The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy
{"WorkMasterId":6302,"WpPageId":281289,"ParentWpPageId":193822,"Slug":"influence-of-darwin-on-philosophy","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/john-dewey/influence-of-darwin-on-philosophy/","RelativeUrl":"theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/john-dewey/influence-of-darwin-on-philosophy/","HasFullText":true,"RawHtmlLength":567609,"CleanHtmlLength":511499,"Kicker":"Philosophy Work","Title":"The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy","Deck":"Dewey argues that Darwinian evolution changes philosophical method, knowledge, naturalism, and the problem of fixed essences.","BackLink":{"Text":"Back to John Dewey","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/john-dewey/"},"AuthorCard":{"Label":"Author","Title":"John Dewey","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/john-dewey/","MediaHref":"","ImageSrc":"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/john-dewey-01-portrait-by-underwood-underwood.jpg","ImageAlt":"Underwood and Underwood portrait of John Dewey","FilterTerra":"North America","ClickText":"John Dewey","ClickHref":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/john-dewey/","Copies":["1859 CE – 1952 CE","Burlington, Vermont","American pragmatist philosopher of instrumentalism, democratic experimentalism, progressive education, inquiry, experience, logic, ethics, aesthetics, public life, science, and naturalistic religion."]},"ContextCards":[{"Label":"Period","Key":"Period:4","Title":"Modern History","DateText":"1800 CE – 1944 CE","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/eras-of-thought/philosophers-of-modern-history/"},{"Label":"Era","Key":"Era:11","Title":"Long 19th Century","DateText":"1870 CE – 1913 CE","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/eras-of-thought/philosophers-of-modern-history/philosophers-of-the-long-19th-century/"},{"Label":"Composition","Title":"1910 CE","Url":"","DateText":""}],"DateNote":"Displayed as 1910 CE for the essay collection.","GeoCards":[{"Label":"Region","Key":"Region:1"},{"Label":"Terra Avita","Key":"TerraAvita:6"},{"Label":"Terra Avita Region","Key":"TerraAvitaRegion:25"},{"Label":"Modern Country","Key":"Country:USA:6"}],"OriginalTitle":"The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy and Other Essays in Contemporary Thought","Language":"English","DisciplineCards":[{"Label":"Primary Discipline","Key":"Discipline:philosophy-of-science"},{"Label":"Secondary Discipline","Key":"Discipline:metaphysics"}],"Tradition":"American pragmatism; instrumentalism; pragmatic naturalism; democratic experimentalism; progressive education","FullText":{"Title":"Full Text","Copy":"Public-domain full text from Project Gutenberg eBook #51525 .","Url":"","Label":"","Kicker":"","Cards":[]},"CoreThesis":["Dewey argues that Darwinian evolution changes philosophical method, knowledge, naturalism, and the problem of fixed essences."],"Classification":{"AlternateTitles":"Influence of Darwin on Philosophy","KeyConcepts":"Darwin; evolution; naturalism; method; science; change; experience","Methodology":"Direct Dewey work-cluster record based on SEP, IEP, Britannica, Center for Dewey Studies, Dewey scholarship, catalog records, and public edition evidence. 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Hegel, Darwinian naturalism, experimental science, Jane Addams and social reform, American democratic institutions, and educational practice.","InfluenceOn":""},"Significance":["Accepted as a direct Dewey work via public edition, catalog, and pragmatist scholarship evidence.","Dewey remains central for inquiry, democratic life, public problem-solving, education, experience, habits, art, values, religion as human faith, and experimental social intelligence."],"EvidenceNote":["Accepted as a direct Dewey work via public edition, catalog, and pragmatist scholarship evidence."],"MainSections":[{"Kind":"RawSection","Title":"Full Versions","BodyHtml":"\u003cdiv class=\"dz-philo__full-version-grid\"\u003e\n \u003carticle class=\"dz-philo__full-version-card\"\u003e\n \u003cp class=\"dz-philo__full-version-provider\"\u003eProject Gutenberg\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003ch3 class=\"dz-philo__full-version-title\"\u003eProject Gutenberg eBook #51525\u003c/h3\u003e\n \u003cp class=\"dz-philo__full-version-meta\"\u003eHtmlText · Imported\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003ca class=\"dz-philo__full-version-link\" href=\"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/51525\"\u003eOpen full version\u003c/a\u003e\n \u003c/article\u003e\n \u003c/div\u003e"},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Core Thesis","Paragraphs":["Dewey argues that Darwinian evolution changes philosophical method, knowledge, naturalism, and the problem of fixed essences."]},{"Kind":"FieldSection","Title":"Classification","Fields":[{"Label":"Alternate Titles","Value":"Influence of Darwin on Philosophy"},{"Label":"Key Concepts","Value":"Darwin; evolution; naturalism; method; science; change; experience"},{"Label":"Methodology","Value":"Direct Dewey work-cluster record based on SEP, IEP, Britannica, Center for Dewey Studies, Dewey scholarship, catalog records, and public edition evidence. No full text is imported."},{"Label":"Structure","Value":"One work-cluster page with explicit integer display year, date note, evidence note, discipline mapping, and public source evidence."}]},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Arguments","Paragraphs":["Dewey argues that Darwinian evolution changes philosophical method, knowledge, naturalism, and the problem of fixed essences."]},{"Kind":"FieldSection","Title":"Influence","Fields":[{"Label":"Influenced By","Value":"William James, Charles Sanders Peirce, G. W. F. Hegel, Darwinian naturalism, experimental science, Jane Addams and social reform, American democratic institutions, and educational practice."},{"Label":"Influence On","Value":"Pragmatism, analytic and continental social philosophy, democratic theory, progressive education, inquiry theory, aesthetics, public philosophy, deliberative democracy, philosophy of science, and American philosophy."}]},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Significance","Paragraphs":["Accepted as a direct Dewey work via public edition, catalog, and pragmatist scholarship evidence.","Dewey remains central for inquiry, democratic life, public problem-solving, education, experience, habits, art, values, religion as human faith, and experimental social intelligence."]},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Evidence Note","Paragraphs":["Accepted as a direct Dewey work via public edition, catalog, and pragmatist scholarship evidence."]},{"Kind":"RawSection","Title":"Full Text","BodyHtml":"\u003cp class=\"dz-philo__section-copy dz-philo__full-text-source\"\u003ePublic-domain full text from \u003ca href=\"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/51525\"\u003eProject Gutenberg eBook #51525\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003carticle class=\"dz-philo__full-text-body\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"transnote covernote\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"center\"\u003eTranscriber’s Note\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nCover created by Transcriber and placed in the Public Domain.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch1 class=\"vspace\"\u003eTHE INFLUENCE OF\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nDARWIN ON PHILOSOPHY\u003c/h1\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"p2 center larger\"\u003eAnd Other Essays in Contemporary\r\nThought\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"p2 center\"\u003eBY\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"large\"\u003eJOHN DEWEY\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003ci class=\"smaller\"\u003eProfessor of Philosophy in Columbia University\u003c/i\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"p2 figcenter\" style=\"width: 102px;\"\u003e\r\n\u003cimg src=\"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/gutenberg-influence-of-darwin-on-philosophy-000.jpg\" width=\"102\" height=\"130\" alt=\"Publisher’s logo\" /\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"p2 center vspace\"\u003eNEW YORK\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"larger\"\u003eHENRY HOLT AND COMPANY\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"newpage p4 center vspace small\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eCopyright\u003c/span\u003e, 1910,\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nBY\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nHENRY HOLT AND COMPANY\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003ci\u003ePublished April, 1910\u003c/i\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_iii\"\u003eiii\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca id=\"PREFACE\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003ePREFACE\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAn elaborate preface to a philosophic work\r\nusually impresses one as a last desperate effort on\r\nthe part of its author to convey what he feels\r\nhe has not quite managed to say in the body of\r\nhis book. Nevertheless, a collection of essays on\r\nvarious topics written during a series of years\r\nmay perhaps find room for an independent word\r\nto indicate the kind of unity they seem, to their\r\nwriter, to possess. Probably every one acquainted\r\nwith present philosophic thought\u0026mdash;found, with\r\nsome notable exceptions, in periodicals rather\r\nthan in books\u0026mdash;would term it a philosophy of\r\ntransition and reconstruction. Its various representatives\r\nagree in what they oppose\u0026mdash;the orthodox\r\nBritish empiricism of two generations ago and\r\nthe orthodox Neo-Kantian idealism of the last\r\ngeneration\u0026mdash;rather than in what they proffer.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe essays of this volume belong, I suppose, to\r\nwhat has come to be known (since the earlier of\r\nthem were written) as the pragmatic phase of the\r\nnewer movement. Now a recent German critic has\r\ndescribed pragmatism as, “Epistemologically,\r\nnominalism; psychologically, voluntarism; cosmologically,\r\nenergism; metaphysically, agnosticism;\r\nethically, meliorism on the basis of the Bentham-\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_iv\"\u003eiv\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003eMill\r\nutilitarianism.”\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_1\" href=\"#Footnote_1\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e1\u003c/a\u003e It may be that pragmatism\r\nwill turn out to be all of this formidable array;\r\nbut even should it, the one who thus defines it has\r\nhardly come within earshot of it. For whatever\r\nelse pragmatism is or is not, the pragmatic spirit\r\nis primarily a revolt against that habit of mind\r\nwhich disposes of anything whatever\u0026mdash;even so\r\nhumble an affair as a new method in Philosophy\u0026mdash;by\r\ntucking it away, after this fashion, in the\r\npigeon holes of a filing cabinet. There are other\r\nvital phases of contemporary transition and revision;\r\nthere are, for example, a new realism and\r\nnaturalistic idealism. When I recall that I find\r\nmyself more interested (even though their representatives\r\nmight decline to reciprocate) in such\r\nphases than in the systems marked by the labels\r\nof our German critic, I am confirmed in a belief\r\nthat after all it is better to view pragmatism quite\r\nvaguely as part and parcel of a general movement\r\nof intellectual reconstruction. For otherwise\r\nwe seem to have no recourse save to define\r\npragmatism\u0026mdash;as does our German author\u0026mdash;in\r\nterms of the very past systems against which it is\r\na reaction; or, in escaping that alternative, to regard\r\nit as a fixed rival system making like claim to\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_v\"\u003ev\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ncompleteness and finality. And if, as I believe, one\r\nof the marked traits of the pragmatic movement is\r\njust the surrender of every such claim, how have\r\nwe furthered our understanding of pragmatism?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eClassic philosophies have to be revised because\r\nthey must be squared up with the many social\r\nand intellectual tendencies that have revealed\r\nthemselves since those philosophies matured. The\r\nconquest of the sciences by the experimental\r\nmethod of inquiry; the injection of evolutionary\r\nideas into the study of life and society; the application\r\nof the historic method to religions and\r\nmorals as well as to institutions; the creation of\r\nthe sciences of “origins” and of the cultural\r\ndevelopment of mankind\u0026mdash;how can such intellectual\r\nchanges occur and leave philosophy what it\r\nwas and where it was? Nor can philosophy remain\r\nan indifferent spectator of the rise of what\r\nmay be termed the new individualism in art and\r\nletters, with its naturalistic method applied in a\r\nreligious, almost mystic spirit to what is primitive,\r\nobscure, varied, inchoate, and growing in\r\nnature and human character. The age of Darwin,\r\nHelmholtz, Pasteur, Ibsen, Maeterlinck, Rodin, and\r\nHenry James must feel some uneasiness until it\r\nhas liquidated its philosophic inheritance in current\r\nintellectual coin. And to accuse those who\r\nare concerned in this transaction of ignorant contempt\r\nfor the classic past of philosophy is to overlook\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_vi\"\u003evi\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe inspiration the movement of translation\r\ndraws from the fact that the history of philosophy\r\nhas become only too well understood.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAny revision of customary notions with its\r\nelimination\u0026mdash;instead of “solution”\u0026mdash;of many\r\ntraditionary problems cannot hope, however, for\r\nany unity save that of tendency and operation.\r\nElaborate and imposing system, the regimenting\r\nand uniforming of thoughts, are, at present, evidence\r\nthat we are assisting at a stage performance\r\nin which borrowed\u0026mdash;or hired\u0026mdash;figures are maneuvering.\r\nTentatively and piecemeal must the reconstruction\r\nof our stock notions proceed. As a\r\ncontribution to such a revision, the present collection\r\nof essays is submitted. With one or two\r\nexceptions, their order is that of a reversed\r\nchronology, the later essays coming first. The\r\nfacts regarding the conditions of their first appearance\r\nare given in connection with each essay.\r\nI wish to thank the Editors of the \u003ccite\u003ePhilosophical\r\nReview\u003c/cite\u003e, of \u003ccite\u003eMind\u003c/cite\u003e, of the \u003ccite\u003eHibbert Journal\u003c/cite\u003e, of the\r\n\u003ccite\u003eJournal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific\r\nMethods\u003c/cite\u003e, and of the \u003ccite\u003ePopular Science Monthly\u003c/cite\u003e,\r\nand the Directors of the Press of Chicago and\r\nColumbia Universities, respectively, for permission\r\nto reprint such of the essays as appeared originally\r\nunder their several auspices.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"sigright\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eJohn Dewey\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"in0 in2\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"in2\"\u003eColumbia University,\u003c/span\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nNew York City\u003c/span\u003e, March 1, 1910.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_vii\"\u003evii\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca id=\"CONTENTS\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eCONTENTS\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ctable summary=\"Contents\"\u003e\r\n \u003ctr class=\"small\"\u003e\r\n \u003ctd\u003e \u003c/td\u003e\r\n \u003ctd class=\"tdr\"\u003ePAGE\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n \u003ctr\u003e\r\n \u003ctd class=\"tdl\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eThe Influence of Darwinism on Philosophy\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n \u003ctd class=\"tdr\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_1\"\u003e1\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n \u003ctr\u003e\r\n \u003ctd class=\"tdl\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eNature and Its Good: A Conversation\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n \u003ctd class=\"tdr\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_20\"\u003e20\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n \u003ctr\u003e\r\n \u003ctd class=\"tdl\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eIntelligence and Morals\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n \u003ctd class=\"tdr\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_46\"\u003e46\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n \u003ctr\u003e\r\n \u003ctd class=\"tdl\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eThe Experimental Theory of Knowledge\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n \u003ctd class=\"tdr\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_77\"\u003e77\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n \u003ctr\u003e\r\n \u003ctd class=\"tdl\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eThe Intellectualist Criterion for Truth\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n \u003ctd class=\"tdr\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_112\"\u003e112\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n \u003ctr\u003e\r\n \u003ctd class=\"tdl\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eA Short Catechism Concerning Truth\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n \u003ctd class=\"tdr\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_154\"\u003e154\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n \u003ctr\u003e\r\n \u003ctd class=\"tdl\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eBeliefs and Existences\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n \u003ctd class=\"tdr\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_169\"\u003e169\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n \u003ctr\u003e\r\n \u003ctd class=\"tdl\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eExperience and Objective Idealism\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n \u003ctd class=\"tdr\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_198\"\u003e198\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n \u003ctr\u003e\r\n \u003ctd class=\"tdl\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eThe Postulate of Immediate Empiricism\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n \u003ctd class=\"tdr\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_226\"\u003e226\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n \u003ctr\u003e\r\n \u003ctd class=\"tdl\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003e“Consciousness” and Experience\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n \u003ctd class=\"tdr\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_242\"\u003e242\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n \u003ctr\u003e\r\n \u003ctd class=\"tdl\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eThe Significance of the Problem of Knowledge\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n \u003ctd class=\"tdr\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_271\"\u003e271\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\u003c/table\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_1\"\u003e1\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\r\n\u003ch2 title=\"THE INFLUENCE OF DARWINISM ON PHILOSOPHY\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"THE_INFLUENCE_OF_DARWINISM_ON_PHILOSOPHY\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eTHE INFLUENCE OF DARWINISM ON PHILOSOPHY\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_2\" href=\"#Footnote_2\" class=\"fnanchor smaller\"\u003e2\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003eI\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"drop-cap\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap1\"\u003eThat\u003c/span\u003e the publication of the “Origin of\r\nSpecies” marked an epoch in the development\r\nof the natural sciences is well known to the\r\nlayman. That the combination of the very words\r\norigin and species embodied an intellectual revolt\r\nand introduced a new intellectual temper is easily\r\noverlooked by the expert. The conceptions that\r\nhad reigned in the philosophy of nature and knowledge\r\nfor two thousand years, the conceptions that\r\nhad become the familiar furniture of the mind,\r\nrested on the assumption of the superiority of the\r\nfixed and final; they rested upon treating change\r\nand origin as signs of defect and unreality. In\r\nlaying hands upon the sacred ark of absolute\r\npermanency, in treating the forms that had been\r\nregarded as types of fixity and perfection as\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_2\"\u003e2\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\noriginating and passing away, the “Origin of\r\nSpecies” introduced a mode of thinking that in\r\nthe end was bound to transform the logic of\r\nknowledge, and hence the treatment of morals,\r\npolitics, and religion.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNo wonder, then, that the publication of Darwin’s\r\nbook, a half century ago, precipitated a crisis.\r\nThe true nature of the controversy is easily concealed\r\nfrom us, however, by the theological clamor\r\nthat attended it. The vivid and popular features\r\nof the anti-Darwinian row tended to leave the impression\r\nthat the issue was between science on one\r\nside and theology on the other. Such was not the\r\ncase\u0026mdash;the issue lay primarily within science itself,\r\nas Darwin himself early recognized. The theological\r\noutcry he discounted from the start, hardly\r\nnoticing it save as it bore upon the “feelings of\r\nhis female relatives.” But for two decades before\r\nfinal publication he contemplated the possibility\r\nof being put down by his scientific peers as a fool\r\nor as crazy; and he set, as the measure of his\r\nsuccess, the degree in which he should affect three\r\nmen of science: Lyell in geology, Hooker in botany,\r\nand Huxley in zoology.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eReligious considerations lent fervor to the controversy,\r\nbut they did not provoke it. Intellectually,\r\nreligious emotions are not creative but conservative.\r\nThey attach themselves readily to the\r\ncurrent view of the world and consecrate it. They\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_3\"\u003e3\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nsteep and dye intellectual fabrics in the seething\r\nvat of emotions; they do not form their warp\r\nand woof. There is not, I think, an instance of\r\nany large idea about the world being independently\r\ngenerated by religion. Although the ideas that\r\nrose up like armed men against Darwinism owed\r\ntheir intensity to religious associations, their origin\r\nand meaning are to be sought in science and philosophy,\r\nnot in religion.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003eII\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFew words in our language foreshorten intellectual\r\nhistory as much as does the word species.\r\nThe Greeks, in initiating the intellectual life of\r\nEurope, were impressed by characteristic traits\r\nof the life of plants and animals; so impressed\r\nindeed that they made these traits the key to\r\ndefining nature and to explaining mind and society.\r\nAnd truly, life is so wonderful that a seemingly\r\nsuccessful reading of its mystery might well lead\r\nmen to believe that the key to the secrets of\r\nheaven and earth was in their hands. The Greek\r\nrendering of this mystery, the Greek formulation\r\nof the aim and standard of knowledge, was in the\r\ncourse of time embodied in the word species, and it\r\ncontrolled philosophy for two thousand years. To\r\nunderstand the intellectual face-about expressed\r\nin the phrase “Origin of Species,” we must, then,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_4\"\u003e4\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nunderstand the long dominant idea against which it\r\nis a protest.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eConsider how men were impressed by the facts\r\nof life. Their eyes fell upon certain things slight\r\nin bulk, and frail in structure. To every appearance,\r\nthese perceived things were inert and passive.\r\nSuddenly, under certain circumstances, these\r\nthings\u0026mdash;henceforth known as seeds or eggs or\r\ngerms\u0026mdash;begin to change, to change rapidly in size,\r\nform, and qualities. Rapid and extensive changes\r\noccur, however, in many things\u0026mdash;as when wood is\r\ntouched by fire. But the changes in the living\r\nthing are orderly; they are cumulative; they tend\r\nconstantly in one direction; they do not, like other\r\nchanges, destroy or consume, or pass fruitless into\r\nwandering flux; they realize and fulfil. Each successive\r\nstage, no matter how unlike its predecessor,\r\npreserves its net effect and also prepares the way\r\nfor a fuller activity on the part of its successor. In\r\nliving beings, changes do not happen as they seem\r\nto happen elsewhere, any which way; the earlier\r\nchanges are regulated in view of later results.\r\nThis progressive organization does not cease till\r\nthere is achieved a true final term, a τελὸς, a completed,\r\nperfected end. This final form exercises\r\nin turn a plenitude of functions, not the least noteworthy\r\nof which is production of germs like those\r\nfrom which it took its own origin, germs capable\r\nof the same cycle of self-fulfilling activity.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_5\"\u003e5\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nBut the whole miraculous tale is not yet told.\r\nThe same drama is enacted to the same destiny\r\nin countless myriads of individuals so sundered in\r\ntime, so severed in space, that they have no opportunity\r\nfor mutual consultation and no means of\r\ninteraction. As an old writer quaintly said,\r\n“things of the same kind go through the same\r\nformalities”\u0026mdash;celebrate, as it were, the same\r\nceremonial rites.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis formal activity which operates throughout\r\na series of changes and holds them to a single\r\ncourse; which subordinates their aimless flux to its\r\nown perfect manifestation; which, leaping the\r\nboundaries of space and time, keeps individuals\r\ndistant in space and remote in time to a uniform\r\ntype of structure and function: this principle\r\nseemed to give insight into the very nature of\r\nreality itself. To it Aristotle gave the name, εῖδος.\r\nThis term the scholastics translated as \u003cem\u003especies\u003c/em\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe force of this term was deepened by its\r\napplication to everything in the universe that observes\r\norder in flux and manifests constancy\r\nthrough change. From the casual drift of daily\r\nweather, through the uneven recurrence of seasons\r\nand unequal return of seed time and harvest, up\r\nto the majestic sweep of the heavens\u0026mdash;the image\r\nof eternity in time\u0026mdash;and from this to the unchanging\r\npure and contemplative intelligence beyond nature\r\nlies one unbroken fulfilment of ends. Nature\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_6\"\u003e6\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nas a whole is a progressive realization of purpose\r\nstrictly comparable to the realization of purpose\r\nin any single plant or animal.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe conception of εῖδος, species, a fixed form\r\nand final cause, was the central principle of knowledge\r\nas well as of nature. Upon it rested the\r\nlogic of science. Change as change is mere flux\r\nand lapse; it insults intelligence. Genuinely to\r\nknow is to grasp a permanent end that realizes\r\nitself through changes, holding them thereby within\r\nthe metes and bounds of fixed truth. Completely\r\nto know is to relate all special forms to their one\r\nsingle end and good: pure contemplative intelligence.\r\nSince, however, the scene of nature which\r\ndirectly confronts us is in change, nature as\r\ndirectly and practically experienced does not satisfy\r\nthe conditions of knowledge. Human experience\r\nis in flux, and hence the instrumentalities\r\nof sense-perception and of inference based upon\r\nobservation are condemned in advance. Science\r\nis compelled to aim at realities lying behind and\r\nbeyond the processes of nature, and to carry on\r\nits search for these realities by means of rational\r\nforms transcending ordinary modes of perception\r\nand inference.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThere are, indeed, but two alternative courses.\r\nWe must either find the appropriate objects and\r\norgans of knowledge in the mutual interactions\r\nof changing things; or else, to escape the infection\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_7\"\u003e7\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof change, we \u003cem\u003emust\u003c/em\u003e seek them in some transcendent\r\nand supernal region. The human mind,\r\ndeliberately as it were, exhausted the logic of the\r\nchangeless, the final, and the transcendent, before\r\nit essayed adventure on the pathless wastes of\r\ngeneration and transformation. We dispose all\r\ntoo easily of the efforts of the schoolmen to interpret\r\nnature and mind in terms of real essences,\r\nhidden forms, and occult faculties, forgetful of\r\nthe seriousness and dignity of the ideas that lay\r\nbehind. We dispose of them by laughing at the\r\nfamous gentleman who accounted for the fact that\r\nopium put people to sleep on the ground it had a\r\ndormitive faculty. But the doctrine, held in our\r\nown day, that knowledge of the plant that yields\r\nthe poppy consists in referring the peculiarities\r\nof an individual to a type, to a universal form,\r\na doctrine so firmly established that any other\r\nmethod of knowing was conceived to be unphilosophical\r\nand unscientific, is a survival of precisely\r\nthe same logic. This identity of conception in\r\nthe scholastic and anti-Darwinian theory may well\r\nsuggest greater sympathy for what has become\r\nunfamiliar as well as greater humility regarding\r\nthe further unfamiliarities that history has in\r\nstore.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eDarwin was not, of course, the first to question\r\nthe classic philosophy of nature and of knowledge.\r\nThe beginnings of the revolution are in the physical\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_8\"\u003e8\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nscience of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.\r\nWhen Galileo said: “It is my opinion that\r\nthe earth is very noble and admirable by reason\r\nof so many and so different alterations and generations\r\nwhich are incessantly made therein,” he\r\nexpressed the changed temper that was coming over\r\nthe world; the transfer of interest from the permanent\r\nto the changing. When Descartes said:\r\n“The nature of physical things is much more\r\neasily conceived when they are beheld coming gradually\r\ninto existence, than when they are only considered\r\nas produced at once in a finished and perfect\r\nstate,” the modern world became self-conscious\r\nof the logic that was henceforth to control it, the\r\nlogic of which Darwin’s “Origin of Species” is\r\nthe latest scientific achievement. Without the\r\nmethods of Copernicus, Kepler, Galileo, and their\r\nsuccessors in astronomy, physics, and chemistry,\r\nDarwin would have been helpless in the organic\r\nsciences. But prior to Darwin the impact of the\r\nnew scientific method upon life, mind, and politics,\r\nhad been arrested, because between these ideal or\r\nmoral interests and the inorganic world intervened\r\nthe kingdom of plants and animals. The gates of\r\nthe garden of life were barred to the new ideas;\r\nand only through this garden was there access\r\nto mind and politics. The influence of Darwin\r\nupon philosophy resides in his having conquered\r\nthe phenomena of life for the principle of transition,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_9\"\u003e9\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nand thereby freed the new logic for application\r\nto mind and morals and life. When he said\r\nof species what Galileo had said of the earth,\r\n\u003ci xml:lang=\"la\" lang=\"la\"\u003ee pur si muove\u003c/i\u003e, he emancipated, once for all,\r\ngenetic and experimental ideas as an organon of\r\nasking questions and looking for explanations.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003eIII\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe exact bearings upon philosophy of the\r\nnew logical outlook are, of course, as yet, uncertain\r\nand inchoate. We live in the twilight\r\nof intellectual transition. One must add the rashness\r\nof the prophet to the stubbornness of the\r\npartizan to venture a systematic exposition of\r\nthe influence upon philosophy of the Darwinian\r\nmethod. At best, we can but inquire as to its\r\ngeneral bearing\u0026mdash;the effect upon mental temper\r\nand complexion, upon that body of half-conscious,\r\nhalf-instinctive intellectual aversions and preferences\r\nwhich determine, after all, our more deliberate\r\nintellectual enterprises. In this vague inquiry\r\nthere happens to exist as a kind of touchstone\r\na problem of long historic currency that\r\nhas also been much discussed in Darwinian literature.\r\nI refer to the old problem of design \u003ci xml:lang=\"la\" lang=\"la\"\u003eversus\u003c/i\u003e\r\nchance, mind \u003ci xml:lang=\"la\" lang=\"la\"\u003eversus\u003c/i\u003e matter, as the causal explanation,\r\nfirst or final, of things.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAs we have already seen, the classic notion of\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_10\"\u003e10\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nspecies carried with it the idea of purpose. In\r\nall living forms, a specific type is present directing\r\nthe earlier stages of growth to the realization of\r\nits own perfection. Since this purposive regulative\r\nprinciple is not visible to the senses, it follows\r\nthat it must be an ideal or rational force. Since,\r\nhowever, the perfect form is gradually approximated\r\nthrough the sensible changes, it also follows\r\nthat in and through a sensible realm a rational\r\nideal force is working out its own ultimate manifestation.\r\nThese inferences were extended to\r\nnature: (\u003cem\u003ea\u003c/em\u003e) She does nothing in vain; but all for\r\nan ulterior purpose. (\u003cem\u003eb\u003c/em\u003e) Within natural sensible\r\nevents there is therefore contained a spiritual\r\ncausal force, which as spiritual escapes perception,\r\nbut is apprehended by an enlightened reason.\r\n(\u003cem\u003ec\u003c/em\u003e) The manifestation of this principle brings\r\nabout a subordination of matter and sense to its\r\nown realization, and this ultimate fulfilment is the\r\ngoal of nature and of man. The design argument\r\nthus operated in two directions. Purposefulness\r\naccounted for the intelligibility of nature\r\nand the possibility of science, while the absolute\r\nor cosmic character of this purposefulness gave\r\nsanction and worth to the moral and religious endeavors\r\nof man. Science was underpinned and\r\nmorals authorized by one and the same principle,\r\nand their mutual agreement was eternally guaranteed.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_11\"\u003e11\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nThis philosophy remained, in spite of sceptical\r\nand polemic outbursts, the official and the regnant\r\nphilosophy of Europe for over two thousand years.\r\nThe expulsion of fixed first and final causes from\r\nastronomy, physics, and chemistry had indeed given\r\nthe doctrine something of a shock. But, on the\r\nother hand, increased acquaintance with the details\r\nof plant and animal life operated as a counterbalance\r\nand perhaps even strengthened the\r\nargument from design. The marvelous adaptations\r\nof organisms to their environment, of organs\r\nto the organism, of unlike parts of a complex\r\norgan\u0026mdash;like the eye\u0026mdash;to the organ itself; the foreshadowing\r\nby lower forms of the higher; the\r\npreparation in earlier stages of growth for organs\r\nthat only later had their functioning\u0026mdash;these\r\nthings were increasingly recognized with the progress\r\nof botany, zoology, paleontology, and embryology.\r\nTogether, they added such prestige to the\r\ndesign argument that by the late eighteenth century\r\nit was, as approved by the sciences of organic\r\nlife, the central point of theistic and idealistic\r\nphilosophy.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe Darwinian principle of natural selection\r\ncut straight under this philosophy. If all organic\r\nadaptations are due simply to constant variation\r\nand the elimination of those variations which are\r\nharmful in the struggle for existence that is\r\nbrought about by excessive reproduction, there\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_12\"\u003e12\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nis no call for a prior intelligent causal force to\r\nplan and preordain them. Hostile critics charged\r\nDarwin with materialism and with making chance\r\nthe cause of the universe.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSome naturalists, like Asa Gray, favored the\r\nDarwinian principle and attempted to reconcile\r\nit with design. Gray held to what may be called\r\ndesign on the installment plan. If we conceive\r\nthe “stream of variations” to be itself intended,\r\nwe may suppose that each successive variation was\r\ndesigned from the first to be selected. In that\r\ncase, variation, struggle, and selection simply define\r\nthe mechanism of “secondary causes” through\r\nwhich the “first cause” acts; and the doctrine\r\nof design is none the worse off because we know\r\nmore of its \u003ci xml:lang=\"la\" lang=\"la\"\u003emodus operandi\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eDarwin could not accept this mediating proposal.\r\nHe admits or rather he asserts that it\r\nis “impossible to conceive this immense and wonderful\r\nuniverse including man with his capacity\r\nof looking far backwards and far into futurity\r\nas the result of blind chance or necessity.”\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_3\" href=\"#Footnote_3\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e3\u003c/a\u003e But\r\nnevertheless he holds that since variations are in\r\nuseless as well as useful directions, and since the\r\nlatter are sifted out simply by the stress of the\r\nconditions of struggle for existence, the design\r\nargument as applied to living beings is unjustifiable;\r\nand its lack of support there deprives it\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_13\"\u003e13\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof scientific value as applied to nature in general.\r\nIf the variations of the pigeon, which under artificial\r\nselection give the pouter pigeon, are not preordained\r\nfor the sake of the breeder, by what logic\r\ndo we argue that variations resulting in natural\r\nspecies are pre-designed?\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_4\" href=\"#Footnote_4\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e4\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003eIV\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSo much for some of the more obvious facts\r\nof the discussion of design \u003ci xml:lang=\"la\" lang=\"la\"\u003eversus\u003c/i\u003e chance, as causal\r\nprinciples of nature and of life as a whole. We\r\nbrought up this discussion, you recall, as a crucial\r\ninstance. What does our touchstone indicate as\r\nto the bearing of Darwinian ideas upon philosophy?\r\nIn the first place, the new logic outlaws,\r\nflanks, dismisses\u0026mdash;what you will\u0026mdash;one type of\r\nproblems and substitutes for it another type.\r\nPhilosophy forswears inquiry after absolute origins\r\nand absolute finalities in order to explore specific\r\nvalues and the specific conditions that generate\r\nthem.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eDarwin concluded that the impossibility of\r\nassigning the world to chance as a whole and to\r\ndesign in its parts indicated the insolubility of\r\nthe question. Two radically different reasons,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_14\"\u003e14\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nhowever, may be given as to why a problem is\r\ninsoluble. One reason is that the problem is too\r\nhigh for intelligence; the other is that the question\r\nin its very asking makes assumptions that render\r\nthe question meaningless. The latter alternative\r\nis unerringly pointed to in the celebrated case\r\nof design \u003ci xml:lang=\"la\" lang=\"la\"\u003eversus\u003c/i\u003e chance. Once admit that the sole\r\nverifiable or fruitful object of knowledge is the\r\nparticular set of changes that generate the object\r\nof study together with the consequences that then\r\nflow from it, and no intelligible question can be\r\nasked about what, by assumption, lies outside.\r\nTo assert\u0026mdash;as is often asserted\u0026mdash;that specific\r\nvalues of particular truth, social bonds and forms\r\nof beauty, if they can be shown to be generated\r\nby concretely knowable conditions, are meaningless\r\nand in vain; to assert that they are justified only\r\nwhen they and their particular causes and effects\r\nhave all at once been gathered up into some inclusive\r\nfirst cause and some exhaustive final goal,\r\nis intellectual atavism. Such argumentation is reversion\r\nto the logic that explained the extinction\r\nof fire by water through the formal essence of\r\naqueousness and the quenching of thirst by water\r\nthrough the final cause of aqueousness. Whether\r\nused in the case of the special event or that of\r\nlife as a whole, such logic only abstracts some\r\naspect of the existing course of events in order\r\nto reduplicate it as a petrified eternal principle\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_15\"\u003e15\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nby which to explain the very changes of which it\r\nis the formalization.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhen Henry Sidgwick casually remarked in a\r\nletter that as he grew older his interest in what\r\nor who made the world was altered into interest\r\nin what kind of a world it is anyway, his voicing\r\nof a common experience of our own day illustrates\r\nalso the nature of that intellectual transformation\r\neffected by the Darwinian logic. Interest shifts\r\nfrom the wholesale essence back of special changes\r\nto the question of how special changes serve and\r\ndefeat concrete purposes; shifts from an intelligence\r\nthat shaped things once for all to the\r\nparticular intelligences which things are even now\r\nshaping; shifts from an ultimate goal of good to\r\nthe direct increments of justice and happiness\r\nthat intelligent administration of existent conditions\r\nmay beget and that present carelessness or\r\nstupidity will destroy or forego.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn the second place, the classic type of logic\r\ninevitably set philosophy upon proving that life\r\n\u003cem\u003emust\u003c/em\u003e have certain qualities and values\u0026mdash;no matter\r\nhow experience presents the matter\u0026mdash;because of\r\nsome remote cause and eventual goal. The duty\r\nof wholesale justification inevitably accompanies all\r\nthinking that makes the meaning of special occurrences\r\ndepend upon something that once and for\r\nall lies behind them. The habit of derogating\r\nfrom present meanings and uses prevents our looking\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_16\"\u003e16\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe facts of experience in the face; it prevents\r\nserious acknowledgment of the evils they present\r\nand serious concern with the goods they promise\r\nbut do not as yet fulfil. It turns thought to the\r\nbusiness of finding a wholesale transcendent remedy\r\nfor the one and guarantee for the other. One\r\nis reminded of the way many moralists and theologians\r\ngreeted Herbert Spencer’s recognition of\r\nan unknowable energy from which welled up the\r\nphenomenal physical processes without and the\r\nconscious operations within. Merely because\r\nSpencer labeled his unknowable energy “God,”\r\nthis faded piece of metaphysical goods was greeted\r\nas an important and grateful concession to the\r\nreality of the spiritual realm. Were it not for\r\nthe deep hold of the habit of seeking justification\r\nfor ideal values in the remote and transcendent,\r\nsurely this reference of them to an unknowable\r\nabsolute would be despised in comparison with the\r\ndemonstrations of experience that knowable energies\r\nare daily generating about us precious values.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe displacing of this wholesale type of philosophy\r\nwill doubtless not arrive by sheer logical disproof,\r\nbut rather by growing recognition of its\r\nfutility. Were it a thousand times true that\r\nopium produces sleep because of its dormitive energy,\r\nyet the inducing of sleep in the tired, and the\r\nrecovery to waking life of the poisoned, would not\r\nbe thereby one least step forwarded. And were\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_17\"\u003e17\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nit a thousand times dialectically demonstrated that\r\nlife as a whole is regulated by a transcendent principle\r\nto a final inclusive goal, none the less truth\r\nand error, health and disease, good and evil, hope\r\nand fear in the concrete, would remain just what\r\nand where they now are. To improve our education,\r\nto ameliorate our manners, to advance our\r\npolitics, we must have recourse to specific conditions\r\nof generation.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFinally, the new logic introduces responsibility\r\ninto the intellectual life. To idealize and rationalize\r\nthe universe at large is after all a confession\r\nof inability to master the courses of things that\r\nspecifically concern us. As long as mankind suffered\r\nfrom this impotency, it naturally shifted a\r\nburden of responsibility that it could not carry\r\nover to the more competent shoulders of the transcendent\r\ncause. But if insight into specific conditions\r\nof value and into specific consequences of\r\nideas is possible, philosophy must in time become\r\na method of locating and interpreting the more\r\nserious of the conflicts that occur in life, and a\r\nmethod of projecting ways for dealing with them:\r\na method of moral and political diagnosis and\r\nprognosis.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe claim to formulate \u003ci xml:lang=\"la\" lang=\"la\"\u003ea priori\u003c/i\u003e the legislative\r\nconstitution of the universe is by its nature\r\na claim that may lead to elaborate dialectic developments.\r\nBut it is also one that removes\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_18\"\u003e18\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthese very conclusions from subjection to experimental\r\ntest, for, by definition, these results make no\r\ndifferences in the detailed course of events. But\r\na philosophy that humbles its pretensions to the\r\nwork of projecting hypotheses for the education\r\nand conduct of mind, individual and social, is\r\nthereby subjected to test by the way in which the\r\nideas it propounds work out in practice. In having\r\nmodesty forced upon it, philosophy also acquires\r\nresponsibility.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eDoubtless I seem to have violated the implied\r\npromise of my earlier remarks and to have turned\r\nboth prophet and partizan. But in anticipating\r\nthe direction of the transformations in philosophy\r\nto be wrought by the Darwinian genetic and experimental\r\nlogic, I do not profess to speak for\r\nany save those who yield themselves consciously\r\nor unconsciously to this logic. No one can fairly\r\ndeny that at present there are two effects of the\r\nDarwinian mode of thinking. On the one hand,\r\nthere are making many sincere and vital efforts\r\nto revise our traditional philosophic conceptions\r\nin accordance with its demands. On the other\r\nhand, there is as definitely a recrudescence of\r\nabsolutistic philosophies; an assertion of a type\r\nof philosophic knowing distinct from that of the\r\nsciences, one which opens to us another kind of\r\nreality from that to which the sciences give access;\r\nan appeal through experience to something\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_19\"\u003e19\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthat essentially goes beyond experience. This reaction\r\naffects popular creeds and religious movements\r\nas well as technical philosophies. The very\r\nconquest of the biological sciences by the new ideas\r\nhas led many to proclaim an explicit and rigid\r\nseparation of philosophy from science.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOld ideas give way slowly; for they are more\r\nthan abstract logical forms and categories. They\r\nare habits, predispositions, deeply engrained attitudes\r\nof aversion and preference. Moreover, the\r\nconviction persists\u0026mdash;though history shows it to be\r\na hallucination\u0026mdash;that all the questions that the\r\nhuman mind has asked are questions that can be\r\nanswered in terms of the alternatives that the questions\r\nthemselves present. But in fact intellectual\r\nprogress usually occurs through sheer abandonment\r\nof questions together with both of the alternatives\r\nthey assume\u0026mdash;an abandonment that results from\r\ntheir decreasing vitality and a change of urgent\r\ninterest. We do not solve them: we get over them.\r\nOld questions are solved by disappearing, evaporating,\r\nwhile new questions corresponding to the\r\nchanged attitude of endeavor and preference take\r\ntheir place. Doubtless the greatest dissolvent in\r\ncontemporary thought of old questions, the greatest\r\nprecipitant of new methods, new intentions, new\r\nproblems, is the one effected by the scientific revolution\r\nthat found its climax in the “Origin of\r\nSpecies.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_20\"\u003e20\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\r\n\u003ch2 title=\"NATURE AND ITS GOOD: A CONVERSATION\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"NATURE_AND_ITS_GOOD_A_CONVERSATION\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eNATURE AND ITS GOOD: A CONVERSATION\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_5\" href=\"#Footnote_5\" class=\"fnanchor smaller\"\u003e5\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"drop-cap a\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap1\"\u003eA\u003c/span\u003e group of people are scattered near one\r\nanother, on the sands of an ocean beach;\r\nwraps, baskets, etc., testify to a day’s outing.\r\nAbove the hum of the varied conversations are\r\nheard the mock sobs of one of the party.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eVarious voices.\u003c/em\u003e What’s the matter, Eaton?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eEaton.\u003c/em\u003e Matter enough. I was watching a\r\nbeautiful wave; its lines were perfect; at its crest,\r\nthe light glinting through its infinitely varied and\r\ndelicate curves of foam made a picture more ravishing\r\nthan any dream. And now it has gone; it\r\nwill never come back. So I weep.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eGrimes.\u003c/em\u003e That’s right, Eaton; give it to them.\r\nOf course well-fed and well-read persons\u0026mdash;with\r\ntheir possessions of wealth and of knowledge both\r\ngained at the expense of others\u0026mdash;finally get bored;\r\nthen they wax sentimental over their boredom and\r\nare worried about “Nature” and its relation to\r\nlife. Not everybody takes it out that way, of\r\ncourse; some take motor cars and champagne for\r\nthat tired feeling. But the rest\u0026mdash;those who aren’t\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_21\"\u003e21\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nin that class financially, or who consider themselves\r\ntoo refined for that kind of relief\u0026mdash;seek a new\r\nsensation in speculating why that brute old world\r\nout there will not stand for what you call spiritual\r\nand ideal values\u0026mdash;for short, your egotisms.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe fact is that the whole discussion is only a\r\nsymptom of the leisure class disease. If you had\r\nto work to the limit and beyond, to keep soul and\r\nbody together, and, more than that, to keep alive\r\nthe soul of your family in its body, you would\r\nknow the difference between your artificial problems\r\nand the genuine problem of life. Your philosophic\r\nproblems about the relation of “the universe\r\nto moral and spiritual good” exist only in\r\nthe sentimentalism that generates them. The genuine\r\nquestion is why social arrangements will not\r\npermit the amply sufficient body of natural resources\r\nto sustain all men and women in security\r\nand decent comfort, with a margin for the cultivation\r\nof their human instincts of sociability, love\r\nof knowledge and of art.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAs I read Plato, philosophy began with some\r\nsense of its essentially political basis and mission\u0026mdash;a\r\nrecognition that its problems were those of the\r\norganization of a just social order. But it soon\r\ngot lost in dreams of another world; and even those\r\nof you philosophers who pride yourselves on being\r\nso advanced that you no longer believe in “another\r\nworld,” are still living and thinking with\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_22\"\u003e22\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nreference to it. You may not call it supernatural;\r\nbut when you talk about a realm of spiritual or\r\nideal values in general, and ask about its relation\r\nto Nature in general, you have only changed the\r\nlabels on the bottles, not the contents in them.\r\nFor what makes anything transcendental\u0026mdash;that is,\r\nin common language, supernatural\u0026mdash;is simply and\r\nonly aloofness from practical affairs\u0026mdash;which affairs\r\nin their ultimate analysis are the business of\r\nmaking a living.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eEaton.\u003c/em\u003e Yes; Grimes has about hit off the point\r\nof my little parable\u0026mdash;in one of its aspects at least.\r\nIn matters of daily life you say a man is “off,”\r\nmore or less insane, when he deliberately goes on\r\nlooking for a certain kind of result from conditions\r\nwhich he has already found to be such that\r\nthey cannot possibly yield it. If he keeps on looking,\r\nand then goes about mourning because stage\r\nmoney won’t buy beefsteaks, or because he cannot\r\nkeep himself warm by burning the sea-sands\r\nhere, you dismiss him as a fool or a hysteric. If\r\nyou would condescend to reason with him at all, you\r\nwould tell him to look for the conditions that will\r\nyield the results; to occupy himself with some of\r\nthe countless goods of life for which, by intelligently\r\ndirected search, adequate means may be\r\nfound.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWell, before lunch, Moore was reiterating the\r\nold tale. “Modern science has completely transformed\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_23\"\u003e23\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nour conceptions of Nature. It has stripped\r\nthe universe bare not only of all the moral values\r\nwhich it wore alike to antique pagan and to our\r\nmedieval ancestors, but also of any regard, any\r\npreference, for such values. They are mere incidents,\r\ntransitory accidents, in her everlasting redistribution\r\nof matter in motion; like the rise and\r\nfall of the wave I lament, or like a single musical\r\nnote that a screeching, rumbling railway train\r\nmight happen to emit.” This is a one-sided view;\r\nbut suppose it were all so, what is the moral?\r\nSurely, to change our standpoint, our angle of\r\nvision; to stop looking for results among conditions\r\nthat we know will not yield them; to turn our\r\ngaze to the goods, the values that exist actually\r\nand indubitably in experience; and consider by\r\nwhat natural conditions these particular values\r\nmay be strengthened and widened.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eInsist, if you please, that Nature as a whole\r\ndoes not stand for good as a whole. Then, in\r\nheaven’s name, just because good is both so plural\r\n(so “numerous”) and so partial, bend your energies\r\nof intelligence and of effort to selecting the\r\nspecific plural and partial natural conditions which\r\nwill at least render values that we do have more\r\nsecure and more extensive. Any other course is\r\nthe way of madness; it is the way of the spoilt\r\nchild who cries at the seashore because the waves\r\ndo not stand still, and who cries even more frantically\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_24\"\u003e24\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nin the mountains because the hills do not melt\r\nand flow.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut no. Moore and his school will not have it\r\nso: we must “go back of the returns.” All this\r\nscience, after all, is a mode of knowledge. Examine\r\nknowledge itself and find it implies a complete\r\nall-inclusive intelligence; and then find (by\r\ntaking another tack) that intelligence involves\r\nsentiency, feeling, and also will. Hence your very\r\nphysical science, if you will only criticise it, examine\r\nit, shows that its object, mechanical nature,\r\nis itself an included and superseded element in an\r\nall-embracing spiritual and ideal whole. And there\r\nyou are.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWell, I do not now insist that all this is mere\r\ndialectic prestidigitation. No; accept it; let it go\r\nat its face value. But what of it? Is any value\r\nmore concretely and securely in life than it was\r\nbefore? Does this perfect intelligence enable us\r\nto correct one single mis-step, one paltry error,\r\nhere and now? Does this perfect all-inclusive\r\ngoodness serve to heal one disease? Does it rectify\r\none transgression? Does it even give the slightest\r\ninkling of how to go to work at any of these\r\nthings? No; it just tells you: Never mind, for\r\nthey are already eternally corrected, eternally\r\nhealed in the eternal consciousness which alone is\r\nreally Real. Stop: there is one evil, one pain,\r\nwhich the doctrine mitigates\u0026mdash;the hysteric sentimentalism\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_25\"\u003e25\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwhich is troubled because the universe\r\nas a whole does not sustain good as a whole. But\r\nthat is the only thing it alters. The “pathetic\r\nfallacy” of Ruskin magnified to the \u003cem\u003en\u003c/em\u003eth power is\r\nthe \u003ci xml:lang=\"fr\" lang=\"fr\"\u003emotif\u003c/i\u003e of modern idealism.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eMoore.\u003c/em\u003e Certainly nobody will accuse Eaton of\r\ntender-mindedness\u0026mdash;except in his logic, which, \u003cem\u003eas\u003c/em\u003e\r\ncertainly, is not tough-minded. His excitement,\r\nhowever, convinces me that he has at least an inkling\r\nthat he is begging the question; and like the\r\ntrue pragmatist that he is, is trying to prevent\r\nby action (to wit, his flood of speech) his false\r\nlogic from becoming articulate to him. The question\r\nbeing whether the values we seem to apprehend,\r\nthe purposes we entertain, the goods we possess,\r\nare anything more than transitory waves,\r\nEaton meets it by saying: “Oh, of course, they\r\nare waves; but don’t think about that\u0026mdash;just sit\r\ndown hard on the wave or get another wave to buttress\r\nit with!” No wonder he recommends action\r\ninstead of thinking! Men have tried this method\r\nbefore, as a counsel of desperation or as cynical\r\npessimism. But it remained for contemporary\r\npragmatism to label the drowning of sorrow in the\r\nintoxication of thoughtless action, the highest\r\nachievement of philosophic method, and to preach\r\nwilful restlessness as a doctrine of hope and illumination.\r\nMeantime, I prefer to be tender-minded\r\nin my attitude toward Reality, and to make\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_26\"\u003e26\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthat attitude more reasonable by a tough-minded\r\nlogic.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eEaton.\u003c/em\u003e I am willing to be quiet long enough\r\nfor you to translate your metaphor into logic, and\r\nshow how I have begged the question.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eMoore.\u003c/em\u003e It is plain enough. You bid us turn\r\nto the cultivation, the nurture, of certain values\r\nin human life. But the question is whether these\r\nare or are not values. And that is a question of\r\ntheir relation to the Universe\u0026mdash;to Reality. If\r\nReality substantiates them, then indeed they are\r\nvalues; if it mocks and flouts them\u0026mdash;as it surely\r\ndoes if what mechanical science calls Nature be\r\nultimate and absolute\u0026mdash;then they are \u003cem\u003enot\u003c/em\u003e values.\r\nYou and your kind are really the sentimentalists,\r\nbecause you are sheer subjectivists. You say: Accept\r\nthe dream as real; do not question about it;\r\nadd a little iridescence to its fog and extend it\r\ntill it obscure even more of Reality than it naturally\r\ndoes, and all is well! I say: Perhaps the\r\ndream is no dream but an intimation of the\r\nsolidest and most ultimate of all realities; and a\r\nthorough examination of what the positivist, the\r\nmaterialist, accepts as solid, namely, science, reveals\r\nas its own aim, standard, and presupposition\r\nthat Reality is one all-exhaustive spiritual\r\nBeing.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eEaton.\u003c/em\u003e This is about the way I thought my\r\nbegging of the question would turn out. You insist\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_27\"\u003e27\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nupon translating my position into terms of\r\nyour own; I am not then surprised to hear that it\r\nwould be a begging of the question for \u003cem\u003eyou\u003c/em\u003e to hold\r\nmy views. My point is precisely that it is only\r\nas long as you take the position that some Reality\r\nbeyond\u0026mdash;some metaphysical or transcendental reality\u0026mdash;is\r\nnecessary to substantiate empirical values\r\nthat you can even discuss whether the latter are\r\ngenuine or illusions. Drop the presupposition that\r\nyou read into everything I say, the idea that the\r\nreality of things as they are is dependent upon something\r\nbeyond and behind, and the facts of the case\r\njust stare you in the eyes: Goods \u003cem\u003eare\u003c/em\u003e, a multitude\r\nof them\u0026mdash;but, unfortunately, evils also \u003cem\u003eare\u003c/em\u003e; and\r\nall grades, pretty much, of both. Not the contrast\r\nand relation of experience \u003ci xml:lang=\"la\" lang=\"la\"\u003ein toto\u003c/i\u003e to something\r\nbeyond experience drives men to religion and\r\nthen to philosophy; but the contrast \u003cem\u003ewithin\u003c/em\u003e experience\r\nof the better and the worse, and the consequent\r\nproblem of how to substantiate the former\r\nand reduce the latter. Until you set up the notion\r\nof a transcendental reality at large, you cannot\r\neven raise the question of whether goods and\r\nevils are, or only seem to be. The trouble and the\r\njoy, the good and the evil, is \u003cem\u003ethat\u003c/em\u003e they are; the\r\nhope is that they may be regulated, guided, increased\r\nin one direction and minimized in another.\r\nInstead of neglecting thought, we (I mean the\r\npragmatists) exalt it, because we say that intelligent\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_28\"\u003e28\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ndiscrimination of means and ends is the sole\r\nfinal resource in this problem of all problems, the\r\ncontrol of the factors of good and ill in life. We\r\nsay, indeed, not merely that that is what intelligence\r\n\u003cem\u003edoes\u003c/em\u003e, but rather what it \u003cem\u003eis\u003c/em\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eHistorically, it is quite possible to show how\r\nunder certain social conditions this human and\r\npractical problem of the relation of good and intelligence\r\ngenerated the notion of the transcendental\r\ngood and the pure reason. As Grimes reminded\r\nus, \u003cspan class=\"locked\"\u003ePlato\u0026mdash;\u0026mdash;\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eMoore.\u003c/em\u003e Yes, and Protagoras\u0026mdash;don’t forget\r\nhim; for unfortunately we know both the origin\r\nand the consequences of your doctrine that being\r\nand seeming are the same. We know quite well\r\nthat pure empiricism leads to the identification\r\nof being and seeming, and that is just why every\r\ndeeply moral and religious soul from the time of\r\nPlato and Aristotle to the present has insisted upon\r\na transcendent reality.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eEaton.\u003c/em\u003e Personally I don’t need an absolute to\r\nenable me to distinguish between, say, the good\r\nof kindness and the evil of slander, or the good of\r\nhealth and the evil of valetudinarianism. In experience,\r\nthings bear their own specific characters.\r\nNor has the absolute idealist as yet answered the\r\nquestion of \u003cem\u003ehow\u003c/em\u003e the absolute reality enables him\r\nto distinguish between being and seeming in one\r\nsingle concrete case. The trouble is that for him\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_29\"\u003e29\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003cem\u003eall\u003c/em\u003e Being is on the other side of experience, and \u003cem\u003eall\u003c/em\u003e\r\nexperience is seeming.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eGrimes.\u003c/em\u003e I think I heard you mention history.\r\nI wish both of you would drop dialectics and go\r\nto history. You would find history to be a struggle\r\nfor existence\u0026mdash;for bread, for a roof, for protected\r\nand nourished offspring. You would find\r\nhistory a picture of the masses always going\r\nunder\u0026mdash;just missing\u0026mdash;in the struggle, because\r\nothers have captured the control of natural resources,\r\nwhich in themselves, if not as benign as\r\nthe eighteenth century imagined, are at least abundantly\r\nample for the needs of all. But because of\r\nthe monopolization of Nature by a few persons,\r\nmost men and women only stick their heads above\r\nthe welter just enough to catch a glimpse of better\r\nthings, then to be shoved down and under. The\r\nonly problem of the relation of Nature to human\r\ngood which is real is the economic problem of the\r\nexploitation of natural resources in the equal interests\r\nof all, instead of in the unequal interests\r\nof a class. The problem you two men are discussing\r\nhas no existence\u0026mdash;and never had any\u0026mdash;outside\r\nof the heads of a few metaphysicians. The latter\r\nwould never have amounted to anything, would\r\nnever have had any career at all, had not shrewd\r\nmonopolists or tyrants (with the skill that characterizes\r\nthem) have seen that these speculations\r\nabout reality and a transcendental world could be\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_30\"\u003e30\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ndistilled into opiates and distributed among the\r\nmasses to make them less rebellious. That, if you\r\nwould know, Eaton, is the real historic origin of\r\nthe ideal world beyond. When you realize that,\r\nyou will perceive that the pragmatists are only\r\nhalf-way over. You will see that practical questions\r\n\u003cem\u003eare\u003c/em\u003e practical, and are not to be solved merely\r\nby having a theory \u003cem\u003eabout\u003c/em\u003e theory different from\r\nthe traditional one\u0026mdash;which is all your pragmatism\r\ncomes to.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eMoore.\u003c/em\u003e If you mean that your own crass Philistinism\r\nis all that pragmatism comes to, I fancy\r\nyou are about right. Forget that the only end of\r\naction is to bring about an approximation to the\r\ncomplete inclusive consciousness; make, as the\r\npragmatists do, consciousness a means to action,\r\nand one form of external activity is just as good as\r\nanother. Art, religion, all the generous reaches\r\nof science which do not show up immediately in\r\nthe factory\u0026mdash;these things become meaningless, and\r\nall that remains is that hard and dry satisfaction\r\nof economic wants which is Grimes’s ideal.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eGrimes.\u003c/em\u003e An ideal which exists, by the way, only\r\nin your imagination. I know of no more convincing\r\nproof of the futile irrelevancy of idealism than\r\nthe damning way in which it narrows the content\r\nof actual daily life in the minds of those who uphold\r\nidealism. I sometimes think I am the only\r\ntrue idealist. If the conditions of an equitable and\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_31\"\u003e31\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nample physical existence for all were once secured,\r\nI, for one, have no fears as to the bloom and harvest\r\nof art and science, and all the “higher” things of\r\nleisure. Life is interesting enough for me; give\r\nit a show for all.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eArthur.\u003c/em\u003e I find myself in a peculiar position in\r\nrespect to this discussion. An analysis of what\r\nis involved in this peculiarity may throw some light\r\non the points at issue, for I have to believe that\r\nanalysis and definition of what exists is the essential\r\nmatter both in resolution of doubts and in\r\nsteps at reform. For brevity, not from conceit,\r\nI will put the peculiarity to which I refer in a\r\npersonal form. I do not believe for a moment in\r\nsome different Reality beyond and behind Nature.\r\nI do not believe that a manipulation of the logical\r\nimplications of science can give results which are\r\nto be put in the place of those which Science herself\r\nyields in her direct application. I accept Nature\r\nas something which is, not seems, and Science as\r\nher faithful transcript. Yet because I believe\r\nthese things, not in spite of them, I believe in the\r\nexistence of purpose and of good. How Eaton can\r\nbelieve that fulfilment and the increasing realization\r\nof purpose can exist in human consciousness\r\nunless they first exist in the world which is revealed\r\nin that consciousness is as much beyond me as how\r\nMoore can believe that a manipulation of the\r\nmethod of knowledge can yield considerations of a\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_32\"\u003e32\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ntotally different order from those directly obtained\r\nby use of the method. If purpose and fulfilment\r\nexist as natural goods, then, and only then, can\r\nconsciousness itself be a fulfilment of Nature, and\r\nbe also a natural good. Any other view is inexplicable\r\nto sound thinking\u0026mdash;save, historically, as a\r\nproduct of modern political individualism and literary\r\nromanticism which have combined to produce\r\nthat idealistic philosophy according to which the\r\nmind in knowing the universe creates it.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe view that purpose and realization are profoundly\r\nnatural, and that consciousness\u0026mdash;or, if\r\nyou will, experience\u0026mdash;is itself a culmination and\r\nclimax of Nature, is not a new view. Formulated\r\nby Aristotle, it has always persisted wherever the\r\ntraditions of sound thinking have not been obscured\r\nby romanticism. The modern scientific doctrine\r\nof evolution confirms and specifies the metaphysical\r\ninsight of Aristotle. This doctrine sets\r\nforth in detail, and in verified detail, as a genuine\r\ncharacteristic of existence, the tendency toward\r\ncumulative results, the definite trend of things toward\r\nculmination and achievement. It describes\r\nthe universe as possessing, in terms of and by right\r\nof its own subject-matter (not as an addition of\r\nsubsequent reflection), differences of value and importance\u0026mdash;differences,\r\nmoreover, that exercise selective\r\ninfluence upon the course of things, that is\r\nto say, genuinely determine the events that occur.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_33\"\u003e33\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nIt tells us that consciousness itself is such a cumulative\r\nand culminating natural event. Hence it is\r\nrelevant to the world in which it dwells, and its\r\ndeterminations of value are not arbitrary, not \u003ci xml:lang=\"la\" lang=\"la\"\u003eobiter\r\ndicta\u003c/i\u003e, but descriptions of Nature herself.