A System of Logic
{"WorkMasterId":6365,"WpPageId":281647,"ParentWpPageId":193819,"Slug":"system-of-logic","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/john-stuart-mill/system-of-logic/","RelativeUrl":"theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/john-stuart-mill/system-of-logic/","HasFullText":true,"RawHtmlLength":3075290,"CleanHtmlLength":3019180,"Kicker":"Philosophy Work","Title":"A System of Logic","Deck":"Mill develops an empiricist logic of inference, induction, causation, evidence, scientific method, and the moral sciences.","BackLink":{"Text":"Back to John Stuart Mill","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/john-stuart-mill/"},"AuthorCard":{"Label":"Author","Title":"John Stuart Mill","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/john-stuart-mill/","MediaHref":"","ImageSrc":"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/john-stuart-mill-01-london-stereoscopic-c1870-portrait-1.jpg","ImageAlt":"John Stuart Mill by the London Stereoscopic Company, c. 1870","FilterTerra":"Western Europe","ClickText":"John Stuart Mill","ClickHref":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/john-stuart-mill/","Copies":["1806 CE – 1873 CE","Pentonville, London","English liberal utilitarian philosopher of liberty, individuality, higher pleasures, inductive logic, political economy, representative government, women\u0027s equality, religious skepticism, and empiricist method."]},"ContextCards":[{"Label":"Period","Key":"Period:4","Title":"Modern History","DateText":"1800 CE – 1944 CE","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/eras-of-thought/philosophers-of-modern-history/"},{"Label":"Era","Key":"Era:11","Title":"Long 19th Century","DateText":"1870 CE – 1913 CE","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/eras-of-thought/philosophers-of-modern-history/philosophers-of-the-long-19th-century/"},{"Label":"Composition","Title":"1843 CE","Url":"","DateText":""}],"DateNote":"Displayed as 1843 CE for the first publication; later revised editions are evidence, not duplicate work rows.","GeoCards":[{"Label":"Region","Key":"Region:1"},{"Label":"Terra Avita","Key":"TerraAvita:1"},{"Label":"Terra Avita Region","Key":"TerraAvitaRegion:2"},{"Label":"Modern Country","Key":"Country:GBR:1"}],"OriginalTitle":"A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive","Language":"English","DisciplineCards":[{"Label":"Primary Discipline","Key":"Discipline:logic"},{"Label":"Secondary Discipline","Key":"Discipline:philosophy-of-science"}],"Tradition":"British empiricism; liberal utilitarianism; associationism; political economy; social reform","FullText":{"Title":"Full Text","Copy":"Public-domain full text from Project Gutenberg eBook #27942 .","Url":"","Label":"","Kicker":"","Cards":[]},"CoreThesis":["Mill develops an empiricist logic of inference, induction, causation, evidence, scientific method, and the moral sciences."],"Classification":{"AlternateTitles":"System of Logic; Mill\u0027s Logic","KeyConcepts":"logic; induction; causation; evidence; scientific method; moral sciences; Mill\u0027s methods","Methodology":"Direct Mill work-cluster record based on SEP, IEP, Britannica, OLL Collected Works, Gutenberg/Wikisource surfaces, catalog records, and scholarship. No full text is imported.","Structure":"One work-cluster page with explicit integer display year, date note, evidence note, discipline mapping, and public source evidence. Serial publication and posthumous publication notes are documented without importing full text."},"Arguments":["Mill develops an empiricist logic of inference, induction, causation, evidence, scientific method, and the moral sciences."],"Influence":{"InfluencedBy":"James Mill, Jeremy Bentham, Harriet Taylor Mill, David Hume, Adam Smith, Ricardo, Auguste Comte, Coleridge, associationist psychology, British empiricism, and nineteenth-century reform politics.","InfluenceOn":""},"Significance":["Accepted as a direct Mill work through SEP, IEP, OLL, Gutenberg, BHL, Logic Museum, catalog, and scholarship evidence.","Mill remains central for liberty, utilitarian ethics, rights, democracy, public reason, induction, scientific method, women\u0027s equality, political economy, secular religion, and liberal social reform."],"EvidenceNote":["Accepted as a direct Mill work through SEP, IEP, OLL, Gutenberg, BHL, Logic Museum, catalog, and scholarship evidence."],"MainSections":[{"Kind":"RawSection","Title":"Full Versions","BodyHtml":"\u003cdiv class=\"dz-philo__full-version-grid\"\u003e\n \u003carticle class=\"dz-philo__full-version-card\"\u003e\n \u003cp class=\"dz-philo__full-version-provider\"\u003eProject Gutenberg\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003ch3 class=\"dz-philo__full-version-title\"\u003eProject Gutenberg eBook #27942\u003c/h3\u003e\n \u003cp class=\"dz-philo__full-version-meta\"\u003eHtmlText · Imported\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003ca class=\"dz-philo__full-version-link\" href=\"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/27942\"\u003eOpen full version\u003c/a\u003e\n \u003c/article\u003e\n \u003c/div\u003e"},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Core Thesis","Paragraphs":["Mill develops an empiricist logic of inference, induction, causation, evidence, scientific method, and the moral sciences."]},{"Kind":"FieldSection","Title":"Classification","Fields":[{"Label":"Alternate Titles","Value":"System of Logic; Mill\u0027s Logic"},{"Label":"Key Concepts","Value":"logic; induction; causation; evidence; scientific method; moral sciences; Mill\u0027s methods"},{"Label":"Methodology","Value":"Direct Mill work-cluster record based on SEP, IEP, Britannica, OLL Collected Works, Gutenberg/Wikisource surfaces, catalog records, and scholarship. No full text is imported."},{"Label":"Structure","Value":"One work-cluster page with explicit integer display year, date note, evidence note, discipline mapping, and public source evidence. 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Of\r\nNames And Propositions.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli style=\"margin-left: 2em\"\u003e\u003ca\r\nhref=\"#toc9\"\u003eChapter I. Of The Necessity Of Commencing With An\r\nAnalysis Of Language.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli style=\"margin-left: 2em\"\u003e\u003ca\r\nhref=\"#toc11\"\u003eChapter II. Of Names.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli style=\"margin-left:\r\n2em\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#toc13\"\u003eChapter III. Of The Things Denoted By\r\nNames.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli style=\"margin-left: 2em\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#toc15\"\u003eChapter\r\nIV. Of Propositions.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli style=\"margin-left: 2em\"\u003e\u003ca\r\nhref=\"#toc17\"\u003eChapter V. Of The Import Of Propositions.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\r\nstyle=\"margin-left: 2em\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#toc19\"\u003eChapter VI. Of\r\nPropositions Merely Verbal.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli style=\"margin-left: 2em\"\u003e\u003ca\r\nhref=\"#toc21\"\u003eChapter VII. Of The Nature Of Classification, And\r\nThe Five Predicables.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli style=\"margin-left: 2em\"\u003e\u003ca\r\nhref=\"#toc23\"\u003eChapter VIII. Of Definition.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003ca\r\nhref=\"#toc25\"\u003eBook II. On Reasoning.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli style=\"margin-left:\r\n2em\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#toc27\"\u003eChapter I. Of Inference, Or Reasoning, In\r\nGeneral.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli style=\"margin-left: 2em\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#toc29\"\u003eChapter\r\nII. Of Ratiocination, Or Syllogism.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli style=\"margin-left:\r\n2em\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#toc31\"\u003eChapter III. Of The Functions And Logical\r\nValue Of The Syllogism.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli style=\"margin-left:\r\n2em\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#toc33\"\u003eChapter IV. Of Trains Of Reasoning, And\r\nDeductive Sciences.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli style=\"margin-left: 2em\"\u003e\u003ca\r\nhref=\"#toc35\"\u003eChapter V. Of Demonstration, And Necessary\r\nTruths.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli style=\"margin-left: 2em\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#toc37\"\u003eChapter\r\nVI. The Same Subject Continued.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli style=\"margin-left:\r\n2em\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#toc39\"\u003eChapter VII. Examination Of Some\r\nOpinions Opposed To The Preceding Doctrines.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003ca\r\nhref=\"#toc41\"\u003eBook III. Of Induction.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli style=\"margin-left:\r\n2em\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#toc43\"\u003eChapter I. Preliminary Observations\r\nOn Induction In General.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli style=\"margin-left:\r\n2em\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#toc45\"\u003eChapter II. Of Inductions Improperly So\r\nCalled.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli style=\"margin-left: 2em\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#toc47\"\u003eChapter\r\nIII. Of The Ground Of Induction.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli style=\"margin-left:\r\n2em\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#toc49\"\u003eChapter IV. Of Laws Of Nature.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\r\nstyle=\"margin-left: 2em\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#toc51\"\u003eChapter V. Of The Law\r\nOf Universal Causation.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli style=\"margin-left: 2em\"\u003e\u003ca\r\nhref=\"#toc53\"\u003eChapter VI. On The Composition Of Causes.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\r\nstyle=\"margin-left: 2em\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#toc55\"\u003eChapter VII. On\r\nObservation And Experiment.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli style=\"margin-left: 2em\"\u003e\u003ca\r\nhref=\"#toc57\"\u003eChapter VIII. Of The Four Methods Of Experimental\r\nInquiry.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli style=\"margin-left: 2em\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#toc59\"\u003eChapter\r\nIX. Miscellaneous Examples Of The Four Methods.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\r\nstyle=\"margin-left: 2em\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#toc61\"\u003eChapter X. Of Plurality\r\nOf Causes, And Of The Intermixture Of Effects.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\r\nstyle=\"margin-left: 2em\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#toc63\"\u003eChapter XI. Of The Deductive\r\nMethod.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli style=\"margin-left: 2em\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#toc65\"\u003eChapter\r\nXII. Of The Explanation Of Laws Of Nature.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\r\nstyle=\"margin-left: 2em\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#toc67\"\u003eChapter XIII. Miscellaneous\r\nExamples Of The Explanation Of Laws Of Nature.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\r\nstyle=\"margin-left: 2em\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#toc69\"\u003eChapter XIV. Of The Limits\r\nTo The Explanation Of Laws Of Nature; And Of Hypotheses.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\r\nstyle=\"margin-left: 2em\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#toc71\"\u003eChapter XV. Of Progressive\r\nEffects; And Of The Continued Action Of Causes.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\r\nstyle=\"margin-left: 2em\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#toc73\"\u003eChapter XVI. Of Empirical\r\nLaws.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli style=\"margin-left: 2em\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#toc75\"\u003eChapter\r\nXVII. Of Chance And Its Elimination.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli style=\"margin-left:\r\n2em\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#toc77\"\u003eChapter XVIII. Of The Calculation Of\r\nChances.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli style=\"margin-left: 2em\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#toc79\"\u003eChapter\r\nXIX. Of The Extension Of Derivative Laws To Adjacent Cases.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\r\nstyle=\"margin-left: 2em\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#toc81\"\u003eChapter XX. Of\r\nAnalogy.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli style=\"margin-left: 2em\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#toc83\"\u003eChapter\r\nXXI. Of The Evidence Of The Law Of Universal Causation.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\r\nstyle=\"margin-left: 2em\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#toc85\"\u003eChapter XXII. Of\r\nUniformities Of Co-Existence Not Dependent On Causation.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\r\nstyle=\"margin-left: 2em\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#toc86\"\u003eChapter XXIII. Of Approximate Generalizations, And Probable Evidence.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\r\nstyle=\"margin-left: 2em\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#toc87\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\r\nstyle=\"margin-left: 2em\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#toc89\"\u003eChapter XXIV. Of\r\nThe Remaining Laws Of Nature.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli style=\"margin-left:\r\n2em\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#toc91\"\u003eChapter XXV. Of The Grounds Of\r\nDisbelief.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003ca href=\"#toc93\"\u003eBook IV. Of Operations\r\nSubsidiary To Induction.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli style=\"margin-left: 2em\"\u003e\u003ca\r\nhref=\"#toc95\"\u003eChapter I. Of Observation And Description.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\r\nstyle=\"margin-left: 2em\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#toc97\"\u003eChapter II. Of\r\nAbstraction, Or The Formation Of Conceptions.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\r\nstyle=\"margin-left: 2em\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#toc99\"\u003eChapter III. Of Naming,\r\nAs Subsidiary To Induction.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli style=\"margin-left: 2em\"\u003e\u003ca\r\nhref=\"#toc101\"\u003eChapter IV. Of The Requisites Of A Philosophical\r\nLanguage, And The Principles Of Definition.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\r\nstyle=\"margin-left: 2em\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#toc103\"\u003eChapter V. On The Natural\r\nHistory Of The Variations In The Meaning Of Terms.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\r\nstyle=\"margin-left: 2em\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#toc105\"\u003eChapter VI. The Principles\r\nOf A Philosophical Language Further Considered.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\r\nstyle=\"margin-left: 2em\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#toc107\"\u003eChapter VII. Of\r\nClassification, As Subsidiary To Induction.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\r\nstyle=\"margin-left: 2em\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#toc109\"\u003eChapter VIII. Of\r\nClassification By Series.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003ca href=\"#toc111\"\u003eBook\r\nV. On Fallacies.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli style=\"margin-left: 2em\"\u003e\u003ca\r\nhref=\"#toc113\"\u003eChapter I. Of Fallacies In General.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\r\nstyle=\"margin-left: 2em\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#toc115\"\u003eChapter II.\r\nClassification Of Fallacies.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli style=\"margin-left:\r\n2em\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#toc117\"\u003eChapter III. Fallacies Of Simple Inspection;\r\nOr A Priori Fallacies.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli style=\"margin-left: 2em\"\u003e\u003ca\r\nhref=\"#toc119\"\u003eChapter IV. Fallacies Of Observation.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\r\nstyle=\"margin-left: 2em\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#toc121\"\u003eChapter V. Fallacies\r\nOf Generalization.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli style=\"margin-left: 2em\"\u003e\u003ca\r\nhref=\"#toc123\"\u003eChapter VI. Fallacies Of Ratiocination.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\r\nstyle=\"margin-left: 2em\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#toc125\"\u003eChapter VII. Fallacies\r\nOf Confusion.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003ca href=\"#toc127\"\u003eBook VI. On The Logic\r\nOf The Moral Sciences.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli style=\"margin-left: 2em\"\u003e\u003ca\r\nhref=\"#toc129\"\u003eChapter I. Introductory Remarks.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\r\nstyle=\"margin-left: 2em\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#toc131\"\u003eChapter II. Of\r\nLiberty And Necessity.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli style=\"margin-left: 2em\"\u003e\u003ca\r\nhref=\"#toc133\"\u003eChapter III. That There Is, Or May Be, A Science\r\nOf Human Nature.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli style=\"margin-left: 2em\"\u003e\u003ca\r\nhref=\"#toc135\"\u003eChapter IV. Of The Laws Of Mind.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\r\nstyle=\"margin-left: 2em\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#toc137\"\u003eChapter V. Of Ethology,\r\nOr The Science Of The Formation Of Character.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\r\nstyle=\"margin-left: 2em\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#toc139\"\u003eChapter VI.\r\nGeneral Considerations On The Social Science.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\r\nstyle=\"margin-left: 2em\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#toc141\"\u003eChapter VII. Of The\r\nChemical, Or Experimental, Method In The Social Science.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\r\nstyle=\"margin-left: 2em\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#toc143\"\u003eChapter VIII. Of The\r\nGeometrical, Or Abstract, Method.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli style=\"margin-left:\r\n2em\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#toc145\"\u003eChapter IX. Of The Physical, Or Concrete\r\nDeductive, Method.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli style=\"margin-left: 2em\"\u003e\u003ca\r\nhref=\"#toc147\"\u003eChapter X. Of The Inverse Deductive, Or Historical,\r\nMethod.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli style=\"margin-left: 2em\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#toc149\"\u003eChapter\r\nXI. Additional Elucidations Of The Science Of History.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\r\nstyle=\"margin-left: 2em\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#toc151\"\u003eChapter XII. Of The Logic\r\nOf Practice, Or Art; Including Morality And Policy.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003cli\u003e\u003ca\r\nhref=\"#toc153\"\u003eFootnotes\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/li\u003e\u003c/ul\u003e\r\n \u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-body\" style=\"margin-bottom: 6.00em; margin-top: 6.00em\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page003\"\u003e[pg 003]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg003\" id=\"Pg003\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"page\" /\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-div\" style=\"margin-bottom: 5.00em; margin-top: 5.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"toc1\" id=\"toc1\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"pdf2\" id=\"pdf2\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\u0027chapter\u0027 /\u003e\u003ch2 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: left; margin-bottom: 3.46em; margin-top: 3.46em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 173%\"\u003ePreface To The First Edition.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThis book makes no pretense of giving to the world a new theory of the\r\nintellectual operations. Its claim to attention, if it possess any, is grounded\r\non the fact that it is an attempt, not to supersede, but to embody and\r\nsystematize, the best ideas which have been either promulgated on its subject\r\nby speculative writers, or conformed to by accurate thinkers in their\r\nscientific inquiries.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nTo cement together the detached fragments of a subject, never yet treated\r\nas a whole; to harmonize the true portions of discordant theories, by\r\nsupplying the links of thought necessary to connect them, and by disentangling\r\nthem from the errors with which they are always more or less interwoven,\r\nmust necessarily require a considerable amount of original speculation.\r\nTo other originality than this, the present work lays no claim. In\r\nthe existing state of the cultivation of the sciences, there would be a very\r\nstrong presumption against any one who should imagine that he had effected\r\na revolution in the theory of the investigation of truth, or added any\r\nfundamentally new process to the practice of it. The improvement which\r\nremains to be effected in the methods of philosophizing (and the author believes\r\nthat they have much need of improvement) can only consist in performing\r\nmore systematically and accurately operations with which, at least\r\nin their elementary form, the human intellect, in some one or other of its\r\nemployments, is already familiar.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIn the portion of the work which treats of Ratiocination, the author has\r\nnot deemed it necessary to enter into technical details which may be obtained\r\nin so perfect a shape from the existing treatises on what is termed\r\nthe Logic of the Schools. In the contempt entertained by many modern\r\nphilosophers for the syllogistic art, it will be seen that he by no means participates;\r\nthough the scientific theory on which its defense is usually rested\r\nappears to him erroneous: and the view which he has suggested of the\r\nnature and functions of the Syllogism may, perhaps, afford the means of\r\nconciliating the principles of the art with as much as is well grounded in\r\nthe doctrines and objections of its assailants.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe same abstinence from details could not be observed in the First\r\nBook, on Names and Propositions; because many useful principles and distinctions\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page004\"\u003e[pg 004]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg004\" id=\"Pg004\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nwhich were contained in the old Logic have been gradually omitted\r\nfrom the writings of its later teachers; and it appeared desirable both\r\nto revive these, and to reform and rationalize the philosophical foundation\r\non which they stood. The earlier chapters of this preliminary Book will\r\nconsequently appear, to some readers, needlessly elementary and scholastic.\r\nBut those who know in what darkness the nature of our knowledge, and\r\nof the processes by which it is obtained, is often involved by a confused\r\napprehension of the import of the different classes of Words and Assertions,\r\nwill not regard these discussions as either frivolous, or irrelevant to\r\nthe topics considered in the later Books.