and uniform power of\r\nthought, but a multitude of different ways in which\r\nspecific things\u0026mdash;things observed, remembered, heard of,\r\nread about\u0026mdash;evoke suggestions or ideas that are pertinent\r\nto the occasion and fruitful in the sequel. Training\r\nis such development of curiosity, suggestion, and\r\nhabits of exploring and testing, as increases their scope\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_46\" id=\"Page_46\"\u003e[Pg 46]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nand efficiency. A subject\u0026mdash;any subject\u0026mdash;is intellectual\r\nin the degree in which \u003ci\u003ewith any given person\u003c/i\u003e it\r\nsucceeds in effecting this growth. On this view the\r\nfourth factor, method, is concerned with providing conditions\r\nso adapted to individual needs and powers as\r\nto make for the permanent improvement of observation,\r\nsuggestion, and investigation.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eTrue and\r\nfalse meaning\r\nof\r\nmethod\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe teacher\u0027s problem is thus twofold. On the one\r\nside, he needs (as we saw in the last chapter) to be a\r\nstudent of individual traits and habits; on the other side,\r\nhe needs to be a student of the conditions that modify\r\nfor better or worse the directions in which individual\r\npowers habitually express themselves. He needs to recognize\r\nthat method covers not only what he intentionally\r\ndevises and employs for the purpose of mental training,\r\nbut also what he does without any conscious reference\r\nto it,\u0026mdash;anything in the atmosphere and conduct of\r\nthe school which reacts in any way upon the curiosity,\r\nthe responsiveness, and the orderly activity of children.\r\nThe teacher who is an intelligent student both of\r\nindividual mental operations and of the effects of school\r\nconditions upon those operations, can largely be trusted\r\nto develop for himself methods of instruction in their narrower\r\nand more technical sense\u0026mdash;those best adapted to\r\nachieve results in particular subjects, such as reading,\r\ngeography, or algebra. In the hands of one who is not\r\nintelligently aware of individual capacities and of the influence\r\nunconsciously exerted upon them by the entire\r\nenvironment, even the best of technical methods are\r\nlikely to get an immediate result only at the expense of\r\ndeep-seated and persistent habits. We may group the\r\nconditioning influences of the school environment under\r\nthree heads: (1) the mental attitudes and habits of the\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_47\" id=\"Page_47\"\u003e[Pg 47]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\npersons with whom the child is in contact; (2) the subjects\r\nstudied; (3) current educational aims and ideals.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e§ 2. \u003ci\u003eInfluence of the Habits of Others\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBare reference to the imitativeness of human nature\r\nis enough to suggest how profoundly the mental habits\r\nof others affect the attitude of the one being trained.\r\nExample is more potent than precept; and a teacher\u0027s\r\nbest conscious efforts may be more than counteracted by\r\nthe influence of personal traits which he is unaware of\r\nor regards as unimportant. Methods of instruction and\r\ndiscipline that are technically faulty may be rendered\r\npractically innocuous by the inspiration of the personal\r\nmethod that lies back of them.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eResponse to\r\nenvironment\r\nfundamental\r\nin method\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eTo confine, however, the conditioning influence of the\r\neducator, whether parent or teacher, to imitation is to\r\nget a very superficial view of the intellectual influence\r\nof others. Imitation is but one case of a deeper principle\u0026mdash;that\r\nof stimulus and response. \u003ci\u003eEverything the\r\nteacher does, as well as the manner in which he does it,\r\nincites the child to respond in some way or other, and\r\neach response tends to set the child\u0027s attitude in some way\r\nor other.\u003c/i\u003e Even the inattention of the child to the adult\r\nis often a mode of response which is the result of unconscious\r\ntraining.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_9_9\" id=\"FNanchor_9_9\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_9_9\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[9]\u003c/a\u003e The teacher is rarely (and even\r\nthen never entirely) a transparent medium of access by\r\nanother mind to a subject. With the young, the influence\r\nof the teacher\u0027s personality is intimately fused\r\nwith that of the subject; the child does not separate\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_48\" id=\"Page_48\"\u003e[Pg 48]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nnor even distinguish the two. And as the child\u0027s response\r\nis \u003ci\u003etoward\u003c/i\u003e or \u003ci\u003eaway from\u003c/i\u003e anything presented, he\r\nkeeps up a running commentary, of which he himself is\r\nhardly distinctly aware, of like and dislike, of sympathy\r\nand aversion, not merely to the acts of the teacher, but\r\nalso to the subject with which the teacher is occupied.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eInfluence of\r\nteacher\u0027s\r\nown habits\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eJudging\r\nothers by\r\nourselves\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe extent and power of this influence upon morals\r\nand manners, upon character, upon habits of speech\r\nand social bearing, are almost universally recognized.\r\nBut the tendency to conceive of thought as an isolated\r\nfaculty has often blinded teachers to the fact that\r\nthis influence is just as real and pervasive in intellectual\r\nconcerns. Teachers, as well as children, stick\r\nmore or less to the main points, have more or less\r\nwooden and rigid methods of response, and display more\r\nor less intellectual curiosity about matters that come up.\r\nAnd every trait of this kind is an inevitable part of the\r\nteacher\u0027s method of teaching. Merely to accept without\r\nnotice slipshod habits of speech, slovenly inferences,\r\nunimaginative and literal response, is to indorse these\r\ntendencies, and to ratify them into habits\u0026mdash;and so it\r\ngoes throughout the whole range of contact between\r\nteacher and student. In this complex and intricate\r\nfield, two or three points may well be singled out for\r\nspecial notice. (\u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e) Most persons are quite unaware of\r\nthe distinguishing peculiarities of their own mental\r\nhabit. They take their own mental operations for\r\ngranted, and unconsciously make them the standard for\r\njudging the mental processes of others.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_10_10\" id=\"FNanchor_10_10\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_10_10\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[10]\u003c/a\u003e Hence there\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_49\" id=\"Page_49\"\u003e[Pg 49]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nis a tendency to encourage everything in the pupil\r\nwhich agrees with this attitude, and to neglect or fail\r\nto understand whatever is incongruous with it. The\r\nprevalent overestimation of the value, for mind-training,\r\nof \u003ci\u003etheoretic\u003c/i\u003e subjects as compared with practical\r\npursuits, is doubtless due partly to the fact that the\r\nteacher\u0027s calling tends to select those in whom the\r\ntheoretic interest is specially strong and to repel those\r\nin whom executive abilities are marked. Teachers\r\nsifted out on this basis judge pupils and subjects by a\r\nlike standard, encouraging an intellectual one-sidedness\r\nin those to whom it is naturally congenial, and repelling\r\nfrom study those in whom practical instincts are more\r\nurgent.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eExaggeration\r\nof direct\r\npersonal\r\ninfluence\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(\u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e) Teachers\u0026mdash;and this holds especially of the stronger\r\nand better teachers\u0026mdash;tend to rely upon their personal\r\nstrong points to hold a child to his work, and thereby\r\nto substitute their personal influence for that of subject-matter\r\nas a motive for study. The teacher finds by\r\nexperience that his own personality is often effective\r\nwhere the power of the subject to command attention\r\nis almost nil; then he utilizes the former more and\r\nmore, until the pupil\u0027s relation to the teacher almost\r\ntakes the place of his relation to the subject. In this\r\nway the teacher\u0027s personality may become a source of\r\npersonal dependence and weakness, an influence that\r\nrenders the pupil indifferent to the value of the subject\r\nfor its own sake.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eIndependent\r\nthinking\r\n\u003ci\u003eversus\u003c/i\u003e\r\n\"getting the\r\nanswer\"\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(\u003ci\u003ec\u003c/i\u003e) The operation of the teacher\u0027s own mental habit\r\ntends, unless carefully watched and guided, to make\r\nthe child a student of the teacher\u0027s peculiarities rather\r\nthan of the subjects that he is supposed to study. His\r\nchief concern is to accommodate himself to what the\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_50\" id=\"Page_50\"\u003e[Pg 50]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nteacher expects of him, rather than to devote himself\r\nenergetically to the problems of subject-matter. \"Is this\r\nright?\" comes to mean \"Will this answer or this process\r\nsatisfy the teacher?\"\u0026mdash;instead of meaning, \"Does\r\nit satisfy the inherent conditions of the problem?\" It\r\nwould be folly to deny the legitimacy or the value of\r\nthe study of human nature that children carry on in\r\nschool; but it is obviously undesirable that their chief\r\nintellectual problem should be that of producing an\r\nanswer approved by the teacher, and their standard of\r\nsuccess be successful adaptation to the requirements of\r\nanother.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e§ 3. \u003ci\u003eInfluence of the Nature of Studies\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eTypes\r\nof studies\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eStudies are conventionally and conveniently grouped\r\nunder these heads: (1) Those especially involving the\r\nacquisition of skill in performance\u0026mdash;the school arts,\r\nsuch as reading, writing, figuring, and music. (2) Those\r\nmainly concerned with acquiring knowledge\u0026mdash;\"informational\"\r\nstudies, such as geography and history. (3)\r\nThose in which skill in doing and bulk of information\r\nare relatively less important, and appeal to abstract\r\nthinking, to \"reasoning,\" is most marked\u0026mdash;\"disciplinary\"\r\nstudies, such as arithmetic and formal grammar.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_11_11\" id=\"FNanchor_11_11\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_11_11\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[11]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nEach of these groups of subjects has its own special\r\npitfalls.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eThe abstract\r\nas the\r\nisolated\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(\u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e) In the case of the so-called disciplinary or pre-eminently\r\nlogical studies, there is danger of the isolation\r\nof intellectual activity from the ordinary affairs\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_51\" id=\"Page_51\"\u003e[Pg 51]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof life. Teacher and student alike tend to set up a\r\nchasm between logical thought as something abstract\r\nand remote, and the specific and concrete demands of\r\neveryday events. The abstract tends to become so\r\naloof, so far away from application, as to be cut loose\r\nfrom practical and moral bearing. The gullibility of\r\nspecialized scholars when out of their own lines, their extravagant\r\nhabits of inference and speech, their ineptness\r\nin reaching conclusions in practical matters, their egotistical\r\nengrossment in their own subjects, are extreme\r\nexamples of the bad effects of severing studies completely\r\nfrom their ordinary connections in life.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eOverdoing\r\nthe mechanical\r\nand\r\nautomatic\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003e\"Drill\"\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(\u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e) The danger in those studies where the main emphasis\r\nis upon acquisition of skill is just the reverse.\r\nThe tendency is to take the shortest cuts possible to\r\ngain the required end. This makes the subjects \u003ci\u003emechanical\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nand thus restrictive of intellectual power. In\r\nthe mastery of reading, writing, drawing, laboratory technique,\r\netc., the need of economy of time and material,\r\nof neatness and accuracy, of promptness and uniformity,\r\nis so great that these things tend to become ends in\r\nthemselves, irrespective of their influence upon general\r\nmental attitude.\r\nSheer imitation, dictation of steps to\r\nbe taken, mechanical drill, may give results most\r\nquickly and yet strengthen traits likely to be fatal\r\nto reflective power. The pupil is enjoined to do this\r\nand that specific thing, with no knowledge of any reason\r\nexcept that by so doing he gets his result most\r\nspeedily; his mistakes are pointed out and corrected\r\nfor him; he is kept at pure repetition of certain acts\r\ntill they become automatic. Later, teachers wonder\r\nwhy the pupil reads with so little expression, and figures\r\nwith so little intelligent consideration of the terms\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_52\" id=\"Page_52\"\u003e[Pg 52]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof his problem. In some educational dogmas and practices,\r\nthe very idea of training mind seems to be hopelessly\r\nconfused with that of a drill which hardly touches\r\n\u003ci\u003emind\u003c/i\u003e at all\u0026mdash;or touches it for the worse\u0026mdash;since it is\r\nwholly taken up with training skill in external execution.\r\nThis method reduces the \"training\" of human beings\r\nto the level of animal training. Practical skill, modes\r\nof effective technique, can be intelligently, non-mechanically\r\n\u003ci\u003eused\u003c/i\u003e, only when intelligence has played a part in\r\ntheir \u003ci\u003eacquisition\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eWisdom\r\n\u003ci\u003eversus\u003c/i\u003e\r\ninformation\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(\u003ci\u003ec\u003c/i\u003e) Much the same sort of thing is to be said regarding\r\nstudies where emphasis traditionally falls upon\r\nbulk and accuracy of information. The distinction\r\nbetween information and wisdom is old, and yet requires\r\nconstantly to be redrawn. Information is knowledge\r\nwhich is merely acquired and stored up; wisdom is knowledge\r\noperating in the direction of powers to the better\r\nliving of life. Information, merely as information, implies\r\nno special training of intellectual capacity; wisdom\r\nis the finest fruit of that training. In school, amassing\r\ninformation always tends to escape from the ideal of\r\nwisdom or good judgment. The aim often seems to be\u0026mdash;especially\r\nin such a subject as geography\u0026mdash;to make\r\nthe pupil what has been called a \"cyclopedia of useless\r\ninformation.\" \"Covering the ground\" is the primary\r\nnecessity; the nurture of mind a bad second. Thinking\r\ncannot, of course, go on in a vacuum; suggestions and\r\ninferences can occur only upon a basis of information\r\nas to matters of fact.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut there is all the difference in the world whether\r\nthe acquisition of information is treated as an end in\r\nitself, or is made an integral portion of the training of\r\nthought. The assumption that information which has\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_53\" id=\"Page_53\"\u003e[Pg 53]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nbeen accumulated apart from use in the recognition and\r\nsolution of a problem may later on be freely employed\r\nat will by thought is quite false. The skill at the ready\r\ncommand of intelligence is the skill acquired with\r\nthe aid of intelligence; the only information which,\r\notherwise than by accident, can be put to logical use is\r\nthat acquired in the course of thinking. Because their\r\nknowledge has been achieved in connection with the\r\nneeds of specific situations, men of little book-learning are\r\noften able to put to effective use every ounce of knowledge\r\nthey possess; while men of vast erudition are often\r\nswamped by the mere bulk of their learning, because\r\nmemory, rather than thinking, has been operative in\r\nobtaining it.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e§4. \u003ci\u003eThe Influence of Current Aims and Ideals\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is, of course, impossible to separate this somewhat\r\nintangible condition from the points just dealt with;\r\nfor automatic skill and quantity of information are educational\r\nideals which pervade the whole school. We\r\nmay distinguish, however, certain tendencies, such as\r\nthat to judge education from the standpoint of external\r\nresults, instead of from that of the development of personal\r\nattitudes and habits. The ideal of the \u003ci\u003eproduct\u003c/i\u003e, as\r\nagainst that of the mental \u003ci\u003eprocess\u003c/i\u003e by which the product\r\nis attained, shows itself in both instruction and moral\r\ndiscipline.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eExternal\r\nresults\r\n\u003ci\u003eversus\u003c/i\u003e\r\nprocesses\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(\u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e) In instruction, the external standard manifests itself\r\nin the importance attached to the \"correct answer.\" No\r\none other thing, probably, works so fatally against focussing\r\nthe attention of teachers upon the training of mind\r\nas the domination of \u003ci\u003etheir\u003c/i\u003e minds by the idea that the chief\r\nthing is to get pupils to recite their lessons correctly.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_54\" id=\"Page_54\"\u003e[Pg 54]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nAs long as this end is uppermost (whether consciously\r\nor unconsciously), training of mind remains an incidental\r\nand secondary consideration. There is no great difficulty\r\nin understanding why this ideal has such vogue. The\r\nlarge number of pupils to be dealt with, and the tendency\r\nof parents and school authorities to demand\r\nspeedy and tangible evidence of progress, conspire to\r\ngive it currency. Knowledge of subject-matter\u0026mdash;not\r\nof children\u0026mdash;is alone exacted of teachers by this aim;\r\nand, moreover, knowledge of subject-matter only in\r\nportions definitely prescribed and laid out, and hence\r\nmastered with comparative ease. Education that takes\r\nas its standard the improvement of the intellectual attitude\r\nand method of students demands more serious preparatory\r\ntraining, for it exacts sympathetic and intelligent\r\ninsight into the workings of individual minds, and\r\na very wide and flexible command of subject-matter\u0026mdash;so\r\nas to be able to select and apply just what is needed\r\nwhen it is needed. Finally, the securing of external\r\nresults is an aim that lends itself naturally to the\r\nmechanics of school administration\u0026mdash;to examinations,\r\nmarks, gradings, promotions, and so on.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eReliance\r\nupon others\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(\u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e) With reference to behavior also, the external\r\nideal has a great influence. Conformity of acts to precepts\r\nand rules is the easiest, because most mechanical,\r\nstandard to employ. It is no part of our present task\r\nto tell just how far dogmatic instruction, or strict adherence\r\nto custom, convention, and the commands of a\r\nsocial superior, should extend in moral training; but\r\nsince problems of conduct are the deepest and most\r\ncommon of all the problems of life, the ways in which\r\nthey are met have an influence that radiates into every\r\nother mental attitude, even those far remote from any\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_55\" id=\"Page_55\"\u003e[Pg 55]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ndirect or conscious moral consideration. Indeed, the\r\n\u003ci\u003edeepest plane of the mental attitude of every one is fixed\r\nby the way in which problems of behavior are treated\u003c/i\u003e. If\r\nthe function of thought, of serious inquiry and reflection,\r\nis reduced to a minimum in dealing with them, it is not\r\nreasonable to expect habits of thought to exercise great\r\ninfluence in less important matters. On the other hand,\r\nhabits of active inquiry and careful deliberation in the\r\nsignificant and vital problems of conduct afford the best\r\nguarantee that the general structure of mind will be\r\nreasonable.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_56\" id=\"Page_56\"\u003e[Pg 56]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003chr style=\"width: 65%;\" /\u003e\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"CHAPTER_FIVE\" id=\"CHAPTER_FIVE\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eCHAPTER FIVE\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eTHE MEANS AND END OF MENTAL TRAINING: THE\r\nPSYCHOLOGICAL AND THE LOGICAL\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e§ 1. \u003ci\u003eIntroductory: The Meaning of Logical\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eSpecial\r\ntopic of\r\nthis chapter\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn the preceding chapters we have considered (\u003ci\u003ei\u003c/i\u003e) what\r\nthinking is; (\u003ci\u003eii\u003c/i\u003e) the importance of its special training;\r\n(\u003ci\u003eiii\u003c/i\u003e) the natural tendencies that lend themselves to its\r\ntraining; and (\u003ci\u003eiv\u003c/i\u003e) some of the special obstacles in the way\r\nof its training under school conditions. We come now\r\nto the relation of \u003ci\u003elogic\u003c/i\u003e to the purpose of mental training.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eThree\r\nsenses of\r\nterm \u003ci\u003elogical\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eThe practical\r\nis the\r\nimportant\r\nmeaning of\r\n\u003ci\u003elogical\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn its broadest sense, any thinking that ends in a\r\nconclusion is logical\u0026mdash;whether the conclusion reached\r\nbe justified or fallacious; that is, the term \u003ci\u003elogical\u003c/i\u003e covers\r\nboth the logically good and the illogical or the logically\r\nbad. In its narrowest sense, the term \u003ci\u003elogical\u003c/i\u003e refers\r\nonly to what is demonstrated to follow necessarily\r\nfrom premises that are definite in meaning and that are\r\neither self-evidently true, or that have been previously\r\nproved to be true. Stringency of proof is here the\r\nequivalent of the logical. In this sense mathematics\r\nand formal logic (perhaps as a branch of mathematics)\r\nalone are strictly logical.\r\nLogical, however, is used in\r\na third sense, which is at once more vital and more\r\npractical; to denote, namely, the systematic care, negative\r\nand positive, taken to safeguard reflection so that it\r\nmay yield the best results under the given conditions.\r\nIf only the word \u003ci\u003eartificial\u003c/i\u003e were associated with the idea\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_57\" id=\"Page_57\"\u003e[Pg 57]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof \u003ci\u003eart\u003c/i\u003e, or expert skill gained through voluntary apprenticeship\r\n(instead of suggesting the factitious and unreal),\r\nwe might say that logical refers to artificial thought.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eCare,\r\nthoroughness,\r\nand\r\nexactness\r\nthe marks\r\nof the logical\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn this sense, the word \u003ci\u003elogical\u003c/i\u003e is synonymous with\r\nwide-awake, thorough, and careful reflection\u0026mdash;thought\r\nin its best sense (\u003ci\u003eante\u003c/i\u003e, p. 5). Reflection is turning a\r\ntopic over in various aspects and in various lights so\r\nthat nothing significant about it shall be overlooked\u0026mdash;almost\r\nas one might turn a stone over to see what its\r\nhidden side is like or what is covered by it. \u003ci\u003eThoughtfulness\u003c/i\u003e\r\nmeans, practically, the same thing as careful attention;\r\nto give our mind to a subject is to give heed to it,\r\nto take pains with it. In speaking of reflection, we\r\nnaturally use the words \u003ci\u003eweigh\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eponder\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003edeliberate\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;terms\r\nimplying a certain delicate and scrupulous balancing\r\nof things against one another. Closely related names\r\nare \u003ci\u003escrutiny\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eexamination\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003econsideration\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003einspection\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;terms\r\nwhich imply close and careful vision. Again, to\r\nthink is to relate things to one another definitely, to \"put\r\ntwo and two together\" as we say. Analogy with the\r\naccuracy and definiteness of mathematical combinations\r\ngives us such expressions as \u003ci\u003ecalculate\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003ereckon\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eaccount\r\nfor\u003c/i\u003e; and even \u003ci\u003ereason\u003c/i\u003e itself\u0026mdash;\u003ci\u003eratio\u003c/i\u003e. Caution, carefulness,\r\nthoroughness, definiteness, exactness, orderliness,\r\nmethodic arrangement, are, then, the traits by which we\r\nmark off the logical from what is random and casual\r\non one side, and from what is academic and formal on\r\nthe other.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eWhole\r\nobject of\r\nintellectual\r\neducation is\r\nformation\r\nof logical\r\ndisposition\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eFalse opposition\r\nof the\r\nlogical and\r\npsychological\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNo argument is needed to point out that the educator\r\nis concerned with the logical in its practical and\r\nvital sense. Argument is perhaps needed to show that\r\nthe \u003ci\u003eintellectual\u003c/i\u003e (as distinct from the \u003ci\u003emoral\u003c/i\u003e) \u003ci\u003eend of education\r\nis entirely and only the logical in this sense\u003c/i\u003e; \u003ci\u003enamely,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_58\" id=\"Page_58\"\u003e[Pg 58]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e the formation of careful, alert, and thorough habits of\r\nthinking\u003c/i\u003e.\r\nThe chief difficulty in the way of recognition\r\nof this principle is a false conception of the relation between\r\nthe psychological tendencies of an individual and\r\nhis logical achievements. If it be assumed\u0026mdash;as it is so\r\nfrequently\u0026mdash;that these have, intrinsically, nothing to do\r\nwith each other, then logical training is inevitably regarded\r\nas something foreign and extraneous, something\r\nto be ingrafted upon the individual from without, so\r\nthat it is absurd to identify the object of education with\r\nthe development of logical power.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eOpposing\r\nthe \u003ci\u003enatural\u003c/i\u003e\r\nto the logical\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe conception that the psychology of individuals\r\nhas no intrinsic connections with logical methods and results\r\nis held, curiously enough, by two opposing schools\r\nof educational theory. To one school, the \u003ci\u003enatural\u003c/i\u003e\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_12_12\" id=\"FNanchor_12_12\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_12_12\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[12]\u003c/a\u003e is\r\nprimary and fundamental; and its tendency is to make\r\nlittle of distinctly intellectual nurture. Its mottoes are\r\nfreedom, self-expression, individuality, spontaneity, play,\r\ninterest, natural unfolding, and so on. In its emphasis\r\nupon individual attitude and activity, it sets slight store\r\nupon organized subject-matter, or the material of study,\r\nand conceives \u003ci\u003emethod\u003c/i\u003e to consist of various devices for\r\nstimulating and evoking, in their natural order of growth,\r\nthe native potentialities of individuals.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eNeglect of\r\nthe innate\r\nlogical\r\nresources\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eIdentification\r\nof\r\nlogical with\r\nsubject-matter,\r\nexclusively\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe other school estimates highly the value of the\r\nlogical, but conceives the natural tendency of individuals\r\nto be averse, or at least indifferent, to logical\r\nachievement. It relies upon \u003ci\u003esubject-matter\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;upon\r\nmatter already defined and classified. Method, then, has\r\nto do with the devices by which these characteristics\r\nmay be imported into a mind naturally reluctant and re\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_59\" id=\"Page_59\"\u003e[Pg 59]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003ebellious.\r\nHence its mottoes are discipline, instruction,\r\nrestraint, voluntary or conscious effort, the necessity of\r\ntasks, and so on.\r\nFrom this point of view studies,\r\nrather than attitudes and habits, embody the logical\r\nfactor in education. The mind becomes logical only by\r\nlearning to conform to an external subject-matter. To\r\nproduce this conformity, the study should first be analyzed\r\n(by text-book or teacher) into its logical elements;\r\nthen each of these elements should be defined; finally,\r\nall of the elements should be arranged in series or\r\nclasses according to logical formulæ or general principles.\r\nThen the pupil learns the definitions one by\r\none; and progressively adding one to another builds up\r\nthe logical system, and thereby is himself gradually\r\nimbued, from without, with logical quality.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eIllustration\r\nfrom\r\ngeography,\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis description will gain meaning through an illustration.\r\nSuppose the subject is geography. The first\r\nthing is to give its definition, marking it off from every\r\nother subject. Then the various abstract terms upon\r\nwhich depends the scientific development of the science\r\nare stated and defined one by one\u0026mdash;pole, equator,\r\necliptic, zone,\u0026mdash;from the simpler units to the more complex\r\nwhich are formed out of them; then the more concrete\r\nelements are taken in similar series: continent,\r\nisland, coast, promontory, cape, isthmus, peninsula,\r\nocean, lake, coast, gulf, bay, and so on. In acquiring\r\nthis material, the mind is supposed not only to gain important\r\ninformation, but, by accommodating itself to\r\nready-made logical definitions, generalizations, and classifications,\r\ngradually to acquire logical habits.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003efrom\r\ndrawing\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis type of method has been applied to every subject\r\ntaught in the schools\u0026mdash;reading, writing, music,\r\nphysics, grammar, arithmetic. Drawing for example,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_60\" id=\"Page_60\"\u003e[Pg 60]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nhas been taught on the theory that since all pictorial\r\nrepresentation is a matter of combining straight and\r\ncurved lines, the simplest procedure is to have the pupil\r\nacquire the ability first to draw straight lines in various\r\npositions (horizontal, perpendicular, diagonals at various\r\nangles), then typical curves; and finally, to combine\r\nstraight and curved lines in various permutations to construct\r\nactual pictures. This seemed to give the ideal\r\n\"logical\" method, beginning with analysis into elements,\r\nand then proceeding in regular order to more\r\nand more complex syntheses, each element being defined\r\nwhen used, and thereby clearly understood.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eFormal\r\nmethod\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eEven when this method in its extreme form is not followed,\r\nfew schools (especially of the middle or upper\r\nelementary grades) are free from an exaggerated attention\r\nto forms supposedly employed by the pupil if he\r\ngets his result logically. It is thought that there are\r\ncertain steps arranged in a certain order, which express\r\npreëminently an understanding of the subject, and the\r\npupil is made to \"analyze\" his procedure into these\r\nsteps, \u003ci\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e to learn a certain routine formula of statement.\r\nWhile this method is usually at its height in grammar\r\nand arithmetic, it invades also history and even literature,\r\nwhich are then reduced, under plea of intellectual training,\r\nto \"outlines,\" diagrams, and schemes of division\r\nand subdivision. In memorizing this simulated cut and\r\ndried copy of the logic of an adult, the child generally\r\nis induced to stultify his own subtle and vital logical\r\nmovement. The adoption by teachers of this misconception\r\nof logical method has probably done more than\r\nanything else to bring pedagogy into disrepute; for to\r\nmany persons \"pedagogy\" means precisely a set of\r\nmechanical, self-conscious devices for replacing by some\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_61\" id=\"Page_61\"\u003e[Pg 61]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ncast-iron external scheme the personal mental movement\r\nof the individual.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eReaction\r\ntoward\r\nlack of form\r\nand method\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eA reaction inevitably occurs from the poor results\r\nthat accrue from these professedly \"logical\" methods.\r\nLack of interest in study, habits of inattention and\r\nprocrastination, positive aversion to intellectual application,\r\ndependence upon sheer memorizing and mechanical\r\nroutine with only a modicum of understanding by\r\nthe pupil of what he is about, show that the theory of\r\nlogical definition, division, gradation, and system does\r\nnot work out practically as it is theoretically supposed to\r\nwork. The consequent disposition\u0026mdash;as in every reaction\u0026mdash;is\r\nto go to the opposite extreme. The \"logical\"\r\nis thought to be wholly artificial and extraneous; teacher\r\nand pupil alike are to turn their backs upon it, and to\r\nwork toward the expression of existing aptitudes and\r\ntastes. Emphasis upon natural tendencies and powers\r\nas the only possible starting-point of development is\r\nindeed wholesome. But the reaction is false, and hence\r\nmisleading, in what it ignores and denies: the presence\r\nof genuinely intellectual factors in existing powers and\r\ninterests.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eLogic of subject-matter\r\nis logic of\r\nadult or\r\ntrained mind\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhat is conventionally termed logical (namely, the\r\nlogical from the standpoint of subject-matter) represents\r\nin truth the logic of the trained adult mind. Ability to\r\ndivide a subject, to define its elements, and to group\r\nthem into classes according to general principles represents\r\nlogical capacity at its best point reached \u003ci\u003eafter\u003c/i\u003e\r\nthorough training. The mind that habitually exhibits\r\nskill in divisions, definitions, generalizations, and systematic\r\nrecapitulations no longer needs training in logical\r\nmethods. But it is absurd to suppose that a mind which\r\nneeds training because it cannot perform these opera\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_62\" id=\"Page_62\"\u003e[Pg 62]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003etions\r\ncan begin where the expert mind stops. \u003ci\u003eThe\r\nlogical from the standpoint of subject-matter represents the\r\ngoal, the last term of training, not the point of departure.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eThe immature\r\nmind\r\nhas its\r\nown logic\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eHence, the\r\n\u003ci\u003epsychological\u003c/i\u003e\r\nand the\r\n\u003ci\u003elogical\u003c/i\u003e\r\nrepresent\r\nthe two ends\r\nof the same\r\nmovement\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn truth, the mind at every stage of development has\r\nits own logic. The error of the notion that by appeal to\r\nspontaneous tendencies and by multiplication of materials\r\nwe may completely dismiss logical considerations, lies in\r\noverlooking how large a part curiosity, inference, experimenting,\r\nand testing already play in the pupil\u0027s life.\r\nTherefore it underestimates the \u003ci\u003eintellectual\u003c/i\u003e factor in the\r\nmore spontaneous play and work of individuals\u0026mdash;the\r\nfactor that alone is truly educative. Any teacher who\r\nis alive to the modes of thought naturally operative in\r\nthe experience of the normal child will have no difficulty\r\nin avoiding the identification of the logical with a ready-made\r\norganization of subject-matter, as well as the notion\r\nthat the only way to escape this error is to pay no\r\nattention to logical considerations. Such a teacher will\r\nhave no difficulty in seeing that the real problem of intellectual\r\neducation is the transformation of natural\r\npowers into expert, tested powers: the transformation\r\nof more or less casual curiosity and sporadic suggestion\r\ninto attitudes of alert, cautious, and thorough inquiry.\r\nHe will see that the \u003ci\u003epsychological\u003c/i\u003e and the \u003ci\u003elogical\u003c/i\u003e, instead\r\nof being opposed to each other (or even independent\r\nof each other), are connected \u003ci\u003eas the earlier and the\r\nlater stages in one continuous process of normal growth\u003c/i\u003e.\r\nThe natural or psychological activities, even when not\r\nconsciously controlled by logical considerations, have\r\ntheir own intellectual function and integrity; conscious\r\nand deliberate skill in thinking, when it is achieved,\r\nmakes habitual or second nature. The first is already logical\r\nin spirit; the last, in presenting an ingrained disposi\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_63\" id=\"Page_63\"\u003e[Pg 63]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003etion\r\nand attitude, is then as \u003ci\u003epsychological\u003c/i\u003e (as personal)\r\nas any caprice or chance impulse could be.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e§ 2. \u003ci\u003eDiscipline and Freedom\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eTrue and\r\nfalse notions\r\nof discipline\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eDiscipline of mind is thus, in truth, a result rather\r\nthan a cause. Any mind is disciplined in a subject in\r\nwhich independent intellectual initiative and control\r\nhave been achieved. Discipline represents original native\r\nendowment turned, through gradual exercise, into\r\neffective power. So far as a mind is disciplined, control\r\nof method in a given subject has been attained\r\nso that the mind is able to manage itself independently\r\nwithout external tutelage. The aim of education is\r\nprecisely to develop intelligence of this independent\r\nand effective type\u0026mdash;a \u003ci\u003edisciplined mind\u003c/i\u003e. Discipline is\r\npositive and constructive.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eDiscipline\r\nas drill\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eDiscipline, however, is frequently regarded as something\r\nnegative\u0026mdash;as a painfully disagreeable forcing of\r\nmind away from channels congenial to it into channels\r\nof constraint, a process grievous at the time but necessary\r\nas preparation for a more or less remote future.\r\nDiscipline is then generally identified with drill; and\r\ndrill is conceived after the mechanical analogy of driving,\r\nby unremitting blows, a foreign substance into a\r\nresistant material; or is imaged after the analogy of\r\nthe mechanical routine by which raw recruits are trained\r\nto a soldierly bearing and habits that are naturally\r\nwholly foreign to their possessors. Training of this\r\nlatter sort, whether it be called discipline or not, is not\r\nmental discipline. Its aim and result are not \u003ci\u003ehabits of\r\nthinking\u003c/i\u003e, but uniform \u003ci\u003eexternal modes of action\u003c/i\u003e. By\r\nfailing to ask what he means by discipline, many a\r\nteacher is misled into supposing that he is developing\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_64\" id=\"Page_64\"\u003e[Pg 64]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nmental force and efficiency by methods which in fact\r\nrestrict and deaden intellectual activity, and which tend\r\nto create mechanical routine, or mental passivity and\r\nservility.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eAs independent\r\npower\r\nor freedom\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eFreedom\r\nand external\r\nspontaneity\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhen discipline is conceived in intellectual terms (as\r\nthe habitual power of effective mental attack), it is identified\r\nwith freedom in its true sense. For freedom of\r\nmind means mental power capable of independent exercise,\r\nemancipated from the leading strings of others,\r\nnot mere unhindered external operation. When spontaneity\r\nor naturalness is identified with more or less\r\ncasual discharge of transitory impulses, the tendency of\r\nthe educator is to supply a multitude of stimuli in order\r\nthat spontaneous activity may be kept up. All sorts of\r\ninteresting materials, equipments, tools, modes of activity,\r\nare provided in order that there may be no flagging of\r\nfree self-expression. This method overlooks some of\r\nthe essential conditions of the attainment of genuine\r\nfreedom.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eSome obstacle\r\nnecessary\r\nfor\r\nthought\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(\u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e) Direct immediate discharge or expression of an\r\nimpulsive tendency is fatal to thinking. Only when the\r\nimpulse is to some extent checked and thrown back\r\nupon itself does reflection ensue. It is, indeed, a stupid\r\nerror to suppose that arbitrary tasks must be imposed\r\nfrom without in order to furnish the factor of perplexity\r\nand difficulty which is the necessary cue to thought.\r\nEvery vital activity of any depth and range inevitably\r\nmeets obstacles in the course of its effort to realize itself\u0026mdash;a\r\nfact that renders the search for artificial or\r\nexternal problems quite superfluous. The difficulties\r\nthat present themselves within the development of an\r\nexperience are, however, to be cherished by the educator,\r\nnot minimized, for they are the natural stimuli\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_65\" id=\"Page_65\"\u003e[Pg 65]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nto reflective inquiry. Freedom does not consist in keeping\r\nup uninterrupted and unimpeded external activity,\r\nbut is something achieved through conquering, by personal\r\nreflection, a way out of the difficulties that prevent\r\nan immediate overflow and a spontaneous success.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eIntellectual\r\nfactors are\r\n\u003ci\u003enatural\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(\u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e) The method that emphasizes the psychological\r\nand natural, but yet fails to see what an important part\r\nof the natural tendencies is constituted at every period\r\nof growth by curiosity, inference, and the desire to test,\r\ncannot secure a \u003ci\u003enatural development\u003c/i\u003e. In natural growth\r\neach successive stage of activity prepares unconsciously,\r\nbut thoroughly, the conditions for the manifestation of\r\nthe next stage\u0026mdash;as in the cycle of a plant\u0027s growth.\r\nThere is no ground for assuming that \"thinking\" is a\r\nspecial, isolated natural tendency that will bloom inevitably\r\nin due season simply because various sense and\r\nmotor activities have been freely manifested before; or\r\nbecause observation, memory, imagination, and manual\r\nskill have been previously exercised without thought.\r\nOnly when thinking is constantly employed in using the\r\nsenses and muscles for the guidance and application of\r\nobservations and movements, is the way prepared for\r\nsubsequent higher types of thinking.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eGenesis of\r\nthought contemporaneous\r\nwith\r\ngenesis of\r\nany human\r\nmental\r\nactivity\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAt present, the notion is current that childhood is\r\nalmost entirely unreflective\u0026mdash;a period of mere sensory,\r\nmotor, and memory development, while adolescence suddenly\r\nbrings the manifestation of thought and reason.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAdolescence is not, however, a synonym for magic.\r\nDoubtless youth should bring with it an enlargement of\r\nthe horizon of childhood, a susceptibility to larger concerns\r\nand issues, a more generous and a more general\r\nstandpoint toward nature and social life. This development\r\naffords an opportunity for thinking of a more com\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_66\" id=\"Page_66\"\u003e[Pg 66]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003eprehensive\r\nand abstract type than has previously obtained.\r\nBut thinking itself remains just what it has been all the\r\ntime: a matter of following up and testing the conclusions\r\nsuggested by the facts and events of life. Thinking\r\nbegins as soon as the baby who has lost the ball\r\nthat he is playing with begins to foresee the possibility\r\nof something not yet existing\u0026mdash;its recovery; and begins\r\nto forecast steps toward the realization of this\r\npossibility, and, by experimentation, to guide his acts by\r\nhis ideas and thereby also test the ideas. Only by\r\nmaking the most of the thought-factor, already active\r\nin the experiences of childhood, is there any promise\r\nor warrant for the emergence of superior reflective\r\npower at adolescence, or at any later period.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eFixation\r\nof bad\r\nmental\r\nhabits\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(\u003ci\u003ec\u003c/i\u003e) In any case \u003ci\u003epositive habits are being formed\u003c/i\u003e: if not\r\nhabits of careful looking into things, then habits of\r\nhasty, heedless, impatient glancing over the surface; if\r\nnot habits of consecutively following up the suggestions\r\nthat occur, then habits of haphazard, grasshopper-like\r\nguessing; if not habits of suspending judgment till inferences\r\nhave been tested by the examination of evidence,\r\nthen habits of credulity alternating with flippant\r\nincredulity, belief or unbelief being based, in either case,\r\nupon whim, emotion, or accidental circumstances. The\r\nonly way to achieve traits of carefulness, thoroughness,\r\nand continuity (traits that are, as we have seen, the\r\nelements of the \"logical\") is by exercising these traits\r\nfrom the beginning, and by seeing to it that conditions\r\ncall for their exercise.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eGenuine\r\nfreedom is\r\nintellectual,\r\nnot external\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eGenuine freedom, in short, is intellectual; it rests in\r\nthe trained \u003ci\u003epower of thought\u003c/i\u003e, in ability to \"turn things\r\nover,\" to look at matters deliberately, to judge whether\r\nthe amount and kind of evidence requisite for decision\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_67\" id=\"Page_67\"\u003e[Pg 67]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nis at hand, and if not, to tell where and how to seek\r\nsuch evidence. If a man\u0027s actions are not guided by\r\nthoughtful conclusions, then they are guided by inconsiderate\r\nimpulse, unbalanced appetite, caprice, or the\r\ncircumstances of the moment. To cultivate unhindered,\r\nunreflective external activity is to foster enslavement,\r\nfor it leaves the person at the mercy of appetite, sense,\r\nand circumstance.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_68\" id=\"Page_68\"\u003e[Pg 68]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003chr style=\"width: 65%;\" /\u003e\r\n\u003ch2\u003ePART TWO: LOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003chr style=\"width: 65%;\" /\u003e\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"CHAPTER_SIX\" id=\"CHAPTER_SIX\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eCHAPTER SIX\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eTHE ANALYSIS OF A COMPLETE ACT OF THOUGHT\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eObject of\r\nPart Two\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAfter a brief consideration in the first chapter of the\r\nnature of reflective thinking, we turned, in the second,\r\nto the need for its training. Then we took up the\r\nresources, the difficulties, and the aim of its training.\r\nThe purpose of this discussion was to set before the\r\nstudent the general problem of the training of mind.\r\nThe purport of the second part, upon which we are\r\nnow entering, is giving a fuller statement of the nature\r\nand normal growth of thinking, preparatory to considering\r\nin the concluding part the special problems\r\nthat arise in connection with its education.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn this chapter we shall make an analysis of the\r\nprocess of thinking into its steps or elementary constituents,\r\nbasing the analysis upon descriptions of a number\r\nof extremely simple, but genuine, cases of reflective\r\nexperience.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_13_13\" id=\"FNanchor_13_13\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_13_13\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[13]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eA simple\r\ncase of\r\npractical\r\ndeliberation\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e1. \"The other day when I was down town on 16th\r\nStreet a clock caught my eye. I saw that the hands\r\npointed to 12.20. This suggested that I had an engagement\r\nat 124th Street, at one o\u0027clock. I reasoned that\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_69\" id=\"Page_69\"\u003e[Pg 69]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nas it had taken me an hour to come down on a surface\r\ncar, I should probably be twenty minutes late if I returned\r\nthe same way. I might save twenty minutes by\r\na subway express. But was there a station near? If\r\nnot, I might lose more than twenty minutes in looking\r\nfor one. Then I thought of the elevated, and I saw\r\nthere was such a line within two blocks. But where\r\nwas the station? If it were several blocks above or\r\nbelow the street I was on, I should lose time instead of\r\ngaining it. My mind went back to the subway express\r\nas quicker than the elevated; furthermore, I remembered\r\nthat it went nearer than the elevated to the part\r\nof 124th Street I wished to reach, so that time would\r\nbe saved at the end of the journey. I concluded in\r\nfavor of the subway, and reached my destination by one\r\no\u0027clock.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eA simple\r\ncase of\r\nreflection\r\nupon an\r\nobservation\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e2. \"Projecting nearly horizontally from the upper\r\ndeck of the ferryboat on which I daily cross the river,\r\nis a long white pole, bearing a gilded ball at its tip. It\r\nsuggested a flagpole when I first saw it; its color,\r\nshape, and gilded ball agreed with this idea, and these\r\nreasons seemed to justify me in this belief. But soon\r\ndifficulties presented themselves. The pole was nearly\r\nhorizontal, an unusual position for a flagpole; in the\r\nnext place, there was no pulley, ring, or cord by which\r\nto attach a flag; finally, there were elsewhere two vertical\r\nstaffs from which flags were occasionally flown. It\r\nseemed probable that the pole was not there for flag-flying.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"I then tried to imagine all possible purposes of such\r\na pole, and to consider for which of these it was best\r\nsuited: (\u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e) Possibly it was an ornament. But as all the\r\nferryboats and even the tugboats carried like poles,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_70\" id=\"Page_70\"\u003e[Pg 70]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthis hypothesis was rejected. (\u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e) Possibly it was the\r\nterminal of a wireless telegraph. But the same considerations\r\nmade this improbable. Besides, the more natural\r\nplace for such a terminal would be the highest\r\npart of the boat, on top of the pilot house. (\u003ci\u003ec\u003c/i\u003e) Its purpose\r\nmight be to point out the direction in which the\r\nboat is moving.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"In support of this conclusion, I discovered that the\r\npole was lower than the pilot house, so that the steersman\r\ncould easily see it. Moreover, the tip was enough\r\nhigher than the base, so that, from the pilot\u0027s position,\r\nit must appear to project far out in front of the boat.\r\nMoreover, the pilot being near the front of the boat, he\r\nwould need some such guide as to its direction. Tugboats\r\nwould also need poles for such a purpose. This hypothesis\r\nwas so much more probable than the others\r\nthat I accepted it. I formed the conclusion that the\r\npole was set up for the purpose of showing the pilot\r\nthe direction in which the boat pointed, to enable him\r\nto steer correctly.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eA simple\r\ncase of\r\nreflection\r\ninvolving\r\nexperiment\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e3. \"In washing tumblers in hot soapsuds and placing\r\nthem mouth downward on a plate, bubbles appeared\r\non the outside of the mouth of the tumblers and\r\nthen went inside. Why? The presence of bubbles\r\nsuggests air, which I note must come from inside the\r\ntumbler. I see that the soapy water on the plate prevents\r\nescape of the air save as it may be caught in bubbles.\r\nBut why should air leave the tumbler? There was no\r\nsubstance entering to force it out. It must have expanded.\r\nIt expands by increase of heat or by decrease\r\nof pressure, or by both. Could the air have\r\nbecome heated after the tumbler was taken from the hot\r\nsuds? Clearly not the air that was already entangled\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_71\" id=\"Page_71\"\u003e[Pg 71]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nin the water. If heated air was the cause, cold air\r\nmust have entered in transferring the tumblers from\r\nthe suds to the plate. I test to see if this supposition\r\nis true by taking several more tumblers out. Some\r\nI shake so as to make sure of entrapping cold air in\r\nthem. Some I take out holding mouth downward in\r\norder to prevent cold air from entering. Bubbles appear\r\non the outside of every one of the former and on\r\nnone of the latter. I must be right in my inference.\r\nAir from the outside must have been expanded by the\r\nheat of the tumbler, which explains the appearance of\r\nthe bubbles on the outside.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"But why do they then go inside? Cold contracts.\r\nThe tumbler cooled and also the air inside it. Tension\r\nwas removed, and hence bubbles appeared inside. To\r\nbe sure of this, I test by placing a cup of ice on the\r\ntumbler while the bubbles are still forming outside.\r\nThey soon reverse.