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eRecall the words of Spencer which Moore quoted\r\nthis morning: “There is no pleasure in the consciousness\r\nof being an infinitesimal bubble on a\r\nglobe that is infinitesimal compared with the totality\r\nof things. Those on whom the unpitying rush\r\nof changes inflicts sufferings which are often without\r\nremedy, find no consolation in the thought that\r\nthey are at the mercy of blind forces,\u0026mdash;which cause\r\nindifferently now the destruction of a sun and now\r\nthe death of an animalcule. Contemplation of a\r\nuniverse which is without conceivable beginning or\r\nend and without intelligible purpose, yields no satisfaction.”\r\nI am naïve enough to believe that the\r\nonly question is whether the object of our “consciousness,”\r\nof our “thought,” of our “contemplation,”\r\nis or is not as the quotation states it to be.\r\nIf the statement be correct, pragmatism, like subjectivism\r\n(of which I suspect it is only a variation,\r\nputting emphasis upon will instead of idea), is an\r\ninvitation to close our eyes to what is, in order to\r\nencourage the delusion that things are other than\r\nthey are. But the case is not so desperate. Speaking\r\ndogmatically, the account given of the universe\r\nis just\u0026mdash;not true. And the doctrine of evolution\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_34\"\u003e34\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof which Spencer professedly made so much\r\nis the evidence. A universe describable in evolutionary\r\nterms is a universe which shows, not indeed\r\ndesign, but tendency and purpose; which exhibits\r\nachievement, not indeed of a single end, but of a\r\nmultiplicity of natural goods at whose apex is consciousness.\r\nNo account of the universe in terms\r\n\u003cem\u003emerely\u003c/em\u003e of the redistribution of matter in motion is\r\ncomplete, no matter how true as far as it goes, for\r\nit ignores the cardinal fact that the character of\r\nmatter in motion and of its redistribution is such\r\nas cumulatively to achieve ends\u0026mdash;to effect the\r\nworld of values we know. Deny this and you deny\r\nevolution; admit it and you admit purpose in the\r\nonly objective\u0026mdash;that is, the only intelligible\u0026mdash;sense\r\nof that term. I do not say that in addition to the\r\nmechanism there are other ideal causes or factors\r\nwhich intervene. I only insist that the whole story\r\nbe told, that the character of the mechanism be\r\nnoted\u0026mdash;namely, that it is such as to produce and\r\nsustain good in a multiplicity of forms. Mechanism\r\nis the mechanism of achieving results. To ignore\r\nthis is to refuse to open our eyes to the total\r\naspects of existence.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAmong these multiple natural goods, I repeat, is\r\nconsciousness itself. One of the ends in which Nature\r\ngenuinely terminates is just awareness of itself\u0026mdash;of\r\nits processes and ends. For note the implication\r\nas to why consciousness is a natural good:\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_35\"\u003e35\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nnot because it is cut off and exists in isolation, nor\r\nyet because we may, pragmatically, cut off and\r\ncultivate certain values which have no existence beyond\r\nit; but because it \u003cem\u003eis\u003c/em\u003e good that things should\r\nbe known in their own characters. And this view\r\ncarries with it a precious result: to know things as\r\nthey are is to know them as culminating in consciousness;\r\nit is to know that the universe genuinely\r\nachieves and maintains its own self-manifestation.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eA final word as to the bearing of this view upon\r\nGrimes’s position. To conceive of human history\r\nas a scene of struggle of classes for domination, a\r\nstruggle caused by love of power or greed for gain,\r\nis the very mythology of the emotions. What we\r\ncall history is largely non-human, but so far as it\r\nis human, it is dominated by intelligence: history\r\nis the history of increasing consciousness. Not\r\nthat intelligence is actually sovereign in life, but\r\nthat at least it is sovereign over stupidity, error,\r\nand ignorance. The acknowledgment of things as\r\nthey are\u0026mdash;that is the causal source of every step\r\nin progress. Our present system of industry is not\r\nthe product of greed or tyrannic lust of power,\r\nbut of physical science giving the mastery over the\r\nmechanism of Nature’s energy. If the existing\r\nsystem is ever displaced, it will be displaced not\r\nby good intentions and vague sentiments, but by a\r\nmore extensive insight into Nature’s secrets.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eModern sentimentalism is revolted at the frank\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_36\"\u003e36\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nnaturalism of Aristotle in saying that some are\r\nslaves by nature and others free by nature. But\r\nlet socialism come to-morrow and somebody\u0026mdash;not\r\nanybody, but \u003cem\u003esome\u003c/em\u003ebody\u0026mdash;will be managing its machinery\r\nand somebody else will be managed by the\r\nmachinery. I do not wonder that my socialistic\r\nfriends always imagine themselves active in the first\r\ncapacity\u0026mdash;perhaps by way of compensation for\r\ndoing all of the imagining and none of the executive\r\nmanagement at present. But those who are managed,\r\nwho are controlled, deserve at least a moment’s\r\nattention. Would you not at once agree\r\nthat if there is any justice at all in these positions\r\nof relative inferiority and superiority, it is because\r\nthose who are capable by insight deserve to rule,\r\nand those who are incapable on account of ignorance,\r\ndeserve to be ruled? If so, how do you differ,\r\nsave verbally, from Aristotle?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOr do you think that all that men want in order\r\nto \u003cem\u003ebe\u003c/em\u003e men is to have their bellies filled, with assurance\r\nof constant plenty and without too much antecedent\r\nlabor? No; believe me, Grimes, men \u003cem\u003eare\u003c/em\u003e\r\nmen, and hence their aspiration is for the divine\u0026mdash;even\r\nwhen they know it not; their desire is for the\r\nruling element, for intelligence. Till they achieve\r\nthat they will still be discontented, rebellious, unruly\u0026mdash;and\r\nhence ruled\u0026mdash;shuffle your social cards\r\nas much as you may.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eGrimes\u003c/em\u003e (after shrugging his shoulders contemptuously,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_37\"\u003e37\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nfinally says): There is one thing I like\r\nabout Arthur: he is frank. He comes out with\r\nwhat you in all your hearts really believe\u0026mdash;theory,\r\nsupreme and sublime. All is to the good in this\r\nbest of all possible worlds, if only some one be\r\ndefining and classifying and syllogizing, according\r\nto the lines already laid down. Aristotle’s God\r\nof pure intelligence (as \u003cem\u003ehe\u003c/em\u003e well knew) was the\r\nglorification of leisure; and Arthur’s point of view,\r\nif Arthur but knew it, is as much the intellectual\r\nsnobbery of a leisure class economy, as the luxury\r\nand display he condemns are its material snobbery.\r\nThere is really nothing more to be said.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eMoore.\u003c/em\u003e To get back into the game which\r\nGrimes despises. Doesn’t Arthur practically say\r\nthat the universe is good because it culminates in\r\nintelligence, and that intelligence is good because\r\nit perceives that the universe culminates in\u0026mdash;itself?\r\nAnd, on this theory, are ignorance and error,\r\nand consequent evil, any less genuine achievements\r\nof Nature than intelligence and good?\r\nAnd on what basis does he call by the titles of\r\nachievement and end that which at best is an\r\ninfinitesimally fragmentary and transitory episode?\r\nI said Eaton begged the question. Arthur\r\nseems to regard it as proof of a superior intelligence\r\n(one which realistically takes things as they\r\nare) to beg the question. What is this Nature,\r\nthis universe in which evil is as stubborn a fact as\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_38\"\u003e38\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ngood, in which good is constantly destroyed by the\r\nvery power that produces it, in which there resides\r\na temporary bird of passage\u0026mdash;consciousness\r\ndoomed to ultimate extinction\u0026mdash;what is such a Nature\r\n(all that Arthur offers us) save the problem,\r\nthe contradiction originally in question? A complacent\r\noptimism may gloss over its intrinsic self-contradictions,\r\nbut a more serious mind is forced to\r\ngo behind and beyond this scene to a permanent\r\ngood which includes and transcends goods defeated\r\nand hopes suborned. Not because idealists have\r\nrefused to note the facts as they are, but precisely\r\nbecause Nature is, on its face, such a scene as\r\nArthur describes, idealists have always held that it\r\nis but Appearance, and have attempted to mount\r\nthrough it to Reality.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eStair.\u003c/em\u003e I had not thought to say anything. My\r\nattitude is so different from that of any one of\r\nyou that it seemed unnecessary to inject another\r\nvarying opinion where already disagreement reigns.\r\nBut when Arthur was speaking, I felt that perhaps\r\nthis disagreement exists precisely because the solvent\r\nword had not been uttered. For, at bottom,\r\nall of you agree with Arthur, and that is the cause\r\nof your disagreement with him and one another.\r\nYou have agreed to make reason, intellect in some\r\nsense, the final umpire. But reason, intellect, is\r\nthe principle of analysis, of division, of discord.\r\nWhen I appeal to feeling as the ultimate organ\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_39\"\u003e39\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof unity, and hence of truth, you smile courteously;\r\nsay\u0026mdash;or think\u0026mdash;mysticism; and the case for you\r\nis dismissed. Words like feeling, sensation, immediate\r\nappreciation, self-communication of Being,\r\nI must indeed use when I try to tell the truth I see.\r\nBut I well know how inadequate the words are.\r\nAnd why? Because language is the chosen tool\r\nof intelligence, and hence inevitably bewrayeth the\r\ntruth it would convey. But remember that words\r\nare but symbols, and that intelligence must dwell\r\nin the realm of symbols, and you realize a way out.\r\nThese words, sensation, feeling, etc., as I utter\r\nthem are but invitations to woo you to put yourselves\r\ninto the one attitude that reveals truth\u0026mdash;an\r\nattitude of direct vision.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe beatific vision? Yes, and No. No, if you\r\nmean something rare, extreme, almost abnormal.\r\nYes, if you mean the commonest and most convincing,\r\nthe \u003cem\u003eonly\u003c/em\u003e convincing self-impartation of the ultimate\r\ngood in the scale of goods; the vision of\r\nblessedness in God. For this doctrine is empirical;\r\nmysticism is the heart of all positive empiricism,\r\nof all empiricism which is not more interested in\r\ndenying rationalism than in asserting itself. The\r\nmystical experience marks every man’s realization\r\nof the supremacy of good, and hence measures the\r\ndistance that separates him from pure materialism.\r\nAnd since the unmitigated materialist is the rarest\r\nof creatures, and the man with faith in an unseen\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_40\"\u003e40\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ngood the commonest, every man is a mystic\u0026mdash;and\r\nthe most so in his best moments.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhat an idle contradiction that Moore and Arthur\r\nshould try to adduce proofs of the supremacy\r\nof ideal values in the universe! The sole possible\r\nproof is the proof that actually exists\u0026mdash;the direct\r\nunhindered realization of those values. For each\r\nvalue brings with it of necessity its own depth of\r\nbeing. Let the pride of intellect and the pride of\r\nwill cease their clamor, and in the silences Being\r\nspeaks its own final word, not an argument or external\r\nground of belief, but the self-impartation of\r\nitself to the soul. Who are the prophets and\r\nteachers of the ages? Those who have been accessible\r\nat the greatest depths to these communications.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eGrimes.\u003c/em\u003e I suppose that poverty\u0026mdash;and possibly\r\ndisease\u0026mdash;are specially competent ministers to the\r\nspiritual vision? The moral is obvious. Economic\r\nchanges are purely irrelevant, because purely material\r\nand external. Indeed, upon the whole, efforts\r\nat reform are undesirable, for they distract\r\nattention from the fact that the final thing, the\r\nvision of good, is totally disconnected from external\r\ncircumstance. I do not say, Stair, you personally\r\nbelieve this; but is not such a quietism the\r\nlogical conclusion of all mysticism?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eStair.\u003c/em\u003e This is not so true as to say that in your\r\nefforts at reform you are really inspired by the\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_41\"\u003e41\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ndivine vision of justice; and that this mystic vision\r\nand not the mere increase of quantity of eatables\r\nand drinkables is your animating motive.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eGrimes\u003c/em\u003e. Well, to my mind this whole affair of\r\nmystical values and experiences comes down to a\r\nsimple straight-away proposition. The submerged\r\nmasses do not occupy themselves with such questions\r\nas those you are discussing. They haven’t\r\nthe time even to consider whether they want to\r\nconsider them. Nor does the occasional free citizen\r\nwho even now exists\u0026mdash;a sporadic reminder and\r\nprophecy of ultimate democracy\u0026mdash;bother himself\r\nabout the relation of the cosmos to value. Why?\r\nNot from mystic insight any more than from metaphysical\r\nproof; but because he has so many other\r\ninterests that are worth while. His friends, his\r\nvocation and avocations, his books, his music, his\r\nclub\u0026mdash;these things engage him and they reward\r\nhim. To multiply such men with such interests\u0026mdash;that\r\nis the genuine problem, I repeat; and it is a\r\nproblem to be solved only through an economic and\r\nmaterial redistribution.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eEaton\u003c/em\u003e. Gladly, Stair, do all of us absolve ourselves\r\nfrom the responsibility of having to create\r\nthe goods that life\u0026mdash;call it God or Nature or\r\nChance\u0026mdash;provides. But we cannot, if we would,\r\nabsolve ourselves from responsibility for maintaining\r\nand extending these goods when they have\r\nhappened. To find it very wonderful\u0026mdash;as Arthur\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_42\"\u003e42\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ndoes\u0026mdash;that intelligence perceives values as they are\r\nis trivial, for it is only an elaborate way of saying\r\nthat they have happened. To invite us, ceasing\r\nstruggle and effort, to commune with Being through\r\nthe moments of insight and joy that life provides,\r\nis to bid us to self-indulgence\u0026mdash;to enjoyment at\r\nthe expense of those upon whom the burden of conducting\r\nlife’s affairs falls. For even the mystics\r\nstill need to eat and drink, be clothed and housed,\r\nand somebody must do these unmystic things. And\r\nto ignore others in the interest of our own perfection\r\nis not conducive to genuine unity of Being.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIntelligence is, indeed, as you say, discrimination,\r\ndistinction. But why? Because we have to\r\n\u003cem\u003eact\u003c/em\u003e in order to keep secure amid the moving flux\r\nof circumstance, some slight but precious good that\r\nNature has bestowed; and because, in order to act\r\nsuccessfully, we must act after conscious selection\u0026mdash;after\r\ndiscrimination of means and ends. Of\r\ncourse, all goods arrive, as Arthur says, as natural\r\nresults, but so do all bads, and all grades of good\r\nand bad. To label the results that occur culminations,\r\nachievements, and then argue to a quasi-moral\r\nconstitution of Nature because she effects\r\nsuch results, is to employ a logic which applies to\r\nthe life-cycle of the germ that, in achieving itself,\r\nkills man with malaria, as well as to the process of\r\nhuman life that in reaching its fullness cuts short\r\nthe germ-fulfilment. It is putting the cart before\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_43\"\u003e43\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe horse to say that because Nature is so constituted\r\nas to produce results of all types of value,\r\ntherefore Nature is actuated by regard for differences\r\nof value, Nature, till it produces a being\r\nwho strives and who thinks in order that he may\r\nstrive more effectively, does not know whether it\r\ncares more for justice or for cruelty, more for the\r\nravenous wolf-like competition of the struggle for\r\nexistence, or for the improvements incidentally introduced\r\nthrough that struggle. Literally it has\r\nno mind of its own. Nor would the mere introduction\r\nof a consciousness that pictured indifferently\r\nthe scene out of which consciousness developed,\r\nadd one iota of reason for attributing eulogistically\r\nto Nature regard for value. But when\r\nthe sentient organism, having experienced natural\r\nvalues, good and bad, begins to select, to prefer,\r\nand to make battle for its preference; and in order\r\nthat it may make the most gallant fight possible\r\npicks out and gathers together in perception\r\nand thought what is favorable to its aims and\r\nwhat hostile, then and there Nature has at last\r\nachieved significant regard for good. And this is\r\nthe same thing as the birth of intelligence. For\r\nthe holding an end in view and the selecting and organizing\r\nout of the natural flux, on the basis of\r\nthis end, conditions that are means, \u003cem\u003eis\u003c/em\u003e intelligence.\r\nNot, then, when Nature produces health or efficiency\r\nor complexity does Nature exhibit regard\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_44\"\u003e44\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nfor value, but only when it produces a living organism\r\nthat has settled preferences and endeavors.\r\nThe mere happening of complexity, health, adjustment,\r\nis all that Nature effects, as rightly called\r\naccident as purpose. But when Nature produces\r\nan intelligence\u0026mdash;ah, then, indeed Nature has\r\nachieved something. Not, however, because this intelligence\r\nimpartially pictures the nature which\r\nhas produced it, but because in human consciousness\r\nNature becomes genuinely partial. Because\r\nin consciousness an end is preferred, is selected for\r\nmaintenance, and because intelligence pictures not\r\na world just as it is \u003ci xml:lang=\"la\" lang=\"la\"\u003ein toto\u003c/i\u003e, but images forth the\r\nconditions and obstacles of the continued maintenance\r\nof the selected good. For in an experience\r\nwhere values are demonstrably precarious, an intelligence\r\nthat is not a principle of emphasis and\r\nvaluation (an intelligence which defines, describes,\r\nand classifies merely for the sake of knowledge,) is\r\na principle of stupidity and catastrophe.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAs for Grimes, it is indeed true that problems\r\nare solved only where they arise\u0026mdash;namely, in action,\r\nin the adjustments of behavior. But, for\r\ngood or for evil, they can be solved there only with\r\nmethod; and ultimately method is intelligence, and\r\nintelligence is method. The larger, the more human,\r\nthe less technical the problem of practice, the\r\nmore open-eyed and wide-viewing must be the corresponding\r\nmethod. I do not say that all things\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_45\"\u003e45\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthat have been called philosophy participate in this\r\nmethod; I do say, however, that a catholic and far-sighted\r\ntheory of the adjustment of the conflicting\r\nfactors of life \u003cem\u003eis\u003c/em\u003e\u0026mdash;whatever it be called\u0026mdash;philosophy.\r\nAnd unless technical philosophy is to go the\r\nway of dogmatic theology, it must loyally identify\r\nitself with such a view of its own aim and destiny.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_46\"\u003e46\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\r\n\u003ch2 title=\"INTELLIGENCE AND MORALS\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"INTELLIGENCE_AND_MORALS\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eINTELLIGENCE AND MORALS\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_6\" href=\"#Footnote_6\" class=\"fnanchor smaller\"\u003e6\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"drop-cap\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap1\"\u003e“Except\u003c/span\u003e the blind forces of nature,” said\r\nSir Henry Maine, “nothing moves in this\r\nworld which is not Greek in its origin.” And if\r\nwe ask why this is so, the response comes that the\r\nGreek discovered the business of man to be pursuit\r\nof good, and intelligence to be central in this quest.\r\nThe utmost to be said in praise of Plato and Aristotle\r\nis not that they invented excellent moral theories,\r\nbut that they rose to the opportunity which\r\nthe spectacle of Greek life afforded. For Athens\r\npresented an all but complete microcosm for the\r\nstudy of the interaction of social organization and\r\nindividual character. A public life of rich diversity\r\nin concentrated and intense splendor trained\r\nthe civic sense. Strife of faction and the rapid\r\noscillations of types of polity provided the occasion\r\nfor intellectual inquiry and analysis. The careers\r\nof dramatic personalities, habits of discussion, ease\r\nof legislative change, facilities for personal ambitions,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_47\"\u003e47\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ndistraction by personal rivalries, fixed attention\r\nupon the elements of character, and upon consideration\r\nof the effect of individual character on\r\nsocial vitality and stability. Happy exemption\r\nfrom ecclesiastic preoccupations, susceptibility to\r\nnatural harmony, and natural piety conspired with\r\nfrank and open observation to acknowledgment of\r\nthe rôle played by natural conditions. Social instability\r\nand shock made equally pertinent and obvious\r\nthe remark that only intelligence can confirm\r\nthe values that natural conditions generate, and\r\nthat intelligence is itself nurtured and matured\r\nonly in a free and stable society.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn Plato the resultant analysis of the mutual\r\nimplications of the individual, the social and the\r\nnatural, converged in the ideas that morals and\r\nphilosophy are one: namely, a love of that wisdom\r\nwhich is the source of secure and social good; that\r\nmathematics and the natural sciences focused upon\r\nthe problem of the perception of the good furnish\r\nthe materials of moral science; that logic is the\r\nmethod of the pregnant organization of social conditions\r\nwith respect to good; that politics and psychology\r\nare sciences of one and the same human\r\nnature, taken first in the large and then in the\r\nlittle. So far that large and expansive vision of\r\nPlato.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut projection of a better life must be based\r\nupon reflection of the life already lived. The inevitable\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_48\"\u003e48\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nlimitations of the Greek city-state were inevitably\r\nwrought into the texture of moral theory.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe business of thought was to furnish a substitute\r\nfor customs which were then relaxing from\r\nthe pressure of contact and intercourse without\r\nand the friction of strife within. Reason was to\r\ntake the place of custom as a guide of life; but it\r\nwas to furnish rules as final, as unalterable as those\r\nof custom. In short, the thinkers were fascinated\r\nby the afterglow of custom. They took for their\r\nown ideal the distillation from custom of its essence\u0026mdash;ends\r\nand laws which should be rigid and invariable.\r\nThus Morals was set upon the track which\r\nit dared not leave for nigh twenty-five hundred\r\nyears: search for \u003cem\u003ethe\u003c/em\u003e final good, and for \u003cem\u003ethe\u003c/em\u003e single\r\nmoral force.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAristotle’s assertions that the state exists by nature,\r\nand that in the state alone does the individual\r\nachieve independence and completeness of life, are\r\nindeed pregnant sayings. But as uttered by Aristotle\r\nthey meant that, in an isolated state, the\r\nGreek city-state, set a garlanded island in the\r\nwaste sea of \u003ci xml:lang=\"it\" lang=\"it\"\u003ebarbaroi\u003c/i\u003e, a community indifferent\r\nwhen not hostile to all other social groupings, individuals\r\nattain their full end. In a social unity\r\nwhich signified social contraction, contempt, and\r\nantagonism, in a social order which despised intercourse\r\nand glorified war, is realized the life of\r\nexcellence!\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_49\"\u003e49\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nThere is likewise a profound saying of Aristotle’s\r\nthat the individual who otherwise than by accident\r\nis not a member of a state is either a brute or a\r\ngod. But it is generally forgotten that elsewhere\r\nAristotle identified the highest excellence, the chief\r\nvirtue, with pure thought, and identifying this with\r\nthe divine, isolated it in lonely grandeur from the\r\nlife of society. That man, so far as in him lay,\r\nshould be godlike, meant that he should be non-social,\r\nbecause supra-civic. Plato the idealist had\r\nshared the belief that reason is the divine; but he\r\nwas also a reformer and a radical and he would\r\nhave those who attained rational insight descend\r\nagain into the civic cave, and in its obscurity labor\r\npatiently for the enlightenment of its blear-eyed\r\ninhabitants. Aristotle, the conservative and the\r\ndefiner of what is, gloried in the exaltation of intelligence\r\nin man above civic excellence and social\r\nneed; and thereby isolated the life of truest knowledge\r\nfrom contact with social experience and from\r\nresponsibility for discrimination of values in the\r\ncourse of life.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eMoral theory, however, accepted from social custom\r\nmore than its cataleptic rigidity, its exclusive\r\narea of common good, and its unfructified and irresponsible\r\nreason. The city-state was a superficial\r\nlayer of cultured citizens, cultured through a participation\r\nin affairs made possible by relief from\r\neconomic pursuits, superimposed upon the dense\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_50\"\u003e50\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nmass of serfs, artizans, and laborers. For this division,\r\nmoral philosophy made itself spiritual sponsor,\r\nand thus took it up into its own being. Plato\r\nwrestled valiantly with the class problem; but his\r\noutcome was the necessity of decisive demarcation,\r\nafter education, of the masses in whom reason was\r\nasleep and appetite much awake, from the few who\r\nwere fit to rule because alertly wise. The most\r\ngenerously imaginative soul of all philosophy could\r\nnot far outrun the institutional practices of his\r\npeople and his times. This might have warned his\r\nsuccessors of the danger of deserting the sober\r\npath of a critical discernment of the better and the\r\nworse within contemporary life for the more exciting\r\nadventure of a final determination of absolute\r\ngood and evil. It might have taught the probability\r\nthat some brute residuum or unrationalized\r\nsocial habit would be erected into an apotheosis of\r\npure reason. But the lesson was not learned.\r\nAristotle promptly yielded to the besetting sin of\r\nall philosophers, the idealization of the existent: he\r\ndeclared that the class distinctions of superiority\r\nand inferiority as between man and woman, master\r\nand slave, liberal-minded and base mechanic, exist\r\nand are justified by nature\u0026mdash;a nature which aims\r\nat embodied reason.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhat, finally, is this Nature to which the philosophy\r\nof society and the individual so bound itself?\r\nIt is the nature which figures in Greek customs\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_51\"\u003e51\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nand myth; the nature resplendent and adorned\r\nwhich confronts us in Greek poetry and art: the\r\nanimism of savage man purged of grossness and\r\ngeneralized by unerring esthetic taste into beauty\r\nand system. The myths had told of the loves and\r\nhates, the caprices and desertions of the gods,\r\nand behind them all, inevitable Fate. Philosophy\r\ntranslated these tales into formulæ of the brute\r\nfluctuation of rapacious change held in bounds\r\nby the final and supreme end: the rational good.\r\nThe animism of the popular mind died to reappear\r\nas cosmology.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eRepeatedly in this course we have heard of sciences\r\nwhich began as parts of philosophy and\r\nwhich gradually won their independence. Another\r\nstatement of the same history is that both science\r\nand philosophy began in subjection to mythological\r\nanimism. Both began with acceptance of a nature\r\nwhose irregularities displayed the meaningless variability\r\nof foolish wants held within the limits of\r\norder and uniformity by an underlying movement\r\ntoward a final and stable purpose. And when\r\nthe sciences gradually assumed the task of reducing\r\nirregular caprice to regular conjunction, philosophy\r\nbravely took upon itself the task of substantiating,\r\nunder the caption of a spiritual view\r\nof the universe, the animistic survival. Doubtless\r\nSocrates brought philosophy to earth; but his injunction\r\nto man to know himself was incredibly\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_52\"\u003e52\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ncompromised in its execution by the fact that later\r\nphilosophers submerged man in the world to which\r\nphilosophy was brought: a world which was the\r\nheavy and sunken center of hierarchic heavens located\r\nin their purity and refinement as remotely as\r\npossible from the gross and muddy vesture of\r\nearth.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe various limitations of Greek custom, its\r\nhostile indifference to all outside the narrow city-state,\r\nits assumption of fixed divisions of wise and\r\nblind among men, its inability socially to utilize\r\nscience, its subordination of human intention to\r\ncosmic aim\u0026mdash;all of these things were worked into\r\nmoral theory. Philosophy had no active hand in\r\nproducing the condition of barbarism in Europe\r\nfrom the fifth to the fifteenth centuries. By an\r\nunwitting irony which would have shocked none\r\nso much as the lucid moralists of Athens, their\r\nphilosophic idealization, under captions of Nature\r\nand Reason, of the inherent limitations of Athenian\r\nsociety and Greek science, furnished the intellectual\r\ntools for defining, standardizing, and justifying all\r\nthe fundamental clefts and antagonisms of feudalism.\r\nWhen practical conditions are not frozen in\r\nmen’s imagination into crystalline truths, they are\r\nnaturally fluid. They come and go. But when\r\nintelligence fixes fluctuating circumstances into\r\nfinal ideals, petrifaction is likely to occur; and\r\nphilosophy gratuitously took upon itself the responsibility\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_53\"\u003e53\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nfor justifying the worst defects of\r\nbarbarian Europe by showing their necessary connection\r\nwith divine reason.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe division of mankind into the two camps of\r\nthe redeemed and the condemned had not needed\r\nphilosophy to produce it. But the Greek cleavage\r\nof men into separate kinds on the basis of their\r\nposition within or without the city-state was used\r\nto rationalize this harsh intolerance. The hierarchic\r\norganization of feudalism, within church\r\nand state, of those possessed of sacred rule and\r\nthose whose sole excellence was obedience, did not\r\nrequire moral theory to generate or explain it.\r\nBut it took philosophy to furnish the intellectual\r\ntools by which such chance episodes were emblazoned\r\nupon the cosmic heavens as a grandiose\r\nspiritual achievement. No; it is all too easy to\r\nexplain bitter intolerance and desire for domination.\r\nStubborn as they are, it was only when\r\nGreek moral theory had put underneath them the\r\ndistinction between the irrational and the rational,\r\nbetween divine truth and good and corrupt and\r\nweak human appetite, that intolerance on system\r\nand earthly domination for the sake of eternal\r\nexcellence were philosophically sanctioned. The\r\nhealth and welfare of the body and the securing\r\nfor all of a sure and a prosperous livelihood\r\nwere not matters for which medieval conditions fostered\r\ncare in any case. But moral philosophy\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_54\"\u003e54\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwas prevailed upon to damn the body on principle,\r\nand to relegate to insignificance as merely mundane\r\nand temporal the problem of a just industrial\r\norder. Circumstances of the times bore with sufficient\r\nhardness upon successful scientific investigation;\r\nbut philosophy added the conviction that in\r\nany case truth is so supernal that it must be supernaturally\r\nrevealed, and so important that it must\r\nbe authoritatively imparted and enforced. Intelligence\r\nwas diverted from the critical consideration\r\nof the natural sources and social consequences\r\nof better and worse into the channel of metaphysical\r\nsubtleties and systems, acceptance of\r\nwhich was made essential to participation in the\r\nsocial order and in rational excellence. Philosophy\r\nbound the once erect form of human endeavor and\r\nprogress to the chariot wheels of cosmology and\r\ntheology.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSince the Renaissance, moral philosophy has repeatedly\r\nreverted to the Greek ideal of natural excellence\r\nrealized in social life, under the fostering\r\ncare of intelligence in action. The return, however,\r\nhas taken place under the influence of democratic\r\npolity, commercial expansion, and scientific\r\nreorganization. It has been a liberation more than\r\na reversion. This combined return and emancipation,\r\nhaving transformed our practice of life in the\r\nlast four centuries, will not be content till it has\r\nwritten itself clear in our theory of that practice.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_55\"\u003e55\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nWhether the consequent revolution in moral philosophy\r\nbe termed pragmatism or be given the happier\r\ntitle of the applied and experimental habit of\r\nmind is of little account. What is of moment is\r\nthat intelligence has descended from its lonely isolation\r\nat the remote edge of things, whence it\r\noperated as unmoved mover and ultimate good, to\r\ntake its seat in the moving affairs of men. Theory\r\nmay therefore become responsible to the practices\r\nthat have generated it; the good be connected\r\nwith nature, but with nature naturally, not metaphysically,\r\nconceived, and social life be cherished\r\nin behalf of its own immediate possibilities, not on\r\nthe ground of its remote connections with a cosmic\r\nreason and an absolute end.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThere is a notion, more familiar than correct,\r\nthat Greek thought sacrificed the individual to the\r\nstate. None has ever known better than the Greek\r\nthat the individual comes to himself and to his\r\nown only in association with others. But Greek\r\nthought subjected, as we have seen, both state and\r\nindividual to an external cosmic order; and thereby\r\nit inevitably restricted the free use in doubt, inquiry,\r\nand experimentation, of the human intelligence.\r\nThe \u003ci xml:lang=\"la\" lang=\"la\"\u003eanima libera\u003c/i\u003e, the free mind of the\r\nsixteenth century, of Galileo and his successors,\r\nwas the counterpart of the disintegration of cosmology\r\nand its animistic teleology. The lecturer\r\non political economy reminded us that his subject\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_56\"\u003e56\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nbegan, in the Middle Ages, as a branch of ethics,\r\nthough, as he hastened to show, it soon got into\r\nbetter association. Well, the same company was\r\nonce kept by all the sciences, mathematical and\r\nphysical as well as social. According to all accounts\r\nit was the integrity of the number one and\r\nthe rectitude of the square that attracted the\r\nattention of Pythagoras to arithmetic and geometry\r\nas promising fields of study. Astronomy was\r\nthe projected picture book of a cosmic object lesson\r\nin morals, Dante’s transcript of which is none\r\nthe less literal because poetic. If physics alone remained\r\noutside the moral fold, while noble essences\r\nredeemed chemistry, occult forces blessed physiology,\r\nand the immaterial soul exalted psychology,\r\nphysics is the exception that proves the rule: matter\r\nwas so inherently immoral that no high-minded\r\nscience would demean itself by contact with it.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf we do not join with many in lamenting the\r\nstripping from nature of those idealistic properties\r\nin which animism survived, if we do not mourn the\r\nsecession of the sciences from ethics, it is because\r\nthe abandonment by intelligence of a fixed and\r\nstatic moral end was the necessary precondition of\r\na free and progressive science of both things and\r\nmorals; because the emancipation of the sciences\r\nfrom ready made, remote, and abstract values was\r\nnecessary to make the sciences available for creating\r\nand maintaining more and specific values here\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_57\"\u003e57\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nand now. The divine comedy of modern medicine\r\nand hygiene is one of the human epics yet to be\r\nwritten; but when composed it may prove no unworthy\r\ncompanion of the medieval epic of other\r\nworldly beatific visions. The great ideas of the\r\neighteenth century, that expansive epoch of moral\r\nperception which ranks in illumination and fervor\r\nalong with classic Greek thought, the great ideas\r\nof the indefinitely continuous progress of humanity\r\nand of the power and significance of freed intelligence,\r\nwere borne by a single mother\u0026mdash;experimental\r\ninquiry.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe growth of industry and commerce is at once\r\ncause and effect of the growth in science. Democritus\r\nand other ancients conceived the mechanical\r\ntheory of the universe. The notion was not only\r\nblank and repellent, because it ignored the rich\r\nsocial material which Plato and Aristotle had organized\r\ninto their rival idealistic views; but it was\r\nscientifically sterile, a piece of dialectics. Contempt\r\nfor machines as the accouterments of despised\r\nmechanics kept the mechanical conception\r\naloof from these specific and controllable experiences\r\nwhich alone could fructify it. This conception,\r\nthen, like the idealistic, was translated into a\r\nspeculative cosmology and thrown like a vast net\r\naround the universe at large, as if to keep it from\r\ncoming to pieces. It is from respect for the lever,\r\nthe pulley, and the screw that modern experimental\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_58\"\u003e58\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nand mathematical mechanics derives itself. Motion,\r\ntraced through the workings of a machine,\r\nwas followed out into natural events and studied\r\njust as motion, not as a poor yet necessary device\r\nfor realizing final causes. So studied, it was found\r\nto be available for new machines and new applications,\r\nwhich in creating new ends also promoted new\r\nwants, and thereby stimulated new activities, new\r\ndiscoveries, and new inventions. The recognition\r\nthat natural energy can be systematically applied,\r\nthrough experimental observation, to the satisfaction\r\nand multiplication of concrete wants is doubtless\r\nthe greatest single discovery ever imported\r\ninto the life of man\u0026mdash;save perhaps the discovery of\r\nlanguage. Science, borrowing from industry, repaid\r\nthe debt with interest, and has made the control\r\nof natural forces for the aims of life so inevitable\r\nthat for the first time man is relieved from\r\noverhanging fear, with its wolflike scramble to possess\r\nand accumulate, and is freed to consider the\r\nmore gracious question of securing to all an ample\r\nand liberal life. The industrial life had been condemned\r\nby Greek exaltation of abstract thought\r\nand by Greek contempt for labor, as representing\r\nthe brute struggle of carnal appetite for its own\r\nsatiety. The industrial movement, offspring of\r\nscience, restored it to its central position in morals.\r\nWhen Adam Smith made economic activity the\r\nmoving spring of man’s unremitting effort, from\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_59\"\u003e59\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe cradle to the grave, to better his own lot, he\r\nrecorded this change. And when he made sympathy\r\nthe central spring in man’s conscious moral endeavor,\r\nhe reported the effect which the increasing\r\nintercourse of men, due primarily to commerce, had\r\nin breaking down suspicion and jealousy and in\r\nliberating man’s kindlier impulses.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eDemocracy, the crucial expression of modern\r\nlife, is not so much an addition to the scientific\r\nand industrial tendencies as it is the perception of\r\ntheir social or spiritual meaning. Democracy is\r\nan absurdity where faith in the individual as individual\r\nis impossible; and this faith is impossible\r\nwhen intelligence is regarded as a cosmic power,\r\nnot an adjustment and application of individual\r\ntendencies. It is also impossible when appetites\r\nand desires are conceived to be the dominant factor\r\nin the constitution of most men’s characters, and\r\nwhen appetite and desire are conceived to be manifestations\r\nof the disorderly and unruly principle of\r\nnature. To put the intellectual center of gravity\r\nin the objective cosmos, outside of men’s own experiments\r\nand tests, and then to invite the application\r\nof individual intelligence to the determination\r\nof society, is to invite chaos. To hold that want\r\nis mere negative flux and hence requires external\r\nfixation by reason, and then to invite the wants to\r\ngive free play to themselves in social construction\r\nand intercourse, is to call down anarchy. Democracy\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_60\"\u003e60\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nis estimable only through the changed conception\r\nof intelligence, that forms modern science,\r\nand of want, that forms modern industry. It is\r\nessentially a changed psychology. The substitution,\r\nfor \u003ci xml:lang=\"la\" lang=\"la\"\u003ea priori\u003c/i\u003e truth and deduction, of fluent\r\ndoubt and inquiry meant trust in human nature\r\nin the concrete; in individual honesty, curiosity,\r\nand sympathy. The substitution of moving commerce\r\nfor fixed custom meant a view of wants as\r\nthe dynamics of social progress, not as the pathology\r\nof private greed. The nineteenth century indeed\r\nturned sour on that somewhat complacent optimism\r\nin which the eighteenth century rested: the\r\nideas that the intelligent self-love of individuals\r\nwould conduce to social cohesion, and competition\r\namong individuals usher in the kingdom of social\r\nwelfare. But the conception of a social harmony\r\nof interests in which the achievement by each individual\r\nof his own freedom should contribute to\r\na like perfecting of the powers of all, through a\r\nfraternally organized society, is the permanent\r\ncontribution of the industrial movement to morals\u0026mdash;even\r\nthough so far it be but the contribution\r\nof a problem.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIntellectually speaking, the centuries since the\r\nfourteenth are the true middle ages. They mark\r\nthe transitional period of mental habit, as the so-called\r\nmedieval period represents the petrifaction,\r\nunder changed outward conditions, of Greek ideas.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_61\"\u003e61\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nThe conscious articulation of genuinely modern\r\ntendencies has yet to come, and till it comes the\r\nethic of our own life must remain undescribed.\r\nBut the system of morals which has come nearest\r\nto the reflection of the movements of science, democracy,\r\nand commerce, is doubtless the utilitarian.\r\nScientific, after the modern mode, it certainly\r\nwould be. Newton’s influence dyes deep the moral\r\nthought of the eighteenth century. The arrangements\r\nof the solar system had been described in\r\nterms of a homogeneous matter and motion, worked\r\nby two opposed and compensating forces: all because\r\na method of analysis, of generalization by\r\nanalogy, and of mathematical deduction back to\r\nnew empirical details had been followed. The imagination\r\nof the eighteenth century was a Newtonian\r\nimagination; and this no less in social\r\nthan in physical matters. Hume proclaims that\r\nmorals is about to become an experimental science.\r\nJust as, almost in our own day, Mill’s interest in a\r\nmethod for social science led him to reformulate\r\nthe logic of experimental inquiry, so all the great\r\nmen of the Enlightenment were in search for the\r\norganon of morals which should repeat the physical\r\ntriumphs of Newton. Bentham notes that physics\r\nhas had its Bacon and Newton; that morals has\r\nhad its Bacon in Helvétius, but still awaits its\r\nNewton; and he leaves us in no doubt that at the\r\nmoment of writing he was ready, modestly but\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_62\"\u003e62\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nfirmly, to fill the waiting niche with its missing\r\nfigure.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe industrial movement furnished the concrete\r\nimagery for this ethical renovation. The utilitarians\r\nborrowed from Adam Smith the notion that\r\nthrough industrial exchange in a free society the\r\nindividual pursuing his own good is led, under the\r\nguidance of the “invisible hand,” to promote the\r\ngeneral good more effectually than if he had set\r\nout to do it. This idea was dressed out in the\r\natomistic psychology which Hartley built out from\r\nLocke\u0026mdash;and was returned at usurious rates to later\r\neconomists.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFrom the great French writers who had sought\r\nto justify and promote democratic individualism,\r\ncame the conception that, since it is perverted\r\npolitical institutions which deprave individuals and\r\nbring them into hostility, nation against nation,\r\nclass against class, individual against individual,\r\nthe great political problem is such a reform of law\r\nand legislation, civil and criminal, of administration,\r\nand of education as will force the individual\r\nto find his own interests in pursuits conducing to\r\nthe welfare of others.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eTremendously effective as a tool of criticism, operative\r\nin abolition and elimination, utilitarianism\r\nfailed to measure up to the constructive needs of\r\nthe time. Its theoretical equalization of the good\r\nof each with that of every other was practically\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_63\"\u003e63\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nperverted by its excessive interest in the middle\r\nand manufacturing classes. Its speculative defect\r\nof an atomistic psychology combined with this\r\nnarrowness of vision to make light of the constructive\r\nwork that needs to be done by the state, before\r\nall can have, otherwise than in name, an equal\r\nchance to count in the common good. Thus the\r\nage-long subordination of economics to politics was\r\nrevenged in the submerging of both politics and\r\nethics in a narrow theory of economic profit; and\r\nutilitarianism, in its orthodox descendants, proffered\r\nthe disjointed pieces of a mechanism, with a\r\nmonotonous reiteration that looked at aright they\r\nform a beautifully harmonious organism.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003ePrevision, and to some extent experience, of this\r\nfailure, conjoined with differing social traditions\r\nand ambitions, evoked German idealism, the transcendental\r\nmorals of Kant and his successors. German\r\nthought strove to preserve the traditions\r\nwhich bound culture to the past, while revising\r\nthese traditions to render them capable of meeting\r\nnovel conditions. It found weapons at hand in the\r\nconceptions borrowed by Roman law from Stoic\r\nphilosophy, and in the conceptions by which Protestant\r\nhumanism had re-edited scholastic Catholicism.\r\nGrotius had made the idea of natural law,\r\nnatural right and obligation, the central idea of\r\nGerman morals, as thoroughly as Locke had made\r\nthe individual desire for liberty and happiness the\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_64\"\u003e64\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nfocus of English and then of French speculation.\r\nMaterialized idealism is the happy monstrosity in\r\nwhich the popular demand for vivid imagery is\r\nmost easily reconciled with the equally strong demand\r\nfor supremacy of moral values; and the complete\r\nidealistic materialism of Stoicism has always\r\ngiven its ideas a practical influence out of all proportion\r\nto their theoretical vogue as a system.\r\nTo the Protestant, that is the German, humanist,\r\nNatural Law, the bond of harmonious reason in\r\nnature, the spring of social intercourse among\r\nmen, the inward light of individual conscience,\r\nunited Cicero, St. Paul, and Luther in blessed\r\nunion; gave a rational, not superrational basis for\r\nmorals, and provided room for social legislation\r\nwhich at the same time could easily be held back\r\nfrom too ruthless application to dominant class interests.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eKant saw the mass of empirical and hence irrelevant\r\ndetail that had found refuge within this liberal\r\nand diffusive reason. He saw that the idea of\r\nreason could be made self-consistent only by stripping\r\nit naked of these empirical accretions. He\r\nthen provided, in his critiques, a somewhat cumbrous\r\nmoving van for transferring the resultant\r\npure or naked reason out of nature and the objective\r\nworld, and for locating it in new quarters,\r\nwith a new stock of goods and new customers. The\r\nnew quarters were particular subjects, individuals;\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_65\"\u003e65\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe stock of goods were the forms of perception and\r\nthe functions of thought by which empirical flux is\r\nwoven into durable fabrics; the new customers were\r\na society of individuals in which all are ends in themselves.\r\nThere ought to be an injunction issued\r\nthat Kant’s saying about Hume’s awakening of\r\nhim should not be quoted save in connection with\r\nhis other saying that Rousseau brought him to himself,\r\nin teaching him that the philosopher is of less\r\naccount than the laborer in the fields unless he contributes\r\nto human freedom. But none the less, the\r\nnew tenant, the universal reason, and the old homestead,\r\nthe empirical tumultuous individual, could\r\nnot get on together. Reason became a mere voice\r\nwhich, having nothing in particular to say, said\r\nLaw, Duty, in general, leaving to the existing\r\nsocial order of the Prussia of Frederick the Great\r\nthe congenial task of declaring just what was obligatory\r\nin the concrete. The marriage of freedom\r\nand authority was thus celebrated with the\r\nunderstanding that sentimental primacy went to\r\nthe former and practical control to the latter.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe effort to force a universal reason that had\r\nbeen used to the broad domains of the cosmos into\r\nthe cramped confines of individuality conceived as\r\nmerely “empirical,” a highly particularized creature\r\nof sense, could have but one result: an explosion.\r\nThe products of that explosion constitute\r\nthe Post-Kantian philosophies. It was the work of\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_66\"\u003e66\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nHegel to attempt to fill in the empty reason of\r\nKant with the concrete contents of history. The\r\nvoice sounded like the voice of Aristotle, Thomas\r\nof Aquino, and Spinoza translated into Swabian\r\nGerman; but the hands were as the hands of Montesquieu,\r\nHerder, Condorcet, and the rising historical\r\nschool. The outcome was the assertion that\r\nhistory is reason, and reason is history: the actual\r\nis rational, the rational is the actual. It gave the\r\npleasant appearance (which Hegel did not strenuously\r\ndiscourage) of being specifically an idealization\r\nof the Prussian nation, and incidentally a systematized\r\napologetic for the universe at large.\r\nBut in intellectual and practical effect, it lifted the\r\nidea of process above that of fixed origins and fixed\r\nends, and presented the social and moral order, as\r\nwell as the intellectual, as a scene of becoming, and\r\nit located reason somewhere within the struggles of\r\nlife.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eUnstable equilibrium, rapid fermentation, and a\r\nsuccession of explosive reports are thus the chief\r\nnotes of modern ethics. Scepticism and traditionalism,\r\nempiricism and rationalism, crude naturalisms\r\nand all-embracing idealisms, flourish side by\r\nside\u0026mdash;all the more flourish, one suspects, because\r\nside by side. Spencer exults because natural science\r\nreveals that a rapid transit system of evolution is\r\ncarrying us automatically to the goal of perfect\r\nman in perfect society; and his English idealistic\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_67\"\u003e67\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ncontemporary, Green, is so disturbed by the removal\r\nfrom nature of its moral qualities, that he\r\ntries to show that this makes no difference, since nature\r\nin any case is constituted and known through\r\na spiritual principle which is as permanent as nature\r\nis changing. An Amiel genteelly laments the\r\ndecadence of the inner life, while his neighbor Nietzsche\r\nbrandishes in rude ecstasy the banner of brute\r\nsurvival as a happy omen of the final victory of\r\nnobility of mind. The reasonable conclusion from\r\nsuch a scene is that there is taking place a transformation\r\nof attitude towards moral theory rather\r\nthan mere propagation of varieties among theories.\r\nThe classic theories all agreed in one regard. They\r\nall alike assumed the existence of \u003cem\u003ethe\u003c/em\u003e end, the \u003ci xml:lang=\"la\" lang=\"la\"\u003esummum\r\nbonum\u003c/i\u003e, the final goal; and of \u003cem\u003ethe\u003c/em\u003e separate\r\nmoral force that moves to that goal. Moralists\r\nhave disputed as to whether the end is an aggregate\r\nof pleasurable state of consciousness, enjoyment\r\nof the divine essence, acknowledgment of the\r\nlaw of duty, or conformity to environment. So they\r\nhave disputed as to the path by which the final\r\ngoal is to be reached: fear or benevolence? reverence\r\nfor pure law or pity for others? self-love or\r\naltruism? But these very controversies implied\r\nthat there was but the one end and the one\r\nmeans.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe transformation in attitude, to which I referred,\r\nis the growing belief that the proper business\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_68\"\u003e68\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof intelligence is discrimination of multiple\r\nand present goods and of the varied immediate\r\nmeans of their realization; not search for the one\r\nremote aim. The progress of biology has accustomed\r\nour minds to the notion that intelligence is\r\nnot an outside power presiding supremely but statically\r\nover the desires and efforts of man, but\r\nis a method of adjustment of capacities and conditions\r\nwithin specific situations. History, as the\r\nlecturer on that subject told us, has discovered itself\r\nin the idea of process. The genetic standpoint\r\nmakes us aware that the systems of the past are\r\nneither fraudulent impostures nor absolute revelations;\r\nbut are the products of political, economic,\r\nand scientific conditions whose change carries with\r\nit change of theoretical formulations. The recognition\r\nthat intelligence is properly an organ of adjustment\r\nin difficult situations makes us aware that\r\npast theories were of value so far as they helped\r\ncarry to an issue the social perplexities from which\r\nthey emerged. But the chief impact of the evolutionary\r\nmethod is upon the present. Theory\r\nhaving learned what it cannot do, is made responsible\r\nfor the better performance of what needs to\r\nbe done, and what only a broadly equipped intelligence\r\ncan undertake: study of the conditions out\r\nof which come the obstacles and the resources of\r\nadequate life, and developing and testing the ideas\r\nthat, as working hypotheses, may be used to diminish\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_69\"\u003e69\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe causes of evil and to buttress and expand\r\nthe sources of good. This program is indeed\r\nvague, but only unfamiliarity with it could lead\r\none to the conclusion that it is less vague than the\r\nidea that there is a single moral ideal and a single\r\nmoral motive force.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFrom this point of view there is no separate body\r\nof moral rules; no separate system of motive powers;\r\nno separate subject-matter of moral knowledge,\r\nand hence no such thing as an isolated ethical\r\nscience. If the business of morals is not to speculate\r\nupon man’s final end and upon an ultimate\r\nstandard of right, it is to utilize physiology, anthropology,\r\nand psychology to discover all that\r\ncan be discovered of man, his organic powers and\r\npropensities. If its business is not to search for\r\nthe one separate moral motive, it is to converge all\r\nthe instrumentalities of the social arts, of law, education,\r\neconomics, and political science upon the\r\nconstruction of intelligent methods of improving\r\nthe common lot.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf we still wish to make our peace with the past,\r\nand to sum up the plural and changing goods of\r\nlife in a single word, doubtless the term happiness\r\nis the one most apt. But we should again exchange\r\nfree morals for sterile metaphysics, if we\r\nimagine that “happiness” is any less unique than\r\nthe individuals who experience it; any less complex\r\nthan the constitution of their capacities, or any less\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_70\"\u003e70\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nvariable than the objects upon which their capacities\r\nare directed.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eTo many timid, albeit sincere, souls of an earlier\r\ncentury, the decay of the doctrine that all true\r\nand worthful science is knowledge of final causes\r\nseemed fraught with danger to science and to morals.\r\nThe rival conception of a wide open universe,\r\na universe without bounds in time or space, without\r\nfinal limits of origin or destiny, a universe with the\r\nlid off, was a menace. We now face in moral science\r\na similar crisis and like opportunity, as well\r\nas share in a like dreadful suspense. The abolition\r\nof a fixed and final goal and causal force in nature\r\ndid not, as matter of fact, render rational conviction\r\nless important or less attainable. It was accompanied\r\nby the provision of a technique of persistent\r\nand detailed inquiry in all special fields of\r\nfact, a technique which led to the detection of unsuspected\r\nforces and the revelation of undreamed\r\nof uses. In like fashion we may anticipate that\r\nthe abolition of \u003cem\u003ethe\u003c/em\u003e final goal and \u003cem\u003ethe\u003c/em\u003e single motive\r\npower and \u003cem\u003ethe\u003c/em\u003e separate and infallible faculty in\r\nmorals, will quicken inquiry into the diversity of\r\nspecific goods of experience, fix attention upon\r\ntheir conditions, and bring to light values now dim\r\nand obscure. The change may relieve men from\r\nresponsibility for what they cannot do, but it will\r\npromote thoughtful consideration of what they\r\nmay do and the definition of responsibility for what\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_71\"\u003e71\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthey do amiss because of failure to think straight\r\nand carefully. Absolute goods will fall into the\r\nbackground, but the question of making more sure\r\nand extensive the share of all men in natural and\r\nsocial goods will be urgent, a problem not to be\r\nescaped nor evaded.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eMorals, philosophy, returns to its first love; love\r\nof the wisdom that is nurse, as nature is mother,\r\nof good. But it returns to the Socratic principle\r\nequipped with a multitude of special methods of inquiry\r\nand testing; with an organized mass of\r\nknowledge, and with control of the arrangements\r\nby which industry, law, and education may concentrate\r\nupon the problem of the participation by all\r\nmen and women, up to their capacity of absorption,\r\nin all attained values. Morals may then well leave\r\nto poetry and to art, the task (so unartistically\r\nperformed by philosophy since Plato) of gathering\r\ntogether and rounding out, into one abiding picture,\r\nthe separate and special goods of life. It\r\nmay leave this task with the assurance that the resultant\r\nsynthesis will not depict any final and all-inclusive\r\ngood, but will add just one more specific\r\ngood to the enjoyable excellencies of life.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eHumorous irony shines through most of the\r\nharsh glances turned towards the idea of an experimental\r\nbasis and career for morals. Some\r\nshiver in the fear that morals will be plunged into\r\nanarchic confusion\u0026mdash;a view well expressed by a\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_72\"\u003e72\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nrecent writer in the saying that if the \u003ci xml:lang=\"la\" lang=\"la\"\u003ea priori\u003c/i\u003e and\r\ntranscendental basis of morals be abandoned “we\r\nshall have merely the same certainty that now exists\r\nin physics and chemistry”! Elsewhere lurks\r\nthe apprehension that the progress of scientific\r\nmethod will deliver the purposive freedom of man\r\nbound hand and foot to the fatal decrees of iron\r\nnecessity, called natural law. The notion that\r\nlaws govern and forces rule is an animistic survival.\r\nIt is a product of reading nature in terms\r\nof politics in order to turn around and then read\r\npolitics in the light of supposed sanctions of nature.\r\nThis idea passed from medieval theology\r\ninto the science of Newton, to whom the universe\r\nwas the dominion of a sovereign whose laws were\r\nthe laws of nature. From Newton it passed into\r\nthe deism of the eighteenth century, whence it migrated\r\ninto the philosophy of the Enlightenment,\r\nto make its last stand in Spencer’s philosophy of\r\nthe fixed environment and the static goal.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNo, nature is not an unchangeable order, unwinding\r\nitself majestically from the reel of law\r\nunder the control of deified forces. It is an indefinite\r\ncongeries of changes. Laws are not governmental\r\nregulations which limit change, but are\r\nconvenient formulations of selected portions of\r\nchange followed through a longer or shorter period\r\nof time, and then registered in statistical forms\r\nthat are amenable to mathematical manipulation.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_73\"\u003e73\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nThat this device of shorthand symbolization presages\r\nthe subjection of man’s intelligent effort to\r\nfixity of law and environment is interesting as a\r\nculture survival, but is not important for moral\r\ntheory. Savage and child delight in creating\r\nbogeys from which, their origin and structure being\r\nconveniently concealed, interesting thrills and\r\nshudders may be had. Civilized man in the nineteenth\r\ncentury outdid these bugaboos in his image\r\nof a fixed universe hung on a cast-iron framework\r\nof fixed, necessary, and universal laws. Knowledge\r\nof nature does not mean subjection to predestination,\r\nbut insight into courses of change; an\r\ninsight which is formulated in “laws,” that is,\r\nmethods of subsequent procedure.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eKnowledge of the process and conditions of physical\r\nand social change through experimental science\r\nand genetic history has one result with a double\r\nname: increase of control, and increase of responsibility;\r\nincrease of power to direct natural change,\r\nand increase of responsibility for its equitable direction\r\ntoward fuller good. Theory located within\r\nprogressive practice instead of reigning statically\r\nsupreme over it, means practice itself made responsible\r\nto intelligence; to intelligence which relentlessly\r\nscrutinizes the consequences of every practice,\r\nand which exacts liability by an equally relentless\r\npublicity. As long as morals occupies itself\r\nwith mere ideals, forces and conditions as they\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_74\"\u003e74\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nare will be good enough for “practical” men,\r\nsince they are then left free to their own devices\r\nin turning these to their own account. As long as\r\nmoralists plume themselves upon possession of the\r\ndomain of the categorical imperative with its bare\r\nprecepts, men of executive habits will always be at\r\ntheir elbows to regulate the concrete social conditions\r\nthrough which the form of law gets its actual\r\nfilling of specific injunctions. When freedom is\r\nconceived to be transcendental, the coercive restraint\r\nof immediate necessity will lay its harsh\r\nhand upon the mass of men.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn the end, men do what they can do. They\r\nrefrain from doing what they cannot do. They\r\ndo what their own specific powers in conjunction\r\nwith the limitations and resources of the environment\r\npermit. The effective control of their powers\r\nis not through precepts, but through the regulation\r\nof their conditions. If this regulation is to\r\nbe not merely physical or coercive, but moral, it\r\nmust consist of the intelligent selection and determination\r\nof the environments in which we act;\r\nand in an intelligent exaction of responsibility for\r\nthe use of men’s powers. Theorists inquire after\r\nthe “motive” to morality, to virtue and the good,\r\nunder such circumstances. What then, one wonders,\r\nis their conception of the make-up of human\r\nnature and of its relation to virtue and to goodness?\r\nThe pessimism that dictates such a question,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_75\"\u003e75\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nif it be justified, precludes any consideration\r\nof morals.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe diversion of intelligence from discrimination\r\nof plural and concrete goods, from noting\r\ntheir conditions and obstacles, and from devising\r\nmethods for holding men responsible for their\r\nconcrete use of powers and conditions, has done\r\nmore than brute love of power to establish inequality\r\nand injustice among men. It has done\r\nmore, because it has confirmed with social sanctions\r\nthe principle of feudal domination. All\r\nmen require moral sanctions in their conduct: the\r\nconsent of their kind. Not getting it otherwise,\r\nthey go insane to feign it. No man ever lived\r\nwith the exclusive approval of his own conscience.\r\nHence the vacuum left in practical matters by the\r\nremote irrelevancy of transcendental morals has to\r\nbe filled in somehow. It is filled in. It is filled in\r\nwith class-codes, class-standards, class-approvals\u0026mdash;with\r\ncodes which recommend the practices and\r\nhabits already current in a given circle, set, calling,\r\nprofession, trade, industry, club, or gang. These\r\nclass-codes always lean back upon and support\r\nthemselves by the professed ideal code. This latter\r\nmeets them more than half-way. Being in its pretense\r\na theory for regulating practice, it must demonstrate\r\nits practicability. It is uneasy in isolation,\r\nand travels hastily to meet with compromise and\r\naccommodation the actual situation in all its brute\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_76\"\u003e76\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nunrationality. Where the pressure is greatest\u0026mdash;in\r\nthe habitual practice of the political and economic\r\nchieftains\u0026mdash;there it accommodates the most.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eClass-codes of morals are sanctions, under the\r\ncaption of ideals, of uncriticised customs; they are\r\nrecommendations, under the head of duties, of what\r\nthe members of the class are already most given\r\nto doing. If there are to obtain more equable and\r\ncomprehensive principles of action, exacting a\r\nmore impartial exercise of natural power and resource\r\nin the interests of a common good, members\r\nof a class must no longer rest content in responsibility\r\nto a class whose traditions constitute its\r\nconscience, but be made responsible to a society\r\nwhose conscience is its free and effectively organized\r\nintelligence.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn such a conscience alone will the Socratic injunction\r\nto man to know himself be fulfilled.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_77\"\u003e77\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\r\n\u003ch2 title=\"THE EXPERIMENTAL THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"THE_EXPERIMENTAL_THEORY_OF_KNOWLEDGE\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eTHE EXPERIMENTAL THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_7\" href=\"#Footnote_7\" class=\"fnanchor smaller\"\u003e7\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"drop-cap\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap1\"\u003eIt\u003c/span\u003e should be possible to discern and describe a\r\nknowing as one identifies any object, concern,\r\nor event. It must have its own marks; it must\r\noffer characteristic features\u0026mdash;as much so as a\r\nthunder-storm, the constitution of a State, or a\r\nleopard. In the search for this affair, we are first\r\nof all desirous for something which is for itself,\r\ncontemporaneously with its occurrence, a cognition,\r\nnot something called knowledge by another and\r\nfrom without\u0026mdash;whether this other be logician,\r\npsychologist, or epistemologist. The “knowledge”\r\nmay turn out false, and hence no knowledge;\r\nbut this is an after-affair; it may prove\r\nto be rich in fruitage of wisdom, but if this\r\noutcome be only wisdom after the event, it\r\ndoes not concern us. What we want is just something\r\nwhich takes itself as knowledge, rightly or\r\nwrongly.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_78\"\u003e78\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003eI\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis means a specific case, a sample. Yet instances\r\nare proverbially dangerous\u0026mdash;so naïvely\r\nand graciously may they beg the questions at issue.\r\nOur recourse is to an example so simple, so much\r\non its face as to be as innocent as may be of assumptions.\r\nThis case we shall gradually complicate,\r\nmindful at each step to state just what new\r\nelements are introduced. Let us suppose a smell,\r\njust a floating odor. This odor may be anchored\r\nby supposing that it moves to action; it starts\r\nchanges that end in picking and enjoying a rose.\r\nThis description is intended to apply to the course\r\nof events witnessed and recounted from without.\r\nWhat sort of a course must it be to constitute a\r\nknowledge, or to have somewhere within its career\r\nthat which deserves this title? The smell, \u003ci xml:lang=\"la\" lang=\"la\"\u003eimprimis\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nis there; the movements that it excites are\r\nthere; the final plucking and gratification are experienced.