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nOn the subject of Induction, the task to be performed was that of generalizing\r\nthe modes of investigating truth and estimating evidence, by which\r\nso many important and recondite laws of nature have, in the various sciences,\r\nbeen aggregated to the stock of human knowledge. That this is not\r\na task free from difficulty may be presumed from the fact that even at a\r\nvery recent period, eminent writers (among whom it is sufficient to name\r\nArchbishop Whately, and the author of a celebrated article on Bacon in the\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eEdinburgh Review\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e) have not scrupled to pronounce it\r\nimpossible.\u003ca id=\"noteref_1\" name=\"noteref_1\" href=\"#note_1\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e1\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The\r\nauthor has endeavored to combat their theory in the manner in which Diogenes\r\nconfuted the skeptical reasonings against the possibility of motion;\r\nremembering that Diogenes’s argument would have been equally conclusive,\r\nthough his individual perambulations might not have extended beyond\r\nthe circuit of his own tub.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWhatever may be the value of what the author has succeeded in effecting\r\non this branch of his subject, it is a duty to acknowledge that for much\r\nof it he has been indebted to several important treatises, partly historical\r\nand partly philosophical, on the generalities and processes of physical science,\r\nwhich have been published within the last few years. To these treatises,\r\nand to their authors, he has endeavored to do justice in the body of\r\nthe work. But as with one of these writers, Dr. Whewell, he has occasion\r\nfrequently to express differences of opinion, it is more particularly incumbent\r\non him in this place to declare, that without the aid derived from the\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page005\"\u003e[pg 005]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg005\" id=\"Pg005\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nfacts and ideas contained in that gentleman’s \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“History of the Inductive\r\nSciences,”\u003c/span\u003e the corresponding portion of this work would probably not have\r\nbeen written.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe concluding Book is an attempt to contribute toward the solution of\r\na question which the decay of old opinions, and the agitation that disturbs\r\nEuropean society to its inmost depths, render as important in the present\r\nday to the practical interests of human life, as it must at all times be to the\r\ncompleteness of our speculative knowledge—viz.: Whether moral and social\r\nphenomena are really exceptions to the general certainty and uniformity\r\nof the course of nature; and how far the methods by which so many of\r\nthe laws of the physical world have been numbered among truths irrevocably\r\nacquired and universally assented to, can be made instrumental to\r\nthe formation of a similar body of received doctrine in moral and political\r\nscience.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page007\"\u003e[pg 007]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg007\" id=\"Pg007\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"page\" /\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-div\" style=\"margin-bottom: 5.00em; margin-top: 5.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"toc3\" id=\"toc3\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"pdf4\" id=\"pdf4\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\u0027chapter\u0027 /\u003e\u003ch2 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: left; margin-bottom: 3.46em; margin-top: 3.46em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 173%\"\u003ePreface To The Third And Fourth Editions.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nSeveral criticisms, of a more or less controversial character, on this\r\nwork, have appeared since the publication of the second edition; and Dr.\r\nWhewell has lately published a reply to those parts of it in which some of\r\nhis opinions were controverted.\u003ca id=\"noteref_2\" name=\"noteref_2\" href=\"#note_2\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e2\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nI have carefully reconsidered all the points on which my conclusions\r\nhave been assailed. But I have not to announce a change of opinion on\r\nany matter of importance. Such minor oversights as have been detected,\r\neither by myself or by my critics, I have, in general silently, corrected: but\r\nit is not to be inferred that I agree with the objections which have been\r\nmade to a passage, in every instance in which I have altered or canceled it.\r\nI have often done so, merely that it might not remain a stumbling-block,\r\nwhen the amount of discussion necessary to place the matter in its true\r\nlight would have exceeded what was suitable to the occasion.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nTo several of the arguments which have been urged against me, I have\r\nthought it useful to reply with some degree of minuteness; not from any\r\ntaste for controversy, but because the opportunity was favorable for placing\r\nmy own conclusions, and the grounds of them, more clearly and completely\r\nbefore the reader. Truth on these subjects is militant, and can\r\nonly establish itself by means of conflict. The most opposite opinions can\r\nmake a plausible show of evidence while each has the statement of its own\r\ncase; and it is only possible to ascertain which of them is in the right, after\r\nhearing and comparing what each can say against the other, and what\r\nthe other can urge in its defense.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nEven the criticisms from which I most dissent have been of great service\r\nto me, by showing in what places the exposition most needed to be\r\nimproved, or the argument strengthened. And I should have been well\r\npleased if the book had undergone a much greater amount of attack; as in\r\nthat case I should probably have been enabled to improve it still more than\r\nI believe I have now done.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-tb\"\u003e\u003chr style=\"width: 50%\" /\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIn the subsequent editions, the attempt to improve the work by additions\r\nand corrections, suggested by criticism or by thought, has been continued.\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page008\"\u003e[pg 008]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg008\" id=\"Pg008\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nThe additions and corrections in the present (eighth) edition,\r\nwhich are not very considerable, are chiefly such as have been suggested\r\nby Professor Bain’s \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Logic,”\u003c/span\u003e a book of great merit and value. Mr. Bain’s\r\nview of the science is essentially the same with that taken in the present\r\ntreatise, the differences of opinion being few and unimportant compared\r\nwith the agreements; and he has not only enriched the exposition by many\r\napplications and illustrative details, but has appended to it a minute and\r\nvery valuable discussion of the logical principles specially applicable to\r\neach of the sciences—a task for which the encyclopedical character of his\r\nknowledge peculiarly qualified him. I have in several instances made use\r\nof his exposition to improve my own, by adopting, and occasionally by\r\ncontroverting, matter contained in his treatise.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe longest of the additions belongs to the chapter on Causation, and is\r\na discussion of the question how far, if at all, the ordinary mode of stating\r\nthe law of Cause and Effect requires modification to adapt it to the new\r\ndoctrine of the Conservation of Force—a point still more fully and elaborately\r\ntreated in Mr. Bain’s work.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page017\"\u003e[pg 017]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg017\" id=\"Pg017\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"page\" /\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-div\" style=\"margin-bottom: 5.00em; margin-top: 5.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"toc5\" id=\"toc5\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"pdf6\" id=\"pdf6\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\u0027chapter\u0027 /\u003e\u003ch2 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: left; margin-bottom: 3.46em; margin-top: 3.46em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 173%\"\u003eIntroduction.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 1. There is as great diversity among authors in the modes which they\r\nhave adopted of defining logic, as in their treatment of the details of it.\r\nThis is what might naturally be expected on any subject on which writers\r\nhave availed themselves of the same language as a means of delivering\r\ndifferent ideas. Ethics and jurisprudence are liable to the remark in common\r\nwith logic. Almost every writer having taken a different view of\r\nsome of the particulars which these branches of knowledge are usually\r\nunderstood to include; each has so framed his definition as to indicate\r\nbeforehand his own peculiar tenets, and sometimes to beg the question in\r\ntheir favor.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThis diversity is not so much an evil to be complained of, as an inevitable\r\nand in some degree a proper result of the imperfect state of those\r\nsciences. It is not to be expected that there should be agreement about\r\nthe definition of any thing, until there is agreement about the thing itself.\r\nTo define, is to select from among all the properties of a thing, those which\r\nshall be understood to be designated and declared by its name; and the\r\nproperties must be well known to us before we can be competent to determine\r\nwhich of them are fittest to be chosen for this purpose. Accordingly,\r\nin the case of so complex an aggregation of particulars as are comprehended\r\nin any thing which can be called a science, the definition we set\r\nout with is seldom that which a more extensive knowledge of the subject\r\nshows to be the most appropriate. Until we know the particulars themselves,\r\nwe can not fix upon the most correct and compact mode of circumscribing\r\nthem by a general description. It was not until after an extensive\r\nand accurate acquaintance with the details of chemical phenomena, that it\r\nwas found possible to frame a rational definition of chemistry; and the\r\ndefinition of the science of life and organization is still a matter of dispute.\r\nSo long as the sciences are imperfect, the definitions must partake of their\r\nimperfection; and if the former are progressive, the latter ought to be so\r\ntoo. As much, therefore, as is to be expected from a definition placed at\r\nthe commencement of a subject, is that it should define the scope of our\r\ninquiries: and the definition which I am about to offer of the science of\r\nlogic, pretends to nothing more than to be a statement of the question\r\nwhich I have put to myself, and which this book is an attempt to resolve.\r\nThe reader is at liberty to object to it as a definition of logic; but it is at\r\nall events a correct definition of the subject of this volume.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 2. Logic has often been called the Art of Reasoning. A\r\nwriter\u003ca id=\"noteref_3\" name=\"noteref_3\" href=\"#note_3\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e3\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e who\r\nhas done more than any other person to restore this study to the rank from\r\nwhich it had fallen in the estimation of the cultivated class in our own\r\ncountry, has adopted the above definition with an amendment; he has defined\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page018\"\u003e[pg 018]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg018\" id=\"Pg018\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nLogic to be the Science, as well as the Art, of reasoning; meaning\r\nby the former term, the analysis of the mental process which takes place\r\nwhenever we reason, and by the latter, the rules, grounded on that analysis,\r\nfor conducting the process correctly. There can be no doubt as to the\r\npropriety of the emendation. A right understanding of the mental process\r\nitself, of the conditions it depends on, and the steps of which it consists,\r\nis the only basis on which a system of rules, fitted for the direction of the\r\nprocess, can possibly be founded. Art necessarily presupposes knowledge;\r\nart, in any but its infant state, presupposes scientific knowledge: and if every\r\nart does not bear the name of a science, it is only because several sciences\r\nare often necessary to form the groundwork of a single art. So complicated\r\nare the conditions which govern our practical agency, that to enable\r\none thing to be \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003edone\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e, it is often requisite to \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eknow\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e the nature\r\nand properties of many things.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nLogic, then, comprises the science of reasoning, as well as an art, founded\r\non that science. But the word Reasoning, again, like most other scientific\r\nterms in popular use, abounds in ambiguities. In one of its acceptations,\r\nit means syllogizing; or the mode of inference which may be called\r\n(with sufficient accuracy for the present purpose) concluding from generals\r\nto particulars. In another of its senses, to reason is simply to infer any\r\nassertion, from assertions already admitted: and in this sense induction is\r\nas much entitled to be called reasoning as the demonstrations of geometry.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWriters on logic have generally preferred the former acceptation of the\r\nterm: the latter, and more extensive signification is that in which I mean\r\nto use it. I do this by virtue of the right I claim for every author, to give\r\nwhatever provisional definition he pleases of his own subject. But sufficient\r\nreasons will, I believe, unfold themselves as we advance, why this\r\nshould be not only the provisional but the final definition. It involves, at\r\nall events, no arbitrary change in the meaning of the word; for, with the\r\ngeneral usage of the English language, the wider signification, I believe,\r\naccords better than the more restricted one.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 3. But reasoning, even in the widest sense of which the word is susceptible,\r\ndoes not seem to comprehend all that is included, either in the\r\nbest, or even in the most current, conception of the scope and province of\r\nour science. The employment of the word Logic to denote the theory of\r\nArgumentation, is derived from the Aristotelian, or, as they are commonly\r\ntermed, the scholastic, logicians. Yet even with them, in their systematic\r\ntreatises, Argumentation was the subject only of the third part: the two\r\nformer treated of Terms, and of Propositions; under one or other of which\r\nheads were also included Definition and Division. By some, indeed, these\r\nprevious topics were professedly introduced only on account of their connection\r\nwith reasoning, and as a preparation for the doctrine and rules of\r\nthe syllogism. Yet they were treated with greater minuteness, and dwelt\r\non at greater length, than was required for that purpose alone. More recent\r\nwriters on logic have generally understood the term as it was employed\r\nby the able author of the Port Royal Logic; viz., as equivalent to the\r\nArt of Thinking. Nor is this acceptation confined to books, and scientific\r\ninquiries. Even in ordinary conversation, the ideas connected with the\r\nword Logic include at least precision of language, and accuracy of classification:\r\nand we perhaps oftener hear persons speak of a logical arrangement,\r\nor of expressions logically defined, than of conclusions logically deduced\r\nfrom premises. Again, a man is often called a great logician, or a\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page019\"\u003e[pg 019]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg019\" id=\"Pg019\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nman of powerful logic, not for the accuracy of his deductions, but for the\r\nextent of his command over premises; because the general propositions\r\nrequired for explaining a difficulty or refuting a sophism, copiously and\r\npromptly occur to him: because, in short, his knowledge, besides being\r\nample, is well under his command for argumentative use. Whether, therefore,\r\nwe conform to the practice of those who have made the subject their\r\nparticular study, or to that of popular writers and common discourse, the\r\nprovince of logic will include several operations of the intellect not usually\r\nconsidered to fall within the meaning of the terms Reasoning and Argumentation.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThese various operations might be brought within the compass of the\r\nscience, and the additional advantage be obtained of a very simple definition,\r\nif, by an extension of the term, sanctioned by high authorities, we\r\nwere to define logic as the science which treats of the operations of the human\r\nunderstanding in the pursuit of truth. For to this ultimate end, naming,\r\nclassification, definition, and all other operations over which logic has\r\never claimed jurisdiction, are essentially subsidiary. They may all be regarded\r\nas contrivances for enabling a person to know the truths which are\r\nneedful to him, and to know them at the precise moment at which they are\r\nneedful. Other purposes, indeed, are also served by these operations; for\r\ninstance, that of imparting our knowledge to others. But, viewed with regard\r\nto this purpose, they have never been considered as within the province\r\nof the logician. The sole object of Logic is the guidance of one’s own\r\nthoughts: the communication of those thoughts to others falls under the\r\nconsideration of Rhetoric, in the large sense in which that art was conceived\r\nby the ancients; or of the still more extensive art of Education.\r\nLogic takes cognizance of our intellectual operations only as they conduce\r\nto our own knowledge, and to our command over that knowledge for our\r\nown uses. If there were but one rational being in the universe, that being\r\nmight be a perfect logician; and the science and art of logic would be the\r\nsame for that one person as for the whole human race.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 4. But, if the definition which we formerly examined included too little,\r\nthat which is now suggested has the opposite fault of including too\r\nmuch.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nTruths are known to us in two ways: some are known directly, and of\r\nthemselves; some through the medium of other truths. The former are\r\nthe subject of Intuition, or Consciousness;\u003ca id=\"noteref_4\" name=\"noteref_4\" href=\"#note_4\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e4\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nthe latter, of Inference. The\r\ntruths known by intuition are the original premises from which all others\r\nare inferred. Our assent to the conclusion being grounded on the truth of\r\nthe premises, we never could arrive at any knowledge by reasoning, unless\r\nsomething could be known antecedently to all reasoning.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nExamples of truths known to us by immediate consciousness, are our\r\nown bodily sensations and mental feelings. I know directly, and of my\r\nown knowledge, that I was vexed yesterday, or that I am hungry to-day.\r\nExamples of truths which we know only by way of inference, are occurrences\r\nwhich took place while we were absent, the events recorded in history,\r\nor the theorems of mathematics. The two former we infer from the\r\ntestimony adduced, or from the traces of those past occurrences which still\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page020\"\u003e[pg 020]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg020\" id=\"Pg020\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nexist; the latter, from the premises laid down in books of geometry, under\r\nthe title of definitions and axioms. Whatever we are capable of knowing\r\nmust belong to the one class or to the other; must be in the number of the\r\nprimitive data, or of the conclusions which can be drawn from these.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWith the original data, or ultimate premises of our knowledge; with\r\ntheir number or nature, the mode in which they are obtained, or the tests\r\nby which they may be distinguished; logic, in a direct way at least, has,\r\nin the sense in which I conceive the science, nothing to do. These questions\r\nare partly not a subject of science at all, partly that of a very different\r\nscience.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWhatever is known to us by consciousness is known beyond possibility\r\nof question. What one sees or feels, whether bodily or mentally, one can\r\nnot but be sure that one sees or feels. No science is required for the purpose\r\nof establishing such truths; no rules of art can render our knowledge\r\nof them more certain than it is in itself. There is no logic for this portion\r\nof our knowledge.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nBut we may fancy that we see or feel what we in reality infer. A truth,\r\nor supposed truth, which is really the result of a very rapid inference, may\r\nseem to be apprehended intuitively. It has long been agreed by thinkers of\r\nthe most opposite schools, that this mistake is actually made in so familiar\r\nan instance as that of the eyesight. There is nothing of which we appear\r\nto ourselves to be more directly conscious than the distance of an object\r\nfrom us. Yet it has long been ascertained, that what is perceived by the\r\neye, is at most nothing more than a variously colored surface; that when\r\nwe fancy we see distance, all we really see is certain variations of apparent\r\nsize, and degrees of faintness of color; that our estimate of the object’s\r\ndistance from us is the result partly of a rapid inference from the muscular\r\nsensations accompanying the adjustment of the focal distance of the eye to\r\nobjects unequally remote from us, and partly of a comparison (made with\r\nso much rapidity that we are unconscious of making it) between the size\r\nand color of the object as they appear at the time, and the size and color\r\nof the same or of similar objects as they appeared when close at hand, or\r\nwhen their degree of remoteness was known by other evidence. The perception\r\nof distance by the eye, which seems so like intuition, is thus, in reality,\r\nan inference grounded on experience; an inference, too, which we\r\nlearn to make; and which we make with more and more correctness as our\r\nexperience increases; though in familiar cases it takes place so rapidly as\r\nto appear exactly on a par with those perceptions of sight which are really\r\nintuitive, our perceptions of color.