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eThe three\r\ncases form\r\na series\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThese three cases have been purposely selected so as\r\nto form a series from the more rudimentary to more\r\ncomplicated cases of reflection. The first illustrates the\r\nkind of thinking done by every one during the day\u0027s\r\nbusiness, in which neither the data, nor the ways of\r\ndealing with them, take one outside the limits of everyday\r\nexperience. The last furnishes a case in which\r\nneither problem nor mode of solution would have been\r\nlikely to occur except to one with some prior scientific\r\ntraining. The second case forms a natural transition;\r\nits materials lie well within the bounds of everyday,\r\nunspecialized experience; but the problem, instead of\r\nbeing directly involved in the person\u0027s business, arises\r\nindirectly out of his activity, and accordingly appeals\r\nto a somewhat theoretic and impartial interest. We\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_72\" id=\"Page_72\"\u003e[Pg 72]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nshall deal, in a later chapter, with the evolution of\r\nabstract thinking out of that which is relatively practical\r\nand direct; here we are concerned only with the common\r\nelements found in all the types.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eFive distinct\r\nsteps in\r\nreflection\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eUpon examination, each instance reveals, more or less\r\nclearly, five logically distinct steps: (\u003ci\u003ei\u003c/i\u003e) a felt difficulty;\r\n(\u003ci\u003eii\u003c/i\u003e) its location and definition; (\u003ci\u003eiii\u003c/i\u003e) suggestion of possible\r\nsolution; (\u003ci\u003eiv\u003c/i\u003e) development by reasoning of the\r\nbearings of the suggestion; (\u003ci\u003ev\u003c/i\u003e) further observation and\r\nexperiment leading to its acceptance or rejection; that\r\nis, the conclusion of belief or disbelief.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003e1. The occurrence\r\nof a\r\ndifficulty\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003e(\u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e) in the\r\nlack of adaptation\r\nof means\r\nto end\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e1. The first and second steps frequently fuse into\r\none. The difficulty may be felt with sufficient definiteness\r\nas to set the mind at once speculating upon its\r\nprobable solution, or an undefined uneasiness and shock\r\nmay come first, leading only later to definite attempt to\r\nfind out what is the matter. Whether the two steps\r\nare distinct or blended, there is the factor emphasized\r\nin our original account of reflection\u0026mdash;\u003ci\u003eviz.\u003c/i\u003e the perplexity\r\nor problem.\r\nIn the first of the three cases cited, the\r\ndifficulty resides in the conflict between conditions at\r\nhand and a desired and intended result, between an end\r\nand the means for reaching it. The purpose of keeping\r\nan engagement at a certain time, and the existing\r\nhour taken in connection with the location, are not congruous.\r\nThe object of thinking is to introduce congruity\r\nbetween the two. The given conditions cannot\r\nthemselves be altered; time will not go backward nor\r\nwill the distance between 16th Street and 124th Street\r\nshorten itself. The problem is \u003ci\u003ethe discovery of intervening\r\nterms which when inserted between the remoter\r\nend and the given means will harmonize them with each\r\nother\u003c/i\u003e.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_73\" id=\"Page_73\"\u003e[Pg 73]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003e(\u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e) in identifying\r\nthe\r\ncharacter of\r\nan object\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn the second case, the difficulty experienced is the\r\nincompatibility of a suggested and (temporarily) accepted\r\nbelief that the pole is a flagpole, with certain\r\nother facts. Suppose we symbolize the qualities that\r\nsuggest \u003ci\u003eflagpole\u003c/i\u003e by the letters \u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003ec\u003c/i\u003e; those that oppose\r\nthis suggestion by the letters \u003ci\u003ep\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eq\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003er\u003c/i\u003e. There is, of\r\ncourse, nothing inconsistent in the qualities themselves;\r\nbut in pulling the mind to different and incongruous\r\nconclusions they conflict\u0026mdash;hence the problem. Here\r\nthe object is the discovery of some object (\u003ci\u003eO\u003c/i\u003e), of which\r\n\u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003ec\u003c/i\u003e, and \u003ci\u003ep\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eq\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003er\u003c/i\u003e, may all be appropriate traits\u0026mdash;just\r\nas, in our first case, it is to discover a course of action\r\nwhich will combine existing conditions and a remoter result\r\nin a single whole. The method of solution is also\r\nthe same: discovery of intermediate qualities (the position\r\nof the pilot house, of the pole, the need of an index\r\nto the boat\u0027s direction) symbolized by \u003ci\u003ed\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eg\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003el\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eo\u003c/i\u003e, which\r\nbind together otherwise incompatible traits.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003e(\u003ci\u003ec\u003c/i\u003e) in explaining\r\nan\r\nunexpected\r\nevent\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn the third case, an observer trained to the idea of\r\nnatural laws or uniformities finds something odd or exceptional\r\nin the behavior of the bubbles. The problem\r\nis to reduce the apparent anomalies to instances of well-established\r\nlaws. Here the method of solution is also\r\nto seek for intermediary terms which will connect, by\r\nregular linkage, the seemingly extraordinary movements\r\nof the bubbles with the conditions known to follow from\r\nprocesses supposed to be operative.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003e2. Definition\r\nof the\r\ndifficulty\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e2. As already noted, the first two steps, the feeling\r\nof a discrepancy, or difficulty, and the acts of observation\r\nthat serve to define the character of the difficulty\r\nmay, in a given instance, telescope together. In cases\r\nof striking novelty or unusual perplexity, the difficulty,\r\nhowever, is likely to present itself at first as a shock, as\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_74\" id=\"Page_74\"\u003e[Pg 74]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nemotional disturbance, as a more or less vague feeling\r\nof the unexpected, of something queer, strange, funny,\r\nor disconcerting. In such instances, there are necessary\r\nobservations deliberately calculated to bring to\r\nlight just what is the trouble, or to make clear the specific\r\ncharacter of the problem. In large measure, the\r\nexistence or non-existence of this step makes the difference\r\nbetween reflection proper, or safeguarded \u003ci\u003ecritical\u003c/i\u003e\r\ninference and uncontrolled thinking. Where sufficient\r\npains to locate the difficulty are not taken, suggestions for\r\nits resolution must be more or less random. Imagine a\r\ndoctor called in to prescribe for a patient. The patient\r\ntells him some things that are wrong; his experienced\r\neye, at a glance, takes in other signs of a certain disease.\r\nBut if he permits the suggestion of this special\r\ndisease to take possession prematurely of his mind, to\r\nbecome an accepted conclusion, his scientific thinking is\r\nby that much cut short. A large part of his technique,\r\nas a skilled practitioner, is to prevent the acceptance of\r\nthe first suggestions that arise; even, indeed, to postpone\r\nthe occurrence of any very definite suggestion till the\r\ntrouble\u0026mdash;the nature of the problem\u0026mdash;has been thoroughly\r\nexplored. In the case of a physician this proceeding\r\nis known as diagnosis, but a similar inspection\r\nis required in every novel and complicated situation to\r\nprevent rushing to a conclusion. The essence of critical\r\nthinking is suspended judgment; and the essence\r\nof this suspense is inquiry to determine the nature of\r\nthe problem before proceeding to attempts at its solution.\r\nThis, more than any other thing, transforms mere\r\ninference into tested inference, suggested conclusions\r\ninto proof.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003e3. Occurrence\r\nof a\r\nsuggested\r\nexplanation\r\nor possible\r\nsolution\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e3. The third factor is suggestion. The situation in\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_75\" id=\"Page_75\"\u003e[Pg 75]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwhich the perplexity occurs calls up something not\r\npresent to the senses: the present location, the thought\r\nof subway or elevated train; the stick before the eyes,\r\nthe idea of a flagpole, an ornament, an apparatus for\r\nwireless telegraphy; the soap bubbles, the law of expansion\r\nof bodies through heat and of their contraction\r\nthrough cold. (\u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e) Suggestion is the very heart of inference;\r\nit involves going from what is present to something\r\nabsent. Hence, it is more or less speculative,\r\nadventurous. Since inference goes beyond what is actually\r\npresent, it involves a leap, a jump, the propriety\r\nof which cannot be absolutely warranted in advance, no\r\nmatter what precautions be taken. Its control is indirect,\r\non the one hand, involving the formation of habits\r\nof mind which are at once enterprising and cautious;\r\nand on the other hand, involving the selection and\r\narrangement of the particular facts upon perception of\r\nwhich suggestion issues. (\u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e) The suggested conclusion\r\nso far as it is not accepted but only tentatively entertained\r\nconstitutes an idea. Synonyms for this are \u003ci\u003esupposition\u003c/i\u003e,\r\n\u003ci\u003econjecture\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eguess\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003ehypothesis\u003c/i\u003e, and (in elaborate\r\ncases) \u003ci\u003etheory\u003c/i\u003e. Since suspended belief, or the postponement\r\nof a final conclusion pending further evidence,\r\ndepends partly upon the presence of rival conjectures\r\nas to the best course to pursue or the probable explanation\r\nto favor, \u003ci\u003ecultivation of a variety of alternative\r\nsuggestions\u003c/i\u003e is an important factor in good thinking.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003e4. The\r\nrational\r\nelaboration\r\nof an idea\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e4. The process of developing the bearings\u0026mdash;or, as\r\nthey are more technically termed, the \u003ci\u003eimplications\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;of\r\nany idea with respect to any problem, is termed \u003ci\u003ereasoning\u003c/i\u003e.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_14_14\" id=\"FNanchor_14_14\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_14_14\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[14]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nAs an idea is inferred from given facts, so reasoning\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_76\" id=\"Page_76\"\u003e[Pg 76]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nsets out from an idea. The \u003ci\u003eidea\u003c/i\u003e of elevated road is developed\r\ninto the idea of difficulty of locating station, length\r\nof time occupied on the journey, distance of station at\r\nthe other end from place to be reached. In the second\r\ncase, the implication of a flagpole is seen to be a vertical\r\nposition; of a wireless apparatus, location on a high\r\npart of the ship and, moreover, absence from every\r\ncasual tugboat; while the idea of index to direction in\r\nwhich the boat moves, when developed, is found to cover\r\nall the details of the case.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eReasoning has the same effect upon a suggested\r\nsolution as more intimate and extensive observation has\r\nupon the original problem. Acceptance of the suggestion\r\nin its first form is prevented by looking into it more\r\nthoroughly. Conjectures that seem plausible at first\r\nsight are often found unfit or even absurd when their\r\nfull consequences are traced out. Even when reasoning\r\nout the bearings of a supposition does not lead to rejection,\r\nit develops the idea into a form in which it is\r\nmore apposite to the problem. Only when, for example,\r\nthe conjecture that a pole was an index-pole had been\r\nthought out into its bearings could its particular applicability\r\nto the case in hand be judged. Suggestions\r\nat first seemingly remote and wild are frequently so\r\ntransformed by being elaborated into what follows from\r\nthem as to become apt and fruitful. The development\r\nof an idea through reasoning helps at least to supply\r\nthe intervening or intermediate terms that link together\r\ninto a consistent whole apparently discrepant extremes\r\n(\u003ci\u003eante\u003c/i\u003e, p. 72).\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_77\" id=\"Page_77\"\u003e[Pg 77]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003e5. Corroboration\r\nof\r\nan idea and\r\nformation of\r\na concluding\r\nbelief\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e5. The concluding and conclusive step is some kind\r\nof \u003ci\u003eexperimental corroboration\u003c/i\u003e, or verification, of the\r\nconjectural idea. Reasoning shows that \u003ci\u003eif\u003c/i\u003e the idea be\r\nadopted, certain consequences follow. So far the conclusion\r\nis hypothetical or conditional. If we look and\r\nfind present all the conditions demanded by the theory,\r\nand if we find the characteristic traits called for by\r\nrival alternatives to be lacking, the tendency to believe,\r\nto accept, is almost irresistible. Sometimes direct\r\nobservation furnishes corroboration, as in the case of\r\nthe pole on the boat. In other cases, as in that of the\r\nbubbles, experiment is required; that is, \u003ci\u003econditions are\r\ndeliberately arranged in accord with the requirements of\r\nan idea or hypothesis to see if the results theoretically\r\nindicated by the idea actually occur\u003c/i\u003e. If it is found that\r\nthe experimental results agree with the theoretical,\r\nor rationally deduced, results, and if there is reason to\r\nbelieve that \u003ci\u003eonly\u003c/i\u003e the conditions in question would yield\r\nsuch results, the confirmation is so strong as to induce a\r\nconclusion\u0026mdash;at least until contrary facts shall indicate\r\nthe advisability of its revision.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eThinking\r\ncomes\r\nbetween\r\nobservations\r\nat the beginning\r\nand\r\nat the end\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eObservation exists at the beginning and again at the\r\nend of the process: at the beginning, to determine more\r\ndefinitely and precisely the nature of the difficulty to be\r\ndealt with; at the end, to test the value of some hypothetically\r\nentertained conclusion. Between those two\r\ntermini of observation, we find the more distinctively\r\n\u003ci\u003emental\u003c/i\u003e aspects of the entire thought-cycle: (\u003ci\u003ei\u003c/i\u003e) inference,\r\nthe suggestion of an explanation or solution; and\r\n(\u003ci\u003eii\u003c/i\u003e) reasoning, the development of the bearings and implications\r\nof the suggestion. Reasoning requires some\r\nexperimental observation to confirm it, while experiment\r\ncan be economically and fruitfully conducted only\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_78\" id=\"Page_78\"\u003e[Pg 78]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\non the basis of an idea that has been tentatively developed\r\nby reasoning.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eThe trained\r\nmind one\r\nthat judges\r\nthe extent\r\nof each step\r\nadvisable in\r\na given\r\nsituation\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe disciplined, or logically trained, mind\u0026mdash;the aim of\r\nthe educative process\u0026mdash;is the mind able to judge how\r\nfar each of these steps needs to be carried in any particular\r\nsituation. No cast-iron rules can be laid down.\r\nEach case has to be dealt with as it arises, on the basis\r\nof its importance and of the context in which it occurs.\r\nTo take too much pains in one case is as foolish\u0026mdash;as\r\nillogical\u0026mdash;as to take too little in another. At one\r\nextreme, almost any conclusion that insures prompt\r\nand unified action may be better than any long delayed\r\nconclusion; while at the other, decision may have to\r\nbe postponed for a long period\u0026mdash;perhaps for a lifetime.\r\nThe trained mind is the one that best grasps the\r\ndegree of observation, forming of ideas, reasoning, and\r\nexperimental testing required in any special case, and that\r\nprofits the most, in future thinking, by mistakes made in\r\nthe past. What is important is that the mind should\r\nbe sensitive to problems and skilled in methods of attack\r\nand solution.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_79\" id=\"Page_79\"\u003e[Pg 79]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003chr style=\"width: 65%;\" /\u003e\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"CHAPTER_SEVEN\" id=\"CHAPTER_SEVEN\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eCHAPTER SEVEN\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eSYSTEMATIC INFERENCE: INDUCTION AND DEDUCTION\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e§ 1. \u003ci\u003eThe Double Movement of Reflection\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eBack and\r\nforth between\r\nfacts and\r\nmeanings\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe characteristic outcome of thinking we saw to be\r\nthe organization of facts and conditions which, just as\r\nthey stand, are isolated, fragmentary, and discrepant, the\r\norganization being effected through the introduction of\r\nconnecting links, or middle terms. The facts as they\r\nstand are the data, the raw material of reflection; their\r\nlack of coherence perplexes and stimulates to reflection.\r\nThere follows the suggestion of some meaning which, \u003ci\u003eif\u003c/i\u003e\r\nit can be substantiated, will give a whole in which various\r\nfragmentary and seemingly incompatible data find\r\ntheir proper place. The meaning suggested supplies a\r\nmental platform, an intellectual point of view, from\r\nwhich to note and define the data more carefully, to\r\nseek for additional observations, and to institute, experimentally,\r\nchanged conditions.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eInductive\r\nand\r\ndeductive\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThere is thus a double movement in all reflection: a\r\nmovement from the given partial and confused data to\r\na suggested comprehensive (or inclusive) entire situation;\r\nand back from this suggested whole\u0026mdash;which as suggested\r\nis a \u003ci\u003emeaning\u003c/i\u003e, an idea\u0026mdash;to the particular facts,\r\nso as to connect these with one another and with additional\r\nfacts to which the suggestion has directed attention.\r\nRoughly speaking, the first of these movements\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_80\" id=\"Page_80\"\u003e[Pg 80]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nis inductive; the second deductive. A complete act of\r\nthought involves both\u0026mdash;it involves, that is, a fruitful\r\ninteraction of observed (or recollected) particular considerations\r\nand of inclusive and far-reaching (general)\r\nmeanings.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eHurry \u003ci\u003eversus\u003c/i\u003e\r\ncaution\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis double movement \u003ci\u003eto\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003efrom\u003c/i\u003e a meaning may\r\noccur, however, in a casual, uncritical way, or in a cautious\r\nand regulated manner. To think means, in any case, to\r\nbridge a gap in experience, to bind together facts or\r\ndeeds otherwise isolated. But we may make only a\r\nhurried jump from one consideration to another, allowing\r\nour aversion to mental disquietude to override the\r\ngaps; or, we may insist upon noting the road traveled\r\nin making connections. We may, in short, accept\r\nreadily any suggestion that seems plausible; or we may\r\nhunt out additional factors, new difficulties, to see whether\r\nthe suggested conclusion really ends the matter. The\r\nlatter method involves definite formulation of the connecting\r\nlinks; the statement of a principle, or, in logical\r\nphrase, the use of a universal. If we thus formulate the\r\nwhole situation, the original data are transformed into\r\npremises of reasoning; the final belief is a logical or\r\n\u003ci\u003erational\u003c/i\u003e conclusion, not a mere \u003ci\u003ede facto\u003c/i\u003e termination.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eContinuity\r\nof relationship\r\nthe\r\nmark of\r\nthe latter\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe importance of \u003ci\u003econnections binding isolated items\r\ninto a coherent single whole\u003c/i\u003e is embodied in all the phrases\r\nthat denote the relation of premises and conclusions to\r\neach other. (1) The premises are called grounds,\r\nfoundations, bases, and are said to underlie, uphold,\r\nsupport the conclusion. (2) We \"descend\" from the\r\npremises to the conclusion, and \"ascend\" or \"mount\"\r\nin the opposite direction\u0026mdash;as a river may be continuously\r\ntraced from source to sea or vice versa. So the conclusion\r\nsprings, flows, or is drawn from its premises.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_81\" id=\"Page_81\"\u003e[Pg 81]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\n(3) The conclusion\u0026mdash;as the word itself implies\u0026mdash;closes,\r\nshuts in, locks up together the various factors stated\r\nin the premises. We say that the premises \"contain\"\r\nthe conclusion, and that the conclusion \"contains\" the\r\npremises, thereby marking our sense of the inclusive\r\nand comprehensive unity in which the elements of\r\nreasoning are bound tightly together.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_15_15\" id=\"FNanchor_15_15\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_15_15\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[15]\u003c/a\u003e Systematic inference,\r\nin short, means the \u003ci\u003erecognition of definite\r\nrelations of interdependence between considerations previously\r\nunorganized and disconnected, this recognition\r\nbeing brought about by the discovery and insertion of\r\nnew facts and properties\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eScientific\r\ninduction\r\nand\r\ndeduction\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis more systematic thinking is, however, like the\r\ncruder forms in its double movement, the movement\r\n\u003ci\u003etoward\u003c/i\u003e the suggestion or hypothesis and the movement\r\n\u003ci\u003eback\u003c/i\u003e to facts. The difference is in the greater conscious\r\ncare with which each phase of the process is performed.\r\n\u003ci\u003eThe conditions under which suggestions are allowed to\r\nspring up and develop are regulated.\u003c/i\u003e Hasty acceptance\r\nof any idea that is plausible, that seems to solve the\r\ndifficulty, is changed into a conditional acceptance\r\npending further inquiry. The idea is accepted as a\r\n\u003ci\u003eworking hypothesis\u003c/i\u003e, as something to guide investigation\r\nand bring to light new facts, not as a final conclusion.\r\nWhen pains are taken to make each aspect of the movement\r\nas accurate as possible, the movement toward\r\nbuilding up the idea is known as \u003ci\u003einductive discovery\u003c/i\u003e\r\n(\u003ci\u003einduction\u003c/i\u003e, for short); the movement toward developing,\r\napplying, and testing, as \u003ci\u003edeductive proof\u003c/i\u003e (\u003ci\u003ededuction\u003c/i\u003e, for\r\nshort).\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eParticular\r\nand\r\nuniversal\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhile induction moves from fragmentary details (or\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_82\" id=\"Page_82\"\u003e[Pg 82]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nparticulars) to a connected view of a situation (universal),\r\ndeduction begins with the latter and works back again\r\nto particulars, connecting them and binding them together.\r\nThe inductive movement is toward \u003ci\u003ediscovery\u003c/i\u003e of\r\na binding principle; the deductive toward its \u003ci\u003etesting\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;confirming,\r\nrefuting, modifying it on the basis of its capacity\r\nto interpret isolated details into a unified experience.\r\nSo far as we conduct each of these processes in\r\nthe light of the other, we get valid discovery or verified\r\ncritical thinking.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eIllustration\r\nfrom everyday\r\nexperience\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eA commonplace illustration may enforce the points\r\nof this formula. A man who has left his rooms in order\r\nfinds them upon his return in a state of confusion, articles\r\nbeing scattered at random. Automatically, the notion\r\ncomes to his mind that burglary would account for\r\nthe disorder. He has not seen the burglars; their presence\r\nis not a fact of observation, but is a thought, an\r\nidea. Moreover, the man has no special burglars in\r\nmind; it is the \u003ci\u003erelation\u003c/i\u003e, the meaning of burglary\u0026mdash;something\r\ngeneral\u0026mdash;that comes to mind. The state of his\r\nroom is perceived and is particular, definite,\u0026mdash;exactly\r\nas it is; burglars are inferred, and have a general status.\r\nThe state of the room is a \u003ci\u003efact\u003c/i\u003e, certain and speaking\r\nfor itself; the presence of burglars is a possible\r\n\u003ci\u003emeaning\u003c/i\u003e which may explain the facts.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eof induction,\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSo far there is an inductive tendency, suggested by\r\nparticular and present facts. In the same inductive\r\nway, it occurs to him that his children are mischievous,\r\nand that they may have thrown the things about. This\r\nrival hypothesis (or conditional principle of explanation)\r\nprevents him from dogmatically accepting the first suggestion.\r\nJudgment is held in suspense and a positive\r\nconclusion postponed.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_83\" id=\"Page_83\"\u003e[Pg 83]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eof deduction\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThen deductive movement begins. Further observations,\r\nrecollections, reasonings are conducted on the\r\nbasis of a development of the ideas suggested: \u003ci\u003eif\u003c/i\u003e burglars\r\nwere responsible, such and such things would have\r\nhappened; articles of value would be missing. Here the\r\nman is going from a general principle or relation to special\r\nfeatures that accompany it, to particulars,\u0026mdash;not back,\r\nhowever, merely to the original particulars (which would\r\nbe fruitless or take him in a circle), but to new details,\r\nthe actual discovery or nondiscovery of which will test\r\nthe principle. The man turns to a box of valuables;\r\nsome things are gone; some, however, are still there.\r\nPerhaps he has himself removed the missing articles,\r\nbut has forgotten it. His experiment is not a decisive\r\ntest. He thinks of the silver in the sideboard\u0026mdash;the\r\nchildren would not have taken that nor would he absent-mindedly\r\nhave changed its place. He looks; all the\r\nsolid ware is gone. The conception of burglars is confirmed;\r\nexamination of windows and doors shows that\r\nthey have been tampered with. Belief culminates; the\r\noriginal isolated facts have been woven into a coherent\r\nfabric. The idea first suggested (inductively) has been\r\nemployed to reason out hypothetically certain additional\r\nparticulars not yet experienced, that \u003ci\u003eought\u003c/i\u003e to be\r\nthere, if the suggestion is correct. Then new acts of\r\nobservation have shown that the particulars theoretically\r\ncalled for are present, and by this process the hypothesis\r\nis strengthened, corroborated. This moving back\r\nand forth between the observed facts and the conditional\r\nidea is kept up till a coherent experience of an object is\r\nsubstituted for the experience of conflicting details\u0026mdash;or\r\nelse the whole matter is given up as a bad job.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eScience is\r\nthe same\r\noperations\r\ncarefully\r\nperformed\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSciences exemplify similar attitudes and operations,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_84\" id=\"Page_84\"\u003e[Pg 84]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nbut with a higher degree of elaboration of the instruments\r\nof caution, exactness and thoroughness. This\r\ngreater elaboration brings about specialization, an accurate\r\nmarking off of various types of problems from\r\none another, and a corresponding segregation and classification\r\nof the materials of experience associated with\r\neach type of problem. We shall devote the remainder\r\nof this chapter to a consideration of the devices by which\r\nthe discovery, the development, and the testing of meanings\r\nare scientifically carried on.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e§ 2. \u003ci\u003eGuidance of the Inductive Movement\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eGuidance\r\nis indirect\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eControl of the formation of suggestion is necessarily\r\n\u003ci\u003eindirect\u003c/i\u003e, not direct; imperfect, not perfect. Just because\r\nall discovery, all apprehension involving thought\r\nof the new, goes from the known, the present, to the\r\nunknown and absent, no rules can be stated that will\r\nguarantee correct inference. Just what is suggested\r\nto a person in a given situation depends upon his native\r\nconstitution (his originality, his genius), temperament,\r\nthe prevalent direction of his interests, his early environment,\r\nthe general tenor of his past experiences, his\r\nspecial training, the things that have recently occupied\r\nhim continuously or vividly, and so on; to some extent\r\neven upon an accidental conjunction of present circumstances.\r\nThese matters, so far as they lie in the past\r\nor in external conditions, clearly escape regulation. A\r\nsuggestion simply does or does not occur; this or that\r\nsuggestion just happens, occurs, springs up. If, however,\r\nprior experience and training have developed an\r\nattitude of patience in a condition of doubt, a capacity\r\nfor suspended judgment, and a liking for inquiry,\r\n\u003ci\u003eindirect\u003c/i\u003e control of the course of suggestions is possible.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_85\" id=\"Page_85\"\u003e[Pg 85]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nThe individual may return upon, revise, restate, enlarge,\r\nand analyze \u003ci\u003ethe facts out of which suggestion springs\u003c/i\u003e.\r\nInductive methods, in the technical sense, all have to\r\ndo with regulating the conditions under which \u003ci\u003eobservation,\r\nmemory, and the acceptance of the testimony of\r\nothers\u003c/i\u003e (\u003ci\u003ethe operations supplying the raw data\u003c/i\u003e) proceed.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eMethod\r\nof indirect\r\nregulation\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eGiven the facts \u003ci\u003eA B C D\u003c/i\u003e on one side and certain individual\r\nhabits on the other, suggestion occurs automatically.\r\nBut if the facts \u003ci\u003eA B C D\u003c/i\u003e are carefully looked\r\ninto and thereby resolved into the facts \u003ci\u003eA´ B´´ R S\u003c/i\u003e, a\r\nsuggestion will automatically present itself different\r\nfrom that called up by the facts in their first form. To\r\ninventory the facts, to describe exactly and minutely\r\ntheir respective traits, to magnify artificially those that\r\nare obscure and feeble, to reduce artificially those that\r\nare so conspicuous and glaring as to be distracting,\u0026mdash;these\r\nare ways of modifying the facts that exercise suggestive\r\nforce, and thereby indirectly guiding the formation\r\nof suggested inferences.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eIllustration\r\nfrom\r\ndiagnosis\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eConsider, for example, how a physician makes his\r\ndiagnosis\u0026mdash;his inductive interpretation. If he is scientifically\r\ntrained, he suspends\u0026mdash;postpones\u0026mdash;reaching a\r\nconclusion in order that he may not be led by superficial\r\noccurrences into a snap judgment. Certain conspicuous\r\nphenomena may forcibly suggest typhoid, but he avoids\r\na conclusion, or even any strong preference for this or\r\nthat conclusion until he has greatly (\u003ci\u003ei\u003c/i\u003e) \u003ci\u003eenlarged\u003c/i\u003e the\r\nscope of his data, and (\u003ci\u003eii\u003c/i\u003e) rendered them more \u003ci\u003eminute\u003c/i\u003e.\r\nHe not only questions the patient as to his feelings and\r\nas to his acts prior to the disease, but by various manipulations\r\nwith his hands (and with instruments made for\r\nthe purpose) brings to light a large number of facts of\r\nwhich the patient is quite unaware. The state of tem\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_86\" id=\"Page_86\"\u003e[Pg 86]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003eperature,\r\nrespiration, and heart-action is accurately\r\nnoted, and their fluctuations from time to time are exactly\r\nrecorded. Until this examination has worked \u003ci\u003eout\u003c/i\u003e\r\ntoward a wider collection and \u003ci\u003ein\u003c/i\u003e toward a minuter scrutiny\r\nof details, inference is deferred.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eSummary:\r\ndefinition of\r\nscientific\r\ninduction\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eScientific induction means, in short, \u003ci\u003eall the processes\r\nby which the observing and amassing of data are regulated\r\nwith a view to facilitating the formation of explanatory\r\nconceptions and theories\u003c/i\u003e. These devices are all\r\ndirected toward selecting the precise facts to which\r\nweight and significance shall attach in forming suggestions\r\nor ideas. Specifically, this selective determination\r\ninvolves devices of (1) elimination by analysis of what\r\nis likely to be misleading and irrelevant, (2) emphasis\r\nof the important by collection and comparison of cases,\r\n(3) deliberate construction of data by experimental\r\nvariation.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eElimination\r\nof irrelevant\r\nmeanings\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(1) It is a common saying that one must learn to discriminate\r\nbetween observed facts and judgments based\r\nupon them. Taken literally, such advice cannot be\r\ncarried out; in every observed thing there is\u0026mdash;if the\r\nthing have any meaning at all\u0026mdash;some consolidation of\r\nmeaning with what is sensibly and physically present,\r\nsuch that, if this were entirely excluded, what is left\r\nwould have no sense. A says: \"I saw my brother.\"\r\nThe term \u003ci\u003ebrother\u003c/i\u003e, however, involves a relation that cannot\r\nbe sensibly or physically observed; it is inferential\r\nin status. If A contents himself with saying, \"I saw a\r\nman,\" the factor of classification, of intellectual reference,\r\nis less complex, but still exists. If, as a last resort,\r\nA were to say, \"Anyway, I saw a colored object,\"\r\nsome relationship, though more rudimentary and undefined,\r\nstill subsists. Theoretically, it is possible that no\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_87\" id=\"Page_87\"\u003e[Pg 87]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nobject was there, only an unusual mode of nerve stimulation.\r\nNone the less, the advice to discriminate what\r\nis observed from what is inferred is sound practical\r\nadvice. Its working import is that one should eliminate\r\nor exclude \u003ci\u003ethose\u003c/i\u003e inferences as to which experience has\r\nshown that there is greatest liability to error. This, of\r\ncourse, is a relative matter. Under ordinary circumstances\r\nno reasonable doubt would attach to the observation,\r\n\"I see my brother\"; it would be pedantic and\r\nsilly to resolve this recognition back into a more elementary\r\nform. Under other circumstances it might be\r\na perfectly genuine question as to whether A saw even\r\na colored \u003ci\u003ething\u003c/i\u003e, or whether the color was due to a stimulation\r\nof the sensory optical apparatus (like \"seeing\r\nstars\" upon a blow) or to a disordered circulation. In\r\ngeneral, the scientific man is one who knows that he is\r\nlikely to be hurried to a conclusion, and that part of\r\nthis precipitancy is due to certain habits which tend to\r\nmake him \"read\" certain meanings into the situation\r\nthat confronts him, so that he must be on the lookout\r\nagainst errors arising from his interests, habits, and\r\ncurrent preconceptions.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eThe technique\r\nof\r\nconclusion\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe technique of scientific inquiry thus consists in\r\nvarious processes that tend to exclude over-hasty \"reading\r\nin\" of meanings; devices that aim to give a purely\r\n\"objective\" unbiased rendering of the data to be interpreted.\r\nFlushed cheeks usually mean heightened\r\ntemperature; paleness means lowered temperature.\r\nThe clinical thermometer records automatically the actual\r\ntemperature and hence checks up the habitual\r\nassociations that might lead to error in a given\r\ncase. All the instrumentalities of observation\u0026mdash;the\r\nvarious -meters and -graphs and -scopes\u0026mdash;fill a part\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_88\" id=\"Page_88\"\u003e[Pg 88]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof their scientific rôle in helping to eliminate meanings\r\nsupplied because of habit, prejudice, the strong momentary\r\npreoccupation of excitement and anticipation,\r\nand by the vogue of existing theories. Photographs,\r\nphonographs, kymographs, actinographs, seismographs,\r\nplethysmographs, and the like, moreover, give records\r\nthat are permanent, so that they can be employed by\r\ndifferent persons, and by the same person in different\r\nstates of mind, \u003ci\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e under the influence of varying expectations\r\nand dominant beliefs. Thus purely personal\r\nprepossessions (due to habit, to desire, to after-effects of\r\nrecent experience) may be largely eliminated. In ordinary\r\nlanguage, the facts are \u003ci\u003eobjectively\u003c/i\u003e, rather than\r\n\u003ci\u003esubjectively\u003c/i\u003e, determined. In this way tendencies to\r\npremature interpretation are held in check.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eCollection\r\nof instances\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(2) Another important method of control consists in\r\nthe multiplication of cases or instances. If I doubt\r\nwhether a certain handful gives a fair sample, or representative,\r\nfor purposes of judging value, of a whole carload\r\nof grain, I take a number of handfuls from various\r\nparts of the car and compare them. If they agree in\r\nquality, well and good; if they disagree, we try to get\r\nenough samples so that when they are thoroughly mixed\r\nthe result will be a fair basis for an evaluation. This\r\nillustration represents roughly the value of that aspect\r\nof scientific control in induction which insists upon\r\nmultiplying observations instead of basing the conclusion\r\nupon one or a few cases.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eThis method\r\nnot the\r\nwhole of\r\ninduction\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSo prominent, indeed, is this aspect of inductive\r\nmethod that it is frequently treated as the whole of induction.\r\nIt is supposed that all inductive inference is\r\nbased upon collecting and comparing a number of like\r\ncases. But in fact such comparison and collection is a\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_89\" id=\"Page_89\"\u003e[Pg 89]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nsecondary development within the process of securing\r\na correct conclusion in some single case. If a man infers\r\nfrom a single sample of grain as to the grade of\r\nwheat of the car as a whole, it is induction and, under\r\ncertain circumstances, a \u003ci\u003esound\u003c/i\u003e induction; other cases\r\nare resorted to simply for the sake of rendering that\r\ninduction more guarded, and more probably correct.\r\nIn like fashion, the reasoning that led up to the burglary\r\nidea in the instance already cited (p. 83) was inductive,\r\nthough there was but one single case examined.\r\nThe particulars upon which the general meaning (or\r\nrelation) of burglary was grounded were simply the sum\r\ntotal of the unlike items and qualities that made up the\r\none case examined. Had this case presented very great\r\nobscurities and difficulties, recourse might \u003ci\u003ethen\u003c/i\u003e have\r\nbeen had to examination of a number of similar cases.\r\nBut this comparison would not make inductive a process\r\nwhich was not previously of that character; it would\r\nonly render induction more wary and adequate. \u003ci\u003eThe\r\nobject of bringing into consideration a multitude of cases\r\nis to facilitate the selection of the evidential or significant\r\nfeatures upon which to base inference in some single case.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eContrast as\r\nimportant\r\nas likeness\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAccordingly, points of \u003ci\u003eunlikeness\u003c/i\u003e are as important as\r\npoints of \u003ci\u003elikeness\u003c/i\u003e among the cases examined. \u003ci\u003eComparison\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nwithout \u003ci\u003econtrast\u003c/i\u003e, does not amount to anything logically.\r\nIn the degree in which other cases observed or\r\nremembered merely duplicate the case in question, we\r\nare no better off for purposes of inference than if we\r\nhad permitted our single original fact to dictate a conclusion.\r\nIn the case of the various samples of grain, it\r\nis the fact that the samples are unlike, at least in the\r\npart of the carload from which they are taken, that is\r\nimportant. Were it not for this unlikeness, their like\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_90\" id=\"Page_90\"\u003e[Pg 90]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003eness\r\nin quality would be of no avail in assisting inference.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_16_16\" id=\"FNanchor_16_16\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_16_16\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[16]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nIf we are endeavoring to get a child to regulate\r\nhis conclusions about the germination of a seed by taking\r\ninto account a number of instances, very little is\r\ngained if the conditions in all these instances closely\r\napproximate one another. But if one seed is placed in\r\npure sand, another in loam, and another on blotting-paper,\r\nand if in each case there are two conditions, one\r\nwith and another without moisture, the unlike factors\r\ntend to throw into relief the factors that are significant\r\n(or \"essential\") for reaching a conclusion. Unless, in\r\nshort, the observer takes care to have the differences in\r\nthe observed cases as extreme as conditions allow, and\r\nunless he notes unlikenesses as carefully as likenesses,\r\nhe has no way of determining the evidential force of\r\nthe data that confront him.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eImportance\r\nof exceptions\r\nand contrary\r\ncases\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAnother way of bringing out this importance of unlikeness\r\nis the emphasis put by the scientist upon \u003ci\u003enegative\u003c/i\u003e\r\ncases\u0026mdash;upon instances which it would seem ought\r\nto fall into line but which as matter of fact do not.\r\nAnomalies, exceptions, things which agree in most respects\r\nbut disagree in some crucial point, are so important\r\nthat many of the devices of scientific technique are\r\ndesigned purely to detect, record, and impress upon\r\nmemory contrasting cases. Darwin remarked that so\r\neasy is it to pass over cases that oppose a favorite\r\ngeneralization, that he had made it a habit not merely\r\nto hunt for contrary instances, but also to write down\r\nany exception he noted or thought of\u0026mdash;as otherwise it\r\nwas almost sure to be forgotten.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_91\" id=\"Page_91\"\u003e[Pg 91]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e§ 3. \u003ci\u003eExperimental Variation of Conditions\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eExperiment\r\nthe typical\r\nmethod of\r\nintroducing\r\ncontrast\r\nfactors\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe have already trenched upon this factor of inductive\r\nmethod, the one that is the most important of all\r\nwherever it is feasible. Theoretically, one sample case\r\n\u003ci\u003eof the right kind\u003c/i\u003e will be as good a basis for an inference\r\nas a thousand cases; but cases of the \"right kind\"\r\nrarely turn up spontaneously. We have to search for\r\nthem, and we may have to \u003ci\u003emake\u003c/i\u003e them. If we take\r\ncases just as we find them\u0026mdash;whether one case or many\r\ncases\u0026mdash;they contain much that is irrelevant to the problem\r\nin hand, while much that is relevant is obscure, hidden.\r\nThe object of experimentation is the \u003ci\u003econstruction,\r\nby regular steps taken on the basis of a plan thought out\r\nin advance, of a typical, crucial case\u003c/i\u003e, a case formed with\r\nexpress reference to throwing light on the difficulty in\r\nquestion. All inductive methods rest (as already stated,\r\np. 85) upon regulation of the conditions of observation\r\nand memory; experiment is simply the most adequate\r\nregulation possible of these conditions. We try to make\r\nthe observation such that every factor entering into\r\nit, together with the mode and the amount of its operation,\r\nmay be open to recognition. Such making of observations\r\nconstitutes experiment.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eThree advantages\r\nof\r\nexperiment\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSuch observations have many and obvious advantages\r\nover observations\u0026mdash;no matter how extensive\u0026mdash;with respect\r\nto which we simply wait for an event to happen\r\nor an object to present itself. Experiment overcomes\r\nthe defects due to (\u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e) the \u003ci\u003erarity\u003c/i\u003e, (\u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e) the \u003ci\u003esubtlety\u003c/i\u003e and\r\nminuteness (or the violence), and (\u003ci\u003ec\u003c/i\u003e) the rigid \u003ci\u003efixity\u003c/i\u003e of\r\nfacts as we ordinarily experience them. The following\r\nquotations from Jevons\u0027s \u003ci\u003eElementary Lessons in Logic\u003c/i\u003e\r\nbring out all these points:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(\u003ci\u003ei\u003c/i\u003e) \"We might have to wait years or centuries to meet\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_92\" id=\"Page_92\"\u003e[Pg 92]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\naccidentally with facts which we can readily produce at\r\nany moment in a laboratory; and it is probable that most\r\nof the chemical substances now known, and many excessively\r\nuseful products would never have been discovered\r\nat all by waiting till nature presented them\r\nspontaneously to our observation.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis quotation refers to the infrequency or rarity of\r\ncertain facts of nature, even very important ones. The\r\npassage then goes on to speak of the minuteness of many\r\nphenomena which makes them escape ordinary experience:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(\u003ci\u003eii\u003c/i\u003e) \"Electricity doubtless operates in every particle\r\nof matter, perhaps at every moment of time; and even\r\nthe ancients could not but notice its action in the loadstone,\r\nin lightning, in the Aurora Borealis, or in a piece\r\nof rubbed amber. But in lightning electricity was too\r\nintense and dangerous; in the other cases it was too\r\nfeeble to be properly understood. The science of electricity\r\nand magnetism could only advance by getting\r\nregular supplies of electricity from the common electric\r\nmachine or the galvanic battery and by making powerful\r\nelectromagnets. Most, if not all, the effects which electricity\r\nproduces must go on in nature, but altogether too\r\nobscurely for observation.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eJevons then deals with the fact that, under ordinary\r\nconditions of experience, phenomena which can be\r\nunderstood only by seeing them under varying conditions\r\nare presented in a fixed and uniform way.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(\u003ci\u003eiii\u003c/i\u003e) \"Thus carbonic acid is only met in the form of\r\na gas, proceeding from the combustion of carbon; but\r\nwhen exposed to extreme pressure and cold, it is condensed\r\ninto a liquid, and may even be converted into a\r\nsnowlike solid substance. Many other gases have in\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_93\" id=\"Page_93\"\u003e[Pg 93]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nlike manner been liquefied or solidified, and there is\r\nreason to believe that every substance is capable of\r\ntaking all three forms of solid, liquid, and gas, if only\r\nthe conditions of temperature and pressure can be\r\nsufficiently varied. Mere observation of nature would\r\nhave led us, on the contrary, to suppose that nearly all\r\nsubstances were fixed in one condition only, and could\r\nnot be converted from solid into liquid and from liquid\r\ninto gas.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eMany volumes would be required to describe in detail\r\nall the methods that investigators have developed in\r\nvarious subjects for analyzing and restating the facts\r\nof ordinary experience so that we may escape from\r\ncapricious and routine suggestions, and may get the\r\nfacts in such a form and in such a light (or context)\r\nthat exact and far-reaching explanations may be suggested\r\nin place of vague and limited ones. But these\r\nvarious devices of inductive inquiry all have one goal in\r\nview: the indirect regulation of the function of suggestion,\r\nor formation of ideas; and, in the main, they will\r\nbe found to reduce to some combination of the three\r\ntypes of selecting and arranging subject-matter just\r\ndescribed.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e§ 4. \u003ci\u003eGuidance of the Deductive Movement\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eValue of\r\ndeduction\r\nfor guiding\r\ninduction\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBefore dealing directly with this topic, we must note\r\nthat systematic regulation of induction depends upon\r\nthe possession of a body of general principles that\r\nmay be applied deductively to the examination or construction\r\nof particular cases as they come up. If the\r\nphysician does not know the general laws of the physiology\r\nof the human body, he has little way of telling\r\nwhat is either peculiarly significant or peculiarly\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_94\" id=\"Page_94\"\u003e[Pg 94]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nexceptional in any particular case that he is called upon\r\nto treat. If he knows the laws of circulation, digestion,\r\nand respiration, he can deduce the conditions that\r\nshould normally be found in a given case. These considerations\r\ngive a base line from which the deviations\r\nand abnormalities of a particular case may be measured.\r\nIn this way, \u003ci\u003ethe nature of the problem at hand is located\r\nand defined\u003c/i\u003e. Attention is not wasted upon features\r\nwhich though conspicuous have nothing to do with the\r\ncase; it is concentrated upon just those traits which\r\nare out of the way and hence require explanation. A\r\nquestion well put is half answered; \u003ci\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e a difficulty\r\nclearly apprehended is likely to suggest its own solution,\u0026mdash;while\r\na vague and miscellaneous perception\r\nof the problem leads to groping and fumbling. Deductive\r\nsystems are necessary in order to put the\r\nquestion in a fruitful form.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003e\"Reasoning\r\na thing out\"\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe control of the origin and development of hypotheses\r\nby deduction does not cease, however, with locating\r\nthe problem. Ideas as they first present themselves are\r\ninchoate and incomplete. \u003ci\u003eDeduction is their elaboration\r\ninto fullness and completeness of meaning\u003c/i\u003e (see p. 76).\r\nThe phenomena which the physician isolates from the\r\ntotal mass of facts that exist in front of him suggest,\r\nwe will say, typhoid fever. Now this conception of\r\ntyphoid fever is one that is capable of development.\r\n\u003ci\u003eIf\u003c/i\u003e there is typhoid, \u003ci\u003ewherever\u003c/i\u003e there is typhoid, there are\r\ncertain results, certain characteristic symptoms. By\r\ngoing over mentally the full bearing of the concept of\r\ntyphoid, the scientist is instructed as to further phenomena\r\nto be found. Its development gives him an\r\ninstrument of inquiry, of observation and experimentation.\r\nHe can go to work deliberately to see whether\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_95\" id=\"Page_95\"\u003e[Pg 95]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe case presents those features that it should have if\r\nthe supposition is valid. The deduced results form a\r\nbasis for comparison with observed results. Except\r\nwhere there is a system of principles capable of being\r\nelaborated by theoretical reasoning, the process of\r\ntesting (or proof) of a hypothesis is incomplete and\r\nhaphazard.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eSuch reasoning\r\nimplies\r\nsystematized\r\nknowledge,\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThese considerations indicate the method by which\r\nthe deductive movement is guided. Deduction requires\r\na system of allied ideas which may be translated into\r\none another by regular or graded steps. The question\r\nis whether the facts that confront us can be identified\r\nas typhoid fever. To all appearances, there is a great\r\ngap between them and typhoid. But if we can, by\r\nsome method of substitutions, go through a series of\r\nintermediary terms (see p. 72), the gap may, after all,\r\nbe easily bridged. Typhoid may mean \u003ci\u003ep\u003c/i\u003e which in turn\r\nmeans \u003ci\u003eo\u003c/i\u003e, which means \u003ci\u003en\u003c/i\u003e which means \u003ci\u003em\u003c/i\u003e, which is very\r\nsimilar to the data selected as the key to the problem.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eor definition\r\nand classification\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOne of the chief objects of science is to provide for\r\nevery typical branch of subject-matter a set of meanings\r\nand principles so closely interknit that any one implies\r\nsome other according to definite conditions, which\r\nunder certain other conditions implies another, and so\r\non. In this way, various substitutions of equivalents\r\nare possible, and reasoning can trace out, without having\r\nrecourse to specific observations, very remote consequences\r\nof any suggested principle. Definition, general\r\nformulæ, and classification are the devices by which the\r\nfixation and elaboration of a meaning into its detailed\r\nramifications are carried on. They are not ends in themselves\u0026mdash;as\r\nthey are frequently regarded even in elementary\r\neducation\u0026mdash;but instrumentalities for facilitating\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_96\" id=\"Page_96\"\u003e[Pg 96]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe development of a conception into the form where\r\nits applicability to given facts may best be tested.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_17_17\" id=\"FNanchor_17_17\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_17_17\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[17]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eThe final\r\ncontrol of\r\ndeduction\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe final test of deduction lies in experimental observation.\r\nElaboration by reasoning may make a suggested\r\nidea very rich and very plausible, but it will not\r\nsettle the validity of that idea. Only if facts can be\r\nobserved (by methods either of collection or of experimentation),\r\nthat agree in detail and without exception\r\nwith the deduced results, are we justified in accepting\r\nthe deduction as giving a valid conclusion. Thinking,\r\nin short, must end as well as begin in the domain of\r\nconcrete observations, if it is to be complete thinking.