\r\nBut, let us say, the smell is not the\r\nsmell of the rose; the resulting change of the organism\r\nis not a sense of walking and reaching; the\r\ndelicious finale is not the fulfilment of the movement,\r\nand, through that, of the original smell; “is\r\nnot,” in each case meaning is “not experienced as”\r\nsuch. We may take, in short, these experiences in\r\na brutely serial fashion. The smell, \u003cem\u003eS\u003c/em\u003e, is replaced\r\n(and displaced) by a felt movement, \u003cem\u003eK\u003c/em\u003e, this is replaced\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_79\"\u003e79\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nby the gratification, \u003cem\u003eG\u003c/em\u003e. Viewed from without,\r\nas we are now regarding it, there is \u003cem\u003eS-K-G\u003c/em\u003e.\r\nBut from within, for itself, it is now \u003cem\u003eS\u003c/em\u003e, now\r\n\u003cem\u003eK\u003c/em\u003e, now \u003cem\u003eG\u003c/em\u003e, and so on to the end of the chapter.\r\nNowhere is there looking before and after;\r\nmemory and anticipation are not born. Such\r\nan experience neither is, in whole or in part,\r\na knowledge, nor does it exercise a cognitive\r\nfunction.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eHere, however, we may be halted. If there is\r\nanything present in “consciousness” at all, we\r\nmay be told (at least we constantly are so told)\r\nthere must be knowledge of it as present\u0026mdash;present,\r\nat all events, in “consciousness.” There is, so it\r\nis argued, knowledge at least of a simple apprehensive\r\ntype, knowledge of the acquaintance order,\r\nknowledge \u003cem\u003ethat\u003c/em\u003e, even though not knowledge \u003cem\u003ewhat\u003c/em\u003e.\r\nThe smell, it is admitted, does not know \u003cem\u003eabout\u003c/em\u003e anything\r\nelse, nor is anything known \u003cem\u003eabout\u003c/em\u003e the smell\r\n(the same thing, perhaps); but the smell is known,\r\neither by itself, or by the mind, or by some subject,\r\nsome unwinking, unremitting eye. No, we\r\nmust reply; there is no apprehension without some\r\n(however slight) context; no acquaintance which\r\nis not either recognition or expectation. Acquaintance\r\nis presence honored with an escort;\r\npresence is introduced as familiar, or an associate\r\nsprings up to greet it. Acquaintance always implies\r\na little friendliness; a trace of re-knowing, of\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_80\"\u003e80\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nanticipatory welcome or dread of the trait to follow.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis claim cannot be dismissed as trivial. If\r\nvalid, it carries with it the distance between being\r\nand knowing: and the recognition of an element of\r\nmediation, that is, of art, in all knowledge. This\r\ndisparity, this transcendence, is not something\r\nwhich holds of \u003cem\u003eour\u003c/em\u003e knowledge, of finite knowledge,\r\njust marking the gap between our type of consciousness\r\nand some other with which we may contrast\r\nit after the manner of the agnostic or the\r\ntranscendentalist (who hold so much property in\r\njoint ownership!), but exists because knowing is\r\nknowing, that way of bringing things to bear upon\r\nthings which we call reflection\u0026mdash;a manipulation of\r\nthings experienced in the light one of another.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e“Feeling,” I read in a recent article, “feeling\r\nis immediately acquainted with its own quality,\r\nwith its own subjective being.”\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_8\" href=\"#Footnote_8\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e8\u003c/a\u003e How and whence\r\nthis duplication in the inwards of feeling into feeling\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_81\"\u003e81\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe knower and feeling the known? into feeling\r\nas being and feeling as acquaintance? Let us\r\nfrankly deny such monsters. Feeling \u003cem\u003eis\u003c/em\u003e its own\r\nquality; is its own \u003cem\u003especific\u003c/em\u003e (whence and why, once\r\nmore, \u003cem\u003esubjective\u003c/em\u003e?) being. If this statement be\r\ndogmatism, it is at least worth insistent declaration,\r\nwere it only by way of counter-irritant to that\r\nother dogmatism which asserts that being in “consciousness”\r\nis always presence for or in knowledge.\r\nSo let us repeat once more, that to be a smell (or\r\nanything else) is one thing, to be \u003cem\u003eknown\u003c/em\u003e as smell,\r\nanother; to be a “feeling” one thing, to be \u003cem\u003eknown\u003c/em\u003e\r\nas a “feeling” another.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_9\" href=\"#Footnote_9\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e9\u003c/a\u003e The first is thinghood;\r\nexistence indubitable, direct; in this way all things\r\n\u003cem\u003eare\u003c/em\u003e that are in “consciousness” at all.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_10\" href=\"#Footnote_10\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e10\u003c/a\u003e The\r\nsecond is \u003cem\u003ereflected\u003c/em\u003e being, things indicating and calling\r\nfor other things\u0026mdash;something offering the possibility\r\nof truth and hence of falsity. The first is\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_82\"\u003e82\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ngenuine immediacy; the second is (in the instance\r\ndiscussed) a pseudo-immediacy, which in the same\r\nbreath that it proclaims its immediacy smuggles in\r\nanother term (and one which is unexperienced both\r\nin itself and in its relation) the subject or “consciousness,”\r\nto which the immediate is related.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_11\" href=\"#Footnote_11\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e11\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut we need not remain with dogmatic assertions.\r\nTo be acquainted with a thing or with a\r\nperson has a definite empirical meaning; we have\r\nonly to call to mind what it is to be genuinely and\r\nempirically acquainted, to have done forever with\r\nthis uncanny presence which, though bare and simple\r\npresence, is yet known, and thus is clothed\r\nupon and complicated. To be acquainted with a\r\nthing is to be assured (from the standpoint of the\r\nexperience itself) that it is of such and such a\r\ncharacter; that it will behave, if given an opportunity,\r\nin such and such a way; that the obviously\r\nand flagrantly present trait is associated with fellow\r\ntraits that will show themselves, if the leadings\r\nof the present trait are followed out. To be\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_83\"\u003e83\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nacquainted is to anticipate to some extent, on the\r\nbasis of prior experience. I am, say, barely acquainted\r\nwith Mr. Smith: then I have no extended\r\nbody of associated qualities along with those palpably\r\npresent, but at least some one suggested trait\r\noccurs; his nose, his tone of voice, the place where\r\nI saw him, his calling in life, an interesting anecdote\r\nabout him, etc. To be acquainted is to know\r\nwhat a thing is \u003cem\u003elike\u003c/em\u003e in some particular. If one is\r\nacquainted with the smell of a flower it means that\r\nthe smell is not just smell, but reminds one of\r\nsome other experienced thing which stands in continuity\r\nwith the smell. There is thus supplied a\r\ncondition of control over or purchase upon what\r\nis present, the possibility of translating it into\r\nterms of some other trait not now sensibly present.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eLet us return to our example. Let us suppose\r\nthat \u003cem\u003eS\u003c/em\u003e is not just displaced by \u003cem\u003eK\u003c/em\u003e and then by \u003cem\u003eG\u003c/em\u003e.\r\nLet us suppose it persists; and persists not as an\r\nunchanged \u003cem\u003eS\u003c/em\u003e alongside \u003cem\u003eK\u003c/em\u003e and \u003cem\u003eG\u003c/em\u003e, nor yet as fused\r\nwith them into a new further quale \u003cem\u003eJ\u003c/em\u003e. For in such\r\nevents, we have only the type already considered\r\nand rejected. For an observer the new quale might\r\nbe more complex, or fuller of meaning, than the\r\noriginal \u003cem\u003eS\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem\u003eK\u003c/em\u003e, or \u003cem\u003eG\u003c/em\u003e, but might not be experienced\r\nas complex. We might thus suppose a composite\r\nphotograph which should suggest nothing of the\r\ncomplexity of its origin and structure. In this\r\ncase we should have simply another picture.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_84\"\u003e84\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nBut we may also suppose that the blur of the\r\nphotograph suggests the superimposition of pictures\r\nand something of their character. Then we\r\nget another, and for our problem, much more fruitful\r\nkind of persistence. We will imagine that the\r\nfinal \u003cem\u003eG\u003c/em\u003e assumes this form: Gratification-terminating-movement-induced-by-smell.\r\nThe smell is\r\nstill present; it has persisted. It is not present in\r\nits original form, but is represented with a quality,\r\nan office, that of having excited activity and thereby\r\nterminating its career in a certain quale of gratification.\r\nIt is not \u003cem\u003eS\u003c/em\u003e, but Σ; that is \u003cem\u003eS\u003c/em\u003e with an\r\nincrement of meaning due to maintenance and fulfilment\r\nthrough a process. \u003cem\u003eS\u003c/em\u003e is no longer just\r\nsmell, but smell which has excited and thereby secured.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eHere we have a cognitive, but not a cognitional\r\nthing. In saying that the smell is finally experienced\r\nas \u003cem\u003emeaning\u003c/em\u003e gratification (through intervening\r\nhandling, seeing, etc.) and meaning it not in a\r\nhapless way, but in a fashion which operates to\r\neffect what is meant, we retrospectively attribute\r\nintellectual force and function to the smell\u0026mdash;and\r\nthis is what is signified by “cognitive.” Yet the\r\nsmell is not cognitional, because it did not knowingly\r\nintend to mean this; but is found, after the\r\nevent, to have meant it. Nor again is the final\r\nexperience, the Σ or transformed \u003cem\u003eS\u003c/em\u003e, a knowledge.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eHere again the statement may be challenged.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_85\"\u003e85\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nThose who agree with the denial that bare presence\r\nof a quale in “consciousness” constitutes acquaintance\r\nand simple apprehension, may now turn\r\nagainst us, saying that experience of fulfilment of\r\nmeaning is just what we mean by knowledge, and\r\nthis is just what the Σ of our illustration is. The\r\npoint is fundamental. As the smell at first was\r\npresence or being, less than knowing, so the fulfilment\r\nis an experience that is more than knowing.\r\nSeeing and handling the flower, enjoying the full\r\nmeaning of the smell as the odor of just this\r\nbeautiful thing, is not knowledge because it is more\r\nthan knowledge.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAs this may seem dogmatic, let us suppose that\r\nthe fulfilment, the realization, experience, is a\r\nknowledge. Then how shall it be distinguished\r\nfrom and yet classed with other things called knowledge,\r\nviz., reflective, discursive cognitions? Such\r\nknowledges are what they are precisely because they\r\nare not fulfilments, but intentions, aims, schemes,\r\nsymbols of overt fulfilment. Knowledge, perceptual\r\nand conceptual, of a hunting dog is prerequisite in\r\norder that I may really hunt with the hounds. The\r\nhunting in turn may increase my knowledge of dogs\r\nand their ways. But the knowledge of the dog, \u003ci xml:lang=\"la\" lang=\"la\"\u003equa\u003c/i\u003e\r\nknowledge, remains characteristically marked off\r\nfrom the use of that knowledge in the fulfilment\r\nexperience, the hunt. The hunt is a \u003cem\u003erealization\u003c/em\u003e of\r\nknowledge; it alone, if you please, verifies, validates,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_86\"\u003e86\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nknowledge, or supplies tests of truth. The\r\nprior knowledge of the dog, was, if you wish,\r\nhypothetical, lacking in assurance or categorical\r\ncertainty. The hunting, the fulfilling, realizing\r\nexperience alone \u003cem\u003egives\u003c/em\u003e knowledge, because it alone\r\ncompletely assures; makes faith good in works.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNow there is and can be no objection to this\r\ndefinition of knowledge, \u003cem\u003eprovided it is consistently\r\nadhered to\u003c/em\u003e. One has as much right to identify\r\nknowledge with complete assurance, as I have to\r\nidentify it with anything else. Considerable justification\r\nin the common use of language, in common\r\nsense, may be found for defining knowledge as complete\r\nassurance. But even upon this definition, the\r\nfulfilling experience is not, as such, complete assurance,\r\nand hence not a knowledge. Assurance, cognitive\r\nvalidation, and guaranteeship, follow from\r\nit, but are not coincident with its occurrence. It\r\n\u003cem\u003egives\u003c/em\u003e, but \u003cem\u003eis\u003c/em\u003e not, assurance. The concrete construction\r\nof a story, the manipulation of a machine,\r\nthe hunting with the dogs, is not, so far as it \u003cem\u003eis\u003c/em\u003e\r\nfulfilment, a confirmation of meanings previously\r\nentertained as cognitional; that is, is not contemporaneously\r\nexperienced as such. To think of\r\nprior schemes, symbols, meanings, as fulfilled in a\r\nsubsequent experience, is reflectively to present\r\nin their relations to one another both the meanings\r\nand the experiences in which they are, as\r\na matter of fact, embodied. This reflective attitude\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_87\"\u003e87\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ncannot be identical with the fulfilment experience\r\nitself; it occurs only in retrospect when\r\nthe worth of the meanings, or cognitive ideas, is\r\ncritically inspected in the light of their fulfilment;\r\nor it occurs as an interruption of the fulfilling\r\nexperience. The hunter stops his hunting as\r\na fulfilment to reflect that he made a mistake\r\nin his idea of his dog, or again, that his dog\r\nis everything he thought he was\u0026mdash;that his notion\r\nof him is confirmed. Or, the man stops the actual\r\nconstruction of his machine and turns back upon\r\nhis plan in correction or in admiring estimate of its\r\nvalue. \u003cem\u003eThe fulfilling experience is not of itself\r\nknowledge\u003c/em\u003e, then, even if we identify knowledge\r\nwith fulness of assurance or guarantee. Moreover\r\nit gives, affords, assurance only in reference\r\nto a situation which we have not yet considered.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_12\" href=\"#Footnote_12\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e12\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBefore the category of confirmation or refutation\r\ncan be introduced, there must be something\r\nwhich \u003cem\u003emeans\u003c/em\u003e to mean something and which therefore\r\ncan be guaranteed or nullified by the issue\u0026mdash;and\r\nthis is precisely what we have not as yet found.\r\nWe must return to our instance and introduce a\r\nfurther complication. Let us suppose that the\r\nsmell quale recurs at a later date, and that it\r\nrecurs neither as the original \u003cem\u003eS\u003c/em\u003e nor yet as the\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_88\"\u003e88\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nfinal Σ but as an \u003cem\u003eS\u003c/em\u003e’ which is fated or charged\r\nwith the sense of the possibility of a fulfilment like\r\nunto Σ. The \u003cem\u003eS\u003c/em\u003e’ that recurs is aware of something\r\nelse which it means, which it intends to effect\r\nthrough an operation incited by it and without\r\nwhich its own presence is abortive, and, so to say,\r\nunjustified, senseless. Now we have an experience\r\nwhich is \u003cem\u003ecognitional\u003c/em\u003e, not merely cognitive; which\r\nis contemporaneously aware of meaning something\r\nbeyond itself, instead of having this meaning ascribed\r\nby another at a later period. \u003cem\u003eThe odor\r\nknows the rose; the rose is known by the odor; and\r\nthe import of each term is constituted by the relationship\r\nin which it stands to the other.\u003c/em\u003e That\r\nis, the import of the smell is the indicating and\r\ndemanding relation which it sustains to the enjoyment\r\nof the rose as its fulfilling experience; while\r\nthis enjoyment is just the content or definition\r\nof what the smell consciously meant, \u003ci xml:lang=\"la\" lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e, meant\r\nto mean. Both the thing meaning and the thing\r\nmeant are elements in the same situation. Both\r\nare present, but both are not present in the same\r\nway. In fact, one is present as-\u003cem\u003enot\u003c/em\u003e-present-in-the-same-way-in-which-the-other-is.\r\nIt is present\r\nas something to be rendered present in the same\r\nway through the intervention of an operation.\r\nWe must not balk at a purely verbal difficulty.\r\nIt suggests a verbal inconsistency to speak of a\r\nthing present-as-absent. But all ideal contents,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_89\"\u003e89\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nall aims (that is, things aimed at) are present in\r\njust such fashion. Things can be presented as\r\nabsent, just as they can be presented as hard or\r\nsoft, black or white, six inches or fifty rods away\r\nfrom the body. The assumption that an ideal\r\ncontent must be either totally absent, or else\r\npresent \u003cem\u003ein just the same fashion\u003c/em\u003e as it will be\r\nwhen it is realized, is not only dogmatic, but self-contradictory.\r\nThe only way in which an ideal\r\ncontent can be experienced at all is to be presented\r\nas \u003cem\u003enot-present-in-the-same-way\u003c/em\u003e in which something\r\nelse is present, the latter kind of presence affording\r\nthe standard or type of \u003cem\u003esatisfactory\u003c/em\u003e presence.\r\nWhen present in the same way it ceases to be an\r\nideal content. Not a contrast of bare existence\r\nover against non-existence, or of present consciousness\r\nover against reality out of present consciousness,\r\nbut of a satisfactory with an unsatisfactory\r\nmode of presence makes the difference between the\r\n“really” and the “ideally” present.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn terms of our illustration, handling and enjoying\r\nthe rose are present, but they are not\r\npresent in the same way that the smell is present.\r\nThey are present as \u003cem\u003egoing\u003c/em\u003e to be there in the\r\nsame way, through an operation which the smell\r\nstands sponsor for. The situation is inherently\r\nan uneasy one\u0026mdash;one in which everything hangs\r\nupon the performance of the operation indicated;\r\nupon the adequacy of movement as a connecting\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_90\"\u003e90\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nlink, or real adjustment of the thing meaning and\r\nthe thing meant. Generalizing from the instance,\r\nwe get the following definition: An experience is a\r\nknowledge, if in its quale there is an experienced\r\ndistinction and connection of two elements of the\r\nfollowing sort: \u003cem\u003eone means or intends the presence\r\nof the other in the same fashion in which itself is\r\nalready present, while the other is that which, while\r\nnot present in the same fashion, must become so\r\npresent if the meaning or intention of its companion\r\nor yoke-fellow is to be fulfilled through the\r\noperation it sets up\u003c/em\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003eII\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe now return briefly to the question of knowledge\r\nas acquaintance, and at greater length to\r\nthat of knowledge as assurance, or as fulfilment\r\nwhich confirms and validates. With the recurrence\r\nof the odor as meaning something beyond itself,\r\nthere is apprehension, knowledge \u003cem\u003ethat\u003c/em\u003e. One may\r\nnow say I know what a \u003cem\u003erose\u003c/em\u003e smells like; or I know\r\nwhat \u003cem\u003ethis\u003c/em\u003e smell is like; I am acquainted with the\r\nrose’s agreeable odor. In short, on the basis of a\r\npresent quality, the odor anticipates and forestalls\r\nsome further trait.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe have also the conditions of knowledge of the\r\nconfirmation and refutation type. In the working\r\nout of the situation just described, in the transformation,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_91\"\u003e91\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nself-indicated and self-demanded, of the\r\ntensional into a harmonious or satisfactory situation,\r\nfulfilment \u003cem\u003eor\u003c/em\u003e disappointment results. The\r\nodor either does or does not fulfil itself in the rose.\r\nThe smell as intention is borne out by the facts,\r\nor is nullified. As has already been pointed out,\r\nthe subsequent experience of the fulfilment type is\r\nnot primarily a confirmation or refutation. Its\r\nimport is too vital, too urgent to be reduced \u003cem\u003ein\r\nitself\u003c/em\u003e just to the value of testing an intention or\r\nmeaning.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_13\" href=\"#Footnote_13\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e13\u003c/a\u003e But it gets \u003cem\u003ein reflection\u003c/em\u003e just such verificatory\r\nsignificance. If the smell’s intention is\r\nunfulfilled, the discrepancy may throw one back,\r\nin reflection, upon the original situation. Interesting\r\ndevelopments then occur. The smell meant\r\na rose; and yet it did not (so it turns out) mean\r\na rose; it meant another flower, or something, one\r\ncan’t just tell what. Clearly there is \u003cem\u003esomething else\u003c/em\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_92\"\u003e92\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwhich enters in; something else beyond the odor\r\nas it was first experienced determined the validity\r\nof its meaning. Here then, perhaps, we have a\r\ntranscendental, as distinct from an experimental\r\nreference? \u003cem\u003eOnly if this something else makes no\r\ndifference, or no detectable difference, in the smell\r\nitself.\u003c/em\u003e If the utmost observation and reflection\r\ncan find no difference in the smell quales that fail\r\nand those that succeed in executing their intentions,\r\nthen there is an outside controlling and disturbing\r\nfactor, which, since it is outside of the situation,\r\ncan never be utilized in knowledge, and\r\nhence can never be employed in any concrete testing\r\nor verifying. In this case, knowing depends\r\nupon an extra-experimental or transcendental factor.\r\nBut this very transcendental quality makes\r\nboth confirmation and refutation, correction, criticism,\r\nof the pretensions or meanings of things,\r\nimpossible. For the conceptions of truth and\r\nerror, we must, upon the transcendental basis, substitute\r\nthose of accidental success or failure.\r\nSometimes the intention chances upon one, sometimes\r\nupon another. Why or how, the gods only\r\nknow\u0026mdash;and they only if to them the extra-experimental\r\nfactor is not extra-experimental, but makes\r\na concrete difference in the concrete smell. But\r\nfortunately the situation is not one to be thus described.\r\nThe factor that determines the success\r\nor failure, does institute a difference in the thing\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_93\"\u003e93\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwhich means the object, and this difference is detectable,\r\nonce attention, through failure, has been\r\ncalled to the need of its discovery. At the very\r\nleast, it makes this difference: the smell is infected\r\nwith an element of uncertainty of meaning\u0026mdash;and\r\nthis as a part of the thing experienced, not for\r\nan observer. This additional \u003cem\u003eawareness\u003c/em\u003e at least\r\nbrings about an additional \u003cem\u003ewariness\u003c/em\u003e. Meaning is\r\nmore critical, and operation more cautious.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut we need not stop here. Attention may be\r\nfully directed to the subject of smells. Smells may\r\nbecome the object of knowledge. They may take,\r\n\u003ci xml:lang=\"la\" lang=\"la\"\u003epro tempore\u003c/i\u003e,\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_14\" href=\"#Footnote_14\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e14\u003c/a\u003e the place which the rose formerly\r\noccupied. One may, that is, observe the cases in\r\nwhich odors mean other things than just roses, may\r\nvoluntarily produce new cases for the sake of\r\nfurther inspection, and thus account for the\r\ncases where meanings had been falsified in the\r\nissue; discriminate more carefully the peculiarities\r\nof those meanings which the event verified, and\r\nthus safeguard and bulwark to some extent the\r\nemploying of similar meanings in the future. Superficially,\r\nit may then seem as if odors were\r\ntreated after the fashion of Locke’s simple ideas,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_94\"\u003e94\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nor Hume’s “distinct ideas which are separate\r\nexistences.” Smells apparently assume an independent,\r\nisolated status during this period of investigation.\r\n“Sensations,” as the laboratory psychologist\r\nand the analytic psychologist generally\r\nstudies them, are examples of just such detached\r\nthings. But egregious error results if we forget\r\nthat this seeming isolation and detachment is the\r\noutcome of a deliberate scientific device\u0026mdash;that it is\r\nsimply a part of the scientific technique of an inquiry\r\ndirected upon securing \u003cem\u003etested\u003c/em\u003e conclusions.\r\nJust and only because odors (or any group of\r\nqualities) are parts of a connected world are\r\nthey signs of things beyond themselves; and only\r\nbecause they are signs is it profitable and necessary\r\nto study them \u003cem\u003eas if\u003c/em\u003e they were complete, self-enclosed\r\nentities.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn the reflective determination of things with\r\nreference to their specifically meaning other things,\r\nexperiences of fulfilment, disappointment, and going\r\nastray inevitably play an important and recurrent\r\n\u003ci xml:lang=\"fr\" lang=\"fr\"\u003erôle\u003c/i\u003e. They also are realistic facts, related in\r\nrealistic ways to the things that intend to mean\r\nother things and to the things intended. When\r\nthese fulfilments and refusals \u003cem\u003eare reflected upon\u003c/em\u003e in\r\nthe determinate relations in which they stand to\r\ntheir relevant meanings, they obtain a quality which\r\nis quite lacking to them in their immediate occurrence\r\nas just fulfilments or disappointments; viz.,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_95\"\u003e95\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe property of affording assurance and correction\u0026mdash;of\r\nconfirming and refuting. Truth and falsity\r\nare not properties of any experience or thing, in\r\nand of itself or in its first intention; \u003cem\u003ebut of things\r\nwhere the problem of assurance consciously enters\r\nin\u003c/em\u003e. \u003cem\u003eTruth and falsity present themselves as significant\r\nfacts only in situations in which specific\r\nmeanings and their already experienced fulfilments\r\nand non-fulfilments are intentionally compared and\r\ncontrasted with reference to the question of the\r\nworth, as to reliability of meaning, of the given\r\nmeaning or class of meanings.\u003c/em\u003e Like knowledge\r\nitself, truth is an experienced relation of things,\r\nand it has no meaning outside of such relation,\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_15\" href=\"#Footnote_15\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e15\u003c/a\u003e any\r\nmore than such adjectives as comfortable applied\r\nto a lodging, correct applied to speech, persuasive\r\napplied to an orator, etc., have worth apart from\r\nthe \u003cem\u003especific\u003c/em\u003e things to which they are applied. It\r\nwould be a great gain for logic and epistemology,\r\nif we were always to translate the noun “truth”\r\nback into the adjective “true,” and this back into\r\nthe adverb “truly”; at least, if we were to do so\r\nuntil we have familiarized ourselves thoroughly\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_96\"\u003e96\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwith the fact that “truth” is an abstract noun,\r\nsummarizing a quality presented by specific affairs\r\nin their own specific contents.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003eIII\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eI have attempted, in the foregoing pages, a description\r\nof the function of knowledge in its own\r\nterms and on its merits\u0026mdash;a description which in\r\nintention is realistic, if by realistic we are content\r\nto mean naturalistic, a description undertaken on\r\nthe basis of what Mr. Santayana has well called\r\n“following the lead of the subject-matter.” Unfortunately\r\nat the present time all such undertakings\r\ncontend with a serious extraneous obstacle.\r\nAccomplishing the undertaking has difficulties\r\nenough of its own to reckon with; and first attempts\r\nare sure to be imperfect, if not radically wrong.\r\nBut at present the attempts are not, for the most\r\npart, even listened to on their own account, they\r\nare not examined and criticised as naturalistic attempts.\r\n\u003cem\u003eThey are compared with undertakings of\r\na wholly different nature, with an epistemological\r\ntheory of knowledge, and the assumptions of this\r\nextraneous theory are taken as a ready-made standard\r\nby which to test their validity.\u003c/em\u003e Literally of\r\ncourse, “epistemology” means only theory of\r\nknowledge; the term \u003cem\u003emight\u003c/em\u003e therefore have been\r\nemployed simply as a synonym for a descriptive\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_97\"\u003e97\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nlogic; for a theory that takes knowledge as it\r\nfinds it and attempts to give the same kind of an\r\naccount of it that would be given of any other natural\r\nfunction or occurrence. But the mere mention\r\nof what \u003cem\u003emight\u003c/em\u003e have been only accentuates what is.\r\nThe things that pass for epistemology all assume\r\nthat knowledge is not a natural function or event,\r\nbut a mystery.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eEpistemology starts from the assumption that\r\ncertain conditions lie back of knowledge. The\r\nmystery would be great enough if knowledge were\r\nconstituted by non-natural conditions back of\r\nknowledge, but the mystery is increased by the fact\r\nthat the conditions are defined so as to be incompatible\r\nwith knowledge. Hence the primary\r\nproblem of epistemology is: How is knowledge\r\n\u003ci xml:lang=\"de\" lang=\"de\"\u003eüberhaupt\u003c/i\u003e, knowledge at large, \u003ci\u003epossible\u003c/i\u003e? Because\r\nof the incompatibility between the concrete occurrence\r\nand function of knowledge and the conditions\r\nback of it to which it must conform, a second\r\nproblem arises: How is knowledge in general,\r\nknowledge \u003ci xml:lang=\"de\" lang=\"de\"\u003eüberhaupt\u003c/i\u003e, \u003cem\u003evalid\u003c/em\u003e? Hence the complete\r\ndivorce in contemporary thought between epistemology\r\nas theory of knowledge and logic as an\r\naccount of the specific ways in which particular\r\nbeliefs that are better than other alternative beliefs\r\nregarding the same matters are formed; and also\r\nthe complete divorce between a naturalistic, a biological\r\nand social psychology, setting forth how\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_98\"\u003e98\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe function of knowledge is evolved out of other\r\nnatural activities, and epistemology as an account\r\nof how knowledge is possible anyhow.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is out of the question to set forth in this place\r\nin detail the contrast between transcendental epistemology\r\nand an experimental theory of knowledge.\r\nIt may assist the understanding of the latter,\r\nhowever, if I point out, baldly and briefly, how,\r\n\u003cem\u003eout of the distinctively empirical situation\u003c/em\u003e, there\r\narise those assumptions which make knowledge a\r\nmystery, and hence a topic for a peculiar branch\r\nof philosophizing.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAs just pointed out, epistemology makes the\r\npossibility of knowledge a problem, because it\r\nassumes back of knowledge conditions incompatible\r\nwith the obvious traits of knowledge as it empirically\r\nexists. These assumptions are that the\r\norgan or instrument of knowledge is not a natural\r\nobject, but some ready-made state of mind or consciousness,\r\nsomething purely “subjective,” a peculiar\r\nkind of existence which lives, moves, and has\r\nits being in a realm different from things to be\r\nknown; and that the ultimate goal and content\r\nof knowledge is a fixed, ready-made thing which\r\nhas no organic connections with the origin, purpose,\r\nand growth of the attempt to know it, some\r\nkind of \u003ci xml:lang=\"de\" lang=\"de\"\u003eDing-an-sich\u003c/i\u003e or absolute, extra-empirical\r\n“Reality.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(1) It is not difficult to see at what point in\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_99\"\u003e99\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe development of natural knowledge, or the signifying\r\nof one thing by another, there arises the\r\nnotion of the knowing medium as something radically\r\ndifferent in the order of existence from the\r\nthing to be known. It arises subsequent to the repeated\r\nexperience of non-fulfilment, of frustration\r\nand disappointment. The odor did not after all\r\nmean the rose; it meant something quite different;\r\nand yet its indicative function was exercised so\r\nforcibly that we could not help\u0026mdash;or at least \u003cem\u003edid\u003c/em\u003e\r\nnot help\u0026mdash;believing in the existence of the rose.\r\nThis is a familiar and typical kind of experience,\r\none which very early leads to the recognition that\r\n“things are not what they seem.” There are\r\ntwo contrasted methods of dealing with this recognition:\r\none is the method indicated above (p. 93).\r\nWe go more thoroughly, patiently, and carefully\r\ninto the facts of the case. We employ all sorts\r\nof methods, invented for the purpose, of examining\r\nthe things that are signs and the things that\r\nare signified, and we experimentally produce various\r\nsituations, in order that we may tell \u003cem\u003ewhat\u003c/em\u003e smells\r\nmean roses \u003cem\u003ewhen\u003c/em\u003e roses are meant, what it is about\r\nthe smell and the rose that led us into error; and\r\nthat we may be able to discriminate those cases in\r\nwhich a suspended conclusion is all that circumstances\r\nadmit. We simply do the best we can to\r\nregulate our system of signs so that they become as\r\ninstructive as possible, utilizing for this purpose\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_100\"\u003e100\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\n(as indicated above) all possible experiences of\r\nsuccess and of failure, and deliberately instituting\r\ncases which will throw light on the specific empirical\r\ncauses of success and failure.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNow it so happens that when the facts of error\r\nwere consciously generalized and formulated,\r\nnamely in Greek thought, such a technique of specific\r\ninquiry and rectification did not exist\u0026mdash;in fact,\r\nit hardly could come into existence until \u003cem\u003eafter\u003c/em\u003e error\r\nhad been seized upon as constituting a fundamental\r\nanomaly. Hence the method just outlined\r\nof dealing with the situation was impossible. We\r\ncan imagine disconsolate ghosts willing to postpone\r\nany professed solution of the difficulty till subsequent\r\ngenerations have thrown more light on the\r\nquestion itself; we can hardly imagine passionate\r\nhuman beings exercising such reserve. At all\r\nevents, Greek thought provided what seemed a satisfactory\r\nway out: there are two orders of existence,\r\none permanent and complete, the noumenal\r\nregion, to which alone the characteristic of Being\r\nis properly applicable, the other transitory, phenomenal,\r\nsensible, a region of non-Being, or at\r\nleast of mere Coming-to-be, a region in which Being\r\nis hopelessly mixed with non-Being, with the\r\nunreal. The former alone is the domain of knowledge,\r\nof truth; the latter is the territory of opinion,\r\nconfusion, and error. In short, the contrast \u003cem\u003ewithin\u003c/em\u003e\r\nexperience of the cases in which things successfully\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_101\"\u003e101\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nand unsuccessfully maintained and executed\r\nthe meanings of other things was erected into\r\na wholesale difference of status in the intrinsic\r\ncharacters of the things involved in the two types\r\nof cases.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWith the beginnings of modern thought, the\r\nregion of the “unreal,” the source of opinion and\r\nerror, was located exclusively in the individual.\r\nThe object was \u003cem\u003eall\u003c/em\u003e real and \u003cem\u003eall\u003c/em\u003e satisfactory, but\r\nthe “subject” could approach the object only\r\nthrough his own subjective states, his “sensations”\r\nand “ideas.” The Greek conception of\r\ntwo orders of existence was retained, but instead\r\nof the two orders characterizing the “universe”\r\nitself, one \u003cem\u003ewas\u003c/em\u003e the universe, the other was the\r\nindividual mind trying to know that universe.\r\nThis scheme would obviously easily account for\r\nerror and hallucination; but how could \u003cem\u003eknowledge\u003c/em\u003e,\r\ntruth, ever come about such a basis? The Greek\r\nproblem of the possibility of error became\r\nthe modern problem of the possibility of knowledge.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003ePutting the matter in terms that are independent\r\nof history, experiences of failure, disappointment,\r\nnon-fulfilment of the function of meaning\r\nand contention may lead the individual to the\r\npath of science\u0026mdash;to more careful and extensive\r\ninvestigation of the things themselves, with a view\r\nto detecting specific sources of error, and guarding\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_102\"\u003e102\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nagainst them, and regulating, so far as\r\npossible, the conditions under which objects are\r\nbearers of meanings beyond themselves. But impatient\r\nof such slow and tentative methods (which\r\ninsure not infallibility but increased probability of\r\nvalid conclusions), by reason of disappointment\r\na person may turn epistemologist. He may then\r\ntake the discrepancy, the failure of the smell to\r\nexecute its own intended meaning, as a wholesale,\r\nrather than as a specific fact: as evidence of a\r\ncontrast in general between things meaning and\r\nthings meant, instead of as evidence of the need\r\nof a more cautious and thorough inspection of\r\nodors and execution of operations indicated by\r\nthem. One may then say: Woe is me; smells are\r\nonly \u003cem\u003emy\u003c/em\u003e smells, subjective states existing in an\r\norder of being made out of consciousness, while\r\nroses exist in another order made out of a radically\r\ndifferent sort of stuff; or, odors are made out of\r\n“finite” consciousness as their stuff, while the real\r\nthings, the objects which fulfil them, are made out\r\nof an “infinite” consciousness as their material.\r\nHence some purely metaphysical tie has to be called\r\nin to bring them into connection with each other.\r\nAnd yet this tie does not concern knowledge; it\r\ndoes not make the meaning of one odor any more\r\ncorrect than that of another, nor enable us to\r\ndiscriminate relative degrees of correctness. As\r\na principle of control, this transcendental connection\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_103\"\u003e103\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nis related to all alike, and hence condemns and\r\njustifies all alike.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_16\" href=\"#Footnote_16\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e16\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is interesting to note that the transcendentalist\r\nalmost invariably first falls into the psychological\r\nfallacy; and then having himself taken the\r\npsychologist’s attitude (the attitude which is interested\r\nin meanings as themselves self-inclosed\r\n“ideas”) accuses the empiricist whom he criticises\r\nof having confused mere psychological existence\r\nwith logical validity. That is, he begins by supposing\r\nthat the smell of our illustration (and all\r\nthe cognitional objects for which this is used as a\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_104\"\u003e104\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nsymbol) is a purely mental or psychical state,\r\nso that the question of logical reference or intention\r\nis the problem of how the merely mental can\r\n“know” the extra-mental. But from a strictly\r\nempirical point of view, the smell which knows is\r\nno more merely mental than is the rose known.\r\nWe may, if we please, say that the smell when\r\ninvolving conscious meaning or intention is “mental,”\r\nbut this term “mental” does not denote some\r\nseparate type of existence\u0026mdash;existence as a state of\r\nconsciousness. It denotes only the fact that the\r\nsmell, a real and non-psychical object, now exercises\r\nan intellectual \u003cem\u003efunction\u003c/em\u003e. This new property\r\ninvolves, as James has pointed out, an \u003cem\u003eadditive\u003c/em\u003e\r\nrelation\u0026mdash;a new property possessed by a non-mental\r\nobject, when that object, occurring in\r\na new context, assumes a further office and\r\nuse.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_17\" href=\"#Footnote_17\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e17\u003c/a\u003e To be “in the mind” means to be in a\r\nsituation in which the function of intending is\r\ndirectly concerned.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_18\" href=\"#Footnote_18\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e18\u003c/a\u003e Will not some one who believes\r\nthat the knowing experience is \u003ci xml:lang=\"la\" lang=\"la\"\u003eab origine\u003c/i\u003e a\r\nstrictly “mental” thing, explain how, as matter\r\nof fact, it does get a specific, extra-mental reference,\r\ncapable of being tested, confirmed, or refuted?\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_105\"\u003e105\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nOr, if he believes that viewing it as\r\nmerely mental expresses only the form it takes\r\nfor psychological analysis, will he not explain\r\nwhy he so persistently attributes the inherently\r\n“mental” characterization of it to the empiricist\r\nwhom he criticises? An object \u003cem\u003ebecomes\u003c/em\u003e meaning\r\nwhen used empirically in a certain way; and, under\r\ncertain circumstances, the exact character and\r\nworth of this meaning \u003cem\u003ebecomes\u003c/em\u003e an object of solicitude.\r\nBut the transcendental epistemologist with\r\nhis purely psychical “meanings” and his purely\r\nextra-empirical “truths” assumes a \u003ci xml:lang=\"la\" lang=\"la\"\u003eDeus ex Machina\u003c/i\u003e\r\nwhose mechanism is preserved a secret. And\r\nas if to add to the arbitrary character of his assumption,\r\nhe has to admit that the transcendental\r\n\u003ci xml:lang=\"la\" lang=\"la\"\u003ea priori\u003c/i\u003e faculty by which mental states get objective\r\nreference does not in the least help us to\r\ndiscriminate, \u003cem\u003ein the concrete\u003c/em\u003e, between an objective\r\nreference that is false and one that is valid.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(2) The counterpart assumption to that of pure\r\naboriginal “mental states” is, of course, that of\r\nan Absolute Reality, fixed and complete in itself,\r\nof which our “mental states” are bare transitory\r\nhints, their true meaning and their transcendent\r\ngoal being the Truth \u003ci xml:lang=\"la\" lang=\"la\"\u003ein rerum natura\u003c/i\u003e. If the\r\norgan and medium of knowing is a self-inclosed\r\norder of existence different in kind from the Object\r\nto be known, then that Object must stand out there\r\nin complete aloofness from the concrete purpose\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_106\"\u003e106\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nand procedure of knowing it. But if we go back to\r\nthe knowing as a natural occurrence, capable of\r\ndescription, we find that just as a smell does not\r\nmean Rose in general (or anything else at large),\r\nbut means a \u003cem\u003especific\u003c/em\u003e group of qualities whose experience\r\nis intended and anticipated, so the function\r\nof knowing is always expressed in connections\r\nbetween a given experience and a specific possible\r\nwanted experience. The “rose” that is meant in a\r\nparticular situation \u003cem\u003eis\u003c/em\u003e the rose of that situation.\r\nWhen this experience is consummated, it is achieved\r\nas the fulfilment of the conditions in which just\r\n\u003cem\u003ethat\u003c/em\u003e intention was entertained\u0026mdash;not as the fulfilment\r\nof a faculty of knowledge or a meaning in\r\ngeneral. Subsequent meanings and subsequent fulfilments\r\nmay increase, may enrich the consummating\r\nexperience; the object or content of the rose\r\nas known may be other and fuller next time and\r\nso on. But we have no right to set up “a rose”\r\nat large or in general as the object of the knowing\r\nodor; the object of a knowledge is always strictly\r\ncorrelative to that particular thing which means it.\r\nIt is not something which can be put in a wholesale\r\nway over against that which cognitively refers to\r\nit, as when the epistemologist puts the “real” rose\r\n(object) over against a merely phenomenal or empirical\r\nrose which \u003cem\u003ethis\u003c/em\u003e smell happens to mean. As\r\nthe meaning gets more complex, fuller, more finely\r\ndiscriminated, the object which realizes or fulfils\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_107\"\u003e107\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe meaning grows similarly in quality. But we\r\ncannot set up a rose, an object of fullest, complete,\r\nand exhaustive content as that which is really\r\nmeant by any and every odor of a rose, whether\r\nit consciously meant to mean it or not. The test\r\nof the cognitional rectitude of the odor lies in the\r\n\u003cem\u003especific\u003c/em\u003e object which it sets out to secure. This\r\nis the meaning of the statement that the import of\r\n\u003cem\u003eeach\u003c/em\u003e term is found in its relationship to the other.\r\nIt applies to object meant as well as to the meaning.\r\nFulfilment, completion are always relative\r\nterms. \u003cem\u003eHence the criterion of the truth or falsity\r\nof the meaning, of the adequacy, of the cognitional\r\nthing lies within the relationships of the situation\r\nand not without.\u003c/em\u003e The thing that means another\r\nby means of an intervening operation either succeeds\r\nor fails in accomplishing the operation indicated,\r\nwhile this operation either gives or fails\r\nto give the object meant. Hence the truth or\r\nfalsity of the original cognitional object.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003eIV\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFrom this excursion, I return in conclusion to a\r\nbrief general characterization of those situations\r\nin which we are aware that things mean other\r\nthings and are so critically aware of it that, in\r\norder to increase the probability of fulfilment and\r\nto decrease the chance of frustration, all possible\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_108\"\u003e108\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\npains are taken to regulate the meanings that attach\r\nto things. These situations define that type\r\nof knowing which we call \u003cem\u003escientific\u003c/em\u003e. There are\r\nthings that claim to mean other experiences; in\r\nwhich the trait of meaning other objects is not discovered\r\n\u003ci xml:lang=\"la\" lang=\"la\"\u003eab extra\u003c/i\u003e, and after the event, but is part of\r\nthe thing itself. This trait of the thing is as realistic,\r\nas specific, as any other of its traits. It is,\r\ntherefore, as open to inspection and determination\r\nas to its nature, as is any other trait. Moreover,\r\nsince it is upon this trait that assurance (as distinct\r\nfrom accident) of fulfilment depends, an especial\r\ninterest, an absorbing interest, attaches to its determination.\r\nHence the scientific type of knowledge\r\nand its growing domination over other sorts.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe \u003cem\u003eemploy\u003c/em\u003e meanings in all intentional constructions\r\nof experience\u0026mdash;in all anticipations, whether\r\nartistic, utilitarian or technological, social or\r\nmoral. The success of the anticipation is found\r\nto depend upon the character of the meaning.\r\nHence the stress upon a right determination of\r\nthese meanings. Since they are the instruments\r\nupon which fulfilment depends \u003cem\u003eso far as that is\r\ncontrolled\u003c/em\u003e or other than accidental, they become\r\nthemselves objects of surpassing interest. For all\r\npersons at some times, and for one class of persons\r\n(scientists) at almost all times, the determination\r\nof the meanings employed in the control of fulfilments\r\n(of acting upon meanings) is central.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_109\"\u003e109\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nThe experimental or pragmatic theory of knowledge\r\nexplains the dominating importance of science;\r\nit does not depreciate it or explain it away.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003ePossibly pragmatic writers are to blame for the\r\ntendency of their critics to assume that the practice\r\nthey have in mind is utilitarian in some narrow\r\nsense, referring to some preconceived and inferior\r\nuse\u0026mdash;though I cannot recall any evidence for this\r\nadmission. But what the pragmatic theory has in\r\nmind is precisely the fact that all the affairs of\r\nlife which need regulation\u0026mdash;\u003cem\u003eall values of all types\u003c/em\u003e\u0026mdash;depend\r\nupon utilizations of meanings. Action\r\nis not to be limited to anything less than the carrying\r\nout of ideas, than the execution, whether strenuous\r\nor easeful, of meanings. Hence the surpassing\r\nimportance which comes to attach to the careful,\r\nimpartial construction of the meanings, and to\r\ntheir constant survey and resurvey with reference\r\nto their value as evidenced by experiences of fulfilment\r\nand deviation.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThat truth denotes \u003cem\u003etruths\u003c/em\u003e, that is, specific verifications,\r\ncombinations of meanings and outcomes\r\nreflectively viewed, is, one may say, the central\r\npoint of the experimental theory. Truth, in general\r\nor in the abstract, is a just name for an experienced\r\nrelation among the things of experience:\r\nthat sort of relation in which intents are retrospectively\r\nviewed from the standpoint of the fulfilment\r\nwhich they secure through their own natural\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_110\"\u003e110\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\noperation or incitement. Thus the experimental\r\ntheory explains directly and simply the absolutistic\r\ntendency to translate concrete true things into the\r\ngeneral relationship, Truth, and then to hypostatize\r\nthis abstraction into identity with real being,\r\nTruth \u003ci xml:lang=\"la\" lang=\"la\"\u003eper se\u003c/i\u003e and \u003ci xml:lang=\"la\" lang=\"la\"\u003ein se\u003c/i\u003e, of which all transitory\r\nthings and events\u0026mdash;that is, all experienced realities\u0026mdash;are\r\nonly shadowy futile approximations. This\r\ntype of relationship is central for man’s will, for\r\nman’s conscious endeavor. To select, to conserve,\r\nto extend, to propagate those meanings which the\r\ncourse of events has generated, to note their peculiarities,\r\nto be in advance on the alert for them, to\r\nsearch for them anxiously, to substitute them for\r\nmeanings that eat up our energy in vain, defines\r\nthe aim of rational effort and the goal of legitimate\r\nambition. The absolutistic theory is the transfer\r\nof this moral or voluntary law of selective action\r\ninto a quasi-physical (that is, metaphysical) law\r\nof indiscriminate being. Identify metaphysical being\r\nwith \u003cem\u003esignificant excellent\u003c/em\u003e being\u0026mdash;that is, with\r\nthose relationships of things which, in our moments\r\nof deepest insight and largest survey, we would\r\ncontinue and reproduce\u0026mdash;and the experimentalist,\r\nrather than the absolutist, is he who has a right\r\nto proclaim the supremacy of Truth, and the superiority\r\nof the life devoted to Truth for its own\r\nsake over that of “mere” activity. But to read\r\nback into an order of things which exists without\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_111\"\u003e111\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe participation of our reflection and aim, the\r\nquality which defines the purpose of our thought\r\nand endeavor is at one and the same stroke to\r\nmythologize reality and to deprive the life of\r\nthoughtful endeavor of its ground for being.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_112\"\u003e112\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\r\n\u003ch2 title=\"THE INTELLECTUALIST CRITERION FOR TRUTH\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"THE_INTELLECTUALIST_CRITERION_FOR_TRUTH\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eTHE INTELLECTUALIST CRITERION FOR TRUTH\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_19\" href=\"#Footnote_19\" class=\"fnanchor smaller\"\u003e19\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003eI\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"drop-cap al\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap1\"\u003eAmong\u003c/span\u003e the influences that have worked in\r\ncontemporary philosophy towards disintegration\r\nof intellectualism of the epistemological\r\ntype, and towards the substitution of a philosophy\r\nof experience, the work of Mr. Bradley must be\r\nseriously counted. One has, for example, only to\r\ncompare his metaphysics with the two fundamental\r\ncontentions of T.\u0026nbsp;H. Green, namely, that reality\r\nis a single, eternal, and all-inclusive system of\r\nrelations, and that this system of relations is one\r\nin kind with that process of relating which constitutes\r\nour thinking, to be instantly aware of a\r\nchanged atmosphere. Much of Bradley’s writings\r\nis a sustained and deliberate polemic against intellectualism\r\nof the Neo-Kantian type. When,\r\nhowever, we find conjoined to this criticism an\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_113\"\u003e113\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nequally sustained contention that the philosophic\r\nconception of reality must be based on an exclusively\r\nintellectual criterion, a criterion belonging\r\nto and confined to theory, we have a situation that\r\nis thought-provoking. The situation grows in interest\r\nwhen it is remembered that there is a general\r\nand growing tendency among those who appeal in\r\nphilosophy to a strictly intellectualistic \u003cem\u003emethod\u003c/em\u003e of\r\ndefining “reality,” to insist that the reality reached\r\nby this method has a super-intellectual \u003cem\u003econtent\u003c/em\u003e:\r\nthat intellectual, affectional, and volitional features\r\nare all joined and fused in “ultimate” reality.\r\nThe curious character of the situation is that\r\nReality is an “absolute experience” of which the\r\nintellectual is simply one partial and transmuted\r\nmoment. Yet this reality is attained unto, in philosophic\r\nmethod, by exclusive emphasis upon the intellectual\r\naspect of present experience and by systematic\r\nexclusion of exactly the emotional, volitional\r\nfeatures which with respect to content are insisted\r\nupon! Under such circumstances the cynically-minded\r\nare moved to wonder whether this tremendous\r\ninsistence upon one factor in present experience\r\nat the expense of others, is not because\r\nthis is the only way to maintain the notion of\r\n“Absolute Experience,” and to prevent it from collapsing\r\ninto ordinary everyday experience. This\r\nparadox is not peculiar to Mr. Bradley. Looking\r\nat the Neo-Kantian movement in the broad in its\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_114\"\u003e114\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nmodern form, one might almost say that its prominent\r\nfeature is its insistence upon reaching a\r\n“Reality” that includes extra-intellectual factors\r\nand phases, traits that are ideal in a moral\r\nand emotional sense, by an exclusive recognition of\r\nthe function of knowledge in its isolation.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSuch being the case, an examination of Mr.\r\nBradley’s method and criterion may have far-reaching\r\nimplications. First, let us set before\r\nourselves the general points of Mr. Bradley’s indictment\r\nof intellectualism.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_20\" href=\"#Footnote_20\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e20\u003c/a\u003e Knowledge or judgment\r\nworks by means of thought; it is predication\r\nof idea (meaning) of existence as its subject. Its\r\nfinal aim is to effect a complete union or harmony\r\nof existence and meaning. But it is fore-doomed\r\nto failure, for in realizing its end it must employ\r\nmeans which contradict its own purpose. This\r\ninherent incapacity lurks in judgment with respect\r\nto subject, predicate, and copula. The predicate\r\nor meaning necessary to complete the reality presented\r\nin the subject can be referred to the latter\r\nand united with it only by being itself alienated\r\nfrom existence. It heals the wounds or deficiencies\r\nof its own subject (and in the end all deficiencies\r\nare to the modern idealist discrepancies) only on\r\ncondition of inflicting another wound,\u0026mdash;only by\r\nsundering meaning from a prior union with existence\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_115\"\u003e115\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nin some other phase. This latter existence,\r\ntherefore, is always left out in the cold. It is as\r\nif we wanted to get all the cloth in the world into\r\none garment and our only way of accomplishing\r\nthis were to tear off a portion from one piece of\r\ngoods in order to patch it on to another.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe subject of the judgment, moreover, as well\r\nas the predicate, stands in the way of judgment\r\nfulfilling its own task. It has “sensuous infinitude”\r\nand it has “immediacy,” but these two\r\ntraits contradict each other. The details of the\r\nsubject always go beyond itself, being indefinitely\r\nrelated to something beyond. “In its given content\r\nit has relations which do not terminate within\r\nthat content” (\u003ccite\u003eibid.\u003c/cite\u003e, p. 176), while in its immediacy\r\nit presents an undivided union of existence\r\nand meaning. No subject can be mere existence\r\nany more than it can be mere meaning. It is always\r\nexistent or embodied meaning. As such it\r\nclaims individuality or the character of a single\r\nsubsistent whole. But this indispensable claim is\r\ninconsistent with its ragged-edged character, its\r\nindefinite external reference, which is indispensable\r\nto it as subject that it may require and receive\r\nfurther meaning from predication.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWith respect to the copula the following quotation\r\nfrom the “Principles” of Logic (p. 10)\r\nmay serve: “Judgment proper is the \u003cem\u003eact\u003c/em\u003e which\r\nrefers the ideal content (recognized as such) to the\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_116\"\u003e116\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nreality beyond the act.” In other words, judgment\r\nas act (and it is the act which is expressed\r\nin the copula) must always fall outside of\r\nthe content of knowledge as such; yet since this\r\nact certainly falls within reality, it would have to\r\nbe recognized and stated by any knowledge pretending\r\nto competency with respect to reality as a\r\nwhole. These considerations, stated in this way,\r\nare highly technical and presuppose a knowledge\r\nnot merely of Mr. Bradley’s own logic, but also of\r\nthe logical analysis of knowledge initiated by Kant\r\nand carried on by Herbart, Lotze, and others.\r\nTheir main import may, however, be stated in\r\ncomparatively non-technical form. Human experience\r\nis full of discrepancies. Were experience\r\npurely a matter of brute existence (such as we sometimes\r\nimagine the animals’ experience to be) it\r\nwould be totally lacking in meaning and there\r\nwould be no problems, no thinking, no occasion for\r\nthinking, and hence no philosophy. On the other\r\nhand, if experience were a complete, tight-jointed\r\nunion of existence and meaning, there would be\r\nno dissatisfaction, no problems, no cause for efforts\r\nto patch up defects and contradictions. Existences,\r\nthings, would embody all the meanings that they\r\nsuggest; while abstract meanings, values that are\r\n\u003cem\u003emerely\u003c/em\u003e ideal, that are projected or thought of\r\nbut not fulfilled, would be totally unheard of. But\r\nour experience stands in marked contrast to both\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_117\"\u003e117\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthese types of experience. It is neither an affair\r\nof meaningless existence nor of existence self-luminous\r\nwith fulfilled meaning. All things that we\r\nexperience have \u003cem\u003esome\u003c/em\u003e meaning, but that meaning\r\nis always so partially embodied in things that we\r\ncannot rest in them. They point beyond themselves;\r\nthey indicate meanings which they do not\r\nfulfil; they suggest values which they fail to embody,\r\nand when we go to other things for the\r\nfruition of what is denied, we either find the same\r\nsituation of division over again, or we find even\r\nmore positive disappointment and frustration\u0026mdash;we\r\nfind contrary meanings set up. Now all thinking\r\ngrows out of this discrepancy between existence\r\nand the meaning which it partially embodies and\r\npartially refuses, which it suggests but declines to\r\nexpress. Yet thinking, the mode of bringing existence\r\nand meaning into harmony with each other,\r\nalways works by selection, by abstraction; it sets\r\nup and projects meanings which are ideal only,\r\nfootless, in the air, matters of thought only, not of\r\nsentiency or immediate existence. It emphasizes\r\nthe ideal of a completed union of existence and\r\nmeaning, but is helpless to effect it. And this\r\nhelplessness (according to Mr. Bradley) is not due\r\nto external pressure but to the very structure of\r\nthought itself.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFrom every point of view knowledge operates\r\nunder conditions, (and these not externally imposed\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_118\"\u003e118\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nbut inherent in its own nature as judgment,) that\r\nrender it incapable of realizing its aim of complete\r\nunion of existence and meaning. Granted the\r\nargument, and it is difficult to imagine a more\r\nserious indictment against the pretensions of philosophy\r\nto reach “Reality” \u003ci xml:lang=\"la\" lang=\"la\"\u003evia\u003c/i\u003e the exclusive path\r\nof knowledge.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe presence of contradiction is Mr. Bradley’s\r\ncriterion for “appearance,” just as its absence\r\nis his criterion for “reality.” It thus goes without\r\nsaying that knowledge and truth which we can\r\nattain are matters of appearance. Contradiction\r\nbetween existence and meaning is its last word.\r\nThis is not merely a logical deduction from Mr.\r\nBradley’s position, but is expressly stated by him.\r\n“Thus the truth belongs to existence, but it does\r\nnot as such exist…. Truth shows a dissection\r\nbut never an actual life” (“Appearance\r\nand Reality,” p. 167). Again, “every truth is\r\nappearance since in it we have divorce of quality\r\nfrom being” (\u003ccite\u003eibid.\u003c/cite\u003e, p. 187). “Even absolute\r\ntruth seems in the end to turn out erroneous….\r\nInternal discrepancy belongs irremovably\r\nto truth’s proper character…. Truth is\r\none aspect of experience and is therefore made imperfect\r\nand limited by what it fails to include”\r\n(\u003ccite\u003eibid.\u003c/cite\u003e, pp. 544\u0026ndash;545). Nothing could be more\r\nexplicit as to the inherently contradictory character\r\nof truth, both as an ideal and as an accomplished\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_119\"\u003e119\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nfact; nothing more positive as to the unreality\r\nor appearance-character of truth. We\r\ncannot, on Mr. Bradley’s method, stop here. Not\r\nonly is knowledge\u0026mdash;working as it does through\r\nthought which is always partial, selective, abstractive\u0026mdash;doomed\r\nto failure in accomplishing its task,\r\nbut the existence of the contradiction between the\r\nsuggestion of meanings by existence and this realization\r\nin existence is itself due to thought.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSpeaking of thought he says: “The relational\r\nform is a compromise on which thought stands and\r\nwhich it develops.” And all the particular antinomies\r\nwhich he discusses are interpreted as having\r\ntheir basis in the category of relation (\u003ccite\u003eibid.\u003c/cite\u003e,\r\np. 180). In his section on Appearance he goes\r\nthrough various aspects and distinctions of the\r\nworld, such as primary and secondary qualities,\r\nsubstance and its properties, relation and qualitative\r\nelements, space and time, motion and change,\r\ncausation, etc., pointing out irreconcilable discrepancies\r\nin them. He does not, in a \u003cem\u003egeneralized\u003c/em\u003e way,\r\nexpressly refer them to any common source or root.\r\nBut it seems a fair inference that the relational\r\ncharacter of thought is at the bottom of the whole\r\ntrouble: so that we have in the cases mentioned\r\nprecisely the same situation \u003ci xml:lang=\"la\" lang=\"la\"\u003ein concreto\u003c/i\u003e which\r\nis set forth \u003ci\u003ein abstracto\u003c/i\u003e in the discussion of\r\nthought. The contradictions brought up are in\r\nevery case resolved into the fundamental discrepancy\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_120\"\u003e120\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nsupposed to exist between relations and elements\r\nrelated. In each case there is the ideal of\r\na final unity in which relations and elements as\r\nsuch disappear, while in every case the nature of\r\nrelation is such as to prevent the desired consummation.\r\nIn at least one place, it is expressly\r\ndeclared that it is the knowledge function which is\r\nresponsible for the degradation of reality to appearance.\r\n“We do not suggest that the thing\r\nalways itself is an appearance. We mean its\r\ncharacter is such \u003cem\u003ethat it becomes one as soon as\r\nwe judge it\u003c/em\u003e. And this character we have seen\r\nthroughout our work, is ideality. Appearance\r\nconsists in the looseness of content from existence….\r\nAnd we have found that everywhere\r\nthroughout the world such ideality prevails”\r\n(\u003ccite\u003eibid.\u003c/cite\u003e, p. 486, italics not in the original). It\r\nis not then strictly true that the divorce of meaning\r\nand existence instigates thought; rather\r\nthought is the unruly member that creates the\r\ndivorce and then engages in the task (in which it\r\nis self-condemned to failure) of trying to establish\r\nthe unity which it has gratuitously destroyed.\r\nThinking, self-consciousness, is disease of the naïve\r\nunity of thoughtless experience.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOn the one hand there is a systematic discrediting\r\nof the ultimate claims of the knowledge function,\r\nand this not from external physiological or\r\npsychological reasons such as are sometimes alleged\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_121\"\u003e121\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nagainst its capacity, but on the basis of its own\r\ninterior logic. But on the other hand, a strictly\r\nlogical criterion is deliberately adopted and employed\r\nas the fundamental and final criterion for\r\nthe philosophic conception of reality. Long familiarity\r\nhas not dulled my astonishment at finding\r\nexactly the same set of considerations which in\r\nthe earlier portion of the book are employed to\r\ncondemn things as experienced by us to the region\r\nof Appearance, employed in the latter portion of\r\nthe book to afford a triumphant demonstration of\r\nthe existence and character of Absolute Reality.\r\nThe argument I take up first on its formal side,\r\nand then with reference to material considerations.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_21\" href=\"#Footnote_21\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e21\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe positive conception of Reality is reached\r\nby the conception that “ultimate reality must be\r\nsuch that it does not contradict itself; here is an\r\nabsolute criterion. And it is proved absolute by\r\nthe fact that either in endeavoring to deny it or\r\neven in attempting to doubt it, we tacitly assume\r\nits validity” (\u003ccite\u003eibid.\u003c/cite\u003e, pp. 136\u0026ndash;137). That is to\r\nsay, when one sets out to think one must avoid self-contradiction;\r\nthis avoidance, or, put positively,\r\nthe attainment of consistency, harmony, is the basic\r\nlaw of all thinking. Since in thinking we set out\r\nto attain reality, it follows that reality itself\r\nmust be self-consistent, and that its self-consistency\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_122\"\u003e122\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ndetermines the law of thought. Or, as Mr. Bradley\r\nagain puts the matter, “In order to think at\r\nall you must subject yourself to the standard, a\r\nstandard which implies an absolute knowledge of\r\nreality; and while you doubt this, you accept it,\r\nand obey, while you rebel” (\u003ccite\u003eibid.\u003c/cite\u003e, p. 153).\r\nThe absolute knowledge referred to is, of course,\r\nthe knowledge of the thoroughly self-consistent,\r\nnon-contradictory character of reality. Every\r\nreader of Mr. Bradley’s book knows how he goes\r\non from this point to supply positive content to\r\nreality; to give an outline sketch of the characters\r\nit must possess and the way in which it must possess\r\nthem in order to maintain its thoroughly self-consistent\r\ncharacter. It is, however, only the\r\nstrictly formal aspect of the matter that I am\r\nhere concerned with.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOn this side we reach, I think, the heart of the\r\nmatter by asking, in reference to the first quotation:\r\nAbsolute \u003cem\u003efor what\u003c/em\u003e? Surely absolute for the\r\nprocess under consideration, that is absolute for\r\nthought. But the significance of this absolute for\r\nthought is, one may say, “absolutely” (since we\r\nare here confessedly in the realm just of thought)\r\ndetermined by the nature of thought itself. Now\r\nthis nature has been already referred by considerations\r\n“belonging irremovably to truth’s proper\r\ncharacter,” to the world of appearance and of internal\r\ndiscrepancy. Yes, one may say (speaking\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_123\"\u003e123\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nformally), the criterion of thought is absolute\u0026mdash;that\r\nis to say absolute or final for thought; but\r\nhow can one imagine that this in any way alters\r\nthe essential nature and value of thought? If\r\nknowledge works by thought, and thought institutes\r\nappearance over against reality, any further fact\r\nabout thought\u0026mdash;such as a statement of its criterion\u0026mdash;falls\r\nwholly within the limits of this situation.\r\nIt is comical to suppose that a \u003cem\u003especial\u003c/em\u003e trait of\r\nthought can be employed to alter the fundamental\r\nand essential nature of thought. The criterion of\r\nthought must be infected by the nature of thought,\r\ninstead of being a redeeming angel which at a\r\ncritical juncture transforms the fragile creature,\r\nthought, into an ambassador with power plenipotentiary\r\nto the court of the Absolute.