Human Nature and Conduct
{"WorkMasterId":6309,"WpPageId":281296,"ParentWpPageId":193822,"Slug":"human-nature-and-conduct","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/john-dewey/human-nature-and-conduct/","RelativeUrl":"theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/john-dewey/human-nature-and-conduct/","HasFullText":true,"RawHtmlLength":643030,"CleanHtmlLength":586920,"Kicker":"Philosophy Work","Title":"Human Nature and Conduct","Deck":"Dewey explains moral conduct through habit, impulse, intelligence, social environment, and reconstructive deliberation.","BackLink":{"Text":"Back to John Dewey","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/john-dewey/"},"AuthorCard":{"Label":"Author","Title":"John Dewey","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/john-dewey/","MediaHref":"","ImageSrc":"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/john-dewey-01-portrait-by-underwood-underwood.jpg","ImageAlt":"Underwood and Underwood portrait of John Dewey","FilterTerra":"North America","ClickText":"John Dewey","ClickHref":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/john-dewey/","Copies":["1859 CE – 1952 CE","Burlington, Vermont","American pragmatist philosopher of instrumentalism, democratic experimentalism, progressive education, inquiry, experience, logic, ethics, aesthetics, public life, science, and naturalistic religion."]},"ContextCards":[{"Label":"Period","Key":"Period:4","Title":"Modern History","DateText":"1800 CE – 1944 CE","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/eras-of-thought/philosophers-of-modern-history/"},{"Label":"Era","Key":"Era:11","Title":"Long 19th Century","DateText":"1870 CE – 1913 CE","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/eras-of-thought/philosophers-of-modern-history/philosophers-of-the-long-19th-century/"},{"Label":"Composition","Title":"1922 CE","Url":"","DateText":""}],"DateNote":"Displayed as 1922 CE for Human Nature and Conduct.","GeoCards":[{"Label":"Region","Key":"Region:1"},{"Label":"Terra Avita","Key":"TerraAvita:6"},{"Label":"Terra Avita Region","Key":"TerraAvitaRegion:25"},{"Label":"Modern Country","Key":"Country:USA:6"}],"OriginalTitle":"Human Nature and Conduct","Language":"English","DisciplineCards":[{"Label":"Primary Discipline","Key":"Discipline:ethics"},{"Label":"Secondary Discipline","Key":"Discipline:philosophy-of-mind"}],"Tradition":"American pragmatism; instrumentalism; pragmatic naturalism; democratic experimentalism; progressive education","FullText":{"Title":"Full Text","Copy":"Public-domain full text from Project Gutenberg eBook #41386 .","Url":"","Label":"","Kicker":"","Cards":[]},"CoreThesis":["Dewey explains moral conduct through habit, impulse, intelligence, social environment, and reconstructive deliberation."],"Classification":{"AlternateTitles":"Human Nature and Conduct: An Introduction to Social Psychology","KeyConcepts":"habit; impulse; intelligence; conduct; ethics; social psychology; deliberation","Methodology":"Direct Dewey work-cluster record based on SEP, IEP, Britannica, Center for Dewey Studies, Dewey scholarship, catalog records, and public edition evidence. 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Hegel, Darwinian naturalism, experimental science, Jane Addams and social reform, American democratic institutions, and educational practice.","InfluenceOn":""},"Significance":["Accepted as a direct Dewey work via Gutenberg, catalog, and scholarship evidence.","Dewey remains central for inquiry, democratic life, public problem-solving, education, experience, habits, art, values, religion as human faith, and experimental social intelligence."],"EvidenceNote":["Accepted as a direct Dewey work via Gutenberg, catalog, and scholarship evidence."],"MainSections":[{"Kind":"RawSection","Title":"Full Versions","BodyHtml":"\u003cdiv class=\"dz-philo__full-version-grid\"\u003e\n \u003carticle class=\"dz-philo__full-version-card\"\u003e\n \u003cp class=\"dz-philo__full-version-provider\"\u003eProject Gutenberg\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003ch3 class=\"dz-philo__full-version-title\"\u003eProject Gutenberg eBook #41386\u003c/h3\u003e\n \u003cp class=\"dz-philo__full-version-meta\"\u003eHtmlText · Imported\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003ca class=\"dz-philo__full-version-link\" href=\"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/41386\"\u003eOpen full version\u003c/a\u003e\n \u003c/article\u003e\n \u003c/div\u003e"},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Core Thesis","Paragraphs":["Dewey explains moral conduct through habit, impulse, intelligence, social environment, and reconstructive deliberation."]},{"Kind":"FieldSection","Title":"Classification","Fields":[{"Label":"Alternate Titles","Value":"Human Nature and Conduct: An Introduction to Social Psychology"},{"Label":"Key Concepts","Value":"habit; impulse; intelligence; conduct; ethics; social psychology; deliberation"},{"Label":"Methodology","Value":"Direct Dewey work-cluster record based on SEP, IEP, Britannica, Center for Dewey Studies, Dewey scholarship, catalog records, and public edition evidence. No full text is imported."},{"Label":"Structure","Value":"One work-cluster page with explicit integer display year, date note, evidence note, discipline mapping, and public source evidence."}]},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Arguments","Paragraphs":["Dewey explains moral conduct through habit, impulse, intelligence, social environment, and reconstructive deliberation."]},{"Kind":"FieldSection","Title":"Influence","Fields":[{"Label":"Influenced By","Value":"William James, Charles Sanders Peirce, G. W. F. Hegel, Darwinian naturalism, experimental science, Jane Addams and social reform, American democratic institutions, and educational practice."},{"Label":"Influence On","Value":"Pragmatism, analytic and continental social philosophy, democratic theory, progressive education, inquiry theory, aesthetics, public philosophy, deliberative democracy, philosophy of science, and American philosophy."}]},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Significance","Paragraphs":["Accepted as a direct Dewey work via Gutenberg, catalog, and scholarship evidence.","Dewey remains central for inquiry, democratic life, public problem-solving, education, experience, habits, art, values, religion as human faith, and experimental social intelligence."]},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Evidence Note","Paragraphs":["Accepted as a direct Dewey work via Gutenberg, catalog, and scholarship evidence."]},{"Kind":"RawSection","Title":"Full Text","BodyHtml":"\u003cp class=\"dz-philo__section-copy dz-philo__full-text-source\"\u003ePublic-domain full text from \u003ca href=\"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/41386\"\u003eProject Gutenberg eBook #41386\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003carticle class=\"dz-philo__full-text-body\"\u003e\r\n\u003ch1 id=\"Pgi\"\u003eHUMAN NATURE\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nAND CONDUCT\u003cbr/\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"spaced\"\u003e\u003csmall\u003eAn Introduction to Social Psychology\u003c/small\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h1\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"center spaced\"\u003e\u003csmall\u003eBY\u003c/small\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\n\u003cbig\u003eJOHN DEWEY\u003c/big\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"figcenter\" style=\"width: 150px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-human-nature-and-conduct-printdevice.jpg\" class=\"plain\" width=\"150\" height=\"202\" alt=\"\" title=\"logo\" /\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"center spaced\"\u003eNEW YORK\u003cbr/\u003e\r\n\u003cbig\u003eHENRY HOLT AND COMPANY\u003c/big\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\n1922\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"center spaced\" id=\"Pgii\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eCopyright\u003c/span\u003e, 1922,\u003cbr/\u003e\r\n\u003csmall\u003eBY\u003c/small\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nHENRY HOLT AND COMPANY\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 20%;\"\u003eFirst Printing, Jan., 1922\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 20%;\"\u003eSecond Printing, Mar., 1922\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 20%;\"\u003eThird Printing, June, 1922\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 20%;\"\u003eFourth Printing, Aug., 1922\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 20%;\"\u003eFifth Printing, Nov., 1922\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\n\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 20%;\"\u003eSixth Printing, April, 1923\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"center\"\u003ePRINTED IN THE U.\u0026nbsp;S.\u0026nbsp;A. BY\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nThe Quinn \u0026amp; Boden Company\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nBOOK MANUFACTURERS\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nRAHWAY NEW JERSEY\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"center\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pgiii\"\u003e[pg iii]\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbig\u003ePREFACE\u003c/big\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn the spring of 1918 I was invited by Leland Stanford\r\nJunior University to give a series of three lectures\r\nupon the West Memorial Foundation. One of\r\nthe topics included within the scope of the Foundation\r\nis Human Conduct and Destiny. This volume is\r\nthe result, as, according to the terms of the Foundation,\r\nthe lectures are to be published. The lectures as\r\ngiven have, however, been rewritten and considerably\r\nexpanded. An Introduction and Conclusion have been\r\nadded. The lectures should have been published within\r\ntwo years from delivery. Absence from the country\r\nrendered strict compliance difficult; and I am indebted\r\nto the authorities of the University for their indulgence\r\nin allowing an extension of time, as well as for so many\r\ncourtesies received during the time when the lectures\r\nwere given.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003ePerhaps the sub-title requires a word of explanation.\r\nThe book does not purport to be a treatment of social\r\npsychology. But it seriously sets forth a belief that\r\nan understanding of habit and of different types of\r\nhabit is the key to social psychology, while the operation\r\nof impulse and intelligence gives the key to individualized\r\nmental activity. But they are secondary to\r\nhabit so that mind can be understood in the concrete\r\nonly as a system of beliefs, desires and purposes which\r\nare formed in the interaction of biological aptitudes\r\nwith a social environment.\u003cspan style=\"margin-left: 25em;\"\u003eJ.\u0026nbsp;D.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp\u003eFebruary, 1921\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"center\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pgv\"\u003e[pg v]\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbig\u003eCONTENTS\u003c/big\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cul class=\"TOC\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan class=\"ralign\"\u003ePAGE\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003eINTRODUCTION\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan class=\"ralign\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Pg001\"\u003e1\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli class=\"sub1\"\u003eContempt for human nature; pathology of goodness; freedom; value of science.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"center\"\u003e\u003ci\u003ePART ONE\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"center\"\u003eTHE PLACE OF HABIT IN CONDUCT\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cul class=\"TOC\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eSection I: Habits as Social Functions\u003c/span\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan class=\"ralign\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Pg014\"\u003e\u003cins class=\"corr\" title=\"13\" id=\"Corr_v_\"\u003e14\u003c/ins\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli class=\"sub1\"\u003eHabits as functions and arts; social complicity; subjective factor.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eSection II: Habits and Will\u003c/span\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan class=\"ralign\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Pg024\"\u003e24\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli class=\"sub1\"\u003eActive means; ideas of ends; means and ends; nature of character.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eSection III: Character and Conduct\u003c/span\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan class=\"ralign\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Pg043\"\u003e43\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli class=\"sub1\"\u003eGood will and consequences; virtues and natural goods; objective and subjective morals.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eSection IV: Custom and Habit\u003c/span\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan class=\"ralign\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Pg058\"\u003e58\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli class=\"sub1\"\u003eHuman psychology is social; habit as conservative; mind and body.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eSection V: Custom and Morality\u003c/span\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan class=\"ralign\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Pg075\"\u003e75\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli class=\"sub1\"\u003eCustoms as standards; authority of standards; class conflicts.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eSection VI: Habit and Social Psychology\u003c/span\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan class=\"ralign\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Pg084\"\u003e84\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli class=\"sub1\"\u003eIsolation of individuality; newer movements.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"center\"\u003e\u003ci\u003ePART TWO\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"center\"\u003eTHE PLACE OF IMPULSE IN CONDUCT\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cul class=\"TOC\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eSection I: Impulses and Change of Habits\u003c/span\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan class=\"ralign\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Pg089\"\u003e89\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli class=\"sub1\"\u003ePresent interest in instincts; impulses as re-organizing.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pgvi\"\u003e[pg vi]\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eSection II: Plasticity of Impulse\u003c/span\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan class=\"ralign\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Pg095\"\u003e95\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli class=\"sub1\"\u003eImpulse and education; uprush of impulse; fixed codes.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eSection III: Changing Human Nature\u003c/span\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan class=\"ralign\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Pg106\"\u003e106\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli class=\"sub1\"\u003eHabits the inert factor; modification of impulses; war a social function; economic regimes as social products; nature of motives.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eSection IV: Impulse and Conflict of Habits\u003c/span\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan class=\"ralign\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Pg125\"\u003e125\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli class=\"sub1\"\u003ePossibility of social betterment; conservatism.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eSection V: Classification of Instincts\u003c/span\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan class=\"ralign\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Pg131\"\u003e131\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli class=\"sub1\"\u003eFalse simplifications; \"self-love\"; will to power; acquisitive and creative.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eSection VI: No Separate Instincts\u003c/span\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan class=\"ralign\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Pg149\"\u003e149\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli class=\"sub1\"\u003eUniqueness of acts; possibilities of operation; necessity of play and art; rebelliousness.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eSection VII: Impulse and Thought\u003c/span\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan class=\"ralign\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Pg169\"\u003e169\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"center\"\u003e\u003ci\u003ePART THREE\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"center\"\u003eTHE PLACE OF INTELLIGENCE IN CONDUCT\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cul class=\"TOC\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eSection I: Habit and Intelligence\u003c/span\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan class=\"ralign\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Pg172\"\u003e172\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli class=\"sub1\"\u003eHabits and intellect; mind, habit and impulse.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eSection II: The Psychology of Thinking\u003c/span\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan class=\"ralign\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Pg181\"\u003e181\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli class=\"sub1\"\u003eThe trinity of intellect; conscience and its alleged separate subject-matter.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eSection III: The Nature of Deliberation\u003c/span\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan class=\"ralign\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Pg189\"\u003e189\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli class=\"sub1\"\u003eDeliberation as imaginative rehearsal; preference and choice; strife of reason and passion; nature of reason.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eSection IV: Deliberation and Calculation\u003c/span\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan class=\"ralign\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Pg199\"\u003e199\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli class=\"sub1\"\u003eError in utilitarian theory; place of the pleasant; hedonistic calculus; deliberation and prediction.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eSection V: The Uniqueness of Good\u003c/span\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan class=\"ralign\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Pg210\"\u003e210\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli class=\"sub1\"\u003eFallacy of a single good; applied to utilitarianism; profit and personality; means and ends.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pgvii\"\u003e[pg vii]\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eSection VI: The Nature of Aims\u003c/span\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan class=\"ralign\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Pg223\"\u003e223\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli class=\"sub1\"\u003eTheory of final ends; aims as directive means; ends as justifying means; meaning well as an aim; wishes and aims.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eSection VII: The Nature of Principles\u003c/span\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan class=\"ralign\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Pg238\"\u003e238\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli class=\"sub1\"\u003eDesire for certainty; morals and probabilities; importance of generalizations.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eSection VIII: Desire and Intelligence\u003c/span\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan class=\"ralign\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Pg248\"\u003e248\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli class=\"sub1\"\u003eObject and consequence of desire; desire and quiescence; self-deception in desire; desire needs intelligence; nature of idealism; living in the ideal.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eSection IX: The Present and Future\u003c/span\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan class=\"ralign\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Pg265\"\u003e265\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli class=\"sub1\"\u003eSubordination of activity to result; control of future; production and consummation; idealism and distant goals.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"center\"\u003e\u003ci\u003ePART FOUR\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"center\"\u003eCONCLUSION\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cul class=\"TOC\"\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eSection I: The Good of Activity\u003c/span\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan class=\"ralign\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Pg278\"\u003e278\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli class=\"sub1\"\u003eBetter and worse; morality a process; evolution and progress; optimism; Epicureanism; making others happy.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eSection II: Morals are Human\u003c/span\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan class=\"ralign\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Pg295\"\u003e295\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli class=\"sub1\"\u003eHumane morals; natural law and morals; place of science.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eSection III: What is Freedom?\u003c/span\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan class=\"ralign\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Pg303\"\u003e303\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli class=\"sub1\"\u003eElements in freedom; capacity in action; novel possibilities; force of desire.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eSection IV: Morality Is Social\u003c/span\u003e\u0026nbsp;\u003cspan class=\"ralign\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Pg314\"\u003e314\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli class=\"sub1\"\u003eConscience and responsibility; social pressure and opportunity; exaggeration of blame; importance of social psychology; category of right; the community as religious symbol.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg001\"\u003e[pg 001]\u003c/span\u003eINTRODUCTION\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"Give a dog a bad name and hang him.\" Human\r\nnature has been the dog of professional moralists, and\r\nconsequences accord with the proverb. Man\u0027s nature\r\nhas been regarded with suspicion, with fear, with sour\r\nlooks, sometimes with enthusiasm for its possibilities\r\nbut only when these were placed in contrast with its\r\nactualities. It has appeared to be so evilly disposed\r\nthat the business of morality was to prune and curb\r\nit; it would be thought better of if it could be replaced\r\nby something else. It has been supposed that morality\r\nwould be quite superfluous were it not for the inherent\r\nweakness, bordering on depravity, of human nature.\r\nSome writers with a more genial conception have attributed\r\nthe current blackening to theologians who have\r\nthought to honor the divine by disparaging the human.\r\nTheologians have doubtless taken a gloomier view of\r\nman than have pagans and secularists. But this explanation\r\ndoesn\u0027t take us far. For after all these theologians\r\nare themselves human, and they would have\r\nbeen without influence if the human audience had not\r\nsomehow responded to them.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eMorality is largely concerned with controlling human\r\nnature. When we are attempting to control anything\r\nwe are acutely aware of what resists us. So moralists\r\nwere led, perhaps, to think of human nature as evil\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg002\"\u003e[pg 002]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nbecause of its reluctance to yield to control, its rebelliousness\r\nunder the yoke. But this explanation only\r\nraises another question. Why did morality set up\r\nrules so foreign to human nature? The ends it insisted\r\nupon, the regulations it imposed, were after all outgrowths\r\nof human nature. Why then was human nature\r\nso averse to them? Moreover rules can be obeyed and\r\nideals realized only as they appeal to something in human\r\nnature and awaken in it an active response. Moral\r\nprinciples that exalt themselves by degrading human\r\nnature are in effect committing suicide. Or else they\r\ninvolve human nature in unending civil war, and treat\r\nit as a hopeless mess of contradictory forces.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe are forced therefore to consider the nature and\r\norigin of that control of human nature with which\r\nmorals has been occupied. And the fact which is forced\r\nupon us when we raise this question is the existence\r\nof classes. Control has been vested in an oligarchy.\r\nIndifference to regulation has grown in the gap which\r\nseparates the ruled from the rulers. Parents, priests,\r\nchiefs, social censors have supplied aims, aims which\r\nwere foreign to those upon whom they were imposed,\r\nto the young, laymen, ordinary folk; a few have given\r\nand administered rule, and the mass have in a passable\r\nfashion and with reluctance obeyed. Everybody knows\r\nthat good children are those who make as little trouble\r\nas possible for their elders, and since most of them\r\ncause a good deal of annoyance they must be naughty\r\nby nature. Generally speaking, good people have been\r\nthose who did what they were told to do, and lack of\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg003\"\u003e[pg 003]\u003c/span\u003e\r\neager compliance is a sign of something wrong in their\r\nnature.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut no matter how much men in authority have\r\nturned moral rules into an agency of class supremacy,\r\nany theory which attributes the origin of rule to deliberate\r\ndesign is false. To take advantage of conditions\r\nafter they have come into existence is one thing;\r\nto create them for the sake of an advantage to accrue\r\nis quite another thing. We must go back \u003cins class=\"corr\" title=\"of\" id=\"Corr_003_\"\u003eto\u003c/ins\u003e the bare\r\nfact of social division into superior and inferior. To\r\nsay that accident produced social conditions is to perceive\r\nthey were not produced by intelligence. Lack of\r\nunderstanding of human nature is the primary cause\r\nof disregard for it. Lack of insight always ends in\r\ndespising or else unreasoned admiration. When men\r\nhad no scientific knowledge of physical nature they\r\neither passively submitted to it or sought to control it\r\nmagically. What cannot be understood cannot be\r\nmanaged intelligently. It has to be forced into subjection\r\nfrom without. The opaqueness of human nature\r\nto reason is equivalent to a belief in its intrinsic irregularity.\r\nHence a decline in the authority of social\r\noligarchy was accompanied by a rise of scientific interest\r\nin human nature. This means that the make-up and\r\nworking of human forces afford a basis for moral ideas\r\nand ideals. Our science of human nature in comparison\r\nwith physical sciences is rudimentary, and morals\r\nwhich are concerned with the health, efficiency and\r\nhappiness of a development of human nature are\r\ncorrespondingly elementary. These pages are a discussion\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg004\"\u003e[pg 004]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof some phases of the ethical change involved\r\nin positive respect for human nature when the\r\nlatter is associated with scientific knowledge. We\r\nmay anticipate the general nature of this change\r\nthrough considering the evils which have resulted from\r\nsevering morals from the actualities of human physiology\r\nand psychology. There is a pathology of goodness\r\nas well as of evil; that is, of that sort of goodness\r\nwhich is nurtured by this separation. The badness of\r\ngood people, for the most part recorded only in fiction,\r\nis the revenge taken by human nature for the injuries\r\nheaped upon it in the name of morality. In the first\r\nplace, morals cut off from positive roots in man\u0027s nature\r\nis bound to be mainly negative. Practical emphasis\r\nfalls upon avoidance, escape of evil, upon not doing\r\nthings, observing prohibitions. Negative morals assume\r\nas many forms as there are types of temperament subject\r\nto it. Its commonest form is the protective coloration\r\nof a neutral respectability, an insipidity of character.\r\nFor one man who thanks God that he is not\r\nas other men there are a thousand to offer thanks\r\nthat they are as other men, sufficiently as others are\r\nto escape attention. Absence of social blame is the\r\nusual mark of goodness for it shows that evil has been\r\navoided. Blame is most readily averted by being so\r\nmuch like everybody else that one passes unnoticed.\r\nConventional morality is a drab morality, in which the\r\nonly fatal thing is to be conspicuous. If there be flavor\r\nleft in it, then some natural traits have somehow escaped\r\nbeing subdued. To be so good as to attract notice is\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg005\"\u003e[pg 005]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nto be priggish, too good for this world. The same\r\npsychology that brands the convicted criminal as forever\r\na social outcast makes it the part of a gentleman\r\nnot to obtrude virtues noticeably upon others.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe Puritan is never popular, not even in a society\r\nof Puritans. In case of a pinch, the mass prefer to be\r\ngood fellows rather than to be good men. Polite vice\r\nis preferable to eccentricity and ceases to be vice.\r\nMorals that professedly neglect human nature end by\r\nemphasizing those qualities of human nature that are\r\nmost commonplace and average; they exaggerate the\r\nherd instinct to conformity. Professional guardians of\r\nmorality who have been exacting with respect to themselves\r\nhave accepted avoidance of conspicuous evil as\r\nenough for the masses. One of the most instructive\r\nthings in all human history is the system of concessions,\r\ntolerances, mitigations and reprieves which the Catholic\r\nChurch with its official supernatural morality has devised\r\nfor the multitude. Elevation of the spirit above\r\neverything natural is tempered by organized leniency\r\nfor the frailties of flesh. To uphold an aloof realm of\r\nstrictly ideal realities is admitted to be possible only\r\nfor a few. Protestantism, except in its most zealous\r\nforms, has accomplished the same result by a sharp\r\nseparation between religion and morality in which a\r\nhigher justification by faith disposes at one stroke of\r\ndaily lapses into the gregarious morals of average\r\nconduct.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThere are always ruder forceful natures who cannot\r\ntame themselves to the required level of colorless\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg006\"\u003e[pg 006]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nconformity. To them conventional morality appears\r\nas an organized futility; though they are usually unconscious\r\nof their own attitude since they are heartily\r\nin favor of morality for the mass as making it easier\r\nto manage them. Their only standard is success, putting\r\nthings over, getting things done. Being good is\r\nto them practically synonymous with ineffectuality;\r\nand accomplishment, achievement is its own justification.\r\nThey know by experience that much is forgiven\r\nto those who succeed, and they leave goodness to the\r\nstupid, to those whom they qualify as boobs. Their\r\ngregarious nature finds sufficient outlet in the conspicuous\r\ntribute they pay to all established institutions\r\nas guardians of ideal interests, and in their\r\ndenunciations of all who openly defy conventionalized\r\nideals. Or they discover that they are the chosen\r\nagents of a higher morality and walk subject to specially\r\nordained laws. Hypocrisy in the sense of a\r\ndeliberate covering up of a will to evil by loud-voiced\r\nprotestations of virtue is one of the rarest of occurrences.\r\nBut the combination in the same person of\r\nan intensely executive nature with a love of popular\r\napproval is bound, in the face of conventional morality,\r\nto produce what the critical term hypocrisy.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAnother reaction to the separation of morals from\r\nhuman nature is a romantic glorification of natural impulse\r\nas something superior to all moral claims. There\r\nare those who lack the persistent force of the executive\r\nwill to break through conventions and to use them for\r\ntheir own purposes, but who unite sensitiveness with\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg007\"\u003e[pg 007]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nintensity of desire. Fastening upon the conventional\r\nelement in morality, they hold that all morality is a\r\nconventionality hampering to the development of individuality.\r\nAlthough appetites are the commonest things\r\nin human nature, the least distinctive or individualized,\r\nthey identify unrestraint in satisfaction of appetite\r\nwith free realization of individuality. They treat subjection\r\nto passion as a manifestation of freedom in the\r\ndegree in which it shocks the bourgeois. The urgent\r\nneed for a transvaluation of morals is caricatured by\r\nthe notion that an avoidance of the avoidances of conventional\r\nmorals constitutes positive achievement.\r\nWhile the executive type keeps its eyes on actual conditions\r\nso as to manipulate them, this school abrogates\r\nobjective intelligence in behalf of sentiment, and withdraws\r\ninto little coteries of emancipated souls.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThere are others who take seriously the idea of\r\nmorals separated from the ordinary actualities of humanity\r\nand who attempt to live up to it. Some become\r\nengrossed in spiritual egotism. They are preoccupied\r\nwith the state of their character, concerned for the\r\npurity of their motives and the goodness of their souls.\r\nThe exaltation of conceit which sometimes accompanies\r\nthis absorption can produce a corrosive inhumanity\r\nwhich exceeds the possibilities of any other known form\r\nof selfishness. In other cases, persistent preoccupation\r\nwith the thought of an ideal realm breeds morbid discontent\r\nwith surroundings, or induces a futile withdrawal\r\ninto an inner world where all facts are fair to\r\nthe eye. The needs of actual conditions are neglected,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg008\"\u003e[pg 008]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nor dealt with in a half-hearted way, because in the light\r\nof the ideal they are so mean and sordid. To speak of\r\nevils, to strive seriously for change, shows a low mind.\r\nOr, again, the ideal becomes a refuge, an asylum, a way\r\nof escape from tiresome responsibilities. In varied ways\r\nmen come to live in two worlds, one the actual, the other\r\nthe ideal. Some are tortured by the sense of their\r\nirreconcilability. Others alternate between the two,\r\ncompensating for the strains of renunciation involved\r\nin membership in the ideal realm by \u003cins class=\"corr\" title=\"pleasureable\" id=\"Corr_008_\"\u003epleasurable\u003c/ins\u003e excursions\r\ninto the delights of the actual.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf we turn from concrete effects upon character to\r\ntheoretical issues, we single out the discussion regarding\r\nfreedom of will as typical of the consequences that come\r\nfrom separating morals from human nature. Men are\r\nwearied with bootless discussion, and anxious to dismiss\r\nit as a metaphysical subtlety. But nevertheless\r\nit contains within itself the most practical of all moral\r\nquestions, the nature of freedom and the means of its\r\nachieving. The separation of morals from human\r\nnature leads to a separation of human nature in its\r\nmoral aspects from the rest of nature, and from ordinary\r\nsocial habits and endeavors which are found in\r\nbusiness, civic life, the run of companionships and recreations.\r\nThese things are thought of at most as places\r\nwhere moral notions need to be applied, not as places\r\nwhere moral ideas are to be studied and moral energies\r\ngenerated. In short, the severance of morals from\r\nhuman nature ends by driving morals inwards from the\r\npublic open out-of-doors air and light of day into the\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg009\"\u003e[pg 009]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nobscurities and privacies of an inner life. The significance\r\nof the traditional discussion of free will is that\r\nit reflects precisely a separation of moral activity from\r\nnature and the public life of men.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOne has to turn from moral theories to the general\r\nhuman struggle for political, economic and religious\r\nliberty, for freedom of thought, speech, assemblage and\r\ncreed, to find significant reality in the conception of\r\nfreedom of will. Then one finds himself out of the\r\nstiflingly close atmosphere of an inner consciousness and\r\nin the open-air world. The cost of confining moral\r\nfreedom to an inner region is the almost complete severance\r\nof ethics from politics and economics. The former\r\nis regarded as summed up in edifying exhortations,\r\nand the latter as connected with arts of expediency\r\nseparated from larger issues of good.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn short, there are two schools of social reform. One\r\nbases itself upon the notion of a morality which springs\r\nfrom an inner freedom, something mysteriously cooped\r\nup within personality. It asserts that the only way\r\nto change institutions is for men to purify their own\r\nhearts, and that when this has been accomplished,\r\nchange of institutions will follow of itself. The other\r\nschool denies the existence of any such inner power, and\r\nin so doing conceives that it has denied all moral freedom.\r\nIt says that men are made what they are by the\r\nforces of the environment, that human nature is purely\r\nmalleable, and that till institutions are changed, nothing\r\ncan be done. Clearly this leaves the outcome as hopeless\r\nas does an appeal to an inner rectitude and benevolence.\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg010\"\u003e[pg 010]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nFor it provides no leverage for change of environment.\r\nIt throws us back upon accident, usually\r\ndisguised as a necessary law of history or evolution, and\r\ntrusts to some violent change, symbolized by civil war,\r\nto usher in an abrupt millennium. There is an alternative\r\nto being penned in between these two theories. We\r\ncan recognize that all conduct is \u003cem\u003einteraction\u003c/em\u003e between elements\r\nof human nature and the environment, natural\r\nand social. Then we shall see that progress proceeds\r\nin two ways, and that freedom is found in that kind of\r\ninteraction which maintains an environment in which\r\nhuman desire and choice count for something. There\r\nare in truth forces in man as well as without him.\r\nWhile they are infinitely frail in comparison with exterior\r\nforces, yet they may have the support of a foreseeing\r\nand contriving intelligence. When we look at the\r\nproblem as one of an adjustment to be intelligently\r\nattained, the issue shifts from within personality to an\r\nengineering issue, the establishment of arts of education\r\nand social guidance.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe idea persists that there is something materialistic\r\nabout natural science and that morals are degraded by\r\nhaving anything seriously to do with material things.\r\nIf a sect should arise proclaiming that men ought to\r\npurify their lungs completely before they ever drew\r\na breath it ought to win many adherents from professed\r\nmoralists. For the neglect of sciences that deal specifically\r\nwith facts of the natural and social environment\r\nleads to a side-tracking of moral forces into an\r\nunreal privacy of an unreal self. It is impossible to\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg011\"\u003e[pg 011]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nsay how much of the remediable suffering of the world\r\nis due to the fact that physical science is looked upon\r\nas merely physical. It is impossible to say how much\r\nof the unnecessary slavery of the world is due to the\r\nconception that moral issues can be settled within conscience\r\nor human sentiment apart from consistent\r\nstudy of facts and application of specific knowledge\r\nin industry, law and politics. Outside of manufacturing\r\nand transportation, science gets its chance\r\nin war. These facts perpetuate war and the hardest,\r\nmost brutal side of modern industry. Each sign of\r\ndisregard for the moral potentialities of physical\r\nscience drafts the conscience of mankind away from\r\nconcern with the interactions of man and nature which\r\nmust be mastered if freedom is to be a reality. It diverts\r\nintelligence to anxious preoccupation with the unrealities\r\nof a purely inner life, or strengthens reliance\r\nupon outbursts of sentimental affection. The masses\r\nswarm to the occult for assistance. The cultivated\r\nsmile contemptuously. They might smile, as the saying\r\ngoes, out of the other side of their mouths if they\r\nrealized how recourse to the occult exhibits the practical\r\nlogic of their own beliefs. For both rest upon a\r\nseparation of moral ideas and feelings from knowable\r\nfacts of life, man and the world.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is not pretended that a moral theory based upon\r\nrealities of human nature and a study of the specific\r\nconnections of these realities with those of physical\r\nscience would do away with moral struggle and defeat.\r\nIt would not make the moral life as simple a matter as\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg012\"\u003e[pg 012]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwending one\u0027s way along a well-lighted boulevard. All\r\naction is an invasion of the future, of the unknown.\r\nConflict and uncertainty are ultimate traits. But\r\nmorals based upon concern with facts and deriving\r\nguidance from knowledge of them would at least locate\r\nthe points of effective endeavor and would focus available\r\nresources upon them. It would put an end to the\r\nimpossible attempt to live in two unrelated worlds. It\r\nwould destroy fixed distinction between the human\r\nand the physical, as well as that between the moral and\r\nthe industrial and political. A morals based on study\r\nof human nature instead of upon disregard for it\r\nwould find the facts of man continuous with those of\r\nthe rest of nature and would thereby ally ethics with\r\nphysics and biology. It would find the nature and\r\nactivities of one person coterminous with those of other\r\nhuman beings, and therefore link ethics with the study\r\nof history, sociology, law and economics.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSuch a morals would not automatically solve moral\r\nproblems, nor resolve perplexities. But it would enable\r\nus to state problems in such forms that action could\r\nbe courageously and intelligently directed to their solution.\r\nIt would not assure us against failure, but it\r\nwould render failure a source of instruction. It would\r\nnot protect us against the future emergence of equally\r\nserious moral difficulties, but it would enable us to approach\r\nthe always recurring troubles with a fund of\r\ngrowing knowledge which would add significant values\r\nto our conduct even when we overtly failed\u0026mdash;as we\r\nshould continue to do. Until the integrity of morals\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg013\"\u003e[pg 013]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwith human nature and of both with the environment is\r\nrecognized, we shall be deprived of the aid of past\r\nexperience to cope with the most acute and deep problems\r\nof life. Accurate and extensive knowledge will\r\ncontinue to operate only in dealing with purely technical\r\nproblems. The intelligent acknowledgment of\r\nthe continuity of nature, man and society will alone\r\nsecure a growth of morals which will be serious without\r\nbeing fanatical, aspiring without sentimentality,\r\nadapted to reality without conventionality, sensible\r\nwithout taking the form of calculation of profits, idealistic\r\nwithout being romantic.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr /\u003e\r\n\r\n \u003ch2 class=\"spaced\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg014\"\u003e[pg 014]\u003c/span\u003ePART ONE\u003cbr/\u003e\r\n\u003csmall\u003eTHE PLACE OF HABIT IN CONDUCT\u003c/small\u003e\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003eI\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eHabits may be profitably compared to physiological\r\nfunctions, like breathing, digesting. The latter are, to\r\nbe sure, involuntary, while habits are acquired. But\r\nimportant as is this difference for many purposes it\r\nshould not conceal the fact that habits are like functions\r\nin many respects, and especially in requiring the\r\ncooperation of organism and environment. Breathing\r\nis an affair of the air as truly as of the lungs; digesting\r\nan affair of food as truly as of tissues of stomach.\r\nSeeing involves light just as certainly as it does the\r\neye and optic nerve. Walking implicates the ground\r\nas well as the legs; speech demands physical air and\r\nhuman companionship and audience as well as vocal\r\norgans. We may shift from the biological to the mathematical\r\nuse of the word function, and say that natural\r\noperations like breathing and digesting, acquired ones\r\nlike speech and honesty, are functions of the surroundings\r\nas truly as of a person. They are things done \u003cem\u003eby\u003c/em\u003e\r\nthe environment by means of organic structures or\r\nacquired dispositions. The same air that under certain\r\nconditions ruffles the pool or wrecks buildings,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg015\"\u003e[pg 015]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nunder other conditions purifies the blood and conveys\r\nthought. The outcome depends upon what air acts\r\nupon. The social environment acts through native impulses\r\nand speech and moral habitudes manifest themselves.\r\nThere are specific good reasons for the usual\r\nattribution of acts to the person from whom they immediately\r\nproceed. But to convert this special reference\r\ninto a belief of exclusive ownership is as misleading\r\nas to suppose that breathing and digesting are\r\ncomplete within the human body. To get a rational\r\nbasis for moral discussion we must begin with recognizing\r\nthat functions and habits are ways of using and\r\nincorporating the environment in which the latter has\r\nits say as surely as the former.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe may borrow words from a context less technical\r\nthan that of biology, and convey the same idea by saying\r\nthat habits are arts. They involve skill of sensory\r\nand motor organs, cunning or craft, and objective\r\nmaterials. They assimilate objective energies, and\r\neventuate in command of environment. They require\r\norder, discipline, and manifest technique. They have\r\na beginning, middle and end. Each stage marks progress\r\nin dealing with materials and tools, advance in converting\r\nmaterial to active use. We should laugh at any\r\none who said that he was master of stone working, but\r\nthat the art was cooped up within himself and in no wise\r\ndependent upon support from objects and assistance\r\nfrom tools.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn morals we are however quite accustomed to such\r\na fatuity. Moral dispositions are thought of as belonging\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg016\"\u003e[pg 016]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nexclusively to a self. The self is thereby isolated\r\nfrom natural and social surroundings. A whole school\r\nof morals flourishes upon capital drawn from restricting\r\nmorals to character and then separating character\r\nfrom conduct, motives from actual deeds. Recognition\r\nof the analogy of moral action with functions and arts\r\nuproots the causes which have made morals subjective\r\nand \"individualistic.\" It brings morals to earth, and\r\nif they still aspire to heaven it is to the heavens of the\r\nearth, and not to another world. Honesty, chastity,\r\nmalice, peevishness, courage, triviality, industry, irresponsibility\r\nare not private possessions of a person.\r\nThey are working adaptations of personal capacities\r\nwith environing forces. All virtues and vices are habits\r\nwhich incorporate objective forces. They are interactions\r\nof elements contributed by the make-up of an\r\nindividual with elements supplied by the out-door world.\r\nThey can be studied as objectively as physiological\r\nfunctions, and they can be modified by change of either\r\npersonal or social elements.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf an individual were alone in the world, he would\r\nform his habits (assuming the impossible, namely, that\r\nhe would be able to form them) in a moral vacuum.\r\nThey would belong to him alone, or to him only in reference\r\nto physical forces. Responsibility and virtue\r\nwould be his alone. But since habits involve the support\r\nof environing conditions, a society or some specific\r\ngroup of fellow-men, is always accessory before and\r\nafter the fact. Some activity proceeds from a man;\r\nthen it sets up reactions in the surroundings. Others\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg017\"\u003e[pg 017]\u003c/span\u003e\r\napprove, disapprove, protest, encourage, share and resist.\r\nEven letting a man alone is a definite response.\r\nEnvy, admiration and imitation are complicities. Neutrality\r\nis non-existent. Conduct is always shared; this\r\nis the difference between it and a physiological process.\r\nIt is not an ethical \"ought\" that conduct \u003cem\u003eshould\u003c/em\u003e be\r\nsocial. It \u003cem\u003eis\u003c/em\u003e social, whether bad or good.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWashing one\u0027s hands of the guilt of others is a way\r\nof sharing guilt so far as it encourages in others a\r\nvicious way of action. Non-resistance to evil which\r\ntakes the form of paying no attention to it is a way\r\nof promoting it. The desire of an individual to keep\r\nhis own conscience stainless by standing aloof from\r\nbadness may be a sure means of causing evil and thus\r\nof creating personal responsibility for it. Yet there are\r\ncircumstances in which passive resistance may be the\r\nmost effective form of nullification of wrong action,\r\nor in which heaping coals of fire on the evil-doer may\r\nbe the most effective way of transforming conduct. To\r\nsentimentalize over a criminal\u0026mdash;to \"forgive\" because\r\nof a glow of feeling\u0026mdash;is to incur liability for production\r\nof criminals. But to suppose that infliction of \u003cins class=\"corr\" title=\"retibutive\" id=\"Corr_017_\"\u003eretributive\u003c/ins\u003e\r\nsuffering suffices, without reference to concrete\r\nconsequences, is to leave untouched old causes of criminality\r\nand to create new ones by fostering revenge and\r\nbrutality. The abstract theory of justice which demands\r\nthe \"vindication\" of law irrespective of instruction\r\nand reform of the wrong-doer is as much a\r\nrefusal to recognize responsibility as is the sentimental\r\ngush which makes a suffering victim out of a criminal.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg018\"\u003e[pg 018]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nCourses of action which put the blame exclusively\r\non a person as if his evil will were the sole cause of\r\nwrong-doing and those which condone offense on account\r\nof the share of social conditions in producing\r\nbad disposition, are equally ways of making an unreal\r\nseparation of man from his surroundings, mind from\r\nthe world. Causes for an act always exist, but causes\r\nare not excuses. Questions of causation are physical,\r\nnot moral except when they concern future consequences.\r\nIt is as causes of future actions that excuses\r\nand accusations alike must be considered. At present\r\nwe give way to resentful passion, and then \"rationalize\"\r\nour surrender by calling it a vindication of justice.\r\nOur entire tradition regarding punitive justice tends\r\nto prevent recognition of social partnership in producing\r\ncrime; it falls in with a belief in metaphysical\r\nfree-will. By killing an evil-doer or shutting him up\r\nbehind stone walls, we are enabled to forget both him\r\nand our part in creating him. Society excuses itself\r\nby laying the blame on the criminal; he retorts by putting\r\nthe blame on bad early surroundings, the temptations\r\nof others, lack of opportunities, and the persecutions\r\nof officers of the law. Both are right, except in\r\nthe wholesale character of their recriminations. But\r\nthe effect on both sides is to throw the whole matter\r\nback into antecedent causation, a method which refuses\r\nto bring the matter to truly moral judgment. For\r\nmorals has to do with acts still within our control, acts\r\nstill to be performed. No amount of guilt on the part\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg019\"\u003e[pg 019]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof the evil-doer absolves us from responsibility for the\r\nconsequences upon him and others of our way of treating\r\nhim, or from our continuing responsibility for the\r\nconditions under which persons develop perverse habits.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe need to discriminate between the physical and the\r\nmoral question. The former concerns what \u003cem\u003ehas\u003c/em\u003e happened,\r\nand how it happened. To consider this question\r\nis indispensable to morals. Without an answer to it we\r\ncannot tell what forces are at work nor how to direct\r\nour actions so as to improve conditions. Until we\r\nknow the conditions which have helped form the characters\r\nwe approve and disapprove, our efforts to create\r\nthe one and do away with the other will be blind and\r\nhalting. But the moral issue concerns the future. It is\r\nprospective. To content ourselves with pronouncing\r\njudgments of merit and demerit without reference to\r\nthe fact that our judgments are themselves facts which\r\nhave consequences and that their value depends upon\r\n\u003cem\u003etheir\u003c/em\u003e consequences, is complacently to dodge the moral\r\nissue, perhaps even to indulge ourselves in pleasurable\r\npassion just as the person we condemn once indulged\r\nhimself. The moral problem is that of modifying the\r\nfactors which now influence future results. To change\r\nthe working character or will of another we have to\r\nalter objective conditions which enter into his habits.\r\nOur own schemes of judgment, of assigning blame and\r\npraise, of awarding punishment and honor, are part\r\nof these conditions.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn practical life, there are many recognitions of the\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg020\"\u003e[pg 020]\u003c/span\u003e\r\npart played by social factors in generating personal\r\ntraits. One of them is our habit of making social\r\nclassifications. We attribute distinctive characteristics\r\nto rich and poor, slum-dweller and captain of industry,\r\nrustic and suburbanite, officials, politicians, professors,\r\nto members of races, sets and parties. These judgments\r\nare usually too coarse to be of much use. But\r\nthey show our practical awareness that personal traits\r\nare functions of social situations. When we generalize\r\nthis perception and act upon it intelligently we are\r\ncommitted by it to recognize that we change character\r\nfrom worse to better only by changing conditions\u0026mdash;among\r\nwhich, once more, are our own ways of dealing\r\nwith the one we judge. We cannot change habit directly:\r\nthat notion is magic. But we can change it\r\nindirectly by modifying conditions, by an intelligent\r\nselecting and weighting of the objects which engage\r\nattention and which influence the fulfilment of desires.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eA savage can travel after a fashion in a jungle.\r\nCivilized activity is too complex to be carried on without\r\nsmoothed roads. It requires signals and junction\r\npoints; traffic authorities and means of easy and rapid\r\ntransportation. It demands a congenial, antecedently\r\nprepared environment. Without it, civilization would\r\nrelapse into barbarism in spite of the best of subjective\r\nintention and internal good disposition. The eternal\r\ndignity of labor and art lies in their effecting that permanent\r\nreshaping of environment which is the substantial\r\nfoundation of future security and progress. Individuals\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg021\"\u003e[pg 021]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nflourish and wither away like the grass of the\r\nfields. But the fruits of their work endure and make\r\npossible the development of further activities having\r\nfuller significance. It is of grace not of ourselves that\r\nwe lead civilized lives. There is sound sense in the old\r\npagan notion that gratitude is the root of all virtue.\r\nLoyalty to whatever in the established environment\r\nmakes a life of excellence possible is the beginning of\r\nall progress. The best we can accomplish for posterity\r\nis to transmit unimpaired and with some increment of\r\nmeaning the environment that makes it possible to\r\nmaintain the habits of decent and refined life. Our\r\nindividual habits are links in forming the endless chain\r\nof humanity. Their significance depends upon the environment\r\ninherited from our forerunners, and it is\r\nenhanced as we foresee the fruits of our labors in the\r\nworld in which our successors live.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFor however much has been done, there always remains\r\nmore to do. We can retain and transmit our own\r\nheritage only by constant remaking of our own environment.\r\nPiety to the past is not for its own sake nor for\r\nthe sake of the past, but for the sake of a present so\r\nsecure and enriched that it will create a yet better\r\nfuture. Individuals with their exhortations, their\r\npreachings and scoldings, their inner aspirations and\r\nsentiments have disappeared, but their habits endure,\r\nbecause these habits incorporate objective conditions in\r\nthemselves. So will it be with \u003cem\u003eour\u003c/em\u003e activities. We may\r\ndesire abolition of war, industrial justice, greater\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg022\"\u003e[pg 022]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nequality of opportunity for all. But no amount of\r\npreaching good will or the golden rule or cultivation\r\nof sentiments of love and equity will accomplish the\r\nresults. There must be change in objective arrangements\r\nand institutions. We must work on the environment\r\nnot merely on the hearts of men. To think otherwise\r\nis to suppose that flowers can be raised in a desert\r\nor motor cars run in a jungle. Both things can happen\r\nand without a miracle. But only by first changing the\r\njungle and desert.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eYet the distinctively personal or subjective factors in\r\nhabit count. Taste for flowers may be the initial step\r\nin building reservoirs and irrigation canals. The stimulation\r\nof desire and effort is one preliminary in the\r\nchange of surroundings. While personal exhortation,\r\nadvice and instruction is a feeble stimulus compared\r\nwith that which steadily proceeds from the impersonal\r\nforces and depersonalized habitudes of the environment,\r\nyet they may start the latter going. Taste, appreciation\r\nand effort always spring from some accomplished\r\nobjective situation. They have objective\r\nsupport; they represent the liberation of something\r\nformerly accomplished so that it is useful in further\r\noperation. A genuine appreciation of the beauty of\r\nflowers is not generated within a self-enclosed consciousness.\r\nIt reflects a world in which beautiful flowers have\r\nalready grown and been enjoyed. Taste and desire\r\nrepresent a prior objective fact recurring in action to\r\nsecure perpetuation and extension. Desire for flowers\r\ncomes after actual enjoyment of flowers. But it comes\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg023\"\u003e[pg 023]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nbefore the work that makes the desert blossom, it comes\r\nbefore \u003cem\u003ecultivation\u003c/em\u003e of plants. Every ideal is preceded by\r\nan actuality; but the ideal is more than a repetition\r\nin inner image of the actual. It projects in securer and\r\nwider and fuller form some good which has been previously\r\nexperienced in a precarious, accidental, fleeting\r\nway.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg024\"\u003e[pg 024]\u003c/span\u003eII\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is a significant fact that in order to appreciate\r\nthe peculiar place of habit in activity we have to betake\r\nourselves to bad habits, foolish idling, gambling,\r\naddiction to liquor and drugs. When we think of such\r\nhabits, the union of habit with desire and with propulsive\r\npower is forced upon us. When we think of\r\nhabits in terms of walking, playing a musical instrument,\r\ntypewriting, we are much given to thinking of\r\nhabits as technical abilities existing apart from our\r\nlikings and as lacking in urgent impulsion. We think\r\nof them as passive tools waiting to be called into action\r\nfrom without. A bad habit suggests an inherent tendency\r\nto action and also a hold, command over us. It\r\nmakes us do things we are ashamed of, things which we\r\ntell ourselves we prefer not to do. It overrides our\r\nformal resolutions, our conscious decisions. When we\r\nare honest with ourselves we acknowledge that a habit\r\nhas this power because it is so intimately a part of ourselves.\r\nIt has a hold upon us because we are the habit.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOur self-love, our refusal to face facts, combined\r\nperhaps with a sense of a possible better although\r\nunrealized self, leads us to eject the habit from the\r\nthought of ourselves and conceive it as an evil power\r\nwhich has somehow overcome us. We feed our conceit\r\nby recalling that the habit was not deliberately formed;\r\nwe never intended to become idlers or gamblers or rouès.\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg025\"\u003e[pg 025]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nAnd how can anything be deeply ourselves which developed\r\naccidentally, without set intention? These\r\ntraits of a bad habit are precisely the things which are\r\nmost instructive about all habits and about ourselves.\r\nThey teach us that all habits are affections, that all\r\nhave projectile power, and that a predisposition\r\nformed by a number of specific acts is an immensely\r\nmore intimate and fundamental part of ourselves than\r\nare vague, general, conscious choices. All habits are\r\ndemands for certain kinds of activity; and they constitute\r\nthe self. In any intelligible sense of the word\r\nwill, they \u003cem\u003eare\u003c/em\u003e will. They form our effective desires and\r\nthey furnish us with our working capacities. They\r\nrule our thoughts, determining which shall appear and\r\nbe strong and which shall pass from light into\r\nobscurity.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe may think of habits as means, waiting, like tools\r\nin a box, to be used by conscious resolve. But they\r\nare something more than that. They are active means,\r\nmeans that project themselves, energetic and dominating\r\nways of acting. We need to distinguish between\r\nmaterials, tools and means proper. Nails and boards\r\nare not strictly speaking means of a box. They are\r\nonly materials for making it. Even the saw and hammer\r\nare means only when they are employed in some\r\nactual making. Otherwise they are tools, or potential\r\nmeans. They are actual means only when brought in\r\nconjunction with eye, arm and hand in some specific\r\noperation. And eye, arm and hand are, correspondingly,\r\nmeans proper only when they are in active operation.\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg026\"\u003e[pg 026]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nAnd whenever they are in action they are cooperating\r\nwith external materials and energies. Without\r\nsupport from beyond themselves the eye stares blankly\r\nand the hand moves fumblingly. They are means only\r\nwhen they enter into organization with things which\r\nindependently accomplish definite results. These organizations\r\nare habits.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis fact cuts two ways. Except in a contingent\r\nsense, with an \"if,\" neither external materials nor bodily\r\nand mental organs are in themselves means. They\r\nhave to be employed in coordinated conjunction with\r\none another to be actual means, or habits. This statement\r\nmay seem like the formulation in technical language\r\nof a common-place. But belief in magic has\r\nplayed a large part in human history. And the essence\r\nof all hocus-pocus is the supposition that results\r\ncan be accomplished without the joint adaptation to\r\neach other of human powers and physical conditions.\r\nA desire for rain may induce men to wave willow\r\nbranches and to sprinkle water. The reaction is natural\r\nand innocent. But men then go on to believe that\r\ntheir act has immediate power to bring rain without\r\nthe cooperation of intermediate conditions of nature.\r\nThis is magic; while it may be natural or spontaneous,\r\nit is not innocent. It obstructs intelligent study of\r\noperative conditions and wastes human desire and effort\r\nin futilities.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBelief in magic did not cease when the coarser forms\r\nof superstitious practice ceased. The principle of\r\nmagic is found whenever it is hoped to get results\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg027\"\u003e[pg 027]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwithout intelligent control of means; and also when it\r\nis supposed that means can exist and yet remain inert\r\nand inoperative. In morals and politics such expectations\r\nstill prevail, and in so far the most important\r\nphases of human action are still affected by magic. We\r\nthink that by feeling strongly enough about something,\r\nby wishing hard enough, we can get a desirable result,\r\nsuch as virtuous execution of a good resolve, or peace\r\namong nations, or good will in industry. We slur over\r\nthe necessity of the cooperative action of objective\r\nconditions, and the fact that this cooperation is assured\r\nonly by persistent and close study. Or, on the\r\nother hand, we fancy we can get these results by\r\nexternal machinery, by tools or potential means, without\r\na corresponding functioning of human desires and\r\ncapacities. Often times these two false and contradictory\r\nbeliefs are combined in the same person. The man\r\nwho feels that \u003cem\u003ehis\u003c/em\u003e virtues are his own personal accomplishments\r\nis likely to be also the one who thinks that\r\nby passing laws he can throw the fear of God into\r\nothers and make them virtuous by edict and prohibitory\r\nmandate.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eRecently a friend remarked to me that there was one\r\nsuperstition current among even cultivated persons.\r\nThey suppose that if one is told what to do, if the\r\nright \u003cem\u003eend\u003c/em\u003e is pointed to them, all that is required in\r\norder to bring about the right act is will or wish on\r\nthe part of the one who is to act. He used as an illustration\r\nthe matter of physical posture; the assumption\r\nis that if a man is told to stand up straight, all that\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg028\"\u003e[pg 028]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nis further needed is wish and effort on his part, and\r\nthe deed is done. He pointed out that this belief is on\r\na par with primitive magic in its neglect of attention\r\nto the means which are involved in reaching an end.\r\nAnd he went on to say that the prevalence of this belief,\r\nstarting with false notions about the control of\r\nthe body and extending to control of mind and character,\r\nis the greatest bar to intelligent social progress.\r\nIt bars the way because it makes us neglect intelligent\r\ninquiry to discover the means which will produce a\r\ndesired result, and intelligent invention to procure the\r\nmeans. In short, it leaves out the importance of intelligently\r\ncontrolled habit.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe may cite his illustration of the real nature of a\r\nphysical aim or order and its execution in its contrast\r\nwith the current false notion.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_1_\" id=\"FNanchor_1_\" href=\"#Footnote_1_\" title=\"I refer to Alexander, \u0027Man\u0027s Supreme Inheritance.\u0027\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[1]\u003c/a\u003e A man who has a bad\r\nhabitual posture tells himself, or is told, to stand up\r\nstraight. If he is interested and responds, he braces\r\nhimself, goes through certain movements, and it is assumed\r\nthat the desired result is substantially attained;\r\nand that the position is retained at least as long as\r\nthe man keeps the idea or order in his mind. Consider\r\nthe assumptions which are here made. It is implied\r\nthat the means or effective conditions of the realization\r\nof a purpose exist independently of established\r\nhabit and even that they may be set in motion in opposition\r\nto habit. It is assumed that means are there,\r\nso that the failure to stand erect is wholly a matter of\r\nfailure of purpose and desire. It needs paralysis or\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg029\"\u003e[pg 029]\u003c/span\u003e\r\na broken leg or some other equally gross phenomenon\r\nto make us appreciate the importance of objective\r\nconditions.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNow in fact a man who \u003cem\u003ecan\u003c/em\u003e stand properly does so,\r\nand only a man who can, does. In the former case,\r\nfiats of will are unnecessary, and in the latter useless.\r\nA man who does not stand properly forms a habit of\r\nstanding improperly, a positive, forceful habit. The\r\ncommon implication that his mistake is merely negative,\r\nthat he is simply failing to do the right thing, and\r\nthat the failure can be made good by an order of will\r\nis absurd. One might as well suppose that the man\r\nwho is a slave of whiskey-drinking is merely one who\r\nfails to drink water. Conditions have been formed for\r\nproducing a bad result, and the bad result will occur\r\nas long as those conditions exist. They can no more\r\nbe dismissed by a direct effort of will than the conditions\r\nwhich create drought can be dispelled by whistling\r\nfor wind. It is as reasonable to expect a fire to go out\r\nwhen it is ordered to stop burning as to suppose that\r\na man can stand straight in consequence of a direct\r\naction of thought and desire. The fire can be put out\r\nonly by changing objective conditions; it is the same\r\nwith rectification of bad posture.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOf course something happens when a man acts upon\r\nhis idea of standing straight. For a little while, he\r\nstands differently, but only a different kind of badly.\r\nHe then takes the unaccustomed feeling which accompanies\r\nhis unusual stand as evidence that he is now\r\nstanding right. But there are many ways of standing\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg030\"\u003e[pg 030]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nbadly, and he has simply shifted his usual way to a\r\ncompensatory bad way at some opposite extreme.\r\nWhen we realize this fact, we are likely to suppose that\r\nit exists because control of the \u003cem\u003ebody\u003c/em\u003e is physical and\r\nhence is external to mind and will. Transfer the command\r\ninside character and mind, and it is fancied that\r\nan idea of an end and the desire to realize it will take\r\nimmediate effect. After we get to the point of recognizing\r\nthat habits must intervene between wish and\r\nexecution in the case of bodily acts, we still cherish\r\nthe illusions that they can be dispensed with in the case\r\nof mental and moral acts. Thus the net result is to\r\nmake us sharpen the distinction between non-moral and\r\nmoral activities, and to lead us to confine the latter\r\nstrictly within a private, immaterial realm. But in\r\nfact, formation of ideas as well as their execution depends\r\nupon habit. \u003cem\u003eIf\u003c/em\u003e we could form a correct idea\r\nwithout a correct habit, then possibly we could carry\r\nit out irrespective of habit. But a wish gets definite\r\nform only in connection with an idea, and an idea gets\r\nshape and consistency only when it has a habit back of\r\nit. Only when a man can already perform an act of\r\nstanding straight does he know what it is like to have\r\na right posture and only then can he summon the\r\nidea required for proper execution. The act must come\r\nbefore the thought, and a habit before an ability to\r\nevoke the thought at will. Ordinary psychology reverses\r\nthe actual state of affairs.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIdeas, thoughts of ends, are not spontaneously generated.\r\nThere is no immaculate conception of meanings\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg031\"\u003e[pg 031]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nor purposes. Reason pure of all influence from\r\nprior habit is a fiction. But pure sensations out of\r\nwhich ideas can be framed apart from habit are equally\r\nfictitious. The sensations and ideas which are the\r\n\"stuff\" of thought and purpose are alike affected by\r\nhabits manifested in the acts which give rise to sensations\r\nand meanings. The dependence of thought, or\r\nthe more intellectual factor in our conceptions, upon\r\nprior experience is usually admitted. But those who\r\nattack the notion of thought pure from the influence\r\nof experience, usually identify experience with sensations\r\nimpressed upon an empty mind. They therefore\r\nreplace the theory of unmixed thoughts with that of\r\npure unmixed sensations as the stuff of all conceptions,\r\npurposes and beliefs. But distinct and independent\r\nsensory qualities, far from being original elements, are\r\nthe products of a highly skilled analysis which disposes\r\nof immense technical scientific resources. To be able to\r\nsingle out a definitive sensory element in any field is\r\nevidence of a high degree of previous training, that is,\r\nof well-formed habits. A moderate amount of observation\r\nof a child will suffice to reveal that even such gross\r\ndiscriminations as black, white, red, green, are the result\r\nof some years of active dealings with things in the\r\ncourse of which habits have been set up. It is not such\r\na simple matter to have a clear-cut sensation. The\r\nlatter is a sign of training, skill, habit.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAdmission that the idea of, say, standing erect is\r\ndependent upon sensory materials is, therefore equivalent\r\nto recognition that it is dependent upon the\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg032\"\u003e[pg 032]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nhabitual attitudes which govern concrete sensory materials.\r\nThe medium of habit filters all the material\r\nthat reaches our perception and thought. The filter is\r\nnot, however, chemically pure. It is a reagent which\r\nadds new qualities and rearranges what is received.\r\nOur ideas truly depend upon experience, but so do our\r\nsensations. And the experience upon which they both\r\ndepend is the operation of habits\u0026mdash;originally of instincts.\r\nThus our purposes and commands regarding\r\naction (whether physical or moral) come to us through\r\nthe refracting medium of bodily and moral habits. Inability\r\nto think aright is sufficiently striking to have\r\ncaught the attention of moralists. But a false psychology\r\nhas led them to interpret it as due to a necessary\r\nconflict of flesh and spirit, not as an indication\r\nthat our ideas are as dependent, to say the least, upon\r\nour habits as are our acts upon our conscious thoughts\r\nand purposes.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOnly the man who can maintain a correct posture\r\nhas the stuff out of which to form that idea of standing\r\nerect which can be the starting point of a right act.\r\nOnly the man whose habits are already good can know\r\nwhat the good is. Immediate, seemingly instinctive,\r\nfeeling of the direction and end of various lines of behavior\r\nis in reality the feeling of habits working below\r\ndirect consciousness. The psychology of illusions of\r\nperception is full of illustrations of the distortion introduced\r\nby habit into observation of objects. The\r\nsame fact accounts for the intuitive element in judgments\r\nof action, an element which is valuable or the\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg033\"\u003e[pg 033]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nreverse in accord with the quality of dominant habits.\r\nFor, as Aristotle remarked, the untutored moral perceptions\r\nof a good man are usually trustworthy, those\r\nof a bad character, not. (But he should have added\r\nthat the influence of social custom as well as personal\r\nhabit has to be taken into account in estimating who\r\nis the good man and the good judge.)\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhat is true of the dependence of execution of an\r\nidea upon habit is true, then, of the formation and\r\nquality of the idea. Suppose that by a happy chance\r\na right concrete idea or purpose\u0026mdash;concrete, not simply\r\ncorrect in words\u0026mdash;has been hit upon: What happens\r\nwhen one with an incorrect habit tries to act in accord\r\nwith it? Clearly the idea can be carried into execution\r\nonly with a mechanism already there. If this is defective\r\nor perverted, the best intention in the world will\r\nyield bad results. In the case of no other engine does\r\none suppose that a defective machine will turn out good\r\ngoods simply because it is invited to. Everywhere else\r\nwe recognize that the design and structure of the agency\r\nemployed tell directly upon the work done. Given a\r\nbad habit and the \"will\" or mental direction to get a\r\ngood result, and the actual happening is a reverse or\r\nlooking-glass manifestation of the usual fault\u0026mdash;a compensatory\r\ntwist in the opposite direction. Refusal\r\nto recognize this fact only leads to a separation of mind\r\nfrom body, and to supposing that mental or \"psychical\"\r\nmechanisms are different in kind from those of\r\nbodily operations and independent of them. So deep\r\nseated is this notion that even so \"scientific\" a theory\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg034\"\u003e[pg 034]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nas modern psycho-analysis thinks that mental habits\r\ncan be straightened out by some kind of purely psychical\r\nmanipulation without reference to the distortions\r\nof sensation and perception which are due to bad bodily\r\nsets. The other side of the error is found in the notion\r\nof \"scientific\" nerve physiologists that it is only necessary\r\nto locate a particular diseased cell or local lesion,\r\nindependent of the whole complex of organic habits, in\r\norder to rectify conduct.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eMeans are means; they are intermediates, middle\r\nterms. To grasp this fact is to have done with the\r\nordinary dualism of means and ends. The \"end\" is\r\nmerely a series of acts viewed at a remote stage; and\r\na means is merely the series viewed at an earlier one.\r\nThe distinction of means and end arises in surveying\r\nthe \u003cem\u003ecourse\u003c/em\u003e of a proposed \u003cem\u003eline\u003c/em\u003e of action, a connected\r\nseries in time. The \"end\" is the last act thought of;\r\nthe means are the acts to be performed prior to it in\r\ntime. To \u003cem\u003ereach\u003c/em\u003e an end we must take our mind off from\r\nit and attend to the act which is next to be performed.\r\nWe must make that the end. The only exception to\r\nthis statement is in cases where customary habit determines\r\nthe course of the series. Then all that is\r\nwanted is a cue to set it off. But when the proposed\r\nend involves any deviation from usual action, or any\r\nrectification of it\u0026mdash;as in the case of standing straight\u0026mdash;then\r\nthe main thing is to find some act which is different\r\nfrom the usual one. The discovery and performance\r\nof this unaccustomed act is the \"end\" to\r\nwhich we must devote all attention. Otherwise we shall\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg035\"\u003e[pg 035]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nsimply do the old thing over again, no matter what is\r\nour conscious command. The only way of accomplishing\r\nthis discovery is through a flank movement. We\r\nmust stop even thinking of standing up straight. To\r\nthink of it is fatal, for it commits us to the operation of\r\nan established habit of standing wrong. We must find\r\nan act within our power which is disconnected from any\r\nthought about standing. We must start to do another\r\nthing which on one side inhibits our falling into the\r\ncustomary bad position and on the other side is the\r\nbeginning of a series of acts which may lead into the\r\ncorrect posture.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_2_\" id=\"FNanchor_2_\" href=\"#Footnote_2_\" title=\"The technique of this process is stated in the book of Mr. Alexander already referred to, and the theoretical statement given is borrowed from Mr. Alexander\u0027s analysis.\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[2]\u003c/a\u003e The hard-drinker who keeps thinking\r\nof not drinking is doing what he can to initiate the\r\nacts which lead to drinking. He is starting with the\r\nstimulus to his habit. To succeed he must find some\r\npositive interest or line of action which will inhibit the\r\ndrinking series and which by instituting another course\r\nof action will bring him to his desired end. In short,\r\nthe man\u0027s true aim is to discover some course of action,\r\nhaving nothing to do with the habit of drink or standing\r\nerect, which will take him where he wants to go.\r\nThe discovery of this other series is at once his means\r\nand his end. Until one takes intermediate acts seriously\r\nenough to treat them as ends, one wastes one\u0027s\r\ntime in any effort at change of habits. Of the intermediate\r\nacts, the most important is the \u003cem\u003enext\u003c/em\u003e one. The\r\nfirst or earliest means is the most important \u003cem\u003eend\u003c/em\u003e to\r\ndiscover.