\r\nAnd the ultimate educative value of all deductive processes\r\nis measured by the degree to which they become\r\nworking tools in the creation and development of new\r\nexperiences.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e§ 5. \u003ci\u003eSome Educational Bearings of the Discussion\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eEducational\r\ncounterparts\r\nof false\r\nlogical\r\ntheories\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eIsolation\r\nof \"facts\"\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSome of the points of the foregoing logical analysis\r\nmay be clinched by a consideration of their educational\r\nimplications, especially with reference to certain practices\r\nthat grow out of a false separation by which each\r\nis thought to be independent of the other and complete\r\nin itself. (\u003ci\u003ei\u003c/i\u003e)\r\nIn some school subjects, or at all events\r\nin some topics or in some lessons, the pupils are immersed\r\nin details; their minds are loaded with disconnected\r\nitems (whether gleaned by observation and\r\nmemory, or accepted on hearsay and authority). Induction\r\nis treated as beginning and ending with the\r\namassing of facts, of particular isolated pieces of information.\r\nThat these items are educative only as\r\nsuggesting a view of some larger situation in which the\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_97\" id=\"Page_97\"\u003e[Pg 97]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nparticulars are included and thereby accounted for, is\r\nignored. In object lessons in elementary education and\r\nin laboratory instruction in higher education, the subject\r\nis often so treated that the student fails to \"see\r\nthe forest on account of the trees.\" Things and their\r\nqualities are retailed and detailed, without reference to\r\na more general character which they stand for and\r\nmean. Or, in the laboratory, the student becomes\r\nengrossed in the processes of manipulation,\u0026mdash;irrespective\r\nof the reason for their performance, without recognizing\r\na typical problem for the solution of which they\r\nafford the appropriate method. Only deduction brings\r\nout and emphasizes consecutive relationships, and only\r\nwhen \u003ci\u003erelationships\u003c/i\u003e are held in view does learning become\r\nmore than a miscellaneous scrap-bag.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eFailure to\r\nfollow up by\r\nreasoning\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(\u003ci\u003eii\u003c/i\u003e) Again, the mind is allowed to hurry on to a vague\r\nnotion of the whole of which the fragmentary facts are\r\nportions, without any attempt to become conscious of\r\n\u003ci\u003ehow\u003c/i\u003e they are bound together as parts of this whole. The\r\nstudent feels that \"in a general way,\" as we say, the\r\nfacts of the history or geography lesson are related\r\nthus and so; but \"in a general way\" here stands only\r\nfor \"in a vague way,\" somehow or other, with no clear\r\nrecognition of just how.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe pupil is encouraged to form, on the basis of the\r\nparticular facts, a general notion, a conception of how\r\nthey stand related; but no pains are taken to make the\r\nstudent follow up the notion, to elaborate it and see just\r\nwhat its bearings are upon the case in hand and upon\r\nsimilar cases. The inductive inference, the guess, is\r\nformed by the student; if it happens to be correct, it is\r\nat once accepted by the teacher; or if it is false, it is rejected.\r\nIf any amplification of the idea occurs, it is\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_98\" id=\"Page_98\"\u003e[Pg 98]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nquite likely carried through by the teacher, who thereby\r\nassumes the responsibility for its intellectual development.\r\nBut a complete, an integral, act of thought requires\r\nthat the person making the suggestion (the\r\nguess) be responsible also for reasoning out its bearings\r\nupon the problem in hand; that he develop the suggestion\r\nat least enough to indicate the ways in which it\r\napplies to and accounts for the specific data of the case.\r\nToo often when a recitation does not consist in simply\r\ntesting the ability of the student to display some form of\r\ntechnical skill, or to repeat facts and principles accepted\r\non the authority of text-book or lecturer, the teacher\r\ngoes to the opposite extreme; and after calling out the\r\nspontaneous reflections of the pupils, their guesses or\r\nideas about the matter, merely accepts or rejects them,\r\nassuming himself the responsibility for their elaboration.\r\nIn this way, the function of suggestion and of interpretation\r\nis excited, but it is not directed and trained. Induction\r\nis stimulated but is not carried over into the\r\n\u003ci\u003ereasoning\u003c/i\u003e phase necessary to complete it.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn other subjects and topics, the deductive phase is\r\nisolated, and is treated as if it were complete in itself.\r\nThis false isolation may show itself in either (and both)\r\nof two points; namely, at the beginning or at the end\r\nof the resort to general intellectual procedure.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eIsolation of\r\ndeduction\r\nby commencing\r\nwith it\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(\u003ci\u003eiii\u003c/i\u003e) Beginning with definitions, rules, general principles,\r\nclassifications, and the like, is a common form\r\nof the first error. This method has been such a uniform\r\nobject of attack on the part of all educational reformers\r\nthat it is not necessary to dwell upon it further\r\nthan to note that the mistake is, logically, due to the\r\nattempt to introduce deductive considerations without\r\nfirst making acquaintance with the particular facts that\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_99\" id=\"Page_99\"\u003e[Pg 99]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ncreate a need for the generalizing rational devices.\r\nUnfortunately, the reformer sometimes carries his objection\r\ntoo far, or rather locates it in the wrong place. He\r\nis led into a tirade against \u003ci\u003eall\u003c/i\u003e definition, all systematization,\r\nall use of general principles, instead of confining\r\nhimself to pointing out their futility and their deadness\r\nwhen not properly motivated by familiarity with concrete\r\nexperiences.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eIsolation of\r\ndeduction\r\nfrom direction\r\nof new\r\nobservations\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(\u003ci\u003eiv\u003c/i\u003e) The isolation of deduction is seen, at the other end,\r\nwherever there is failure to clinch and test the results\r\nof the general reasoning processes by application to new\r\nconcrete cases. The final point of the deductive devices\r\nlies in their use in assimilating and comprehending individual\r\ncases. No one understands a general principle\r\nfully\u0026mdash;no matter how adequately he can demonstrate\r\nit, to say nothing of repeating it\u0026mdash;till he can employ it\r\nin the mastery of new situations, which, if they \u003ci\u003eare\u003c/i\u003e new,\r\ndiffer in manifestation from the cases used in reaching the\r\ngeneralization. Too often the text-book or teacher is\r\ncontented with a series of somewhat perfunctory examples\r\nand illustrations, and the student is not forced to\r\ncarry the principle that he has formulated over into\r\nfurther cases of his own experience. In so far, the\r\nprinciple is inert and dead.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eLack of provision\r\nfor\r\nexperimentation\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(\u003ci\u003ev\u003c/i\u003e) It is only a variation upon this same theme to\r\nsay that every complete act of reflective inquiry makes\r\nprovision for experimentation\u0026mdash;for testing suggested\r\nand accepted principles by employing them for the\r\nactive construction of new cases, in which new qualities\r\nemerge. Only slowly do our schools accommodate\r\nthemselves to the general advance of scientific method.\r\nFrom the scientific side, it is demonstrated that effective\r\nand integral thinking is possible only where the experi\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_100\" id=\"Page_100\"\u003e[Pg 100]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003emental\r\nmethod in some form is used. Some recognition\r\nof this principle is evinced in higher institutions\r\nof learning, colleges and high schools. But in elementary\r\neducation, it is still assumed, for the most part,\r\nthat the pupil\u0027s natural range of observations, supplemented\r\nby what he accepts on hearsay, is adequate for\r\nintellectual growth. Of course it is not necessary that\r\nlaboratories shall be introduced under that name, much\r\nless that elaborate apparatus be secured; but the entire\r\nscientific history of humanity demonstrates that\r\nthe conditions for complete mental activity will not be\r\nobtained till adequate provision is made for the carrying\r\non of activities that actually modify physical conditions,\r\nand that books, pictures, and even objects that are passively\r\nobserved but not manipulated do not furnish the\r\nprovision required.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_101\" id=\"Page_101\"\u003e[Pg 101]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003chr style=\"width: 65%;\" /\u003e\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"CHAPTER_EIGHT\" id=\"CHAPTER_EIGHT\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eCHAPTER EIGHT\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eJUDGMENT: THE INTERPRETATION OF FACTS\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e§ 1. \u003ci\u003eThe Three Factors of Judging\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eGood\r\njudgment\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eA man of good judgment in a given set of affairs is a\r\nman in so far educated, trained, whatever may be his\r\nliteracy. And if our schools turn out their pupils in\r\nthat attitude of mind which is conducive to good judgment\r\nin any department of affairs in which the pupils\r\nare placed, they have done more than if they sent out\r\ntheir pupils merely possessed of vast stores of information,\r\nor high degrees of skill in specialized branches.\r\nTo know what is \u003ci\u003egood\u003c/i\u003e judgment we need first to know\r\nwhat judgment is.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eJudgment\r\nand\r\ninference\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThat there is an intimate connection between judgment\r\nand inference is obvious enough. The aim of inference\r\nis to terminate itself in an adequate judgment\r\nof a situation, and the course of inference goes on through\r\na series of partial and tentative judgments. What are\r\nthese units, these terms of inference when we examine\r\nthem on their own account? Their significant traits\r\nmay be readily gathered from a consideration of the\r\noperations to which the word \u003ci\u003ejudgment\u003c/i\u003e was originally\r\napplied: namely, the authoritative decision of matters in\r\nlegal controversy\u0026mdash;the procedure of the \u003ci\u003ejudge on the\r\nbench\u003c/i\u003e. There are three such features: (1) a controversy,\r\nconsisting of opposite claims regarding the same\r\nobjective situation; (2) a process of defining and elaborating\r\nthese claims and of sifting the facts adduced to\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_102\" id=\"Page_102\"\u003e[Pg 102]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nsupport them; (3) a final decision, or sentence, closing\r\nthe particular matter in dispute and also serving as a\r\nrule or principle for deciding future cases.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eUncertainty\r\nthe antecedent\r\nof\r\njudgment\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e1. Unless there is something doubtful, the situation\r\nis read off at a glance; it is taken in on sight, \u003ci\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e there\r\nis merely apprehension, perception, recognition, not\r\njudgment. If the matter is wholly doubtful, if it is dark\r\nand obscure throughout, there is a blind mystery and\r\nagain no judgment occurs. But if it suggests, however\r\nvaguely, different meanings, rival possible interpretations,\r\nthere is some \u003ci\u003epoint at issue\u003c/i\u003e, some \u003ci\u003ematter at stake\u003c/i\u003e.\r\nDoubt takes the form of dispute, controversy; different\r\nsides compete for a conclusion in their favor. Cases\r\nbrought to trial before a judge illustrate neatly and unambiguously\r\nthis strife of alternative interpretations;\r\nbut any case of trying to clear up intellectually a doubtful\r\nsituation exemplifies the same traits. A moving\r\nblur catches our eye in the distance; we ask ourselves:\r\n\"What is it? Is it a cloud of whirling dust? a tree\r\nwaving its branches? a man signaling to us?\" Something\r\nin the total situation suggests each of these possible\r\nmeanings. Only one of them can possibly be\r\nsound; perhaps none of them is appropriate; yet \u003ci\u003esome\u003c/i\u003e\r\nmeaning the thing in question surely has. Which of\r\nthe alternative suggested meanings has the rightful\r\nclaim? What does the perception really mean? How\r\nis it to be interpreted, estimated, appraised, placed?\r\nEvery judgment proceeds from some such situation.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eJudgment\r\ndefines\r\nthe issue,\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e2. The hearing of the controversy, the trial, \u003ci\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e the\r\nweighing of alternative claims, divides into two branches,\r\neither of which, in a given case, may be more conspicuous\r\nthan the other. In the consideration of a legal dispute,\r\nthese two branches are sifting the evidence and\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_103\" id=\"Page_103\"\u003e[Pg 103]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nselecting the rules that are applicable; they are \"the\r\nfacts\" and \"the law\" of the case. In judgment they\r\nare (\u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e) the determination of the data that are important\r\nin the given case (compare the inductive movement);\r\nand (\u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e) the elaboration of the conceptions or\r\nmeanings suggested by the crude data (compare the\r\ndeductive movement). (\u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e) What portions or aspects of\r\nthe situation are significant in controlling the formation\r\nof the interpretation? (\u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e) Just what is the full meaning\r\nand bearing of the conception that is used as a method\r\nof interpretation? These questions are strictly correlative;\r\nthe answer to each depends upon the answer to\r\nthe other. We may, however, for convenience, consider\r\nthem separately.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003e(\u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e) by\r\nselecting\r\nwhat facts\r\nare evidence\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(\u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e) In every actual occurrence, there are many details\r\nwhich are part of the total occurrence, but which\r\nnevertheless are not significant in relation to the point\r\nat issue. All parts of an experience are equally present,\r\nbut they are very far from being of equal value as\r\nsigns or as evidences. Nor is there any tag or label on\r\nany trait saying: \"This is important,\" or \"This is\r\ntrivial.\" Nor is intensity, or vividness or conspicuousness,\r\na safe measure of indicative and proving value.\r\nThe glaring thing may be totally insignificant in this\r\nparticular situation, and the key to the understanding\r\nof the whole matter may be modest or hidden (compare\r\np. 74). Features that are not significant are distracting;\r\nthey proffer their claims to be regarded as clues and\r\ncues to interpretation, while traits that are significant do\r\nnot appear on the surface at all. Hence, judgment is\r\nrequired \u003ci\u003eeven in reference\u003c/i\u003e to the situation or event that\r\nis present to the senses; elimination or rejection, selection,\r\ndiscovery, or bringing to light must take place.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_104\" id=\"Page_104\"\u003e[Pg 104]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nTill we have reached a final conclusion, rejection and\r\nselection must be tentative or conditional. We select\r\nthe things that we hope or trust are cues to meaning.\r\nBut if they do not suggest a situation that accepts and\r\nincludes them (see p. 81), we reconstitute our data, the\r\nfacts of the case; for we mean, intellectually, by the\r\nfacts of the case \u003ci\u003ethose traits that are used as evidence\r\nin reaching a conclusion or forming a decision\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eExpertness\r\nin selecting\r\nevidence\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNo hard and fast rules for this operation of selecting\r\nand rejecting, or fixing upon the facts, can be given. It\r\nall comes back, as we say, to the good judgment, the\r\ngood sense, of the one judging. To be a good judge is\r\nto have a sense of the relative indicative or signifying\r\nvalues of the various features of the perplexing situation;\r\nto know what to let go as of no account; what to\r\neliminate as irrelevant; what to retain as conducive to\r\noutcome; what to emphasize as a clue to the difficulty.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_18_18\" id=\"FNanchor_18_18\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_18_18\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[18]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nThis power in ordinary matters we call \u003ci\u003eknack\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003etact\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003ecleverness\u003c/i\u003e;\r\nin more important affairs, \u003ci\u003einsight\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003ediscernment\u003c/i\u003e.\r\nIn part it is instinctive or inborn; but it also represents\r\nthe funded outcome of long familiarity with like operations\r\nin the past. Possession of this ability to seize\r\nwhat is evidential or significant and to let the rest go is\r\nthe mark of the expert, the connoisseur, the \u003ci\u003ejudge\u003c/i\u003e, in\r\nany matter.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eIntuitive\r\njudgments\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eMill cites the following case, which is worth noting as\r\nan instance of the extreme delicacy and accuracy to\r\nwhich may be developed this power of sizing up the\r\nsignificant factors of a situation. \"A Scotch manufacturer\r\nprocured from England, at a high rate of wages,\r\na working dyer, famous for producing very fine colors,\r\nwith the view of teaching to his other workmen the same\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_105\" id=\"Page_105\"\u003e[Pg 105]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nskill. The workman came; but his method of proportioning\r\nthe ingredients, in which lay the secret of the\r\neffects he produced, was by taking them up in handfuls,\r\nwhile the common method was to weigh them. The\r\nmanufacturer sought to make him turn his handling\r\nsystem into an equivalent weighing system, that the\r\ngeneral principles of his peculiar mode of proceeding\r\nmight be ascertained. This, however, the man found\r\nhimself quite unable to do, and could therefore impart\r\nhis own skill to nobody. He had, from individual cases\r\nof his own experience, established a connection in his\r\nmind between fine effects of color and tactual perceptions\r\nin handling his dyeing materials; and from these\r\nperceptions he could, in any particular case, \u003ci\u003einfer the\r\nmeans to be employed\u003c/i\u003e and the effects which would be\r\nproduced.\" Long brooding over conditions, intimate\r\ncontact associated with keen interest, thorough absorption\r\nin a multiplicity of allied experiences, tend to bring\r\nabout those judgments which we then call intuitive; but\r\nthey are true judgments because they are based on intelligent\r\nselection and estimation, with the solution of a\r\nproblem as the controlling standard. Possession of this\r\ncapacity makes the difference between the artist and the\r\nintellectual bungler.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSuch is judging ability, in its completest form, as to\r\nthe data of the decision to be reached. But in any case\r\nthere is a certain feeling along for the way to be followed;\r\na constant tentative picking out of certain qualities\r\nto see what emphasis upon them would lead to; a\r\nwillingness to hold final selection in suspense; and to\r\nreject the factors entirely or relegate them to a different\r\nposition in the evidential scheme if other features yield\r\nmore solvent suggestions. Alertness, flexibility, curios\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_106\" id=\"Page_106\"\u003e[Pg 106]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003eity\r\nare the essentials; dogmatism, rigidity, prejudice,\r\ncaprice, arising from routine, passion, and flippancy are\r\nfatal.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003e(\u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e) To decide\r\nan issue,\r\nthe appropriate\r\nprinciples\r\nmust\r\nalso be\r\nselected\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(\u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e) This selection of data is, of course, for the sake\r\nof controlling the \u003ci\u003edevelopment and elaboration of the suggested\r\nmeaning in the light of which they are to be interpreted\u003c/i\u003e\r\n(compare p. 76). An evolution of conceptions\r\nthus goes on simultaneously with the determination of the\r\nfacts; one possible meaning after another is held before\r\nthe mind, considered in relation to the data to which it\r\nis applied, is developed into its more detailed bearings\r\nupon the data, is dropped or tentatively accepted and\r\nused. We do not approach any problem with a wholly\r\nnaïve or virgin mind; we approach it with certain acquired\r\nhabitual modes of understanding, with a certain\r\nstore of previously evolved meanings, or at least of experiences\r\nfrom which meanings may be educed. If the\r\ncircumstances are such that a habitual response is called\r\ndirectly into play, there is an immediate grasp of meaning.\r\nIf the habit is checked, and inhibited from easy\r\napplication, a possible meaning for the facts in question\r\npresents itself. No hard and fast rules decide whether\r\na meaning suggested is the right and proper meaning to\r\nfollow up. The individual\u0027s own good (or bad) judgment\r\nis the guide. There is no label on any given idea\r\nor principle which says automatically, \"Use me in\r\nthis situation\"\u0026mdash;as the magic cakes of Alice in Wonderland\r\nwere inscribed \"Eat me.\" The thinker has to\r\ndecide, to choose; and there is always a risk, so that the\r\nprudent thinker selects warily, subject, that is, to confirmation\r\nor frustration by later events. If one is not\r\nable to estimate wisely what is relevant to the interpretation\r\nof a given perplexing or doubtful issue, it avails\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_107\" id=\"Page_107\"\u003e[Pg 107]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nlittle that arduous learning has built up a large stock of\r\nconcepts. For learning is not wisdom; information does\r\nnot guarantee good judgment. Memory may provide an\r\nantiseptic refrigerator in which to store a stock of meanings\r\nfor future use, but judgment selects and adopts the\r\none used in a given emergency\u0026mdash;and without an emergency\r\n(some crisis, slight or great) there is no call for\r\njudgment. No conception, even if it is carefully and\r\nfirmly established in the abstract, can at first safely be\r\nmore than a \u003ci\u003ecandidate\u003c/i\u003e for the office of interpreter. Only\r\ngreater success than that of its rivals in clarifying dark\r\nspots, untying hard knots, reconciling discrepancies, can\r\nelect it or prove it a valid idea for the given situation.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eJudging\r\nterminates\r\nin a \u003ci\u003edecision\u003c/i\u003e\r\nor statement\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e3. The judgment when formed is a \u003ci\u003edecision\u003c/i\u003e; it closes\r\n(or concludes) the question at issue. This determination\r\nnot only settles that particular case, but it helps fix a\r\nrule or method for deciding similar matters in the future;\r\nas the sentence of the judge on the bench both terminates\r\nthat dispute and also forms a precedent for future\r\ndecisions. If the interpretation settled upon is not controverted\r\nby subsequent events, a presumption is built\r\nup in favor of similar interpretation in other cases where\r\nthe features are not so obviously unlike as to make it\r\ninappropriate. In this way, principles of judging are\r\ngradually built up; a certain manner of interpretation\r\ngets weight, authority. In short, meanings get \u003ci\u003estandardized\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nthey become logical concepts (see below, p. 118).\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e§ 2. \u003ci\u003eThe Origin and Nature of Ideas\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eIdeas are\r\nconjectures\r\nemployed\r\nin judging\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis brings us to the question of \u003ci\u003eideas in relation to\r\njudgments\u003c/i\u003e.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_19_19\" id=\"FNanchor_19_19\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_19_19\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[19]\u003c/a\u003e Something in an obscure situation sug\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_108\" id=\"Page_108\"\u003e[Pg 108]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003egests\r\nsomething else as its meaning. If this meaning is\r\nat once accepted, there is no reflective thinking, no\r\ngenuine judging. Thought is cut short uncritically;\r\ndogmatic belief, with all its attending risks, takes place.\r\nBut if the meaning suggested is held \u003ci\u003ein suspense\u003c/i\u003e, pending\r\nexamination and inquiry, there is true judgment.\r\nWe stop and think, we \u003ci\u003ede-fer\u003c/i\u003e conclusion in order to\r\n\u003ci\u003ein-fer\u003c/i\u003e more thoroughly. In this process of being only\r\nconditionally accepted, accepted only for examination,\r\n\u003ci\u003emeanings become ideas\u003c/i\u003e. \u003ci\u003eThat is to say, an idea is a\r\nmeaning that is tentatively entertained, formed, and\r\nused with reference to its fitness to decide a perplexing\r\nsituation,\u0026mdash;a meaning used as a tool of\r\njudgment.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eOr tools\r\nof interpretation\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eLet us recur to our instance of a blur in motion\r\nappearing at a distance. We wonder what \u003ci\u003ethe thing is\u003c/i\u003e,\r\n\u003ci\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e what the \u003ci\u003eblur means\u003c/i\u003e. A man waving his arms, a\r\nfriend beckoning to us, are suggested as possibilities.\r\nTo accept at once either alternative is to arrest judgment.\r\nBut if we treat what is suggested as only a suggestion,\r\na supposition, a possibility, it becomes an idea,\r\nhaving the following traits: (\u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e) As merely a suggestion,\r\nit is a conjecture, a guess, which in cases of greater dignity\r\nwe call a hypothesis or a theory. That is to say,\r\nit is \u003ci\u003ea possible but as yet doubtful mode of interpretation\u003c/i\u003e.\r\n(\u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e) Even though doubtful, it has an office to perform;\r\nnamely, that of directing inquiry and examination. If\r\nthis blur means a friend beckoning, then careful observation\r\nshould show certain other traits. If it is a man\r\ndriving unruly cattle, certain other traits should be\r\nfound. Let us look and see if these traits are found.\r\nTaken merely as a doubt, an idea would paralyze inquiry.\r\nTaken merely as a certainty, it would arrest\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_109\" id=\"Page_109\"\u003e[Pg 109]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ninquiry. Taken as a doubtful possibility, it affords a\r\nstandpoint, a platform, a method of inquiry.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003ePseudo-ideas\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIdeas are not then genuine ideas unless they are tools\r\nin a reflective examination which tends to solve a\r\nproblem. Suppose it is a question of having the\r\npupil grasp \u003ci\u003ethe idea\u003c/i\u003e of the sphericity of the earth.\r\nThis is different from teaching him its sphericity \u003ci\u003eas a\r\nfact\u003c/i\u003e. He may be shown (or reminded of) a ball or a\r\nglobe, and be told that the earth is round like those\r\nthings; he may then be made to repeat that statement\r\nday after day till the shape of the earth and the shape\r\nof the ball are welded together in his mind. But he has\r\nnot thereby acquired any idea of the earth\u0027s sphericity;\r\nat most, he has had a certain image of a sphere and\r\nhas finally managed to image the earth after the analogy\r\nof his ball image. To grasp sphericity as an idea, the\r\npupil must first have realized certain perplexities or\r\nconfusing features in observed facts and have had the\r\nidea of spherical shape suggested to him as a possible\r\nway of accounting for the phenomena in question.\r\nOnly by use as a method of interpreting data so as to\r\ngive them fuller meaning does sphericity become a genuine\r\nidea. There may be a vivid image and no idea;\r\nor there may be a fleeting, obscure image and yet an\r\nidea, if that image performs the function of instigating\r\nand directing the observation and relation of facts.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eIdeas furnish\r\nthe only alternative\r\nto\r\n\"hit or\r\nmiss\"\r\nmethods\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eLogical ideas are like keys which are shaping with\r\nreference to opening a lock. Pike, separated by a\r\nglass partition from the fish upon which they ordinarily\r\nprey, will\u0026mdash;so it is said\u0026mdash;butt their heads against the\r\nglass until it is literally beaten into them that they cannot\r\nget at their food. Animals learn (when they learn at\r\nall) by a \"cut and try\" method; by doing at random\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_110\" id=\"Page_110\"\u003e[Pg 110]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nfirst one thing and another thing and then preserving\r\nthe things that happen to succeed. Action directed\r\nconsciously by ideas\u0026mdash;by suggested meanings accepted\r\nfor the sake of experimenting with them\u0026mdash;is the\r\nsole alternative both to bull-headed stupidity and\r\nto learning bought from that dear teacher\u0026mdash;chance\r\nexperience.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eThey are\r\nmethods of\r\nindirect\r\nattack\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is significant that many words for intelligence\r\nsuggest the idea of circuitous, evasive activity\u0026mdash;often\r\nwith a sort of intimation of even moral obliquity. The\r\nbluff, hearty man goes straight (and stupidly, it is implied)\r\nat some work. The intelligent man is cunning,\r\nshrewd (crooked), wily, subtle, crafty, artful, designing\u0026mdash;the\r\nidea of indirection is involved.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_20_20\" id=\"FNanchor_20_20\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_20_20\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[20]\u003c/a\u003e An idea is a\r\nmethod of evading, circumventing, or surmounting\r\nthrough reflection obstacles that otherwise would have\r\nto be attacked by brute force. But ideas may lose their\r\nintellectual quality as they are habitually used. When\r\na child was first learning to recognize, in some hesitating\r\nsuspense, cats, dogs, houses, marbles, trees, shoes,\r\nand other objects, ideas\u0026mdash;conscious and tentative meanings\u0026mdash;intervened\r\nas methods of identification. Now,\r\nas a rule, the thing and the meaning are so completely\r\nfused that there is no judgment and no idea proper, but\r\nonly automatic recognition. On the other hand, things\r\nthat are, as a rule, directly apprehended and familiar\r\nbecome subjects of judgment when they present themselves\r\nin unusual contexts: as forms, distances, sizes,\r\npositions when we attempt to draw them; triangles,\r\nsquares, and circles when they turn up, not in connection\r\nwith familiar toys, implements, and utensils, but\r\nas problems in geometry.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"Page_111\" id=\"Page_111\"\u003e[Pg 111]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e§ 3. \u003ci\u003eAnalysis and Synthesis\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eJudging\r\nclears up\r\nthings:\r\nanalysis\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThrough judging confused data are cleared up, and\r\nseemingly incoherent and disconnected facts brought\r\ntogether. Things may have a peculiar feeling for us,\r\nthey may make a certain indescribable impression upon\r\nus; the thing may \u003ci\u003efeel\u003c/i\u003e round (that is, present a quality\r\nwhich we afterwards define as round), an act may seem\r\nrude (or what we afterwards classify as rude), and yet\r\nthis quality may be lost, absorbed, blended in the total\r\nvalue of the situation. Only as we need to use just that\r\naspect of the original situation as a tool of grasping\r\nsomething perplexing or obscure in another situation,\r\ndo we abstract or detach the quality so that it becomes\r\nindividualized. Only because we need to characterize\r\nthe shape of some new object or the moral quality of\r\nsome new act, does the element of roundness or rudeness\r\nin the old experience detach itself, and stand out as a\r\ndistinctive feature. If the element thus selected clears\r\nup what is otherwise obscure in the new experience, if\r\nit settles what is uncertain, it thereby itself gains in\r\npositiveness and definiteness of meaning. This point\r\nwill meet us again in the following chapter; here we\r\nshall speak of the matter only as it bears upon the\r\nquestions of analysis and synthesis.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eMental\r\nanalysis is\r\nnot like\r\nphysical\r\ndivision\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eMisapprehension\r\nof\r\nanalysis in\r\neducation\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eEven when it is definitely stated that intellectual and\r\nphysical analyses are different sorts of operations, intellectual\r\nanalysis is often treated after the analogy of\r\nphysical; as if it were the breaking up of a whole into\r\nall its constituent parts in the mind instead of in space.\r\nAs nobody can possibly tell what breaking a whole into\r\nits parts in the mind means, this conception leads to the\r\nfurther notion that logical analysis is a mere enumeration\r\nand listing of all conceivable qualities and relations.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_112\" id=\"Page_112\"\u003e[Pg 112]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nThe influence upon education of this conception has\r\nbeen very great.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_21_21\" id=\"FNanchor_21_21\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_21_21\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[21]\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\nEvery subject in the curriculum has\r\npassed through\u0026mdash;or still remains in\u0026mdash;what may be\r\ncalled the phase of anatomical or morphological method:\r\nthe stage in which understanding the subject is thought\r\nto consist of multiplying distinctions of quality, form,\r\nrelation, and so on, and attaching some name to each\r\ndistinguished element. In normal growth, specific\r\nproperties are emphasized and so individualized only\r\nwhen they serve to clear up a present difficulty. Only\r\nas they are involved in judging some specific situation\r\nis there any motive or use for analyses, \u003ci\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e for emphasis\r\nupon some element or relation as peculiarly significant.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eEffects of\r\npremature\r\nformulation\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe same putting the cart before the horse, the product\r\nbefore the process, is found in that overconscious\r\nformulation of methods of procedure so current in elementary\r\ninstruction. (See p. 60.) The method that\r\nis employed in discovery, in reflective inquiry, cannot\r\npossibly be identified with the method that emerges\r\n\u003ci\u003eafter\u003c/i\u003e the discovery is made. In the genuine operation\r\nof inference, the mind is in the attitude of \u003ci\u003esearch\u003c/i\u003e, of\r\n\u003ci\u003ehunting\u003c/i\u003e, of \u003ci\u003eprojection\u003c/i\u003e, of \u003ci\u003etrying this and that\u003c/i\u003e; when the\r\nconclusion is reached, the search is at an end. The\r\nGreeks used to discuss: \"How is learning (or inquiry)\r\npossible? For either we know already what we are\r\nafter, and then we do not learn or inquire; or we do\r\nnot know, and then we cannot inquire, for we do not\r\nknow what to look for.\" The dilemma is at least suggestive,\r\nfor it points to the true alternative: the use in\r\ninquiry of doubt, of tentative suggestion, of experimen\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_113\" id=\"Page_113\"\u003e[Pg 113]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003etation.\r\nAfter we have reached the conclusion, a reconsideration\r\nof the steps of the process to see what is\r\nhelpful, what is harmful, what is merely useless, will\r\nassist in dealing more promptly and efficaciously with\r\nanalogous problems in the future. In this way, more or\r\nless explicit method is gradually built up. (Compare\r\nthe earlier discussion on p. 62 of the psychological and\r\nthe logical.)\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eMethod\r\ncomes\r\nbefore its\r\nformulation\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is, however, a common assumption that unless the\r\npupil from the outset \u003ci\u003econsciously recognizes and explicitly\r\nstates\u003c/i\u003e the method logically implied in the result he is to\r\nreach, he will have \u003ci\u003eno\u003c/i\u003e method, and his mind will work\r\nconfusedly or anarchically; while if he accompanies his\r\nperformance with conscious statement of some form of\r\nprocedure (outline, topical analysis, list of headings and\r\nsubheadings, uniform formula) his mind is safeguarded\r\nand strengthened. As a matter of fact, the development\r\nof \u003ci\u003ean unconscious logical attitude and habit\u003c/i\u003e must\r\ncome first. A conscious setting forth of the method\r\nlogically adapted for reaching an end is possible only\r\nafter the result has first been reached by more unconscious\r\nand tentative methods, while it is valuable only\r\nwhen a review of the method that achieved success in a\r\ngiven case will throw light upon a new, similar case.\r\nThe ability to fasten upon and single out (abstract,\r\nanalyze) those features of one experience which are\r\nlogically best is hindered by premature insistence upon\r\ntheir explicit formulation. It is repeated use that gives\r\na \u003ci\u003emethod\u003c/i\u003e definiteness; and given this definiteness, precipitation\r\ninto formulated statement should follow naturally.\r\nBut because teachers find that the things which\r\nthey themselves best understand are marked off and defined\r\nin clear-cut ways, our schoolrooms are pervaded\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_114\" id=\"Page_114\"\u003e[Pg 114]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwith the superstition that children are to begin with\r\nalready crystallized formulæ of method.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eJudgment\r\nreveals the\r\nbearing or\r\nsignificance\r\nof facts:\r\nsynthesis\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAs analysis is conceived to be a sort of picking to\r\npieces, so synthesis is thought to be a sort of physical\r\npiecing together; and so imagined, it also becomes a\r\nmystery. In fact, synthesis takes place wherever we\r\ngrasp the bearing of facts on a conclusion, or of a principle\r\non facts. As analysis is \u003ci\u003eemphasis\u003c/i\u003e, so synthesis is\r\n\u003ci\u003eplacing\u003c/i\u003e; the one causes the emphasized fact or property\r\nto stand out as significant; the other gives what is selected\r\nits \u003ci\u003econtext\u003c/i\u003e, or its connection with what is signified.\r\nEvery judgment is analytic in so far as it involves discernment,\r\ndiscrimination, marking off the trivial from\r\nthe important, the irrelevant from what points to a conclusion;\r\nand it is synthetic in so far as it leaves the mind\r\nwith an inclusive situation within which the selected\r\nfacts are placed.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eAnalysis and\r\nsynthesis\r\nare correlative\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eEducational methods that pride themselves on being\r\nexclusively analytic or exclusively synthetic are therefore\r\n(so far as they carry out their boasts) incompatible with\r\nnormal operations of judgment. Discussions have taken\r\nplace, for example, as to whether the teaching of geography\r\nshould be analytic or synthetic. The synthetic\r\nmethod is supposed to begin with the partial, limited\r\nportion of the earth\u0027s surface already familiar to the\r\npupil, and then gradually piece on adjacent regions (the\r\ncounty, the country, the continent, and so on) till an\r\nidea of the entire globe is reached, or of the solar system\r\nthat includes the globe. The analytic method is supposed\r\nto begin with the physical whole, the solar system or\r\nglobe, and to work down through its constituent portions\r\ntill the immediate environment is reached. The underlying\r\nconceptions are of physical wholes and physical\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_115\" id=\"Page_115\"\u003e[Pg 115]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nparts. As matter of fact, we cannot assume that the\r\nportion of the earth already familiar to the child is such\r\na definite object, mentally, that he can at once begin with\r\nit; his knowledge of it is misty and vague as well as incomplete.\r\nAccordingly, mental progress will involve\r\nanalysis of it\u0026mdash;emphasis of the features that are significant,\r\nso that they will stand out clearly. Moreover, his\r\nown locality is not sharply marked off, neatly bounded,\r\nand measured. His experience of it is already an experience\r\nthat involves sun, moon, and stars as parts of\r\nthe scene he surveys; it involves a changing horizon\r\nline as he moves about; that is, even his more limited\r\nand local experience involves far-reaching factors that\r\ntake his imagination clear beyond his own street and\r\nvillage. Connection, relationship with a larger whole, is\r\nalready involved. But his recognition of these relations\r\nis inadequate, vague, incorrect. He needs to utilize the\r\nfeatures of the local environment which are understood\r\nto help clarify and enlarge his conceptions of the larger\r\ngeographical scene to which they belong. At the same\r\ntime, not till he has grasped the larger scene will many\r\nof even the commonest features of his environment\r\nbecome intelligible. Analysis leads to synthesis; while\r\nsynthesis perfects analysis. As the pupil grows in comprehension\r\nof the vast complicated earth in its setting in\r\nspace, he also sees more definitely the meaning of the\r\nfamiliar local details. This intimate interaction between\r\nselective emphasis and interpretation of what is selected\r\nis found wherever reflection proceeds normally. Hence\r\nthe folly of trying to set analysis and synthesis over\r\nagainst each other.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_116\" id=\"Page_116\"\u003e[Pg 116]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003chr style=\"width: 65%;\" /\u003e\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"CHAPTER_NINE\" id=\"CHAPTER_NINE\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eCHAPTER NINE\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eMEANING: OR CONCEPTIONS AND UNDERSTANDING\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e§ 1. \u003ci\u003eThe Place of Meanings in Mental Life\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eMeaning\r\nis central\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAs in our discussion of judgment we were making\r\nmore explicit what is involved in inference, so in the\r\ndiscussion of meaning we are only recurring to the\r\ncentral function of all reflection. For one thing to\r\n\u003ci\u003emean\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003esignify\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003ebetoken\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eindicate\u003c/i\u003e, or \u003ci\u003epoint to\u003c/i\u003e, another we\r\nsaw at the outset to be the essential mark of thinking\r\n(see p. 8). To find out what facts, just as they stand,\r\nmean, is the object of all discovery; to find out what\r\nfacts will carry out, substantiate, support a given meaning,\r\nis the object of all testing. When an inference\r\nreaches a satisfactory conclusion, we attain a goal of\r\nmeaning. The act of judging involves both the growth\r\nand the application of meanings. In short, in this chapter\r\nwe are not introducing a new topic; we are only\r\ncoming to closer quarters with what hitherto has been\r\nconstantly assumed. In the first section, we shall consider\r\nthe equivalence of meaning and understanding,\r\nand the two types of understanding, direct and indirect.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"center\"\u003eI. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eMeaning and Understanding\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eTo understand\r\nis\r\nto grasp\r\nmeaning\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf a person comes suddenly into your room and calls\r\nout \"Paper,\" various alternatives are possible. If you\r\ndo not understand the English language, there is simply\r\na noise which may or may not act as a physical stimulus\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_117\" id=\"Page_117\"\u003e[Pg 117]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nand irritant. But the noise is not an intellectual object; it\r\ndoes not have intellectual value. (Compare above, p. 15.)\r\nTo say that you do not understand it and that it has no\r\nmeaning are equivalents. If the cry is the usual accompaniment\r\nof the delivery of the morning paper, the\r\nsound will have meaning, intellectual content; you will\r\nunderstand it. Or if you are eagerly awaiting the receipt\r\nof some important document, you may assume\r\nthat the cry means an announcement of its arrival. If\r\n(in the third place) you understand the English language,\r\nbut no context suggests itself from your habits\r\nand expectations, the \u003ci\u003eword\u003c/i\u003e has meaning, but not the\r\nwhole event. You are then perplexed and incited to\r\nthink out, to hunt for, some explanation of the apparently\r\nmeaningless occurrence. If you find something\r\nthat accounts for the performance, it gets meaning; you\r\ncome to understand it. As intelligent beings, we presume\r\nthe existence of meaning, and its absence is an\r\nanomaly. Hence, if it should turn out that the person\r\nmerely meant to inform you that there was a scrap of\r\npaper on the sidewalk, or that paper existed somewhere\r\nin the universe, you would think him crazy or yourself\r\nthe victim of a poor joke. To grasp a meaning, to\r\nunderstand, to identify a thing in a situation in which\r\nit is important, are thus equivalent terms; they express\r\nthe nerves of our intellectual life. Without them\r\nthere is (\u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e) lack of intellectual content, or (\u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e) intellectual\r\nconfusion and perplexity, or else (\u003ci\u003ec\u003c/i\u003e) intellectual\r\nperversion\u0026mdash;nonsense, insanity.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eKnowledge\r\nand meaning\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAll knowledge, all science, thus aims to grasp the\r\nmeaning of objects and events, and this process always\r\nconsists in taking them out of their apparent brute isolation\r\nas events, and finding them to be parts of some\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_118\" id=\"Page_118\"\u003e[Pg 118]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nlarger whole \u003ci\u003esuggested by them\u003c/i\u003e, which, in turn, \u003ci\u003eaccounts\r\nfor\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eexplains\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003einterprets them\u003c/i\u003e; \u003ci\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e renders them significant.\r\n(Compare above, p. 75.) Suppose that a stone\r\nwith peculiar markings has been found. What do these\r\nscratches mean? So far as the object forces the raising\r\nof this question, it is not understood; while so far as\r\nthe color and form that we see mean to us a stone, the\r\nobject is understood. It is such peculiar combinations\r\nof the understood and the nonunderstood that provoke\r\nthought. If at the end of the inquiry, the markings\r\nare decided to mean glacial scratches, obscure and\r\nperplexing traits have been translated into meanings\r\nalready understood: namely, the moving and grinding\r\npower of large bodies of ice and the friction thus\r\ninduced of one rock upon another. Something already\r\nunderstood in one situation has been transferred\r\nand applied to what is strange and perplexing in another,\r\nand thereby the latter has become plain and familiar, \u003ci\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e\r\nunderstood. This summary illustration discloses that\r\nour power to think effectively depends upon possession\r\nof a capital fund of meanings which may be applied\r\nwhen desired. (Compare what was said about deduction,\r\np. 94.)\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"center\"\u003eII. \u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eDirect and Indirect Understanding\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eDirect and\r\ncircuitous\r\nunderstanding\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn the above illustrations two types of grasping of\r\nmeaning are exemplified. When the English language\r\nis understood, the person grasps at once the meaning of\r\n\"paper.\" He may not, however, see any meaning or\r\nsense in the performance as a whole. Similarly, the\r\nperson identifies the object on sight as a stone; there\r\nis no secret, no mystery, no perplexity about that. But\r\nhe does not understand the markings on it. They have\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_119\" id=\"Page_119\"\u003e[Pg 119]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nsome meaning, but what is it? In one case, owing to\r\nfamiliar acquaintance, the thing and its meaning, up to\r\na certain point, are one. In the other, the thing and its\r\nmeaning are, temporarily at least, sundered, and meaning\r\nhas to be sought in order to understand the thing. In\r\none case understanding is direct, prompt, immediate; in\r\nthe other, it is roundabout and delayed.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eInteraction\r\nof the\r\ntwo types\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eMost languages have two sets of words to express\r\nthese two modes of understanding; one for the direct\r\ntaking in or grasp of meaning, the other for its circuitous\r\napprehension, thus: \u003cspan lang=\"el\" title=\"Greek: gnônai\"\u003e\u0026#947;\u0026#957;\u0026#969;\u0026#957;\u0026#945;\u0026#953;\u003c/span\u003e\r\nand \u003cspan lang=\"el\" title=\"Greek: eidenai\"\u003e\u0026#949;\u0026#953;\u0026#948;\u0026#949;\u0026#957;\u0026#945;\u0026#953;\u003c/span\u003e in Greek;\r\n\u003ci\u003enoscere\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003escire\u003c/i\u003e in Latin; \u003ci\u003ekennen\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003ewissen\u003c/i\u003e in German;\r\n\u003ci\u003econnaître\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003esavoir\u003c/i\u003e in French; while in English to be\r\n\u003ci\u003eacquainted with\u003c/i\u003e and to \u003ci\u003eknow of or about\u003c/i\u003e have been suggested\r\nas equivalents.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_22_22\" id=\"FNanchor_22_22\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_22_22\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[22]\u003c/a\u003e Now our intellectual life consists\r\nof a peculiar interaction between these two types of\r\nunderstanding. All judgment, all reflective inference,\r\npresupposes some lack of understanding, a partial\r\nabsence of meaning. We reflect in order that we may\r\nget hold of the full and adequate significance of what\r\nhappens. Nevertheless, \u003ci\u003esomething\u003c/i\u003e must be already\r\nunderstood, the mind must be in possession of some\r\nmeaning which it has mastered, or else thinking is impossible.\r\nWe think in order to grasp meaning, but\r\nnone the less every extension of knowledge makes us\r\naware of blind and opaque spots, where with less knowledge\r\nall had seemed obvious and natural. A scientist\r\nbrought into a new district will find many things that\r\nhe does not understand, where the native savage or\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_120\" id=\"Page_120\"\u003e[Pg 120]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nrustic will be wholly oblivious to any meanings beyond\r\nthose directly apparent. Some Indians brought to a\r\nlarge city remained stolid at the sight of mechanical\r\nwonders of bridge, trolley, and telephone, but were held\r\nspellbound by the sight of workmen climbing poles to\r\nrepair wires. Increase of the store of meanings makes\r\nus conscious of new problems, while only through translation\r\nof the new perplexities into what is already familiar\r\nand plain do we understand or solve these problems.\r\nThis is the constant spiral movement of knowledge.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eIntellectual\r\nprogress\r\na rhythm\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOur progress in genuine knowledge always consists \u003ci\u003ein\r\npart in the discovery of something not understood in what\r\nhad previously been taken for granted as plain, obvious,\r\nmatter-of-course, and in part in the use of meanings that\r\nare directly grasped without question, as instruments\r\nfor getting hold of obscure, doubtful, and perplexing\r\nmeanings\u003c/i\u003e. No object is so familiar, so obvious, so\r\ncommonplace that it may not unexpectedly present, in a\r\nnovel situation, some problem, and thus arouse reflection\r\nin order to understand it. No object or principle is\r\nso strange, peculiar, or remote that it may not be dwelt\r\nupon till its meaning becomes familiar\u0026mdash;taken in on\r\nsight without reflection. We may come to \u003ci\u003esee\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eperceive\u003c/i\u003e,\r\n\u003ci\u003erecognize\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003egrasp\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eseize\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003elay hold of\u003c/i\u003e principles, laws, abstract\r\ntruths\u0026mdash;\u003ci\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e to understand their meaning in very immediate\r\nfashion. Our intellectual progress consists, as\r\nhas been said, in a rhythm of direct understanding\u0026mdash;technically\r\ncalled \u003ci\u003eap\u003c/i\u003eprehension\u0026mdash;with indirect, mediated\r\nunderstanding\u0026mdash;technically called \u003ci\u003ecom\u003c/i\u003eprehension.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e§ 2. \u003ci\u003eThe Process of Acquiring Meanings\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eFamiliarity\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe first problem that comes up in connection with\r\ndirect understanding is how a store of directly apprehen\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_121\" id=\"Page_121\"\u003e[Pg 121]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003esible\r\nmeanings is built up. How do we learn to view things\r\non sight as significant members of a situation, or as\r\nhaving, as a matter of course, specific meanings? Our\r\nchief difficulty in answering this question lies in the\r\nthoroughness with which the lesson of familiar things\r\nhas been learnt. Thought can more easily traverse an\r\nunexplored region than it can undo what has been so\r\nthoroughly done as to be ingrained in unconscious\r\nhabit. We apprehend chairs, tables, books, trees,\r\nhorses, clouds, stars, rain, so promptly and directly that\r\nit is hard to realize that as meanings they had once to\r\nbe acquired,\u0026mdash;the meanings are now so much parts of\r\nthe things themselves.