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThere really seems to be ground for supposing\r\nthat the whole argument turns on an ambiguity\r\nin the use of the word “absolute.” Keeping\r\nstrictly within the limits of the argument, it means\r\nnothing more than that thinking has a certain\r\nprinciple, a law of its own; that it has an appropriate\r\nmode of procedure which must not be violated.\r\nIt means, in short, whatever is finally controlling\r\nfor the thought-function. But Mr. Bradley\r\nimmediately takes the word to mean absolute\r\nin the sense of describing a reality which by its very\r\nnature is totally contradistinguished from appearance\u0026mdash;that\r\nis to say, from the realm of thought.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_124\"\u003e124\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nUpon the ambiguity of a word, the systematic indictment\r\nof intellectualism becomes the cornerstone\r\nof a systematically intellectualistic method of\r\nconceiving reality!\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eMr. Bradley has himself recognized the seeming\r\ncontradiction between his indictment of thought\r\nand his use of the criterion of thought as the exclusive\r\npath to a philosophic notion of the real.\r\nIn dealing with it, he (to my mind) comes within\r\nan ace of stating a truer doctrine, and also exhibits\r\neven more clearly the weakness of his own\r\nposition. He goes so far as to put the following\r\nwords into the mouth of an objector, and to\r\naccept their general import: “All axioms, as a\r\nmatter of fact, are practical … for none of\r\nthem in the end can amount to more than the impulse\r\nto behave in a certain way. And they cannot\r\nexpress more than this impulse, together with\r\nthe impossibility of satisfaction unless it is complied\r\nwith” (p. 151). After accepting this (p.\r\n152) he goes on to say: “Take for example the\r\nlaw of avoiding contradiction. When two elements\r\nwill not remain quietly together, but collide and\r\nstruggle, we cannot rest satisfied with that state.\r\nOur impulse is to alter it and, on the theoretical\r\nside, to bring the content to such shape that the\r\nvariety remains peaceably in one. And this inability\r\nto rest otherwise and this tendency to alter\r\nin a certain way and direction is, \u003cem\u003ewhen reflected\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_125\"\u003e125\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nupon and made explicit\u003c/em\u003e, our axiom and our intellectual\r\nstandard” (p. 152; italics mine).\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe retort is obvious: if \u003cem\u003ethe\u003c/em\u003e intellectual criterion,\r\nthe principle of non-contradiction on which\r\nhis whole Absolute Reality rests, is itself a practical\r\nprinciple, then surely the ultimate criterion\r\nfor regulating intellectual undertakings is practical.\r\nTo this obvious answer Mr. Bradley makes\r\nreply as follows: “You may call the intellect, if\r\nyou like, a mere tendency to a movement, but you\r\nmust remember that it is a movement of a \u003cem\u003every\r\nspecial kind\u003c/em\u003e…. Thinking is the attempt\r\nto satisfy a \u003cem\u003especial\u003c/em\u003e impulse, and the attempt implies\r\nan assumption about reality…. But\r\nwhy, it may be objected, is this assumption better\r\nthan what holds for practice? Why is the theoretical\r\nto be superior to the practical end? I have\r\nnever said that this is so, only \u003cem\u003ehere\u003c/em\u003e, that is, in \u003cem\u003emetaphysics\u003c/em\u003e,\r\nI must be allowed to reply, we are acting\r\ntheoretically…. The \u003cem\u003etheoretical standard\r\nwithin theory must surely be absolute\u003c/em\u003e” (p. 153.\r\nThe italics again are mine; compare with the quotation\r\nthis, from p. 485: “Our attitude, however,\r\nin metaphysics must be theoretical.” So, also, p.\r\n154, “Since metaphysics is mere theory and since\r\ntheory from its nature must be made by the intellect,\r\nit is here the intellect alone which is to be\r\nsatisfied”).\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eGrant that intellect is a special movement or\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_126\"\u003e126\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nmode of practice; grant that we are not merely\r\nacting (are we ever \u003cem\u003emerely\u003c/em\u003e acting?) but are “specially\r\noccupied and therefore subject to special conditions,”\r\nand the problem remains \u003cem\u003ewhat\u003c/em\u003e special kind\r\nof activity is thinking? what is its experienced\r\ndifferentia from other kinds? what is its commerce\r\nwith them? When the problem is \u003cem\u003ewhat\u003c/em\u003e special kind\r\nof an activity is thinking and of \u003cem\u003ewhat\u003c/em\u003e nature is the\r\nconsistency which is its criterion, somehow we do\r\nnot get forward by being told that thinking \u003cem\u003eis\u003c/em\u003e a\r\nspecial mode of practice and that its criterion \u003cem\u003eis\u003c/em\u003e\r\nconsistency. The unquestioned presupposition of\r\nMr. Bradley is that thinking is such a wholly separate\r\nactivity (the “intellect \u003cem\u003ealone\u003c/em\u003e” which has to\r\nbe satisfied), that to give it autonomy is to say\r\nthat it, and its criterion, have nothing to do with\r\nother activities; that it is “independent” as to\r\ncriterion, in a way which excludes interdependence\r\nin function and outcome. Unless the term “special”\r\nbe interpreted to mean \u003cem\u003eisolated\u003c/em\u003e, to say that\r\nthinking is a \u003cem\u003especial\u003c/em\u003e mode of activity no more nullifies\r\nthe proposition that it arises in a practical contest\r\nand operates for practical ends, than to say\r\nthat blacksmithing is a \u003cem\u003especial\u003c/em\u003e activity, negates its\r\nbeing one connected mode of industrial activity.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eHis underlying presupposition of the separate\r\ncharacter of thought comes out in the passage last\r\nquoted. “Our impulse,” he says, “is to alter the\r\nconflicting situation and, \u003cem\u003eon the theoretical side\u003c/em\u003e,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_127\"\u003e127\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nto bring its contents into peaceable unity.” If\r\none substitutes for the word “on” the word\r\n“through,” one gets a conception of theory and\r\nof thinking that does justice to the autonomy\r\nof the operation and yet so connects it with other\r\nactivities as to give it a serious business, real purpose,\r\nand concrete responsibility and hence testibility.\r\nFrom this point of view the theoretical\r\nactivity is simply the form that certain practical\r\nactivities take after colliding, as the most effective\r\nand fruitful way of securing their own harmonization.\r\nThe collision is not theoretical; the issue in\r\n“peaceable unity” is not theoretical. But theory\r\nnames the type of activity by which the transformation\r\nfrom war to peace is most amply and\r\nsecurely effected.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_22\" href=\"#Footnote_22\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e22\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAdmit, however, the force of Mr. Bradley’s\r\ncontention on its own terms and see how futile is\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_128\"\u003e128\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe result. It is quite true, as Mr. Bradley says\r\n(p. 153), that if a man sits down to play the metaphysical\r\ngame, he must abide by the rules of thinking;\r\nbut if thinking be already, with respect to\r\nreality, an idle and futile game, simply abiding\r\nby the rules does not give additional value to its\r\nstakes. Grant the premises as to the character\r\nof thought, and the assertion of the final character\r\nof the theoretical standard within metaphysics\u0026mdash;since\r\nmetaphysics is a form of theory\u0026mdash;is a warning\r\nagainst metaphysics. If the intellect involves\r\nself-contradiction, it is either impossible that it\r\nshould be satisfied, or else self-contradiction is its\r\nsatisfaction.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003eII\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eLet us, however, turn from Mr. Bradley’s formal\r\nproof that the criterion of philosophic truth must\r\nbe exclusively a canon of formal thought. Let\r\nus ignore the contradiction involved in first making\r\nthe work of thought to be the producing of\r\nappearance and then making the law of this\r\nthought the law of an Absolute Reality. What\r\nabout the intellectualist criterion? The intellectualism\r\nof Mr. Bradley’s philosophy is represented\r\nin the statement that it is “the theoretical standard\r\nwhich guarantees that reality is a self-consistent\r\nsystem” (p. 148). But how can the fact that\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_129\"\u003e129\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe criterion of thinking is consistency be employed\r\nto determine the nature of the consistency of its\r\nobject? Consistency in one sense, consistency of\r\nreasoning with itself, we know; but what is the\r\nnature of the consistency of reality which this consistency\r\nnecessitates? Thinking without doubt\r\nmust be logical; but does it follow from this that\r\nthe reality about which one thinks, and about which\r\none must think consistently if one is to think to any\r\npurpose, must itself be already logical? The pivot\r\nof the argument is, of course, the old ontological\r\nargument, stripped of all theological irrelevancies\r\nand reduced to its fighting weight as a metaphysical\r\nproposition. Those who question this basic\r\nprinciple of intellectualism will, of course, question\r\nit here. They will urge that, instead of the consistency\r\nof “reality” resting on the basis of\r\nconsistency in the reasoning process the latter derives\r\nits meaning from the material consistency at\r\nwhich it aims. They will say that the definition\r\nof the nature of the consistency which is the end\r\nof thinking and which prescribes its technique is\r\nto be reached from inquiry into such questions as\r\nthese: What sort of an activity in the concrete is\r\nthinking? what are the specific conditions which it\r\nhas to fulfil? what is its use; its relevancy; its\r\npurport in present concrete experiences? The\r\nmore it is insisted that the theoretical standard\u0026mdash;consistency\u0026mdash;is\r\nfinal within theory, the more germane\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_130\"\u003e130\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nand the more urgent is the question: What\r\nthen in the concrete is theory? and of what nature\r\n\u003cem\u003eis\u003c/em\u003e the material consistency which is the test of its\r\nformal consistency?\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_23\" href=\"#Footnote_23\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e23\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eTake the instance of a man who wishes to deny\r\nthe criterion of self-consistency in thinking. Is\r\nhe refuted by pointing to the “fact” that eternal\r\nreality is eternally self-consistent? Would not his\r\nobvious answer to such a mode of refutation be:\r\n“What of it? What is the relevancy of that\r\nproposition to my procedure in thinking here and\r\nnow? Doubtless absolute reality may be a great\r\nnumber of things, possibly very sublime and precious\r\nthings; but what I am concerned with is a\r\nparticular job of thinking, and until you show me\r\nthe intermediate terms which link that job to the\r\nasserted self-consistent character of absolute reality,\r\nI fail to see what difference this doubtless\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_131\"\u003e131\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwholly amiable trait of reality has to make in what\r\nI am here and now concerned with. You might as\r\nwell quote any other irrelevant fact, such as the\r\nheight of the Empress of China.” We take another\r\ntack in dealing with the man in question.\r\nWe call his attention to his specific aim in the situation\r\nwith reference to which he is thinking, and\r\npoint out the conditions that have to be observed\r\nif that aim is to fulfil itself. We show that if he\r\ndoes not observe the conditions imposed by his aim\r\nhis thinking will go on so wildly as to defeat itself.\r\nIt is to consistency of means with the end\r\nof the concrete activity that we appeal. “Try\r\nthinking,” we tell such a man, “experiment with\r\nit, taking pains sometimes to have your reasonings\r\nconsistent with one another, and at other times\r\ndeliberately introducing inconsistencies; then see\r\nwhat you get in the two cases and how the result\r\nreached is related to your purpose in thinking.”\r\nWe point out that since that purpose is to reach a\r\nsettled conclusion, that purpose will be defeated unless\r\nthe steps of reasoning are kept consistent with\r\none another. We do not appeal from the mere consistency\r\nof the reasoning process\u0026mdash;the intellectual\r\naspect of the matter\u0026mdash;to an absolute self-consistent\r\nreality; but we appeal from the material\r\ncharacter of the end to be reached to the type of\r\nthe formal procedure necessary to accomplish it.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWith all our heart, then, the standard of thinking\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_132\"\u003e132\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nis absolute (that is final) within thinking.\r\nBut what is thinking? The standard of blacksmithing\r\nmust be absolute within blacksmithing,\r\nbut what is blacksmithing? No prejudice prevents\r\nacknowledging that blacksmithing is one\r\npractical activity existing as a distinct and relevant\r\nmember of a like system of activities: that it\r\nis because men use horses to transport persons and\r\ngoods that horses need to be shod. The ultimate\r\ncriterion of blacksmithing is producing a good\r\nshoe, but the nature of a good shoe is fixed,\r\nnot by blacksmithing, but by the activities in\r\nwhich horses are used. The end is ultimate (absolute)\r\nfor the operation, but this very finality is\r\nevidence that the operation is not absolute and\r\nself-inclosed, but is related and responsible. Why\r\nmust the fact that the end of thinking is ultimate\r\nfor thought stand on any different footing?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eLet us then, by way of experiment, follow this\r\nsuggestion. Let us assume that among real objects\r\nin their values and significances, real oppositions\r\nand incompatibilities exist; that these conflicts are\r\nboth troublesome in themselves, and the source of\r\nall manner of further difficulties\u0026mdash;so much so that\r\nthey may be suspected of being the source of all\r\nman’s woe, of all encroachment upon and destruction\r\nof value, of good. Suppose that thinking\r\nis, not accidentally but essentially, a way, and the\r\nonly way that proves adequate, of dealing with\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_133\"\u003e133\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthese predicaments\u0026mdash;that being “in a hole,” in\r\ndifficulty, is the fundamental “predicament” of intelligence.\r\nSuppose when effort is made in a brute\r\nway to remove these oppositions and to secure an\r\narrangement of things which means satisfaction,\r\nfulfilment, happiness, that the method of brute attack,\r\nof trying directly to force warrings into\r\npeace fails; suppose then an effort to effect the\r\ntransformation by an indirect method\u0026mdash;by inquiry\r\ninto the disordered state of affairs and by framing\r\nviews, conceptions, of what the situation would be\r\nlike were it reduced to harmonious order. Finally,\r\nsuppose that upon this basis a plan of action\r\nis worked out, and that this plan, when carried into\r\novert effect, succeeds infinitely better than the\r\nbrute method of attack in bringing about the desired\r\nconsummation. Suppose again this indirection\r\nof activity is precisely what we mean by thinking.\r\nWould it not hold that harmony is the end\r\nand the test of thinking? that observations are pertinent\r\nand ideas correct just in so far as, overtly\r\nacted upon, they succeed in removing the undesirable,\r\nthe inconsistent.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut, it is said, the very process of thinking makes\r\na certain assumption regarding the nature of reality,\r\nviz., that reality is self-consistent. This statement\r\nputs the end for the beginning. The assumption\r\nis not that “reality” \u003cem\u003eis\u003c/em\u003e self-consistent, but\r\nthat by thinking it may, for some special purpose,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_134\"\u003e134\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nor as respects some concrete problem, attain\r\ngreater consistency. Why should the assumption\r\nregarding “reality” be other than that\r\nspecific realities with which thought is concerned\r\nare \u003cem\u003ecapable of receiving\u003c/em\u003e harmonization? To say\r\nthat thought must assume, in order to go on, that\r\nreality already possesses harmony is to say that\r\nthought must begin by contradicting its own direct\r\ndata, and by assuming that its concrete aim is vain\r\nand illusory. Why put upon thought the onus of\r\nintroducing discrepancies into reality in order just\r\nto give itself exercise in the gymnastic of removing\r\nthem? The assumption that concrete thinking\r\nmakes about “reality” is that things just as they\r\nexist may acquire \u003cem\u003ethrough activity, guided by\r\nthinking\u003c/em\u003e, a certain character which it is excellent\r\nfor them to possess; and may acquire it more liberally\r\nand effectively than by other methods.\r\nOne might as well say that the blacksmith could\r\nnot think to any effect concerning iron, without a\r\nPlatonic archetypal horseshoe, laid up in the\r\nheavens. His thinking also makes an assumption\r\nabout present, given reality, viz., that this piece\r\nof iron, through the exercise of intelligently directed\r\nactivity, may be shaped into a satisfactory\r\nhorseshoe. The assumption is practical: the assumption\r\nthat a specific thing may take on in a\r\nspecific way a specific needed value. The test,\r\nmoreover, of this assumption is practical; it consists\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_135\"\u003e135\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nin acting upon it to see if it will do what\r\nit pretends it can do, namely, guide activities to\r\nthe required result. The assumption about reality\r\nis not something in addition to the idea, which an\r\nidea already in existence makes; some assumption\r\nabout the possibility of a change in the state of\r\nthings as experienced \u003cem\u003eis\u003c/em\u003e the idea\u0026mdash;and its test or\r\ncriterion is whether this possible change can be\r\neffected when the idea is acted upon in good\r\nfaith.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn any case, how much simpler the case becomes\r\nwhen we stick by the empirical facts. According\r\nto them there is no wholesale discrepancy of existence\r\nand meaning; there is simply a “loosening”\r\nof the two when objects do not fulfil our\r\nplans and meet our desires; or when we project\r\ninventions and cannot find immediately the means\r\nfor their realization. The “collisions” are neither\r\nphysical, metaphysical, nor logical; they are moral\r\nand practical. They exist between an aim and\r\nthe means of its execution. Consequently the\r\nobject of thinking is not to effect some wholesale\r\nand “Absolute” reconciliation of meaning and\r\nexistence, but to make a specific adjustment of\r\nthings to our purposes and of our purposes to\r\nthings at just the crucial point of the crisis. Making\r\nthe utmost concessions to Mr. Bradley’s account\r\nof the discrepancy of meaning and existence\r\nin our experience, to his statement of the relation\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_136\"\u003e136\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof this to the function of judgment (as involving\r\nnamely an explicit \u003cem\u003estatement\u003c/em\u003e at once of the actual\r\nsundering and the ideal union) and to his account\r\nof consistency as the goal and standard, there is\r\nstill not a detail of the account that is not met\r\namply and with infinitely more empirical warrant\r\nby the conception that the “collision” in which\r\nthinking starts and the “consistency” in which it\r\nterminates are practical and human.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003eIII\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis brings us explicitly to the question of\r\ntruth, “truth” being confessedly the end and\r\nstandard of thinking. I confess to being much\r\nat a loss to realize just what the intellectualists\r\nconceive to be the relation of truth to ideas on one\r\nside and to “reality” on the other. My difficulty\r\noccurs, I think, because they describe so little in\r\nanalytical detail; in writing of truth they seem\r\nrather to be under a strong emotional influence\u0026mdash;as\r\nif they were victims of an uncritical pragmatism\u0026mdash;which\r\nleaves much of their thought to be\r\nguessed at. The implication of their discussions\r\nassigns three distinct values to the term “truth.”\r\nOn the one hand, truth is something which characterizes\r\nideas, theories, hypotheses, beliefs, judgments,\r\npropositions, assertions, etc.,\u0026mdash;anything\r\nwhatsoever involving \u003cem\u003eintellectual\u003c/em\u003e statement. From\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_137\"\u003e137\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthis standpoint a criterion of truth means the test\r\nof the worth of the intellectual intent, import, or\r\nclaim of any intellectual statement as intellectual.\r\nThis is an intelligible sense of the term truth. In\r\nthe second place, it seems to be assumed that a\r\ncertain kind of reality is already, apart from ideas\r\nor meanings, Truth, and that \u003cem\u003ethis\u003c/em\u003e Truth is the\r\ncriterion of that lower and more unworthy kind\r\nof truth that may be possessed or aimed at by\r\nideas. But we do not stop here. The conception\r\nthat \u003cem\u003eall\u003c/em\u003e truth must have a criterion haunts the\r\nintellectualist, so that the reality, which, as contrasted\r\nwith ideas, is taken to be The Truth (and\r\nthe criterion of \u003cem\u003etheir\u003c/em\u003e truth) is treated as if it itself\r\nhad to have support and warrant from some other\r\nReality, lying back of it, which is \u003cem\u003eits\u003c/em\u003e criterion.\r\nThis, then, gives the third type of truth, \u003cem\u003eThe\r\nAbsolute Truth\u003c/em\u003e. (Just why this process should\r\nnot go on indefinitely is not clear, but the necessity\r\nof infinite regress may be emotionally prevented\r\nby always referring to this last type of\r\ntruth as Absolute). Now this scheme may be\r\n“true,” but it is not self-explanatory or even\r\neasily apprehensible. In just what sense, truth is\r\n(1) that to which ideas as ideas lay claim and yet\r\nis (2) Reality which as reality is the criterion of\r\ntruth of ideas, and yet again is (3) a Reality\r\nwhich completely annuls and transcends all reference\r\nto ideas, is not in the least clear to me: nor,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_138\"\u003e138\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ntill better informed, shall I believe it to be clear\r\nto any one.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn his more strictly logical discussions, Mr.\r\nBradley sets out from the notion that truth refers\r\nto intellectual statements and positions as such.\r\nBut the Truth soon becomes a sort of transcendent\r\nessence on its own account. The identification\r\nof reality and truth on page 146 may be a\r\nmere casual phrase, but the distinction drawn between\r\nvalidity and absolute truth (p. 362), and the\r\ndiscussion of Degrees of Truth and Reality, involve\r\nassumptions of an identity of truth and\r\nreality. Truth in this sense turns out to be the\r\ncriterion for the truth, the truth, that is, of ideas.\r\nBut, again (p. 545), a distinction is made between\r\n“Finite Truth,” that is, a view of reality which\r\nwould completely satisfy intelligence as such, and\r\n“Absolute Truth,” which is obtained only by\r\n\u003cem\u003epassing beyond intelligence\u003c/em\u003e\u0026mdash;only when intelligence\r\nas such is absorbed in some Absolute in which it\r\nloses its distinctive character.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt would advance the state of discussion, I am\r\nsure, if there were more explicit statements regarding\r\nthe relations of “true idea,” “truth,” “the\r\ncriterion of truth” and “reality,” to one another.\r\nA more explicit exposition also of the view\r\nthat is held concerning the relation of verification\r\nand truth could hardly fail to be of value. Not\r\ninfrequently the intellectualist admits that the\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_139\"\u003e139\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nprocess of verification is experimental, consisting\r\nin setting on foot various activities that express\r\nthe intent of the idea and confirm or refute it according\r\nto the changes effected. This seems to\r\nmean that truth is simply the tested or verified\r\nbelief as such. But then a curious reservation is\r\nintroduced; the experimental process \u003cem\u003efinds\u003c/em\u003e, it is\r\nsaid, that an idea is true, while the error of the\r\npragmatist is to take the process by which truth\r\nis \u003cem\u003efound\u003c/em\u003e as one by which it is made. The claim\r\nof “making truth” is treated as blasphemy\r\nagainst the very notion of truth: such are the consequences\r\nof venturing to translate the Latin\r\n“verification” into the English “making true.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf we face the bogie thus called up, it will be\r\nfound that the horror is largely sentimental. Suppose\r\nwe stick to the notion that truth is a character\r\nwhich belongs to a meaning so far as tested\r\nthrough action that carries it to successful completion.\r\nIn this case, to make an idea true is to\r\nmodify and transform it until it reaches this successful\r\noutcome: until it initiates a mode of response\r\nwhich in its issue realizes its claim to be the method\r\nof harmonizing the discrepancies of a given situation.\r\nThe meaning is remade by constantly acting\r\nupon it, and by introducing into its content such\r\ncharacters as are indicated by any resulting failures\r\nto secure harmony. From this point of view,\r\nverification and truth are two names for the same\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_140\"\u003e140\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthing. We call it “verification” when we regard\r\nit as process; when the development of the idea is\r\nstrung out and exposed to view in all that makes\r\nit true. We call it “truth” when we take it as\r\nproduct, as process telescoped and condensed.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSuppose the idea to be an invention, say of the\r\ntelephone. In this case, is not the verification of\r\nthe idea and the construction of the device which\r\ncarries out its intent one and the same? In this\r\ncase, does the truth of the idea mean anything\r\nelse than that the issue proves the idea can be\r\ncarried into effect? There are certain intellectualists\r\nwho are not of the absolutist type; who do\r\nnot believe that all of men’s aims, designs, projects,\r\nthat have to do with action, whether industrial,\r\nsocial, or moral in scope, have been from all\r\neternity registered as already accomplished in reality.\r\nHow do such persons dispose of this problem\r\nof the truth of practical ideas?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIs not the truth of \u003cem\u003esuch\u003c/em\u003e ideas an affair of \u003cem\u003emaking\u003c/em\u003e\r\nthem true by constructing, through appropriate\r\nbehavior, a condition that satisfies the requirements\r\nof the case? If, in this case, truth\r\nmeans the effective capacity of the idea “to make\r\ngood,” what is there in the logic of the case to\r\nforbid the application of analogous considerations\r\nto any idea?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eI hear a noise in the street. It suggests as its\r\nmeaning a street-car. To test this idea I go to\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_141\"\u003e141\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe window and through listening and looking intently\u0026mdash;the\r\nlistening and the looking being modes\r\nof behavior\u0026mdash;organize into a single situation elements\r\nof existence and meaning which were previously\r\ndisconnected. In this way an idea is made\r\ntrue; that which was a proposal or hypothesis is\r\nno longer merely a propounding or a guess. If I\r\nhad not reacted in a way appropriate to the idea\r\nit would have remained a mere idea; at most a\r\ncandidate for truth that, unless acted upon upon\r\nthe spot, would always have remained a theory.\r\nNow in such a case\u0026mdash;where the end to be accomplished\r\nis the discovery of a certain order of facts\u0026mdash;would\r\nthe intellectualist claim that apart from\r\nthe forming and entertaining of some interpretation,\r\nthe category of truth has either existence or\r\nmeaning? Will he claim that without an original\r\npractical uneasiness introducing a practical aim of\r\ninquiry there must have been, whether or no, an\r\nidea? Must the world for some purely intellectual\r\nreason be intellectually reduplicated? Could not\r\nthat occurrence which I now identify as a noisy\r\nstreet-car have retained, so far as pure intelligence\r\nis concerned, its unidentified status of being mere\r\nphysical alteration in a vast unidentified complex\r\nof matter-in-motion? Was there any \u003cem\u003eintellectual\u003c/em\u003e\r\nnecessity that compelled the event to arouse just\r\nthis judgment, that it meant a street-car? Was\r\nthere any physical or metaphysical necessity?\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_142\"\u003e142\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nWas there any necessity save a need of characterizing\r\nit for some purpose of our own? And why\r\nshould we be mealy-mouthed about calling this\r\nneed practical? If the necessity which led to the\r\nformation and development of an intellectual judgment\r\nwas purely objective (whether physical or\r\nmetaphysical) why should not the thing have also to\r\nbe characterized in countless millions of other ways;\r\nfor example, as to its distance from some crater in\r\nthe moon, or its effect upon the circulation of my\r\nblood, or upon my irascible neighbor’s temper, or\r\nbearing upon the Monroe Doctrine? In short, do\r\nnot intellectual positions and statements mean new\r\nand significant events in the treatment of things?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is perhaps dangerous to attempt to follow\r\nthe inner workings of the processes by which truth\r\nis first identified with some superior type of Reality,\r\nand then this Truth is taken as the criterion\r\nof the truth of ideas; while all the time it is held\r\nthat truth is something already possessed by ideas\r\nas purely intellectual. But there seems to be some\r\nground for believing that this identification is due\r\nto a twofold confusion, one having to do with ideas,\r\nand the other with things. As to the first point:\r\nAfter an idea is made true, we naturally say, in\r\nretrospect, “it \u003cem\u003ewas\u003c/em\u003e true all the time.” Now this\r\ntruism is quite innocuous as a truism, being just a\r\nrestatement of the fact that the idea has, as matter\r\nof fact, worked successfully. But it may be regarded\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_143\"\u003e143\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nnot as a truism but as furnishing some additional\r\nknowledge; as if it were, indeed, the dawning\r\nof a revelation regarding truth. Then it is\r\nsaid that the idea worked or was verified because\r\nit was already inherently, just as idea, the truth;\r\nthe pragmatist, so it is said, making the error\r\nof supposing that it is true because it works. If\r\none remembers that what the experimentalist means\r\nis that the effective working of an idea and its\r\ntruth are one and the same thing\u0026mdash;this working\r\nbeing neither the cause nor the evidence of truth\r\nbut its nature\u0026mdash;it is hard to see the point of this\r\nstatement. A man under peculiarly precarious\r\ncircumstances has been rescued from drowning. A\r\nby-stander remarks that now he is a saved man.\r\n“Yes,” replies some one, “but he was a saved man\r\nall the time, and the process of rescuing, while it\r\ngives evidence of that fact, does not constitute it.”\r\nNow even such a statement as pure tautology,\r\nas characterizing the entire process in terms of its\r\nissue, is objectionable only in the fact that, like\r\nall tautology, it seems to say something but does\r\nnot. But if it be regarded as revealing the earlier\r\ncondition of affairs, apart from the active process\r\nby which it was carried to a happy conclusion, such\r\na statement would be monstrously false; and would\r\ndeclare its falsity in the fact that, if acted upon,\r\nthe man would have been left to drown. In like\r\nfashion, to say, \u003cem\u003eafter the event\u003c/em\u003e, that a given idea\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_144\"\u003e144\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwas true all the time, is to lose sight of what makes\r\nan idea an idea, its hypothetical character; and\r\nthereby deliberately to transform it into brute\r\ndogma\u0026mdash;something to which no canon of verification\r\ncan ever be applied. The intellectualist almost\r\nalways treats the pragmatic account as if it\r\nwere, from the standpoint of the pragmatist as well\r\nas from his own, a denial of the existence of truth,\r\nwhile it is nothing but a statement of its nature.\r\nWhen the intellectualist realizes this, he will, I hope,\r\nask himself: What, then, on the pragmatic basis is\r\nmeant by the proposition that an idea is true all\r\nthe time? If the statement that an idea was true\r\nall the time has no meaning except that the idea\r\nwas one which as matter of fact succeeded through\r\naction in achieving its intent, mere reiteration that\r\nthe idea was true all the time or it could not have\r\nsucceeded, does not take us far.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_24\" href=\"#Footnote_24\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e24\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_145\"\u003e145\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nOn the side of things, \u003cem\u003ereality\u003c/em\u003e is identified with\r\ntruth; then on the principle that two things\r\nthat are equal to the same thing are equal to\r\neach other, truth as idea and truth as reality are\r\ntaken to be one and the same thing. Wherever\r\nthere is an improved or tested idea, an idea which\r\nhas made good, there is a concrete existence in the\r\nway of a completed or harmonized situation. The\r\nsame activity which proves the idea constructs an\r\ninherently satisfied situation out of an inherently\r\ndissentient one,\u0026mdash;for it is precisely the capacity\r\nof the idea as an aim and method of action to\r\ndetermine such transformation that is the criterion\r\nof its truth. Now unless all the elements\r\nin the situation are held steadily in view, the specific\r\nway in which the harmonized reality affords the\r\ncriterion of truth (namely, through its function\r\nof being the last term of a process of active determination)\r\nis lost from sight; and the achieved\r\nexistence in its merely existent character, apart\r\nfrom its practical or fulfilment character, is treated\r\nas The Truth. But when the reality is thus separated\r\nfrom the process by which it is achieved,\r\nwhen it is taken just as given, it is neither truth\r\nnor a criterion of truth. It is a state of facts like\r\nany other. The achieved telephone is a criterion\r\nof the validity of a certain prior idea in so far\r\nas it is the fulfilment of activities that embody\r\nthe nature of that idea, but just as telephone, as\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_146\"\u003e146\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\na machine actually in existence, it is no more truth\r\nnor criterion of truth than is a crack in the wall\r\nor a cobble-stone on the street.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe intervening term that mediates and completes\r\nthe confusion of truth with ideas on one\r\nhand and “reality” on the other, is, I think, the\r\nfact that ideas after they have been tested in action\r\nare employed in the development and grounding of\r\nfurther beliefs. There are cases in which an idea\r\nceases to exist as idea as soon as it is made true;\r\nthis is so as matter of fact and it is impossible to\r\nconceive any reason why it should not be so in point\r\nof theory. Such is the case, I take it, with a large\r\npart\u0026mdash;possibly the major portion\u0026mdash;of the ideas\r\nthat mediate the smaller and transient crises of\r\ndaily practice. I cannot imagine the situation in\r\nwhich the truth to which I have referred above\u0026mdash;the\r\nverification of a certain idea about a certain\r\nnoise\u0026mdash;would ever function again as truth\u0026mdash;save\r\nas I have given it a function in this paper by using\r\nit as a corroboration of a certain theory. Such\r\nideas mostly cease, giving way to a matter-of-fact\r\nstatus: say, the perception of the noisy street-car.\r\nOne at the time may say “My idea regarding\r\nthat noise was a true idea”; or one may\r\nnot even go so far as that, he may just stop with\r\nthe eventual perception. But the tested idea need\r\nnot ever recur as a factor of proof in any other\r\nproblem. Such, however, is conspicuously not\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_147\"\u003e147\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe case with our scientific ideas. In its first\r\nvalue, the idea or hypothesis of gravitation entertained\r\nby Newton, stood, when verified, on\r\nexactly the same level as the hypothesis regarding\r\nthe noise in the street. Theoretically, that\r\ntruth might have been so isolated that its truth\r\ncharacter would disappear from thought as\r\nsoon as a certain factual condition was ascertained.\r\nBut practically quite the opposite has\r\nhappened. The idea operates in many other inquiries,\r\nand operates no longer as mere idea, but\r\nas \u003cem\u003eproved\u003c/em\u003e idea. Such truths get an “eternal”\r\nstatus;\u0026mdash;one irrespective of application just now\r\nand here, because there are so many nows and heres\r\nin which they are useful. Just as to say an idea\r\nwas true all the time is a way of saying \u003cem\u003ein retrospect\u003c/em\u003e\r\nthat it has come out in a certain fashion,\r\nso to say that an idea is “eternally true” is to\r\nindicate \u003cem\u003eprospective\u003c/em\u003e modes of application which\r\nare indefinitely anticipated. Its meaning, therefore,\r\nis strictly pragmatic. It does not indicate\r\na property inherent in the idea as intellectualized\r\nexistence, but denotes a property of use and\r\nemployment. Always at hand when needed is\r\na good enough eternal for reasonably minded\r\npersons.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_148\"\u003e148\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003eIV\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eI have gone from the very general considerations\r\nwhich occupied us in the earlier portions of this\r\narticle to matters which relatively at least are\r\nspecific. I conclude with a summary in the hope\r\nthat it may bind together the earlier and the later\r\nparts of this paper.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e1. The condition which antecedes and provokes\r\nany particular exercise of reflective knowing is always\r\none of discrepancy, struggle, “collision.”\r\nThis condition is practical, for it involves the habits\r\nand interests of the organism, an agent. This\r\ndoes not mean that the struggle is merely personal,\r\nor subjective, or psychological. The agent or\r\nindividual is one factor in the situation\u0026mdash;not the\r\nsituation something subsisting in the individual.\r\nThe individual has to be identified in the situation,\r\nbefore any situation can be referred\u0026mdash;as in psychology\u0026mdash;to\r\nthe individual. But the discrepancy\r\ncalls out and controls reflective knowing only as\r\nthe fortunes of an agent are implicated in the\r\ncrisis. Certain elements stand out as obstacles, as\r\ninterferences, as deficiencies\u0026mdash;in short as unsatisfactory\r\nand as requiring something for their completion.\r\nOther elements stand out as wanted\u0026mdash;as\r\nrequired, as a satisfaction which does not exist.\r\nThis clash (an accompaniment of all desire) between\r\nthe given and the wanted, between the present\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_149\"\u003e149\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nand the absent, is at once the root and the\r\ntype of that peculiar paradoxical relation between\r\nexistence and meaning which Bradley insists upon\r\nas the essence of judgment. It is not irrational\r\nin the sense that we are dealing with appearance\r\nwholesale, but it is non-rational\u0026mdash;an evidence that\r\nwe are dealing with a practical affair.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e2. The intellectual or reflective and logical is a\r\n\u003cem\u003estatement\u003c/em\u003e of this conflict: an attempt to describe\r\nand define it. It is, as it were, the practical clash\r\nheld off at arm’s length for inspection and investigation.\r\nIn this way brute blind reaction\r\nagainst the unsatisfactoriness of the situation is\r\nsuspended. Action is turned into the channel of\r\nobserving, of inferring, of reasoning, or defining\r\nmeans and end. It is this change in the quality\r\nof activity, from directly overt, to indirect, or inquiring\r\nwith view to stating, that constitutes the\r\n\u003cem\u003especific\u003c/em\u003e nature of reflective practice to which Mr.\r\nBradley calls attention. The discovery of the nature\r\nof the conflict supplies materials for the fact\r\nor existence side of the judgement. The conception\r\nor projection of the object in which the conflict\r\nwould be terminated furnishes material for\r\nthe meaning side of the judgment. It is ideal\r\nbecause anticipatory, just as the fact side is\r\nexistential, because reminiscent or recording.\r\nHence the two are necessarily both distinguished\r\nfrom and yet referred to each other: only\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_150\"\u003e150\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthrough location of a problem can a solution be\r\nconceived; only in reference to the intent of finding\r\na solution can the elements of a problem be\r\nselected and interpreted. In origin and in destiny,\r\nthis correlative determination of existence and\r\nmeaning is tentative and experimental. The aim\r\nof the subject of the judgment is not to include all\r\npossible reality, but to select those elements of a\r\nreality that are useful in locating the source and\r\nnature of the difficulty in hand. The aim of the\r\npredicate is not to bunch all possible meaning and\r\nrefer it in one final act indiscriminately to all existence,\r\nbut to state the standpoint and method\r\nthrough which the difficulty of the particular situation\r\nmay most effectively be dealt with. The selection\r\nof what is relevant to the characterization of\r\nthe problem and the projection of the method of\r\ndealing with it are theoretic, hypothetic, intellectual:\u0026mdash;that\r\nis, they are tentative ways of viewing\r\nthe matter for the sake of guiding, economizing,\r\nand freeing the activities through which it may\r\n\u003cem\u003ereally\u003c/em\u003e be dealt with.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e3. The criterion of the worth of the idea is thus\r\nthe capacity of the idea (as a definition of the end\r\nor outcome in terms of what is likely to be serviceable\r\nas a method) to operate in fulfilling the object\r\nfor the sake of which it was projected. Capacity\r\nof operation in this fashion is the test, measure, or\r\ncriterion of truth. Hence the criterion is practical\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_151\"\u003e151\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nin the most overt sense of that term. We\r\nmay, if we choose, regard the object in which the\r\nidea terminates through its use in guiding action,\r\nas the criterion; but if we so choose, it is at our\r\nperil that we forget that this object serves as\r\ncriterion in its capacity of fulfilment and not as\r\nsheer objective existence.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e4. Difficulties overlap; problems recur which resemble\r\neach other in the kind of treatment they\r\ndemand for solution. Various modes of activity\r\nwith their respective ends, going on at some time\r\nmore or less independently, get organized into\r\nsingle comprehensive systems of behavior. The solution\r\nof one problem is found to create difficulties\r\nelsewhere; or the truth that is made in the solution\r\nof one problem is found to afford an effective\r\nmethod of dealing with questions arising apparently\r\nfrom unallied sources. Thus certain tested\r\nideas in performing a constant or recurrent function\r\nsecure a certain permanent status. The prospective\r\nuse of such truths, the satisfaction that\r\nwe anticipate in their employ, the assurance of\r\ncontrol that we feel in their possession, becomes\r\nrelatively much more important than the circumstances\r\nunder which they were first made true. In\r\nbecoming permanent resources, such tested ideas\r\nget a generalized energy of position. They are\r\ntruths in general, truths “in themselves” or in the\r\nabstract, truths to which positive value is assigned\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_152\"\u003e152\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\non their own account. Such truths are the “eternal\r\ntruths” of current discussion. They naturally\r\nand properly add to their intellectual and to their\r\npractical worth a certain esthetic quality. They\r\nare interesting to contemplate, and their contemplation\r\narouses emotions of admiration and\r\nreverence. To make these emotions the basis of\r\nassigning peculiar inherent sanctity to them apart\r\nfrom their warrant in use, is simply to give way\r\nto that mood which in primitive man is the cause\r\nof attributing magical efficacy to physical things.\r\nEsthetically such truths are more than instrumentalities.\r\nBut to ignore both the instrumental and\r\nthe esthetic aspect, and to ascribe values due to an\r\ninstrumental and esthetic character to some interior\r\nand \u003ci xml:lang=\"la\" lang=\"la\"\u003ea priori\u003c/i\u003e constitution of truth is to make\r\nfetishes of them.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe may not exaggerate the permanence and\r\nstability of such truths with respect to their recurring\r\nand prospective use. It is only relatively\r\nthat they are unchanging. When applied to new\r\ncases, used as resources for coping with new difficulties,\r\nthe oldest of truths are to some extent\r\nremade. Indeed it is only through such application\r\nand such remaking that truths retain their\r\nfreshness and vitality. Otherwise they are relegated\r\nto faint reminiscences of an antique tradition.\r\nEven the truth that two and two make four\r\nhas gained a new meaning, has had its truth in\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_153\"\u003e153\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nsome degree remade, in the development of the\r\nmodern theory of number. If we put ourselves in\r\nthe attitude of a scientific inquirer in asking what\r\nis the meaning of truth \u003ci xml:lang=\"la\" lang=\"la\"\u003eper se\u003c/i\u003e, there spring up\r\nbefore us those ideas which are actively employed\r\nin the mastery of new fields, in the organization\r\nof new materials. This is the essential difference\r\nbetween truth and dogma; between the living and\r\nthe dead and decaying. Above all, it is in the\r\nregion of moral truth that this perception stands\r\nout. Moral truths that are not recreated in application\r\nto the urgencies of the passing hour, no matter\r\nhow true in the place and time of their origin,\r\nare pernicious and misleading, \u003ci xml:lang=\"la\" lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e, false. And it\r\nis perhaps through emphasizing this fact, embodied\r\nin one form or another in every system of morals\r\nand in every religion of moral import, that one\r\nmost readily realizes the character of truth.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_154\"\u003e154\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\r\n\u003ch2 title=\"A SHORT CATECHISM CONCERNING TRUTH\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"A_SHORT_CATECHISM_CONCERNING_TRUTH\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eA SHORT CATECHISM CONCERNING TRUTH\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_25\" href=\"#Footnote_25\" class=\"fnanchor smaller\"\u003e25\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"drop-cap\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap1\"\u003e\u003cem\u003ePupil.\u003c/em\u003e\u003c/span\u003e I am desirous, respected teacher, of\r\nforming an independent judgment concerning\r\nthe novel theory of truth that you are said\r\nto profess. My eagerness is whetted because the\r\ntheory as expounded to me by my old teacher,\r\nProfessor Purus Intellectus, so obviously contravenes\r\ncommon sense, science, and philosophy that I\r\ndo not understand how it can be advanced in good\r\nfaith by any reasonable man.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eTeacher.\u003c/em\u003e As you are already somewhat acquainted\r\nwith the theory (or at least with what\r\nit purports to be), perhaps if you will set forth in\r\norder your objections, it will appear that the\r\ntheory that you are acquainted with is not advanced\r\nby any reasonable persons, and that by\r\nunderstanding the theory as it is you will also be\r\nled to embrace it.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003ePupil: Objection One.\u003c/em\u003e Pragmatism makes\r\ntruth a subjective affair, namely the satisfaction\r\nafforded individuals by ideas, while everybody\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_155\"\u003e155\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nknows that the truth of ideas depends upon their\r\nrelation to things.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eTeacher: Reply.\u003c/em\u003e If I were to reply that I\r\nhold to existences independent of ideas, existences\r\nprior to, synchronous with, and subsequent to ideas,\r\nthat might seem to you to express only my personal\r\nopinion and to have no logical connection with\r\npragmatism. So I beg to remind you that, according\r\nto pragmatism, ideas (judgments and\r\nreasonings being included for convenience in this\r\nterm) are attitudes of response taken toward extra-ideal,\r\nextra-mental things. Instinct and habit\r\nexpress, for instance, modes of response, but modes\r\ninadequate for a progressive being, or for adaptation\r\nto an environment presenting novel and unmastered\r\nfeatures. Under such conditions, ideas\r\nare their surrogates. The origin of an idea is thus\r\nin some empirical, extra-mental situation which\r\nprovokes ideas as modes of response, while their\r\nmeaning is found in the modifications\u0026mdash;the “differences”\u0026mdash;they\r\nmake in this extra-mental situation.\r\nTheir validity is in turn measured by their capacity\r\nto effect the transformation they intend.\r\nOrigin, content, and value\u0026mdash;all alike are extra-ideational.\r\nThe satisfaction upon which the\r\npragmatist dwells is just the better adjustment of\r\nliving beings to their environment effected by\r\ntransformations of the environment through forming\r\nand applying ideas.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_156\"\u003e156\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003cem\u003ePupil: Objection Two.\u003c/em\u003e But, as I understand\r\nit and as you have yourself confessed in your language,\r\nthese external things, while they may be\r\nexternal to the particular idea in question, are \u003cem\u003eempirical\u003c/em\u003e;\r\nthey are just other experiences and so\r\nmental after all. You hold, I have been informed,\r\nthat truth is an \u003cem\u003eexperienced\u003c/em\u003e relation, instead of\r\na relation between experience and what transcends\r\nit; why then be mealy-mouthed (pardon my eagerness\r\nif it leads me astray) in admitting that the\r\nwhole business is intra-mental?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eTeacher: Reply.\u003c/em\u003e Your objection combines and\r\nconfuses two things. To disentangle them is to\r\nanswer the objection. (1) The notion of transcendence\r\nhas a double meaning; first, it denotes\r\nthat which lies inherently and essentially beyond\r\nexperience. It is interesting to note that the opponents\r\nof pragmatism have been forced by the\r\nexigencies of their hostility to resuscitate a doctrine\r\nsupposedly dead: the doctrine of unexperienceable,\r\nunknowable “Things in Themselves.”\r\nAnd as if this were not enough, they identify Truth\r\nwith relationship to this unknowable. Thereby\r\nin behalf of the notion of Truth in general, they\r\nland in scepticism with reference to the possibility\r\nof any truth in particular. The pragmatist \u003cem\u003eis\u003c/em\u003e\r\nbound to deny \u003cem\u003esuch\u003c/em\u003e transcendence. (2) That he is\r\nthereby landed in pure subjectivism or the reduction\r\nof every existence to the purely mental, follows\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_157\"\u003e157\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nonly if experience means only mental states. The\r\ncritic appears to hold the Humian doctrine that\r\nexperience is made up of states of mind, of sensations\r\nand ideas. It is then for \u003cem\u003ehim\u003c/em\u003e to decide how,\r\non \u003cem\u003ehis\u003c/em\u003e basis, he escapes subjective idealism, or\r\n“mentalism.” The pragmatist starts from a much\r\nmore commonplace notion of experience, that of\r\nthe plain man who never dreams that to experience\r\na thing is first to destroy the thing and then to\r\nsubstitute a mental state for it. More particularly,\r\nthe pragmatist has insisted that experience\r\nis a matter of functions and habits, of active adjustments\r\nand re-adjustments, of co-ordinations\r\nand activities, rather than of states of consciousness.\r\nTo criticise the pragmatist by reading into\r\nhim exactly the notion of experience that he denies\r\nand replaces, may be psychological and unregenerately\r\n“pragmatic,” but it is hardly “intellectual.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003ePupil: Objection Three.\u003c/em\u003e You remind me, curiously\r\nenough, of a contention of my old instructor\r\nto the effect that the pragmatist, when criticised,\r\nalways shifts his ground. To avoid solipsism and\r\nsubjectivism, he falls back on things independent\r\nof ideas, adducing them in order to pass upon the\r\ntruth or falsity of the latter. But thereby he only\r\ncovertly recognizes the intellectualistic standard.\r\nThus he swings unevenly between a denial of science\r\nand a clamorous reiteration, in new phraseology,\r\nof what all philosophers hold.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_158\"\u003e158\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003cem\u003eTeacher: Reply.\u003c/em\u003e Your words have indeed a\r\nfamiliar sound. Apparently, the average intellectualist\r\nhas got so accustomed to taking truth\r\nas a Relation at Large, without specification or\r\nanalysis, that any attempt at a concrete statement\r\nof just what the relationship is appears to be a\r\ndenial of the relation itself; in which case, he interprets\r\nan occasional reminder from the pragmatist\r\nthat the latter is, after all, attempting to\r\nspecify the nature of the relation, to be a surrender\r\nof the pragmatist’s own case, since it admits\r\nafter all that there is some relation!\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eHowever that may be, the pragmatist holds that\r\nthe relation in question is one of correspondence\r\nbetween existence and thought; but he holds that\r\ncorrespondence instead of being an ultimate and\r\nunanalyzable mystery, to be defined by iteration,\r\nis precisely a matter of cor-respondence in its\r\nplain, familiar sense. A condition of dubious and\r\nconflicting tendencies calls out thinking as a method\r\nof handling it. This condition produces its own\r\nappropriate consequences, bearing its own fruits\r\nof weal and woe. The thoughts, the estimates,\r\nintents, and projects it calls out, just because\r\nthey are attitudes of response and of attempted\r\nadjustment (\u003cem\u003enot\u003c/em\u003e mere “states of consciousness”),\r\nproduce their effects also. The kind of interlocking,\r\nof interadjustment that then occurs between\r\nthese two sorts of consequences constitutes the\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_159\"\u003e159\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ncorrespondence that makes truth, just as failure to\r\nrespond to each other, to work together, constitutes\r\nmistake and error\u0026mdash;mishandling and wandering.\r\nThis account may, of course, be wrong\u0026mdash;may\r\ninvolve a maladjustment of consequences\u0026mdash;but\r\nthe error in the account, if it exists, must be\r\nspecific and empirical, and cannot be located by\r\ngeneral epistemological accusations.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003ePupil: Objection Four.\u003c/em\u003e Well, even admitting\r\nthis version of pragmatism, you cannot deny it\r\nstill contravenes common sense; for, according to\r\nyou, the correspondence that constitutes truth does\r\nnot exist till \u003cem\u003eafter\u003c/em\u003e ideas have worked, while common\r\nsense perceives and knows that it is the antecedent\r\nagreement of the ideas with reality that enables\r\nthem to work. If you make the truth of the existence\r\nof a Carboniferous age, or the landing of\r\nColumbus in 1492, depend upon a future working\r\nof an idea about them, you commit yourself to the\r\nmost fantastic of philosophies.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eTeacher: Reply.\u003c/em\u003e May I recall to your attention\r\nthe accusation of “shifting ground” when\r\nhard pressed? The intellectualist began, if I remember\r\ncorrectly, with conceiving truth as a relation\r\nof thought and existence; has he not, in your\r\nlast objection, substituted for this conception an\r\nidentification of the bare existence or event with\r\ntruth? Which does he mean? How will he have\r\nit? The existence of the Carboniferous age, the\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_160\"\u003e160\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ndiscovery of America by Columbus are not truths;\r\nthey are events. Some conviction, some belief,\r\nsome judgment with reference to them is necessary\r\nto introduce the category of truth and falsity.\r\nAnd since the conviction, the judgment, is as matter\r\nof fact subsequent to the event, how can its\r\ntruth consist in the kind of blank, wholesale relationship\r\nthe intellectualist contends for? How\r\ncan the present belief jump out of its present\r\nskin, dive into the past, and land upon just the\r\none event (that \u003cem\u003eas\u003c/em\u003e past is gone forever) which, by\r\ndefinition, constitutes its truth? I do not wonder\r\nthe intellectualist has much to say about “transcendence”\r\nwhen he comes to dealing with the truth\r\nof judgments about the past; but why does he\r\nnot tell us how we manage to know when one\r\nthought lands straight on the devoted head of\r\nsomething past and gone, while another thought\r\ncomes down on the wrong thing in the past?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003ePupil.\u003c/em\u003e Well, of course, knowledge of the past\r\nis very mysterious, but how is the pragmatist\r\nany better off?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eTeacher.\u003c/em\u003e The reply to that may be inferred\r\nfrom what has already been said. The past event\r\nhas left effects, consequences, that are present\r\nand that will continue in the future. Our belief\r\nabout it, if genuine, must also modify action in\r\n\u003cem\u003esome\u003c/em\u003e way and so have objective effects. If these\r\ntwo sets of effects interlock harmoniously, then the\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_161\"\u003e161\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\njudgment is true. If perchance the past event\r\nhad no discoverable consequences or our thought of\r\nit can work out to no assignable difference anywhere,\r\nthen there is no possibility of genuine judgment.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003ePupil.\u003c/em\u003e You have, perhaps, anticipated my next\r\nobjection, which was that upon the pragmatic\r\ntheory (by which truth is constituted by future\r\nconsequences) there are no truths about what is\r\npast and gone, since in respect to that ideas can\r\nmake no difference. For, I suppose, you would\r\nsay that the difference made is in the effects that\r\ncontinue, since ideas may work out to facilitate or\r\nto confuse our relations to these effects. Nevertheless,\r\nI am not quite satisfied. For when I say\r\nit is true that it rained yesterday, surely the\r\nobject of my judgment is something past, not\r\nfuture, while pragmatism makes all objects of\r\njudgment future.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eTeacher: Reply.\u003c/em\u003e You confuse the content of\r\na judgment with the \u003cem\u003ereference\u003c/em\u003e of that content.\r\nThe content of any idea about yesterday’s rain\r\ncertainly involves past time, but the distinctive\r\nor characteristic aim of judgment is none the\r\nless to give this content a future reference and\r\nfunction.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003ePupil: Objection Five.\u003c/em\u003e But your argument requires\r\nan absurd identification of truth and verification.\r\nTo verify ideas is to find out that they\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_162\"\u003e162\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwere already true; or possessed of the truth relation\r\nprior to its discovery in verification. But the\r\npragmatist holds that the act of finding out that\r\nideas are true creates the thing that is found.\r\nIn short, you confuse the psychology of finding\r\nout with the reality found out.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eTeacher: Reply.\u003c/em\u003e Many intellectualists have\r\nnow gone so far as to admit that \u003cem\u003everification\u003c/em\u003e is\r\nthe testing of a judgment by the consequence it\r\nimports, the difference it makes\u0026mdash;its working. But\r\nthey still deny any organic connection between the\r\n“antecedent” truth property of ideas and the\r\nverification (or “making true”) process. Surely\r\nthey admit either too much or too little. (i) If\r\nan idea about a past event is already true because\r\nof some mysterious static correspondence that\r\nit possesses to that past event, how in the world\r\ncan its truth be \u003cem\u003eproved\u003c/em\u003e by the \u003cem\u003efuture consequences\u003c/em\u003e\r\nof that idea? Why is it that the intellectualist\r\nhas not produced any positive theory about the\r\nrelation of verification to his notion of truth?\r\n(ii) Moreover, if verification consists in the experimental\r\nworking out of a belief, the intellectualist\r\nthereby admits that his \u003cem\u003eown\u003c/em\u003e theory of truth\r\ncan be \u003cem\u003eknown\u003c/em\u003e to be true only as it is verified by its\r\nworkings. But if the theory that truth is a ready-made\r\nstatic property of judgments \u003cem\u003eis\u003c/em\u003e true, how\r\nin the world \u003cem\u003ecan\u003c/em\u003e it be verified by making any specific\r\ndifferences in the course of events? Everywhere\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_163\"\u003e163\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwe have to proceed \u003cem\u003eas if\u003c/em\u003e the pragmatic\r\ntheory were the right one. (iii) If he admits\r\nthat the pragmatic theory of verification is true,\r\nwhat meaning remains to the statement that the\r\nidea had the truth property in advance? Why,\r\nsimply that it had the property of \u003cem\u003eability to work\u003c/em\u003e\u0026mdash;an\r\nability revealed by its actual working. How\r\ncan a given fact be an objection to the pragmatic\r\ntheory when that fact has a definitely assignable\r\nmeaning on the pragmatic theory, while upon the\r\nanti-pragmatic theory it just has to be accepted\r\nas an ultimate, unanalyzable fact?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAs to your remark about verification being\r\nmerely psychological, I have something to say.\r\nColleagues of mine are steadily at work in various\r\nlaboratories on various researches, forming\r\nhypotheses, experimenting, testing, corroborating,\r\nrefuting, modifying ideas. One of them, for example,\r\nrecently put an immense pendulum in place\r\nin order to repeat and test Foucault’s experiment\r\nwith reference to the earth’s rotation. Do you regard\r\nsuch verification processes as merely psychological?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003ePupil.\u003c/em\u003e I don’t know. Why do you ask?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eTeacher.\u003c/em\u003e Because if the objector means that\r\nsuch experimental provings are \u003cem\u003emerely\u003c/em\u003e psychological,\r\nhe has of course relegated to the merely psychological\r\n(wherever that may be) all the technique\r\nof all the physical sciences\u0026mdash;a rather high\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_164\"\u003e164\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nprice to pay for the confutation of the pragmatist.\r\nThe intellectualist is thus in the dilemma\r\neither of conceding to the pragmatist the whole\r\nsphere of concrete scientific logic or else of himself\r\nregarding all science as merely subjective? Which\r\nhorn does he choose?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003ePupil: Objection Six.\u003c/em\u003e I noticed a moment\r\nago that you spoke of the pragmatic theory of\r\ntruth being true. Surely the pragmatist does not\r\nlive up to his reputation of having a sense of\r\nhumor when he claims assent to his theory on the\r\nground that it is true. What is this but to admit\r\nintellectualism?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eTeacher: Reply.\u003c/em\u003e My son, we are evidently\r\nnearing the end. Naturally, the pragmatist claims\r\nhis theory to be true in the pragmatic sense of\r\ntruth: it works, it clears up difficulties, removes\r\nobscurities, puts individuals into more experimental,\r\nless dogmatic, and less arbitrarily sceptical\r\nrelations to life; aligns philosophic with scientific\r\nmethod; does away with self-made problems of\r\nepistemology; clarifies and reorganizes logical theory,\r\netc. He is quite content to have the truth\r\nof his theory consist in its working in these various\r\nways, and to leave to the intellectualist the proud\r\npossession of a static, unanalyzable, unverifiable,\r\nunworking property.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003ePupil: Objection Seven.\u003c/em\u003e Nevertheless, the pragmatist\r\nis always appealing to the judgments of\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_165\"\u003e165\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nothers to corroborate his own judgment. Surely\r\nthis admits the principle of a judgment that is\r\ncorrect, true, \u003ci xml:lang=\"la\" lang=\"la\"\u003ein se\u003c/i\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eTeacher: Reply.\u003c/em\u003e The pragmatist says that\r\njudgment \u003cem\u003eis\u003c/em\u003e pragmatic, \u003ci xml:lang=\"la\" lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e, originated under conditions\r\nof need for a survey and statement, and\r\ntested by efficiency in meeting this need. And\r\nthen you think you have refuted him by saying\r\nthat any appeal to judgment is intellectualistic!\r\nSuch begging of the question convinces me that\r\nthe radical difficulty of the intellectualist is that\r\nhe conceives of the pragmatist as beginning with\r\na theory of truth, when in reality the latter begins\r\nwith a theory about judgments and meanings of\r\nwhich the theory of truth is a corollary.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003ePupil: Objection Eight.\u003c/em\u003e Nevertheless, you are\r\nendeavoring to convert your opponent to a certain\r\ntheory. Surely that is an intellectual undertaking,\r\nand in theory (at least) the theoretical criterion,\r\nas Mr. Bradley has well said, must be\r\nsupreme.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eTeacher: Reply.\u003c/em\u003e A little reflection will convince\r\nyou that you are going around in the same old\r\ncircle. Since men have to act together, since the\r\nindividual subsists in social bonds and activities,\r\nto convert another to a certain way of looking\r\nat things is to make social ties and functions better\r\nadapted, more prosperous in their workings. Only\r\nif the pragmatist held the \u003cem\u003eintellectualist’s\u003c/em\u003e position,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_166\"\u003e166\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwould he appeal to other than what is ultimately\r\na practical need and a practical criterion in endeavoring\r\nto convert others.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003ePupil: Objection Nine.\u003c/em\u003e Still the pragmatic\r\ncriterion, being satisfactory working, is purely\r\npersonal and subjective. Whatever works so as\r\nto please me is true. Either this is your result (in\r\nwhich case your reference to social relations only\r\ndenotes at bottom a \u003cem\u003enumber\u003c/em\u003e of purely subjectivistic\r\nsatisfactions) or else you unconsciously assume an\r\nintellectual department of our nature that has\r\nto be satisfied; and whose satisfaction is truth.\r\nThereby you admit the intellectualistic criterion.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eTeacher: Reply.\u003c/em\u003e We seem to have got back\r\nto our starting-point, the nature of satisfaction.\r\nThe intellectualist seems to think that because the\r\npragmatist insists upon the factor of human want,\r\npurpose, and realization in the making and testing\r\nof judgments, the impersonal factor is therefore\r\ndenied. But what the pragmatist does is to insist\r\nthat the human factor must work itself out in\r\n\u003cem\u003eco-operation\u003c/em\u003e with the environmental factor, and\r\nthat their co-adaptation \u003cem\u003eis\u003c/em\u003e both “correspondence”\r\nand “satisfaction.” As long as the human factor\r\nis ignored and denied, or is regarded as \u003cem\u003emerely\u003c/em\u003e\r\npsychological (whatever, once more, that means),\r\nthis human factor will assert itself in irresponsible\r\nways. So long as, particularly in philosophy, a\r\nflagrantly unchastened pragmatism reigns, we\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_167\"\u003e167\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nshall find, as at present, the most ambitious intellectualistic\r\nsystems accepted simply because of the\r\npersonal comfort they yield those who contrive\r\nand accept them. Once recognize the human factor,\r\nand pragmatism is at hand to insist that the\r\nbeliever must accept the full consequences of his\r\nbeliefs, and that his beliefs must be tried out,\r\nthrough acting upon them, to discover what is\r\ntheir meaning or consequence. Till so tested, he\r\ninsists that beliefs, no matter how noble and seemingly\r\nedifying, are dogmas, not truths. Till the\r\ntesting has been worked out very completely and\r\npatiently, he holds his beliefs as but provisional,\r\nas working hypotheses, as methods:\u0026mdash;and he recognizes\r\nthe probability that, as additional modes of\r\ntesting develop, more and more so-called truths\r\nwill be relegated to the category of working hypotheses\u0026mdash;till\r\nthe dogmatic mind is crowded out and\r\nstarved out. At present, the ignoring by philosophers\r\nof the part played by personal education,\r\ntemperament, and preference in their philosophies\r\nis the chief source of pretentiousness and insincerity\r\nin their systems, and is the ground of the\r\npopular disregard for them.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003ePupil.\u003c/em\u003e What you say calls to mind something\r\nof Chesterton’s that I read recently: “I agree with\r\nthe pragmatists that apparent objective truth is\r\nnot the whole matter; that there is an authoritative\r\nneed to believe the things that are necessary to\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_168\"\u003e168\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe human mind. But I say that one of those\r\nnecessities precisely is a belief in objective truth.