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg036\"\u003e[pg 036]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nMeans and ends are two names for the same reality.\r\nThe terms denote not a division in reality but a distinction\r\nin judgment. Without understanding this fact\r\nwe cannot understand the nature of habits nor can we\r\npass beyond the usual separation of the moral and\r\nnon-moral in conduct. \"End\" is a name for a series\r\nof acts taken collectively\u0026mdash;like the term army.\r\n\"Means\" is a name for the same series taken distributively\u0026mdash;like\r\nthis soldier, that officer. To think of the\r\nend signifies to extend and enlarge our view of the act\r\nto be performed. It means to look at the next act in\r\nperspective, not permitting it to occupy the entire field\r\nof vision. To bear the end in mind signifies that we\r\nshould not stop thinking about our \u003cem\u003enext\u003c/em\u003e act until we\r\nform some reasonably clear idea of the \u003cem\u003ecourse\u003c/em\u003e of action\r\nto which it commits us. To attain a remote end means\r\non the other hand to treat the end as a series of means.\r\nTo say that an end is remote or distant, to say in fact\r\nthat it is an end at all, is equivalent to saying that\r\nobstacles intervene between us and it. If, however, it\r\nremains a distant end, it becomes a \u003cem\u003emere\u003c/em\u003e end, that is a\r\ndream. As soon as we have projected it, we must begin\r\nto work backward in thought. We must change \u003cem\u003ewhat\u003c/em\u003e\r\nis to be done into a \u003cem\u003ehow\u003c/em\u003e, the means whereby. The\r\nend thus re-appears as a series of \"what nexts,\" and the\r\nwhat next of chief importance is the one nearest the\r\npresent state of the one acting. Only as the end is\r\nconverted into means is it definitely conceived, or intellectually\r\ndefined, to say nothing of being executable.\r\nJust as end, it is vague, cloudy, impressionistic. We\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg037\"\u003e[pg 037]\u003c/span\u003e\r\ndo not \u003cem\u003eknow\u003c/em\u003e what we are really after until a \u003cem\u003ecourse\u003c/em\u003e of\r\naction is mentally worked out. Aladdin with his lamp\r\ncould dispense with translating ends into means, but no\r\none else can do so.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNow the thing which is closest to us, the means\r\nwithin our power, is a habit. Some habit impeded by\r\ncircumstances is the source of the projection of the end.\r\nIt is also the primary means in its realization. The\r\nhabit is propulsive and moves anyway toward some end,\r\nor result, whether it is projected as an end-in-view or\r\nnot. The man who can walk does walk; the man who\r\ncan talk does converse\u0026mdash;if only with himself. How is\r\nthis statement to be reconciled with the fact that we\r\nare not always walking and talking; that our habits\r\nseem so often to be latent, inoperative? Such inactivity\r\nholds only of \u003cem\u003eovert\u003c/em\u003e, visibly obvious operation. In\r\nactuality each habit operates all the time of waking\r\nlife; though like a member of a crew taking his turn\r\nat the wheel, its operation becomes the dominantly\r\ncharacteristic trait of an act only occasionally or\r\nrarely.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe habit of walking is expressed in what a man\r\nsees when he keeps still, even in dreams. The recognition\r\nof distances and directions of things from his\r\nplace at rest is the obvious proof of this statement.\r\nThe habit of locomotion is latent in the sense that it is\r\ncovered up, counteracted, by a habit of seeing which is\r\ndefinitely at the fore. But counteraction is not suppression.\r\nLocomotion is a potential energy, not in\r\nany metaphysical sense, but in the physical sense in\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg038\"\u003e[pg 038]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwhich potential energy as well as kinetic has to be taken\r\naccount of in any scientific description. Everything\r\nthat a man who has the habit of locomotion does and\r\nthinks he does and thinks differently on that account.\r\nThis fact is recognized in current psychology, but is\r\nfalsified into an association of sensations. Were it not\r\nfor the continued operation of all habits in every act,\r\nno such thing as character could exist. There would\r\nbe simply a bundle, an untied bundle at that, of isolated\r\nacts. Character is the interpenetration of habits. If\r\neach habit existed in an insulated compartment and\r\noperated without affecting or being affected by others,\r\ncharacter would not exist. That is, conduct would lack\r\nunity being only a juxtaposition of disconnected reactions\r\nto separated situations. But since environments\r\noverlap, since situations are continuous and those remote\r\nfrom one another contain like elements, a continuous\r\nmodification of habits by one another is constantly\r\ngoing on. A man may give himself away in a look or\r\na gesture. Character can be read through the medium\r\nof individual acts.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOf course interpenetration is never total. It is most\r\nmarked in what we call strong characters. Integration\r\nis an achievement rather than a datum. A weak, unstable,\r\nvacillating character is one in which different\r\nhabits alternate with one another rather than embody\r\none another. The strength, solidity of a habit is not\r\nits own possession but is due to reinforcement by the\r\nforce of other habits which it absorbs into itself.\r\nRoutine specialization always works against interpenetration.\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg039\"\u003e[pg 039]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nMen with \"pigeon-hole\" minds are not infrequent.\r\nTheir diverse standards and methods of\r\njudgment for scientific, religious, political matters testify\r\nto isolated compartmental habits of action. Character\r\nthat is unable to undergo successfully the strain\r\nof thought and effort required to bring competing\r\ntendencies into a unity, builds up barriers between\r\ndifferent systems of likes and dislikes. The emotional\r\nstress incident to conflict is avoided not by readjustment\r\nbut by effort at confinement. Yet the exception\r\nproves the rule. Such persons are successful in keeping\r\ndifferent ways of reacting apart from one another in\r\nconsciousness rather than in action. Their character\r\nis marked by stigmata resulting from this division.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe mutual modification of habits by one another\r\nenables us to define the nature of the moral situation.\r\nIt is not necessary nor advisable to be always considering\r\nthe interaction of habits with one another, that\r\nis to say the effect of a particular habit upon character\u0026mdash;which\r\nis a name for the total interaction. Such\r\nconsideration distracts attention from the problem of\r\nbuilding up an effective habit. A man who is learning\r\nFrench, or chess-playing or engineering has his hands\r\nfull with his particular occupation. He would be confused\r\nand hampered by constant inquiry into its effect\r\nupon character. He would resemble the centipede who\r\nby trying to think of the movement of each leg in relation\r\nto all the others was rendered unable to travel.\r\nAt any given time, certain habits must be taken for\r\ngranted as a matter of course. Their operation is not\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg040\"\u003e[pg 040]\u003c/span\u003e\r\na matter of moral judgment. They are treated as\r\ntechnical, recreational, professional, hygienic or economic\r\nor esthetic rather than moral. To lug in morals,\r\nor ulterior effect on character at every point, is to\r\ncultivate moral valetudinarianism or priggish posing.\r\nNevertheless any act, even that one which passes ordinarily\r\nas trivial, may entail such consequences for habit\r\nand character as upon occasion to require judgment\r\nfrom the standpoint of the whole body of conduct. It\r\nthen comes under moral scrutiny. To know when to\r\nleave acts without distinctive moral judgment and\r\nwhen to subject them to it is itself a large factor in\r\nmorality. The serious matter is that this relative\r\npragmatic, or intellectual, distinction between the moral\r\nand non-moral, has been solidified into a fixed and absolute\r\ndistinction, so that some acts are popularly regarded\r\nas forever within and others forever without the\r\nmoral domain. From this fatal error recognition of the\r\nrelations of one habit to others preserves us. For it\r\nmakes us see that character is the name given to the\r\nworking interaction of habits, and that the cumulative\r\neffect of insensible modifications worked by a particular\r\nhabit in the body of preferences may at any moment\r\nrequire attention.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe word habit may seem twisted somewhat from\r\nits customary use when employed as we have been using\r\nit. But we need a word to express that kind of human\r\nactivity which is influenced by prior activity and in\r\nthat sense acquired; which contains within itself a certain\r\nordering or systematization of minor elements of\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg041\"\u003e[pg 041]\u003c/span\u003e\r\naction; which is projective, dynamic in quality, ready\r\nfor overt manifestation; and which is operative in some\r\nsubdued subordinate form even when not obviously\r\ndominating activity. Habit even in its ordinary usage\r\ncomes nearer to denoting these facts than any other\r\nword. If the facts are recognized we may also use the\r\nwords attitude and disposition. But unless we have\r\nfirst made clear to ourselves the facts which have been\r\nset forth under the name of habit, these words are more\r\nlikely to be misleading than is the word habit. For the\r\nlatter conveys explicitly the sense of operativeness,\r\nactuality. Attitude and, as ordinarily used, disposition\r\nsuggest something latent, potential, something which\r\nrequires a positive stimulus outside themselves to become\r\nactive. If we perceive that they denote positive\r\nforms of action which are released merely through\r\nremoval of \u003cins class=\"corr\" title=\"some-counteracting\" id=\"Corr_041_\"\u003esome counteracting\u003c/ins\u003e \"inhibitory\" tendency,\r\nand then become overt, we may employ them instead of\r\nthe word habit to denote subdued, non-patent forms of\r\nthe latter.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn this case, we must bear in mind that the word\r\ndisposition means predisposition, readiness to act\r\novertly in a specific fashion whenever opportunity is\r\npresented, this opportunity consisting in removal of\r\nthe pressure due to the dominance of some overt habit;\r\nand that attitude means some special case of a predisposition,\r\nthe disposition waiting as it were to spring\r\nthrough an opened door. While it is admitted that the\r\nword habit has been used in a somewhat broader sense\r\nthan is usual, we must protest against the tendency in\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg042\"\u003e[pg 042]\u003c/span\u003e\r\npsychological literature to limit its meaning to repetition.\r\nThis usage is much less in accord with popular\r\nusage than is the wider way in which we have used the\r\nword. It assumes from the start the identity of habit\r\nwith routine. Repetition is in no sense the essence of\r\nhabit. Tendency to repeat acts is an incident of many\r\nhabits but not of all. A man with the habit of giving\r\nway to anger may show his habit by a murderous attack\r\nupon some one who has offended. His act is nonetheless\r\ndue to habit because it occurs only once in his life.\r\nThe essence of habit is an acquired predisposition to\r\n\u003cem\u003eways\u003c/em\u003e or modes of response, not to particular acts except\r\nas, under special conditions, these express a way\r\nof behaving. Habit means special sensitiveness or accessibility\r\nto certain classes of stimuli, standing predilections\r\nand aversions, rather than bare recurrence of\r\nspecific acts. It means will.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg043\"\u003e[pg 043]\u003c/span\u003eIII\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe dynamic force of habit taken in connection with\r\nthe continuity of habits with one another explains the\r\nunity of character and conduct, or speaking more concretely\r\nof motive and act, will and deed. Moral theories\r\nhave frequently separated these things from each\r\nother. One type of theory, for example, has asserted\r\nthat only will, disposition, motive counts morally; that\r\nacts are external, physical, accidental; that moral good\r\nis different from goodness in act since the latter is measured\r\nby consequences, while moral good or virtue is intrinsic,\r\ncomplete in itself, a jewel shining by its own\r\nlight\u0026mdash;a somewhat dangerous metaphor however. The\r\nother type of theory has asserted that such a view is\r\nequivalent to saying that all that is necessary to be\r\nvirtuous is to cultivate states of feeling; that a premium\r\nis put on disregard of the actual consequences\r\nof conduct, and agents are deprived of any objective\r\ncriterion for the rightness and wrongness of acts, being\r\nthrown back on their own whims, prejudices and private\r\npeculiarities. Like most opposite extremes in philosophic\r\ntheories, the two theories suffer from a common\r\nmistake. Both of them ignore the projective force of\r\nhabit and the implication of habits in one another.\r\nHence they separate a unified deed into two disjoined\r\nparts, an inner called motive and an outer called act.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg044\"\u003e[pg 044]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nThe doctrine that the chief good of man is good will\r\neasily wins acceptance from honest men. For common-sense\r\nemploys a juster psychology than either of the\r\ntheories just mentioned. By will, common-sense understands\r\nsomething practical and moving. It understands\r\nthe body of habits, of active dispositions which\r\nmakes a man do what he does. Will is thus not something\r\nopposed to consequences or severed from them.\r\nIt is a \u003cem\u003ecause\u003c/em\u003e of consequences; it is causation in its personal\r\naspect, the aspect immediately preceding action.\r\nIt hardly seems conceivable to practical sense that by\r\nwill is meant something which can be complete without\r\nreference to deeds prompted and results occasioned.\r\nEven the sophisticated specialist cannot prevent relapses\r\nfrom such an absurdity back into common-sense.\r\nKant, who went the limit in excluding consequences from\r\nmoral value, was sane enough to maintain that a society\r\nof men of good will would be a society which in fact\r\nwould maintain social peace, freedom and cooperation.\r\nWe take the will for the deed not as a substitute for\r\ndoing, or a form of doing nothing, but in the sense\r\nthat, other things being equal, the right disposition\r\nwill produce the right deed. For a disposition means\r\na tendency to act, a potential energy needing only opportunity\r\nto become kinetic and overt. Apart from\r\nsuch tendency a \"virtuous\" disposition is either hypocrisy\r\nor self-deceit.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eCommon-sense in short never loses sight wholly of\r\nthe two facts which limit and define a moral situation.\r\nOne is that consequences fix the moral quality of an\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg045\"\u003e[pg 045]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nact. The other is that upon the whole, or in the long\r\nrun but not unqualifiedly, consequences are what they\r\nare because of the nature of desire and disposition.\r\nHence there is a natural contempt for the morality of\r\nthe \"good\" man who does not show his goodness in\r\nthe results of his habitual acts. But there is also an\r\naversion to attributing omnipotence to even the best\r\nof good dispositions, and hence an aversion to applying\r\nthe criterion of consequences unreservedly. A holiness\r\nof character which is celebrated only on holy-days is\r\nunreal. A virtue of honesty, or chastity or benevolence\r\nwhich lives upon itself apart from definite results\r\nconsumes itself and goes up in smoke. The separation\r\nof motive from motive-force in action accounts both\r\nfor the morbidities and futilities of the professionally\r\ngood, and for the more or less subconscious contempt\r\nfor morality entertained by men of a strong executive\r\nhabit with their preference for \"getting things done.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eYet there is justification for the common assumption\r\nthat deeds cannot be judged properly without taking\r\ntheir animating disposition as well as their concrete\r\nconsequences into account. The reason, however, lies\r\nnot in isolation of disposition from consequences, but\r\nin the need for viewing consequences broadly. \u003cem\u003eThis\u003c/em\u003e act\r\nis only one of a multitude of acts. If we confine ourselves\r\nto the consequences of this one act we shall come\r\nout with a poor reckoning. Disposition is habitual,\r\npersistent. It shows itself therefore in many acts and\r\nin many consequences. Only as we keep a running account,\r\ncan we judge disposition, disentangling its tendency\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg046\"\u003e[pg 046]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nfrom accidental accompaniments. When once\r\nwe have got a fair idea of its tendency, we are able to\r\nplace the particular consequences of a single act in a\r\nwider context of continuing consequences. Thus we\r\nprotect ourselves from taking as trivial a habit which\r\nis serious, and from exaggerating into momentousness\r\nan act which, viewed in the light of aggregate consequences,\r\nis innocent. There is no need to abandon\r\ncommon-sense which tells us in judging acts first to\r\ninquire into disposition; but there is great need that the\r\nestimate of disposition be enlightened by a scientific\r\npsychology. Our legal procedure, for example, wobbles\r\nbetween a too tender treatment of criminality and\r\na viciously drastic treatment of it. The vacillation can\r\nbe remedied only as we can analyze an act in the light\r\nof habits, and analyze habits in the light of education,\r\nenvironment and prior acts. The dawn of truly scientific\r\ncriminal law will come when each individual case\r\nis approached with something corresponding to the\r\ncomplete clinical record which every competent physician\r\nattempts to procure as a matter of course in dealing\r\nwith his subjects.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eConsequences include effects upon character, upon\r\nconfirming and weakening habits, as well as tangibly\r\nobvious results. To keep an eye open to these effects\r\nupon character may signify the most reasonable of\r\nprecautions or one of the most nauseating of practices.\r\nIt may mean concentration of attention upon personal\r\nrectitude in neglect of objective consequences, a practice\r\nwhich creates a wholly unreal rectitude. But it\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg047\"\u003e[pg 047]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nmay mean that the survey of objective consequences\r\nis duly extended in time. An act of gambling may be\r\njudged, for example, by its immediate overt effects,\r\nconsumption of time, energy, disturbance of ordinary\r\nmonetary considerations, etc. It may also be judged\r\nby its consequences upon character, setting up an enduring\r\nlove of excitement, a persistent temper of speculation,\r\nand a persistent disregard of sober, steady\r\nwork. To take the latter effects into account is equivalent\r\nto taking a broad view of future consequences;\r\nfor these dispositions affect future companionships,\r\nvocation and avocations, the whole tenor of domestic\r\nand public life.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFor similar reasons, while common-sense does not run\r\ninto that sharp opposition of virtues or moral goods\r\nand natural goods which has played such a large part\r\nin professed moralities, it does not insist upon an exact\r\nidentity of the two. Virtues are ends because they are\r\nsuch important means. To be honest, courageous,\r\nkindly is to be in the way of producing specific natural\r\ngoods or satisfactory fulfilments. Error comes into\r\ntheories when the moral goods are separated from their\r\nconsequences and also when the attempt is made to\r\nsecure an exhaustive and unerring identification of the\r\ntwo. There is a reason, valid as far as it goes, for\r\ndistinguishing virtue as a moral good resident in character\r\nalone, from objective consequences. As matter\r\nof fact, a desirable trait of character does not always\r\nproduce desirable results while good things often happen\r\nwith no assistance from good will. Luck, accident,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg048\"\u003e[pg 048]\u003c/span\u003e\r\ncontingency, plays its part. The act of a good character\r\nis deflected in operation, while a monomaniacal\r\negotism may employ a desire for glory and power to\r\nperform acts which satisfy crying social needs. Reflection\r\nshows that we must supplement the conviction of\r\nthe moral connection between character or habit and\r\nconsequences by two considerations.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOne is the fact that we are inclined to take the notions\r\nof goodness in character and goodness in results\r\nin too fixed a way. Persistent disparity between virtuous\r\ndisposition and actual outcome shows that we have\r\nmisjudged either the nature of virtue or of success.\r\nJudgments of both motive and consequences are still,\r\nin the absence of methods of scientific analysis and continuous\r\nregistration and reporting, rudimentary and\r\nconventional. We are inclined to wholesale judgments\r\nof character, dividing men into goats and sheep, instead\r\nof recognizing that all character is speckled, and\r\nthat the problem of moral judgment is one of discriminating\r\nthe complex of acts and habits into tendencies\r\nwhich are to be \u003cem\u003especifically\u003c/em\u003e cultivated and condemned.\r\nWe need to study consequences more thoroughly and\r\nkeep track of them more continuously before we shall\r\nbe in a position where we can pass with reasonable assurance\r\nupon the good and evil in either disposition\r\nor results. But even when proper allowances are made,\r\nwe are forcing the pace when we assume that there is or\r\never can be an exact equation of disposition and outcome.\r\nWe have to admit the rôle of accident.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe cannot get beyond tendencies, and must perforce\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg049\"\u003e[pg 049]\u003c/span\u003e\r\ncontent ourselves with judgments of tendency. The\r\nhonest man, we are told, acts upon \"principle\" and\r\nnot from considerations of expediency, that is, of particular\r\nconsequences. The truth in this saying is that\r\nit is not safe to judge the worth of a proposed act\r\nby its probable consequences in an isolated case. The\r\nword \"principle\" is a eulogistic cover for the fact of\r\n\u003cem\u003etendency\u003c/em\u003e. The word \"tendency\" is an attempt to\r\ncombine two facts, one that habits have a certain causal\r\nefficacy, the other that their outworking in any particular\r\ncase is subject to contingencies, to circumstances\r\nwhich are unforeseeable and which carry an act one\r\nside of its usual effect. In cases of doubt, there is no\r\nrecourse save to stick to \"tendency,\" that is, to the\r\nprobable effect of a habit in the long run, or as we say\r\nupon the whole. Otherwise we are on the lookout for\r\nexceptions which favor our immediate desire. The\r\ntrouble is that we are not content with modest probabilities.\r\nSo when we find that a good disposition may\r\nwork out badly, we say, as Kant did, that the working-out,\r\nthe consequence, has nothing to do with the moral\r\nquality of an act, or we strain for the impossible, and\r\naim at some infallible calculus of consequences by which\r\nto measure moral worth in each specific case.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eHuman conceit has played a great part. It has\r\ndemanded that the whole universe be judged from the\r\nstandpoint of desire and disposition, or at least from\r\nthat of the desire and disposition of the good man. The\r\neffect of religion has been to cherish this conceit by\r\nmaking men think that the universe invariably conspires\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg050\"\u003e[pg 050]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nto support the good and bring the evil to naught. By a\r\nsubtle logic, the effect has been to render morals unreal\r\nand transcendental. For since the world of actual experience\r\ndoes not guarantee this identity of character\r\nand outcome, it is inferred that there must be some\r\nulterior truer reality which enforces an equation that\r\nis violated in this life. Hence the common notion of another\r\nworld in which vice and virtue of character produce\r\ntheir exact moral meed. The idea is equally found\r\nas an actuating force in Plato. Moral realities must be\r\nsupreme. Yet they are flagrantly contradicted in a\r\nworld where a Socrates drinks the hemlock of the criminal,\r\nand where the vicious occupy the seats of the\r\nmighty. Hence there must be a truer ultimate reality\r\nin which justice is only and absolutely justice. Something\r\nof the same idea lurks behind every aspiration\r\nfor realization of abstract justice or equality or liberty.\r\nIt is the source of all \"idealistic\" utopias and\r\nalso of all wholesale pessimism and distrust of life.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eUtilitarianism illustrates another way of mistreating\r\nthe situation. Tendency is not good enough for the\r\nutilitarians. They want a mathematical equation of\r\nact and consequence. Hence they make light of the\r\nsteady and controllable factor, the factor of disposition,\r\nand fasten upon just the things which are most\r\nsubject to incalculable accident\u0026mdash;pleasures and pains\u0026mdash;and\r\nembark upon the hopeless enterprise of judging an\r\nact apart from character on the basis of definite results.\r\nAn honestly modest theory will stick to the probabilities\r\nof tendency, and not import mathematics into\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg051\"\u003e[pg 051]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nmorals. It will be alive and sensitive to consequences\r\nas they actually present themselves, because it knows\r\nthat they give the only instruction we can procure as\r\nto the meaning of habits and dispositions. But it will\r\nnever assume that a moral judgment which reaches certainty\r\nis possible. We have just to do the best we can\r\nwith habits, the forces most under our control; and\r\nwe shall have our hands more than full in spelling out\r\ntheir general tendencies without attempting an exact\r\njudgment upon each deed. For every habit incorporates\r\nwithin itself some part of the objective environment,\r\nand no habit and no amount of habits can incorporate\r\nthe entire environment within itself or themselves.\r\nThere will always be disparity between them\r\nand the results actually attained. Hence the work of\r\nintelligence in observing consequences and in revising\r\nand readjusting habits, even the best of good habits,\r\ncan never be foregone. Consequences reveal unexpected\r\npotentialities in our habits whenever these habits are\r\nexercised in a different environment from that in which\r\nthey were formed. The assumption of a stably uniform\r\nenvironment (even the hankering for one) expresses a\r\nfiction due to attachment to old habits. The utilitarian\r\ntheory of equation of acts with consequences is as much\r\na fiction of self-conceit as is the assumption of a fixed\r\ntranscendental world wherein moral ideals are eternally\r\nand immutably real. Both of them deny in effect the\r\nrelevancy of time, of change, to morals, while time is\r\nof the essence of the moral struggle.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe thus come, by an unexpected path, upon the old\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg052\"\u003e[pg 052]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nquestion of the objectivity or subjectivity of morals.\r\nPrimarily they are objective. For will, as we have\r\nseen, means, in the concrete, habits; and habits incorporate\r\nan environment within themselves. They are\r\nadjustments \u003cem\u003eof\u003c/em\u003e the environment, not merely \u003cem\u003eto\u003c/em\u003e it. At\r\nthe same time, the environment is many, not one; hence\r\nwill, disposition, is plural. Diversity does not of itself\r\nimply conflict, but it implies the possibility of conflict,\r\nand this possibility is realized in fact. Life, for example,\r\ninvolves the habit of eating, which in turn involves\r\na unification of organism and nature. But nevertheless\r\nthis habit comes into conflict with other habits\r\nwhich are also \"objective,\" or in equilibrium with \u003cem\u003etheir\u003c/em\u003e\r\nenvironments. Because the environment is not all of\r\none piece, man\u0027s house is divided within itself, against\r\nitself. Honor or consideration for others or courtesy\r\nconflict with hunger. Then the notion of the complete\r\nobjectivity of morals gets a shock. Those who wish\r\nto maintain the idea unimpaired take the road which\r\nleads to transcendentalism. The empirical world, they\r\nsay, is indeed divided, and hence any natural morality\r\nmust be in conflict with itself. This self-contradiction\r\nhowever only points to a higher fixed reality with which\r\na true and superior morality is alone concerned. Objectivity\r\nis saved but at the expense of connection with\r\nhuman affairs. Our problem is to see what objectivity\r\nsignifies upon a naturalistic basis; how morals are objective\r\nand yet secular and social. Then we may be\r\nable to decide in what crisis of experience morals become\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg053\"\u003e[pg 053]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nlegitimately dependent upon character or self\u0026mdash;that\r\nis, \"subjective.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003ePrior discussion points the way to the answer. A\r\nhungry man could not conceive food as a good unless\r\nhe had actually experienced, with the support of environing\r\nconditions, food as good. The objective satisfaction\r\ncomes first. But he finds himself in a situation\r\nwhere the good is denied in fact. It then lives in\r\nimagination. The habit denied overt expression asserts\r\nitself in idea. It sets up the thought, the ideal, of\r\nfood. This thought is not what is sometimes called\r\nthought, a pale bloodless abstraction, but is charged\r\nwith the motor urgent force of habit. Food as a good\r\nis now subjective, personal. But it has its source in\r\nobjective conditions and it moves forward to new objective\r\nconditions. For it works to secure a change of\r\nenvironment so that food will again be present in fact.\r\nFood is a \"subjective\" good during a temporary transitional\r\nstage from one object to another.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe analogy with morals lies upon the surface. A\r\nhabit impeded in overt operation continues nonetheless\r\nto operate. It manifests itself in desireful thought,\r\nthat is in an ideal or imagined object which embodies\r\nwithin itself the force of a frustrated habit. There is\r\ntherefore demand for a changed environment, a demand\r\nwhich can be achieved only by some modification and\r\nrearrangement of old habits. Even Plato preserves an\r\nintimation of the natural function of ideal objects when\r\nhe insists upon their value as patterns for use in reorganization\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg054\"\u003e[pg 054]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof the actual scene. The pity is that he\r\ncould not see that patterns exist only within and for\r\nthe sake of reorganization, so that they, rather than\r\nempirical or natural objects, are the instrumental affairs.\r\nNot seeing this, he converted a function of\r\nreorganization into a metaphysical reality. If we essay\r\na technical formulation we shall say that morality becomes\r\nlegitimately subjective or personal when activities\r\nwhich once included objective factors in their operation\r\ntemporarily lose support from objects, and yet\r\nstrive to change existing conditions until they regain\r\na support which has been lost. It is all of a kind\r\nwith the doings of a man, who remembering a prior\r\nsatisfaction of thirst and the conditions under which\r\nit occurred, digs a well. For the time being water in\r\nreference to his activity exists in imagination not in\r\nfact. But this imagination is not a self-generated, self-enclosed,\r\npsychical existence. It is the persistent operation\r\nof a prior object which has been incorporated\r\nin effective habit. There is no miracle in the fact that\r\nan object in a new context operates in a new way.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOf transcendental morals, it may at least be said\r\nthat they retain the intimation of the objective character\r\nof purposes and goods. Purely subjective morals\r\narise when the incidents of the temporary (though recurrent)\r\ncrisis of reorganization are taken as complete\r\nand final in themselves. A self having habits and attitudes\r\nformed with the cooperation of objects runs\r\nahead of immediately surrounding objects to effect a\r\nnew equilibration. Subjective morals substitutes a self\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg055\"\u003e[pg 055]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nalways set over against objects and generating its\r\nideals independently of objects, and in permanent, not\r\ntransitory, opposition to them. Achievement, any\r\nachievement, is to it a negligible second best, a cheap\r\nand poor substitute for ideals that live only in the\r\nmind, a compromise with actuality made from physical\r\nnecessity not from moral reasons. In truth, there is\r\nbut a temporal episode. For a time, a self, a person,\r\ncarries in his own habits against the forces of the immediate\r\nenvironment, a good which the existing environment\r\ndenies. For this self moving temporarily, in\r\nisolation from objective conditions, between a good, a\r\ncompleteness, that has been and one that it is hoped\r\nto restore in some new form, subjective theories have\r\nsubstituted an erring soul wandering hopelessly between\r\na Paradise Lost in the dim past and a Paradise to be\r\nRegained in a dim future. In reality, even when a\r\nperson is in some respects at odds with his environment\r\nand so has to act for the time being as the sole agent\r\nof a good, he in many respects is still supported by\r\nobjective conditions and is in possession of undisturbed\r\ngoods and virtues. Men do die from thirst at times,\r\nbut upon the whole in their search for water they are\r\nsustained by other fulfilled powers. But subjective\r\nmorals taken wholesale sets up a solitary self without\r\nobjective ties and sustenance. In fact, there exists a\r\nshifting mixture of vice and virtue. Theories paint a\r\nworld with a God in heaven and a Devil in hell. Moralists\r\nin short have failed to recall that a severance of\r\nmoral desire and purpose from immediate actualities\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg056\"\u003e[pg 056]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nis an inevitable phase of activity when habits persist\r\nwhile the world which they have incorporated alters.\r\nBack of this failure lies the failure to recognize that\r\nin a changing world, old habits must perforce need modification,\r\nno matter how good they have been.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eObviously any such change can be only experimental.\r\nThe lost objective good persists in habit, but it\r\ncan recur in objective form only through some condition\r\nof affairs which has not been yet experienced,\r\nand which therefore can be anticipated only uncertainly\r\nand inexactly. The essential point is that anticipation\r\nshould at least guide as well as stimulate effort, that it\r\nshould be a working hypothesis corrected and developed\r\nby events as action proceeds. There was a time when\r\nmen believed that each object in the external world\r\ncarried its nature stamped upon it as a form, and that\r\nintelligence consisted in simply inspecting and reading\r\noff an intrinsic self-enclosed complete nature. The scientific\r\nrevolution which began in the seventeenth century\r\ncame through a surrender of this point of\r\nview. It began with recognition that every natural\r\nobject is in truth an event continuous in space and time\r\nwith other events; and is to be \u003cem\u003eknown\u003c/em\u003e only by experimental\r\ninquiries which will exhibit a multitude of complicated,\r\nobscure and minute relationships. Any observed\r\nform or object is but a challenge. The case is\r\nnot otherwise with ideals of justice or peace or human\r\nbrotherhood, or equality, or order. They too are not\r\nthings self-enclosed to be known by introspection, as\r\nobjects were once supposed to be known by rational insight.\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg057\"\u003e[pg 057]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nLike thunderbolts and tubercular disease and\r\nthe rainbow they can be known only by extensive and\r\nminute observation of consequences incurred in action.\r\nA false psychology of an isolated self and a subjective\r\nmorality shuts out from morals the things important\r\nto it, acts and habits in their objective consequences.\r\nAt the same time it misses the point characteristic of\r\nthe personal subjective aspect of morality: the significance\r\nof desire and thought in breaking down old\r\nrigidities of habit and preparing the way for acts that\r\nre-create an environment.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg058\"\u003e[pg 058]\u003c/span\u003eIV\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe often fancy that institutions, social custom, collective\r\nhabit, have been formed by the consolidation of\r\nindividual habits. In the main this supposition is false\r\nto fact. To a considerable extent customs, or wide-spread\r\nuniformities of habit, exist because individuals\r\nface the same situation and react in like fashion. But\r\nto a larger extent customs persist because individuals\r\nform their personal habits under conditions set by prior\r\ncustoms. An individual usually acquires the morality\r\nas he inherits the speech of his social group. The\r\nactivities of the group are already there, and some\r\nassimilation of his own acts to their pattern is a prerequisite\r\nof a share therein, and hence of having any\r\npart in what is going on. Each person is born an\r\ninfant, and every infant is subject from the first breath\r\nhe draws and the first cry he utters to the attentions\r\nand demands of others. These others are not just\r\npersons in general with minds in general. They are\r\nbeings with habits, and beings who upon the whole\r\nesteem the habits they have, if for no other reason than\r\nthat, having them, their imagination is thereby limited.\r\nThe nature of habit is to be assertive, insistent,\r\nself-perpetuating. There is no miracle in the fact that\r\nif a child learns any language he learns the language\r\nthat those about him speak and teach, especially since\r\nhis ability to speak that language is a pre-condition of\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg059\"\u003e[pg 059]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nhis entering into effective connection with them, making\r\nwants known and getting them satisfied. Fond parents\r\nand relatives frequently pick up a few of the child\u0027s\r\nspontaneous modes of speech and for a time at least\r\nthey are portions of the speech of the group. But the\r\nratio which such words bear to the total vocabulary\r\nin use gives a fair measure of the part played by purely\r\nindividual habit in forming custom in comparison with\r\nthe part played by custom in forming individual habits.\r\nFew persons have either the energy or the wealth to\r\nbuild private roads to travel upon. They find it convenient,\r\n\"natural,\" to use the roads that are already\r\nthere; while unless their private roads connect at some\r\npoint with the high-way they cannot build them even\r\nif they would.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThese simple facts seem to me to give a simple explanation\r\nof matters that are often surrounded with\r\nmystery. To talk about the priority of \"society\" to\r\n\u003cem\u003ethe\u003c/em\u003e individual is to indulge in nonsensical metaphysics.\r\nBut to say that some pre-existent association of human\r\nbeings is prior to every particular human being who is\r\nborn into the world is to mention a commonplace.\r\nThese associations are definite modes of interaction of\r\npersons with one another; that is to say they form\r\ncustoms, institutions. There is no problem in all history\r\nso artificial as that of how \"individuals\" manage\r\nto form \"society.\" The problem is due to the pleasure\r\ntaken in manipulating concepts, and discussion goes\r\non because concepts are kept from inconvenient contact\r\nwith facts. The facts of infancy and sex have\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg060\"\u003e[pg 060]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nonly to be called to mind to see how manufactured are\r\nthe conceptions which enter into this particular\r\nproblem.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe problem, however, of how those established\r\nand more or less deeply grooved systems of interaction\r\nwhich we call social groups, big and small, modify the\r\nactivities of individuals who perforce are caught-up\r\nwithin them, and how the activities of component individuals\r\nremake and redirect previously established customs\r\nis a deeply significant one. Viewed from the standpoint\r\nof custom and its priority to the formation of\r\nhabits in human beings who are born babies and gradually\r\ngrow to maturity, the facts which are now usually\r\nassembled under the conceptions of collective minds,\r\ngroup-minds, national-minds, crowd-minds, etc., etc.,\r\nlose the mysterious air they exhale when mind is\r\nthought of (as orthodox psychology teaches us to think\r\nof it) as something which precedes action. It is difficult\r\nto see that collective mind means anything more\r\nthan a custom brought at some point to explicit, emphatic\r\nconsciousness, emotional or intellectual.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_3_\"\r\nid=\"FNanchor_3_\" href=\"#Footnote_3_\" title=\"Mob psychology comes under the same principles, but in a negative aspect. The crowd and mob express a disintegration of habits which releases impulse and renders persons susceptible to immediate stimuli, rather than such a functioning of habits as is found in the mind of a club or school of thought or a political party. … \" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[3]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg061\"\u003e[pg 061]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nThe family into which one is born is a family in a\r\nvillage or city which interacts with other more or less\r\nintegrated systems of activity, and which includes a\r\ndiversity of groupings within itself, say, churches, political\r\nparties, clubs, cliques, partnerships, trade-unions,\r\ncorporations, etc. If we start with the traditional\r\nnotion of mind as something complete in itself,\r\nthen we may well be perplexed by the problem of how\r\na common mind, common ways of feeling and believing\r\nand purposing, comes into existence and then forms\r\nthese groups. The case is quite otherwise if we\r\nrecognize that in any case we must start with grouped\r\naction, that is, with some fairly settled system of interaction\r\namong individuals. The problem of origin and\r\ndevelopment of the various groupings, or definite customs,\r\nin existence at any particular time in any particular\r\nplace is not solved by reference to psychic\r\ncauses, elements, forces. It is to be solved by reference\r\nto facts of action, demand for food, for houses, for a\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg062\"\u003e[pg 062]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nmate, for some one to talk to and to listen to one talk,\r\nfor control of others, demands which are all intensified\r\nby the fact already mentioned that each person begins\r\na helpless, dependent creature. I do not mean of course\r\nthat hunger, fear, sexual love, gregariousness, sympathy,\r\nparental love, love of bossing and of being ordered\r\nabout, imitation, etc., play no part. But I do\r\nmean that these words do not express elements or forces\r\nwhich are psychic or mental in their first intention.\r\nThey denote \u003cem\u003eways of behavior\u003c/em\u003e. These ways of behaving\r\ninvolve interaction, that is to say, and prior groupings.\r\nAnd to understand the existence of organized ways or\r\nhabits we surely need to go to physics, chemistry and\r\nphysiology rather than to psychology.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThere is doubtless a great mystery as to why any\r\nsuch thing as being conscious should exist at all. But\r\n\u003cem\u003eif\u003c/em\u003e consciousness exists at all, there is no mystery in its\r\nbeing connected with what it is connected with. That\r\nis to say, if an activity which is an interaction of various\r\nfactors, or a grouped activity, comes to consciousness\r\nit seems natural that it should take the form of\r\nan emotion, belief or purpose that reflects the interaction,\r\nthat it should be an \"our\" consciousness or a\r\n\"my\" consciousness. And by this is meant both that\r\nit will be shared by those who are implicated in the\r\nassociative custom, or more or less alike in them all,\r\nand that it will be felt or thought to concern others as\r\nwell as one\u0027s self. A family-custom or organized habit\r\nof action comes into contact and conflict for example\r\nwith that of some other family. The emotions of ruffled\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg063\"\u003e[pg 063]\u003c/span\u003e\r\npride, the belief about superiority or being \"as\r\ngood as other people,\" the intention to hold one\u0027s own\r\nare naturally \u003cem\u003eour\u003c/em\u003e feeling and idea of \u003cem\u003eour\u003c/em\u003e treatment and\r\nposition. Substitute the Republican party or the\r\nAmerican nation for the family and the general situation\r\nremains the same. The conditions which determine\r\nthe nature and extent of the particular grouping\r\nin question are matters of supreme import. But\r\nthey are not as such subject-matter of psychology, but\r\nof the history of politics, law, religion, economics, invention,\r\nthe technology of communication and intercourse.\r\nPsychology comes in as an indispensable tool.\r\nBut it enters into the matter of understanding these\r\nvarious special topics, not into the question of what\r\npsychic forces form a collective mind and therefore a\r\nsocial group. That way of stating the case puts the\r\ncart a long way before the horse, and naturally gathers\r\nobscurities and mysteries to itself. In short, the primary\r\nfacts of social psychology center about collective\r\nhabit, custom. In addition to the general psychology\r\nof habit\u0026mdash;which \u003cem\u003eis\u003c/em\u003e general not individual in any intelligible\r\nsense of that word\u0026mdash;we need to find out just\r\nhow different customs shape the desires, beliefs, purposes\r\nof those who are affected by them. The problem\r\nof social psychology is not how either individual or\r\ncollective mind forms social groups and customs, but\r\nhow different customs, established interacting arrangements,\r\nform and nurture different minds. From this\r\ngeneral statement we return to our special problem,\r\nwhich is how the rigid character of past custom has\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg064\"\u003e[pg 064]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nunfavorably influenced beliefs, emotions and purposes\r\nhaving to do with morals.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe come back to the fact that individuals begin their\r\ncareer as infants. For the plasticity of the young presents\r\na temptation to those having greater experience\r\nand hence greater power which they rarely resist. It\r\nseems putty to be molded according to current designs.\r\nThat plasticity also means power to change prevailing\r\ncustom is ignored. Docility is looked upon not as ability\r\nto learn whatever the world has to teach, but as\r\nsubjection to those instructions of others which reflect\r\n\u003cem\u003etheir\u003c/em\u003e current habits. To be truly docile is to be eager\r\nto learn all the lessons of active, inquiring, expanding\r\nexperience. The inert, stupid quality of current customs\r\nperverts learning into a willingness to follow\r\nwhere others point the way, into conformity, constriction,\r\nsurrender of scepticism and experiment. When\r\nwe think of the docility of the young we first think of\r\nthe stocks of information adults wish to impose and\r\nthe ways of acting they want to reproduce. Then we\r\nthink of the insolent coercions, the insinuating briberies,\r\nthe pedagogic solemnities by which the freshness of\r\nyouth can be faded and its vivid curiosities dulled.\r\nEducation becomes the art of taking advantage of the\r\nhelplessness of the young; the forming of habits becomes\r\na guarantee for the maintenance of hedges of\r\ncustom.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOf course it is not wholly forgotten that habits are\r\nabilities, arts. Any striking exhibition of acquired\r\nskill in physical matters, like that of an acrobat or\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg065\"\u003e[pg 065]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nbilliard-player, arouses universal admiration. But we\r\nlike to have innovating power limited to technical matters\r\nand reserve our admiration for those manifestations\r\nthat display virtuosity rather than virtue. In moral\r\nmatters it is assumed that it is enough if some ideal has\r\nbeen exemplified in the life of a leader, so that it is now\r\nthe part of others to follow and reproduce. For every\r\nbranch of conduct, there is a Jesus or Buddha, a Napoleon\r\nor Marx, a Froebel or Tolstoi, whose pattern\r\nof action, exceeding our own grasp, is reduced to a\r\npracticable copy-size by passage through rows and\r\nrows of lesser leaders.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe notion that it suffices if the idea, the end, is\r\npresent in the mind of some authority dominates formal\r\nschooling. It permeates the unconscious education derived\r\nfrom ordinary contact and intercourse. Where\r\nfollowing is taken to be normal, moral originality is\r\npretty sure to be eccentric. But if independence were\r\nthe rule, originality would be subjected to severe, experimental\r\ntests and be saved from cranky eccentricity,\r\nas it now is in say higher mathematics. The regime\r\nof custom assumes that the outcome is the same whether\r\nan individual understands what he is about or whether\r\nhe goes through certain motions while mouthing the\r\nwords of others\u0026mdash;repetition of formulæ being esteemed\r\nof greater importance, upon the whole, than repetition\r\nof deeds. To say what the sect or clique or class says\r\nis the way of proving that one also understands and\r\napproves what the clique clings to. In theory, democracy\r\nshould be a means of stimulating original thought,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg066\"\u003e[pg 066]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nand of evoking action deliberately adjusted in advance\r\nto cope with new forces. In fact it is still so immature\r\nthat its main effect is to multiply occasions for imitation.\r\nIf progress in spite of this fact is more rapid\r\nthan in other social forms, it is by accident, since the\r\ndiversity of models conflict with one another and\r\nthus give individuality a chance in the resulting chaos\r\nof opinions. Current democracy acclaims success more\r\nboisterously than do other social forms, and surrounds\r\nfailure with a more reverberating train of echoes. But\r\nthe prestige thus given excellence is largely adventitious.\r\nThe achievement of thought attracts others not\r\nso much intrinsically as because of an eminence due to\r\nmultitudinous advertising and a swarm of imitators.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eEven liberal thinkers have treated habit as essentially,\r\nnot because of the character of existing customs,\r\nconservative. In fact only in a society dominated by\r\nmodes of belief and admiration fixed by past custom is\r\nhabit any more conservative than it is progressive. It\r\nall depends upon its quality. Habit is an ability, an\r\nart, formed through past experience. But whether an\r\nability is limited to repetition of past acts adopted to\r\npast conditions or is available for new emergencies\r\ndepends wholly upon what kind of habit exists. The\r\ntendency to think that only \"bad\" habits are disserviceable\r\nand that bad habits are conventionally\r\nenumerable, conduces to make all habits more or less\r\nbad. For what makes a habit bad is enslavement to\r\nold ruts. The common notion that enslavement to good\r\nends converts mechanical routine into good is a\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg067\"\u003e[pg 067]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nnegation of the principle of moral goodness. It identifies\r\nmorality with what \u003cem\u003ewas\u003c/em\u003e sometime rational, possibly\r\nin some prior experience of one\u0027s own, but more\r\nprobably in the experience of some one else who is now\r\nblindly set up as a final authority. The genuine heart\r\nof reasonableness (and of goodness in conduct) lies\r\nin effective mastery of the conditions which \u003cem\u003enow\u003c/em\u003e enter\r\ninto action. To be satisfied with repeating, with traversing\r\nthe ruts which in other conditions led to good,\r\nis the surest way of creating carelessness about present\r\nand actual good.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eConsider what happens to thought when habit is\r\nmerely power to repeat acts without thought. Where\r\ndoes thought exist and operate when it is excluded from\r\nhabitual activities? Is not such thought of necessity\r\nshut out from effective power, from ability to control\r\nobjects and command events? Habits deprived of\r\nthought and thought which is futile are two sides of the\r\nsame fact. To laud habit as conservative while praising\r\nthought as the main spring of progress is to take\r\nthe surest course to making thought abstruse and\r\nirrelevant and progress a matter of accident and catastrophe.\r\nThe concrete fact behind the current separation\r\nof body and mind, practice and theory, actualities\r\nand ideals, is precisely this separation of habit and\r\nthought. Thought which does not exist within ordinary\r\nhabits of action lacks means of execution. In lacking\r\napplication, it also lacks test, criterion. Hence it is\r\ncondemned to a separate realm. If we try to act upon\r\nit, our actions are clumsy, forced. In fact, contrary\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg068\"\u003e[pg 068]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nhabits (as we have already seen) come into operation\r\nand betray our purpose. After a few such experiences,\r\nit is subconsciously decided that thought is too precious\r\nand high to be exposed to the contingencies of action.\r\nIt is reserved for separate uses; thought feeds only\r\nthought not action. Ideals must not run the risk of\r\ncontamination and perversion by contact with actual\r\nconditions. Thought then either resorts to specialized\r\nand technical matters influencing action in the library\r\nor laboratory alone, or else it becomes sentimentalized.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eMeantime there are certain \"practical\" men who\r\ncombine thought and habit and who are effectual. Their\r\nthought is about their own advantage; and their habits\r\ncorrespond. They dominate the actual situation. They\r\nencourage routine in others, and they also subsidize\r\nsuch thought and learning as are kept remote from\r\naffairs. This they call sustaining the standard of the\r\nideal. Subjection they praise as team-spirit, loyalty,\r\ndevotion, obedience, industry, law-and-order. But they\r\ntemper respect for law\u0026mdash;by which they mean the order\r\nof the existing status\u0026mdash;on the part of others with most\r\nskilful and thoughtful manipulation of it in behalf of\r\ntheir own ends. While they denounce as subversive\r\nanarchy signs of independent thought, of thinking for\r\nthemselves, on the part of others lest such thought\r\ndisturb the conditions by which they profit, they think\r\nquite literally \u003cem\u003efor\u003c/em\u003e themselves, that is, \u003cem\u003eof\u003c/em\u003e themselves.\r\nThis is the eternal game of the practical men. Hence\r\nit is only by accident that the separate and endowed\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg069\"\u003e[pg 069]\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\"thought\" of professional thinkers leaks out into action\r\nand affects custom.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFor thinking cannot itself escape the influence of\r\nhabit, any more than anything else human. If it is not\r\na part of ordinary habits, then it is a separate habit,\r\nhabit alongside other habits, apart from them, as\r\nisolated and indurated as human structure permits.\r\nTheory is a possession of the theorist, intellect of the\r\nintellectualist. The so-called separation of theory and\r\npractice means in fact the separation of two kinds of\r\npractice, one taking place in the outdoor world, the\r\nother in the study. The habit of thought commands\r\nsome materials (as every habit must do) but the materials\r\nare technical, books, words. Ideas are objectified\r\nin action but speech and writing monopolize their\r\nfield of action. Even then subconscious pains are\r\ntaken to see that the words used are not too widely\r\nunderstood. Intellectual habits like other habits demand\r\nan environment, but the environment is the study,\r\nlibrary, laboratory and academy. Like other habits\r\nthey produce external results, possessions. Some men\r\nacquire ideas and knowledge as other men acquire monetary\r\nwealth. While practising thought for their own\r\nspecial ends they deprecate it for the untrained and\r\nunstable masses for whom \"habits,\" that is unthinking\r\nroutines, are necessities. They favor popular education\u0026mdash;up\r\nto the point of disseminating as matter of\r\nauthoritative information for the many what the few\r\nhave established by thought, and up to the point of\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg070\"\u003e[pg 070]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nconverting an original docility to the new into a docility\r\nto repeat and to conform.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eYet all habit involves mechanization. Habit is impossible\r\nwithout setting up a mechanism of action,\r\nphysiologically engrained, which operates \"spontaneously,\"\r\nautomatically, whenever the cue is given. But\r\nmechanization is not of necessity \u003cem\u003eall\u003c/em\u003e there is to habit.\r\nConsider the conditions under which the first serviceable\r\nabilities of life are formed. When a child begins to\r\nwalk he acutely observes, he intently and intensely experiments.\r\nHe looks to see what is going to happen\r\nand he keeps curious watch on every incident. What\r\nothers do, the assistance they give, the models they set,\r\noperate not as limitations but as encouragements to his\r\nown acts, reinforcements of personal perception and\r\nendeavor. The first toddling is a romantic adventuring\r\ninto the unknown; and every gained power is a\r\ndelightful discovery of one\u0027s own powers and of the\r\nwonders of the world. We may not be able to retain\r\nin adult habits this zest of intelligence and this\r\nfreshness of satisfaction in newly discovered powers.\r\nBut there is surely a middle term between a normal\r\nexercise of power which includes some excursion into\r\nthe unknown, and a mechanical activity hedged within\r\na drab world. Even in dealing with inanimate machines\r\nwe rank that invention higher which adapts its movements\r\nto varying conditions.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAll life operates through a mechanism, and the\r\nhigher the form of life the more complex, sure and\r\nflexible the mechanism. This fact alone should save\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg071\"\u003e[pg 071]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nus from opposing life and mechanism, thereby reducing\r\nthe latter to unintelligent automatism and the former\r\nto an aimless splurge. How delicate, prompt, sure and\r\nvaried are the movements of a violin player or an engraver!\r\nHow unerringly they phrase every shade of\r\nemotion and every turn of idea! Mechanism is indispensable.\r\nIf each act has to be consciously searched\r\nfor at the moment and intentionally performed, execution\r\nis painful and the product is clumsy and halting.\r\nNevertheless the difference between the artist and the\r\nmere technician is unmistakeable. The artist is a masterful\r\ntechnician. The technique or mechanism is fused\r\nwith thought and feeling. The \"mechanical\" performer\r\npermits the mechanism to dictate the performance.\r\nIt is absurd to say that the latter exhibits habit\r\nand the former not. We are confronted with two kinds\r\nof habit, intelligent and routine. All life has its élan,\r\nbut only the prevalence of dead habits deflects life into\r\nmere élan.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eYet the current dualism of mind and body, thought\r\nand action, is so rooted that we are taught (and science\r\nis said to support the teaching) that the art, the habit,\r\nof the artist is acquired by previous mechanical exercises\r\nof repetition in which skill apart from thought is\r\nthe aim, until suddenly, magically, this soulless mechanism\r\nis taken possession of by sentiment and imagination\r\nand it becomes a flexible instrument of mind. The fact,\r\nthe scientific fact, is that even in his exercises, his practice\r\n\u003cem\u003efor\u003c/em\u003e skill, an artist uses an art he already has. He\r\nacquires greater skill because practice \u003cem\u003eof\u003c/em\u003e skill is more\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg072\"\u003e[pg 072]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nimportant to him than practice \u003cem\u003efor\u003c/em\u003e skill. Otherwise\r\nnatural endowment would count for nothing, and\r\nsufficient mechanical exercise would make any one\r\nan expert in any field. A flexible, sensitive habit grows\r\nmore varied, more adaptable by practice and use. We\r\ndo not as yet fully understand the physiological factors\r\nconcerned in mechanical routine on one hand and\r\nartistic skill on the other, but we do know that the\r\nlatter is just as much habit as is the former.\r\nWhether it concerns the cook, musician, carpenter, citizen,\r\nor statesman, the intelligent or artistic habit is\r\nthe desirable thing, and the routine the undesirable\r\nthing:\u0026mdash;or, at least, desirable and undesirable from\r\nevery point of view except one.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThose who wish a monopoly of social power find\r\ndesirable the separation of habit and thought, action\r\nand soul, so characteristic of history. For the dualism\r\nenables them to do the thinking and planning, while\r\nothers remain the docile, even if awkward, instruments\r\nof execution. Until this scheme is changed, democracy\r\nis bound to be perverted in realization. With our\r\npresent system of education\u0026mdash;by which something much\r\nmore extensive than schooling is meant\u0026mdash;democracy\r\nmultiplies occasions for imitation not occasions for\r\nthought in action. If the visible result is rather a\r\nmessy confusion than an ordered discipline of habits, it\r\nis because there are so many models of imitation set up\r\nthat they tend to cancel one another, so that individuals\r\nhave the advantage neither of uniform training\r\nnor of intelligent adaptation. Whence an intellectualist;\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg073\"\u003e[pg 073]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe one with whom thinking is itself a segregated\r\nhabit, infers that the choice is between muss-and-muddling\r\nand a bureaucracy. He prefers the latter,\r\nthough under some other name, usually an aristocracy\r\nof talent and intellect, possibly a dictatorship of the\r\nproletariat.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt has been repeatedly stated that the current philosophical\r\ndualism of mind and body, of spirit and mere\r\noutward doing, is ultimately but an intellectual reflex\r\nof the social divorce of routine habit from thought, of\r\nmeans from ends, practice from theory. One hardly\r\nknows whether most to admire the acumen with which\r\nBergson has penetrated through the accumulation of\r\nhistoric technicalities to this essential fact, or to deplore\r\nthe artistic skill with which he has recommended\r\nthe division and the metaphysical subtlety with which\r\nhe has striven to establish its necessary and unchangeable\r\nnature. For the latter tends to confirm and sanction\r\nthe dualism in all its obnoxiousness. In the end,\r\nhowever, detection, discovery, is the main thing. To\r\nenvisage the relation of spirit, life, to matter, body,\r\nas in effect an affair of a force which outruns habit\r\nwhile it leaves a trail of routine habits behind it, will\r\nsurely turn out in the end to imply the acknowledgment\r\nof the need of a continuous unification of spirit\r\nand habit, rather than to be a sanction of their divorce.\r\nAnd when Bergson carries the implicit logic\r\nto the point of a clear recognition that upon this basis\r\nconcrete intelligence is concerned with the habits\r\nwhich incorporate and deal with objects, and that nothing\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg074\"\u003e[pg 074]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nremains to spirit, pure thought, except a blind onward\r\npush or impetus, the net conclusion is surely the\r\nneed of revision of the fundamental premiss of separation\r\nof soul and habit. A blind creative force is as\r\nlikely to turn out to be destructive as creative; the vital\r\n\u003cem\u003eélan\u003c/em\u003e may delight in war rather than in the laborious\r\narts of civilization, and a mystic intuition of an \u003cins class=\"corr\" title=\"ungoing\" id=\"Corr_074_\"\u003eongoing\u003c/ins\u003e\r\nsplurge be a poor substitute for the detailed work of an\r\nintelligence embodied in custom and institution, one\r\nwhich creates by means of flexible continuous contrivances\r\nof reorganization. For the eulogistic qualities\r\nwhich Bergson attributes to the \u003ci lang=\"fr\" xml:lang=\"fr\"\u003eélan vital\u003c/i\u003e flow not from\r\nits nature but from a reminiscence of the optimism of\r\nromanticism, an optimism which is only the reverse side\r\nof pessimism about actualities. A spiritual life which\r\nis nothing but a blind urge separated from thought\r\n(which is said to be confined to mechanical manipulation\r\nof material objects for personal uses) is\r\nlikely to have the attributes of the Devil in spite of its\r\nbeing ennobled with the name of God.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg075\"\u003e[pg 075]\u003c/span\u003eV\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFor practical purposes morals mean customs, folkways,\r\nestablished collective habits. This is a commonplace\r\nof the anthropologist, though the moral theorist\r\ngenerally suffers from an illusion that his own place\r\nand day is, or ought to be, an exception. But always\r\nand everywhere customs supply the standards for personal\r\nactivities. They are the pattern into which individual\r\nactivity must weave itself. This is as true\r\ntoday as it ever was. But because of present mobility\r\nand interminglings of customs, an individual is now\r\noffered an enormous range of custom-patterns, and can\r\nexercise personal ingenuity in selecting and rearranging\r\ntheir elements. In short he can, if he will, intelligently\r\nadapt customs to conditions, and thereby remake them.\r\nCustoms in any case constitute moral standards. For\r\nthey are active demands for certain ways of acting.\r\nEvery habit creates an unconscious expectation. It\r\nforms a certain outlook. What psychologists have laboriously\r\ntreated under the caption of association of\r\nideas has little to do with ideas and everything to do\r\nwith the influence of habit upon recollection and perception.\r\nA habit, a routine habit, when interfered with\r\ngenerates uneasiness, sets up a protest in favor of\r\nrestoration and a sense of need of some expiatory act,\r\nor else it goes off in casual reminiscence. It is the\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg076\"\u003e[pg 076]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nessence of routine to insist upon its own continuation.\r\nBreach of it is violation of right. Deviation from it\r\nis transgression.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAll that metaphysics has said about the nisus of\r\nBeing to conserve its essence and all that a mythological\r\npsychology has said about a special instinct of\r\nself-preservation is a cover for the persistent self-assertion\r\nof habit. Habit is energy organized in certain\r\nchannels. When interfered with, it swells as resentment\r\nand as an avenging force. To say that it\r\nwill be obeyed, that custom makes law, that \u003ci lang=\"la\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003enomos\u003c/i\u003e is\r\nlord of all, is after all only to say that habit is habit.\r\nEmotion is a perturbation from clash or failure of\r\nhabit, and reflection, roughly speaking, is the painful\r\neffort of disturbed habits to readjust themselves. It\r\nis a pity that Westermarck in his monumental collection\r\nof facts which show the connection of custom with\r\nmorals\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_4_\" id=\"FNanchor_4_\" href=\"#Footnote_4_\" title=\"\u0027The Origin and Development of Moral Ideas.\u0027\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[4]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nis still so much under the influence of current\r\nsubjective psychology that he misstates the point of\r\nhis data. For although he recognizes the objectivity\r\nof custom, he treats sympathetic resentment and approbation\r\nas distinctive inner feelings or conscious\r\nstates which give rise to acts. In his anxiety to displace\r\nan unreal rational source of morals he sets up an\r\nequally unreal emotional basis. In truth, feelings as\r\nwell as reason spring up within action. Breach of custom\r\nor habit is the source of sympathetic resentment,\r\nwhile overt approbation goes out to fidelity to custom\r\nmaintained under exceptional circumstances.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg077\"\u003e[pg 077]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nThose who recognize the place of custom in lower\r\nsocial forms generally regard its presence in civilized\r\nsociety as a mere survival. Or, like Sumner, they fancy\r\nthat to recognize its abiding place is equivalent to the\r\ndenial of all rationality and principle to morality;\r\nequivalent to the assertion of blind, arbitrary forces\r\nin life. In effect, this point of view has already\r\nbeen dealt with. It overlooks the fact that the real\r\nopposition is not between reason and habit but between\r\nroutine, unintelligent habit, and intelligent habit or\r\nart. Even a savage custom may be reasonable in that\r\nit is adapted to social needs and uses. Experience may\r\nadd to such adaptation a conscious recognition of it,\r\nand then the custom of rationality is added to a prior\r\ncustom.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eExternal reasonableness or adaptation to ends precedes\r\nreasonableness of mind. This is only to say that\r\nin morals as well as in physics things have to be there\r\nbefore we perceive them, and that rationality of mind\r\nis not an original endowment but is the offspring of\r\nintercourse with objective adaptations and relations\u0026mdash;a\r\nview which under the influence of a conception of\r\nknowing the like by the like has been distorted into\r\nPlatonic and other objective idealisms. Reason as\r\nobservation of an adaptation of acts to valuable results\r\nis not however a mere idle mirroring of pre-existent\r\nfacts. It is an additional event having its own\r\ncareer. It sets up a heightened emotional appreciation\r\nand provides a new motive for fidelities previously blind.\r\nIt sets up an attitude of criticism, of inquiry, and\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg078\"\u003e[pg 078]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nmakes men sensitive to the brutalities and extravagancies\r\nof customs. In short, it becomes a custom of\r\nexpectation and outlook, an active demand for reasonableness\r\nin other customs. The reflective disposition is\r\nnot self-made nor a gift of the gods. It arises in some\r\nexceptional circumstance out of social customs, as we\r\nsee in the case of the Greeks. But when it has been\r\ngenerated it establishes a new custom, which is capable\r\nof exercising the most revolutionary influence upon\r\nother customs.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eHence the growing importance of personal rationality\r\nor intelligence, in moral theory if not in practice.\r\nThat current customs contradict one another, that\r\nmany of them are unjust, and that without criticism\r\nnone of them is fit to be the guide of life was the discovery\r\nwith which the Athenian Socrates initiated conscious\r\nmoral theorizing. Yet a dilemma soon presented\r\nitself, one which forms the burden of Plato\u0027s ethical\r\nwritings. How shall thought which is personal arrive\r\nat standards which hold good for all, which, in modern\r\nphrase, are objective? The solution found by Plato\r\nwas that reason is itself objective, universal, cosmic\r\nand makes the individual soul its vehicle. The result,\r\nhowever, was merely to substitute a metaphysical or\r\ntranscendental ethics for the ethics of custom. If Plato\r\nhad been able to see that reflection and criticism express\r\na conflict of customs, and that their purport and office\r\nis to re-organize, re-adjust customs, the subsequent\r\ncourse of moral theory would have been very different.\r\nCustom would have provided needed objective and substantial\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg079\"\u003e[pg 079]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nballast, and personal rationality or reflective\r\nintelligence been treated as the necessary organ of\r\nexperimental initiative and creative invention in remaking\r\ncustom.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe have another difficulty to face: a greater wave\r\nrises to overwhelm us. It is said that to derive moral\r\nstandards from social customs is to evacuate the latter\r\nof all authority. Morals, it is said, imply the subordination\r\nof fact to ideal consideration, while the view presented\r\nmakes morals secondary to bare fact, which is\r\nequal to depriving them of dignity and jurisdiction.\r\nThe objection has the force of the custom of moral\r\ntheorists behind it; and therefore in its denial of custom\r\navails itself of the assistance of the notion it attacks.\r\nThe criticism rests upon a false separation.\r\nIt argues in effect that either ideal standards antecede\r\ncustoms and confer their moral quality upon them, or\r\nthat in being subsequent to custom and evolved from\r\nthem, they are mere accidental by-products. But how\r\ndoes the case stand with language? Men did not intend\r\nlanguage; they did not have social objects consciously\r\nin view when they began to talk, nor did they\r\nhave grammatical and phonetic principles before them\r\nby which to regulate their efforts at communication.\r\nThese things come after the fact and because of it.\r\nLanguage grew out of unintelligent babblings, instinctive\r\nmotions called gestures, and the pressure of circumstance.\r\nBut nevertheless language once called into existence\r\nis language and operates as language. It operates\r\nnot to perpetuate the forces which produced it\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg080\"\u003e[pg 080]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nbut to modify and redirect them. It has such transcendent\r\nimportance that pains are taken with its use.\r\nLiteratures are produced, and then a vast apparatus\r\nof grammar, rhetoric, dictionaries, literary criticism,\r\nreviews, essays, a derived literature \u003ci lang=\"fr\" xml:lang=\"fr\"\u003ead lib\u003c/i\u003e. Education,\r\nschooling, becomes a necessity; literacy an end. In\r\nshort language when it is produced meets old needs and\r\nopens new possibilities. It creates demands which take\r\neffect, and the effect is not confined to speech and literature,\r\nbut extends to the common life in communication,\r\ncounsel and instruction.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhat is said of the institution of language holds\r\ngood of every institution. Family life, property, legal\r\nforms, churches and schools, academies of art and science\r\ndid not originate to serve conscious ends nor was\r\ntheir generation regulated by consciousness of principles\r\nof reason and right. Yet each institution has\r\nbrought with its development demands, expectations,\r\nrules, standards. These are not mere embellishments\r\nof the forces which produced them, idle decorations of\r\nthe scene. They are additional forces. They reconstruct.\r\nThey open new avenues of endeavor and impose\r\nnew labors. In short they are civilization, culture,\r\nmorality.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eStill the question recurs: What authority have standards\r\nand ideas which have originated in this way?\r\nWhat claim have they upon us? In one sense\r\nthe question is unanswerable. In the same sense,\r\nhowever, the question is unanswerable whatever\r\norigin and sanction is ascribed to moral obligations\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg081\"\u003e[pg 081]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nand loyalties. Why attend to metaphysical and\r\ntranscendental ideal realities even if we concede they\r\nare the authors of moral standards? Why do this act\r\nif I feel like doing something else? Any moral question\r\nmay reduce itself to this question if we so choose.\r\nBut in an empirical sense the answer is simple. The\r\nauthority is that of life. Why employ language, cultivate\r\nliterature, acquire and develop science, sustain\r\nindustry, and submit to the refinements of art? To\r\nask these questions is equivalent to asking: Why live?\r\nAnd the only answer is that if one is going to live one\r\nmust live a life of which these things form the substance.\r\nThe only question having sense which can be\r\nasked is \u003cem\u003ehow\u003c/em\u003e we are going to use and be used by these\r\nthings, not whether we are going to use them. Reason,\r\nmoral principles, cannot in any case be shoved behind\r\nthese affairs, for reason and morality grow out of them.\r\nBut they have grown into them as well as out of them.\r\nThey are there as part of them. No one can escape\r\nthem if he wants to. He cannot escape the problem\r\nof \u003cem\u003ehow\u003c/em\u003e to engage in life, since in any case he must engage\r\nin it in some way or other\u0026mdash;or else quit and get\r\nout. In short, the choice is not between a moral authority\r\noutside custom and one within it. It is between\r\nadopting more or less intelligent and significant\r\ncustoms.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eCuriously enough, the chief practical effect of refusing\r\nto recognize the connection of custom with moral\r\nstandards is to deify some special custom and treat it\r\nas eternal, immutable, outside of criticism and revision.\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg082\"\u003e[pg 082]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nThis consequence is especially harmful in times of rapid\r\nsocial flux. For it leads to disparity between nominal\r\nstandards, which become ineffectual and hypocritical in\r\nexact ratio to their theoretical exaltation, and actual\r\nhabits which have to take note of existing conditions.\r\nThe disparity breeds disorder. Irregularity\r\nand confusion are however practically intolerable, and\r\neffect the generation of a new rule of some sort or\r\nother. Only such complete disturbance of the physical\r\nbases of life and security as comes from plague and\r\nstarvation can throw society into utter disorder. No\r\namount of intellectual transition can seriously disturb\r\nthe main tenor of custom, or morals. Hence the\r\ngreater danger which attends the attempt in period of\r\nsocial change to maintain the immutability of old\r\nstandards is not general moral relaxation. It is rather\r\nsocial clash, an irreconciled conflict of moral standards\r\nand purposes, the most serious form of class warfare.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFor segregated classes develop their own customs,\r\nwhich is to say their own working morals. As long as\r\nsociety is mainly immobile these diverse principles and\r\nruling aims do not clash. They exist side by side in\r\ndifferent strata. Power, glory, honor, magnificence,\r\nmutual faith here; industry, obedience, abstinence,\r\nhumility, and reverence there: noble and plebeian virtues.\r\nVigor, courage, energy, enterprise here; submission,\r\npatience, charm, personal fidelity there: the\r\nmasculine and feminine virtues. But mobility invades\r\nsociety. War, commerce, travel, communication, contact\r\nwith the thoughts and desires of other classes, new\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg083\"\u003e[pg 083]\u003c/span\u003e\r\ninventions in productive industry, disturb the settled\r\ndistribution of customs. Congealed habits thaw out,\r\nand a flood mixes things once separated.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eEach class is rigidly sure of the rightness of its own\r\nends and hence not overscrupulous about the means of\r\nattaining them. One side proclaims the ultimacy of\r\norder\u0026mdash;that of some old order which conduces to its\r\nown interest. The other side proclaims its rights to\r\nfreedom, and identifies justice with its submerged\r\nclaims. There is no common ground, no moral understanding,\r\nno agreed upon standard of appeal. Today\r\nsuch a conflict occurs between propertied classes and\r\nthose who depend upon daily wage; between men and\r\nwomen; between old and young. Each appeals to its\r\nown standard of right, and each thinks the other the\r\ncreature of personal desire, whim or obstinacy. Mobility\r\nhas affected peoples as well. Nations and races\r\nface one another, each with its own immutable standards.\r\nNever before in history have there existed such\r\nnumerous contacts and minglings. Never before have\r\nthere been such occasions for conflict which are the\r\nmore significant because each side feels that it is supported\r\nby moral principles. Customs relating to what\r\nhas been and emotions referring to what may come to\r\nbe go their independent ways. The demand of each side\r\ntreats its opponent as a wilful violator of moral principles,\r\nan expression of self-interest or superior might.