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eConfusion\r\nis prior to\r\nfamiliarity\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn an often quoted passage, Mr. James has said: \"The\r\nbaby, assailed by eyes, ears, nose, skin, and entrails at\r\nonce, feels it all as one great blooming, buzzing confusion.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_23_23\" id=\"FNanchor_23_23\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_23_23\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[23]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nMr. James is speaking of a baby\u0027s world\r\ntaken as a whole; the description, however, is equally\r\napplicable to the way any new thing strikes an adult, so\r\nfar as the thing is really new and strange. To the traditional\r\n\"cat in a strange garret,\" everything is blurred\r\nand confused; the wonted marks that label things so as\r\nto separate them from one another are lacking. Foreign\r\nlanguages that we do not understand always seem jabberings,\r\nbabblings, in which it is impossible to fix a definite,\r\nclear-cut, individualized group of sounds. The\r\ncountryman in the crowded city street, the landlubber\r\nat sea, the ignoramus in sport at a contest between experts\r\nin a complicated game, are further instances. Put\r\nan unexperienced man in a factory, and at first the work\r\nseems to him a meaningless medley. All strangers of\r\nanother race proverbially look alike to the visiting\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_122\" id=\"Page_122\"\u003e[Pg 122]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nforeigner. Only gross differences of size or color are\r\nperceived by an outsider in a flock of sheep, each of\r\nwhich is perfectly individualized to the shepherd. A\r\ndiffusive blur and an indiscriminately shifting suction\r\ncharacterize what we do not understand. The problem\r\nof the acquisition of meaning by things, or (stated in\r\nanother way) of forming habits of simple apprehension,\r\nis thus the problem of introducing (\u003ci\u003ei\u003c/i\u003e) \u003ci\u003edefiniteness\u003c/i\u003e and\r\n\u003ci\u003edistinction\u003c/i\u003e and (\u003ci\u003eii\u003c/i\u003e) \u003ci\u003econsistency\u003c/i\u003e or \u003ci\u003estability\u003c/i\u003e of meaning\r\ninto what is otherwise vague and wavering.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003ePractical\r\nresponses\r\nclarify\r\nconfusion\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe acquisition of definiteness and of coherency (or\r\nconstancy) of meanings is derived primarily from practical\r\nactivities. By rolling an object, the child makes its\r\nroundness appreciable; by bouncing it, he singles out\r\nits elasticity; by throwing it, he makes weight its conspicuous\r\ndistinctive factor. Not through the senses, but by\r\nmeans of the reaction, the responsive adjustment, is the\r\nimpression made distinctive, and given a character\r\nmarked off from other qualities that call out unlike reactions.\r\nChildren, for example, are usually quite slow\r\nin apprehending differences of color. Differences from\r\nthe standpoint of the adult so glaring that it is impossible\r\nnot to note them are recognized and recalled with great\r\ndifficulty. Doubtless they do not all \u003ci\u003efeel\u003c/i\u003e alike, but there\r\nis no intellectual recognition of what makes the difference.\r\nThe redness or greenness or blueness of the object\r\ndoes not tend to call out a reaction that is sufficiently\r\npeculiar to give prominence or distinction to the color\r\ntrait. Gradually, however, certain characteristic habitual\r\nresponses associate themselves with certain things; the\r\nwhite becomes the sign, say, of milk and sugar, to which\r\nthe child reacts favorably; blue becomes the sign of a\r\ndress that the child likes to wear, and so on: and the\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_123\" id=\"Page_123\"\u003e[Pg 123]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ndistinctive reactions tend to single out color qualities\r\nfrom other things in which they had been submerged.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eWe identify\r\nby use or\r\nfunction\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eTake another example. We have little difficulty in\r\ndistinguishing from one another rakes, hoes, plows and\r\nharrows, shovels and spades. Each has its own associated\r\ncharacteristic use and function. We may have,\r\nhowever, great difficulty in recalling the difference between\r\nserrate and dentate, ovoid and obovoid, in the\r\nshapes and edges of leaves, or between acids in \u003ci\u003eic\u003c/i\u003e and\r\nin \u003ci\u003eous\u003c/i\u003e. There is some difference; but just what? Or,\r\nwe know what the difference is; but which is which?\r\nVariations in form, size, color, and arrangement of parts\r\nhave much less to do, and the uses, purposes, and functions\r\nof things and of their parts much more to do,\r\nwith distinctness of character and meaning than we\r\nshould be likely to think. What misleads us is the fact\r\nthat the qualities of form, size, color, and so on, are\r\n\u003ci\u003enow\u003c/i\u003e so distinct that we fail to see that the problem is\r\nprecisely to account for the way in which they originally\r\nobtained their definiteness and conspicuousness.\r\nSo far as we sit passive before objects, they are not distinguished\r\nout of a vague blur which swallows them all.\r\nDifferences in the pitch and intensity of sounds leave\r\nbehind a different feeling, but until we assume different\r\nattitudes toward them, or \u003ci\u003edo\u003c/i\u003e something special in reference\r\nto them, their vague difference cannot be \u003ci\u003eintellectually\u003c/i\u003e\r\ngripped and retained.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eChildren\u0027s\r\ndrawings\r\nillustrate\r\ndomination\r\nby value\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eChildren\u0027s drawings afford a further exemplification\r\nof the same principle. Perspective does not exist, for\r\nthe child\u0027s interest is not in \u003ci\u003epictorial representation\u003c/i\u003e, but\r\nin the \u003ci\u003ethings\u003c/i\u003e represented; and while perspective is\r\nessential to the former, it is no part of the characteristic\r\nuses and values of the things themselves. The house\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_124\" id=\"Page_124\"\u003e[Pg 124]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nis drawn with transparent walls, because the rooms,\r\nchairs, beds, people inside, are the important things in\r\nthe house-meaning; smoke always comes out of the\r\nchimney\u0026mdash;otherwise, why have a chimney at all? At\r\nChristmas time, the stockings may be drawn almost as\r\nlarge as the house or even so large that they have to be\r\nput outside of it:\u0026mdash;in any case, it is the scale of values\r\nin use that furnishes the scale for their qualities, the pictures\r\nbeing diagrammatic reminders of these values, not\r\nimpartial records of physical and sensory qualities. One\r\nof the chief difficulties felt by most persons in learning\r\nthe art of pictorial representation is that habitual uses\r\nand results of use have become so intimately read into\r\nthe character of things that it is practically impossible to\r\nshut them out at will.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eAs do sounds\r\nused as\r\nlanguage\r\nsigns\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe acquiring of meaning by sounds, in virtue of which\r\nthey become words, is perhaps the most striking illustration\r\nthat can be found of the way in which mere sensory\r\nstimuli acquire definiteness and constancy of meaning\r\nand are thereby themselves defined and interconnected\r\nfor purposes of recognition. Language is a specially\r\ngood example because there are hundreds or even thousands\r\nof words in which meaning is now so thoroughly\r\nconsolidated with physical qualities as to be directly\r\napprehended, while in the case of words it is easier\r\nto recognize that this connection has been gradually and\r\nlaboriously acquired than in the case of physical objects\r\nsuch as chairs, tables, buttons, trees, stones, hills, flowers,\r\nand so on, where it seems as if the union of intellectual\r\ncharacter and meaning with the physical fact were aboriginal,\r\nand thrust upon us passively rather than acquired\r\nthrough active explorations. And in the case of the\r\nmeaning of words, we see readily that it is by making\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_125\" id=\"Page_125\"\u003e[Pg 125]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nsounds and noting the results which follow, by listening\r\nto the sounds of others and watching the activities\r\nwhich accompany them, that a given sound finally\r\nbecomes the stable bearer of a meaning.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eSummary\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFamiliar acquaintance with meanings thus signifies\r\nthat we have acquired in the presence of objects definite\r\nattitudes of response which lead us, without reflection,\r\nto anticipate certain possible consequences. The definiteness\r\nof the expectation defines the meaning or takes\r\nit out of the vague and pulpy; its habitual, recurrent\r\ncharacter gives the meaning constancy, stability, consistency,\r\nor takes it out of the fluctuating and wavering.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e§ 3. \u003ci\u003eConceptions and Meaning\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eA conception\r\nis a\r\ndefinite\r\nmeaning\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe word \u003ci\u003emeaning\u003c/i\u003e is a familiar everyday term; the\r\nwords \u003ci\u003econception\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003enotion\u003c/i\u003e, are both popular and technical\r\nterms. Strictly speaking, they involve, however, nothing\r\nnew; any meaning sufficiently individualized to be\r\ndirectly grasped and readily used, and thus fixed by a\r\nword, is a conception or notion. Linguistically, every\r\ncommon noun is the carrier of a meaning, while proper\r\nnouns and common nouns with the word \u003ci\u003ethis\u003c/i\u003e or \u003ci\u003ethat\u003c/i\u003e prefixed,\r\nrefer to the things in which the meanings are exemplified.\r\nThat thinking both employs and expands\r\nnotions, conceptions, is then simply saying that in inference\r\nand judgment we use meanings, and that this use\r\nalso corrects and widens them.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003ewhich is\r\nstandardized\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eVarious persons talk about an object not physically\r\npresent, and yet all get the same material of belief.\r\nThe same person in different moments often refers to the\r\nsame object or kind of objects. The sense experience,\r\nthe physical conditions, the psychological conditions,\r\nvary, but the same meaning is conserved. If pounds\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_126\" id=\"Page_126\"\u003e[Pg 126]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\narbitrarily changed their weight, and foot rules their\r\nlength, while we were using them, obviously we could\r\nnot weigh nor measure. This would be our intellectual\r\nposition if meanings could not be maintained with a certain\r\nstability and constancy through a variety of physical\r\nand personal changes.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eBy it we\r\nidentify the\r\nunknown\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eand supplement\r\nthe\r\nsensibly\r\npresent\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eand also\r\nsystematize\r\nthings\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eTo insist upon the fundamental importance of conceptions\r\nwould, accordingly, only repeat what has been\r\nsaid. We shall merely summarize, saying that conceptions,\r\nor standard meanings, are instruments (\u003ci\u003ei\u003c/i\u003e) of identification,\r\n(\u003ci\u003eii\u003c/i\u003e) of supplementation, and (\u003ci\u003eiii\u003c/i\u003e) of placing\r\nin a system. Suppose a little speck of light hitherto\r\nunseen is detected in the heavens. Unless there is a\r\nstore of meanings to fall back upon as tools of inquiry\r\nand reasoning, that speck of light will remain just what\r\nit is to the senses\u0026mdash;a mere speck of light. For all that\r\nit leads to, it might as well be a mere irritation of the\r\noptic nerve. Given the stock of meanings acquired in\r\nprior experience, this speck of light is mentally attacked\r\nby means of appropriate concepts. Does it indicate\r\nasteroid, or comet, or a new-forming sun, or a nebula\r\nresulting from some cosmic collision or disintegration?\r\nEach of these conceptions has its own specific and differentiating\r\ncharacters, which are then sought for by\r\nminute and persistent inquiry. As a result, then, the\r\nspeck is identified, we will say, as a comet. Through\r\na standard meaning, it gets identity and stability of\r\ncharacter.\r\nSupplementation then takes place. All\r\nthe known qualities of comets are read into this particular\r\nthing, even though they have not been as yet\r\nobserved. All that the astronomers of the past have\r\nlearned about the paths and structure of comets becomes\r\navailable capital with which to interpret the speck\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_127\" id=\"Page_127\"\u003e[Pg 127]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof light.\r\nFinally, this comet-meaning is itself not isolated;\r\nit is a related portion of the whole system of\r\nastronomic knowledge. Suns, planets, satellites, nebulæ,\r\ncomets, meteors, star dust\u0026mdash;all these conceptions\r\nhave a certain mutuality of reference and interaction,\r\nand when the speck of light is identified as meaning a\r\ncomet, it is at once adopted as a full member in this vast\r\nkingdom of beliefs.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eImportance\r\nof system to\r\nknowledge\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eDarwin, in an autobiographical sketch, says that\r\nwhen a youth he told the geologist, Sidgwick, of finding\r\na tropical shell in a certain gravel pit. Thereupon\r\nSidgwick said it must have been thrown there by some\r\nperson, adding: \"But if it were really embedded there,\r\nit would be the greatest misfortune to geology, because\r\nit would overthrow all that we know about the superficial\r\ndeposits of the Midland Counties\"\u0026mdash;since they were\r\nglacial. And then Darwin adds: \"I was then utterly\r\nastonished at Sidgwick not being delighted at so wonderful\r\na fact as a tropical shell being found near the\r\nsurface in the middle of England. Nothing before had\r\nmade me thoroughly realize \u003ci\u003ethat science consists in grouping\r\nfacts so that general laws or conclusions may be drawn\r\nfrom them\u003c/i\u003e.\" This instance (which might, of course, be\r\nduplicated from any branch of science) indicates how\r\nscientific notions make explicit the systematizing tendency\r\ninvolved in all use of concepts.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e§ 4. \u003ci\u003eWhat Conceptions are Not\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe idea that a conception is a meaning that supplies\r\na standard rule for the identification and placing\r\nof particulars may be contrasted with some current misapprehensions\r\nof its nature.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eA concept\r\nis not a bare\r\nresidue\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e1. Conceptions are not derived from a multitude of\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_128\" id=\"Page_128\"\u003e[Pg 128]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ndifferent definite objects by leaving out the qualities in\r\nwhich they differ and retaining those in which they agree.\r\nThe origin of concepts is sometimes described to be as\r\nif a child began with a lot of different particular things,\r\nsay particular dogs; his own Fido, his neighbor\u0027s Carlo,\r\nhis cousin\u0027s Tray. Having all these different objects before\r\nhim, he analyzes them into a lot of different qualities,\r\nsay (\u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e) color, (\u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e) size, (\u003ci\u003ec\u003c/i\u003e) shape, (\u003ci\u003ed\u003c/i\u003e) number of legs,\r\n(\u003ci\u003ee\u003c/i\u003e) quantity and quality of hair, (\u003ci\u003ef\u003c/i\u003e) digestive organs,\r\nand so on; and then strikes out all the unlike qualities\r\n(such as color, size, shape, hair), retaining traits such\r\nas quadruped and domesticated, which they all have in\r\ngeneral.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003ebut an active\r\nattitude\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAs a matter of fact, the child begins with whatever\r\nsignificance he has got out of the one dog he has seen,\r\nheard, and handled. He has found that he can carry\r\nover from one experience of this object to subsequent\r\nexperience certain expectations of certain characteristic\r\nmodes of behavior\u0026mdash;may expect these even before\r\nthey show themselves. He tends to assume this attitude\r\nof anticipation whenever any clue or stimulus presents\r\nitself; whenever the object gives him any excuse for\r\nit. Thus he might call cats little dogs, or horses\r\nbig dogs. But finding that other expected traits and\r\nmodes of behavior are not fulfilled, he is forced to\r\nthrow out certain traits from the dog-meaning, while\r\nby contrast (see p. 90) certain other traits are selected\r\nand emphasized. As he further applies the meaning to\r\nother dogs, the dog-meaning gets still further defined\r\nand refined. He does not begin with a lot of ready-made\r\nobjects from which he extracts a common meaning;\r\nhe tries to apply to every new experience whatever\r\nfrom his old experience will help him understand it,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_129\" id=\"Page_129\"\u003e[Pg 129]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nand as this process of constant assumption and experimentation\r\nis fulfilled and refuted by results, his conceptions\r\nget body and clearness.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eIt is general\r\nbecause\r\nof its application\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e2. Similarly, conceptions are general because of their\r\nuse and application, not because of their ingredients.\r\nThe view of the origin of conception in an impossible\r\nsort of analysis has as its counterpart the idea that the\r\nconception is made up out of all the like elements that\r\nremain after dissection of a number of individuals. Not\r\nso; the moment a meaning is gained, it is a working\r\ntool of further apprehensions, an instrument of understanding\r\nother things. Thereby the meaning is \u003ci\u003eextended\u003c/i\u003e\r\nto cover them. Generality resides in application to the\r\ncomprehension of new cases, not in constituent parts.\r\nA collection of traits left as the common residuum, the\r\n\u003ci\u003ecaput mortuum\u003c/i\u003e, of a million objects, would be merely a\r\ncollection, an inventory or aggregate, not a \u003ci\u003egeneral idea\u003c/i\u003e;\r\na striking trait emphasized in any one experience which\r\nthen served to help understand some one other experience,\r\nwould become, in virtue of that service of application,\r\nin so far general. Synthesis is not a matter of\r\nmechanical addition, but of application of something\r\ndiscovered in one case to bring other cases into line.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e§ 5. \u003ci\u003eDefinition and Organization of Meanings\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eDefiniteness\r\n\u003ci\u003eversus\u003c/i\u003e\r\nvagueness\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eIn the\r\nabstract\r\nmeaning is\r\nintension\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eIn its\r\napplication\r\nit is\r\nextension\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eA being that cannot understand at all is at least protected\r\nfrom \u003ci\u003emis\u003c/i\u003e-understandings. But beings that get\r\nknowledge by means of inferring and interpreting, by\r\njudging what things signify in relation to one another,\r\nare constantly exposed to the danger of \u003ci\u003emis\u003c/i\u003e-apprehension,\r\n\u003ci\u003emis\u003c/i\u003e-understanding, \u003ci\u003emis\u003c/i\u003e-taking\u0026mdash;taking a thing amiss.\r\nA constant source of misunderstanding and mistake\r\nis indefiniteness of meaning. Through vagueness of\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_130\" id=\"Page_130\"\u003e[Pg 130]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nmeaning we misunderstand other people, things, and ourselves;\r\nthrough its ambiguity we distort and pervert.\r\nConscious distortion of meaning may be enjoyed as\r\nnonsense; erroneous meanings, if clear-cut, may be\r\nfollowed up and got rid of. But vague meanings are\r\ntoo gelatinous to offer matter for analysis, and too\r\npulpy to afford support to other beliefs. They evade testing\r\nand responsibility. Vagueness disguises the unconscious\r\nmixing together of different meanings, and facilitates\r\nthe substitution of one meaning for another, and\r\ncovers up the failure to have any precise meaning at all.\r\nIt is the aboriginal logical sin\u0026mdash;the source from which\r\nflow most bad intellectual consequences. Totally to\r\neliminate indefiniteness is impossible; to reduce it in extent\r\nand in force requires sincerity and vigor. To be\r\nclear or perspicuous a meaning must be detached, single,\r\nself-contained, homogeneous as it were, throughout.\r\nThe technical name for any meaning which is thus individualized\r\nis \u003ci\u003eintension\u003c/i\u003e. The process of arriving at such\r\nunits of meaning (and of stating them when reached) is\r\n\u003ci\u003edefinition\u003c/i\u003e. The intension of the terms \u003ci\u003eman\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eriver\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eseed\u003c/i\u003e,\r\n\u003ci\u003ehonesty\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003ecapital\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003esupreme court\u003c/i\u003e, is the meaning that\r\n\u003ci\u003eexclusively\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003echaracteristically\u003c/i\u003e attaches to those terms.\r\nThis meaning is set forth in the definitions of those\r\nwords.\r\nThe test of the distinctness of a meaning is\r\nthat it shall successfully mark off a group of things\r\nthat exemplify the meaning from other groups, especially\r\nof those objects that convey nearly allied meanings.\r\nThe river-meaning (or character) must serve to \u003ci\u003edesignate\u003c/i\u003e\r\nthe Rhone, the Rhine, the Mississippi, the Hudson, the\r\nWabash, in spite of their varieties of place, length,\r\nquality of water; and must be such as \u003ci\u003enot\u003c/i\u003e to suggest\r\nocean currents, ponds, or brooks. This use of a mean\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_131\" id=\"Page_131\"\u003e[Pg 131]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003eing\r\nto mark off and group together a variety of distinct\r\nexistences constitutes its \u003ci\u003eextension\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eDefinition\r\nand\r\ndivision\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAs definition sets forth intension, so division (or the\r\nreverse process, classification) expounds extension. Intension\r\nand extension, definition and division, are clearly\r\ncorrelative; in language previously used, \u003ci\u003eintension\u003c/i\u003e is meaning\r\nas a principle of identifying particulars; extension is\r\nthe group of particulars identified and distinguished.\r\nMeaning, as extension, would be wholly in the air or unreal,\r\ndid it not point to some object or group of objects; while\r\nobjects would be as isolated and independent intellectually\r\nas they seem to be spatially, were they not bound\r\ninto groups or classes on the basis of characteristic\r\nmeanings which they constantly suggest and exemplify.\r\nTaken together, definition and division put us in possession\r\nof individualized or definite meanings and indicate\r\nto what group of objects meanings refer. They typify\r\nthe fixation and the organization of meanings. In the\r\ndegree in which the meanings of any set of experiences\r\nare so cleared up as to serve as principles for grouping\r\nthose experiences in relation to one another, that set of\r\nparticulars becomes a science; \u003ci\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e definition and classification\r\nare the marks of a science, as distinct from both\r\nunrelated heaps of miscellaneous information and from\r\nthe habits that introduce coherence into our experience\r\nwithout our being aware of their operation.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eDefinitions are of three types, \u003ci\u003edenotative\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eexpository\u003c/i\u003e,\r\n\u003ci\u003escientific\u003c/i\u003e. Of these, the first and third are logically\r\nimportant, while the expository type is socially and\r\npedagogically important as an intervening step.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eWe define\r\nby picking\r\nout\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eI. Denotative. A blind man can never have an\r\nadequate understanding of the meaning of \u003ci\u003ecolor\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003ered\u003c/i\u003e;\r\na seeing person can acquire the knowledge only by hav\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_132\" id=\"Page_132\"\u003e[Pg 132]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003eing\r\ncertain things designated in such a way as to fix attention\r\nupon some of their qualities. This method of\r\ndelimiting a meaning by calling out a certain attitude\r\ntoward objects may be called \u003ci\u003edenotative\u003c/i\u003e or \u003ci\u003eindicative\u003c/i\u003e.\r\nIt is required for all sense qualities\u0026mdash;sounds, tastes,\r\ncolors\u0026mdash;and equally for all emotional and moral qualities.\r\nThe meanings of \u003ci\u003ehonesty\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003esympathy\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003ehatred\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003efear\u003c/i\u003e, must be\r\ngrasped by having them presented in an individual\u0027s\r\nfirst-hand experience. The reaction of educational reformers\r\nagainst linguistic and bookish training has always\r\ntaken the form of demanding recourse to personal experience.\r\nHowever advanced the person is in knowledge\r\nand in scientific training, understanding of a new subject,\r\nor a new aspect of an old subject, must always be through\r\nthese acts of experiencing directly the existence or\r\nquality in question.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eand also by\r\ncombining\r\nwhat is\r\nalready\r\nmore\r\ndefinite,\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e2. Expository. Given a certain store of meanings\r\nwhich have been directly or denotatively marked out,\r\nlanguage becomes a resource by which imaginative\r\ncombinations and variations may be built up. A color\r\nmay be defined to one who has not experienced it\r\nas lying between green and blue; a tiger may be defined\r\n(\u003ci\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e the idea of it made more definite) by selecting some\r\nqualities from known members of the cat tribe and combining\r\nthem with qualities of size and weight derived\r\nfrom other objects. Illustrations are of the nature of\r\nexpository definitions; so are the accounts of meanings\r\ngiven in a dictionary. By taking better-known meanings\r\nand associating them,\u0026mdash;the attained store of meanings\r\nof the community in which one resides is put at one\u0027s\r\ndisposal. But in themselves these definitions are secondhand\r\nand conventional; there is danger that instead of\r\ninciting one to effort after personal experiences that\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_133\" id=\"Page_133\"\u003e[Pg 133]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwill exemplify and verify them, they will be accepted on\r\nauthority as \u003ci\u003esubstitutes\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eand by discovering\r\nmethod of\r\nproduction\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e3. Scientific. Even popular definitions serve as rules\r\nfor identifying and classifying individuals, but the purpose\r\nof such identifications and classifications is mainly\r\npractical and social, not intellectual. To conceive the\r\nwhale as a fish does not interfere with the success\r\nof whalers, nor does it prevent recognition of a whale\r\nwhen seen, while to conceive it not as fish but as\r\nmammal serves the practical end equally well, and also\r\nfurnishes a much more valuable principle for scientific\r\nidentification and classification. Popular definitions select\r\ncertain fairly obvious traits as keys to classification.\r\nScientific definitions select \u003ci\u003econditions of causation, production,\r\nand generation\u003c/i\u003e as their characteristic material.\r\nThe traits used by the popular definition do not help\r\nus to understand why an object has its common meanings\r\nand qualities; they simply state the fact that it\r\ndoes have them. Causal and genetic definitions fix\r\nupon the way an object is constructed as the key to\r\nits being a certain kind of object, and thereby explain\r\nwhy it has its class or common traits.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eContrast of\r\ncausal and\r\ndescriptive\r\ndefinitions\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eScience is\r\nthe most\r\nperfect type\r\nof knowledge\r\nbecause\r\nit\r\nuses causal\r\ndefinitions\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf, for example, a layman of considerable practical\r\nexperience were asked what he meant or understood by\r\n\u003ci\u003emetal\u003c/i\u003e, he would probably reply in terms of the qualities\r\nuseful (\u003ci\u003ei\u003c/i\u003e) in recognizing any given metal and (\u003ci\u003eii\u003c/i\u003e) in the\r\narts. Smoothness, hardness, glossiness, and brilliancy,\r\nheavy weight for its size, would probably be included\r\nin his definition, because such traits enable us to identify\r\nspecific things when we see and touch them; the serviceable\r\nproperties of capacity for being hammered and\r\npulled without breaking, of being softened by heat and\r\nhardened by cold, of retaining the shape and form\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_134\" id=\"Page_134\"\u003e[Pg 134]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ngiven, of resistance to pressure and decay, would probably\r\nbe included\u0026mdash;whether or not such terms as \u003ci\u003emalleable\u003c/i\u003e\r\nor \u003ci\u003efusible\u003c/i\u003e were used. Now a scientific conception,\r\ninstead of using, even with additions, traits of this\r\nkind, determines \u003ci\u003emeaning on a different basis\u003c/i\u003e. The\r\npresent definition of metal is about like this: Metal\r\nmeans any chemical element that enters into combination\r\nwith oxygen so as to form a base, \u003ci\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e a compound\r\nthat combines with an acid to form a salt. This scientific\r\ndefinition is founded, not on directly perceived\r\nqualities nor on directly useful properties, but on the\r\n\u003ci\u003eway in which certain things are causally related to other\r\nthings\u003c/i\u003e; \u003ci\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e it denotes a relation. As chemical concepts\r\nbecome more and more those of relationships of interaction\r\nin constituting other substances, so physical concepts\r\nexpress more and more relations of operation:\r\nmathematical, as expressing functions of dependence\r\nand order of grouping; biological, relations of differentiation\r\nof descent, effected through adjustment of\r\nvarious environments; and so on through the sphere of\r\nthe sciences. In short, our conceptions attain a maximum\r\nof definite individuality and of generality (or applicability)\r\nin the degree to which they show how things\r\ndepend upon one another or influence one another, instead\r\nof expressing the qualities that objects possess\r\nstatically. The ideal of a system of scientific conceptions\r\nis to attain continuity, freedom, and flexibility of\r\ntransition in passing from any fact and meaning to any\r\nother; this demand is met in the degree in which we\r\nlay hold of the dynamic ties that hold things together\r\nin a continuously changing process\u0026mdash;a principle that\r\nstates insight into mode of production or growth.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_135\" id=\"Page_135\"\u003e[Pg 135]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003chr style=\"width: 65%;\" /\u003e\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"CHAPTER_TEN\" id=\"CHAPTER_TEN\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eCHAPTER TEN\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eCONCRETE AND ABSTRACT THINKING\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eFalse\r\nnotions of\r\nconcrete\r\nand abstract\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe maxim enjoined upon teachers, \"to proceed from\r\nthe concrete to the abstract,\" is perhaps familiar rather\r\nthan comprehended. Few who read and hear it gain a\r\nclear conception of the starting-point, the concrete; of\r\nthe nature of the goal, the abstract; and of the exact\r\nnature of the path to be traversed in going from one to\r\nthe other. At times the injunction is positively misunderstood,\r\nbeing taken to mean that education should\r\nadvance from things to thought\u0026mdash;as if any dealing\r\nwith things in which thinking is not involved could\r\npossibly be educative. So understood, the maxim encourages\r\nmechanical routine or sensuous excitation\r\nat one end of the educational scale\u0026mdash;the lower\u0026mdash;and\r\nacademic and unapplied learning at the upper\r\nend.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eActually, all dealing with things, even the child\u0027s,\r\nis immersed in inferences; things are clothed by the\r\nsuggestions they arouse, and are significant as challenges\r\nto interpretation or as evidences to substantiate\r\na belief. Nothing could be more unnatural than instruction\r\nin things without thought; in sense-perceptions\r\nwithout judgments based upon them. And if the\r\nabstract to which we are to proceed denotes thought\r\napart from things, the goal recommended is formal and\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_136\" id=\"Page_136\"\u003e[Pg 136]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nempty, for effective thought always refers, more or less\r\ndirectly, to things.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eDirect and\r\nindirect understanding\r\nagain\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eYet the maxim has a meaning which, understood and\r\nsupplemented, states the line of development of logical\r\ncapacity. What is this signification? Concrete denotes\r\na meaning definitely marked off from other meanings so\r\nthat it is readily apprehended by itself. When we hear\r\nthe words, \u003ci\u003etable\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003echair\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003estove\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003ecoat\u003c/i\u003e, we do not have to\r\nreflect in order to grasp what is meant. The terms\r\nconvey meaning so directly that no effort at translating\r\nis needed. The meanings of some terms and things,\r\nhowever, are grasped only by first calling to mind more\r\nfamiliar things and then tracing out connections between\r\nthem and what we do not understand. Roughly\r\nspeaking, the former kind of meanings is concrete; the\r\nlatter abstract.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eWhat is\r\nfamiliar is\r\nmentally\r\nconcrete\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eTo one who is thoroughly at home in physics and\r\nchemistry, the notions of \u003ci\u003eatom\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003emolecule\u003c/i\u003e are fairly\r\nconcrete. They are constantly used without involving\r\nany labor of thought in apprehending what they mean.\r\nBut the layman and the beginner in science have first to\r\nremind themselves of things with which they already\r\nare well acquainted, and go through a process of slow\r\ntranslation; the terms \u003ci\u003eatom\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003emolecule\u003c/i\u003e losing, moreover,\r\ntheir hard-won meaning only too easily if familiar\r\nthings, and the line of transition from them to the\r\nstrange, drop out of mind. The same difference is\r\nillustrated by any technical terms: \u003ci\u003ecoefficient\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003eexponent\u003c/i\u003e\r\nin algebra, \u003ci\u003etriangle\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003esquare\u003c/i\u003e in their geometric as\r\ndistinct from their popular meanings; \u003ci\u003ecapital\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci\u003evalue\u003c/i\u003e\r\nas used in political economy, and so on.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003ePractical\r\nthings are\r\nfamiliar\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe difference as noted is purely relative to the\r\nintellectual progress of an individual; what is abstract\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_137\" id=\"Page_137\"\u003e[Pg 137]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nat one period of growth is concrete at another; or even\r\nthe contrary, as one finds that things supposed to be\r\nthoroughly familiar involve strange factors and unsolved\r\nproblems. There is, nevertheless, a general line of\r\ncleavage which, deciding upon the whole what things\r\nfall within the limits of familiar acquaintance and what\r\nwithout, marks off the concrete and the abstract in a\r\nmore permanent way. \u003ci\u003eThese limits are fixed mainly by\r\nthe demands of practical life.\u003c/i\u003e Things such as sticks\r\nand stones, meat and potatoes, houses and trees, are\r\nsuch constant features of the environment of which we\r\nhave to take account in order to live, that their important\r\nmeanings are soon learnt, and indissolubly\r\nassociated with objects. We are acquainted with a\r\nthing (or it is familiar to us) when we have so much to\r\ndo with it that its strange and unexpected corners are\r\nrubbed off. The necessities of social intercourse convey\r\nto adults a like concreteness upon such terms as\r\n\u003ci\u003etaxes\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eelections\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003ewages\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003ethe law\u003c/i\u003e, and so on. Things the\r\nmeaning of which I personally do not take in directly,\r\nappliances of cook, carpenter, or weaver, for example,\r\nare nevertheless unhesitatingly classed as concrete,\r\nsince they are so directly connected with our common\r\nsocial life.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eThe theoretical,\r\nor\r\nstrictly intellectual,\r\nis abstract\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBy contrast, the abstract is the \u003ci\u003etheoretical\u003c/i\u003e, or that\r\nnot intimately associated with practical concerns. The\r\nabstract thinker (the man of pure science as he is sometimes\r\ncalled) deliberately abstracts from application in\r\nlife; that is, he leaves practical uses out of account.\r\nThis, however, is a merely negative statement. What\r\nremains when connections with use and application are\r\nexcluded? \u003ci\u003eEvidently only what has to do with knowing\r\nconsidered as an end in itself.\u003c/i\u003e Many notions of science\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_138\" id=\"Page_138\"\u003e[Pg 138]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nare abstract, not only because they cannot be understood\r\nwithout a long apprenticeship in the science (which is\r\nequally true of technical matters in the arts), but also\r\nbecause the whole content of their meaning has been\r\nframed for the sole purpose of facilitating further knowledge,\r\ninquiry, and speculation. \u003ci\u003eWhen thinking is used\r\nas a means to some end, good, or value beyond itself, it is\r\nconcrete; when it is employed simply as a means to\r\nmore thinking, it is abstract.\u003c/i\u003e To a theorist an idea is\r\nadequate and self-contained just because it engages and\r\nrewards thought; to a medical practitioner, an engineer,\r\nan artist, a merchant, a politician, it is complete only\r\nwhen employed in the furthering of some interest in\r\nlife\u0026mdash;health, wealth, beauty, goodness, success, or what\r\nyou will.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eContempt\r\nfor theory\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFor the great majority of men under ordinary circumstances,\r\nthe practical exigencies of life are almost,\r\nif not quite, coercive. Their main business is the\r\nproper conduct of their affairs. Whatever is of significance\r\nonly as affording scope for thinking is pallid and\r\nremote\u0026mdash;almost artificial. Hence the contempt felt by\r\nthe practical and successful executive for the \"mere\r\ntheorist\"; hence his conviction that certain things may\r\nbe all very well in theory, but that they will not do in\r\npractice; in general, the depreciatory way in which he\r\nuses the terms \u003ci\u003eabstract\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003etheoretical\u003c/i\u003e, and \u003ci\u003eintellectual\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;as\r\ndistinct from \u003ci\u003eintelligent\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eBut theory\r\nis highly\r\npractical\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis attitude is justified, of course, under certain conditions.\r\nBut depreciation of theory does not contain\r\nthe whole truth, as common or practical sense recognizes.\r\nThere is such a thing, even from the common-sense\r\nstandpoint, as being \"too practical,\" as being so\r\nintent upon the immediately practical as not to see\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_139\" id=\"Page_139\"\u003e[Pg 139]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nbeyond the end of one\u0027s nose or as to cut off the limb\r\nupon which one is sitting. The question is one of\r\nlimits, of degrees and adjustments, rather than one of\r\nabsolute separation. Truly practical men give their\r\nminds free play about a subject without asking too\r\nclosely at every point for the advantage to be gained;\r\nexclusive preoccupation with matters of use and application\r\nso narrows the horizon as in the long run to defeat\r\nitself. It does not pay to tether one\u0027s thoughts to\r\nthe post of use with too short a rope. Power in action\r\nrequires some largeness and imaginativeness of vision.\r\nMen must at least have enough interest in thinking for\r\nthe sake of thinking to escape the limits of routine and\r\ncustom. Interest in knowledge for the sake of knowledge,\r\nin thinking for the sake of the free play of thought,\r\nis necessary then to the \u003ci\u003eemancipation\u003c/i\u003e of practical life\u0026mdash;to\r\nmake it rich and progressive.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe may now recur to the pedagogic maxim of going\r\nfrom the concrete to the abstract.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eBegin with\r\nthe concrete\r\nmeans begin\r\nwith practical\r\nmanipulations\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e1. Since the \u003ci\u003econcrete\u003c/i\u003e denotes thinking applied to\r\nactivities for the sake of dealing effectively with the\r\ndifficulties that present themselves practically, \"beginning\r\nwith the concrete\" signifies that we should at the\r\noutset make much of \u003ci\u003edoing\u003c/i\u003e; especially, make much in\r\noccupations that are not of a routine and mechanical\r\nkind and hence require intelligent selection and adaptation\r\nof means and materials. We do not \"follow the\r\norder of nature\" when we multiply mere sensations or\r\naccumulate physical objects. Instruction in number is\r\nnot concrete merely because splints or beans or dots are\r\nemployed, while whenever the use and bearing of number\r\nrelations are clearly perceived, the number idea is concrete\r\neven if figures alone are used. Just what sort of\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_140\" id=\"Page_140\"\u003e[Pg 140]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nsymbol it is best to use at a given time\u0026mdash;whether blocks,\r\nor lines, or figures\u0026mdash;is entirely a matter of adjustment\r\nto the given case. If physical things used in teaching\r\nnumber or geography or anything else do not leave the\r\nmind illuminated with recognition of a \u003ci\u003emeaning\u003c/i\u003e beyond\r\nthemselves, the instruction that uses them is as abstract\r\nas that which doles out ready-made definitions and rules;\r\nfor it distracts attention from ideas to mere physical\r\nexcitations.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eConfusion\r\nof the concrete\r\nwith\r\nthe sensibly\r\nisolated\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe conception that we have only to put before the\r\nsenses particular physical objects in order to impress\r\ncertain ideas upon the mind amounts almost to a superstition.\r\nThe introduction of object lessons and sense-training\r\nscored a distinct advance over the prior method\r\nof linguistic symbols, and this advance tended to blind\r\neducators to the fact that only a halfway step had been\r\ntaken. Things and sensations develop the child, indeed,\r\nbut only because he \u003ci\u003euses\u003c/i\u003e them in mastering his body and\r\nin the scheme of his activities. Appropriate continuous\r\noccupations or activities involve the use of natural\r\nmaterials, tools, modes of energy, and do it in a way\r\nthat compels thinking as to what they mean, how they\r\nare related to one another and to the realization of ends;\r\nwhile the mere isolated presentation of things remains\r\nbarren and dead. A few generations ago the great obstacle\r\nin the way of reform of primary education was\r\nbelief in the almost magical efficacy of the symbols of language\r\n(including number) to produce mental training;\r\nat present, belief in the efficacy of objects just as objects,\r\nblocks the way. As frequently happens, the better is\r\nan enemy of the best.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eTransfer of\r\ninterest to\r\nintellectual\r\nmatters\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e2. The interest in results, in the successful carrying on\r\nof an activity, should be gradually transferred to study\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_141\" id=\"Page_141\"\u003e[Pg 141]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof objects\u0026mdash;their properties, consequences, structures,\r\ncauses, and effects. The adult when at work in his life\r\ncalling is rarely free to devote time or energy\u0026mdash;beyond\r\nthe necessities of his immediate action\u0026mdash;to the study of\r\nwhat he deals with. (\u003ci\u003eAnte\u003c/i\u003e, p. 43.) The educative activities\r\nof childhood should be so arranged that direct\r\ninterest in the activity and its outcome create a demand\r\nfor attention to matters that have a more and more \u003ci\u003eindirect\r\nand remote\u003c/i\u003e connection with the original activity.\r\nThe direct interest in carpentering or shop work should\r\nyield organically and gradually an interest in geometric\r\nand mechanical problems. The interest in cooking\r\nshould grow into an interest in chemical experimentation\r\nand in the physiology and hygiene of bodily growth.\r\nThe making of pictures should pass to an interest in the\r\ntechnique of representation and the æsthetics of appreciation,\r\nand so on. This development is what the term\r\n\u003ci\u003ego\u003c/i\u003e signifies in the maxim \"\u003ci\u003ego\u003c/i\u003e from the concrete to the\r\nabstract\"; it represents the dynamic and truly educative\r\nfactor of the process.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eDevelopment\r\nof\r\ndelight in\r\nthe activity\r\nof thinking\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e3. The outcome, the \u003ci\u003eabstract\u003c/i\u003e to which education is to\r\nproceed, is an interest in intellectual matters for their\r\nown sake, a delight in thinking for the sake of thinking.\r\nIt is an old story that acts and processes which at the\r\noutset are incidental to something else develop and\r\nmaintain an absorbing value of their own. So it is with\r\nthinking and with knowledge; at first incidental to results\r\nand adjustments beyond themselves, they attract\r\nmore and more attention to themselves till they become\r\nends, not means. Children engage, unconstrainedly\r\nand continually, in reflective inspection and testing for\r\nthe sake of what they are interested in doing successfully.\r\nHabits of thinking thus generated may increase in volume\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_142\" id=\"Page_142\"\u003e[Pg 142]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nand extent till they become of importance on their own\r\naccount.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eExamples\r\nof the\r\ntransition\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe three instances cited in \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_SIX\"\u003eChapter Six\u003c/a\u003e represented\r\nan ascending cycle from the practical to the theoretical.\r\nTaking thought to keep a personal engagement is obviously\r\nof the concrete kind. Endeavoring to work out\r\nthe meaning of a certain part of a boat is an instance of\r\nan intermediate kind. The reason for the existence and\r\nposition of the pole is a practical reason, so that to the\r\narchitect the problem was purely concrete\u0026mdash;the maintenance\r\nof a certain system of action. But for the passenger\r\non the boat, the problem was theoretical, more\r\nor less speculative. It made no difference to his reaching\r\nhis destination whether he worked out the meaning\r\nof the pole. The third case, that of the appearance and\r\nmovement of the bubbles, illustrates a strictly theoretical\r\nor abstract case. No overcoming of physical obstacles,\r\nno adjustment of external means to ends, is at\r\nstake. Curiosity, intellectual curiosity, is challenged by\r\na seemingly anomalous occurrence; and thinking tries\r\nsimply to account for an apparent exception in terms of\r\nrecognized principles.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eTheoretical\r\nknowledge\r\nnever the\r\nwhole end\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(\u003ci\u003ei\u003c/i\u003e) Abstract thinking, it should be noted, represents\r\n\u003ci\u003ean\u003c/i\u003e end, not \u003ci\u003ethe\u003c/i\u003e end. The power of sustained thinking\r\non matters remote from direct use is an outgrowth of\r\npractical and immediate modes of thought, but not a\r\nsubstitute for them. The educational end is not the destruction\r\nof power to think so as to surmount obstacles\r\nand adjust means and ends; it is not its replacement by\r\nabstract reflection. Nor is theoretical thinking a higher\r\ntype of thinking than practical. A person who has at\r\ncommand both types of thinking is of a higher order\r\nthan he who possesses only one. Methods that in de\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_143\" id=\"Page_143\"\u003e[Pg 143]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003eveloping\r\nabstract intellectual abilities weaken habits of\r\npractical or concrete thinking, fall as much short of the\r\neducational ideal as do the methods that in cultivating\r\nability to plan, to invent, to arrange, to forecast, fail to\r\nsecure some delight in thinking irrespective of practical\r\nconsequences.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eNor that\r\nmost congenial\r\nto the\r\nmajority\r\nof pupils\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(\u003ci\u003eii\u003c/i\u003e) Educators should also note the very great individual\r\ndifferences that exist; they should not try to force\r\none pattern and model upon all. In many (probably\r\nthe majority) the executive tendency, the habit of mind\r\nthat thinks for purposes of conduct and achievement,\r\nnot for the sake of knowing, remains dominant to the\r\nend. Engineers, lawyers, doctors, merchants, are much\r\nmore numerous in adult life than scholars, scientists,\r\nand philosophers. While education should strive to\r\nmake men who, however prominent their professional\r\ninterests and aims, partake of the spirit of the scholar,\r\nphilosopher, and scientist, no good reason appears why\r\neducation should esteem the one mental habit inherently\r\nsuperior to the other, and deliberately try to\r\ntransform the type from practical to theoretical. Have\r\nnot our schools (as already suggested, p. 49) been one-sidedly\r\ndevoted to the more abstract type of thinking,\r\nthus doing injustice to the majority of pupils? Has not\r\nthe idea of a \"liberal\" and \"humane\" education tended\r\ntoo often in practice to the production of technical, because\r\noverspecialized, thinkers?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eAim of\r\neducation is\r\na working\r\nbalance\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe aim of education should be to secure a balanced\r\ninteraction of the two types of mental attitude, having\r\nsufficient regard to the disposition of the individual not\r\nto hamper and cripple whatever powers are naturally\r\nstrong in him. The narrowness of individuals of strong\r\nconcrete bent needs to be liberalized. Every oppor\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_144\" id=\"Page_144\"\u003e[Pg 144]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003etunity\r\nthat occurs within their practical activities for\r\ndeveloping curiosity and susceptibility to intellectual\r\nproblems should be seized. Violence is not done to\r\nnatural disposition, but the latter is broadened. As regards\r\nthe smaller number of those who have a taste\r\nfor abstract, purely intellectual topics, pains should be\r\ntaken to multiply opportunities and demands for the\r\napplication of ideas; for translating symbolic truths into\r\nterms of social life and its ends. Every human being\r\nhas both capabilities, and every individual will be more\r\neffective and happier if both powers are developed in\r\neasy and close interaction with each other.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_145\" id=\"Page_145\"\u003e[Pg 145]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003chr style=\"width: 65%;\" /\u003e\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"CHAPTER_ELEVEN\" id=\"CHAPTER_ELEVEN\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eCHAPTER ELEVEN\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eEMPIRICAL AND SCIENTIFIC THINKING\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e§ 1. \u003ci\u003eEmpirical Thinking\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eEmpirical\r\nthinking\r\ndepends on\r\npast habits\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eApart from the development of scientific method,\r\ninferences depend upon habits that have been built up\r\nunder the influence of a number of particular experiences\r\nnot themselves arranged for logical purposes.\r\nA says, \"It will probably rain to-morrow.\" B asks,\r\n\"Why do you think so?\" and A replies, \"Because the\r\nsky was lowering at sunset.\" When B asks, \"What has\r\nthat to do with it?\" A responds, \"I do not know, but\r\nit generally does rain after such a sunset.\" He does not\r\nperceive any \u003ci\u003econnection\u003c/i\u003e between the appearance of the\r\nsky and coming rain; he is not aware of any continuity\r\nin the facts themselves\u0026mdash;any law or principle, as we\r\nusually say. He simply, from frequently recurring conjunctions\r\nof the events, has associated them so that\r\nwhen he sees one he thinks of the other. One \u003ci\u003esuggests\u003c/i\u003e\r\nthe other, or is \u003ci\u003eassociated\u003c/i\u003e with it. A man may believe\r\nit will rain to-morrow because he has consulted the barometer;\r\nbut if he has no conception how the height of\r\nthe mercury column (or the position of an index moved\r\nby its rise and fall) is connected with variations of atmospheric\r\npressure, and how these in turn are connected\r\nwith the amount of moisture in the air, his belief in the\r\nlikelihood of rain is purely empirical. When men lived\r\nin the open and got their living by hunting, fishing, or\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_146\" id=\"Page_146\"\u003e[Pg 146]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\npasturing flocks, the detection of the signs and indications\r\nof weather changes was a matter of great importance.