\u003ca id=\"noteref_5\" name=\"noteref_5\" href=\"#note_5\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e5\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nOf the science, therefore, which expounds the operations of the human\r\nunderstanding in the pursuit of truth, one essential part is the inquiry:\r\nWhat are the facts which are the objects of intuition or consciousness, and\r\nwhat are those which we merely infer? But this inquiry has never been\r\nconsidered a portion of logic. Its place is in another and a perfectly distinct\r\ndepartment of science, to which the name metaphysics more particularly\r\nbelongs: that portion of mental philosophy which attempts to determine\r\nwhat part of the furniture of the mind belongs to it originally, and\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page021\"\u003e[pg 021]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg021\" id=\"Pg021\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nwhat part is constructed out of materials furnished to it from without. To\r\nthis science appertain the great and much debated questions of the existence\r\nof matter; the existence of spirit, and of a distinction between it and\r\nmatter; the reality of time and space, as things without the mind, and\r\ndistinguishable from the objects which are said to exist in them. For\r\nin the present state of the discussion on these topics, it is almost universally\r\nallowed that the existence of matter or of spirit, of space or of\r\ntime, is in its nature unsusceptible of being proved; and that if any thing\r\nis known of them, it must be by immediate intuition. To the same science\r\nbelong the inquiries into the nature of Conception, Perception, Memory,\r\nand Belief; all of which are operations of the understanding in the pursuit\r\nof truth; but with which, as phenomena of the mind, or with the possibility\r\nwhich may or may not exist of analyzing any of them into simpler phenomena,\r\nthe logician as such has no concern. To this science must also be\r\nreferred the following, and all analogous questions: To what extent our intellectual\r\nfaculties and our emotions are innate—to what extent the result\r\nof association: Whether God and duty are realities, the existence of which\r\nis manifest to us \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea priori\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e by the constitution\r\nof our rational faculty; or whether our ideas of them are acquired notions, the origin of\r\nwhich we are able to trace and explain; and the reality of the objects themselves a\r\nquestion not of consciousness or intuition, but of evidence and reasoning.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe province of logic must be restricted to that portion of our knowledge\r\nwhich consists of inferences from truths previously known; whether\r\nthose antecedent data be general propositions, or particular observations\r\nand perceptions. Logic is not the science of Belief, but the science of\r\nProof, or Evidence. In so far as belief professes to be founded on proof,\r\nthe office of logic is to supply a test for ascertaining whether or not the belief\r\nis well grounded. With the claims which any proposition has to belief\r\non the evidence of consciousness—that is, without evidence in the\r\nproper sense of the word—logic has nothing to do.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 5. By far the greatest portion of our knowledge, whether of general\r\ntruths or of particular facts, being avowedly matter of inference, nearly the\r\nwhole, not only of science, but of human conduct, is amenable to the authority\r\nof logic. To draw inferences has been said to be the great business\r\nof life. Every one has daily, hourly, and momentary need of ascertaining\r\nfacts which he has not directly observed; not from any general purpose of\r\nadding to his stock of knowledge, but because the facts themselves are of\r\nimportance to his interests or to his occupations. The business of the\r\nmagistrate, of the military commander, of the navigator, of the physician,\r\nof the agriculturist, is merely to judge of evidence, and to act accordingly.\r\nThey all have to ascertain certain facts, in order that they may afterward\r\napply certain rules, either devised by themselves or prescribed for their\r\nguidance by others; and as they do this well or ill, so they discharge well\r\nor ill the duties of their several callings. It is the only occupation in which\r\nthe mind never ceases to be engaged; and is the subject, not of logic, but\r\nof knowledge in general.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nLogic, however, is not the same thing with knowledge, though the field\r\nof logic is co-extensive with the field of knowledge. Logic is the common\r\njudge and arbiter of all particular investigations. It does not undertake\r\nto find evidence, but to determine whether it has been found. Logic\r\nneither observes, nor invents, nor discovers; but judges. It is no part of\r\nthe business of logic to inform the surgeon what appearances are found to\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page022\"\u003e[pg 022]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg022\" id=\"Pg022\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\naccompany a violent death. This he must learn from his own experience\r\nand observation, or from that of others, his predecessors in his peculiar\r\npursuit. But logic sits in judgment on the sufficiency of that observation\r\nand experience to justify his rules, and on the sufficiency of his rules to\r\njustify his conduct. It does not give him proofs, but teaches him what\r\nmakes them proofs, and how he is to judge of them. It does not teach\r\nthat any particular fact proves any other, but points out to what conditions\r\nall facts must conform, in order that they may prove other facts. To decide\r\nwhether any given fact fulfills these conditions, or whether facts can\r\nbe found which fulfill them in a given case, belongs exclusively to the particular\r\nart or science, or to our knowledge of the particular subject.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt is in this sense that logic is, what it was so expressively called by the\r\nschoolmen and by Bacon, \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ears artium\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e; the\r\nscience of science itself. All science consists of data and conclusions from those data,\r\nof proofs and what they prove: now logic points out what relations must subsist between\r\ndata and whatever can be concluded from them, between proof and every thing\r\nwhich it can prove. If there be any such indispensable relations, and if\r\nthese can be precisely determined, every particular branch of science, as\r\nwell as every individual in the guidance of his conduct, is bound to conform\r\nto those relations, under the penalty of making false inferences—of\r\ndrawing conclusions which are not grounded in the realities of things.\r\nWhatever has at any time been concluded justly, whatever knowledge has\r\nbeen acquired otherwise than by immediate intuition, depended on the observance\r\nof the laws which it is the province of logic to investigate. If\r\nthe conclusions are just, and the knowledge real, those laws, whether known\r\nor not, have been observed.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 6. We need not, therefore, seek any further for a solution of the question,\r\nso often agitated, respecting the utility of logic. If a science of logic\r\nexists, or is capable of existing, it must be useful. If there be rules to\r\nwhich every mind consciously or unconsciously conforms in every instance\r\nin which it infers rightly, there seems little necessity for discussing whether\r\na person is more likely to observe those rules, when he knows the rules, than\r\nwhen he is unacquainted with them.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nA science may undoubtedly be brought to a certain, not inconsiderable,\r\nstage of advancement, without the application of any other logic to it than\r\nwhat all persons, who are said to have a sound understanding, acquire empirically\r\nin the course of their studies. Mankind judged of evidence, and\r\noften correctly, before logic was a science, or they never could have made\r\nit one. And they executed great mechanical works before they understood\r\nthe laws of mechanics. But there are limits both to what mechanicians can\r\ndo without principles of mechanics, and to what thinkers can do without\r\nprinciples of logic. A few individuals, by extraordinary genius, or by the\r\naccidental acquisition of a good set of intellectual habits, may work without\r\nprinciples in the same way, or nearly the same way, in which they\r\nwould have worked if they had been in possession of principles. But the\r\nbulk of mankind require either to understand the theory of what they are\r\ndoing, or to have rules laid down for them by those who have understood\r\nthe theory. In the progress of science from its easiest to its more difficult\r\nproblems, each great step in advance has usually had either as its precursor,\r\nor as its accompaniment and necessary condition, a corresponding improvement\r\nin the notions and principles of logic received among the most\r\nadvanced thinkers. And if several of the more difficult sciences are still\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page023\"\u003e[pg 023]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg023\" id=\"Pg023\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nin so defective a state; if not only so little is proved, but disputation has\r\nnot terminated even about the little which seemed to be so; the reason\r\nperhaps is, that men’s logical notions have not yet acquired the degree of\r\nextension, or of accuracy, requisite for the estimation of the evidence proper\r\nto those particular departments of knowledge.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 7. Logic, then, is the science of the operations of the understanding\r\nwhich are subservient to the estimation of evidence: both the process itself\r\nof advancing from known truths to unknown, and all other intellectual\r\noperations in so far as auxiliary to this. It includes, therefore, the operation\r\nof Naming; for language is an instrument of thought, as well as a\r\nmeans of communicating our thoughts. It includes, also, Definition, and\r\nClassification. For, the use of these operations (putting all other minds\r\nthan one’s own out of consideration) is to serve not only for keeping our\r\nevidences and the conclusions from them permanent and readily accessible\r\nin the memory, but for so marshaling the facts which we may at any time\r\nbe engaged in investigating, as to enable us to perceive more clearly what\r\nevidence there is, and to judge with fewer chances of error whether it be\r\nsufficient. These, therefore, are operations specially instrumental to the\r\nestimation of evidence, and, as such, are within the province of Logic.\r\nThere are other more elementary processes, concerned in all thinking, such\r\nas Conception, Memory, and the like; but of these it is not necessary that\r\nLogic should take any peculiar cognizance, since they have no special\r\nconnection with the problem of Evidence, further than that, like all other\r\nproblems addressed to the understanding, it presupposes them.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nOur object, then, will be, to attempt a correct analysis of the intellectual\r\nprocess called Reasoning or Inference, and of such other mental operations\r\nas are intended to facilitate this: as well as, on the foundation of this analysis,\r\nand \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-foreign\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003epari passu\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e with it, to bring together or frame a set\r\nof rules or canons for testing the sufficiency of any given evidence to prove any given\r\nproposition.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWith respect to the first part of this undertaking, I do not attempt to\r\ndecompose the mental operations in question into their ultimate elements.\r\nIt is enough if the analysis as far as it goes is correct, and if it goes far\r\nenough for the practical purposes of logic considered as an art. The separation\r\nof a complicated phenomenon into its component parts is not like\r\na connected and interdependent chain of proof. If one link of an argument\r\nbreaks, the whole drops to the ground; but one step toward an analysis\r\nholds good and has an independent value, though we should never be\r\nable to make a second. The results which have been obtained by analytical\r\nchemistry are not the less valuable, though it should be discovered that\r\nall which we now call simple substances are really compounds. All other\r\nthings are at any rate compounded of those elements: whether the elements\r\nthemselves admit of decomposition, is an important inquiry, but\r\ndoes not affect the certainty of the science up to that point.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nI shall, accordingly, attempt to analyze the process of inference, and the\r\nprocesses subordinate to inference, so far only as may be requisite for ascertaining\r\nthe difference between a correct and an incorrect performance\r\nof those processes. The reason for thus limiting our design, is evident.\r\nIt has been said by objectors to logic, that we do not learn to use our\r\nmuscles by studying their anatomy. The fact is not quite fairly stated;\r\nfor if the action of any of our muscles were vitiated by local weakness, or\r\nother physical defect, a knowledge of their anatomy might be very necessary\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page024\"\u003e[pg 024]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg024\" id=\"Pg024\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nfor effecting a cure. But we should be justly liable to the criticism\r\ninvolved in this objection, were we, in a treatise on logic, to carry the analysis\r\nof the reasoning process beyond the point at which any inaccuracy\r\nwhich may have crept into it must become visible. In learning bodily\r\nexercises (to carry on the same illustration) we do, and must, analyze the\r\nbodily motions so far as is necessary for distinguishing those which ought\r\nto be performed from those which ought not. To a similar extent, and no\r\nfurther, it is necessary that the logician should analyze the mental processes\r\nwith which Logic is concerned. Logic has no interest in carrying the analysis\r\nbeyond the point at which it becomes apparent whether the operations\r\nhave in any individual case been rightly or wrongly performed: in the\r\nsame manner as the science of music teaches us to discriminate between\r\nmusical notes, and to know the combinations of which they are susceptible,\r\nbut not what number of vibrations in a second correspond to each; which,\r\nthough useful to be known, is useful for totally different purposes. The\r\nextension of Logic as a Science is determined by its necessities as an Art:\r\nwhatever it does not need for its practical ends, it leaves to the larger\r\nscience which may be said to correspond, not to any particular art, but to\r\nart in general; the science which deals with the constitution of the human\r\nfaculties; and to which, in the part of our mental nature which concerns\r\nLogic, as well as in all other parts, it belongs to decide what are ultimate\r\nfacts, and what are resolvable into other facts. And I believe it will be\r\nfound that most of the conclusions arrived at in this work have no necessary\r\nconnection with any particular views respecting the ulterior analysis.\r\nLogic is common ground on which the partisans of Hartley and of Reid,\r\nof Locke and of Kant, may meet and join hands. Particular and detached\r\nopinions of all these thinkers will no doubt occasionally be controverted,\r\nsince all of them were logicians as well as metaphysicians; but the field on\r\nwhich their principal battles have been fought, lies beyond the boundaries\r\nof our science.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt can not, indeed, be pretended that logical principles can be altogether\r\nirrelevant to those more abstruse discussions; nor is it possible but that\r\nthe view we are led to take of the problem which logic proposes, must\r\nhave a tendency favorable to the adoption of some one opinion, on these\r\ncontroverted subjects, rather than another. For metaphysics, in endeavoring\r\nto solve its own peculiar problem, must employ means, the validity of\r\nwhich falls under the cognizance of logic. It proceeds, no doubt, as far as\r\npossible, merely by a closer and more attentive interrogation of our consciousness,\r\nor more properly speaking, of our memory; and so far is not\r\namenable to logic. But wherever this method is insufficient to attain the\r\nend of its inquiries, it must proceed, like other sciences, by means of evidence.\r\nNow, the moment this science begins to draw inferences from evidence,\r\nlogic becomes the sovereign judge whether its inferences are well\r\ngrounded, or what other inferences would be so.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThis, however, constitutes no nearer or other relation between logic and\r\nmetaphysics, than that which exists between logic and every other science.\r\nAnd I can conscientiously affirm that no one proposition laid down in this\r\nwork has been adopted for the sake of establishing, or with any reference\r\nto its fitness for being employed in establishing, preconceived opinions in\r\nany department of knowledge or of inquiry on which the speculative world\r\nis still undecided.\u003ca id=\"noteref_6\" name=\"noteref_6\" href=\"#note_6\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e6\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page026\"\u003e[pg 026]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg026\" id=\"Pg026\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"page\" /\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-div\" style=\"margin-bottom: 5.00em; margin-top: 5.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"toc7\" id=\"toc7\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"pdf8\" id=\"pdf8\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\u0027chapter\u0027 /\u003e\u003ch2 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: center; margin-bottom: 2.88em; margin-top: 2.88em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 144%\"\u003eBook I.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\u0027chapter\u0027 /\u003e\u003ch2 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: left; margin-bottom: 3.46em; margin-top: 3.46em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 173%\"\u003eOf Names And Propositions.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“La scolastique, qui produisit dans la logique, comme dans la morale, et dans une partie\r\nde la métaphysique, une subtilité, une précision d’idées, dont l’habitude inconnue aux\r\nanciens, a contribué plus qu’on ne croit au progrès de la bonne\r\nphilosophie.”\u003c/span\u003e—\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-variant: small-caps\"\u003eCondorcet\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eVie de\r\nTurgot\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“To the schoolmen the vulgar languages are principally indebted for what precision and\r\nanalytic subtlety they possess.”\u003c/span\u003e—\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-variant: small-caps\"\u003eSir W. Hamilton\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eDiscussions in Philosophy\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-div\" style=\"margin-bottom: 4.00em; margin-top: 4.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"toc9\" id=\"toc9\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"pdf10\" id=\"pdf10\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: center; margin-bottom: 2.40em; margin-top: 2.40em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 120%\"\u003eChapter I.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: left; margin-bottom: 2.88em; margin-top: 2.88em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 144%\"\u003eOf The Necessity Of Commencing With An Analysis Of Language.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 1. It is so much the established practice of writers on logic to commence\r\ntheir treatises by a few general observations (in most cases, it is\r\ntrue, rather meagre) on Terms and their varieties, that it will, perhaps,\r\nscarcely be required from me, in merely following the common usage, to be\r\nas particular in assigning my reasons, as it is usually expected that those\r\nshould be who deviate from it.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe practice, indeed, is recommended by considerations far too obvious\r\nto require a formal justification. Logic is a portion of the Art of Thinking:\r\nLanguage is evidently, and by the admission of all philosophers, one\r\nof the principal instruments or helps of thought; and any imperfection in\r\nthe instrument, or in the mode of employing it, is confessedly liable, still\r\nmore than in almost any other art, to confuse and impede the process, and\r\ndestroy all ground of confidence in the result. For a mind not previously\r\nversed in the meaning and right use of the various kinds of words, to attempt\r\nthe study of methods of philosophizing, would be as if some one\r\nshould attempt to become an astronomical observer, having never learned to\r\nadjust the focal distance of his optical instruments so as to see distinctly.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nSince Reasoning, or Inference, the principal subject of logic, is an operation\r\nwhich usually takes place by means of words, and in complicated cases\r\ncan take place in no other way; those who have not a thorough insight\r\ninto the signification and purposes of words, will be under chances, amounting\r\nalmost to certainty, of reasoning or inferring incorrectly. And logicians\r\nhave generally felt that unless, in the very first stage, they removed\r\nthis source of error; unless they taught their pupil to put away the glasses\r\nwhich distort the object, and to use those which are adapted to his purpose\r\nin such a manner as to assist, not perplex, his vision; he would not be\r\nin a condition to practice the remaining part of their discipline with any\r\nprospect of advantage. Therefore it is that an inquiry into language, so\r\nfar as is needful to guard against the errors to which it gives rise, has at\r\nall times been deemed a necessary preliminary to the study of logic.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page027\"\u003e[pg 027]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg027\" id=\"Pg027\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nBut there is another reason, of a still more fundamental nature, why the\r\nimport of words should be the earliest subject of the logician’s consideration:\r\nbecause without it he can not examine into the import of Propositions.\r\nNow this is a subject which stands on the very threshold of the\r\nscience of logic.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe object of logic, as defined in the Introductory Chapter, is to ascertain\r\nhow we come by that portion of our knowledge (much the greatest\r\nportion) which is not intuitive: and by what criterion we can, in matters\r\nnot self-evident, distinguish between things proved and things not proved,\r\nbetween what is worthy and what is unworthy of belief. Of the various\r\nquestions which present themselves to our inquiring faculties, some receive\r\nan answer from direct consciousness, others, if resolved at all, can only be\r\nresolved by means of evidence. Logic is concerned with these last. But\r\nbefore inquiring into the mode of resolving questions, it is necessary to inquire\r\nwhat are those which offer themselves; what questions are conceivable;\r\nwhat inquiries are there, to which mankind have either obtained, or\r\nbeen able to imagine it possible that they should obtain, an answer. This\r\npoint is best ascertained by a survey and analysis of Propositions.