\r\nIntelligence which is the only possible messenger of\r\nreconciliation dwells in a far land of abstractions or\r\ncomes after the event to record accomplished facts.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg084\"\u003e[pg 084]\u003c/span\u003eVI\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe prior discussion has tried to show why the psychology\r\nof habit is an objective and social psychology.\r\nSettled and regular action must contain an adjustment\r\nof environing conditions; it must incorporate them in\r\nitself. For human beings, the environing affairs directly\r\nimportant are those formed by the activities of\r\nother human beings. This fact is accentuated and\r\nmade fundamental by the fact of infancy\u0026mdash;the fact\r\nthat each human being begins life completely dependent\r\nupon others. The net outcome accordingly is that\r\nwhat can be called distinctively individual in behavior\r\nand mind is not, contrary to traditional theory, an\r\noriginal datum. Doubtless physical or physiological\r\nindividuality always colors responsive activity and\r\nhence modifies the form which custom assumes in its\r\npersonal reproductions. In forceful energetic characters\r\nthis quality is marked. But it is important to\r\nnote that it is a quality of habit, not an element or\r\nforce existing apart from adjustment of the environment\r\nand capable of being termed a separate individual\r\nmind. Orthodox psychology starts however\r\nfrom the assumption of precisely such independent\r\nminds. However much different schools may vary in\r\ntheir definitions of mind, they agree in this premiss\r\nof separateness and priority. Hence social psychology\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg085\"\u003e[pg 085]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nis confused by the effort to render its facts in the terms\r\ncharacteristic of old psychology, when the distinctive\r\nthing about it is that it implies an abandonment of that\r\npsychology.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe traditional psychology of the original separate\r\nsoul, mind or consciousness is in truth a reflex of conditions\r\nwhich cut human nature off from its natural\r\nobjective relations. It implies first the severance of\r\nman from nature and then of each man from his fellows.\r\nThe isolation of man from nature is duly manifested\r\nin the split between mind and body\u0026mdash;since body\r\nis clearly a connected part of nature. Thus the instrument\r\nof action and the means of the continuous modification\r\nof action, of the cumulative carrying forward\r\nof old activity into new, is regarded as a mysterious\r\nintruder or as a mysterious parallel accompaniment.\r\nIt is fair to say that the psychology of a separate and\r\nindependent consciousness began as an intellectual\r\nformulation of those facts of morality which treated\r\nthe most important kind of action as a private concern,\r\nsomething to be enacted and concluded within\r\ncharacter as a purely personal possession. The religious\r\nand metaphysical interests which wanted the\r\nideal to be a separate realm finally coincided with a\r\npractical revolt against current customs and institutions\r\nto enforce current psychological individualism.\r\nBut this formulation (put forth in the name of science)\r\nreacted to confirm the conditions out of which it arose,\r\nand to convert it from a historic episode into an essential\r\ntruth. Its exaggeration of individuality is largely\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg086\"\u003e[pg 086]\u003c/span\u003e\r\na compensatory reaction against the pressure of institutional\r\nrigidities.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAny moral theory which is seriously influenced by\r\ncurrent psychological theory is bound to emphasize\r\nstates of consciousness, an inner private life, at the expense\r\nof acts which have public meaning and which\r\nincorporate and exact social relationships. A psychology\r\nbased upon habits (and instincts which become\r\nelements in habits as soon as they are acted upon) will\r\non the contrary fix its attention upon the objective\r\nconditions in which habits are formed and operate. The\r\nrise at the present time of a clinical psychology which\r\nrevolts at traditional and orthodox psychology is a\r\nsymptom of ethical import. It is a protest against the\r\nfutility, as a tool of understanding and dealing with\r\nhuman nature in the concrete, of the psychology of\r\nconscious sensations, images and ideas. It exhibits a\r\nsense for reality in its insistence upon the profound\r\nimportance of unconscious forces in determining not\r\nonly overt conduct but desire, judgment, belief, idealization.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eEvery moment of reaction and protest, however,\r\nusually accepts some of the basic ideas of the position\r\nagainst which it rebels. So the most popular forms of\r\nthe clinical psychology, those associated with the\r\nfounders of psycho-analysis, retain the notion of a separate\r\npsychic realm or force. They add a statement\r\npointing to facts of the utmost value, and which is\r\nequivalent to practical recognition of the dependence of\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg087\"\u003e[pg 087]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nmind upon habit and of habit upon social conditions.\r\nThis is the statement of the existence and operation of\r\nthe \"unconscious,\" of complexes due to contacts and\r\nconflicts with others, of the social censor. But they still\r\ncling to the idea of the separate psychic realm and so\r\nin effect talk about unconscious consciousness. They\r\nget their truths mixed up in theory with the false psychology\r\nof original individual consciousness, just as\r\nthe school of social psychologists does upon its side.\r\nTheir elaborate artificial explanations, like the mystic\r\ncollective mind, consciousness, over-soul, of social psychology,\r\nare due to failure to begin with the facts of\r\nhabit and custom.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhat then is meant by individual mind, by mind as\r\nindividual? In effect the reply has already been given.\r\nConflict of habits releases impulsive activities which in\r\ntheir manifestation require a modification of habit, of\r\ncustom and convention. That which was at first the individualized\r\ncolor or quality of habitual activity is abstracted,\r\nand becomes a center of activity aiming to\r\nreconstruct customs in accord with some desire which\r\nis rejected by the immediate situation and which therefore\r\nis felt to belong to one\u0027s self, to be the mark and\r\npossession of an individual in partial and temporary\r\nopposition to his environment. These general and necessarily\r\nvague statements will be made more definite in\r\nthe further discussion of impulse and intelligence. For\r\nimpulse when it asserts itself deliberately against an\r\nexisting custom is the beginning of individuality in\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg088\"\u003e[pg 088]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nmind. This beginning is developed and consolidated in\r\nthe observations, judgments, inventions which try to\r\ntransform the environment so that a variant, deviating\r\nimpulse may itself in turn become incarnated in objective\r\nhabit.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2 class=\"spaced\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg089\"\u003e[pg 089]\u003c/span\u003ePART TWO\u003cbr/\u003e\r\n\u003csmall\u003eTHE PLACE OF IMPULSE IN CONDUCT\u003c/small\u003e\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003eI\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eHabits as organized activities are secondary and\r\nacquired, not native and original. They are outgrowths\r\nof unlearned activities which are part of man\u0027s\r\nendowment at birth. The order of topics followed in\r\nour discussion may accordingly be questioned. Why\r\nshould what is derived and therefore in some sense artificial\r\nin conduct be discussed before what is primitive,\r\nnatural and inevitable? Why did we not set out with\r\nan examination of those instinctive activities upon\r\nwhich the acquisition of habits is conditioned?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe query is a natural one, yet it tempts to flinging\r\nforth a paradox. In conduct the acquired is the primitive.\r\nImpulses although first in time are never primary\r\nin fact; they are secondary and dependent. The\r\nseeming paradox in statement covers a familiar fact.\r\nIn the life of the individual, instinctive activity comes\r\nfirst. But an individual begins life as a baby, and\r\nbabies are dependent beings. Their activities could\r\ncontinue at most for only a few hours were it not for\r\nthe presence and aid of adults with their formed habits.\r\nAnd babies owe to adults more than procreation, more\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg090\"\u003e[pg 090]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthan the continued food and protection which preserve\r\nlife. They owe to adults the opportunity to express\r\ntheir native activities in ways which have meaning.\r\nEven if by some miracle original activity could continue\r\nwithout assistance from the organized skill and art of\r\nadults, it would not amount to anything. It would be\r\nmere sound and fury.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn short, the \u003cem\u003emeaning\u003c/em\u003e of native activities is not native;\r\nit is acquired. It depends upon interaction with\r\na matured social medium. In the case of a tiger or\r\neagle, anger may be identified with a serviceable life-activity,\r\nwith attack and defense. With a human being\r\nit is as meaningless as a gust of wind on a \u003cins class=\"corr\" title=\"mudpuddle\" id=\"Corr_090_\"\u003emud puddle\u003c/ins\u003e\r\napart from a direction given it by the presence of other\r\npersons, apart from the responses they make to it. It\r\nis a physical spasm, a blind dispersive burst of wasteful\r\nenergy. It gets quality, significance, when it becomes\r\na smouldering sullenness, an annoying interruption,\r\na peevish irritation, a murderous revenge, a blazing\r\nindignation. And although these phenomena which\r\nhave a meaning spring from original native reactions\r\nto stimuli, yet they depend also upon the responsive\r\nbehavior of others. They and all similar human displays\r\nof anger are not pure impulses; they are habits\r\nformed under the influence of association with others\r\nwho have habits already and who show their habits in\r\nthe treatment which converts a blind physical discharge\r\ninto a significant anger.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAfter ignoring impulses for a long time in behalf of\r\nsensations, modern psychology now tends to start out\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg091\"\u003e[pg 091]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwith an inventory and description of instinctive activities.\r\nThis is an undoubted improvement. But when\r\nit tries to explain complicated events in personal and\r\nsocial life by direct reference to these native powers,\r\nthe explanation becomes hazy and forced. It is like\r\nsaying the flea and the elephant, the lichen and the redwood,\r\nthe timid hare and the ravening wolf, the plant\r\nwith the most inconspicuous blossom and the plant with\r\nthe most glaring color are alike products of natural\r\nselection. There may be a sense in which the statement\r\nis true; but till we know the specific environing conditions\r\nunder which selection took place we really know\r\nnothing. And so we need to know about the social\r\nconditions which have educated original activities into\r\ndefinite and significant dispositions before we can discuss\r\nthe psychological element in society. This is the\r\ntrue meaning of social psychology.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAt some place on the globe, at some time, every kind\r\nof practice seems to have been tolerated or even praised.\r\nHow is the tremendous diversity of institutions (including\r\nmoral codes) to be accounted for? The native\r\nstock of instincts is practically the same everywhere.\r\nExaggerate as much as we like the native differences of\r\nPatagonians and Greeks, Sioux Indians and Hindoos,\r\nBushmen and Chinese, their original differences will bear\r\nno comparison to the amount of difference found in\r\ncustom and culture. Since such a diversity cannot be\r\nattributed to an original identity, the development of\r\nnative impulse must be stated in terms of acquired\r\nhabits, not the growth of customs in terms of instincts.\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg092\"\u003e[pg 092]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nThe wholesale human sacrifices of Peru and the tenderness\r\nof St. Francis, the cruelties of pirates and the\r\nphilanthropies of Howard, the practice of Suttee and\r\nthe cult of the Virgin, the war and peace dances of the\r\nComanches and the parliamentary institutions of the\r\nBritish, the communism of the \u003cins class=\"corr\" title=\"southsea\" id=\"Corr_092_\"\u003eSouthsea\u003c/ins\u003e islander and\r\nthe proprietary thrift of the Yankee, the magic of the\r\nmedicine man and the experiments of the chemist in his\r\nlaboratory, the non-resistance of Chinese and the aggressive\r\nmilitarism of an imperial Prussia, monarchy\r\nby divine right and government by the people; the\r\ncountless diversity of habits suggested by such a random\r\nlist springs from practically the same capital-stock\r\nof native instincts.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt would be pleasant if we could pick and choose\r\nthose institutions which we like and impute them to\r\nhuman nature, and the rest to some devil; or those we\r\nlike to our kind of human nature, and those we dislike\r\nto the nature of despised foreigners on the ground they\r\nare not really \"native\" at all. It would appear to be\r\nsimpler if we could point to certain customs, saying\r\nthat they are the unalloyed products of certain instincts,\r\nwhile those other social arrangements are to be\r\nattributed wholly to other impulses. But such methods\r\nare not feasible. The same original fears, angers, loves\r\nand hates are hopelessly entangled in the most opposite\r\ninstitutions. The thing we need to know is how a\r\nnative stock has been modified by interaction with different\r\nenvironments.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eYet it goes without saying that original, unlearned\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg093\"\u003e[pg 093]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nactivity has its distinctive place and that an important\r\none in conduct. Impulses are the pivots upon which\r\nthe re-organization of activities turn, they are agencies\r\nof deviation, for giving new directions to old habits\r\nand changing their quality. Consequently whenever\r\nwe are concerned with understanding social transition\r\nand flux or with projects for reform, personal and collective,\r\nour study must go to analysis of native tendencies.\r\nInterest in progress and reform is, indeed, the\r\nreason for the present great development of scientific\r\ninterest in primitive human nature. If we inquire why\r\nmen were so long blind to the existence of powerful and\r\nvaried instincts in human beings, the answer seems to\r\nbe found in the lack of a conception of orderly progress.\r\nIt is fast becoming incredible that psychologists disputed\r\nas to whether they should choose between innate\r\nideas and an empty, passive, wax-like mind. For it\r\nseems as if a glance at a child would have revealed that\r\nthe truth lay in neither doctrine, so obvious is the surging\r\nof specific native activities. But this obtuseness\r\nto facts was evidence of lack of interest in what could\r\nbe done with impulses, due, in turn, to lack of interest in\r\nmodifying existing institutions. It is no accident that\r\nmen became interested in the psychology of savages\r\nand babies when they became interested in doing away\r\nwith old institutions.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eA combination of traditional individualism with the\r\nrecent interest in progress explains why the discovery\r\nof the scope and force of instincts has led many psychologists\r\nto think of them as the fountain head of all\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg094\"\u003e[pg 094]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nconduct, as occupying a place before instead of after\r\nthat of habits. The orthodox tradition in psychology\r\nis built upon isolation of individuals from their surroundings.\r\nThe soul or mind or consciousness was\r\nthought of as self-contained and self-enclosed. Now in\r\nthe career of an individual if it is regarded as complete\r\nin itself instincts clearly come before habits. Generalize\r\nthis individualistic view, and we have an assumption\r\nthat all customs, all significant episodes in the life\r\nof individuals can be carried directly back to the operation\r\nof instincts.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut, as we have already noted, if an individual be\r\nisolated in this fashion, along with the fact of primacy\r\nof instinct we find also the fact of death. The inchoate\r\nand scattered impulses of an infant do not coordinate\r\ninto serviceable powers except through social dependencies\r\nand companionships. His impulses are merely\r\nstarting points for assimilation of the knowledge and\r\nskill of the more matured beings upon whom he depends.\r\nThey are tentacles sent out to gather that nutrition\r\nfrom customs which will in time render the infant capable\r\nof independent action. They are agencies for\r\ntransfer of existing social power into personal ability;\r\nthey are means of reconstructive growth. Abandon an\r\nimpossible individualistic psychology, and we arrive at\r\nthe fact that native activities are organs of re-organization\r\nand re-adjustment. The hen precedes the egg.\r\nBut nevertheless this particular egg may be so treated\r\nas to modify the future type of hen.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg095\"\u003e[pg 095]\u003c/span\u003eII\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn the case of the young it is patent that impulses\r\nare highly flexible starting points for activities which\r\nare diversified according to the ways in which they are\r\nused. Any impulse may become organized into almost\r\nany disposition according to the way it interacts with\r\nsurroundings. Fear may become abject cowardice,\r\nprudent caution, reverence for superiors or respect for\r\nequals; an agency for credulous swallowing of absurd\r\nsuperstitions or for wary scepticism. A man may be\r\nchiefly afraid of the spirits of his ancestors, of officials,\r\nof arousing the disapproval of his associates, of being\r\ndeceived, of fresh air, or of Bolshevism. The actual\r\noutcome depends upon how the impulse of fear is interwoven\r\nwith other impulses. This depends in turn upon\r\nthe outlets and inhibitions supplied by the social environment.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn a definite sense, then, a human society is always\r\nstarting afresh. It is always in process of renewing,\r\nand it endures only because of renewal. We speak of\r\nthe peoples of southern Europe as Latin peoples. Their\r\nexisting languages depart widely from one another and\r\nfrom the Latin mother tongue. Yet there never was a\r\nday when this alteration of speech was intentional or\r\nexplicit. Persons always meant to reproduce the speech\r\nthey heard from their elders and supposed they were\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg096\"\u003e[pg 096]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nsucceeding. This fact may stand as a kind of symbol\r\nof the reconstruction wrought in habits because of the\r\nfact that they can be transmitted and be made to endure\r\nonly through the medium of the crude activities\r\nof the young or through contact with persons having\r\ndifferent habits.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFor the most part, this continuous alteration has\r\nbeen unconscious and unintended. Immature, undeveloped\r\nactivity has succeeded in modifying adult organized\r\nactivity accidentally and surreptitiously. But\r\nwith the dawn of the idea of progressive betterment and\r\nan interest in new uses of impulses, there has grown\r\nup some consciousness of the extent to which a future\r\nnew society of changed purposes and desires may be\r\ncreated by a deliberate humane treatment of the impulses\r\nof youth. This is the meaning of education;\r\nfor a truly humane education consists in an intelligent\r\ndirection of native activities in the light of the possibilities\r\nand necessities of the social situation. But for\r\nthe most part, adults have given training rather than\r\neducation. An impatient, premature mechanization of\r\nimpulsive activity after the fixed pattern of adult habits\r\nof thought and affection has been desired. The combined\r\neffect of love of power, timidity in the face of the\r\nnovel and a self-admiring complacency has been too\r\nstrong to permit immature impulse to exercise its re-organizing\r\npotentialities. The younger generation\r\nhas hardly even knocked frankly at the door of adult\r\ncustoms, much less been invited in to rectify through\r\nbetter education the brutalities and inequities established\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg097\"\u003e[pg 097]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nin adult habits. Each new generation has crept\r\nblindly and furtively through such chance gaps as have\r\nhappened to be left open. Otherwise it has been modeled\r\nafter the old.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe have already noted how original plasticity is\r\nwarped and docility is taken mean advantage of. It\r\nhas been used to signify not capacity to learn liberally\r\nand generously, but willingness to learn the customs of\r\nadult associates, ability to learn just those special\r\nthings which those having power and authority wish\r\nto teach. Original modifiability has not been given a\r\nfair chance to act as a trustee for a better human life.\r\nIt has been loaded with convention, biased by adult\r\nconvenience. It has been practically rendered into an\r\nequivalent of non-assertion of originality, a pliant accommodation\r\nto the embodied opinions of others.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eConsequently docility has been identified with imitativeness,\r\ninstead of with power to re-make old habits,\r\nto re-create. Plasticity and originality have been opposed\r\nto each other. That the most precious part of\r\nplasticity consists in ability to form habits of independent\r\njudgment and of inventive initiation has been\r\nignored. For it demands a more complete and intense\r\ndocility to form flexible easily re-adjusted habits than\r\nit does to acquire those which rigidly copy the ways\r\nof others. In short, among the native activities of the\r\nyoung are some that work towards accommodation, assimilation,\r\nreproduction, and others that work toward\r\nexploration, discovery and creation. But the weight\r\nof adult custom has been thrown upon retaining\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg098\"\u003e[pg 098]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nand strengthening tendencies toward conformity, and\r\nagainst those which make for variation and independence.\r\nThe habits of the growing person are jealously\r\nkept within the limit of adult customs. The delightful\r\noriginality of the child is tamed. Worship of institutions\r\nand personages themselves lacking in imaginative\r\nforesight, versatile observation and liberal thought, is\r\nenforced.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eVery early in life sets of mind are formed without\r\nattentive thought, and these sets persist and control the\r\nmature mind. The child learns to avoid the shock of\r\nunpleasant disagreement, to find the easy way out,\r\nto appear to conform to customs which are wholly\r\nmysterious to him in order to get his own way\u0026mdash;that\r\nis to display some natural impulse without exciting the\r\nunfavorable notice of those in authority. Adults distrust\r\nthe intelligence which a child has while making\r\nupon him demands for a kind of conduct that requires\r\na high order of intelligence, if it is to be intelligent at\r\nall. The inconsistency is reconciled by instilling in him\r\n\"moral\" habits which have a maximum of emotional\r\nempressment and adamantine hold with a minimum of\r\nunderstanding. These habitudes, deeply engrained before\r\nthought is awake and even before the day of experiences\r\nwhich can later be recalled, govern conscious\r\nlater thought. They are usually deepest and most\r\nunget-at-able just where critical thought is most needed\u0026mdash;in\r\nmorals, religion and politics. These \"infantalisms\"\r\naccount for the mass of irrationalities that prevail\r\namong men of otherwise rational tastes. These\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg099\"\u003e[pg 099]\u003c/span\u003e\r\npersonal \"hang-overs\" are the cause of what the student\r\nof culture calls survivals. But unfortunately\r\nthese survivals are much more numerous and pervasive\r\nthan the anthropologist and historian are wont to admit.\r\nTo list them would perhaps oust one from \"respectable\"\r\nsociety.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAnd yet the intimation never wholly deserts us that\r\nthere is in the unformed activities of childhood and\r\nyouth the possibilities of a better life for the community\r\nas well as for individuals here and there. This\r\ndim sense is the ground of our abiding idealization of\r\nchildhood. For with all its extravagancies and uncertainties,\r\nits effusions and reticences, it remains a standing\r\nproof of a life wherein growth is normal not an\r\nanomaly, activity a delight not a task, and where habit-forming\r\nis an expansion of power not its shrinkage.\r\nHabit and impulse may war with each other, but it is\r\na combat between the habits of adults and the impulses\r\nof the young, and not, as with the adult, a civil warfare\r\nwhereby personality is rent asunder. Our usual\r\nmeasure for the \"goodness\" of children is the amount\r\nof trouble they make for grownups, which means of\r\ncourse the amount they deviate from adult habits and\r\nexpectations. Yet by way of expiation we envy children\r\ntheir love of new experiences, their intentness in\r\nextracting the last drop of significance from each situation,\r\ntheir vital seriousness in things that to us are\r\noutworn.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe compensate for the harshness and monotony\r\nof our present insistence upon formed habits by\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg100\"\u003e[pg 100]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nimagining a future heaven in which we too shall respond\r\nfreshly and generously to each incident of life. In\r\nconsequence of our divided attitude, our ideals are self-contradictory.\r\nOn the one hand, we dream of an attained\r\nperfection, an ultimate static goal, in which\r\neffort shall cease, and desire and execution be once and\r\nfor all in complete equilibrium. We wish for a character\r\nwhich shall be steadfast, and we then conceive this\r\ndesired faithfulness as something immutable, a character\r\nexactly the same yesterday, today and forever.\r\nBut we also have a sneaking sympathy for the courage\r\nof an Emerson in declaring that consistency should be\r\nthrown to the winds when it stands between us and the\r\nopportunities of present life. We reach out to the\r\nopposite extreme of our ideal of fixity, and under\r\nthe guise of a return to nature dream of a romantic\r\nfreedom, in which \u003cem\u003eall\u003c/em\u003e life is plastic to impulse, a continual\r\nsource of improvised spontaneities and novel inspirations.\r\nWe rebel against all organization and all\r\nstability. If modern thought and sentiment is to escape\r\nfrom this division in its ideals, it must be through\r\nutilizing released impulse as an agent of steady reorganization\r\nof custom and institutions.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhile childhood is the conspicuous proof of the\r\nrenewing of habit rendered possible by impulse, the\r\nlatter never wholly ceases to play its refreshing rôle\r\nin adult life. If it did, life would petrify, society stagnate.\r\nInstinctive reactions are sometimes too intense\r\nto be woven into a smooth pattern of habits. Under\r\nordinary circumstances they appear to be tamed to\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg101\"\u003e[pg 101]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nobey their master, custom. But extraordinary crises\r\nrelease them and they show by wild violent energy how\r\nsuperficial is the control of routine. The saying that\r\ncivilization is only skin deep, that a savage persists\r\nbeneath the clothes of a civilized man, is the common\r\nacknowledgment of this fact. At critical moments of\r\nunusual stimuli the emotional outbreak and rush of\r\ninstincts dominating all activity show how superficial\r\nis the modification which a rigid habit has been able to\r\neffect.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhen we face this fact in its general significance,\r\nwe confront one of the ominous aspects of the history\r\nof man. We realize how little the progress of man\r\nhas been the product of intelligent guidance, how\r\nlargely it has been a by-product of accidental upheavals,\r\neven though by an apologetic interest in behalf of\r\nsome privileged institution we later transmute chance\r\ninto providence. We have depended upon the clash of\r\nwar, the stress of revolution, the emergence of heroic\r\nindividuals, the impact of migrations generated by war\r\nand famine, the incoming of barbarians, to change established\r\ninstitutions. Instead of constantly utilizing\r\nunused impulse to effect continuous reconstruction, we\r\nhave waited till an accumulation of stresses suddenly\r\nbreaks through the dikes of custom.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is often supposed that as old persons die, so must\r\nold peoples. There are many facts in history to support\r\nthe belief. Decadence and degeneration seems to\r\nbe the rule as age increases. An irruption of some uncivilized\r\nhorde has then provided new blood and fresh\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg102\"\u003e[pg 102]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nlife\u0026mdash;so much so that history has been defined as a process\r\nof rebarbarization. In truth the analogy between\r\na person and a nation with respect to senescence and\r\ndeath is defective. A nation is always renewed by the\r\ndeath of its old constituents and the birth of those who\r\nare as young and fresh as ever were any individuals in\r\nthe hey-day of the nation\u0027s glory. Not the nation but\r\nits customs get old. Its institutions petrify into rigidity;\r\nthere is social arterial sclerosis. Then some people\r\nnot overburdened with elaborate and stiff habits\r\ntake up and carry on the moving process of life. The\r\nstock of fresh peoples is, however, approaching exhaustion.\r\nIt is not safe to rely upon this expensive\r\nmethod of renewing civilization. We need to discover\r\nhow to rejuvenate it from within. A normal perpetuation\r\nbecomes a fact in the degree in which impulse is\r\nreleased and habit is plastic to the transforming touch\r\nof impulse. When customs are flexible and youth is\r\neducated as youth and not as premature adulthood,\r\nno nation grows old.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThere always exists a goodly store of non-functioning\r\nimpulses which may be drawn upon. Their manifestation\r\nand utilization is called conversion or regeneration\r\nwhen it comes suddenly. But they may be\r\ndrawn upon continuously and moderately. Then we\r\ncall it learning or educative growth. Rigid custom\r\nsignifies not that there are no such impulses but that\r\nthey are not organically taken advantage of. As matter\r\nof fact, the stiffer and the more encrusted the customs,\r\nthe larger is the number of instinctive activities\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg103\"\u003e[pg 103]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthat find no regular outlet and that accordingly merely\r\nawait a chance to get an irregular, uncoordinated manifestation.\r\nRoutine habits never take up all the slack.\r\nThey apply only where conditions remain the same or\r\nrecur in uniform ways. They do not fit the unusual\r\nand novel.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eConsequently rigid moral codes that attempt to lay\r\ndown definite injunctions and prohibitions for every\r\noccasion in life turn out in fact loose and slack.\r\nStretch ten commandments or any other number as far\r\nas you will by ingenious exegesis, yet acts unprovided\r\nfor by them will occur. No elaboration of statute law\r\ncan forestall variant cases and the need of interpretation\r\n\u003ci lang=\"la\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003ead hoc\u003c/i\u003e. Moral and legal schemes that attempt\r\nthe impossible in the way of definite formulation compensate\r\nfor explicit strictness in some lines by implicit\r\nlooseness in others. The only truly severe code is the\r\none which foregoes codification, throwing responsibility\r\nfor judging each case upon the agents concerned, imposing\r\nupon them the burden of discovery and adaptation.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe relation which actually exists between undirected\r\ninstinct and over-organized custom is illustrated\r\nin the two views that are current about savage\r\nlife. The popular view looks at the savage as a wild\r\nman; as one who knows no controlling principles or\r\nrules of action, who freely follows his own impulse,\r\nwhim or desire whenever it seizes him and wherever it\r\ntakes him. Anthropologists are given to the opposed\r\nnotion. They view savages as bondsmen to custom.\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg104\"\u003e[pg 104]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nThey note the network of regulations that order his\r\nrisings-up and his sittings-down, his goings-out and\r\nhis comings-in. They conclude that in comparison\r\nwith civilized man the savage is a slave, governed by\r\nmany inflexible tribal habitudes in conduct and ideas.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe truth about savage life lies in a combination of\r\nthese two conceptions. Where customs exist they are\r\nof one pattern and binding on personal sentiment and\r\nthought to a degree unknown in civilized life. But since\r\nthey cannot possibly exist with respect to all the changing\r\ndetail of daily life, whatever is left uncovered by\r\ncustom is free from regulation. It is therefore left to\r\nappetite and momentary circumstance. Thus enslavement\r\nto custom and license of impulse exist side by side.\r\nStrict conformity and unrestrained wildness intensify\r\neach other. This picture of life shows us in an exaggerated\r\nform the psychology current in civilized life\r\nwhenever customs harden and hold individuals enmeshed.\r\nWithin civilization, the savage still exists. He\r\nis known in his degree by oscillation between loose indulgence\r\nand stiff habit.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eImpulse in short brings with itself the possibility\r\nbut not the assurance of a steady reorganization of\r\nhabits to meet new elements in new situations. The\r\nmoral problem in child and adult alike as regards impulse\r\nand instinct is to utilize them for formation of\r\nnew habits, or what is the same thing, the modification\r\nof an old habit so that it may be adequately serviceable\r\nunder novel conditions. The place of impulse in conduct\r\nas a pivot of re-adjustment, re-organization, in\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg105\"\u003e[pg 105]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nhabits may be defined as follows: On one side, it is\r\nmarked off from the territory of arrested and encrusted\r\nhabits. On the other side, it is demarcated from the\r\nregion in which impulse is a law unto itself.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_5_\" id=\"FNanchor_5_\" href=\"#Footnote_5_\" title=\"The use of the words instinct and impulse as practical equivalents is intentional, even though it may grieve critical readers. The word instinct taken alone is still too laden with the older notion that an instinct is always definitely organized and adapted\u0026mdash;which for the most part is just what it is not in human beings. The word impulse suggests something primitive, yet loose, undirected, initial. …\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[5]\u003c/a\u003e Generalizing\r\nthese distinctions, a valid moral theory contrasts\r\nwith all those theories which set up static goals (even\r\nwhen they are called perfection), and with those theories\r\nwhich idealize raw impulse and find in its spontaneities\r\nan adequate mode of human freedom. Impulse\r\nis a source, an indispensable source, of liberation;\r\nbut only as it is employed in giving habits pertinence\r\nand freshness does it liberate power.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg106\"\u003e[pg 106]\u003c/span\u003eIII\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIncidentally we have touched upon a most far-reaching\r\nproblem: The alterability of human nature. Early\r\nreformers, following John Locke, were inclined to minimize\r\nthe significance of native activities, and to emphasize\r\nthe possibilities inherent in practice and habit-acquisition.\r\nThere was a political slant to this denial\r\nof the native and a priori, this magnifying of the accomplishments\r\nof acquired experience. It held out a\r\nprospect of continuous development, of improvement\r\nwithout end. Thus writers like Helvetius made the idea\r\nof the complete malleability of a human nature which\r\noriginally is wholly empty and passive, the basis for\r\nasserting the omnipotence of education to shape human\r\nsociety, and the ground of proclaiming the infinite perfectibility\r\nof mankind.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWary, experienced men of the world have always\r\nbeen sceptical of schemes of unlimited improvement.\r\nThey tend to regard plans for social change with an\r\neye of suspicion. They find in them evidences of the\r\nproneness of youth to illusion, or of incapacity on the\r\npart of those who have grown old to learn anything\r\nfrom experience. This type of conservative has\r\nthought to find in the doctrine of native instincts a\r\nscientific support for asserting the practical unalterability\r\nof human nature. Circumstances may change,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg107\"\u003e[pg 107]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nbut human nature remains from age to age the same.\r\nHeredity is more potent than environment, and human\r\nheredity is untouched by human intent. Effort for a\r\nserious alteration of human institutions is utopian. As\r\nthings have been so they will be. The more they change\r\nthe more they remain the same.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eCuriously enough both parties rest their case upon\r\njust the factor which when it is analyzed weakens their\r\nrespective conclusions. That is to say, the radical reformer\r\nrests his contention in behalf of easy and rapid\r\nchange upon the psychology of habits, of institutions\r\nin shaping raw nature, and the conservative grounds\r\nhis counter-assertion upon the psychology of instincts.\r\nAs matter of fact, it is precisely custom which has\r\ngreatest inertia, which is least susceptible of alteration;\r\nwhile instincts are most readily modifiable through use,\r\nmost subject to educative direction. The conservative\r\nwho begs scientific support from the psychology of instincts\r\nis the victim of an outgrown psychology which\r\nderived its notion of instinct from an exaggeration of\r\nthe fixity and certainty of the operation of instincts\r\namong the lower animals. He is a victim of a popular\r\nzoology of the bird, bee and beaver, which was largely\r\nframed to the greater glory of God. He is ignorant\r\nthat instincts in the animals are less infallible and definite\r\nthan is supposed, and also that the human being\r\ndiffers from the lower animals in precisely the fact that\r\nhis native activities lack the complex ready-made organization\r\nof the animals\u0027 original abilities.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut the short-cut revolutionist fails to realize the\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg108\"\u003e[pg 108]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nfull force of the things about which he talks most,\r\nnamely institutions as embodied habits. Any one with\r\nknowledge of the stability and force of habit will hesitate\r\nto propose or prophesy rapid and sweeping social\r\nchanges. A social revolution may effect abrupt and\r\ndeep alterations in external customs, in legal and political\r\ninstitutions. But the habits that are behind\r\nthese institutions and that have, willy-nilly, been shaped\r\nby objective conditions, the habits of thought and feeling,\r\nare not so easily modified. They persist and insensibly\r\nassimilate to themselves the outer innovations\u0026mdash;much\r\nas American judges nullify the intended\r\nchanges of statute law by interpreting legislation in\r\nthe light of common law. The force of lag in human\r\nlife is enormous.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eActual social change is never so great as is apparent\r\nchange. Ways of belief, of expectation, of judgment\r\nand attendant emotional dispositions of like and dislike,\r\nare not easily modified after they have once taken\r\nshape. Political and legal institutions may be altered,\r\neven abolished; but the bulk of popular thought which\r\nhas been shaped to their pattern persists. This is why\r\nglowing predictions of the immediate coming of a social\r\nmillennium terminate so uniformly in disappointment,\r\nwhich gives point to the standing suspicion of\r\nthe cynical conservative about radical changes. Habits\r\nof thought outlive modifications in habits of overt\r\naction. The former are vital, the latter, without the\r\nsustaining life of the former, are muscular tricks. Consequently\r\nas a rule the moral effects of even great political\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg109\"\u003e[pg 109]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nrevolutions, after a few years of outwardly conspicuous\r\nalterations, do not show themselves till after\r\nthe lapse of years. A new generation must come upon\r\nthe scene whose habits of mind have been formed under\r\nthe new conditions. There is pith in the saying that\r\nimportant reforms cannot take real effect until after\r\na number of influential persons have died. Where general\r\nand enduring moral changes do accompany an\r\nexternal revolution it is because appropriate habits of\r\nthought have previously been insensibly matured. The\r\nexternal change merely registers the removal of an external\r\nsuperficial barrier to the operation of existing\r\nintellectual tendencies.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThose who argue that social and moral reform is\r\nimpossible on the ground that the Old Adam of human\r\nnature remains forever the same, attribute however to\r\nnative activities the permanence and inertia that in\r\ntruth belong only to acquired customs. To Aristotle\r\nslavery was rooted in aboriginal human nature. Native\r\ndistinctions of quality exist such that some persons\r\nare by nature gifted with power to plan, command and\r\nsupervise, and others possess merely capacity to obey\r\nand execute. Hence slavery is natural and inevitable.\r\nThere is error in supposing that because domestic and\r\nchattel slavery has been legally abolished, therefore\r\nslavery as conceived by Aristotle has disappeared. But\r\nmatters have at least progressed to a point where it is\r\nclear that slavery is a social state not a psychological\r\nnecessity. Nevertheless the worldlywise Aristotles of\r\ntoday assert that the institutions of war and the present\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg110\"\u003e[pg 110]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwage-system are so grounded in immutable human\r\nnature that effort to change them is foolish.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eLike Greek slavery or feudal serfdom, war and the\r\nexisting economic regime are social patterns woven out\r\nof the stuff of instinctive activities. Native human\r\nnature supplies the raw materials, but custom furnishes\r\nthe machinery and the designs. War would not be possible\r\nwithout anger, pugnacity, rivalry, self-display,\r\nand such like native tendencies. Activity inheres in\r\nthem and will persist under every condition of life. To\r\nimagine they can be eradicated is like supposing that\r\nsociety can go on without eating and without union of\r\nthe sexes. But to fancy that they must eventuate in\r\nwar is as if a savage were to believe that because he\r\nuses fibers having fixed natural properties in order to\r\nweave baskets, therefore his immemorial tribal patterns\r\nare also natural necessities and immutable forms.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFrom a humane standpoint our study of history is\r\nstill all too primitive. It is possible to study a multitude\r\nof histories, and yet permit history, the record of\r\nthe transitions and transformations of human activities,\r\nto escape us. Taking history in separate doses of this\r\ncountry and that, we take it as a succession of isolated\r\nfinalities, each one in due season giving way to another,\r\nas supernumeraries succeed one another in a march\r\nacross the stage. We thus miss the fact of history and\r\nalso its lesson; the diversity of institutional forms and\r\ncustoms which the same human nature may produce\r\nand employ. An infantile logic, now happily expelled\r\nfrom physical science, taught that opium put men to\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg111\"\u003e[pg 111]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nsleep because of its dormitive potency. We follow the\r\nsame logic in social matters when we believe that war\r\nexists because of bellicose instincts; or that a particular\r\neconomic regime is necessary because of acquisitive\r\nand competitive impulses which must find expression.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003ePugnacity and fear are no more native than are\r\npity and sympathy. The important thing morally is\r\nthe way these native tendencies interact, for their interaction\r\nmay give a chemical transformation not a mechanical\r\ncombination. Similarly, no social institution\r\nstands alone as a product of one dominant force. It is\r\na phenomenon or function of a multitude of social factors\r\nin their mutual inhibitions and reinforcements. If\r\nwe follow an infantile logic we shall reduplicate the\r\nunity of result in an assumption of unity of force behind\r\nit\u0026mdash;as men once did with natural events employing\r\nteleology as an exhibition of causal efficiency. We thus\r\ntake the same social custom twice over: once as an\r\nexisting fact and then as an original force which produced\r\nthe fact, and utter sage platitudes about the\r\nunalterable workings of human nature or of race. As\r\nwe account for war by pugnacity, for the capitalistic\r\nsystem by the necessity of an incentive of gain to stir\r\nambition and effort, so we account for Greece by power\r\nof esthetic observation, Rome by administrative ability,\r\nthe middle ages by interest in religion and so on. We\r\nhave constructed an elaborate political zoology as\r\nmythological and not nearly as poetic as the other\r\nzoology of ph\u0026oelig;nixes, griffins and unicorns. Native\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg112\"\u003e[pg 112]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nracial spirit, the spirit of the people or of the time,\r\nnational destiny are familiar figures in this social zoo.\r\nAs names for effects, for existing customs, they are\r\nsometimes useful. As names for explanatory forces\r\nthey work havoc with intelligence.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAn immense debt is due William James for the mere\r\ntitle of his essay: The Moral Equivalents of War. It\r\nreveals with a flash of light the true psychology.\r\nClans, tribes, races, cities, empires, nations, states have\r\nmade war. The argument that this fact proves an\r\nineradicable belligerent instinct which makes war forever\r\ninevitable is much more respectable than many\r\narguments about the immutability of this and that\r\nsocial tradition. For it has the weight of a certain\r\nempirical generality back of it. Yet the suggestion of\r\nan \u003cem\u003eequivalent\u003c/em\u003e for war calls attention to the medley of\r\nimpulses which are casually bunched together under the\r\ncaption of belligerent impulse; and it calls attention to\r\nthe fact that the elements of this medley may be woven\r\ntogether into many differing types of activity, some\r\nof which may function the native impulses in much\r\nbetter ways than war has ever done.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003ePugnacity, rivalry, vainglory, love of booty, fear,\r\nsuspicion, anger, desire for freedom from the conventions\r\nand restrictions of peace, love of power and\r\nhatred of oppression, opportunity for novel displays,\r\nlove of home and soil, attachment to one\u0027s people and\r\nto the altar and the hearth, courage, loyalty, opportunity\r\nto make a name, money or a career, affection,\r\npiety to ancestors and ancestral gods\u0026mdash;all of these\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg113\"\u003e[pg 113]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthings and many more make up the war-like force. To\r\nsuppose there is some one unchanging native force which\r\ngenerates war is as naive as the usual assumption that\r\nour enemy is actuated solely by the meaner of the tendencies\r\nnamed and we only by the nobler. In earlier\r\ndays there was something more than a verbal connection\r\nbetween pugnacity and fighting; anger and fear\r\nmoved promptly through the fists. But between a\r\nloosely organized pugilism and the highly organized\r\nwarfare of today there intervenes a long economic,\r\nscientific and political history. Social conditions\r\nrather than an old and unchangeable Adam have generated\r\nwars; the ineradicable impulses that are utilized\r\nin them are capable of being drafted into many other\r\nchannels. The century that has witnessed the triumph\r\nof the scientific doctrine of the convertibility of natural\r\nenergies ought not to balk at the lesser miracle of\r\nsocial equivalences and substitutes.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is likely that if Mr. James had witnessed the world\r\nwar, he would have modified his mode of treatment. So\r\nmany new transformations entered into the war, that\r\nthe war seems to prove that though an equivalent has\r\nnot been found for war, the psychological forces traditionally\r\nassociated with it have already undergone\r\nprofound changes. We may take the Iliad as a classic\r\nexpression of war\u0027s traditional psychology as well as\r\nthe source of the literary tradition regarding its motives\r\nand glories. But where are Helen, Hector and\r\nAchilles in modern warfare? The activities that evoke\r\nand incorporate a war are no longer personal love,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg114\"\u003e[pg 114]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nlove of glory, or the soldier\u0027s love of his own privately\r\namassed booty, but are of a collective, prosaic political\r\nand economic nature.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eUniversal conscription, the general mobilization of\r\nall agricultural and industrial forces of the folk not\r\nengaged in the trenches, the application of every conceivable\r\nscientific and mechanical device, the mass\r\nmovements of soldiery regulated from a common center\r\nby a depersonalized general staff: these factors relegate\r\nthe traditional psychological apparatus of war to a\r\nnow remote antiquity. The motives once appealed to\r\nare out of date; they do not now induce war. They\r\nsimply are played upon after war has been brought\r\ninto existence in order to keep the common soldiers\r\nkeyed up to their task. The more horrible a depersonalized\r\nscientific mass war becomes, the more necessary\r\nit is to find universal ideal motives to justify it.\r\nLove of Helen of Troy has become a burning love for\r\nall humanity, and hatred of the foe symbolizes a hatred\r\nof all the unrighteousness and injustice and oppression\r\nwhich he embodies. The more prosaic the actual causes,\r\nthe more necessary is it to find glowingly sublime\r\nmotives.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSuch considerations hardly prove that war is to be\r\nabolished at some future date. But they destroy that\r\nargument for its necessary continuance which is based\r\non the immutability of specified forces in original human\r\nnature. Already the forces that once caused wars have\r\nfound other outlets for themselves; while new provocations,\r\nbased on new economic and political conditions,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg115\"\u003e[pg 115]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nhave come into being. War is thus seen to be a function\r\nof social institutions, not of what is natively fixed in\r\nhuman constitution. The last great war has not, it\r\nmust be confessed, made the problem of finding social\r\nequivalents simpler and easier. It is now naive to attribute\r\nwar to specific isolable human impulses for\r\nwhich separate channels of expression may be found,\r\nwhile the rest of life is left to go on about the same.\r\nA general social re-organization is needed which will\r\nredistribute forces, immunize, divert and nullify. Hinton\r\nwas doubtless right when he wrote that the only\r\nway to abolish war was to make peace heroic. It now\r\nappears that the heroic emotions are not anything\r\nwhich may be specialized in a side-line, so that the war-impulses\r\nmay find a sublimation in special practices\r\nand occupations. They have to get an outlet in all the\r\ntasks of peace.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe argument for the abiding necessity of war turns\r\nout, accordingly, to have this much value. It makes us\r\nwisely suspicious of all cheap and easy equivalencies.\r\nIt convinces us of the folly of striving to eliminate war\r\nby agencies which leave other institutions of society\r\npretty much unchanged. History does not prove the\r\ninevitability of war, but it does prove that customs and\r\ninstitutions which organize native powers into certain\r\npatterns in politics and economics will also generate the\r\nwar-pattern. The problem of war is difficult because it\r\nis serious. It is none other than the wider problem of\r\nthe effective moralizing or humanizing of native impulses\r\nin times of peace.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg116\"\u003e[pg 116]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nThe case of economic institutions is as suggestive as\r\nthat of war. The present system is indeed much more\r\nrecent and more local than is the institution of war. But\r\nno system has ever as yet existed which did not in some\r\nform involve the exploitation of some human beings\r\nfor the advantage of others. And it is argued that this\r\ntrait is unassailable because it flows from the inherent,\r\nimmutable qualities of human nature. It is argued, for\r\nexample, that economic inferiorities and disabilities are\r\nincidents of an institution of private property which\r\nflows from an original proprietary instinct; it is contended\r\nthey spring from a competitive struggle for\r\nwealth which in turn flows from the absolute need of\r\nprofit as an inducement to industry. The pleas are\r\nworth examination for the light they throw upon the\r\nplace of impulses in organized conduct.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNo unprejudiced observer will lightly deny the existence\r\nof an original tendency to assimilate objects and\r\nevents to the self, to make them part of the \"me.\" We\r\nmay even admit that the \"me\" cannot exist without\r\nthe \"mine.\" The self gets solidity and form through\r\nan appropriation of things which identifies them with\r\nwhatever we call myself. Even a workman in a modern\r\nfactory where depersonalization is extreme gets to have\r\n\"his\" machine and is perturbed at a change. Possession\r\nshapes and consolidates the \"I\" of philosophers.\r\n\"I own, therefore I am\" expresses a truer psychology\r\nthan the Cartesian \"I think, therefore I am.\" A man\u0027s\r\ndeeds are imputed to him as their owner, not merely\r\nas their creator. That he cannot disown them when\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg117\"\u003e[pg 117]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe moment of their occurrence passes is the root of\r\nresponsibility, moral as well as legal.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut these same considerations evince the versatility\r\nof possessive activity. My worldly goods, my good\r\nname, my friends, my honor and shame all depend upon\r\na possessive tendency. The need for appropriation has\r\nhad to be satisfied; but only a calloused imagination\r\nfancies that the institution of private property as it\r\nexists A.\u0026nbsp;D. 1921 is the sole or the indispensable means\r\nof its realization. Every gallant life is an experiment\r\nin different ways of fulfilling it. It expends itself in\r\npredatory aggression, in forming friendships, in seeking\r\nfame, in literary creation, in scientific production.\r\nIn the face of this elasticity, it requires an arrogant ignorance\r\nto take the existing complex system of stocks\r\nand bonds, of wills and inheritance, a system supported\r\nat every point by manifold legal and political arrangements,\r\nand treat it as the sole legitimate and baptized\r\nchild of an instinct of appropriation. Sometimes, even\r\nnow, a man most accentuates the fact of ownership\r\nwhen he gives something away; use, consumption, is\r\nthe normal end of possession. We can conceive a state\r\nof things in which the proprietary impulse would get\r\nfull satisfaction by holding goods as mine in just the\r\ndegree in which they were visibly administered for a\r\nbenefit in which a corporate community shared.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eDoes the case stand otherwise with the other psychological\r\nprinciple appealed to, namely, the need of an\r\nincentive of personal profit to keep men engaged in\r\nuseful work? We need not content ourselves with pointing\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg118\"\u003e[pg 118]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nout the elasticity of the idea of gain, and possible\r\nequivalences for pecuniary gain, and the possibility of a\r\nstate of affairs in which only those things would be\r\ncounted personal gains which profit a group. It will\r\nadvance the discussion if we instead subject to analysis\r\nthe whole conception of incentive and motive.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThere is doubtless some sense in saying that every\r\nconscious act has an incentive or motive. But this\r\nsense is as truistic as that of the not dissimilar saying\r\nthat every event has a cause. Neither statement throws\r\nany light on any particular occurrence. It is at most\r\na maxim which advises us to search for some other fact\r\nwith which the one in question may be correlated.\r\nThose who attempt to defend the necessity of existing\r\neconomic institutions as manifestations of human nature\r\nconvert this suggestion of a concrete inquiry into\r\na generalized truth and hence into a definitive falsity.\r\nThey take the saying to mean that nobody would do\r\nanything, or at least anything of use to others, without\r\na prospect of some tangible reward. And beneath\r\nthis false proposition there is another assumption still\r\nmore monstrous, namely, that man exists naturally in a\r\nstate of rest so that he requires some external force\r\nto set him into action.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe idea of a thing intrinsically wholly inert in the\r\nsense of absolutely passive is expelled from physics and\r\nhas taken refuge in the psychology of current economics.\r\nIn truth man acts anyway, he can\u0027t help acting.\r\nIn every fundamental sense it is false that a man requires\r\na motive to make him do something. To a\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg119\"\u003e[pg 119]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nhealthy man inaction is the greatest of woes. Any one\r\nwho observes children knows that while periods of rest\r\nare natural, laziness is an acquired vice\u0026mdash;or virtue.\r\nWhile a man is awake he will do something, if only to\r\nbuild castles in the air. If we like the form of words\r\nwe may say that a man eats only because he is\r\n\"moved\" by hunger. The statement is nevertheless\r\nmere tautology. For what does hunger mean except\r\nthat one of the things which man does naturally, instinctively,\r\nis to search for food\u0026mdash;that his activity naturally\r\nturns that way? Hunger primarily names an\r\nact or active process not a motive to an act. It is an\r\nact if we take it grossly, like a babe\u0027s blind hunt for the\r\nmother\u0027s breast; it is an activity if we take it minutely\r\nas a chemico-physiological occurrence.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe whole concept of motives is in truth extra-psychological.\r\nIt is an outcome of the attempt of men\r\nto influence human action, first that of others, then of\r\na man to influence his own behavior. No sensible person\r\nthinks of attributing the acts of an animal or an idiot\r\nto a motive. We call a biting dog ugly, but we don\u0027t\r\nlook for his motive in biting. If however we were able\r\nto direct the dog\u0027s action by inducing him to reflect\r\nupon his acts, we should at once become interested in\r\nthe dog\u0027s motives for acting as he does, and should\r\nendeavor to get him interested in the same subject. It\r\nis absurd to ask what induces a man to activity generally\r\nspeaking. He is an active being and that is all\r\nthere is to be said on that score. But when we want\r\nto get him to act in this specific way rather than in\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg120\"\u003e[pg 120]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthat, when we want to direct his activity that is to say\r\nin a specified channel, then the question of motive is\r\npertinent. A motive is then that element in the total\r\ncomplex of a man\u0027s activity which, if it can be sufficiently\r\nstimulated, will result in an act having specified\r\nconsequences. And part of the process of intensifying\r\n(or reducing) certain elements in the total activity\r\nand thus regulating actual consequence is to impute\r\nthese elements to a person as his actuating motives.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eA child naturally grabs food. But he does it in our\r\npresence. His manner is socially displeasing and we\r\nattribute to his act, up to this time wholly innocent,\r\nthe motive of greed or selfishness. Greediness simply\r\nmeans the quality of his act as socially observed and\r\ndisapproved. But by attributing it to him as his motive\r\nfor acting in the disapproved way, we induce him\r\nto refrain. We analyze his total act and call his attention\r\nto an obnoxious element in its outcome. A child\r\nwith equal spontaneity, or thoughtlessness, gives way\r\nto others. We point out to him with approval that he\r\nacted considerately, generously. And this quality of\r\naction when noted and encouraged becomes a reinforcing\r\nstimulus of that factor which will induce similar\r\nacts in the future. An element in an act viewed as a\r\ntendency to produce such and such consequences is a\r\nmotive. A motive does not exist prior to an act and\r\nproduce it. It is an act \u003cem\u003eplus\u003c/em\u003e a judgment upon some\r\nelement of it, the judgment being made in the light of\r\nthe consequences of the act.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg121\"\u003e[pg 121]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nAt first, as was said, others characterize an act with\r\nfavorable or condign qualities which they impute to an\r\nagent\u0027s character. They react in this fashion in order\r\nto encourage him in future acts of the same sort, or in\r\norder to dissuade him\u0026mdash;in short to build or destroy a\r\nhabit. This characterization is part of the technique\r\nof influencing the development of character and conduct.\r\nIt is a refinement of the ordinary reactions of\r\npraise and blame. After a time and to some extent,\r\na person teaches himself to think of the results of acting\r\nin this way or that before he acts. He recalls that\r\nif he acts this way or that some observer, real or imaginary,\r\nwill attribute to him noble or mean disposition,\r\nvirtuous or vicious motive. Thus he learns to influence\r\nhis own conduct. An inchoate activity taken\r\nin this forward-looking reference to results, especially\r\nresults of approbation and condemnation, constitutes\r\na motive. Instead then of saying that a man requires\r\na motive in order to induce him to act, we should say\r\nthat when a man is going to act he needs to know \u003cem\u003ewhat\u003c/em\u003e\r\nhe is going to do\u0026mdash;what the quality of his act is in\r\nterms of consequences to follow. In order to act properly\r\nhe needs to view his act as others view it; namely,\r\nas a manifestation of a character or will which is good\r\nor bad according as it is bent upon specific things which\r\nare desirable or obnoxious. There is no call to furnish\r\na man with incentives to activity in general. But there\r\nis every need to induce him to guide his own action by\r\nan intelligent perception of its results. For in the long\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg122\"\u003e[pg 122]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nrun this is the most effective way of influencing activity\r\nto take this desirable direction rather than that objectionable\r\none.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eA motive in short is simply an impulse viewed as a\r\nconstituent in a habit, a factor in a disposition. In\r\ngeneral its meaning is simple. But in fact motives are\r\nas numerous as are original impulsive activities multiplied\r\nby the diversified consequences they produce as\r\nthey operate under diverse conditions. How then does\r\nit come about that current economic psychology has so\r\ntremendously oversimplified the situation? Why does\r\nit recognize but one type of motive, that which concerns\r\npersonal gain. Of course part of the answer is\r\nto be found in the natural tendency in all sciences\r\ntoward a substitution of artificial conceptual simplifications\r\nfor the tangles of concrete empirical facts. But\r\nthe significant part of the answer has to do with the\r\nsocial conditions under which work is done, conditions\r\nwhich are such as to put an unnatural emphasis upon\r\nthe prospect of reward. It exemplifies again our leading\r\nproposition that social customs are not direct and\r\nnecessary consequences of specific impulses, but that\r\nsocial institutions and expectations shape and crystallize\r\nimpulses into dominant habits.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe social peculiarity which explains the emphasis\r\nput upon profit as an inducement to productive serviceable\r\nwork stands out in high relief in the identification\r\nof work with labor. For labor means in economic\r\ntheory something painful, something so onerously disagreeable\r\nor \"costly\" that every individual avoids it\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg123\"\u003e[pg 123]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nif he can, and engages in it only because of the promise\r\nof an overbalancing gain. Thus the question we are\r\ninvited to consider is what the social condition is which\r\nmakes productive work uninteresting and toilsome.\r\nWhy is the psychology of the industrialist so different\r\nfrom that of inventor, explorer, artist, sportsman,\r\nscientific investigator, physician, teacher? For the\r\nlatter we do not assert that activity is such a burdensome\r\nsacrifice that it is engaged in only because men are\r\nbribed to act by hope of reward or are coerced by fear\r\nof loss.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe social conditions under which \"labor\" is undertaken\r\nhave become so uncongenial to human nature that\r\nit is not undertaken because of intrinsic meaning. It is\r\ncarried on under conditions which render it immediately\r\nirksome. The alleged need of an incentive to stir\r\nmen out of quiescent inertness is the need of an incentive\r\npowerful enough to overcome contrary stimuli\r\nwhich proceed from the social conditions. Circumstances\r\nof productive service now shear away direct\r\nsatisfaction from those engaging in it. A real and\r\nimportant fact is thus contained in current economic\r\npsychology, but it is a fact about existing industrial\r\nconditions and not a fact about native, original\r\nactivity.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is \"natural\" for activity to be agreeable. It\r\ntends to find \u003cins class=\"corr\" title=\"fulfillment\" id=\"Corr_123_\"\u003efulfilment\u003c/ins\u003e, and finding an outlet is itself\r\nsatisfactory, for it marks partial accomplishment. If\r\nproductive activity has become so inherently unsatisfactory\r\nthat men have to be artificially induced to\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg124\"\u003e[pg 124]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nengage in it, this fact is ample proof that the conditions\r\nunder which work is carried on balk the complex\r\nof activities instead of promoting them, irritate and\r\nfrustrate natural tendencies instead of carrying them\r\nforward to fruition. Work then becomes labor, the\r\nconsequence of some aboriginal curse which forces man\r\nto do what he would not do if he could help it, the outcome\r\nof some original sin which excluded man from a\r\nparadise in which desire was satisfied without industry,\r\ncompelling him to pay for the means of livelihood with\r\nthe sweat of his brow. From which it follows naturally\r\nthat Paradise Regained means the accumulation of investments\r\nsuch that a man can live upon their return\r\nwithout labor. There is, we repeat, too much truth in\r\nthis picture. But it is not a truth concerning original\r\nhuman nature and activity. It concerns the form\r\nhuman impulses have taken under the influence of a\r\nspecific social environment. If there are difficulties\r\nin the way of social alteration\u0026mdash;as there certainly are\u0026mdash;they\r\ndo not lie in an original aversion of human nature\r\nto serviceable action, but in the historic conditions\r\nwhich have differentiated the work of the laborer for\r\nwage from that of the artist, adventurer, sportsman,\r\nsoldier, administrator and speculator.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg125\"\u003e[pg 125]\u003c/span\u003eIV\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWar and the existing economic regime have not been\r\ndiscussed primarily on their own account. They are\r\ncrucial cases of the relation existing between original\r\nimpulse and acquired habit. They are so fraught with\r\nevil consequences that any one who is disposed can heap\r\nup criticisms without end. Nevertheless they persist.\r\nThis persistence constitutes the case for the conservative\r\nwho argues that such institutions are rooted in an\r\nunalterable human nature. A truer psychology locates\r\nthe difficulty elsewhere. It shows that the trouble lies\r\nin the inertness of established habit. No matter how\r\naccidental and irrational the circumstances of its\r\norigin, no matter how different the conditions which\r\nnow exist to those under which the habit was formed,\r\nthe latter persists until the environment obstinately\r\nrejects it. Habits once formed perpetuate themselves,\r\nby acting unremittingly upon the native stock of activities.\r\nThey stimulate, inhibit, intensify, weaken, select,\r\nconcentrate and organize the latter into their own likeness.\r\nThey create out of the formless void of impulses\r\na world made in their own image. Man is a creature of\r\nhabit, not of reason nor yet of instinct.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eRecognition of the correct psychology locates the\r\nproblem but does not guarantee its solution. Indeed,\r\nat first sight it seems to indicate that every attempt to\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg126\"\u003e[pg 126]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nsolve the problem and secure fundamental reorganizations\r\nis caught in a vicious circle. For the direction\r\nof native activity depends upon acquired habits, and\r\nyet acquired habits can be modified only by redirection\r\nof impulses. Existing institutions impose their stamp,\r\ntheir superscription, upon impulse and instinct. They\r\nembody the modifications the latter have undergone.\r\nHow then can we get leverage for changing institutions?\r\nHow shall impulse exercise that re-adjusting\r\noffice which has been claimed for it? Shall we not have\r\nto depend in the future as in the past upon upheaval and\r\naccident to dislocate customs so as to release impulses\r\nto serve as points of departure for new habits?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe existing psychology of the industrial worker for\r\nexample is slack, irresponsible, combining a maximum\r\nof mechanical routine with a maximum of explosive,\r\nunregulated impulsiveness. These things have been\r\nbred by the existing economic system. But they exist,\r\nand are formidable obstacles to social change. We\r\ncannot breed in men the desire to get something for\r\nas nearly nothing as possible and in the end not pay\r\nthe price. We satisfy ourselves cheaply by preaching\r\nthe charm of productivity and by blaming the inherent\r\nselfishness of human nature, and urging some great\r\nmoral and religious revival. The evils point in reality\r\nto the necessity of a change in economic institutions,\r\nbut meantime they offer serious obstacles to the\r\nchange. At the same time, the existing economic system\r\nhas enlisted in behalf of its own perpetuity the\r\nmanagerial and the technological abilities which must\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg127\"\u003e[pg 127]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nserve the cause of the laborer if he is to be emancipated.\r\nIn the face of these difficulties other persons seek an\r\nequally cheap satisfaction in the thought of universal\r\ncivil war and revolution.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIs there any way out of the vicious circle? In the\r\nfirst place, there are possibilities resident in the education\r\nof the young which have never yet been taken\r\nadvantage of. The idea of universal education is as\r\nyet hardly a century old, and it is still much more of\r\nan idea than a fact, when we take into account the\r\nearly age at which it terminates for the mass. Also,\r\nthus far schooling has been largely utilized as a convenient\r\ntool of the existing nationalistic and economic\r\nregimes. Hence it is easy to point out defects and\r\nperversions in every existing school system. It is easy\r\nfor a critic to ridicule the religious devotion to education\r\nwhich has characterized for example the American\r\nrepublic. It is easy to represent it as zeal without\r\nknowledge, fanatical faith apart from understanding.\r\nAnd yet the cold fact of the situation is that the chief\r\nmeans of continuous, graded, economical improvement\r\nand social rectification lies in utilizing the opportunities\r\nof educating the young to modify prevailing types\r\nof thought and desire.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe young are not as yet as subject to the full impact\r\nof established customs. Their life of impulsive\r\nactivity is vivid, flexible, experimenting, curious.\r\nAdults have their habits formed, fixed, at least comparatively.\r\nThey are the subjects, not to say victims,\r\nof an environment which they can directly change only\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg128\"\u003e[pg 128]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nby a maximum of effort and disturbance. They may\r\nnot be able to perceive clearly the needed changes, or\r\nbe willing to pay the price of effecting them. Yet they\r\nwish a different life for the generation to come. In\r\norder to realize that wish they may create a special\r\nenvironment whose main function is education. In\r\norder that education of the young be efficacious in inducing\r\nan improved society, it is not necessary for\r\nadults to have a formulated definite ideal of some better\r\nstate. An educational enterprise conducted in this\r\nspirit would probably end merely in substituting one\r\nrigidity for another. What is necessary is that habits\r\nbe formed which are more intelligent, more sensitively\r\npercipient, more informed with foresight, more aware\r\nof what they are about, more direct and sincere, more\r\nflexibly responsive than those now current. Then they\r\nwill meet their own problems and propose their own\r\nimprovements.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eEducative development of the young is not the only\r\nway in which the life of impulse may be employed to\r\neffect social ameliorations, though it is the least expensive\r\nand most orderly. No adult environment is all of\r\none piece. The more complex a culture is, the more\r\ncertain it is to include habits formed on differing, even\r\nconflicting patterns. Each custom may be rigid, unintelligent\r\nin itself, and yet this rigidity may cause it to\r\nwear upon others. The resulting attrition may release\r\nimpulse for new adventures. The present time is conspicuously\r\na time of such internal frictions and liberations.\r\nSocial life seems chaotic, unorganized, rather\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg129\"\u003e[pg 129]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthan too fixedly regimented. Political and legal institutions\r\nare now inconsistent with the habits that\r\ndominate friendly intercourse, science and art. Different\r\ninstitutions foster antagonistic impulses and\r\nform contrary dispositions.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf we had to wait upon exhortations and unembodied\r\n\"ideals\" to effect social alterations, we should indeed\r\nwait long. But the conflict of patterns involved in institutions\r\nwhich are inharmonious with one another is\r\nalready producing great changes. The significant\r\npoint is not whether modifications shall continue to\r\noccur, but whether they shall be characterized chiefly\r\nby uneasiness, discontent and blind antagonistic struggles,\r\nor whether intelligent direction may modulate the\r\nharshness of conflict, and turn the elements of disintegration\r\ninto a constructive synthesis. At all events,\r\nthe social situation in \"advanced\" countries is such\r\nas to impart an air of absurdity to our insistence upon\r\nthe rigidity of customs. There are plenty of persons\r\nto tell us that the real trouble lies in lack of fixity of\r\nhabit and principle; in departure from immutable\r\nstandards and structures constituted once for all. We\r\nare told that we are suffering from an excess of instinct,\r\nand from laxity of habit due to surrender to impulse\r\nas a law of life. The remedy is said to be to return\r\nfrom contemporary fluidity to the stable and spacious\r\npatterns of a classic antiquity that observed law and\r\nproportion: for somehow antiquity is always classic.\r\nWhen instability, uncertainty, erratic change are diffused\r\nthroughout the situation, why dwell upon the\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg130\"\u003e[pg 130]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nevils of fixed habit and the need of release of impulse\r\nas an initiator of reorganizations? Why not rather\r\ncondemn impulse and exalt habits of reverencing order\r\nand fixed truth?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe question is natural, but the remedy suggested\r\nis futile. It is not easy to exaggerate the extent to\r\nwhich we now pass from one kind of nurture to\r\nanother as we go from business to church, from science\r\nto the newspaper, from business to art, from companionship\r\nto politics, from home to school. An individual\r\nis now subjected to many conflicting schemes of\r\neducation. Hence habits are divided against one another,\r\npersonality is disrupted, the scheme of conduct\r\nis confused and disintegrated. But the remedy lies in\r\nthe development of a new morale which can be attained\r\nonly as released impulses are intelligently employed to\r\nform harmonious habits adapted to one another in a\r\nnew situation. A laxity due to decadence of old habits\r\ncannot be corrected by exhortations to restore old\r\nhabits in their former rigidity. Even though it were\r\nabstractly desirable it is impossible. And it is not desirable\r\nbecause the inflexibility of old habits is precisely\r\nthe chief cause of their decay and disintegration.\r\nPlaintive lamentations at the prevalence of change and\r\nabstract appeals for restoration of senile authority are\r\nsigns of personal feebleness, of inability to cope with\r\nchange. It is a \"defense reaction.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg131\"\u003e[pg 131]\u003c/span\u003eV\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe may sum up the discussion in a few generalized\r\nstatements. In the first place, it is unscientific to try\r\nto restrict original activities to a definite number of\r\nsharply demarcated classes of instincts. And the practical\r\nresult of this attempt is injurious. To classify\r\nis, indeed, as useful as it is natural. The indefinite\r\nmultitude of particular and changing events is met by\r\nthe mind with acts of defining, inventorying and listing,\r\nreducing to common heads and tying up in bunches.\r\nBut these acts like other intelligent acts are performed\r\nfor a purpose, and the accomplishment of purpose is\r\ntheir only justification. Speaking generally, the purpose\r\nis to facilitate our dealings with unique individuals\r\nand changing events. When we assume that our\r\nclefts and bunches represent fixed separations and collections\r\n\u003ci lang=\"la\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003ein rerum natura\u003c/i\u003e, we obstruct rather than aid\r\nour transactions with things. We are guilty of a\r\npresumption which nature promptly punishes. We are\r\nrendered incompetent to deal effectively with the delicacies\r\nand novelties of nature and life. Our thought is\r\nhard where facts are mobile; bunched and chunky where\r\nevents are fluid, dissolving.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe tendency to forget the office of distinctions and\r\nclassifications, and to take them as marking things in\r\nthemselves, is the current fallacy of scientific specialism.