\r\nA body of proverbs and maxims, forming an\r\nextensive section of traditionary folklore, was developed.\r\nBut as long as there was no understanding \u003ci\u003ewhy\u003c/i\u003e or \u003ci\u003ehow\u003c/i\u003e\r\ncertain events were signs, as long as foresight and\r\nweather shrewdness rested simply upon repeated conjunction\r\namong facts, beliefs about the weather were\r\nthoroughly empirical.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eIt is fairly\r\nadequate in\r\nsome\r\nmatters,\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn similar fashion learned men in the Orient learned\r\nto predict, with considerable accuracy, the recurrent\r\npositions of the planets, the sun and the moon, and to\r\nforetell the time of eclipses, without understanding in\r\nany degree the laws of the movements of heavenly\r\nbodies\u0026mdash;that is, without having a notion of the continuities\r\nexisting among the facts themselves. They\r\nhad learned from repeated observations that things happened\r\nin about such and such a fashion. Till a comparatively\r\nrecent time, the truths of medicine were mainly in\r\nthe same condition. Experience had shown that \"upon\r\nthe whole,\" \"as a rule,\" \"generally or usually speaking,\"\r\ncertain results followed certain remedies, when\r\nsymptoms were given. Our beliefs about human nature\r\nin individuals (psychology) and in masses (sociology)\r\nare still very largely of a purely empirical sort.\r\nEven the science of geometry, now frequently reckoned\r\na typical rational science, began, among the Egyptians,\r\nas an accumulation of recorded observations about\r\nmethods of approximate mensuration of land surfaces;\r\nand only gradually assumed, among the Greeks, scientific\r\nform.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe \u003ci\u003edisadvantages\u003c/i\u003e of purely empirical thinking are\r\nobvious.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_147\" id=\"Page_147\"\u003e[Pg 147]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003ebut is very\r\napt to lead to\r\nfalse beliefs,\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e1. While many empirical conclusions are, roughly\r\nspeaking, correct; while they are exact enough to be of\r\ngreat help in practical life; while the presages of a\r\nweatherwise sailor or hunter may be more accurate,\r\nwithin a certain restricted range, than those of a scientist\r\nwho relies wholly upon scientific observations and\r\ntests; while, indeed, empirical observations and records\r\nfurnish the raw or crude material of scientific knowledge,\r\nyet the empirical method affords no way of\r\ndiscriminating between right and wrong conclusions.\r\nHence it is responsible for a multitude of \u003ci\u003efalse\u003c/i\u003e beliefs.\r\nThe technical designation for one of the commonest\r\nfallacies is \u003ci\u003epost hoc, ergo propter hoc\u003c/i\u003e; the belief that because\r\none thing comes \u003ci\u003eafter\u003c/i\u003e another, it comes \u003ci\u003ebecause\u003c/i\u003e\r\nof the other. Now this fallacy of method is the animating\r\nprinciple of empirical conclusions, even when correct\u0026mdash;the\r\ncorrectness being almost as much a matter of\r\ngood luck as of method. That potatoes should be\r\nplanted only during the crescent moon, that near the sea\r\npeople are born at high tide and die at low tide, that a\r\ncomet is an omen of danger, that bad luck follows the\r\ncracking of a mirror, that a patent medicine cures a\r\ndisease\u0026mdash;these and a thousand like notions are asseverated\r\non the basis of empirical coincidence and\r\nconjunction. Moreover, habits of expectation and belief\r\nare formed otherwise than by a number of repeated\r\nsimilar cases.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eand does\r\nnot enable\r\nus to cope\r\nwith the\r\nnovel,\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e2. The more numerous the experienced instances and\r\nthe closer the watch kept upon them, the greater is\r\nthe trustworthiness of constant conjunction as evidence\r\nof connection among the things themselves. Many of\r\nour most important beliefs still have only this sort of\r\nwarrant. No one can yet tell, with certainty, the neces\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_148\" id=\"Page_148\"\u003e[Pg 148]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003esary\r\ncause of old age or of death\u0026mdash;which are empirically\r\nthe most certain of all expectations. But even the most\r\nreliable beliefs of this type fail when they confront the\r\n\u003ci\u003enovel\u003c/i\u003e. Since they rest upon past uniformities, they are\r\nuseless when further experience departs in any considerable\r\nmeasure from ancient incident and wonted precedent.\r\nEmpirical inference follows the grooves and ruts\r\nthat custom wears, and has no track to follow when the\r\ngroove disappears. So important is this aspect of the\r\nmatter that Clifford found the difference between ordinary\r\nskill and scientific thought right here. \"Skill\r\nenables a man to deal with the same circumstances that\r\nhe has met before, scientific thought enables him to deal\r\nwith different circumstances that he has never met\r\nbefore.\" And he goes so far as to define scientific\r\nthinking as \"the application of old experience to new\r\ncircumstances.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eand leads to\r\nlaziness and\r\npresumption,\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e3. We have not yet made the acquaintance of the most\r\nharmful feature of the empirical method. Mental inertia,\r\nlaziness, unjustifiable conservatism, are its probable\r\naccompaniments. Its general effect upon mental attitude\r\nis more serious than even the specific wrong conclusions\r\nin which it has landed. Wherever the chief dependence\r\nin forming inferences is upon the conjunctions observed\r\nin past experience, failures to agree with the usual order\r\nare slurred over, cases of successful confirmation are\r\nexaggerated. Since the mind naturally demands some\r\nprinciple of continuity, some connecting link between\r\nseparate facts and causes, forces are arbitrarily invented\r\nfor that purpose. Fantastic and mythological explanations\r\nare resorted to in order to supply missing links.\r\nThe pump brings water because nature abhors a\r\nvacuum; opium makes men sleep because it has a dormi\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_149\" id=\"Page_149\"\u003e[Pg 149]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003etive\r\npotency; we recollect a past event because we have\r\na faculty of memory. In the history of the progress of\r\nhuman knowledge, out and out myths accompany the\r\nfirst stage of empiricism; while \"hidden essences\" and\r\n\"occult forces\" mark its second stage. By their very\r\nnature, these \"causes\" escape observation, so that their\r\nexplanatory value can be neither confirmed nor refuted\r\nby further observation or experience. Hence belief in\r\nthem becomes purely traditionary. They give rise to\r\ndoctrines which, inculcated and handed down, become\r\ndogmas; subsequent inquiry and reflection are actually\r\nstifled. (\u003ci\u003eAnte\u003c/i\u003e, p. 23.)\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eand to\r\ndogmatism\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eCertain men or classes of men come to be the accepted\r\nguardians and transmitters\u0026mdash;instructors\u0026mdash;of established\r\ndoctrines. To question the beliefs is to question their\r\nauthority; to accept the beliefs is evidence of loyalty to\r\nthe powers that be, a proof of good citizenship. Passivity,\r\ndocility, acquiescence, come to be primal intellectual\r\nvirtues. Facts and events presenting novelty and\r\nvariety are slighted, or are sheared down till they fit\r\ninto the Procrustean bed of habitual belief. Inquiry\r\nand doubt are silenced by citation of ancient laws or a\r\nmultitude of miscellaneous and unsifted cases. This\r\nattitude of mind generates dislike of change, and the\r\nresulting aversion to novelty is fatal to progress. What\r\nwill not fit into the established canons is outlawed; men\r\nwho make new discoveries are objects of suspicion and\r\neven of persecution. Beliefs that perhaps originally\r\nwere the products of fairly extensive and careful observation\r\nare stereotyped into fixed traditions and semi-sacred\r\ndogmas accepted simply upon authority, and\r\nare mixed with fantastic conceptions that happen to\r\nhave won the acceptance of authorities.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_150\" id=\"Page_150\"\u003e[Pg 150]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e§ 2. \u003ci\u003eScientific Method\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eScientific\r\nthinking\r\nanalyzes the\r\npresent case\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn contrast with the empirical method stands the\r\nscientific. Scientific method replaces the repeated conjunction\r\nor coincidence of separate facts by discovery of\r\na single comprehensive fact, effecting this replacement\r\nby \u003ci\u003ebreaking up the coarse or gross facts of observation into\r\na number of minuter processes not directly accessible to\r\nperception\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eIllustration\r\nfrom \u003ci\u003esuction\u003c/i\u003e\r\nof empirical\r\nmethod,\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf a layman were asked why water rises from the\r\ncistern when an ordinary pump is worked, he would\r\ndoubtless answer, \"By suction.\" Suction is regarded\r\nas a force like heat or pressure. If such a person is\r\nconfronted by the fact that water rises with a suction\r\npump only about thirty-three feet, he easily disposes of\r\nthe difficulty on the ground that all forces vary in their\r\nintensities and finally reach a limit at which they cease\r\nto operate. The variation with elevation above the\r\nsea level of the height to which water can be pumped\r\nis either unnoticed, or, if noted, is dismissed as one of\r\nthe curious anomalies in which nature abounds.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eof scientific\r\nmethod\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eRelies on\r\ndifferences,\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNow the scientist advances by assuming that what\r\nseems to observation to be a single total fact is in truth\r\ncomplex. He attempts, therefore, to break up the\r\nsingle fact of water-rising-in-the-pipe into a number of\r\nlesser facts. His method of proceeding is by \u003ci\u003evarying\r\nconditions one by one\u003c/i\u003e so far as possible, and noting just\r\nwhat happens when a given condition is eliminated.\r\nThere are two methods for varying conditions.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_24_24\" id=\"FNanchor_24_24\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_24_24\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[24]\u003c/a\u003e The\r\nfirst is an extension of the empirical method of observation.\r\nIt consists in comparing very carefully the results\r\nof a great number of observations which have occurred\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_151\" id=\"Page_151\"\u003e[Pg 151]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nunder accidentally \u003ci\u003edifferent\u003c/i\u003e conditions. The difference\r\nin the rise of the water at different heights above the\r\nsea level, and its total cessation when the distance to be\r\nlifted is, even at sea level, more than thirty-three feet,\r\nare emphasized, instead of being slurred over. The\r\npurpose is to find out what \u003ci\u003especial conditions\u003c/i\u003e are present\r\nwhen the effect occurs and absent when it fails to\r\noccur. These special conditions are then substituted\r\nfor the gross fact, or regarded as its principle\u0026mdash;the\r\nkey to understanding it.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eand creates\r\ndifferences\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe method of analysis by comparing cases is, however,\r\nbadly handicapped; it can do nothing until it is\r\npresented with a certain number of diversified cases.\r\nAnd even when different cases are at hand, it will be\r\nquestionable whether they vary in just these respects in\r\nwhich it is important that they should vary in order to\r\nthrow light upon the question at issue. The method is\r\npassive and dependent upon external accidents. Hence\r\nthe superiority of the active or experimental method.\r\nEven a small number of observations may suggest an\r\nexplanation\u0026mdash;a hypothesis or theory. Working upon\r\nthis suggestion, the scientist may then \u003ci\u003eintentionally\u003c/i\u003e\r\nvary conditions and note what happens. If the empirical\r\nobservations have suggested to him the possibility\r\nof a connection between air pressure on the water and\r\nthe rising of the water in the tube where air pressure is\r\nabsent, he deliberately empties the air out of the vessel\r\nin which the water is contained and notes that suction\r\nno longer works; or he intentionally increases atmospheric\r\npressure on the water and notes the result. He\r\ninstitutes experiments to calculate the weight of air at\r\nthe sea level and at various levels above, and compares\r\nthe results of reasoning based upon the pressure of air\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_152\" id=\"Page_152\"\u003e[Pg 152]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof these various weights upon a certain volume of water\r\nwith the results actually obtained by observation. \u003ci\u003eObservations\r\nformed by variation of conditions on the basis\r\nof some idea or theory constitute experiment.\u003c/i\u003e Experiment\r\nis the chief resource in scientific reasoning because it\r\nfacilitates the picking out of significant elements in a\r\ngross, vague whole.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eAnalysis\r\nand synthesis\r\nagain\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eExperimental thinking, or scientific reasoning, is thus\r\na conjoint process of \u003ci\u003eanalysis and synthesis\u003c/i\u003e, or, in less\r\ntechnical language, of discrimination and assimilation\r\nor identification. The gross fact of water rising when\r\nthe suction valve is worked is resolved or discriminated\r\ninto a number of independent variables, some of which\r\nhad never before been observed or even thought of in\r\nconnection with the fact. One of these facts, the\r\nweight of the atmosphere, is then selectively seized upon\r\nas the key to the entire phenomenon. This disentangling\r\nconstitutes \u003ci\u003eanalysis\u003c/i\u003e. But atmosphere and its pressure\r\nor weight is a fact not confined to this single\r\ninstance. It is a fact familiar or at least discoverable\r\nas operative in a great number of other events. In fixing\r\nupon this imperceptible and minute fact as the essence\r\nor key to the elevation of water by the pump, the pump-fact\r\nhas thus been assimilated to a whole group of ordinary\r\nfacts from which it was previously isolated. This\r\nassimilation constitutes \u003ci\u003esynthesis\u003c/i\u003e. Moreover, the fact\r\nof atmospheric pressure is itself a case of one of the\r\ncommonest of all facts\u0026mdash;weight or gravitational force.\r\nConclusions that apply to the common fact of weight\r\nare thus transferable to the consideration and interpretation\r\nof the \u003ci\u003erelatively\u003c/i\u003e rare and exceptional case of\r\nthe suction of water. The suction pump is seen to be\r\na case of the same kind or sort as the siphon, the\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_153\" id=\"Page_153\"\u003e[Pg 153]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nbarometer, the rising of the balloon, and a multitude of\r\nother things with which at first sight it has no connection\r\nat all. This is another instance of the synthetic or\r\nassimilative phase of scientific thinking.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf we revert to the advantages of scientific over empirical\r\nthinking, we find that we now have the clue to\r\nthem.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eLessened\r\nliability\r\nto error\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(\u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e) The increased security, the added factor of certainty\r\nor proof, is due to the substitution of the \u003ci\u003edetailed\r\nand specific fact\u003c/i\u003e of atmospheric pressure for the gross\r\nand total and relatively miscellaneous fact of suction.\r\nThe latter is complex, and its complexity is due to many\r\nunknown and unspecified factors; hence, any statement\r\nabout it is more or less random, and likely to be\r\ndefeated by any unforeseen variation of circumstances.\r\n\u003ci\u003eComparatively\u003c/i\u003e, at least, the minute and detailed fact of\r\nair pressure is a measurable and definite fact\u0026mdash;one\r\nthat can be picked out and managed with assurance.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eAbility to\r\nmanage\r\nthe new\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(\u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e) As analysis accounts for the added certainty, so\r\nsynthesis accounts for ability to cope with the novel\r\nand variable. Weight is a much commoner fact than\r\natmospheric weight, and this in turn is a much commoner\r\nfact than the workings of the suction pump.\r\nTo be able to substitute the common and frequent fact\r\nfor that which is relatively rare and peculiar is to reduce\r\nthe seemingly novel and exceptional to cases of a general\r\nand familiar principle, and thus to bring them\r\nunder control for interpretation and prediction.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAs Professor James says: \"Think of heat as motion\r\nand whatever is true of motion will be true of heat; but\r\nwe have a hundred experiences of motion for every one\r\nof heat. Think of rays passing through this lens as\r\ncases of bending toward the perpendicular, and you\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_154\" id=\"Page_154\"\u003e[Pg 154]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nsubstitute for the comparatively unfamiliar lens the very\r\nfamiliar notion of a particular change in direction of a\r\nline, of which notion every day brings us countless\r\nexamples.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_25_25\" id=\"FNanchor_25_25\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_25_25\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[25]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eInterest in\r\nthe future\r\nor in\r\nprogress\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(\u003ci\u003ec\u003c/i\u003e) The change of attitude from conservative reliance\r\nupon the past, upon routine and custom, to faith in progress\r\nthrough the intelligent regulation of existing conditions,\r\nis, of course, the reflex of the scientific method of\r\nexperimentation. The empirical method inevitably magnifies\r\nthe influences of the past; the experimental method\r\nthrows into relief the possibilities of the future. The\r\nempirical method says, \"\u003ci\u003eWait\u003c/i\u003e till there is a sufficient\r\nnumber of cases;\" the experimental method says, \"\u003ci\u003eProduce\u003c/i\u003e\r\nthe cases.\" The former depends upon nature\u0027s\r\naccidentally happening to present us with certain conjunctions\r\nof circumstances; the latter deliberately and\r\nintentionally endeavors to bring about the conjunction.\r\nBy this method the notion of progress secures scientific\r\nwarrant.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003ePhysical\r\n\u003ci\u003eversus\u003c/i\u003e\r\nlogical force\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOrdinary experience is controlled largely by the direct\r\nstrength and intensity of various occurrences. What is\r\nbright, sudden, loud, secures notice and is given a conspicuous\r\nrating. What is dim, feeble, and continuous\r\ngets ignored, or is regarded as of slight importance.\r\nCustomary experience tends to the control of thinking\r\nby considerations of \u003ci\u003edirect and immediate strength\u003c/i\u003e rather\r\nthan by those of importance in the long run. Animals\r\nwithout the power of forecast and planning must, upon\r\nthe whole, respond to the stimuli that are most urgent\r\nat the moment, or cease to exist. These stimuli lose\r\nnothing of their direct urgency and clamorous insistency\r\nwhen the thinking power develops; and yet thinking\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_155\" id=\"Page_155\"\u003e[Pg 155]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ndemands the subordination of the immediate stimulus to\r\nthe remote and distant. The feeble and the minute may\r\nbe of much greater importance than the glaring and the\r\nbig. The latter may be signs of a force that is already\r\nexhausting itself; the former may indicate the beginnings\r\nof a process in which the whole fortune of the\r\nindividual is involved. The prime necessity for scientific\r\nthought is that the thinker be freed from the tyranny\r\nof sense stimuli and habit, and this emancipation\r\nis also the necessary condition of progress.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eIllustration\r\nfrom moving\r\nwater\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eConsider the following quotation: \"When it first occurred\r\nto a reflecting mind that moving water had a\r\nproperty identical with human or brute force, namely,\r\nthe property of setting other masses in motion, overcoming\r\ninertia and resistance,\u0026mdash;when the sight of the\r\nstream suggested through this point of likeness the\r\npower of the animal,\u0026mdash;a new addition was made to\r\nthe class of prime movers, and when circumstances permitted,\r\nthis power could become a substitute for the\r\nothers. It may seem to the modern understanding,\r\nfamiliar with water wheels and drifting rafts, that the\r\nsimilarity here was an extremely obvious one. But if\r\nwe put ourselves back into an early state of mind, when\r\nrunning water affected the mind \u003ci\u003eby its brilliancy, its roar\r\nand irregular devastation\u003c/i\u003e, we may easily suppose that\r\nto identify this with animal muscular energy was by no\r\nmeans an obvious effort.\"\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_26_26\" id=\"FNanchor_26_26\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_26_26\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[26]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eValue of\r\nabstraction\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf we add to these obvious sensory features the various\r\nsocial customs and expectations which fix the attitude\r\nof the individual, the evil of the subjection of free\r\nand fertile suggestion to empirical considerations be\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_156\" id=\"Page_156\"\u003e[Pg 156]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003ecomes\r\nclear. A certain power of \u003ci\u003eabstraction\u003c/i\u003e, of deliberate\r\nturning away from the habitual responses to a\r\nsituation, was required before men could be emancipated\r\nto follow up suggestions that in the end are fruitful.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eExperience\r\nas inclusive\r\nof thought\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn short, the term \u003ci\u003eexperience\u003c/i\u003e may be interpreted either\r\nwith reference to the \u003ci\u003eempirical\u003c/i\u003e or the \u003ci\u003eexperimental\u003c/i\u003e attitude\r\nof mind. Experience is not a rigid and closed\r\nthing; it is vital, and hence growing. When dominated\r\nby the past, by custom and routine, it is often opposed\r\nto the reasonable, the thoughtful. But experience also\r\nincludes the reflection that sets us free from the limiting\r\ninfluence of sense, appetite, and tradition. Experience\r\nmay welcome and assimilate all that the most exact and\r\npenetrating thought discovers. Indeed, the business of\r\neducation might be defined as just such an emancipation\r\nand enlargement of experience. Education takes the\r\nindividual while he is relatively plastic, before he has\r\nbecome so indurated by isolated experiences as to be\r\nrendered hopelessly empirical in his habit of mind. The\r\nattitude of childhood is naïve, wondering, experimental;\r\nthe world of man and nature is new. Right methods of\r\neducation preserve and perfect this attitude, and thereby\r\nshort-circuit for the individual the slow progress of the\r\nrace, eliminating the waste that comes from inert routine.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_157\" id=\"Page_157\"\u003e[Pg 157]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003chr style=\"width: 65%;\" /\u003e\r\n\u003ch2\u003ePART THREE: THE TRAINING OF\r\nTHOUGHT\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003chr style=\"width: 65%;\" /\u003e\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"CHAPTER_TWELVE\" id=\"CHAPTER_TWELVE\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eCHAPTER TWELVE\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eACTIVITY AND THE TRAINING OF THOUGHT\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn this chapter we shall gather together and amplify\r\nconsiderations that have already been advanced, in various\r\npassages of the preceding pages, concerning the relation\r\nof \u003ci\u003eaction to thought\u003c/i\u003e. We shall follow, though not\r\nwith exactness, the order of development in the unfolding\r\nhuman being.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e§ 1. \u003ci\u003eThe Early Stage of Activity\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003e1. The\r\nbaby\u0027s problem\r\ndetermines\r\nhis\r\nthinking\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe sight of a baby often calls out the question:\r\n\"What do you suppose he is thinking about?\" By the\r\nnature of the case, the question is unanswerable in detail;\r\nbut, also by the nature of the case, we may be sure\r\nabout a baby\u0027s chief interest. His primary problem is\r\nmastery of his body as a tool of securing comfortable and\r\neffective adjustments to his surroundings, physical and\r\nsocial. The child has to learn to do almost everything:\r\nto see, to hear, to reach, to handle, to balance the body,\r\nto creep, to walk, and so on. Even if it be true that\r\nhuman beings have even more instinctive reactions than\r\nlower animals, it is also true that instinctive tendencies\r\nare much less perfect in men, and that most of them are\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_158\" id=\"Page_158\"\u003e[Pg 158]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof little use till they are intelligently combined and directed.\r\nA little chick just out of the shell will after a\r\nfew trials peck at and grasp grains of food with its beak\r\nas well as at any later time. This involves a complicated\r\ncoördination of the eye and the head. An infant does\r\nnot even begin to reach definitely for things that the\r\neye sees till he is several months old, and even then\r\nseveral weeks\u0027 practice is required before he learns\r\nthe adjustment so as neither to overreach nor to underreach.\r\nIt may not be literally true that the child will\r\ngrasp for the moon, but it is true that he needs much\r\npractice before he can tell whether an object is within\r\nreach or not. The arm is thrust out instinctively in response\r\nto a stimulus from the eye, and this tendency is\r\nthe origin of the ability to reach and grasp exactly and\r\nquickly; but nevertheless final mastery requires observing\r\nand selecting the successful movements, and\r\narranging them in view of an end. \u003ci\u003eThese operations of\r\nconscious selection and arrangement constitute thinking\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nthough of a rudimentary type.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eMastery of\r\nthe body is\r\nan intellectual\r\nproblem\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSince mastery of the bodily organs is necessary for\r\nall later developments, such problems are both interesting\r\nand important, and solving them supplies a very\r\ngenuine training of thinking power. The joy the child\r\nshows in learning to use his limbs, to translate what he\r\nsees into what he handles, to connect sounds with sights,\r\nsights with taste and touch, and the rapidity with which\r\nintelligence grows in the first year and a half of life (the\r\ntime during which the more fundamental problems of\r\nthe use of the organism are mastered), are sufficient evidence\r\nthat the development of physical control is not a\r\nphysical but an intellectual achievement.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003e2. The problem\r\nof social\r\nadjustment\r\nand intercourse\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAlthough in the early months the child is mainly oc\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_159\" id=\"Page_159\"\u003e[Pg 159]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003ecupied\r\nin learning to use his body to accommodate himself\r\nto physical conditions in a comfortable way and to\r\nuse things skillfully and effectively, yet social adjustments\r\nare very important. In connection with parents,\r\nnurse, brother, and sister, the child learns the signs of\r\nsatisfaction of hunger, of removal of discomfort, of the\r\napproach of agreeable light, color, sound, and so on.\r\nHis contact with physical things is regulated by persons,\r\nand he soon distinguishes persons as the most important\r\nand interesting of all the objects with which he has to do.\r\nSpeech, the accurate adaptation of sounds heard to the\r\nmovements of tongue and lips, is, however, the great\r\ninstrument of social adaptation; and with the development\r\nof speech (usually in the second year) adaptation\r\nof the baby\u0027s activities to and with those of other\r\npersons gives the keynote of mental life. His range\r\nof possible activities is indefinitely widened as he\r\nwatches what other persons do, and as he tries to understand\r\nand to do what they encourage him to attempt.\r\nThe outline pattern of mental life is thus set in the\r\nfirst four or five years. Years, centuries, generations\r\nof invention and planning, may have gone to the development\r\nof the performances and occupations of the adults\r\nsurrounding the child. Yet for him their activities are\r\ndirect stimuli; they are part of his natural environment;\r\nthey are carried on in physical terms that appeal to his\r\neye, ear, and touch. He cannot, of course, appropriate\r\ntheir meaning directly through his senses; but they\r\nfurnish stimuli to which he responds, so that his attention\r\nis focussed upon a higher order of materials and of\r\nproblems. Were it not for this process by which the\r\nachievements of one generation form the stimuli that\r\ndirect the activities of the next, the story of civilization\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_160\" id=\"Page_160\"\u003e[Pg 160]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwould be writ in water, and each generation would have\r\nlaboriously to make for itself, if it could, its way out of\r\nsavagery.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eSocial adjustment\r\nresults in\r\nimitation\r\nbut is not\r\ncaused\r\nby it\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eImitation is one (though only one, see p. 47) of the\r\nmeans by which the activities of adults supply stimuli\r\nwhich are so interesting, so varied, so complex, and so\r\nnovel, as to occasion a rapid progress of thought. Mere\r\nimitation, however, would not give rise to thinking; if\r\nwe could learn like parrots by simply copying the outward\r\nacts of others, we should never have to think; nor\r\nshould we know, after we had mastered the copied act,\r\nwhat was the meaning of the thing we had done. Educators\r\n(and psychologists) have often assumed that\r\nacts which reproduce the behavior of others are acquired\r\nmerely by imitation. But a child rarely learns by conscious\r\nimitation; and to say that his imitation is unconscious\r\nis to say that it is not from his standpoint imitation\r\nat all. The word, the gesture, the act, the occupation\r\nof another, falls in line with \u003ci\u003esome impulse already active\u003c/i\u003e\r\nand suggests some satisfactory mode of expression, some\r\nend in which it may find fulfillment. Having this\r\nend of his own, the child then notes other persons,\r\nas he notes natural events, to get further suggestions\r\nas to means of its realization. He selects some of\r\nthe means he observes, tries them on, finds them successful\r\nor unsuccessful, is confirmed or weakened in his\r\nbelief in their value, and so continues selecting, arranging,\r\nadapting, testing, till he can accomplish what he\r\nwishes. The onlooker may then observe the resemblance\r\nof this act to some act of an adult, and conclude\r\nthat it was acquired by imitation, while as a matter of\r\nfact it was acquired by attention, observation, selection,\r\nexperimentation, and confirmation by results. Only\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_161\" id=\"Page_161\"\u003e[Pg 161]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nbecause this method is employed is there intellectual\r\ndiscipline and an educative result. The presence of\r\nadult activities plays an enormous rôle in the intellectual\r\ngrowth of the child because they add to the natural\r\nstimuli of the world new stimuli which are more exactly\r\nadapted to the needs of a human being, which are richer,\r\nbetter organized, more complex in range, permitting\r\nmore flexible adaptations, and calling out novel reactions.\r\nBut in utilizing these stimuli the child follows the same\r\nmethods that he uses when he is forced to think in order\r\nto master his body.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e§ 2. \u003ci\u003ePlay, Work, and Allied Forms of Activity\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003ePlay indicates\r\nthe\r\ndomination\r\nof activity\r\nby meanings\r\nor ideas\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eOrganization\r\nof ideas\r\ninvolved in\r\nplay\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhen things become signs, when they gain a representative\r\ncapacity as standing for other things, play is\r\ntransformed from mere physical exuberance into an\r\nactivity involving a mental factor. A little girl who\r\nhad broken her doll was seen to perform with the leg\r\nof the doll all the operations of washing, putting to\r\nbed, and fondling, that she had been accustomed to perform\r\nwith the entire doll. The part stood for the whole;\r\nshe reacted not to the stimulus sensibly present, but to\r\nthe meaning suggested by the sense object. So children\r\nuse a stone for a table, leaves for plates, acorns\r\nfor cups. So they use their dolls, their trains, their\r\nblocks, their other toys. In manipulating them, they\r\nare living not with the physical things, but in the large\r\nworld of meanings, natural and social, evoked by these\r\nthings. So when children play horse, play store, play\r\nhouse or making calls, they are subordinating the physically\r\npresent to the ideally signified. In this way, a\r\nworld of meanings, a store of concepts (so fundamental\r\nto all intellectual achievement), is defined and built up.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_162\" id=\"Page_162\"\u003e[Pg 162]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nMoreover, not only do meanings thus become familiar\r\nacquaintances, but they are organized, arranged in\r\ngroups, made to cohere in connected ways. A play\r\nand a story blend insensibly into each other. The most\r\nfanciful plays of children rarely lose all touch with the\r\nmutual fitness and pertinency of various meanings to\r\none another; the \"freest\" plays observe some principles\r\nof coherence and unification. They have a beginning,\r\nmiddle, and end. In games, rules of order run through\r\nvarious minor acts and bind them into a connected\r\nwhole. The rhythm, the competition, and coöperation\r\ninvolved in most plays and games also introduce\r\norganization. There is, then, nothing mysterious or\r\nmystical in the discovery made by Plato and remade by\r\nFroebel that play is the chief, almost the only, mode of\r\neducation for the child in the years of later infancy.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eThe playful\r\nattitude\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ci\u003ePlayfulness\u003c/i\u003e is a more important consideration than\r\nplay. The former is an attitude of mind; the latter is\r\na passing outward manifestation of this attitude. When\r\nthings are treated simply as vehicles of suggestion,\r\nwhat is suggested overrides the thing. Hence the\r\nplayful attitude is one of freedom. The person is\r\nnot bound to the physical traits of things, nor does he\r\ncare whether a thing really means (as we say) what he\r\ntakes it to represent. When the child plays horse with\r\na broom and cars with chairs, the fact that the broom\r\ndoes not really represent a horse, or a chair a locomotive,\r\nis of no account. In order, then, that playfulness\r\nmay not terminate in arbitrary fancifulness and in building\r\nup an imaginary world alongside the world of\r\nactual things, it is necessary that the play attitude should\r\ngradually pass into a work attitude.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eThe work\r\nattitude is\r\ninterested\r\nin means\r\nand ends\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhat is work\u0026mdash;work not as mere external perform\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_163\" id=\"Page_163\"\u003e[Pg 163]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003eance,\r\nbut as attitude of mind? It signifies that the\r\nperson is not content longer to accept and to act upon\r\nthe meanings that things suggest, but demands congruity\r\nof meaning with the things themselves. In the\r\nnatural course of growth, children come to find irresponsible\r\nmake-believe plays inadequate. A fiction is too\r\neasy a way out to afford content. There is not enough\r\nstimulus to call forth satisfactory mental response. When\r\nthis point is reached, the ideas that things suggest must\r\nbe applied to the things with some regard to fitness. A\r\nsmall cart, resembling a \"real\" cart, with \"real\" wheels,\r\ntongue, and body, meets the mental demand better than\r\nmerely making believe that anything which comes to\r\nhand is a cart. Occasionally to take part in setting a\r\n\"real\" table with \"real\" dishes brings more reward\r\nthan forever to make believe a flat stone is a table and\r\nthat leaves are dishes. The interest may still center in\r\nthe meanings, the things may be of importance only as\r\namplifying a certain meaning. So far the attitude is\r\none of play. But the meaning is now of such a character\r\nthat it must find appropriate embodiment in actual\r\nthings.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe dictionary does not permit us to call such activities\r\nwork. Nevertheless, they represent a genuine passage\r\nof play into work. For work (as a mental attitude, not\r\nas mere external performance) \u003ci\u003emeans interest in the adequate\r\nembodiment of a meaning\u003c/i\u003e (a suggestion, purpose,\r\naim) \u003ci\u003ein objective form through the use of appropriate materials\r\nand appliances\u003c/i\u003e. Such an attitude takes advantage\r\nof the meanings aroused and built up in free play, but\r\n\u003ci\u003econtrols their development by seeing to it that they are applied\r\nto things in ways consistent with the observable\r\nstructure of the things themselves\u003c/i\u003e.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_164\" id=\"Page_164\"\u003e[Pg 164]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eand in processes\r\non\r\naccount\r\nof their\r\nresults\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe point of this distinction between play and work\r\nmay be cleared up by comparing it with a more usual way\r\nof stating the difference. In play activity, it is said, the\r\ninterest is in the activity for its own sake; in work, it is\r\nin the product or result in which the activity terminates.\r\nHence the former is purely free, while the latter is tied\r\ndown by the end to be achieved. When the difference\r\nis stated in this sharp fashion, there is almost always\r\nintroduced a false, unnatural separation between process\r\nand product, between activity and its achieved outcome.\r\nThe true distinction is not between an interest in activity\r\nfor its own sake and interest in the external result of that\r\nactivity, but between an interest in an activity just as it\r\nflows on from moment to moment, and an interest in an\r\nactivity as tending to a culmination, to an outcome, and\r\ntherefore possessing a thread of continuity binding together\r\nits successive stages. Both may equally exemplify\r\ninterest in an activity \"for its own sake\"; but in\r\none case the activity in which the interest resides is more\r\nor less casual, following the accident of circumstance and\r\nwhim, or of dictation; in the other, the activity is enriched\r\nby the sense that it leads somewhere, that it amounts to\r\nsomething.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eConsequences\r\nof\r\nthe sharp\r\nseparation\r\nof play and\r\nwork\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWere it not that the false theory of the relation of the\r\nplay and the work attitudes has been connected with\r\nunfortunate modes of school practice, insistence upon a\r\ntruer view might seem an unnecessary refinement. But\r\nthe sharp break that unfortunately prevails between\r\nthe kindergarten and the grades is evidence that\r\nthe theoretical distinction has practical implications.\r\nUnder the title of play, the former is rendered unduly\r\nsymbolic, fanciful, sentimental, and arbitrary; while\r\nunder the antithetical caption of work the latter con\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_165\" id=\"Page_165\"\u003e[Pg 165]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003etains\r\nmany \u003ci\u003etasks externally assigned\u003c/i\u003e. The former has\r\nno end and the latter an end so remote that only the\r\neducator, not the child, is aware that it is an end.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThere comes a time when children must extend and\r\nmake more exact their acquaintance with existing things;\r\nmust conceive ends and consequences with sufficient\r\ndefiniteness to guide their actions by them, and must\r\nacquire some technical skill in selecting and arranging\r\nmeans to realize these ends. Unless these factors are\r\ngradually introduced in the earlier play period, they\r\nmust be introduced later abruptly and arbitrarily, to the\r\nmanifest disadvantage of both the earlier and the later\r\nstages.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eFalse\r\nnotions of\r\nimagination\r\nand utility\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe sharp opposition of play and work is usually\r\nassociated with false notions of utility and imagination.\r\nActivity that is directed upon matters of home and\r\nneighborhood interest is depreciated as merely utilitarian.\r\nTo let the child wash dishes, set the table, engage\r\nin cooking, cut and sew dolls\u0027 clothes, make boxes\r\nthat will hold \"real things,\" and construct his own\r\nplaythings by using hammer and nails, excludes, so\r\nit is said, the æsthetic and appreciative factor, eliminates\r\nimagination, and subjects the child\u0027s development\r\nto material and practical concerns; while (so it is said)\r\nto reproduce symbolically the domestic relationships of\r\nbirds and other animals, of human father and mother\r\nand child, of workman and tradesman, of knight, soldier,\r\nand magistrate, secures a liberal exercise of mind, of\r\ngreat moral as well as intellectual value. It has been\r\neven stated that it is over-physical and utilitarian if a\r\nchild plants seeds and takes care of growing plants in\r\nthe kindergarten; while reproducing dramatically operations\r\nof planting, cultivating, reaping, and so on, either\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_166\" id=\"Page_166\"\u003e[Pg 166]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwith no physical materials or with symbolic representatives,\r\nis highly educative to the imagination and to\r\nspiritual appreciation. Toy dolls, trains of cars, boats, and\r\nengines are rigidly excluded, and the employ of cubes,\r\nballs, and other symbols for representing these social\r\nactivities is recommended on the same ground. The\r\nmore unfitted the physical object for its imagined purpose,\r\nsuch as a cube for a boat, the greater is the\r\nsupposed appeal to the imagination.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eImagination\r\na medium\r\nof realizing\r\nthe absent\r\nand\r\nsignificant\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThere are several fallacies in this way of thinking.\r\n(\u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e) The healthy imagination deals not with the unreal,\r\nbut with the mental realization of what is suggested.\r\nIts exercise is not a flight into the purely fanciful and\r\nideal, but a method of expanding and filling in what is\r\nreal. To the child the homely activities going on about\r\nhim are not utilitarian devices for accomplishing physical\r\nends; they exemplify a wonderful world the depths of\r\nwhich he has not sounded, a world full of the mystery\r\nand promise that attend all the doings of the grown-ups\r\nwhom he admires. However prosaic this world may be\r\nto the adults who find its duties routine affairs, to the\r\nchild it is fraught with social meaning. To engage in\r\nit is to exercise the imagination in constructing an experience\r\nof wider value than any the child has yet\r\nmastered.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eOnly the\r\nalready\r\nexperienced\r\ncan be\r\nsymbolized\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(\u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e) Educators sometimes think children are reacting\r\nto a great moral or spiritual truth when the children\u0027s\r\nreactions are largely physical and sensational. Children\r\nhave great powers of dramatic simulation, and their\r\nphysical bearing may seem (to adults prepossessed with\r\na philosophic theory) to indicate they have been impressed\r\nwith some lesson of chivalry, devotion, or nobility,\r\nwhen the children themselves are occupied only\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_167\" id=\"Page_167\"\u003e[Pg 167]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwith transitory physical excitations. To symbolize great\r\ntruths far beyond the child\u0027s range of actual experience\r\nis an impossibility, and to attempt it is to invite love of\r\nmomentary stimulation.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eUseful work\r\nis not necessarily\r\nlabor\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(\u003ci\u003ec\u003c/i\u003e) Just as the opponents of play in education always\r\nconceive of play as mere amusement, so the opponents\r\nof direct and useful activities confuse occupation with\r\nlabor. The adult is acquainted with responsible labor\r\nupon which serious financial results depend. Consequently\r\nhe seeks relief, relaxation, amusement. Unless\r\nchildren have prematurely worked for hire, unless they\r\nhave come under the blight of child labor, no such division\r\nexists for them. Whatever appeals to them at all,\r\nappeals directly on its own account. There is no contrast\r\nbetween doing things for utility and for fun. Their\r\nlife is more united and more wholesome. To suppose\r\nthat activities customarily performed by adults only\r\nunder the pressure of utility may not be done perfectly\r\nfreely and joyously by children indicates a lack of imagination.\r\nNot the thing done but the quality of mind\r\nthat goes into the doing settles what is utilitarian and\r\nwhat is unconstrained and educative.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e§ 3. \u003ci\u003eConstructive Occupations\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eThe historic\r\ngrowth of\r\nsciences out\r\nof occupations\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe history of culture shows that mankind\u0027s scientific\r\nknowledge and technical abilities have developed, especially\r\nin all their earlier stages, out of the fundamental\r\nproblems of life. Anatomy and physiology grew out of\r\nthe practical needs of keeping healthy and active; geometry\r\nand mechanics out of demands for measuring\r\nland, for building, and for making labor-saving machines;\r\nastronomy has been closely connected with navigation,\r\nkeeping record of the passage of time; botany grew out\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_168\" id=\"Page_168\"\u003e[Pg 168]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof the requirements of medicine and of agronomy;\r\nchemistry has been associated with dyeing, metallurgy,\r\nand other industrial pursuits. In turn, modern industry\r\nis almost wholly a matter of applied science; year by\r\nyear the domain of routine and crude empiricism is narrowed\r\nby the translation of scientific discovery into\r\nindustrial invention. The trolley, the telephone, the\r\nelectric light, the steam engine, with all their revolutionary\r\nconsequences for social intercourse and control,\r\nare the fruits of science.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eThe intellectual\r\npossibilities\r\nof\r\nschool occupations\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThese facts are full of educational significance. Most\r\nchildren are preëminently active in their tendencies.\r\nThe schools have also taken on\u0026mdash;largely from utilitarian,\r\nrather than from strictly educative reasons\u0026mdash;a large\r\nnumber of active pursuits commonly grouped under the\r\nhead of manual training, including also school gardens,\r\nexcursions, and various graphic arts. Perhaps the most\r\npressing problem of education at the present moment is\r\nto organize and relate these subjects so that they will\r\nbecome instruments for forming alert, persistent, and\r\nfruitful intellectual habits. That they take hold of the\r\nmore primary and native equipment of children (appealing\r\nto their desire to do) is generally recognized; that\r\nthey afford great opportunity for training in self-reliant\r\nand efficient social service is gaining acknowledgment.\r\nBut they may also be used for presenting \u003ci\u003etypical problems\r\nto be solved by personal reflection and experimentation,\r\nand by acquiring definite bodies of knowledge\r\nleading later to more specialized scientific knowledge\u003c/i\u003e.\r\nThere is indeed no magic by which mere physical\r\nactivity or deft manipulation will secure intellectual\r\nresults. (See p. 43.) Manual subjects may be taught\r\nby routine, by dictation, or by convention as readily\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_169\" id=\"Page_169\"\u003e[Pg 169]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nas bookish subjects. But intelligent consecutive work\r\nin gardening, cooking, or weaving, or in elementary\r\nwood and iron, may be planned which will inevitably\r\nresult in students not only amassing information of practical\r\nand scientific importance in botany, zoölogy, chemistry,\r\nphysics, and other sciences, but (what is more\r\nsignificant) in their becoming versed in methods of experimental\r\ninquiry and proof.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eReorganization\r\nof the\r\ncourse of\r\nstudy\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThat the elementary curriculum is overloaded is a common\r\ncomplaint. The only alternative to a reactionary\r\nreturn to the educational traditions of the past lies in\r\nworking out the intellectual possibilities resident in the\r\nvarious arts, crafts, and occupations, and reorganizing\r\nthe curriculum accordingly. Here, more than elsewhere,\r\nare found the means by which the blind and\r\nroutine experience of the race may be transformed into\r\nilluminated and emancipated experiment.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_170\" id=\"Page_170\"\u003e[Pg 170]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003chr style=\"width: 65%;\" /\u003e\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"CHAPTER_THIRTEEN\" id=\"CHAPTER_THIRTEEN\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eCHAPTER THIRTEEN\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eLANGUAGE AND THE TRAINING OF THOUGHT\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e§ 1. \u003ci\u003eLanguage as the Tool of Thinking\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eAmbiguous\r\nposition of\r\nlanguage\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSpeech has such a peculiarly intimate connection with\r\nthought as to require special discussion. Although the\r\nvery word logic comes from logos (\u003cspan lang=\"el\" title=\"Greek: logos\"\u003e\u0026#955;\u0026#959;\u0026#947;\u0026#959;\u0026#962;\u003c/span\u003e), meaning indifferently\r\nboth word or speech, and thought or reason,\r\nyet \"words, words, words\" denote intellectual barrenness,\r\na sham of thought. Although schooling has language\r\nas its chief instrument (and often as its chief matter) of\r\nstudy, educational reformers have for centuries brought\r\ntheir severest indictments against the current use of language\r\nin the schools. The conviction that language is\r\nnecessary to thinking (is even identical with it) is met\r\nby the contention that language perverts and conceals\r\nthought.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eLanguage\r\na necessary\r\ntool of\r\nthinking,\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003efor it alone\r\nfixes meanings\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThree typical views have been maintained regarding\r\nthe relation of thought and language: first, that they\r\nare identical; second, that words are the garb or clothing\r\nof thought, necessary not for thought but only for conveying\r\nit; and third (the view we shall here maintain)\r\nthat while language is not thought it is necessary for\r\nthinking as well as for its communication. When it is\r\nsaid, however, that thinking is impossible without language,\r\nwe must recall that language includes much more\r\nthan oral and written speech. Gestures, pictures, monuments,\r\nvisual images, finger movements\u0026mdash;anything con\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_171\" id=\"Page_171\"\u003e[Pg 171]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003esciously\r\nemployed as a \u003ci\u003esign\u003c/i\u003e is, logically, language. To\r\nsay that language is necessary for thinking is to say\r\nthat signs are necessary. Thought deals not with bare\r\nthings, but with their \u003ci\u003emeanings\u003c/i\u003e, their suggestions;\r\nand meanings, in order to be apprehended, must be\r\nembodied in sensible and particular existences. Without\r\nmeaning, things are nothing but blind stimuli or\r\nchance sources of pleasure and pain; and since meanings\r\nare not themselves tangible things, they must be\r\nanchored by attachment to some physical existence.\r\nExistences that are especially set aside to fixate and\r\nconvey meanings are \u003ci\u003esigns\u003c/i\u003e or \u003ci\u003esymbols\u003c/i\u003e. If a man moves\r\ntoward another to throw him out of the room, his movement\r\nis not a sign. If, however, the man points to the\r\ndoor with his hand, or utters the sound \u003ci\u003ego\u003c/i\u003e, his movement\r\nis reduced to a vehicle of meaning: it is a sign or symbol.\r\nIn the case of signs we care nothing for what they are\r\nin themselves, but everything for what they signify and\r\nrepresent. \u003ci\u003eCanis\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003ehund\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003echien\u003c/i\u003e, dog\u0026mdash;it makes no difference\r\nwhat the outward thing is, so long as the meaning\r\nis presented.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eLimitations\r\nof natural\r\nsymbols\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNatural objects are signs of other things and events.\r\nClouds stand for rain; a footprint represents game or\r\nan enemy; a projecting rock serves to indicate minerals\r\nbelow the surface. The limitations of natural signs are,\r\nhowever, great. (\u003ci\u003ei\u003c/i\u003e) The physical or direct sense excitation\r\ntends to distract attention from what is meant or\r\nindicated.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_27_27\" id=\"FNanchor_27_27\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_27_27\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[27]\u003c/a\u003e Almost every one will recall pointing out to\r\na kitten or puppy some object of food, only to have the\r\nanimal devote himself to the hand pointing, not to the\r\nthing pointed at. (\u003ci\u003eii\u003c/i\u003e) Where natural signs alone exist,\r\nwe are mainly at the mercy of external happenings; we\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_172\" id=\"Page_172\"\u003e[Pg 172]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nhave to wait until the natural event presents itself in\r\norder to be warned or advised of the possibility of some\r\nother event. (\u003ci\u003eiii\u003c/i\u003e) Natural signs, not being originally\r\nintended to be signs, are cumbrous, bulky, inconvenient,\r\nunmanageable.