\r\nPragmatism is a matter of human needs and one\r\nof the first of human needs is to be something more\r\nthan a pragmatist.” You would say, if I understand\r\nyou aright, that to fall back upon a supposed\r\nnecessity of the “human mind” to believe\r\nin certain absolute truths, is to evade a proper\r\ndemand for testing the human mind and all its\r\nworks.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eTeacher.\u003c/em\u003e My son, I am glad to leave the last\r\nword with you. This \u003ci xml:lang=\"fr\" lang=\"fr\"\u003eenfant terrible\u003c/i\u003e of intellectualism\r\nhas revealed that the chief objection of absolutists\r\nto the pragmatic doctrine of the personal\r\n(or “subjective”) factor in belief is that the\r\npragmatist has spilled the personal milk in the\r\nabsolutist’s cocoanut.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_169\"\u003e169\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\r\n\u003ch2 title=\"BELIEFS AND EXISTENCES\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"BELIEFS_AND_EXISTENCES\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eBELIEFS AND EXISTENCES\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_26\" href=\"#Footnote_26\" class=\"fnanchor smaller\"\u003e26\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003eI\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"drop-cap\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap1\"\u003eBeliefs\u003c/span\u003e look both ways, towards persons and\r\ntoward things. They are the original Mr.\r\nFacing-both-ways. They form or judge\u0026mdash;justify\r\nor condemn\u0026mdash;the agents who entertain them and\r\nwho insist upon them. They are of things whose\r\nimmediate meanings form their content. To believe\r\nis to ascribe value, impute meaning, assign\r\nimport. The collection and interaction of these\r\nappraisals and assessments is the world of the\r\ncommon man,\u0026mdash;that is, of man as an individual\r\nand not as a professional being or class specimen.\r\nThus things are characters, not mere entities; they\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_170\"\u003e170\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nbehave and respond and provoke. In the behavior\r\nthat exemplifies and tests their character, they\r\nhelp and hinder; disturb and pacify; resist and\r\ncomply; are dismal and mirthful, orderly and\r\ndeformed, queer and commonplace; they agree and\r\ndisagree; are better and worse.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThus the human world, whether or no it have\r\ncore and axis, has presence and transfiguration.\r\nIt means here and now, not in some transcendent\r\nsphere. It moves, of itself, to varied incremental\r\nmeaning, not to some far off event, whether divine\r\nor diabolic. Such movement constitutes conduct,\r\nfor conduct is the working out of the commitments\r\nof belief. That believed better is held to, asserted,\r\naffirmed, acted upon. The moments of its crucial\r\nfulfilment are the natural “transcendentals”; the\r\ndecisive, the critical, standards of further estimation,\r\nselection, and rejection. That believed worse\r\nis fled, resisted, transformed into an instrument for\r\nthe better. Characters, in being condensations of\r\nbelief, are thus at once the reminders and the\r\nprognostications of weal and woe; they concrete\r\nand they regulate the terms of effective apprehension\r\nand appropriation of things. This general\r\nregulative function is what we mean in calling\r\nthem characters, forms.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFor beliefs, made in the course of existence,\r\nreciprocate by making existence still farther, by\r\ndeveloping it. Beliefs are not made \u003cem\u003eby\u003c/em\u003e existence\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_171\"\u003e171\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nin a mechanical or logical or psychological sense.\r\n“Reality” naturally instigates belief. It appraises\r\nitself and through this self-appraisal manages\r\nits affairs. As things are surcharged valuations,\r\nso “consciousness” means ways of believing\r\nand disbelieving. It is interpretation; not merely\r\nexistence aware of itself as fact, but existence discerning,\r\njudging itself, approving and disapproving.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis double outlook and connection of belief, its\r\nimplication, on one side, with beings who suffer\r\nand endeavor, and, its complication on the other,\r\nwith the meanings and worths of things, is its glory\r\nor its unpardonable sin. We cannot keep connection\r\non one side and throw it away on the\r\nother. We cannot preserve significance and decline\r\nthe personal attitude in which it is inscribed\r\nand operative, any more than we can succeed in\r\nmaking things “states” of a “consciousness”\r\nwhose business is to be an interpretation of things.\r\nBeliefs are personal affairs, and personal affairs\r\nare adventures, and adventures are, if you please,\r\nshady. But equally discredited, then, is the universe\r\nof meanings. For the world has meaning\r\nas somebody’s, somebody’s at a juncture, taken for\r\nbetter or worse, and you shall not have completed\r\nyour metaphysics till you have told whose world\r\nis meant and how and what for\u0026mdash;in what bias and\r\nto what effect. Here is a cake that is had only\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_172\"\u003e172\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nby eating it, just as there is digestion only \u003cem\u003efor\u003c/em\u003e\r\nlife as well as \u003cem\u003eby\u003c/em\u003e life.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSo far the standpoint of the common man.\r\nBut the professional man, the philosopher, has been\r\nlargely occupied in a systematic effort to discredit\r\nthe standpoint of the common man, that is, to\r\ndisable belief as an ultimately valid principle. Philosophy\r\nis shocked at the frank, almost brutal,\r\nevocation of beliefs by and in natural existence,\r\nlike witches out of a desert heath\u0026mdash;at a mode of\r\nproduction which is neither logical, nor physical,\r\nnor psychological, but just natural, empirical.\r\nFor modern philosophy is, as every college senior\r\nrecites, epistemology; and epistemology, as perhaps\r\nour books and lectures sometimes forget to tell\r\nthe senior, has absorbed Stoic dogma. Passionless\r\nimperturbability, absolute detachment, complete\r\nsubjection to a ready-made and finished reality\u0026mdash;physical\r\nit may be, mental it may be, logical it may\r\nbe\u0026mdash;is its professed ideal. Forswearing the reality\r\nof affection, and the gallantry of adventure, the\r\ngenuineness of the incomplete, the tentative, it has\r\ntaken an oath of allegiance to Reality, objective,\r\nuniversal, complete; made perhaps of atoms, perhaps\r\nof sensations, perhaps of logical meanings.\r\nThis ready-made reality, already including everything,\r\nmust of course swallow and absorb belief,\r\nmust produce it psychologically, mechanically, or\r\nlogically, according to its own nature; must in any\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_173\"\u003e173\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ncase, instead of acquiring aid and support from\r\nbelief, resolve it into one of its own preordained\r\ncreatures, making a desert and calling it harmony,\r\nunity, totality.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_27\" href=\"#Footnote_27\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e27\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003ePhilosophy has dreamed the dream of a knowledge\r\nwhich is other than the propitious outgrowth\r\nof beliefs that shall develop aforetime their ulterior\r\nimplications in order to recast them, to\r\nrectify their errors, cultivate their waste places,\r\nheal their diseases, fortify their feeblenesses:\u0026mdash;the\r\ndream of a knowledge that has to do with objects\r\nhaving no nature save to be known.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNot that their philosophers have admitted the\r\nconcrete realizability of their scheme. On the\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_174\"\u003e174\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ncontrary, the assertion of the absolute “Reality”\r\nof what is empirically unrealizable is a part of the\r\nscheme; the ideal of a universe of pure, cognitional\r\nobjects, fixed elements in fixed relations.\r\nSensationalist and idealist, positivist and transcendentalist,\r\nmaterialist and spiritualist, defining\r\nthis object in as many differing ways as they have\r\ndifferent conceptions of the ideal and method of\r\nknowledge, are at one in their devotion to an identification\r\nof Reality with something that connects\r\nmonopolistically with passionless knowledge, belief\r\npurged of all personal reference, origin, and outlook.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_28\" href=\"#Footnote_28\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e28\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhat is to be said of this attempt to sever the\r\ncord which naturally binds together personal attitudes\r\nand the meaning of things? This much at\r\nleast: the effort to extract meanings, values, from\r\nthe beliefs that ascribe them, and to give the\r\nformer absolute metaphysical validity while the\r\nlatter are sent to wander as scapegoats in the wilderness\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_175\"\u003e175\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof mere phenomena, is an attempt, which,\r\nas long as “our interest’s on the dangerous edge\r\nof things,” will attract an admiring, even if suspicious,\r\naudience. Moreover, we may admit that\r\nthe attempt to catch the universe of immediate\r\nexperience, of action and passion, coming and\r\ngoing, to damn it in its present body in order expressly\r\nto glorify its spirit to all eternity, to validate\r\nthe meaning of beliefs by discrediting their\r\nnatural existence, to attribute absolute worth to\r\nthe intent of human convictions just because of\r\nthe absolute worthlessness of their content\u0026mdash;that\r\nthe performance of this feat of virtuosity has\r\ndeveloped philosophy to its present wondrous, if\r\nformidable, technique.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut can we claim more than a \u003ci xml:lang=\"fr\" lang=\"fr\"\u003esuccès d’estime\u003c/i\u003e?\r\nConsider again the nature of the effort. The\r\nworld of immediate meanings, of the world empirically\r\nsustained in beliefs, is to be sorted out\r\ninto two portions, metaphysically discontinuous,\r\none of which shall alone be good and true “Reality,”\r\nthe fit material of passionless, beliefless knowledge;\r\nwhile the other part, that which is excluded,\r\nshall be referred exclusively to belief and treated\r\nas mere appearance, purely subjective, impressions\r\nor effects in consciousness, or as that ludicrously\r\nabject modern discovery\u0026mdash;an epiphenomenon.\r\nAnd this division into the real and the unreal is\r\naccomplished by the very individual whom his own\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_176\"\u003e176\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\n“absolute” results reduce to phenomenality, in\r\nterms of the very immediate experience which is\r\ninfected with worthlessness, and on the basis of\r\npreference, of selection that are declared to be\r\nunreal! Can the thing be done?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAnyway, the snubbed and excluded factor may\r\nalways reassert itself. The very pushing it out\r\nof “Reality” may but add to its potential energy,\r\nand invoke a more violent recoil. When affections\r\nand aversions, with the beliefs in which they record\r\nthemselves and the efforts they exact, are reduced\r\nto epiphenomena, dancing an idle attendance\r\nupon a reality complete without them, to which\r\nthey vainly strive to accommodate themselves by\r\nmirroring, then may the emotions flagrantly burst\r\nforth with the claim that, as a friend of mine puts\r\nit, reason is \u003cem\u003eonly\u003c/em\u003e a fig leaf for \u003cem\u003etheir\u003c/em\u003e nakedness.\r\nWhen one man says that need, uncertainty, choice,\r\nnovelty, and strife have no place in Reality, which\r\nis made up wholly of established things behaving\r\nby foregone rules, then may another man be provoked\r\nto reply that all such fixities, whether named\r\natoms or God, whether they be fixtures of a sensational,\r\na positivistic, or an idealistic system, have\r\nexistence and import only in the problems, needs,\r\nstruggles, and instrumentalities of conscious\r\nagents and patients. For home rule may be found\r\nin the unwritten efficacious constitution of experience.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_177\"\u003e177\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nThat contemporaneously we are in the presence\r\nof such a reaction is apparent. Let us, in pursuit\r\nof our topic, inquire how it came about and why\r\nit takes the form that it takes. This consideration\r\nmay not only occupy the hour, but may help\r\ndiagram some future parallelogram of forces.\r\nThe account calls for some sketching (1) of the\r\nhistorical tendencies which have shaped the situation\r\nin which a Stoic theory of knowledge claims\r\nmetaphysical monopoly, and (2) of the tendencies\r\nthat have furnished the despised principle of belief\r\nopportunity and means of reassertion.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003eII\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eImagination readily travels to a period when a\r\ngospel of intense, and, one may say, deliberate\r\npassionate disturbance appeared to be conquering\r\nthe Stoic ideal of passionless reason; when the demand\r\nfor individual assertion by faith against the\r\nestablished, embodied objective order was seemingly\r\nsubduing the idea of the total subordination\r\nof the individual to the universal. By what course\r\nof events came about the dramatic reversal, in\r\nwhich an ethically conquered Stoicism became the\r\nconqueror, epistemologically, of Christianity?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eHow are our imaginations haunted by the idea\r\nof what might have happened if Christianity had\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_178\"\u003e178\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nfound ready to its hand intellectual formulations\r\ncorresponding to its practical proclamations!\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThat the ultimate principle of conduct is affectional\r\nand volitional; that God is love; that access\r\nto the principle is by faith, a personal attitude;\r\nthat belief, surpassing logical basis and warrant,\r\nworks out through its own operation its own fulfilling\r\nevidence: such was the implied moral metaphysic\r\nof Christianity. But this implication needed\r\nto become a theory, a theology, a formulation;\r\nand in this need, it found no recourse save to\r\nphilosophies that had identified true existence with\r\nthe proper object of logical reason. For, in\r\nGreek thought, after the valuable meanings, the\r\nmeanings of industry and art that appealed to sustained\r\nand serious choice, had given birth and\r\nstatus to reflective reason, reason denied its ancestry\r\nof organized endeavor, and proclaimed itself\r\nin its function of self-conscious logical thought to\r\nbe the author and warrant of all genuine things.\r\nYet how nearly Christianity had found prepared\r\nfor it the needed means of its own intellectual\r\nstatement! We recall Aristotle’s account of moral\r\nknowing, and his definition of man. Man as man,\r\nhe tells us, is a principle that may be termed\r\neither desiring thought or thinking desire. Not\r\nas pure intelligence does \u003cem\u003eman\u003c/em\u003e know, but as an\r\norganization of desires effected through reflection\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_179\"\u003e179\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nupon their own conditions and consequences. What\r\nif Aristotle had only assimilated his idea of theoretical\r\nto his notion of practical knowledge! Because\r\npractical thinking was so human, Aristotle\r\nrejected it in favor of pure, passionless cognition,\r\nsomething superhuman. Thinking desire is experimental,\r\nis tentative, not absolute. It looks to\r\nthe future and to the past for help in the future.\r\nIt is contingent, not necessary. It doubly relates\r\nto the individual: to the individual thing as experienced\r\nby an individual agent; not to the universal.\r\nHence desire is a sure sign of defect, of\r\nprivation, of non-being, and seeks surcease in\r\nsomething which knows it not. Hence desiring\r\nreason culminating in beliefs relating to imperfect\r\nexistence, stands forever in contrast with passionless\r\nreason functioning in pure knowledge, logically\r\ncomplete, of perfect being.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eI need not remind you how through Neo-Platonism,\r\nSt. Augustine, and the Scholastic renaissance,\r\nthese conceptions became imbedded in Christian\r\nphilosophy; and what a reversal occurred of the\r\noriginal practical principle of Christianity. Belief\r\nis henceforth important because it is the mere\r\nantecedent in a finite and fallen world, a temporal\r\nand phenomenal world infected with non-being, of\r\ntrue knowledge to be achieved only in a world\r\nof completed Being. Desire is but the self-consciousness\r\nof defect striving to its own termination\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_180\"\u003e180\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nin perfect possession, through perfect knowledge of\r\nperfect being. I need not remind you that the\r\n\u003ci xml:lang=\"la\" lang=\"la\"\u003eprima facie\u003c/i\u003e subordination of reason to authority,\r\nof knowledge to faith, in the medieval code, is, after\r\nall, but the logical result of the doctrine that man\r\nas man (since only reasoning desire) is merely\r\nphenomenal; and has his reality in God, who as\r\nGod is the complete union of rational insight and\r\nbeing\u0026mdash;the term of man’s desire, and the fulfilment\r\nof his feeble attempts at knowing. Authority,\r\n“faith” as it then had to be conceived, meant just\r\nthat this Being comes externally to the aid of man,\r\notherwise hopelessly doomed to misery in long\r\ndrawn out error and non-being, and disciplines\r\nhim till, in the next world under more favoring\r\nauspices, he may have his desires stilled in good,\r\nand his faith may yield to knowledge:\u0026mdash;for we\r\nforget that the doctrine of immortality was not an\r\nappendage, but an integral part of the theory that\r\nsince knowledge is the \u003cem\u003etrue\u003c/em\u003e function of man, happiness\r\nis attained only in knowledge, which itself\r\nexists only in achievement of perfect Being or God.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFor my part, I can but think that medieval\r\nabsolutism, with its provision for authoritative\r\nsupernatural assistance in this world and assertion\r\nof supernatural realization in the next, was more\r\nlogical, as well as more humane, than the modern\r\nabsolutism, that, with the same logical premises,\r\nbids man find adequate consolation and support in\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_181\"\u003e181\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe fact that, after all, his strivings are already\r\neternally fulfilled, his errors already eternally\r\ntranscended, his partial beliefs already eternally\r\ncomprehended.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe modern age is marked by a refusal to be\r\nsatisfied with the postponement of the exercise and\r\nfunction of reason to another and supernatural\r\nsphere, and by a resolve to practise itself upon its\r\npresent object, nature, with all the joys thereunto\r\nappertaining. The pure intelligence of Aristotle,\r\nthought thinking itself, expresses itself as free\r\ninquiry directed upon the present conditions of its\r\nown most effective exercise. The principle of the\r\ninherent relation of thought to being was preserved\r\nintact, but its practical locus was moved\r\ndown from the next world to this. Spinoza’s\r\n“God or Nature” is the logical outcome; as is also\r\nhis strict correlation of the attribute of matter with\r\nthe attribute of thought; while his combination\r\nof thorough distrust of passion and faith with\r\ncomplete faith in reason and all-absorbing passion\r\nfor knowledge is so classic an embodiment of the\r\nwhole modern contradiction that it may awaken admiration\r\nwhere less thorough-paced formulations\r\ncall out irritation.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn the practical devotion of present intelligence\r\nto its present object, nature, science was born,\r\nand also its philosophical counterpart, the theory\r\nof knowledge. Epistemology only generalized in\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_182\"\u003e182\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nits loose, although narrow and technical way, the\r\nquestion practically urgent in Europe: How is\r\nscience possible? How can intelligence actively\r\nand directly get at its object?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eMeantime, through Protestantism the values,\r\nthe meanings formerly characterizing the next life\r\n(the opportunity for full perception of perfect\r\nbeing), were carried over into present-day emotions\r\nand responses.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe dualism between faith authoritatively supported\r\nas the principle of this life, and knowledge\r\nsupernaturally realized as the principle of the next,\r\nwas transmuted into the dualism between intelligence\r\nnow and here occupied with natural things,\r\nand the affections and accompanying beliefs, now\r\nand here realizing spiritual worths. For a time\r\nthis dualism operated as a convenient division of\r\nlabor. Intelligence, freed from responsibility for\r\nand preoccupation with supernatural truths, could\r\noccupy itself the more fully and efficiently with the\r\nworld that now is; while the affections, charged\r\nwith the values evoked in the medieval discipline,\r\nentered into the present enjoyment of the delectations\r\npreviously reserved for the saints. Directness\r\ntook the place of systematic intermediation;\r\nthe present of the future; the individual’s emotional\r\nconsciousness of the supernatural institution.\r\nBetween science and faith, thus conceived, a\r\nbargain was struck. Hands off; each to his own,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_183\"\u003e183\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwas the compact; the natural world to intelligence,\r\nthe moral, the spiritual world to belief. This\r\n(natural) world for knowledge; that (supernatural)\r\nworld for belief. Thus the antithesis, unexpressed,\r\nignored, \u003cem\u003ewithin experience\u003c/em\u003e, between belief\r\nand knowledge, between the purely objective values\r\nof thought and the personal values of passion and\r\nvolition, was more fundamental, more determining,\r\nthan the opposition, explicit and harassing, \u003cem\u003ewithin\r\nknowledge\u003c/em\u003e, between subject and object, mind and\r\nmatter.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis latent antagonism worked out into the\r\nopen. In scientific detail, knowledge encroached\r\nupon the historic traditions and opinions with\r\nwhich the moral and religious life had identified\r\nitself. It made history to be as natural, as much\r\nits spoil, as physical nature. It turned itself upon\r\nman, and proceeded remorselessly to account for\r\nhis emotions, his volitions, his opinions. Knowledge,\r\nin its general theory, as philosophy, went\r\nthe same way. It was pre-committed to the old\r\nnotion: the absolutely real is the object of \u003cem\u003eknowledge\u003c/em\u003e,\r\nand hence is something universal and impersonal.\r\nSo, whether by the road of sensationalism\r\nor rationalism, by the path of mechanicalism or\r\nobjective idealism, it came about that concrete\r\nselves, specific feeling and willing beings, were\r\nrelegated with the beliefs in which they declare\r\nthemselves to the “phenomenal.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_184\"\u003e184\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003eIII\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSo much for the situation against which some\r\ncontemporary tendencies are a deliberate protest.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhat of the positive conditions that give us\r\nnot mere protest, like the unreasoning revolt of\r\nheart against head found at all epochs, but something\r\narticulate and constructive? The field is\r\nonly too large, and I shall limit myself to the\r\nevolution of the knowledge standpoint itself. I\r\nshall suggest, first, that the progress of intelligence\r\ndirected upon natural materials has evolved a procedure\r\nof knowledge that renders untenable the\r\ninherited conception of knowledge; and, secondly,\r\nthat this result is reinforced by the specific results\r\nof some of the special sciences.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e1. First, then, the very use of the knowledge\r\nstandpoint, the very expression of the knowledge\r\npreoccupation, has produced methods and tests\r\nthat, when formulated, intimate a radically different\r\nconception of knowledge, and of its relation to\r\nexistence and belief, than the orthodox one.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe one thing that stands out is that thinking\r\nis inquiry, and that knowledge as science is the\r\noutcome of systematically directed inquiry. For\r\na time it was natural enough that inquiry should\r\nbe interpreted in the old sense, as just change of\r\nsubjective attitudes and opinions to make them\r\nsquare up with a “reality” that is already there\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_185\"\u003e185\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nin ready-made, fixed, and finished form. The\r\nrationalist had one notion of the reality, \u003ci xml:lang=\"la\" lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e, that it\r\nwas of the nature of laws, genera, or an ordered\r\nsystem, and so thought of concepts, axioms, etc.,\r\nas the indicated modes of representation. The\r\nempiricist, holding reality to be a lot of little discrete\r\nparticular lumps, thought of disjointed sensations\r\nas its appropriate counterpart. But\r\nboth alike were thorough conformists. If “reality”\r\nis already and completely given, and if knowledge\r\nis just submissive acceptance, then, of course,\r\ninquiry is only a subjective change in the human\r\n“mind” or in “consciousness,”\u0026mdash;these being subjective\r\nand “unreal.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut the very development of the sciences served\r\nto reveal a peculiar and intolerable paradox.\r\nEpistemology, having condemned inquiry once for\r\nall to the region of subjectivity in an invidious\r\nsense, finds itself in flat opposition in principle and\r\nin detail to the assumption and to the results of the\r\nsciences. Epistemology is bound to deny to the\r\nresults of the special sciences in detail any ulterior\r\nobjectivity just because they always \u003cem\u003eare\u003c/em\u003e in a process\r\nof inquiry\u0026mdash;\u003cem\u003ein\u003c/em\u003e solution. While a man may not\r\nbe halted at being told that his mental activities,\r\nsince his, are not genuinely real, many men will\r\ndraw violently back at being told that all the discoveries,\r\nconclusions, explanations, and theories of\r\nthe sciences share the same fate, being the products\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_186\"\u003e186\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof a discredited mind. And, in general, epistemology,\r\nin relegating human thinking as inquiry to a\r\nmerely phenomenal region, makes concrete approximation\r\nand conformity to objectivity hopeless.\r\nEven if it did square itself up to and by “reality”\r\nit never could be sure of it. The ancient myth of\r\nTantalus and his effort to drink the water before\r\nhim seems to be ingeniously prophetic of modern\r\nepistemology. The thirstier, the needier of truth\r\nthe human mind, and the intenser the efforts put\r\nforth to slake itself in the ocean of being just\r\nbeyond the edge of consciousness, the more surely\r\nthe living waters of truth recede!\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhen such self-confessed sterility is joined with\r\nconsistent derogation of all the special results of\r\nthe special sciences, some one is sure to raise the cry\r\nof “dog in the manger,” or of “sour grapes.” A\r\nrevision of the theory of thinking, of inquiry, would\r\nseem to be inevitable; a revision which should cease\r\ntrying to construe knowledge as an attempted approximation\r\nto a reproduction of reality under conditions\r\nthat condemn it in advance to failure; a\r\nrevision which should start frankly from the fact\r\nof thinking as inquiring, and purely external realities\r\nas terms in inquiries, and which should construe\r\nvalidity, objectivity, truth, and the test and\r\nsystem of truths, on the basis of what they actually\r\nmean and do within inquiry.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSuch a standpoint promises ample revenge for\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_187\"\u003e187\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe long damnation and longer neglect to which\r\nthe principle of belief has been subjected. The\r\nwhole procedure of thinking as developed in those\r\nextensive and intensive inquiries that constitute\r\nthe sciences, is but rendering into a systematic\r\ntechnique, into an art deliberately and delightfully\r\npursued, the rougher and cruder means by which\r\npractical human beings have in all ages worked\r\nout the implications of their beliefs, tested them,\r\nand endeavored in the interests of economy, efficiency,\r\nand freedom, to render them coherent with\r\none another. Belief, sheer, direct, unmitigated\r\nbelief, reappears as the working hypothesis;\r\naction that at once develops and tests belief reappears\r\nin experimentation, deduction, demonstration;\r\nwhile the machinery of universals, axioms,\r\n\u003ci xml:lang=\"la\" lang=\"la\"\u003ea priori\u003c/i\u003e truths, etc., becomes a systematization of\r\nthe way in which men have always worked out, in\r\nanticipation of overt action, the implications of\r\ntheir beliefs, with a view to revising them, in the\r\ninterests of obviating unfavorable, and securing\r\nwelcome consequences. Observation, with its machinery\r\nof sensations, measurements, etc., is the\r\nresurrection of the way in which agents have always\r\nfaced and tried to define the problems that face\r\nthem; truth is the union of abstract postulated\r\nmeanings and of concrete brute facts in a way\r\nthat circumvents the latter by judging them from\r\na new standpoint, while it tests concepts by using\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_188\"\u003e188\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthem as methods in the same active experience.\r\nIt all comes to experience personally conducted\r\nand personally consummated.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eLet consciousness of these facts dawn a little\r\nmore brightly over the horizon of epistemological\r\nprejudices, and it will be seen that nothing prevents\r\nadmitting the genuineness both of thinking\r\nactivities and of their characteristic results, except\r\nthe notion that belief itself is not a genuine\r\ningredient of existence\u0026mdash;a notion which itself is not\r\nonly a belief, but a belief which, unlike the convictions\r\nof the common man and the hypotheses of\r\nscience, finds its proud proof in the fact that it\r\ndoes not demean itself so unworthily as to work.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOnce believe that beliefs themselves are as\r\n“real” as anything else can ever be, and we have\r\na world in which uncertainty, doubtfulness, really\r\ninhere; and in which personal attitudes and responses\r\nare real both in their own distinctive existence,\r\nand as the only ways in which an as yet\r\nundetermined factor of reality takes on shape,\r\nmeaning, value, truth. If “to wilful men the injuries\r\nthat they themselves procure, must be their\r\nschoolmasters”\u0026mdash;and all beliefs are wilful\u0026mdash;then\r\nby the same token the propitious evolutions of\r\nmeaning, which wilful men secure to an expectant\r\nuniverse, must be their compensation and their\r\njustification. In a doubtful and needy universe\r\nelements must be beggarly, and the development\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_189\"\u003e189\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof personal beliefs into experimentally executed\r\nsystems of actions, is the organized bureau of\r\nphilanthropy which confers upon a travailing universe\r\nthe meaning for which it cries out. The\r\napostrophe of the poet is above all to man the\r\nthinker, the inquirer, the knower:\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"poem-container\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"poem\"\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"stanza\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"i0\"\u003eO Dreamer! O Desirer, goer down\u003cbr /\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"i0\"\u003eUnto untraveled seas in untried ships,\u003cbr /\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"i0\"\u003eO crusher of the unimagined grape,\u003cbr /\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"i0\"\u003eOn unconceivèd lips.\u003cbr /\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e2. Biology, psychology, and the social sciences\r\nproffer an imposing body of concrete facts that\r\nalso point to the rehabilitation of belief\u0026mdash;to the\r\ninterpretation of knowledge as a human and practical\r\noutgrowth of belief, not to belief as the state\r\nto which knowledge is condemned in a merely finite\r\nand phenomenal world. I need not, as I cannot,\r\nhere summarize the psychological revision which\r\nthe notions of sensation, perception, conception,\r\ncognition in general have undergone, all to one intent.\r\n“Motor” is writ large on their face. The\r\ntestimony of biology is unambiguous to the effect\r\nthat the organic instruments of the whole intellectual\r\nlife, the sense-organs and brain and their\r\nconnections, have been developed on a definitely\r\npractical basis and for practical aims, for the\r\npurpose of such control over conditions as will\r\nsustain and vary the meanings of life. The historic\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_190\"\u003e190\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nsciences are equally explicit in their evidence\r\nthat knowledge as a system of information and\r\ninstruction is a coöperative social achievement,\r\nat all times socially toned, sustained, and directed;\r\nand that logical thinking is a reweaving through\r\nindividual activity of this social fabric at such\r\npoints as are indicated by prevailing needs and\r\naims.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis bulky and coherent body of testimony is\r\nnot, of course, of itself philosophy. But it supplies,\r\nat all events, facts that have scientific backing,\r\nand that are as worthy of regard as the facts\r\npertinent to any science. At the present time these\r\nfacts seem to have some peculiar claim just because\r\nthey present traits largely ignored in prior\r\nphilosophic formulations, while those belonging to\r\nmathematics and physics have so largely wrought\r\ntheir sweet will on systems. Again, it would seem\r\nas if in philosophies built deliberately upon the\r\nknowledge principle, any body of known facts\r\nshould not have to clamor for sympathetic attention.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSuch being the case, the reasons for ruling\r\npsychology and sociology and allied sciences out of\r\ncompetency to give philosophic testimony have\r\nmore significance than the bare denial of jurisdiction.\r\nThey are evidences of the deep-rooted\r\npreconception that whatever concerns a particular\r\nconscious agent, a wanting, struggling, satisfied\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_191\"\u003e191\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nand dissatisfied being, must of course be only “phenomenal”\r\nin import.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis aversion is the more suggestive when the\r\nprofessed idealist appears as the special champion\r\nof the virginity of pure knowledge. The idealist,\r\nso content with the notion that consciousness determines\r\nreality, provided it be done once for all,\r\nat a jump and in lump, is so uneasy in presence\r\nof the idea that empirical conscious beings genuinely\r\ndetermine existences now and here! One is\r\nreminded of the story told, I think, by Spencer.\r\nSome committee had organized and contended,\r\nthrough a long series of parliaments, for the\r\npassage of a measure. At last one of their meetings\r\nwas interrupted with news of success. Consternation\r\nwas the result. What was to become\r\nof the occupation of the committee? So, one asks,\r\nwhat is to become of idealism at large, of the\r\nwholesale unspecifiable determination of “reality”\r\nby or in “consciousness,” if specific conscious beings,\r\nJohn Smiths, and Susan Smiths (to say nothing\r\nof their animal relations), beings with bowels\r\nand brains, are found to exercise influence upon\r\nthe character and existence of reals?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOne would be almost justified in construing\r\nidealism as a Pickwickian scheme, so willing is it to\r\nidealize the principle of intelligence at the expense\r\nof its specific undertakings, were it not that this\r\nreluctance is the necessary outcome of the Stoic\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_192\"\u003e192\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nbasis and tenor of idealism\u0026mdash;its preoccupation\r\nwith logical contents and relations in abstraction\r\nfrom their \u003ci xml:lang=\"la\" lang=\"la\"\u003esitus\u003c/i\u003e and function in conscious living\r\nbeings.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003eIV\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eI have suggested to you the naïve conception of\r\nthe relation of beliefs to realities: that beliefs are\r\nthemselves real without discount, manifesting their\r\nreality in the usual proper way, namely, by modifying\r\nand shaping the reality of other things, so that\r\nthey connect the bias, the preferences and affections,\r\nthe needs and endeavors of personal lives\r\nwith the values, the characters ascribed to things:\u0026mdash;the\r\nlatter thus becoming worthy of human acquaintance\r\nand responsive to human intercourse.\r\nThis was followed by a sketch of the history of\r\nthought, indicating how beliefs and all they insinuate\r\nwere subjected to preconceived notions of\r\nknowledge and of “reality” as a monopolistic possession\r\nof pure intellect. Then I traced some of\r\nthe \u003ci xml:lang=\"fr\" lang=\"fr\"\u003emotifs\u003c/i\u003e that make for reconsideration of the\r\nsupposed uniquely exclusive relation of logical\r\nknowledge and “reality”; \u003ci xml:lang=\"fr\" lang=\"fr\"\u003emotifs\u003c/i\u003e that make for a\r\nless invidiously superior attitude towards the convictions\r\nof the common man.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn concluding, I want to say a word or two to\r\nmitigate\u0026mdash;for escape is impossible\u0026mdash;some misunderstandings.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_193\"\u003e193\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nAnd, to begin with, while possible\r\ndoubts inevitably troop with actual beliefs, the doctrine\r\nin question is not particularly sceptical. The\r\nradical empiricist, the humanist, the pragmatist,\r\nlabel him as you will, believes not in fewer but in\r\nmore “realities” than the orthodox philosophers\r\nwarrant. He is not concerned, for example, in\r\ndiscrediting objective realities and logical or universal\r\nthinking; he is interested in such a reinterpretation\r\nof the sort of “reality” which these\r\nthings possess as will accredit, without depreciation,\r\nconcrete empirical conscious centers of action\r\nand passion.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eMy second remark is to the opposite effect. The\r\nintent is not especially credulous, although it starts\r\nfrom and ends with the radical credulity of all\r\nknowledge. To suppose that because the sciences\r\nare ultimately instrumental to human beliefs, we\r\nare therefore to be careless of the most exact possible\r\nuse of extensive and systematic scientific\r\nmethods, is like supposing that because a watch is\r\nmade to tell present time, and not to be an exemplar\r\nof transcendent, absolute time, watches might\r\nas well be made of cheap stuffs, casually wrought\r\nand clumsily put together. It is the task of telling\r\npresent time, with all its urgent implications, that\r\nbrings home, steadies, and enlarges the responsibility\r\nfor the best possible use of intelligence, the\r\ninstrument.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_194\"\u003e194\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nFor one, I have no interest in the old, old scheme\r\nof derogating from the worth of knowledge in\r\norder to give an uncontrolled field for some \u003cem\u003especial\u003c/em\u003e\r\nbeliefs to run riot in,\u0026mdash;be these beliefs even faith\r\nin immortality, in some special sort of a Deity,\r\nor in some particular brand of freedom. Any one\r\nof our beliefs is subject to criticism, revision, and\r\neven ultimate elimination through the development\r\nof its own implications by intelligently directed\r\naction. Because reason is a scheme of working out\r\nthe meanings of convictions in terms of one another\r\nand of the consequences they import in\r\nfurther experience, convictions are the more, not\r\nthe less, amenable and responsible to the full exercise\r\nof reason.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_29\" href=\"#Footnote_29\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e29\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThus we are put on the road to that most desirable\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_195\"\u003e195\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthing,\u0026mdash;the union of acknowledgment of\r\nmoral powers and demands with thoroughgoing\r\nnaturalism. No one really wants to lame man’s\r\npractical nature; it is the supposed exigencies of\r\nnatural science that force the hand. No one\r\nreally bears a grudge against naturalism for the\r\nsake of obscurantism. It is the need of some sacred\r\nreservation for moral interests that coerces. We\r\nall want to be as naturalistic as we can be. But\r\nthe “can be” is the rub. If we set out with a\r\nfixed dualism of belief and knowledge, then the\r\nuneasy fear that the natural sciences are going to\r\nencroach and destroy “spiritual values” haunts\r\nus. So we build them a citadel and fortify it;\r\nthat is, we isolate, professionalize, and thereby\r\nweaken beliefs. But if beliefs are the most natural,\r\nand in that sense, the most metaphysical of\r\nall things, and if knowledge is an organized technique\r\nfor working out their implications and interrelations,\r\nfor directing their formation and employ,\r\nhow unnecessary, how petty the fear and the\r\ncaution. Because freedom of belief is ours, free\r\nthought may exercise itself; the freer the thought\r\nthe more sure the emancipation of belief. Hug\r\nsome special belief and one fears knowledge; believe\r\nin belief and one loves and cleaves to knowledge.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe have here, too, the possibility of a common\r\nunderstanding, in thought, in language, in outlook,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_196\"\u003e196\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof the philosopher and the common man. What\r\nwould not the philosopher give, did he not have\r\nto part with some of his common humanity in order\r\nto join a class? Does he not always, when challenged,\r\njustify himself with the contention that all\r\nmen naturally philosophize, and that he but does\r\nin a conscious and orderly way what leads to\r\nharm when done in an indiscriminate and irregular\r\nway? If philosophy be at once a natural history\r\n\u003cem\u003eand\u003c/em\u003e a logic\u0026mdash;an art\u0026mdash;of beliefs, then its technical\r\njustification is at one with its human justification.\r\nThe natural attitude of man, said Emerson,\r\nis believing; “the philosopher, after some\r\nstruggle, having only reasons for believing.” Let\r\nthe struggle then enlighten and enlarge beliefs;\r\nlet the reasons kindle and engender new beliefs.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFinally, it is not a solution, but a problem which\r\nis presented. As philosophers, our disagreements\r\nas to conclusions are trivial compared with our disagreement\r\nas to problems. To see the problem\r\nanother sees, in the same perspective and at the\r\nsame angle\u0026mdash;that amounts to something. Agreement\r\nin solutions is in comparison perfunctory.\r\nTo experience the same problem another feels\u0026mdash;that\r\nperhaps is agreement. In a world where distinctions\r\nare as invidious as comparisons are odious,\r\nand where intellect works only by comparison\r\nand distinction, pray what is one to do?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut beliefs are personal matters, and the person,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_197\"\u003e197\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwe may still believe, is social. To be a man is to\r\nbe thinking desire; and the agreement of desires is\r\nnot in oneness of intellectual conclusion, but in the\r\nsympathies of passion and the concords of action:\u0026mdash;and\r\nyet significant union in affection and behavior\r\nmay depend upon a consensus in thought\r\nthat is secured only by discrimination and comparison.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_198\"\u003e198\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\r\n\u003ch2 title=\"EXPERIENCE AND OBJECTIVE IDEALISM\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"EXPERIENCE_AND_OBJECTIVE_IDEALISM\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eEXPERIENCE AND OBJECTIVE IDEALISM\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_30\" href=\"#Footnote_30\" class=\"fnanchor smaller\"\u003e30\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003eI\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"drop-cap\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap1\"\u003eIdealism\u003c/span\u003e as a philosophic system stands in\r\nsuch a delicate relation to experience as to invite\r\nattention. In its subjective form, or sensationalism,\r\nit claims to be the last word of empiricism.\r\nIn its objective, or rational form, it claims\r\nto make good the deficiencies of the subjective type,\r\nby emphasizing the work of thought that supplies\r\nthe factors of objectivity and universality lacking\r\nin sensationalism. With reference to experience\r\n\u003cem\u003eas it now is\u003c/em\u003e, such idealism is half opposed to empiricism\r\nand half committed to it,\u0026mdash;antagonistic,\r\nso far as existing experience is regarded as tainted\r\nwith a sensational character; favorable, so far as\r\nthis experience is even now prophetic of some final,\r\nall-comprehensive, or absolute experience, which\r\nin truth is one with reality.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThat this combination of opposition to present\r\nexperience with devotion to the cause of experience\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_199\"\u003e199\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nin the abstract leaves objective idealism in a position\r\nof unstable equilibrium from which it can find\r\nrelease only by euthanasia in a thorough-going\r\nempiricism seems evident. Some of the reasons for\r\nthis belief may be readily approached by a summary\r\nsketch of three historic episodes in which have\r\nemerged important conceptions of experience and\r\nits relation to reason. The first takes us to classic\r\nGreek thought. Here experience means the preservation,\r\nthrough memory, of the net result of a multiplicity\r\nof particular doings and sufferings; a\r\npreservation that affords positive skill in maintaining\r\nfurther practice, and promise of success in\r\nnew emergencies. The craft of the carpenter, the\r\nart of the physician are standing examples of its\r\nnature. It differs from instinct and blind routine\r\nor servile practice because there is some knowledge\r\nof materials, methods, and aims, in their adjustment\r\nto one another. Yet the marks of its passive,\r\nhabitual origin are indelibly stamped upon it. On\r\nthe knowledge side it can never aspire beyond opinion,\r\nand if true opinion be achieved, it is only by\r\nhappy chance. On the active side it is limited to\r\nthe accomplishment of a special work or a particular\r\nproduct, following some unjustified, because\r\nassumed, method. Thus it contrasts with the true\r\nknowledge of reason, which is direct apprehension,\r\nself-revealing and self-validating, of an eternal\r\nand harmonious content. The regions in which\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_200\"\u003e200\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nexperience and reason respectively hold sway are\r\nthus explained. Experience has to do with production,\r\nwhich, in turn, is relative to decay. It\r\ndeals with generation, becoming, not with finality,\r\nbeing. Hence it is infected with the trait of relative\r\nnon-being, of mere imitativeness; hence its\r\nmultiplicity, its logical inadequacy, its relativity\r\nto a standard and end beyond itself. Reason, \u003ci xml:lang=\"la\" lang=\"la\"\u003eper\r\ncontra\u003c/i\u003e, has to do with meaning, with significance\r\n(ideas, forms), that is eternal and ultimate. Since\r\nthe meaning of anything is the worth, the good,\r\nthe end of that thing, experience presents us with\r\npartial and tentative efforts to achieve the embodiment\r\nof purpose, under conditions that doom\r\nthe attempt to inconclusiveness. It has, however,\r\nits meed of reality in the degree in which\r\nits results \u003cem\u003eparticipate\u003c/em\u003e in meaning, the good,\r\nreason.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFrom this classic period, then, comes the antithesis\r\nof experience as the historically achieved\r\n\u003cem\u003eembodiments\u003c/em\u003e of meaning, partial, multiple, insecure,\r\nto reason as the source, author, and container\r\nof \u003cem\u003emeaning\u003c/em\u003e, permanent, assured, unified.\r\nIdealism means ideality, experience means brute\r\nand broken facts. That things exist because of\r\nand for the sake of meaning, and that experience\r\ngives us meaning in a servile, interrupted, and\r\ninherently deficient way\u0026mdash;such is the standpoint.\r\nExperience gives us meaning in process of becoming;\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_201\"\u003e201\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nspecial and isolated instances in which it\r\n\u003cem\u003ehappens\u003c/em\u003e, temporally, to appear, rather than meaning\r\npure, undefiled, independent. Experience presents\r\npurpose, the good, struggling against obstacles,\r\n“involved in matter.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eJust how much the vogue of modern neo-Kantian\r\nidealism, professedly built upon a strictly epistemological\r\ninstead of upon a cosmological basis,\r\nis due, in days of a declining theology, to a vague\r\nsense that affirming the function of reason in the\r\nconstitution of a knowable world (which in its own\r\nconstitution as logically knowable may be, morally\r\nand spiritually, anything you please), carries with\r\nit an assurance of the superior reality of the good\r\nand the beautiful as well as of the “true,” it would\r\nbe hard to say. Certainly unction seems to have\r\ndescended upon epistemology, in apostolic succession,\r\nfrom classic idealism; so that neo-Kantianism\r\nis rarely without a tone of edification, as if feeling\r\nitself the patron of man’s spiritual interests in\r\ncontrast to the supposed crudeness and insensitiveness\r\nof naturalism and empiricism. At all events,\r\nwe find here one element in our problem: Experience\r\nconsidered as the summary of past episodic\r\nadventures and happenings in relation to fulfilled\r\nand adequately expressed meaning.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe second historic event centers about the controversy\r\nof innate ideas, or pure concepts. The\r\nissue is between empiricism and rationalism as theories\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_202\"\u003e202\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof the origin and validation of scientific\r\nknowledge. The empiricist is he who feels that\r\nthe chief obstacle which prevents scientific method\r\nfrom making way is the belief in pure thoughts,\r\nnot derived from particular observations and hence\r\nnot responsible to the course of experience. His\r\nobjection to the “high \u003ci xml:lang=\"la\" lang=\"la\"\u003ea priori\u003c/i\u003e road” is that it\r\nintroduces in irresponsible fashion a mode of presumed\r\nknowledge which may be used at any turn\r\nto stand sponsor for mere tradition and prejudice,\r\nand thus to nullify the results of science resting\r\nupon and verified by observable facts. Experience\r\nthus comes to mean, to use the words of\r\nPeirce, “that which is forced upon a man’s recognition\r\nwill-he, nill-he, and shapes his thoughts to\r\nsomething quite different from what they naturally\r\nwould have taken.”\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_31\" href=\"#Footnote_31\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e31\u003c/a\u003e The same definition is\r\nfound in James, in his chapter on Necessary\r\nTruths: “Experience means experience of something\r\nforeign supposed to impress us whether\r\nspontaneously or in consequence of our own exertions\r\nand acts.”\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_32\" href=\"#Footnote_32\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e32\u003c/a\u003e As Peirce points out, this\r\nnotion of experience as the foreign element that\r\nforces the hand of thought and controls its\r\nefficacy, goes back to Locke. Experience is “observation\r\nemployed either about external sensible\r\nobjects, or about the internal operations of our\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_203\"\u003e203\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nminds”\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_33\" href=\"#Footnote_33\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e33\u003c/a\u003e\u0026mdash;as furnishing in short all the valid data\r\nand tests of thinking and knowledge. This meaning,\r\nthinks Peirce, should be accepted “as a landmark\r\nwhich it would be a crime to disturb or displace.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe contention of idealism, here bound up with\r\nrationalism, is that perception and observation\r\ncannot guarantee knowledge in its honorific sense\r\n(science); that the peculiar differentia of scientific\r\nknowledge is a constancy, a universality, and necessity\r\nthat contrast at every point with perceptual\r\ndata, and that indispensably require the function\r\nof conception.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_34\" href=\"#Footnote_34\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e34\u003c/a\u003e In short, \u003cem\u003equalitative transformation\u003c/em\u003e\r\nof \u003cem\u003efacts\u003c/em\u003e (data of perception), not their mechanical\r\nsubtraction and recombination, is the difference\r\nbetween scientific and perceptual knowledge.\r\nHere the problem which emerges is, of\r\ncourse, the significance of perception and of conception\r\nin respect to experience.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_35\" href=\"#Footnote_35\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e35\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_204\"\u003e204\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nThe third episode reverses in a curious manner\r\n(which confuses present discussion) the notion\r\nof experience as a foreign, alien, coercive material.\r\nIt regards experience as a fortuitous association,\r\nby merely psychic connections, of individualistic\r\nstates of consciousness. This is due to the Humian\r\ndevelopment of Locke. The “objects” and “operations,”\r\nwhich to Locke were just given and\r\nsecured in observation, become shifting complexes\r\nof subjective sensations and ideas, whose apparent\r\npermanency is due to discoverable illusions. This,\r\nof course, is the empiricism which made Kant so\r\nuneasily toss in his dogmatic slumbers (a tossing\r\nthat he took for an awakening); and which, by reaction,\r\ncalled out the conception of thought as a\r\nfunction operating both to elevate perceptual\r\ndata to scientific status, and also to confer objective\r\nstatus, or knowable character, upon even\r\nsensational data and their associative combinations.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_36\" href=\"#Footnote_36\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e36\u003c/a\u003e\r\nHere emerges the third element in our\r\nproblem: The function of thought as furnishing\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_205\"\u003e205\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nobjectivity to any experience that claims cognitive\r\nreference or capacity.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSumming up the matter, idealism stands forth\r\nwith its assertion of thought or reason as (1) the\r\nsponsor for all significance, ideality, purpose, in\r\nexperience,\u0026mdash;the author of the good and the beautiful\r\nas well as the true; (2) the power, located in\r\npure conceptions, required to elevate perceptive or\r\nobservational material to the plane of science; and\r\n(3) the constitution that gives objectivity, even\r\nthe semblance of order, system, connection, mutual\r\nreference, to sensory data that without its assistance\r\nare mere subjective flux.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_206\"\u003e206\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003eII\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eI begin the discussion with the last-named function.\r\nThought is here conceived as \u003ci xml:lang=\"la\" lang=\"la\"\u003ea priori\u003c/i\u003e, not\r\nin the sense of particular innate ideas, but of a\r\nfunction that constitutes the very possibility of\r\nany objective experience, any experience involving\r\nreference beyond its own mere subjective happening.\r\nI shall try to show that idealism is condemned\r\nto move back and forth between two inconsistent\r\ninterpretations of this \u003ci xml:lang=\"la\" lang=\"la\"\u003ea priori\u003c/i\u003e thought.\r\nIt is taken to mean both the organized, the regulated,\r\nthe informed, established character of experience,\r\nan order immanent and constitutional;\r\nand an agency which organizes, regulates, forms,\r\nsynthesizes, a power operative and constructive.\r\nAnd the oscillation between and confusion of these\r\ntwo diverse senses is necessary to Neo-Kantian\r\nidealism.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhen Kant compared his work in philosophy to\r\nthat of the men who introduced construction into\r\ngeometry, and experimentation into physics and\r\nchemistry, the point of his remarks depends upon\r\ntaking the \u003ci xml:lang=\"la\" lang=\"la\"\u003ea priori\u003c/i\u003e worth of thought in a regulative,\r\ndirective, controlling sense, thought as consciously,\r\nintentionally, making an experience \u003cem\u003edifferent\u003c/em\u003e\r\nin a \u003cem\u003edeterminate\u003c/em\u003e sense and manner. But the\r\npoint of his answer to Hume consists in taking the\r\n\u003ci xml:lang=\"la\" lang=\"la\"\u003ea priori\u003c/i\u003e in the other sense, as something which\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_207\"\u003e207\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nis \u003cem\u003ealready\u003c/em\u003e immanent in \u003cem\u003eany\u003c/em\u003e experience, and which\r\naccordingly makes no determinate difference to any\r\none experience as compared with any other, or with\r\nany past or future form of itself. The concept is\r\ntreated first as that which makes an experience\r\nactually different, controlling its evolution towards\r\nconsistency, coherency, and objective reliability;\r\nthen, it is treated as that which has already effected\r\nthe organization of any and every experience that\r\ncomes to recognition at all. The fallacy from\r\nwhich he never emerges consists in vibrating between\r\nthe definition of a concept as a rule of constructive\r\nsynthesis in a \u003cem\u003edifferential\u003c/em\u003e sense, and the\r\ndefinition of it as a static endowment lurking in\r\n“mind,” and giving automatically a hard and fixed\r\nlaw for the determination of every experienced\r\nobject. The \u003ci xml:lang=\"la\" lang=\"la\"\u003ea priori\u003c/i\u003e conceptions of Kant as immanent\r\nfall, like the rain, upon the just and the\r\nunjust; upon error, opinion, and hallucination.\r\nBut Kant slides into these \u003ci xml:lang=\"la\" lang=\"la\"\u003ea priori\u003c/i\u003e functions the\r\npreferential values exercised by empirical reflective\r\nthought. The concept of triangle, taken geometrically,\r\nmeans doubtless a determinate method\r\nof construing space elements; but to Kant it also\r\nmeans something that exists in the mind \u003cem\u003eprior\u003c/em\u003e to\r\nall such geometrical constructions and that unconsciously\r\nlays down the law not only for their\r\nconscious elaboration, but also for any space perception,\r\neven for that which takes a rectangle to\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_208\"\u003e208\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nbe a triangle. The first of the meanings is intelligible,\r\nand marks a definite contribution to the logic\r\nof science. But it is not “objective idealism”;\r\nit is a contribution to a revised empiricism. The\r\nsecond is a dark saying.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThat organization of some sort exists in every\r\nexperience I make no doubt. That isolation, discrepancy,\r\nthe fragmentary, the incompatible, are\r\nbrought to recognition and to logical function only\r\nwith reference to some prior existential mode of\r\norganization seems clear. And it seems equally\r\nclear that reflection goes on with profit only because\r\nthe materials with which it deals have already\r\nsome degree of organization, or exemplify\r\nvarious relationships. As against Hume, or even\r\nLocke, we may be duly grateful to Kant for enforcing\r\nacknowledgment of these facts. But the\r\nacknowledgment means simply an improved and\r\nrevised empiricism.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFor, be it noted, this organization, first, is not\r\nthe work of reason or thought, unless “reason” be\r\nstretched beyond all identification; and, secondly,\r\nit has no sacrosanct or finally valid and worthful\r\ncharacter. (1) Experience always carries with\r\nit and within it certain systematized arrangements,\r\ncertain classifications (using the term without intellectualistic\r\nprejudice), coexistent and serial. If\r\nwe attribute these to “thought” then the structure\r\nof the brain of a Mozart which hears and combines\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_209\"\u003e209\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nsounds in certain groupings, the psycho-physical\r\nvisual habit of the Greek, the locomotor apparatus\r\nof the human body in the laying-out and plotting\r\nof space is “thought.” Social institutions, established\r\npolitical customs, effect and perpetuate\r\nmodes of reaction and of perception that compel\r\na certain grouping of objects, elements, and values.\r\nA national constitution brings about a definite\r\narrangement of the factors of human action which\r\nholds even physical things together in certain\r\ndeterminate orders. Every successful economic\r\nprocess, with its elaborate divisions and adjustments\r\nof labor, of materials and instruments, is\r\njust such an objective organization. Now it is one\r\nthing to say that thought has played a part in\r\nthe origin and development of such organizations,\r\nand continues to have a rôle in their judicious employment\r\nand application; it is another to say that\r\nthese organizations \u003cem\u003eare\u003c/em\u003e thought, or are its exclusive\r\nproduct. Thought that functions in these\r\nways is distinctively \u003cem\u003ereflective\u003c/em\u003e thought, thought as\r\npractical, volitional, deliberately exercised for specific\r\naims\u0026mdash;thought as an act, an art of skilled\r\nmediation. As \u003cem\u003ereflective\u003c/em\u003e thought, its end is to\r\nterminate its own first and experimental forms, and\r\nto secure an organization which, while it may evoke\r\nnew reflective thinking, puts an end to the thinking\r\nthat secured the organization. \u003cem\u003eAs organizations\u003c/em\u003e,\r\nas established, effectively controlling arrangements\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_210\"\u003e210\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof objects in experience, their mark\r\nis that they are not thoughts, but habits, customs\r\nof action.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_37\" href=\"#Footnote_37\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e37\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eMoreover, such reflective thought as does intervene\r\nin the formation and maintenance of these\r\npractical organizations harks back to prior practical\r\norganizations, biological and social in nature.\r\nIt serves to \u003cem\u003evaluate\u003c/em\u003e organizations already existent\r\nas biological functions and instincts, while, as itself\r\na biological activity, it redirects them to new conditions\r\nand results. Recognize, for example, that\r\na geometric concept is a practical locomotor\r\nfunction of arranging stimuli in reference to maintenance\r\nof life activities \u003cem\u003ebrought into consciousness\u003c/em\u003e,\r\nand then serving as a center of reorganization of\r\nsuch activities to freer, more varied flexible and\r\nvaluable forms; recognize this, and we have the\r\ntruth of the Kantian idea, without its excrescences\r\nand miracles. The concept is the practical activity\r\ndoing consciously and artfully what it had\r\naforetime done blindly and aimlessly, and thereby\r\nnot only doing it better but opening up a freer\r\nworld of significant activities. Thought as such a\r\nreorganization of natural functions does naturally\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_211\"\u003e211\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwhat Kantian forms and schematizations do only\r\nsupernaturally. In a word, the constructive or\r\norganizing activity of “thought” does not inhere\r\nin thought as a transcendental function, a form or\r\nmode of some supra-empirical ego, mind, or consciousness,\r\nbut in thought as itself vital activity.\r\nAnd in any case we have passed to the idea of\r\nthought as reflectively reconstructive and directive,\r\nand away from the notion of thought as\r\nimmanently constitutional and organizational.\r\nTo make this passage and yet to ignore its\r\nexistence and import is essential to objective\r\nidealism.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e(2) No final or ultimate validity attaches to\r\nthese original arrangements and institutionalizations\r\nin any case. Their value is teleological and\r\nexperimental, not fixedly ontological. “Law and\r\norder” are good things, but not when they become\r\nrigidity, and create mechanical uniformity or routine.\r\nPrejudice is the acme of the \u003ci xml:lang=\"la\" lang=\"la\"\u003ea priori\u003c/i\u003e. Of\r\nthe \u003ci xml:lang=\"la\" lang=\"la\"\u003ea priori\u003c/i\u003e in this sense we may say what is always\r\nto be said of habits and institutions: They are good\r\nservants, but harsh and futile masters. Organization\r\nas already effected is always in danger of\r\nbecoming a \u003cem\u003emortmain\u003c/em\u003e; it may be a way of sacrificing\r\nnovelty, flexibility, freedom, creation to\r\nstatic standards. The curious inefficiency of idealism\r\nat this point is evident in the fact that genuine\r\nthought, empirical reflective thought, is required\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_212\"\u003e212\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nprecisely for the purpose of re-forming established\r\nand set formations.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn short, (\u003cem\u003ea\u003c/em\u003e) \u003ci xml:lang=\"la\" lang=\"la\"\u003ea priori\u003c/i\u003e character is no exclusive\r\nfunction of thought. Every biological function,\r\nevery motor attitude, every vital impulse as the\r\ncarrying vehicle of experience is thus \u003cem\u003eapriorily\u003c/em\u003e\r\nregulative in prospective reference; what we call\r\napperception, expectation, anticipation, desire, demand,\r\nchoice, are pregnant with this constitutive\r\nand organizing power. (\u003cem\u003eb\u003c/em\u003e) In so far as\r\n“thought” does exercise such reorganizing power,\r\nit is because thought is itself still a \u003cem\u003evital\u003c/em\u003e function.\r\n(\u003cem\u003ec\u003c/em\u003e) Objective idealism depends not only upon ignoring\r\nthe existence and capacity of vital functions,\r\nbut upon a profound confusion of the constitutional\r\n\u003ci xml:lang=\"la\" lang=\"la\"\u003ea priori\u003c/i\u003e, the unconsciously dominant,\r\nwith empirically reflective thought. In the sense\r\nin which the \u003ci xml:lang=\"la\" lang=\"la\"\u003ea priori\u003c/i\u003e is worth while as an attribute\r\nof thought, thought cannot be what the objective\r\nidealist defines it as being. Plain, ordinary, everyday\r\nempirical reflections, operating as centers of\r\ninquiry, of suggestion, of experimentation, exercise\r\nthe valuable function of regulation, in an\r\nauspicious direction, of subsequent experiences.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe categories of accomplished systematization\r\ncover alike the just and the unjust, the false and\r\nthe true, while (unlike God’s rain) they exercise\r\nno \u003cem\u003especific\u003c/em\u003e or \u003cem\u003edifferential\u003c/em\u003e activity of stimulation\r\nand control. Error and inefficiency, as well as\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_213\"\u003e213\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nvalue and energy, are embodied in our objective\r\ninstitutional classifications. As a special favor,\r\nwill not the objective idealist show how, in some\r\none single instance, his immanent “reason” makes\r\nany difference as respects the detection and elimination\r\nof error, or gives even the slightest assistance\r\nin discovering and validating the truly worthful?\r\nThis practical work, the life blood of intelligence\r\nin everyday life and in critical science, is\r\ndone by the despised and rejected matter of concrete\r\nempirical contexts and functions. Generalizing\r\nthe issue: If the immanent organization be\r\nascribed to thought, why should its work be such\r\nas to demand continuous correction and revision?\r\nIf specific reflective thought, as empirical, be subject\r\nto all the limitations supposed to inhere in\r\nexperience as such, how can it assume the burden\r\nof making good, of supplementing, reconstructing,\r\nand developing meanings? The logic of the\r\ncase seems to be that Neo-Kantian idealism gets\r\nits status against empiricism by first accepting\r\nthe Humian idea of experience, while the express\r\nimport of its positive contribution is to show the\r\n\u003cem\u003enon-existence\u003c/em\u003e (not merely the cognitive invalidity)\r\nof anything describable as mere states of subjective\r\nconsciousness. Thus in the end it tends to destroy\r\nitself and to make way for a more adequate empiricism.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_214\"\u003e214\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003eIII\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn the above discussion, I have unavoidably anticipated\r\nthe second problem: the relation of conceptual\r\nthought to perceptual data. A distinct\r\naspect still remains, however. Perception, as well\r\nas apriority, is a term harboring a fundamental\r\nambiguity. It may mean (1) a distinct type of\r\nactivity, predominantly practical in character,\r\nthough carrying at its heart important cognitive\r\nand esthetic qualities; or (2) a distinctively cognitional\r\nexperience, the function of observation as\r\nexplicitly logical\u0026mdash;a factor in science \u003ci xml:lang=\"la\" lang=\"la\"\u003equa\u003c/i\u003e science.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn the first sense, as recent functional empiricism\r\n(working in harmony with psychology, but not\r\nitself peculiarly psychological) has abundantly\r\nshown, perception is primarily an act of adjustment\r\nof organism and environment, differing from\r\na mere reflex or instinctive adaptation in that, in\r\norder to compensate for the failure of the instinctive\r\nadjustment, it requires an objective or discriminative\r\npresentation of conditions of action:\r\nthe negative conditions or obstacles, and the positive\r\nconditions or means and resources.