\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg132\"\u003e[pg 132]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nIt is one of the conspicuous traits of highbrowism,\r\nthe essence of false abstractionism. This attitude\r\nwhich once flourished in physical science now\r\ngoverns theorizing about human nature. Man has been\r\nresolved into a definite collection of primary instincts\r\nwhich may be numbered, catalogued and exhaustively\r\ndescribed one by one. Theorists differ only or chiefly\r\nas to their number and ranking. Some say one, self-love;\r\nsome two, egoism and altruism; some three, greed,\r\nfear and glory; while today writers of a more empirical\r\nturn run the number up to fifty and sixty. But\r\nin fact there are as many specific reactions to differing\r\nstimulating conditions as there is time for, and\r\nour lists are only classifications for a purpose.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOne of the great evils of this artificial simplification\r\nis its influence upon social science. Complicated provinces\r\nof life have been assigned to the jurisdiction of\r\nsome special instinct or group of instincts, which has\r\nreigned despotically with the usual consequences of\r\ndespotism. Politics has replaced religion as the set of\r\nphenomena based upon fear; or after having been the\r\nfruit of a special Aristotelian political faculty, has become\r\nthe necessary condition of restraining man\u0027s self-seeking\r\nimpulse. All sociological facts are disposed of\r\nin a few fat volumes as products of imitation and invention,\r\nor of cooperation and conflict. Ethics rest\r\nupon sympathy, pity, benevolence. Economics is the\r\nscience of phenomena due to one love and one aversion\u0026mdash;gain\r\nand labor. It is surprising that men can engage\r\nin these enterprises without being reminded of their exact\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg133\"\u003e[pg 133]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nsimilarity to natural science before scientific method\r\nwas discovered in the seventeenth century. Just now\r\nanother simplification is current. All instincts go back\r\nto the sexual, so that \u003ci lang=\"fr\" xml:lang=\"fr\"\u003echerchez la femme\u003c/i\u003e (under multitudinous\r\nsymbolic disguises) is the last word of science\r\nwith respect to the analysis of conduct.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSome sophisticated simplifications which once had\r\ngreat influence are now chiefly matters of historic moment.\r\nEven so they are instructive. They show how\r\nsocial conditions put a heavy load on certain tendencies,\r\nso that in the end an acquired disposition is treated\r\nas if it were an original, and almost the only original\r\nactivity. Consider, for example, the burden of causal\r\npower placed by Hobbes upon the reaction of fear. To\r\na man living with reasonable security and comfort today,\r\nHobbes\u0027 pervasive consciousness of fear seems like\r\nthe idiosyncrasy of an abnormally timid temperament.\r\nBut a survey of the conditions of his own time, of the\r\ndisorders which bred general distrust and antagonism,\r\nwhich led to brutal swashbuckling and disintegrating\r\nintrigue, puts the matter on a different footing. The\r\nsocial situation conduced to fearfulness. As an account\r\nof the psychology of the natural man his theory is unsound.\r\nAs a report of contemporary social conditions\r\nthere is much to be said for it.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSomething of the same sort may be said regarding\r\nthe emphasis of eighteenth century moralists upon\r\nbenevolence as the inclusive moral spring to action, an\r\nemphasis represented in the nineteenth century by\r\nComte\u0027s exaltation of altruism. The load was excessive.\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg134\"\u003e[pg 134]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nBut it testifies to the growth of a new philanthropic\r\nspirit. With the breaking down of feudal barriers and\r\na consequent mingling of persons previously divided,\r\na sense of responsibility for the happiness of others,\r\nfor the mitigation of misery, grew up. Conditions were\r\nnot ripe for its translation into political action. Hence\r\nthe importance attached to the private disposition of\r\nvoluntary benevolence.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf we venture into more ancient history, Plato\u0027s\r\nthreefold division of the human soul into a rational\r\nelement, a spirited active one, and an appetitive one,\r\naiming at increase or gain, is immensely illuminating.\r\nAs is well known, Plato said that society is the human\r\nsoul writ large. In society he found three classes: the\r\nphilosophic and scientific, the soldier-citizenry, and the\r\ntraders and artisans. Hence the generalization as to\r\nthe three dominating forces in human nature. Read\r\nthe other way around, we perceive that trade in his days\r\nappealed especially to concupiscence, citizenship to a\r\ngenerous \u003cem\u003eélan\u003c/em\u003e of self-forgetting loyalty, and scientific\r\nstudy to a disinterested love of wisdom that seemed to\r\nbe monopolized by a small isolated group. The distinctions\r\nwere not in truth projected from the breast\r\nof the natural individual into society, but they were\r\ncultivated in classes of individuals by force of social\r\ncustom and expectation.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNow the prestige that once attached to the \"instinct\"\r\nof self-love has not wholly vanished. The case\r\nis still worth examination. In its \"scientific\" form,\r\nstart was taken from an alleged instinct of self-preservation,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg135\"\u003e[pg 135]\u003c/span\u003e\r\ncharacteristic of man as well as of other\r\nanimals. From this seemingly innocuous assumption, a\r\nmythological psychology burgeoned. Animals, including\r\nman, certainly perform many acts whose consequence is\r\nto protect and preserve life. If their acts did not upon\r\nthe whole have this tendency, neither the individual or\r\nthe species would long endure. The acts that spring\r\nfrom life also in the main conserve life. Such is the undoubted\r\nfact. What does the statement amount to?\r\nSimply the truism that life is life, that life is a continuing\r\nactivity as long as it is life at all. But the\r\nself-love school converted the fact that life tends to\r\nmaintain life into a separate and special force which\r\nsomehow lies back of life and accounts for its various\r\nacts. An animal exhibits in its life-activity a multitude\r\nof acts of breathing, digesting, secreting, excreting, attack,\r\ndefense, search for food, etc., a multitude of specific\r\nresponses to specific stimulations of the environment.\r\nBut mythology comes in and attributes them\r\nall to a nisus for self-preservation. Thence it is but a\r\nstep to the idea that all conscious acts are prompted\r\nby self-love. This premiss is then elaborated in ingenious\r\nschemes, often amusing when animated by a\r\ncynical knowledge of the \"world,\" tedious when of a\r\nwould-be logical nature, to prove that every act of man\r\nincluding his apparent generosities is a variation\r\nplayed on the theme of self-interest.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe fallacy is obvious. Because an animal cannot\r\nlive except as it is alive, except that is as its acts have\r\nthe result of sustaining life, it is concluded that all its\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg136\"\u003e[pg 136]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nacts are instigated by an impulse to self-preservation.\r\nSince all acts affect the well-being of their agent in one\r\nway or another, and since when a person becomes reflective\r\nhe prefers consequences in the way of weal to\r\nthose of woe, therefore all his acts are due to self-love.\r\nIn actual substance, one statement says that life is life;\r\nand the other says that a self is a self. One says that\r\nspecial acts are acts of a living creature and the other\r\nthat they are acts of a self. In the biological statement\r\nthe concrete diversity between the acts of say a clam\r\nand of a dog are covered up by pointing out that the\r\nacts of each tend to self-preservation, ignoring the\r\nsomewhat important fact that in one case it is the life\r\nof a clam and in the other the life of a dog which is\r\ncontinued. In morals, the concrete differences between\r\na Jesus, a Peter, a John and a Judas are covered up\r\nby the wise remark that after all they are all selves and\r\nall act as selves. In every case, a result or \"end\" is\r\ntreated as an actuating cause.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe fallacy consists in transforming the (truistic)\r\nfact of acting \u003cem\u003eas\u003c/em\u003e a self into the fiction of acting always\r\n\u003cem\u003efor\u003c/em\u003e self. Every act, truistically again, tends to a certain\r\nfulfilment or satisfaction of some habit which is\r\nan undoubted element in the structure of character.\r\nEach satisfaction is qualitatively what it is because of\r\nthe disposition fulfilled in the object attained, treachery\r\nor loyalty, mercy or cruelty. But theory comes in and\r\nblankets the tremendous diversity in the quality of the\r\nsatisfactions which are experienced by pointing out that\r\nthey are all satisfactions. The harm done is then completed\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg137\"\u003e[pg 137]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nby transforming this artificial unity of result\r\ninto an original love of satisfaction as the force that\r\ngenerates all acts alike. Because a Nero and a Peabody\r\nboth get satisfaction in acting as they do it is inferred\r\nthat the satisfaction of each is the same in quality, and\r\nthat both were actuated by love of the same objective.\r\nIn reality the more we concretely dwell upon the common\r\nfact of fulfilment, the more we realize the difference\r\nin the kinds of selves fulfilled. In pointing out\r\nthat both the north and the south poles are poles we\r\ndo not abolish the difference of north from south; we\r\naccentuate it.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe explanation of the fallacy is however too easy\r\nto be convincing. There must have been some material,\r\nempirical reason why intelligent men were so easily entrapped\r\nby a fairly obvious fallacy. That material\r\nerror was a belief in the fixity and simplicity of the\r\nself, a belief which had been fostered by a school far\r\nremoved from the one in question, the theologians with\r\ntheir dogma of the unity and ready-made completeness\r\nof the soul. We arrive at true conceptions of motivation\r\nand interest only by the recognition that selfhood\r\n(except as it has encased itself in a shell of routine)\r\nis in process of making, and that any self is capable of\r\nincluding within itself a number of inconsistent selves,\r\nof unharmonized dispositions. Even a Nero may be\r\ncapable upon occasion of acts of kindness. It is even\r\nconceivable that under certain circumstances he may be\r\nappalled by the consequences of cruelty, and turn to the\r\nfostering of kindlier impulses. A sympathetic person is\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg138\"\u003e[pg 138]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nnot immune to harsh arrogances, and he may find himself\r\ninvolved in so much trouble as a consequence of a\r\nkindly act, that he allows his generous impulses to\r\nshrivel and henceforth governs his conduct by the dictates\r\nof the strictest worldly prudence. Inconsistencies\r\nand shiftings in character are the commonest things in\r\nexperience. Only the hold of a traditional conception\r\nof the singleness and simplicity of soul and self blinds\r\nus to perceiving what they mean: the relative fluidity\r\nand diversity of the constituents of selfhood. There\r\nis no one ready-made self behind activities. There are\r\ncomplex, unstable, opposing attitudes, habits, impulses\r\nwhich gradually come to terms with one another, and\r\nassume a certain consistency of configuration, even\r\nthough only by means of a distribution of inconsistencies\r\nwhich keeps them in water-tight compartments,\r\ngiving them separate turns or tricks in action.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eMany good words get spoiled when the word self is\r\nprefixed to them: Words like pity, confidence, sacrifice,\r\ncontrol, love. The reason is not far to seek. The word\r\nself infects them with a fixed introversion and isolation.\r\nIt implies that the act of love or trust or control is\r\nturned back upon a self which already is in full existence\r\nand in whose behalf the act operates. Pity fulfils\r\nand creates a self when it is directed outward, opening\r\nthe mind to new contacts and receptions. Pity for self\r\nwithdraws the mind back into itself, rendering its subject\r\nunable to learn from the buffetings of fortune.\r\nSacrifice may enlarge a self by bringing about surrender\r\nof acquired possessions to requirements of new\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg139\"\u003e[pg 139]\u003c/span\u003e\r\ngrowth. Self-sacrifice means a self-maiming which asks\r\nfor compensatory pay in some later possession or indulgence.\r\nConfidence as an outgoing act is directness\r\nand courage in meeting the facts of life, trusting them\r\nto bring instruction and support to a developing self.\r\nConfidence which terminates in the self means a smug\r\ncomplacency that renders a person obtuse to instruction\r\nby events. Control means a command of resources\r\nthat enlarges the self; self-control denotes a self which\r\nis contracting, concentrating itself upon its own\r\nachievements, hugging them tight, and thereby estopping\r\nthe growth that comes when the self is generously\r\nreleased; a self-conscious moral athleticism that ends\r\nin a disproportionate enlargement of some organ.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhat makes the difference in each of these cases is\r\nthe difference between a self taken as something already\r\nmade and a self still making through action. In the\r\nformer case, action has to contribute profit or security\r\nor consolation \u003cem\u003eto\u003c/em\u003e a self. In the latter, impulsive\r\naction becomes an adventure in discovery of a self\r\nwhich is possible but as yet unrealized, an experiment in\r\ncreating a self which shall be more inclusive than the\r\none which exists. The idea that only those impulses\r\nhave moral validity which aim at the welfare of others,\r\nor are altruistic, is almost as one-sided a doctrine as\r\nthe dogma of self-love. Yet altruism has one marked\r\nsuperiority; it at least suggests a generosity of outgoing\r\naction, a liberation of power as against the close,\r\npent in, protected atmosphere of a ready-made ego.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe reduction of all impulses to forms of self-love\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg140\"\u003e[pg 140]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nis worth investigation because it gives an opportunity\r\nto say something about self as an ongoing process. The\r\ndoctrine itself is faded, its advocates are belated. The\r\nnotion is too tame to appeal to a generation that has\r\nexperienced romanticism and has been intoxicated by\r\nimbibing from the streams of power released by the\r\nindustrial revolution. The fashionable unification of\r\ntoday goes by the name of the will to power.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn the beginning, this is hardly more than a name for\r\na quality of all activity. Every fulfilled activity terminates\r\nin added control of conditions, in an art of\r\nadministering objects. Execution, satisfaction, realization,\r\nfulfilment are all names for the fact that an\r\nactivity implies an accomplishment which is possible\r\nonly by subduing circumstance to serve as an accomplice\r\nof achievement. Each impulse or habit is thus\r\na will to its \u003cem\u003eown\u003c/em\u003e power. To say this is to clothe a\r\ntruism in a figure. It says that anger or fear or love\r\nor hate is successful when it effects some change outside\r\nthe organism which measures its force and registers\r\nits efficiency. The achieved outcome marks the\r\ndifference between action and a cooped-up sentiment\r\nwhich is expended upon itself. The eye hungers for\r\nlight, the ear for sound, the hand for surfaces, the arm\r\nfor things to reach, throw and lift, the leg for distance,\r\nanger for an enemy to destroy, curiosity for something\r\nto shiver and cower before, love for a mate. Each impulse\r\nis a demand for an object which will enable it to\r\nfunction. Denied an object in reality it tends to create\r\none in fancy, as pathology shows.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg141\"\u003e[pg 141]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nSo far we have no generalized will to power, but only\r\nthe inherent pressure of every activity for an adequate\r\nmanifestation. It is not so much a demand for power\r\nas search for an opportunity to use a power already\r\nexisting. If opportunities corresponded to the need,\r\na desire \u003cem\u003efor\u003c/em\u003e power would hardly arise: power would be\r\nused and satisfaction would accrue. But impulse is\r\nbalked. If conditions are right for an educative\r\ngrowth, the snubbed impulse will be \"sublimated.\"\r\nThat is, it will become a contributory factor in some\r\nmore inclusive and complex activity, in which it\r\nis reduced to a subordinate yet effectual place. Sometimes\r\nhowever frustration dams activity up, and intensifies\r\nit. A longing for satisfaction at any cost is engendered.\r\nAnd when social conditions are such that\r\nthe path of least resistance lies through subjugation\r\nof the energies of others, the will to power bursts into\r\nflower.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis explains why we attribute a will to power to\r\nothers but not to ourselves, except in the complimentary\r\nsense that being strong we naturally wish to exercise\r\nour strength. Otherwise for ourselves we only\r\nwant what we want when we want it, not being overscrupulous\r\nabout the means we take to get it. This\r\npsychology is naive but it is truer to facts than the\r\nsupposition that there exists by itself as a separate and\r\noriginal thing a will to power. For it indicates that\r\nthe real fact is some existing power which demands outlet,\r\nand which becomes self-conscious only when it is\r\ntoo weak to overcome obstacles. Conventionally the\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg142\"\u003e[pg 142]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwill to power is imputed only to a comparatively small\r\nnumber of ambitious and ruthless men. They are probably\r\nupon the whole quite unconscious of any such will,\r\nbeing mastered by specific intense impulses that find\r\ntheir realization most readily by bending others to serve\r\nas tools of their aims. Self-conscious will to power\r\nis found mainly in those who have a so-called inferiority\r\ncomplex, and who would compensate for a sense of personal\r\ndisadvantage (acquired early in childhood) by\r\nmaking a striking impression upon others, in the reflex\r\nof which they feel their strength appreciated. The\r\nliterateur who has to take his action out in imagination\r\nis much more likely to evince a will to power than\r\na Napoleon who sees definite objects with extraordinary\r\nclearness and who makes directly for them. Explosive\r\nirritations, naggings, the obstinacy of weak persons,\r\ndreams of grandeur, the violence of those usually submissive\r\nare the ordinary marks of a will to power.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eDiscussion of the false simplification involved in this\r\ndoctrine suggests another unduly fixed and limited\r\nclassification. Critics of the existing economic regime\r\nhave divided instincts into the creative and the acquisitive,\r\nand have condemned the present order because it\r\nembodies the latter at the expense of the former. The\r\ndivision is convenient, yet mistaken. Convenient because\r\nit sums up certain facts of the present system,\r\nmistaken because it takes social products for psychological\r\noriginals. Speaking roughly we may say that\r\nnative activity is both creative and acquisitive, creative\r\nas a process, acquisitive in that it terminates as a rule\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg143\"\u003e[pg 143]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nin some tangible product which brings the process to\r\nconsciousness of itself.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eActivity is creative in so far as it moves to its own\r\nenrichment as activity, that is, bringing along with itself\r\na release of further activities. Scientific inquiry,\r\nartistic production, social companionship possess this\r\ntrait to a marked degree; some amount of it is a normal\r\naccompaniment of all successfully coordinated action.\r\nWhile from the standpoint of what precedes it is a\r\nfulfilment, it is a liberative expansion with respect to\r\nwhat comes after. There is here no antagonism between\r\ncreative expression and the production of results which\r\nendure and which give a sense of accomplishment.\r\nArchitecture at its best, for example, would probably\r\nappear to most persons to be \u003cem\u003emore\u003c/em\u003e creative, not less,\r\nthan dancing at its best. There is nothing in industrial\r\nproduction which of necessity excludes creative activity.\r\nThe fact that it terminates in tangible utilities no\r\nmore lowers its status than the uses of a bridge exclude\r\ncreative art from a share in its design and construction.\r\nWhat requires explanation is why process is so definitely\r\nsubservient to product in so much of modern industry:\u0026mdash;that\r\nis, why later use rather than present\r\nachieving is the emphatic thing. The answer seems to\r\nbe twofold.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAn increasingly large portion of economic work is\r\ndone with machines. As a rule, these machines are not\r\nunder the personal control of those who operate them.\r\nThe machines are operated for ends which the worker\r\nhas no share in forming and in which as such, or apart\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg144\"\u003e[pg 144]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nfrom his wage, he has no interest. He neither understands\r\nthe machines nor cares for their purpose. He is\r\nengaged in an activity in which means are cut off from\r\nends, instruments from what they achieve. Highly\r\nmechanized activity tends as Emerson said to turn men\r\ninto spiders and needles. But if men understand what\r\nthey are about, if they see the whole process of which\r\ntheir special work is a necessary part, and if they have\r\nconcern, care, for the whole, then the mechanizing effect\r\nis counteracted. But when a man is only the tender\r\nof a machine, he can have no insight and no affection;\r\ncreative activity is out of the question.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhat remains to the workman is however not so much\r\nacquisitive desires as love of security and a wish for\r\na good time. An excessive premium on security springs\r\nfrom the precarious conditions of the workman; desire\r\nfor a good time, so far as it needs any explanation,\r\nfrom demand for relief from drudgery, due to the absence\r\nof culturing factors in the work done. Instead of\r\nacquisition being a primary end, the net effect of the\r\nprocess is rather to destroy sober care for materials\r\nand products; to induce careless wastefulness, so far\r\nas that can be indulged in without lessening the weekly\r\nwage. From the standpoint of orthodox economic\r\ntheory, the most surprising thing about modern industry\r\nis the small number of persons who have any effective\r\ninterest in acquisition of wealth. This disregard\r\nfor acquisition makes it easier for a few who do\r\nwant to have things their own way, and who monopolize\r\nwhat is amassed. If an acquisitive impulse were only\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg145\"\u003e[pg 145]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nmore evenly developed, more of a real fact, than it is, it\r\n\u003cins class=\"corr\" title=\"it\" id=\"Corr_145_\"\u003eis\u003c/ins\u003e quite possible that things would be\r\nbetter than they are.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eEven with respect to men who succeed in accumulating\r\nwealth it is a mistake to suppose that acquisitiveness\r\nplays with most of them a large rôle, beyond getting\r\ncontrol of the tools of the game. Acquisition is\r\nnecessary as an outcome, but it arises not from love of\r\naccumulation but from the fact that without a large\r\nstock of possessions one cannot engage effectively in\r\nmodern business. It is an incident of love of power, of\r\ndesire to impress fellows, to obtain prestige, to secure\r\ninfluence, to manifest ability, to \"succeed\" in short\r\nunder the conditions of the given regime. And if we\r\nare to shove a mythological psychology of instincts behind\r\nmodern economics, we should do better to invent\r\ninstincts for security, a good time, power and success\r\nthan to rely upon an acquisitive instinct. We should\r\nhave also to give much weight to a peculiar sporting\r\ninstinct. Not acquiring dollars, but chasing them,\r\nhunting them is the important thing. Acquisition has\r\nits part in the big game, for even the most devoted\r\nsportsman prefers, other things being equal, to bring\r\nhome the fox\u0027s brush. A tangible result is the mark to\r\none\u0027s self and to others of success in sport.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eInstead of dividing sharply an acquisitive impulse\r\nmanifested in business and a creative instinct displayed\r\nin science, art and social fellowship, we should rather\r\nfirst inquire why it is that so much of creative activity\r\nis in our day diverted into business, and then ask why\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg146\"\u003e[pg 146]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nit is that opportunity for exercise of the creative capacity\r\nin business is now restricted to such a small\r\nclass, those who have to do with banking, finding a\r\nmarket, and manipulating investments; and finally ask\r\nwhy creative activity is perverted into an over-specialized\r\nand frequently inhumane operation. For after all\r\nit is not the bare fact of creation but its quality which\r\ncounts.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThat captains of industry are creative artists of a\r\nsort, and that industry absorbs an undue share of the\r\ncreative activity of the present time cannot be denied.\r\nTo impute to the leaders of industry and commerce\r\nsimply an acquisitive motive is not merely to lack insight\r\ninto their conduct, but it is to lose the clew to\r\nbettering conditions. For a more proportionate distribution\r\nof creative power between business and other\r\noccupations, and a more humane, wider use of it in\r\nbusiness depend upon grasping aright the forces actually\r\nat work. Industrial leaders combine interest in\r\nmaking far-reaching plans, large syntheses of conditions\r\nbased upon study, mastery of refined and complex\r\ntechnical skill, control over natural forces and events,\r\nwith love of adventure, excitement and mastery of fellow-men.\r\nWhen these interests are reinforced with\r\nactual command of all the means of luxury, of display\r\nand procuring admiration from the less fortunate, it is\r\nnot surprising that creative force is drafted largely\r\ninto business channels, and that competition for an opportunity\r\nto display power becomes brutal.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe strategic question, as was said, is to understand\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg147\"\u003e[pg 147]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nhow and why political, legal, scientific and educational\r\nconditions of society for the last centuries have stimulated\r\nand nourished such a one-sided development of\r\ncreative activities. To approach the problem from\r\nthis point of view is much more hopeful, though infinitely\r\nmore complex intellectually, than the approach\r\nwhich sets out with a fixed dualism between acquisitive\r\nand creative impulses. The latter assumes a complete\r\nsplit of higher and lower in the original constitution of\r\nman. Were this the case, there would be no organic\r\nremedy. The sole appeal would be to sentimental exhortation\r\nto men to wean themselves from devotion to\r\nthe things which are beloved by their lower and material\r\nnature. And if the appeal were moderately successful\r\nthe social result would be a fixed class division. There\r\nwould remain a lower class, superciliously looked down\r\nupon by the higher, consisting of those in whom the\r\nacquisitive instinct remains stronger and who do the\r\nnecessary work of life, while the higher \"creative\"\r\nclass devotes itself to social intercourse, science and\r\nart.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSince the underlying psychology is wrong, the problem\r\nand its solution assumes in fact a radically different\r\nform. There are an indefinite number of original\r\nor instinctive activities, which are organized into interests\r\nand dispositions according to the situations to\r\nwhich they respond. To increase the creative phase\r\nand the humane quality of these activities is an affair\r\nof modifying the social conditions which stimulate, select,\r\nintensify, weaken and coordinate native activities.\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg148\"\u003e[pg 148]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nThe first step in dealing with it is to increase our detailed\r\nscientific knowledge. We need to know exactly\r\nthe selective and directive force of each social situation;\r\nexactly how each tendency is promoted and retarded.\r\nCommand of the physical environment on a large and\r\ndeliberate scale did not begin until belief in gross forces\r\nand entities was abandoned. Control of physical energies\r\nis due to inquiry which establishes specific correlations\r\nbetween minute elements. It will not be otherwise\r\nwith social control and adjustment. Having the\r\nknowledge we may set hopefully at work upon a course\r\nof social invention and experimental engineering. A\r\nstudy of the educative effect, the influence upon habit,\r\nof each definite form of human intercourse, is prerequisite\r\nto effective reform.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg149\"\u003e[pg 149]\u003c/span\u003eVI\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn spite of what has been said, it will be asserted that\r\nthere are definite, independent, original instincts which\r\nmanifest themselves in specific acts in a one-to-one\r\ncorrespondence. Fear, it will be said, is a reality, and\r\nso is anger, and rivalry, and love of mastery of others,\r\nand self-abasement, maternal love, sexual desire, gregariousness\r\nand envy, and each has its own appropriate\r\ndeed as a result. Of course they are realities. So are\r\nsuction, rusting of metals, thunder and lightning and\r\nlighter-than-air flying machines. But science and invention\r\ndid not get on as long as men indulged in the\r\nnotion of special forces to account for such phenomena.\r\nMen tried that road, and it only led them into learned\r\nignorance. They spoke of nature\u0027s abhorrence of a\r\nvacuum; of a force of combustion; of intrinsic nisus\r\ntoward this and that; of heaviness and levity as forces.\r\nIt turned out that these \"forces\" were only the phenomena\r\nover again, translated from a specific and concrete\r\nform (in which they were at least actual) into a\r\ngeneralized form in which they were verbal. They converted\r\na problem into a solution which afforded a simulated\r\nsatisfaction.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAdvance in insight and control came only when the\r\nmind turned squarely around. After it had dawned\r\nupon inquirers that their alleged causal forces were only\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg150\"\u003e[pg 150]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nnames which condensed into a duplicate form a variety\r\nof complex occurrences, they set about breaking up\r\nphenomena into minute detail and searching for correlations,\r\nthat is, for elements in other gross phenomena\r\nwhich also varied. Correspondence of variations of\r\nelements took the place of large and imposing forces.\r\nThe psychology of behavior is only beginning to undergo\r\nsimilar treatment. It is probable that the vogue\r\nof sensation-psychology was due to the fact that it\r\nseemed to promise a similar detailed treatment of personal\r\nphenomena. But as yet we tend to regard sex,\r\nhunger, fear, and even much more complex active interests\r\nas if they were lump forces, like the combustion\r\nor gravity of old-fashioned physical science.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is not hard to see how the notion of a single and\r\nseparate tendency grew up in the case of simpler acts\r\nlike hunger and sex. The paths of motor outlet or discharge\r\nare comparatively few and are fairly well defined.\r\nSpecific bodily organs are conspicuously involved.\r\nHence there is suggested the notion of a correspondingly\r\nseparate psychic force or impulse. There\r\nare two fallacies in this assumption. The first consists\r\nin ignoring the fact that no activity (even one\r\nthat is limited by routine habit) is confined to the\r\nchannel which is most flagrantly involved in its execution.\r\nThe whole organism is concerned in every act to\r\nsome extent and in some fashion, internal organs as\r\nwell as muscular, those of circulation, secretion, etc.\r\nSince the total state of the organism is never exactly\r\ntwice alike, in so far the phenomena of hunger and sex\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg151\"\u003e[pg 151]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nare never twice the same in fact. The difference may\r\nbe negligible for some purposes, and yet give the key\r\nfor the purposes of a psychological analysis which shall\r\nterminate in a correct judgment of value. Even\r\nphysiologically the context of organic changes accompanying\r\nan act of hunger or sex makes the difference\r\nbetween a normal and a morbid phenomenon.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn the second place, the environment in which the act\r\ntakes place is never twice alike. Even when the overt\r\norganic discharge is substantially the same, the acts\r\nimpinge upon a different environment and thus have\r\ndifferent consequences. It is impossible to regard\r\nthese differences of objective result as indifferent to\r\nthe quality of the acts. They are immediately\r\nsensed if not clearly perceived; and they are the\r\nonly \u003cem\u003ecomponents of the meaning\u003c/em\u003e of the act. When\r\nfeelings, dwelling antecedently in the soul, were supposed\r\nto be the causes of acts, it was natural to suppose\r\nthat each psychic element had its own inherent\r\nquality which might be directly read off by introspection.\r\nBut when we surrender this notion, it becomes\r\nevident that the only way of telling what an organic\r\nact is like is by the sensed or perceptible changes which\r\nit occasions. Some of these will be intra-organic, and\r\n(as just indicated) they will vary with every act.\r\nOthers will be external to the organism, and these consequences\r\nare more important than the intra-organic\r\nones for determining the quality of the act. For they\r\nare consequences in which others are concerned and\r\nwhich evoke reactions of favor and disfavor as well as\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg152\"\u003e[pg 152]\u003c/span\u003e\r\ncooperative and resisting activities of a more indirect\r\nsort.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eMost so-called self-deception is due to employing\r\nimmediate organic states as criteria of the value of\r\nan act. To say that it feels good or yields direct satisfaction\r\nis to say that it gives rise to a comfortable\r\ninternal state. The judgment based upon this experience\r\nmay be entirely different from the judgment passed\r\nby others upon the basis of its objective or social consequences.\r\nAs a matter of even the most rudimentary\r\nprecaution, therefore, every person learns to recognize\r\nto some extent the quality of an act on the basis of its\r\nconsequences in the acts of others. But even without\r\nthis judgment, the exterior changes produced by an act\r\nare immediately sensed, and being associated with the\r\nact become a part of its quality. Even a young child\r\nsees the smash of things occasionally by his anger, and\r\nthe smash may compete with his satisfied feeling of discharged\r\nenergy as an index of value.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eA child gives way to what, grossly speaking, we call\r\nanger. Its felt or appreciated quality depends in the\r\nfirst place upon the condition of his organism at the\r\ntime, and this is never twice alike. In the second place,\r\nthe act is at once modified by the environment upon\r\nwhich it impinges so that different consequences are\r\nimmediately reflected back to the doer. In one case,\r\nanger is directed say at older and stronger playmates\r\nwho immediately avenge themselves upon the offender,\r\nperhaps cruelly. In another case, it takes effect upon\r\nweaker and impotent children, and the reflected appreciated\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg153\"\u003e[pg 153]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nconsequence is one of achievement, victory,\r\npower and a knowledge of the means of having one\u0027s own\r\nway. The notion that anger still remains a single\r\nforce is a lazy mythology. Even in the cases of hunger\r\nand sex, where the channels of action are fairly demarcated\r\nby antecedent conditions (or \"nature\"), the\r\nactual content and feel of hunger and sex, are indefinitely\r\nvaried according to their social contexts. Only\r\nwhen a man is starving, is hunger an unqualified natural\r\nimpulse; as it approaches this limit, it tends to\r\nlose, moreover, its psychological distinctiveness and to\r\nbecome a raven of the entire organism.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe treatment of sex by psycho-analysts is most instructive,\r\nfor it flagrantly exhibits both the consequences\r\nof artificial simplification and the transformation\r\nof social results into psychic causes. Writers,\r\nusually male, hold forth on the psychology of woman,\r\nas if they were dealing with a Platonic universal entity,\r\nalthough they habitually treat men as individuals, varying\r\nwith structure and environment. They treat phenomena\r\nwhich are peculiarly symptoms of the civilization\r\nof the West at the present time as if they were\r\nthe necessary effects of fixed native impulses of human\r\nnature. Romantic love as it exists today, with all the\r\nvarying perturbations it occasions, is as definitely a\r\nsign of specific historic conditions as are big battle\r\nships with turbines, internal-combustion engines, and\r\nelectrically driven machines. It would be as sensible\r\nto treat the latter as effects of a single psychic cause\r\nas to attribute the phenomena of disturbance and conflict\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg154\"\u003e[pg 154]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwhich accompany present sexual relations as manifestations\r\nof an original single psychic force or \u003ci lang=\"la\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003eLibido\u003c/i\u003e.\r\nUpon this point at least a Marxian simplification is\r\nnearer the truth than that of Jung.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAgain it is customary to suppose that there is\r\na single instinct of fear, or at most a few well-defined\r\nsub-species of it. In reality, when one is afraid the\r\nwhole being reacts, and this entire responding organism\r\nis never twice the same. In fact, also, every reaction\r\ntakes place in a different environment, and its meaning\r\nis never twice alike, since the difference in environment\r\nmakes a difference in consequences. It is only mythology\r\nwhich sets up a single, identical psychic force\r\nwhich \"causes\" all the reactions of fear, a force beginning\r\nand ending in itself. It is true enough that in\r\nall cases we are able to identify certain more or less\r\nseparable characteristic acts\u0026mdash;muscular contractions,\r\nwithdrawals, evasions, concealments. But in the latter\r\nwords we have already brought in an environment. Such\r\nterms as withdrawal and concealment have no meaning\r\nexcept as attitudes toward objects. There is no such\r\nthing as an environment in general; there are specific\r\nchanging objects and events. Hence the kind of evasion\r\nor running away or shrinking up which takes place\r\nis directly correlated with specific surrounding conditions.\r\nThere is no one fear having diverse manifestations;\r\nthere are as many qualitatively different fears as\r\nthere are objects responded to and different consequences\r\nsensed and observed.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFear of the dark is different from fear of publicity,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg155\"\u003e[pg 155]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nfear of the dentist from fear of ghosts, fear of conspicuous\r\nsuccess from fear of humiliation, fear of a\r\nbat from fear of a bear. Cowardice, embarrassment,\r\ncaution and reverence may all be regarded as forms of\r\nfear. They all have certain physical organic acts in\r\ncommon\u0026mdash;those of organic shrinkage, gestures of hesitation\r\nand retreat. But each is qualitatively unique.\r\nEach is what it is in virtue of its total interactions or\r\ncorrelations with other acts and with the environing\r\nmedium, with consequences. High explosives and the\r\naeroplane have brought into being something new in\r\nconduct. There is no error in calling it fear. But\r\nthere is error, even from a limited clinical standpoint,\r\nin permitting the classifying name to blot from view\r\nthe difference between fear of bombs dropped from the\r\nsky and the fears which previously existed. The new\r\nfear is just as much and just as little original and\r\nnative as a child\u0027s fear of a stranger.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFor any activity is original when it first occurs. As\r\nconditions are continually changing, new and \u003cem\u003eprimitive\u003c/em\u003e\r\nactivities are continually occurring. The traditional\r\npsychology of instincts obscures recognition of this\r\nfact. It sets up a hard-and-fast preordained class\r\nunder which specific acts are subsumed, so that their\r\nown quality and originality are lost from view. This is\r\nwhy the novelist and dramatist are so much more illuminating\r\nas well as more interesting commentators on\r\nconduct than the schematizing psychologist. The\r\nartist makes perceptible individual responses and thus\r\ndisplays a new phase of human nature evoked in new\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg156\"\u003e[pg 156]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nsituations. In putting the case visibly and dramatically\r\nhe reveals vital actualities. The scientific systematizer\r\ntreats each act as merely another sample of some\r\nold principle, or as a mechanical combination of elements\r\ndrawn from a ready-made inventory.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhen we recognize the diversity of native activities\r\nand the varied ways in which they are modified through\r\ninteractions with one another in response to different\r\nconditions, we are able to understand moral phenomena\r\notherwise baffling. In the career of any impulse activity\r\nthere are speaking generally three possibilities. It\r\nmay find a surging, explosive discharge\u0026mdash;blind, unintelligent.\r\nIt may be sublimated\u0026mdash;that is, become a factor\r\ncoordinated intelligently with others in a continuing\r\ncourse of action. Thus a gust of anger may, because\r\nof its dynamic incorporation into disposition,\r\nbe converted into an abiding conviction of social injustice\r\nto be remedied, and furnish the dynamic to\r\ncarry the conviction into execution. Or an excitation\r\nof sexual attraction may reappear in art or in tranquil\r\ndomestic attachments and services. Such an outcome\r\nrepresents the normal or desirable functioning of impulse;\r\nin which, to use our previous language, the impulse\r\noperates as a pivot, or reorganization of habit.\r\nOr again a released impulsive activity may be neither\r\nimmediately expressed in isolated spasmodic action, nor\r\nindirectly employed in an enduring interest. It may\r\nbe \"suppressed.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSuppression is not annihilation. \"Psychic\" energy\r\nis no more capable of being abolished than the forms\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg157\"\u003e[pg 157]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwe recognize as physical. If it is neither exploded nor\r\nconverted, it is turned inwards, to lead a surreptitious,\r\nsubterranean life. An isolated or spasmodic manifestation\r\nis a sign of immaturity, crudity, savagery; a\r\nsuppressed activity is the cause of all kinds of intellectual\r\nand moral pathology. One form of the resulting\r\npathology constitutes \"reaction\" in the sense in\r\nwhich the historian speaks of reactions. A conventionally\r\nfamiliar instance is Stuart license after Puritan\r\nrestraint. A striking modern instance is the orgy\r\nof extravagance following upon the enforced economies\r\nand hardships of war, the moral let-down after its\r\nhighstrung exalted idealisms, the deliberate carelessness\r\nafter an attention too intense and too narrow.\r\nOutward manifestation of many normal activities had\r\nbeen suppressed. But activities were not suppressed.\r\nThey were merely dammed up awaiting their chance.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNow such \"reactions\" are simultaneous as well as\r\nsuccessive. Resort to artificial stimulation, to alcoholic\r\nexcess, sexual debauchery, opium and narcotics are examples.\r\nImpulses and interests that are not manifested\r\nin the regular course of serviceable activity or in recreation\r\ndemand and secure a special manifestation.\r\nAnd it is interesting to note that there are two opposite\r\nforms. Some phenomena are characteristic of persons\r\nengaged in a routine monotonous life of toil attended\r\nwith fatigue and hardship. And others are\r\nfound in persons who are intellectual and executive,\r\nmen whose activities are anything but monotonous, but\r\nare narrowed through over-specialization. Such men\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg158\"\u003e[pg 158]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthink too much, that is, too much along a \u003cem\u003eparticular\u003c/em\u003e\r\nline. They carry too heavy responsibilities; that is,\r\ntheir offices of service are not adequately shared with\r\nothers. They seek relief by escape into a more sociable\r\nand easy-going world. The imperative demand for\r\ncompanionship not satisfied in ordinary activity is met\r\nby convivial indulgence. The other class has recourse\r\nto excess because its members have in ordinary occupations\r\nnext to no opportunity for imagination. They\r\nmake a foray into a more highly colored world as a\r\nsubstitute for a normal exercise of invention, planning\r\nand judgment. Having no regular responsibilities,\r\nthey seek to recover an illusion of potency and of social\r\nrecognition by an artificial exaltation of their submerged\r\nand humiliated selves.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eHence the love of pleasure against which moralists\r\nissue so many warnings. Not that love of pleasures is\r\nin itself in any way demoralizing. Love of the pleasures\r\nof cheerfulness, of companionship is one of the\r\nsteadying influences in conduct. But pleasure has\r\noften become identified with special thrills, excitations,\r\nticklings of sense, stirrings of appetite for the express\r\npurpose of enjoying the immediate stimulation irrespective\r\nof results. Such pleasures are signs of dissipation,\r\ndissoluteness, in the literal sense. An activity\r\nwhich is deprived of regular stimulation and normal\r\nfunction is piqued into isolated activity, and the result\r\nis division, disassociation. A life of routine and of\r\nover-specialization in non-routine lines seek occasions\r\nin which to arouse by abnormal means a \u003cem\u003efeeling\u003c/em\u003e of satisfaction\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg159\"\u003e[pg 159]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwithout any accompanying objective fulfilment.\r\nHence, as moralists have pointed out, the insatiable\r\ncharacter of such appetites. Activities are not\r\nreally satisfied, that is fulfilled in objects. They continue\r\nto seek for gratification in more intensified stimulations.\r\nOrgies of pleasure-seeking, varying from\r\nsaturnalia to mild sprees, result.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt does not follow however that the sole alternative\r\nis satisfaction by means of objectively serviceable action,\r\nthat is by action which effects useful changes in\r\nthe environment. There is an optimistic theory of\r\nnature according to which wherever there is natural\r\nlaw there is also natural harmony. Since man as\r\nwell as the world is included in the scope of natural\r\nlaw, it is inferred that there is natural harmony between\r\nhuman activities and surroundings, a harmony\r\nwhich is disturbed only when man indulges in \"artificial\"\r\ndepartures from nature. According to this view,\r\nall man has to do is to keep his occupations in balance\r\nwith the energies of the environment and he will be\r\nboth happy and efficient. Rest, recuperation, relief can\r\nbe found in a proper alternation of forms of useful\r\nwork. Do the things which surroundings indicate need\r\ndoing, and success, content, restoration of powers will\r\ntake care of themselves.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis benevolent view of nature falls in with a Puritanic\r\ndevotion to work for its own sake and creates\r\ndistrust of amusement, play and recreation. They are\r\nfelt to be unnecessary, and worse, dangerous diversions\r\nfrom the path of useful action which is also the path of\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg160\"\u003e[pg 160]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nduty. Social conditions certainly impart to occupations\r\nas they are now carried on an undue element of\r\nfatigue, strain and drudgery. Consequently useful occupations\r\nwhich are so ordered socially as to engage\r\nthought, feed imagination and equalize the impact of\r\nstress would surely introduce a tranquillity and recreation\r\nwhich are now lacking. But there is good reason\r\nto think that even in the best conditions there is enough\r\nmaladjustment between the necessities of the environment\r\nand the activities \"natural\" to man, so that constraint\r\nand fatigue would always accompany activity,\r\nand special forms of action be needed\u0026mdash;forms that are\r\nsignificantly called re-creation.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eHence the immense moral importance of play and of\r\nfine, or make-believe, art\u0026mdash;of activity, that is, which is\r\nmake-believe from the standpoint of the useful arts enforced\r\nby the demands of the environment. When moralists\r\nhave not regarded play and art with a censorious\r\neye, they often have thought themselves carrying matters\r\nto the pitch of generosity by conceding that they\r\nmay be morally indifferent or innocent. But in truth\r\nthey are moral necessities. They are required to take\r\ncare of the margin that exists between the total stock\r\nof impulses that demand outlet and the amount expended\r\nin regular action. They keep the balance which\r\nwork cannot indefinitely maintain. They are required\r\nto introduce variety, flexibility and sensitiveness into\r\ndisposition. Yet upon the whole the humanizing capabilities\r\nof sport in its varied forms, drama, fiction,\r\nmusic, poetry, newspapers have been neglected. They\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg161\"\u003e[pg 161]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nhave been left in a kind of a moral no-man\u0027s territory.\r\nThey have accomplished part of their function but they\r\nhave not done what they are capable of doing. In\r\nmany cases they have operated merely as reactions\r\nlike those artificial and isolated stimulations already\r\nmentioned.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe suggestion that play and art have an indispensable\r\nmoral function which should receive an attention\r\nnow denied, calls out an immediate and vehement protest.\r\nWe omit reference to that which proceeds from\r\nprofessional moralists to whom art, fun and sport are\r\nhabitually under suspicion. For those interested in\r\nart, professional estheticians, will protest even more\r\nstrenuously. They at once imagine that some kind of\r\norganized supervision if not censorship of play, drama\r\nand fiction is contemplated which will convert them into\r\nmeans of moral edification. If they do not think of\r\nComstockian interference in the alleged interest of public\r\nmorals, they at least think that what is intended is\r\nthe elimination by persons of a Puritanic, unartistic\r\ntemperament of everything not found sufficiently earnest\r\nand elevating, a fostering of art not for its own\r\nsake but as a means of doing good by something to\r\nsomebody. There is a natural fear of injecting into\r\nart a spirit of earnest uplift, of surrendering art to the\r\nreformers.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut something quite other than this is meant. Relief\r\nfrom continuous moral activity\u0026mdash;in the conventional\r\nsense of moral\u0026mdash;is itself a moral necessity. The service\r\nof art and play is to engage and release impulses in\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg162\"\u003e[pg 162]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nways quite different from those in which they are occupied\r\nand employed in ordinary activities. Their function\r\nis to forestall and remedy the usual exaggerations\r\nand deficits of activity, even of \"moral\" activity\r\nand to prevent a stereotyping of attention. To say\r\nthat society is altogether too careless about the moral\r\nworth of art is not to say that carelessness about useful\r\noccupations is not a necessity for art. On the contrary,\r\nwhatever deprives play and art of their own\r\ncareless rapture thereby deprives them of their moral\r\nfunction. Art then becomes poorer as art as a matter\r\nof course, but it also becomes in the same measure less\r\neffectual in its pertinent moral office. It tries to do\r\nwhat other things can do better, and it fails to do what\r\nnothing but itself can do for human nature, softening\r\nrigidities, relaxing strains, allaying bitterness, dispelling\r\nmoroseness, and breaking down the narrowness consequent\r\nupon specialized tasks.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eEven if the matter be put in this negative way, the\r\nmoral value of art cannot be depreciated. But there is\r\na more positive function. Play and art add fresh and\r\ndeeper meanings to the usual activities of life. In contrast\r\nwith a Philistine relegation of the arts to a trivial\r\nby-play from serious concerns, it is truer to say that\r\nmost of the significance now found in serious occupations\r\noriginated in activities not immediately useful,\r\nand gradually found its way from them into objectively\r\nserviceable employments. For their spontaneity and\r\nliberation from external necessities permits to them an\r\nenhancement and vitality of meaning not possible in\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg163\"\u003e[pg 163]\u003c/span\u003e\r\npreoccupation with immediate needs. Later this meaning\r\nis transferred to useful activities and becomes a\r\npart of their ordinary working. In saying then that\r\nart and play have a moral office not adequately taken\r\nadvantage of it is asserted that they are responsible\r\nto life, to the enriching and freeing of its meanings,\r\nnot that they are responsible to a moral code, commandment\r\nor special task.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eTo a coarse view\u0026mdash;and professed moral refinement is\r\noften given to taking coarse views\u0026mdash;there is something\r\nvulgar not only in recourse to abnormal artificial \u003cins class=\"corr\" title=\"exitents\" id=\"Corr_163_\"\u003eexigents\u003c/ins\u003e\r\nand stimulations but also in interest in useless\r\ngames and arts. Negatively the two things have features\r\nwhich are alike. They both spring from failure\r\nof regular occupations to engage the full scope of impulses\r\nand instincts in an elastically balanced way.\r\nThey both evince a surplusage of imagination over\r\nfact; a demand in imaginative activity for an outlet\r\nwhich is denied in overt activity. They both aim at\r\nreducing the domination of the prosaic; both are protests\r\nagainst the lowering of meanings attendant upon\r\nordinary vocations. As a consequence no rule can be\r\nlaid down for discriminating by direct inspection between\r\nunwholesome stimulations and invaluable excursions\r\ninto appreciative enhancements of life. Their\r\ndifference lies in the way they work, the careers to\r\nwhich they commit us.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eArt releases energy and focuses and tranquilizes it.\r\nIt releases energy in constructive forms. Castles in\r\nthe air like art have their source in a turning of impulse\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg164\"\u003e[pg 164]\u003c/span\u003e\r\naway from useful production. Both are due to\r\nthe failure in some part of man\u0027s constitution to secure\r\nfulfilment in ordinary ways. But in one case the conversion\r\nof direct energy into imagination is the starting\r\npoint of an activity which \u003cem\u003eshapes\u003c/em\u003e material; fancy is fed\r\nupon a stuff of life which assumes under its influence a\r\nrejuvenated, composed and enhanced form. In the other\r\ncase, fancy remains an end in itself. It becomes an indulging\r\nin fantasies which bring about withdrawal from\r\nall realities, while wishes impotent in action build a\r\nworld which yields temporary excitement. Any imagination\r\nis a sign that impulse is impeded and is groping\r\nfor utterance. Sometimes the outcome is a refreshed\r\nuseful habit; sometimes it is an articulation in creative\r\nart; and sometimes it is a futile romancing which for\r\nsome natures does what self-pity does for others. The\r\namount of potential energy of reconstruction that is\r\ndissipated in unexpressed fantasy supplies us with a\r\nfair measure of the extent to which the current organization\r\nof occupation balks and twists impulse, and, by\r\nthe same sign, with a measure of the function of art\r\nwhich is not yet utilized.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe development of mental pathologies to the point\r\nwhere they need clinical attention has of late enforced\r\na widespread consciousness of some of the evils of suppression\r\nof impulse. The studies of psychiatrists have\r\nmade clear that impulses driven into pockets distil\r\npoison and produce festering sores. An organization\r\nof impulse into a working habit forms an interest. A\r\nsurreptitious furtive organization which does not articulate\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg165\"\u003e[pg 165]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nin avowed expression forms a \"complex.\" Current\r\nclinical psychology has undoubtedly overworked\r\nthe influence of sexual impulse in this connection, refusing\r\nat the hands of some writers to recognize the operation\r\nof any other modes of disturbance. There are\r\nexplanations of this onesidedness. The intensity of the\r\nsexual instinct and its organic ramifications produce\r\nmany of the cases that are so noticeable as to demand\r\nthe attention of physicians. And social taboos and the\r\ntradition of secrecy have put this impulse under greater\r\nstrain than has been imposed upon others. If a society\r\nexisted in which the existence of impulse toward food\r\nwere socially disavowed until it was compelled to live\r\nan illicit, covert life, alienists would have plenty of\r\ncases of mental and moral disturbance to relate in connection\r\nwith hunger.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe significant thing is that the pathology arising\r\nfrom the sex instinct affords a striking case of a universal\r\nprinciple. Every impulse is, as far as it goes,\r\nforce, urgency. It must either be used in some function,\r\ndirect or sublimated, or be driven into a concealed,\r\nhidden activity. It has long been asserted on\r\nempirical grounds that expression and enslavement result\r\nin corruption and perversion. We have at last\r\ndiscovered the reason for this fact. The wholesome\r\nand saving force of intellectual freedom, open confrontation,\r\npublicity, now has the stamp of scientific sanction.\r\nThe evil of checking impulses is not that they\r\nare checked. Without inhibition there is no instigation\r\nof imagination, no redirection into more discriminated\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg166\"\u003e[pg 166]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nand comprehensive activities. The evil resides\r\nin a refusal of direct attention which forces the\r\nimpulse into disguise and concealment, until it enacts\r\nits own unavowed uneasy private life subject to no\r\ninspection and no control.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eA rebellious disposition is also a form of romanticism.\r\nAt least rebels set out as romantics, or, in popular\r\nparlance, as idealists. There is no bitterness like\r\nthat of conscious impotency, the sense of suffocatingly\r\ncomplete suppression. The world is hopeless to one\r\nwithout hope. The rage of total despair is a vain effort\r\nat blind destructiveness. Partial suppression induces\r\nin some natures a picture of complete freedom,\r\nwhile it arouses a destructive protest against existing\r\ninstitutions as enemies that stand in the way of freedom.\r\nRebellion has at least one advantage over recourse\r\nto artificial stimulation and to subconscious\r\nnursings of festering sore spots. It engages in action\r\nand thereby comes in contact with realities. It contains\r\nthe possibility of learning something. Yet learning\r\nby this method is immensely expensive. The costs\r\nare incalculable. As Napoleon said, every revolution\r\nmoves in a vicious circle. It begins and ends in excess.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eTo view institutions as enemies of freedom, and all\r\nconventions as slaveries, is to deny the only means by\r\nwhich positive freedom in action can be secured. A\r\ngeneral liberation of impulses may set things going\r\nwhen they have been stagnant, but if the released forces\r\nare on their way to anything they do not know the\r\nway nor where they are going. Indeed, they are bound\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg167\"\u003e[pg 167]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nto be mutually contradictory and hence destructive\u0026mdash;destructive\r\nnot only of the habits they wish to destroy\r\nbut of themselves, of their own efficacy. Convention\r\nand custom are necessary to carrying forward impulse\r\nto any happy conclusion. A romantic return to nature\r\nand a freedom sought within the individual without\r\nregard to the existing environment finds its terminus\r\nin chaos. Every belief to the contrary combines pessimism\r\nregarding the actual with an even more optimistic\r\nfaith in some natural harmony or other\u0026mdash;a faith\r\nwhich is a survival of some of the traditional metaphysics\r\nand theologies which professedly are to be\r\nswept away. Not convention but stupid and rigid convention\r\nis the foe. And, as we have noted, a convention\r\ncan be reorganized and made mobile only by using some\r\nother custom for giving leverage to an impulse.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eYet it is too easy to utter commonplaces about the\r\nsuperiority of constructive action to destructive. At\r\nall events the professed conservative and classicist of\r\ntradition seeks too cheap a victory over the rebel. For\r\nthe rebel is not self-generated. In the beginning no\r\none is a revolutionist simply for the fun of it, however\r\nit may be after the furor of destructive power gets\r\nunder way. The rebel is the product of extreme fixation\r\nand unintelligent immobilities. Life is perpetuated\r\nonly by renewal. If conditions do not permit renewal\r\nto take place continuously it will take place explosively.\r\nThe cost of revolutions must be charged up\r\nto those who have taken for their aim arrest of custom\r\ninstead of its readjustment. The only ones who have\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg168\"\u003e[pg 168]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe right to criticize \"radicals\"\u0026mdash;adopting for the\r\nmoment that perversion of language which identifies the\r\nradical with the destructive rebel\u0026mdash;are those who put\r\nas much effort into reconstruction as the rebels are putting\r\ninto destruction. The primary accusation against\r\nthe revolutionary must be directed against those who\r\nhaving power refuse to use it for ameliorations. They\r\nare the ones who accumulate the wrath that sweeps\r\naway customs and institutions in an undiscriminating\r\navalanche. Too often the man who should be criticizing\r\ninstitutions expends his energy in criticizing\r\nthose who would re-form them. What he really objects\r\nto is any disturbance of his own vested securities, comforts\r\nand privileged powers.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg169\"\u003e[pg 169]\u003c/span\u003eVII\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe return to the original proposition. The position\r\nof impulse in conduct is intermediary. Morality is an\r\nendeavor to find for the manifestation of impulse in\r\nspecial situations an office of refreshment and renewal.\r\nThe endeavor is not easy of accomplishment. It is\r\neasier to surrender the main and public channels of\r\naction and belief to the sluggishness of custom, and\r\nidealize tradition by emotional attachment to its ease,\r\ncomforts and privileges instead of idealizing it in practice\r\nby making it more equably balanced with present\r\nneeds. Again, impulses not used for the work of\r\nrejuvenation and vital recovery are sidetracked to find\r\ntheir own lawless barbarities or their own sentimental\r\nrefinements. Or they are perverted to pathological\r\ncareers\u0026mdash;some of which have been mentioned.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn the course of time custom becomes intolerable because\r\nof what it suppresses and some accident of war\r\nor inner catastrophe releases impulses for unrestrained\r\nexpression. At such times we have philosophies which\r\nidentify progress with motion, blind spontaneity with\r\nfreedom, and which under the name of the sacredness of\r\nindividuality or a return to the norms of nature make\r\nimpulse a law unto itself. The oscillation between impulse\r\narrested and frozen in rigid custom and impulse\r\nisolated and undirected is seen most conspicuously when\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg170\"\u003e[pg 170]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nepochs of conservatism and revolutionary ardor alternate.\r\nBut the same phenomenon is repeated on a\r\nsmaller scale in individuals. And in society the two\r\ntendencies and philosophies exist simultaneously; they\r\nwaste in controversial strife the energy that is needed\r\nfor specific criticism and specific reconstruction.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe release of some portion of the stock of impulses\r\nis an opportunity, not an end. In its origin it is the\r\nproduct of chance; but it affords imagination and invention\r\n\u003cem\u003etheir\u003c/em\u003e chance. The moral correlate of liberated\r\nimpulse is not immediate activity, but reflection upon\r\nthe way in which to use impulse to renew disposition\r\nand reorganize habit. Escape from the clutch of custom\r\ngives an opportunity to do old things in new ways,\r\nand thus to construct new ends and means. Breach\r\nin the crust of the cake of custom releases impulses;\r\nbut it is the work of intelligence to find the ways of\r\nusing them. There is an alternative between anchoring\r\na boat in the harbor till it becomes a rotting hulk and\r\nletting it loose to be the sport of every contrary gust.\r\nTo discover and define this alternative is the business\r\nof mind, of observant, remembering, contriving disposition.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eHabit as a vital art depends upon the animation of\r\nhabit by impulse; only this inspiriting stands between\r\nhabit and stagnation. But art, little as well as great,\r\nanonymous as well as that distinguished by titles of\r\ndignity, cannot be improvised. It is impossible without\r\nspontaneity, but it is not spontaneity. Impulse is\r\nneeded to arouse thought, incite reflection and enliven\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg171\"\u003e[pg 171]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nbelief. But only thought notes obstructions, invents\r\ntools, conceives aims, directs technique, and thus converts\r\nimpulse into an art which lives in objects.\r\nThought is born as the twin of impulse in every moment\r\nof impeded habit. But unless it is nurtured, it\r\nspeedily dies, and habit and instinct continue their\r\ncivil warfare. There is instinctive wisdom in the tendency\r\nof the young to ignore the limitations of the environment.\r\nOnly thus can they discover their own\r\npower and learn the differences in different kinds of\r\nenvironing limitations. But this discovery when once\r\nmade marks the birth of intelligence; and with its birth\r\ncomes the responsibility of the mature to observe, to\r\nrecall, to forecast. Every moral life has its radicalism;\r\nbut this radical factor does not find its full expression\r\nin direct action but in the courage of intelligence\r\nto go deeper than either tradition or immediate\r\nimpulse goes. To the study of intelligence in action we\r\nnow turn our attention.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2 class=\"spaced\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg172\"\u003e[pg 172]\u003c/span\u003ePART THREE\u003cbr/\u003e\r\n\u003csmall\u003eTHE PLACE OF INTELLIGENCE IN CONDUCT\u003c/small\u003e\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003eI\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn discussing habit and impulse we have repeatedly\r\nmet topics where reference to the work of thought was\r\nimperative. Explicit consideration of the place and\r\noffice of intelligence in conduct can hardly begin otherwise\r\nthan by gathering together these incidental references\r\nand reaffirming their significance. The stimulation\r\nof reflective imagination by impulse, its dependence\r\nupon established habits, and its effect in transforming\r\nhabit and regulating impulse forms, accordingly,\r\nour first theme.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eHabits are conditions of intellectual efficiency. They\r\noperate in two ways upon intellect. Obviously, they\r\nrestrict its reach, they fix its boundaries. They are\r\nblinders that confine the eyes of mind to the road ahead.\r\nThey prevent thought from straying away from its imminent\r\noccupation to a landscape more varied and\r\npicturesque but irrelevant to practice. Outside the\r\nscope of habits, thought works gropingly, fumbling in\r\nconfused uncertainty; and yet habit made complete in\r\nroutine shuts in thought so effectually that it is no\r\nlonger needed or possible. The routineer\u0027s road is a\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg173\"\u003e[pg 173]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nditch out of which he cannot get, whose sides enclose\r\nhim, directing his course so thoroughly that he no\r\nlonger thinks of his path or his destination. All habit-forming\r\ninvolves the beginning of an intellectual specialization\r\nwhich if unchecked ends in thoughtless\r\naction.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSignificantly enough this fullblown result is called\r\nabsentmindedness. Stimulus and response are mechanically\r\nlinked together in an unbroken chain. Each successive\r\nact facilely evoked by its predecessor pushes us\r\nautomatically into the next act of a predetermined series.\r\nOnly a signal flag of distress recalls consciousness\r\nto the task of carrying on. Fortunately nature which\r\nbeckons us to this path of least resistance also puts\r\nobstacles in the way of our complete acceptance of its\r\ninvitation. Success in achieving a ruthless and dull\r\nefficiency of action is thwarted by untoward circumstance.\r\nThe most skilful aptitude bumps at times into\r\nthe unexpected, and so gets into trouble from which\r\nonly observation and invention extricate it. Efficiency\r\nin following a beaten path has then to be converted\r\ninto breaking a new road through strange lands.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNevertheless what in effect is love of ease has masqueraded\r\nmorally as love of perfection. A goal of finished\r\naccomplishment has been set up which if it were\r\nattained would mean only mindless action. It has been\r\ncalled complete and free activity when in truth it is\r\nonly a treadmill activity or marching in one place. The\r\npractical impossibility of reaching, in an all around\r\nway and all at once such a \"perfection\" has been recognized.\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg174\"\u003e[pg 174]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nBut such a goal has nevertheless been conceived\r\nas the ideal, and progress has been defined as\r\napproximation to it. Under diverse intellectual skies\r\nthe ideal has assumed diverse forms and colors. But\r\nall of them have involved the conception of a completed\r\nactivity, a static perfection. Desire and need have been\r\ntreated as signs of deficiency, and endeavor as proof\r\nnot of power but of incompletion.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn Aristotle this conception of an end which exhausts\r\nall realization and excludes all potentiality appears\r\nas a definition of the highest excellence. It of\r\nnecessity excludes all want and struggle and all dependencies.\r\nIt is neither practical nor social. Nothing\r\nis left but a self-revolving, self-sufficing thought\r\nengaged in contemplating its own sufficiency. Some\r\nforms of Oriental morals have united this logic with a\r\nprofounder psychology, and have seen that the final\r\nterminus on this road is Nirvana, an obliteration of\r\nall thought and desire. In medieval science, the ideal\r\nreappeared as a definition of heavenly bliss accessible\r\nonly to a redeemed immortal soul. Herbert Spencer\r\nis far enough away from Aristotle, medieval Christianity\r\nand Buddhism; but the idea re-emerges in his conception\r\nof a goal of evolution in which adaptation of\r\norganism to environment is complete and final. In\r\npopular thought, the conception lives in the vague\r\nthought of a remote state of attainment in which we\r\nshall be beyond \"temptation,\" and in which virtue\r\nby its own inertia will persist as a triumphant consummation.\r\nEven Kant who begins with a complete scorn\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg175\"\u003e[pg 175]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nfor happiness ends with an \"ideal\" of the eternal and\r\nundisturbed union of virtue and joy, though in his\r\ncase nothing but a symbolic approximation is admitted\r\nto be feasible.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe fallacy in these versions of the same idea is\r\nperhaps the most pervasive of all fallacies in philosophy.\r\nSo common is it that one questions whether it\r\nmight not be called \u003cem\u003ethe\u003c/em\u003e philosophical fallacy. It consists\r\nin the supposition that whatever is found true\r\nunder certain conditions may forthwith be asserted universally\r\nor without limits and conditions. Because a\r\nthirsty man gets satisfaction in drinking water, bliss\r\nconsists in being drowned. Because the success of any\r\nparticular struggle is measured by reaching a point of\r\nfrictionless action, therefore there is such a thing as an\r\nall-inclusive end of effortless smooth activity endlessly\r\nmaintained. It is forgotten that success is success \u003cem\u003eof\u003c/em\u003e\r\na specific effort, and satisfaction the fulfilment \u003cem\u003eof\u003c/em\u003e a\r\nspecific demand, so that success and satisfaction become\r\nmeaningless when severed from the wants and\r\nstruggles whose consummations they are, or when\r\ntaken universally. The philosophy of Nirvana comes\r\nthe closest to admission of this fact, but even it holds\r\nNirvana to be desirable.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eHabit is however more than a restriction of thought.\r\nHabits become negative limits because they are first\r\npositive agencies. The more numerous our habits the\r\nwider the field of possible observation and foretelling.\r\nThe more flexible they are, the more refined is perception\r\nin its discrimination and the more delicate the presentation\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg176\"\u003e[pg 176]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nevoked by imagination. The sailor is intellectually\r\nat home on the sea, the hunter in the forest,\r\nthe painter in his studio, the man of science in his laboratory.\r\nThese commonplaces are universally recognized\r\nin the concrete; but their significance is obscured\r\nand their truth denied in the current general theory\r\nof mind. For they mean nothing more or less than\r\nthat habits formed in process of exercising biological\r\naptitudes are the sole agents of observation, recollection,\r\nforesight and judgment: a mind or consciousness\r\nor soul in general which performs these operations is\r\na myth.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe doctrine of a single, simple and indissoluble soul\r\nwas the cause and the effect of failure to recognize that\r\nconcrete habits are the means of knowledge and\r\nthought. Many who think themselves scientifically\r\nemancipated and who freely advertise the soul for a\r\nsuperstition, perpetuate a false notion of what knows,\r\nthat is, of a separate knower. Nowadays they usually\r\nfix upon consciousness in general, as a stream or process\r\nor entity; or else, more specifically upon sensations and\r\nimages as the tools of intellect. Or sometimes they\r\nthink they have scaled the last heights of realism by\r\nadverting grandiosely to a formal knower in general\r\nwho serves as one term in the knowing relation;\r\nby dismissing psychology as irrelevant to knowledge\r\nand logic, they think to conceal the psychological monster\r\nthey have conjured up.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNow it is dogmatically stated that no such conceptions\r\nof the seat, agent or vehicle will go psychologically\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg177\"\u003e[pg 177]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nat the present time. Concrete habits do all the\r\nperceiving, recognizing, imagining, recalling, judging,\r\nconceiving and reasoning that is done. \"Consciousness,\"\r\nwhether as a stream or as special sensations and\r\nimages, expresses functions of habits, phenomena of\r\ntheir formation, operation, their interruption and reorganization.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eYet habit does not, of itself, know, for it does not\r\nof itself stop to think, observe or remember. Neither\r\ndoes impulse of itself engage in reflection or contemplation.\r\nIt just lets go. Habits by themselves are too\r\norganized, too insistent and determinate to need to\r\nindulge in inquiry or imagination. And impulses are\r\ntoo chaotic, tumultuous and confused to be able to\r\nknow even if they wanted to. Habit as such is too\r\ndefinitely adapted to an environment to survey or analyze\r\nit, and impulse is too indeterminately related to\r\nthe environment to be capable of reporting anything\r\nabout it. Habit incorporates, enacts or overrides objects,\r\nbut it doesn\u0027t know them. Impulse scatters and\r\nobliterates them with its restless stir. A certain delicate\r\ncombination of habit and impulse is requisite for\r\nobservation, memory and judgment. Knowledge which\r\nis not projected against the black unknown lives in the\r\nmuscles, not in consciousness.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe may, indeed, be said to \u003cem\u003eknow how\u003c/em\u003e by means of our\r\nhabits. And a sensible intimation of the practical function\r\nof knowledge has led men to identify all acquired\r\npractical skill, or even the instinct of animals, with\r\nknowledge. We walk and read aloud, we get off and\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg178\"\u003e[pg 178]\u003c/span\u003e\r\non street cars, we dress and undress, and do a thousand\r\nuseful acts without thinking of them. We know something,\r\nnamely, how to do them. Bergson\u0027s philosophy\r\nof intuition is hardly more than an elaborately documented\r\ncommentary on the popular conception that by\r\ninstinct a bird knows how to build a nest and a spider\r\nto weave a web. But after all, this practical work\r\ndone by habit and instinct in securing prompt and exact\r\nadjustment to the environment is not knowledge, except\r\nby courtesy. Or, if we choose to call it knowledge\u0026mdash;and\r\nno one has the right to issue an ukase to the contrary\u0026mdash;then\r\nother things also called knowledge, knowledge\r\n\u003cem\u003eof\u003c/em\u003e and \u003cem\u003eabout\u003c/em\u003e things, knowledge \u003cem\u003ethat\u003c/em\u003e things are\r\nthus and so, knowledge that involves reflection and conscious\r\nappreciation, remains of a different sort, unaccounted\r\nfor and undescribed.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFor it is a commonplace that the more suavely efficient\r\na habit the more unconsciously it operates. Only\r\na hitch in its workings occasions emotion and provokes\r\nthought. Carlyle and Rousseau, hostile in temperament\r\nand outlook, yet agree in looking at consciousness\r\nas a kind of disease, since we have no consciousness\r\nof bodily or mental organs as long as they work at ease\r\nin perfect health. The idea of disease is, however, aside\r\nfrom the point, unless we are pessimistic enough to\r\nregard every slip in total adjustment of a person to its\r\nsurroundings as something abnormal\u0026mdash;a point of view\r\nwhich once more would identify well-being with perfect\r\nautomatism. The truth is that in every waking moment,\r\nthe complete balance of the organism and its\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg179\"\u003e[pg 179]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nenvironment is constantly interfered with and as constantly\r\nrestored. Hence the \"stream of consciousness\"\r\nin general, and in particular that phase of it celebrated\r\nby William James as alternation of flights and\r\nperchings. Life is interruptions and recoveries. Continuous\r\ninterruption is not possible in the activities\r\nof an individual. Absence of perfect equilibrium is not\r\nequivalent to a complete crushing of organized activity.\r\nWhen the disturbance amounts to such a pitch\r\nas that, the self goes to pieces. It is like shell-shock.\r\nNormally, the environment remains sufficiently in harmony\r\nwith the body of organized activities to sustain\r\nmost of them in active function. But a novel factor\r\nin the surroundings releases some impulse which tends\r\nto initiate a different and incompatible activity, to\r\nbring about a redistribution of the elements of organized\r\nactivity between those have been respectively\r\ncentral and subsidiary. Thus the hand guided by the\r\neye moves toward a surface. Visual quality is the dominant\r\nelement. The hand comes in contact with an\r\nobject. The eye does not cease to operate but some\r\nunexpected quality of touch, a voluptuous smoothness\r\nor annoying heat, compels a readjustment in which the\r\ntouching, handling activity strives to dominate the action.