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eArtificial\r\nsigns overcome\r\nthese\r\nrestrictions.\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is therefore indispensable for any high development\r\nof thought that there should be also intentional signs.\r\nSpeech supplies the requirement. Gestures, sounds,\r\nwritten or printed forms, are strictly physical existences,\r\nbut their native value is intentionally subordinated to\r\nthe value they acquire as representative of meanings.\r\n(\u003ci\u003ei\u003c/i\u003e) The direct and sensible value of faint sounds and\r\nminute written or printed marks is very slight.\r\nAccordingly, attention is not distracted from their\r\n\u003ci\u003erepresentative\u003c/i\u003e function. (\u003ci\u003eii\u003c/i\u003e) Their production is under\r\nour direct control so that they may be produced\r\nwhen needed. When we can make the word \u003ci\u003erain\u003c/i\u003e, we\r\ndo not have to wait for some physical forerunner of rain\r\nto call our thoughts in that direction. We cannot make\r\nthe cloud; we can make the sound, and as a token of\r\nmeaning the sound serves the purpose as well as the\r\ncloud. (\u003ci\u003eiii\u003c/i\u003e) Arbitrary linguistic signs are convenient\r\nand easy to manage. They are compact, portable, and\r\ndelicate. As long as we live we breathe; and modifications\r\nby the muscles of throat and mouth of the volume\r\nand quality of the air are simple, easy, and indefinitely\r\ncontrollable. Bodily postures and gestures of the hand\r\nand arm are also employed as signs, but they are coarse\r\nand unmanageable compared with modifications of breath\r\nto produce sounds. No wonder that oral speech has been\r\nselected as the main stuff of intentional intellectual signs.\r\nSounds, while subtle, refined, and easily modifiable, are\r\ntransitory. This defect is met by the system of written\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_173\" id=\"Page_173\"\u003e[Pg 173]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nand printed words, appealing to the eye. \u003ci\u003eLitera scripta\r\nmanet.\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBearing in mind the intimate connection of meanings\r\nand signs (or language), we may note in more detail\r\nwhat language does (1) for specific meanings, and (2) for\r\nthe organization of meanings.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eI. Individual Meanings. A verbal sign (\u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e) selects,\r\ndetaches, a meaning from what is otherwise a vague\r\nflux and blur (see p. 121); (\u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e) it retains, registers, stores\r\nthat meaning; and (\u003ci\u003ec\u003c/i\u003e) applies it, when needed, to the\r\ncomprehension of other things. Combining these various\r\nfunctions in a mixture of metaphors, we may say\r\nthat a linguistic sign is a fence, a label, and a vehicle\u0026mdash;all\r\nin one.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eA sign\r\nmakes a\r\nmeaning\r\ndistinct\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(\u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e) Every one has experienced how learning an appropriate\r\nname for what was dim and vague cleared up\r\nand crystallized the whole matter. Some meaning seems\r\nalmost within reach, but is elusive; it refuses to condense\r\ninto definite form; the attaching of a word somehow\r\n(just how, it is almost impossible to say) puts limits\r\naround the meaning, draws it out from the void, makes\r\nit stand out as an entity on its own account. When\r\nEmerson said that he would almost rather know the true\r\nname, the poet\u0027s name, for a thing, than to know the\r\nthing itself, he presumably had this irradiating and illuminating\r\nfunction of language in mind. The delight\r\nthat children take in demanding and learning the names\r\nof everything about them indicates that meanings are\r\nbecoming concrete individuals to them, so that their\r\ncommerce with things is passing from the physical to\r\nthe intellectual plane. It is hardly surprising that savages\r\nattach a magic efficacy to words. To name anything\r\nis to give it a title; to dignify and honor it by\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_174\" id=\"Page_174\"\u003e[Pg 174]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nraising it from a mere physical occurrence to a meaning\r\nthat is distinct and permanent. To know the names of\r\npeople and things and to be able to manipulate these\r\nnames is, in savage lore, to be in possession of their\r\ndignity and worth, to master them.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eA sign\r\npreserves a\r\nmeaning\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(\u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e) Things come and go; or we come and go, and\r\neither way things escape our notice. Our direct sensible\r\nrelation to things is very limited. The suggestion of\r\nmeanings by natural signs is limited to occasions of direct\r\ncontact or vision. But a meaning fixed by a linguistic\r\nsign is conserved for future use. Even if the thing is not\r\nthere to represent the meaning, the word may be produced\r\nso as to evoke the meaning. Since intellectual\r\nlife depends on possession of a store of meanings, the\r\nimportance of language as a tool of preserving meanings\r\ncannot be overstated. To be sure, the method of storage\r\nis not wholly aseptic; words often corrupt and modify\r\nthe meanings they are supposed to keep intact, but\r\nliability to infection is a price paid by every living thing\r\nfor the privilege of living.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eA sign\r\ntransfers a\r\nmeaning\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(\u003ci\u003ec\u003c/i\u003e) When a meaning is detached and fixed by a sign,\r\nit is possible to use that meaning in a new context and\r\nsituation. This transfer and reapplication is the key to\r\nall judgment and inference. It would little profit a man\r\nto recognize that a given particular cloud was the premonitor\r\nof a given particular rainstorm if his recognition\r\nended there, for he would then have to learn over and\r\nover again, since the next cloud and the next rain are different\r\nevents. No cumulative growth of intelligence would\r\noccur; experience might form habits of physical adaptation\r\nbut it would not teach anything, for we should not\r\nbe able to use a prior experience consciously to anticipate\r\nand regulate a further experience. To be able to use\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_175\" id=\"Page_175\"\u003e[Pg 175]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe past to judge and infer the new and unknown implies\r\nthat, although the past thing has gone, its \u003ci\u003emeaning\u003c/i\u003e\r\nabides in such a way as to be applicable in determining\r\nthe character of the new. Speech forms are our great\r\ncarriers: the easy-running vehicles by which meanings\r\nare transported from experiences that no longer concern\r\nus to those that are as yet dark and dubious.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eLogical organization\r\ndepends\r\nupon signs\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eII. Organization of Meanings. In emphasizing the\r\nimportance of signs in relation to specific meanings,\r\nwe have overlooked another aspect, equally valuable.\r\nSigns not only mark off specific or individual meanings,\r\nbut they are also instruments of grouping meanings in\r\nrelation to one another. Words are not only names or\r\ntitles of single meanings; they also form \u003ci\u003esentences\u003c/i\u003e in which\r\nmeanings are organized in relation to one another. When\r\nwe say \"That book is a dictionary,\" or \"That blur of\r\nlight in the heavens is Halley\u0027s comet,\" we express a\r\n\u003ci\u003elogical\u003c/i\u003e connection\u0026mdash;an act of classifying and defining\r\nthat goes beyond the physical thing into the logical\r\nregion of genera and species, things and attributes. Propositions,\r\nsentences, bear the same relation to judgments\r\nthat distinct words, built up mainly by analyzing propositions\r\nin their various types, bear to meanings or conceptions;\r\nand just as words imply a sentence, so a sentence\r\nimplies a larger whole of consecutive discourse into\r\nwhich it fits. As is often said, grammar expresses the\r\nunconscious logic of the popular mind. \u003ci\u003eThe chief intellectual\r\nclassifications that constitute the working capital\r\nof thought have been built up for us by our mother tongue.\u003c/i\u003e\r\nOur very lack of explicit consciousness in using language\r\nthat we are employing the intellectual systematizations\r\nof the race shows how thoroughly accustomed we have\r\nbecome to its logical distinctions and groupings.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_176\" id=\"Page_176\"\u003e[Pg 176]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e§ 2. \u003ci\u003eThe Abuse of Linguistic Methods in Education\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eTeaching\r\nmerely\r\nthings, not\r\neducative\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eTaken literally, the maxim, \"Teach things, not words,\"\r\nor \"Teach things before words,\" would be the negation of\r\neducation; it would reduce mental life to mere physical\r\nand sensible adjustments. Learning, in the proper sense,\r\nis not learning things, but the \u003ci\u003emeanings\u003c/i\u003e of things, and\r\nthis process involves the use of signs, or language in its\r\ngeneric sense. In like fashion, the warfare of some\r\neducational reformers against symbols, if pushed to extremes,\r\ninvolves the destruction of the intellectual life,\r\nsince this lives, moves, and has its being in those processes\r\nof definition, abstraction, generalization, and\r\nclassification that are made possible by symbols alone.\r\nNevertheless, these contentions of educational reformers\r\nhave been needed. The liability of a thing to abuse\r\nis in proportion to the value of its right use.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eBut words\r\nseparated\r\nfrom things\r\nare not true\r\nsigns\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSymbols are themselves, as pointed out above, particular,\r\nphysical, sensible existences, like any other things.\r\nThey are symbols only by virtue of what they suggest\r\nand represent, \u003ci\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e meanings. (\u003ci\u003ei\u003c/i\u003e) They stand for these\r\nmeanings to any individual only when he has had \u003ci\u003eexperience\u003c/i\u003e\r\nof some situation to which these meanings are\r\nactually relevant. Words can detach and preserve a\r\nmeaning only when the meaning has been first involved in\r\nour own direct intercourse with things. To attempt to\r\ngive a meaning through a word alone without any dealings\r\nwith a thing is to deprive the word of intelligible\r\nsignification; against this attempt, a tendency only too\r\nprevalent in education, reformers have protested. Moreover,\r\nthere is a tendency to assume that whenever there\r\nis a definite word or form of speech there is also a definite\r\nidea; while, as a matter of fact, adults and children\r\nalike are capable of using even precise verbal formulæ\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_177\" id=\"Page_177\"\u003e[Pg 177]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwith only the vaguest and most confused sense of what\r\nthey mean. Genuine ignorance is more profitable because\r\nlikely to be accompanied by humility, curiosity,\r\nand open-mindedness; while ability to repeat catch-phrases,\r\ncant terms, familiar propositions, gives the\r\nconceit of learning and coats the mind with a varnish\r\nwaterproof to new ideas.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eLanguage\r\ntends to\r\narrest personal\r\ninquiry\r\nand\r\nreflection\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(\u003ci\u003eii\u003c/i\u003e) Again, although new combinations of words without\r\nthe intervention of physical things may supply new\r\nideas, there are limits to this possibility. Lazy inertness\r\ncauses individuals to accept ideas that have currency\r\nabout them without personal inquiry and testing. A\r\nman uses thought, perhaps, to find out what others\r\nbelieve, and then stops. The ideas of others as embodied\r\nin language become substitutes for one\u0027s own\r\nideas. The use of linguistic studies and methods to\r\nhalt the human mind on the level of the attainments\r\nof the past, to prevent new inquiry and discovery, to\r\nput the authority of tradition in place of the authority\r\nof natural facts and laws, to reduce the individual to a\r\nparasite living on the secondhand experience of others\u0026mdash;these\r\nthings have been the source of the reformers\u0027\r\nprotest against the preëminence assigned to language in\r\nschools.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eWords as\r\nmere\r\nstimuli\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFinally, words that originally stood for ideas come,\r\nwith repeated use, to be mere counters; they become\r\nphysical things to be manipulated according to certain\r\nrules, or reacted to by certain operations without consciousness\r\nof their meaning. Mr. Stout (who has called\r\nsuch terms \"substitute signs\")remarks that \"algebraical\r\nand arithmetical signs are to a great extent used as\r\nmere substitute signs…. It is possible to use signs\r\nof this kind whenever fixed and definite rules of opera\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_178\" id=\"Page_178\"\u003e[Pg 178]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003etion\r\ncan be derived from the nature of the things symbolized,\r\nso as to be applied in manipulating the signs,\r\nwithout further reference to their signification. A\r\nword is an instrument for thinking about the meaning\r\nwhich it expresses; a substitute sign is a means of \u003ci\u003enot\u003c/i\u003e\r\nthinking about the meaning which it symbolizes.\" The\r\nprinciple applies, however, to ordinary words, as well as\r\nto algebraic signs; they also enable us to use meanings\r\nso as to get results without thinking. In many respects,\r\nsigns that are means of not thinking are of great advantage;\r\nstanding for the familiar, they release attention for\r\nmeanings that, being novel, require conscious interpretation.\r\nNevertheless, the premium put in the schoolroom\r\nupon attainment of technical facility, upon skill in\r\nproducing external results (\u003ci\u003eante\u003c/i\u003e, p. 51), often changes\r\nthis advantage into a positive detriment. In manipulating\r\nsymbols so as to recite well, to get and give correct\r\nanswers, to follow prescribed formulæ of analysis, the\r\npupil\u0027s attitude becomes mechanical, rather than thoughtful;\r\nverbal memorizing is substituted for inquiry into\r\nthe meaning of things. This danger is perhaps the one\r\nuppermost in mind when verbal methods of education\r\nare attacked.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e§ 3. \u003ci\u003eThe Use of Language in its Educational Bearings\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eLanguage stands in a twofold relation to the work of\r\neducation. On the one hand, it is continually used in\r\nall studies as well as in all the social discipline of the\r\nschool; on the other, it is a distinct object of study.\r\nWe shall consider only the ordinary use of language,\r\nsince its effects upon habits of thought are much deeper\r\nthan those of conscious study.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eLanguage\r\nnot primarily\r\nintellectual\r\nin\r\npurpose\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe common statement that \"language is the expres\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_179\" id=\"Page_179\"\u003e[Pg 179]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003esion\r\nof thought\" conveys only a half-truth, and a half-truth\r\nthat is likely to result in positive error. Language\r\ndoes express thought, but not primarily, nor, at first,\r\neven consciously. The primary motive for language is\r\nto influence (through the expression of desire, emotion,\r\nand thought) the activity of others; its secondary use is\r\nto enter into more intimate sociable relations with them;\r\nits employment as a conscious vehicle of thought and\r\nknowledge is a tertiary, and relatively late, formation.\r\nThe contrast is well brought out by the statement of\r\nJohn Locke that words have a double use,\u0026mdash;\"civil\" and\r\n\"philosophical.\" \"By their civil use, I mean such a\r\ncommunication of thoughts and ideas by words as may\r\nserve for the upholding of common conversation and\r\ncommerce about the ordinary affairs and conveniences\r\nof civil life…. By the philosophical use of words, I\r\nmean such a use of them as may serve to convey the\r\nprecise notions of things, and to express in general\r\npropositions certain and undoubted truths.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eHence education\r\nhas\r\nto transform\r\nit into an\r\nintellectual\r\ntool\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis distinction of the practical and social from the\r\nintellectual use of language throws much light on the\r\nproblem of the school in respect to speech. That problem\r\nis \u003ci\u003eto direct pupils\u0027 oral and written speech, used\r\nprimarily for practical and social ends, so that gradually\r\nit shall become a conscious tool of conveying knowledge\r\nand assisting thought\u003c/i\u003e. How without checking the\r\nspontaneous, natural motives\u0026mdash;motives to which language\r\nowes its vitality, force, vividness, and variety\u0026mdash;are\r\nwe to modify speech habits so as to render them accurate\r\nand flexible \u003ci\u003eintellectual\u003c/i\u003e instruments? It is comparatively\r\neasy to encourage the original spontaneous\r\nflow and not make language over into a servant of reflective\r\nthought; it is comparatively easy to check and\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_180\" id=\"Page_180\"\u003e[Pg 180]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nalmost destroy (so far as the schoolroom is concerned)\r\nnative aim and interest, and to set up artificial and\r\nformal modes of expression in some isolated and technical\r\nmatters. The difficulty lies in making over habits\r\nthat have to do with \"ordinary affairs and conveniences\"\r\ninto habits concerned with \"precise notions.\" The successful\r\naccomplishing of the transformation requires\r\n(\u003ci\u003ei\u003c/i\u003e) enlargement of the pupil\u0027s vocabulary; (\u003ci\u003eii\u003c/i\u003e) rendering\r\nits terms more precise and accurate, and (\u003ci\u003eiii\u003c/i\u003e) formation\r\nof habits of consecutive discourse.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eTo enlarge\r\nvocabulary,\r\nthe fund of\r\nconcepts\r\nshould be\r\nenlarged\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(\u003ci\u003ei\u003c/i\u003e) Enlargement of vocabulary. This takes place, of\r\ncourse, by wider intelligent contact with things and\r\npersons, and also vicariously, by gathering the meanings\r\nof words from the context in which they are heard or\r\nread. To grasp by either method a word in its meaning\r\nis to exercise intelligence, to perform an act of intelligent\r\nselection or analysis, and it is also to widen the fund of\r\nmeanings or concepts readily available in further intellectual\r\nenterprises (\u003ci\u003eante\u003c/i\u003e, p. 126). It is usual to distinguish\r\nbetween one\u0027s active and one\u0027s passive vocabulary,\r\nthe latter being composed of the words that are understood\r\nwhen they are heard or seen, the former of words\r\nthat are used intelligently. The fact that the passive\r\nvocabulary is ordinarily much larger than the active\r\nindicates a certain amount of inert energy, of power not\r\nfreely controlled by an individual. Failure to use meanings\r\nthat are nevertheless understood reveals dependence\r\nupon external stimulus, and lack of intellectual initiative.\r\nThis mental laziness is to some extent an artificial product\r\nof education. Small children usually attempt to\r\nput to use every new word they get hold of, but when\r\nthey learn to read they are introduced to a large variety\r\nof terms that there is no ordinary opportunity to use.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_181\" id=\"Page_181\"\u003e[Pg 181]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nThe result is a kind of mental suppression, if not smothering.\r\nMoreover, the meaning of words not actively used\r\nin building up and conveying ideas is never quite clear-cut\r\nor complete.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eLooseness of\r\nthinking accompanies\r\na limited\r\nvocabulary\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhile a limited vocabulary may be due to a limited\r\nrange of experience, to a sphere of contact with persons\r\nand things so narrow as not to suggest or require a full\r\nstore of words, it is also due to carelessness and vagueness.\r\nA happy-go-lucky frame of mind makes the\r\nindividual averse to clear discriminations, either in perception\r\nor in his own speech. Words are used loosely\r\nin an indeterminate kind of reference to things, and\r\nthe mind approaches a condition where practically\r\neverything is just a thing-um-bob or a what-do-you-call-it.\r\nPaucity of vocabulary on the part of those with\r\nwhom the child associates, triviality and meagerness in\r\nthe child\u0027s reading matter (as frequently even in his\r\nschool readers and text-books), tend to shut down the\r\narea of mental vision.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eCommand\r\nof language\r\ninvolves\r\ncommand of\r\nthings\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe must note also the great difference between flow\r\nof words and command of language. Volubility is not\r\nnecessarily a sign of a large vocabulary; much talking\r\nor even ready speech is quite compatible with moving\r\nround and round in a circle of moderate radius.\r\nMost schoolrooms suffer from a lack of materials and\r\nappliances save perhaps books\u0026mdash;and even these are\r\n\"written down\" to the supposed capacity, or incapacity,\r\nof children. Occasion and demand for an enriched vocabulary\r\nare accordingly restricted. The vocabulary of\r\nthings studied in the schoolroom is very largely isolated;\r\nit does not link itself organically to the range of the\r\nideas and words that are in vogue outside the school.\r\nHence the enlargement that takes place is often nominal,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_182\" id=\"Page_182\"\u003e[Pg 182]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nadding to the inert, rather than to the active, fund of\r\nmeanings and terms.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(\u003ci\u003eii\u003c/i\u003e) Accuracy of vocabulary. One way in which the\r\nfund of words and concepts is increased is by discovering\r\nand naming shades of meaning\u0026mdash;that is to say, by making\r\nthe vocabulary more precise. Increase in definiteness\r\nis as important relatively as is the enlargement of\r\nthe capital stock absolutely.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eThe \u003ci\u003egeneral\u003c/i\u003e\r\nas the vague\r\nand as the\r\ndistinctly\r\ngeneric\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe first meanings of terms, since they are due to\r\nsuperficial acquaintance with things, are general in the\r\nsense of being vague. The little child calls all men\r\npapa; acquainted with a dog, he may call the first horse\r\nhe sees a big dog. Differences of quantity and intensity\r\nare noted, but the fundamental meaning is so vague that\r\nit covers things that are far apart. To many persons\r\ntrees are just trees, being discriminated only into deciduous\r\ntrees and evergreens, with perhaps recognition\r\nof one or two kinds of each. Such vagueness tends to\r\npersist and to become a barrier to the advance of thinking.\r\nTerms that are miscellaneous in scope are clumsy\r\ntools at best; in addition they are frequently treacherous,\r\nfor their ambiguous reference causes us to confuse\r\nthings that should be distinguished.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eTwofold\r\ngrowth of\r\nwords in\r\nsense or\r\nsignification\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe growth of precise terms out of original vagueness\r\ntakes place normally in two directions: toward\r\nwords that stand for relationships and words that stand\r\nfor highly individualized traits (compare what was said\r\nabout the development of meanings, p. 122); the first\r\nbeing associated with abstract, the second with concrete,\r\nthinking. Some Australian tribes are said to have no\r\nwords for \u003ci\u003eanimal\u003c/i\u003e or for \u003ci\u003eplant\u003c/i\u003e, while they have specific\r\nnames for every variety of plant and animal in their\r\nneighborhoods. This minuteness of vocabulary repre\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_183\" id=\"Page_183\"\u003e[Pg 183]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003esents\r\nprogress toward definiteness, but in a one-sided way.\r\nSpecific properties are distinguished, but not relationships.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_28_28\" id=\"FNanchor_28_28\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_28_28\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[28]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nOn the other hand, students of philosophy and\r\nof the general aspects of natural and social science are\r\napt to acquire a store of terms that signify relations\r\nwithout balancing them up with terms that designate\r\nspecific individuals and traits. The ordinary use of\r\nsuch terms as \u003ci\u003ecausation\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003elaw\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003esociety\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eindividual\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003ecapital\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nillustrates this tendency.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eWords alter\r\ntheir meanings\r\nso as to\r\nchange their\r\nlogical\r\nfunctions\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn the history of language we find both aspects of the\r\ngrowth of vocabulary illustrated by changes in the sense\r\nof words: some words originally wide in their application\r\nare narrowed to denote shades of meaning; others\r\noriginally specific are widened to express relationships.\r\nThe term \u003ci\u003evernacular\u003c/i\u003e, now meaning mother speech, has\r\nbeen generalized from the word \u003ci\u003everna\u003c/i\u003e, meaning a slave\r\nborn in the master\u0027s household. \u003ci\u003ePublication\u003c/i\u003e has evolved\r\nits meaning of communication by means of print, through\r\nrestricting an earlier meaning of any kind of communication\u0026mdash;although\r\nthe wider meaning is retained in legal\r\nprocedure, as publishing a libel. The sense of the word\r\n\u003ci\u003eaverage\u003c/i\u003e has been generalized from a use connected with\r\ndividing loss by shipwreck proportionately among various\r\nsharers in an enterprise.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_29_29\" id=\"FNanchor_29_29\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Footnote_29_29\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[29]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eSimilar\r\nchanges\r\noccur in the\r\nvocabulary\r\nof every\r\nstudent\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThese historical changes assist the educator to appreciate\r\nthe changes that occur with individuals together\r\nwith advance in intellectual resources. In studying\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_184\" id=\"Page_184\"\u003e[Pg 184]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ngeometry, a pupil must learn both to narrow and to\r\nextend the meanings of such familiar words as \u003ci\u003eline\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003esurface\u003c/i\u003e,\r\n\u003ci\u003eangle\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003esquare\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003ecircle\u003c/i\u003e; to narrow them to the precise\r\nmeanings involved in demonstrations; to extend them\r\nto cover generic relations not expressed in ordinary\r\nusage. Qualities of color and size must be excluded;\r\nrelations of direction, of variation in direction, of limit,\r\nmust be definitely seized. A like transformation occurs,\r\nof course, in every subject of study. Just at this point\r\nlies the danger, alluded to above, of simply overlaying\r\ncommon meanings with new and isolated meanings instead\r\nof effecting a genuine working-over of popular\r\nand practical meanings into adequate logical tools.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eThe value\r\nof technical\r\nterms\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eTerms used with intentional exactness so as to express\r\na meaning, the whole meaning, and only the meaning,\r\nare called \u003ci\u003etechnical\u003c/i\u003e. For educational purposes, a\r\ntechnical term indicates something relative, not absolute;\r\nfor a term is technical not because of its verbal form or\r\nits unusualness, but because it is employed to fix a\r\nmeaning precisely. Ordinary words get a technical\r\nquality when used intentionally for this end. Whenever\r\nthought becomes more accurate, a (relatively) technical\r\nvocabulary grows up. Teachers are apt to oscillate\r\nbetween extremes in regard to technical terms. On the\r\none hand, these are multiplied in every direction, seemingly\r\non the assumption that learning a new piece of\r\nterminology, accompanied by verbal description or\r\ndefinition, is equivalent to grasping a new idea. When\r\nit is seen how largely the net outcome is the accumulation\r\nof an isolated set of words, a jargon or scholastic\r\ncant, and to what extent the natural power of judgment\r\nis clogged by this accumulation, there is a reaction to\r\nthe opposite extreme. Technical terms are banished:\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_185\" id=\"Page_185\"\u003e[Pg 185]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\"name words\" exist but not nouns; \"action words\" but\r\nnot verbs; pupils may \"take away,\" but not subtract;\r\nthey may tell what four fives are, but not what four\r\ntimes five are, and so on. A sound instinct underlies this\r\nreaction\u0026mdash;aversion to words that give the pretense, but\r\nnot the reality, of meaning. Yet the fundamental difficulty\r\nis not with the word, but with the idea. If the\r\nidea is not grasped, nothing is gained by using a more\r\nfamiliar word; if the idea is perceived, the use of the\r\nterm that exactly names it may assist in fixing the idea.\r\nTerms denoting highly exact meanings should be introduced\r\nonly sparingly, that is, a few at a time; they\r\nshould be led up to gradually, and great pains should be\r\ntaken to secure the circumstances that render precision\r\nof meaning significant.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eImportance\r\nof consecutive\r\ndiscourse\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(\u003ci\u003eiii\u003c/i\u003e) Consecutive discourse. As we saw, language\r\nconnects and organizes meanings as well as selects and\r\nfixes them. As every meaning is set in the context of\r\nsome situation, so every word in concrete use belongs to\r\nsome sentence (it may itself represent a condensed sentence),\r\nand the sentence, in turn, belongs to some larger\r\nstory, description, or reasoning process. It is unnecessary\r\nto repeat what has been said about the importance of\r\ncontinuity and ordering of meanings. We may, however,\r\nnote some ways in which school practices tend to interrupt\r\nconsecutiveness of language and thereby interfere\r\nharmfully with systematic reflection. (\u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e) Teachers have\r\na habit of monopolizing continued discourse. Many, if\r\nnot most, instructors would be surprised if informed at\r\nthe end of the day of the amount of time they have\r\ntalked as compared with any pupil. Children\u0027s conversation\r\nis often confined to answering questions in brief\r\nphrases, or in single disconnected sentences. Expatia\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_186\" id=\"Page_186\"\u003e[Pg 186]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003etion\r\nand explanation are reserved for the teacher, who\r\noften admits any hint at an answer on the part of the\r\npupil, and then amplifies what he supposes the child must\r\nhave meant. The habits of sporadic and fragmentary\r\ndiscourse thus promoted have inevitably a disintegrating\r\nintellectual influence.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eToo minute\r\nquestioning\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(\u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e) Assignment of too short lessons when accompanied\r\n(as it usually is in order to pass the time of the\r\nrecitation period) by minute \"analytic\" questioning\r\nhas the same effect. This evil is usually at its height\r\nin such subjects as history and literature, where not\r\ninfrequently the material is so minutely subdivided as\r\nto break up the unity of meaning belonging to a given\r\nportion of the matter, to destroy perspective, and in\r\neffect to reduce the whole topic to an accumulation of\r\ndisconnected details all upon the same level. More\r\noften than the teacher is aware, \u003ci\u003ehis\u003c/i\u003e mind carries and\r\nsupplies the background of unity of meaning against\r\nwhich pupils project isolated scraps.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eMaking\r\navoidance\r\nof error the\r\naim\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(\u003ci\u003ec\u003c/i\u003e) Insistence upon avoiding error instead of attaining\r\npower tends also to interruption of continuous discourse\r\nand thought. Children who begin with something\r\nto say and with intellectual eagerness to say it are sometimes\r\nmade so conscious of minor errors in substance\r\nand form that the energy that should go into constructive\r\nthinking is diverted into anxiety not to make mistakes,\r\nand even, in extreme cases, into passive quiescence as\r\nthe best method of minimizing error. This tendency\r\nis especially marked in connection with the writing of\r\ncompositions, essays, and themes. It has even been\r\ngravely recommended that little children should always\r\nwrite on trivial subjects and in short sentences because\r\nin that way they are less likely to make mistakes, while\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_187\" id=\"Page_187\"\u003e[Pg 187]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe teaching of writing to high school and college\r\nstudents occasionally reduces itself to a technique for\r\ndetecting and designating mistakes. The resulting self-consciousness\r\nand constraint are only part of the evil\r\nthat comes from a negative ideal.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_188\" id=\"Page_188\"\u003e[Pg 188]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003chr style=\"width: 65%;\" /\u003e\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"CHAPTER_FOURTEEN\" id=\"CHAPTER_FOURTEEN\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eCHAPTER FOURTEEN\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eOBSERVATION AND INFORMATION IN THE TRAINING\r\nOF MIND\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eNo thinking\r\nwithout acquaintance\r\nwith facts\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThinking is an ordering of subject-matter with reference\r\nto discovering what it signifies or indicates.\r\nThinking no more exists apart from this arranging of\r\nsubject-matter than digestion occurs apart from the\r\nassimilating of food. The way in which the subject-matter\r\nis furnished marks, therefore, a fundamental\r\npoint. If the subject-matter is provided in too scanty\r\nor too profuse fashion, if it comes in disordered array or\r\nin isolated scraps, the effect upon habits of thought is\r\ndetrimental. If personal observation and communication\r\nof information by others (whether in books or\r\nspeech) are rightly conducted, half the logical battle is\r\nwon, for they are the channels of obtaining subject-matter.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e§ 1. \u003ci\u003eThe Nature and Value of Observation\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eFallacy of\r\nmaking\r\n\"facts\" an\r\nend in\r\nthemselves\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe protest, mentioned in the last chapter, of educational\r\nreformers against the exaggerated and false use\r\nof language, insisted upon personal and direct observation\r\nas the proper alternative course. The reformers\r\nfelt that the current emphasis upon the linguistic factor\r\neliminated all opportunity for first-hand acquaintance\r\nwith real things; hence they appealed to sense-perception\r\nto fill the gap. It is not surprising that this\r\nenthusiastic zeal failed frequently to ask how and why\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_189\" id=\"Page_189\"\u003e[Pg 189]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nobservation is educative, and hence fell into the error of\r\nmaking observation an end in itself and was satisfied\r\nwith any kind of material under any kind of conditions.\r\nSuch isolation of observation is still manifested in the\r\nstatement that this faculty develops first, then that of\r\nmemory and imagination, and finally the faculty of\r\nthought. From this point of view, observation is regarded\r\nas furnishing crude masses of raw material, to\r\nwhich, later on, reflective processes may be applied.\r\nOur previous pages should have made obvious the fallacy\r\nof this point of view by bringing out the fact that\r\nsimple concrete thinking attends all our intercourse with\r\nthings which is not on a purely physical level.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eThe sympathetic\r\nmotive in\r\nextending\r\nacquaintance\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eI. All persons have a natural desire\u0026mdash;akin to curiosity\u0026mdash;for\r\na widening of their range of acquaintance\r\nwith persons and things. The sign in art galleries that\r\nforbids the carrying of canes and umbrellas is obvious\r\ntestimony to the fact that simply to see is not enough\r\nfor many people; there is a feeling of lack of acquaintance\r\nuntil some direct contact is made. This demand\r\nfor fuller and closer knowledge is quite different from\r\nany conscious interest in observation for its own sake.\r\nDesire for expansion, for \"self-realization,\" is its motive.\r\nThe interest is sympathetic, socially and æsthetically\r\nsympathetic, rather than cognitive. While the interest\r\nis especially keen in children (because their actual experience\r\nis so small and their possible experience so\r\nlarge), it still characterizes adults when routine has not\r\nblunted its edge. This sympathetic interest provides\r\nthe medium for carrying and binding together what\r\nwould otherwise be a multitude of items, diverse, disconnected,\r\nand of no intellectual use. These systems are\r\nindeed social and æsthetic rather than consciously intel\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_190\" id=\"Page_190\"\u003e[Pg 190]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003electual;\r\nbut they provide the natural medium for more\r\nconscious intellectual explorations. Some educators have\r\nrecommended that nature study in the elementary schools\r\nbe conducted with a love of nature and a cultivation of\r\næsthetic appreciation in view rather than in a purely\r\nanalytic spirit. Others have urged making much of the\r\ncare of animals and plants. Both of these important\r\nrecommendations have grown out of experience, not out\r\nof theory, but they afford excellent exemplifications of\r\nthe theoretic point just made.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eAnalytic\r\ninspection\r\nfor the sake\r\nof doing\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eDirect and\r\nindirect\r\nsense\r\ntraining\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eII. In normal development, specific analytic observations\r\nare originally connected almost exclusively with\r\nthe imperative need for noting means and ends in carrying\r\non activities. When one is \u003ci\u003edoing\u003c/i\u003e something, one is\r\ncompelled, if the work is to succeed (unless it is purely\r\nroutine), to use eyes, ears, and sense of touch as guides\r\nto action. Without a constant and alert exercise of the\r\nsenses, not even plays and games can go on; in any\r\nform of work, materials, obstacles, appliances, failures,\r\nand successes, must be intently watched. Sense-perception\r\ndoes not occur for its own sake or for purposes of\r\ntraining, but because it is an indispensable factor of success\r\nin doing what one is interested in doing. Although\r\nnot designed for sense-training, this method effects sense-training\r\nin the most economical and thoroughgoing way.\r\nVarious schemes have been designed by teachers for\r\ncultivating sharp and prompt observation of forms, as\r\nby writing words,\u0026mdash;even in an unknown language,\u0026mdash;making\r\narrangements of figures and geometrical forms,\r\nand having pupils reproduce them after a momentary\r\nglance. Children often attain great skill in quick seeing\r\nand full reproducing of even complicated meaningless\r\ncombinations. But such methods of training\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_191\" id=\"Page_191\"\u003e[Pg 191]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u0026mdash;however\r\nvaluable as occasional games and diversions\u0026mdash;compare\r\nvery unfavorably with the training of eye and\r\nhand that comes as an incident of work with tools in\r\nwood or metals, or of gardening, cooking, or the care of\r\nanimals. Training by isolated exercises leaves no deposit,\r\nleads nowhere; and even the technical skill acquired\r\nhas little radiating power, or transferable value.\r\nCriticisms made upon the training of observation on the\r\nground that many persons cannot correctly reproduce\r\nthe forms and arrangement of the figures on the face of\r\ntheir watches misses the point because persons do not\r\nlook at a watch to find out whether four o\u0027clock is indicated\r\nby IIII or by IV, but to find out what time it is,\r\nand, if observation decides this matter, noting other details\r\nis irrelevant and a waste of time. In the training\r\nof observation the question of end and motive is all-important.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eScientific\r\nobservations\r\nare linked to\r\nproblems\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003e\"Object-lessons\"\r\nrarely\r\nsupply\r\nproblems\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIII. The further, more intellectual or scientific, development\r\nof observation follows the line of the growth\r\nof practical into theoretical reflection already traced\r\n(\u003ci\u003eante\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_TEN\"\u003eChapter Ten\u003c/a\u003e). As problems emerge and are\r\ndwelt upon, observation is directed less to the facts\r\nthat bear upon a practical aim and more upon what\r\nbears upon a problem as such. What makes observations\r\nin schools often intellectually ineffective is (more\r\nthan anything else) that they are carried on independently\r\nof a sense of a problem that they serve to define\r\nor help to solve. The evil of this isolation is seen\r\nthrough the entire educational system, from the kindergarten,\r\nthrough the elementary and high schools, to\r\nthe college. Almost everywhere may be found, at some\r\ntime, recourse to observations as if they were of complete\r\nand final value in themselves, instead of the means\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_192\" id=\"Page_192\"\u003e[Pg 192]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof getting material that bears upon some difficulty and\r\nits solution. In the kindergarten are heaped up observations\r\nregarding geometrical forms, lines, surfaces,\r\ncubes, colors, and so on. In the elementary school, under\r\nthe name of \"object-lessons,\" the form and properties\r\nof objects,\u0026mdash;apple, orange, chalk,\u0026mdash;selected almost at\r\nrandom, are minutely noted, while under the name of\r\n\"nature study\" similar observations are directed upon\r\nleaves, stones, insects, selected in almost equally arbitrary\r\nfashion. In high school and college, laboratory and microscopic\r\nobservations are carried on as if the accumulation\r\nof observed facts and the acquisition of skill in\r\nmanipulation were educational ends in themselves.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eCompare with these methods of isolated observations\r\nthe statement of Jevons that observation as conducted\r\nby scientific men is effective \"only when excited and\r\nguided by hope of verifying a theory\"; and again, \"the\r\nnumber of things which can be observed and experimented\r\nupon are infinite, and if we merely set to work to\r\nrecord facts without any distinct purpose, our records will\r\nhave no value.\" Strictly speaking, the first statement\r\nof Jevons is too narrow. Scientific men institute observations\r\nnot merely to test an idea (or suggested explanatory\r\nmeaning), but also to locate the nature of a problem and\r\nthereby guide the formation of a hypothesis. But the\r\nprinciple of his remark, namely, that scientific men never\r\nmake the accumulation of observations an end in itself,\r\nbut always a means to a general intellectual conclusion,\r\nis absolutely sound. Until the force of this principle is\r\nadequately recognized in education, observation will be\r\nlargely a matter of uninteresting dead work or of acquiring\r\nforms of technical skill that are not available as intellectual\r\nresources.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_193\" id=\"Page_193\"\u003e[Pg 193]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e§ 2. \u003ci\u003eMethods and Materials of Observation in the Schools\u003c/i\u003e\r\nThe best methods in use in our schools furnish many\r\nsuggestions for giving observation its right place in\r\nmental training.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eObservation\r\nshould involve\r\ndiscovery\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eI. They rest upon the sound assumption that observation\r\nis an \u003ci\u003eactive\u003c/i\u003e process. Observation is exploration,\r\ninquiry for the sake of discovering something previously\r\nhidden and unknown, this something being needed in\r\norder to reach some end, practical or theoretical. Observation\r\nis to be discriminated from recognition, or\r\nperception of what is familiar. The identification of\r\nsomething already understood is, indeed, an indispensable\r\nfunction of further investigation (\u003ci\u003eante\u003c/i\u003e, p. 119); but\r\nit is relatively automatic and passive, while observation\r\nproper is searching and deliberate. Recognition refers\r\nto the already mastered; observation is concerned with\r\nmastering the unknown. The common notions that\r\nperception is like writing on a blank piece of paper, or\r\nlike impressing an image on the mind as a seal is\r\nimprinted on wax or as a picture is formed on a photographic\r\nplate (notions that have played a disastrous rôle\r\nin educational methods), arise from a failure to distinguish\r\nbetween automatic recognition and the searching\r\nattitude of genuine observation.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eand suspense\r\nduring\r\nan unfolding\r\nchange\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eII. Much assistance in the selection of appropriate\r\nmaterial for observation may be derived from considering\r\nthe eagerness and closeness of observation that attend\r\nthe following of a story or drama. Alertness of observation\r\nis at its height wherever there is \"plot interest.\"\r\nWhy? Because of the balanced combination of the old\r\nand the new, of the familiar and the unexpected. We\r\nhang on the lips of the story-teller because of the\r\nelement of mental suspense. Alternatives are suggested,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_194\" id=\"Page_194\"\u003e[Pg 194]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nbut are left ambiguous, so that our whole being questions:\r\nWhat befell next? Which way did things turn out?\r\nContrast the ease and fullness with which a child notes\r\nall the salient traits of a story, with the labor and\r\ninadequacy of his observation of some dead and static\r\nthing where nothing raises a question or suggests alternative\r\noutcomes.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eThis \"plot\r\ninterest\"\r\nmanifested\r\nin activity,\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhen an individual is engaged in doing or making\r\nsomething (the activity not being of such a mechanical\r\nand habitual character that its outcome is assured), there\r\nis an analogous situation. Something is going to come\r\nof what is present to the sense, but just what is doubtful.\r\nThe plot is unfolding toward success or failure,\r\nbut just when or how is uncertain. Hence the keen\r\nand tense observation of conditions and results that\r\nattends constructive manual operations. Where the\r\nsubject-matter is of a more impersonal sort, the same\r\nprinciple of movement toward a dénouement may apply.\r\nIt is a commonplace that what is moving attracts notice\r\nwhen that which is at rest escapes it. Yet too often it\r\nwould almost seem as if pains had been taken to deprive\r\nthe material of school observations of all life and dramatic\r\nquality, to reduce it to a dead and inert form.\r\nMere change is not enough, however. Vicissitude,\r\nalteration, motion, excite observation; but if they\r\nmerely excite it, there is no thought. The changes\r\nmust (like the incidents of a well-arranged story or plot)\r\ntake place in a certain cumulative order; each successive\r\nchange must at once remind us of its predecessor\r\nand arouse interest in its successor if observations of\r\nchange are to be logically fruitful.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eand in cycles\r\nof growth\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eLiving beings, plants, and animals, fulfill the twofold\r\nrequirement to an extraordinary degree. Where there\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_195\" id=\"Page_195\"\u003e[Pg 195]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nis growth, there is motion, change, process; and there is\r\nalso arrangement of the changes in a cycle. The first\r\narouses, the second organizes, observation. Much of the\r\nextraordinary interest that children take in planting\r\nseeds and watching the stages of their growth is due to\r\nthe fact that a drama is enacting before their eyes;\r\nthere is something doing, each step of which is important\r\nin the destiny of the plant. The great practical\r\nimprovements that have occurred of late years in the\r\nteaching of botany and zoölogy will be found, upon inspection,\r\nto involve treating plants and animals as beings\r\nthat act, that do something, instead of as mere inert\r\nspecimens having static properties to be inventoried,\r\nnamed, and registered. Treated in the latter fashion,\r\nobservation is inevitably reduced to the falsely \"analytic\"\r\n(\u003ci\u003eante\u003c/i\u003e, p. 112),\u0026mdash;to mere dissection and enumeration.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eObservation\r\nof structure\r\ngrows out\r\nof noting\r\nfunction\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThere is, of course, a place, and an important place,\r\nfor observation of the mere static qualities of objects.\r\nWhen, however, the primary interest is in \u003ci\u003efunction\u003c/i\u003e, in\r\nwhat the object does, there is a motive for more minute\r\nanalytic study, for the observation of \u003ci\u003estructure\u003c/i\u003e. Interest\r\nin noting an activity passes insensibly into noting how\r\nthe activity is carried on; the interest in what is accomplished\r\npasses over into an interest in the organs of its\r\naccomplishing. But when the beginning is made with\r\nthe morphological, the anatomical, the noting of peculiarities\r\nof form, size, color, and distribution of parts, the\r\nmaterial is so cut off from significance as to be dead and\r\ndull. It is as natural for children to look intently for\r\nthe \u003ci\u003estomata\u003c/i\u003e of a plant after they have become interested\r\nin its function of breathing, as it is repulsive to attend\r\nminutely to them when they are considered as isolated\r\npeculiarities of structure.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_196\" id=\"Page_196\"\u003e[Pg 196]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eScientific\r\nobservation\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIII. As the center of interest of observations becomes\r\nless personal, less a matter of means for effecting one\u0027s\r\nown ends, and less æsthetic, less a matter of contribution\r\nof parts to a total emotional effect, observation becomes\r\nmore consciously intellectual in quality. Pupils learn\r\nto observe for the sake (\u003ci\u003ei\u003c/i\u003e) of finding out what sort of\r\nperplexity confronts them; (\u003ci\u003eii\u003c/i\u003e) of inferring hypothetical\r\nexplanations for the puzzling features that observation\r\nreveals; and (\u003ci\u003eiii\u003c/i\u003e) of testing the ideas thus suggested.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eshould be\r\nextensive\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eand\r\nintensive\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn short, observation becomes scientific in nature.\r\nOf such observations it may be said that they should\r\nfollow a rhythm between the extensive and the intensive.\r\nProblems become definite, and suggested explanations\r\nsignificant by a certain alternation between a wide and\r\nsomewhat loose soaking in of relevant facts and a minutely\r\naccurate study of a few selected facts. The\r\nwider, less exact observation is necessary to give the\r\nstudent a feeling for the reality of the field of inquiry, a\r\nsense of its bearings and possibilities, and to store his\r\nmind with materials that imagination may transform\r\ninto suggestions. The intensive study is necessary for\r\nlimiting the problem, and for securing the conditions of\r\nexperimental testing. As the latter by itself is too\r\nspecialized and technical to arouse intellectual growth,\r\nthe former by itself is too superficial and scattering for\r\ncontrol of intellectual development. In the sciences\r\nof life, field study, excursions, acquaintance with living\r\nthings in their natural habitats, may alternate with\r\nmicroscopic and laboratory observation. In the physical\r\nsciences, phenomena of light, of heat, of electricity, of\r\nmoisture, of gravity, in their broad setting in nature\u0026mdash;their\r\nphysiographic setting\u0026mdash;should prepare for an exact\r\nstudy of selected facts under conditions of laboratory\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_197\" id=\"Page_197\"\u003e[Pg 197]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ncontrol. In this way, the student gets the benefit of\r\ntechnical scientific methods of discovery and testing,\r\nwhile he retains his sense of the identity of the laboratory\r\nmodes of energy with large out-of-door realities,\r\nthereby avoiding the impression (that so often accrues)\r\nthat the facts studied are peculiar to the laboratory.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e§ 3. \u003ci\u003eCommunication of Information\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eImportance\r\nof hearsay\r\nacquaintance\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhen all is said and done the field of fact open to\r\nany one observer by himself is narrow. Into every one of\r\nour beliefs, even those that we have worked out under the\r\nconditions of utmost personal, first-hand acquaintance,\r\nmuch has insensibly entered from what we have heard\r\nor read of the observations and conclusions of others.\r\nIn spite of the great extension of direct observation in\r\nour schools, the vast bulk of educational subject-matter\r\nis derived from other sources\u0026mdash;from text-book, lecture,\r\nand viva-voce interchange. No educational question is\r\nof greater import than how to get the most logical good\r\nout of learning through transmission from others.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eLogically,\r\nthis ranks\r\nonly as evidence\r\nor\r\ntestimony\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eDoubtless the chief meaning associated with the\r\nword \u003ci\u003einstruction\u003c/i\u003e is this conveying and instilling of the\r\nresults of the observations and inferences of others.\r\nDoubtless the undue prominence in education of the\r\nideal of amassing information (\u003ci\u003eante\u003c/i\u003e, p. 52) has its source\r\nin the prominence of the learning of other persons.