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 2. The answer to every question which it is possible to frame, must\r\nbe contained in a Proposition, or Assertion. Whatever can be an object\r\nof belief, or even of disbelief, must, when put into words, assume the form\r\nof a proposition. All truth and all error lie in propositions. What, by\r\na convenient misapplication of an abstract term, we call a Truth, means\r\nsimply a True Proposition; and errors are false propositions. To know\r\nthe import of all possible propositions would be to know all questions\r\nwhich can be raised, all matters which are susceptible of being either believed\r\nor disbelieved. How many kinds of inquiries can be propounded;\r\nhow many kinds of judgments can be made; and how many kinds\r\nof propositions it is possible to frame with a meaning, are but different\r\nforms of one and the same question. Since, then, the objects of all Belief\r\nand of all Inquiry express themselves in propositions, a sufficient scrutiny\r\nof Propositions and of their varieties will apprise us what questions\r\nmankind have actually asked of themselves, and what, in the nature of answers\r\nto those questions, they have actually thought they had grounds to\r\nbelieve.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nNow the first glance at a proposition shows that it is formed by putting\r\ntogether two names. A proposition, according to the common simple definition,\r\nwhich is sufficient for our purpose is, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ediscourse, in which something\r\nis affirmed or denied of something\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e. Thus, in the proposition, Gold is yellow,\r\nthe quality yellow is affirmed of the substance \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003egold\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e. In the\r\nproposition, Franklin was not born in England, the fact expressed by the words\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eborn in England\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e is denied of the man Franklin.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nEvery proposition consists of three parts: the Subject, the Predicate,\r\nand the Copula. The predicate is the name denoting that which is affirmed\r\nor denied. The subject is the name denoting the person or thing which\r\nsomething is affirmed or denied of. The copula is the sign denoting that\r\nthere is an affirmation or denial, and thereby enabling the hearer or reader\r\nto distinguish a proposition from any other kind of discourse. Thus, in the\r\nproposition, The earth is round, the Predicate is the word \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eround\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\nwhich denotes the quality affirmed, or (as the phrase is) predicated:\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ethe earth\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, words denoting the object which that quality is\r\naffirmed of, compose the Subject; the word \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eis\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, which serves as\r\nthe connecting mark between the subject and\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page028\"\u003e[pg 028]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg028\" id=\"Pg028\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\npredicate, to show that one of them is affirmed of the other, is called the\r\nCopula.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nDismissing, for the present, the copula, of which more will be said hereafter,\r\nevery proposition, then, consists of at least two names—brings together\r\ntwo names, in a particular manner. This is already a first step toward\r\nwhat we are in quest of. It appears from this, that for an act of belief,\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eone\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e object is not sufficient; the simplest act of belief supposes, and has\r\nsomething to do with, \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003etwo\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e objects—two names, to say the least; and\r\n(since the names must be names of something) two \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003enamable things\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e. A large\r\nclass of thinkers would cut the matter short by saying, two \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eideas\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e. They\r\nwould say, that the subject and predicate are both of them names of ideas;\r\nthe idea of gold, for instance, and the idea of yellow; and that what takes\r\nplace (or part of what takes place) in the act of belief consists in bringing\r\n(as it is often expressed) one of these ideas under the other. But this\r\nwe are not yet in a condition to say: whether such be the correct mode\r\nof describing the phenomenon, is an after consideration. The result with\r\nwhich for the present we must be contented, is, that in every act of belief\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003etwo\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e objects are in some manner taken cognizance of; that there can be no\r\nbelief claimed, or question propounded, which does not embrace two distinct\r\n(either material or intellectual) subjects of thought; each of them\r\ncapable, or not, of being conceived by itself, but incapable of being believed\r\nby itself.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nI may say, for instance, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“the sun.”\u003c/span\u003e The word has a meaning, and suggests\r\nthat meaning to the mind of any one who is listening to me. But\r\nsuppose I ask him, Whether it is true: whether he believes it? He can\r\ngive no answer. There is as yet nothing to believe, or to disbelieve. Now,\r\nhowever, let me make, of all possible assertions respecting the sun, the one\r\nwhich involves the least of reference to any object besides itself; let me\r\nsay, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“the sun exists.”\u003c/span\u003e Here, at once, is something which a person can say\r\nhe believes. But here, instead of only one, we find two distinct objects of\r\nconception: the sun is one object; existence is another. Let it not be said\r\nthat this second conception, existence, is involved in the first; for the sun\r\nmay be conceived as no longer existing. \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“The sun”\u003c/span\u003e does not convey all\r\nthe meaning that is conveyed by \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“the sun exists:”\u003c/span\u003e \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“my father”\u003c/span\u003e does not\r\ninclude all the meaning of \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“my father exists,”\u003c/span\u003e for he may be dead; \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“a\r\nround square”\u003c/span\u003e does not include the meaning of \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“a round square exists,”\u003c/span\u003e\r\nfor it does not and can not exist. When I say \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“the sun,”\u003c/span\u003e \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“my father,”\u003c/span\u003e or\r\na \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“round square,”\u003c/span\u003e I do not call upon the hearer for any belief or disbelief,\r\nnor can either the one or the other be afforded me; but if I say, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“the sun\r\nexists,”\u003c/span\u003e \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“my father exists,”\u003c/span\u003e or \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“a round square exists,”\u003c/span\u003e I call for belief;\r\nand should, in the first of the three instances, meet with it; in the second,\r\nwith belief or disbelief, as the case might be; in the third, with disbelief.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 3. This first step in the analysis of the object of belief, which, though\r\nso obvious, will be found to be not unimportant, is the only one which we\r\nshall find it practicable to make without a preliminary survey of language.\r\nIf we attempt to proceed further in the same path, that is, to analyze any\r\nfurther the import of Propositions; we find forced upon us, as a subject of\r\nprevious consideration, the import of Names. For every proposition consists\r\nof two names; and every proposition affirms or denies one of these\r\nnames, of the other. Now what we do, what passes in our mind, when we\r\naffirm or deny two names of one another, must depend on what they are\r\nnames of; since it is with reference to that, and not to the mere names\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page029\"\u003e[pg 029]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg029\" id=\"Pg029\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nthemselves, that we make the affirmation or denial. Here, therefore, we\r\nfind a new reason why the signification of names, and the relation generally\r\nbetween names and the things signified by them, must occupy the preliminary\r\nstage of the inquiry we are engaged in.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt may be objected that the meaning of names can guide us at most only\r\nto the opinions, possibly the foolish and groundless opinions, which mankind\r\nhave formed concerning things, and that as the object of philosophy\r\nis truth, not opinion, the philosopher should dismiss words and look into\r\nthings themselves, to ascertain what questions can be asked and answered\r\nin regard to them. This advice (which no one has it in his power to follow)\r\nis in reality an exhortation to discard the whole fruits of the labors of\r\nhis predecessors, and conduct himself as if he were the first person who\r\nhad ever turned an inquiring eye upon nature. What does any one’s personal\r\nknowledge of Things amount to, after subtracting all which he has\r\nacquired by means of the words of other people? Even after he has learned\r\nas much as people usually do learn from others, will the notions of\r\nthings contained in his individual mind afford as sufficient a basis for a\r\n\u003cspan lang=\"fr\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"fr\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ecatalogue raisonné\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e as the notions\r\nwhich are in the minds of all mankind?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIn any enumeration and classification of Things, which does not set out\r\nfrom their names, no varieties of things will of course be comprehended\r\nbut those recognized by the particular inquirer; and it will still remain to\r\nbe established, by a subsequent examination of names, that the enumeration\r\nhas omitted nothing which ought to have been included. But if we\r\nbegin with names, and use them as our clue to the things, we bring at once\r\nbefore us all the distinctions which have been recognized, not by a single\r\ninquirer, but by all inquirers taken together. It doubtless may, and I believe\r\nit will, be found, that mankind have multiplied the varieties unnecessarily,\r\nand have imagined distinctions among things, where there were only\r\ndistinctions in the manner of naming them. But we are not entitled to assume\r\nthis in the commencement. We must begin by recognizing the distinctions\r\nmade by ordinary language. If some of these appear, on a close\r\nexamination, not to be fundamental, the enumeration of the different kinds\r\nof realities may be abridged accordingly. But to impose upon the facts in\r\nthe first instance the yoke of a theory, while the grounds of the theory are\r\nreserved for discussion in a subsequent stage, is not a course which a logician\r\ncan reasonably adopt.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-div\" style=\"margin-bottom: 4.00em; margin-top: 4.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"toc11\" id=\"toc11\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"pdf12\" id=\"pdf12\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: center; margin-bottom: 2.40em; margin-top: 2.40em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 120%\"\u003eChapter II.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: left; margin-bottom: 2.88em; margin-top: 2.88em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 144%\"\u003eOf Names.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 1. \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“A name,”\u003c/span\u003e says Hobbes,\u003ca id=\"noteref_7\" name=\"noteref_7\" href=\"#note_7\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e7\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“is a word taken at pleasure to serve for\r\na mark which may raise in our mind a thought like to some thought we had\r\nbefore, and which being pronounced to others, may be to them a sign of\r\nwhat thought the speaker had\u003ca id=\"noteref_8\" name=\"noteref_8\" href=\"#note_8\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e8\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e before in his mind.”\u003c/span\u003e This\r\nsimple definition of a name, as a word (or set of words) serving the double purpose of\r\na mark to recall to ourselves the likeness of a former thought, and a sign\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page030\"\u003e[pg 030]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg030\" id=\"Pg030\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nto make it known to others, appears unexceptionable. Names, indeed, do\r\nmuch more than this; but whatever else they do, grows out of, and is the\r\nresult of this: as will appear in its proper place.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAre names more properly said to be the names of things, or of our ideas\r\nof things? The first is the expression in common use; the last is that of\r\nsome metaphysicians, who conceived that in adopting it they were introducing\r\na highly important distinction. The eminent thinker, just quoted,\r\nseems to countenance the latter opinion. \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“But seeing,”\u003c/span\u003e he continues,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“names ordered in speech (as is defined) are signs of our conceptions, it\r\nis manifest they are not signs of the things themselves; for that the sound\r\nof this word \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003estone\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e should be the sign of a stone, can not be\r\nunderstood in any sense but this, that he that hears it collects that he that pronounces\r\nit thinks of a stone.”\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIf it be merely meant that the conception alone, and not the thing itself,\r\nis recalled by the name, or imparted to the hearer, this of course can not\r\nbe denied. Nevertheless, there seems good reason for adhering to the\r\ncommon usage, and calling (as indeed Hobbes himself does in other places)\r\nthe word \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003esun\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e the name of the sun, and not the name of our idea of\r\nthe sun. For names are not intended only to make the hearer conceive what\r\nwe conceive, but also to inform him what we believe. Now, when I use a\r\nname for the purpose of expressing a belief, it is a belief concerning the\r\nthing itself, not concerning my idea of it. When I say, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“the sun is the\r\ncause of day,”\u003c/span\u003e I do not mean that my idea of the sun causes or excites in\r\nme the idea of day; or in other words, that thinking of the sun makes me\r\nthink of day. I mean, that a certain physical fact, which is called the sun’s\r\npresence (and which, in the ultimate analysis, resolves itself into sensations,\r\nnot ideas) causes another physical fact, which is called day. It seems proper\r\nto consider a word as the \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ename\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e of that which we intend to be understood\r\nby it when we use it; of that which any fact that we assert of it is\r\nto be understood of; that, in short, concerning which, when we employ the\r\nword, we intend to give information. Names, therefore, shall always be\r\nspoken of in this work as the names of things themselves, and not merely\r\nof our ideas of things.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nBut the question now arises, of what things? and to answer this it is\r\nnecessary to take into consideration the different kinds of names.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 2. It is usual, before examining the various classes into which names\r\nare commonly divided, to begin by distinguishing from names of every\r\ndescription, those words which are not names, but only parts of names.\r\nAmong such are reckoned particles, as \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eof\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eto\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003etruly\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eoften\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e;\r\nthe inflected cases of nouns substantive, as \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eme\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ehim\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eJohn’s\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e; and even adjectives, as\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003elarge\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eheavy\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e. These words do not express\r\nthings of which any thing can\r\nbe affirmed or denied. We can not say, Heavy fell, or A heavy fell; Truly,\r\nor A truly, was asserted; Of, or An of, was in the room. Unless, indeed,\r\nwe are speaking of the mere words themselves, as when we say, Truly is\r\nan English word, or, Heavy is an adjective. In that case they are complete\r\nnames—viz., names of those particular sounds, or of those particular collections\r\nof written characters. This employment of a word to denote the\r\nmere letters and syllables of which it is composed, was termed by the\r\nschoolmen the \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003esuppositio materialis\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e of the\r\nword. In any other sense we can not introduce one of these words into the subject of a\r\nproposition, unless in combination with other words; as, A heavy\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ebody\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e fell, A truly \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eimportant fact\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e was\r\nasserted, A \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003emember\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e of \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eparliament\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e was in\r\nthe room.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page031\"\u003e[pg 031]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg031\" id=\"Pg031\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAn adjective, however, is capable of standing by itself as the predicate\r\nof a proposition; as when we say, Snow is white; and occasionally even\r\nas the subject, for we may say, White is an agreeable color. The adjective\r\nis often said to be so used by a grammatical ellipsis: Snow is white,\r\ninstead of Snow is a white object; White is an agreeable color, instead of,\r\nA white color, or, The color white, is agreeable. The Greeks and Romans\r\nwere allowed, by the rules of their language, to employ this ellipsis universally\r\nin the subject as well as in the predicate of a proposition. In\r\nEnglish this can not, generally speaking, be done. We may say, The earth\r\nis round; but we can not say, Round is easily moved; we must say, A\r\nround object. This distinction, however, is rather grammatical than logical.\r\nSince there is no difference of meaning between \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eround\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, and\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea round object\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, it is only custom which prescribes that on any\r\ngiven occasion one shall be used, and not the other. We shall, therefore, without\r\nscruple, speak of adjectives as names, whether in their own right, or as representative\r\nof the more circuitous forms of expression above exemplified. The\r\nother classes of subsidiary words have no title whatever to be considered\r\nas names. An adverb, or an accusative case, can not under any circumstances\r\n(except when their mere letters and syllables are spoken of) figure\r\nas one of the terms of a proposition.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWords which are not capable of being used as names, but only as parts\r\nof names, were called by some of the schoolmen Syncategorematic terms:\r\nfrom σὺν, with, and κατηγορέω, to predicate, because it was only \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ewith\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e some\r\nother word that they could be predicated. A word which could be used\r\neither as the subject or predicate of a proposition without being accompanied\r\nby any other word, was termed by the same authorities a Categorematic\r\nterm. A combination of one or more Categorematic, and one\r\nor more Syncategorematic words, as A heavy body, or A court of justice,\r\nthey sometimes called a \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003emixed\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e term; but this seems a needless\r\nmultiplication of technical expressions. A mixed term is, in the only useful sense of\r\nthe word, Categorematic. It belongs to the class of what have been called\r\nmany-worded names.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nFor, as one word is frequently not a name, but only part of a name, so\r\na number of words often compose one single name, and no more. These\r\nwords, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“The place which the wisdom or policy of antiquity had destined\r\nfor the residence of the Abyssinian princes,”\u003c/span\u003e form in the estimation of the\r\nlogician only one name; one Categorematic term. A mode of determining\r\nwhether any set of words makes only one name, or more than one, is by\r\npredicating something of it, and observing whether, by this predication, we\r\nmake only one assertion or several. Thus, when we say, John Nokes, who\r\nwas the mayor of the town, died yesterday—by this predication we make\r\nbut one assertion; whence it appears that \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“John Nokes, who was the\r\nmayor of the town,”\u003c/span\u003e is no more than one name. It is true that in this\r\nproposition, besides the assertion that John Nokes died yesterday, there\r\nis included another assertion, namely, that John Nokes was mayor of the\r\ntown. But this last assertion was already made: we did not make it by\r\nadding the predicate, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“died yesterday.”\u003c/span\u003e Suppose, however, that the words\r\nhad been, John Nokes \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eand\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e the mayor of the town, they would have formed\r\ntwo names instead of one. For when we say, John Nokes and the mayor\r\nof the town died yesterday, we make two assertions: one, that John Nokes\r\ndied yesterday; the other, that the mayor of the town died yesterday.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt being needless to illustrate at any greater length the subject of many-worded\r\nnames, we proceed to the distinctions which have been established\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page032\"\u003e[pg 032]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg032\" id=\"Pg032\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\namong names, not according to the words they are composed of, but according\r\nto their signification.