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_38\" href=\"#Footnote_38\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e38\u003c/a\u003e This, of\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_215\"\u003e215\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ncourse, is its cognitive phase. In so far as the\r\nmaterial thus presented not only serves as a direct\r\ncue to further successful activity (successful in\r\nthe overcoming of obstacles to the maintenance of\r\nthe function entered upon) but presents auxiliary\r\ncollateral objects and qualities that give additional\r\nrange and depth of meaning to the activity\r\nof adjustment, perceiving is esthetic as well as\r\nintellectual.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_39\" href=\"#Footnote_39\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e39\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNow such perception cannot be made antithetical\r\nto thought, for it may itself be surcharged with\r\nany amount of imaginatively supplied and reflectively\r\nsustained ideal factors\u0026mdash;such as are needed\r\nto determine and select relevant stimuli and to\r\nsuggest and develop an appropriate plan and\r\ncourse of behavior. The amount of such saturating\r\nintellectual material depends upon the complexity\r\nand maturity of the behaving agent. Such\r\nperception, moreover, is strictly teleological, since\r\nit arises from an experienced need and functions to\r\nfulfil the purpose indicated by this need. The\r\ncognitional content is, indeed, carried by affectional\r\nand intentional contexts.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_216\"\u003e216\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nThen we have perception as scientific observation.\r\nThis involves the deliberate, artful exclusion\r\nof affectional and purposive factors as exercising\r\nmayhap a vitiating influence upon the cognitive\r\nor objective content; or, more strictly speaking,\r\na transformation of the more ordinary or\r\n“natural” emotional and purposive concomitants,\r\ninto what Bain calls “neutral” emotion, and a\r\npurpose of finding out what the present conditions\r\nof the problem are. (The practical feature is not\r\nthus denied or eliminated, but the overweening influence\r\nof a present dominating end is avoided, so\r\nthat \u003cem\u003echange of the character of the end\u003c/em\u003e may be\r\neffected, if found desirable.) Here observation\r\nmay be opposed to thought, in the sense that exact\r\nand minute description may be set over against\r\ninterpretation, explanation, theorizing, and inference.\r\nIn the wider sense of thought as equaling\r\nreflective process, the work of observation and description\r\nforms a constituent division of labor\r\n\u003cem\u003ewithin\u003c/em\u003e thought. The impersonal demarcation and\r\naccurate registration of what is objectively there\r\nor present occurs for the sake (\u003cem\u003ea\u003c/em\u003e) of eliminating\r\nmeaning which is habitually but uncritically referred,\r\nand (\u003cem\u003eb\u003c/em\u003e) of getting a basis for a meaning\r\n(at first purely inferential or hypothetical) that\r\nmay be consistently referred; and that (\u003cem\u003ec\u003c/em\u003e), resting\r\nupon examination and not upon mere \u003ci xml:lang=\"la\" lang=\"la\"\u003ea priori\u003c/i\u003e\r\ncustom, may weather the strain of subsequent experiences.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_217\"\u003e217\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nBut in so far as thought is identified\r\nwith the conceptual phase as such of the entire\r\nlogical function, observation is, of course, set over\r\nagainst thought: deliberately, purposely, and artfully\r\nso.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIt is not uncommon to hear it said that the\r\nLockeian movement was all well enough for psychology,\r\nbut went astray because it invaded the\r\nfield of logic. If we mean by psychology a natural\r\nhistory of what at any time \u003cem\u003epasses\u003c/em\u003e for knowledge,\r\nand by logic conscious control in the direction\r\nof grounded assurance, this remark appears\r\nto reverse the truth. As a natural history of\r\nknowledge in the sense of opinion and belief,\r\nLocke’s account of discrete, simple ideas or meanings,\r\nwhich are compounded and then distributed,\r\ndoes palpable violence to the facts. But every\r\nline of Locke shows that he was interested in knowledge\r\nin its honorific sense\u0026mdash;controlled certainty,\r\nor, where this is not feasible, measured probability.\r\nAnd to logic as an account of the way in which\r\nwe by art build up a \u003cem\u003etested\u003c/em\u003e assurance, a rationalized\r\nconviction, Locke makes an important positive\r\ncontribution. The pity is that he inclined to\r\ntake it for the whole of the logic of science,\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_40\" href=\"#Footnote_40\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e40\u003c/a\u003e not\r\nseeing that it was but a correlative division of\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_218\"\u003e218\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nlabor to the work of hypotheses or inference; and\r\nthat he tended to identify it with a natural history\r\nor psychology. The latter tendency exposed\r\nLocke to the Humian interpretation, and permanently\r\nsidetracked the positive contribution of his\r\ntheory to logic, while it led to that confusion of\r\nan untrue psychology with a logic valid within\r\nlimits, of which Mill is the standard example.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn analytic observation, it is a positive object\r\nto strip off all inferential meaning so far as may\r\nbe\u0026mdash;to reduce the facts as nearly as may be to\r\nderationalized data, in order to make possible a\r\nnew and better rationalization. In and because of\r\nthis process, the perceptual data approach the\r\nlimit of a disconnected manifold, of the brutely\r\ngiven, of the merely sensibly present; while meaning\r\nstands out as a searched for principle of unification\r\nand explanation, that is, as a thought, a\r\nconcept, an hypothesis. The extent to which this\r\nis carried depends wholly upon the character of\r\nthe specific situation and problem; but, speaking\r\ngenerally, or of limiting tendencies, one may say\r\nit is carried to mere observation, pure brute description,\r\non the one side, and to mere thought,\r\nthat is hypothetical inference, on the other.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSo far as Locke ignored this instrumental character\r\nof observation, he naturally evoked and\r\nstrengthened rationalistic idealism; he called forth\r\nits assertion of the need of reason, of concepts, of\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_219\"\u003e219\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nuniversals, to constitute knowledge in its eulogistic\r\nsense. But two contrary errors do not make a\r\ntruth, although they suggest and determine the\r\nnature of some relevant truth. This truth is the\r\nempirical origin, in a determinate type of situation,\r\nof the contrast of observation and conception;\r\nthe empirical relevancy and the empirical\r\nworth of this contrast in controlling the character\r\nof subsequent experiences. To suppose that perception\r\nas it concretely exists, either in the early\r\nexperiences of the animal, the race, or the individual,\r\nor in its later refined and expanded experiences,\r\nis identical with the sharply analyzed,\r\nobjectively discriminated and internally disintegrated\r\nelements of scientific observation, is a perversion\r\nof experience; a perversion for which, indeed,\r\nprofessed empiricists set the example, but\r\nwhich idealism must perpetuate if it is not to find\r\nits end in an improved, functional empiricism.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_41\" href=\"#Footnote_41\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e41\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003eIV\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe come now to the consideration of the third\r\nelement in our problem; ideality, important and\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_220\"\u003e220\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nnormative value, in relation to experience; the antithesis\r\nof experience as a tentative, fragmentary,\r\nand ineffectual embodiment of meaning over\r\nagainst the perfect, eternal system of meanings\r\nwhich experience suggests even in nullifying and\r\nmutilating.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThat from the \u003cem\u003ememory\u003c/em\u003e standpoint experience\r\npresents itself as a multiplicity of episodic events\r\nwith just enough continuity among them to suggest\r\nprinciples true “on the whole” or usually,\r\nbut without furnishing instruction as to their exact\r\nrange and bearing, seems obvious enough.\r\nWhy should it not? The motive which leads to\r\nreflection on \u003cem\u003epast\u003c/em\u003e experience could be satisfied in\r\nno other way. Continuities, connecting links, dynamic\r\ntransitions drop out because, for the purpose\r\nof the recollection, they would be hindrances\r\nif now repeated; or because they are now available\r\nonly when themselves objectified in definite terms\r\nand thus given a \u003ci xml:lang=\"la\" lang=\"la\"\u003equasi\u003c/i\u003e independent, a \u003ci xml:lang=\"la\" lang=\"la\"\u003equasi\u003c/i\u003e atomistic\r\nstanding of their own. This is the only alternative\r\nto what the psychologists term “total reminiscence,”\r\nwhich, so far as total, leave us with\r\nan elephant on our hands. Unless we are going\r\nto have a wholesale revivification of the past, giving\r\nus just another embarrassing present experience,\r\nillusory because irrelevant, memory must\r\nwork by retail\u0026mdash;by summoning \u003cem\u003edistinct\u003c/em\u003e cases,\r\nevents, sequences, precedents. Dis-membering is\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_221\"\u003e221\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\na positively necessary part of re-membering. But\r\nthe resulting \u003ci xml:lang=\"la\" lang=\"la\"\u003edisjecta membra\u003c/i\u003e are in no sense\r\nexperience as it was or is; they are simply elements\r\nheld apart, and yet tentatively implicated together,\r\nin present experience for the sake of its most favorable\r\nevolution; evolution in the direction of the\r\nmost excellent meaning or value conceived. If the\r\nremembering is efficacious and pertinent, it reveals\r\nthe possibilities of the present; that is to say, it\r\nclarifies the transitive, transforming character\r\nthat belongs inherently to the present. The dismembering\r\nof the vital present into the disconnected\r\npast is correlative to an anticipation, an\r\nidealization of the future.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eMoreover, the contingent character of the principle\r\nor rule that emerges from a survey of cases,\r\ninstances, as distinct from a fixed or necessary\r\ncharacter, secures just what is wanted in the exigency\r\nof a prospective idealization, or refinement\r\nof excellence. It is just this character that\r\nsecures flexibility and variety of outlook, that\r\nmakes possible a consideration of alternatives and\r\nan attempt to select and to execute the more\r\nworthy among them. The fixed or necessary law\r\nwould mean a future like the past\u0026mdash;a dead, an\r\nunidealized future. It is exasperating to imagine\r\nhow completely different would have been Aristotle’s\r\nvaluation of “experience” with respect to\r\nits contingency, if he had but once employed the\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_222\"\u003e222\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nfunction of developing and perfecting value, instead\r\nof the function of knowing an unalterable\r\nobject, as the standard by which to estimate and\r\nmeasure intelligence.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe one constant trait of experience from its\r\ncrudest to its most mature forms is that its contents\r\nundergo change of meaning, and of meaning\r\nin the sense of excellence, value. Every experience\r\nis in-course,\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_42\" href=\"#Footnote_42\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e42\u003c/a\u003e in course of becoming worse or\r\nbetter as to its contents, or in course of conscious\r\nendeavor to sustain some satisfactory level of\r\nvalue against encroachment or lapse. In this effort,\r\nboth precedent, the reduction of the present\r\nidealization, the anticipation of the possible,\r\nthough doubtful, future, emerge. Without idealization,\r\nthat is, without conception of the favorable\r\nissue that the present, defined in terms of\r\nprecedents, may portend in its transition, the\r\nrecollection of precedents, and the formulation of\r\ntentative rules is nonsense. But without the identification\r\nof the present in terms of elements suggested\r\nby the past, without recognition, the ideal,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_223\"\u003e223\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe value projected as end, remains inert, helpless,\r\nsentimental, without means of realization. Resembling\r\ncases and anticipation, memory and idealization,\r\nare the corresponding terms in which a\r\npresent experience has its transitive force analyzed\r\ninto reciprocally pertinent means and ends.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cem\u003eThat\u003c/em\u003e an experience will change in content and\r\nvalue is the one thing certain. \u003cem\u003eHow\u003c/em\u003e it will change\r\nis the one thing naturally uncertain. Hence the\r\nimport of the art of reflection and invention. Control\r\nof the character of the change in the direction\r\nof the worthful is the common business of theory\r\nand practice. Here is the province of the episodic\r\nrecollection of past history and of the idealized\r\nforesight of possibilities. The irrelevancy of an\r\nobjective idealism lies in the fact that it totally\r\nignores the position and function of ideality in\r\nsustained and serious endeavor. Were values automatically\r\ninjected and kept in the world of experience\r\nby any force not reflected in human memories\r\nand projects, it would make no difference\r\nwhether this force were a Spencerian environment\r\nor an Absolute Reason. Did purpose ride in a\r\ncosmic automobile toward a predestined goal, it\r\nwould not cease to be physical and mechanical in\r\nquality because labeled Divine Idea, or Perfect\r\nReason. The moral would be “let us eat, drink,\r\nand be merry,” for to-morrow\u0026mdash;or if not this to-morrow,\r\nthen upon some to-morrow, unaffected by\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_224\"\u003e224\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nour empirical memories, reflections, inventions,\r\nand idealizations\u0026mdash;the cosmic automobile arrives.\r\nSpirituality, ideality, meaning as purpose, would\r\nbe the last things to present themselves if objective\r\nidealism were true. Values cannot be both ideal\r\nand given, and their “given” character is emphasized,\r\nnot transformed, when they are called\r\neternal and absolute. But natural values become\r\nideal the moment their maintenance is dependent\r\nupon the intentional activities of an empirical\r\nagent. To suppose that values are ideal because\r\nthey are so eternally given is the contradiction in\r\nwhich objective idealism has intrenched itself. Objective\r\nontological teleology spells machinery. Reflective\r\nand volitional, experimental teleology alone\r\nspells ideality.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_43\" href=\"#Footnote_43\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e43\u003c/a\u003e Objective, rationalistic idealism\r\nbreaks upon the fact that it can have no intermediary\r\nbetween a brutally achieved embodiment of\r\nmeaning (physical in character or else of that peculiar\r\nquasi-physical character which goes generally\r\nby the name of metaphysical) and a total opposition\r\nof the given and the ideal, connoting their mutual\r\nindifference and incapacity. An empiricism that\r\nacknowledges the transitive character of experience,\r\nand that acknowledges the possible control\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_225\"\u003e225\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof the character of the transition by means of\r\nintelligent effort, has abundant opportunity to\r\ncelebrate in productive art, genial morals, and\r\nimpartial inquiry the grace and the severity of\r\nthe ideal.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_226\"\u003e226\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\r\n\u003ch2 title=\"THE POSTULATE OF IMMEDIATE EMPIRICISM\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"THE_POSTULATE_OF_IMMEDIATE_EMPIRICISM\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eTHE POSTULATE OF IMMEDIATE EMPIRICISM\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_44\" href=\"#Footnote_44\" class=\"fnanchor smaller\"\u003e44\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"drop-cap\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap1\"\u003eThe\u003c/span\u003e criticisms made upon that vital but still\r\nunformed movement variously termed radical\r\nempiricism, pragmatism, humanism, functionalism,\r\naccording as one or another aspect of it is uppermost,\r\nhave left me with a conviction that the\r\n\u003cem\u003efundamental\u003c/em\u003e difference is not so much in matters\r\novertly discussed as in a presupposition that remains\r\ntacit: a presupposition as to what experience\r\nis and means. To do my little part in clearing\r\nup the confusion, I shall try to make my own\r\npresupposition explicit. The object of this paper\r\nis, then, to set forth what I understand to be the\r\npostulate and the criterion of \u003cem\u003eimmediate empiricism\u003c/em\u003e.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_45\" href=\"#Footnote_45\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e45\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_227\"\u003e227\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nImmediate empiricism postulates that things\u0026mdash;anything,\r\neverything, in the ordinary or non-technical\r\nuse of the term “thing”\u0026mdash;are what they\r\nare experienced as. Hence, if one wishes to describe\r\nanything truly, his task is to tell what it is\r\nexperienced as being. If it is a horse that is to\r\nbe described, or the \u003ci xml:lang=\"la\" lang=\"la\"\u003eequus\u003c/i\u003e that is to be defined,\r\nthen must the horse-trader, or the jockey, or the\r\ntimid family man who wants a “safe driver,” or\r\nthe zoologist or the paleontologist tell us what the\r\nhorse is which is experienced. If these accounts\r\nturn out different in some respects, as well as congruous\r\nin others, this is no reason for assuming\r\nthe content of one to be exclusively “real,” and\r\nthat of others to be “phenomenal”; for each account\r\nof what is experienced will manifest that it is\r\nthe account \u003cem\u003eof\u003c/em\u003e the horse-dealer, or \u003cem\u003eof\u003c/em\u003e the zoologist,\r\nand hence will give the conditions requisite\r\nfor understanding the differences as well as the\r\nagreements of the various accounts. And the\r\nprinciple varies not a whit if we bring in the psychologist’s\r\nhorse, the logician’s horse, or the metaphysician’s\r\nhorse.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_228\"\u003e228\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nIn each case, the nub of the question is, \u003cem\u003ewhat\r\nsort of experience\u003c/em\u003e is denoted or indicated: a concrete\r\nand determinate experience, varying, when it\r\nvaries, in specific real elements, and agreeing, when\r\nit agrees, in specific real elements, so that we have\r\na contrast, not between \u003cem\u003ea\u003c/em\u003e Reality, and various\r\napproximations to, or phenomenal representations\r\nof Reality, but between different reals of experience.\r\nAnd the reader is begged to bear in mind\r\nthat from this standpoint, when “an experience”\r\nor “some sort of experience” is referred to, “some\r\nthing” or “some sort of thing” is always\r\nmeant.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eNow, this statement that things are what they\r\nare experienced to be is usually translated into\r\nthe statement that things (or, ultimately, Reality,\r\nBeing) \u003cem\u003eare\u003c/em\u003e only and just what they are \u003cem\u003eknown\u003c/em\u003e to\r\nbe or that things are, or Reality \u003cem\u003eis\u003c/em\u003e, what it is for\r\na conscious knower\u0026mdash;whether the knower be conceived\r\nprimarily as a perceiver or as a thinker being\r\na further, and secondary, question. This is\r\nthe root-paralogism of all idealisms, whether subjective\r\nor objective, psychological or epistemological.\r\nBy our postulate, things are what they are\r\nexperienced to be; and, unless knowing is the sole\r\nand only genuine mode of experiencing, it is fallacious\r\nto say that Reality is just and exclusively\r\nwhat it is or would be to an all-competent all-knower;\r\nor even that it \u003cem\u003eis\u003c/em\u003e, relatively and piecemeal,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_229\"\u003e229\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwhat it is to a finite and partial knower. Or,\r\nput more positively, knowing is one mode of experiencing,\r\nand the primary philosophic demand\r\n(from the standpoint of immediatism) is to find out\r\n\u003cem\u003ewhat\u003c/em\u003e sort of an experience knowing is\u0026mdash;or, concretely\r\nhow things are experienced when they are\r\nexperienced \u003cem\u003eas\u003c/em\u003e known things.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_46\" href=\"#Footnote_46\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e46\u003c/a\u003e By concretely is\r\nmeant, obviously enough (among other things),\r\nsuch an account of the experience of things as\r\nknown that will bring out the characteristic traits\r\nand distinctions they possess as things of a knowing\r\nexperience, as compared with things experienced\r\nesthetically, or morally, or economically, or\r\ntechnologically. To assume that, because from\r\nthe \u003cem\u003estandpoint of the knowledge experience\u003c/em\u003e things\r\n\u003cem\u003eare\u003c/em\u003e what they are known to be, therefore, metaphysically,\r\nabsolutely, without qualification, everything\r\nin its reality (as distinct from its “appearance,”\r\nor phenomenal occurrence) is what a knower\r\nwould find it to be, is, from the immediatist’s standpoint,\r\nif not the root of all philosophic evil, at\r\nleast one of its main roots. For this leaves out\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_230\"\u003e230\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof account what the knowledge standpoint is itself\r\n\u003cem\u003eexperienced as\u003c/em\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eI start and am flustered by a noise heard. Empirically,\r\nthat noise \u003cem\u003eis\u003c/em\u003e fearsome; it \u003cem\u003ereally\u003c/em\u003e is, not\r\nmerely phenomenally or subjectively so. That \u003cem\u003eis\r\nwhat\u003c/em\u003e it is experienced as being. But, when I experience\r\nthe noise as a \u003cem\u003eknown\u003c/em\u003e thing, I find it to\r\nbe innocent of harm. It is the tapping of a shade\r\nagainst the window, owing to movements of the\r\nwind. The experience has changed; that is, the\r\nthing experienced has changed\u0026mdash;not that an unreality\r\nhas given place to a reality, nor that\r\nsome transcendental (unexperienced) Reality has\r\nchanged,\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_47\" href=\"#Footnote_47\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e47\u003c/a\u003e not that truth has changed, but just\r\nand only the concrete reality experienced has\r\nchanged. I now feel ashamed of my fright; and\r\nthe noise as fearsome is changed to noise as a wind-curtain\r\nfact, and hence practically indifferent to\r\nmy welfare. This is a change of experienced existence\r\neffected through the medium of cognition.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_231\"\u003e231\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nThe content of the latter experience cognitively regarded\r\nis doubtless \u003cem\u003etruer\u003c/em\u003e than the content of the\r\nearlier; but it is in no sense more real. To call it\r\ntruer, moreover, must, from the empirical standpoint,\r\nmean a concrete \u003cem\u003edifference\u003c/em\u003e in actual things\r\nexperienced.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_48\" href=\"#Footnote_48\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e48\u003c/a\u003e Again, in many cases, only in retrospect\r\nis the prior experience cognitionally regarded\r\nat all. In such cases, it is only in regard to contrasted\r\ncontent \u003cem\u003ein\u003c/em\u003e a subsequent experience that\r\nthe determination “truer” has force.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003ePerhaps some reader may now object that as\r\nmatter of fact the entire experience \u003cem\u003eis\u003c/em\u003e cognitive,\r\nbut that the earlier parts of it are only imperfectly\r\nso, resulting in a phenomenon that is not real;\r\nwhile the latter part, being a more complete cognition,\r\nresults in what is relatively, at least, more\r\nreal.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_49\" href=\"#Footnote_49\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e49\u003c/a\u003e In short, a critic may say that, when I was\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_232\"\u003e232\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nfrightened by the noise, I \u003cem\u003eknew\u003c/em\u003e I was frightened;\r\notherwise there would have been no experience at\r\nall. At this point, it is necessary to make a distinction\r\nso simple and yet so all-fundamental that\r\nI am afraid the reader will be inclined to pooh-pooh\r\nit away as a mere verbal distinction. But\r\nto see that to the empiricist this distinction is not\r\nverbal, but genuine, is the precondition of any understanding\r\nof him. The immediatist must, by his\r\npostulate, ask what is the fright experienced \u003cem\u003eas\u003c/em\u003e.\r\nIs what is actually experienced, I-know-I-am-frightened,\r\nor I-\u003cem\u003eam\u003c/em\u003e-frightened? I see absolutely\r\nno reason for claiming that the experience \u003cem\u003emust\u003c/em\u003e\r\nbe described by the former phrase. In all probability\r\n(and all the empiricist logically needs is just\r\none case of this sort) the experience is simply and\r\njust of fright-at-the-noise. Later one may (or\r\nmay not) have an experience describable \u003cem\u003eas\u003c/em\u003e I-know-I-am-(or-was)\r\nand improperly or properly,\r\nfrightened. But this is a different experience\u0026mdash;that\r\nis, a different \u003cem\u003ething\u003c/em\u003e. And if the critic goes\r\non to urge that the person “\u003cem\u003ereally\u003c/em\u003e” must have\r\nknown that he was frightened, I can only point\r\nout that the critic is shifting the venue. He may\r\nbe right, but, if so, it is only because the “really”\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_233\"\u003e233\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nis something not concretely experienced (whose nature\r\naccordingly is the critic’s business); and this\r\nis to depart from the empiricist’s point of view,\r\nto attribute to him a postulate he expressly\r\nrepudiates.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe material point may come out more clearly\r\nif I say that we must make a distinction between\r\na thing as \u003cem\u003ecognitive\u003c/em\u003e, and one as \u003cem\u003ecognized\u003c/em\u003e.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_50\" href=\"#Footnote_50\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e50\u003c/a\u003e I\r\nshould define a cognitive experience as one that\r\nhas certain bearings or implications which induce,\r\nand fulfil themselves in, a subsequent experience\r\nin which the relevant thing is experienced \u003cem\u003eas\u003c/em\u003e cognized,\r\n\u003cem\u003eas\u003c/em\u003e a known object, and is thereby transformed,\r\nor reorganized. The fright-at-the-noise\r\nin the case cited is obviously \u003cem\u003ecognitive\u003c/em\u003e, in this sense.\r\nBy description, it induces an investigation or inquiry\r\nin which both noise and fright are objectively\r\nstated or presented\u0026mdash;the noise as a shade-wind\r\nfact, the fright as an organic reaction to a sudden\r\nacoustic stimulus, a reaction that under the given\r\ncircumstances was useless or even detrimental, a\r\nmaladaptation. Now, pretty much all of experience\r\nis of this sort (the “is” meaning, of course,\r\nis experienced \u003cem\u003eas\u003c/em\u003e), and the empiricist is false to his\r\nprinciple if he does not duly note this fact.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_51\" href=\"#Footnote_51\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e51\u003c/a\u003e But\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_234\"\u003e234\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nhe is equally false to his principle if he permits\r\nhimself to be confused as to the concrete differences\r\nin the two things experienced.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThere are two little words through explication\r\nof which the empiricist’s position may be brought\r\nout\u0026mdash;“\u003cem\u003eas\u003c/em\u003e” and “\u003cem\u003ethat\u003c/em\u003e.” We may express his\r\npresupposition by saying that things are what they\r\nare experienced \u003cem\u003eas\u003c/em\u003e being; or that to give a just\r\naccount of anything is to tell what \u003cem\u003ethat\u003c/em\u003e thing is\r\nexperienced to be. By these words I want to indicate\r\nthe absolute, final, irreducible, and inexpugnable\r\nconcrete \u003cem\u003equale\u003c/em\u003e which everything experienced\r\nnot so much \u003cem\u003ehas\u003c/em\u003e as \u003cem\u003eis\u003c/em\u003e. To grasp this aspect\r\nof empiricism is to see what the empiricist means\r\nby objectivity, by the element of control. Suppose\r\nwe take, as a crucial case for the empiricist,\r\nan out and out illusion, say of Zöllner’s lines.\r\nThese are experienced as convergent; they are\r\n“truly” parallel. If things are what they are\r\nexperienced as being, how can the distinction be\r\ndrawn between illusion and the true state of the\r\ncase? There is no answer to this question except\r\nby sticking to the fact that the experience of the\r\nlines as divergent is a concrete qualitative thing or\r\n\u003cem\u003ethat\u003c/em\u003e. It is \u003cem\u003ethat\u003c/em\u003e experience which it is, and no\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_235\"\u003e235\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nother. And if the reader rebels at the iteration of\r\nsuch obvious tautology, I can only reiterate that\r\nthe realization of the \u003cem\u003emeaning\u003c/em\u003e of this tautology is\r\nthe key to the whole question of the objectivity of\r\nexperience, as that stands to the empiricist. The\r\nlines of \u003cem\u003ethat\u003c/em\u003e experience \u003cem\u003eare\u003c/em\u003e divergent; not merely\r\n\u003cem\u003eseem\u003c/em\u003e so. The question of truth is not as to\r\nwhether Being or Non-Being, Reality or mere\r\nAppearance, is experienced, but as to the \u003cem\u003eworth\u003c/em\u003e of\r\na certain concretely experienced thing. The only\r\nway of passing upon this question is by sticking\r\nin the most uncompromising fashion to \u003cem\u003ethat\u003c/em\u003e experience\r\nas real. \u003cem\u003eThat\u003c/em\u003e experience is that two\r\nlines with certain cross-hatchings are apprehended\r\nas convergent; only by taking that experience as\r\nreal and as fully real, is there any basis for, or\r\nway of going to, an experienced knowledge that\r\nthe lines are parallel. It is in the concrete thing\r\n\u003cem\u003eas experienced\u003c/em\u003e that all the grounds and clues to\r\nits own intellectual or logical rectification are contained.\r\nIt is because this thing, afterwards adjudged\r\nfalse, is a concrete \u003cem\u003ethat\u003c/em\u003e, that it develops\r\ninto a corrected experience (that is, experience of\r\na corrected thing\u0026mdash;we reform things just as we\r\nreform ourselves or a bad boy) whose full content\r\nis not a whit more real, but which is true or truer.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_52\" href=\"#Footnote_52\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e52\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_236\"\u003e236\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nIf \u003cem\u003eany\u003c/em\u003e experience, then a \u003cem\u003edeterminate\u003c/em\u003e experience;\r\nand this determinateness is the only, and is\r\nthe adequate, principle of control, or “objectivity.”\r\nThe experience may be of the vaguest sort.\r\nI may not see anything which I can identify as a\r\nfamiliar object\u0026mdash;a table, a chair, etc. It may be\r\ndark; I may have only the vaguest impression that\r\nthere is something which looks like a table. Or I\r\nmay be completely befogged and confused, as when\r\none rises quickly from sleep in a pitch-dark room.\r\nBut this vagueness, this doubtfulness, this confusion\r\nis the thing experienced, and, \u003ci xml:lang=\"la\" lang=\"la\"\u003equa\u003c/i\u003e real, is as\r\n“good” a reality as the self-luminous vision of\r\nan Absolute. It is not just vagueness, doubtfulness,\r\nconfusion, at large or in general. It is \u003cem\u003ethis\u003c/em\u003e\r\nvagueness, and no other; absolutely unique, absolutely\r\nwhat \u003cem\u003eit\u003c/em\u003e is.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_53\" href=\"#Footnote_53\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e53\u003c/a\u003e Whatever gain in clearness, in\r\nfullness, in trueness of content is experienced must\r\ngrow out of some element in the experience of \u003cem\u003ethis\u003c/em\u003e\r\nexperienced \u003cem\u003eas\u003c/em\u003e what it is. To return to the illusion:\r\nIf the experience of the lines as convergent\r\nis illusory, it is because of some elements in the\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_237\"\u003e237\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthing as experienced, not because of something defined\r\nin terms of externality to this particular experience.\r\nIf the illusoriness can be detected, it is\r\nbecause the thing experienced is real, having within\r\nits experienced reality elements whose \u003cem\u003eown mutual\u003c/em\u003e\r\ntension effects its reconstruction. Taken concretely,\r\nthe experience of convergent lines contains\r\nwithin itself the elements of the transformation\r\nof its own content. It is \u003cem\u003ethis\u003c/em\u003e thing, and not\r\nsome separate truth, that clamors for its own\r\nreform. There is, then, from the empiricist’s point\r\nof view, no need to search for some aboriginal \u003cem\u003ethat\u003c/em\u003e\r\nto which all successive experiences are attached,\r\nand which is somehow thereby undergoing continuous\r\nchange. Experience is always of \u003cem\u003ethats\u003c/em\u003e; and\r\nthe most comprehensive and inclusive experience\r\nof the universe that the philosopher himself can\r\nobtain is the experience of a characteristic \u003cem\u003ethat\u003c/em\u003e.\r\nFrom the empiricist’s point of view, this is as true\r\nof the exhaustive and complete insight of a hypothetical\r\nall-knower as of the vague, blind experience\r\nof the awakened sleeper. As reals, they stand\r\non the same level. As trues, the latter has by\r\ndefinition the better of it; but if this insight is in\r\nany way the truth of the blind awakening, it is\r\nbecause the latter has, in its \u003cem\u003eown\u003c/em\u003e determinate \u003ci xml:lang=\"la\" lang=\"la\"\u003equale\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nelements of real continuity with the former; it is,\r\n\u003ci xml:lang=\"la\" lang=\"la\"\u003eex hypothesi\u003c/i\u003e, transformable through a series of\r\nexperienced reals without break of continuity, into\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_238\"\u003e238\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe absolute thought-experience. There is no need\r\nof logical manipulation to effect the transformation,\r\nnor \u003cem\u003ecould\u003c/em\u003e any logical consideration effect it.\r\nIf effected at all it is just by immediate experiences,\r\neach of which is just as real (no more, no less)\r\nas either of the two terms between which they lie.\r\nSuch, at least, is the meaning of the empiricist’s\r\ncontention. So, when he talks of experience, he\r\ndoes not mean some grandiose, remote affair that\r\nis cast like a net around a succession of fleeting\r\nexperiences; he does not mean an indefinite total,\r\ncomprehensive experience which somehow engirdles\r\nan endless flux; he means that \u003cem\u003ethings\u003c/em\u003e are what\r\nthey are experienced to be, and that every experience\r\nis \u003cem\u003esome\u003c/em\u003e thing.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFrom the postulate of empiricism, then (or, what\r\nis the same thing, from a \u003cem\u003egeneral\u003c/em\u003e consideration of\r\nthe concept of experience), nothing can be deduced,\r\nnot a single philosophical proposition.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_54\" href=\"#Footnote_54\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e54\u003c/a\u003e The reader\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_239\"\u003e239\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nmay hence conclude that all this just comes to the\r\ntruism that experience is experience, or is what it is.\r\nIf one attempts to draw conclusions from the bare\r\nconcept of experience, the reader is quite right.\r\nBut the real significance of the principle is that of\r\na method of philosophical analysis\u0026mdash;a method identical\r\nin kind (but differing in problem and hence\r\nin operation) with that of the scientist. If you\r\nwish to find out what subjective, objective, physical,\r\nmental, cosmic, psychic, cause, substance, purpose,\r\nactivity, evil, being, quality\u0026mdash;any philosophic\r\nterm, in short\u0026mdash;means, go to experience and\r\nsee what the thing is experienced \u003cem\u003eas\u003c/em\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSuch a method is not spectacular; it permits of\r\nno offhand demonstrations of God, freedom, immortality,\r\nnor of the exclusive reality of matter,\r\nor ideas, or consciousness, etc. But it supplies a\r\nway of telling what all these terms mean. It may\r\nseem insignificant, or chillingly disappointing, but\r\nonly upon condition that it be not worked. Philosophic\r\nconceptions have, I believe, outlived their\r\nusefulness considered as stimulants to emotion, or\r\nas a species of sanctions; and a larger, more fruitful\r\nand more valuable career awaits them considered\r\nas specifically experienced meanings.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e[\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eNote\u003c/span\u003e: The reception of this essay proved that I was unreasonably\r\nsanguine in thinking that the foot-note of warning,\r\nappended to the title, would forfend radical misapprehension.\r\nI see now that it was unreasonable to expect\r\nthat the word “immediate” in a philosophic writing could\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_240\"\u003e240\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nbe generally understood to apply to anything except \u003cem\u003eknowledge\u003c/em\u003e,\r\neven though the body of the essay is a protest\r\nagainst such limitation. But I venture to repeat that the\r\nessay is not a denial of the necessity of “mediation,” or reflection,\r\nin knowledge, but is an assertion that the inferential\r\nfactor must \u003cem\u003eexist\u003c/em\u003e, or must occur, and that all existence is\r\ndirect and vital, so that philosophy can pass upon its nature\u0026mdash;as\r\nupon the nature of all of the rest of its subject-matter\u0026mdash;only\r\nby first ascertaining what it exists or occurs \u003cem\u003eas\u003c/em\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eI venture to repeat also another statement of the text:\r\nI do not mean by “immediate experience” any aboriginal\r\nstuff out of which things are evolved, but I use the term\r\nto indicate the necessity of employing in philosophy the\r\ndirect descriptive method that has now made its way in\r\nall the natural sciences, with such modifications, of course,\r\nas the subject itself entails.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThere is nothing in the text to imply that things exist in\r\nexperience atomically or in isolation. When it is said that a\r\nthing as cognized is \u003cem\u003edifferent\u003c/em\u003e from an earlier non-cognitionally\r\nexperienced thing, the saying no more implies lack of\r\ncontinuity between the things, than the obvious remark\r\nthat a seed is different from a flower or a leaf denies their\r\ncontinuity. The amount and kind of continuity or discreteness\r\nthat exists is to be discovered by recurring to\r\nwhat actually occurs in experience.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eFinally, there is nothing in the text that denies the\r\nexistence of things temporally prior to human experiencing\r\nof them. Indeed, I should think it fairly obvious that we\r\nexperience most things \u003cem\u003eas\u003c/em\u003e temporally prior to our experiencing\r\nof them. The import of the article is to the\r\neffect that we are not entitled to draw philosophic (as distinct\r\nfrom scientific) conclusions as to the meaning of prior\r\ntemporal existence till we have ascertained what it is to\r\nexperience a thing as past. These four disclaimers cover,\r\nI think, all the misapprehensions disclosed in the four or\r\nfive controversial articles (noted below) that the original\r\nessay evoked. One of these articles (that of Professor\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_241\"\u003e241\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nWoodbridge), raised a point of fact, holding that cognitional\r\nexperience tells us, without alteration, just what the\r\nthings of other types of experience are, and in that sense\r\ntranscends other experiences. This is too fundamental an\r\nissue to discuss in a note, and I content myself with remarking\r\nthat with respect to it, the bearing of the article\r\nis that the issue must be settled by a careful descriptive\r\nsurvey of things as experienced, to see whether modifications\r\ndo not occur in existences when they are experienced \u003cem\u003eas\u003c/em\u003e\r\nknown; \u003ci xml:lang=\"la\" lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e, as true or false in character. The reader\r\ninterested in following up this discussion is referred to\r\nthe following articles: Vol. II. of the \u003ccite\u003eJournal of Philosophy,\r\nPsychology, and Scientific Methods\u003c/cite\u003e, two articles by Bakewell,\r\np. 520 and p. 687; one by Bode, p. 658; one by Woodbridge,\r\np. 573; Vol. III. of the same Journal, by Leighton,\r\np. 174.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_242\"\u003e242\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\r\n\u003ch2 title=\"“CONSCIOUSNESS” AND EXPERIENCE\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"CONSCIOUSNESS_AND_EXPERIENCE\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e“CONSCIOUSNESS” AND EXPERIENCE\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_55\" href=\"#Footnote_55\" class=\"fnanchor smaller\"\u003e55\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"drop-cap\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap1\"\u003eEvery\u003c/span\u003e science in its final standpoint and working\r\naims is controlled by conditions lying outside\r\nitself\u0026mdash;conditions that subsist in the practical\r\nlife of the time. With no science is this as\r\nobviously true as with psychology. Taken without\r\nnicety of analysis, no one would deny that psychology\r\nis specially occupied with the individual;\r\nthat it wishes to find out those things that proceed\r\npeculiarly from the individual, and the mode of\r\ntheir connection with him. Now, the way in which\r\nthe individual is conceived, the value that is attributed\r\nto him, the things in his make-up that arouse\r\ninterest, are not due at the outset to psychology.\r\nThe scientific view regards these matters in a reflected,\r\na borrowed, medium. They are revealed\r\nin the light of social life. An autocratic, an\r\naristocratic, a democratic society propound such\r\ndifferent estimates of the worth and place of\r\nindividuality; they procure for the individual as\r\nan individual such different sorts of experience;\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_243\"\u003e243\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthey aim at arousing such different impulses and at\r\norganizing them according to such different purposes,\r\nthat the psychology arising in each must\r\nshow a different temper.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn this sense, psychology is a political science.\r\nWhile the professed psychologist, in his conscious\r\nprocedure, may easily cut his subject-matter loose\r\nfrom these practical ties and references, yet the\r\nstarting point and goal of his course are none the\r\nless socially set. In this conviction I venture to\r\nintroduce to an audience that could hardly be\r\nexpected to be interested in the technique of psychology,\r\na technical subject, hoping that the\r\nhuman meaning may yet appear.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThere is at present a strong, apparently a growing\r\ntendency to conceive of psychology as an account\r\nof the consciousness of the individual, considered\r\nas something in and by itself; consciousness,\r\nthe assumption virtually runs, being of such\r\nan order that it may be analyzed, described, and\r\nexplained in terms of just itself. The statement,\r\nas commonly made, is that psychology is an account\r\nof consciousness, \u003ci xml:lang=\"la\" lang=\"la\"\u003equa\u003c/i\u003e consciousness; and the\r\nphrase is supposed to limit psychology to a certain\r\ndefinite sphere of fact that may receive adequate\r\ndiscussion for scientific purposes, without troubling\r\nitself with what lies outside. Now if this conception\r\nbe true, there is no intimate, no important\r\nconnection of psychology and philosophy at large.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_244\"\u003e244\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nThat philosophy, whose range is comprehensive,\r\nwhose problems are catholic, should be held down\r\nby a discipline whose voice is as partial as its\r\nmaterial is limited, is out of the range of intelligent\r\ndiscussion.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut there is another possibility. If the individual\r\nof whom psychology treats be, after all, a\r\nsocial individual, any absolute setting off and\r\napart of a sphere of consciousness as, even for scientific\r\npurposes, self-sufficient, is condemned in advance.\r\nAll such limitation, and all inquiries,\r\ndescriptions, explanations that go with it, are only\r\npreliminary. “Consciousness” is but a symbol,\r\nan anatomy whose life is in natural and social\r\noperations. To know the symbol, the psychical\r\nletter, is important; but its necessity lies not within\r\nitself, but in the need of a language for reading\r\nthe things signified. If this view be correct, we\r\ncannot be so sure that psychology is without large\r\nphilosophic significance. Whatever meaning the\r\nindividual has for the social life that he both incorporates\r\nand animates, that meaning has psychology\r\nfor philosophy.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis problem is too important and too large to\r\nsuffer attack in an evening’s address. Yet I venture\r\nto consider a portion of it, hoping that such\r\nthings as appear will be useful clues in entering\r\nwider territory. We may ask what is the effect\r\nupon psychology of considering its material as\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_245\"\u003e245\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nsomething so distinct as to be capable of treatment\r\nwithout involving larger issues. In this inquiry\r\nwe take as representative some such account of the\r\nscience as this: Psychology deals with consciousness\r\n“as such” in its various modes and processes.\r\nIt aims at an isolation of each such as will permit\r\naccurate description: at statement of its place in\r\nthe serial order such as will enable us to state the\r\nlaws by which one calls another into being, or as\r\nwill give the natural history of its origin, maturing,\r\nand dissolution. It is both analytic and synthetic\u0026mdash;analytic\r\nin that it resolves each state into\r\nits constituent elements; synthetic in that it discovers\r\nthe processes by which these elements combine\r\ninto complex wholes and series. It leaves\r\nalone\u0026mdash;it shuts out\u0026mdash;questions concerning the\r\nvalidity, the objective import of these modifications:\r\nof their value in conveying truth, in effecting\r\ngoodness, in constituting beauty. For it is\r\njust with such questions of worth, of validity, that\r\nphilosophy has to do.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSome such view as this is held by the great\r\nmajority of working psychologists to-day. A variety\r\nof reasons have conspired to bring about\r\ngeneral acceptance. Such a view seems to enroll\r\none in the ranks of the scientific men rather than\r\nof the metaphysicians\u0026mdash;and there are those who\r\ndistrust the metaphysicians. Others desire to take\r\nproblems piecemeal and in detail, avoiding that excursion\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_246\"\u003e246\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ninto ultimates, into that never-ending panorama\r\nof new questions and new possibilities that\r\nseems to be the fate of the philosopher. While no\r\ntemperate mind can do other than sympathize with\r\nthis view, it is hardly more than an expedient.\r\nFor, as Mr. James remarks, after disposing of the\r\nquestion of free-will by relegating it to the domain\r\nof the metaphysician:\u0026mdash;“Metaphysics means only\r\nan unusually obstinate attempt to think clearly and\r\nconsistently”\u0026mdash;and clearness and consistency are\r\nnot things to be put off beyond a certain point.\r\nWhen the metaphysician chimes in with this new-found\r\nmodesty of the psychologist, so different\r\nfrom the disposition of Locke and Hume and the\r\nMills, salving his metaphysical conscience with the\r\nremark\u0026mdash;it hardly possesses the dignity of a conviction\u0026mdash;that\r\nthe partial sciences, just because they\r\nare partial, are not expected to be coherent with\r\nthemselves nor with one another; when the metaphysician,\r\nI say, praises the psychologist for sticking\r\nto his last, we are reminded that another motive\r\nis also at work. There is a half-conscious\r\nirony in this abnegation of psychology. It is not\r\nthe first time that science has assumed the work\r\nof Cinderella; and, since Mr. Huxley has happily\r\nreminded her, she is not altogether oblivious, in her\r\nmodesty, of a possible future check to the pride\r\nof her haughty sister, and of a certain coronation\r\nthat shall mark her coming to her own.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_247\"\u003e247\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nBut, be the reasons as they may, there is little\r\ndoubt of the fact. Almost all our working psychologists\r\nadmit, nay, herald this limitation of\r\ntheir work. I am not presumptuous enough to\r\nset myself against this array. I too proclaim\r\nmyself of those who believe that psychology has to\r\ndo (at a certain point, that is) with “consciousness\r\nas such.” But I do not believe that the limitation\r\nis final. Quite the contrary: if “consciousness”\r\nor “state of consciousness” be given intelligible\r\nmeaning, I believe that this conception is\r\nthe open gateway into the fair fields of philosophy.\r\nFor, note you, the phrase is an ambiguous one. It\r\nmay mean one thing to the metaphysician who\r\nproclaims: Here finally we have psychology recognizing\r\nher due metes and bounds, giving bonds\r\nto trespass no more. It may mean quite another\r\nthing to the psychologist in his work\u0026mdash;whatever\r\nhe may happen to say about it. It may be that\r\nthe psychologist deals with states of consciousness\r\nas the significant, the analyzable and describable\r\nform, to which he reduces the things he is studying.\r\nNot that they \u003cem\u003eare\u003c/em\u003e that existence, but that\r\nthey are its indications, its clues, in shape for\r\nhandling by scientific methods. So, for example,\r\ndoes the paleontologist work. Those curiously\r\nshaped and marked forms to which he is devoted\r\nare not life, nor are they the literal termini of his\r\nendeavor; but through them as signs and records\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_248\"\u003e248\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nhe construes a life. And again, the painter-artist\r\nmight well say that he is concerned only with\r\ncolored paints as such. Yet none the less through\r\nthem as registers and indices, he reveals to us\r\nthe mysteries of sunny meadow, shady forest, and\r\ntwilight wave. These are the things-in-themselves\r\nof which the oils on his palette are phenomena.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSo the preoccupation of the psychologist with\r\nstates of consciousness may signify that they are\r\nthe media, the concrete conditions to which he\r\npurposely reduces his material, in order, \u003cem\u003ethrough\r\nthem\u003c/em\u003e, as methodological helps, to get at and understand\r\nthat which is anything but a state of consciousness.\r\nTo him, however, who insists upon the\r\nfixed and final limitation of psychology, the state\r\nof consciousness is not the shape some fact takes\r\nfrom the exigency of investigation; it is literally\r\nthe full fact itself. It is not an intervening term;\r\nit bounds the horizon. Here, then, the issue defines\r\nitself. I conceive that states of consciousness\r\n(and I hope you will take the phrase broadly\r\nenough to cover all the specific data of psychology)\r\nhave no existence before the psychologist\r\nbegins to work. He brings them into existence.\r\nWhat we are really after is the process of experience,\r\nthe way in which it arises and behaves.\r\nWe want to know its course, its history, its laws.\r\nWe want to know its various typical forms; how\r\neach originates; how it is related to others; the\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_249\"\u003e249\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\npart it plays in maintaining an inclusive, expanding,\r\nconnected course of experience. Our problem\r\nas psychologists is to learn its \u003ci xml:lang=\"la\" lang=\"la\"\u003emodus operandi\u003c/i\u003e, its\r\nmethod.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe paleontologist is again summoned to our\r\naid. In a given district he finds a great number\r\nand variety of footprints. From these he goes to\r\nwork to construct the structure and the life habits\r\nof the animals that made them. The tracks exist\r\nundoubtedly; they are there; but yet he deals with\r\nthem not as final existences but as signs, phenomena\r\nin the literal sense. Imagine the hearing\r\nthat the critic would receive who should inform the\r\npaleontologist that he is transcending his field of\r\nscientific activity; that his concern is with footprints\r\nas such, aiming to describe each, to analyze\r\nit into its simplest forms, to compare the different\r\nkinds with one another so as to detect common elements,\r\nand finally, thereby, to discover the laws\r\nof their arrangement in space!\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eYet the immediate data are footprints, and footprints\r\nonly. The paleontologist does in a way do\r\nall these things that our imaginary critic is urging\r\nupon him. The difference is not that he arbitrarily\r\nlugs in other data; that he invents entities and\r\nfaculties that are not there. The difference is\r\nin his standpoint. His interest is in the animals,\r\nand the data are treated in whatever way seems\r\nlikely to serve this interest. So with the psychologist.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_250\"\u003e250\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nHe is continually and perforce occupied\r\nwith minute and empirical investigation of special\r\nfacts\u0026mdash;states of consciousness, if you please. But\r\nthese neither define nor exhaust his scientific problem.\r\nThey are his footprints, his clues through\r\nwhich he places before himself the life-process he is\r\nstudying\u0026mdash;with the further difference that his footprints\r\nare not after all given to him, but are developed\r\nby his investigation.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_56\" href=\"#Footnote_56\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e56\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe supposition that these states are somehow\r\nexistent by themselves and in this existence provide\r\nthe psychologist with ready-made material is just\r\nthe supreme case of the “psychological fallacy”:\r\nthe confusion of experience as it is to the one experiencing\r\nwith what the psychologist makes out\r\nof it with his reflective analysis.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe psychologist begins with certain operations,\r\nacts, functions as his data. If these fall out of\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_251\"\u003e251\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nsight in the course of discussion, it is only because\r\nhaving been taken for granted, they remain to\r\ncontrol the whole development of the inquiry, and\r\nto afford the sterling medium of redemption. Acts\r\nsuch as perceiving, remembering, intending, loving\r\ngive the points of departure; they alone are\r\nconcrete experiences. To understand these experiences,\r\nunder what conditions they arise, and\r\nwhat effects they produce, analysis into states of\r\nconsciousness occurs. And the modes of consciousness\r\nthat are figured remain unarranged and unimportant,\r\nsave as they may be translated back\r\ninto acts.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eTo remember is to do something, as much as\r\nto shoe a horse, or to cherish a keepsake. To propose,\r\nto observe, to be kindly affectioned, are terms\r\nof value, of practice, of operation; just as digestion,\r\nrespiration, locomotion express functions, not\r\nobservable “objects.” But there is an object\r\nthat may be described: lungs, stomach, leg-muscles,\r\nor whatever. Through the structure we present\r\nto ourselves the function; it appears laid out\r\nbefore us, spread forth in detail\u0026mdash;objectified in a\r\nword. The anatomist who devotes himself to this\r\ndetail may, if he please (and he probably does\r\nplease to concentrate his devotion) ignore the\r\nfunction: to discover what is there, to analyze, to\r\nmeasure, to describe, gives him outlet enough.\r\nBut nevertheless it is the function that fixed the\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_252\"\u003e252\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\npoint of departure, that prescribed the problem\r\nand that set the limits, physical as well as intellectual,\r\nof subsequent investigation. Reference to\r\nfunction makes the details discovered other than a\r\njumble of incoherent trivialities. One might as\r\nwell devote himself to the minute description of a\r\nsquare yard of desert soil were it not for this translation.\r\nStates of consciousness are the morphology\r\nof certain functions.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_57\" href=\"#Footnote_57\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e57\u003c/a\u003e What is true of analysis,\r\nof description, is true equally of classification.\r\nKnowing, willing, feeling, name states of\r\nconsciousness not in terms of themselves, but in\r\nterms of acts, attitudes, found in experience.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_58\" href=\"#Footnote_58\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e58\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_253\"\u003e253\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nExplanation, even of an “empirical sort” is as\r\nimpossible as determination of a “state” and its\r\nclassification, when we rigidly confine ourselves to\r\nmodifications of consciousness as a self-existent.\r\nSensations are always defined, classified, and explained\r\nby reference to conditions which, according\r\nto the theory, are extraneous\u0026mdash;sense-organs and\r\nstimuli. The whole physiological side assumes a\r\nludicrously anomalous aspect on this basis.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_59\" href=\"#Footnote_59\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e59\u003c/a\u003e\r\nWhile experimentation is retained, and even made\r\nmuch of, it is at the cost of logical coherence. To\r\nexperiment with reference to a bare state of consciousness\r\nis a performance of which one cannot\r\nimagine the nature, to say nothing of doing it;\r\nwhile to experiment with reference to acts and the\r\nconditions of their occurrence is a natural and\r\nstraightforward undertaking. Such simple processes\r\nas association are concretely inexplicable when\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_254\"\u003e254\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwe assume states of consciousness as existences by\r\nthemselves. As recent psychology testifies, we\r\nagain have to resort to conditions that have no\r\nplace nor calling on the basis of the theory\u0026mdash;the\r\nprinciple of habit, of neural action, or else some\r\nconnection in the object.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_60\" href=\"#Footnote_60\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e60\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe have only to note that there are two opposing\r\nschools in psychology to see in what an unscientific\r\nstatus is the subject. We have only to\r\nconsider that these two schools are the result of\r\nassuming states of consciousness as existences \u003ci xml:lang=\"la\" lang=\"la\"\u003eper\r\nse\u003c/i\u003e to locate the source of the scientific scandal.\r\nNo matter what the topic, whether memory or\r\nassociation or attention or effort, the same dualisms\r\npresent themselves, the same necessity of\r\nchoosing between two schools. One, lost in the distinctions\r\nthat it has developed, denies the function\r\nbecause it can find objectively presented only\r\nstates of consciousness. So it abrogates the function,\r\nregarding it as a mere aggregate of such\r\nstates, or as a purely external and factitious relation\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_255\"\u003e255\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nbetween them. The other school, recognizing\r\nthat this procedure explains away rather than\r\nexplains, the values of experience, attempts to even\r\nup by declaring that certain functions are themselves\r\nimmediately given data of consciousness, existing\r\nside by side with the “states,” but indefinitely\r\ntranscending them in worth, and apprehended\r\nby some higher organ. So against the\r\nelementary contents and external associations of\r\nthe analytic school in psychology, we have the\r\ncomplicated machinery of the intellectualist school,\r\nwith its pure self-consciousness as a source of ultimate\r\ntruths, its hierarchy of intuitions, its ready-made\r\nfaculties. To be sure, these “spiritual faculties”\r\nare now largely reduced to some one comprehensive\r\nform\u0026mdash;Apperception, or Will, or Attention,\r\nor whatever the fashionable term may be.\r\nBut the principle remains the same; the assumption\r\nof a function as a given existent, distinguishable\r\nin itself and acting upon other existences\u0026mdash;as if\r\nthe functions digestion and vision were regarded\r\nas separate from organic structures, somehow acting\r\nupon them from the outside so as to bring co-operation\r\nand harmony into them!\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_61\" href=\"#Footnote_61\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e61\u003c/a\u003e This division\r\ninto psychological schools is as reasonable as would\r\nbe one of botanists into rootists and flowerists; of\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_256\"\u003e256\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthose proclaiming the root to be the rudimentary\r\nand essential structure, and those asserting that\r\nsince the function of seed-bearing is the main thing,\r\nthe flower is really the controlling “synthetic”\r\nprinciple. Both sensationalist and intellectualist\r\nsuppose that psychology has some special sphere\r\nof “reality” or of experience marked off for it\r\nwithin which the data are just lying around, self-existent\r\nand ready-made, to be picked up and\r\nassorted as pebbles await the visitor on the beach.\r\nBoth alike fail to recognize that the psychologist\r\nfirst has experience to deal with; the same experience\r\nthat the zoologist, geologist, chemist, mathematician,\r\nand historian deal with, and that what\r\ncharacterizes his specialty is not some data or existences\r\nwhich he may call uniquely his own; but\r\nthe problem raised\u0026mdash;the problem of the \u003cem\u003ecourse\u003c/em\u003e of\r\nthe acts that constitute experiencing.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eHere psychology gets its revenge upon those who\r\nwould rule it out of possession of important philosophical\r\nbearing. As a matter of fact, the larger\r\npart of the questions that are being discussed in\r\ncurrent epistemology and what is termed metaphysic\r\nof logic and ethic arise out of (and are\r\nhopelessly compromised by) this original assumption\r\nof “consciousness as such”\u0026mdash;in other words,\r\nare provoked by the exact reason that is given\r\nfor denying to psychology any essential meaning\r\nfor epistemology and metaphysic. Such is the\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_257\"\u003e257\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nirony of the situation. The epistemologist’s problem\r\nis, indeed, usually put as the question of how\r\nthe subject can so far “transcend” itself as to\r\nget valid assurance of the objective world. The\r\nvery phraseology in which the problem is put reveals\r\nthe thoroughness of the psychologist’s revenge.\r\nJust and only because experience has been\r\nreduced to “states of consciousness” as independent\r\nexistences, does the question of self-transcendence\r\nhave any meaning. The entire epistemological\r\nindustry is one\u0026mdash;shall I say it\u0026mdash;of a Sisyphean\r\nnature. \u003ci xml:lang=\"la\" lang=\"la\"\u003eMutatis mutandis\u003c/i\u003e, the same holds of the\r\nmetaphysic of logic, ethic, and esthetic. In each\r\ncase, the basic problem has come to be how a mere\r\nstate of consciousness can be the vehicle of a system\r\nof truth, of an objectively valid good, of beauty\r\nwhich is other than agreeable feeling. We may, indeed,\r\nexcuse the psychologist for not carrying on\r\nthe special inquiries that are the business of logical,\r\nethical, and esthetical philosophy; but can we\r\nexcuse ourselves for forcing his results into such\r\na shape as to make philosophic problems so arbitrary\r\nthat they are soluble only by arbitrarily\r\nwrenching scientific facts?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eUndoubtedly we are between two fires. In placing\r\nupon psychology the responsibility of discovering\r\nthe method of experience, as a sequence of\r\nacts and passions, do we not destroy just that\r\nlimitation to concrete detail which now constitutes\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_258\"\u003e258\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nit a science? Will not the psychologist be the\r\nfirst to repudiate this attempt to mix him up in\r\nmatters philosophical? We need only to keep in\r\nmind the specific facts involved in the term Course\r\nor Process of Experience to avoid this danger.\r\nThe immediate preoccupation of the psychologist\r\nis with very definite and empirical facts\u0026mdash;questions\r\nlike the limits of audition, of the origin of pitch,\r\nof the structure and conditions of the musical scale,\r\netc. Just so the immediate affair of the geologist\r\nis with particular rock-structures, of the botanist\r\nwith particular plants, and so on. But through\r\nthe collection, description, location, classification\r\nof rocks the geologist is led to the splendid story\r\nof world-forming. The limited, fixed, and separate\r\npiece of work is dissolved away in the fluent\r\nand dynamic drama of the earth. So, the plant\r\nleads with inevitableness to the whole process of\r\nlife and its evolution.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn form, the botanist still studies the genus,\r\nthe species, the plant\u0026mdash;hardly, indeed, that; rather\r\nthe special parts, the structural elements, of the\r\nplant. In reality, he studies life itself; the\r\nstructures are the indications, the signature\r\nthrough which he renders transparent the mystery\r\nof life growing in the changing world. It was\r\ndoubtless necessary for the botanist to go through\r\nthe Linnean period\u0026mdash;the period of engagement\r\nwith rigid detail and fixed classifications; of tearing\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_259\"\u003e259\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\napart and piecing together; of throwing all\r\nemphasis upon peculiarities of number, size, and\r\nappearance of matured structure; of regarding\r\nchange, growth, and function as external, more or\r\nless interesting, attachments to form. Examination\r\nof this period is instructive; there is much in\r\ncontemporary investigation and discussion that is\r\nalmost unpleasantly reminiscent in its suggestiveness.\r\nThe psychologist should profit by the intervening\r\nhistory of science. The conception of evolution\r\nis not so much an additional law as it is a\r\nface-about. The fixed structure, the separate\r\nform, the isolated element, is henceforth at best a\r\nmere stepping-stone to knowledge of process, and\r\nwhen not at its best, marks the end of comprehension,\r\nand betokens failure to grasp the problem.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWith the change in standpoint from self-included\r\nexistence to including process, from structural\r\nunit of composition to controlling unity of\r\nfunction, from changeless form to movement in\r\ngrowth, the whole scheme of values is transformed.\r\nFaculties are definite directions of development;\r\nelements are products that are starting-points for\r\nnew processes; bare facts are indices of change;\r\nstatic conditions are modes of accomplished adjustment.\r\nNot that the concrete, empirical phenomenon\r\nloses in worth, much less that unverifiable\r\n“metaphysical” entities are impertinently introduced;\r\nbut that our aim is the discovery of a\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_260\"\u003e260\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nprocess of actions in its adaptations to circumstance.\r\nIf we apply this evolutionary logic in\r\npsychology, where shall we stop? Questions of\r\nlimits of stimuli in a given sense, say hearing, are\r\nin reality questions of temporary arrests, adjustments\r\nmarking the favorable equilibrium of the\r\nwhole organism; they connect with the question of\r\nthe use of sensation in general and auditory sensations\r\nin particular for life-habits; of the origin\r\nand use of localized and distinguished perception;\r\nand this, in turn, involves within itself the whole\r\nquestion of space and time recognition; the significance\r\nof the thing-and-quality experience, and\r\nso on. And when we are told that the question of\r\nthe origin of space experience has nothing at all\r\nto do with the question of the nature and significance\r\nof the space experienced, the statement is\r\nsimply evidence that the one who makes it is still\r\nat the static standpoint; he believes that things,\r\nthat relations, have existence and significance\r\napart from the particular conditions under which\r\nthey come into experience, and apart from the\r\nspecial service rendered in those particular conditions.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOf course, I am far from saying that every psychologist\r\nmust make the whole journey. Each individual\r\nmay contract, as he pleases, for any section\r\nor subsection he prefers; and undoubtedly the\r\nwell-being of the science is advanced by such division\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_261\"\u003e261\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof labor. But psychology goes over the whole\r\nground from detecting every distinct act of experiencing,\r\nto seeing what need calls out the special\r\norgan fitted to cope with the situation, and discovering\r\nthe machinery through which it operates to\r\nkeep a-going the course of action.