\r\nThe problem then is how to convert it into an intellectual\r\nasset. In logical terms, the material supplied\r\nfrom the experience of others is \u003ci\u003etestimony\u003c/i\u003e: that is to\r\nsay, \u003ci\u003eevidence\u003c/i\u003e submitted by others to be employed by\r\none\u0027s own judgment in reaching a conclusion. How\r\nshall we treat the subject-matter supplied by text-book\r\nand teacher so that it shall rank as material for reflec\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_198\" id=\"Page_198\"\u003e[Pg 198]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003etive\r\ninquiry, not as ready-made intellectual pabulum\r\nto be accepted and swallowed just as supplied by the\r\nstore?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eCommunication\r\nby\r\nothers\r\nshould not\r\nencroach on\r\nobservation,\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn reply to this question, we may say (\u003ci\u003ei\u003c/i\u003e) that the communication\r\nof material should be \u003ci\u003eneeded\u003c/i\u003e. That is to say,\r\nit should be such as cannot readily be attained by personal\r\nobservation. For teacher or book to cram pupils\r\nwith facts which, with little more trouble, they could\r\ndiscover by direct inquiry is to violate their intellectual\r\nintegrity by cultivating mental servility. This does not\r\nmean that the material supplied through communication\r\nof others should be meager or scanty. With the utmost\r\nrange of the senses, the world of nature and history\r\nstretches out almost infinitely beyond. But the fields\r\nwithin which direct observation is feasible should be\r\ncarefully chosen and sacredly protected.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eshould not\r\nbe dogmatic\r\nin tone,\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(\u003ci\u003eii\u003c/i\u003e) Material should be supplied by way of stimulus,\r\nnot with dogmatic finality and rigidity. When pupils\r\nget the notion that any field of study has been definitely\r\nsurveyed, that knowledge about it is exhaustive and final,\r\nthey may continue docile pupils, but they cease to be\r\nstudents. All thinking whatsoever\u0026mdash;so be it \u003ci\u003eis\u003c/i\u003e thinking\u0026mdash;contains\r\na phase of originality. This originality\r\ndoes not imply that the student\u0027s conclusion varies from\r\nthe conclusions of others, much less that it is a radically\r\nnovel conclusion. His originality is not incompatible\r\nwith large use of materials and suggestions contributed\r\nby others. Originality means personal interest in the\r\nquestion, personal initiative in turning over the suggestions\r\nfurnished by others, and sincerity in following\r\nthem out to a tested conclusion. Literally, the phrase\r\n\"Think for yourself\" is tautological; any thinking is\r\nthinking for one\u0027s self.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_199\" id=\"Page_199\"\u003e[Pg 199]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eshould have\r\nrelation to a\r\npersonal\r\nproblem,\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(\u003ci\u003eiii\u003c/i\u003e) The material furnished by way of information\r\nshould be relevant to a question that is vital in the\r\nstudent\u0027s own experience. What has been said about\r\nthe evil of observations that begin and end in themselves\r\nmay be transferred without change to communicated\r\nlearning. Instruction in subject-matter that does not\r\nfit into any problem already stirring in the student\u0027s own\r\nexperience, or that is not presented in such a way as to\r\narouse a problem, is worse than useless for intellectual\r\npurposes. In that it fails to enter into any process of\r\nreflection, it is useless; in that it remains in the mind as\r\nso much lumber and débris, it is a barrier, an obstruction\r\nin the way of effective thinking when a problem\r\narises.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eand to prior\r\nsystems of\r\nexperience\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAnother way of stating the same principle is that\r\nmaterial furnished by communication must be such\r\nas to enter into some existing system or organization of\r\nexperience. All students of psychology are familiar\r\nwith the principle of apperception\u0026mdash;that we assimilate\r\nnew material with what we have digested and retained\r\nfrom prior experiences. Now the \"apperceptive basis\"\r\nof material furnished by teacher and text-book should\r\nbe found, as far as possible, in what the learner has derived\r\nfrom more direct forms of his own experience.\r\nThere is a tendency to connect material of the schoolroom\r\nsimply with the material of prior school lessons,\r\ninstead of linking it to what the pupil has acquired in\r\nhis out-of-school experience. The teacher says, \"Do\r\nyou not remember what we learned from the book last\r\nweek?\"\u0026mdash;instead of saying, \"Do you not recall such\r\nand such a thing that you have seen or heard?\" As a\r\nresult, there are built up detached and independent\r\nsystems of school knowledge that inertly overlay the\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_200\" id=\"Page_200\"\u003e[Pg 200]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nordinary systems of experience instead of reacting to\r\nenlarge and refine them. Pupils are taught to live in\r\ntwo separate worlds, one the world of out-of-school experience,\r\nthe other the world of books and lessons.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_201\" id=\"Page_201\"\u003e[Pg 201]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003chr style=\"width: 65%;\" /\u003e\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"CHAPTER_FIFTEEN\" id=\"CHAPTER_FIFTEEN\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eCHAPTER FIFTEEN\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eTHE RECITATION AND THE TRAINING OF THOUGHT\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eImportance\r\nof the\r\nrecitation\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn the recitation the teacher comes into his closest\r\ncontact with the pupil. In the recitation focus the\r\npossibilities of guiding children\u0027s activities, influencing\r\ntheir language habits, and directing their observations.\r\nIn discussing the significance of the recitation as an\r\ninstrumentality of education, we are accordingly bringing\r\nto a head the points considered in the last three\r\nchapters, rather than introducing a new topic. The\r\nmethod in which the recitation is carried on is a crucial\r\ntest of a teacher\u0027s skill in diagnosing the intellectual\r\nstate of his pupils and in supplying the conditions that\r\nwill arouse serviceable mental responses: in short, of\r\nhis art as a teacher.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eRe-citing\r\n\u003ci\u003eversus\u003c/i\u003e\r\nreflecting\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe use of the word \u003ci\u003erecitation\u003c/i\u003e to designate the period\r\nof most intimate intellectual contact of teacher with\r\npupil and pupil with pupil is a fateful fact. To re-cite\r\nis to cite again, to repeat, to tell over and over. If we\r\nwere to call this period \u003ci\u003ereiteration\u003c/i\u003e, the designation\r\nwould hardly bring out more clearly than does the word\r\n\u003ci\u003erecitation\u003c/i\u003e, the complete domination of instruction by\r\nrehearsing of secondhand information, by memorizing\r\nfor the sake of producing correct replies at the proper\r\ntime. Everything that is said in this chapter is insignificant\r\nin comparison with the primary truth that\r\nthe recitation is a place and time for stimulating and\r\ndirecting reflection, and that reproducing memorized\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_202\" id=\"Page_202\"\u003e[Pg 202]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nmatter is only an incident\u0026mdash;even though an indispensable\r\nincident\u0026mdash;in the process of cultivating a thoughtful\r\nattitude.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e§ 1. \u003ci\u003eThe Formal Steps of Instruction\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eHerbart\u0027s\r\nanalysis\r\nof method\r\nof teaching\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut few attempts have been made to formulate a\r\nmethod, resting on general principles, of conducting\r\na recitation. One of these is of great importance and\r\nhas probably had more and better influence upon the\r\n\"hearing of lessons\" than all others put together;\r\nnamely, the analysis by Herbart of a recitation into\r\nfive successive steps. The steps are commonly known\r\nas \"the formal steps of instruction.\" The underlying\r\nnotion is that no matter how subjects vary in scope and\r\ndetail there is one and only one best way of mastering\r\nthem, since there is a single \"general method\" uniformly\r\nfollowed by the mind in effective attack upon\r\nany subject. Whether it be a first-grade child mastering\r\nthe rudiments of number, a grammar-school pupil\r\nstudying history, or a college student dealing with\r\nphilology, in each case the first step is preparation,\r\nthe second presentation, followed in turn by comparison\r\nand generalization, ending in the application of the\r\ngeneralizations to specific and new instances.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eIllustration\r\nof method\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBy preparation is meant asking questions to remind\r\npupils of familiar experiences of their own that will be\r\nuseful in acquiring the new topic. What one already\r\nknows supplies the means with which one apprehends\r\nthe unknown. Hence the process of learning the new\r\nwill be made easier if related ideas in the pupil\u0027s mind\r\nare aroused to activity\u0026mdash;are brought to the foreground\r\nof consciousness. When pupils take up the study of\r\nrivers, they are first questioned about streams or brooks\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_203\" id=\"Page_203\"\u003e[Pg 203]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwith which they are already acquainted; if they have\r\nnever seen any, they may be asked about water running\r\nin gutters. Somehow \"apperceptive masses\" are stirred\r\nthat will assist in getting hold of the new subject. The\r\nstep of preparation ends with statement of the aim of\r\nthe lesson. Old knowledge having been made active,\r\nnew material is then \"presented\" to the pupils. Pictures\r\nand relief models of rivers are shown; vivid oral\r\ndescriptions are given; if possible, the children are\r\ntaken to see an actual river. These two steps terminate\r\nthe acquisition of particular facts.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe next two steps are directed toward getting a\r\ngeneral principle or conception. The local river is\r\ncompared with, perhaps, the Amazon, the St. Lawrence,\r\nthe Rhine; by this comparison accidental and\r\nunessential features are eliminated and the river \u003ci\u003econcept\u003c/i\u003e is\r\nformed: the elements involved in the river-meaning are\r\ngathered together and formulated. This done, the resulting\r\nprinciple is fixed in mind and is clarified by\r\nbeing applied to other streams, say to the Thames, the\r\nPo, the Connecticut.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eComparison\r\nwith our\r\nprior analysis\r\nof\r\nreflection\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf we compare this account of the methods of instruction\r\nwith our own analysis of a complete operation\r\nof thinking, we are struck by obvious resemblances. In\r\nour statement (compare \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_SIX\"\u003eChapter Six\u003c/a\u003e) the \"steps\" are\r\nthe occurrence of a problem or a puzzling phenomenon;\r\nthen observation, inspection of facts, to locate\r\nand clear up the problem; then the formation of a\r\nhypothesis or the suggestion of a possible solution\r\ntogether with its elaboration by reasoning; then the\r\ntesting of the elaborated idea by using it as a guide\r\nto new observations and experimentations. In each\r\naccount, there is the sequence of (\u003ci\u003ei\u003c/i\u003e) specific facts and\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_204\" id=\"Page_204\"\u003e[Pg 204]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nevents, (\u003ci\u003eii\u003c/i\u003e) ideas and reasonings, and (\u003ci\u003eiii\u003c/i\u003e) application of\r\ntheir result to specific facts. In each case, the movement\r\nis inductive-deductive. We are struck also by one\r\ndifference: the Herbartian method makes no reference\r\nto a difficulty, a discrepancy requiring explanation, as\r\nthe origin and stimulus of the whole process. As a\r\nconsequence, it often seems as if the Herbartian method\r\ndeals with thought simply as an incident in the process\r\nof acquiring information, instead of treating the latter\r\nas an incident in the process of developing thought.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eThe formal\r\nsteps concern\r\nthe\r\nteacher\u0027s\r\npreparation\r\nrather than\r\nthe recitation\r\nitself\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBefore following up this comparison in more detail,\r\nwe may raise the question whether the recitation should,\r\nin any case, follow a uniform prescribed series of steps\u0026mdash;even\r\nif it be admitted that this series expresses the\r\nnormal logical order. In reply, it may be said that just\r\nbecause the order is logical, it represents the survey of\r\nsubject-matter made by one who already understands\r\nit, not the path of progress followed by a mind that is\r\nlearning. The former may describe a uniform straight-way\r\ncourse, the latter must be a series of tacks, of zigzag\r\nmovements back and forth. In short, the formal\r\nsteps indicate the points that should be covered by the\r\nteacher in preparing to conduct a recitation, but should\r\nnot prescribe the actual course of teaching.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eThe\r\nteacher\u0027s\r\nproblem\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eLack of any preparation on the part of a teacher\r\nleads, of course, to a random, haphazard recitation, its\r\nsuccess depending on the inspiration of the moment,\r\nwhich may or may not come. Preparation in simply\r\nthe subject-matter conduces to a rigid order, the teacher\r\nexamining pupils on their exact knowledge of their text.\r\nBut the teacher\u0027s problem\u0026mdash;as a teacher\u0026mdash;does not\r\nreside in mastering a subject-matter, but in adjusting\r\na subject-matter to the nurture of thought. Now the\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_205\" id=\"Page_205\"\u003e[Pg 205]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nformal steps indicate excellently well the questions a\r\nteacher should ask in working out the problem of teaching\r\na topic. What preparation have my pupils for attacking\r\nthis subject? What familiar experiences of\r\ntheirs are available? What have they already learned\r\nthat will come to their assistance? How shall I present\r\nthe matter so as to fit economically and effectively into\r\ntheir present equipment? What pictures shall I show?\r\nTo what objects shall I call their attention? What incidents\r\nshall I relate? What comparisons shall I lead\r\nthem to draw, what similarities to recognize? What\r\nis the general principle toward which the whole discussion\r\nshould point as its conclusion? By what applications\r\nshall I try to fix, to clear up, and to make\r\nreal their grasp of this general principle? What\r\nactivities of their own may bring it home to them as\r\na genuinely significant principle?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eOnly flexibility\r\nof\r\nprocedure\r\ngives a\r\nrecitation\r\nvitality\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eAny step\r\nmay come\r\nfirst\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNo teacher can fail to teach better if he has considered\r\nsuch questions somewhat systematically. But\r\nthe more the teacher has reflected upon pupils\u0027 probable\r\nintellectual response to a topic from the various stand-points\r\nindicated by the five formal steps, the more he\r\nwill be prepared to conduct the recitation in a flexible\r\nand free way, and yet not let the subject go to\r\npieces and the pupils\u0027 attention drift in all directions;\r\nthe less necessary will he find it, in order to preserve a\r\nsemblance of intellectual order, to follow some one\r\nuniform scheme. He will be ready to take advantage\r\nof any sign of vital response that shows itself from any\r\ndirection. One pupil may already have some inkling\u0026mdash;probably\r\nerroneous\u0026mdash;of a general principle. Application\r\nmay then come at the very beginning in order to\r\nshow that the principle will not work, and thereby\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_206\" id=\"Page_206\"\u003e[Pg 206]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ninduce search for new facts and a new generalization.\r\nOr the abrupt presentation of some fact or object may\r\nso stimulate the minds of pupils as to render quite\r\nsuperfluous any preliminary preparation. If pupils\u0027\r\nminds are at work at all, it is quite impossible that they\r\nshould wait until the teacher has conscientiously taken\r\nthem through the steps of preparation, presentation, and\r\ncomparison before they form at least a working hypothesis\r\nor generalization. Moreover, unless comparison of\r\nthe familiar and the unfamiliar is introduced at the\r\nbeginning, both preparation and presentation will be\r\naimless and without logical motive, isolated, and in\r\nso far meaningless. The student\u0027s mind cannot be\r\nprepared at large, but only for something in particular,\r\nand presentation is usually the best way of\r\nevoking associations. The emphasis may fall now on\r\nthe familiar concept that will help grasp the new, now\r\non the new facts that frame the problem; but in either\r\ncase it is comparison and contrast with the other term\r\nof the pair which gives either its force. In short,\r\nto transfer the logical steps from the points that the\r\nteacher needs to consider to uniform successive steps\r\nin the conduct of a recitation, is to impose the logical\r\nreview of a mind that already understands the subject,\r\nupon the mind that is struggling to comprehend it, and\r\nthereby to obstruct the logic of the student\u0027s own mind.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e§ 2. \u003ci\u003eThe Factors in the Recitation\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBearing in mind that the formal steps represent intertwined\r\nfactors of a student\u0027s progress and not mileposts\r\non a beaten highway, we may consider each by itself.\r\nIn so doing, it will be convenient to follow the example\r\nof many of the Herbartians and reduce the steps to\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_207\" id=\"Page_207\"\u003e[Pg 207]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthree: first, the apprehension of specific or particular\r\nfacts; second, rational generalization; third, application\r\nand verification.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003ePreparation\r\nis getting\r\nthe sense of\r\na problem\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eI. The processes having to do with particular facts\r\nare preparation and presentation. The best, indeed the\r\nonly preparation is arousal to a perception of something\r\nthat needs explanation, something unexpected, puzzling,\r\npeculiar. When the feeling of a genuine perplexity lays\r\nhold of any mind (no matter how the feeling arises), that\r\nmind is alert and inquiring, because stimulated from\r\nwithin. The shock, the bite, of a question will force the\r\nmind to go wherever it is capable of going, better than\r\nwill the most ingenious pedagogical devices unaccompanied\r\nby this mental ardor. It is the sense of a\r\nproblem that forces the mind to a survey and recall of\r\nthe past to discover what the question means and how\r\nit may be dealt with.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003ePitfalls in\r\npreparation\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe teacher in his more deliberate attempts to call\r\ninto play the familiar elements in a student\u0027s experience,\r\nmust guard against certain dangers. (\u003ci\u003ei\u003c/i\u003e) The step of\r\npreparation must not be too long continued or too exhaustive,\r\nor it defeats its own end. The pupil loses interest\r\nand is bored, when a plunge \u003ci\u003ein medias res\u003c/i\u003e might\r\nhave braced him to his work. The preparation part of\r\nthe recitation period of some conscientious teachers reminds\r\none of the boy who takes so long a run in order\r\nto gain headway for a jump that when he reaches the\r\nline, he is too tired to jump far. (\u003ci\u003eii\u003c/i\u003e) The organs by\r\nwhich we apprehend new material are our habits. To\r\ninsist too minutely upon turning over habitual dispositions\r\ninto conscious ideas is to interfere with their best\r\nworkings. Some factors of familiar experience must indeed\r\nbe brought to conscious recognition, just as trans\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_208\" id=\"Page_208\"\u003e[Pg 208]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003eplanting\r\nis necessary for the best growth of some plants.\r\nBut it is fatal to be forever digging up either experiences\r\nor plants to see how they are getting along. Constraint,\r\nself-consciousness, embarrassment, are the consequence of\r\ntoo much conscious refurbishing of familiar experiences.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eStatement\r\nof aim of\r\nlesson\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eStrict Herbartians generally lay it down that statement\u0026mdash;by\r\nthe teacher\u0026mdash;of the aim of a lesson is an\r\nindispensable part of preparation. This preliminary\r\nstatement of the aim of the lesson hardly seems more\r\nintellectual in character, however, than tapping a bell\r\nor giving any other signal for attention and transfer of\r\nthoughts from diverting subjects. To the teacher the\r\nstatement of an end is significant, because he has already\r\nbeen at the end; from a pupil\u0027s standpoint the statement\r\nof what he is \u003ci\u003egoing\u003c/i\u003e to learn is something of an Irish\r\nbull. If the statement of the aim is taken too seriously\r\nby the instructor, as meaning more than a signal to attention,\r\nits probable result is forestalling the pupil\u0027s own\r\nreaction, relieving him of the responsibility of developing\r\na problem and thus arresting his mental initiative.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eHow much\r\nthe teacher\r\nshould tell\r\nor show\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is unnecessary to discuss at length presentation as\r\na factor in the recitation, because our last chapter\r\ncovered the topic under the captions of observation and\r\ncommunication. The function of presentation is to supply\r\nmaterials that force home the nature of a problem\r\nand furnish suggestions for dealing with it. The practical\r\nproblem of the teacher is to preserve a balance between\r\nso little showing and telling as to fail to stimulate\r\nreflection and so much as to choke thought. Provided\r\nthe student is genuinely engaged upon a topic, and provided\r\nthe teacher is willing to give the student a good\r\ndeal of leeway as to what he assimilates and retains (not\r\nrequiring rigidly that everything be grasped or repro\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_209\" id=\"Page_209\"\u003e[Pg 209]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003educed),\r\nthere is comparatively little danger that one who\r\nis himself enthusiastic will communicate too much concerning\r\na topic.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eThe pupil\u0027s\r\nresponsibility\r\nfor making\r\nout a\r\nreasonable\r\ncase\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eII. The distinctively rational phase of reflective inquiry\r\nconsists, as we have already seen, in the elaboration\r\nof an idea, or working hypothesis, through conjoint\r\ncomparison and contrast, terminating in definition or\r\nformulation. (\u003ci\u003ei\u003c/i\u003e) So far as the recitation is concerned,\r\nthe primary requirement is that the student be held\r\nresponsible for working out mentally every suggested\r\nprinciple so as to show what he means by it, how\r\nit bears upon the facts at hand, and how the facts\r\nbear upon it. Unless the pupil is made responsible for\r\ndeveloping on his own account the \u003ci\u003ereasonableness\u003c/i\u003e of the\r\nguess he puts forth, the recitation counts for practically\r\nnothing in the training of reasoning power. A clever\r\nteacher easily acquires great skill in dropping out the\r\ninept and senseless contributions of pupils, and in selecting\r\nand emphasizing those in line with the result he\r\nwishes to reach. But this method (sometimes called\r\n\"suggestive questioning\") relieves the pupils of intellectual\r\nresponsibility, save for acrobatic agility in following\r\nthe teacher\u0027s lead.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eThe necessity\r\nfor\r\nmental\r\nleisure\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(\u003ci\u003eii\u003c/i\u003e) The working over of a vague and more or less\r\ncasual idea into coherent and definite form is impossible\r\nwithout a pause, without freedom from distraction.\r\nWe say \"Stop and think\"; well, all reflection involves,\r\nat some point, stopping external observations and reactions\r\nso that an idea may mature. Meditation, withdrawal\r\nor abstraction from clamorous assailants of the\r\nsenses and from demands for overt action, is as necessary\r\nat the reasoning stage, as are observation and experiment\r\nat other periods. The metaphors of digestion and\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_210\" id=\"Page_210\"\u003e[Pg 210]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nassimilation, that so readily occur to mind in connection\r\nwith rational elaboration, are highly instructive. A\r\nsilent, uninterrupted working-over of considerations by\r\ncomparing and weighing alternative suggestions, is\r\nindispensable for the development of coherent and compact\r\nconclusions. Reasoning is no more akin to disputing\r\nor arguing, or to the abrupt seizing and dropping of\r\nsuggestions, than digestion is to a noisy champing of the\r\njaws. The teacher must secure opportunity for leisurely\r\nmental digestion.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eA typical\r\ncentral\r\nobject necessary\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(\u003ci\u003eiii\u003c/i\u003e) In the process of comparison, the teacher must\r\navert the distraction that ensues from putting before\r\nthe mind a number of facts on the same level of importance.\r\nSince attention is selective, some one object\r\nnormally claims thought and furnishes the center of\r\ndeparture and reference. This fact is fatal to the success\r\nof the pedagogical methods that endeavor to conduct\r\ncomparison on the basis of putting before the mind\r\na row of objects of equal importance. In comparing,\r\nthe mind does not naturally begin with objects \u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003ec\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ci\u003ed\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nand try to find the respect in which they agree. It begins\r\nwith a single object or situation more or less vague\r\nand inchoate in meaning, and makes excursions to other\r\nobjects in order to render understanding of the central\r\nobject consistent and clear. The mere multiplication\r\nof objects of comparison is adverse to successful reasoning.\r\nEach fact brought within the field of comparison\r\nshould clear up some obscure feature or extend some\r\nfragmentary trait of the primary object.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eImportance\r\nof types\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn short, pains should be taken to see that the object\r\non which thought centers is \u003ci\u003etypical\u003c/i\u003e: material being typical\r\nwhen, although individual or specific, it is such as\r\nreadily and fruitfully suggests the principles of an en\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_211\" id=\"Page_211\"\u003e[Pg 211]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003etire\r\nclass of facts. No sane person begins to think\r\nabout rivers wholesale or at large. He begins with the\r\none river that has presented some puzzling trait. Then\r\nhe studies other rivers to get light upon the baffling\r\nfeatures of this one, and at the same time he employs\r\nthe characteristic traits of his original object to reduce to\r\norder the multifarious details that appear in connection\r\nwith other rivers. This working back and forth preserves\r\nunity of meaning, while protecting it from monotony\r\nand narrowness. Contrast, unlikeness, throws\r\nsignificant features into relief, and these become instruments\r\nfor binding together into an organized or coherent\r\nmeaning dissimilar characters. The mind is defended\r\nagainst the deadening influence of many isolated\r\nparticulars and also against the barrenness of a merely\r\nformal principle. Particular cases and properties supply\r\nemphasis and concreteness; general principles convert\r\nthe particulars into a single system.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eAll insight\r\ninto meaning\r\neffects\r\ngeneralization\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(\u003ci\u003eiv\u003c/i\u003e) Hence generalization is not a separate and single\r\nact; it is rather a constant tendency and function of the\r\nentire discussion or recitation. Every step forward\r\ntoward an idea that comprehends, that explains, that\r\nunites what was isolated and therefore puzzling, generalizes.\r\nThe little child generalizes as truly as the adolescent\r\nor adult, even though he does not arrive at the\r\nsame generalities. If he is studying a river basin, his\r\nknowledge is generalized in so far as the various details\r\nthat he apprehends are found to be the effects of a single\r\nforce, as that of water pushing downward from\r\ngravity, or are seen to be successive stages of a single history\r\nof formation. Even if there were acquaintance\r\nwith only one river, knowledge of it under such conditions\r\nwould be generalized knowledge.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_212\" id=\"Page_212\"\u003e[Pg 212]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eInsight into\r\nmeaning\r\nrequires\r\nformulation\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe factor of formulation, of conscious stating, involved\r\nin generalization, should also be a constant function,\r\nnot a single formal act. Definition means essentially\r\nthe growth of a meaning out of vagueness into \u003ci\u003edefiniteness\u003c/i\u003e.\r\nSuch final verbal definition as takes place should\r\nbe only the culmination of a steady growth in distinctness.\r\nIn the reaction against ready-made verbal definitions\r\nand rules, the pendulum should never swing to the\r\nopposite extreme, that of neglecting to summarize the\r\nnet meaning that emerges from dealing with particular\r\nfacts. Only as general summaries are made from time\r\nto time does the mind reach a conclusion or a resting\r\nplace; and only as conclusions are reached is there an\r\nintellectual deposit available in future understanding.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eGeneralization\r\nmeans\r\ncapacity for\r\napplication\r\nto the new\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIII. As the last words indicate, application and generalization\r\nlie close together. Mechanical skill for further\r\nuse may be achieved without any explicit recognition\r\nof a principle; nay, in routine and narrow technical\r\nmatters, conscious formulation may be a hindrance.\r\nBut without recognition of a principle, without generalization,\r\nthe power gained cannot be transferred to new\r\nand dissimilar matters. The inherent significance of\r\ngeneralization is that it frees a meaning from local restrictions;\r\nrather, generalization \u003ci\u003eis\u003c/i\u003e meaning so freed;\r\nit is meaning emancipated from accidental features so\r\nas to be available in new cases. The surest test for detecting\r\na spurious generalization (a statement general in\r\nverbal form but not accompanied by discernment of\r\nmeaning), is the failure of the so-called principle spontaneously\r\nto extend itself. The essence of the general\r\nis application. (\u003ci\u003eAnte\u003c/i\u003e, p. 29.)\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eFossilized\r\n\u003ci\u003eversus\u003c/i\u003e\r\nflexible\r\nprinciples\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe true purpose of exercises that apply rules and\r\nprinciples is, then, not so much to drive or drill them\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_213\" id=\"Page_213\"\u003e[Pg 213]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nin as to give adequate insight into an idea or principle.\r\nTo treat application as a separate final step is\r\ndisastrous. In every judgment some meaning is employed\r\nas a basis for estimating and interpreting some\r\nfact; by this application the meaning is itself enlarged\r\nand tested. When the general meaning is regarded as\r\ncomplete in itself, application is treated as an external,\r\nnon-intellectual use to which, for practical purposes alone,\r\nit is advisable to put the meaning. The principle is one\r\nself-contained thing; its use is another and independent\r\nthing. When this divorce occurs, principles become\r\nfossilized and rigid; they lose their inherent vitality,\r\ntheir self-impelling power.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eSelf-application\r\na\r\nmark of\r\ngenuine\r\nprinciples\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eA true conception is a \u003ci\u003emoving\u003c/i\u003e idea, and it seeks outlet,\r\nor application to the interpretation of particulars and\r\nthe guidance of action, as naturally as water runs downhill.\r\nIn fine, just as reflective thought requires particular\r\nfacts of observation and events of action for its\r\norigination, so it also requires particular facts and deeds\r\nfor its own consummation. \"Glittering generalities\"\r\nare inert because they are spurious. Application is\r\nas much an intrinsic part of genuine reflective inquiry\r\nas is alert observation or reasoning itself. Truly general\r\nprinciples tend to apply themselves. The teacher\r\nneeds, indeed, to supply conditions favorable to use and\r\nexercise; but something is wrong when artificial tasks\r\nhave arbitrarily to be invented in order to secure application\r\nfor principles.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_214\" id=\"Page_214\"\u003e[Pg 214]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003chr style=\"width: 65%;\" /\u003e\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"CHAPTER_SIXTEEN\" id=\"CHAPTER_SIXTEEN\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eCHAPTER SIXTEEN\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch4\u003eSOME GENERAL CONCLUSIONS\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe shall conclude our survey of how we think and\r\nhow we should think by presenting some factors of\r\nthinking which should balance each other, but which constantly\r\ntend to become so isolated that they work against\r\neach other instead of cooperating to make reflective inquiry\r\nefficient.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e§ 1. \u003ci\u003eThe Unconscious and the Conscious\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eThe\r\n\u003ci\u003eunderstood\u003c/i\u003e\r\nas the unconsciously\r\nassumed\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is significant that one meaning of the term \u003ci\u003eunderstood\u003c/i\u003e\r\nis something so thoroughly mastered, so completely\r\nagreed upon, as to be \u003ci\u003eassumed\u003c/i\u003e; that is to say, taken as a\r\nmatter of course without explicit statement. The familiar\r\n\"goes without saying\" means \"it is understood.\" If\r\ntwo persons can converse intelligently with each other, it\r\nis because a common experience supplies a background\r\nof mutual understanding upon which their respective remarks\r\nare projected. To dig up and to formulate this\r\ncommon background would be imbecile; it is \"understood\";\r\nthat is, it is silently supplied and implied as the\r\ntaken-for-granted medium of intelligent exchange of ideas.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eInquiry as\r\nconscious\r\nformulation\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf, however, the two persons find themselves at cross-purposes,\r\nit is necessary to dig up and compare the presuppositions,\r\nthe implied context, on the basis of which\r\neach is speaking. The implicit is made explicit; what\r\nwas unconsciously assumed is exposed to the light of\r\nconscious day. In this way, the root of the misunder\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_215\" id=\"Page_215\"\u003e[Pg 215]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003estanding\r\nis removed. Some such rhythm of the unconscious\r\nand the conscious is involved in all fruitful\r\nthinking. A person in pursuing a consecutive train of\r\nthoughts takes some system of ideas for granted (which\r\naccordingly he leaves unexpressed, \"unconscious\") as\r\nsurely as he does in conversing with others. Some context,\r\nsome situation, some controlling purpose dominates\r\nhis explicit ideas so thoroughly that it does not need\r\nto be consciously formulated and expounded. Explicit\r\nthinking goes on within the limits of what is implied or\r\nunderstood. Yet the fact that reflection originates in a\r\nproblem makes it necessary \u003ci\u003eat some points\u003c/i\u003e consciously\r\nto inspect and examine this familiar background. We\r\nhave to turn upon some unconscious assumption and\r\nmake it explicit.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eRules cannot\r\nbe given\r\nfor attaining\r\na\r\nbalance\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNo rules can be laid down for attaining the due balance\r\nand rhythm of these two phases of mental life. No ordinance\r\ncan prescribe at just what point the spontaneous\r\nworking of some unconscious attitude and habit is to be\r\nchecked till we have made explicit what is implied in it.\r\nNo one can tell in detail just how far the analytic inspection\r\nand formulation are to be carried. We can say\r\nthat they must be carried far enough so that the individual\r\nwill know what he is about and be able to guide his\r\nthinking; but in a given case just how far is that? We\r\ncan say that they must be carried far enough to detect and\r\nguard against the source of some false perception or\r\nreasoning, and to get a leverage on the investigation;\r\nbut such statements only restate the original difficulty.\r\nSince our reliance must be upon the disposition and tact\r\nof the individual in the particular case, there is no test\r\nof the success of an education more important than the\r\nextent to which it nurtures a type of mind competent to\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_216\" id=\"Page_216\"\u003e[Pg 216]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nmaintain an economical balance of the unconscious and\r\nthe conscious.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eThe over-\u003ci\u003eanalytic\u003c/i\u003e\r\nto be\r\navoided\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe ways of teaching criticised in the foregoing pages\r\nas false \"analytic\" methods of instruction (\u003ci\u003eante\u003c/i\u003e, p. 112),\r\nall reduce themselves to the mistake of directing explicit\r\nattention and formulation to what would work better if\r\nleft an unconscious attitude and working assumption.\r\nTo pry into the familiar, the usual, the automatic, simply\r\nfor the sake of making it conscious, simply for the sake of\r\nformulating it, is both an impertinent interference, and\r\na source of boredom. To be forced to dwell consciously\r\nupon the accustomed is the essence of ennui; to pursue\r\nmethods of instruction that have that tendency is deliberately\r\nto cultivate lack of interest.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eThe detection\r\nof error,\r\nthe clinching\r\nof truth,\r\ndemand\r\nconscious\r\nstatement\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOn the other hand, what has been said in criticism of\r\nmerely routine forms of skill, what has been said about\r\nthe importance of having a genuine problem, of introducing\r\nthe novel, and of reaching a deposit of general\r\nmeaning weighs on the other side of the scales.\r\nIt is as fatal to good thinking to fail to make conscious\r\nthe standing source of some error or failure as\r\nit is to pry needlessly into what works smoothly. To\r\nover-simplify, to exclude the novel for the sake of\r\nprompt skill, to avoid obstacles for the sake of averting\r\nerrors, is as detrimental as to try to get pupils to formulate\r\neverything they know and to state every step of the\r\nprocess employed in getting a result. Where the shoe\r\npinches, analytic examination is indicated. When a\r\ntopic is to be clinched so that knowledge of it will carry\r\nover into an effective resource in further topics, conscious\r\ncondensation and summarizing are imperative. In the\r\nearly stage of acquaintance with a subject, a good deal of\r\nunconstrained unconscious mental play about it may be\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_217\" id=\"Page_217\"\u003e[Pg 217]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\npermitted, even at the risk of some random experimenting;\r\nin the later stages, conscious formulation and review\r\nmay be encouraged. Projection and reflection,\r\ngoing directly ahead and turning back in scrutiny, should\r\nalternate. Unconsciousness gives spontaneity and freshness;\r\nconsciousness, conviction and control.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e§ 2. \u003ci\u003eProcess and Product\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003ePlay and\r\nwork again\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eA like balance in mental life characterizes process and\r\nproduct. We met one important phase of this adjustment\r\nin considering play and work. In play, interest centers\r\nin activity, without much reference to its outcome.\r\nThe sequence of deeds, images, emotions, suffices on\r\nits own account. In work, the end holds attention and\r\ncontrols the notice given to means. Since the difference\r\nis one of direction of interest, the contrast is one of emphasis,\r\nnot of cleavage. When comparative prominence\r\nin consciousness of activity or outcome is transformed\r\ninto isolation of one from the other, play degenerates\r\ninto fooling, and work into drudgery.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003ePlay should\r\nnot be\r\nfooling,\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBy \"fooling\" we understand a series of disconnected\r\ntemporary overflows of energy dependent upon whim\r\nand accident. When all reference to outcome is eliminated\r\nfrom the sequence of ideas and acts that make\r\nplay, each member of the sequence is cut loose from\r\nevery other and becomes fantastic, arbitrary, aimless;\r\nmere fooling follows. There is some inveterate tendency\r\nto fool in children as well as in animals; nor is the\r\ntendency wholly evil, for at least it militates against\r\nfalling into ruts. But when it is excessive in amount,\r\ndissipation and disintegration follow; and the only way\r\nof preventing this consequence is to make regard for\r\nresults enter into even the freest play activity.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_218\" id=\"Page_218\"\u003e[Pg 218]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003enor work,\r\ndrudgery\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eExclusive interest in the result alters work to drudgery.\r\nFor by drudgery is meant those activities in\r\nwhich the interest in the outcome does not suffuse the\r\nmeans of getting the result. Whenever a piece of work\r\nbecomes drudgery, the process of doing loses all value\r\nfor the doer; he cares solely for what is to be had at\r\nthe end of it. The work itself, the putting forth of energy,\r\nis hateful; it is just a necessary evil, since without\r\nit some important end would be missed. Now it is a\r\ncommonplace that in the work of the world many things\r\nhave to be done the doing of which is not intrinsically\r\nvery interesting. However, the argument that children\r\nshould be kept doing drudgery-tasks because thereby\r\nthey acquire power to be faithful to distasteful duties, is\r\nwholly fallacious. Repulsion, shirking, and evasion are\r\nthe consequences of having the repulsive imposed\u0026mdash;not\r\nloyal love of duty. Willingness to work for ends by\r\nmeans of acts not naturally attractive is best attained by\r\nsecuring such an appreciation of the value of the end\r\nthat a sense of its value is transferred to its means of\r\naccomplishment. Not interesting in themselves, they\r\nborrow interest from the result with which they are\r\nassociated.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eBalance of\r\nplayfulness\r\nand seriousness\r\nthe\r\nintellectual\r\nideal\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eFree play\r\nof mind\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eis normal in\r\nchildhood\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe intellectual harm accruing from divorce of work\r\nand play, product and process, is evidenced in the\r\nproverb, \"All work and no play makes Jack a dull\r\nboy.\" That the obverse is true is perhaps sufficiently\r\nsignalized in the fact that fooling is so near to foolishness.\r\nTo be playful and serious at the same time\r\nis possible, and it defines the ideal mental condition.\r\nAbsence of dogmatism and prejudice, presence of intellectual\r\ncuriosity and flexibility, are manifest in the free\r\nplay of the mind upon a topic. To give the mind this\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_219\" id=\"Page_219\"\u003e[Pg 219]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nfree play is not to encourage toying with a subject,\r\nbut is to be interested in the unfolding of the subject\r\non its own account, apart from its subservience to a\r\npreconceived belief or habitual aim. Mental play is\r\nopen-mindedness, faith in the power of thought to\r\npreserve its own integrity without external supports and\r\narbitrary restrictions. Hence free mental play involves\r\nseriousness, the earnest following of the development of\r\nsubject-matter. It is incompatible with carelessness or\r\nflippancy, for it exacts accurate noting of every result\r\nreached in order that every conclusion may be put to\r\nfurther use. What is termed the interest in truth for\r\nits own sake is certainly a serious matter, yet this pure\r\ninterest in truth coincides with love of the free play of\r\nthought.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn spite of many appearances to the contrary\u0026mdash;usually\r\ndue to social conditions of either undue superfluity\r\nthat induces idle fooling or undue economic pressure\r\nthat compels drudgery\u0026mdash;childhood normally realizes the\r\nideal of conjoint free mental play and thoughtfulness.\r\nSuccessful portrayals of children have always made\r\ntheir wistful intentness at least as obvious as their lack\r\nof worry for the morrow. To live in the present is\r\ncompatible with condensation of far-reaching meanings\r\nin the present. Such enrichment of the present for its\r\nown sake is the just heritage of childhood and the best\r\ninsurer of future growth. The child forced into premature\r\nconcern with economic remote results may develop\r\na surprising sharpening of wits in a particular\r\ndirection, but this precocious specialization is always\r\npaid for by later apathy and dullness.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eThe attitude\r\nof the\r\nartist\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThat art originated in play is a common saying.\r\nWhether or not the saying is historically correct, it\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_220\" id=\"Page_220\"\u003e[Pg 220]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nsuggests that harmony of mental playfulness and seriousness\r\ndescribes the artistic ideal. When the artist is\r\npreoccupied overmuch with means and materials, he\r\nmay achieve wonderful technique, but not the artistic\r\nspirit \u003ci\u003epar excellence\u003c/i\u003e. When the animating idea is in excess\r\nof the command of method, æsthetic feeling may be\r\nindicated, but the art of presentation is too defective\r\nto express the feeling thoroughly. When the thought\r\nof the end becomes so adequate that it compels translation\r\ninto the means that embody it, or when attention\r\nto means is inspired by recognition of the end they\r\nserve, we have the attitude typical of the artist, an attitude\r\nthat may be displayed in all activities, even though\r\nnot conventionally designated arts.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eThe art of\r\nthe teacher\r\nculminates\r\nin nurturing\r\nthis attitude\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThat teaching is an art and the true teacher an artist is\r\na familiar saying. Now the teacher\u0027s own claim to rank\r\nas an artist is measured by his ability to foster the attitude\r\nof the artist in those who study with him, whether they\r\nbe youth or little children. Some succeed in arousing\r\nenthusiasm, in communicating large ideas, in evoking\r\nenergy. So far, well; but the final test is whether the\r\nstimulus thus given to wider aims succeeds in transforming\r\nitself into power, that is to say, into the attention to\r\ndetail that ensures mastery over means of execution.\r\nIf not, the zeal flags, the interest dies out, the ideal becomes\r\na clouded memory. Other teachers succeed in\r\ntraining facility, skill, mastery of the technique of subjects.\r\nAgain it is well\u0026mdash;so far. But unless enlargement\r\nof mental vision, power of increased discrimination\r\nof final values, a sense for ideas\u0026mdash;for principles\u0026mdash;accompanies\r\nthis training, forms of skill ready to be\r\nput indifferently to any end may be the result. Such\r\nmodes of technical skill may display themselves, accord\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_221\" id=\"Page_221\"\u003e[Pg 221]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003eing\r\nto circumstances, as cleverness in serving self-interest,\r\nas docility in carrying out the purposes of others, or\r\nas unimaginative plodding in ruts. To nurture inspiring\r\naim and executive means into harmony with each\r\nother is at once the difficulty and the reward of the\r\nteacher.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e§ 3. \u003ci\u003eThe Far and the Near\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003e\"Familiarity\r\nbreeds\r\ncontempt,\"\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eTeachers who have heard that they should avoid\r\nmatters foreign to pupils\u0027 experience, are frequently\r\nsurprised to find pupils wake up when something beyond\r\ntheir ken is introduced, while they remain apathetic in\r\nconsidering the familiar. In geography, the child upon\r\nthe plains seems perversely irresponsive to the intellectual\r\ncharms of his local environment, and fascinated\r\nby whatever concerns mountains or the sea. Teachers\r\nwho have struggled with little avail to extract from\r\npupils essays describing the details of things with which\r\nthey are well acquainted, sometimes find them eager\r\nto write on lofty or imaginary themes. A woman of\r\neducation, who has recorded her experience as a factory\r\nworker, tried retelling \u003ci\u003eLittle Women\u003c/i\u003e to some factory girls\r\nduring their working hours. They cared little for it,\r\nsaying, \"Those girls had no more interesting experience\r\nthan we have,\" and demanded stories of millionaires and\r\nsociety leaders. A man interested in the mental condition\r\nof those engaged in routine labor asked a Scotch\r\ngirl in a cotton factory what she thought about all\r\nday. She replied that as soon as her mind was free\r\nfrom starting the machinery, she married a duke, and\r\ntheir fortunes occupied her for the remainder of the day.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003esince only\r\nthe novel\r\ndemands\r\nattention,\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNaturally, these incidents are not told in order to encourage\r\nmethods of teaching that appeal to the sensa\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_222\" id=\"Page_222\"\u003e[Pg 222]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003etional,\r\nthe extraordinary, or the incomprehensible.\r\nThey are told, however, to enforce the point that the\r\nfamiliar and the near do not excite or repay thought on\r\ntheir own account, but only as they are adjusted to\r\nmastering the strange and remote. It is a commonplace\r\nof psychology that we do not attend to the old,\r\nnor consciously mind that to which we are thoroughly\r\naccustomed. For this, there is good reason: to devote\r\nattention to the old, when new circumstances are constantly\r\narising to which we should adjust ourselves,\r\nwould be wasteful and dangerous. Thought must be\r\nreserved for the new, the precarious, the problematic.\r\nHence the mental constraint, the sense of being lost,\r\nthat comes to pupils when they are invited to turn their\r\nthoughts upon that with which they are already familiar.\r\nThe old, the near, the accustomed, is not that \u003ci\u003eto\u003c/i\u003e which\r\nbut that \u003ci\u003ewith\u003c/i\u003e which we attend; it does not furnish the\r\nmaterial of a problem, but of its solution.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003ewhich, in\r\nturn, can be\r\ngiven only\r\nthrough the\r\nold\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe last sentence has brought us to the balancing of\r\nnew and old, of the far and that close by, involved in reflection.\r\nThe more remote supplies the stimulus and the\r\nmotive; the nearer at hand furnishes the point of approach\r\nand the available resources. This principle may\r\nalso be stated in this form: the best thinking occurs\r\nwhen the easy and the difficult are duly proportioned to\r\neach other. The easy and the familiar are equivalents,\r\nas are the strange and the difficult. Too much that is\r\neasy gives no ground for inquiry; too much of the hard\r\nrenders inquiry hopeless.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eThe given\r\nand the\r\nsuggested\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe necessity of the interaction of the near and the\r\nfar follows directly from the nature of thinking. Where\r\nthere is thought, something present suggests and indicates\r\nsomething absent. Accordingly unless the familiar\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_223\" id=\"Page_223\"\u003e[Pg 223]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nis presented under conditions that are in some respect\r\nunusual, it gives no jog to thinking, it makes no demand\r\nupon what is not present in order to be understood.\r\nAnd if the subject presented is totally strange, there is\r\nno basis upon which it may suggest anything serviceable\r\nfor its comprehension. When a person first has to\r\ndo with fractions, for example, they will be wholly\r\nbaffling so far as they do not signify to him some relation\r\nthat he has already mastered in dealing with whole\r\nnumbers. When fractions have become thoroughly\r\nfamiliar, his perception of them acts simply as a signal\r\nto do certain things; they are a \"substitute sign,\" to\r\nwhich he can react without thinking. (\u003ci\u003eAnte\u003c/i\u003e, p. 178.)\r\nIf, nevertheless, the situation as a whole presents something\r\nnovel and hence uncertain, the entire response is\r\nnot mechanical, because this mechanical operation is put\r\nto use in solving a problem. There is no end to this\r\nspiral process: foreign subject-matter transformed\r\nthrough thinking into a familiar possession becomes a\r\nresource for judging and assimilating additional foreign\r\nsubject-matter.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eObservation\r\nsupplies the\r\nnear, imagination\r\nthe remote\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe need for both imagination and observation in\r\nevery mental enterprise illustrates another aspect of the\r\nsame principle. Teachers who have tried object-lessons\r\nof the conventional type have usually found that when\r\nthe lessons were new, pupils were attracted to them as\r\na diversion, but as soon as they became matters of\r\ncourse they were as dull and wearisome as was ever the\r\nmost mechanical study of mere symbols. Imagination\r\ncould not play about the objects so as to enrich them.\r\nThe feeling that instruction in \"facts, facts\" produces\r\na narrow Gradgrind is justified not because facts in\r\nthemselves are limiting, but because facts are dealt out\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_224\" id=\"Page_224\"\u003e[Pg 224]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nas such hard and fast ready-made articles as to leave\r\nno room to imagination. Let the facts be presented so\r\nas to stimulate imagination, and culture ensues naturally\r\nenough. The converse is equally true. The imaginative\r\nis not necessarily the imaginary; that is, the unreal.