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 3. All names are names of something, real or imaginary; but all things\r\nhave not names appropriated to them individually. For some individual\r\nobjects we require, and consequently have, separate distinguishing names;\r\nthere is a name for every person, and for every remarkable place. Other\r\nobjects, of which we have not occasion to speak so frequently, we do not\r\ndesignate by a name of their own; but when the necessity arises for naming\r\nthem, we do so by putting together several words, each of which, by\r\nitself, might be and is used for an indefinite number of other objects; as\r\nwhen I say, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ethis stone\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e: \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“this”\u003c/span\u003e and \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“stone”\u003c/span\u003e being, each\r\nof them, names that may be used of many other objects besides the particular one meant,\r\nthough the only object of which they can both be used at the given moment,\r\nconsistently with their signification, may be the one of which I wish\r\nto speak.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWere this the sole purpose for which names, that are common to more\r\nthings than one, could be employed; if they only served, by mutually limiting\r\neach other, to afford a designation for such individual objects as have\r\nno names of their own: they could only be ranked among contrivances for\r\neconomizing the use of language. But it is evident that this is not their\r\nsole function. It is by their means that we are enabled to assert \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003egeneral\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e\r\npropositions; to affirm or deny any predicate of an indefinite number of\r\nthings at once. The distinction, therefore, between \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003egeneral\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e names, and\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eindividual\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e or \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003esingular\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e names, is fundamental; and may be\r\nconsidered as the first grand division of names.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nA general name is familiarly defined, a name which is capable of being\r\ntruly affirmed, in the same sense, of each of an indefinite number of things.\r\nAn individual or singular name is a name which is only capable of being\r\ntruly affirmed, in the same sense, of one thing.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThus, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eman\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e is capable of being truly affirmed of John, George,\r\nMary, and other persons without assignable limit; and it is affirmed of all of them in\r\nthe same sense; for the word man expresses certain qualities, and when we\r\npredicate it of those persons, we assert that they all possess those qualities.\r\nBut \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eJohn\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e is only capable of being truly affirmed of one single\r\nperson, at least in the same sense. For, though there are many persons who bear\r\nthat name, it is not conferred upon them to indicate any qualities, or any\r\nthing which belongs to them in common; and can not be said to be affirmed\r\nof them in any \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003esense\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e at all, consequently not in the same sense. \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“The\r\nking who succeeded William the Conqueror,”\u003c/span\u003e is also an individual name.\r\nFor, that there can not be more than one person of whom it can be truly\r\naffirmed, is implied in the meaning of the words. Even \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ethe\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e king,”\u003c/span\u003e when\r\nthe occasion or the context defines the individual of whom it is to be understood,\r\nmay justly be regarded as an individual name.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt is not unusual, by way of explaining what is meant by a general name,\r\nto say that it is the name of a \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eclass\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e. But this, though a convenient mode\r\nof expression for some purposes, is objectionable as a definition, since it\r\nexplains the clearer of two things by the more obscure. It would be more\r\nlogical to reverse the proposition, and turn it into a definition of the word\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eclass\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e: \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“A class is the indefinite multitude of individuals\r\ndenoted by a general name.”\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt is necessary to distinguish \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003egeneral\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e from \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ecollective\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e names.\r\nA general name is one which can be predicated of \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eeach\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e individual of a\r\nmultitude; a\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page033\"\u003e[pg 033]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg033\" id=\"Pg033\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\ncollective name can not be predicated of each separately, but only of all\r\ntaken together. \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“The 76th regiment of foot in the British army,”\u003c/span\u003e which\r\nis a collective name, is not a general but an individual name; for though it\r\ncan be predicated of a multitude of individual soldiers taken jointly, it can\r\nnot be predicated of them severally. We may say, Jones is a soldier, and\r\nThompson is a soldier, and Smith is a soldier, but we can not say, Jones is\r\nthe 76th regiment, and Thompson is the 76th regiment, and Smith is the\r\n76th regiment. We can only say, Jones, and Thompson, and Smith, and\r\nBrown, and so forth (enumerating all the soldiers), are the 76th regiment.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“The 76th regiment”\u003c/span\u003e is a collective name, but not a general one: \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“a\r\nregiment”\u003c/span\u003e is both a collective and a general name. General with respect\r\nto all individual regiments, of each of which separately it can be affirmed:\r\ncollective with respect to the individual soldiers of whom any regiment is\r\ncomposed.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 4. The second general division of names is into \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003econcrete\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e and\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eabstract\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e. A concrete name is a name which stands for a thing; an\r\nabstract name is a name which stands for an attribute of a thing. Thus\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eJohn\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ethe sea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ethis\r\ntable\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, are names of things. \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eWhite\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, also, is a name of a\r\nthing, or rather of things. Whiteness, again, is the name of a quality or attribute of\r\nthose things. Man is a name of many things; humanity is a name of an attribute\r\nof those things. \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eOld\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e is a name of things: \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eold\r\nage\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e is a name of one of their attributes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nI have used the words concrete and abstract in the sense annexed to\r\nthem by the schoolmen, who, notwithstanding the imperfections of their\r\nphilosophy, were unrivaled in the construction of technical language, and\r\nwhose definitions, in logic at least, though they never went more than a little\r\nway into the subject, have seldom, I think, been altered but to be spoiled.\r\nA practice, however, has grown up in more modern times, which, if\r\nnot introduced by Locke, has gained currency chiefly from his example, of\r\napplying the expression \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“abstract name”\u003c/span\u003e to all names which are the result\r\nof abstraction or generalization, and consequently to all general names, instead\r\nof confining it to the names of attributes. The metaphysicians of the\r\nCondillac school—whose admiration of Locke, passing over the profoundest\r\nspeculations of that truly original genius, usually fastens with peculiar\r\neagerness upon his weakest points—have gone on imitating him in this\r\nabuse of language, until there is now some difficulty in restoring the word\r\nto its original signification. A more wanton alteration in the meaning of a\r\nword is rarely to be met with; for the expression \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003egeneral name\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\nthe exact equivalent of which exists in all languages I am acquainted with, was already\r\navailable for the purpose to which \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eabstract\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e has been\r\nmisappropriated, while the misappropriation leaves that important class of words, the\r\nnames of attributes, without any compact distinctive appellation. The old\r\nacceptation, however, has not gone so completely out of use as to deprive\r\nthose who still adhere to it of all chance of being understood. By\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eabstract\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, then, I shall always, in Logic proper, mean the\r\nopposite of \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003econcrete\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e; by an abstract name, the name of an\r\nattribute; by a concrete name, the name of an object.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nDo abstract names belong to the class of general, or to that of singular\r\nnames? Some of them are certainly general. I mean those which are\r\nnames not of one single and definite attribute, but of a class of attributes.\r\nSuch is the word \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ecolor\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, which is a name common to whiteness,\r\nredness, etc. Such is even the word whiteness, in respect of the different shades of\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page034\"\u003e[pg 034]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg034\" id=\"Pg034\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nwhiteness to which it is applied in common: the word magnitude, in respect\r\nof the various degrees of magnitude and the various dimensions of\r\nspace; the word weight, in respect of the various degrees of weight. Such\r\nalso is the word \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eattribute\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e itself, the common name of all\r\nparticular attributes. But when only one attribute, neither variable in degree nor in\r\nkind, is designated by the name; as visibleness; tangibleness; equality;\r\nsquareness; milk-whiteness; then the name can hardly be considered general;\r\nfor though it denotes an attribute of many different objects, the attribute\r\nitself is always conceived as one, not many.\u003ca id=\"noteref_9\" name=\"noteref_9\" href=\"#note_9\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e9\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nTo avoid needless logomachies,\r\nthe best course would probably be to consider these names as\r\nneither general nor individual, and to place them in a class apart.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt may be objected to our definition of an abstract name, that not only\r\nthe names which we have called abstract, but adjectives, which we have\r\nplaced in the concrete class, are names of attributes; that \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ewhite\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\nfor example, is as much the name of the color as \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ewhiteness\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e is.\r\nBut (as before remarked) a word ought to be considered as the name of that which we intend\r\nto be understood by it when we put it to its principal use, that is, when we\r\nemploy it in predication. When we say snow is white, milk is white, linen\r\nis white, we do not mean it to be understood that snow, or linen, or milk,\r\nis a color. We mean that they are things having the color. The reverse\r\nis the case with the word whiteness; what we affirm to \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ebe\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e whiteness is not\r\nsnow, but the color of snow. Whiteness, therefore, is the name of the color\r\nexclusively: white is a name of all things whatever having the color; a\r\nname, not of the quality whiteness, but of every white object. It is true,\r\nthis name was given to all those various objects on account of the quality;\r\nand we may therefore say, without impropriety, that the quality forms part\r\nof its signification; but a name can only be said to stand for, or to be a\r\nname of, the things of which it can be predicated. We shall presently see\r\nthat all names which can be said to have any signification, all names by applying\r\nwhich to an individual we give any information respecting that individual,\r\nmay be said to \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eimply\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e an attribute of some sort; but they are not\r\nnames of the attribute; it has its own proper abstract name.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 5. This leads to the consideration of a third great division of names,\r\ninto \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003econnotative\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e and \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003enon-connotative\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, the\r\nlatter sometimes, but improperly, called \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eabsolute\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e. This is one of\r\nthe most important distinctions which we shall have occasion to point out, and one of\r\nthose which go deepest into the nature of language.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nA non-connotative term is one which signifies a subject only, or an attribute\r\nonly. A connotative term is one which denotes a subject, and implies\r\nan attribute. By a subject is here meant any thing which possesses attributes.\r\nThus John, or London, or England, are names which signify a subject\r\nonly. Whiteness, length, virtue, signify an attribute only. None of\r\nthese names, therefore, are connotative. But \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ewhite\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003elong\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003evirtuous\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, are connotative.\r\nThe word white, denotes all white things, as snow, paper, the\r\nfoam of the sea, etc., and implies, or in the language of the schoolmen,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003econnotes\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\u003ca id=\"noteref_10\" name=\"noteref_10\" href=\"#note_10\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e10\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nthe attribute \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ewhiteness\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e. The word white is not predicated of the\r\nattribute, but of the subjects, snow, etc.; but when we predicate it of\r\nthem, we convey the meaning that the attribute whiteness belongs to them.\r\nThe same may be said of the other words above cited. Virtuous, for example,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page035\"\u003e[pg 035]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg035\" id=\"Pg035\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nis the name of a class, which includes Socrates, Howard, the Man of\r\nRoss, and an undefinable number of other individuals, past, present, and to\r\ncome. These individuals, collectively and severally, can alone be said with\r\npropriety to be denoted by the word: of them alone can it properly be said\r\nto be a name. But it is a name applied to all of them in consequence of\r\nan attribute which they are supposed to possess in common, the attribute\r\nwhich has received the name of virtue. It is applied to all beings that are\r\nconsidered to possess this attribute; and to none which are not so considered.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAll concrete general names are connotative. The word \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eman\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, for\r\nexample, denotes Peter, Jane, John, and an indefinite number of other individuals,\r\nof whom, taken as a class, it is the name. But it is applied to them,\r\nbecause they possess, and to signify that they possess, certain attributes.\r\nThese seem to be, corporeity, animal life, rationality, and a certain external\r\nform, which for distinction we call the human. Every existing thing,\r\nwhich possessed all these attributes, would be called a man; and any thing\r\nwhich possessed none of them, or only one, or two, or even three of them\r\nwithout the fourth, would not be so called. For example, if in the interior\r\nof Africa there were to be discovered a race of animals possessing reason\r\nequal to that of human beings, but with the form of an elephant, they\r\nwould not be called men. Swift’s Houyhnhnms would not be so called.\r\nOr if such newly-discovered beings possessed the form of man without any\r\nvestige of reason, it is probable that some other name than that of man\r\nwould be found for them. How it happens that there can be any doubt\r\nabout the matter, will appear hereafter. The word \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eman\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, therefore,\r\nsignifies all these attributes, and all subjects which possess these attributes.\r\nBut it can be predicated only of the subjects. What we call men, are the\r\nsubjects, the individual Stiles and Nokes; not the qualities by which their\r\nhumanity is constituted. The name, therefore, is said to signify the subjects\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003edirectly\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e, the attributes \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eindirectly\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e; it \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003edenotes\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e\r\nthe subjects, and implies, or involves, or indicates, or as we shall say henceforth\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003econnotes\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, the attributes. It is a connotative name.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nConnotative names have hence been also called \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003edenominative\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, because\r\nthe subject which they denote is denominated by, or receives a name from\r\nthe attribute which they connote. Snow, and other objects, receive the\r\nname white, because they possess the attribute which is called whiteness;\r\nPeter, James, and others receive the name man because they possess the\r\nattributes which are considered to constitute humanity. The attribute, or\r\nattributes, may therefore be said to denominate those objects, or to give\r\nthem a common name.\u003ca id=\"noteref_11\" name=\"noteref_11\" href=\"#note_11\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e11\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt has been seen that all concrete general names are connotative. Even\r\nabstract names, though the names only of attributes, may in some instances\r\nbe justly considered as connotative; for attributes themselves may have\r\nattributes ascribed to them; and a word which denotes attributes may connote\r\nan attribute of those attributes. Of this description, for example, is\r\nsuch a word as \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003efault\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e; equivalent to \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ebad\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nor \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ehurtful quality\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e. This word is\r\na name common to many attributes, and connotes hurtfulness, an attribute\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page036\"\u003e[pg 036]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg036\" id=\"Pg036\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nof those various attributes. When, for example, we say that slowness, in\r\na horse, is a fault, we do not mean that the slow movement, the actual\r\nchange of pace of the slow horse, is a bad thing, but that the property or\r\npeculiarity of the horse, from which it derives that name, the quality of being\r\na slow mover, is an undesirable peculiarity.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIn regard to those concrete names which are not general but individual,\r\na distinction must be made.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nProper names are not connotative: they denote the individuals who are\r\ncalled by them; but they do not indicate or imply any attributes as belonging\r\nto those individuals. When we name a child by the name Paul, or a\r\ndog by the name Cæsar, these names are simply marks used to enable those\r\nindividuals to be made subjects of discourse. It may be said, indeed, that\r\nwe must have had some reason for giving them those names rather than\r\nany others; and this is true; but the name, once given, is independent\r\nof the reason. A man may have been named John, because that was the\r\nname of his father; a town may have been named Dartmouth, because it is\r\nsituated at the mouth of the Dart. But it is no part of the signification of\r\nthe word John, that the father of the person so called bore the same name;\r\nnor even of the word Dartmouth, to be situated at the mouth of the Dart.\r\nIf sand should choke up the mouth of the river, or an earthquake change\r\nits course, and remove it to a distance from the town, the name of the\r\ntown would not necessarily be changed. That fact, therefore, can form no\r\npart of the signification of the word; for otherwise, when the fact confessedly\r\nceased to be true, no one would any longer think of applying the\r\nname. Proper names are attached to the objects themselves, and are not\r\ndependent on the continuance of any attribute of the object.