\r\nNow at these moments of a shifting in activity\r\nconscious feeling and thought arise and are accentuated.\r\nThe disturbed adjustment of organism and environment\r\nis reflected in a temporary strife which concludes\r\nin a coming to terms of the old habit and the new\r\nimpulse.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg180\"\u003e[pg 180]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nIn this period of redistribution impulse determines\r\nthe direction of movement. It furnishes the focus about\r\nwhich reorganization swirls. Our attention in short is\r\nalways directed forward to bring to notice something\r\nwhich is imminent but which as yet escapes us. Impulse\r\ndefines the peering, the search, the inquiry. It is, in\r\nlogical language, the movement into the unknown, not\r\ninto the immense inane of the unknown at large, but into\r\nthat special unknown which when it is hit upon restores\r\nan ordered, unified action. During this search, old\r\nhabit supplies content, filling, definite, recognizable,\r\nsubject-matter. It begins as vague presentiment of\r\nwhat we are going towards. As organized habits are\r\ndefinitely deployed and focused, the confused situation\r\ntakes on form, it is \"cleared up\"\u0026mdash;the essential function\r\nof intelligence. Processes become objects. Without\r\nhabit there is only irritation and confused hesitation.\r\nWith habit alone there is a machine-like repetition,\r\na duplicating recurrence of old acts. With conflict\r\nof habits and release of impulse there is conscious\r\nsearch.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg181\"\u003e[pg 181]\u003c/span\u003eII\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe are going far afield from any direct moral issue.\r\nBut the problem of the place of knowledge and judgment\r\nin conduct depends upon getting the fundamental\r\npsychology of thought straightened out. So the excursion\r\nmust be continued. We compare life to a traveler\r\nfaring forth. We may consider him first at a\r\nmoment where his activity is confident, straightforward,\r\norganized. He marches on giving no direct attention to\r\nhis path, nor thinking of his destination. Abruptly he\r\nis pulled up, arrested. Something is going wrong in\r\nhis activity. From the standpoint of an onlooker, he\r\nhas met an obstacle which must be overcome before his\r\nbehavior can be unified into a successful ongoing. From\r\nhis own standpoint, there is shock, confusion, perturbation,\r\nuncertainty. For the moment he doesn\u0027t know\r\nwhat hit him, as we say, nor where he is going. But\r\na new impulse is stirred which becomes the starting\r\npoint of an investigation, a looking into things, a trying\r\nto see them, to find out what is going on. Habits which\r\nwere interfered with begin to get a new direction as they\r\ncluster about the impulse to look and see. The blocked\r\nhabits of locomotion give him a sense of where he \u003cem\u003ewas\u003c/em\u003e\r\ngoing, of what he had set out to do, and of the ground\r\nalready traversed. As he looks, he sees definite things\r\nwhich are not just things at large but which are related\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg182\"\u003e[pg 182]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nto his course of action. The momentum of the activity\r\nentered upon persists as a sense of direction, of aim;\r\nit is an anticipatory project. In short, he recollects,\r\nobserves and plans.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe trinity of these forecasts, perceptions and remembrances\r\nform a subject-matter of discriminated\r\nand identified objects. These objects represent habits\r\nturned inside out. They exhibit both the onward tendency\r\nof habit and the objective conditions which have\r\nbeen incorporated within it. Sensations in immediate\r\nconsciousness are elements of action dislocated through\r\nthe shock of interruption. They never, however, completely\r\nmonopolize the scene; for there is a body of\r\nresidual undisturbed habits which is reflected in remembered\r\nand perceived objects having a meaning. Thus\r\nout of shock and puzzlement there gradually emerges a\r\nfigured framework of objects, past, present, future.\r\nThese shade off variously into a vast penumbra of\r\nvague, unfigured things, a setting which is taken for\r\ngranted and not at all explicitly presented. The complexity\r\nof the figured scene in its scope and refinement\r\nof contents depends wholly upon prior habits and their\r\norganization. The reason a baby can know little and\r\nan experienced adult know much when confronting the\r\nsame things is not because the latter has a \"mind\"\r\nwhich the former has not, but because one has already\r\nformed habits which the other has still to acquire. The\r\nscientific man and the philosopher like the carpenter,\r\nthe physician and politician know with their habits not\r\nwith their \"consciousness.\" The latter is eventual, not\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg183\"\u003e[pg 183]\u003c/span\u003e\r\na source. Its occurrence marks a peculiarly delicate\r\nconnection between highly organized habits and unorganized\r\nimpulses. Its contents or objects, observed,\r\nrecollected, projected and generalized into principles,\r\nrepresent the incorporated material of habits coming\r\nto the surface, because habits are disintegrating at the\r\ntouch of conflicting impulses. But they also gather\r\nthemselves together to comprehend impulse and make\r\nit effective.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis account is more or less strange as psychology\r\nbut certain aspects of it are commonplaces in a static\r\nlogical formulation. It is, for example, almost a truism\r\nthat knowledge is both synthetic and analytic; a set of\r\ndiscriminated elements connected by relations. This\r\ncombination of opposite factors of unity and difference,\r\nelements and relations, has been a standing paradox and\r\nmystery of the theory of knowledge. It will remain so\r\nuntil we connect the theory of knowledge with an empirically\r\nverifiable theory of behavior. The steps of\r\nthis connection have been sketched and we may enumerate\r\nthem. We know at such times as habits are\r\nimpeded, when a conflict is set up in which impulse is\r\nreleased. So far as this impulse sets up a definite forward\r\ntendency it constitutes the forward, prospective\r\ncharacter of knowledge. In this phase unity or synthesis\r\nis found. We are striving to unify our responses,\r\nto achieve a consistent environment which will restore\r\nunity of conduct. Unity, relations, are prospective;\r\nthey mark out lines converging to a focus. They are\r\n\"ideal.\" But \u003cem\u003ewhat\u003c/em\u003e we know, the objects that present\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg184\"\u003e[pg 184]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthemselves with definiteness and assurance, are retrospective;\r\nthey are the conditions which have been mastered,\r\nincorporated in the past. They are elements,\r\ndiscriminated, analytic just because old habits so far\r\nas they are checked are also broken into objects which\r\ndefine the obstruction of ongoing activity. They are\r\n\"real,\" not ideal. Unity is something sought; split,\r\ndivision is something given, at hand. Were we to carry\r\nthe same psychology into detail we should come upon\r\nthe explanation of perceived particulars and conceived\r\nuniversals, of the relation of discovery and proof, induction\r\nand deduction, the discrete and the continuous.\r\nAnything approaching an adequate discussion is too\r\ntechnical to be here in place. But the main point,\r\nhowever technical and abstract it may be in statement,\r\nis of far reaching importance for everything concerned\r\nwith moral beliefs, conscience and judgments of right\r\nand wrong.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe most general, if vaguest issue, concerns the nature\r\nof the organ of moral knowledge. As long as\r\nknowledge in general is thought to be the work of a\r\nspecial agent, whether soul, consciousness, intellect or\r\na knower in general, there is a logical propulsion towards\r\npostulating a special agent for knowledge of\r\nmoral distinctions. Consciousness and conscience have\r\nmore than a verbal connection. If the former is something\r\nin itself, a seat or power which antecedes intellectual\r\nfunctions, why should not the latter be also a\r\nunique faculty with its own separate jurisdiction? If\r\nreason in general is independent of empirically verifiable\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg185\"\u003e[pg 185]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nrealities of human nature, such as instincts and\r\norganized habits, why should there not also exist a\r\nmoral or practical reason independent of natural operations?\r\nOn the other hand if it is recognized that\r\nknowing is carried on through the medium of natural\r\nfactors, the assumption of special agencies for moral\r\nknowing becomes outlawed and incredible. Now the\r\nmatter of the existence or non-existence of such special\r\nagencies is no technically remote matter. The belief\r\nin a separate organ involves belief in a separate and\r\nindependent subject-matter. The question fundamentally\r\nat issue is nothing more or less than whether\r\nmoral values, regulations, principles and objects form\r\na separate and independent domain or whether they are\r\npart and parcel of a normal development of a life\r\nprocess.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThese considerations explain why the denial of a\r\nseparate organ of knowledge, of a separate instinct or\r\nimpulse toward knowing, is not the wilful philistinism\r\nit is sometimes alleged to be. There is of course a sense\r\nin which there is a distinctive impulse, or rather habitual\r\ndisposition, to know. But in the same sense there\r\nis an impulse to aviate, to run a typewriter or write\r\nstories for magazines. Some activities result in knowledge,\r\nas others result in these other things. The result\r\nmay be so important as to induce distinctive attention to\r\nthe activities in order to foster them. From an incident,\r\nalmost a by-product, attainment of truth, physical, social,\r\nmoral, may become the leading characteristic of\r\nsome activities. Under such circumstances, they become\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg186\"\u003e[pg 186]\u003c/span\u003e\r\ntransformed. Knowing is then a distinctive activity,\r\nwith its own ends and its peculiarly adapted processes.\r\nAll this is a matter of course. Having hit\r\nupon knowledge accidentally, as it were, and the product\r\nbeing liked and its importance noted, knowledge-getting\r\nbecomes, upon occasion, a definite occupation.\r\nAnd education confirms the disposition, as it may confirm\r\nthat of a musician or carpenter or tennis-player.\r\nBut there is no more an original separate impulse\r\nor power in one case than in the other. Every\r\nhabit is impulsive, that is projective, urgent, and the\r\nhabit of knowing is no exception.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe reason for insisting on this fact is not failure\r\nto appreciate the distinctive value of knowledge when\r\nonce it comes into existence. This value is so immense\r\nit may be called unique. The aim of the discussion is\r\nnot to subordinate knowing to some hard, prosaic utilitarian\r\nend. The reason for insistence upon the derivative\r\nposition of knowing in activity, roots in a sense for\r\nfact, and in a realization that the doctrine of a separate\r\noriginal power and impulse of knowledge cuts\r\nknowledge off from other phases of human nature, and\r\nresults in its non-natural treatment. The isolation of\r\nintellectual disposition from concrete empirical facts\r\nof biological impulse and habit-formation entails a denial\r\nof the continuity of mind with nature. Aristotle\r\nasserted that the faculty of pure knowing enters a man\r\nfrom without as through a door. Many since his day\r\nhave asserted that knowing and doing have no intrinsic\r\nconnection with each other. Reason is asserted to have\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg187\"\u003e[pg 187]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nno responsibility to experience; conscience is said to be\r\na sublime oracle independent of education and social influences.\r\nAll of these views follow naturally from a\r\nfailure to recognize that all knowing, judgment, belief\r\nrepresent an acquired result of the workings of natural\r\nimpulses in connection with environment.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eUpon the ethical side, as has been intimated, the matter\r\nat issue concerns the nature of conscience. Conscience\r\nhas been asserted by orthodox moralists to be\r\nunique in origin and subject-matter. The same view is\r\nembodied by implication in all those popular methods\r\nof moral training which attempt to fix rigid authoritative\r\nnotions of right and wrong by disconnecting moral\r\njudgments from the aids and tests which are used in\r\nother forms of knowledge. Thus it has been asserted\r\nthat conscience is an original faculty of illumination\r\nwhich (if it has not been dimmed by indulgence in sin)\r\nshines upon moral truths and objects and reveals them\r\nwithout effort for precisely what they are. Those who\r\nhold this view differ enormously among themselves as\r\nto the nature of the objects of conscience. Some hold\r\nthem to be general principles, others individual acts,\r\nothers the order of worth among motives, others the\r\nsense of duty in general, others the unqualified authority\r\nof right. Still others carry the implied logic of\r\nauthority to conclusion, and identify knowledge of\r\nmoral truths with a divine supernatural revelation of a\r\ncode of commandments.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut among these diversities there is agreement about\r\none fundamental. There must be a separate non-natural\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg188\"\u003e[pg 188]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nfaculty of moral knowledge because the things\r\nto be known, the matters of right and wrong, good and\r\nevil, obligation and responsibility, form a separate domain,\r\nseparate that is from that of ordinary action in\r\nits usual human and social significance. The latter activities\r\nmay be prudential, political, scientific, economic.\r\nBut, from the standpoint of these theories, they have\r\nno moral meaning until they are brought under the\r\npurview of this separate unique department of our\r\nnature. It thus turns out that the so-called intuitional\r\ntheories of moral knowledge concentrate in themselves\r\nall the ideas which are subject to criticism in these\r\npages: Namely, the assertion that morality is distinct\r\nin origin, working and destiny from the natural structure\r\nand career of human nature. This fact is the excuse,\r\nif excuse be desired, for a seemingly technical\r\nexcursion that links intellectual activity with the conjoint\r\noperation of habit and impulse.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg189\"\u003e[pg 189]\u003c/span\u003eIII\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSo far the discussion has ignored the fact that there\r\nis an influential school of moralists (best represented\r\nin contemporary thought by the utilitarians) which\r\nalso insists upon the natural, empirical character of\r\nmoral judgments and beliefs. But unfortunately this\r\nschool has followed a false psychology; and has tended,\r\nby calling out a reaction, actually to strengthen the\r\nhands of those who persist in assigning to morals a\r\nseparate domain of action and in demanding a separate\r\nagent of moral knowledge. The essentials of this false\r\npsychology consist in two traits. The first, that knowledge\r\noriginates from sensations (instead of from habits\r\nand impulses); and the second, that judgment about\r\ngood and evil in action consists in calculation of agreeable\r\nand disagreeable consequences, of profit and loss.\r\nIt is not surprising that this view seems to many to\r\ndegrade morals, as well as to be false to facts. If the\r\nlogical outcome of an empirical view of moral knowledge\r\nis that all morality is concerned with calculating what\r\nis expedient, politic, prudent, measured by consequences\r\nin the ways of pleasurable and painful sensations, then,\r\nsay moralists of the orthodox school, we will have\r\nnaught to do with such a sordid view: It is a reduction\r\nto the absurd of its premisses. We will have a separate\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg190\"\u003e[pg 190]\u003c/span\u003e\r\ndepartment for morals and a separate organ of\r\nmoral knowledge.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOur first problem is then to investigate the nature\r\nof ordinary judgments upon what it is best or wise to\r\ndo, or, in ordinary language, the nature of deliberation.\r\nWe begin with a summary assertion that deliberation is\r\na dramatic rehearsal (in imagination) of various competing\r\npossible lines of action. It starts from the\r\nblocking of efficient overt action, due to that conflict\r\nof prior habit and newly released impulse to which reference\r\nhas been made. Then each habit, each impulse,\r\ninvolved in the temporary suspense of overt action\r\ntakes its turn in being tried out. Deliberation is an\r\nexperiment in finding out what the various lines of possible\r\naction are really like. It is an experiment in\r\nmaking various combinations of selected elements of\r\nhabits and impulses, to see what the resultant action\r\nwould be like if it were entered upon. But the trial is\r\nin imagination, not in overt fact. The experiment is\r\ncarried on by tentative rehearsals in thought which do\r\nnot affect physical facts outside the body. Thought\r\nruns ahead and foresees outcomes, and thereby avoids\r\nhaving to await the instruction of actual failure and\r\ndisaster. An act overtly tried out is irrevocable, its\r\nconsequences cannot be blotted out. An act tried out\r\nin imagination is not final or fatal. It is retrievable.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eEach conflicting habit and impulse takes its turn in\r\nprojecting itself upon the screen of imagination. It\r\nunrolls a picture of its future history, of the career it\r\nwould have if it were given head. Although overt exhibition\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg191\"\u003e[pg 191]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nis checked by the pressure of contrary propulsive\r\ntendencies, this very inhibition gives habit a chance\r\nat manifestation in thought. Deliberation means precisely\r\nthat activity is disintegrated, and that its various\r\nelements hold one another up. While none has force\r\nenough to become the center of a re-directed activity,\r\nor to dominate a course of action, each has enough\r\npower to check others from exercising mastery. Activity\r\ndoes not cease in order to give way to reflection;\r\nactivity is turned from execution into intra-organic\r\nchannels, resulting in dramatic rehearsal.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf activity were directly exhibited it would result in\r\ncertain experiences, contacts with the environment. It\r\nwould succeed by making environing objects, things and\r\npersons, co-partners in its forward movement; or else\r\nit would run against obstacles and be troubled, possibly\r\ndefeated. These experiences of contact with objects\r\nand their qualities give meaning, character, to an\r\notherwise fluid, unconscious activity. We find out what\r\nseeing means by the objects which are seen. They constitute\r\nthe significance of visual activity which would\r\notherwise remain a blank. \"Pure\" activity is for consciousness\r\npure emptiness. It acquires a content or\r\nfilling of meanings only in static termini, what it comes\r\nto rest in, or in the obstacles which check its onward\r\nmovement and deflect it. As has been remarked, the object\r\nis that which objects.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThere is no difference in this respect between a visible\r\ncourse of conduct and one proposed in deliberation.\r\nWe have no direct consciousness of what we purpose\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg192\"\u003e[pg 192]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nto do. We can judge its nature, assign its meaning,\r\nonly by following it into the situations whither it leads,\r\nnoting the objects against which it runs and seeing how\r\nthey rebuff or unexpectedly encourage it. In imagination\r\nas in fact we know a road only by what we see as\r\nwe travel on it. Moreover the objects which prick out\r\nthe course of a proposed act until we can see its design\r\nalso serve to direct eventual overt activity. Every object\r\nhit upon as the habit traverses its imaginary path\r\nhas a direct effect upon existing activities. It reinforces,\r\ninhibits, redirects habits already working or\r\nstirs up others which had not previously actively\r\nentered in. In thought as well as in overt action, the\r\nobjects experienced in following out a course of action\r\nattract, repel, satisfy, annoy, promote and retard.\r\nThus deliberation proceeds. To say that at last it\r\nceases is to say that choice, decision, takes place.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhat then is choice? Simply hitting in imagination\r\nupon an object which furnishes an adequate stimulus\r\nto the recovery of overt action. Choice is made as soon\r\nas some habit, or some combination of elements of habits\r\nand impulse, finds a way fully open. Then energy is\r\nreleased. The mind is made up, composed, unified. As\r\nlong as deliberation pictures shoals or rocks or troublesome\r\ngales as marking the route of a contemplated\r\nvoyage, deliberation goes on. But when the various\r\nfactors in action fit harmoniously together, when imagination\r\nfinds no annoying hindrance, when there is a\r\npicture of open seas, filled sails and favoring winds, the\r\nvoyage is definitely entered upon. This decisive direction\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg193\"\u003e[pg 193]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof action constitutes choice. It is a great error to\r\nsuppose that we have no preferences until there is a\r\nchoice. We are always biased beings, tending in one\r\ndirection rather than another. The occasion of deliberation\r\nis an \u003cem\u003eexcess\u003c/em\u003e of preferences, not natural\r\napathy or an absence of likings. We want things that\r\nare incompatible with one another; therefore we have\r\nto make a choice of what we \u003cem\u003ereally\u003c/em\u003e want, of the course\r\nof action, that is, which most fully releases activities.\r\nChoice is not the emergence of preference out of indifference.\r\nIt is the emergence of a unified preference out\r\nof competing preferences. Biases that had held one\r\nanother in check now, temporarily at least, reinforce\r\none another, and constitute a unified attitude. The\r\nmoment arrives when imagination pictures an objective\r\nconsequence of action which supplies an adequate stimulus\r\nand releases definitive action. All deliberation is\r\na search for a \u003cem\u003eway\u003c/em\u003e to act, not for a final terminus. Its\r\noffice is to facilitate stimulation.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eHence there is reasonable and unreasonable choice.\r\nThe object thought of may simply stimulate some impulse\r\nor habit to a pitch of intensity where it is temporarily\r\nirresistible. It then overrides all competitors\r\nand secures for itself the sole right of way. The object\r\nlooms large in imagination; it swells to fill the field. It\r\nallows no room for alternatives; it absorbs us, enraptures\r\nus, carries us away, sweeps us off our feet by\r\nits own attractive force. Then choice is arbitrary, unreasonable.\r\nBut the object thought of may be one\r\nwhich stimulates by unifying, harmonizing, different\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg194\"\u003e[pg 194]\u003c/span\u003e\r\ncompeting tendencies. It may release an activity in\r\nwhich all are fulfilled, not indeed, in their original form,\r\nbut in a \"sublimated\" fashion, that is in a way which\r\nmodifies the original direction of each by reducing it\r\nto a component along with others in an action of transformed\r\nquality. Nothing is more extraordinary than\r\nthe delicacy, promptness and ingenuity with which deliberation\r\nis capable of making eliminations and recombinations\r\nin projecting the course of a possible\r\nactivity. To every shade of imagined circumstance\r\nthere is a vibrating response; and to every complex situation\r\na sensitiveness as to its integrity, a feeling of\r\nwhether it does justice to all facts, or overrides some\r\nto the advantage of others. Decision is reasonable\r\nwhen deliberation is so conducted. There may be\r\nerror in the result, but it comes from lack of data not\r\nfrom ineptitude in handling them.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThese facts give us the key to the old controversy\r\nas to the respective places of desire and reason in conduct.\r\nIt is notorious that some moralists have deplored\r\nthe influence of desire; they have found the heart\r\nof strife between good and evil in the conflict of desire\r\nwith reason, in which the former has force on its side\r\nand the latter authority. But reasonableness is in fact\r\na quality of an effective relationship among desires\r\nrather than a thing opposed to desire. It signifies the\r\norder, perspective, proportion which is achieved, during\r\ndeliberation, out of a diversity of earlier incompatible\r\npreferences. Choice is reasonable when it induces us\r\nto act reasonably; that is, with regard to the claims\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg195\"\u003e[pg 195]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof each of the competing habits and impulses. This\r\nimplies, of course, the presence of a comprehensive object,\r\none which coordinates, organizes and functions\r\neach factor of the situation which gave rise to conflict,\r\nsuspense and deliberation. This is as true when some\r\n\"bad\" impulses and habits enter in as when approved\r\nones require unification. We have already seen the\r\neffects of choking them off, of efforts at direct suppression.\r\nBad habits can be subdued only by being\r\nutilized as elements in a new, more generous and comprehensive\r\nscheme of action, and good ones be preserved\r\nfrom rot only by similar use.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe nature of the strife of reason and passion is\r\nwell stated by William James. The cue of passion, he\r\nsays in effect, is to keep imagination dwelling upon\r\nthose objects which are congenial to it, which feed it,\r\nand which by feeding it intensify its force, until it\r\ncrowds out all thought of other objects. An impulse\r\nor habit which is strongly emotional magnifies all objects\r\nthat are congruous with it and smothers those\r\nwhich are opposed whenever they present themselves. A\r\npassionate activity learns to work itself up artificially\u0026mdash;as\r\nOliver Cromwell indulged in fits of anger when\r\nhe wanted to do things that his conscience would not\r\njustify. A presentiment is felt that if the thought of\r\ncontrary objects is allowed to get a lodgment in imagination,\r\nthese objects will work and work to chill and\r\nfreeze out the ardent passion of the moment.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe conclusion is not that the emotional, passionate\r\nphase of action can be or should be eliminated in behalf\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg196\"\u003e[pg 196]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof a bloodless reason. More \"passions,\" not fewer,\r\nis the answer. To check the influence of hate there must\r\nbe sympathy, while to rationalize sympathy there are\r\nneeded emotions of curiosity, caution, respect for the\r\nfreedom of others\u0026mdash;dispositions which evoke objects\r\nwhich balance those called up by sympathy, and prevent\r\nits degeneration into maudlin sentiment and meddling\r\ninterference. Rationality, once more, is not a\r\nforce to evoke against impulse and habit. It is the\r\nattainment of a working harmony among diverse desires.\r\n\"Reason\" as a noun signifies the happy cooperation\r\nof a multitude of dispositions, such as sympathy,\r\ncuriosity, exploration, experimentation, frankness, pursuit\u0026mdash;to\r\nfollow things through\u0026mdash;circumspection, to\r\nlook about at the context, etc., etc. The elaborate systems\r\nof science are born not of reason but of impulses\r\nat first slight and flickering; impulses to handle, move\r\nabout, to hunt, to uncover, to mix things separated and\r\ndivide things combined, to talk and to listen. Method\r\nis their effectual organization into continuous dispositions\r\nof inquiry, development and testing. It occurs\r\nafter these acts and because of their consequences.\r\nReason, the rational attitude, is the resulting disposition,\r\nnot a ready-made antecedent which can be invoked\r\nat will and set into movement. The man who\r\nwould intelligently cultivate intelligence will widen, not\r\nnarrow, his life of strong impulses while aiming at their\r\nhappy coincidence in operation.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe clew of impulse is, as we say, to start something.\r\nIt is in a hurry. It rushes us off our feet. It\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg197\"\u003e[pg 197]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nleaves no time for examination, memory and foresight.\r\nBut the clew of reason is, as the phrase also goes, to\r\nstop and think. Force, however, is required to stop the\r\nongoing of a habit or impulse. This is supplied by\r\nanother habit. The resulting period of delay, of suspended\r\nand postponed overt action, is the period in\r\nwhich activities that are refused direct outlet project\r\nimaginative counterparts. It signifies, in technical\r\nphrase, the mediation of impulse. For an isolated impulse\r\n\u003cem\u003eis\u003c/em\u003e immediate, narrowing the world down to the\r\ndirectly present. Variety of competing tendencies enlarges\r\nthe world. It brings a diversity of considerations\r\nbefore the mind, and enables action to take place\r\nfinally in view of an object generously conceived and\r\ndelicately refined, composed by a long process of\r\nselections and combinations. In popular phrase, to be\r\ndeliberate is to be slow, unhurried. It takes time to put\r\nobjects in order.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThere are however vices of reflection as well as of\r\nimpulse. We may not look far enough ahead because\r\nwe are hurried into action by stress of impulse; but\r\nwe may also become overinterested in the delights of\r\nreflection; we become afraid of assuming the responsibilities\r\nof decisive choice and action, and in general be\r\nsicklied over by a pale cast of thought. We may become\r\nso curious about remote and abstract matters\r\nthat we give only a begrudged, impatient attention to\r\nthe things right about us. We may fancy we are glorifying\r\nthe love of truth for its own sake when we are\r\nonly indulging a pet occupation and slighting demands\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg198\"\u003e[pg 198]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof the immediate situation. Men who devote themselves\r\nto thinking are likely to be unusually unthinking in\r\nsome respects, as for example in immediate personal relationships.\r\nA man to whom exact scholarship is an\r\nabsorbing pursuit may be more than ordinarily vague\r\nin ordinary matters. Humility and impartiality may\r\nbe shown in a specialized field, and pettiness and arrogance\r\nin dealing with other persons. \"Reason\" is\r\nnot an antecedent force which serves as a panacea. It\r\nis a laborious achievement of habit needing to be continually\r\nworked over. A balanced arrangement of propulsive\r\nactivities manifested in deliberation\u0026mdash;namely,\r\nreason\u0026mdash;depends upon a sensitive and proportionate\r\nemotional sensitiveness. Only a one-sided, over-specialized\r\nemotion leads to thinking of it as separate from\r\nemotion. The traditional association of justice and\r\nreason has good psychology back of it. Both imply a\r\nbalanced distribution of thought and energy. Deliberation\r\nis irrational in the degree in which an end is\r\nso fixed, a passion or interest so absorbing, that the\r\nforesight of consequences is warped to include only\r\nwhat furthers execution of its predetermined bias. Deliberation\r\nis rational in the degree in which forethought\r\nflexibly remakes old aims and habits, institutes perception\r\nand love of new ends and acts.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg199\"\u003e[pg 199]\u003c/span\u003eIV\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe now return to a consideration of the utilitarian\r\ntheory according to which deliberation consists in calculation\r\nof courses of action on the basis of the profit\r\nand loss to which they lead. The contrast of this notion\r\nwith fact is obvious. The office of deliberation is\r\nnot to supply an inducement to act by figuring out\r\nwhere the most advantage is to be procured. It is to\r\nresolve entanglements in existing activity, restore continuity,\r\nrecover harmony, utilize loose impulse and redirect\r\nhabit. To this end observation of present conditions,\r\nrecollection of previous situations are devoted.\r\nDeliberation has its beginning in troubled activity and\r\nits conclusion in choice of a course of action which\r\nstraightens it out. It no more resembles the casting-up\r\nof accounts of profit and loss, pleasures and pains, than\r\nan actor engaged in drama resembles a clerk recording\r\ndebit and credit items in his ledger.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe primary fact is that man is a being who responds\r\nin action to the stimuli of the environment. This fact\r\nis complicated in deliberation, but it certainly is not\r\nabolished. We continue to react to an object presented\r\nin imagination as we react to objects presented in observation.\r\nThe baby does not move to the mother\u0027s\r\nbreast because of calculation of the advantages of\r\nwarmth and food over against the pains of effort. Nor\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg200\"\u003e[pg 200]\u003c/span\u003e\r\ndoes the miser seek gold, nor the architect strive to\r\nmake plans, nor the physician to heal, because of reckonings\r\nof comparative advantage and disadvantage.\r\nHabit, occupation, furnishes the necessity of forward\r\naction in one case as instinct does in the other. We do\r\nnot act \u003cem\u003efrom\u003c/em\u003e reasoning; but reasoning puts before us\r\nobjects which are not directly or sensibly present, so\r\nthat we then may react directly to these objects, with\r\naversion, attraction, indifference or attachment, precisely\r\nas we would to the same objects if they were\r\nphysically present. In the end it results in a case of\r\ndirect stimulus and response. In one case the stimulus\r\nis presented at once through sense; in the other case, it\r\nis indirectly reached through memory and constructive\r\nimagination. But the matter of directness and indirectness\r\nconcerns the way the stimulus is reached,\r\nnot the way in which it operates.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eJoy and suffering, pain and pleasure, the agreeable\r\nand disagreeable, play their considerable rôle in deliberation.\r\nNot, however, by way of a calculated estimate\r\nof future delights and miseries, but by way of\r\nexperiencing present ones. The reaction of joy and\r\nsorrow, elation and depression, is as natural a response\r\nto objects presented in imagination as to those presented\r\nin sense. Complacency and annoyance follow\r\nhard at the heels of any object presented in image as\r\nthey do upon its sensuous experience. Some objects\r\nwhen thought of are congruent to our existing state\r\nof activity. They fit in, they are welcome. They agree,\r\nor are agreeable, not as matter of calculation but as\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg201\"\u003e[pg 201]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nmatter of experienced fact. Other objects rasp; they\r\ncut across activity; they are tiresome, hateful, unwelcome.\r\nThey disagree with the existing trend of\r\nactivity, that is, they are disagreeable, and in no other\r\nway than as a bore who prolongs his visit, a dun we\r\ncan\u0027t pay, or a pestiferous mosquito who goes on buzzing.\r\nWe do not think of future losses and expansions.\r\nWe think, through imagination, of objects into which\r\nin the future some course of action will run, and we\r\nare \u003cem\u003enow\u003c/em\u003e delighted or depressed, pleased or pained at\r\nwhat is presented. This running commentary of likes\r\nand dislikes, attractions and disdains, joys and sorrows,\r\nreveals to any man who is intelligent enough to\r\nnote them and to study their occasions his own character.\r\nIt instructs him as to the composition and direction\r\nof the activities that make him what he is. To\r\nknow what jars an activity and what agrees with it is\r\nto know something important about that activity and\r\nabout ourselves.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSome one may ask what practical difference it makes\r\nwhether we are influenced by calculation of future joys\r\nand annoyances or by experience of present ones. To\r\nsuch a question one can hardly reply except in the\r\nwords \"All the difference in the world.\" In the first\r\nplace, no difference can be more important than that\r\nwhich concerns the nature of the \u003cem\u003esubject-matter\u003c/em\u003e of deliberation.\r\nThe calculative theory would have it that\r\nthis subject-matter is future feelings, sensations, and\r\nthat actions and thought are external means to get\r\nand avoid these sensations. If such a theory has any\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg202\"\u003e[pg 202]\u003c/span\u003e\r\npractical influence, it is to advise a person to concentrate\r\nupon his own most subjective and private feelings.\r\nIt gives him no choice except between a sickly introspection\r\nand an intricate calculus of remote, inaccessible\r\nand indeterminate results. In fact, deliberation, as\r\na tentative trying-out of various courses of action, is\r\noutlooking. It flies toward and settles upon objective\r\nsituations not upon feelings. No doubt we sometimes\r\nfall to deliberating upon the effect of action upon our\r\nfuture feelings, thinking of a situation mainly with reference\r\nto the comforts and discomforts it will excite in\r\nus. But these moments are precisely our sentimental\r\nmoments of self-pity or self-glorification. They conduce\r\nto morbidity, sophistication, isolation from others;\r\nwhile facing our acts in terms of their objective consequences\r\nleads to enlightenment and to consideration\r\nof others. The first objection therefore to deliberation\r\nas a calculation of future feelings is that, if it is consistently\r\nadhered to, it makes an abnormal case the\r\nstandard one.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf however an objective estimate is attempted,\r\nthought gets speedily lost in a task impossible of\r\nachievement. Future pleasures and pains are influenced\r\nby two factors which are independent of present\r\nchoice and effort. They depend upon our own state at\r\nsome future moment and upon the surrounding circumstances\r\nof that moment. Both of these are variables\r\nwhich change independently of present resolve and\r\naction. They are much more important determinants\r\nof future sensations than is anything which can now be\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg203\"\u003e[pg 203]\u003c/span\u003e\r\ncalculated. Things sweet in anticipation are bitter in\r\nactual taste, things we now turn from in aversion are\r\nwelcome at another moment in our career. Independently\r\nof deep changes in character, such as from mercifulness\r\nto callousness, from fretfulness to cheerfulness,\r\nthere are unavoidable changes in the waxing and waning\r\nof activity. A child pictures a future of unlimited\r\ntoys and unrestricted sweetmeats. An adult pictures an\r\nobject as giving pleasure while he is empty while the\r\nthing arrives in a moment of repletion. A sympathetic\r\nperson reckons upon the utilitarian basis the pains of\r\nothers as a debit item in his calculations. But why not\r\nharden himself so that others\u0027 sufferings won\u0027t count?\r\nWhy not foster an arrogant cruelty so that the suffering\r\nof others which will follow from one\u0027s own action\r\nwill fall on the credit side of the reckoning, be pleasurable,\r\nall to the good?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFuture pleasures and pains, even of one\u0027s own, are\r\namong the things most elusive of calculation. Of all\r\nthings they lend themselves least readily to anything\r\napproaching a mathematical calculus. And the further\r\ninto the future we extend our view, and the more the\r\npleasures of others enter into the account, the more\r\nhopeless does the problem of estimating future consequences\r\nbecome. All of the elements become more and\r\nmore indeterminate. Even if one could form a fairly\r\naccurate picture of the things that give pleasure to\r\nmost people at the present moment\u0026mdash;an exceedingly\r\ndifficult task\u0026mdash;he cannot foresee the detailed circumstances\r\nwhich will give a decisive turn to enjoyment at\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg204\"\u003e[pg 204]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nfuture times and remote places. Do pleasures due to\r\ndefective education or unrefined disposition, to say\r\nnothing of the pleasures of sensuality and brutality,\r\nrank the same as those of cultivated persons having\r\nacute social sensitiveness? The only reason the impossibility\r\nof the hedonistic calculus is not self-evident\r\nis that theorists in considering it unconsciously substitute\r\nfor calculation of future pleasures an appreciation\r\nof present ones, a present realization in imagination\r\nof future objective situations.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFor, in truth, a man\u0027s judgment of future joys and\r\nsorrows is but a projection of what now satisfies and\r\nannoys him. A man of considerate disposition now\r\nfeels hurt at the thought of an act bringing harm to\r\nothers, and so he is on the lookout for consequences of\r\nthat sort, ranking them as of high importance. He\r\nmay even be so abnormally sensitive to such consequences\r\nthat he is held back from needed vigorous action.\r\nHe fears to do the things which are for the real\r\nwelfare of others because he shrinks from the thought\r\nof the pain to be inflicted upon them by needed measures.\r\nA man of an executive type, engrossed in carrying\r\nthrough a scheme, will react in present emotion to\r\neverything concerned with its external success; the pain\r\nits execution brings to others will not occur to him, or\r\nif it does, his mind will easily glide over it. This sort\r\nof consequence will seem to him of slight importance\r\nin comparison with the commercial or political changes\r\nwhich bulk in his plans. What a man foresees and fails\r\nto foresee, what he appraises highly and at a low rate,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg205\"\u003e[pg 205]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwhat he deems important and trivial, what he dwells\r\nupon and what he slurs over, what he easily recalls and\r\nwhat he naturally forgets\u0026mdash;all of these things depend\r\nupon his character. His estimate of future consequences\r\nof the agreeable and annoying is consequently\r\nof much greater value as an index of what he now is\r\nthan as a prediction of future results.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOne has only to read between the lines to see the\r\nenormous difference that marks off modern utilitarianism\r\nfrom epicureanism, in spite of similarities in professed\r\npsychologies. Epicureanism is too worldly-wise\r\nto indulge in attempts to base present action upon precarious\r\nestimates of future and universal pleasures and\r\npains. On the contrary it says let the future go, for\r\nlife is uncertain. Who knows when it will end, or what\r\nfortune the morrow will bring? Foster, then, with jealous\r\ncare every gift of pleasure now allotted to you,\r\ndwell upon it with lingering love, prolong it as best you\r\nmay. Utilitarianism on the contrary was a part of a\r\nphilanthropic and reform movement of the nineteenth\r\ncentury. Its commendation of an elaborate and impossible\r\ncalculus was in reality part of a movement to\r\ndevelop a type of character which should have a wide\r\nsocial outlook, sympathy with the experiences of all\r\nsentient creatures, one zealous about the social effects\r\nof all proposed acts, especially those of collective legislation\r\nand administration. It was concerned not with\r\nextracting the honey of the passing moment but with\r\nbreeding improved bees and constructing hives.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAfter all, the object of foresight of consequences is\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg206\"\u003e[pg 206]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nnot to predict the future. It is to ascertain the meaning\r\nof present activities and to secure, so far as possible,\r\na present activity with a unified meaning. We are\r\nnot the creators of heaven and earth; we have no responsibility\r\nfor their operations save as their motions\r\nare altered by our movements. Our concern is with\r\nthe significance of that slight fraction of total activity\r\nwhich starts from ourselves. The best laid plans of\r\nmen as well of mice gang aglee; and for the same\r\nreason: inability to dominate the future. The power\r\nof man and mouse is infinitely constricted in comparison\r\nwith the power of events. Men always build better or\r\nworse than they know, for their acts are taken up into\r\nthe broad sweep of events.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eHence the problem of deliberation is not to calculate\r\nfuture happenings but to appraise present proposed\r\nactions. We judge present desires and habits by their\r\ntendency to produce certain consequences. It is our\r\nbusiness to watch the course of our action so as to see\r\nwhat is the significance, the import of our habits and\r\ndispositions. The future outcome is not certain. But\r\nneither is it certain what the present fire will do in the\r\nfuture. It may be unexpectedly fed or extinguished.\r\nBut its \u003cem\u003etendency\u003c/em\u003e is a knowable matter, what it will do\r\nunder certain circumstances. And so we know what is\r\nthe tendency of malice, charity, conceit, patience. We\r\nknow by observing their consequences, by recollecting\r\nwhat we have observed, by using that recollection in\r\nconstructive imaginative forecasts of the future, by\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg207\"\u003e[pg 207]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nusing the thought of future consequence to tell the\r\nquality of the act now proposed.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eDeliberation is not calculation of indeterminate future\r\nresults. The present, not the future, is ours. No\r\nshrewdness, no store of information will make it ours.\r\nBut by constant watchfulness concerning the tendency\r\nof acts, by noting disparities between former judgments\r\nand actual outcomes, and tracing that part of the disparity\r\nthat was due to deficiency and excess in disposition,\r\nwe come to know the meaning of present acts,\r\nand to guide them in the light of that meaning. The\r\nmoral is to develop conscientiousness, ability to judge\r\nthe significance of what we are doing and to use that\r\njudgment in directing what we do, not by means of\r\ndirect cultivation of something called conscience, or\r\nreason, or a faculty of moral knowledge, but by fostering\r\nthose impulses and habits which experience has\r\nshown to make us sensitive, generous, imaginative, impartial\r\nin perceiving the tendency of our inchoate dawning\r\nactivities. Every attempt to forecast the future is\r\nsubject in the end to the auditing of present concrete\r\nimpulse and habit. Therefore the important thing is\r\nthe fostering of those habits and impulses which lead to\r\na broad, just, sympathetic survey of situations.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe occasion of deliberation, that is of the attempt\r\nto find a stimulus to complete overt action in thought\r\nof some future object, is confusion and uncertainty\r\nin present activities. A similar devision in activities\r\nand need of a like deliberative activity for the\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg208\"\u003e[pg 208]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nsake of recovery of unity is sure to recur, to recur again\r\nand again, no matter how wise the decision. Even the\r\nmost comprehensive deliberation leading to the most\r\nmomentous choice only fixes a disposition which has to\r\nbe continuously applied in new and unforeseen conditions,\r\nre-adapted by future deliberations. Always our\r\nold habits and dispositions carry us into new fields.\r\nWe have to be always learning and relearning the meaning\r\nof our active tendencies. Does not this reduce\r\nmoral life to the futile toil of a Sisyphus who is forever\r\nrolling a stone uphill only to have it roll back so\r\nthat he has to repeat his old task? Yes, judged from\r\nprogress made in a control of conditions which shall\r\nstay put and which excludes the necessity of future deliberations\r\nand reconsiderations. No, because continual\r\nsearch and experimentation to discover the meaning\r\nof changing activity, keeps activity alive, growing\r\nin significance. The future situation involved in deliberation\r\nis of necessity marked by contingency. What\r\nit will be in fact remains dependent upon conditions that\r\nescape our foresight and power of regulation. But\r\nforesight which draws liberally upon the lessons of past\r\nexperience reveals the tendency, the meaning, of present\r\naction; and, once more, it is this present meaning rather\r\nthan the future outcome which counts. Imaginative\r\nforethought of the probable consequences of a proposed\r\nact keeps that act from sinking below consciousness into\r\nroutine habit or whimsical brutality. It preserves the\r\nmeaning of that act alive, and keeps it growing in\r\ndepth and refinement of meaning. There is no limit to\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg209\"\u003e[pg 209]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe amount of meaning which reflective and meditative\r\nhabit is capable of importing into even simple acts,\r\njust as the most splendid successes of the skilful executive\r\nwho manipulates events may be accompanied by an\r\nincredibly meager and superficial consciousness.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg210\"\u003e[pg 210]\u003c/span\u003eV\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe reason for dividing conduct into two distinct\r\nregions, one of expediency and the other of morality,\r\ndisappears when the psychology that identifies ordinary\r\ndeliberation with calculation is disposed of. There\r\nis seen to be but one issue involved in all reflection upon\r\nconduct: The rectifying of present troubles, the harmonizing\r\nof present incompatibilities by projecting a\r\ncourse of action which gathers into itself the meaning\r\nof them all. The recognition of the true psychology\r\nalso reveals to us the nature of good or satisfaction.\r\nGood consists in the meaning that is experienced to\r\nbelong to an activity when conflict and entanglement\r\nof various incompatible impulses and habits terminate\r\nin a unified orderly release in action. This human good,\r\nbeing a fulfilment conditioned upon thought, differs\r\nfrom the pleasures which an animal nature\u0026mdash;of course\r\nwe also remain animals so far as we do not think\u0026mdash;hits\r\nupon accidentally. Moreover there is a genuine difference\r\nbetween a false good, a spurious satisfaction,\r\nand a \"true\" good, and there is an empirical test for\r\ndiscovering the difference. The unification which ends\r\nthought in act may be only a superficial compromise,\r\nnot a real decision but a postponement of the issue.\r\nMany of our so-called decisions are of this nature. Or\r\nit may present, as we have seen, a victory of a temporarily\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg211\"\u003e[pg 211]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nintense impulse over its rivals, a unity by oppression\r\nand suppression, not by coordination. These\r\nseeming unifications which are not unifications of fact\r\nare revealed by the event, by subsequent occurrences.\r\nIt is one of the penalties of evil choice, perhaps the chief\r\npenalty, that the wrong-doer becomes more and more incapable\r\nof detecting these objective revelations of\r\nhimself.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn quality, the good is never twice alike. It never\r\ncopies itself. It is new every morning, fresh every\r\nevening. It is unique in its every \u003cins class=\"corr\" title=\"presentation\" id=\"Corr_211_\"\u003epresentation.\u003c/ins\u003e For it\r\nmarks the resolution of a distinctive complication of\r\ncompeting habits and impulses which can never repeat\r\nitself. Only with a habit rigid to the point of immobility\r\ncould exactly the same good recur twice. And\r\nwith such rigid routines the same good does not after\r\nall recur, for it does not even occur. There is no consciousness\r\nat all, either of good or bad. Rigid habits\r\nsink below the level of any meaning at all. And since\r\nwe live in a moving world, they plunge us finally against\r\nconditions to which they are not adapted and so terminate\r\nin disaster.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eTo utilitarianism with all its defects belongs the distinction\r\nof enforcing in an unforgettable way the fact\r\nthat moral good, like every good, consists in a satisfaction\r\nof the forces of human nature, in welfare, happiness.\r\nTo Bentham remains, in spite of all crudities\r\nand eccentricities, the imperishable renown of forcing\r\nhome to the popular consciousness that \"conscience,\"\r\nintelligence applied to in moral matters, is too often\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg212\"\u003e[pg 212]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nnot intelligence but is veiled caprice, dogmatic \u003ci lang=\"la\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003eipse\r\ndixitism\u003c/i\u003e, vested class interest. It is truly conscience\r\nonly as it contributes to relief of misery and promotion\r\nof happiness. An examination of utilitarianism\r\nbrings out however the catastrophe involved in thinking\r\nof the good to which intelligence is pertinent as consisting\r\nin future pleasures and pains, and moral reflection\r\nas their algebraic calculus. It emphasizes the\r\ncontrast between such conceptions of good and of intelligence,\r\nand the facts of human nature according to\r\nwhich good, happiness, is found in the present meaning\r\nof activity, depending upon the proportion, order and\r\nfreedom introduced into it by thought as it discovers\r\nobjects which release and unify otherwise contending\r\nelements.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAn adequate discussion of why utilitarianism with its\r\njust insight into the central place of good, and its\r\nardent devotion to rendering morals more intelligent\r\nand more equitably human took its onesided course (and\r\nthereby provoked an intensified reaction to transcendental\r\nand dogmatic morals) would take us far afield\r\ninto social conditions and the antecedent history of\r\nthought. We can deal with \u003cins class=\"corr\" title=\"only\" id=\"Corr_212_\"\u003eonly one\u003c/ins\u003e factor, the domination\r\nof intellectual interest by economic considerations. The\r\nindustrial revolution was bound in any case to give a\r\nnew direction to thought. It enforced liberation from\r\nother-worldly concerns by fixing attention upon the\r\npossibility of the betterment of this world through control\r\nand utilization of natural forces; it opened up\r\nmarvelous possibilities in industry and commerce, and\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg213\"\u003e[pg 213]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nnew social conditions conducive to invention, ingenuity,\r\nenterprise, constructive energy and an impersonal habit\r\nof mind dealing with mechanisms rather than appearances.\r\nBut new movements do not start in a new and\r\nclear field. The context of old institutions and corresponding\r\nhabits of thought persisted. The new movement\r\nwas perverted in theory because prior established\r\nconditions deflected it in practice. Thus the new industrialism\r\nwas largely the old feudalism, living in a\r\nbank instead of a castle and brandishing the check of\r\ncredit instead of the sword.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAn old theological doctrine of total depravity was\r\ncontinued and carried over in the idea of an inherent\r\nlaziness of human nature which rendered it averse to\r\nuseful work, unless bribed by expectations of pleasure,\r\nor driven by fears of pains. This being the \"incentive\"\r\nto action, it followed that the office of reason is\r\nonly to enlighten the search for good or gain by instituting\r\na more exact calculus of profit and loss. Happiness\r\nwas thus identified with a maximum net gain of\r\npleasures on the basis of analogy with business conducted\r\nfor pecuniary profit, and directed by means of\r\na science of accounting dealing with quantities of receipts\r\nand expenses expressed in definite monetary\r\nunits.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_6_\" id=\"FNanchor_6_\" href=\"#Footnote_6_\" title=\"I owe the suggestion of this mode of interpreting the hedonistic calculus of utilitarianism to Dr. Wesley Mitchell. See his articles in Journal of Political Economy, vol. 18. Compare also his article in Political Science Quarterly, vol. 33.\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[6]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nFor business was conducted as matter of fact\r\nwith primary reference to procuring gain and averting\r\nloss. Gain and loss were reckoned in terms of units of\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg214\"\u003e[pg 214]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nmoney, assumed to be fixed and equal, exactly comparable\r\nwhether loss or gain occurred, while business foresight\r\nreduced future prospects to definitely measured\r\nforms, to dollars and cents. A dollar is a dollar, past,\r\npresent or future; and every business transaction, every\r\nexpenditure and consumption of time, energy, goods,\r\nis, in theory, capable of exact statement in terms of\r\ndollars. Generalize this point of view into the notion\r\nthat gain is the object of \u003cem\u003eall\u003c/em\u003e action; that gain takes the\r\nform of pleasure; that there are definite, commensurable\r\nunits of pleasure, which are exactly offset by units\r\nof pain (loss), and the working psychology of the\r\nBenthamite school is at hand.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNow admitting that the device of money accounting\r\nmakes possible more exact estimates of the consequences\r\nof many acts than is otherwise possible, and that accordingly\r\nthe use of money and accounting may work a\r\ntriumph for the application of intelligence in daily affairs,\r\nyet there exists a difference in kind between business\r\ncalculation of profit and loss and deliberation upon\r\nwhat purposes to form. Some of these differences are\r\ninherent and insuperable. Others of them are due to\r\nthe nature of present business conducted for pecuniary\r\nprofit, and would disappear if business were conducted\r\nprimarily for service of needs. But it is important to\r\nsee \u003cem\u003ehow\u003c/em\u003e in the latter case the assimilation of business\r\naccounting and normal deliberation would occur. For\r\nit would not consist in making deliberation identical\r\nwith calculation of loss and gain; it would proceed in\r\nthe opposite direction. It would make accounting and\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg215\"\u003e[pg 215]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nauditing a subordinate factor in discovering the meaning\r\nof present activity. Calculation would be a means\r\nof stating future results more exactly and objectively\r\nand thus of making action more humane. Its function\r\nwould be that of statistics in all social science.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut first as to the inherent difference between deliberation\r\nregarding business profit and loss and deliberation\r\nabout ordinary conduct. The distinction between\r\nwide and narrow use of reason has already been\r\nnoted. The latter holds a fixed end in view and deliberates\r\nonly upon means of reaching it. The former\r\nregards the end-in-view in deliberation as tentative and\r\npermits, nay encourages the coming into view of consequences\r\nwhich will transform it and create a new\r\npurpose and plan. Now business calculation is obviously\r\nof the kind where the end is taken for granted\r\nand does not enter into deliberation. It resembles the\r\ncase in which a man has already made his final decision,\r\nsay to take a walk, and deliberates only upon what\r\nwalk to take. His end-in-view already exists; it is not\r\nquestioned. The question is as to comparative advantages\r\nof this tramp or that. Deliberation is not free\r\nbut occurs within the limits of a decision reached by\r\nsome prior deliberation or else fixed by unthinking routine.\r\nSuppose, however, that a man\u0027s question is not\r\nwhich path to walk upon, but whether to walk or to\r\nstay with a friend whom continued confinement has rendered\r\npeevish and uninteresting as a companion. The\r\nutilitarian theory demands that in the latter case the\r\ntwo alternatives still be of the same kind, alike in quality,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg216\"\u003e[pg 216]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthat their only difference be a quantitative one, of\r\nplus or minus in pleasure. This assumption that all\r\ndesires and dispositions, all habits and impulses, are\r\nthe same in quality is equivalent to the assertion that\r\nno real or significant conflict among them is possible;\r\nand hence there is no need of discovering an object and\r\nan activity which will bring them into unity. It asserts\r\nby implication that there is no genuine doubt or suspense\r\nas to the meaning of any impulse or habit. Their\r\nmeaning is ready-made, fixed: pleasure. The only\r\n\"problem\" or doubt is as to the \u003cem\u003eamount\u003c/em\u003e of pleasure\r\n(or pain) that is involved.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis assumption does violence to fact. The poignancy\r\nof situations that evoke reflection lies in the fact\r\nthat we really do not know the meaning of the tendencies\r\nthat are pressing for action. We have to\r\nsearch, to experiment. Deliberation is a work of discovery.\r\nConflict is acute; one impulse carries us one\r\nway into one situation, and another impulse takes us\r\nanother way to a radically different objective result.\r\nDeliberation is not an attempt to do away with this\r\nopposition of quality by reducing it to one of amount.\r\nIt is an attempt to \u003cem\u003euncover\u003c/em\u003e the conflict in its full scope\r\nand bearing. What we want to find out is what difference\r\neach impulse and habit imports, to reveal qualitative\r\nincompatibilities by detecting the different\r\ncourses to which they commit us, the different dispositions\r\nthey form and foster, the different situations\r\ninto which they plunge us.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn short, the thing actually at stake in any serious\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg217\"\u003e[pg 217]\u003c/span\u003e\r\ndeliberation is not a difference of quantity, but what\r\nkind of person one is to become, what sort of self is in\r\nthe making, what kind of a world is making. This\r\nis plain enough in those crucial decisions where the\r\ncourse of life is thrown into widely different channels,\r\nwhere the pattern of life is rendered different and diversely\r\ndyed according as this alternative or that is\r\nchosen. Deliberation as to whether to be a merchant\r\nor a school teacher, a physician or a politician is not a\r\nchoice of quantities. It is just what it appears to be,\r\na choice of careers which are incompatible with one\r\nanother, within each of which definitive inclusions and\r\nrejections are involved. With the difference in career\r\nbelongs a difference in the constitution of the self, of\r\nhabits of thought and feeling as well as of outward\r\naction. With it comes profound differences in all future\r\nobjective relationships. Our minor decisions differ\r\nin acuteness and range, but not in principle. Our world\r\ndoes not so obviously hang upon any one of them; but\r\nput together they make the world what it is in meaning\r\nfor each one of us. Crucial decisions can hardly be\r\nmore than a disclosure of the cumulative force of trivial\r\nchoices.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eA radical distinction thus exists between deliberation\r\nwhere the only question is whether to invest money in\r\nthis bond or that stock, and deliberation where the\r\nprimary decision is as to the \u003cem\u003ekind\u003c/em\u003e of activity which is\r\nto be engaged in. Definite quantitative calculation is\r\npossible in the former case because a decision as to kind\r\nor direction of action does not have to be made. It has\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg218\"\u003e[pg 218]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nbeen decided already, whether by persistence of habit,\r\nor prior deliberation, that the man is to be an investor.\r\nThe significant thing in decisions proper, the course\r\nof action, the kind of a self simply, doesn\u0027t enter in;\r\nit isn\u0027t in question. To reduce all cases of judgment of\r\naction to this simplified and comparatively unimportant\r\ncase of calculation of quantities, is to miss the\r\nwhole point of deliberation.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_7_\" id=\"FNanchor_7_\" href=\"#Footnote_7_\" title=\"So far as I am aware Dr. H.\u0026nbsp;W. Stuart was the first to point out this difference between economic and moral valuations in his essay in Studies in Logical Theory.\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[7]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is another way of saying the same thing to note\r\nthat business calculations about pecuniary gain never\r\nconcern direct use in experience. They are, as such,\r\nnot deliberations about good or satisfaction at all. The\r\nman who decides to put business activity before all other\r\nclaims whatsoever, before that of family or country or\r\nart or science, does make a choice about satisfaction\r\nor good. But he makes it as a man, not as a business\r\nman. On the other hand, what is to be \u003cem\u003edone\u003c/em\u003e with business\r\nprofit when it accrues (except to invest it in similar\r\nundertakings) does not enter at all into a strictly\r\nbusiness deliberation. Its use, in which alone good or\r\nsatisfaction is found, is left indeterminate, contingent\r\nupon further deliberation, or else is left matter of routine\r\nhabit. We do not eat money, or wear it, or marry\r\nit, or listen for musical strains to issue from it. If by\r\nany chance a man prefers a less amount of money to\r\na greater amount, it is not for economic reasons. Pecuniary\r\nprofit in itself, in other words, is always strictly\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg219\"\u003e[pg 219]\u003c/span\u003e\r\ninstrumental, and it is of the nature of this instrument\r\nto be effective in proportion to size. In choosing with\r\nrespect to it, we are not making a significant choice,\r\na choice of ends.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe have already seen, however, there is something\r\nabnormal and in the strict sense impossible in mere\r\nmeans, in, that is, instruments totally dissevered from\r\nends. We may view economic activity in abstraction,\r\nbut it does not \u003cem\u003eexist\u003c/em\u003e by itself. Business takes for\r\ngranted non-business uses to which its results are to\r\nbe put. The stimuli for economic activity (in the sense\r\nin which business means activity subject to monetary\r\nreckoning) are found in non-pecuniary, non-economic\r\nactivities. Taken by itself then economic action throws\r\nno light upon the nature of satisfaction and the relation\r\nof intelligence to it, because the whole question of\r\nsatisfaction is either taken for granted or else is ignored\r\nby it. Only when money-making is itself taken as\r\na good does it exhibit anything pertinent to the question.\r\nAnd when it is so taken, then the question is not\r\none of future gain but of present activity and its meaning.\r\nBusiness then becomes an activity carried on for\r\nits own sake. It is then a career, a continuous occupation\r\nin which are developed daring, adventure,\r\npower, rivalry, overcoming of competitors, conspicuous\r\nachievement which attracts admiration, play of imagination,\r\ntechnical knowledge, skill in foresight and\r\nmaking combinations, management of men and goods\r\nand so on. In this case, it exemplifies what has been\r\nsaid about good or happiness as incorporating in itself\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg220\"\u003e[pg 220]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nat \u003cem\u003epresent\u003c/em\u003e the foreseen future consequences that result\r\nfrom intelligent action. The problem concerns the\r\nquality of such a good.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn short the attempt to assimilate other activities\r\nto the model of economic activity (defined as a calculated\r\npursuit of gain) reverses the state of the facts.\r\nThe \"economic man\" defined as a creature devoted to\r\nan enlightened or calculating pursuit of gain is morally\r\nobjectionable because the conception of such a being\r\nempirically falsifies empirical facts. Love of pecuniary\r\ngain is an undoubted and powerful fact. But\r\nit and its importance are affairs of social not of psychological\r\nnature. It is not a primary fact which can\r\nbe used to account for other phenomena. It depends\r\nupon other impulses and habits. It expresses and organizes\r\nthe use to which they are put. It cannot be\r\nused to define the nature of desire, effort and satisfaction,\r\nbecause it embodies a socially selected type of desire\r\nand satisfaction. It affords, like steeple-chasing,\r\nor collecting postage stamps, seeking political office, astronomical\r\nobservation of the heavens, a special case of\r\ndesire, effort, and happiness. And like them it is subject\r\nto examination, criticism and valuation in the light\r\nof the place it occupies in the system of developing\r\nactivities.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe reason that it is so easy and for specific purposes\r\nso useful to select economic activities and subject\r\nthem to separate scientific treatment is because the men\r\nwho engage in it are men who are also more than business\r\nmen, whose usual habits may be more or less safely\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg221\"\u003e[pg 221]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nguessed at. As human beings they have desires and occupations\r\nwhich are affected by social custom, expectation\r\nand admiration. The uses to which gains will be\r\nput, that is the current scheme of activities into which\r\nthey enter as factors, are passed over only because they\r\nare so inevitably present. Support of family, of church,\r\nphilanthropic benefactions, political influence, automobiling,\r\ncommand of luxuries, freedom of movement, respect\r\nfrom others, are in general terms some of the\r\nobvious activities into which economic activity fits.\r\nThis context of activities enters into the real make-up\r\nand meaning of economic activity. Calculated pursuit\r\nof gain is in fact never what it is made out to be when\r\neconomic action is separated from the rest of life, for\r\nin fact it is what it is because of a complex social environment\r\ninvolving scientific, legal, political and domestic\r\nconditions.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eA certain tragic fate seems to attend all intellectual\r\nmovements. That of utilitarianism is suggested in the\r\nnot infrequent criticism that it exaggerated the rôle of\r\nrational thought in human conduct, that it assumed\r\nthat everybody is moved by conscious considerations\r\nand that all that is really necessary is to make the process\r\nof consideration sufficiently enlightened. Then it\r\nis objected that a better psychology reveals that men\r\nare not moved by thought but rather by instinct and\r\nhabit. Thus a partially sound criticism is employed to\r\nconceal the one factor in utilitarianism from which we\r\nought to learn something; is used to foster an obscurantist\r\ndoctrine of trusting to impulse, instinct or intuition.\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg222\"\u003e[pg 222]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nNeither the utilitarians nor any one else can exaggerate\r\nthe proper office of reflection, of intelligence,\r\nin conduct. The mistake lay not here but in a false\r\nconception of what constitutes reflection, deliberation.\r\nThe truth that men are not moved by consideration of\r\nself-interest, that men are not good judges of where\r\ntheir interests lie and are not moved to act by these\r\njudgments, cannot properly be converted into the belief\r\nthat consideration of consequences is a negligible factor\r\nin conduct. So far as it is negligible in fact it evinces\r\nthe rudimentary character of civilization. We may\r\nindeed safely start from the assumption that impulse\r\nand habit, not thought, are the primary determinants\r\nof conduct. But the conclusion to be drawn from these\r\nfacts is that the need is therefore the greater for cultivation\r\nof thought. The error of utilitarianism is not\r\nat this point. It is found in its wrong conception of\r\nwhat thought, deliberation, is and does.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg223\"\u003e[pg 223]\u003c/span\u003eVI\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOur problem now concerns the nature of ends, that\r\nis ends-in-view or aims. The essential elements in the\r\nproblem have already been stated. It has been pointed\r\nout that the ends, objectives, of conduct are those foreseen\r\nconsequences which influence present deliberation\r\nand which finally bring it to rest by furnishing an adequate\r\nstimulus to overt action. Consequently ends arise\r\nand function within action. They are not, as current\r\ntheories too often imply, things lying beyond activity\r\nat which the latter is directed. They are not strictly\r\nspeaking ends or termini of action at all. They are\r\nterminals of deliberation, and so turning points \u003cem\u003ein\u003c/em\u003e activity.\r\nMany opposed moral theories agree however in\r\nplacing ends beyond action, although they differ in\r\ntheir notions of what the ends are. The utilitarian sets\r\nup pleasure as such an outside-and-beyond, as something\r\nnecessary to induce action and in which it terminates.\r\nMany harsh critics of utilitarianism have however\r\nagreed that there is some end in which action terminates,\r\na final goal. They have denied that pleasure is\r\nsuch an outside aim, and put perfection or self-realization\r\nin its place. The entire popular notion of\r\n\"ideals\" is infected with this conception of some fixed\r\nend beyond activity at which we should aim. According\r\nto this view ends-in-themselves come before aims.\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg224\"\u003e[pg 224]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nWe have a moral aim only as our purpose coincides\r\nwith some end-in-itself. We \u003cem\u003eought\u003c/em\u003e to aim at the latter\r\nwhether we actually do or not.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhen men believed that fixed ends existed for all\r\nnormal changes in nature, the conception of similar\r\nends for men was but a special case of a general belief.\r\nIf the changes in a tree from acorn to full-grown oak\r\nwere regulated by an end which was somehow immanent\r\nor potential in all the less perfect forms, and if change\r\nwas simply the effort to realize a perfect or complete\r\nform, then the acceptance of a like view for human conduct\r\nwas consonant with the rest of what passed for\r\nscience. Such a view, consistent and systematic, was\r\nfoisted by Aristotle upon western culture and endured\r\nfor two thousand years. When the notion was expelled\r\nfrom natural science by the intellectual revolution of\r\nthe seventeenth century, logically it should also have\r\ndisappeared from the theory of human action. But\r\nman is not logical and his intellectual history is a record\r\nof mental reserves and compromises. He hangs on\r\nto what he can in his old beliefs even when he is compelled\r\nto surrender their logical basis. So the doctrine\r\nof fixed ends-in-themselves at which human acts are\u0026mdash;or\r\nshould be\u0026mdash;directed and by which they are regulated\r\nif they are regulated at all persisted in morals, and was\r\nmade the cornerstone of orthodox moral theory. The\r\nimmediate effect was to dislocate moral from natural\r\nscience, to divide man\u0027s world as it never had been divided\r\nin prior culture. One point of view, one method\r\nand spirit animated inquiry into natural occurrences;\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg225\"\u003e[pg 225]\u003c/span\u003e\r\na radically opposite set of ideas prevailed about man\u0027s\r\naffairs. Completion of the scientific change begun in\r\nthe seventeenth century thus depends upon a revision\r\nof the current notion of ends of action as fixed limits\r\nand conclusions.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn fact, ends are ends-in-view or aims. They arise\r\nout of natural effects or consequences which in the\r\nbeginning are hit upon, stumbled upon so far as any\r\npurpose is concerned. Men \u003cem\u003elike\u003c/em\u003e some of the consequences\r\nand \u003cem\u003edislike\u003c/em\u003e others. Henceforth (or till attraction\r\nand repulsion alter) attaining or averting similar\r\nconsequences are aims or ends. These consequences\r\nconstitute the meaning and value of an activity as it\r\ncomes under deliberation. Meantime of course imagination\r\nis busy. Old consequences are enhanced, recombined,\r\nmodified in imagination. Invention operates.\r\nActual consequences, that is effects which have happened\r\nin the past, become possible future consequences\r\nof acts still to be performed. This operation of imaginative\r\nthought complicates the relation of ends to\r\nactivity, but it does not alter the substantial fact: Ends\r\nare foreseen consequences which arise in the course of\r\nactivity and which are employed to give activity added\r\nmeaning and to direct its further course. They are in\r\nno sense ends \u003cem\u003eof\u003c/em\u003e action. In being ends of \u003cem\u003edeliberation\u003c/em\u003e\r\nthey are redirecting pivots \u003cem\u003ein\u003c/em\u003e action.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eMen shoot and throw. At first this is done as an\r\n\"instinctive\" or natural reaction to some situation.\r\nThe result when it is observed gives a new meaning to\r\nthe activity. Henceforth men in throwing and shooting\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg226\"\u003e[pg 226]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthink of it in terms of its outcome; they act intelligently\r\nor have an end. Liking the activity in its acquired\r\nmeaning, they not only \"take aim\" when they\r\nthrow instead of throwing at random, but they find or\r\nmake targets at which to aim. This is the origin and\r\nnature of \"goals\" of action. They are ways of defining\r\nand deepening the meaning of activity. Having\r\nan end or aim is thus a characteristic of \u003cem\u003epresent\u003c/em\u003e activity.\r\nIt is the means by which an activity becomes\r\nadapted when otherwise it would be blind and disorderly,\r\nor by which it gets meaning when otherwise it\r\nwould be mechanical. In a strict sense an end-in-view\r\nis a \u003cem\u003emeans\u003c/em\u003e in present action; present action is not a\r\nmeans to a remote end. Men do not shoot because targets\r\nexist, but they set up targets in order that throwing\r\nand shooting may be more effective and significant.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eA mariner does not sail towards the stars, but by\r\nnoting the stars he is aided in conducting his present\r\nactivity of sailing. A port or harbor is his objective,\r\nbut only in the sense of \u003cem\u003ereaching\u003c/em\u003e it not of taking possession\r\nof it. The harbor stands in his thought as a\r\nsignificant point at which his activity will need re-direction.\r\nActivity will not cease when the port is attained,\r\nbut merely the \u003cem\u003epresent direction\u003c/em\u003e of activity. The port\r\nis as truly the beginning of another mode of activity as\r\nit is the termination of the present one. The only\r\nreason we ignore this fact is because it is empirically\r\ntaken for granted. We know without thinking that our\r\n\"ends\" are perforce beginnings. But theories of ends\r\nand ideals have converted a theoretical ignoring which\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg227\"\u003e[pg 227]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nis equivalent to practical acknowledgment into an intellectual\r\ndenial, and have thereby confused and perverted\r\nthe nature of ends.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eEven the most important among all the consequences\r\nof an act is not necessarily its aim. Results which\r\nare objectively most important may not even be thought\r\nof at all; ordinarily a man does not think in connection\r\nwith exercise of his profession that it will sustain him\r\nand his family in existence. The end-thought-of is\r\nuniquely important, but it is indispensable to state the\r\nrespect in which it is important. It gives the decisive\r\nclew to the act to be performed under the existing circumstances.\r\nIt is that particular foreseen object that\r\nwill stimulate the act which relieves existing troubles,\r\nstraightens out existing entanglements. In a temporary\r\nannoyance, even if only that caused by the singing\r\nof a mosquito, the thought of that which gives relief\r\nmay engross the mind in spite of consequences much\r\nmore important, objectively speaking. Moralists have\r\ndeplored such facts as evidence of levity. But the remedy,\r\nif a remedy be needed, is not found in insisting\r\nupon the importance of ends in general. It is found in\r\na change of the dispositions which make things either\r\nimmediately troublesome or tolerable or agreeable.