\r\nThe proper function of imagination is vision of realities\r\nthat cannot be exhibited under existing conditions of\r\nsense-perception. Clear insight into the remote, the\r\nabsent, the obscure is its aim. History, literature, and\r\ngeography, the principles of science, nay, even geometry\r\nand arithmetic, are full of matters that must be imaginatively\r\nrealized if they are realized at all. Imagination\r\nsupplements and deepens observation; only when it\r\nturns into the fanciful does it become a substitute for\r\nobservation and lose logical force.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"sidenote\"\u003eExperience\r\nthrough\r\ncommunication\r\nof\r\nothers\u0027\r\nexperience\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eA final exemplification of the required balance between\r\nnear and far is found in the relation that obtains\r\nbetween the narrower field of experience realized in an\r\nindividual\u0027s own contact with persons and things, and\r\nthe wider experience of the race that may become\r\nhis through communication. Instruction always runs\r\nthe risk of swamping the pupil\u0027s own vital, though narrow,\r\nexperience under masses of communicated material.\r\nThe instructor ceases and the teacher begins at the\r\npoint where communicated matter stimulates into fuller\r\nand more significant life that which has entered by\r\nthe strait and narrow gate of sense-perception and\r\nmotor activity. Genuine communication involves contagion;\r\nits name should not be taken in vain by terming\r\ncommunication that which produces no community of\r\nthought and purpose between the child and the race\r\nof which he is the heir.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_225\" id=\"Page_225\"\u003e[Pg 225]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003chr style=\"width: 65%;\" /\u003e\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"INDEX\" id=\"INDEX\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eINDEX\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAbstract, \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_TEN\"\u003e135-144\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nAbstraction, \u003ca href=\"#Page_155\"\u003e155\u003c/a\u003e f.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nAction, activity, activities, \u003ca href=\"#Page_46\"\u003e46\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_140\"\u003e140\u003c/a\u003e f., \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_TWELVE\"\u003e157-169\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_190\"\u003e190\u003c/a\u003e f.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nActive attitude and the concept, \u003ca href=\"#Page_128\"\u003e128\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nAnalysis, \u003ca href=\"#Page_111\"\u003e111-115\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_152\"\u003e152\u003c/a\u003e f.;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ein education, \u003ca href=\"#Page_112\"\u003e112\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nApperception, \u003ca href=\"#Page_199\"\u003e199\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eapperceptive masses, \u003ca href=\"#Page_203\"\u003e203\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nApplication, \u003ca href=\"#Page_129\"\u003e129\u003c/a\u003e f., \u003ca href=\"#Page_212\"\u003e212\u003c/a\u003e f.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nApprehension, \u003ca href=\"#Page_119\"\u003e119\u003c/a\u003e f.;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003e\u003ci\u003esee\u003c/i\u003e Understanding.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nArtist, attitude of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_219\"\u003e219\u003c/a\u003e f.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nArticulation, \u003ca href=\"#Page_3\"\u003e3\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nAuthority, \u003ca href=\"#Page_4\"\u003e4\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_25\"\u003e25\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nBacon, \u003ca href=\"#Page_22\"\u003e22\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_25\"\u003e25\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_33\"\u003e33\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nBain, \u003ca href=\"#Page_155\"\u003e155\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nBalance, \u003ca href=\"#Page_38\"\u003e38\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nBehavior, \u003ca href=\"#Page_5\"\u003e5\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_42\"\u003e42-4\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_54\"\u003e54\u003c/a\u003e f.;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003e\u003ci\u003esee\u003c/i\u003e Action, Occupations\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nBelief, \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_ONE\"\u003e1\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_3\"\u003e3-7\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ereached indirectly, \u003ca href=\"#Page_18\"\u003e18\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nCentral factor in thinking, \u003ca href=\"#Page_7\"\u003e7\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nChildren, \u003ca href=\"#Page_42\"\u003e42\u003c/a\u003e f.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nClifford, \u003ca href=\"#Page_148\"\u003e148\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nCoherence, \u003ca href=\"#Page_3\"\u003e3\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_80\"\u003e80\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nComparison, \u003ca href=\"#Page_89\"\u003e89\u003c/a\u003e f., \u003ca href=\"#Page_202\"\u003e202\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nComprehension, \u003ca href=\"#Page_120\"\u003e120\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003e\u003ci\u003esee\u003c/i\u003e Understanding.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nConcentration, \u003ca href=\"#Page_40\"\u003e40\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nConcept, conception, \u003ca href=\"#Page_107\"\u003e107\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_125\"\u003e125-9\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_213\"\u003e213\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003e\u003ci\u003esee\u003c/i\u003e Meaning.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nConclusion, \u003ca href=\"#Page_3\"\u003e3\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_5\"\u003e5\u003c/a\u003e f., \u003ca href=\"#Page_40\"\u003e40\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_77\"\u003e77\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_80\"\u003e80\u003c/a\u003e f.;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003etechnique of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_87\"\u003e87\u003c/a\u003e f.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nConcrete, \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_TEN\"\u003e135-44\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nCongruity, \u003ca href=\"#Page_3\"\u003e3\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_72\"\u003e72\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nConnection, \u003ca href=\"#Page_7\"\u003e7\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003e\u003ci\u003esee\u003c/i\u003e Relation.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nConsecutive, \u003ca href=\"#Page_2\"\u003e2\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_40\"\u003e40\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_42\"\u003e42\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nConsequence, consequential, \u003ca href=\"#Page_2\"\u003e2\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003econsequences, \u003ca href=\"#Page_5\"\u003e5\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nConsistency, \u003ca href=\"#Page_40\"\u003e40\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nContinuity, \u003ca href=\"#Page_3\"\u003e3\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_40\"\u003e40\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_80\"\u003e80\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nControl, \u003ca href=\"#Page_18\"\u003e18-28\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eof deduction, \u003ca href=\"#Page_93\"\u003e93-100\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eof induction, \u003ca href=\"#Page_84\"\u003e84-93\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eof suggestion, \u003ca href=\"#Page_84\"\u003e84\u003c/a\u003e f., \u003ca href=\"#Page_93\"\u003e93\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003e\u003ci\u003esee\u003c/i\u003e Regulation.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nCorroborate, corroboration, \u003ca href=\"#Page_9\"\u003e9\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_77\"\u003e77\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nCuriosity, \u003ca href=\"#Page_31\"\u003e31\u003c/a\u003e ff., \u003ca href=\"#Page_105\"\u003e105\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nDarwin, \u003ca href=\"#Page_38\"\u003e38\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_90\"\u003e90\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_127\"\u003e127\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nData, \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_SEVEN\"\u003e79\u003c/a\u003e f., \u003ca href=\"#Page_95\"\u003e95\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_103\"\u003e103\u003c/a\u003e f., \u003ca href=\"#Page_106\"\u003e106\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nDecision, \u003ca href=\"#Page_107\"\u003e107\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nDeduction, \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_SEVEN\"\u003e79\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_93\"\u003e93-100\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_103\"\u003e103\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003econtrol of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_93\"\u003e93-100\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nDefinition, \u003ca href=\"#Page_130\"\u003e130\u003c/a\u003e f.;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003edefinitions, \u003ca href=\"#Page_131\"\u003e131-4\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_212\"\u003e212\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nDevelopment, of ideas, \u003ca href=\"#Page_83\"\u003e83\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003e\u003ci\u003esee\u003c/i\u003e Elaboration, Ratiocination, Reasoning.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nDiscipline, \u003ca href=\"#Page_63\"\u003e63\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_78\"\u003e78\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eformal, \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_FOUR\"\u003e45\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_50\"\u003e50\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nDiscourse, consecutive, \u003ca href=\"#Page_185\"\u003e185\u003c/a\u003e f.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nDiscovery, inductive, \u003ca href=\"#Page_81\"\u003e81\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_NINE\"\u003e116\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nDivision, \u003ca href=\"#Page_131\"\u003e131\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nDogmatism, \u003ca href=\"#Page_149\"\u003e149\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_198\"\u003e198\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_226\" id=\"Page_226\"\u003e[Pg 226]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nDoing, \u003ca href=\"#Page_139\"\u003e139\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_190\"\u003e190\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nDoubt, \u003ca href=\"#Page_6\"\u003e6\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_9\"\u003e9\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_13\"\u003e13\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_102\"\u003e102\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003e\u003ci\u003esee\u003c/i\u003e Perplexity, Uncertainty.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nDrill, \u003ca href=\"#Page_52\"\u003e52\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_63\"\u003e63\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nDrudgery, \u003ca href=\"#Page_218\"\u003e218\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nEducation, intellectual, \u003ca href=\"#Page_57\"\u003e57\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_62\"\u003e62\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eaim of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_143\"\u003e143\u003c/a\u003e f., \u003ca href=\"#Page_156\"\u003e156\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nElaboration, of ideas, \u003ca href=\"#Page_75\"\u003e75\u003c/a\u003e f., \u003ca href=\"#Page_84\"\u003e84\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_94\"\u003e94\u003c/a\u003e f., \u003ca href=\"#Page_103\"\u003e103\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_106\"\u003e106\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_209\"\u003e209\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003e\u003ci\u003esee\u003c/i\u003e Development, Ratiocination, Reasoning.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nEmerson, \u003ca href=\"#Page_173\"\u003e173\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nEmotion, \u003ca href=\"#Page_4\"\u003e4\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_11\"\u003e11\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_74\"\u003e74\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nEmphasis, \u003ca href=\"#Page_112\"\u003e112\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_114\"\u003e114\u003c/a\u003e f.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nEmpirical thinking, \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_ELEVEN\"\u003e145-9\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nEnd, \u003ca href=\"#Page_11\"\u003e11\u003c/a\u003e f.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nEvidence, \u003ca href=\"#Page_5\"\u003e5\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_7\"\u003e7\u003c/a\u003e f., \u003ca href=\"#Page_27\"\u003e27\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_103\"\u003e103\u003c/a\u003e f.;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003e\u003ci\u003esee\u003c/i\u003e Grounds.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nExperience, \u003ca href=\"#Page_132\"\u003e132\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_156\"\u003e156\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_199\"\u003e199\u003c/a\u003e f., \u003ca href=\"#Page_224\"\u003e224\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nExperiment, experimental, \u003ca href=\"#Page_70\"\u003e70\u003c/a\u003e f., \u003ca href=\"#Page_77\"\u003e77\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_91\"\u003e91\u003c/a\u003e f., \u003ca href=\"#Page_99\"\u003e99\u003c/a\u003e f., \u003ca href=\"#Page_151\"\u003e151\u003c/a\u003e f., \u003ca href=\"#Page_154\"\u003e154\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nExtension, \u003ca href=\"#Page_130\"\u003e130\u003c/a\u003e f.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nFact \u003ci\u003evs\u003c/i\u003e idea, \u003ca href=\"#Page_109\"\u003e109\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003efacts, \u003ca href=\"#Page_3\"\u003e3\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_5\"\u003e5\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nFaculty psychology, \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_FOUR\"\u003e45\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nFamiliar, familiarity, \u003ca href=\"#Page_120\"\u003e120-25\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_136\"\u003e136\u003c/a\u003e f., \u003ca href=\"#Page_206\"\u003e206\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_SIXTEEN\"\u003e214\u003c/a\u003e f., \u003ca href=\"#Page_221\"\u003e221\u003c/a\u003e f.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nFooling, \u003ca href=\"#Page_217\"\u003e217\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nFormalism;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003e\u003ci\u003esee\u003c/i\u003e Discipline.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nFormal steps of instruction, \u003ca href=\"#Page_202\"\u003e202\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_206\"\u003e206\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nFormulation, \u003ca href=\"#Page_112\"\u003e112\u003c/a\u003e f., \u003ca href=\"#Page_209\"\u003e209\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_212\"\u003e212\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_SIXTEEN\"\u003e214-17\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nFreedom, \u003ca href=\"#Page_64\"\u003e64\u003c/a\u003e f.;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eintellectual, \u003ca href=\"#Page_66\"\u003e66\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nFunction, \u003ca href=\"#Page_123\"\u003e123\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003efunction of signifying, \u003ca href=\"#Page_7\"\u003e7\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_15\"\u003e15\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nGeneral \u003ca href=\"#Page_80\"\u003e80\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_82\"\u003e82\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_99\"\u003e99\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_182\"\u003e182\u003c/a\u003e f.;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003e\u003ci\u003esee\u003c/i\u003e Principles, Universal.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nGenerality, \u003ca href=\"#Page_129\"\u003e129\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_134\"\u003e134\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nGeneralization, \u003ca href=\"#Page_211\"\u003e211\u003c/a\u003e f.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nGrounds, \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_ONE\"\u003e1\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_4\"\u003e4-8\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_80\"\u003e80\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003e\u003ci\u003esee\u003c/i\u003e Evidence.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nGuiding factor in reflection, \u003ca href=\"#Page_11\"\u003e11\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nHabits;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003e\u003ci\u003esee\u003c/i\u003e Action.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nHerbart, \u003ca href=\"#Page_202\"\u003e202\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nHerbartian method, \u003ca href=\"#Page_202\"\u003e202-6\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nHobhouse, \u003ca href=\"#Page_31\"\u003e31\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nHypothesis, \u003ca href=\"#Page_5\"\u003e5\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_75\"\u003e75\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_77\"\u003e77\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_81\"\u003e81\u003c/a\u003e f., \u003ca href=\"#Page_94\"\u003e94\u003c/a\u003e f., \u003ca href=\"#Page_108\"\u003e108\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_209\"\u003e209\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nIdea, \u003ca href=\"#Page_75\"\u003e75\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_77\"\u003e77\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_SEVEN\"\u003e79\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_107\"\u003e107-10\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003e\u003ci\u003esee\u003c/i\u003e Meaning.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nIdle thinking, \u003ca href=\"#Page_2\"\u003e2\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nImage, \u003ca href=\"#Page_109\"\u003e109\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nImagination, \u003ca href=\"#Page_165\"\u003e165\u003c/a\u003e f., \u003ca href=\"#Page_223\"\u003e223\u003c/a\u003e f.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nImitation, \u003ca href=\"#Page_47\"\u003e47\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_51\"\u003e51\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_160\"\u003e160\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nImplication, \u003ca href=\"#Page_5\"\u003e5\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_75\"\u003e75\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_77\"\u003e77\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nImpulse, \u003ca href=\"#Page_64\"\u003e64\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nInduction, \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_SEVEN\"\u003e79-93\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_103\"\u003e103\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003econtrol of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_84\"\u003e84-93\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003escientific, \u003ca href=\"#Page_86\"\u003e86\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nInference, \u003ca href=\"#Page_26\"\u003e26\u003c/a\u003e f., \u003ca href=\"#Page_75\"\u003e75\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_77\"\u003e77\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_EIGHT\"\u003e101\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ecritical, \u003ca href=\"#Page_74\"\u003e74\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_82\"\u003e82\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003esystematic, \u003ca href=\"#Page_81\"\u003e81\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nInformation, \u003ca href=\"#Page_52\"\u003e52\u003c/a\u003e f., \u003ca href=\"#Page_197\"\u003e197-200\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nInquiry, \u003ca href=\"#Page_5\"\u003e5\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_9\"\u003e9\u003c/a\u003e f.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nIntellect, intellectual activity, \u003ca href=\"#Page_44\"\u003e44\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_50\"\u003e50\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_62\"\u003e62\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nIntension, \u003ca href=\"#Page_130\"\u003e130\u003c/a\u003e f.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nInternal congruity, \u003ca href=\"#Page_3\"\u003e3\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nIsolation, \u003ca href=\"#Page_96\"\u003e96-100\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_117\"\u003e117\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_191\"\u003e191\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nJames, \u003ca href=\"#Page_119\"\u003e119\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_121\"\u003e121\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_153\"\u003e153\u003c/a\u003e f.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nJevons, \u003ca href=\"#Page_91\"\u003e91\u003c/a\u003e f., \u003ca href=\"#Page_183\"\u003e183\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_192\"\u003e192\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nJudgment, \u003ca href=\"#Page_5\"\u003e5\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003efactors of, \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_EIGHT\"\u003e101\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003egood judgment, \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_EIGHT\"\u003e101\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_103\"\u003e103\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_106\"\u003e106\u003c/a\u003e f.;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eand inference, \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_EIGHT\"\u003e101\u003c/a\u003e ff.;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eintuitive, \u003ca href=\"#Page_104\"\u003e104\u003c/a\u003e f.;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eprinciples of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_106\"\u003e106\u003c/a\u003e f.;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003esuspended, \u003ca href=\"#Page_74\"\u003e74\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_82\"\u003e82\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_105\"\u003e105\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_108\"\u003e108\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_227\" id=\"Page_227\"\u003e[Pg 227]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003etentative, \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_EIGHT\"\u003e101\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nKnowledge, \u003ca href=\"#Page_3\"\u003e3\u003c/a\u003e f., \u003ca href=\"#Page_6\"\u003e6\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_95\"\u003e95\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003espiral movement of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_120\"\u003e120\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_223\"\u003e223\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nLanguage, \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_THIRTEEN\"\u003e170-87\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eand education, \u003ca href=\"#Page_176\"\u003e176-87\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eand meaning, \u003ca href=\"#Page_171\"\u003e171\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003etechnical, \u003ca href=\"#Page_184\"\u003e184\u003c/a\u003e f.;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas a tool of thought, \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_THIRTEEN\"\u003e170\u003c/a\u003e ff., \u003ca href=\"#Page_179\"\u003e179\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nLeap, in inference, \u003ca href=\"#Page_26\"\u003e26\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_75\"\u003e75\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nLeisure, \u003ca href=\"#Page_209\"\u003e209\u003c/a\u003e f.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nLocke, \u003ca href=\"#Page_19\"\u003e19\u003c/a\u003e n., \u003ca href=\"#Page_22\"\u003e22-5\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nLogical, \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_FIVE\"\u003e56\u003c/a\u003e f.;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003e\u003ci\u003evs.\u003c/i\u003e psychological, \u003ca href=\"#Page_62\"\u003e62\u003c/a\u003e f.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nMeaning, meanings, \u003ca href=\"#Page_7\"\u003e7\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_17\"\u003e17\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_SEVEN\"\u003e79\u003c/a\u003e f., \u003ca href=\"#Page_82\"\u003e82\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_94\"\u003e94\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_NINE\"\u003e116-34\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ecapital fund of, store of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_118\"\u003e118\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_120\"\u003e120\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_126\"\u003e126\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_161\"\u003e161\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_174\"\u003e174\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_180\"\u003e180\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eindividual, \u003ca href=\"#Page_173\"\u003e173\u003c/a\u003e f.;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eorganization of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_175\"\u003e175\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_185\"\u003e185\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eas tools, keys, instruments, \u003ca href=\"#Page_108\"\u003e108\u003c/a\u003e f., \u003ca href=\"#Page_120\"\u003e120\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_125\"\u003e125\u003c/a\u003e f., \u003ca href=\"#Page_129\"\u003e129\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003e\u003ci\u003eSee\u003c/i\u003e Concept.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nMemory, \u003ca href=\"#Page_107\"\u003e107\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nMethod, \u003ca href=\"#Page_46\"\u003e46-50\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_58\"\u003e58\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eanalytic and synthetic, \u003ca href=\"#Page_114\"\u003e114\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eformal, \u003ca href=\"#Page_60\"\u003e60\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nMill, \u003ca href=\"#Page_18\"\u003e18\u003c/a\u003e n.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nMood, \u003ca href=\"#Page_5\"\u003e5\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nMotivation, \u003ca href=\"#Page_42\"\u003e42\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nNegative cases, \u003ca href=\"#Page_90\"\u003e90\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nNotion. \u003ci\u003eSee\u003c/i\u003e Concept.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nObject lessons, \u003ca href=\"#Page_140\"\u003e140\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_192\"\u003e192\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nObservation, \u003ca href=\"#Page_3\"\u003e3\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_7\"\u003e7\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_69\"\u003e69\u003c/a\u003e f., \u003ca href=\"#Page_76\"\u003e76\u003c/a\u003e f., \u003ca href=\"#Page_85\"\u003e85\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_91\"\u003e91\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_96\"\u003e96\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_FOURTEEN\"\u003e188-97\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_223\"\u003e223\u003c/a\u003e f.;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ein schools, \u003ca href=\"#Page_193\"\u003e193-7\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003escientific, \u003ca href=\"#Page_196\"\u003e196\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nOccupation, occupations, \u003ca href=\"#Page_43\"\u003e43\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_99\"\u003e99\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_167\"\u003e167\u003c/a\u003e f.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nOpenmindedness, \u003ca href=\"#Page_219\"\u003e219\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nOrder, orderliness, \u003ca href=\"#Page_2\"\u003e2\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_39\"\u003e39\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_41\"\u003e41\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_46\"\u003e46\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_57\"\u003e57\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003e\u003ci\u003esee\u003c/i\u003e Consecutive.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nOrganization, \u003ca href=\"#Page_39\"\u003e39\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_41\"\u003e41\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eof subject matter, \u003ca href=\"#Page_62\"\u003e62\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nOriginality, \u003ca href=\"#Page_198\"\u003e198\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nParticulars, \u003ca href=\"#Page_80\"\u003e80\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_82\"\u003e82\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003e\u003ci\u003ecf.\u003c/i\u003e General, Universal.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nPassion, \u003ca href=\"#Page_4\"\u003e4\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_23\"\u003e23\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_25\"\u003e25\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_106\"\u003e106\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nPerception, \u003ca href=\"#Page_3\"\u003e3\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_190\"\u003e190\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003e\u003ci\u003ecf.\u003c/i\u003e Observation\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nPerplexity, \u003ca href=\"#Page_9\"\u003e9\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_11\"\u003e11\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_72\"\u003e72\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nPlacing, \u003ca href=\"#Page_114\"\u003e114\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_126\"\u003e126\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nPlay, \u003ca href=\"#Page_161\"\u003e161-7\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_217\"\u003e217-21\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eof mind, \u003ca href=\"#Page_219\"\u003e219\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nPlayfulness, \u003ca href=\"#Page_162\"\u003e162\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_218\"\u003e218\u003c/a\u003e f.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nPractical deliberation, \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_SIX\"\u003e68\u003c/a\u003e f.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nPrejudice, \u003ca href=\"#Page_4\"\u003e4\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nPrinciples, \u003ca href=\"#Page_212\"\u003e212\u003c/a\u003e f.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nProblem, \u003ca href=\"#Page_9\"\u003e9\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_12\"\u003e12\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_33\"\u003e33\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_72\"\u003e72\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_74\"\u003e74\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_76\"\u003e76\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_109\"\u003e109\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_120\"\u003e120\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_191\"\u003e191\u003c/a\u003e f., \u003ca href=\"#Page_199\"\u003e199\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_207\"\u003e207\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nProof, \u003ca href=\"#Page_7\"\u003e7\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_27\"\u003e27\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_81\"\u003e81\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nPseudo-idea, \u003ca href=\"#Page_109\"\u003e109\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nPsychological (\u003ci\u003evs.\u003c/i\u003e logical), \u003ca href=\"#Page_62\"\u003e62\u003c/a\u003e f.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nPurpose, \u003ca href=\"#Page_11\"\u003e11\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nRatiocination, \u003ca href=\"#Page_75\"\u003e75\u003c/a\u003e f., \u003ca href=\"#Page_83\"\u003e83\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nReason, reasoning, \u003ca href=\"#Page_75\"\u003e75-8\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_94\"\u003e94\u003c/a\u003e f., \u003ca href=\"#Page_98\"\u003e98\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nReasons, \u003ca href=\"#Page_5\"\u003e5\u003c/a\u003e f.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nRecitation, \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_FIFTEEN\"\u003e201-13\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003efactors in, \u003ca href=\"#Page_206\"\u003e206-13\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nReflection, \u003ca href=\"#Page_2\"\u003e2\u003c/a\u003e f., \u003ca href=\"#Page_5\"\u003e5\u003c/a\u003e f.;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ecentral function of, \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_NINE\"\u003e116\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003edouble movement of, \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_SEVEN\"\u003e79-84\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003efive steps in, \u003ca href=\"#Page_72\"\u003e72-8\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_203\"\u003e203\u003c/a\u003e f.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nRegulation, \u003ca href=\"#Page_18\"\u003e18-28\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003e\u003ci\u003esee\u003c/i\u003e Control.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nRelation, relationship, \u003ca href=\"#Page_82\"\u003e82\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_97\"\u003e97\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003e\u003ci\u003esee\u003c/i\u003e Connection.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nScientific thinking, \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_ELEVEN\"\u003e145-6\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nSense training, \u003ca href=\"#Page_190\"\u003e190-97\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_228\" id=\"Page_228\"\u003e[Pg 228]\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/span\u003eSequence, \u003ca href=\"#Page_2\"\u003e2\u003c/a\u003e; \u003ci\u003ecf.\u003c/i\u003e Consequence.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nSidgwick, \u003ca href=\"#Page_127\"\u003e127\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nSignify, \u003ca href=\"#Page_7\"\u003e7\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_15\"\u003e15\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nSigns, \u003ca href=\"#Page_16\"\u003e16\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_171\"\u003e171-6\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nSpiral movement, \u003ci\u003esee\u003c/i\u003e Knowledge.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nStimulus-response, \u003ca href=\"#Page_47\"\u003e47\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nStudies, types of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_50\"\u003e50\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nSubject matter, \u003ca href=\"#Page_58\"\u003e58\u003c/a\u003e f.;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eintellectual, \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_FOUR\"\u003e45\u003c/a\u003e f.;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003elogical, \u003ca href=\"#Page_61\"\u003e61\u003c/a\u003e f.;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003epractical, \u003ca href=\"#Page_49\"\u003e49\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003etheoretical, \u003ca href=\"#Page_49\"\u003e49\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eand the teacher, \u003ca href=\"#Page_204\"\u003e204\u003c/a\u003e f.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nSubstitute signs, \u003ca href=\"#Page_177\"\u003e177\u003c/a\u003e f., \u003ca href=\"#Page_223\"\u003e223\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nSuccession, \u003ca href=\"#Page_3\"\u003e3\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nSuggestion, \u003ca href=\"#Page_7\"\u003e7\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_12\"\u003e12\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_27\"\u003e27\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_74\"\u003e74\u003c/a\u003e f., \u003ca href=\"#Page_84\"\u003e84\u003c/a\u003e f.;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003econtrol of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_84\"\u003e84\u003c/a\u003e f., \u003ca href=\"#Page_93\"\u003e93\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003edimensions of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_34\"\u003e34-7\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nSupposition, \u003ca href=\"#Page_4\"\u003e4\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_9\"\u003e9\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nSuspense of judgment, \u003ca href=\"#Page_13\"\u003e13\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_74\"\u003e74\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_82\"\u003e82\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nSymbols, \u003ci\u003esee\u003c/i\u003e Signs.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nSynthesis, \u003ca href=\"#Page_114\"\u003e114\u003c/a\u003e f.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nTerms, \u003ca href=\"#Page_3\"\u003e3\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_72\"\u003e72\u003c/a\u003e f., \u003ca href=\"#Page_76\"\u003e76\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_SEVEN\"\u003e79\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_95\"\u003e95\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nTesting, \u003ca href=\"#Page_9\"\u003e9\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_13\"\u003e13\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_41\"\u003e41\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_82\"\u003e82\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_NINE\"\u003e116\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eof deduction, \u003ca href=\"#Page_96\"\u003e96\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_99\"\u003e99\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nTheory, \u003ca href=\"#Page_138\"\u003e138\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nTheoretical, \u003ca href=\"#Page_137\"\u003e137\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nThinking, complete, \u003ca href=\"#Page_96\"\u003e96\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_98\"\u003e98\u003c/a\u003e f., \u003ca href=\"#Page_100\"\u003e100\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003e\u003ci\u003esee\u003c/i\u003e Reasoning, Reflection.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nThought, \u003ca href=\"#Page_8\"\u003e8\u003c/a\u003e f.;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003eeducative value of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_2\"\u003e2\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003ereflective, \u003ca href=\"#Page_2\"\u003e2\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003etrain of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_3\"\u003e3\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003etypes of, \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_ONE\"\u003e1\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nTruth, truths, \u003ca href=\"#Page_3\"\u003e3\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nUncertainty, \u003ci\u003esee\u003c/i\u003e Doubt, Perplexity.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nUnconscious, \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_SIXTEEN\"\u003e214\u003c/a\u003e ff.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nUncritical thinking, \u003ca href=\"#Page_12\"\u003e12\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nUnderstanding, \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_NINE\"\u003e116-20\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 1em;\"\u003edirect and indirect, \u003ca href=\"#Page_118\"\u003e118-20\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_136\"\u003e136\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nUniversal, \u003ca href=\"#Page_9\"\u003e9\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nVagueness, \u003ca href=\"#Page_129\"\u003e129\u003c/a\u003e f., \u003ca href=\"#Page_182\"\u003e182\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_212\"\u003e212\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nVailati, \u003ca href=\"#Page_81\"\u003e81\u003c/a\u003e n.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nVenn, \u003ca href=\"#Page_17\"\u003e17\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nVerification, \u003ca href=\"#Page_77\"\u003e77\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nVocabulary, \u003ca href=\"#Page_180\"\u003e180-4\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nWard, \u003ca href=\"#Page_110\"\u003e110\u003c/a\u003e n.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nWarrant, \u003ca href=\"#Page_7\"\u003e7\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nWisdom, \u003ca href=\"#Page_52\"\u003e52\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nWonder, \u003ca href=\"#Page_31\"\u003e31\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_33\"\u003e33\u003c/a\u003e f.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nWordsworth, \u003ca href=\"#Page_31\"\u003e31\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nWork, \u003ca href=\"#Page_162\"\u003e162-7\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_217\"\u003e217-19\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003ch3\u003eFOOTNOTES:\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_1_1\" id=\"Footnote_1_1\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_1_1\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[1]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e This mode of thinking in its contrast with thoughtful inquiry receives\r\nspecial notice in the next chapter.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_2_2\" id=\"Footnote_2_2\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_2_2\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[2]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eImplies\u003c/i\u003e is more often used when a principle or general truth brings\r\nabout belief in some other truth; the other phrases are more frequently\r\nused to denote the cases in which one fact or event leads us to believe in\r\nsomething else.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_3_3\" id=\"Footnote_3_3\"\u003e\r\n\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_3_3\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[3]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Mill, \u003ci\u003eSystem of Logic\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nIntroduction, § 5.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_4_4\" id=\"Footnote_4_4\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_4_4\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[4]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Locke, \u003ci\u003eOf the Conduct of the Understanding\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nfirst paragraph.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca name=\"Page_20\" id=\"Page_20\"\u003e[Pg 20]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_5_5\" id=\"Footnote_5_5\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_5_5\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[5]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e In another place he says: \"Men\u0027s prejudices and inclinations impose\r\noften upon themselves…. Inclination suggests and slides into discourse\r\nfavorable terms, which introduce favorable ideas; till at last by\r\nthis means that is concluded clear and evident, thus dressed up, which,\r\ntaken in its native state, by making use of none but precise determined\r\nideas, would find no admittance at all.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_6_6\" id=\"Footnote_6_6\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_6_6\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[6]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eThe Conduct of the Understanding\u003c/i\u003e, § 3.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_7_7\" id=\"Footnote_7_7\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_7_7\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[7]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003eEssay Concerning Human Understanding\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nbk. IV, ch. XX, \"Of\r\nWrong Assent or Error.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_8_8\" id=\"Footnote_8_8\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_8_8\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[8]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Hobhouse, \u003ci\u003eMind in Evolution\u003c/i\u003e, p. 195.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_9_9\" id=\"Footnote_9_9\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_9_9\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[9]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e A child of four or five who had been repeatedly called to the house\r\nby his mother with no apparent response on his own part, was asked if he\r\ndid not hear her. He replied quite judicially, \"Oh, yes, but she doesn\u0027t\r\ncall very mad yet.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_10_10\" id=\"Footnote_10_10\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_10_10\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[10]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e People who have \u003ci\u003enumber-forms\u003c/i\u003e\u0026mdash;\u003ci\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e project number series into\r\nspace and see them arranged in certain shapes\u0026mdash;when asked why they\r\nhave not mentioned the fact before, often reply that it never occurred to\r\nthem; they supposed that everybody had the same power.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_11_11\" id=\"Footnote_11_11\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_11_11\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[11]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Of course, any one subject has all three aspects: \u003ci\u003ee.g.\u003c/i\u003e in arithmetic,\r\ncounting, writing, and reading numbers, rapid adding, etc., are cases of\r\nskill in doing; the tables of weights and measures are a matter of information,\r\netc.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_12_12\" id=\"Footnote_12_12\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_12_12\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[12]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Denoting whatever has to do with the natural constitution and functions\r\nof an individual.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_13_13\" id=\"Footnote_13_13\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_13_13\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[13]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nThese are taken, almost verbatim, from the class papers of students.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_14_14\" id=\"Footnote_14_14\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_14_14\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[14]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e This term is sometimes extended to denote the entire reflective process\u0026mdash;just\r\nas \u003ci\u003einference\u003c/i\u003e (which in the sense of \u003ci\u003etest\u003c/i\u003e is best reserved for\r\nthe third step) is sometimes used in the same broad sense. But \u003ci\u003ereasoning\u003c/i\u003e\r\n(or \u003ci\u003eratiocination\u003c/i\u003e) seems to be peculiarly adapted to express what the\r\nolder writers called the \"notional\" or \"dialectic\" process of developing\r\nthe meaning of a given idea.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_15_15\" id=\"Footnote_15_15\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_15_15\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[15]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e See Vailati,\r\n\u003ci\u003eJournal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nVol. V, No. 12.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_16_16\" id=\"Footnote_16_16\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_16_16\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[16]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e In terms of the phrases used in logical treatises, the so-called \"methods\r\nof agreement\" (comparison) and \"difference\" (contrast) must accompany\r\neach other or constitute a \"joint method\" in order to be of logical use.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_17_17\" id=\"Footnote_17_17\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_17_17\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[17]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nThese processes are further discussed in \u003ca href=\"#CHAPTER_NINE\"\u003eChapter IX\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_18_18\" id=\"Footnote_18_18\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_18_18\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[18]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nCompare what was said about \u003ci\u003eanalysis\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_19_19\" id=\"Footnote_19_19\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_19_19\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[19]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The term \u003ci\u003eidea\u003c/i\u003e is also used popularly to denote (\u003ci\u003ea\u003c/i\u003e) a mere fancy, (\u003ci\u003eb\u003c/i\u003e)\r\nan accepted belief, and also (\u003ci\u003ec\u003c/i\u003e) judgment itself. But \u003ci\u003elogically\u003c/i\u003e it denotes a\r\ncertain \u003ci\u003efactor\u003c/i\u003e in judgment, as explained in the text.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_20_20\" id=\"Footnote_20_20\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_20_20\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[20]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e See Ward,\r\n\u003ci\u003ePsychic Factors of Civilization\u003c/i\u003e, p. 153.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_21_21\" id=\"Footnote_21_21\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_21_21\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[21]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Thus arise all those falsely analytic methods in geography, reading,\r\nwriting, drawing, botany, arithmetic, which we have already considered in\r\nanother connection. (See p. 59.)\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_22_22\" id=\"Footnote_22_22\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_22_22\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[22]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e James, \u003ci\u003ePrinciples of Psychology\u003c/i\u003e, vol. I, p. 221. To \u003ci\u003eknow\u003c/i\u003e and to\r\n\u003ci\u003eknow that\u003c/i\u003e are perhaps more precise equivalents; compare \"I know him\"\r\nand \"I know that he has gone home.\" The former expresses a fact\r\nsimply; for the latter, evidence might be demanded and supplied.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_23_23\" id=\"Footnote_23_23\"\u003e\r\n\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_23_23\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[23]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ci\u003ePrinciples of Psychology\u003c/i\u003e, vol. I, p. 488.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_24_24\" id=\"Footnote_24_24\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_24_24\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[24]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nThe next two paragraphs repeat, for purposes of the present discussion,\r\nwhat we have already noted in a different context. See p. 88 and p. 99.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_25_25\" id=\"Footnote_25_25\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_25_25\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[25]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ci\u003ePsychology\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nvol. II. p. 342.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_26_26\" id=\"Footnote_26_26\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_26_26\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[26]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Bain, \u003ci\u003eThe Senses and Intellect\u003c/i\u003e, third American ed., 1879, p. 492 (italics\r\nnot in original).\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_27_27\" id=\"Footnote_27_27\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_27_27\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[27]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nCompare the quotation from Bain on p. 155.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_28_28\" id=\"Footnote_28_28\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_28_28\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[28]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The term \u003ci\u003egeneral\u003c/i\u003e is itself an ambiguous term, meaning (in its best\r\nlogical sense) the related and also (in its natural usage) the indefinite, the\r\nvague. \u003ci\u003eGeneral\u003c/i\u003e, in the first sense, denotes the discrimination of a principle\r\nor generic relation; in the second sense, it denotes the absence of\r\ndiscrimination of specific or individual properties.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_29_29\" id=\"Footnote_29_29\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003ca href=\"#FNanchor_29_29\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"label\"\u003e[29]\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e A large amount of material illustrating the twofold change in the sense\r\nof words will be found in Jevons, \u003ci\u003eLessons in Logic\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\n\u003c/article\u003e"}],"SectionSequence":["Back Link","Work Title","Deck","Author","Period","Era","Composition","Date Note","Region","Terra Avita","Terra Avita Region","Modern Country","Original Title","Language","Primary Discipline","Secondary Discipline","Tradition","Full Versions","Core Thesis","Classification","Arguments","Influence","Significance","Evidence Note","Full Text"],"Counts":{"ContextCards":3,"GeoCards":4,"DisciplineCards":2,"Links":11,"Sections":25,"Styles":3,"Scripts":1}}