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nBut there is another kind of names, which, although they are individual\r\nnames—that is, predicable only of one object—are really connotative. For,\r\nthough we may give to an individual a name utterly unmeaning, which we\r\ncall a proper name—a word which answers the purpose of showing what\r\nthing it is we are talking about, but not of telling any thing about it; yet\r\na name peculiar to an individual is not necessarily of this description. It\r\nmay be significant of some attribute, or some union of attributes, which,\r\nbeing possessed by no object but one, determines the name exclusively to\r\nthat individual. \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“The sun”\u003c/span\u003e is a name of this description; \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“God,”\u003c/span\u003e when\r\nused by a monotheist, is another. These, however, are scarcely examples\r\nof what we are now attempting to illustrate, being, in strictness of language,\r\ngeneral, not individual names: for, however they may be \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ein fact\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e\r\npredicable only of one object, there is nothing in the meaning of the words\r\nthemselves which implies this: and, accordingly, when we are imagining\r\nand not affirming, we may speak of many suns; and the majority of mankind\r\nhave believed, and still believe, that there are many gods. But it is\r\neasy to produce words which are real instances of connotative individual\r\nnames. It may be part of the meaning of the connotative name itself, that\r\nthere can exist but one individual possessing the attribute which it connotes:\r\nas, for instance, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“the \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eonly\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e son of John Stiles;”\u003c/span\u003e \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“the\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003efirst\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e emperor of Rome.”\u003c/span\u003e Or the attribute connoted may be a connection\r\nwith some determinate event, and the connection may be of such a kind as only one\r\nindividual could have; or may at least be such as only one individual actually\r\nhad; and this may be implied in the form of the expression. \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“The father\r\nof Socrates”\u003c/span\u003e is an example of the one kind (since Socrates could not have\r\nhad two fathers); \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“the author of the Iliad,”\u003c/span\u003e \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“the murderer of Henri Quatre,”\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof the second. For, though it is conceivable that more persons than\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page037\"\u003e[pg 037]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg037\" id=\"Pg037\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\none might have participated in the authorship of the Iliad, or in the murder\r\nof Henri Quatre, the employment of the article \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ethe\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e implies that, in fact,\r\nthis was not the case. What is here done by the word \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ethe\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e, is done in other\r\ncases by the context: thus, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Cæsar’s army”\u003c/span\u003e is an individual name, if it\r\nappears from the context that the army meant is that which Cæsar commanded\r\nin a particular battle. The still more general expressions, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“the\r\nRoman army,”\u003c/span\u003e or \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“the Christian army,”\u003c/span\u003e may be individualized in a similar\r\nmanner. Another case of frequent occurrence has already been noticed;\r\nit is the following: The name, being a many-worded one, may consist, in\r\nthe first place, of a \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003egeneral\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e name, capable therefore in itself of being\r\naffirmed of more things than one, but which is, in the second place, so limited by\r\nother words joined with it, that the entire expression can only be predicated\r\nof one object, consistently with the meaning of the general term.\r\nThis is exemplified in such an instance as the following: \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“the present\r\nprime minister of England.”\u003c/span\u003e Prime Minister of England is a general\r\nname; the attributes which it connotes may be possessed by an indefinite\r\nnumber of persons: in succession however, not simultaneously; since the\r\nmeaning of the name itself imports (among other things) that there can be\r\nonly one such person at a time. This being the case, and the application\r\nof the name being afterward limited by the article and the word\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003epresent\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, to such individuals as possess the attributes at one\r\nindivisible point of time, it becomes applicable only to one individual. And as this\r\nappears from the meaning of the name, without any extrinsic proof, it is strictly an\r\nindividual name.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nFrom the preceding observations it will easily be collected, that whenever\r\nthe names given to objects convey any information—that is, whenever\r\nthey have properly any meaning—the meaning resides not in what they\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003edenote\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e, but in what they \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003econnote\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e. The only names of\r\nobjects which connote nothing are \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eproper\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e names; and these have,\r\nstrictly speaking, no signification.\u003ca id=\"noteref_12\" name=\"noteref_12\" href=\"#note_12\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e12\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIf, like the robber in the Arabian Nights, we make a mark with chalk on\r\na house to enable us to know it again, the mark has a purpose, but it has\r\nnot properly any meaning. The chalk does not declare any thing about\r\nthe house; it does not mean, This is such a person’s house, or This is a\r\nhouse which contains booty. The object of making the mark is merely\r\ndistinction. I say to myself, All these houses are so nearly alike that if I\r\nlose sight of them I shall not again be able to distinguish that which I am\r\nnow looking at, from any of the others; I must therefore contrive to make\r\nthe appearance of this one house unlike that of the others, that I may hereafter\r\nknow when I see the mark—not indeed any attribute of the house—but\r\nsimply that it is the same house which I am now looking at. Morgiana\r\nchalked all the other houses in a similar manner, and defeated the\r\nscheme: how? simply by obliterating the difference of appearance between\r\nthat house and the others. The chalk was still there, but it no longer\r\nserved the purpose of a distinctive mark.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page038\"\u003e[pg 038]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg038\" id=\"Pg038\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWhen we impose a proper name, we perform an operation in some degree\r\nanalogous to what the robber intended in chalking the house. We\r\nput a mark, not indeed upon the object itself, but, so to speak, upon the\r\nidea of the object. A proper name is but an unmeaning mark which we\r\nconnect in our minds with the idea of the object, in order that whenever\r\nthe mark meets our eyes or occurs to our thoughts, we may think of that\r\nindividual object. Not being attached to the thing itself, it does not, like\r\nthe chalk, enable us to distinguish the object when we see it; but it enables\r\nus to distinguish it when it is spoken of, either in the records of our\r\nown experience, or in the discourse of others; to know that what we find\r\nasserted in any proposition of which it is the subject, is asserted of the individual\r\nthing with which we were previously acquainted.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWhen we predicate of any thing its proper name; when we say, pointing\r\nto a man, this is Brown or Smith, or pointing to a city, that it is York,\r\nwe do not, merely by so doing, convey to the reader any information about\r\nthem, except that those are their names. By enabling him to identify the\r\nindividuals, we may connect them with information previously possessed\r\nby him; by saying, This is York, we may tell him that it contains the Minster.\r\nBut this is in virtue of what he has previously heard concerning\r\nYork; not by any thing implied in the name. It is otherwise when objects\r\nare spoken of by connotative names. When we say, The town is\r\nbuilt of marble, we give the hearer what may be entirely new information,\r\nand this merely by the signification of the many-worded connotative name,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“built of marble.”\u003c/span\u003e Such names are not signs of the mere objects, invented\r\nbecause we have occasion to think and speak of those objects individually;\r\nbut signs which accompany an attribute; a kind of livery in which the\r\nattribute clothes all objects which are recognized as possessing it. They\r\nare not mere marks, but more, that is to say, significant marks; and the\r\nconnotation is what constitutes their significance.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAs a proper name is said to be the name of the one individual which it\r\nis predicated of, so (as well from the importance of adhering to analogy, as\r\nfor the other reasons formerly assigned) a connotative name ought to be\r\nconsidered a name of all the various individuals which it is predicable of,\r\nor in other words \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003edenotes\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, and not of what it connotes. But by\r\nlearning what things it is a name of, we do not learn the meaning of the name: for\r\nto the same thing we may, with equal propriety, apply many names, not\r\nequivalent in meaning. Thus, I call a certain man by the name Sophroniscus:\r\nI call him by another name, The father of Socrates. Both these are\r\nnames of the same individual, but their meaning is altogether different;\r\nthey are applied to that individual for two different purposes: the one,\r\nmerely to distinguish him from other persons who are spoken of; the other\r\nto indicate a fact relating to him, the fact that Socrates was his son. I\r\nfurther apply to him these other expressions: a man, a Greek, an Athenian,\r\na sculptor, an old man, an honest man, a brave man. All these are, or may\r\nbe, names of Sophroniscus, not indeed of him alone, but of him and each\r\nof an indefinite number of other human beings. Each of these names is\r\napplied to Sophroniscus for a different reason, and by each whoever understands\r\nits meaning is apprised of a distinct fact or number of facts concerning\r\nhim; but those who knew nothing about the names except that\r\nthey were applicable to Sophroniscus, would be altogether ignorant of their\r\nmeaning. It is even possible that I might know every single individual of\r\nwhom a given name could be with truth affirmed, and yet could not be said\r\nto know the meaning of the name. A child knows who are its brothers\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page039\"\u003e[pg 039]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg039\" id=\"Pg039\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nand sisters, long before it has any definite conception of the nature of the\r\nfacts which are involved in the signification of those words.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIn some cases it is not easy to decide precisely how much a particular\r\nword does or does not connote; that is, we do not exactly know (the case\r\nnot having arisen) what degree of difference in the object would occasion\r\na difference in the name. Thus, it is clear that the word man, besides\r\nanimal life and rationality, connotes also a certain external form; but it\r\nwould be impossible to say precisely what form; that is, to decide how\r\ngreat a deviation from the form ordinarily found in the beings whom we are\r\naccustomed to call men, would suffice in a newly-discovered race to make\r\nus refuse them the name of man. Rationality, also, being a quality which\r\nadmits of degrees, it has never been settled what is the lowest degree of\r\nthat quality which would entitle any creature to be considered a human\r\nbeing. In all such cases, the meaning of the general name is so far unsettled\r\nand vague; mankind have not come to any positive agreement\r\nabout the matter. When we come to treat of Classification, we shall have\r\noccasion to show under what conditions this vagueness may exist without\r\npractical inconvenience; and cases will appear in which the ends of language\r\nare better promoted by it than by complete precision; in order that,\r\nin natural history for instance, individuals or species of no very marked\r\ncharacter may be ranged with those more strongly characterized individuals\r\nor species to which, in all their properties taken together, they bear the\r\nnearest resemblance.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nBut this partial uncertainty in the connotation of names can only be\r\nfree from mischief when guarded by strict precautions. One of the chief\r\nsources, indeed, of lax habits of thought, is the custom of using connotative\r\nterms without a distinctly ascertained connotation, and with no more precise\r\nnotion of their meaning than can be loosely collected from observing\r\nwhat objects they are used to denote. It is in this manner that we all acquire,\r\nand inevitably so, our first knowledge of our vernacular language.\r\nA child learns the meaning of the words \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eman\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, or\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ewhite\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, by hearing them\r\napplied to a variety of individual objects, and finding out, by a process of\r\ngeneralization and analysis which he could not himself describe, what those\r\ndifferent objects have in common. In the case of these two words the\r\nprocess is so easy as to require no assistance from culture; the objects\r\ncalled human beings, and the objects called white, differing from all others\r\nby qualities of a peculiarly definite and obvious character. But in many\r\nother cases, objects bear a general resemblance to one another, which leads\r\nto their being familiarly classed together under a common name, while,\r\nwithout more analytic habits than the generality of mankind possess, it is\r\nnot immediately apparent what are the particular attributes, upon the possession\r\nof which in common by them all, their general resemblance depends.\r\nWhen this is the case, people use the name without any recognized connotation,\r\nthat is, without any precise meaning; they talk, and consequently\r\nthink, vaguely, and remain contented to attach only the same degree of\r\nsignificance to their own words, which a child three years old attaches to\r\nthe words brother and sister. The child at least is seldom puzzled by the\r\nstarting up of new individuals, on whom he is ignorant whether or not to\r\nconfer the title; because there is usually an authority close at hand competent\r\nto solve all doubts. But a similar resource does not exist in the\r\ngenerality of cases; and new objects are continually presenting themselves\r\nto men, women, and children, which they are called upon to class \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eproprio motu\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e. They, accordingly, do this on no other\r\nprinciple than that of superficial\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page040\"\u003e[pg 040]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg040\" id=\"Pg040\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nsimilarity, giving to each new object the name of that familiar object,\r\nthe idea of which it most readily recalls, or which, on a cursory inspection,\r\nit seems to them most to resemble: as an unknown substance found in the\r\nground will be called, according to its texture, earth, sand, or a stone. In\r\nthis manner, names creep on from subject to subject, until all traces of\r\na common meaning sometimes disappear, and the word comes to denote\r\na number of things not only independently of any common attribute,\r\nbut which have actually no attribute in common; or none but what is shared\r\nby other things to which the name is capriciously refused.\u003ca id=\"noteref_13\" name=\"noteref_13\" href=\"#note_13\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e13\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Even\r\nscientific writers have aided in this perversion of general language from\r\nits purpose; sometimes because, like the vulgar, they knew no better;\r\nand sometimes in deference to that aversion to admit new words, which\r\ninduces mankind, on all subjects not considered technical, to attempt to\r\nmake the original stock of names serve with but little augmentation to\r\nexpress a constantly increasing number of objects and distinctions, and,\r\nconsequently, to express them in a manner progressively more and more\r\nimperfect.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nTo what a degree this loose mode of classing and denominating objects\r\nhas rendered the vocabulary of mental and moral philosophy unfit for the\r\npurposes of accurate thinking, is best known to whoever has most meditated\r\non the present condition of those branches of knowledge. Since,\r\nhowever, the introduction of a new technical language as the vehicle of\r\nspeculations on subjects belonging to the domain of daily discussion, is extremely\r\ndifficult to effect, and would not be free from inconvenience even\r\nif effected, the problem for the philosopher, and one of the most difficult\r\nwhich he has to resolve, is, in retaining the existing phraseology, how best\r\nto alleviate its imperfections. This can only be accomplished by giving to\r\nevery general concrete name which there is frequent occasion to predicate,\r\na definite and fixed connotation; in order that it may be known what attributes,\r\nwhen we call an object by that name, we really mean to predicate of\r\nthe object. And the question of most nicety is, how to give this fixed connotation\r\nto a name, with the least possible change in the objects which the\r\nname is habitually employed to denote; with the least possible disarrangement,\r\neither by adding or subtraction, of the group of objects which, in\r\nhowever imperfect a manner, it serves to circumscribe and hold together;\r\nand with the least vitiation of the truth of any propositions which are commonly\r\nreceived as true.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThis desirable purpose, of giving a fixed connotation where it is wanting,\r\nis the end aimed at whenever any one attempts to give a definition of\r\na general name already in use; every definition of a connotative name being\r\nan attempt either merely to declare, or to declare and analyze, the connotation\r\nof the name. And the fact, that no questions which have arisen\r\nin the moral sciences have been subjects of keener controversy than the\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page041\"\u003e[pg 041]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg041\" id=\"Pg041\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\ndefinitions of almost all the leading expressions, is a proof how great an\r\nextent the evil to which we have adverted has attained.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nNames with indeterminate connotation are not to be confounded with\r\nnames which have more than one connotation, that is to say, ambiguous\r\nwords. A word may have several meanings, but all of them fixed and recognized\r\nones; as the word \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003epost\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, for example, or the word\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ebox\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, the various\r\nsenses of which it would be endless to enumerate. And the paucity of existing\r\nnames, in comparison with the demand for them, may often render\r\nit advisable and even necessary to retain a name in this multiplicity of acceptations,\r\ndistinguishing these so clearly as to prevent their being confounded\r\nwith one another. Such a word may be considered as two or\r\nmore names, accidentally written and spoken alike.\u003ca id=\"noteref_14\" name=\"noteref_14\" href=\"#note_14\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e14\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 6. The fourth principal division of names, is into \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003epositive\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nand \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003enegative\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e. Positive, as \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eman\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003etree\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003egood\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e; negative, as\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003enot-man\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003enot-tree\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003enot-good\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e.\r\nTo every positive concrete name, a corresponding negative one might be\r\nframed. After giving a name to any one thing, or to any plurality of\r\nthings, we might create a second name which should be a name of all things\r\nwhatever, except that particular thing or things. These negative names\r\nare employed whenever we have occasion to speak collectively of all things\r\nother than some thing or class of things. When the positive name is connotative,\r\nthe corresponding negative name is connotative likewise; but in a\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page042\"\u003e[pg 042]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg042\" id=\"Pg042\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\npeculiar way, connoting not the presence but the absence of an attribute.\r\nThus, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003enot-white\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e denotes all things whatever except white things;\r\nand connotes the attribute of not possessing whiteness. For the non-possession of\r\nany given attribute is also an attribute, and may receive a name as such;\r\nand thus negative concrete names may obtain negative abstract names to\r\ncorrespond to them.\u003ca id=\"noteref_15\" name=\"noteref_15\" href=\"#note_15\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e15\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nNames which are positive in form are often negative in reality, and others\r\nare really positive though their form is negative. The word\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003einconvenient\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\nfor example, does not express the mere absence of convenience; it expresses\r\na positive attribute—that of being the cause of discomfort or annoyance.