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhen ends are regarded as literally ends to action\r\nrather than as directive stimuli to present choice they\r\nare frozen and isolated. It makes no difference whether\r\nthe \"end\" is \"natural\" good like health or a \"moral\"\r\ngood like honesty. Set up as complete and exclusive,\r\nas demanding and justifying action as a means to itself,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg228\"\u003e[pg 228]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nit leads to narrowness; in extreme cases fanaticism, inconsiderateness,\r\narrogance and hypocrisy. Joshua\u0027s\r\nreputed success in getting the sun to stand still to serve\r\nhis desire is recognized to have involved a miracle. But\r\nmoral theorists constantly assume that the continuous\r\ncourse of events can be arrested at the point of a particular\r\nobject; that men can plunge with their own\r\ndesires into the unceasing flow of changes, and\r\nseize upon some object as their end irrespective of\r\neverything else. The use of intelligence to discover the\r\nobject that will best operate as a releasing and unifying\r\nstimulus in the existing situation is discounted. One\r\nreminds one\u0027s self that one\u0027s end is justice or charity\r\nor professional achievement or putting over a deal for\r\na needed public improvement, and further questionings\r\nand qualms are stilled.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is customary to suppose that such methods merely\r\nignore the question of the morality of the means which\r\nare used to secure the end desired. Common sense revolts\r\nagainst the maxim, conveniently laid off upon\r\nJesuits or other far-away people, that the end justifies\r\nthe means. There is no incorrectness in saying that the\r\nquestion of means employed is overlooked in such cases.\r\nBut analysis would go further if it were also pointed\r\nout that overlooking means is only a device for failing\r\nto note those ends, or consequences, which, if they were\r\nnoted would be seen to be so evil that action would be\r\nestopped. Certainly nothing can justify or condemn\r\nmeans except ends, results. But we have to include\r\nconsequences impartially. Even admitting that lying\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg229\"\u003e[pg 229]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwill save a man\u0027s soul, whatever that may mean, it\r\nwould still be true that lying will have other consequences,\r\nnamely, the usual consequences that follow\r\nfrom tampering with good faith and that lead lying to\r\nbe condemned. It is wilful folly to fasten upon some\r\nsingle end or consequence which is liked, and permit\r\nthe view of that to blot from perception all other undesired\r\nand undesirable consequences. It is like supposing\r\nthat when a finger held close to the eye covers\r\nup a distant mountain the finger is really larger than\r\nthe mountain. Not \u003cem\u003ethe\u003c/em\u003e end\u0026mdash;in the singular\u0026mdash;justifies\r\nthe means; for there is no such thing as the single all-important\r\nend. To suppose that there is such an end\r\nis like working over again, in behalf of our private\r\nwishes, the miracle of Joshua in arresting the course of\r\nnature. It is not possible adequately to characterize\r\nthe presumption, the falsity and the deliberate perversion\r\nof intelligence involved in refusal to note the plural\r\neffects that flow from any act, a refusal adopted in\r\norder that we may justify an act by picking out that\r\none consequence which will enable us to do what we wish\r\nto do and for which we feel the need of justification.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eYet this assumption is continually made. It is made\r\nby implication in the current view of purposes or ends-in-view\r\nas objects in themselves, instead of means to\r\nunification and liberation of present conflicting, confused\r\nhabits and impulses. There is something almost\r\nsinister in the desire to label the doctrine that the end\r\njustifies the means with the name of some one obnoxious\r\nschool. Politicians, especially if they have to do with\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg230\"\u003e[pg 230]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe foreign affairs of a nation and are called statesmen,\r\nalmost uniformly act upon the doctrine that the\r\nwelfare of their own country justifies any measure irrespective\r\nof all the demoralization it works. Captains\r\nof industry, great executives in all lines, usually work\r\nupon this plan. But they are not the original offenders\r\nby any means. Every man works upon it so far as he\r\npermits himself to become so absorbed in one aspect of\r\nwhat he is doing that he loses a view of its varied consequences,\r\nhypnotizing his attention by consideration\r\nof just those consequences which in the abstract are\r\ndesirable and slurring over other consequences equally\r\nreal. Every man works upon this principle who becomes\r\nover-interested in any cause or project, and who\r\nuses its desirability in the abstract to justify himself\r\nin employing any means that will assist him in arriving,\r\nignoring all the collateral \"ends\" of his behavior. It\r\nis frequently pointed out that there is a type of executive-man\r\nwhose conduct seems to be as non-moral as\r\nthe action of the forces of nature. We all tend to\r\nrelapse into this non-moral condition whenever we want\r\nany one thing intensely. In general, the identification\r\nof the end prominent in conscious desire and effort with\r\n\u003cem\u003ethe\u003c/em\u003e end is part of the technique of avoiding a reasonable\r\nsurvey of consequences. The survey is avoided\r\nbecause of a subconscious recognition that it would reveal\r\ndesire in its true worth and thus preclude action to\r\nsatisfy it\u0026mdash;or at all events give us an uneasy conscience\r\nin striving to realize it. Thus the doctrine of the isolated,\r\ncomplete or fixed end limits intelligent examination,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg231\"\u003e[pg 231]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nencourages insincerity, and puts a pseudo-stamp\r\nof moral justification upon success at any price.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eMoralistic persons are given to escaping this evil\r\nby falling into another pit. They deny that consequences\r\nhave anything at all to do with the morality\r\nof acts. Not ends but motives they say justify or condemn\r\nacts. The thing to do, accordingly, is to cultivate\r\ncertain motives or dispositions, benevolence, purity,\r\nlove of perfection, loyalty. The denial of consequences\r\nthus turns out formal, verbal. In reality a\r\nconsequence is set up at which to aim, only it is a subjective\r\nconsequence. \"Meaning well\" is selected as \u003cem\u003ethe\u003c/em\u003e\r\nconsequence or end to be cultivated at all hazards, an\r\nend which is all-justifying and to which everything else\r\nis offered up in sacrifice. The result is a sentimental\r\nfutile complacency rather than the brutal efficiency of\r\nthe executive. But the root of both evils is the same.\r\nOne man selects some external consequence, the other\r\nman a state of internal feeling, to serve as the end. The\r\ndoctrine of meaning well as \u003cem\u003ethe\u003c/em\u003e end is if anything the\r\nmore contemptible of the two, for it shrinks from accepting\r\nany responsibility for actual results. It is negative,\r\nself-protective and sloppy. It lends itself to complete\r\nself-deception.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhy have men become so attached to fixed, external\r\nends? Why is it not universally recognized that an end\r\nis a device of intelligence in guiding action, instrumental\r\nto freeing and harmonizing troubled and divided tendencies?\r\nThe answer is virtually contained in what was\r\nearlier said about rigid habits and their effect upon intelligence.\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg232\"\u003e[pg 232]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nEnds are, in fact, literally endless, forever\r\ncoming into existence as new activities occasion new\r\nconsequences. \"Endless ends\" is a way of saying that\r\nthere are no ends\u0026mdash;that is no fixed self-enclosed finalities.\r\nWhile however we cannot actually prevent change\r\nfrom occurring we can and do regard it as evil. We\r\nstrive to retain action in ditches already dug. We regard\r\nnovelties as dangerous, experiments as illicit and\r\ndeviations as forbidden. Fixed and separate ends reflect\r\na projection of our own fixed and non-interacting\r\ncompartmental habits. We see only consequences which\r\ncorrespond to our habitual courses. As we have said,\r\nmen did not begin to shoot because there were ready-made\r\ntargets to aim at. They made things into targets\r\nby shooting at them, and then made special targets to\r\nmake shooting more significantly interesting. But if\r\ngeneration after generation were shown targets they\r\nhad had no part in constructing, if bows and arrows\r\nwere thrust into their hands, and pressure were brought\r\nto bear upon them to keep them shooting in season and\r\nout, some wearied soul would soon propound to willing\r\nlisteners the theory that shooting was unnatural, that\r\nman was naturally wholly at rest, and that targets existed\r\nin order that men might be forced to be active;\r\nthat the duty of shooting and the virtue of hitting are\r\nexternally imposed and fostered, and that otherwise\r\nthere would be no such thing as a shooting-activity\u0026mdash;that\r\nis, morality.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe doctrine of fixed ends not only diverts attention\r\nfrom examination of consequences and the intelligent\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg233\"\u003e[pg 233]\u003c/span\u003e\r\ncreation of purpose, but, since means and ends are two\r\nways of regarding the same actuality, it also renders\r\nmen careless in their inspection of existing conditions.\r\nAn aim not framed on the basis of a survey of those\r\npresent conditions which are to be employed as means\r\nof its realization simply throws us back upon past habits.\r\nWe then do not do what we intended to do but\r\nwhat we have got used to doing, or else we thrash about\r\nin a blind ineffectual way. The result is failure. Discouragement\r\nfollows, assuaged perhaps by the thought\r\nthat in any case the end is too ideal, too noble and\r\nremote, to be capable of realization. We fall back on\r\nthe consoling thought that our moral ideals are too\r\ngood for this world and that we must accustom ourselves\r\nto a gap between aim and execution. Actual\r\nlife is then thought of as a compromise with the best,\r\nan enforced second or third best, a dreary exile from\r\nour true home in the ideal, or a temporary period of\r\ntroubled probation to be followed by a period of unending\r\nattainment and peace. At the same time, as has\r\nbeen repeatedly pointed out, persons of a more practical\r\nturn of mind accept the world \"as it is,\" that is as\r\npast customs have made it to be, and consider what\r\nadvantages for themselves may be extracted from it.\r\nThey form aims on the basis of existing habits of life\r\nwhich may be turned to their own private account.\r\nThey employ intelligence in framing ends and selecting\r\nand arranging means. But intelligence is confined to\r\nmanipulation; it does not extend to construction. It is\r\nthe intelligence of the politician, administrator and professional\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg234\"\u003e[pg 234]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nexecutive\u0026mdash;the kind of intelligence which has\r\ngiven a bad meaning to a word that ought to have a fine\r\nmeaning, opportunism. For the highest task of intelligence\r\nis to grasp and realize genuine opportunity,\r\npossibility.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eRoughly speaking, the course of forming aims is as\r\nfollows. The beginning is with a wish, an emotional\r\nreaction against the present state of things and a hope\r\nfor something different. Action fails to connect satisfactorily\r\nwith surrounding conditions. Thrown back\r\nupon itself, it projects itself in an imagination of a\r\nscene which if it were present would afford satisfaction.\r\nThis picture is often called an aim, more often an ideal.\r\nBut in itself it is a fancy which may be only a \u003cins class=\"corr\" title=\"phantasy\" id=\"Corr_234_\"\u003efantasy\u003c/ins\u003e,\r\na dream, a castle in the air. In itself it is a romantic\r\nembellishment of the present; at its best it is\r\nmaterial for poetry or the novel. Its natural home is\r\nnot in the future but in the dim past or in some distant\r\nand supposedly better part of the present world. Every\r\nsuch idealized object is suggested by something actually\r\nexperienced, as the flight of birds suggests the liberation\r\nof human beings from the restrictions of slow\r\nlocomotion on dull earth. It becomes an aim or end\r\nonly when it is worked out in terms of concrete conditions\r\navailable for its realization, that is in terms of\r\n\"means.\"\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis transformation depends upon study of the conditions\r\nwhich generate or make possible the fact observed\r\nto exist already. The fancy of the delight of\r\nmoving at will through the air became an actuality\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg235\"\u003e[pg 235]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nonly after men carefully studied the way in which a bird\r\nalthough heavier than air actually sustains itself in\r\nair. A fancy becomes an aim, in short, when some past\r\nsequence of known cause-and-effect is projected into the\r\nfuture, and when by assembling its causal conditions\r\nwe strive to generate a like result. We have to fall back\r\nupon what has already happened naturally without design,\r\nand study it to see \u003cem\u003ehow\u003c/em\u003e it happened, which is what\r\nis meant by causation. This knowledge joined to wish\r\ncreates a purpose. Many men have doubtless dreamed\r\nof ability to have light in darkness without the trouble\r\nof oil, lamps and friction. Glow-worms, lightning, the\r\nsparks of cut electric conductors suggest such a possibility.\r\nBut the picture remained a dream until an\r\nEdison studied all that could be found out about such\r\ncasual phenomena of light, and then set to work to\r\nsearch out and gather together the means for reproducing\r\ntheir operation. The great trouble with what\r\npasses for moral ends and ideals is that they do not\r\nget beyond the stage of fancy of something agreeable\r\nand desirable based upon an emotional wish; very often,\r\nat that, not even an original wish, but the wish of some\r\nleader which has been conventionalized and transmitted\r\nthrough channels of authority. Every gain in natural\r\nscience makes possible new aims. That is, the discovery\r\nof how things \u003cem\u003edo\u003c/em\u003e occur makes it possible to conceive\r\nof their happening at will, and gives us a start on selecting\r\nand combining the conditions, the means, to\r\ncommand their happening. In technical matters, this\r\nlesson has been fairly well learned. But in moral matters,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg236\"\u003e[pg 236]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nmen still largely neglect the need of studying the\r\nway in which results similar to those which we desire\r\nactually happen. Mechanism is despised as of importance\r\nonly in low material things. The consequent\r\ndivorce of moral ends from scientific study of natural\r\nevents renders the former impotent wishes, compensatory\r\ndreams in consciousness. In \u003cem\u003efact\u003c/em\u003e ends or\r\nconsequences are still determined by fixed habit and\r\nthe force of circumstance. The evils of idle dreaming\r\nand of routine are experienced in conjunction.\r\n\"Idealism\" must indeed come first\u0026mdash;the imagination of\r\nsome better state generated by desire. But unless ideals\r\nare to be dreams and idealism a synonym for romanticism\r\nand \u003cins class=\"corr\" title=\"phantasy-building\" id=\"Corr_236_\"\u003efantasy-building\u003c/ins\u003e, there must be a most\r\nrealistic study of actual conditions and of the mode or\r\nlaw of natural events, in order to give the imagined or\r\nideal object definite form and solid substance\u0026mdash;to give\r\nit, in short, practicality and constitute it a working\r\nend.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe acceptance of fixed ends in themselves is an\r\naspect of man\u0027s devotion to an ideal of certainty. This\r\naffection was inevitably cherished as long as men believed\r\nthat the highest things in physical nature are at\r\nrest, and that science is possible only by grasping immutable\r\nforms and species: in other words, for much\r\nthe greater part of the intellectual history of mankind.\r\nOnly reckless sceptics would have dared entertain any\r\nidea of ends except as fixed in themselves as long\r\nas the whole structure of science was erected upon the\r\nimmobile. Behind however the conception of fixity\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg237\"\u003e[pg 237]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwhether in science or morals lay adherence to certainty\r\nof \"truth,\" a clinging to something fixed, born of fear\r\nof the new and of attachment to possessions. When\r\nthe classicist condemns concession to impulse and holds\r\nup to admiration the patterns tested in tradition, he\r\nlittle suspects how much he is himself affected by unavowed\r\nimpulses\u0026mdash;timidity which makes him cling to\r\nauthority, conceit which moves him to be himself the\r\nauthority who speaks in the name of authority,\r\npossessive impulse which fears to risk acquisition in\r\nnew adventures. Love of certainty is a demand for\r\nguarantees in advance of action. Ignoring the fact\r\nthat truth can be bought only by the adventure of\r\nexperiment, dogmatism turns truth into an insurance\r\ncompany. Fixed ends upon one side and fixed \"principles\"\u0026mdash;that\r\nis authoritative rules\u0026mdash;on the other, are\r\nprops for a feeling of safety, the refuge of the timid\r\nand the means by which the bold prey upon the timid.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg238\"\u003e[pg 238]\u003c/span\u003eVII\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIntelligence is concerned with foreseeing the future\r\nso that action may have order and direction. It is also\r\nconcerned with principles and criteria of judgment.\r\nThe diffused or wide applicability of habits is reflected\r\nin the \u003cem\u003egeneral\u003c/em\u003e character of principles: a principle is\r\nintellectually what a habit is for direct action. As\r\nhabits set in grooves dominate activity and swerve it\r\nfrom conditions instead of increasing its adaptability,\r\nso principles treated as fixed rules instead of as helpful\r\nmethods take men away from experience. The more\r\ncomplicated the situation, and the less we really know\r\nabout it, the more insistent is the orthodox type of\r\nmoral theory upon the prior existence of some fixed\r\nand universal principle or law which is to be directly\r\napplied and followed. Ready-made rules available at\r\na moment\u0027s notice for settling any kind of moral difficulty\r\nand resolving every species of moral doubt have\r\nbeen the chief object of the ambition of moralists. In\r\nthe much less complicated and less changing matters of\r\nbodily health such pretensions are known as quackery.\r\nBut in morals a hankering for certainty, born of timidity\r\nand nourished by love of authoritative prestige,\r\nhas led to the idea that absence of immutably fixed and\r\nuniversally applicable ready-made principles is equivalent\r\nto moral chaos.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg239\"\u003e[pg 239]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nIn fact, situations into which change and the unexpected\r\nenter are a challenge to intelligence to create\r\nnew principles. Morals must be a growing science if\r\nit is to be a science at all, not merely because all truth\r\nhas not yet been appropriated by the mind of man, but\r\nbecause life is a moving affair in which old moral truth\r\nceases to apply. Principles are methods of inquiry and\r\nforecast which require verification by the event; and the\r\ntime honored effort to assimilate morals to mathematics\r\nis only a way of bolstering up an old dogmatic authority,\r\nor putting a new one upon the throne of the old.\r\nBut the experimental character of moral judgments\r\ndoes not mean complete uncertainty and fluidity. Principles\r\nexist as hypotheses with which to experiment.\r\nHuman history is long. There is a long record of past\r\nexperimentation in conduct, and there are cumulative\r\nverifications which give many principles a well earned\r\nprestige. Lightly to disregard them is the height of\r\nfoolishness. But social situations alter; and it is also\r\nfoolish not to observe how old principles actually work\r\nunder new conditions, and not to modify them so that\r\nthey will be more effectual instruments in judging new\r\ncases. Many men are now aware of the harm done in\r\nlegal matters by assuming the antecedent existence of\r\nfixed principles under which every new case may be\r\nbrought. They recognize that this assumption merely\r\nputs an artificial premium on ideas developed under bygone\r\nconditions, and that their perpetuation in the\r\npresent works inequity. Yet the choice is not between\r\nthrowing away rules previously developed and sticking\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg240\"\u003e[pg 240]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nobstinately by them. The intelligent alternative is to\r\nrevise, adapt, expand and alter them. The problem is\r\none of continuous, vital readaptation.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe popular objection to casuistry is similar to the\r\npopular objection to the maxim that the end justifies\r\nthe means. It is creditable to practical moral sense,\r\nbut not to popular logical consistency. For recourse\r\nto casuistry is the only conclusion which can be drawn\r\nfrom belief in fixed universal principles, just as the\r\nJesuit maxim is the only conclusion proper to be drawn\r\nfrom belief in fixed ends. Every act, every deed is individual.\r\nWhat is the sense in having fixed general\r\nrules, commandments, laws, unless they are such as to\r\nconfer upon individual cases of action (where alone instruction\r\nis finally needed) something of their own infallible\r\ncertainty? Casuistry, so-called, is simply the\r\nsystematic effort to secure for particular instances of\r\nconduct the advantage of general rules which are asserted\r\nand believed in. By those who accept the notion\r\nof immutable regulating principles, casuistry ought to\r\nbe lauded for sincerity and helpfulness, not dispraised\r\nas it usually is. Or else men ought to carry back their\r\naversion to manipulation of particular cases, until they\r\nwill fit into the procrustean beds of fixed rules, to the\r\npoint where it is clear that all principles are empirical\r\ngeneralizations from the ways in which previous judgments\r\nof conduct have practically worked out. When\r\nthis fact is apparent, these generalizations will be seen\r\nto be not fixed rules for deciding doubtful cases, but\r\ninstrumentalities for their investigation, methods by\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg241\"\u003e[pg 241]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwhich the net value of past experience is rendered available\r\nfor present scrutiny of new perplexities. Then it\r\nwill also follow that they are hypotheses to be tested\r\nand revised by their further working.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_8_\" id=\"FNanchor_8_\" href=\"#Footnote_8_\" title=\"Among contemporary moralists, Mr. G.\u0026nbsp;E. Moore may be cited as almost alone in having the courage of the convictions shared by many. He insists that it is the true business of moral theory to enable men to arrive at precise and sure judgments in concrete cases of moral perplexity.\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[8]\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eEvery such statement meets with prompt objection.\r\nWe are told that in deliberation rival goods present\r\nthemselves. We are faced by competing desires and\r\nends which are incompatible with one another. They\r\nare all attractive, seductive. How then shall we choose\r\namong them? We can choose rationally among values,\r\nthe argument continues, only if we have some fixed\r\nmeasure of values, just as we decide the respective\r\nlengths of physical things by recourse to the fixed foot-rule.\r\nOne might reply that after all there is no fixed\r\nfoot-rule, no fixed foot \"in itself\" and that the standard\r\nlength or weight of measure is only another special\r\nportion of matter, subject to change from heat, moisture\r\nand gravitational position, defined only by conditions,\r\nrelations. One might reply that the foot-rule is\r\na tool which has been worked out in actual prior comparisons\r\nof concrete things for use in facilitating further\r\ncomparisons. But we content ourselves with remarking\r\nthat we find in this conception of a fixed antecedent\r\nstandard another manifestation of the desire to\r\nescape the strain of the actual moral situation, its\r\ngenuine uncertainty of possibilities and consequences.\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg242\"\u003e[pg 242]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nWe are confronted with another case of the all too\r\nhuman love of certainty, a case of the wish for an intellectual\r\npatent issued by authority. The issue after all\r\nis one of fact. The critic is not entitled to enforce\r\nagainst the facts his private wish for a ready-made\r\nstandard which will relieve him from the burden of examination,\r\nobservation and continuing generalization\r\nand test.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe worth of this private wish is moreover open to\r\nquestion in the light of the history of the development\r\nof natural science. There was a time when in astronomy,\r\nchemistry and biology men claimed that judgment\r\nof individual phenomena was possible only because the\r\nmind was already in possession of fixed truths, universal\r\nprinciples, pre-ordained axioms. Only by their\r\nmeans could contingent, varying particular events be\r\ntruly known. There was, it was argued, no way to\r\njudge the truth of any particular statement about a\r\nparticular plant, heavenly body, or case of combustion\r\nunless there was a general truth already in hand with\r\nwhich to compare a particular empirical occurrence.\r\nThe contention was successful, that is for a long time\r\nit maintained its hold upon men\u0027s minds. But its effect\r\nwas merely to encourage intellectual laziness, reliance\r\nupon authority and blind acceptance of conceptions\r\nthat had somehow become traditional. The actual\r\nadvance of science did not begin till men broke\r\naway from this method. When men insisted upon judging\r\nastronomical phenomena by bringing them directly\r\nunder established truths, those of geometry, they had\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg243\"\u003e[pg 243]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nno astronomy, but only a private esthetic construction.\r\nAstronomy began when men trusted themselves to embarking\r\nupon the uncertain sea of events and were willing\r\nto be instructed by changes in the concrete. Then\r\nantecedent principles were tentatively employed as\r\nmethods for conducting observations and experiments,\r\nand for organizing special facts: as hypotheses.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn morals now, as in physical science then, the work\r\nof intelligence in reaching such relative certainty, or\r\ntested probability, as is open to man is retarded by the\r\nfalse notion of fixed antecedent truths. Prejudice is\r\nconfirmed. Rules formed accidentally or under the\r\npressure of conditions long past, are protected from\r\ncriticism and thus perpetuated. Every group and person\r\nvested with authority strengthens possessed power\r\nby harping upon the sacredness of immutable principle.\r\nMoral facts, that is the concrete careers of special\r\ncourses of action, are not studied. There is no counterpart\r\nto clinical medicine. Rigid classifications forced\r\nupon facts are relied upon. And all is done, as it used\r\nto be done in natural science, in praise of Reason and\r\nin fear of the variety and fluctuation of actual\r\nhappenings.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe hypothesis that each moral situation is unique\r\nand that consequently general moral principles are instrumental\r\nto developing the individualized meaning of\r\nsituations is declared to be anarchic. It is said to be\r\nethical atomism, pulverizing the order and dignity of\r\nmorals. The question, again is not what our inherited\r\nhabits lead us to prefer, but where the facts take us.\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg244\"\u003e[pg 244]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nBut in this instance the facts do not take us into atomism\r\nand anarchy. These things are specters seen by the\r\ncritic when he is suddenly confused by the loss of customary\r\nspectacles. He takes his own confusion due to\r\nloss of artificial aids for an objective situation. \u003cem\u003eBecause\u003c/em\u003e\r\nsituations in which deliberation is evoked are new,\r\nand therefore unique, general principles are needed.\r\nOnly an uncritical vagueness will assume that the sole\r\nalternative to fixed generality is absence of continuity.\r\nRigid habits insist upon duplication, repetition, recurrence;\r\nin their case there is accordingly fixed principles.\r\nOnly there is no \u003cem\u003eprinciple\u003c/em\u003e at all, that is, no conscious\r\nintellectual rule, for thought is not needed. But all\r\nhabit has \u003cem\u003econtinuity\u003c/em\u003e, and while a flexible habit does not\r\nsecure in its operation bare recurrence nor absolute assurance\r\nneither does it plunge us into the hopeless confusion\r\nof the absolutely different. To insist upon\r\nchange and the new is to insist upon alteration \u003cem\u003eof\u003c/em\u003e the\r\nold. In denying that the meaning of any genuine case\r\nof deliberation can be exhausted by treating it as a\r\nmere case of an established classification the value of\r\nclassification is not denied. It is shown where its value\r\nlies, namely, in directing attention to resemblances and\r\ndifferences in the new case, in economizing effort in foresight.\r\nTo call a generalization a tool is not to say it is\r\nuseless; the contrary is patently the case. A tool is\r\nsomething to use. Hence it is also something to be improved\r\nby noting how it works. The need of such noting\r\nand improving is indispensable if, as is the case with\r\nmoral principles, the tool has to be used in unwonted\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg245\"\u003e[pg 245]\u003c/span\u003e\r\ncircumstances. Continuity of growth not atomism is\r\nthus the alternative to fixity of principles and aims.\r\nThis is no Bergsonian plea for dividing the universe\r\ninto two portions, one all of fixed, recurrent habits, and\r\nthe other all spontaneity of flux. Only in such a universe\r\nwould reason in morals have to take its choice between\r\nabsolute fixity and absolute looseness.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNothing is more instructive about the genuine value\r\nof generalization in conduct than the errors of Kant.\r\nHe took the doctrine that the essence of reason is complete\r\nuniversality (and hence necessity and immutability),\r\nwith the seriousness becoming the professor of\r\nlogic. Applying the doctrine to morality he saw that\r\nthis conception severed morals from connection with\r\nexperience. Other moralists had gone that far before\r\nhis day. But none of them had done what Kant proceeded\r\nto do: carry this separation of moral principles\r\nand ideals from experience to its logical conclusion.\r\nHe saw that to exclude from principles all\r\nconnection with empirical details meant to exclude\r\nall reference of any kind to consequences.\r\nHe then saw with a clearness which does his\r\nlogic credit that with such exclusion, reason becomes\r\nentirely empty: nothing is left except the universality\r\nof the universal. He was then confronted by the seemingly\r\ninsoluble problem of getting moral instruction regarding\r\nspecial cases out of a principle that having\r\nforsworn intercourse with experience was barren and\r\nempty. His ingenious method was as follows. Formal\r\nuniversality means at least logical identity; it means\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg246\"\u003e[pg 246]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nself-consistency or absence of contradiction. Hence\r\nfollows the method by which a would-be truly moral\r\nagent will proceed in judging the rightness of any proposed\r\nact. He will ask: Can its motive be made universal\r\nfor all cases? How would one like it if by one\u0027s\r\nact one\u0027s motive in that act were to be erected into a\r\nuniversal law of actual nature? Would one then be\r\nwilling to make the same choice?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSurely a man would hesitate to steal if by his choice\r\nto make stealing the motive of his act he were also to\r\nerect it into such a fixed law of nature that henceforth\r\nhe and everybody else would always steal whenever\r\nproperty was in question. No stealing without property,\r\nand with universal stealing also no property; a\r\nclear self-contradiction. Looked at in the light of\r\nreason every mean, insincere, inconsiderate motive of\r\naction shrivels into a private exception which a person\r\nwants to take advantage of in his own favor, and which\r\nhe would be horrified to have others act upon. It violates\r\nthe great principle of logic that A is A. Kindly,\r\ndecent acts, on the contrary, extend and multiply\r\nthemselves in a continuing harmony.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis treatment by Kant evinces deep insight into\r\nthe office of intelligence and principle in conduct. But\r\nit involves flat contradiction of Kant\u0027s own original\r\nintention to exclude consideration of concrete consequences.\r\nIt turns out to be a method of recommending\r\na broad impartial view of consequences. Our forecast\r\nof consequences is always subject, as we have noted, to\r\nthe bias of impulse and habit. We see what we want to\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg247\"\u003e[pg 247]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nsee, we obscure what is unfavorable to a cherished, probably\r\nunavowed, wish. We dwell upon favoring circumstances\r\ntill they become weighted with reinforcing considerations.\r\nWe don\u0027t give opposing consequences half\r\na chance to develop in thought. Deliberation needs\r\nevery possible help it can get against the twisting, exaggerating\r\nand slighting tendency of passion and habit.\r\nTo form the habit of asking how we should be willing\r\nto be treated in a similar case\u0026mdash;which is what Kant\u0027s\r\nmaxim amounts to\u0026mdash;is to gain an ally for impartial and\r\nsincere deliberation and judgment. It is a safeguard\r\nagainst our tendency to regard our own case as exceptional\r\nin comparison with the case of others. \"Just\r\nthis once,\" a plea for isolation; secrecy\u0026mdash;a plea for\r\nnon-inspection, are forces which operate in every passionate\r\ndesire. Demand for consistency, for \"universality,\"\r\nfar from implying a rejection of all consequences,\r\nis a demand to survey consequences broadly,\r\nto link effect to effect in a chain of continuity. Whatever\r\nforce works to this end \u003cem\u003eis\u003c/em\u003e reason. For reason, let\r\nit be repeated is an outcome, a function, not a primitive\r\nforce. What we need are those habits, dispositions\r\nwhich lead to impartial and consistent foresight of consequences.\r\nThen our judgments are reasonable; we are\r\nthen reasonable creatures.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg248\"\u003e[pg 248]\u003c/span\u003eVIII\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eCertain critics in sympathy with at least the negative\r\ncontention, the critical side, of such a theory as has\r\nbeen advanced, regard it as placing too much emphasis\r\nupon intelligence. They find it intellectualistic, cold-blooded.\r\nThey say we must change desire, love, aspiration,\r\nadmiration, and then action will be transformed.\r\nA new affection, a changed appreciation, brings with it\r\na revaluation of life and insists upon its realization. A\r\nrefinement of intellect at most only figures out better\r\nways of reaching old and accustomed ends. In fact we\r\nare lucky if intellect does not freeze the ardor of generous\r\ndesire and paralyze creative endeavor. Intellect\r\nis critical, unproductive while desire is generative. In\r\nits dispassionateness intellect is aloof from humanity\r\nand its needs. It fosters detachment where sympathy\r\nis needed. It cultivates contemplation when salvation\r\nlies in liberating desire. Intellect is analytic, taking\r\nthings to pieces; its devices are the scalpel and test-tube.\r\nAffection is synthetic, unifying. This argument\r\naffords an opportunity for making more explicit those\r\nrespective offices of wish and thought in forming ends\r\nwhich have already been touched upon.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFirst we must undertake an independent analysis\r\nof desire. It is customary to describe desires in terms\r\nof their objects, meaning by objects the things which\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg249\"\u003e[pg 249]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nfigure as in imagination their goals. As the object is\r\nnoble or base, so, it is thought, is desire. In any case,\r\nemotions rise and cluster about the object. This stands\r\nout so conspicuously in immediate experience that it\r\nmonopolizes the central position in the traditional psychological\r\ntheory of desire. Barring gross self-deception\r\nor the frustration of external circumstance, the\r\noutcome, or end-result, of desire is regarded by this\r\ntheory as similar to the end-in-view or object consciously\r\ndesired. Such, however, is not the case, as\r\nreadily appears from the analysis of deliberation. In\r\nsaying that the actual outcome of desire is different in\r\nkind from the object upon which desire consciously\r\nfastens, I do not mean to repeat the old complaint\r\nabout the fallibility and feebleness of mortals in virtue\r\nof which man\u0027s hopes are frustrated and twisted in realization.\r\nThe difference is one of diverse dimensions,\r\nnot of degree or amount.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe object desired and the attainment of desire are\r\nno more alike than a signboard on the road is like the\r\ngarage to which it points and which it recommends to\r\nthe traveler. Desire is the forward urge of living creatures.\r\nWhen the push and drive of life meets no obstacle,\r\nthere is nothing which we call desire. There is\r\njust life-activity. But obstructions present themselves,\r\nand activity is dispersed and divided. Desire is the outcome.\r\nIt is activity surging forward to break through\r\nwhat dams it up. The \"object\" which then presents\r\nitself in thought as the goal of desire is the object of\r\nthe environment \u003cem\u003ewhich, if it were present\u003c/em\u003e, would secure\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg250\"\u003e[pg 250]\u003c/span\u003e\r\na re-unification of activity and the restoration of its\r\nongoing unity. The end-in-view of desire is that object\r\nwhich were it present would link into an organized\r\nwhole activities which are now partial and competing.\r\nIt is no more like the actual end of desire, or the\r\nresulting state attained, than the coupling of cars\r\nwhich have been separated is like an ongoing single\r\ntrain. Yet the train cannot go on without the coupling.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSuch statements may seem contrary to common sense.\r\nThe pertinency of the illustration used will be denied.\r\nNo man desires the signboard which he sees, he desires\r\nthe garage, the objective, the ulterior thing. But does\r\nhe? Or is the garage simply a means by which a divided\r\nbody of activities is redintegrated or coordinated?\r\nIs it desired in any sense for itself, or only because it is\r\nthe means of effective adjustment of a whole set of underlying\r\nhabits? While common sense responds to the\r\nordinary statement of the end of desire, it also responds\r\nto a statement that no one desires the object\r\nfor its own sake, but only for what can be got out of it.\r\nHere is just the point at which the theory that pleasure\r\nis the real objective of desire makes its appeal. It\r\npoints out that not the physical object nor even its\r\npossession is really wanted; that they are only means\r\nto something personal and experiential. And hence it\r\nis argued that they are means to pleasure. The present\r\nhypothesis offers an alternative: it says that they\r\nare means of removal of obstructions to an ongoing,\r\nunified system of activities. It is easy to see why an\r\nobjective looms so large and why emotional surge\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg251\"\u003e[pg 251]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nand stress gather about it and lift it high above the\r\nfloor of consciousness. The objective is (or is taken to\r\nbe) the key to the situation. If we can attain it, lay\r\nhold of it, the trick is turned. It is like the piece of\r\npaper which carries the reprieve a condemned man\r\nwaits for. Issues of life hang upon it. The desired object\r\nis in no sense the end or goal of desire, but it is\r\nthe \u003ci lang=\"la\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003esine qua non\u003c/i\u003e of that end. A practical man will fix\r\nhis attention upon it, and not dream about eventualities\r\nwhich are only dreams if the objective is not attained,\r\nbut which will follow in their own natural course\r\nif it is reached. For then it becomes a factor in the\r\nsystem of activities. Hence the truth in the various so-called\r\nparadoxes of desire. If pleasure or perfection\r\nwere the true end of desire, it would still be true that\r\nthe way to attainment is not to think of them. For\r\nobject thought of and object achieved exist in different\r\ndimensions.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn addition to the popular notions that either the object\r\nin view or else pleasure is the end of desire, there\r\nis a less popular theory that quiescence is the actual\r\noutcome or true terminal of desire. The theory finds\r\nits most complete practical statement in Buddhism. It\r\nis nearer the psychological truth than either of the\r\nother notions. But it views the attained outcome simply\r\nin its negative aspect. The end reached quiets the\r\nclash and removes the discomfort attendant upon divided\r\nand obstructed activity. The uneasiness, unrest,\r\ncharacteristic of desire is put to sleep. For this reason,\r\nsome persons resort to intoxicants and anodynes. If\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg252\"\u003e[pg 252]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nquiescence were the end and it could be perpetuated,\r\nthis way of removing disagreeable uneasiness would be\r\nas satisfactory a way out as the way of objective effort.\r\nBut in fact desire satisfied does not bring quiescence\r\nunqualifiedly, but that \u003cem\u003ekind\u003c/em\u003e of quiescence which marks\r\nthe recovery of unified activity: the absence of internal\r\nstrife among habits and instincts. Equilibration of activities\r\nrather than quiescence is the actual result of\r\nsatisfied desire. This names the outcome positively,\r\nrather than comparatively and negatively.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis disparity of dimensions in desire between the\r\nobject thought of and the outcome reached is the explanation\r\nof those self-deceptions which psycho-analysis\r\nhas brought home to us so forcibly, but of which it\r\ngives elaborately cumbrous accounts. The object\r\nthought of and the outcome \u003cem\u003enever\u003c/em\u003e agree. There is no\r\nself-deceit in this fact. What, then, really happens\r\nwhen the actual outcome of satisfied revenge figures in\r\nthought as virtuous eagerness for justice? Or when\r\nthe tickled vanity of social admiration is masked as\r\npure love of learning? The trouble lies in the refusal\r\nof a person to note the quality of the outcome, not in\r\nthe unavoidable disparity of desire\u0027s object and the outcome.\r\nThe honest or integral mind attends to the result,\r\nand sees what it really is. For no terminal condition\r\nis exclusively terminal. Since it exists in time it\r\nhas consequences as well as antecedents. In being a\r\nconsummation it is also a force having causal potentialities.\r\nIt is initial as well as terminal.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSelf-deception originates in looking at an outcome in\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg253\"\u003e[pg 253]\u003c/span\u003e\r\none direction only\u0026mdash;as a satisfaction of what has gone\r\nbefore, ignoring the fact that what is attained is a state\r\nof habits which will continue in action and which will\r\ndetermine future results. Outcomes of desire are also\r\nbeginnings of new acts and hence are portentous. Satisfied\r\nrevenge may \u003cem\u003efeel\u003c/em\u003e like justice vindicated; the\r\nprestige of learning may \u003cem\u003efeel\u003c/em\u003e like an enlargement and\r\nrectification of an objective outlook. But since different\r\ninstincts and habits have entered into them, they\r\nare actually, that is dynamically, unlike. The function\r\nof moral judgment is to detect this unlikeness. Here,\r\nagain, the belief that we can know ourselves immediately\r\nis as disastrous to moral science as the corresponding\r\nidea regarding knowledge of nature was to physical\r\nscience. Obnoxious \"subjectivity\" of moral judgment\r\nis due to the fact that the immediate or esthetic quality\r\nswells and swells and displaces the thought of the active\r\npotency which gives activity its moral quality.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe are all natural Jack Horners. If the plum comes\r\nwhen we put in and pull out our thumb we attribute\r\nthe satisfactory result to personal virtue. The plum\r\nis obtained, and it is not easy to distinguish obtaining\r\nfrom attaining, acquisition from achieving. Jack Horner,\r\nEsq., put forth \u003cem\u003esome\u003c/em\u003e effort; and results and efforts\r\nare always more or less incommensurate. For the\r\nresult is always dependent to some extent upon the\r\nfavor or disfavor of circumstance. Why then should\r\nnot the satisfactory plum shed its halo retrospectively\r\nupon what precedes and be taken as a sign of virtue?\r\nIn this way heroes and leaders are constructed. Such\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg254\"\u003e[pg 254]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nis the worship of success. And the evil of success-worship\r\nis precisely the evil with which we have been\r\ndealing. \"Success\" is never merely final or terminal.\r\nSomething else succeeds it, and its successors are influenced\r\nby its nature, that is by the persisting habits\r\nand impulses that enter into it. The world does not\r\nstop when the successful person pulls out his plum;\r\nnor does he stop, and the kind of success he obtains,\r\nand his attitude toward it, is a factor in what comes\r\nafterwards. By a strange turn of the wheel, the success\r\nof the ultra-practical man is psychologically like\r\nthe refined enjoyment of the ultra-esthetic person. Both\r\nignore the eventualities with which every state of experience\r\nis charged. There is no reason for not enjoying\r\nthe present, but there is every reason for examination\r\nof the objective factors of \u003cem\u003ewhat\u003c/em\u003e is enjoyed before\r\nwe translate enjoyment into a belief in excellence.\r\nThere is every reason in other words for cultivating another\r\nenjoyment, that of the habit of examining the\r\nproductive potentialities of the objects enjoyed.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAnalysis of desire thus reveals the falsity of theories\r\nwhich magnify it at the expense of intelligence. Impulse\r\nis primary and intelligence is secondary and in\r\nsome sense derivative. There should be no blinking of\r\nthis fact. But recognition of it as a fact exalts intelligence.\r\nFor thought is not the slave of impulse to\r\ndo its bidding. Impulse does not know what it is after;\r\nit cannot give orders, not even if it wants to. It rushes\r\nblindly into any opening it chances to find. Anything\r\nthat expends it, satisfies it. One outlet is like another\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg255\"\u003e[pg 255]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nto it. It is indiscriminate. Its vagaries and excesses\r\nare the stock theme of classical moralists; and while\r\nthey point the wrong moral in urging the abdication\r\nof impulse in favor of reason, their characterization of\r\nimpulse is not wholly wrong. What intelligence has to\r\ndo in the service of impulse is to act not as its obedient\r\nservant but as its clarifier and liberator. And this can\r\nbe accomplished only by a study of the conditions and\r\ncauses, the workings and consequences of the greatest\r\npossible variety of desires and combinations of desire.\r\nIntelligence converts desire into plans, systematic plans\r\nbased on assembling facts, reporting events as they happen,\r\nkeeping tab on them and analyzing them.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNothing is so easy to fool as impulse and no one is\r\ndeceived so readily as a person under strong emotion.\r\nHence the idealism of man is easily brought to naught.\r\nGenerous impulses are aroused; there is a vague anticipation,\r\na burning hope, of a marvelous future. Old\r\nthings are to pass speedily away and a new heavens\r\nand earth are to come into existence. But impulse burns\r\nitself up. Emotion cannot be kept at its full tide. Obstacles\r\nare encountered upon which action dashes itself\r\ninto ineffectual spray. Or if it achieves, by luck, a\r\ntransitory success, it is intoxicated, and plumes itself\r\non victory while it is on the road to sudden defeat.\r\nMeantime, other men, not carried away by impulse, use\r\nestablished habits and a shrewd cold intellect that manipulates\r\nthem. The outcome is the victory of baser\r\ndesire directed by insight and cunning over generous\r\ndesire which does not know its way.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg256\"\u003e[pg 256]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nThe realistic man of the world has evolved a regular\r\ntechnique for dealing with idealistic outbursts that\r\nthreaten his supremacy. His aims are low, but he\r\nknows the means by which they are to be executed. His\r\nknowledge of conditions is narrow but it is effective\r\nwithin its confines. His foresight is limited to results\r\nthat concern personal success, but is sharp, clearcut.\r\nHe has no great difficulty in drafting the idealistic\r\ndesire of others with its vague enthusiasms and its\r\ncloudy perceptions into canals where it will serve his\r\nown purposes. The energies excited by emotional idealism\r\nrun into the materialistic reservoirs provided by\r\nthe contriving thought of those who have not surrendered\r\ntheir minds to their sentiment.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe glorification of affection and aspiration at the\r\nexpense of thought is a survival of romantic optimism.\r\nIt assumes a pre-established harmony between natural\r\nimpulse and natural objects. Only such a harmony\r\njustifies the belief that generous feeling will find its\r\nway illuminated by the sheer nobility of its own quality.\r\nPersons of a literary turn of mind are as subject\r\nto this fallacy as intellectual specialists are apt to the\r\ncontrary fallacy that theorizing apart from force of\r\nimpulse and habit will get affairs forward. They tend\r\nto fancy that things are as pliant to imagination as\r\nare words, that an emotion can compose affairs as if\r\nthey were materials for a lyric poem. But if the objects\r\nof the environment were only as plastic as the\r\nmaterials of poetic art, men would never have been\r\nobliged to have recourse to creation in the medium of\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg257\"\u003e[pg 257]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwords. We idealize in fancy because our idealizations\r\nin fact are balked. And while the latter must start\r\nwith imaginative idealizations instigated by release of\r\ngenerous impulse, they can be carried through only\r\nwhen the hard labor of observation, memory and foresight\r\nweds the vision of imagination to the organized\r\nefficiencies of habit.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSometimes desire means not bare impulse but impulse\r\nwhich has sense of an objective. In this case desire and\r\nthought cannot be opposed, for desire includes thought\r\nwithin itself. The question is now how far the work of\r\nthought has been done, how adequate is its perception\r\nof its directing object. For the moving force may be\r\na shadowy presentiment constructed by wishful hope\r\nrather than by study of conditions; it may be an emotional\r\nindulgence rather than a solid plan built upon\r\nthe rocks of actuality discovered by accurate inquiries.\r\nThere is no thought without the impeding of impulse.\r\nBut the obstruction may merely intensify its blind surge\r\nforward; or it may divert the force of forward impulse\r\ninto observation of existing conditions and forecast of\r\ntheir future consequences. This long way around is\r\nthe short way home for desire.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNo issue of morals is more far-reaching than the one\r\nherewith sketched. Historically speaking, there is\r\npoint in the attacks of those who speak slightingly of\r\nscience and intellect, and who would limit their moral\r\nsignificance to supplying incidental help to execution\r\nof purposes born of affection. Thought too often is\r\nspecialized in a remote and separate pursuit, or employed\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg258\"\u003e[pg 258]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nin a hard way to contrive the instrumentalities\r\nof \"success.\" Intellect is too often made a tool for a\r\nsystematized apology for things as \"they are,\" that\r\nis for customs that benefit the class in power, or else\r\na road to an interesting occupation which accumulates\r\nfacts and ideas as other men gather dollars, while\r\npriding itself on its ideal quality. No wonder that at\r\ntimes catastrophes that affect men in common are welcomed.\r\nFor the moment they turn science away from\r\nits abstract technicalities into a servant of some human\r\naspiration; the hard, chilly calculations of intellect are\r\nswept away by floods of sympathy and common\r\nloyalties.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut, alas, emotion without thought is unstable. It\r\nrises like the tide and subsides like the tide irrespective\r\nof what it has accomplished. It is easily diverted into\r\nany side channel dug by old habits or provided by cool\r\ncunning, or it disperses itself aimlessly. Then comes\r\nthe reaction of disillusionment, and men turn all the\r\nmore fiercely to the pursuit of narrow ends where they\r\nare habituated to use observation and planning and\r\nwhere they have acquired some control of conditions.\r\nThe separation of warm emotion and cool intelligence\r\nis the great moral tragedy. This division is perpetuated\r\nby those who deprecate science and foresight in\r\nbehalf of affection as it is by those who in the name of\r\nan idol labeled reason would quench passion. The intellect\r\nis always inspired by some impulse. Even the\r\nmost case-hardened scientific specialist, the most abstract\r\nphilosopher, is moved by some passion. But\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg259\"\u003e[pg 259]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nan actuating impulse easily hardens into isolated habit.\r\nIt is unavowed and disconnected. The remedy\r\nis not lapse of thought, but its quickening and\r\nextension to contemplate the continuities of existence,\r\nand restore the connection of the isolated desire to\r\nthe companionship of its fellows. The glorification of\r\n\"will\" apart from thought turns out either a commitment\r\nto blind action which serves the purpose of\r\nthose who guide their deeds by narrow plans, or else\r\na sentimental, romantic faith in the harmonies of nature\r\nleading straight to disaster.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn words at least, the association of idealism with\r\nemotion and impulse has been repeatedly implied in\r\nthe foregoing. The connection is more than verbal.\r\nEvery end that man holds up, every project he entertains\r\nis ideal. It marks something wanted, rather than\r\nsomething existing. It is wanted because existence as it\r\n\u003cem\u003enow\u003c/em\u003e is does not furnish it. It carries with itself, then,\r\na sense of contrast to the achieved, to the existent.\r\nIt outruns the seen and touched. It is the work of\r\nfaith and hope even when it is the plan of the most\r\nhard-headed \"practical\" man. But though ideal in\r\nthis sense it is not \u003cem\u003ean\u003c/em\u003e ideal. Common sense revolts at\r\ncalling every project, every design, every contrivance of\r\ncunning, ideal, because common sense includes above all\r\nin its conception of the ideal the \u003cem\u003equality\u003c/em\u003e of the plan\r\nproposed.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIdealistic revolt is blind and like every blind reaction\r\nsweeps us away. The quality of the ideal is exalted till\r\nit is something beyond all possibility of definite plan and\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg260\"\u003e[pg 260]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nexecution. Its sublimity renders it inaccessibly remote.\r\nAn ideal becomes a synonym for whatever is inspiring\u0026mdash;and\r\nimpossible. Then, since intelligence cannot be\r\nwholly suppressed, the ideal is hardened by thought\r\ninto some high, far-away object. It is so elevated and\r\nso distant that it does not belong to this world or to\r\nexperience. It is in technical language, transcendental;\r\nin common speech, supernatural, of heaven not of\r\nearth. The ideal is then a goal of final exhaustive,\r\ncomprehensive perfection which can be defined only by\r\ncomplete contrast with the actual. Although impossible\r\nof realization and of conception, it is still regarded\r\nas the source of all generous discontent with actualities\r\nand of all inspiration to progress.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis notion of the nature and office of ideals combines\r\nin one contradictory whole all that is vicious in\r\nthe separation of desire and thought. It strives while\r\nretaining the vagueness of emotion to simulate the\r\nobjective definiteness of thought. It follows the natural\r\ncourse of intelligence in demanding an object which\r\nwill unify and fulfil desire, and then cancels the work\r\nof thought by treating the object as ineffable and unrelated\r\nto present action and experience. It converts\r\nthe surge of present impulse into a future end only to\r\nswamp the endeavor to clarify this end in a gush of\r\nunconsidered feeling. It is supposed that the thought\r\nof the ideal is necessary to arouse dissatisfaction with\r\nthe present and to arouse effort to change it. But in\r\nreality the ideal is itself the product of discontent with\r\nconditions. Instead however of serving to organize and\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg261\"\u003e[pg 261]\u003c/span\u003e\r\ndirect effort, it operates as a compensatory dream. It\r\nbecomes another ready-made world. Instead of promoting\r\neffort at concrete transformations of what exists,\r\nit constitutes another kind of existence already\r\nsomewhere in being. It is a refuge, an asylum from\r\neffort. Thus the energy that might be spent in transforming\r\npresent ills goes into oscillating flights into a\r\nfar away perfect world and the tedium of enforced returns\r\ninto the necessities of the present evil world.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe can recover the genuine import of ideals and\r\nidealism only by disentangling this unreal mixture of\r\nthought and emotion. The action of deliberation, as\r\nwe have seen, consists in selecting some foreseen consequence\r\nto serve as a stimulus to present action. It\r\nbrings future possibilities into the present scene and\r\nthereby frees and expands present tendencies. But the\r\nselected consequence is set in an indefinite context of\r\nother consequences just as real as it is, and many of\r\nthem much more certain in fact. The \"ends\" that\r\nare foreseen and utilized mark out a little island in an\r\ninfinite sea. This limitation would be fatal were the\r\nproper function of ends anything else than to liberate\r\nand guide present action out of its perplexities and\r\nconfusions. But this service constitutes the sole meaning\r\nof aims and purposes. Hence their slight extent\r\nin comparison with ignored and unforeseen consequences\r\nis of no import in itself. The \"ideal\" as it\r\nstands in popular thought, the notion of a complete\r\nand exhaustive realization, is remote from the true\r\nfunctions of ends, and would only embarrass us if it\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg262\"\u003e[pg 262]\u003c/span\u003e\r\ncould be embraced in thought instead of being, as it is,\r\na comment by the emotions.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFor the sense of an indefinite context of consequences\r\nfrom among which the aim is selected enters into the\r\n\u003cem\u003epresent\u003c/em\u003e meaning of activity. The \"end\" is the figured\r\npattern at the center of the field through which runs\r\nthe axis of conduct. About this central figuration extends\r\ninfinitely a supporting background in a vague\r\nwhole, undefined and undiscriminated. At most intelligence\r\nbut throws a spotlight on that little part of the\r\nwhole which marks out the axis of movement. Even\r\nif the light is flickering and the illuminated portion\r\nstands forth only dimly from the shadowy background,\r\nit suffices if we are shown the way to move. To the rest\r\nof the consequences, collateral and remote, corresponds\r\na background of feeling, of diffused emotion. This\r\nforms the stuff of the ideal.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFrom the standpoint of its \u003cem\u003edefinite\u003c/em\u003e aim any act is\r\npetty in comparison with the totality of natural events.\r\nWhat is accomplished directly as the outcome of a turn\r\nwhich our action gives the course of events is infinitesimal\r\nin comparison with their total sweep. Only an\r\nillusion of conceit persuades us that cosmic difference\r\nhangs upon even our wisest and most strenuous effort.\r\nYet discontent with this limitation is as \u003cins class=\"corr\" title=\"unreasonble\" id=\"Corr_262_\"\u003eunreasonable\u003c/ins\u003e as\r\nrelying upon an illusion of external importance to keep\r\nourselves going. In a genuine sense every act is already\r\npossessed of infinite import. The little part of the\r\nscheme of affairs which is modifiable by our efforts is\r\ncontinuous with the rest of the world. The boundaries\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg263\"\u003e[pg 263]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof our garden plot join it to the world of our neighbors\r\nand our neighbors\u0027 neighbors. That small effort which\r\nwe can put forth is in turn connected with an infinity of\r\nevents that sustain and support it. The consciousness\r\nof this encompassing infinity of connections is ideal.\r\nWhen a sense of the infinite reach of an act physically\r\noccurring in a small point of space and occupying a\r\npetty instant of times comes home to us, the \u003cem\u003emeaning\u003c/em\u003e of\r\na present act is seen to be vast, immeasurable, unthinkable.\r\nThis ideal is not a goal to be attained. It\r\nis a significance to be felt, appreciated. Though consciousness\r\nof it cannot become intellectualized (identified\r\nin objects of a distinct character) yet emotional\r\nappreciation of it is won only by those willing to think.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is the office of art and religion to evoke such appreciations\r\nand intimations; to enhance and steady them\r\ntill they are wrought into the texture of our lives. Some\r\nphilosophers define religious consciousness as beginning\r\nwhere moral and intellectual consciousness leave off. In\r\nthe sense that definite purposes and methods shade off\r\nof necessity into a vast whole which is incapable of objective\r\npresentation this view is correct. But they have\r\nfalsified the conception by treating the religious consciousness\r\nas something that comes \u003cem\u003eafter\u003c/em\u003e an experience\r\nin which striving, resolution and foresight are found.\r\nTo them morality and science are a striving; when striving\r\nceases a moral holiday begins, an excursion beyond\r\nthe utmost flight of legitimate thought and endeavor.\r\nBut there is a point in \u003cem\u003eevery\u003c/em\u003e intelligent activity where\r\neffort ceases; where thought and doing fall back upon a\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg264\"\u003e[pg 264]\u003c/span\u003e\r\ncourse of events which effort and reflection cannot\r\ntouch. There is a point \u003cem\u003ein\u003c/em\u003e deliberate action where definite\r\nthought fades into the ineffable and undefinable\u0026mdash;into\r\nemotion. If the sense of this effortless and unfathomable\r\nwhole comes only in alternation with the sense of\r\nstrain in action and labor in thought, then we spend\r\nour lives in oscillating between what is cramped and\r\nenforced and a brief transitory escape. The function\r\nof religion is then caricatured rather than realized.\r\nMorals, like war, is thought of as hell, and religion,\r\nlike peace, as a respite. The religious experience is a\r\nreality in so far as in the midst of effort to foresee\r\nand regulate future objects we are sustained and expanded\r\nin feebleness and failure by the sense of an\r\nenveloping whole. Peace in action not after it is the\r\ncontribution of the ideal to conduct.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg265\"\u003e[pg 265]\u003c/span\u003eIX\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOver and over again, one point has recurred for criticism;\u0026mdash;the\r\nsubordination of activity to a result outside\r\nitself. Whether that goal be thought of as pleasure, as\r\nvirtue, as perfection, as final enjoyment of salvation,\r\nis secondary to the fact that the moralists who\r\nhave asserted fixed ends have in all their differences\r\nfrom one another agreed in the basic idea that present\r\nactivity is but a means. We have insisted that happiness,\r\nreasonableness, virtue, perfecting, are on the\r\ncontrary parts of the present significance of present\r\naction. Memory of the past, observation of the present,\r\nforesight of the future are indispensable. But they\r\nare indispensable \u003cem\u003eto\u003c/em\u003e a present liberation, an enriching\r\ngrowth of action. Happiness is fundamental in morals\r\nonly because happiness is not something to be sought\r\nfor, but is something now attained, even in the midst of\r\npain and trouble, whenever recognition of our ties with\r\nnature and with fellow-men releases and informs our\r\naction. Reasonableness is a necessity because it is the\r\nperception of the continuities that take action out of\r\nits immediateness and isolation into connection with\r\nthe past and future.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003ePerhaps the criticism and insistence have been too\r\nincessant. They may have provoked the reader to reaction.\r\nHe may readily concede that orthodox theories\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg266\"\u003e[pg 266]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nhave been onesided in sacrificing the present to\r\nfuture good, making of the present but an onerous\r\nobligation or a sacrifice endured for future gain. But\r\nwhy, he may protest, go to an opposite extreme and\r\nmake the future but a means to the significance of the\r\npresent? Why should the power of foresight and effort\r\nto shape the future, to regulate what is to happen, be\r\nslighted? Is not the effect of such a doctrine to weaken\r\nputting forth of endeavor in order to make the future\r\nbetter than the present? Control of the future may be\r\nlimited in extent, but it is correspondingly precious;\r\nwe should jealously cherish whatever encourages and\r\nsustains effort to that end. To make little of this possibility,\r\nin effect, it will be argued, is to decrease the\r\ncare and endeavor upon which progress depends.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eControl of the future is indeed precious in exact\r\nproportion to its difficulty, its moderate degree of attainability.\r\nAnything that actually tends to make that\r\ncontrol less than it now is would be a movement backward\r\ninto sloth and triviality. But there is a difference\r\nbetween future improvement as a result and as a\r\ndirect aim. To make it an aim is to throw away the\r\nsurest means of attaining it, namely attention to the\r\nfull use of present resources in the present situation.\r\nForecast of future conditions, scientific study of past\r\nand present in order that the forecast may be intelligent,\r\nare indeed necessities. Concentration of intellectual\r\nconcern upon the future, solicitude for scope and\r\nprecision of estimate characteristic of any well conducted\r\naffair, naturally give the impression that their\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg267\"\u003e[pg 267]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nanimating purpose is control of the future. But\r\nthought about future happenings is the only way we\r\ncan judge the present; it is the only way to appraise\r\nits significance. Without such projection, there can be\r\nno projects, no plans for administering present energies,\r\novercoming present obstacles. Deliberately to\r\nsubordinate the present to the future is to subject the\r\ncomparatively secure to the precarious, exchange resources\r\nfor liabilities, surrender what is under control\r\nto what is, relatively, incapable of control.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe \u003cem\u003eamount\u003c/em\u003e of control which will come into existence\r\nin the future is not within control. But such\r\nan amount as turns out to be practicable accrues only\r\nin consequence of the best possible management of\r\npresent means and obstacles. Dominating \u003cem\u003eintellectual\u003c/em\u003e\r\npre-occupation with the future is the way by which\r\nefficiency in dealing with the present is attained. It is\r\na way, not a goal. And, upon the very most hopeful\r\noutlook, study and planning are more important in the\r\nmeaning, the enrichment of content, which they add to\r\npresent activity than is the increase of external control\r\nthey effect. Nor is this doctrine passivistic in\r\ntendency. What sense is there in increased external\r\ncontrol except to increase the intrinsic significance of\r\nliving? The future that is foreseen is a future that is\r\nsometime to be a present. Is the value of \u003cem\u003ethat\u003c/em\u003e present\r\nalso to be postponed to a future date, and so on indefinitely?\r\nOr, if the good we are struggling to attain in\r\nthe future is one to be actually realized when that future\r\nbecomes present, why should not the good of \u003cem\u003ethis\u003c/em\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg268\"\u003e[pg 268]\u003c/span\u003e\r\npresent be equally precious? And is there, again, any\r\nintelligent way of modifying the future except to attend\r\nto the full possibilities of the present? Scamping\r\nthe present in behalf of the future leads only to rendering\r\nthe future less manageable. It increases the probability\r\nof molestation by future events.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eRemarks cast in this form probably seem too much\r\nlike a logical manipulation of the concepts of present\r\nand future to be convincing. Building a house is a\r\ntypical instance of an intelligent activity. It is an\r\nactivity directed by a plan, a design. The plan is\r\nitself based upon a foresight of future uses. This foresight\r\nis in turn dependent upon an organized survey\r\nof past experiences and of present conditions, a recollection\r\nof former experiences of living in houses and an\r\nacquaintance with present materials, prices, resources,\r\netc. Now if a legitimate case of subordination of present\r\nto regulation of the future may anywhere be found,\r\nit is in such a case as this. For a man usually builds\r\na house for the sake of the comfort and security, the\r\n\"control,\" thereby afforded to future living rather than\r\njust for the fun\u0026mdash;or the trouble\u0026mdash;of building. If in\r\nsuch a case inspection shows that, after all, intellectual\r\nconcern with the past and future is for the sake of\r\ndirecting present activity and giving it meaning, the\r\nconclusion may be accepted for other cases.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNote that the present activity is the only one really\r\nunder control. The man may die before the house is\r\nbuilt, or his financial conditions may change, or he may\r\nneed to remove to another place. If he attempts to\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg269\"\u003e[pg 269]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nprovide for all contingencies, he will never do anything;\r\nif he allows his attention to be much distracted by them,\r\nhe won\u0027t do well his present planning and execution.\r\nThe more he considers the future uses to which the house\r\nwill probably be put the better he will do his present\r\njob which is the activity of building. Control of future\r\nliving, such as it may turn out to be, is wholly\r\ndependent upon taking his present activity, seriously\r\nand devotedly, as an end, not a means. And a man has\r\nhis hands full in doing well what now needs to be done.\r\nUntil men have formed the habit of using intelligence\r\nfully as a guide to present action they will never find\r\nout how much control of future contingencies is possible.\r\nAs things are, men so habitually scamp present\r\naction in behalf of future \"ends\" that the facts for\r\nestimating the extent of the possibility of reduction of\r\nfuture contingencies have not been disclosed. What a\r\nman \u003cem\u003eis\u003c/em\u003e doing limits both his direct control and his responsibility.\r\nWe must not confuse the act of building\r\nwith the house when built. The latter \u003cem\u003eis\u003c/em\u003e a means, not\r\na fulfilment. But it is such only because it enters into\r\na new activity which is present not future. Life is continuous.\r\nThe act of building in time gives way to the\r\nacts connected with a domicile. But everywhere the\r\ngood, the fulfilment, the meaning of activity, resides in\r\na present made possible by judging existing conditions\r\nin their connections.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf we seek for an illustration on a larger scale, education\r\nfurnishes us with a poignant example. As traditionally\r\nconducted, it strikingly exhibits a subordination\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg270\"\u003e[pg 270]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof the living present to a remote and precarious\r\nfuture. To prepare, to get ready, is its key-note. The\r\nactual outcome is lack of adequate preparation, of intelligent\r\nadaptation. The professed exaltation of the\r\nfuture turns out in practice a blind following of tradition,\r\na rule of thumb muddling along from day to\r\nday; or, as in some of the projects called industrial\r\neducation, a determined effort on the part of one class\r\nof the community to secure \u003cem\u003eits\u003c/em\u003e future at the expense\r\nof another class. If education were conducted as a\r\nprocess of fullest utilization of present resources, liberating\r\nand guiding capacities that are now urgent, it\r\ngoes without saying that the lives of the young would\r\nbe much richer in meaning than they are now. It also\r\nfollows that intelligence would be kept busy in studying\r\nall indications of power, all obstacles and perversions,\r\nall products of the past that throw light upon present\r\ncapacity, and in forecasting the future career of impulse\r\nand habit now active\u0026mdash;not for the sake of subordinating\r\nthe latter but in order to treat them intelligently.\r\nAs a consequence whatever fortification\r\nand expansion of the future that is possible will be\r\nachieved\u0026mdash;as it is now dismally unattained.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eA more complicated instance is found in the dominant\r\nquality of our industrial activity. It may be dogmatically\r\ndeclared that the roots of its evils are found\r\nin the separation of production from consumption\u0026mdash;that\r\nis, actual consummation, fulfilment. A normal\r\ncase of their relationship is found in the taking of\r\nfood. Food is consumed and vigor is produced. The\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg271\"\u003e[pg 271]\u003c/span\u003e\r\ndifference between the two is one of directions or dimensions\r\ndistinguished by intellect. In reality there is\r\nsimply conversion of energy from one form to another\r\nwherein it is more available\u0026mdash;of greater significance.\r\nThe activity of the artist, the sportsman, the scientific\r\ninquirer exemplifies the same balance. Activity should\r\nbe productive. This is to say it should have a bearing\r\non the future, should effect control of it. But so far as\r\na productive action is intrinsically creative, it has its\r\nown intrinsic value. Reference to future products and\r\nfuture enjoyments is but a way of enhancing perception\r\nof an immanent meaning. A skilled artisan who\r\nenjoys his work is aware that what he is making is made\r\nfor future use. Externally his action is one technically\r\nlabeled \"production.\" It seems to illustrate the subjection\r\nof present activity to remote ends. But actually,\r\nmorally, psychologically, the sense of the utility\r\nof the article produced is a factor in the present significance\r\nof action due to the present utilization of\r\nabilities, giving play to taste and skill, accomplishing\r\nsomething now. The moment production is severed\r\nfrom immediate satisfaction, it becomes \"labor,\"\r\ndrudgery, a task reluctantly performed.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eYet the whole tendency of modern economic life has\r\nbeen to assume that consumption will take care of itself\r\nprovided only production is grossly and intensely attended\r\nto. Making things is frantically accelerated;\r\nand every mechanical device used to swell the senseless\r\nbulk. As a result most workers find no replenishment,\r\nno renewal and growth of mind, no fulfilment in work.\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg272\"\u003e[pg 272]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nThey labor to get mere means of later satisfaction.\r\nThis when procured is isolated in turn from production\r\nand is reduced to a barren physical affair or a sensuous\r\ncompensation for normal goods denied. Meantime the\r\nfatuity of severing production from consumption, from\r\npresent enriching of life, is made evident by economic\r\ncrises, by periods of unemployment alternating with\r\nperiods of exercise, work or \"over-production.\" Production\r\napart from fulfilment becomes purely a matter\r\nof quantity; for distinction, quality, is a matter of present\r\nmeaning. Esthetic elements being excluded, the\r\nmechanical reign. Production lacks criteria; one thing\r\nis better than another if it can be made faster or in\r\ngreater mass. Leisure is not the nourishment of mind\r\nin work, nor a recreation; it is a feverish hurry for\r\ndiversion, excitement, display, otherwise there is no\r\nleisure except a sodden torpor. Fatigue due for some\r\nto monotony and for others to overstrain in maintaining\r\nthe pace is inevitable. Socially, the separation\r\nof production and consumption, means and ends, is the\r\nroot of the most profound division of classes. Those\r\nwho fix the \"ends\" for production are in control, those\r\nwho engage in isolated productive activity are the subject-class.\r\nBut if the latter are oppressed the former\r\nare not truly free. Their consumptions are accidental\r\nostentation and extravagance, not a normal consummation\r\nor fulfilment of activity. The remainder of\r\ntheir lives is spent in enslavement to keeping the machinery\r\ngoing at an increasingly rapid rate.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eMeantime class struggle grows between those whose\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg273\"\u003e[pg 273]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nproductive labor is enforced by necessity and those who\r\nare privileged consumers. And the exaggeration of\r\nproduction due to its isolation from ignored consumption\r\nso hypnotizes attention that even would-be reformers,\r\nlike Marxian socialists, assert that the entire\r\nsocial problem focuses at the point of production.\r\nSince this separation of means from ends signifies an\r\nerection of means into ends, it is no wonder that a\r\n\"materialistic conception of history\" emerges. It is\r\nnot an invention of Marx; it is a record of fact so far\r\nas the separation in question obtains. For practicable\r\nidealism is found only in a fulfilment, a consumption\r\nwhich is a replenishing, growth, renewal of mind and\r\nbody. Harmony of social interests is found in the\r\nwide-spread sharing of activities significant in themselves,\r\nthat is to say, at the point of \u003cem\u003econsumption\u003c/em\u003e.\u003ca name=\"FNanchor_9_\" id=\"FNanchor_9_\" href=\"#Footnote_9_\" title=\"Acknowledgment is due \u0027The Social Interpretation of History\u0027 by Maurice Williams.\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e[9]\u003c/a\u003e But\r\nthe forcing of production apart from consumption leads\r\nto the monstrous belief that class-struggle civil war is\r\na means of social progress, instead of a register of the\r\nbarriers to its attainment. Yet here too the Marxian\r\nreads aright the character of most current economic\r\nactivity.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe history of economic activity thus exemplifies the\r\nmoral consequences of the separation of present activity\r\nand future \"ends\" from each other. It also embodies\r\nthe difficulty of the problem\u0026mdash;the tax placed by\r\nit upon thought and good will. For the professed idealist\r\nand the hard-headed materialist or \"practical\"\r\nman, have conspired together to sustain this situation.\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg274\"\u003e[pg 274]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nThe \"idealist\" sets up as the ideal not fullness of\r\nmeaning of the present but a remote goal. Hence the\r\npresent is evacuated of meaning. It is reduced to being\r\na mere external instrument, an evil necessity due to the\r\ndistance between us and significant valid satisfaction.\r\nAppreciation, joy, peace in present activity are suspect.