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut, I shall be told, the wall that divides psychology\r\nfrom philosophy cannot be so easily\r\ntreated as non-existent. Psychology is a matter\r\nof natural history, even though it may be admitted\r\nthat it is the natural history of the course of experience.\r\nBut philosophy is a matter of values;\r\nof the criticism and justification of certain validities.\r\nOne deals, it is said, with genesis, with conditions\r\nof temporal origin and transition; the other\r\nwith analysis, with eternal constitution. I shall\r\nhave to repeat that just this rigid separation of\r\ngenesis and analysis seems to me a survival from a\r\npre-evolutionary, a pre-historic age. It indicates\r\nnot so much an assured barrier between philosophy\r\nand psychology as the distance dividing philosophy\r\nfrom all science. For the lesson that\r\nmathematicians first learned, that physics and\r\nchemistry pondered over, in which the biological\r\ndisciplines were finally tutored, is that sure and\r\ndelicate analysis is possible only through the patient\r\nstudy of conditions of origin and development.\r\nThe method of analysis in mathematics is the\r\nmethod of construction. The experimental method\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_262\"\u003e262\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nis the method of making, of following the history\r\nof production; the term “cause” that has (when\r\ntaken as an existent entity) so hung on the heels\r\nof science as to impede its progress, has universal\r\nmeaning when read as condition of appearance in\r\na process. And, as already intimated, the conception\r\nof evolution is no more and no less the discovery\r\nof a general law of life than it is the generalization\r\nof all scientific method. Everywhere\r\nanalysis that cannot proceed by examining the successive\r\nstages of its subject, from its beginning\r\nup to its culmination, that cannot control this\r\nexamination by discovering the conditions under\r\nwhich successive stages appear, is only preliminary.\r\nIt may further the invention of proper tools\r\nof inquiry, it may help define problems, it may\r\nserve to suggest valuable hypotheses. But as\r\nscience it breathes an air already tainted. There\r\nis no way to sort out the results flowing from the\r\nsubject-matter itself from those introduced by the\r\nassumptions and presumptions of our own reflection.\r\nNot so with natural history when it is\r\nworthy of its name. Here the analysis is the unfolding\r\nof the existence itself. Its distinctions are\r\nnot pigeon-holes of our convenience; they are\r\nstakes that mark the parting of the ways in the\r\nprocess itself. Its classifications are not a grasp\r\nat factors resisting further analysis; they are\r\nthe patient tracings of the paths pursued. Nothing\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_263\"\u003e263\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nis more out of date than to suppose that\r\ninterest in genesis is interest in reducing higher\r\nforms to cruder ones: it is interest in locating the\r\nexact and objective conditions under which a\r\ngiven fact appears, and in relation to which accordingly\r\nit has its meaning. Nothing is more\r\nnaïve than to suppose that in pursuing “natural\r\nhistory” (term of scorn in which yet resides\r\nthe dignity of the world-drama) we simply learn\r\nsomething of the temporal conditions under which\r\na given value appears, while its own eternal\r\nessential quality remains as opaque as before. Nature\r\nknows no such divorce of quality and circumstance.\r\nThings come when they are wanted and\r\nas they are wanted; their quality is precisely the\r\nresponse they give to the conditions that call for\r\nthem, while the furtherance they afford to the\r\nmovement of their whole is their meaning. The\r\nseverance of analysis and genesis, instead of serving\r\nas a ready-made test by which to try out the\r\nempirical, temporal events of psychology from the\r\nrational abiding constitution of philosophy, is a\r\nbrand of philosophic dualism: the supposition\r\nthat values are externally obtruded and statically\r\nset in irrelevant rubbish.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThere are those who will admit that “states of\r\nconsciousness” are but the cross-sections of flow of\r\nbehavior, arrested for inspection, made in order\r\nthat we may reconstruct experience in its lifehistory.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_264\"\u003e264\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nYet in the knowledge of the course and\r\nmethod of our experience, they will hold that we\r\nare far from the domain proper of philosophy.\r\nExperience, they say, is just the historic achievement\r\nof finite individuals; it tells the tale of approach\r\nto the treasures of truth, of partial victory,\r\nbut larger defeat, in laying hold of the\r\ntreasure. But, they say, reality is not the path\r\nto reality, and record of devious wanderings in the\r\npath is hardly a safe account of the goal. Psychology,\r\nin other words, may tell us something of how\r\nwe mortals lay hold of the world of things and\r\ntruths; of how we appropriate and assimilate its\r\ncontents; and of how we react. It may trace the\r\nissues of such approaches and apprehensions upon\r\nthe course of our own individual destinies. But it\r\ncannot wisely ignore nor sanely deny the distinction\r\nbetween these individual strivings and achievements,\r\nand the “Reality” that subsists and supports\r\nits own structure outside these finite futilities.\r\nThe processes by which we turn over The Reality\r\ninto terms of our fragmentary unconcluded, inconclusive\r\nexperiences are so extrinsic to the Reality\r\nitself as to have no revealing power with reference\r\nto it. There is the \u003ci xml:lang=\"la\" lang=\"la\"\u003eordo ad universum\u003c/i\u003e, the\r\nsubject of philosophy; there is the \u003ci xml:lang=\"la\" lang=\"la\"\u003eordo ad individuum\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nthe subject of psychology.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSome such assumption as this lies latent, I am\r\nconvinced, in all forswearings of the kinship of\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_265\"\u003e265\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\npsychology and philosophy. Two conceptions\r\nhang together. The opinion that psychology is an\r\naccount only and finally of states of consciousness,\r\nand therefore can throw no light upon the objects\r\nwith which philosophy deals, is twin to the doctrine\r\nthat the whole conscious life of the individual is\r\nnot organic to the world. The philosophic basis\r\nand scope of this doctrine lie beyond examination\r\nhere. But even in passing one cannot avoid remarking\r\nthat the doctrine is almost never consistently\r\nheld; the doctrine logically carried out leads\r\nso directly to intellectual and moral scepticism that\r\nthe theory usually prefers to work in the dark\r\nbackground as a disposition and temper of thought\r\nrather than to make a frank statement of itself.\r\nEven in the half-hearted expositions of the process\r\nof human experience as something merely annexed\r\nto the reality of the universe, we are brought face\r\nto face to the consideration with which we set out:\r\nthe dependence of theories of the individual upon\r\nthe position at a given time of the individual practical\r\nand social. The doctrine of the accidental,\r\nfutile, transitory significance of the individual’s\r\nexperience as compared with eternal realities;\r\nthe notion that at best the individual is simply\r\nrealizing for and in himself what already has fixed\r\ncompleteness in itself is congruous only with a\r\ncertain intellectual and political scheme and must\r\nmodify itself as that shifts. When such rearrangement\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_266\"\u003e266\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ncomes, our estimate of the nature\r\nand importance of psychology will mirror the\r\nchange.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhen man’s command of the methods that control\r\naction was precarious and disturbed; when\r\nthe tools that subject the world of things and\r\nforces to use and operation were rare and clumsy,\r\nit was unavoidable that the individual should submit\r\nhis perception and purpose blankly to the\r\nblank reality beyond. Under such circumstances,\r\nexternal authority must reign; the belief that human\r\nexperience in itself is approximate, not intrinsic,\r\nis inevitable. Under such circumstances,\r\nreference to the individual, to the subject, is a resort\r\nonly for explaining error, illusion, and uncertainty.\r\nThe necessity of external control and external\r\nredemption of experience reports itself in a\r\nlow valuation of the self, and of all the factors and\r\nphases of experience that spring from the self.\r\nThat the psychology of medievalism should appear\r\nonly as a portion of its theology of sin and salvation\r\nis as obvious as that the psychology of the\r\nGreeks should be a chapter of cosmology.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAs against all this, the assertion is ventured\r\nthat psychology, supplying us with knowledge of\r\nthe behavior of experience, is a conception of democracy.\r\nIts postulate is that since experience\r\nfulfils itself in individuals, since it administers\r\nitself through their instrumentality, the account of\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_267\"\u003e267\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe course and method of this achievement is a\r\nsignificant and indispensable affair.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eDemocracy is possible only because of a change\r\nin intellectual conditions. It implies tools for getting\r\nat truth in detail, and day by day, as we go\r\nalong. Only such possession justifies the surrender\r\nof fixed, all-embracing principles to which, as universals,\r\nall particulars and individuals are subject\r\nfor valuation and regulation. Without such possession,\r\nit is only the courage of the fool that\r\nwould undertake the venture to which democracy\r\nhas committed itself\u0026mdash;the ordering of life in response\r\nto the needs of the moment in accordance\r\nwith the ascertained truth of the moment. Modern\r\nlife involves the deification of the here and the\r\nnow; of the specific, the particular, the unique,\r\nthat which happens once and has no measure of\r\nvalue save such as it brings with itself. Such deification\r\nis monstrous fetishism, unless the deity be\r\nthere; unless the universal lives, moves, and has its\r\nbeing in experience as individualized.\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_62\" href=\"#Footnote_62\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e62\u003c/a\u003e This conviction\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_268\"\u003e268\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof the value of the individualized finds its\r\nfurther expression in psychology, which undertakes\r\nto show how this individualization proceeds, and in\r\nwhat aspect it presents itself.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOf course, such a conception means something\r\nfor philosophy as well as for psychology; possibly\r\nit involves for philosophy the larger measure of\r\ntransformation. It involves surrender of any claim\r\non the part of philosophy to be the sole source\r\nof some truths and the exclusive guardian of some\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_269\"\u003e269\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nvalues. It means that philosophy be a method;\r\nnot an assurance company, nor a knight errant.\r\nIt means an alignment with science. Philosophy\r\nmay not be sacrificed to the partial and superficial\r\nclamor of that which sometimes officiously and pretentiously\r\nexhibits itself as Science. But there is\r\na sense in which philosophy must go to school to\r\nthe sciences; must have no data save such as it\r\nreceives at their hands; and be hospitable to no\r\nmethod of inquiry or reflection not akin to those in\r\ndaily use among the sciences. As long as it claims\r\nfor itself special territory of fact, or peculiar\r\nmodes of access to truth, so long must it occupy a\r\ndubious position. Yet this claim it has to make\r\nuntil psychology comes to its own. There is something\r\nin experience, something in things, which the\r\nphysical and the biological sciences do not touch;\r\nsomething, moreover, which is not just more experiences\r\nor more existences; but without which\r\ntheir materials are inexperienced, unrealized. Such\r\nsciences deal only with what \u003cem\u003emight\u003c/em\u003e be experienced;\r\nwith the content of experience, provided and assumed\r\nthere be experience. It is psychology which\r\ntells us how this possible experience loses its barely\r\nhypothetical character, and is stamped with categorical\r\nunquestioned experiencedness; how, in a\r\nword, it becomes here and now in some uniquely\r\nindividualized life. Here is the necessary transition\r\nof science into philosophy; a passage that\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_270\"\u003e270\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ncarries the verified and solid body of the one into the\r\nlarge and free form of the other.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cblockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e[\u003cspan class=\"smcap\"\u003eNote\u003c/span\u003e: I have let this paper stand much as written, though\r\nnow conscious that much more is crowded into it than could\r\nproperly be presented in one paper. The drift of the ten\r\nyears from ’99 to ’09 has made, I venture to believe, for increased\r\nclearness in the main positions of the paper: The\r\nrevival of a naturalistic realism, the denial of the existence\r\nof “consciousness,” the development of functional and\r\ndynamic psychology (accompanied by aversion to interpretation\r\nof functions as faculties of a soul-substance)\u0026mdash;all of\r\nthese tendencies are sympathetic with the aim of the paper.\r\nThere is another reason for letting it stand: the new functional\r\nand pragmatic empiricism proffered in this volume\r\nhas been constantly objected to on the ground that its conceptions\r\nof knowledge and verification lead only to subjectivism\r\nand solipsism. The paper may indicate that the\r\nidentification of experience with bare states of consciousness\r\nrepresents the standpoint of the critic, not of the empiricism\r\ncriticised, and that it is for him, not for me, to fear the\r\nsubjective implications of such a position. The paper also\r\nclearly raises the question as to how far the isolation of\r\n“consciousness” from nature and social life, which characterizes\r\nthe procedure of many psychologists of to-day, is\r\nresponsible for keeping alive quite unreal problems in philosophy.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/blockquote\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_271\"\u003e271\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\r\n\u003ch2 title=\"THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"THE_SIGNIFICANCE_OF_THE_PROBLEM_OF_KNOWLEDGE\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eTHE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE\u003ca id=\"FNanchor_63\" href=\"#Footnote_63\" class=\"fnanchor smaller\"\u003e63\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"drop-cap\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"smcap1\"\u003eIt\u003c/span\u003e is now something over a century since Kant\r\ncalled upon philosophers to cease their discussion\r\nregarding the nature of the world and the\r\nprinciples of existence until they had arrived at\r\nsome conclusion regarding the nature of the knowing\r\nprocess. But students of philosophy know\r\nthat Kant formulated the question “how knowledge\r\nis possible” rather than created it. As matter\r\nof fact, reflective thought for two centuries\r\nbefore Kant had been principally interested in just\r\nthis problem, although it had not generalized its\r\nown interest. Kant brought to consciousness the\r\ncontrolling motive. The discussion, both in Kant\r\nhimself and in his successors, often seems scholastic,\r\nlost in useless subtlety, scholastic argument,\r\nand technical distinctions. Within the last decade\r\nin particular there have been signs of a growing\r\nweariness as to epistemology, and a tendency to\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_272\"\u003e272\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nturn away to more fertile fields. The interest\r\nshows signs of exhaustion.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eStudents of philosophy will recognize what I\r\nmean when I say that this growing conviction of\r\nfutility and consequent distaste are associated with\r\nthe outcome of the famous dictum of Kant, that\r\nperception without conception is blind, while conception\r\nwithout perception is empty. The whole\r\ncourse of reflection since Kant’s time has tended to\r\njustify this remark. The sensationalist and the\r\nrationalist have worked themselves out. Pretty\r\nmuch all students are convinced that we can reduce\r\nknowledge neither to a set of associated sensations,\r\nnor yet to a purely rational system of relations of\r\nthought. Knowledge is judgment, and judgment\r\nrequires both a material of sense perception and\r\nan ordering, regulating principle, reason; so much\r\nseems certain, but we do not get any further.\r\nSensation and thought themselves seem to stand\r\nout more rigidly opposed to each other in their\r\nown natures than ever. Why both are necessary,\r\nand how two such opposed factors coöperate in\r\nbringing about the unified result of science, becomes\r\nmore and more of a mystery. It is the\r\ncontinual running up against this situation which\r\naccounts for the flagging of interest and the desire\r\nto direct energy where it will have more outcome.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis situation creates a condition favorable to\r\ntaking stock of the question as it stands; to inquiring\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_273\"\u003e273\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwhat this interest, prolonged for over three\r\ncenturies, in the possibility and nature of knowledge,\r\nstands for; what the conviction as to the\r\nnecessity of the union of sensation and thought,\r\ntogether with the inability to reach conclusions regarding\r\nthe nature of the union, signifies.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eI propose then to raise this evening precisely\r\nthis question: What is the meaning of the problem\r\nof knowledge? What is its meaning, not simply\r\nfor reflective philosophy or in terms of epistemology\r\nitself, but what is its meaning in the historical\r\nmovement of humanity and as a part of a larger\r\nand more comprehensive experience? My thesis\r\nis perhaps sufficiently indicated in the mere taking\r\nof this point of view. It implies that the abstractness\r\nof the discussion of knowledge, its remoteness\r\nfrom everyday experience, is one of form, rather\r\nthan of substance. It implies that the problem of\r\nknowledge is not a problem that has its origin, its\r\nvalue, or its destiny within itself. The problem is\r\none which social life, the organized practice of mankind,\r\nhas had to face. The seemingly technical and\r\nabstruse discussion of the philosophers results from\r\nthe formulation and statement of the question.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eI suggest that the problem of the possibility of\r\nknowledge is but an aspect of the question of the\r\nrelation of knowing to acting, of theory to practice.\r\nThe distinctions which the philosophers raise,\r\nthe oppositions which they erect, the weary treadmill\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_274\"\u003e274\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwhich they pursue between sensation and\r\nthought, subject and object, mind and matter, are\r\nnot invented \u003ci xml:lang=\"la\" lang=\"la\"\u003ead hoc\u003c/i\u003e, but are simply the concise reports\r\nand condensed formula of points of view and\r\npractical conflicts having their source in the very\r\nnature of modern life, conflicts which must be met\r\nand solved if modern life is to go on its way untroubled,\r\nwith clear consciousness of what it is\r\nabout. As the philosopher has received his problem\r\nfrom the world of action, so he must return\r\nhis account there for auditing and liquidation.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eMore especially, I suggest that the tendency of\r\nall the points at issue to precipitate in the opposition\r\nof sensationalism and rationalism is due to the\r\nfact that sensation and reason stand for the two\r\nforces contending for mastery in social life: the\r\nradical and the conservative. The reason that the\r\ncontest does not end, the reason for the necessity\r\nof the combination of the two in the resultant statement,\r\nis that both factors are necessary in action;\r\none stands for stimulus, for initiative; the other for\r\ncontrol, for direction.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eI cannot hope, in the time at my command this\r\nevening, to justify these wide and sweeping assertions\r\nregarding either the origin, the work, or the\r\nfinal destiny of philosophic reflection. I simply\r\nhope, by reference to some of the chief periods of\r\nthe development of philosophy, to illustrate to you\r\nsomething of what I mean.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_275\"\u003e275\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nAt the outset we take a long scope in our survey\r\nand present to ourselves the epoch when philosophy\r\nwas still consciously, and not simply by implication,\r\nhuman, when reflective thought had not developed\r\nits own technique of method, and was in no\r\ndanger of being caught in its own machinery\u0026mdash;the\r\ntime of Socrates. What does the assertion of\r\nSocrates that an unexamined life is not one fit to\r\nbe led by man; what does his injunction “Know\r\nthyself” mean? It means that the corporate\r\nmotives and guarantees of conduct are breaking\r\ndown. We have got away from the time when the\r\nindividual could both regulate and justify his\r\ncourse of life by reference to the ideals incarnate\r\nin the habits of the community of which he is a\r\nmember. The time of direct and therefore unconscious\r\nunion with corporate life, finding therein\r\nstimuli, codes, and values, has departed. The development\r\nof industry and commerce, of war and\r\npolitics, has brought face to face communities with\r\ndifferent aims and diverse habits; the development\r\nof myth and animism into crude but genuine scientific\r\nobservation and imagination has transformed\r\nthe physical widening of the horizon, brought\r\nabout by commerce and intercourse, into an intellectual\r\nand moral expansion. The old supports\r\nfail precisely at the time when they are most needed\u0026mdash;before\r\na widening and more complex scene of\r\naction. Where, then, shall the agent of action\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_276\"\u003e276\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nturn? The “Know thyself” of Socrates is the reply\r\nto the practical problem which confronted\r\nAthens in his day. Investigation into the true\r\nends and worths of human life, sifting and testing\r\nof all competing ends, the discovery of a\r\nmethod which should validate the genuine and\r\ndismiss the spurious, had henceforth to do for\r\nman what consolidated and incorporate custom\r\nhad hitherto presented as a free and precious\r\ngift.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWith Socrates the question is as direct and practical\r\nas the question of making one’s living or of\r\ngoverning the state; it is indeed the same question\r\nput in its general form. It is a question that the\r\nflute player, the cobbler, and the politician must\r\nface no more and no less than the reflective philosopher.\r\nThe question is addressed by Socrates to\r\nevery individual and to every group with which he\r\ncomes in contact. Because the question is practical\r\nit is individual and direct. It is a question\r\nwhich every one must face and answer for himself,\r\njust as in the Protestant scheme every individual\r\nmust face and solve for himself the question of his\r\nfinal destiny.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eYet the very attitude of Socrates carried with it\r\nthe elements of its own destruction. Socrates could\r\nonly raise the question, or rather demand of every\r\nindividual that he raise it for himself. Of the\r\nanswer he declared himself to be as ignorant as\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_277\"\u003e277\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwas any one. The result could be only a shifting\r\nof the center of interest. If the question is so all-important,\r\nand yet the wisest of all men must confess\r\nthat he only knows his own ignorance as to its\r\nanswer, the inevitable point of further consideration\r\nis the discovery of a method which shall enable\r\nthe question to be answered. This is the significance\r\nof Plato. The problem is the absolutely inevitable\r\noutgrowth of the Socratic position; and\r\nyet it carried with it just as inevitably the separation\r\nof philosopher from shoemaker and statesman,\r\nand the relegation of theory to a position remote\r\nfor the time being from conduct.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIf the Socratic command, “Know thyself,” runs\r\nagainst the dead wall of inability to conduct this\r\nknowledge, some one must take upon himself the\r\ndiscovery of how the requisite knowledge may be\r\nobtained. A new profession is born, that of the\r\nthinker. At this time the means, the discovery of\r\nhow the aims and worths of the self may be known\r\nand measured, becomes, for this class, an end in\r\nitself. Theory is ultimately to be applied to practice;\r\nbut in the meantime the theory must be worked\r\nout as theory or else no application. This represents\r\nthe peculiar equilibrium and the peculiar\r\npoint of contradiction in the Platonic system. All\r\nphilosophy is simply for the sake of the organization\r\nand regulation of social life; and yet the philosophers\r\nmust be a class by themselves, working\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_278\"\u003e278\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nout their peculiar problems with their own particular\r\ntools.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWith Aristotle the attempted balance failed.\r\nSocial life is disintegrating beyond the point of\r\nhope of a successful reorganization, and thinking\r\nis becoming a fascinating pursuit for its own sake.\r\nThe world of practice is now the world of compromise\r\nand of adjustment. It is relative to partial\r\naims and finite agents. The sphere of absolute\r\nand enduring truth and value can be reached\r\nonly in and through thought. The one who acts\r\ncompromises himself with the animal desire that\r\ninspires his action and with the alien material that\r\nforms its stuff. In two short generations the\r\ndivorce of philosophy from life, the isolation of\r\nreflective theory from practical conduct, has completed\r\nitself. So great is the irony of history that\r\nthis sudden and effective outcome was the result\r\nof the attempt to make thought the instrument of\r\naction, and action the manifestation of truth\r\nreached by thinking.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut this statement must not be taken too literally.\r\nIt is impossible that men should really separate\r\ntheir ideas from their acts. If we look ahead\r\na few centuries we find that the philosophy of\r\nPlato and Aristotle has accomplished, in an indirect\r\nand unconscious way, what perhaps it could\r\nnever have effected by the more immediate and\r\npractical method of Socrates. Philosophy became\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_279\"\u003e279\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nan organ of vision, an instrument of interpretation;\r\nit furnished the medium through which the\r\nworld was seen and the course of life estimated.\r\nPhilosophy died as philosophy, to rise as the set\r\nand bent of the human mind. Through a thousand\r\nand devious and roundabout channels, the thoughts\r\nof the philosophers filtered through the strata of\r\nhuman consciousness and conduct. Through the\r\nteachings of grammarians, rhetoricians, and a variety\r\nof educational schools, they were spread in\r\ndiluted form through the whole Roman Empire\r\nand were again precipitated in the common forms\r\nof speech. Through the earnestness of the moral\r\npropaganda of the Stoics they became the working\r\nrules of life for the more strenuous and earnest\r\nspirits. Through the speculations of the Sceptics\r\nand Epicureans they became the chief reliance and\r\nconsolation of a large number of highly cultured\r\nindividuals amid social turmoil and political disintegration.\r\nAll these influences and many more\r\nfinally summed themselves up in the two great\r\nmedia through which Greek philosophy finally\r\nfixed the intellectual horizon of man, determined\r\nthe values of its perspective, and meted out the\r\nboundaries and divisions of the scene of human\r\naction.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThese two influences were the development of\r\nChristian theology and moral theory, and the organization\r\nof the system of Roman jurisprudence.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_280\"\u003e280\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nThere is perhaps no more fascinating chapter in\r\nthe history of humanity than the slow and tortuous\r\nprocesses by which the ideas set in motion by\r\nthat Athenian citizen who faced death as serenely\r\nas he conversed with a friend, finally became the\r\nintellectually organizing centers of the two great\r\nmovements that bridge the span between ancient\r\ncivilization and modern. As the personal and immediate\r\nforce and enthusiasm of the movement\r\ninitiated by Jesus began to grow fainter and the\r\ncommanding influence of his own personality commenced\r\nto dim, the ideas of the world and of\r\nlife, of God and of man, elaborated in Greek\r\nphilosophy, served to transform moral enthusiasm\r\nand personal devotion to the redemption of humanity,\r\ninto a splendid and coherent view of the\r\nuniverse; a view that resisted all disintegrating influences\r\nand gathered into itself the permanent\r\nideas and progressive ideals thus far developed in\r\nthe history of man.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe have only a faint idea of how this was accomplished,\r\nor of the thoroughness of the work\r\ndone. We have perhaps even more inadequate\r\nconceptions of the great organizing and centralizing\r\nwork done by Greek thought in the political\r\nsphere. When the military and administrative\r\ngenius of Rome brought the whole world in subjection\r\nto itself, the most pressing of practical\r\nproblems was to give unity of practical aim and\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_281\"\u003e281\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nharmony of working machinery to the vast and\r\nconfused mass of local custom and tradition, religious,\r\nsocial, economic, and intellectual, as well\r\nas political. In this juncture the great administrators\r\nand lawyers of Rome seized with avidity\r\nupon the results of the intellectual analysis of social\r\nand political relations elaborated in Greek\r\nphilosophy. Caring naught for these results in\r\ntheir reflective and theoretical character, they saw\r\nin them the possible instrument of introducing order\r\ninto chaos and of transforming the confused\r\nand conflicting medley of practice and opinion\r\ninto a harmonious social structure. Roman law,\r\nthat formed the vertebral column of civilization\r\nfor a thousand years, and which articulated the\r\nouter order of life as distinctly as Christianity\r\ncontrolled the inner, was the outcome.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThought was once more in unity with action,\r\nphilosophy had become the instrument of conduct.\r\nMr. Bosanquet makes the pregnant remark “that\r\nthe weakness of medieval science and philosophy\r\nare connected rather with excess of practice than\r\nwith excess of theory. The subordination of philosophy\r\nto theology is a subordination of science to\r\na formulated conception of human welfare. Its\r\nessence is present, not wherever there is metaphysics\r\nbut wherever the spirit of truth is subordinated\r\nto any preconceived practical intent.” (“History\r\nof Esthetics,” p. 146.)\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_282\"\u003e282\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nOnce more the irony of history displays itself.\r\nThought has become practical, it has become the\r\nregulator of individual conduct and social organization,\r\nbut at the expense of its own freedom and\r\npower. The defining characteristic of medievalism\r\nin state and in church, in political and spiritual\r\nlife, is that truth presents itself to the individual\r\nonly through the medium of organized authority.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThere was a historical necessity on the external\r\nas well as the internal side. We have not the remotest\r\nway of imagining what the outcome would\r\nfinally have been if, at the time when the intellectual\r\nstructure of the Christian church and the legal\r\nstructure of the Roman Empire had got themselves\r\nthoroughly organized, the barbarians had not made\r\ntheir inroads and seized upon all this accumulated\r\nand consolidated wealth as their own legitimate\r\nprey. But this was what did happen. As a result,\r\ntruths originally developed by the freest\r\npossible criticism and investigation became external,\r\nand imposed themselves upon the mass of individuals\r\nby the mere weight of authoritative\r\nlaw. The external, transcendental, and supernatural\r\ncharacter of spiritual truth and of social\r\ncontrol during the Middle Ages is naught but the\r\nmirror, in consciousness, of the relation existing\r\nbetween the eager, greedy, undisciplined horde of\r\nbarbarians on one side, and the concentrated\r\nachievements of ancient civilization on the other.\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_283\"\u003e283\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nThere was no way out save that the keen barbarian\r\nwhet his appetite upon the rich banquet spread\r\nbefore him. But there was equally no way out so\r\nfar as the continuity of civilization was concerned\r\nsave that the very fullness and richness of this\r\nbanquet set limits to the appetite, and finally, when\r\nassimilated and digested, it be transformed into the\r\nflesh and blood, the muscles and sinew of him who\r\nsat at the feast. Thus the barbarian ceased to be\r\na barbarian and a new civilization arose.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut the time came when the work of absorption\r\nwas fairly complete. The northern barbarians\r\nhad eaten the food and drunk the wine of Græco-Roman\r\ncivilization. The authoritative truth embodied\r\nin medieval state and church succeeded, in\r\nprinciple, in disciplining the untrained masses.\r\nIts very success issued its own death warrant. To\r\nsay that it had succeeded means that the new\r\npeople had finally eaten their way into the heart\r\nof the ideas offered them, had got from them\r\nwhat they wanted, and were henceforth prepared\r\nto go their own way and make their own living.\r\nHere a new rhythm of the movement of thought\r\nand action begins to show itself.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe beginning of this change in the swing of\r\nthought and action forms the transition from the\r\nMiddle Ages to the modern times. It is the epoch\r\nof the Renaissance. The individual comes to a\r\nnew birth and asserts his own individuality and\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_284\"\u003e284\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ndemands his own rights in the way of feeling, doing,\r\nand knowing for himself. Science, art, religion,\r\npolitical life, must all be made over on the\r\nbasis of recognizing the claims of the individual.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003ePardon me these commonplaces, but they are\r\nnecessary to the course of the argument. By historic\r\nfallacy we often suppose, or imagine that we\r\nsuppose, that the individual had been present as a\r\npossible center of action all through the Middle\r\nAges, but through some external and arbitrary interference\r\nhad been weighted down by political and\r\nintellectual despotism. All this inverts the true\r\norder of the case. The very possibility of the\r\nindividual making such unlimited demands for himself,\r\nclaiming to be the legitimate center of all\r\naction and standard for all organization, was dependent,\r\nas I have already indicated, upon the intervening\r\nmedievalism. Save as having passed\r\nthrough this period of tremendous discipline, and\r\nhaving gradually worked over into his own habits\r\nand purposes the truths embodied in the church\r\nand state that controlled his conduct, the individual\r\ncould be only a source of disorder and a disturber\r\nof civilization. The very maintenance of\r\nthe spiritual welfare of mankind was bound up in\r\nthe extent to which the claim of truth and reality\r\nto be universal and objective, far above all individual\r\nfeeling and thought, could make itself valid.\r\nThe logical realism and universalism of scholastic\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_285\"\u003e285\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nphilosophy simply reflect the actual subjection of\r\nthe individual to that associated and corporate life\r\nwhich, in conserving the past, provided the principle\r\nof control.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut the eager, hungry barbarian was there, implicated\r\nin this universalism. He must be active\r\nin receiving and in absorbing the truth authoritatively\r\ndoled out to him. Even the most rigid forms\r\nof medieval Christianity could not avoid postulating\r\nthe individual will as having a certain initiative\r\nwith reference to its own salvation. The impulses,\r\nthe appetite, the instinct of the individual were all\r\nassumed in medieval morals, religion, and politics.\r\nThe imagined medieval tyranny took them for\r\ngranted as completely as does the modern herald\r\nof liberty and equality. But the medieval civilization\r\nknew that the time had not come when\r\nthese appetites and impulses could be trusted to\r\nwork themselves out. They must be controlled by\r\nthe incorporate truths inherited from Athens and\r\nRome.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe very logic of the relationship, however, required\r\nthat the time come when the individual\r\nmakes his own the objective and universal truths.\r\nHe is now the incorporation of truth. He now has\r\nthe control as well as the stimulus of action within\r\nhimself. He is the standard and the end, as well\r\nas the initiator and the effective force of execution.\r\nJust because the authoritative truth of medievalism\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_286\"\u003e286\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nhas succeeded, has fulfilled its function, the\r\nindividual can begin to assert himself.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eContrast this critical period, finding its expression\r\nequally in the art of the Renaissance, the revival\r\nof learning, the Protestant Reformation, and\r\npolitical democracy, with Athens in the time of\r\nSocrates. Then individuals felt their own social\r\nlife disintegrated, dissolving under their very feet.\r\nThe problem was how the value of that social life\r\nwas to be maintained against the external and internal\r\nforces that were threatening it. The problem\r\nwas on the side neither of the individual nor of\r\nprogress; save as the individual was seen to be an\r\nintervening instrument in the reconstruction of the\r\nsocial unity. But with the individual of the fourteenth\r\ncentury, it was not his own intimate community\r\nlife which was slipping away from him. It\r\nwas an alien and remote life which had finally become\r\nhis own; which had passed over into his own\r\ninner being. The problem was not how a unity\r\nof social life should be conserved, but what the individual\r\nshould do with the wealth of resources of\r\nwhich he found himself the rightful heir and administrator.\r\nThe problem looked out upon the\r\nfuture, not back to the past. It was how to create\r\na new order, both of modes of individual conduct\r\nand forms of social life that should be the appropriate\r\nmanifestations of the vigorous and richly\r\nendowed individual.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_287\"\u003e287\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nHence the conception of progress as a ruling\r\nidea; the conception of the individual as\r\nthe source and standard of rights; and the problem\r\nof knowledge, were all born together. Given the\r\nfreed individual, who feels called upon to create a\r\nnew heaven and a new earth, and who feels himself\r\ngifted with the power to perform the task to which\r\nhe is called:\u0026mdash;and the demand for science, for a\r\nmethod of discovering and verifying truth, becomes\r\nimperious. The individual is henceforth to supply\r\ncontrol, law, and not simply stimulation and initiation.\r\nWhat does this mean but that instead of\r\nany longer receiving or assimilating truth, he is\r\nnow to search for and create it? Having no\r\nlonger the truth imposed by authority to rely upon,\r\nthere is no resource save to secure the authority\r\nof truth. The possibility of getting at and utilizing\r\nthis truth becomes therefore the underlying\r\nand conditioning problem of modern life. Strange\r\nas it may sound, the question which was formulated\r\nby Kant as that of the possibility of knowledge,\r\nis the fundamental political problem of modern\r\nlife.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eScience and metaphysics or philosophy, though\r\nseeming often to be at war, with their respective\r\nadherents often throwing jibes and slurs at each\r\nother, are really the most intimate allies. The\r\nphilosophic movement is simply the coming to consciousness\r\nof this claim of the individual to be able\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_288\"\u003e288\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nto discover and verify truth for himself, and\r\nthereby not only to direct his own conduct, but to\r\nbecome an influential and decisive factor in the organization\r\nof life itself. Modern philosophy is the\r\nformulation of this creed, both in general and in\r\nits more specific implications. We often forget\r\nthat the technical problem “\u003cem\u003ehow\u003c/em\u003e knowledge is possible,”\r\nalso means “how \u003cem\u003eknowledge\u003c/em\u003e is possible”;\r\nhow, that is, shall the individual be able to back\r\nhimself up by truth which has no authority save\r\nthat of its own intrinsic truthfulness. Science, on\r\nthe other hand, is simply this general faith or creed\r\nasserting itself in detail; it is the practical faith\r\nat work engaged in subjugating the foreign territory\r\nof ignorance and falsehood step by step. If\r\nthe ultimate outcome depends upon this detailed\r\nand concrete work, we must not forget that the\r\nearnestness and courage, as well as the intelligence\r\nand clearness with which the task has been undertaken,\r\nhave depended largely upon the wider, even\r\nif vaguer, operation of philosophy.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eBut the student of philosophy knows more than\r\nthat the problem of knowledge has been with increasing\r\nurgency and definiteness the persistent\r\nand comprehensive problem. So conscious is he of\r\nthe two opposed theories regarding the nature of\r\nscience, that he often forgets the underlying\r\nbond of unity of which we have been speaking.\r\nThese two opposing schools are those which we\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_289\"\u003e289\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nknow as the sensationalist and the intellectualist,\r\nthe empiricist and the rationalist. Admitting that\r\nthe dominance of the question of the possibility\r\nand nature of knowledge is at bottom a fundamental\r\nquestion of practice and of social direction,\r\nis \u003cem\u003ethis\u003c/em\u003e distinction anything more than the\r\nclash of scholastic opinions, a rivalry of ideas\r\nmeaningless for conduct?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eI think it is. Having made so many sweeping\r\nassertions I must venture one more. Fanciful and\r\nforced as it may seem, I would say that the sensational\r\nand empirical schools represent in conscious\r\nand reflective form the continuation of the principle\r\nof the northern and barbarian side of medieval\r\nlife; while the intellectualist and the rationalist\r\nstand for the conscious elaboration of the principle\r\ninvolved in the Græco-Roman tradition.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eOnce more, as I cannot hope to prove, let me\r\nexpand and illustrate. The sensationalist has\r\nstaked himself upon the possibility of explaining\r\nand justifying knowledge by conceiving it as the\r\ngrouping and combination of the qualities directly\r\ngiven us in sensation. The special reasons advanced\r\nin support of this position are sufficiently\r\ntechnical and remote. But the motive which has\r\nkept the sensationalist at work, which animated\r\nHobbes and Locke, Hume and John Stuart Mill,\r\nVoltaire and Diderot, was a human not a scholastic\r\none. It was the belief that only in sensation do\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_290\"\u003e290\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwe get any personal contact with reality, and\r\nhence, any genuine guarantee of vital truth.\r\nThought is pale, and remote from the concrete\r\nstuff of knowledge and experience. It only formulates\r\nand duplicates; it only divides and recombines\r\nthat fullness of vivid reality got directly and at\r\nfirst hand in sense experience. Reason, compared\r\nwith sense, is indirect, emasculate, and faded.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eMoreover, reason and thought in their very\r\ngenerality seem to lie beyond and outside the individual.\r\nIn this remoteness, when they claim any\r\nfinal value, they violate the very first principle of\r\nthe modern consciousness. What is the distinguishing\r\ncharacteristic of modern life, unless it be\r\nprecisely that the individual shall not simply get,\r\nand reason about, truth in the abstract, but shall\r\nmake it his own in the most intimate and personal\r\nway? He has not only to know the truth in the\r\nsense of knowing about it, but he must feel it.\r\nWhat is sensation but the answer to this demand\r\nfor the most individual and intimate contact with\r\nreality? Show me a sensationalist and I will show\r\nyou not only one who believes that he is on the\r\nside of concreteness and definiteness, as against\r\nwashed-out abstractions and misty general notions:\r\nbut also one who believes that he is identified\r\nwith the cause of the individual as distinct from\r\nthat of external authority. We have only to go\r\nto our Locke and our Mill to see that opposition\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_291\"\u003e291\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nto the innate and the \u003ci xml:lang=\"la\" lang=\"la\"\u003ea priori\u003c/i\u003e was felt to be opposition\r\nto the deification of hereditary prejudice and\r\nto the reception of ideas without examination or\r\ncriticism. Personal contact with reality through\r\nsensation seemed to be the only safeguard from\r\nopinions which, while masquerading in the guise of\r\nabsolute and eternal truth, were in reality but the\r\nprejudices of the past become so ingrained as to\r\ninsist upon being standards of truth and action.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003ePositively as well as negatively, the sensationalists\r\nhave felt themselves to represent the side of\r\nprogress. In its supposed eternal character, a\r\ngeneral notion stands ready made, fixed forever,\r\nwithout reference to time, without the possibility\r\nof change or diversity. As distinct from this, the\r\nsensation represents the never-failing eruption of\r\nthe new. It is the novel, the unexpected, that\r\nwhich cannot be reasoned out in eternal formula,\r\nbut must be hit upon in the ever-changing flow of\r\nour experience. It thus represents stimulation,\r\nexcitation, momentum onwards. It gives a constant\r\nprotest against the assumption of any theory\r\nor belief to possess finality; and it supplies the\r\never-renewed presentation of material out of which\r\nto build up new objects and new laws.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe sensationalist appears to have a good case.\r\nHe stands for vividness and definiteness against\r\nabstraction; for the engagement of the individual\r\nin experience as against the remote and general\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_292\"\u003e292\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthought about experience; and for progress and\r\nfor variety against the eternal fixed monotony of\r\nthe concept. But what says the rationalist?\r\nWhat value has experience, he inquires, if it is simply\r\na chaos of disintegrated and floating débris?\r\nWhat is the worth of personality and individuality\r\nwhen they are reduced to crudity of brute feeling\r\nand sheer intensity of impulsive reaction? What\r\nis there left in progress that we should desire it,\r\nwhen it has become a mere unregulated flux of\r\ntransitory sensations, coming and going without\r\nreasonable motivation or rational purpose?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThus the intellectualist has endeavored to frame\r\nthe structure of knowledge as a well-ordered economy,\r\nwhere reason is sovereign, where the permanent\r\nis the standard of reference for the changing,\r\nand where the individual may always escape from\r\nhis own mere individuality and find support and\r\nreinforcement in a system of relations that lies\r\noutside of and yet gives validity to his own passing\r\nstates of consciousness. Thus the rationalists hold\r\nthat we must find in a universal intelligence a\r\nsource of truth and guarantee of value that is\r\nsought in vain in the confused and flowing mass\r\nof sensations.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe rationalist, in making the concept or general\r\nidea the all-important thing in knowledge, believes\r\nhimself to be asserting the interests of order\r\nas against destructive caprice and the license of\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_293\"\u003e293\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nmomentary whim. He finds that his cause is\r\nbound up with that of the discovery of truth as\r\nthe necessary instrument and method for action.\r\nOnly by reference to the general and the rational\r\ncan the individual find perspective, secure direction\r\nfor his appetites and impulses, and escape from\r\nthe uncontrolled and ruinous reactions of his own\r\nimmediate tendency.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe concept, once more, in its very generality,\r\nin its elevation above the intensities and conflicts of\r\nmomentary passions and interests, is the conserver\r\nof the experience of the past. It is the wisdom of\r\nthe past put into capitalized and funded form to\r\nenable the individual to get away from the stress\r\nand competition of the needs of the passing moment.\r\nIt marks the difference between barbarism\r\nand civilization, between continuity and disintegration,\r\nbetween the sequence of tradition that is the\r\nnecessity of intelligent thought and action, and\r\nthe random and confused excitation of the hour.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhen we thus consider not the details of the\r\npositions of the sensationalist and rationalist, but\r\nthe motives that have induced them to assume\r\nthese positions, we discover what is meant in saying\r\nthat the question is still a practical, a social one,\r\nand that the two schools stand for certain one-sided\r\nfactors of social life. If we have on one side\r\nthe demand for freedom, for personal initiation\r\ninto experience, for variety and progress, we have\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_294\"\u003e294\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\non the other side the demand for general order,\r\nfor continuous and organized unity, for the conservation\r\nof the dearly bought resources of the\r\npast. This is what I mean by saying that the\r\nsensationalist abstracts in conscious form the\r\nposition and tendency of the Germanic element in\r\nmodern civilization, the factor of appetite and impulse,\r\nof keen enjoyment and satisfaction, of stimulus\r\nand initiative. Just so the rationalist erects\r\ninto conscious abstraction the principle of the\r\nGræco-Roman world, that of control, of system,\r\nof order and authority.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThat the principles of freedom and order, of\r\npast and future, or conservation and progress, of\r\nincitement to action and control of that incitation,\r\nare correlative, I shall not stop to argue. It may\r\nbe worth while, however, to point out that exactly\r\nthe same correlative and mutually implicating connection\r\nexists between sensationalism and rationalism,\r\nconsidered as philosophical accounts of the\r\norigin and nature of knowledge.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe strength of each school lies in the weakness\r\nof its opponent. The more the sensationalist appears\r\nto succeed in reducing knowledge to the associations\r\nof sensation, the more he creates a demand\r\nfor thought to introduce background and\r\nrelationship. The more consistent the sensationalist,\r\nthe more openly he reveals the sensation in its\r\nown nakedness crying aloud for a clothing of\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_295\"\u003e295\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nvalue and meaning which must be borrowed from\r\nreflective and rational interpretation. On the\r\nother hand, the more reason and the system of\r\nrelations that make up the functioning of reason\r\nare magnified, the more is felt the need of sensation\r\nto bring reason into some fruitful contact\r\nwith the materials of experience. Reason must\r\nhave the stimulus of this contact in order to be\r\nincited to its work and to get materials to operate\r\nwith. The cause, then, why neither school can\r\ncome to rest in itself is precisely that each abstracts\r\none essential factor of conduct.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThis suggests, finally, that the next move in\r\nphilosophy is precisely to transfer attention from\r\nthe details of the position assumed, and the arguments\r\nused in these two schools, to the practical\r\nmotives that have unconsciously controlled the\r\ndiscussion. The positions have been sufficiently\r\nelaborated. Within the past one hundred years,\r\nwithin especially the last generation, each has succeeded\r\nin fully stating its case. The result, if we\r\nremain at this point, is practically a deadlock.\r\nEach can make out its case against the other. To\r\nstop at such a point is a patent absurdity. If we\r\nare to get out of the cul-de-sac it must be by bringing\r\ninto consciousness the tacit reference to action\r\nthat all the time has been the controlling factor.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIn a word, another great rhythmic movement is\r\nseen to be approaching its end. The demand for\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_296\"\u003e296\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nscience and philosophy was the demand for truth\r\nand a sure standard of truth which the new-born\r\nindividual might employ in his efforts to build up\r\na new world to afford free scope to the powers\r\nstirring within him. The urgency and acuteness\r\nof this demand caused, for the time being, the\r\ntransfer of attention from the nature of practice\r\nto that of knowledge. The highly theoretical and\r\nabstract character of modern epistemology, combined\r\nwith the fact that this highly abstract and\r\ntheoretic problem has continuously engaged the\r\nattention of thought for more than three centuries,\r\nis, to my mind, proof positive that the question of\r\nknowledge was for the time being the point in which\r\nthe question of practice centered, and through\r\nwhich it must find outlet and solution.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWe return, then, to our opening problem: the\r\nmeaning of the question of the possibility of knowledge\r\nraised by Kant a century ago, and of his\r\nassertion that sensation without thought is blind,\r\nthought without sensation empty. Once more I\r\nrecall to the student of philosophy how this assertion\r\nof Kant has haunted and determined the course\r\nof philosophy in the intervening years\u0026mdash;how his\r\nsolution at once seems inevitable and unsatisfactory.\r\nIt is inevitable in that no one can fairly\r\ndeny that both sense and reason are implicated in\r\nevery fruitful and significant statement of the\r\nworld; unconvincing because we are after all left\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_297\"\u003e297\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwith these two opposed things still at war with\r\neach other, plus the miracle of their final combination.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhen I say that the only way out is to place the\r\nwhole modern industry of epistemology in relation\r\nto the conditions that gave it birth and the function\r\nit has to fulfil, I mean that the unsatisfactory\r\ncharacter of the entire neo-Kantian movement lies\r\nin its assumption that knowledge gives birth to itself\r\nand is capable of affording its own justification.\r\nThe solution that is always sought and\r\nnever found so long as we deal with knowledge as\r\na self-sufficing purveyor of reality, reveals itself\r\nwhen we conceive of knowledge as a statement of\r\naction, that statement being necessary, moreover,\r\nto the successful ongoing of action.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe entire problem of medieval philosophy is\r\nthat of absorption, of assimilation. The result\r\nwas the creation of the individual. Hence the problem\r\nof modern life is that of reconstruction, reform,\r\nreorganization. The entire content of experience\r\nneeds to be passed through the alembic\r\nof individual agency and realization. The individual\r\nis to be the bearer of civilization; but this\r\ninvolves a remaking of the civilization that he\r\nbears. Thus we have the dual question: How can\r\nthe individual become the organ of corporate action?\r\nHow can he make over the truth authoritatively\r\nembodied in institutions of church and state\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_298\"\u003e298\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ninto frank, healthy, and direct expressions of the\r\nsimple act of free living? On the other hand, how\r\ncan civilization preserve its own integral value and\r\nimport when subordinated to the agency of the\r\nindividual instead of exercising supreme sway over\r\nhim?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe question of knowledge, of the discovery and\r\nstatement of truth, gives the answer to this question;\r\nand it alone gives the answer. Admitting\r\nthat the practical problem of modern life is the\r\nmaintenance of the moral values of civilization\r\nthrough the medium of the insight and decision of\r\nthe individual, the problem is foredoomed to futile\r\nfailure save as the individual in performing his\r\ntask can work with a definite and controllable tool.\r\nThis tool is science. But this very fact, constituting\r\nthe dignity of science and measuring the importance\r\nof the philosophic theory of knowledge,\r\nconferring upon them the religious value once attaching\r\nto dogma and the disciplinary significance\r\nonce belonging to political rules, also sets their\r\nlimit. The servant is not above his master.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eWhen a theory of knowledge forgets that its\r\nvalue rests in solving the problem out of which it\r\nhas arisen, viz., that of securing a method of action;\r\nwhen it forgets that it has to work out the conditions\r\nunder which the individual may freely direct\r\nhimself without loss to the historic values of civilization\u0026mdash;when\r\nit forgets these things it begins to\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_299\"\u003e299\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ncumber the ground. It is a luxury, and hence a\r\nsocial nuisance and disturber. Of course, in the\r\nvery nature of things, every means or instrument\r\nwill for a while absorb attention so that it becomes\r\nthe end. Indeed it is the end when it is an indispensable\r\ncondition of onward movement. But\r\nwhen once the means have been worked out they\r\nmust operate as such. When the nature and\r\nmethod of knowledge are fairly understood, then\r\ninterest must transfer itself from the possibility\r\nof knowledge to the possibility of its application\r\nto life.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThe sensationalist has played his part in bringing\r\nto effective recognition the demand in valid\r\nknowledge for individuality of experience, for personal\r\nparticipation in materials of knowledge.\r\nThe rationalist has served his time in making it\r\nclear once for all that valid knowledge requires\r\norganization, and the operation of a relatively permanent\r\nand general factor. The Kantian epistemologist\r\nhas formulated the claims of both schools\r\nin defining judgment as the relation of perception\r\nand conception. But when it goes on to state\r\nthat this relation is itself knowledge, or can be found\r\nin knowledge, it stultifies itself. Knowledge can\r\ndefine the percept and elaborate the concept, but\r\ntheir union can be found only in action. The experimental\r\nmethod of modern science, its erection\r\ninto the ultimate mode of verification, is simply this\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_300\"\u003e300\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nfact obtaining recognition. Only action can reconcile\r\nthe old, the general, and the permanent with\r\nthe changing, the individual, and the new. It is\r\naction as progress, as development, making over\r\nthe wealth of the past into capital with which to\r\ndo an enlarging and freer business, that alone can\r\nfind its way out of the cul-de-sac of the theory of\r\nknowledge. Each of the older movements passed\r\naway because of its own success, failed because it\r\ndid its work, died in accomplishing its purpose.\r\nSo also with the modern philosophy of knowledge;\r\nthere must come a time when we have so much\r\nknowledge in detail, and understand so well its\r\nmethod in general, that it ceases to be a problem.\r\nIt becomes a tool. If the problem of knowledge\r\nis not intrinsically meaningless and absurd it must\r\nin course of time be solved. Then the dominating\r\ninterest becomes the \u003cem\u003euse\u003c/em\u003e of knowledge; the conditions\r\nunder which and ways in which it may be\r\nmost organically and effectively employed to direct\r\nconduct.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThus the Socratic period recurs; but recurs with\r\nthe deepened meaning of the intervening weary\r\nyears of struggle, confusion, and conflict in the\r\ngrowth of the recognition of the need of patient\r\nand specific methods of interrogation. So, too, the\r\nauthoritative and institutional truth of scholasticism\r\nrecurs, but recurs borne up upon the vigorous\r\nand conscious shoulders of the freed individual who\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_301\"\u003e301\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nis aware of his own intrinsic relations to truth,\r\nand who glories in his ability to carry civilization\u0026mdash;not\r\nmerely to carry it, but to carry it on.\r\nThus another swing in the rhythm of theory and\r\npractice begins.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eHow does this concern us as philosophers? For\r\nthe world it means that philosophy is henceforth\r\na method and not an original fountain head of\r\ntruth, nor an ultimate standard of reference. But\r\nwhat is involved for philosophy itself in this\r\nchange? I make no claims to being a prophet,\r\nbut I venture one more and final unproved statement,\r\nbelieving, with all my heart, that it is justified\r\nboth by the moving logic of the situation, and\r\nby the signs of the times. I refer to the growing\r\ntransfer of interest from metaphysics and the theory\r\nof knowledge to psychology and social ethics\u0026mdash;including\r\nin the latter term all the related concrete\r\nsocial sciences, so far as they may give guidance\r\nto conduct.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThere are those who see in psychology only a\r\nparticular science which they are pleased to term\r\npurely empirical (unless it happen to restate in\r\nchanged phraseology the metaphysics with which\r\nthey are familiar). They see in it only a more\r\nor less incoherent mass of facts, interesting because\r\nrelating to human nature, but below the natural\r\nsciences in point of certainty and definiteness,\r\nas also far below pure philosophy as to comprehensiveness\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_302\"\u003e302\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nand ability to deal with fundamental\r\nissues. But if I may be permitted to dramatize a\r\nlittle the position of the psychologist, he can well\r\nafford to continue patiently at work, unmindful\r\nof the occasional supercilious sneers of the epistemologist.\r\nThe cause of modern civilization stands\r\nand falls with the ability of the individual to\r\nserve as its agent and bearer. And psychology\r\nis naught but the account of the way in which\r\nindividual life is thus progressively maintained\r\nand reorganized. Psychology is the attempt to\r\nstate in detail the machinery of the individual\r\nconsidered as the instrument and organ through\r\nwhich social action operates. It is the answer\r\nto Kant’s demand for the formal phase of experience\u0026mdash;how\r\nexperience as such is constituted.\r\nJust because the whole burden and stress, both\r\nof conserving and advancing experience is more and\r\nmore thrown upon the individual, everything which\r\nsheds light upon how the individual may weather\r\nthe stress and assume the burden is precious and\r\nimperious.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSocial ethics in inclusive sense is the correlative\r\nscience. Dealing not with the form or mode\r\nor machinery of action, it attempts rather to make\r\nout its filling and make up the values that are\r\nnecessary to constitute an experience which is\r\nworth while. The sociologist, like the psychologist,\r\noften presents himself as a camp follower of\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_303\"\u003e303\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ngenuine science and philosophy, picking up scraps\r\nhere and there and piecing them together in somewhat\r\nof an aimless fashion\u0026mdash;fortunate indeed, if\r\nnot vague and over-ambitious. Yet social ethics\r\nrepresents the attempt to translate philosophy\r\nfrom a general and therefore abstract method into\r\na working and specific method; it is the change\r\nfrom inquiring into the nature of value in general\r\nto inquiring as to the \u003cem\u003eparticular\u003c/em\u003e values that ought\r\nto be realized in the life of every one, and as to the\r\nconditions which render possible this realization.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eThere are those who will see in this conception of\r\nthe outcome of a four-hundred-year discussion concerning\r\nthe nature and possibility of knowledge a\r\nderogation from the high estate of philosophy.\r\nThere are others who will see in it a sign that philosophy,\r\nafter wandering aimlessly hither and yon\r\nin a wilderness without purpose or outcome, has\r\nfinally come to its senses\u0026mdash;has given up metaphysical\r\nabsurdities and unverifiable speculations, and\r\nbecome a purely positive science of phenomena.\r\nBut there are yet others who will see in this movement\r\nthe fulfilment of its vocation, the clear consciousness\r\nof a function that it has always striven\r\nto perform; and who will welcome it as a justification\r\nof the long centuries when it appeared to sit\r\napart, far from the common concerns of man,\r\nbusied with discourse of essence and cause, absorbed\r\nin argument concerning subject and object,\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_304\"\u003e304\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nreason and sensation. To such this outcome will\r\nappear the inevitable sequel of the saying of Socrates\r\nthat “an unexamined life is not one fit to\r\nbe led by man”; and a better response to his injunction\r\n“Know thyself.”\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"p2 center smaller\"\u003eTHE END\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003chr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_307\"\u003e307\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\r\n\u003ch2 class=\"nobreak p1\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"INDEX\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eINDEX\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"index\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cul class=\"index\"\u003e\u003cli class=\"ifrst\"\u003eAbsolutism, \u003ca href=\"#Page_18\"\u003e18\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_25\"\u003e25\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_98\"\u003e98\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_102\"\u003e102\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_109\"\u003e109\u0026ndash;110\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_121\"\u003e121\u0026ndash;123\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_130\"\u003e130\u0026ndash;132\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli class=\"isub1\"\u003e\u003ccite\u003eEssay IV.\u003c/cite\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_142\"\u003e142\u0026ndash;153\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_176\"\u003e176\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_180\"\u003e180\u0026ndash;181\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cli class=\"indx\"\u003eAcquaintance, and knowledge, \u003ca href=\"#Page_79\"\u003e79\u0026ndash;82\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cli class=\"indx\"\u003eAction, and problem of knowledge, \u003ccite\u003eEssay XI.\u003c/cite\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_271\"\u003e271\u0026ndash;304\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cli class=\"indx\"\u003e\u003ci xml:lang=\"la\" lang=\"la\"\u003eA priori\u003c/i\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_206\"\u003e206\u0026ndash;213\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_292\"\u003e292\u0026ndash;294\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cli class=\"indx\"\u003eAppearance, and reality, \u003ca href=\"#Page_26\"\u003e26\u0026ndash;28\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_118\"\u003e118\u0026ndash;121\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cli class=\"indx\"\u003eAristotle, referred to, \u003ca href=\"#Page_5\"\u003e5\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_32\"\u003e32\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_35\"\u003e35\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_37\"\u003e37\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_48\"\u003e48\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_50\"\u003e50\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_78\"\u003e78\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_221\"\u003e221\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_278\"\u003e278\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cli class=\"indx\"\u003eAssurance, \u003ca href=\"#Page_85\"\u003e85\u0026ndash;88\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cli class=\"indx\"\u003eAwareness, \u003ca href=\"#Page_93\"\u003e93\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cli class=\"ifrst\"\u003eBehavior, and intelligence, \u003ca href=\"#Page_44\"\u003e44\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cli class=\"indx\"\u003eBelief, \u003ccite\u003eEssay VI.\u003c/cite\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_169\"\u003e169\u0026ndash;197\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cli class=\"indx\"\u003eBosanquet, B., \u003ca href=\"#Page_281\"\u003e281\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cli class=\"indx\"\u003eBradley, F. H., \u003ccite\u003eEssay IV.