\r\nSo the word \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eunpleasant\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, notwithstanding its negative form, does\r\nnot connote the mere absence of pleasantness, but a less degree of what is\r\nsignified by the word \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003epainful\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, which, it is hardly necessary to\r\nsay, is positive.\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eIdle\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, on the other hand, is a word which, though positive in form,\r\nexpresses nothing but what would be signified either by the phrase \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003enot\r\nworking\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, or by the phrase \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003enot disposed to work\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e; and\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003esober\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, either by \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003enot drunk\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e or by\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003enot drunken\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThere is a class of names called \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eprivative\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e. A privative name is\r\nequivalent in its signification to a positive and a negative name taken together;\r\nbeing the name of something which has once had a particular attribute, or\r\nfor some other reason might have been expected to have it, but which has\r\nit not. Such is the word \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eblind\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, which is not equivalent to\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003enot seeing\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, or to \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003enot capable of seeing\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\nfor it would not, except by a poetical or rhetorical\r\nfigure, be applied to stocks and stones. A thing is not usually said to be\r\nblind, unless the class to which it is most familiarly referred, or to which\r\nit is referred on the particular occasion, be chiefly composed of things\r\nwhich can see, as in the case of a blind man, or a blind horse; or unless it\r\nis supposed for any reason that it ought to see; as in saying of a man, that\r\nhe rushed blindly into an abyss, or of philosophers or the clergy that the\r\ngreater part of them are blind guides. The names called privative, therefore,\r\nconnote two things; the absence of certain attributes, and the presence\r\nof others, from which the presence also of the former might naturally\r\nhave been expected.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 7. The fifth leading division of names is into \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003erelative\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e and\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eabsolute\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, or let us rather say, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003erelative\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nand \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003enon-relative\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e; for the word absolute is put\r\nupon much too hard duty in metaphysics, not to be willingly spared when\r\nits services can be dispensed with. It resembles the word \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ecivil\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nin the language\r\nof jurisprudence, which stands for the opposite of criminal, the opposite\r\nof ecclesiastical, the opposite of military, the opposite of political—in\r\nshort, the opposite of any positive word which wants a negative.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nRelative names are such as father, son; ruler, subject; like; equal; unlike;\r\nunequal; longer, shorter; cause, effect. Their characteristic property\r\nis, that they are always given in pairs. Every relative name which is predicated\r\nof an object, supposes another object (or objects), of which we may\r\npredicate either that same name or another relative name which is said to\r\nbe the \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ecorrelative\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e of the former. Thus, when we call any person a son, we\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page043\"\u003e[pg 043]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg043\" id=\"Pg043\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nsuppose other persons who must be called parents. When we call any event\r\na cause, we suppose another event which is an effect. When we say of\r\nany distance that it is longer, we suppose another distance which is shorter.\r\nWhen we say of any object that it is like, we mean that it is like some\r\nother object, which is also said to be like the first. In this last case both\r\nobjects receive the same name; the relative term is its own correlative.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt is evident that these words, when concrete, are, like other concrete\r\ngeneral names, connotative; they denote a subject, and connote an attribute;\r\nand each of them has, or might have, a corresponding abstract name,\r\nto denote the attribute connoted by the concrete. Thus the concrete\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003elike\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e has its abstract \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003elikeness\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e; the\r\nconcretes, father and son, have, or might have,\r\nthe abstracts, paternity, and filiety, or sonship. The concrete name connotes\r\nan attribute, and the abstract name which answers to it denotes that\r\nattribute. But of what nature is the attribute? Wherein consists the\r\npeculiarity in the connotation of a relative name?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe attribute signified by a relative name, say some, is a relation; and\r\nthis they give, if not as a sufficient explanation, at least as the only one attainable.\r\nIf they are asked, What then is a relation? they do not profess\r\nto be able to tell. It is generally regarded as something peculiarly recondite\r\nand mysterious. I can not, however, perceive in what respect it is more\r\nso than any other attribute; indeed, it appears to me to be so in a somewhat\r\nless degree. I conceive rather, that it is by examining into the signification\r\nof relative names, or, in other words, into the nature of the attribute\r\nwhich they connote, that a clear insight may best be obtained into\r\nthe nature of all attributes: of all that is meant by an attribute.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt is obvious, in fact, that if we take any two correlative names,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003efather\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e and \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eson\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e for instance, though the\r\nobjects \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ede\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003enoted by the names are different,\r\nthey both, in a certain sense, connote the same thing. They can not,\r\nindeed, be said to connote the same \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eattribute\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e: to be a father, is\r\nnot the same thing as to be a son. But when we call one man a father, another a\r\nson, what we mean to affirm is a set of facts, which are exactly the same in\r\nboth cases. To predicate of A that he is the father of B, and of B that he\r\nis the son of A, is to assert one and the same fact in different words. The\r\ntwo propositions are exactly equivalent: neither of them asserts more or\r\nasserts less than the other. The paternity of A and the filiety of B are\r\nnot two facts, but two modes of expressing the same fact. That fact, when\r\nanalysed, consists of a series of physical events or phenomena, in which\r\nboth A and B are parties concerned, and from which they both derive\r\nnames. What those names really connote, is this series of events: that is\r\nthe meaning, and the whole meaning, which either of them is intended to\r\nconvey. The series of events may be said to \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003econstitute\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e the\r\nrelation; the schoolmen called it the foundation of the relation, \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003efundamentum relationis\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIn this manner any fact, or series of facts, in which two different objects\r\nare implicated, and which is therefore predicable of both of them, may be\r\neither considered as constituting an attribute of the one, or an attribute of\r\nthe other. According as we consider it in the former, or in the latter aspect,\r\nit is connoted by the one or the other of the two correlative names.\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eFather\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e connotes the fact, regarded as constituting an attribute\r\nof A; \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eson\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e connotes the same fact, as constituting an attribute of\r\nB. It may evidently be regarded with equal propriety in either light. And all that appears\r\nnecessary to account for the existence of relative names, is, that whenever\r\nthere is a fact in which two individuals are concerned, an attribute grounded\r\non that fact may be ascribed to either of these individuals.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page044\"\u003e[pg 044]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg044\" id=\"Pg044\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nA name, therefore, is said to be relative, when, over and above the object\r\nwhich it denotes, it implies in its signification the existence of another object,\r\nalso deriving a denomination from the same fact which is the ground\r\nof the first name. Or (to express the same meaning in other words) a\r\nname is relative, when, being the name of one thing, its signification can\r\nnot be explained but by mentioning another. Or we may state it thus—when\r\nthe name can not be employed in discourse so as to have a meaning,\r\nunless the name of some other thing than what it is itself the name of, be\r\neither expressed or understood. These definitions are all, at bottom, equivalent,\r\nbeing modes of variously expressing this one distinctive circumstance—that\r\nevery other attribute of an object might, without any contradiction, be conceived still\r\nto exist if no object besides that one had ever existed;\u003ca id=\"noteref_16\" name=\"noteref_16\" href=\"#note_16\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e16\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nbut those of its attributes which are expressed by relative names, would on\r\nthat supposition be swept away.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 8. Names have been further distinguished into \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eunivocal\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e and\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eæquivocal\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e: these, however, are not two kinds of names, but two\r\ndifferent modes of employing names. A name is univocal, or applied univocally, with\r\nrespect to all things of which it can be predicated \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ein the same sense\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e;\r\nit is æquivocal, or applied æquivocally, as respects those things of which it is\r\npredicated in different senses. It is scarcely necessary to give instances of a\r\nfact so familiar as the double meaning of a word. In reality, as has been\r\nalready observed, an æquivocal or ambiguous word is not one name, but\r\ntwo names, accidentally coinciding in sound. \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eFile\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e meaning a\r\nsteel instrument, and \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003efile\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e meaning a line of soldiers, have\r\nno more title to be considered one word, because written alike, than\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003egrease\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e and \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eGreece\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e have, because\r\nthey are pronounced alike. They are one sound, appropriated to form two\r\ndifferent words.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAn intermediate case is that of a name used \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eanalogically\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e or\r\nmetaphorically; that is, a name which is predicated of two things, not univocally,\r\nor exactly in the same signification, but in significations somewhat similar,\r\nand which being derived one from the other, one of them may be considered\r\nthe primary, and the other a secondary signification. As when we\r\nspeak of a brilliant light and a brilliant achievement. The word is not\r\napplied in the same sense to the light and to the achievement; but having\r\nbeen applied to the light in its original sense, that of brightness to the eye,\r\nit is transferred to the achievement in a derivative signification, supposed\r\nto be somewhat like the primitive one. The word, however, is just as\r\nproperly two names instead of one, in this case, as in that of the most perfect\r\nambiguity. And one of the commonest forms of fallacious reasoning\r\narising from ambiguity, is that of arguing from a metaphorical expression\r\nas if it were literal; that is, as if a word, when applied metaphorically,\r\nwere the same name as when taken in its original sense: which will be\r\nseen more particularly in its place.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page045\"\u003e[pg 045]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg045\" id=\"Pg045\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-div\" style=\"margin-bottom: 4.00em; margin-top: 4.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"toc13\" id=\"toc13\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"pdf14\" id=\"pdf14\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: center; margin-bottom: 2.40em; margin-top: 2.40em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 120%\"\u003eChapter III.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: left; margin-bottom: 2.88em; margin-top: 2.88em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 144%\"\u003eOf The Things Denoted By Names.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 1. Looking back now to the commencement of our inquiry, let us attempt\r\nto measure how far it has advanced. Logic, we found, is the Theory\r\nof Proof. But proof supposes something provable, which must be a Proposition\r\nor Assertion; since nothing but a Proposition can be an object of\r\nbelief, or therefore of proof. A Proposition is, discourse which affirms or\r\ndenies something of some other thing. This is one step: there must, it\r\nseems, be two things concerned in every act of belief. But what are these\r\nThings? They can be no other than those signified by the two names,\r\nwhich being joined together by a copula constitute the Proposition. If,\r\ntherefore, we knew what all names signify, we should know every thing\r\nwhich, in the existing state of human knowledge, is capable either of being\r\nmade a subject of affirmation or denial, or of being itself affirmed or denied\r\nof a subject. We have accordingly, in the preceding chapter, reviewed\r\nthe various kinds of Names, in order to ascertain what is signified\r\nby each of them. And we have now carried this survey far enough to be\r\nable to take an account of its results, and to exhibit an enumeration of all\r\nkinds of Things which are capable of being made predicates, or of having\r\nany thing predicated of them: after which to determine the import of\r\nPredication, that is, of Propositions, can be no arduous task.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe necessity of an enumeration of Existences, as the basis of Logic, did\r\nnot escape the attention of the schoolmen, and of their master Aristotle,\r\nthe most comprehensive, if not also the most sagacious, of the ancient philosophers.\r\nThe Categories, or Predicaments—the former a Greek word,\r\nthe latter its literal translation in the Latin language—were believed to be\r\nan enumeration of all things capable of being named; an enumeration by\r\nthe \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003esumma genera\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, the most extensive classes into which things could\r\nbe distributed; which, therefore, were so many highest Predicates, one or\r\nother of which was supposed capable of being affirmed with truth of every\r\nnamable thing whatsoever. The following are the classes into which, according\r\nto this school of philosophy, Things in general might be reduced:\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nΟὐσία, Substantia.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nΠοσὸν, Quantitas.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nΠοιόν, Qualitas.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nΠρός τι, Relatio.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nΠοιεῖν, Actio.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nΠάσχειν, Passio.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nΠοῦ, Ubi.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nΠότε, Quando.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nΚεῖσθακ, Situs.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nἜχειν, Habitus.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe imperfections of this classification are too obvious to require, and\r\nits merits are not sufficient to reward, a minute examination. It is a mere\r\ncatalogue of the distinctions rudely marked out by the language of familiar\r\nlife, with little or no attempt to penetrate, by philosophic analysis, to the\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003erationale\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e even of those common distinctions. Such an analysis, however\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page046\"\u003e[pg 046]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg046\" id=\"Pg046\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nsuperficially conducted, would have shown the enumeration to be both redundant\r\nand defective. Some objects are omitted, and others repeated\r\nseveral times under different heads. It is like a division of animals into\r\nmen, quadrupeds, horses, asses, and ponies. That, for instance, could not\r\nbe a very comprehensive view of the nature of Relation which could exclude\r\naction, passivity, and local situation from that category. The same\r\nobservation applies to the categories Quando (or position in time), and Ubi\r\n(or position in space); while the distinction between the latter and Situs\r\nis merely verbal. The incongruity of erecting into a \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003esummum genus\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e the\r\nclass which forms the tenth category is manifest. On the other hand, the\r\nenumeration takes no notice of any thing besides substances and attributes.\r\nIn what category are we to place sensations, or any other feelings and\r\nstates of mind; as hope, joy, fear; sound, smell, taste; pain, pleasure;\r\nthought, judgment, conception, and the like? Probably all these would\r\nhave been placed by the Aristotelian school in the categories of \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eactio\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e and \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003epassio\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e; and\r\nthe relation of such of them as are active, to their objects, and\r\nof such of them as are passive, to their causes, would rightly be so placed;\r\nbut the things themselves, the feelings or states of mind, wrongly. Feelings,\r\nor states of consciousness, are assuredly to be accounted among realities, but they can\r\nnot be reckoned either among substances or attributes.\u003ca id=\"noteref_17\" name=\"noteref_17\" href=\"#note_17\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e17\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 2. Before recommencing, under better auspices, the attempt made with\r\nsuch imperfect success by the early logicians, we must take notice of an\r\nunfortunate ambiguity in all the concrete names which correspond to the\r\nmost general of all abstract terms, the word Existence. When we have\r\noccasion for a name which shall be capable of denoting whatever exists,\r\nas contradistinguished from non-entity or Nothing, there is hardly a word\r\napplicable to the purpose which is not also, and even more familiarly, taken\r\nin a sense in which it denotes only substances. But substances are not all\r\nthat exists; attributes, if such things are to be spoken of, must be said to\r\nexist; feelings certainly exist. Yet when we speak of an \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eobject\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e, or of a\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page047\"\u003e[pg 047]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg047\" id=\"Pg047\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ething\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e, we are almost always supposed to mean a substance. There seems\r\na kind of contradiction in using such an expression as that one \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ething\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e is\r\nmerely an attribute of another thing. And the announcement of a Classification\r\nof Things would, I believe, prepare most readers for an enumeration\r\nlike those in natural history, beginning with the great divisions of animal,\r\nvegetable, and mineral, and subdividing them into classes and orders.\r\nIf, rejecting the word Thing, we endeavor to find another of a more general\r\nimport, or at least more exclusively confined to that general import, a word\r\ndenoting all that exists, and connoting only simple existence; no word\r\nmight be presumed fitter for such a purpose than \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ebeing\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e:\r\noriginally the present participle of a verb which in one of its meanings is exactly\r\nequivalent to the verb \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eexists\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e; and therefore suitable, even by\r\nits grammatical formation, to be the concrete of the abstract\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eexistence\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e. But this word, strange as the fact may appear, is\r\nstill more completely spoiled for the purpose which it seemed expressly made for, than\r\nthe word Thing. \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eBeing\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nis, by custom, exactly synonymous with substance; except that it is free\r\nfrom a slight taint of a second ambiguity; being implied impartially to\r\nmatter and to mind, while substance, though originally and in strictness\r\napplicable to both, is apt to suggest in preference the idea of matter. Attributes\r\nare never called Beings; nor are feelings. A Being is that which\r\nexcites feelings, and which possesses attributes. The soul is called a Being;\r\nGod and angels are called Beings; but if we were to say, extension,\r\ncolor, wisdom, virtue, are beings, we should perhaps be suspected of thinking\r\nwith some of the ancients, that the cardinal virtues are animals; or, at\r\nthe least, of holding with the Platonic school the doctrine of self-existent\r\nIdeas, or with the followers of Epicurus that of Sensible Forms, which detach\r\nthemselves in every direction from bodies, and by coming in contact\r\nwith our organs, cause our perceptions. We should be supposed, in short,\r\nto believe that Attributes are Substances.