\r\nThey are regarded as diversions, temptations,\r\nunworthy relaxations. Then since human nature \u003cem\u003emust\u003c/em\u003e\r\nhave present realization, a sentimental, romantic enjoyment\r\nof the ideal becomes a substitute for intelligent\r\nand rewarding activity. The utopia cannot be\r\nrealized in fact but it may be appropriated in fantasy\r\nand serve as an anodyne to blunt the sense of a misery\r\nwhich after all endures. Some private key to a present\r\nentering upon remote and superior bliss is sought, just\r\nas the evangelical enjoys a complacent and superior\r\nsense of a salvation unobtained by fellow mortals. Thus\r\nthe normal demand for realization, for satisfaction in\r\nthe present, is abnormally met.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eMeantime the practical man wants something definite,\r\ntangible and presumably obtainable for which to\r\nwork. He is looking after \"a good thing\" as the average\r\nman is looking after a \"good time,\" that natural\r\ncaricature of an intrinsically significant activity. Yet\r\nhis activity is impractical. He is looking for satisfaction\r\nsomewhere else than where it can be found. In his\r\nutopian search for a future good he neglects the only\r\nplace where good can be found. He empties present\r\nactivity of meaning by making it a mere instrumentality.\r\nWhen the future arrives it is only after all another\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg275\"\u003e[pg 275]\u003c/span\u003e\r\ndespised present. By habit as well as by definition it\r\nis still a means to something which has yet to come.\r\nAgain human nature must have its claims satisfied, and\r\nsensuality is the inevitable recourse. Usually a compromise\r\nis worked out, by which a man for his working-hours\r\naccepts the philosophy of activity for some future\r\nresult, while at odd leisure times he enters by conventionally\r\nrecognized channels upon an enjoyment of\r\n\"spiritual\" blessings and \"ideal\" refinements. The\r\nproblem of serving God and Mammon is thus solved.\r\nThe situation exemplifies the concrete meaning of the\r\nseparation of means from ends which is the intellectual\r\nreflex of the divorce of theory and practice, intelligence\r\nand habit, foresight and present impulse. Moralists\r\nhave spent time and energy in showing what happens\r\nwhen appetite, impulse, is indulged without reference to\r\nconsequences and reason. But they have mostly ignored\r\nthe counterpart evils of an intelligence that conceives\r\nideals and goods which do not enter into present impulse\r\nand habit. The life of reason has been specialized,\r\nromanticized, or made a heavy burden. This situation\r\nembodies the import of the problem of actualizing the\r\nplace of intelligence in conduct.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOur whole account of the place of intelligence in conduct\r\nis exposed however to the charge of being itself\r\nromantic, a compensatory idealization. The history of\r\nmind is a record of intellect which registers, with more\r\nor less inaccuracy, what has happened after it has happened.\r\nThe crisis in which the intervention of foreseeing\r\nand directing mind is needed passes unnoted,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg276\"\u003e[pg 276]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwith attention directed toward incidentals and irrelevancies.\r\nThe work of intellect is \u003ci lang=\"la\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003epost mortem\u003c/i\u003e. The\r\nrise of social science, it will be pointed out, has increased\r\nthe amount of registering that occurs. Social\r\npost mortems occur much more frequently than they\r\nused to. But one of the things which the unbiased mind\r\nwill register is the impotency of discussion, analysis\r\nand reporting in modifying the course of events. The\r\nlatter goes its way unheeding. The reply that this\r\ncondition of matters shows not the impotency of intelligence\r\nbut that what passes for science is not science\r\nis too easy a retort to be satisfactory. We must have\r\nrecourse to some concrete facts or surrender our doctrine\r\njust at the moment when we have formulated it.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eTechnical affairs give evidence that the work of inquiry,\r\nreporting \u003cins class=\"corr\" title=\"an\" id=\"Corr_276_\"\u003eand\u003c/ins\u003e analysis is not always ineffectual.\r\nThe development of a chain of \"nation-wide\" tobacco\r\nshops, of a well managed national telephone system, of\r\nthe extension of the service of an electric-light plant\r\ntestify to the fact that study, reflection and the formation\r\nof plans do in some instances determine a course\r\nof events. The effect is seen in both engineering management\r\nand in national commercial expansion. Such\r\npotency however, it must be admitted, is limited to just\r\nthose matters that are called technical in contrast with\r\nthe larger affairs of humanity. But if we seek, as we\r\nshould, for a definition of \"technical,\" we can hardly\r\nfind any save one that goes in a circle: Affairs are technical\r\nin which observation, analysis and intellectual organization\r\nare determining factors. Is the conclusion\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg277\"\u003e[pg 277]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nto be drawn a conviction that our wider social interests\r\nare so different from those in which intelligence is a\r\ndirecting factor that in the former science must always\r\nremain a belated visitor coming upon the scene after\r\nmatters are settled? No, the logical conclusion is that\r\nas yet we have no technique in important economic,\r\npolitical and international affairs. Complexity of conditions\r\nrender the difficulties in the way of the development\r\nof a technique enormous. It is imaginable they\r\nwill never be overcome. But our choice is between the\r\ndevelopment of a technique by which intelligence will\r\nbecome an intervening partner and a continuation of a\r\nregime of accident, waste and distress.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2 class=\"spaced\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg278\"\u003e[pg 278]\u003c/span\u003ePART FOUR\u003cbr/\u003e\r\n\u003csmall\u003eCONCLUSION\u003c/small\u003e\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eConduct when distributed under heads like habit, impulse\r\nand intelligence gets artificially shredded. In\r\ndiscussing each of these topics we have run into the\r\nothers. We conclude, then, with an attempt to gather\r\ntogether some outstanding considerations about conduct\r\nas a whole.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003eI\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe foremost conclusion is that morals has to do\r\nwith all activity into which alternative possibilities\r\nenter. For wherever they enter a difference between\r\nbetter and worse arises. Reflection upon action means\r\nuncertainty and consequent need of decision as to which\r\ncourse is better. The better is the good; the best is\r\nnot better than the good but is simply the discovered\r\ngood. Comparative and superlative degrees are only\r\npaths to the positive degree of action. The worse or\r\nevil is a rejected good. In deliberation and before\r\nchoice no evil presents itself as evil. Until it is rejected,\r\nit is a competing good. After rejection, it figures not\r\nas a lesser good, but as the bad of that situation.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg279\"\u003e[pg 279]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nActually then only deliberate action, conduct into\r\nwhich reflective choice enters, is distinctively moral, for\r\nonly then does there enter the question of better and\r\nworse. Yet it is a perilous error to draw a hard and\r\nfast line between action into which deliberation and\r\nchoice enter and activity due to impulse and matter-of-fact\r\nhabit. One of the consequences of action is to involve\r\nus in predicaments where we have to reflect upon\r\nthings formerly done as matter of course. One of the\r\nchief problems of our dealings with others is to induce\r\nthem to reflect upon affairs which they usually perform\r\nfrom unreflective habit. On the other hand, every reflective\r\nchoice tends to relegate some conscious issue\r\ninto a deed or habit henceforth taken for granted and\r\nnot thought upon. Potentially therefore every and\r\nany act is within the scope of morals, being a candidate\r\nfor possible judgment with respect to its better-or-worse\r\nquality. It thus becomes one of the most perplexing\r\nproblems of reflection to discover just how far\r\nto carry it, what to bring under examination and what\r\nto leave to unscrutinized habit. Because there is no\r\nfinal recipe by which to decide this question all moral\r\njudgment is experimental and subject to revision by its\r\nissue.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe recognition that conduct covers every act that\r\nis judged with reference to better and worse and that\r\nthe need of this judgment is potentially coextensive\r\nwith all portions of conduct, saves us from the mistake\r\nwhich makes morality a separate department of life.\r\nPotentially conduct is one hundred per cent of our acts.\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg280\"\u003e[pg 280]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nHence we must decline to admit theories which identify\r\nmorals with the purification of motives, edifying character,\r\npursuing remote and elusive perfection, obeying\r\nsupernatural command, acknowledging the authority of\r\nduty. Such notions have a dual bad effect. First they\r\nget in the way of observation of conditions and consequences.\r\nThey divert thought into side issues. Secondly,\r\nwhile they confer a morbid exaggerated quality\r\nupon things which are viewed under the aspect of morality,\r\nthey release the larger part of the acts of life\r\nfrom serious, that is moral, survey. Anxious solicitude\r\nfor the few acts which are deemed moral is accompanied\r\nby edicts of exemption and baths of immunity for most\r\nacts. A moral moratorium prevails for everyday\r\naffairs.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhen we observe that morals is at home wherever\r\nconsiderations of the worse and better are involved, we\r\nare committed to noting that morality is a continuing\r\nprocess not a fixed achievement. Morals means growth\r\nof conduct in meaning; at least it means that kind of\r\nexpansion in meaning which is consequent upon observations\r\nof the conditions and outcome of conduct. It\r\nis all one with growing. Growing and growth are the\r\nsame fact expanded in actuality or telescoped in\r\nthought. In the largest sense of the word, morals is\r\neducation. It is learning the meaning of what we are\r\nabout and employing that meaning in action. The\r\ngood, satisfaction, \"end,\" of growth of present action\r\nin shades and scope of meaning is the only good within\r\nour control, and the only one, accordingly, for which\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg281\"\u003e[pg 281]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nresponsibility exists. The rest is luck, fortune. And\r\nthe tragedy of the moral notions most insisted upon by\r\nthe morally self-conscious is the relegation of the only\r\ngood which can fully engage thought, namely present\r\nmeaning of action, to the rank of an incident of a remote\r\ngood, whether that future good be defined as\r\npleasure, or perfection, or salvation, or attainment of\r\nvirtuous character.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\"Present\" activity is not a sharp narrow knife-blade\r\nin time. The present is complex, containing\r\nwithin itself a multitude of habits and impulses. It is\r\nenduring, a course of action, a process including memory,\r\nobservation and foresight, a pressure forward, a\r\nglance backward and a look outward. It is of \u003cem\u003emoral\u003c/em\u003e\r\nmoment because it marks a transition in the direction\r\nof breadth and clarity of action or in that of triviality\r\nand confusion. Progress is present reconstruction adding\r\nfullness and distinctness of meaning, and retrogression\r\nis a present slipping away of significance, determinations,\r\ngrasp. Those who hold that progress can\r\nbe perceived and measured only by reference to a remote\r\ngoal, first confuse meaning with space, and then treat\r\nspatial position as absolute, as limiting movement instead\r\nof being bounded in and by movement. There are\r\nplenty of negative elements, due to conflict, entanglement\r\nand obscurity, in most of the situations of life,\r\nand we do not require a revelation of some supreme\r\nperfection to inform us whether or no we are making\r\nheadway in present rectification. We move on from\r\nthe worse and into, not just towards, the better, which\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg282\"\u003e[pg 282]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nis authenticated not by comparison with the foreign but\r\nin what is indigenous. Unless progress is a present\r\nreconstructing, it is nothing; if it cannot be told by\r\nqualities belonging to the movement of transition it\r\ncan never be judged.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eMen have constructed a strange dream-world when\r\nthey have supposed that without a fixed ideal of a remote\r\ngood to inspire them, they have no inducement to\r\nget relief from present troubles, no desires for liberation\r\nfrom what oppresses and for clearing-up what\r\nconfuses present action. The world in which we could\r\nget enlightenment and instruction about the direction\r\nin which we are moving only from a vague conception of\r\nan unattainable perfection would be totally unlike our\r\npresent world. Sufficient unto the day is the evil\r\nthereof. Sufficient it is to stimulate us to remedial\r\naction, to endeavor in order to convert strife into harmony,\r\nmonotony into a variegated scene, and limitation\r\ninto expansion. The converting is progress, the only\r\nprogress conceivable or attainable by man. Hence\r\nevery situation has its own measure and quality of\r\nprogress, and the need for progress is recurrent, constant.\r\nIf it is better to travel than to arrive, it is because\r\ntraveling is a constant arriving, while arrival\r\nthat precludes further traveling is most easily attained\r\nby going to sleep or dying. We find our clews to direction\r\nin the projected recollections of definite experienced\r\ngoods not in vague anticipations, even when\r\nwe label the vagueness perfection, the Ideal, and proceed\r\nto manipulate its definition with dry dialectic logic.\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg283\"\u003e[pg 283]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nProgress means increase of present meaning, which involves\r\nmultiplication of sensed distinctions as well as\r\nharmony, unification. This statement may, perhaps, be\r\nmade generally, in application to the experience of\r\nhumanity. If history shows progress it can hardly be\r\nfound elsewhere than in this complication and extension\r\nof the significance found within experience. It is clear\r\nthat such progress brings no surcease, no immunity\r\nfrom perplexity and trouble. If we wished to transmute\r\nthis generalization into a categorical imperative\r\nwe should say: \"So act as to increase the meaning of\r\npresent experience.\" But even then in order to get instruction\r\nabout the concrete quality of such increased\r\nmeaning we should have to run away from the law and\r\nstudy the needs and alternative possibilities lying within\r\na unique and localized situation. The imperative,\r\nlike everything absolute, is sterile. Till men give up\r\nthe search for a general formula of progress they will\r\nnot know where to look to find it.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eA business man proceeds by comparing today\u0027s liabilities\r\nand assets with yesterday\u0027s, and projects plans\r\nfor tomorrow by a study of the movement thus indicated\r\nin conjunction with study of the conditions of\r\nthe environment now existing. It is not otherwise with\r\nthe business of living. The future is a projection of the\r\nsubject-matter of the present, a projection which is not\r\narbitrary in the extent in which it divines the movement\r\nof the moving present. The physician is lost who would\r\nguide his activities of healing by building up a picture\r\nof perfect health, the same for all and in its nature\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg284\"\u003e[pg 284]\u003c/span\u003e\r\ncomplete and self-enclosed once for all. He employs\r\nwhat he has discovered about actual cases of good\r\nhealth and ill health and their causes to investigate the\r\npresent ailing individual, so as to further his recovering;\r\nrecovering, an intrinsic and living process rather\r\nthan recovery, which is comparative and static. Moral\r\ntheories, which however have not remained mere theories\r\nbut which have found their way into the opinions of\r\nthe common man, have reversed the situation and made\r\nthe present subservient to a rigid yet abstract future.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe ethical import of the doctrine of evolution is\r\nenormous. But its import has been misconstrued because\r\nthe doctrine has been appropriated by the very\r\ntraditional notions which in truth it subverts. It has\r\nbeen thought that the doctrine of evolution means the\r\ncomplete subordination of present change to a future\r\ngoal. It has been constrained to teach a futile dogma\r\nof approximation, instead of a gospel of present\r\ngrowth. The usufruct of the new science has been\r\nseized upon by the old tradition of fixed and external\r\nends. In fact evolution means continuity of change;\r\nand the fact that change may take the form of present\r\ngrowth of complexity and interaction. Significant\r\nstages in change are found not in access of fixity of\r\nattainment but in those crises in which a seeming fixity\r\nof habits gives way to a release of capacities that have\r\nnot previously functioned: in times that is of readjustment\r\nand redirection.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNo matter what the present success in straightening\r\nout difficulties and harmonizing conflicts, it is certain\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg285\"\u003e[pg 285]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthat problems will recur in the future in a new form\r\nor on a different plane. Indeed every genuine accomplishment\r\ninstead of winding up an affair and enclosing\r\nit as a jewel in a casket for future contemplation,\r\ncomplicates the practical situation. It effects a new\r\ndistribution of energies which have henceforth to be\r\nemployed in ways for which past experience gives no\r\nexact instruction. Every important satisfaction of an\r\nold want creates a new one; and this new one has to\r\nenter upon an experimental adventure to find its satisfaction.\r\nFrom the side of what has gone before\r\nachievement settles something. From the side of what\r\ncomes after, it complicates, introducing new problems,\r\nunsettling factors. There is something pitifully juvenile\r\nin the idea that \"evolution,\" progress, means a\r\ndefinite sum of accomplishment which will forever stay\r\ndone, and which by an exact amount lessens the amount\r\nstill to be done, disposing once and for all of just so\r\nmany perplexities and advancing us just so far on our\r\nroad to a final stable and unperplexed goal. Yet the\r\ntypical nineteenth century, mid-victorian conception of\r\nevolution was precisely a formulation of such a consummate\r\njuvenilism.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf the true ideal is that of a stable condition free\r\nfrom conflict and disturbance, then there are a number\r\nof theories whose claims are superior to those of the\r\npopular doctrine of evolution. Logic points rather in\r\nthe direction of Rousseau and Tolstoi who would recur\r\nto some primitive simplicity, who would return from\r\ncomplicated and troubled civilization to a state of nature.\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg286\"\u003e[pg 286]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nFor certainly progress in civilization has not only\r\nmeant increase in the scope and intricacy of problems\r\nto be dealt with, but it entails increasing instability.\r\nFor in multiplying wants, instruments and possibilities,\r\nit increases the variety of forces which enter into relations\r\nwith one another and which have to be intelligently\r\ndirected. Or again, Stoic indifference or Buddhist\r\ncalm have greater claims. For, it may be argued,\r\nsince all objective achievement only complicates the situation,\r\nthe victory of a final stability can be secured\r\nonly by renunciation of desire. Since every satisfaction\r\nof desire increases force, and this in turn creates\r\nnew desires, withdrawal into an inner passionless state,\r\nindifference to action and attainment, is the sole road\r\nto possession of the eternal, stable and final reality.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAgain, from the standpoint of definite approximation\r\nto an ultimate goal, the balance falls heavily on the side\r\nof pessimism. The more striving the more attainments,\r\nperhaps; but also assuredly the more needs and the\r\nmore disappointments. The more we do and the more\r\nwe accomplish, the more the end is vanity and vexation.\r\nFrom the standpoint of attainment of good that\r\nstays put, that constitutes a definite sum performed\r\nwhich lessens the amount of effort required in order to\r\nreach the ultimate goal of final good, progress \u003cem\u003eis\u003c/em\u003e an\r\nillusion. But we are looking for it in the wrong place.\r\nThe world war is a bitter commentary on the nineteenth\r\ncentury misconception of moral achievement\u0026mdash;a misconception\r\nhowever which it only inherited from the\r\ntraditional theory of fixed ends, attempting to bolster\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg287\"\u003e[pg 287]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nup that doctrine with aid from the \"scientific\" theory\r\nof evolution. The doctrine of progress is not yet bankrupt.\r\nThe bankruptcy of the notion of fixed goods to\r\nbe attained and stably possessed may possibly be the\r\nmeans of turning the mind of man to a tenable theory\r\nof progress\u0026mdash;to attention to present troubles and possibilities.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAdherents of the idea that betterment, growth in\r\ngoodness, consists in approximation to an exhaustive,\r\nstable, immutable end or good, have been compelled to\r\nrecognize the truth that in fact we envisage the good\r\nin specific terms that are relative to existing needs, and\r\nthat the attainment of every specific good merges insensibly\r\ninto a new condition of maladjustment with its\r\nneed of a new end and a renewed effort. But they\r\nhave elaborated an ingenious dialectical theory to account\r\nfor the facts while maintaining their theory intact.\r\nThe goal, the ideal, is infinite; man is finite, subject\r\nto conditions imposed by space and time. The\r\nspecific character of the ends which man entertains\r\nand of the satisfaction he achieves is due therefore\r\nprecisely to his empirical and finite nature in its contrast\r\nwith the infinite and complete character of the\r\ntrue reality, the end. Consequently when man reaches\r\nwhat he had taken to be the destination of his journey\r\nhe finds that he has only gone a piece on the road. Infinite\r\nvistas still stretch before him. Again he sets his\r\nmark a little way further ahead, and again when he\r\nreaches the station set, he finds the road opening before\r\nhim in unexpected ways, and sees new distant objects\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg288\"\u003e[pg 288]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nbeckoning him forward. Such is the popular doctrine.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBy some strange perversion this theory passes for\r\nmoral idealism. An office of inspiration and guidance is\r\nattributed to the thought of the goal of ultimate completeness\r\nor perfection. As matter of fact, the idea\r\nsincerely held brings discouragement and despair not\r\ninspiration or hopefulness. There is something either\r\nludicrous or tragic in the notion that inspiration to\r\ncontinued progress is had in telling man that no matter\r\nwhat he does or what he achieves, the outcome is negligible\r\nin comparison with what he set out to achieve, that\r\nevery endeavor he makes is bound to turn out a failure\r\ncompared with what should be done, that every attained\r\nsatisfaction is only forever bound to be only a\r\ndisappointment. The honest conclusion is pessimism.\r\nAll is vexation, and the greater the effort the greater\r\nthe vexation. But the fact is that it is not the negative\r\naspect of an outcome, its failure to reach infinity,\r\nwhich renews courage and hope. Positive attainment,\r\nactual enrichment of meaning and powers opens new\r\nvistas and sets new tasks, creates new aims and stimulates\r\nnew efforts. The facts are not such as to yield\r\nunthinking optimism and consolation; for they render\r\nit impossible to rest upon attained goods. New struggles\r\nand failures are inevitable. The total scene of\r\naction remains as before, only for us more complex,\r\nand more subtly unstable. But this very situation is a\r\nconsequence of expansion, not of failures of power, and\r\nwhen grasped and admitted it is a challenge to intelligence.\r\nInstruction in what to do next can never come\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg289\"\u003e[pg 289]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nfrom an infinite goal, which for us is bound to be empty.\r\nIt can be derived only from study of the deficiencies,\r\nirregularities and possibilities of the actual situation.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn any case, however, arguments about pessimism and\r\noptimism based upon considerations regarding fixed\r\nattainment of good and evil are mainly literary in quality.\r\nMan continues to live because he is a living creature\r\nnot because reason convinces him of the certainty\r\nor probability of future satisfactions and achievements.\r\nHe is instinct with activities that carry him on. Individuals\r\nhere and there cave in, and most individuals\r\nsag, withdraw and seek refuge at this and that point.\r\nBut man as man still has the dumb pluck of the animal.\r\nHe has endurance, hope, curiosity, eagerness, love of\r\naction. These traits belong to him by structure, not by\r\ntaking thought. Memory of past and foresight of future\r\nconvert dumbness to some degree of articulateness.\r\nThey illumine curiosity and steady courage.\r\nThen when the future arrives with its inevitable disappointments\r\nas well as fulfilments, and with new\r\nsources of trouble, failure loses something of its fatality,\r\nand suffering yields fruit of instruction not of bitterness.\r\nHumility is more demanded at our moments\r\nof triumph than at those of failure. For humility is\r\nnot a caddish self-depreciation. It is the sense of our\r\nslight inability even with our best intelligence and effort\r\nto command events; a sense of our dependence\r\nupon forces that go their way without our wish and\r\nplan. Its purport is not to relax effort but to make\r\nus prize every opportunity of present growth. In\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg290\"\u003e[pg 290]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nmorals, the infinitive and the imperative develop from\r\nthe participle, present tense. Perfection means perfecting,\r\nfulfilment, fulfilling, and the good is now or\r\nnever.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIdealistic philosophies, those of Plato, Aristotle, Spinoza,\r\nlike the hypothesis now offered, have found the\r\ngood in meanings belonging to a conscious life, a life\r\nof reason, not in external achievement. Like it, they\r\nhave exalted the place of intelligence in securing fulfilment\r\nof conscious life. These theories have at least\r\nnot subordinated conscious life to external obedience,\r\nnot thought of virtue as something different from excellence\r\nof life. But they set up a transcendental meaning\r\nand reason, remote from present experience and\r\nopposed to it; or they insist upon a special form of\r\nmeaning and consciousness to be attained by peculiar\r\nmodes of knowledge inaccessible to the common man,\r\ninvolving not continuous reconstruction of ordinary\r\nexperience, but its wholesale reversal. They have\r\ntreated regeneration, change of heart, as wholesale and\r\nself-enclosed, not as continuous.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe utilitarians also made good and evil, right and\r\nwrong, matters of conscious experience. In addition\r\nthey brought them down to earth, to everyday experience.\r\nThey strove to humanize other-worldly goods.\r\nBut they retained the notion that the good is future,\r\nand hence outside the meaning of present activity. In\r\nso far it is sporadic, exceptional, subject to accident,\r\npassive, an enjoyment not a joy, something hit upon,\r\nnot a fulfilling. The future end is for them not \u003cem\u003eso\u003c/em\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg291\"\u003e[pg 291]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nremote from present action as the Platonic realm of\r\nideals, or as the Aristotelian rational thought, or the\r\nChristian heaven, or Spinoza\u0027s conception of the universal\r\nwhole. But still it is separate in principle and\r\nin fact from present activity. The next step is to identify\r\nthe sought for good with the meaning of our\r\nimpulses and our habits, and the specific \u003cem\u003emoral\u003c/em\u003e good\r\nor virtue with \u003cem\u003elearning\u003c/em\u003e this meaning, a learning that\r\ntakes us back not into an isolated self but out into the\r\nopen-air world of objects and social ties, terminating\r\nin an increment of present significance.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eDoubtless there are those who will think that we\r\nthus escape from remote and external ends only to fall\r\ninto an Epicureanism which teaches us to subordinate\r\neverything else to present satisfactions. The hypothesis\r\npreferred may seem to some to advise a subjective,\r\nself-centered life of intensified consciousness, an esthetically\r\ndilettante type of egoism. For is not its lesson\r\nthat we should concentrate attention, each upon the\r\nconsciousness accompanying his action so as to refine\r\nand develop it? Is not this, like all subjective morals,\r\nan anti-social doctrine, instructing us to subordinate\r\nthe objective consequences of our acts, those which promote\r\nthe welfare of others, to an enrichment of our\r\nprivate conscious lives?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt can hardly be denied that as compared with the\r\ndogmas against which it reacted there is an element of\r\ntruth in Epicureanism. It strove to center attention\r\nupon what is actually within control and to find the\r\ngood in the present instead of in a contingent uncertain\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg292\"\u003e[pg 292]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nfuture. The trouble with it lies in its account of\r\npresent good. It failed to connect this good with the\r\nfull reach of activities. It contemplated good of withdrawal\r\nrather than of active participation. That is\r\nto say, the objection to Epicureanism lies in its conception\r\nof what constitutes present good, not in its\r\nemphasis upon satisfaction as at present. The same remark\r\nmay be made about every theory which recognizes\r\nthe individual self. If any such theory is objectionable,\r\nthe objection is against the character or quality\r\nassigned to the self. Of course an individual is the\r\nbearer or carrier of experience. What of that? Everything\r\ndepends upon the kind of experience that centers\r\nin him. Not the residence of experience counts, but its\r\ncontents, what\u0027s in the house. The center is not in the\r\nabstract amenable to our control, but what gathers\r\nabout it is our affair. We can\u0027t help being individual\r\nselves, each one of us. If selfhood as such is a bad\r\nthing, the blame lies not with the self but with the universe,\r\nwith providence. But in fact the distinction between\r\na selfishness with which we find fault and an\r\nunselfishness which we esteem is found in the quality\r\nof the activities which proceed from and enter into the\r\nself, according as they are contractive, exclusive, or\r\nexpansive, outreaching. Meaning exists for some self,\r\nbut this truistic fact doesn\u0027t fix the quality of any particular\r\nmeaning. It may be such as to make the self\r\nsmall, or such as to exalt and dignify the self. It is\r\nas impertinent to decry the worth of experience because\r\nit is connected with a self as it is fantastic to\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg293\"\u003e[pg 293]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nidealize personality just as personality aside from the\r\nquestion what sort of a person one is.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOther persons are selves too. If one\u0027s own present\r\nexperience is to be depreciated in its meaning because\r\nit centers in a self, why act for the welfare of others?\r\nSelfishness for selfishness, one is as good as another;\r\nour own is worth as much as another\u0027s. But the recognition\r\nthat good is always found in a present growth\r\nof significance in activity protects us from thinking\r\nthat welfare can consist in a soup-kitchen happiness,\r\nin pleasures we can confer upon others from without.\r\nIt shows that good is the same in quality wherever it is\r\nfound, whether in some other self or in one\u0027s own. An\r\nactivity has meaning in the degree in which it establishes\r\nand acknowledges variety and intimacy of connections.\r\nAs long as any social impulse endures, so long an activity\r\nthat shuts itself off will bring inward dissatisfaction\r\nand entail a struggle for compensatory goods, no matter\r\nwhat pleasures or external successes acclaim its\r\ncourse.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eTo say that the welfare of others, like our own,\r\nconsists in a widening and deepening of the perceptions\r\nthat give activity its meaning, in an educative growth,\r\nis to set forth a proposition of political import. To\r\n\"make others happy\" except through liberating their\r\npowers and engaging them in activities that enlarge\r\nthe meaning of life is to harm them and to indulge\r\nourselves under cover of exercising a special virtue.\r\nOur moral measure for estimating any existing arrangement\r\nor any proposed reform is its effect upon\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg294\"\u003e[pg 294]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nimpulse and habits. Does it liberate or suppress, ossify\r\nor render flexible, divide or unify interest? Is perception\r\nquickened or dulled? Is memory made apt and\r\nextensive or narrow and diffusely irrelevant? Is imagination\r\ndiverted to fantasy and compensatory dreams,\r\nor does it add fertility to life? Is thought creative or\r\npushed one side into pedantic specialisms? There is a\r\nsense in which to set up social welfare as an end of\r\naction only promotes an offensive condescension, a\r\nharsh interference, or an oleaginous display of complacent\r\nkindliness. It always tends in this direction\r\nwhen it is aimed at giving happiness to others\r\ndirectly, that is, as we can hand a physical thing to\r\nanother. To foster conditions that widen the horizon\r\nof others and give them command of their own powers,\r\nso that they can find their own happiness in their own\r\nfashion, is the way of \"social\" action. Otherwise the\r\nprayer of a freeman would be to be left alone, and to be\r\ndelivered, above all, from \"reformers\" and \"kind\"\r\npeople.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg295\"\u003e[pg 295]\u003c/span\u003eII\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSince morals is concerned with conduct, it grows out\r\nof specific empirical facts. Almost all influential moral\r\ntheories, with the exception of the utilitarian, have refused\r\nto admit this idea. For Christendom as a whole,\r\nmorality has been connected with supernatural commands,\r\nrewards and penalties. Those who have escaped\r\nthis superstition have contented themselves with\r\nconverting the difference between this world and the\r\nnext into a distinction between the actual and the ideal,\r\nwhat is and what should be. The actual world has not\r\nbeen surrendered to the devil in name, but it is treated\r\nas a display of physical forces incapable of generating\r\nmoral values. Consequently, moral considerations must\r\nbe introduced from above. Human nature may not be\r\nofficially declared to be infected because of some aboriginal\r\nsin, but it is said to be sensuous, impulsive, subjected\r\nto necessity, while natural intelligence is such\r\nthat it cannot rise above a reckoning of private expediency.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut in fact morals is the most humane of all subjects.\r\nIt is that which is closest to human nature; it\r\nis ineradicably empirical, not theological nor metaphysical\r\nnor mathematical. Since it directly concerns\r\nhuman nature, everything that can be known of the\r\nhuman mind and body in physiology, medicine, anthropology,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg296\"\u003e[pg 296]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nand psychology is pertinent to moral inquiry.\r\nHuman nature exists and operates in an environment.\r\nAnd it is not \"in\" that environment as coins are in a\r\nbox, but as a plant is in the sunlight and soil. It is\r\nof them, continuous with their energies, dependent upon\r\ntheir support, capable of increase only as it utilizes\r\nthem, and as it gradually rebuilds from their crude indifference\r\nan environment genially civilized. Hence\r\nphysics, chemistry, history, statistics, engineering science,\r\nare a part of disciplined moral knowledge so far\r\nas they enable us to understand the conditions and\r\nagencies through which man lives, and on account of\r\nwhich he forms and executes his plans. Moral science\r\nis not something with a separate province. It is physical,\r\nbiological and historic knowledge placed in a\r\nhuman context where it will illuminate and guide the\r\nactivities of men.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe path of truth is narrow and straitened. It is\r\nonly too easy to wander beyond the course from this\r\nside to that. In a reaction from that error which has\r\nmade morals fanatic or fantastic, sentimental or\r\nauthoritative by severing them from actual facts and\r\nforces, theorists have gone to the other extreme. They\r\nhave insisted that natural laws are themselves moral\r\nlaws, so that it remains, after noting them, only to conform\r\nto them. This doctrine of accord with nature\r\nhas usually marked a transition period. When mythology\r\nis dying in its open forms, and when social life is\r\nso disturbed that custom and tradition fail to supply\r\ntheir wonted control, men resort to Nature as a norm.\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg297\"\u003e[pg 297]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nThey apply to Nature all the eulogistic predicates previously\r\nassociated with divine law; or natural law is\r\nconceived of as the only true divine law. This happened\r\nin one form in Stoicism. It happened in another\r\nform in the deism of the eighteenth century with its\r\nnotion of a benevolent, harmonious, wholly rational\r\norder of Nature.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn our time this notion has been perpetuated in connection\r\nwith a laissez-faire social philosophy and the\r\ntheory of evolution. Human intelligence is thought to\r\nmark an artificial interference if it does more than register\r\nfixed natural laws as rules of human action. The\r\nprocess of natural evolution is conceived as the exact\r\nmodel of human endeavor. The two ideas met in Spencer.\r\nTo the \"enlightened\" of a former generation,\r\nSpencer\u0027s evolutionary philosophy seemed to afford a\r\nscientific sanction for the necessity of moral progress,\r\nwhile it also proved, up to the hilt, the futility of deliberate\r\n\"interference\" with the benevolent operations\r\nof nature. The idea of justice was identified with the\r\nlaw of cause and effect. Transgression of natural law\r\nwrought in the struggle for existence its own penalty of\r\nelimination, and conformity with it brought the reward\r\nof increased vitality and happiness. By this process\r\negoistic desire is gradually coming into harmony with\r\nthe necessity of the environment, till at last the individual\r\nautomatically finds happiness in doing what the\r\nnatural and social environment demands, and serves\r\nhimself in serving others. From this point of view,\r\nearlier \"scientific\" philosophers made a mistake, but\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg298\"\u003e[pg 298]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nonly the mistake of anticipating the date of complete\r\nnatural harmony. All that reason can do is to acknowledge\r\nthe evolutionary forces, and thereby refrain from\r\nretarding the arrival of the happy day of perfect harmony.\r\nMeantime justice demands that the weak and\r\nignorant suffer the effect of violation of natural law,\r\nwhile the wise and able reap the rewards of their\r\nsuperiority.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe fundamental defect of such views is that they\r\nfail to see the difference made in conditions and energies\r\nby perception of them. It is the first business of\r\nmind to be \"realistic,\" to see things \"as they are.\"\r\nIf, for example, biology can give us knowledge of the\r\ncauses of competency and incompetency, strength and\r\nweakness, that knowledge is all to the good. A non-sentimental\r\nmorals will seek for all the instruction natural\r\nscience can give concerning the biological conditions\r\nand consequences of inferiority and superiority.\r\nBut knowledge of facts does not entail conformity and\r\nacquiescence. The contrary is the case. Perception\r\nof things as they are is but a stage in the process of\r\nmaking them different. They have already begun to be\r\ndifferent in being known, for by that fact they enter\r\ninto a different context, a context of foresight and\r\njudgment of better and worse. A false psychology of\r\na separate realm of consciousness is the only reason\r\nthis fact is not generally acknowledged. Morality resides\r\nnot in perception of fact, but in the \u003cem\u003euse\u003c/em\u003e made of\r\nits perception. It is a monstrous assumption that\r\nits sole use is to utter benedictions upon fact and its\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg299\"\u003e[pg 299]\u003c/span\u003e\r\noffspring. It is the part of intelligence to tell when\r\nto use the fact to conform and perpetuate, and when\r\nto use it to vary conditions and consequences.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is absurd to suppose that knowledge about the connection\r\nbetween inferiority and its consequences prescribes\r\nadherence to that connection. It is like supposing\r\nthat knowledge of the connection between malaria\r\nand mosquitoes enjoins breeding mosquitoes. The\r\nfact when it is known enters into a new environment.\r\nWithout ceasing to belong to the physical environment\r\nit enters also into a medium of human activities, of\r\ndesires and aversions, habits and instincts. It thereby\r\ngains new potencies, new capacities. Gunpowder in\r\nwater does not act the same as gunpowder next a flame.\r\nA fact known does not operate the same as a fact unperceived.\r\nWhen it is known it comes into contact with\r\nthe flame of desire and the cold bath of antipathy.\r\nKnowledge of the conditions that breed incapacity may\r\nfit into some desire to maintain others in that state\r\nwhile averting it for one\u0027s self. Or it may fall in with\r\na character which finds itself blocked by such facts, and\r\ntherefore strives to use knowledge of causes to make a\r\nchange in effects. Morality begins at this point of use\r\nof knowledge of natural law, a use varying with the\r\nactive system of dispositions and desires. Intelligent\r\naction is not concerned with the bare consequences of\r\nthe thing known, but with consequences \u003cem\u003eto be\u003c/em\u003e brought\r\ninto existence by action conditioned on the knowledge.\r\nMen may use their knowledge to induce conformity or\r\nexaggeration, or to effect change and abolition of conditions.\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg300\"\u003e[pg 300]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nThe quality of these consequences determines\r\nthe question of better or worse.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe exaggeration of the harmony attributed to Nature\r\naroused men to note its disharmonies. An optimistic\r\nview of natural benevolence was followed by a more\r\nhonest, less romantic view of struggle and conflict in\r\nnature. After Helvetius and Bentham came Malthus\r\nand Darwin. The problem of morals is the problem of\r\ndesire and intelligence. What is to be done with these\r\nfacts of disharmony and conflict? After we have discovered\r\nthe place and consequences of conflict in nature,\r\nwe have still to discover its place and working in\r\nhuman need and thought. What is its office, its function,\r\nits \u003cem\u003epossibility\u003c/em\u003e, or use? In general, the answer is simple.\r\nConflict is the gadfly of thought. It stirs us to observation\r\nand memory. It instigates to invention. It\r\nshocks us out of sheep-like passivity, and sets us at\r\nnoting and contriving. Not that it always effects this\r\nresult; but that conflict is a \u003ci lang=\"la\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003esine qua non\u003c/i\u003e of reflection\r\nand ingenuity. When this possibility of making use of\r\nconflict has once been noted, it is possible to utilize it\r\nsystematically to substitute the arbitration of mind for\r\nthat of brutal attack and brute collapse. But the\r\ntendency to take natural law for a norm of action which\r\nthe supposedly scientific have inherited from eighteenth\r\ncentury rationalism leads to an idealization of the principle\r\nof conflict itself. Its office in promoting progress\r\nthrough arousing intelligence is overlooked, and it is\r\nerected into the generator of progress. Karl Marx\r\nborrowed from the dialectic of Hegel the idea of the\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg301\"\u003e[pg 301]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nnecessity of a negative element, of opposition, for advance.\r\nHe projected it into social affairs and reached\r\nthe conclusion that all social development comes from\r\nconflict between classes, and that therefore class-warfare\r\nis to be cultivated. Hence a supposedly scientific\r\nform of the doctrine of social evolution preaches social\r\nhostility as the road to social harmony. It would be\r\ndifficult to find a more striking instance of what happens\r\nwhen natural events are given a social and practical\r\nsanctification. Darwinism has been similarly used\r\nto justify war and the brutalities of competition for\r\nwealth and power.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe excuse, the provocation, though not the justification\r\nfor such a doctrine is found in the actions of those\r\nwho say peace, peace, when there is no peace, who refuse\r\nto recognize facts as they are, who proclaim a natural\r\nharmony of wealth and merit, of capital and labor, and\r\nthe natural justice, in the main, of existing conditions.\r\nThere is something horrible, something that makes one\r\nfear for civilization, in denunciations of class-differences\r\nand class struggles which proceed from a class in\r\npower, one that is seizing every means, even to a monopoly\r\nof moral ideals, to carry on its struggle for\r\nclass-power. This class adds hypocrisy to conflict and\r\nbrings all idealism into disrepute. It does everything\r\nwhich ingenuity and prestige can do to give color to\r\nthe assertions of those who say that all moral considerations\r\nare irrelevant, and that the issue is one of\r\nbrute trial of forces between this side and that. The\r\nalternative, here as elsewhere, is not between denying\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg302\"\u003e[pg 302]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nfacts in behalf of something termed moral ideals and\r\naccepting facts as final. There remains the possibility\r\nof recognizing facts and using them as a challenge\r\nto intelligence to modify the environment and change\r\nhabits.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg303\"\u003e[pg 303]\u003c/span\u003eIII\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe place of natural fact and law in morals brings us\r\nto the problem of freedom. We are told that seriously\r\nto import empirical facts into morals is equivalent to\r\nan abrogation of freedom. Facts and laws mean necessity\r\nwe are told. The way to freedom is to turn our\r\nback upon them and take flight to a separate ideal\r\nrealm. Even if the flight could be successfully accomplished,\r\nthe efficacy of the prescription may be\r\ndoubted. For we need freedom in and among\r\nactual events, not apart from them. It is to\r\nbe hoped therefore that there remains an alternative;\r\nthat the road to freedom may be found in that\r\nknowledge of facts which enables us to employ them in\r\nconnection with desires and aims. A physician or engineer\r\nis free in his thought and his action in the degree\r\nin which he knows what he deals with. Possibly we find\r\nhere the key to any freedom.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhat men have esteemed and fought for in the name\r\nof liberty is varied and complex\u0026mdash;but certainly it has\r\nnever been a metaphysical freedom of will. It seems\r\nto contain three elements of importance, though on\r\ntheir face not all of them are directly compatible with\r\none another. (i) It includes efficiency in action, ability\r\nto carry out plans, the absence of cramping and\r\nthwarting obstacles. (ii) It also includes capacity to\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg304\"\u003e[pg 304]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nvary plans, to change the course of action, to experience\r\nnovelties. And again (iii) it signifies the power of\r\ndesire and choice to be factors in events.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFew men would purchase even a high amount of efficient\r\naction along definite lines at the price of monotony,\r\nor if success in action were bought by all abandonment\r\nof personal preference. They would probably feel\r\nthat a more precious freedom was possessed in a life\r\nof ill-assured objective achievement that contained\r\nundertaking of risks, adventuring in new fields, a pitting\r\nof personal choice against the odds of events, and\r\na mixture of success and failures, provided choice had\r\na career. The slave is a man who executes the wish of\r\nothers, one doomed to act along lines predetermined to\r\nregularity. Those who have defined freedom as ability\r\nto act have unconsciously assumed that this ability is\r\nexercised in accord with desire, and that its operation\r\nintroduces the agent into fields previously unexplored.\r\nHence the conception of freedom as involving three\r\nfactors.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eYet efficiency in execution cannot be ignored. To say\r\nthat a man is free to choose to walk while the only walk\r\nhe can take will lead him over a precipice is to strain\r\nwords as well as facts. Intelligence is the key to freedom\r\nin act. We are likely to be able to go ahead prosperously\r\nin the degree in which we have consulted conditions\r\nand formed a plan which enlists their consenting\r\ncooperation. The gratuitous help of unforeseen\r\ncircumstance we cannot afford to despise. Luck, bad\r\nif not good, will always be with us. But it has a way\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg305\"\u003e[pg 305]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof favoring the intelligent and showing its back to the\r\nstupid. And the gifts of fortune when they come are\r\nfleeting except when they are made taut by intelligent\r\nadaptation of conditions. In neutral and adverse circumstances,\r\nstudy and foresight are the only roads to\r\nunimpeded action. Insistence upon a metaphysical\r\nfreedom of will is generally at its most strident pitch\r\nwith those who despise knowledge of matters-of-fact.\r\nThey pay for their contempt by halting and confined\r\naction. Glorification of freedom in general at the expense\r\nof positive abilities in particular has often characterized\r\nthe official creed of historic liberalism. Its\r\noutward sign is the separation of politics and law from\r\neconomics. Much of what is called the \"individualism\"\r\nof the early nineteenth century has in truth little\r\nto do with the nature of individuals. It goes back to a\r\nmetaphysics which held that harmony between man and\r\nnature can be taken for granted, if once certain artificial\r\nrestrictions upon man are removed. Hence it\r\nneglected the necessity of studying and regulating industrial\r\nconditions so that a nominal freedom can\r\nbe made an actuality. Find a man who believes that all\r\nmen need is freedom \u003cem\u003efrom\u003c/em\u003e oppressive legal and political\r\nmeasures, and you have found a man who, unless he is\r\nmerely obstinately maintaining his own private privileges,\r\ncarries at the back of his head some heritage of\r\nthe metaphysical doctrine of free-will, plus an optimistic\r\nconfidence in natural harmony. He needs a philosophy\r\nthat recognizes the objective character of freedom\r\nand its dependence upon a congruity of environment\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg306\"\u003e[pg 306]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwith human wants, an agreement which can be\r\nobtained only by profound thought and unremitting\r\napplication. For freedom as a fact depends upon conditions\r\nof work which are socially and scientifically\r\nbuttressed. Since industry covers the most pervasive\r\nrelations of man with his environment, freedom is unreal\r\nwhich does not have as its basis an economic command\r\nof environment.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eI have no desire to add another to the cheap and easy\r\nsolutions which exist of the seeming conflict between\r\nfreedom and organization. It is reasonably obvious\r\nthat organization may become a hindrance to freedom;\r\nit does not take us far to say that the trouble lies not\r\nin organization but in over-organization. At the same\r\ntime, it must be admitted that there is no effective or\r\nobjective freedom without organization. It is easy to\r\ncriticize the contract theory of the state which states\r\nthat individuals surrender some at least of their natural\r\nliberties in order to make secure as civil liberties what\r\nthey retain. Nevertheless there is some truth in the\r\nidea of surrender and exchange. A certain natural\r\nfreedom is possessed by man. That is to say, in some\r\nrespects harmony exists between a man\u0027s energies and\r\nhis surroundings such that the latter support and execute\r\nhis purposes. In so far he is free; without such\r\na basic natural support, conscious contrivances of legislation,\r\nadministration and deliberate human institution\r\nof social arrangements cannot take place. In this\r\nsense natural freedom is prior to political freedom and\r\nis its condition. But we cannot trust wholly to a freedom\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg307\"\u003e[pg 307]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthus procured. It is at the mercy of accident.\r\nConscious agreements among men must supplement and\r\nin some degree supplant freedom of action which is the\r\ngift of nature. In order to arrive at these agreements,\r\nindividuals have to make concessions. They must consent\r\nto curtailment of some natural liberties in order\r\nthat any of them may be rendered secure and enduring.\r\nThey must, in short, enter into an organization with\r\nother human beings so that the activities of others may\r\nbe permanently counted upon to assure regularity of\r\naction and far-reaching scope of plans and courses of\r\naction. The procedure is not, in so far, unlike surrendering\r\na portion of one\u0027s income in order to buy insurance\r\nagainst future contingencies, and thus to render\r\nthe future course of life more equably secure. It would\r\nbe folly to maintain that there is no sacrifice; we can\r\nhowever contend that the sacrifice is a reasonable one,\r\njustified by results.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eViewed in this light, the relation of individual freedom\r\nto organization is seen to be an experimental affair.\r\nIt is not capable of being settled by abstract\r\ntheory. Take the question of labor unions and the\r\nclosed or open shop. It is folly to fancy that no restrictions\r\nand surrenders of prior freedoms and possibilities\r\nof future freedoms are involved in the extension\r\nof this particular form of organization. But to\r\ncondemn such organization on the theoretical ground\r\nthat a restriction of liberty is entailed is to adopt a\r\nposition which would have been fatal to every advance\r\nstep in civilization, and to every net gain in effective\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg308\"\u003e[pg 308]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nfreedom. Every such question is to be judged not on\r\nthe basis of antecedent theory but on the basis of concrete\r\nconsequences. The question is to the balance of\r\nfreedom and security achieved, as compared with practicable\r\nalternatives. Even the question of the point\r\nwhere membership in an organization ceases to be a\r\nvoluntary matter and becomes coercive or required, is\r\nalso an experimental matter, a thing to be decided by\r\nscientifically conducted study of consequences, of pros\r\nand cons. It is definitely an affair of specific detail,\r\nnot of wholesale theory. It is equally amusing to see\r\none man denouncing on grounds of pure theory the\r\ncoercion of workers by a labor union while he avails\r\nhimself of the increased power due to corporate action\r\nin business and praises the coercion of the political\r\nstate; and to see another man denouncing the latter as\r\npure tyranny, while lauding the power of industrial\r\nlabor organizations. The position of one or the other\r\nmay be justified in particular cases, but justification\r\nis due to results in practice not to general theory.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOrganization tends, however, to become rigid and\r\nto limit freedom. In addition to security and energy\r\nin action, novelty, risk, change are ingredients of the\r\nfreedom which men desire. Variety is more than the\r\nspice of life; it is largely of its essence, making a difference\r\nbetween the free and the enslaved. Invariant\r\nvirtue appears to be as mechanical as uninterrupted\r\nvice, for true excellence changes with conditions. Unless\r\ncharacter rises to overcome some new difficulty or\r\nconquer some temptation from an unexpected quarter\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg309\"\u003e[pg 309]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwe suspect its grain is only a veneer. Choice is an element\r\nin freedom and there can be no choice without\r\nunrealized and precarious possibilities. It is this demand\r\nfor genuine contingency which is caricatured in\r\nthe orthodox doctrine of a freedom of indifference, a\r\npower to choose this way or that apart from any habit\r\nor impulse, without even a desire on the part of will to\r\nshow off. Such an indetermination of choice is not\r\ndesired by the lover of either reason or excitement.\r\nThe theory of arbitrary free choice represents indeterminateness\r\nof conditions grasped in a vague and lazy\r\nfashion and hardened into a desirable attribute of will.\r\nUnder the title of freedom men prize such uncertainty\r\nof conditions as give deliberation and choice an opportunity.\r\nBut uncertainty of volition which is more than\r\na reflection of uncertainty of conditions is the mark of\r\na person who has acquired imbecility of character\r\nthrough permanent weakening of his springs of action.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhether or not indeterminateness, uncertainty,\r\nactually exists in the world is a difficult question. It is\r\neasier to think of the world as fixed, settled once for\r\nall, and man as accumulating all the uncertainty there\r\nis in his will and all the doubt there is in his intellect.\r\nThe rise of natural science has facilitated this dualistic\r\npartitioning, making nature wholly fixed and mind\r\nwholly open and empty. Fortunately for us we do not\r\nhave to settle the question. A hypothetical answer is\r\nenough. \u003cem\u003eIf\u003c/em\u003e the world is already done and done for, if\r\nits character is entirely achieved so that its behavior\r\nis like that of a man lost in routine, then the only freedom\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg310\"\u003e[pg 310]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nfor which man can hope is one of efficiency in overt\r\naction. But \u003cem\u003eif\u003c/em\u003e change is genuine, if accounts are still\r\nin process of making, and if objective uncertainty is the\r\nstimulus to reflection, then variation in action, novelty\r\nand experiment, have a true meaning. In any case the\r\nquestion is an objective one. It concerns not man in\r\nisolation from the world but man in his connection with\r\nit. A world that is at points and times indeterminate\r\nenough to call out deliberation and to give play to\r\nchoice to shape its future is a world in which will is\r\nfree, not because it is inherently vacillating and unstable,\r\nbut because deliberation and choice are determining\r\nand stabilizing factors.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eUpon an empirical view, uncertainty, doubt, hesitation,\r\ncontingency and novelty, genuine change which is\r\nnot mere disguised repetition, are facts. Only deductive\r\nreasoning from certain fixed premisses creates a\r\nbias in favor of complete determination and finality.\r\nTo say that these things exist only in human experience\r\nnot in the world, and exist there only because of our\r\n\"finitude\" is dangerously like paying ourselves with\r\nwords. Empirically the life of man seems in these respects\r\nas in others to express a culmination of facts in\r\nnature. To admit ignorance and uncertainty in man\r\nwhile denying them to nature involves a curious dualism.\r\nVariability, initiative, innovation, departure from\r\nroutine, experimentation are empirically the manifestation\r\nof a genuine nisus in things. At all events it is\r\nthese things that are precious to us under the name\r\nof freedom. It is their elimination from the life of a\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg311\"\u003e[pg 311]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nslave which makes his life servile, intolerable to the\r\nfreeman who has once been on his own, no matter what\r\nhis animal comfort and security. A free man would\r\nrather take his chance in an open world than be guaranteed\r\nin a closed world.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThese considerations give point to the third factor\r\nin love of freedom: the desire to have desire count as a\r\nfactor, a force. Even if will chooses unaccountably,\r\neven if it be a capricious impulse, it does not follow\r\nthat there are real alternatives, genuine possibilities,\r\nopen in the future. What we want is possibilities open\r\nin the \u003cem\u003eworld\u003c/em\u003e not in the will, except as will or deliberate\r\nactivity reflects the world. To foresee future objective\r\nalternatives and to be able by deliberation to choose\r\none of them and thereby weight its chances in the\r\nstruggle for future existence, measures our freedom.\r\nIt is assumed sometimes that if it can be shown that\r\ndeliberation determines choice and deliberation is determined\r\nby character and conditions, there is no freedom.\r\nThis is like saying that because a flower comes\r\nfrom root and stem it cannot bear fruit. The question\r\nis not what are the antecedents of deliberation and\r\nchoice, but what are their consequences. What do they\r\ndo that is distinctive? The answer is that they give us\r\nall the control of future possibilities which is open to us.\r\nAnd this control is the crux of our freedom. Without\r\nit, we are pushed from behind. With it we walk in the\r\nlight.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe doctrine that knowledge, intelligence rather than\r\nwill, constitutes freedom is not new. It has been\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg312\"\u003e[pg 312]\u003c/span\u003e\r\npreached by moralists of many a school. All rationalists\r\nhave identified freedom with action emancipated\r\nby insight into truth. But insight into necessity has\r\nby them been substituted for foresight of possibilities.\r\nTolstoi for example expressed the idea of Spinoza and\r\nHegel when he said that the ox is a slave as long as\r\nhe refuses to recognize the yoke and chafes under it,\r\nwhile if he identifies himself with its necessity and draws\r\nwillingly instead of rebelliously, he is free. But as long\r\nas the yoke is a yoke it is impossible that voluntary\r\nidentification with it should occur. Conscious submission\r\nis then either fatalistic submissiveness or cowardice.\r\nThe ox accepts in fact not the yoke but the stall\r\nand the hay to which the yoke is a necessary incident.\r\nBut if the ox foresees the consequences of the use of\r\nthe yoke, if he anticipates the possibility of harvest,\r\nand identifies himself not with the yoke but with the\r\nrealization of its possibilities, he acts freely, voluntarily.\r\nHe hasn\u0027t accepted a necessity as unavoidable; he\r\nhas welcomed a possibility as a desirability.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003ePerception of necessary law plays, indeed, a part.\r\nBut no amount of insight into necessity brings with it,\r\nas such, anything but a consciousness of necessity.\r\nFreedom is the \"truth of necessity\" only when we use\r\none \"necessity\" to alter another. When we use the\r\nlaw to foresee consequences and to consider how they\r\nmay be averted or secured, then freedom begins. Employing\r\nknowledge of law to enforce desire in execution\r\ngives power to the engineer. Employing knowledge of\r\nlaw in order to submit to it without further action constitutes\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg313\"\u003e[pg 313]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nfatalism, no matter how it be dressed up. Thus\r\nwe recur to our main contention. Morality depends\r\nupon events, not upon commands and ideals alien to\r\nnature. But intelligence treats events as moving, as\r\nfraught with possibilities, not as ended, final. In forecasting\r\ntheir possibilities, the distinction between better\r\nand worse arises. Human desire and ability cooperates\r\nwith this or that natural force according as this\r\nor that eventuality is judged better. We do not use\r\nthe present to control the future. We use the foresight\r\nof the future to refine and expand present activity.\r\nIn this use of desire, deliberation and choice, freedom\r\nis actualized.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg314\"\u003e[pg 314]\u003c/span\u003eIV\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIntelligence becomes ours in the degree in which we\r\nuse it and accept responsibility for consequences. It\r\nis not ours originally or by production. \"It thinks\"\r\nis a truer psychological statement than \"I think.\"\r\nThoughts sprout and vegetate; ideas proliferate. They\r\ncome from deep unconscious sources. \"I think\" is a\r\nstatement about voluntary action. Some suggestion\r\nsurges from the unknown. Our active body of habits\r\nappropriates it. The suggestion then becomes an assertion.\r\nIt no longer merely comes to us. It is accepted\r\nand uttered by us. We act upon it and thereby assume,\r\nby implication, its consequences. The stuff of belief\r\nand proposition is not originated by us. It comes to us\r\nfrom others, by education, tradition and the suggestion\r\nof the environment. Our intelligence is bound up, so\r\nfar as its materials are concerned, with the community\r\nlife of which we are a part. We know what it communicates\r\nto us, and know according to the habits it forms\r\nin us. Science is an affair of civilization not of individual\r\nintellect.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSo with conscience. When a child acts, those about\r\nhim re-act. They shower encouragement upon him,\r\nvisit him with approval, or they bestow frowns and\r\nrebuke. What others do to us when we act is as natural\r\na consequence of our action as what the fire does\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg315\"\u003e[pg 315]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nto us when we plunge our hands in it. The social environment\r\nmay be as artificial as you please. But its\r\naction in response to ours is natural not artificial. In\r\nlanguage and imagination we rehearse the responses of\r\nothers just as we dramatically enact other consequences.\r\nWe foreknow how others will act, and the foreknowledge\r\nis the beginning of judgment passed on action. We\r\nknow \u003cem\u003ewith\u003c/em\u003e them; there is conscience. An assembly is\r\nformed within our breast which discusses and appraises\r\nproposed and performed acts. The community without\r\nbecomes a forum and tribunal within, a judgment-seat\r\nof charges, assessments and exculpations. Our\r\nthoughts of our own actions are saturated with the\r\nideas that others entertain about them, ideas which\r\nhave been expressed not only in explicit instruction but\r\nstill more effectively in reaction to our acts.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eLiability is the beginning of responsibility. We are\r\nheld accountable by others for the consequences of our\r\nacts. They visit their like and dislike of these consequences\r\nupon us. In vain do we claim that these are\r\nnot ours; that they are products of ignorance not\r\ndesign, or are incidents in the execution of a most laudable\r\nscheme. Their authorship is imputed to us. We\r\nare disapproved, and disapproval is not an inner state\r\nof mind but a most definite act. Others say to us by\r\ntheir deeds we do not care a fig whether you did this\r\ndeliberately or not. We intend that you \u003cem\u003eshall\u003c/em\u003e deliberate\r\nbefore you do it again, and that if possible your\r\ndeliberation shall prevent a repetition of this act we\r\nobject to. The reference in blame and every unfavorable\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg316\"\u003e[pg 316]\u003c/span\u003e\r\njudgment is prospective, not retrospective. Theories\r\nabout responsibility may become confused, but in\r\npractice no one is stupid enough to try to change the\r\npast. Approbation and disapprobation are ways of\r\ninfluencing the formation of habits and aims; that is,\r\nof influencing future acts. The individual is \u003cem\u003eheld\u003c/em\u003e accountable\r\nfor what he \u003cem\u003ehas\u003c/em\u003e done in order that he may be\r\nresponsive in what he is \u003cem\u003egoing\u003c/em\u003e to do. Gradually persons\r\nlearn by dramatic imitation to hold themselves\r\naccountable, and liability becomes a voluntary deliberate\r\nacknowledgment that deeds are our own, that\r\ntheir consequences come from us.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThese two facts, that moral judgment and moral\r\nresponsibility are the work wrought in us by the social\r\nenvironment, signify that all morality is social; not\r\nbecause we \u003cem\u003eought\u003c/em\u003e to take into account the effect of our\r\nacts upon the welfare of others, but because of facts.\r\nOthers \u003cem\u003edo\u003c/em\u003e take account of what we do, and they respond\r\naccordingly to our acts. Their responses actually\r\n\u003cem\u003edo\u003c/em\u003e affect the meaning of what we do. The significance\r\nthus contributed is as inevitable as is the effect\r\nof interaction with the physical environment. In fact\r\nas civilization advances the physical environment gets\r\nitself more and more humanized, for the meaning of\r\nphysical energies and events becomes involved with the\r\npart they play in human activities. Our conduct \u003cem\u003eis\u003c/em\u003e\r\nsocially conditioned whether we perceive the fact or\r\nnot.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe effect of custom on habit, and of habit upon\r\nthought is enough to prove this statement. When we\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg317\"\u003e[pg 317]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nbegin to forecast consequences, the consequences that\r\nmost stand out are those which will proceed from other\r\npeople. The resistance and the cooperation of others\r\nis the central fact in the furtherance or failure of our\r\nschemes. Connections with our fellows furnish both the\r\nopportunities for action and the instrumentalities by\r\nwhich we take advantage of opportunity. All of the\r\nactions of an individual bear the stamp of his community\r\nas assuredly as does the language he speaks.\r\nDifficulty in reading the stamp is due to variety of impressions\r\nin consequence of membership in many groups.\r\nThis social saturation is, I repeat, a matter of fact,\r\nnot of what should be, not of what is desirable or undesirable.\r\nIt does not guarantee the rightness of goodness\r\nof an act; there is no excuse for thinking of evil\r\naction as individualistic and right action as social.\r\nDeliberate unscrupulous pursuit of self-interest is as\r\nmuch conditioned upon social opportunities, training\r\nand assistance as is the course of action prompted by\r\na beaming benevolence. The difference lies in the quality\r\nand degree of the perception of ties and interdependencies;\r\nin the use to which they are put. Consider\r\nthe form commonly assumed today by self-seeking;\r\nnamely command of money and economic power.\r\nMoney is a social institution; property is a legal custom;\r\neconomic opportunities are dependent upon the\r\nstate of society; the objects aimed at, the rewards\r\nsought for, are what they are because of social admiration,\r\nprestige, competition and power. If money-making\r\nis morally obnoxious it is because of the way these\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg318\"\u003e[pg 318]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nsocial facts are handled, not because a money-making\r\nman has withdrawn from society into an isolated selfhood\r\nor turned his back upon society. His \"individualism\"\r\nis not found in his original nature but in his\r\nhabits acquired under social influences. It is found in\r\nhis concrete aims, and these are reflexes of social conditions.\r\nWell-grounded moral objection to a mode of\r\nconduct rests upon the kind of social connections that\r\nfigure, not upon lack of social aim. A man may attempt\r\nto utilize social relationships for his own advantage\r\nin an inequitable way; he may intentionally\r\nor unconsciously try to make them feed one of his own\r\nappetites. Then he is denounced as egoistic. But both\r\nhis course of action and the disapproval he is subject\r\nto are facts \u003cem\u003ewithin\u003c/em\u003e society. They are social phenomena.\r\nHe pursues his unjust advantage as a social\r\nasset.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eExplicit recognition of this fact is a prerequisite of\r\nimprovement in moral education and of an intelligent\r\nunderstanding of the chief ideas or \"categories\" of\r\nmorals. Morals is as much a matter of interaction of\r\na person with his social environment as walking is an\r\ninteraction of legs with a physical environment. The\r\ncharacter of walking depends upon the strength and\r\ncompetency of legs. But it also depends upon whether\r\na man is walking in a bog or on a paved street, upon\r\nwhether there is a safeguarded path set aside or whether\r\nhe has to walk amid dangerous vehicles. If the standard\r\nof morals is low it is because the education given\r\nby the interaction of the individual with his social environment\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg319\"\u003e[pg 319]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nis defective. Of what avail is it to preach\r\nunassuming simplicity and contentment of life when\r\ncommunal admiration goes to the man who \"succeeds\"\u0026mdash;who\r\nmakes himself conspicuous and envied because of\r\ncommand of money and other forms of power? If a\r\nchild gets on by peevishness or intrigue, then others\r\nare his accomplices who assist in the habits which are\r\nbuilt up. The notion that an abstract ready-made\r\nconscience exists in individuals and that it is only necessary\r\nto make an occasional appeal to it and to indulge\r\nin occasional crude rebukes and punishments, is associated\r\nwith the causes of lack of definitive and orderly\r\nmoral advance. For it is associated with lack of attention\r\nto social forces.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThere is a peculiar inconsistency in the current idea\r\nthat morals \u003cem\u003eought\u003c/em\u003e to be social. The introduction of\r\nthe moral \"ought\" into the idea contains an implicit\r\nassertion that morals depend upon something apart\r\nfrom social relations. Morals \u003cem\u003eare\u003c/em\u003e social. The question\r\nof ought, should be, is a question of better and\r\nworse \u003cem\u003ein\u003c/em\u003e social affairs. The extent to which the weight\r\nof theories has been thrown against the perception of\r\nthe place of social ties and connections in moral activity\r\nis a fair measure of the extent to which social forces\r\nwork blindly and develop an accidental morality. The\r\nchief obstacle for example to recognizing the truth of\r\na proposition frequently set forth in these pages to the\r\neffect that all conduct is potential, if not actual, matter\r\nof moral judgment is the habit of identifying moral\r\njudgment with praise and blame. So great is the influence\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg320\"\u003e[pg 320]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof this habit that it is safe to say that every\r\nprofessed moralist when he leaves the pages of theory\r\nand faces some actual item of his own or others\u0027 behavior,\r\nfirst or \"instinctively\" thinks of acts as moral\r\nor non-moral in the degree in which they are exposed to\r\ncondemnation or approval. Now this kind of judgment\r\nis certainly not one which could profitably be dispensed\r\nwith. Its influence is much needed. But the tendency\r\nto equate it with all moral judgment is largely responsible\r\nfor the current idea that there is a sharp\r\nline between moral conduct and a larger region of non-moral\r\nconduct which is a matter of expediency, shrewdness,\r\nsuccess or manners.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eMoreover this tendency is a chief reason why the\r\nsocial forces effective in shaping actual morality work\r\nblindly and unsatisfactorily. Judgment in which the\r\nemphasis falls upon blame and approbation has more\r\nheat than light. It is more emotional than intellectual.\r\nIt is guided by custom, personal convenience and resentment\r\nrather than by insight into causes and consequences.\r\nIt makes toward reducing moral instruction,\r\nthe educative influence of social opinion, to an\r\nimmediate personal matter, that is to say, to an adjustment\r\nof personal likes and dislikes. Fault-finding creates\r\nresentment in the one blamed, and approval, complacency,\r\nrather than a habit of scrutinizing conduct\r\nobjectively. It puts those who are sensitive to the\r\njudgments of others in a standing defensive attitude,\r\ncreating an apologetic, self-accusing and self-exculpating\r\nhabit of mind when what is needed is an impersonal\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg321\"\u003e[pg 321]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nimpartial habit of observation. \"Moral\" persons get\r\nso occupied with defending their conduct from real and\r\nimagined criticism that they have little time left to see\r\nwhat their acts really amount to, and the habit of self-blame\r\ninevitably extends to include others since it is a\r\nhabit.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNow it is a wholesome thing for any one to be\r\nmade aware that thoughtless, self-centered action on\r\nhis part exposes him to the indignation and dislike of\r\nothers. There is no one who can be safely trusted to\r\nbe exempt from immediate reactions of criticism, and\r\nthere are few who do not need to be braced by occasional\r\nexpressions of approval. But these influences are\r\nimmensely overdone in comparison with the assistance\r\nthat might be given by the influence of social judgments\r\nwhich operate without accompaniments of praise\r\nand blame; which enable an individual to see for himself\r\nwhat he is doing, and which put him in command of\r\na method of analyzing the obscure and usually unavowed\r\nforces which move him to act. We need a permeation\r\nof judgments on conduct by the method and\r\nmaterials of a science of human nature. Without such\r\nenlightenment even the best-intentioned attempts at\r\nthe moral guidance and improvement of others often\r\neventuate in tragedies of misunderstanding and division,\r\nas is so often seen in the relations of parents and\r\nchildren.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe development therefore of a more adequate science\r\nof human nature is a matter of first-rate importance.\r\nThe present revolt against the notion that psychology\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg322\"\u003e[pg 322]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nis a science of consciousness may well turn out\r\nin the future to be the beginning of a definitive turn\r\nin thought and action. Historically there are good\r\nreasons for the isolation and exaggeration of the conscious\r\nphase of human action, an isolation which forgot\r\nthat \"conscious\" is an adjective of some acts and\r\nwhich erected the resulting abstraction, \"consciousness,\"\r\ninto a noun, an existence separate and complete.\r\nThese reasons are interesting not only to the student\r\nof technical philosophy but also to the student of the\r\nhistory of culture and even of politics. They have to\r\ndo with the attempt to drag realities out of occult essences\r\nand hidden forces and get them into the light of\r\nday. They were part of the general movement called\r\nphenomenalism, and of the growing importance of individual\r\nlife and private voluntary concerns. But the\r\neffect was to isolate the individual from his connections\r\nboth with his fellows and with nature, and thus to create\r\nan artificial human nature, one not capable of being\r\nunderstood and effectively directed on the basis of\r\nanalytic understanding. It shut out from view, not to\r\nsay from scientific examination, the forces which really\r\nmove human nature. It took a few surface phenomena\r\nfor the whole story of significant human motive-forces\r\nand acts.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAs a consequence physical science and its technological\r\napplications were highly developed while the science\r\nof man, moral science, is backward. I believe\r\nthat it is not possible to estimate how much of the difficulties\r\nof the present world situation are due to the\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg323\"\u003e[pg 323]\u003c/span\u003e\r\ndisproportion and unbalance thus introduced into affairs.