\u003c/cite\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_112\"\u003e112\u0026ndash;153\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cli class=\"ifrst\"\u003eChange, its supposed unreality, \u003ca href=\"#Page_1\"\u003e1\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli class=\"isub1\"\u003ein modern science, \u003ca href=\"#Page_8\"\u003e8\u0026ndash;9\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli class=\"isub1\"\u003eand law, \u003ca href=\"#Page_72\"\u003e72\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli class=\"isub1\"\u003eand thought, \u003ca href=\"#Page_133\"\u003e133\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli class=\"isub1\"\u003eof truth, \u003ca href=\"#Page_153\"\u003e153\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli class=\"isub1\"\u003eof experience, \u003ca href=\"#Page_222\"\u003e222\u0026ndash;224\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_259\"\u003e259\u0026ndash;260\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cli class=\"indx\"\u003eChristianity, metaphysic of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_178\"\u003e178\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cli class=\"indx\"\u003eCognitive, \u003ca href=\"#Page_84\"\u003e84\u0026ndash;85\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_230\"\u003e230\u0026ndash;233\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cli class=\"indx\"\u003eConflict, and thinking, \u003ca href=\"#Page_116\"\u003e116\u0026ndash;117\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_126\"\u003e126\u0026ndash;127\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_132\"\u003e132\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_148\"\u003e148\u0026ndash;149\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cli class=\"indx\"\u003eConsistency, as criterion, \u003ca href=\"#Page_128\"\u003e128\u0026ndash;136\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cli class=\"indx\"\u003eConsciousness, as end of nature, \u003ca href=\"#Page_34\"\u003e34\u0026ndash;35\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli class=\"isub1\"\u003eis partial, \u003ca href=\"#Page_43\"\u003e43\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli class=\"isub1\"\u003eand knowledge, \u003ca href=\"#Page_79\"\u003e79\u0026ndash;80\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_102\"\u003e102\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_171\"\u003e171\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli class=\"isub1\"\u003e\u003ccite\u003eEssay X.\u003c/cite\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_242\"\u003e242\u0026ndash;270\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli class=\"isub1\"\u003enon-existence of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_247\"\u003e247\u0026ndash;248\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cli class=\"indx\"\u003eCorrespondence, \u003ca href=\"#Page_158\"\u003e158\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cli class=\"indx\"\u003eCosmology, and morals, \u003ca href=\"#Page_54\"\u003e54\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cli class=\"indx\"\u003eCustom, as background of morals, \u003ca href=\"#Page_48\"\u003e48\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_52\"\u003e52\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cli class=\"ifrst\"\u003eDarwin, his influence on philosophy, \u003ccite\u003eEssay I.\u003c/cite\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_1\"\u003e1\u0026ndash;19\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli class=\"isub1\"\u003equoted, \u003ca href=\"#Page_2\"\u003e2\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_12\"\u003e12\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cli class=\"indx\"\u003eDemocracy, moral meaning of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_59\"\u003e59\u0026ndash;60\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_266\"\u003e266\u0026ndash;267\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cli class=\"indx\"\u003eDescartes, \u003ca href=\"#Page_8\"\u003e8\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cli class=\"indx\"\u003eDesign, \u003ci\u003esee\u003c/i\u003e \u003ca href=\"#Teleology\"\u003eTeleology\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cli class=\"ifrst\"\u003eEconomic Struggle, \u003ca href=\"#Page_21\"\u003e21\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_29\"\u003e29\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_35\"\u003e35\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_41\"\u003e41\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_50\"\u003e50\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cli class=\"indx\"\u003eEconomics, influences on morals, \u003ca href=\"#Page_57\"\u003e57\u0026ndash;59\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cli class=\"indx\"\u003eEmpiricism, \u003ca href=\"#Page_200\"\u003e200\u0026ndash;202\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli class=\"isub1\"\u003e\u003ccite\u003eEssay IX.\u003c/cite\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_226\"\u003e226\u0026ndash;241\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_289\"\u003e289\u0026ndash;291\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cli class=\"indx\"\u003eEpistemology, \u003ci xml:lang=\"la\" lang=\"la\"\u003eversus\u003c/i\u003e logic, \u003ca href=\"#Page_95\"\u003e95\u0026ndash;107\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_172\"\u003e172\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_185\"\u003e185\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_201\"\u003e201\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_296\"\u003e296\u0026ndash;298\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cli class=\"indx\"\u003eError, and becoming, \u003ca href=\"#Page_100\"\u003e100\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cli class=\"indx\"\u003eEvolution, of species, \u003ca href=\"#Page_1\"\u003e1\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_8\"\u003e8\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli class=\"isub1\"\u003eand design, \u003ca href=\"#Page_12\"\u003e12\u0026ndash;13\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli class=\"isub1\"\u003eand teleology, \u003ca href=\"#Page_32\"\u003e32\u0026ndash;35\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli class=\"isub1\"\u003eand intelligence, \u003ca href=\"#Page_42\"\u003e42\u0026ndash;43\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cli class=\"indx\"\u003eExperience, \u003ccite\u003eEssay VII.\u003c/cite\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_198\"\u003e198\u0026ndash;225\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cli class=\"indx\"\u003eExperiment, and knowledge, \u003ccite\u003eEssay IV.\u003c/cite\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_77\"\u003e77\u0026ndash;111\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cli class=\"indx\"\u003eFeeling, \u003ca href=\"#Page_80\"\u003e80\u0026ndash;81\u003c/a\u003e\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_308\"\u003e308\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cli class=\"ifrst\"\u003eFinal Cause, \u003ci\u003esee\u003c/i\u003e \u003ca href=\"#Teleology\"\u003eTeleology\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cli class=\"indx\"\u003eFunctions, true data of psychology, \u003ca href=\"#Page_250\"\u003e250\u0026ndash;255\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cli class=\"ifrst\"\u003eGalileo, \u003ca href=\"#Page_8\"\u003e8\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cli class=\"indx\"\u003eGenesis, and value, \u003ca href=\"#Page_261\"\u003e261\u0026ndash;264\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cli class=\"indx\"\u003eGood, is concrete and plural, \u003ca href=\"#Page_15\"\u003e15\u0026ndash;17\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_23\"\u003e23\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_27\"\u003e27\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli class=\"isub1\"\u003eof Nature, \u003ccite\u003eEssay II.\u003c/cite\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_20\"\u003e20\u0026ndash;45\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli class=\"isub1\"\u003eand evolution, \u003ca href=\"#Page_31\"\u003e31\u0026ndash;35\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_43\"\u003e43\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli class=\"isub1\"\u003eand mysticism, \u003ca href=\"#Page_39\"\u003e39\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_42\"\u003e42\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli class=\"isub1\"\u003eGreek view of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_46\"\u003e46\u0026ndash;50\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli class=\"isub1\"\u003emedieval view of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_52\"\u003e52\u0026ndash;54\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli class=\"isub1\"\u003eas fixed, \u003ca href=\"#Page_67\"\u003e67\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cli class=\"indx\"\u003eGordon, K., \u003ca href=\"#Page_215\"\u003e215\u003c/a\u003e n.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cli class=\"indx\"\u003eGray, Asa, on evolution and design, \u003ca href=\"#Page_12\"\u003e12\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cli class=\"ifrst\"\u003eHappiness, nature of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_69\"\u003e69\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cli class=\"indx\"\u003eHegel, \u003ca href=\"#Page_65\"\u003e65\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_174\"\u003e174\u003c/a\u003e n.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cli class=\"indx\"\u003eHobbes, \u003ca href=\"#Page_203\"\u003e203\u003c/a\u003e n.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cli class=\"indx\"\u003eHume, \u003ca href=\"#Page_82\"\u003e82\u003c/a\u003e n., \u003ca href=\"#Page_204\"\u003e204\u003c/a\u003e n.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cli class=\"ifrst\"\u003eIdealism, \u003ca href=\"#Page_28\"\u003e28\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_38\"\u003e38\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_191\"\u003e191\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli class=\"isub1\"\u003e\u003ccite\u003eEssay VII.\u003c/cite\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_198\"\u003e198\u0026ndash;225\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_228\"\u003e228\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cli class=\"indx\"\u003eIdeality, \u003ca href=\"#Page_89\"\u003e89\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_120\"\u003e120\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_219\"\u003e219\u0026ndash;225\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cli class=\"indx\"\u003eIdeas, nature of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_134\"\u003e134\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_155\"\u003e155\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli class=\"isub1\"\u003etheir verification, \u003ca href=\"#Page_141\"\u003e141\u003c/a\u003e ff.;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli class=\"isub1\"\u003eare hypothetical, \u003ca href=\"#Page_144\"\u003e144\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_150\"\u003e150\u0026ndash;151\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_187\"\u003e187\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cli class=\"indx\"\u003eIndividual, \u003ca href=\"#Page_244\"\u003e244\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_265\"\u003e265\u0026ndash;68\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_285\"\u003e285\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_297\"\u003e297\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cli class=\"indx\"\u003eIntellectualism, \u003ccite\u003eEssay IV.\u003c/cite\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_112\"\u003e112\u0026ndash;153\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_159\"\u003e159\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cli class=\"indx\"\u003eIntelligence, is discriminative, \u003ca href=\"#Page_39\"\u003e39\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_42\"\u003e42\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_75\"\u003e75\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli class=\"isub1\"\u003eis the good of nature, \u003ca href=\"#Page_44\"\u003e44\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli class=\"isub1\"\u003eand Morals, \u003ccite\u003eEssay III.\u003c/cite\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_46\"\u003e46\u0026ndash;76\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli class=\"isub1\"\u003ecosmic and personal, \u003ca href=\"#Page_55\"\u003e55\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_59\"\u003e59\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli class=\"isub1\"\u003eas biological instrument, \u003ca href=\"#Page_68\"\u003e68\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli class=\"isub1\"\u003eindirection of activity, \u003ca href=\"#Page_133\"\u003e133\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_149\"\u003e149\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cli class=\"indx\"\u003eIntrospection, \u003ca href=\"#Page_250\"\u003e250\u003c/a\u003e n.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cli class=\"ifrst\"\u003eJames, Wm., \u003ca href=\"#Page_104\"\u003e104\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_194\"\u003e194\u003c/a\u003e n., \u003ca href=\"#Page_202\"\u003e202\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_222\"\u003e222\u003c/a\u003e n., \u003ca href=\"#Page_246\"\u003e246\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cli class=\"indx\"\u003eJudgment, Bradley’s theory of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_114\"\u003e114\u0026ndash;117\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli class=\"isub1\"\u003eof the past, \u003ca href=\"#Page_160\"\u003e160\u0026ndash;61\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_165\"\u003e165\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli class=\"isub1\"\u003eKant’s theory of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_272\"\u003e272\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cli class=\"ifrst\"\u003eKant, \u003ca href=\"#Page_63\"\u003e63\u0026ndash;65\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_206\"\u003e206\u0026ndash;213\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_271\"\u003e271\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cli class=\"indx\"\u003eKnowledge, its proper object, \u003ca href=\"#Page_6\"\u003e6\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_10\"\u003e10\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_14\"\u003e14\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli class=\"isub1\"\u003eand nature, \u003ca href=\"#Page_41\"\u003e41\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli class=\"isub1\"\u003eand freedom, \u003ca href=\"#Page_73\"\u003e73\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli class=\"isub1\"\u003eThe Experimental Theory of, \u003ccite\u003eEssay IV.\u003c/cite\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_77\"\u003e77\u0026ndash;111\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli class=\"isub1\"\u003edefined, \u003ca href=\"#Page_90\"\u003e90\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli class=\"isub1\"\u003eand inquiry, \u003ca href=\"#Page_184\"\u003e184\u0026ndash;189\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli class=\"isub1\"\u003e\u003ccite\u003eEssay XI.\u003c/cite\u003e, problem of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_271\"\u003e271\u0026ndash;304\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cli class=\"ifrst\"\u003eLocke, \u003ca href=\"#Page_93\"\u003e93\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_202\"\u003e202\u0026ndash;204\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_217\"\u003e217\u0026ndash;218\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cli class=\"ifrst\"\u003eMaine, Sir Henry, quoted, \u003ca href=\"#Page_46\"\u003e46\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cli class=\"indx\"\u003eMeaning, and knowledge, \u003ca href=\"#Page_87\"\u003e87\u0026ndash;90\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli class=\"isub1\"\u003eand judgment, \u003ca href=\"#Page_116\"\u003e116\u0026ndash;117\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_200\"\u003e200\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cli class=\"indx\"\u003eMechanism, \u003ca href=\"#Page_23\"\u003e23\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_34\"\u003e34\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_57\"\u003e57\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cli class=\"indx\"\u003eMemory, \u003ca href=\"#Page_220\"\u003e220\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cli class=\"indx\"\u003eMoore, A. W., \u003ca href=\"#Page_91\"\u003e91\u003c/a\u003e n.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cli class=\"indx\"\u003eMorals, \u003ccite\u003eEssay III.\u003c/cite\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_46\"\u003e46\u0026ndash;76\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cli class=\"indx\"\u003eMysticism, \u003ca href=\"#Page_38\"\u003e38\u0026ndash;40\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_42\"\u003e42\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cli class=\"ifrst\"\u003eNaturalism, \u003ca href=\"#Page_195\"\u003e195\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cli class=\"indx\"\u003eNature, teleology of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_10\"\u003e10\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli class=\"isub1\"\u003eThe Good of, \u003ccite\u003eEssay II.\u003c/cite\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_20\"\u003e20\u0026ndash;45\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli class=\"isub1\"\u003eanimistic character of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_51\"\u003e51\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli class=\"isub1\"\u003echange in, \u003ca href=\"#Page_72\"\u003e72\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cli class=\"indx\"\u003eNewton, influence of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_61\"\u003e61\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_72\"\u003e72\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cli class=\"ifrst\"\u003eOrganization, of experience, \u003ca href=\"#Page_208\"\u003e208\u0026ndash;211\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cli class=\"ifrst\"\u003ePerception, ambiguity of term, \u003ca href=\"#Page_214\"\u003e214\u0026ndash;219\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cli class=\"indx\"\u003ePhilosophy, changes in, \u003ca href=\"#Page_14\"\u003e14\u0026ndash;19\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli class=\"isub1\"\u003epolitical nature of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_21\"\u003e21\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli class=\"isub1\"\u003edefined, \u003ca href=\"#Page_45\"\u003e45\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli class=\"isub1\"\u003eand science, \u003ca href=\"#Page_51\"\u003e51\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli class=\"isub1\"\u003eand psychology, \u003ca href=\"#Page_189\"\u003e189\u0026ndash;191\u003c/a\u003e;\u003cspan class=\"pagenum\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Page_309\"\u003e309\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli class=\"isub1\"\u003e\u003ccite\u003eEssay X.\u003c/cite\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_242\"\u003e242\u0026ndash;270\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cli class=\"indx\"\u003ePlato, \u003ca href=\"#Page_21\"\u003e21\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_47\"\u003e47\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_49\"\u003e49\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_72\"\u003e72\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_219\"\u003e219\u003c/a\u003e n., \u003ca href=\"#Page_278\"\u003e278\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cli class=\"indx\"\u003ePragmatism, \u003ca href=\"#Page_25\"\u003e25\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_31\"\u003e31\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_33\"\u003e33\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_55\"\u003e55\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_95\"\u003e95\u003c/a\u003e n., \u003ca href=\"#Page_109\"\u003e109\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_130\"\u003e130\u003c/a\u003e n., \u003ca href=\"#Page_144\"\u003e144\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli class=\"isub1\"\u003e\u003ccite\u003eEssay V.\u003c/cite\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_154\"\u003e154\u0026ndash;168\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_193\"\u003e193\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cli class=\"indx\"\u003ePsychical, \u003ca href=\"#Page_81\"\u003e81\u003c/a\u003e n., \u003ca href=\"#Page_104\"\u003e104\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cli class=\"indx\"\u003ePsychology, and philosophy, \u003ccite\u003eEssay X.\u003c/cite\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_242\"\u003e242\u0026ndash;270\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_301\"\u003e301\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cli class=\"ifrst\"\u003eRationalism, \u003ccite\u003eEssay XI.\u003c/cite\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_271\"\u003e271\u0026ndash;304\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cli class=\"indx\"\u003e“Reality,” \u003ca href=\"#Page_98\"\u003e98\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_105\"\u003e105\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_113\"\u003e113\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_129\"\u003e129\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_169\"\u003e169\u003c/a\u003e n., \u003ca href=\"#Page_172\"\u003e172\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_228\"\u003e228\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_264\"\u003e264\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cli class=\"indx\"\u003eRelation, and appearance, \u003ca href=\"#Page_119\"\u003e119\u0026ndash;120\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cli class=\"ifrst\"\u003eSantayana, G., \u003ca href=\"#Page_96\"\u003e96\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_224\"\u003e224\u003c/a\u003e n.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cli class=\"indx\"\u003eSciences, developed out of morals, \u003ca href=\"#Page_56\"\u003e56\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli class=\"isub1\"\u003eand industry, \u003ca href=\"#Page_57\"\u003e57\u0026ndash;58\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli class=\"isub1\"\u003eas mode of knowledge, \u003ca href=\"#Page_108\"\u003e108\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli class=\"isub1\"\u003eand philosophy, \u003ca href=\"#Page_268\"\u003e268\u0026ndash;270\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_287\"\u003e287\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cli class=\"indx\"\u003eSensation, \u003ca href=\"#Page_94\"\u003e94\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_262\"\u003e262\u003c/a\u003e n.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cli class=\"indx\"\u003eSensationalism, \u003ccite\u003eEssay XI.\u003c/cite\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_271\"\u003e271\u0026ndash;304\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cli class=\"indx\"\u003eSocial Ethics, \u003ca href=\"#Page_302\"\u003e302\u0026ndash;304\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cli class=\"indx\"\u003eSocrates, \u003ca href=\"#Page_51\"\u003e51\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_76\"\u003e76\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_275\"\u003e275\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_304\"\u003e304\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cli class=\"indx\"\u003eSpecies, equivalent to scholastic form, \u003ca href=\"#Page_3\"\u003e3\u0026ndash;4\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli class=\"isub1\"\u003eas eternal and teleological, \u003ca href=\"#Page_4\"\u003e4\u0026ndash;5\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli class=\"isub1\"\u003ebasis of knowledge, \u003ca href=\"#Page_6\"\u003e6\u0026ndash;7\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cli class=\"indx\"\u003eSpencer, Herbert, \u003ca href=\"#Page_16\"\u003e16\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_33\"\u003e33\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_66\"\u003e66\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cli class=\"indx\"\u003eSpinoza, \u003ca href=\"#Page_181\"\u003e181\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cli class=\"indx\"\u003eStoicism, \u003ca href=\"#Page_172\"\u003e172\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_279\"\u003e279\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cli class=\"indx\"\u003eStuart, H. W., \u003ca href=\"#Page_214\"\u003e214\u003c/a\u003e n.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cli class=\"indx\"\u003eSubjective, \u003ca href=\"#Page_98\"\u003e98\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_155\"\u003e155\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_204\"\u003e204\u003c/a\u003e n., \u003ca href=\"#Page_270\"\u003e270\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cli class=\"ifrst\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Teleology\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eTeleology, of life, \u003ca href=\"#Page_4\"\u003e4\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli class=\"isub1\"\u003eof nature, \u003ca href=\"#Page_10\"\u003e10\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_32\"\u003e32\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli class=\"isub1\"\u003ebasis of idealism, \u003ca href=\"#Page_11\"\u003e11\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli class=\"isub1\"\u003econcrete, \u003ca href=\"#Page_15\"\u003e15\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_22\"\u003e22\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli class=\"isub1\"\u003eand evolution, \u003ca href=\"#Page_32\"\u003e32\u0026ndash;35\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli class=\"isub1\"\u003esubjective, \u003ca href=\"#Page_223\"\u003e223\u0026ndash;224\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cli class=\"indx\"\u003eTheory, \u003ca href=\"#Page_124\"\u003e124\u0026ndash;127\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cli class=\"indx\"\u003eThinking, practical character of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_124\"\u003e124\u0026ndash;127\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cli class=\"indx\"\u003eTolstoi, \u003ca href=\"#Page_173\"\u003e173\u003c/a\u003e n.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cli class=\"indx\"\u003eTranscendence, of knowledge, \u003ca href=\"#Page_103\"\u003e103\u003c/a\u003e n., \u003ca href=\"#Page_156\"\u003e156\u0026ndash;157\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cli class=\"indx\"\u003eTranscendental, and supernatural, \u003ca href=\"#Page_22\"\u003e22\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_29\"\u003e29\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_282\"\u003e282\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli class=\"isub1\"\u003eview of knowledge, \u003ca href=\"#Page_24\"\u003e24\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_27\"\u003e27\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli class=\"isub1\"\u003efreedom, \u003ca href=\"#Page_74\"\u003e74\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cli class=\"indx\"\u003eTruth, criterion of, \u003ca href=\"#Page_92\"\u003e92\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_95\"\u003e95\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_107\"\u003e107\u0026ndash;111\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli class=\"isub1\"\u003e\u003ccite\u003eEssay IV.\u003c/cite\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_112\"\u003e112\u0026ndash;153\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli class=\"isub1\"\u003eabsolute, \u003ca href=\"#Page_137\"\u003e137\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli class=\"isub1\"\u003eidentified with existence, \u003ca href=\"#Page_138\"\u003e138\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_145\"\u003e145\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli class=\"isub1\"\u003eeternal, \u003ca href=\"#Page_147\"\u003e147\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_152\"\u003e152\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli class=\"isub1\"\u003e\u003ccite\u003eEssay V.\u003c/cite\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_154\"\u003e154\u0026ndash;168\u003c/a\u003e;\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003cli class=\"isub1\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Page_230\"\u003e230\u0026ndash;231\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_237\"\u003e237\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Page_282\"\u003e282\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cli class=\"ifrst\"\u003eUtilitarianism, \u003ca href=\"#Page_62\"\u003e62\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cli class=\"ifrst\"\u003eVerification, making true, \u003ca href=\"#Page_139\"\u003e139\u003c/a\u003e ff., \u003ca href=\"#Page_162\"\u003e162\u0026ndash;164\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cli class=\"ifrst\"\u003eWoodbridge, F. J. E., \u003ca href=\"#Page_104\"\u003e104\u003c/a\u003e n., \u003ca href=\"#Page_240\"\u003e240\u003c/a\u003e n.\u003c/li\u003e\r\n\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnotes\"\u003e\r\n\u003ch2 class=\"nobreak p1\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"FOOTNOTES\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eFOOTNOTES\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"fn1\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_1\" href=\"#FNanchor_1\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e1\u003c/a\u003e The affair is even more portentous in the German with\r\nits capital letters and series of \u003cem\u003emuses\u003c/em\u003e: “\u003cspan xml:lang=\"de\" lang=\"de\"\u003eGewiss ist der\r\nPragmatismus erkenntnisstheoretisch Nominalismus, psychologisch\r\nVoluntarismus, naturphilosophisch Energismus,\r\nmetaphysisch Agnosticismus, ethisch Meliorismus auf\r\nGrundlage des Bentham-Millschen Utilitarismus.\u003c/span\u003e”\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"fn1\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_2\" href=\"#FNanchor_2\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e2\u003c/a\u003e A lecture in a course of public lectures on “Charles\r\nDarwin and His Influence on Science,” given at Columbia\r\nUniversity in the winter and spring of 1909. Reprinted\r\nfrom the \u003ccite\u003ePopular Science Monthly\u003c/cite\u003e for July, 1909.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"fn1\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_3\" href=\"#FNanchor_3\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e3\u003c/a\u003e “Life and Letters,” Vol. I., p. 282; cf. 285.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"fn1\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_4\" href=\"#FNanchor_4\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e4\u003c/a\u003e “Life and Letters,” Vol. II., pp. 146, 170, 245; Vol. I.,\r\npp. 283\u0026ndash;84. See also the closing portion of his “Variations\r\nof Animals and Plants under Domestication.”\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"fn1\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_5\" href=\"#FNanchor_5\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e5\u003c/a\u003e Reprinted from the \u003ccite\u003eHibbert Journal\u003c/cite\u003e, Vol. VII., No. 4,\r\nJuly, 1909.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"fn1\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_6\" href=\"#FNanchor_6\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e6\u003c/a\u003e A public lecture delivered at Columbia University in\r\nMarch, 1908, under the title of “Ethics,” in a series of\r\nlectures on “Science, Philosophy, and Art.” Reprinted\r\nfrom a monograph published by the Columbia University\r\nPress.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"fn1\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_7\" href=\"#FNanchor_7\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e7\u003c/a\u003e Reprinted, with considerable change in the arrangement\r\nand in the matter of the latter portion, from \u003ccite\u003eMind\u003c/cite\u003e,\r\nVol. XV., N.S., July, 1906.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"fn1\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_8\" href=\"#FNanchor_8\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e8\u003c/a\u003e I must remind the reader again of a point already suggested.\r\nIt is the identification of presence in consciousness\r\nwith knowledge as such that leads to setting up \u003cem\u003ea\u003c/em\u003e mind\r\n(\u003cem\u003eego\u003c/em\u003e, subject) which has the peculiar property of knowing\r\n(only so often it knows wrong!), or else that leads to\r\nsupplying “sensations” with the peculiar property of surveying\r\ntheir own entrails. Given the correct feeling that\r\nknowledge involves relationship, there being, by supposition,\r\nno other \u003cem\u003ething\u003c/em\u003e to which the thing in consciousness is related,\r\nit is forthwith related to a soul substance, or to its ghostly\r\noffspring, a “subject,” or to “consciousness” itself.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"fn1\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_9\" href=\"#FNanchor_9\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e9\u003c/a\u003e Let us further recall that this theory requires either that\r\nthings present shall already be psychical things (feelings,\r\nsensations, etc.), in order to be assimilated to the knowing\r\nmind, subject to consciousness; or else translates genuinely\r\nnaïve realism into the miracle of a mind that gets outside\r\nitself to lay its ghostly hands upon the things of an\r\nexternal world.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"fn2\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_10\" href=\"#FNanchor_10\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e10\u003c/a\u003e This means that things may be present \u003cem\u003eas\u003c/em\u003e known, just as\r\nthey be present as hard or soft, agreeable or disgusting,\r\nhoped for or dreaded. The mediacy, or the art of intervention,\r\nwhich characterizes knowledge, indicates precisely the\r\nway in which known things as known are immediately\r\npresent.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"fn2\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_11\" href=\"#FNanchor_11\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e11\u003c/a\u003e If Hume had had a tithe of the interest in the \u003cem\u003eflux\u003c/em\u003e of\r\nperceptions and in \u003cem\u003ehabit\u003c/em\u003e\u0026mdash;principles of continuity and of\r\norganization\u0026mdash;which he had in distinct and isolated existences,\r\nhe might have saved us both from German \u003ci xml:lang=\"de\" lang=\"de\"\u003eErkenntnisstheorie\u003c/i\u003e,\r\nand from that modern miracle play, the psychology\r\nof elements of consciousness, that under the ægis of\r\nscience, does not hesitate to have psychical elements compound\r\nand breed, and in their agile intangibility put to\r\nshame the performances of their less acrobatic cousins,\r\nphysical atoms.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"fn2\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_12\" href=\"#FNanchor_12\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e12\u003c/a\u003e In other words, the situation as described is not to be\r\nconfused with the case of hunting on purpose to test an idea\r\nregarding the dog.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"fn2\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_13\" href=\"#FNanchor_13\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e13\u003c/a\u003e Dr. Moore, in an essay in “Contributions to Logical\r\nTheory” has brought out clearly, on the basis of a criticism\r\nof the theory of meaning and fulfilment advanced in\r\nRoyce’s “World and Individual,” the full consequences of\r\nthis distinction. I quote one sentence (p. 350): “Surely there\r\nis a pretty discernible difference between experience as a\r\npurposive idea, and the experience which fulfils this purpose.\r\nTo call them both ‘ideas’ is at least confusing.” The text\r\nabove simply adds that there is also a discernible and important\r\ndifference between experiences which, \u003ci xml:lang=\"la\" lang=\"la\"\u003ede facto\u003c/i\u003e, are\r\npurposing and fulfilling (that is, are seen to be such \u003ci xml:lang=\"la\" lang=\"la\"\u003eab\r\nextra\u003c/i\u003e), and those which meant to be such, and are found to\r\nbe what they meant.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"fn2\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_14\" href=\"#FNanchor_14\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e14\u003c/a\u003e The association of science and philosophy with leisure,\r\nwith a certain economic surplus, is not accidental. It is\r\npractically worth while to postpone practice; to substitute\r\ntheorizing, to develop a new and fascinating mode of practice.\r\nBut it is the excess achievement of practice which\r\nmakes this postponement and substitution possible.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"fn2\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_15\" href=\"#FNanchor_15\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e15\u003c/a\u003e It is the failure to grasp the coupling of truth of meaning\r\nwith a \u003cem\u003especific\u003c/em\u003e promise, undertaking, or intention expressed\r\nby a thing which underlies, so far as I can see,\r\nthe criticisms passed upon the experimental or pragmatic\r\nview of the truth. It is the same failure which is responsible\r\nfor the wholly \u003cem\u003eat large\u003c/em\u003e view of truth which characterizes\r\nthe absolutists.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"fn2\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_16\" href=\"#FNanchor_16\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e16\u003c/a\u003e The belief in the \u003cem\u003emetaphysical\u003c/em\u003e transcendence of the object\r\nof knowledge seems to have its real origin in an\r\n\u003cem\u003eempirical\u003c/em\u003e transcendence of a very specific and describable\r\nsort. The thing meaning is one thing; the thing meant is\r\nanother thing, and is (as already pointed out) a thing presented\r\nas not given in the same way as is the thing which\r\nmeans. It is something \u003cem\u003eto be\u003c/em\u003e so given. No amount of careful\r\nand thorough inspection of the indicating and signifying\r\nthings can remove or annihilate this gap. The \u003cem\u003eprobability\u003c/em\u003e\r\nof correct meaning may be increased in varying degrees\u0026mdash;and\r\nthis is what we mean by control. But final certitude\r\ncan never be reached except experimentally\u0026mdash;except by\r\nperforming the operations indicated and discovering whether\r\nor no the intended meaning is fulfilled \u003ci xml:lang=\"la\" lang=\"la\"\u003ein propria persona\u003c/i\u003e.\r\nIn this experimental sense, truth or the object of any given\r\nmeaning is always beyond or outside of the cognitional thing\r\nthat means it. Error as well as truth is a necessary\r\nfunction of knowing. But the non-empirical account of\r\nthis transcendent (or beyond) relationship puts \u003cem\u003eall\u003c/em\u003e the\r\nerror in one place (\u003cem\u003eour\u003c/em\u003e knowledge), and \u003cem\u003eall\u003c/em\u003e the truth in\r\nanother (absolute consciousness or else a thing-in-itself).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"fn2\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_17\" href=\"#FNanchor_17\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e17\u003c/a\u003e Compare his essay, “Does Consciousness Exist?” in\r\nthe \u003ccite\u003eJournal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific\r\nMethods\u003c/cite\u003e, Vol. I., p. 480.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"fn2\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_18\" href=\"#FNanchor_18\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e18\u003c/a\u003e Compare the essay on the “Problem of Consciousness,”\r\nby Professor Woodbridge, in the Garman Memorial Volume,\r\nentitled “Studies in Philosophy and Psychology.”\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"fn2\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_19\" href=\"#FNanchor_19\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e19\u003c/a\u003e Reprinted, with many changes, from an article in \u003ccite\u003eMind\u003c/cite\u003e,\r\nVol. XVI., N.S., July 1907. Although the changes have\r\nbeen made to render the article less technical, it still remains,\r\nI fear, too technical to be intelligible to those not\r\nfamiliar with recent discussions of logical theory.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"fn2\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_20\" href=\"#FNanchor_20\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e20\u003c/a\u003e I follow chiefly Chapter XV. of “Appearance and\r\nReality”\u0026mdash;the chapter on “Thought and Reality.”\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"fn2\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_21\" href=\"#FNanchor_21\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e21\u003c/a\u003e The crux of the argument is contained in Chapters XIII.\r\nand XIV., on the “General Nature of Reality.”\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"fn2\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_22\" href=\"#FNanchor_22\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e22\u003c/a\u003e The same point comes out in Mr. Bradley’s treatment\r\nof the way in which the practical demand for the good or\r\nsatisfaction is to be taken account of in a philosophical conception\r\nof the nature of reality. He admits that it comes\r\nin; but holds that it enters not directly, but because if left\r\noutside it indirectly introduces a feature of “discontent”\r\non the intellectual side (see p. 155). This, as an argument\r\nfor the supremacy of the isolated theoretical standard, loses\r\nall its force if we cease to conceive of intellect as from\r\nthe start an independent function, and realize that intellectual\r\ndiscontent is the practical conflict becoming deliberately\r\naware of itself as the most effective means of its own\r\nrectification.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"fn2\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_23\" href=\"#FNanchor_23\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e23\u003c/a\u003e This suggests that many of the stock arguments against\r\npragmatism fail to take its contention seriously enough.\r\nThey proceed from the assumption that it is an account\r\nof truth which leaves untouched current notions of the\r\nnature of intelligence. But the essential point of pragmatism\r\nis that it bases its changed account of truth on a\r\nchanged conception of the nature of intelligence, both as\r\nto its objective and its method. Now this different account\r\nof intelligence may be wrong, but controversy which leaves\r\nstanding the conventionally current theories about thought\r\nand merely discusses “truth” will not go far. Since truth\r\nis the adequate fulfilment of the function of intelligence, the\r\nquestion turns on the nature of the latter.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"fn2\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_24\" href=\"#FNanchor_24\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e24\u003c/a\u003e Such a statement as, for example, Mr. Bradley’s (\u003ccite\u003eMind\u003c/cite\u003e,\r\nVol. XIII., No. 51, N.S., p. 3, article on “Truth and\r\nPractice”) “The idea works … but is able to work\r\nbecause I have chosen the right idea” surely loses any\r\nargumentative force it may seem to have, when it is recalled\r\nthat, upon the theory argued against, ability to work and\r\nrightness are one and the same thing. If the wording is\r\nchanged to read “The idea is able to work because I have\r\nchosen an idea which is able to work” the question-begging\r\ncharacter of the implied criticism is evident. The\r\nchange of phraseology also may suggest the crucial and\r\npregnant question: How does any one know that an idea\r\nis able to work excepting by setting it at work?\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"fn2\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_25\" href=\"#FNanchor_25\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e25\u003c/a\u003e A paper read in the spring of 1909 before the Philosophical\r\nClub of Smith College and not previously published.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"fn2\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_26\" href=\"#FNanchor_26\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e26\u003c/a\u003e Read as the Presidential Address at the fifth annual\r\nmeeting of the American Philosophical Association, at Cambridge,\r\nDecember 28, 1905, and reprinted with verbal revisions\r\nfrom the \u003ccite\u003ePhilosophical Review\u003c/cite\u003e, Vol. XV., March,\r\n1906. The substitution of the word “Existences” for the\r\nword “Realities” (in the original title) is due to a subsequent\r\nrecognition on my part that the eulogistic historic\r\nassociations with the word “Reality” (against which the\r\npaper was a protest) infected the interpretation of the\r\npaper itself, so that the use of some more colorless word\r\nwas desirable.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"fn2\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_27\" href=\"#FNanchor_27\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e27\u003c/a\u003e Since writing the above I have read the following words\r\nof a candidly unsympathetic friend of philosophy: “Neither\r\nphilosophy nor science can institute man’s relation to the\r\nuniverse, because such reciprocity must have existed before\r\nany kind of science or philosophy can begin; since each\r\ninvestigates phenomena by means of the intellect, and independent\r\nof the position and feeling of the investigator;\r\nwhereas the relation of man to the universe is defined, not\r\nby the intellect alone, but by his sensitive perception aided\r\nby all his spiritual powers. However much one may assure\r\nand instruct a man that all real existence is an idea, that\r\nmatter is made up of atoms, that the essence of life is corporality\r\nor will, that heat, light, movement, electricity, are\r\ndifferent manifestations of one and the same energy, one\r\ncannot thereby explain to a being with pains, pleasures,\r\nhopes, and fears his position in the universe.” Tolstoi, essay\r\non “Religion and Morality,” in “Essays, Letters, and Miscellanies.”\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"fn2\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_28\" href=\"#FNanchor_28\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e28\u003c/a\u003e Hegel may be excepted from this statement. The habit\r\nof interpreting Hegel as a Neo-Kantian, a Kantian enlarged\r\nand purified, is a purely Anglo-American habit.\r\nThis is no place to enter into the intricacies of Hegelian\r\nexegesis, but the subordination of both logical meaning and\r\nof mechanical existence to \u003ci xml:lang=\"de\" lang=\"de\"\u003eGeist\u003c/i\u003e, to life in its own developing\r\nmovement, would seem to stand out in any unbiased\r\nview of Hegel. At all events, I wish to recognize my own\r\npersonal debt to Hegel for the view set forth in this paper,\r\nwithout, of course, implying that it represents Hegel’s own\r\nintention.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"fn2\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_29\" href=\"#FNanchor_29\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e29\u003c/a\u003e There will of course come in time with the development\r\nof this point of view an organon of beliefs. The signs of\r\na genuine as against a simulated belief will be studied;\r\nbelief as a vital personal reaction will be discriminated from\r\nhabitual, incorporate, unquestioned (because unconsciously\r\nexercised) traditions of social classes and professions. In\r\nhis “Will to Believe” Professor James has already laid\r\ndown two traits of genuine belief (viz., “forced option,”\r\nand acceptance of responsibility for results) which are\r\nalmost always ignored in criticisms (really caricatures) of\r\nhis position. In the light of such an organon, one might\r\ncome to doubt whether \u003cem\u003ebelief\u003c/em\u003e in, say, immortality (as distinct\r\nfrom hope on one side and a sort of intellectual balance\r\nof probability of opinion on the other) can genuinely\r\nexist at all.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"fn2\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_30\" href=\"#FNanchor_30\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e30\u003c/a\u003e Reprinted, with slight verbal changes, from the \u003ccite\u003ePhilosophical\r\nReview\u003c/cite\u003e, Vol. XV. (1906).\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"fn2\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_31\" href=\"#FNanchor_31\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e31\u003c/a\u003e C. S. Peirce, \u003ccite\u003eMonist\u003c/cite\u003e, Vol. XVI., p. 150.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"fn2\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_32\" href=\"#FNanchor_32\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e32\u003c/a\u003e \u003ccite\u003ePsychology\u003c/cite\u003e, Vol. II., p. 618.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"fn2\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_33\" href=\"#FNanchor_33\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e33\u003c/a\u003e “Essay concerning Human Understanding,” Book II.,\r\nChapter II., § 2. Locke doubtless derived this notion from\r\nBacon.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"fn2\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_34\" href=\"#FNanchor_34\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e34\u003c/a\u003e It is hardly necessary to refer to the stress placed upon\r\nmathematics, as well as upon fundamental propositions in\r\nlogic, ethics, and cosmology.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"fn2\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_35\" href=\"#FNanchor_35\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e35\u003c/a\u003e Of course there are internal historic connections between\r\nexperience as effective “memory,” and experience as “observation.”\r\nBut the motivation and stress, the problem, has\r\nquite shifted. It may be remarked that Hobbes still writes\r\nunder the influence of the Aristotelian conception. “Experience\r\nis nothing but Memory” (“Elements of Philosophy,”\r\nPart I., Chapter I., § 2), and hence is opposed to science.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"fn2\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_36\" href=\"#FNanchor_36\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e36\u003c/a\u003e There are, of course, anticipations of Hume in Locke.\r\nBut to regard Lockeian experience as equivalent to Humian\r\nis to pervert history. Locke, as he was to himself and to\r\nthe century succeeding him, was not a subjectivist, but in the\r\nmain a common sense objectivist. It was this that gave him\r\nhis historic influence. But so completely has the Hume-Kant\r\ncontroversy dominated recent thinking that it is constantly\r\nprojected backward. Within a few weeks I have\r\nseen three articles, all insisting that the meaning of the\r\nterm experience must be subjective, and stating or implying\r\nthat those who take the term objectively are subverters of\r\nestablished usage! But a casual study of the dictionary\r\nwill reveal that experience has always meant “\u003cem\u003ewhat\u003c/em\u003e is experienced,”\r\nobservation as a source of knowledge, as well as\r\nthe act, fact, or mode of experiencing. In the Oxford Dictionary,\r\nthe (obsolete) sense of “experimental testing,” of\r\nactual “observation of facts and events,” and “the fact of\r\nbeing consciously affected by an act” have almost contemporaneous\r\ndatings, viz., 1384, 1377, and 1382 respectively.\r\nA usage almost more objective than the second, the Baconian\r\nuse, is “what has been experienced; the events that have\r\ntaken place within the knowledge of an individual, a community,\r\nmankind at large, either during a particular period\r\nor generally.” This dates back to 1607. Let us have no\r\nmore captious criticisms and plaints based on ignorance of\r\nlinguistic usage. [This pious wish has not been met. J.\u0026nbsp;D.,\r\n1909.]\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"fn2\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_37\" href=\"#FNanchor_37\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e37\u003c/a\u003e The relationship of organization and thought is precisely\r\nthat which we find psychologically typified by the rhythmic\r\nfunctions of habit and attention, attention being always,\r\n\u003ci xml:lang=\"la\" lang=\"la\"\u003eab quo\u003c/i\u003e, a sign of the failure of habit, and, \u003ci xml:lang=\"la\" lang=\"la\"\u003ead quem\u003c/i\u003e, a reconstructive\r\nmodification of habit.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"fn2\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_38\" href=\"#FNanchor_38\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e38\u003c/a\u003e Compare, for example, Dr. Stuart’s paper in the “Studies\r\nin Logical Theory,” pp. 253\u0026ndash;256. I may here remark that I\r\nremain totally unable to see how the \u003cem\u003einterpretation\u003c/em\u003e of objectivity\r\nto mean controlling conditions of action (negative\r\nand positive as above) derogates at all from its naïve\r\nobjectivity, or how it connotes cognitive subjectivity, or is\r\nin any way incompatible with a common-sense realistic\r\ntheory of perception.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"fn2\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_39\" href=\"#FNanchor_39\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e39\u003c/a\u003e For this suggested interpretation of the esthetic as surprising,\r\nor unintended, gratuitous collateral reinforcement,\r\nsee Gordon, “Psychology of Meaning.”\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"fn2\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_40\" href=\"#FNanchor_40\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e40\u003c/a\u003e This, however, is not strictly true, since Locke goes far to\r\nsupply the means of his own correction in his account of the\r\n“workmanship of the understanding.”\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"fn2\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_41\" href=\"#FNanchor_41\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e41\u003c/a\u003e Plato, especially in his “Theætetus,” seems to have\r\nbegun the procedure of blasting the good name of perceptive\r\nexperience by identifying a late and instrumental\r\ndistinction, having to do with logical control, with all experience\r\nwhatsoever.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"fn2\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_42\" href=\"#FNanchor_42\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e42\u003c/a\u003e Compare James, “Continuous transition is one sort of\r\nconjunctive relation; and to be a radical empiricist means to\r\nhold fast to this conjunctive relation of all others, for this\r\nis the strategic point, the position through which, if a hole\r\nbe made, all the corruptions of dialectics and all the metaphysical\r\nfictions pour into our philosophy.”\u0026mdash;\u003ccite\u003eJournal of\r\nPhilosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods\u003c/cite\u003e, Vol. I., p.\r\n536.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"fn2\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_43\" href=\"#FNanchor_43\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e43\u003c/a\u003e One of the not least of the many merits of Santayana’s\r\n“Life of Reason” is the consistency and vigor with which\r\nis upheld the doctrine that significant idealism means idealization.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"fn2\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_44\" href=\"#FNanchor_44\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e44\u003c/a\u003e Reprinted, with very slight change, from the \u003ccite\u003eJournal of\r\nPhilosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods\u003c/cite\u003e, Vol. II., No.\r\n15, July, 1905.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"fn2\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_45\" href=\"#FNanchor_45\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e45\u003c/a\u003e All labels are, of course, obnoxious and misleading. I\r\nhope, however, the term will be taken by the reader in the\r\nsense in which it is forthwith explained, and not in some\r\nmore usual and familiar sense. Empiricism, as herein used,\r\nis as antipodal to sensationalistic empiricism, as it is to\r\ntranscendentalism, and for the same reason. Both of these\r\nsystems fall back on something which is defined in non-directly-experienced\r\nterms in order to justify that which is\r\ndirectly experienced. Hence I have criticised such empiricism\r\n(\u003ccite\u003ePhilosophical Review\u003c/cite\u003e, Vol. XI., No. 4, p. 364) as essentially\r\nabsolutistic in character; and also (“Studies in\r\nLogical Theory,” pp. 30, 58) as an attempt to build up experience\r\nin terms of certain methodological checks and cues\r\nof attaining \u003cem\u003ecertainty\u003c/em\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"fn2\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_46\" href=\"#FNanchor_46\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e46\u003c/a\u003e I hope the reader will not therefore assume that from\r\nthe empiricist’s standpoint knowledge is of small worth\r\nor import. On the contrary, from the empiricist’s standpoint\r\nit has \u003cem\u003eall\u003c/em\u003e the worth which it is concretely experienced\r\nas possessing\u0026mdash;which is simply tremendous. But the exact\r\n\u003cem\u003enature\u003c/em\u003e of this worth is a thing to be found out in describing\r\nwhat we mean by experiencing objects as known\u0026mdash;the actual\r\ndifferences made or found in experience.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"fn2\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_47\" href=\"#FNanchor_47\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e47\u003c/a\u003e Since the non-empiricist believes in things-in-themselves\r\n(which he may term “atoms,” “sensations,” transcendental\r\nunities, \u003ci xml:lang=\"la\" lang=\"la\"\u003ea priori\u003c/i\u003e concepts, \u003cem\u003ean\u003c/em\u003e absolute experience, or whatever),\r\nand since he finds that the empiricist makes much of\r\nchange (as he must, since change is continuously experienced)\r\nhe assumes that the empiricist means \u003cem\u003ehis own\u003c/em\u003e non-empirical\r\nRealities are in continual flux, and he naturally\r\nshudders at having his divinities so violently treated. But,\r\nonce recognize that the empiricist doesn’t have any such\r\nRealities at all, and the entire problem of the relation of\r\nchange to reality takes a very different aspect.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"fn2\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_48\" href=\"#FNanchor_48\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e48\u003c/a\u003e It would lead us aside from the point to try to tell\r\njust what is the nature of the experienced difference we call\r\ntruth. Professor James’s recent articles may well be consulted.\r\nThe point to bear in mind here is just what sort\r\nof a thing the empiricist must mean by true, or truer (the\r\nnoun Truth is, of course, a generic name for all cases of\r\n“Trues”). The adequacy of any particular account is not\r\na matter to be settled by general reasoning, but by finding\r\nout what sort of an experience the truth-experience actually\r\nis.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"fn2\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_49\" href=\"#FNanchor_49\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e49\u003c/a\u003e I say “relatively,” because the transcendentalist still\r\nholds that finally the cognition is imperfect, giving us only\r\nsome symbol or phenomenon of Reality (which \u003cem\u003eis\u003c/em\u003e only in\r\nthe Absolute or in some Thing-in-Itself)\u0026mdash;otherwise the\r\ncurtain-wind fact would have as much ontological reality as\r\nthe existence of the Absolute itself: a conclusion at which\r\nthe non-empiricist perhorresces, for no reason obvious to\r\nme\u0026mdash;save that it would put an end to his transcendentalism.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"fn2\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_50\" href=\"#FNanchor_50\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e50\u003c/a\u003e In general, I think the distinction between -\u003cem\u003eive\u003c/em\u003e and -\u003cem\u003eed\u003c/em\u003e\r\none of the most fundamental of philosophic distinctions, and\r\none of the most neglected. The same holds of -\u003cem\u003etion\u003c/em\u003e and -\u003cem\u003eing\u003c/em\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"fn2\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_51\" href=\"#FNanchor_51\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e51\u003c/a\u003e What is criticised, now as “geneticism” (if I may coin\r\nthe word) and now as “pragmatism” is, in its truth, just\r\nthe fact that the empiricist does take account of the experienced\r\n“drift, occasion, and contexture” of things experienced\u0026mdash;to\r\nuse Hobbes’s phrase.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"fn2\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_52\" href=\"#FNanchor_52\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e52\u003c/a\u003e Perhaps the point would be clearer if expressed in this\r\nway: Except as subsequent estimates of \u003cem\u003eworth\u003c/em\u003e are introduced,\r\n“real” means only existent. The eulogistic connotation\r\nthat makes the term Reality equivalent to \u003cem\u003etrue\u003c/em\u003e or\r\n\u003cem\u003egenuine\u003c/em\u003e being has great pragmatic significance, but its confusion\r\nwith reality as existence is the point aimed at in the\r\nabove paragraph.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"fn2\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_53\" href=\"#FNanchor_53\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e53\u003c/a\u003e One does not so easily escape medieval Realism as one\r\nthinks. Either every experienced thing has its own determinateness,\r\nits own unsubstitutable, unredeemable reality, or\r\nelse “generals” \u003cem\u003eare\u003c/em\u003e separate existences after all.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"fn2\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_54\" href=\"#FNanchor_54\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e54\u003c/a\u003e Excepting, of course, some negative ones. One could\r\nsay that certain views are certainly \u003cem\u003enot\u003c/em\u003e true, because, by\r\nhypothesis, they refer to nonentities, \u003ci xml:lang=\"la\" lang=\"la\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/i\u003e, non-empiricals.\r\nBut even here the empiricist must go slowly. From his\r\nown standpoint, even the most professedly transcendental\r\nstatements are, after all, real as experiences, and hence\r\nnegotiate some transaction with facts. For this reason, he\r\ncannot, in theory, reject them \u003ci xml:lang=\"la\" lang=\"la\"\u003ein toto\u003c/i\u003e, but has to show concretely\r\nhow they arose and how they are to be corrected.\r\nIn a word, his logical relationship to statements that profess\r\nto relate to things-in-themselves, unknowables, inexperienced\r\nsubstances, etc., is precisely that of the psychologist\r\nto the Zöllner lines.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"fn2\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_55\" href=\"#FNanchor_55\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e55\u003c/a\u003e Delivered as a public address before the Philosophic\r\nUnion of the University of California, with the title\r\n“Psychology and Philosophic Method,” May, 1899, and published\r\nin the \u003ccite\u003eUniversity Chronicle\u003c/cite\u003e for August, 1899. Reprinted,\r\nwith slight verbal changes, mostly excisions.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"fn2\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_56\" href=\"#FNanchor_56\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e56\u003c/a\u003e This is a fact not without its bearings upon the question\r\nof the nature and value of introspection. The objection that\r\nintrospection “alters” the reality and hence is untrustworthy,\r\nmost writers dispose of by saying that, after all, it\r\nneed not alter the reality so very much\u0026mdash;not beyond repair\u0026mdash;and\r\nthat, moreover, memory assists in restoring the ruins.\r\nIt would be simpler to admit the fact: that the purpose\r\nof introspection is precisely to effect the right sort of alteration.\r\nIf introspection should give us the original experience\r\nagain, we should just be living through the experience\r\nover again in direct fashion; as psychologists we should not\r\nbe forwarded one bit. Reflection upon this obvious proposition\r\nmay bring to light various other matters worthy of note.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"fn2\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_57\" href=\"#FNanchor_57\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e57\u003c/a\u003e Thus to divorce “structure psychology” from “function\r\npsychology” is to leave us without possibility of scientific\r\ncomprehension of function, while it deprives us of all\r\nstandard of reference in selecting, observing, and explaining\r\nthe structure.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"fn2\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_58\" href=\"#FNanchor_58\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e58\u003c/a\u003e The following answer may fairly be anticipated: “This\r\nis true of the operations cited, but only because complex\r\nprocesses have been selected. Such a term as ‘knowing’\r\ndoes of course express a function involving a system of\r\nintricate references. But, for that very reason, we go back\r\nto the sensation which is the genuine type of the ‘state\r\nof consciousness’ as such, pure and unadulterate and unsophisticated.”\r\nThe point is large for a footnote, but the\r\nfollowing considerations are instructive: (1) The same\r\npsychologist will go on to inform us that sensations, as\r\nwe experience them, are networks of reference\u0026mdash;they are\r\nperceptual, and more or less conceptual even. From which\r\nit would appear that whatever else they are or are not,\r\nthe sensations, for which self-inclosed existence is claimed,\r\nare \u003cem\u003enot\u003c/em\u003e states of consciousness. And (2) we are told that\r\nthese are reached by scientific abstraction in order to account\r\nfor complex forms. From which it would appear\r\nthat they are hypothecated as products of interpretation\r\nand for purposes of further interpretation. Only the delusion\r\nthat the more complex forms are just aggregates (instead\r\nof being acts, like seeing, hoping, etc.) prevents\r\nrecognition of the point in question\u0026mdash;that the “state of\r\nconsciousness” is an instrument of inquiry or methodological\r\nappliance.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"fn2\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_59\" href=\"#FNanchor_59\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e59\u003c/a\u003e On the other hand, if what we are trying to get at is\r\njust the course and procedure of experiencing, of course\r\nany consideration that helps distinguish and make comprehensible\r\nthat process is thoroughly pertinent.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"fn2\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_60\" href=\"#FNanchor_60\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e60\u003c/a\u003e It may avoid misunderstanding if I anticipate here\r\na subsequent remark: that my point is not in the least that\r\n“states of consciousness” require some “synthetic unity”\r\nor faculty of substantial mind to effect their association.\r\nQuite the contrary; for this theory also admits the “states\r\nof consciousness” as existences in themselves also. My\r\ncontention is that the “state of consciousness” as such is\r\nalways a methodological product, developed in the course\r\nand for the purposes of psychological analysis.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"fn2\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_61\" href=\"#FNanchor_61\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e61\u003c/a\u003e The “functions” are in truth ordinary everyday acts\r\nand attitudes: seeing, smelling, talking, listening, remembering,\r\nhoping, loving, fearing.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"fn2\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_62\" href=\"#FNanchor_62\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e62\u003c/a\u003e This is perhaps a suitable moment to allude to the absence,\r\nin this discussion, of reference to what is sometimes\r\ntermed rational psychology\u0026mdash;the assumption of a\r\nseparate, substantialized ego, soul, or whatever, existing\r\nside by side with particular experiences and “states of consciousness,”\r\nacting upon them and acted upon by them. In\r\nignoring this and confining myself to the “states of consciousness”\r\ntheory and the “natural history” theory, I\r\nmay appear not only to have unduly narrowed the concerns\r\nat issue, but to have weakened my own point, as this doctrine\r\nseems to offer a special vantage ground whence to\r\ndefend the close relationship of psychology and philosophy.\r\nThe “narrowing,” if such it be, will have to pass\u0026mdash;from\r\nlimits of time and other matters. But the other point\r\nI cannot concede. The independently existing soul restricts\r\nand degrades individuality, making of it a separate thing\r\noutside of the full flow of things, alien to things experienced\r\nand consequently in either mechanical or miraculous\r\nrelations to them. It is vitiated by just the quality already\r\nobjected to\u0026mdash;that psychology has a separate piece of reality\r\napportioned to it, instead of occupying itself with the\r\nmanifestation and operation of any and all existences in\r\nreference to concrete action. From this point of view, the\r\n“states of consciousness” attitude is a much more hopeful\r\nand fruitful one. It ignores certain considerations, to be\r\nsure; and when it turns its ignoring into denial, it leaves\r\nus with curious hieroglyphics. But after all, there is a key;\r\nthese symbols can be read; they may be translated into\r\nterms of the course of experience. When thus translated,\r\nselfhood, individuality, is neither wiped out nor set up as a\r\nmiraculous and foreign entity; it is seen as the unity of\r\nreference and function involved in all things when fully\r\nexperienced\u0026mdash;the pivot about which they turn.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"fn2\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Footnote_63\" href=\"#FNanchor_63\" class=\"fnanchor\"\u003e63\u003c/a\u003e Delivered before the Philosophical Club of the University\r\nof Michigan, in the winter of 1897, and reprinted with\r\nslight change from a monograph in the “University of Chicago\r\nContributions to Philosophy,” 1897.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"transnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ch2 class=\"nobreak p1\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"Transcribers_Notes\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eTranscriber’s Notes\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003ePunctuation, hyphenation, and spelling were made consistent when a predominant\r\npreference was found in this book; otherwise they were not changed.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eSimple typographical errors were corrected; occasional unbalanced\r\nquotation marks retained.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eAmbiguous hyphens at the ends of lines were retained.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003eIndex not checked for proper alphabetization or correct page references.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003ePage \u003ca href=\"#Page_24\"\u003e24\u003c/a\u003e: “transgression” was misprinted as “trangression”; changed here.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003ePage \u003ca href=\"#Page_39\"\u003e39\u003c/a\u003e: “bewrayeth” was printed that way.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003ePage \u003ca href=\"#Page_158\"\u003e158\u003c/a\u003e: “cor-respondence” was printed with the hyphen.\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/article\u003e"}],"SectionSequence":["Back Link","Work Title","Deck","Author","Period","Era","Composition","Date Note","Region","Terra Avita","Terra Avita Region","Modern Country","Original Title","Language","Primary Discipline","Secondary Discipline","Tradition","Full Versions","Core Thesis","Classification","Arguments","Influence","Significance","Evidence Note","Full Text"],"Counts":{"ContextCards":3,"GeoCards":4,"DisciplineCards":2,"Links":11,"Sections":25,"Styles":3,"Scripts":1}}