\r\nIt would have seemed absurd to say in the seventeenth\r\ncentury that in the end the alteration in\r\nmethods of physical investigation which was then beginning\r\nwould prove more important than the religious\r\nwars of that century. Yet the wars marked the end\r\nof one era; the dawn of physical science the beginning\r\nof a new one. And a trained imagination may discover\r\nthat the nationalistic and economic wars which are the\r\nchief outward mark of the present are in the end to be\r\nless significant than the development of a science of\r\nhuman nature now inchoate.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt sounds academic to say that substantial bettering\r\nof social relations waits upon the growth of a scientific\r\nsocial psychology. For the term suggests something\r\nspecialized and remote. But the formation of habits of\r\nbelief, desire and judgment is going on at every instant\r\nunder the influence of the conditions set by men\u0027s\r\ncontact, intercourse and associations with one another.\r\nThis is the fundamental fact in social life and in personal\r\ncharacter. It is the fact about which traditional\r\nhuman science gives no enlightenment\u0026mdash;a fact which\r\nthis traditional science blurs and virtually denies. The\r\nenormous rôle played in popular morals by appeal to\r\nthe supernatural and quasi-magical is in effect a desperate\r\nadmission of the futility of our science. Consequently\r\nthe whole matter of the formation of the predispositions\r\nwhich effectively control human relationships\r\nis left to accident, to custom and immediate personal\r\nlikings, resentments and ambitions. It is a commonplace\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg324\"\u003e[pg 324]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthat modern industry and commerce are conditioned\r\nupon a control of physical energies due to\r\nproper methods of physical inquiry and analysis. We\r\nhave no social arts which are comparable because we\r\nhave so nearly nothing in the way of psychological science.\r\nYet through the development of physical science,\r\nand especially of chemistry, biology, physiology, medicine\r\nand anthropology we now have the basis for the\r\ndevelopment of such a science of man. Signs of its\r\ncoming into existence are present in the movements in\r\nclinical, behavioristic and social (in its narrower sense)\r\npsychology.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAt present we not only have no assured means of\r\nforming character except crude devices of blame, praise,\r\nexhortation and punishment, but the very meaning of\r\nthe general notions of moral inquiry is matter of doubt\r\nand dispute. The reason is that these notions are discussed\r\nin isolation from the concrete facts of the interactions\r\nof human beings with one another\u0026mdash;an abstraction\r\nas fatal as was the old discussion of phlogiston,\r\ngravity and vital force apart from concrete correlations\r\nof changing events with one another. Take\r\nfor example such a basic conception as that of Right\r\ninvolving the nature of authority in conduct. There\r\nis no need here to rehearse the multitude of contending\r\nviews which give evidence that discussion of this matter\r\nis still in the realm of opinion. We content ourselves\r\nwith pointing out that this notion is the last resort of\r\nthe anti-empirical school in morals and that it proves\r\nthe effect of neglect of social conditions.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg325\"\u003e[pg 325]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nIn effect its adherents argue as follows: \"Let us concede\r\nthat concrete ideas about right and wrong and\r\nparticular notions of what is obligatory have grown up\r\nwithin experience. But we cannot admit this about the\r\nidea of Right, of Obligation itself. Why does moral\r\nauthority exist at all? Why is the claim of the Right\r\nrecognized in conscience even by those who violate it\r\nin deed? Our opponents say that such and such a\r\ncourse is wise, expedient, better. But \u003cem\u003ewhy\u003c/em\u003e act for the\r\nwise, or good, or better? Why not follow our own immediate\r\ndevices if we are so inclined? There is only\r\none answer: We have a moral nature, a conscience, call\r\nit what you will. And this nature responds directly in\r\nacknowledgment of the supreme authority of the Right\r\nover all claims of inclination and habit. We may not\r\nact in accordance with this acknowledgment, but we\r\nstill know that the authority of the moral law, although\r\nnot its power, is unquestionable. Men may differ indefinitely\r\naccording to what their experience has been as\r\nto just \u003cem\u003ewhat\u003c/em\u003e is Right, what its contents are. But they\r\nall spontaneously agree in recognizing the supremacy of\r\nthe claims of whatever is thought of as Right. Otherwise\r\nthere would be no such thing as morality, but\r\nmerely calculations of how to satisfy \u003cins class=\"corr\" title=\"desire.\" id=\"Corr_325_\"\u003edesire.\"\u003c/ins\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eGrant the foregoing argument, and all the apparatus\r\nof abstract moralism follows in its wake. A remote\r\ngoal of perfection, ideals that are contrary in a wholesale\r\nway to what is actual, a free will of arbitrary\r\nchoice; all of these conceptions band themselves together\r\nwith that of a non-empirical authority of Right\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg326\"\u003e[pg 326]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nand a non-empirical conscience which acknowledges it.\r\nThey constitute its ceremonial or formal train.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhy, indeed, acknowledge the authority of Right?\r\nThat many persons do not acknowledge it in fact, in\r\naction, and that all persons ignore it at times, is assumed\r\nby the argument. Just what is the significance\r\nof an alleged recognition of a supremacy which is continually\r\ndenied in fact? How much would be lost if it\r\nwere dropped out, and we were left face to face with\r\nactual facts? If a man lived alone in the world there\r\nmight be some sense in the question \"Why be moral?\"\r\nwere it not for one thing: No such question would then\r\narise. As it is, we live in a world where other persons\r\nlive too. Our acts affect them. They perceive these\r\neffects, and react upon us in consequence. Because they\r\nare living beings they make demands upon us for certain\r\nthings from us. They approve and condemn\u0026mdash;not\r\nin abstract theory but in what they do to us. The answer\r\nto the question \"Why not put your hand in the\r\nfire?\" is the answer of fact. If you do your hand will\r\nbe burnt. The answer to the question why acknowledge\r\nthe right is of the same sort. For Right is only an\r\nabstract name for the multitude of concrete demands\r\nin action which others impress upon us, and of which\r\nwe are obliged, if we would live, to take some account.\r\nIts authority is the exigency of their demands, the efficacy\r\nof their insistencies. There may be good ground\r\nfor the contention that in theory the idea of the right\r\nis subordinate to that of the good, being a statement\r\nof the course proper to attain good. But in fact it\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg327\"\u003e[pg 327]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nsignifies the totality of social pressures exercised upon\r\nus to induce us to think and desire in certain ways.\r\nHence the right can in fact become the road to the good\r\nonly as the elements that compose this unremitting\r\npressure are enlightened, only as social relationships\r\nbecome themselves reasonable.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt will be retorted that all pressure is a non-moral\r\naffair partaking of force, not of right; that right must\r\nbe ideal. Thus we are invited to enter again the circle\r\nin which the ideal has no force and social actualities no\r\nideal quality. We refuse the invitation because social\r\npressure is involved in our own lives, as much so as the\r\nair we breathe and the ground we walk upon. If we\r\nhad desires, judgments, plans, in short a mind, apart\r\nfrom social connections, then the latter would be external\r\nand their action might be regarded as that of a non-moral\r\nforce. But we live mentally as physically only\r\n\u003cem\u003ein\u003c/em\u003e and \u003cem\u003ebecause\u003c/em\u003e of our environment. Social pressure is\r\nbut a name for the interactions which are always going\r\non and in which we participate, living so far as we partake\r\nand dying so far as we do not. The pressure is\r\nnot ideal but empirical, yet empirical here means only\r\nactual. It calls attention to the fact that considerations\r\nof right are claims originating not outside of life,\r\nbut within it. They are \"ideal\" in precisely the degree\r\nin which we intelligently recognize and act upon\r\nthem, just as colors and canvas become ideal when\r\nused in ways that give an added meaning to life.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAccordingly failure to recognize the authority of\r\nright means defect in effective apprehension of the realities\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg328\"\u003e[pg 328]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof human association, not an arbitrary exercise of\r\nfree will. This deficiency and perversion in apprehension\r\nindicates a defect in education\u0026mdash;that is to say, in\r\nthe operation of actual conditions, in the consequences\r\nupon desire and thought of existing interactions and\r\ninterdependencies. It is false that every person has a\r\nconsciousness of the supreme authority of right and\r\nthen misconceives it or ignores it in action. One has\r\nsuch a sense of the claims of social relationships as\r\nthose relationships enforce in one\u0027s desires and observations.\r\nThe belief in a separate, ideal or transcendental,\r\npractically ineffectual Right is a reflex of the\r\ninadequacy with which existing institutions perform\r\ntheir educative office\u0026mdash;their office in generating observation\r\nof social continuities. It is an endeavor to\r\n\"rationalize\" this defect. Like all rationalizations, it\r\noperates to divert attention from the real state of\r\naffairs. Thus it helps maintain the conditions which\r\ncreated it, standing in the way of effort to make our\r\ninstitutions more humane and equitable. A theoretical\r\nacknowledgment of the supreme authority of Right, of\r\nmoral law, gets twisted into an effectual substitute for\r\nacts which would better the customs which now produce\r\nvague, dull, halting and evasive observation of\r\nactual social ties. We are not caught in a circle; we\r\ntraverse a spiral in which social customs generate some\r\nconsciousness of interdependencies, and this consciousness\r\nis embodied in acts which in improving the environment\r\ngenerate new perceptions of social ties, and so\r\non forever. The relationships, the interactions are forever\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg329\"\u003e[pg 329]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthere as fact, but they acquire meaning only in\r\nthe desires, judgments and purposes they awaken.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe recur to our fundamental propositions. Morals\r\nis connected with actualities of existence, not with\r\nideals, ends and obligations independent of concrete\r\nactualities. The facts upon which it depends are those\r\nwhich arise out of active connections of human beings\r\nwith one another, the consequences of their mutually\r\nintertwined activities in the life of desire, belief, judgment,\r\nsatisfaction and dissatisfaction. In this sense\r\nconduct and hence morals are social: they are not just\r\nthings which \u003cem\u003eought\u003c/em\u003e to be social and which fail to come\r\nup to the scratch. But there are enormous differences\r\nof better and worse in the quality of what is social.\r\nIdeal morals begin with the perception of these differences.\r\nHuman interaction and ties are there, are\r\noperative in any case. But they can be regulated, employed\r\nin an orderly way for good only as we know how\r\nto observe them. And they cannot be observed aright,\r\nthey cannot be understood and utilized, when the mind\r\nis left to itself to work without the aid of science. For\r\nthe natural unaided mind means precisely the habits\r\nof belief, thought and desire which have been accidentally\r\ngenerated and confirmed by social institutions or\r\ncustoms. But with all their admixture of accident and\r\nreasonableness we have at last reached a point where\r\nsocial conditions create a mind capable of scientific\r\noutlook and inquiry. To foster and develop this spirit\r\nis the social obligation of the present because it is its\r\nurgent need.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg330\"\u003e[pg 330]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nYet the last word is not with obligation nor with the\r\nfuture. Infinite relationships of man with his fellows\r\nand with nature already exist. The ideal means, as\r\nwe have seen, a sense of these encompassing continuities\r\nwith their infinite reach. This meaning even now\r\nattaches to present activities because they are set in a\r\nwhole to which they belong and which belongs to them.\r\nEven in the midst of conflict, struggle and defeat a\r\nconsciousness is possible of the enduring and comprehending\r\nwhole.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eTo be grasped and held this consciousness needs, like\r\nevery form of consciousness, objects, symbols. In the\r\npast men have sought many symbols which no longer\r\nserve, especially since men have been idolators worshiping\r\nsymbols as things. Yet within these symbols which\r\nhave so often claimed to be realities and which have imposed\r\nthemselves as dogmas and intolerances, there has\r\nrarely been absent some trace of a vital and enduring\r\nreality, that of a community of life in which continuities\r\nof existence are consummated. Consciousness of the\r\nwhole has been connected with reverences, affections,\r\nand loyalties which are communal. But special ways of\r\nexpressing the communal sense have been established.\r\nThey have been limited to a select social group; they\r\nhave hardened into obligatory rites and been imposed\r\nas conditions of salvation. Religion has lost itself in\r\ncults, dogmas and myths. Consequently the office of\r\nreligion as sense of community and one\u0027s place in\r\nit has been lost. In effect religion has been distorted\r\ninto a possession\u0026mdash;or burden\u0026mdash;of a limited part of\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg331\"\u003e[pg 331]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nhuman nature, of a limited portion of humanity which\r\nfinds no way to universalize religion except by imposing\r\nits own dogmas and ceremonies upon others; of a limited\r\nclass within a partial group; priests, saints, a\r\nchurch. Thus other gods have been set up before the\r\none God. Religion as a sense of the whole is the most\r\nindividualized of all things, the most spontaneous, undefinable\r\nand varied. For individuality signifies unique\r\nconnections in the whole. Yet it has been perverted\r\ninto something uniform and immutable. It has been\r\nformulated into fixed and defined beliefs expressed in\r\nrequired acts and ceremonies. Instead of marking the\r\nfreedom and peace of the individual as a member of an\r\ninfinite whole, it has been petrified into a slavery of\r\nthought and sentiment, an intolerant superiority on\r\nthe part of the few and an intolerable burden on the\r\npart of the many.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eYet every act may carry within itself a consoling and\r\nsupporting consciousness of the whole to which it\r\nbelongs and which in some sense belongs to it. With\r\nresponsibility for the intelligent determination of particular\r\nacts may go a joyful emancipation from the\r\nburden for responsibility for the whole which sustains\r\nthem, giving them their final outcome and quality.\r\nThere is a conceit fostered by perversion of religion\r\nwhich assimilates the universe to our personal desires;\r\nbut there is also a conceit of carrying the load of the\r\nuniverse from which religion liberates us. Within the\r\nflickering inconsequential acts of separate selves dwells\r\na sense of the whole which claims and dignifies them.\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg332\"\u003e[pg 332]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nIn its presence we put off mortality and live in the universal.\r\nThe life of the community in which we live\r\nand have our being is the fit symbol of this relationship.\r\nThe acts in which we express our perception of the ties\r\nwhich bind us to others are its only rites and ceremonies.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg333\"\u003e[pg 333]\u003c/span\u003eINDEX\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAbsentmindedness, \u003ca href=\"#Pg173\"\u003e173\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"Accident\" id=\"Accident\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eAccidents, in history, \u003ca href=\"#Pg101\"\u003e101\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr/\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"indent\"\u003ein consequences, \u003ca href=\"#Pg049\"\u003e49\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg051\"\u003e51\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg206\"\u003e206\u0026ndash;208\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg241\"\u003e241\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg253\"\u003e253\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg304\"\u003e304\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg309\"\u003e309\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nAcquisition, \u003ca href=\"#Pg116\"\u003e116\u0026ndash;118\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg143\"\u003e143\u0026ndash;148\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nActivity is natural, \u003ca href=\"#Pg118\"\u003e118\u0026ndash;123\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg160\"\u003e160\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg226\"\u003e226\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg293\"\u003e293\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nAims, \u003cem\u003esee\u003c/em\u003e \u003ca href=\"#Consequences\"\u003eConsequences\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Ends\"\u003eEnds\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nAlexander M., \u003ca href=\"#Pg028\"\u003e28\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg036\"\u003e36\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nAltruism, \u003ca href=\"#Pg133\"\u003e133\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg293\"\u003e293\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nAnalysis, \u003ca href=\"#Pg183\"\u003e183\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nAnger, \u003ca href=\"#Pg090\"\u003e90\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg152\"\u003e152\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nAppetite, \u003ca href=\"#Pg007\"\u003e7\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg275\"\u003e275\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr/\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"indent\"\u003e\u003cem\u003esee\u003c/em\u003e \u003ca href=\"#Impulse\"\u003eImpulse\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nAristotle, \u003ca href=\"#Pg033\"\u003e33\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg109\"\u003e109\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg174\"\u003e174\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg224\"\u003e224\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg290\"\u003e290\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nArts, \u003ca href=\"#Pg015\"\u003e15\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg023\"\u003e23\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg071\"\u003e71\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg159\"\u003e159\u0026ndash;164\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg263\"\u003e263\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nAtomism moral, \u003ca href=\"#Pg243\"\u003e243\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nAttitude, \u003ca href=\"#Pg041\"\u003e41\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr/\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"indent\"\u003e\u003cem\u003esee\u003c/em\u003e \u003ca href=\"#Habit\"\u003eHabit\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nAuthority, \u003ca href=\"#Pg002\"\u003e2\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg065\"\u003e65\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg072\"\u003e72\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg079\"\u003e79\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg187\"\u003e187\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg324\"\u003e324\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBenevolence, \u003ca href=\"#Pg133\"\u003e133\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nBergson, \u003ca href=\"#Pg073\"\u003e73\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg178\"\u003e178\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg245\"\u003e245\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nBlame, \u003ca href=\"#Pg018\"\u003e18\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg121\"\u003e121\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg320\"\u003e320\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eCausation, \u003ca href=\"#Pg018\"\u003e18\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg044\"\u003e44\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nCalculation, \u003ca href=\"#Pg189\"\u003e189\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg199\"\u003e199\u0026ndash;209\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr/\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"indent\"\u003e\u003cem\u003esee\u003c/em\u003e \u003ca href=\"#Deliberation\"\u003eDeliberation\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nCasuistry, \u003ca href=\"#Pg240\"\u003e240\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nCertainty, love of, \u003ca href=\"#Pg236\"\u003e236\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"Character\" id=\"Character\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eCharacter, defined, \u003ca href=\"#Pg038\"\u003e38\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr/\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"indent\"\u003eand consequences, \u003ca href=\"#Pg047\"\u003e47\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nChildhood, \u003ca href=\"#Pg002\"\u003e2\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg064\"\u003e64\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg089\"\u003e89\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg096\"\u003e96\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg099\"\u003e99\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nChoice, \u003ca href=\"#Pg192\"\u003e192\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg304\"\u003e304\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg311\"\u003e311\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nClasses, \u003ca href=\"#Pg002\"\u003e2\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg082\"\u003e82\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg270\"\u003e270\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nClassification, \u003ca href=\"#Pg131\"\u003e131\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg244\"\u003e244\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nCodes, \u003ca href=\"#Pg103\"\u003e103\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nCompensatory, \u003ca href=\"#Pg008\"\u003e8\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg030\"\u003e30\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg033\"\u003e33\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg257\"\u003e257\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg275\"\u003e275\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nConduct, \u003cem\u003esee\u003c/em\u003e \u003ca href=\"#Character\"\u003eCharacter\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Habit\"\u003eHabit\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Impulse\"\u003eImpulse\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Intelligence\"\u003eIntelligence\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nConfidence, \u003ca href=\"#Pg139\"\u003e139\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nConflict, \u003ca href=\"#Pg012\"\u003e12\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg039\"\u003e39\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg066\"\u003e66\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg082\"\u003e82\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg194\"\u003e194\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg208\"\u003e208\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg217\"\u003e217\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg300\"\u003e300\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"Conscience\" id=\"Conscience\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eConscience, \u003ca href=\"#Pg184\"\u003e184\u0026ndash;188\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg314\"\u003e314\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nConsciousness, \u003ca href=\"#Pg062\"\u003e62\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg179\"\u003e179\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg184\"\u003e184\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg208\"\u003e208\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"Consequences\" id=\"Consequences\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eConsequences, and motives, \u003ca href=\"#Pg045\"\u003e45\u0026ndash;47\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr/\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"indent\"\u003eand aims, \u003ca href=\"#Pg225\"\u003e225\u0026ndash;229\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg245\"\u003e245\u0026ndash;247\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nConservatism, \u003ca href=\"#Pg066\"\u003e66\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg106\"\u003e106\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg168\"\u003e168\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nContinuity, \u003ca href=\"#Pg012\"\u003e12\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg232\"\u003e232\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg239\"\u003e239\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg244\"\u003e244\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg259\"\u003e259\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nControl, \u003ca href=\"#Pg021\"\u003e21\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg023\"\u003e23\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg037\"\u003e37\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg101\"\u003e101\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg139\"\u003e139\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg148\"\u003e148\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg266\"\u003e266\u0026ndash;270\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr/\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"indent\"\u003e\u003cem\u003esee\u003c/em\u003e \u003ca href=\"#Accident\"\u003eAccident\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nConventions, \u003ca href=\"#Pg006\"\u003e6\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg097\"\u003e97\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg166\"\u003e166\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nCrowd psychology, \u003ca href=\"#Pg060\"\u003e60\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nCreative and acquisitive, \u003ca href=\"#Pg143\"\u003e143\u0026ndash;148\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nCustoms and habits, \u003ca href=\"#Pg058\"\u003e58\u0026ndash;69\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr/\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"indent\"\u003eand standards, \u003ca href=\"#Pg075\"\u003e75\u0026ndash;83\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"indent\"\u003erigidity, \u003ca href=\"#Pg103\"\u003e103\u0026ndash;105\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Deliberation\" id=\"Deliberation\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eDeliberation, \u003ca href=\"#Pg189\"\u003e189\u0026ndash;209\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr/\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"indent\"\u003eas discovery, \u003ca href=\"#Pg216\"\u003e216\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nDemocracy, \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_3_\"\u003e61n\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg066\"\u003e66\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg072\"\u003e72\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nDesire, \u003ca href=\"#Pg024\"\u003e24\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg033\"\u003e33\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg194\"\u003e194\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg234\"\u003e234\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg299\"\u003e299\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg304\"\u003e304\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr/\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"indent\"\u003eand intelligence, \u003ca href=\"#Pg248\"\u003e248\u0026ndash;264\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"indent\"\u003eobject of, \u003ca href=\"#Pg249\"\u003e249\u0026ndash;252\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nDisposition, \u003ca href=\"#Pg041\"\u003e41\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr/\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"indent\"\u003e\u003cem\u003esee\u003c/em\u003e \u003ca href=\"#Habit\"\u003eHabit\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nDocility, \u003ca href=\"#Pg064\"\u003e64\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg097\"\u003e97\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"Dualism\" id=\"Dualism\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eDualism, \u003ca href=\"#Pg008\"\u003e8\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg012\"\u003e12\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg040\"\u003e40\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg055\"\u003e55\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg067\"\u003e67\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg071\"\u003e71\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg147\"\u003e147\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg275\"\u003e275\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg309\"\u003e309\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eEconomic man, \u003ca href=\"#Pg220\"\u003e220\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"Economics\" id=\"Economics\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eEconomics, \u003ca href=\"#Pg009\"\u003e9\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg012\"\u003e12\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg120\"\u003e120\u0026ndash;124\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg132\"\u003e132\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg143\"\u003e143\u0026ndash;148\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg212\"\u003e212\u0026ndash;221\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg270\"\u003e270\u0026ndash;273\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg305\"\u003e305\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nEducation, \u003ca href=\"#Pg064\"\u003e64\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg072\"\u003e72\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg091\"\u003e91\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg107\"\u003e107\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg270\"\u003e270\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg320\"\u003e320\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nEgotism, \u003ca href=\"#Pg007\"\u003e7\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nEmerson, \u003ca href=\"#Pg100\"\u003e100\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg144\"\u003e144\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nEmotion, \u003ca href=\"#Pg075\"\u003e75\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg083\"\u003e83\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg255\"\u003e255\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg264\"\u003e264\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg334\"\u003e[pg 334]\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"Ends\" id=\"Ends\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eEnd, \u003ca href=\"#Pg028\"\u003e28\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg034\"\u003e34\u0026ndash;37\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr/\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"indent\"\u003eknowledge as, \u003ca href=\"#Pg187\"\u003e187\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg215\"\u003e215\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"indent\"\u003enature of, \u003ca href=\"#Pg223\"\u003e223\u0026ndash;237\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"indent\"\u003eof desire, \u003ca href=\"#Pg250\"\u003e250\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg261\"\u003e261\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"indent\"\u003eand means, \u003ca href=\"#Pg269\"\u003e269\u0026ndash;272\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"indent\"\u003e\u003cem\u003esee\u003c/em\u003e \u003ca href=\"#Consequences\"\u003eConsequences\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Means\"\u003eMeans\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"Environments\" id=\"Environments\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eEnvironments, \u003ca href=\"#Pg002\"\u003e2\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg010\"\u003e10\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg015\"\u003e15\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg018\"\u003e18\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg021\"\u003e21\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg051\"\u003e51\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg151\"\u003e151\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg159\"\u003e159\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg179\"\u003e179\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg316\"\u003e316\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nEpicureanism, \u003ca href=\"#Pg205\"\u003e205\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg291\"\u003e291\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nEquilibration, \u003ca href=\"#Pg179\"\u003e179\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg252\"\u003e252\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"Evolution\" id=\"Evolution\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eEvolution, \u003ca href=\"#Pg284\"\u003e284\u0026ndash;287\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg297\"\u003e297\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nExecution, of desires, \u003ca href=\"#Pg033\"\u003e33\u0026ndash;35\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nExpediency, \u003ca href=\"#Pg049\"\u003e49\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg189\"\u003e189\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg210\"\u003e210\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr/\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"indent\"\u003e\u003cem\u003esee\u003c/em\u003e \u003ca href=\"#Deliberation\"\u003eDeliberation\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nExperience, \u003ca href=\"#Pg031\"\u003e31\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg245\"\u003e245\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nExperimentation, moral, \u003ca href=\"#Pg056\"\u003e56\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg307\"\u003e307\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFallacy, philosophic, \u003ca href=\"#Pg175\"\u003e175\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nFanaticism, \u003ca href=\"#Pg228\"\u003e228\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\n\u003cins class=\"corr\" title=\"Phantasies\" id=\"Corr_334_\"\u003eFantasies\u003c/ins\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg158\"\u003e158\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg164\"\u003e164\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg236\"\u003e236\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nFear, \u003ca href=\"#Pg111\"\u003e111\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg132\"\u003e132\u0026ndash;133\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg154\"\u003e154\u0026ndash;155\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg237\"\u003e237\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nFiat of will, \u003ca href=\"#Pg029\"\u003e29\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nForesight, \u003ca href=\"#Pg204\"\u003e204\u0026ndash;206\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg238\"\u003e238\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg265\"\u003e265\u0026ndash;270\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr/\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"indent\"\u003e\u003cem\u003esee\u003c/em\u003e \u003ca href=\"#Deliberation\"\u003eDeliberation\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Ends\"\u003eEnds\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nFreedom, \u003ca href=\"#Pg008\"\u003e8\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg165\"\u003e165\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr/\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"indent\"\u003ethree phases of, \u003ca href=\"#Pg303\"\u003e303\u0026ndash;313\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"indent\"\u003e\u003cem\u003esee\u003c/em\u003e \u003ca href=\"#Will\"\u003eWill\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nFunctions, \u003ca href=\"#Pg018\"\u003e18\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eGain, \u003ca href=\"#Pg117\"\u003e117\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nGoal, \u003ca href=\"#Pg260\"\u003e260\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg265\"\u003e265\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg274\"\u003e274\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg281\"\u003e281\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg287\"\u003e287\u0026ndash;289\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr/\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"indent\"\u003e\u003cem\u003esee\u003c/em\u003e \u003ca href=\"#Evolution\"\u003eEvolution\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Perfection\"\u003ePerfection\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nGood, \u003ca href=\"#Pg002\"\u003e2\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg044\"\u003e44\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg210\"\u003e210\u0026ndash;222\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg274\"\u003e274\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg278\"\u003e278\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"Goodness\" id=\"Goodness\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eGoodness, \u003ca href=\"#Pg004\"\u003e4\u0026ndash;8\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg016\"\u003e16\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg043\"\u003e43\u0026ndash;45\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg048\"\u003e48\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg067\"\u003e67\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg227\"\u003e227\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nGood-will, \u003ca href=\"#Pg044\"\u003e44\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Habit\" id=\"Habit\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eHabits, place in conduct, \u003ca href=\"#Pg014\"\u003e14\u0026ndash;88\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr/\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"indent\"\u003eand desire, \u003ca href=\"#Pg024\"\u003e24\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"indent\"\u003eas functions, \u003ca href=\"#Pg014\"\u003e14\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"indent\"\u003eas arts or abilities, \u003ca href=\"#Pg015\"\u003e15\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg064\"\u003e64\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg066\"\u003e66\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg071\"\u003e71\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg170\"\u003e170\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"indent\"\u003eand thought, \u003ca href=\"#Pg031\"\u003e31\u0026ndash;33\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg066\"\u003e66\u0026ndash;69\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg172\"\u003e172\u0026ndash;180\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg182\"\u003e182\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"indent\"\u003edefinition, \u003ca href=\"#Pg041\"\u003e41\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"indent\"\u003eand impulses, \u003ca href=\"#Pg090\"\u003e90\u0026ndash;98\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg107\"\u003e107\u0026ndash;111\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"indent\"\u003eand principles, \u003ca href=\"#Pg238\"\u003e238\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nHarmony, natural, \u003ca href=\"#Pg159\"\u003e159\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg167\"\u003e167\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg298\"\u003e298\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nHedonistic calculus, \u003ca href=\"#Pg204\"\u003e204\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nHegel, \u003ca href=\"#Pg312\"\u003e312\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nHelvetius, \u003ca href=\"#Pg106\"\u003e106\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg300\"\u003e300\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nHerd-instinct, \u003ca href=\"#Pg004\"\u003e4\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nHistory, \u003ca href=\"#Pg101\"\u003e101\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg110\"\u003e110\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nHobbes, \u003ca href=\"#Pg133\"\u003e133\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nHuman nature, \u003ca href=\"#Pg001\"\u003e1\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr/\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"indent\"\u003eand morals, \u003ca href=\"#Pg001\"\u003e1\u0026ndash;13\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg295\"\u003e295\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"indent\"\u003ealterability, \u003ca href=\"#Pg106\"\u003e106\u0026ndash;124\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nHumility, \u003ca href=\"#Pg289\"\u003e289\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nHypocrisy, \u003ca href=\"#Pg006\"\u003e6\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nHypothesis, moral, \u003ca href=\"#Pg239\"\u003e239\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg243\"\u003e243\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIdeas, \u003cem\u003esee\u003c/em\u003e \u003ca href=\"#Ends\"\u003eEnds\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Thought\"\u003eThought\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nIdeals and Idealism, \u003ca href=\"#Pg002\"\u003e2\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg008\"\u003e8\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg050\"\u003e50\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg068\"\u003e68\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg077\"\u003e77\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg081\"\u003e81\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg099\"\u003e99\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg157\"\u003e157\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg166\"\u003e166\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg184\"\u003e184\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg233\"\u003e233\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg236\"\u003e236\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg255\"\u003e255\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg259\"\u003e259\u0026ndash;264\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg274\"\u003e274\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg282\"\u003e282\u0026ndash;288\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg301\"\u003e301\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg331\"\u003e331\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nImagination, \u003ca href=\"#Pg052\"\u003e52\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg163\"\u003e163\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg190\"\u003e190\u0026ndash;192\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg204\"\u003e204\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg225\"\u003e225\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg234\"\u003e234\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nImitation, \u003ca href=\"#Pg066\"\u003e66\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg097\"\u003e97\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg132\"\u003e132\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"Impulse\" id=\"Impulse\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eImpulse, place in conduct, \u003ca href=\"#Pg089\"\u003e89\u0026ndash;171\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr/\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"indent\"\u003esecondary, \u003ca href=\"#Pg089\"\u003e89\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"indent\"\u003eintermediary, \u003ca href=\"#Pg169\"\u003e169\u0026ndash;170\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"indent\"\u003eas means of reorganization, \u003ca href=\"#Pg093\"\u003e93\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg102\"\u003e102\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg104\"\u003e104\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg179\"\u003e179\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"indent\"\u003eplastic, \u003ca href=\"#Pg095\"\u003e95\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"indent\"\u003esame as human instincts, \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_5_\"\u003e105n\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"indent\"\u003eand habit, \u003ca href=\"#Pg107\"\u003e107\u0026ndash;111\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"indent\"\u003efalse simplification, \u003ca href=\"#Pg131\"\u003e131\u0026ndash;149\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"indent\"\u003eand reason, \u003ca href=\"#Pg196\"\u003e196\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg254\"\u003e254\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nIndividualism, \u003ca href=\"#Pg007\"\u003e7\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg085\"\u003e85\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg093\"\u003e93\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nIndustry, \u003ca href=\"#Pg011\"\u003e11\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nInfantilisms, \u003ca href=\"#Pg098\"\u003e98\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nInstinct, not fixed, \u003ca href=\"#Pg149\"\u003e149\u0026ndash;168\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr/\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"indent\"\u003eand knowledge, \u003ca href=\"#Pg178\"\u003e178\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"indent\"\u003e\u003cem\u003esee\u003c/em\u003e \u003ca href=\"#Impulse\"\u003eImpulse\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nInstitutions, \u003ca href=\"#Pg009\"\u003e9\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg080\"\u003e80\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg102\"\u003e102\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg111\"\u003e111\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg166\"\u003e166\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"Intelligence\" id=\"Intelligence\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eIntelligence, \u003ca href=\"#Pg010\"\u003e10\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg013\"\u003e13\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg051\"\u003e51\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg299\"\u003e299\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg312\"\u003e312\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr/\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"indent\"\u003eplace of, in conduct, \u003ca href=\"#Pg172\"\u003e172\u0026ndash;277\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"indent\"\u003erelation to habits, \u003ca href=\"#Pg172\"\u003e172\u0026ndash;180\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg228\"\u003e228\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"indent\"\u003eand desire, \u003ca href=\"#Pg248\"\u003e248\u0026ndash;264\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg276\"\u003e276\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nInterpenetration of habits, \u003ca href=\"#Pg037\"\u003e37\u0026ndash;39\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nIntuitions, \u003ca href=\"#Pg033\"\u003e33\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg188\"\u003e188\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eJames, Wm., \u003ca href=\"#Pg112\"\u003e112\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg179\"\u003e179\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg195\"\u003e195\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nJustice, \u003ca href=\"#Pg018\"\u003e18\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg052\"\u003e52\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg198\"\u003e198\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eKant, \u003ca href=\"#Pg044\"\u003e44\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg049\"\u003e49\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg055\"\u003e55\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg245\"\u003e245\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nKnowledge, moral, \u003ca href=\"#Pg181\"\u003e181\u0026ndash;188\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr/\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"indent\"\u003e\u003cem\u003esee\u003c/em\u003e \u003ca href=\"#Conscience\"\u003eConscience\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Intelligence\"\u003eIntelligence\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eLabor, \u003ca href=\"#Pg121\"\u003e121\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg144\"\u003e144\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nLanguage, \u003ca href=\"#Pg058\"\u003e58\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg079\"\u003e79\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg095\"\u003e95\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg335\"\u003e[pg 335]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nLe Bon, \u003ca href=\"#Pg061\"\u003e61\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nLiberalism, \u003ca href=\"#Pg305\"\u003e305\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nLocke, \u003ca href=\"#Pg106\"\u003e106\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eMarx, \u003ca href=\"#Pg154\"\u003e154\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg273\"\u003e273\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg300\"\u003e300\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nMagic, \u003ca href=\"#Pg020\"\u003e20\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg026\"\u003e26\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nMeaning, \u003ca href=\"#Pg037\"\u003e37\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg090\"\u003e90\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg151\"\u003e151\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg207\"\u003e207\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg262\"\u003e262\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg271\"\u003e271\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg280\"\u003e280\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"Means\" id=\"Means\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eMeans, \u003ca href=\"#Pg020\"\u003e20\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr/\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"indent\"\u003erelation to ends, \u003ca href=\"#Pg025\"\u003e25\u0026ndash;36\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg218\"\u003e218\u0026ndash;220\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg251\"\u003e251\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"indent\"\u003e\u003cem\u003esee\u003c/em\u003e \u003ca href=\"#Habit\"\u003eHabit\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nMechanization, \u003ca href=\"#Pg028\"\u003e28\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg070\"\u003e70\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg096\"\u003e96\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg144\"\u003e144\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nMediation, \u003ca href=\"#Pg197\"\u003e197\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nMind, \u003ca href=\"#Pg061\"\u003e61\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg095\"\u003e95\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr/\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"indent\"\u003eand habit, \u003ca href=\"#Pg175\"\u003e175\u0026ndash;180\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nMind and body, \u003ca href=\"#Pg030\"\u003e30\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg067\"\u003e67\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg071\"\u003e71\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nMitchell, W.\u0026nbsp;C., \u003ca href=\"#Pg213\"\u003e213\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nMoore, G.\u0026nbsp;E., \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_8_\"\u003e241n\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nMorals, introduction, \u003ca href=\"#Pg040\"\u003e40\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr/\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"indent\"\u003econclusion, as objective, \u003ca href=\"#Pg052\"\u003e52\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"indent\"\u003eof art, \u003ca href=\"#Pg167\"\u003e167\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"indent\"\u003escope, \u003ca href=\"#Pg278\"\u003e278\u0026ndash;281\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nMotives, \u003ca href=\"#Pg043\"\u003e43\u0026ndash;45\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg118\"\u003e118\u0026ndash;122\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg213\"\u003e213\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg231\"\u003e231\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg329\"\u003e329\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNatural law and morals, \u003ca href=\"#Pg296\"\u003e296\u0026ndash;300\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nNecessity, \u003ca href=\"#Pg312\"\u003e312\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nNirvana, \u003ca href=\"#Pg175\"\u003e175\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg286\"\u003e286\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nNon-moral, \u003ca href=\"#Pg008\"\u003e8\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg027\"\u003e27\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg040\"\u003e40\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg188\"\u003e188\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg230\"\u003e230\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOccult, \u003ca href=\"#Pg011\"\u003e11\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nOligarchy, \u003ca href=\"#Pg002\"\u003e2\u0026ndash;3\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nOptimism, \u003ca href=\"#Pg286\"\u003e286\u0026ndash;288\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nOrganization, \u003ca href=\"#Pg306\"\u003e306\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003ePassion, \u003ca href=\"#Pg009\"\u003e9\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg193\"\u003e193\u0026ndash;196\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nPathology, \u003ca href=\"#Pg004\"\u003e4\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg050\"\u003e50\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"Perfection\" id=\"Perfection\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003ePerfection, \u003ca href=\"#Pg173\"\u003e173\u0026ndash;175\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg223\"\u003e223\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg282\"\u003e282\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nPessimism, \u003ca href=\"#Pg286\"\u003e286\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nPlato, \u003ca href=\"#Pg050\"\u003e50\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg078\"\u003e78\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg134\"\u003e134\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg290\"\u003e290\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nPlay, \u003ca href=\"#Pg159\"\u003e159\u0026ndash;164\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nPleasure, \u003ca href=\"#Pg158\"\u003e158\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg200\"\u003e200\u0026ndash;205\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg250\"\u003e250\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nPosture, \u003ca href=\"#Pg032\"\u003e32\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nPotentiality, \u003ca href=\"#Pg037\"\u003e37\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nPower, will to, \u003ca href=\"#Pg140\"\u003e140\u0026ndash;142\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nPragmatic knowing, \u003ca href=\"#Pg181\"\u003e181\u0026ndash;188\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nPrinciples, \u003ca href=\"#Pg002\"\u003e2\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr/\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"indent\"\u003eand tendencies, \u003ca href=\"#Pg049\"\u003e49\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"indent\"\u003enature of, \u003ca href=\"#Pg238\"\u003e238\u0026ndash;247\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nPrivate, \u003ca href=\"#Pg009\"\u003e9\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg016\"\u003e16\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg043\"\u003e43\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg085\"\u003e85\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nProcess and product, \u003ca href=\"#Pg142\"\u003e142\u0026ndash;143\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg280\"\u003e280\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nProgress, \u003ca href=\"#Pg010\"\u003e10\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg021\"\u003e21\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg093\"\u003e93\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg096\"\u003e96\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg101\"\u003e101\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_5_\"\u003e105n\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr/\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"indent\"\u003ein science, \u003ca href=\"#Pg149\"\u003e149\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"indent\"\u003enature of, \u003ca href=\"#Pg281\"\u003e281\u0026ndash;288\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nProperty, \u003ca href=\"#Pg116\"\u003e116\u0026ndash;118\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr/\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"indent\"\u003e\u003cem\u003esee\u003c/em\u003e \u003ca href=\"#Economics\"\u003eEconomics\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nPsycho-analysis, \u003ca href=\"#Pg034\"\u003e34\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg086\"\u003e86\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg133\"\u003e133\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg153\"\u003e153\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg252\"\u003e252\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nPsychology and moral theory, \u003ca href=\"#Pg012\"\u003e12\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg046\"\u003e46\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg091\"\u003e91\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr/\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"indent\"\u003esocial, \u003ca href=\"#Pg060\"\u003e60\u0026ndash;63\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg084\"\u003e84\u0026ndash;88\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"indent\"\u003ecurrent, \u003ca href=\"#Pg118\"\u003e118\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg135\"\u003e135\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg147\"\u003e147\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg155\"\u003e155\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"indent\"\u003eand scientific method, \u003ca href=\"#Pg150\"\u003e150\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg322\"\u003e322\u0026ndash;324\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nPunishment, \u003ca href=\"#Pg018\"\u003e18\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nPuritanism, \u003ca href=\"#Pg005\"\u003e5\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg157\"\u003e157\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nPurpose, \u003cem\u003esee\u003c/em\u003e \u003ca href=\"#Ends\"\u003eEnds\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eRadicalism, \u003ca href=\"#Pg168\"\u003e168\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nReactions, \u003ca href=\"#Pg157\"\u003e157\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nRealism, \u003ca href=\"#Pg176\"\u003e176\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg256\"\u003e256\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg298\"\u003e298\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nReason, pure, \u003ca href=\"#Pg031\"\u003e31\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr/\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"indent\"\u003ereasonableness, \u003ca href=\"#Pg067\"\u003e67\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg077\"\u003e77\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg193\"\u003e193\u0026ndash;198\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg215\"\u003e215\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nRebellion, \u003ca href=\"#Pg166\"\u003e166\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nReconstruction, \u003ca href=\"#Pg164\"\u003e164\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nReligion, \u003ca href=\"#Pg005\"\u003e5\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg263\"\u003e263\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg330\"\u003e330\u0026ndash;332\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nResponsibility, \u003ca href=\"#Pg315\"\u003e315\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nRevolution, \u003ca href=\"#Pg010\"\u003e10\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg108\"\u003e108\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nRight, \u003ca href=\"#Pg324\"\u003e324\u0026ndash;328\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nRomanticism, \u003ca href=\"#Pg006\"\u003e6\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg100\"\u003e100\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg166\"\u003e166\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg256\"\u003e256\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nRoutine, \u003ca href=\"#Pg042\"\u003e42\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg066\"\u003e66\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg070\"\u003e70\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg098\"\u003e98\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg211\"\u003e211\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg232\"\u003e232\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg238\"\u003e238\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSatisfaction, \u003ca href=\"#Pg140\"\u003e140\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg158\"\u003e158\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg175\"\u003e175\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg210\"\u003e210\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg213\"\u003e213\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg265\"\u003e265\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg285\"\u003e285\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nSavagery, \u003ca href=\"#Pg093\"\u003e93\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg101\"\u003e101\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg103\"\u003e103\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nScience of morals, \u003ca href=\"#Pg003\"\u003e3\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg011\"\u003e11\u0026ndash;12\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg018\"\u003e18\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg056\"\u003e56\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg224\"\u003e224\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg243\"\u003e243\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg296\"\u003e296\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg321\"\u003e321\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nSelf, \u003ca href=\"#Pg016\"\u003e16\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg055\"\u003e55\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg085\"\u003e85\u0026ndash;87\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg136\"\u003e136\u0026ndash;139\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg217\"\u003e217\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg292\"\u003e292\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg314\"\u003e314\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nSelf-deception, \u003ca href=\"#Pg152\"\u003e152\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg252\"\u003e252\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nSelf-love, \u003ca href=\"#Pg134\"\u003e134\u0026ndash;139\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg293\"\u003e293\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nSensations, \u003ca href=\"#Pg018\"\u003e18\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg031\"\u003e31\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg189\"\u003e189\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nSentimentalism, \u003ca href=\"#Pg017\"\u003e17\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nSex, \u003ca href=\"#Pg133\"\u003e133\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg150\"\u003e150\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg153\"\u003e153\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg164\"\u003e164\u0026ndash;165\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nSocial, \u003cem\u003esee\u003c/em\u003e \u003ca href=\"#Environments\"\u003eEnvironments\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nSocial mind, \u003ca href=\"#Pg060\"\u003e60\u0026ndash;63\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"pb\" id=\"Pg336\"\u003e[pg 336]\u003c/span\u003e\r\nSocrates, \u003ca href=\"#Pg056\"\u003e56\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nSoul, \u003ca href=\"#Pg085\"\u003e85\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg094\"\u003e94\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg138\"\u003e138\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg176\"\u003e176\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nSpencer, \u003ca href=\"#Pg175\"\u003e175\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg297\"\u003e297\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nStandards, \u003ca href=\"#Pg075\"\u003e75\u0026ndash;82\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg241\"\u003e241\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nStimulation, \u003ca href=\"#Pg157\"\u003e157\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nStimulus and response, \u003ca href=\"#Pg199\"\u003e199\u0026ndash;207\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nStuart, H.\u0026nbsp;W., \u003ca href=\"#Pg218\"\u003e218\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nSubjective, \u003ca href=\"#Pg016\"\u003e16\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg022\"\u003e22\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg027\"\u003e27\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg052\"\u003e52\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg054\"\u003e54\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg085\"\u003e85\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg202\"\u003e202\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr/\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"indent\"\u003e\u003cem\u003esee\u003c/em\u003e \u003ca href=\"#Dualism\"\u003eDualism\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nSublimation, \u003ca href=\"#Pg141\"\u003e141\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg156\"\u003e156\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg164\"\u003e164\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg194\"\u003e194\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nSuccess, \u003ca href=\"#Pg006\"\u003e6\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg173\"\u003e173\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg254\"\u003e254\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nSumner, \u003ca href=\"#Pg077\"\u003e77\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nSuppression, \u003ca href=\"#Pg156\"\u003e156\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg166\"\u003e166\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nSynthesis, \u003ca href=\"#Pg183\"\u003e183\u0026ndash;184\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eTendency, \u003ca href=\"#Pg049\"\u003e49\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"Thought\" id=\"Thought\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eThought, \u003ca href=\"#Pg030\"\u003e30\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg067\"\u003e67\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg098\"\u003e98\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg108\"\u003e108\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg171\"\u003e171\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg190\"\u003e190\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg200\"\u003e200\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg222\"\u003e222\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg258\"\u003e258\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr/\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"indent\"\u003evices of, \u003ca href=\"#Pg197\"\u003e197\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nTolstoi, \u003ca href=\"#Pg285\"\u003e285\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg312\"\u003e312\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nTools, \u003ca href=\"#Pg025\"\u003e25\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg032\"\u003e32\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr/\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"indent\"\u003eintellectual, \u003ca href=\"#Pg244\"\u003e244\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nTranscendentalism, \u003ca href=\"#Pg050\"\u003e50\u0026ndash;52\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg054\"\u003e54\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg081\"\u003e81\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eUniversality, \u003ca href=\"#Pg245\"\u003e245\u0026ndash;247\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nUtilitarianism, \u003ca href=\"#Pg050\"\u003e50\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg189\"\u003e189\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg199\"\u003e199\u0026ndash;209\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg211\"\u003e211\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg221\"\u003e221\u0026ndash;222\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg291\"\u003e291\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eVirtues, \u003ca href=\"#Pg004\"\u003e4\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg016\"\u003e16\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg022\"\u003e22\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr/\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"indent\"\u003e\u003cem\u003esee\u003c/em\u003e \u003ca href=\"#Goodness\"\u003eGoodness\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWar, \u003ca href=\"#Pg110\"\u003e110\u0026ndash;115\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nWestermarck, \u003ca href=\"#Pg076\"\u003e76\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"Will\" id=\"Will\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eWill, and habits, \u003ca href=\"#Pg025\"\u003e25\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg029\"\u003e29\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg040\"\u003e40\u0026ndash;44\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg259\"\u003e259\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cbr/\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"indent\"\u003ewill to power, \u003ca href=\"#Pg140\"\u003e140\u0026ndash;143\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"indent\"\u003efreedom of, \u003ca href=\"#Pg009\"\u003e9\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr/\u003e\r\nWilliams, M., \u003ca href=\"#Footnote_9_\"\u003e273n\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"center\"\u003e\u003cbig\u003eFOOTNOTES:\u003c/big\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_1_\" id=\"Footnote_1_\"\r\nhref=\"#FNanchor_1_\" class=\"label\"\u003e[1]\u003c/a\u003e I refer\r\nto Alexander, \"Man\u0027s Supreme Inheritance.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_2_\" id=\"Footnote_2_\"\r\nhref=\"#FNanchor_2_\" class=\"label\"\u003e[2]\u003c/a\u003e The technique of\r\nthis process is stated in the book of Mr. Alexander already referred to,\r\nand the theoretical statement given is borrowed from Mr. Alexander\u0027s\r\nanalysis.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_3_\" id=\"Footnote_3_\"\r\nhref=\"#FNanchor_3_\" class=\"label\"\u003e[3]\u003c/a\u003e Mob\r\npsychology comes under the same principles, but in a\r\nnegative aspect. The crowd and mob express a disintegration of\r\nhabits which releases impulse and renders persons susceptible\r\nto immediate stimuli, rather than such a functioning of habits\r\nas is found in the mind of a club or school of thought or a\r\npolitical party. Leaders of an organization, that is of an interaction\r\nhaving settled habits, may, however, in order to put over\r\nsome schemes deliberately resort to stimuli which will break\r\nthrough the crust of ordinary custom and release impulses on\r\nsuch a scale as to create a mob psychology. Since fear is a\r\nnormal reaction to the unfamiliar, dread and suspicion are the\r\nforces most played upon to accomplish this result, together with\r\nvast vague contrary hopes. This is an ordinary technique in\r\nexcited political campaigns, in starting war, etc. But an assimilation\r\nlike that of Le Bon of the psychology of democracy to the\r\npsychology of a crowd in overriding individual judgment shows\r\nlack of psychological insight. A political democracy exhibits\r\nan overriding of thought like that seen in any convention or institution.\r\nThat is, thought is submerged in habit. In the crowd\r\nand mob, it is submerged in undefined emotion. China and Japan\r\nexhibit crowd psychology more frequently than do western democratic\r\ncountries. Not in my judgment because of any essentially\r\nOriental psychology but because of a nearer background of rigid\r\nand solid customs conjoined with the phenomena of a period of\r\ntransition. The introduction of many novel stimuli creates occasions\r\nwhere habits afford no ballast. Hence great waves of emotion\r\neasily sweep through masses. Sometimes they are waves of\r\nenthusiasm for the new; sometimes of violent reaction against\r\nit\u0026mdash;both equally undiscriminating. The war has left behind it\r\na somewhat similar situation in western countries.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_4_\" id=\"Footnote_4_\"\r\nhref=\"#FNanchor_4_\" class=\"label\"\u003e[4]\u003c/a\u003e \"The Origin\r\nand Development of Moral Ideas.\"\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_5_\" id=\"Footnote_5_\"\r\nhref=\"#FNanchor_5_\" class=\"label\"\u003e[5]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nThe use of the words instinct and impulse as practical equivalents\r\nis intentional, even though it may grieve critical readers.\r\nThe word instinct taken alone is still too laden with the older\r\nnotion that an instinct is always definitely organized and adapted\u0026mdash;which\r\nfor the most part is just what it is not in human beings.\r\nThe word impulse suggests something primitive, yet loose, undirected,\r\ninitial. Man can progress as beasts cannot, precisely\r\nbecause he has so many \u0027instincts\u0027 that they cut across one\r\nanother, so that most serviceable actions must be \u003cem\u003elearned\u003c/em\u003e. In\r\nlearning habits it is possible for man to learn the habit of\r\nlearning. Then betterment becomes a conscious principle of life.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_6_\" id=\"Footnote_6_\"\r\nhref=\"#FNanchor_6_\" class=\"label\"\u003e[6]\u003c/a\u003e I owe the\r\nsuggestion of this mode of interpreting the\r\nhedonistic calculus of utilitarianism to Dr. Wesley Mitchell.\r\nSee his articles in \u003ccite\u003eJournal of Political Economy\u003c/cite\u003e, vol. 18. Compare\r\nalso his article in \u003ccite\u003ePolitical Science Quarterly\u003c/cite\u003e, vol. 33.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_7_\" id=\"Footnote_7_\"\r\nhref=\"#FNanchor_7_\" class=\"label\"\u003e[7]\u003c/a\u003e So far\r\nas I am aware Dr. H.\u0026nbsp;W. Stuart was the first to point\r\nout this difference between economic and moral valuations in his\r\nessay in \u003ccite\u003eStudies in Logical Theory\u003c/cite\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_8_\" id=\"Footnote_8_\"\r\nhref=\"#FNanchor_8_\" class=\"label\"\u003e[8]\u003c/a\u003e Among\r\ncontemporary moralists, Mr. G.\u0026nbsp;E. Moore may be\r\ncited as almost alone in having the courage of the convictions\r\nshared by many. He insists that it is the true business of moral\r\ntheory to enable men to arrive at precise and sure judgments in\r\nconcrete cases of moral perplexity.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\u003cp\u003e\u003ca name=\"Footnote_9_\" id=\"Footnote_9_\"\r\nhref=\"#FNanchor_9_\" class=\"label\"\u003e[9]\u003c/a\u003e Acknowledgment is due \"The Social Interpretation of History\"\r\nby Maurice Williams.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"center\"\u003e\u003cbig\u003eCORRECTIONS:\u003ca name=\"Corrections\" id=\"Corrections\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/big\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctable cellpadding=\"4\" summary=\"Corrections\" \u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd\u003epage\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003eoriginal\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003ecorrection\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Corr_v_\"\u003ev\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003e13\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003e14\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Corr_003_\"\u003e003\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003eof\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003eto\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Corr_008_\"\u003e008\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003epleasureable\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003epleasurable\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Corr_017_\"\u003e017\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003eretibutive\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003eretributive\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Corr_041_\"\u003e041\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003esome-counteracting\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003esome counteracting\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Corr_074_\"\u003e074\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003eungoing\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003eongoing\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Corr_090_\"\u003e090\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003emudpuddle\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003emud puddle\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Corr_092_\"\u003e092\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003esouthsea\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003eSouthsea\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Corr_123_\"\u003e123\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003efulfillment\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003efulfilment\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Corr_145_\"\u003e145\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003eit\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003eis\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Corr_163_\"\u003e163\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003eexitents\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003eexigents\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Corr_211_\"\u003e211\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003epresentation\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003epresentation.\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Corr_212_\"\u003e212\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003eonly\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003eonly one\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Corr_234_\"\u003e234\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003ephantasy\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003efantasy\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Corr_236_\"\u003e236\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003ephantasy-building\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003efantasy-building\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Corr_262_\"\u003e262\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003eunreasonble\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003eunreasonable\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Corr_276_\"\u003e276\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003ean\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003eand\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Corr_325_\"\u003e325\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003edesire.\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003edesire.\"\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\u003ctd\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Corr_334_\"\u003e334\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003ePhantasies\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd\u003eFantasies\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003c/table\u003e\r\n\u003c/article\u003e"}],"SectionSequence":["Back Link","Work Title","Deck","Author","Period","Era","Composition","Date Note","Region","Terra Avita","Terra Avita Region","Modern Country","Original Title","Language","Primary Discipline","Secondary Discipline","Tradition","Full Versions","Core Thesis","Classification","Arguments","Influence","Significance","Evidence Note","Full Text"],"Counts":{"ContextCards":3,"GeoCards":4,"DisciplineCards":2,"Links":11,"Sections":25,"Styles":3,"Scripts":1}}