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIn consequence of this perversion of the word Being, philosophers looking\r\nabout for something to supply its place, laid their hands upon the word\r\nEntity, a piece of barbarous Latin, invented by the schoolmen to be used\r\nas an abstract name, in which class its grammatical form would seem to\r\nplace it: but being seized by logicians in distress to stop a leak in their\r\nterminology, it has ever since been used as a concrete name. The kindred\r\nword \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eessence\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, born at the same time and of the same parents,\r\nscarcely underwent a more complete transformation when, from being the abstract\r\nof the verb \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eto be\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, it came to denote something sufficiently\r\nconcrete to be inclosed in a glass bottle. The word Entity, since it settled down into a\r\nconcrete name, has retained its universality of signification somewhat less\r\nimpaired than any of the names before mentioned. Yet the same gradual\r\ndecay to which, after a certain age, all the language of psychology seems\r\nliable, has been at work even here. If you call virtue an \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eentity\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\nyou are indeed somewhat less strongly suspected of believing it to be a substance\r\nthan if you called it a \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ebeing\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e; but you are by no means free from\r\nthe suspicion. Every word which was originally intended to connote mere existence,\r\nseems, after a time, to enlarge its connotation to \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eseparate\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e existence,\r\nor existence freed from the condition of belonging to a substance; which\r\ncondition being precisely what constitutes an attribute, attributes are gradually\r\nshut out; and along with them feelings, which in ninety-nine cases\r\nout of a hundred have no other name than that of the attribute which is\r\ngrounded on them. Strange that when the greatest embarrassment felt by\r\nall who have any considerable number of thoughts to express, is to find a\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page048\"\u003e[pg 048]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg048\" id=\"Pg048\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nsufficient variety of precise words fitted to express them, there should be\r\nno practice to which even scientific thinkers are more addicted than that\r\nof taking valuable words to express ideas which are sufficiently expressed\r\nby other words already appropriated to them.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWhen it is impossible to obtain good tools, the next best thing is to understand\r\nthoroughly the defects of those we have. I have therefore warned\r\nthe reader of the ambiguity of the names which, for want of better, I\r\nam necessitated to employ. It must now be the writer’s endeavor so to\r\nemploy them as in no case to leave the meaning doubtful or obscure. No\r\none of the above terms being altogether unambiguous, I shall not confine\r\nmyself to any one, but shall employ on each occasion the word which seems\r\nleast likely in the particular case to lead to misunderstanding; nor do I\r\npretend to use either these or any other words with a rigorous adherence\r\nto one single sense. To do so would often leave us without a word to express\r\nwhat is signified by a known word in some one or other of its senses:\r\nunless authors had an unlimited license to coin new words, together with\r\n(what it would be more difficult to assume) unlimited power of making\r\nreaders understand them. Nor would it be wise in a writer, on a subject\r\ninvolving so much of abstraction, to deny himself the advantage derived\r\nfrom even an improper use of a term, when, by means of it, some familiar\r\nassociation is called up which brings the meaning home to the mind, as it\r\nwere by a flash.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe difficulty both to the writer and reader, of the attempt which must\r\nbe made to use vague words so as to convey a precise meaning, is not\r\nwholly a matter of regret. It is not unfitting that logical treatises should\r\nafford an example of that, to facilitate which is among the most important\r\nuses of logic. Philosophical language will for a long time, and popular\r\nlanguage still longer, retain so much of vagueness and ambiguity, that logic\r\nwould be of little value if it did not, among its other advantages, exercise\r\nthe understanding in doing its work neatly and correctly with these imperfect\r\ntools.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAfter this preamble it is time to proceed to our enumeration. We shall\r\ncommence with Feelings, the simplest class of namable things; the term\r\nFeeling being of course understood in its most enlarged sense.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-div\" style=\"margin-bottom: 3.00em; margin-top: 3.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003ch4 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: left; margin-bottom: 2.40em; margin-top: 2.40em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 120%\"\u003eI. Feelings, Or States of Consciousness.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 3. A Feeling and a State of consciousness are, in the language of philosophy,\r\nequivalent expressions: every thing is a feeling of which the mind\r\nis conscious; every thing which it \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003efeels\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e, or, in other words, which forms a\r\npart of its own sentient existence. In popular language Feeling is not always\r\nsynonymous with State of Consciousness; being often taken more\r\npeculiarly for those states which are conceived as belonging to the sensitive,\r\nor to the emotional, phasis of our nature, and sometimes, with a still\r\nnarrower restriction, to the emotional alone, as distinguished from what\r\nare conceived as belonging to the percipient or to the intellectual phasis.\r\nBut this is an admitted departure from correctness of language; just as,\r\nby a popular perversion the exact converse of this, the word Mind is withdrawn\r\nfrom its rightful generality of signification, and restricted to the\r\nintellect. The still greater perversion by which Feeling is sometimes confined\r\nnot only to bodily sensations, but to the sensations of a single sense,\r\nthat of touch, needs not be more particularly adverted to.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nFeeling, in the proper sense of the term, is a genus, of which Sensation,\r\nEmotion, and Thought, are subordinate species. Under the word Thought\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page049\"\u003e[pg 049]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg049\" id=\"Pg049\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nis here to be included whatever we are internally conscious of when we are\r\nsaid to think; from the consciousness we have when we think of a red color\r\nwithout having it before our eyes, to the most recondite thoughts of a\r\nphilosopher or poet. Be it remembered, however, that by a thought is to\r\nbe understood what passes in the mind itself, and not any object external\r\nto the mind, which the person is commonly said to be thinking of. He may\r\nbe thinking of the sun, or of God, but the sun and God are not thoughts;\r\nhis mental image, however, of the sun, and his idea of God, are thoughts;\r\nstates of his mind, not of the objects themselves; and so also is his belief\r\nof the existence of the sun, or of God; or his disbelief, if the case be so.\r\nEven imaginary objects (which are said to exist only in our ideas) are to be\r\ndistinguished from our ideas of them. I may think of a hobgoblin, as I may\r\nthink of the loaf which was eaten yesterday, or of the flower which will\r\nbloom to-morrow. But the hobgoblin which never existed is not the same\r\nthing with my idea of a hobgoblin, any more than the loaf which once existed\r\nis the same thing with my idea of a loaf, or the flower which does not\r\nyet exist, but which will exist, is the same with my idea of a flower. They\r\nare all, not thoughts, but objects of thought; though at the present time all\r\nthe objects are alike non-existent.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIn like manner, a Sensation is to be carefully distinguished from the object\r\nwhich causes the sensation; our sensation of white from a white object:\r\nnor is it less to be distinguished from the attribute whiteness, which we\r\nascribe to the object in consequence of its exciting the sensation. Unfortunately\r\nfor clearness and due discrimination in considering these subjects,\r\nour sensations seldom receive separate names. We have a name for the\r\nobjects which produce in us a certain sensation: the word \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ewhite\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e. We\r\nhave a name for the quality in those objects, to which we ascribe the sensation:\r\nthe name \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ewhiteness\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e. But when we speak of the sensation itself\r\n(as we have not occasion to do this often except in our scientific speculations),\r\nlanguage, which adapts itself for the most part only to the common\r\nuses of life, has provided us with no single-worded or immediate designation;\r\nwe must employ a circumlocution, and say, The sensation of white,\r\nor The sensation of whiteness; we must denominate the sensation either\r\nfrom the object, or from the attribute, by which it is excited. Yet the sensation,\r\nthough it never \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003edoes\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e, might very well be \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003econceived\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e to exist,\r\nwithout any thing whatever to excite it. We can conceive it as arising spontaneously\r\nin the mind. But if it so arose, we should have no name to denote\r\nit which would not be a misnomer. In the case of our sensations of\r\nhearing we are better provided; we have the word Sound, and a whole\r\nvocabulary of words to denote the various kinds of sounds. For as we\r\nare often conscious of these sensations in the absence of any perceptible\r\nobject, we can more easily conceive having them in the absence of any\r\nobject whatever. We need only shut our eyes and listen to music, to have\r\na conception of a universe with nothing in it except sounds, and ourselves\r\nhearing them: and what is easily conceived separately, easily obtains a\r\nseparate name. But in general our names of sensations denote indiscriminately\r\nthe sensation and the attribute. Thus, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ecolor\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e stands for the\r\nsensations of white, red, etc., but also for the quality in the colored object. We\r\ntalk of the colors of things as among their \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eproperties\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 4. In the case of sensations, another distinction has also to be kept in\r\nview, which is often confounded, and never without mischievous consequences.\r\nThis is, the distinction between the sensation itself, and the state\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page050\"\u003e[pg 050]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg050\" id=\"Pg050\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nof the bodily organs which precedes the sensation, and which constitutes\r\nthe physical agency by which it is produced. One of the sources of confusion\r\non this subject is the division commonly made of feelings into Bodily\r\nand Mental. Philosophically speaking, there is no foundation at all for this\r\ndistinction: even sensations are states of the sentient mind, not states of\r\nthe body, as distinguished from it. What I am conscious of when I see\r\nthe color blue, is a feeling of blue color, which is one thing; the picture on\r\nmy retina, or the phenomenon of hitherto mysterious nature which takes\r\nplace in my optic nerve or in my brain, is another thing, of which I am\r\nnot at all conscious, and which scientific investigation alone could have apprised\r\nme of. These are states of my body; but the sensation of blue,\r\nwhich is the consequence of these states of body, is not a state of body:\r\nthat which perceives and is conscious is called Mind. When sensations\r\nare called bodily feelings, it is only as being the class of feelings which are\r\nimmediately occasioned by bodily states; whereas the other kinds of feelings,\r\nthoughts, for instance, or emotions, are immediately excited not by\r\nany thing acting upon the bodily organs, but by sensations, or by previous\r\nthoughts. This, however, is a distinction not in our feelings, but in the\r\nagency which produces our feelings: all of them when actually produced\r\nare states of mind.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nBesides the affection of our bodily organs from without, and the sensation\r\nthereby produced in our minds, many writers admit a third link in the\r\nchain of phenomena, which they call a Perception, and which consists in\r\nthe recognition of an external object as the exciting cause of the sensation.\r\nThis perception, they say, is an \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eact\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e of the mind, proceeding from its own\r\nspontaneous activity; while in a sensation the mind is passive, being merely\r\nacted upon by the outward object. And according to some metaphysicians,\r\nit is by an act of the mind, similar to perception, except in not being\r\npreceded by any sensation, that the existence of God, the soul, and other\r\nhyperphysical objects, is recognized.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThese acts of what is termed perception, whatever be the conclusion ultimately\r\ncome to respecting their nature, must, I conceive, take their place\r\namong the varieties of feelings or states of mind. In so classing them,\r\nI have not the smallest intention of declaring or insinuating any theory\r\nas to the law of mind in which these mental processes may be supposed\r\nto originate, or the conditions under which they may be legitimate or the\r\nreverse. Far less do I mean (as Dr. Whewell seems to suppose must be\r\nmeant in an analogous case\u003ca id=\"noteref_18\" name=\"noteref_18\" href=\"#note_18\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e18\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e) to indicate that as they are\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003emerely\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e states of mind,”\u003c/span\u003e it is superfluous to inquire into their\r\ndistinguishing peculiarities. I abstain from the inquiry as irrelevant to the science of\r\nlogic. In these so-called perceptions, or direct recognitions by the mind, of objects,\r\nwhether physical or spiritual, which are external to itself, I can see only cases of\r\nbelief; but of belief which claims to be intuitive, or independent of external\r\nevidence. When a stone lies before me, I am conscious of certain sensations\r\nwhich I receive from it; but if I say that these sensations come to\r\nme from an external object which I \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eperceive\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e, the meaning of these words\r\nis, that receiving the sensations, I intuitively \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ebelieve\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e that an external\r\ncause of those sensations exists. The laws of intuitive belief, and the conditions\r\nunder which it is legitimate, are a subject which, as we have already so\r\noften remarked, belongs not to logic, but to the science of the ultimate laws\r\nof the human mind.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page051\"\u003e[pg 051]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg051\" id=\"Pg051\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nTo the same region of speculation belongs all that can be said respecting\r\nthe distinction which the German metaphysicians and their French and\r\nEnglish followers so elaborately draw between the \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eacts\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e of the mind and its\r\nmerely passive \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003estates\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e; between what it receives from, and what it gives to,\r\nthe crude materials of its experience. I am aware that with reference to\r\nthe view which those writers take of the primary elements of thought and\r\nknowledge, this distinction is fundamental. But for the present purpose,\r\nwhich is to examine, not the original groundwork of our knowledge, but\r\nhow we come by that portion of it which is not original; the difference between\r\nactive and passive states of mind is of secondary importance. For\r\nus, they all are states of mind, they all are feelings; by which, let it be\r\nsaid once more, I mean to imply nothing of passivity, but simply that they\r\nare psychological facts, facts which take place in the mind, and are to be\r\ncarefully distinguished from the external or physical facts with which they\r\nmay be connected either as effects or as causes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 5. Among active states of mind, there is, however, one species which\r\nmerits particular attention, because it forms a principal part of the connotation\r\nof some important classes of names. I mean \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003evolitions\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e, or acts of\r\nthe will. When we speak of sentient beings by relative names, a large\r\nportion of the connotation of the name usually consists of the actions of\r\nthose beings; actions past, present, and possible or probable future. Take,\r\nfor instance, the words Sovereign and Subject. What meaning do these\r\nwords convey, but that of innumerable actions, done or to be done by the\r\nsovereign and the subjects, to or in regard to one another reciprocally?\r\nSo with the words physician and patient, leader and follower, tutor and\r\npupil. In many cases the words also connote actions which would be\r\ndone under certain contingencies by persons other than those denoted: as\r\nthe words mortgagor and mortgagee, obligor and obligee, and many other\r\nwords expressive of legal relation, which connote what a court of justice\r\nwould do to enforce the legal obligation if not fulfilled. There are also\r\nwords which connote actions previously done by persons other than those\r\ndenoted either by the name itself or by its correlative; as the word brother.\r\nFrom these instances, it may be seen how large a portion of the connotation\r\nof names consists of actions. Now what is an action? Not one thing,\r\nbut a series of two things: the state of mind called a volition, followed by\r\nan effect. The volition or intention to produce the effect, is one thing;\r\nthe effect produced in consequence of the intention, is another thing; the\r\ntwo together constitute the action. I form the purpose of instantly moving\r\nmy arm; that is a state of my mind: my arm (not being tied or paralytic)\r\nmoves in obedience to my purpose; that is a physical fact, consequent\r\non a state of mind. The intention, followed by the fact, or (if we\r\nprefer the expression) the fact when preceded and caused by the intention,\r\nis called the action of moving my arm.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 6. Of the first leading division of namable things, viz., Feelings or\r\nStates of Consciousness, we began by recognizing three subdivisions; Sensations,\r\nThoughts, and Emotions. The first two of these we have illustrated\r\nat considerable length; the third, Emotions, not being perplexed by similar\r\nambiguities, does not require similar exemplification. And, finally, we have\r\nfound it necessary to add to these three a fourth species, commonly known\r\nby the name Volitions. We shall now proceed to the two remaining classes\r\nof namable things; all things which are regarded as external to the\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page052\"\u003e[pg 052]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg052\" id=\"Pg052\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nmind being considered as belonging either to the class of Substances or to\r\nthat of Attributes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-div\" style=\"margin-bottom: 3.00em; margin-top: 3.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003ch4 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: left; margin-bottom: 2.40em; margin-top: 2.40em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 120%\"\u003eII. Substances.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nLogicians have endeavored to define Substance and Attribute; but their\r\ndefinitions are not so much attempts to draw a distinction between the\r\nthings themselves, as instructions what difference it is customary to make\r\nin the grammatical structure of the sentence, according as we are speaking\r\nof substances or of attributes. Such definitions are rather lessons of\r\nEnglish, or of Greek, Latin, or German, than of mental philosophy. An\r\nattribute, say the school logicians, must be the attribute \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eof\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e something;\r\ncolor, for example, must be the color \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eof\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e something; goodness must be the\r\ngoodness \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eof\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e something; and if this something should cease to exist, or\r\nshould cease to be connected with the attribute, the existence of the attribute\r\nwould be at an end. A substance, on the contrary, is self-existent; in\r\nspeaking about it, we need not put \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eof\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e after its name. A stone is not the\r\nstone of any thing; the moon is not the moon \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eof\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e any thing, but simply the\r\nmoon. Unless, indeed, the name which we choose to give to the substance\r\nbe a relative name; if so, it must be followed either by \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eof\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e, or by some\r\nother particle, implying, as that preposition does, a reference to something\r\nelse: but then the other characteristic peculiarity of an attribute would\r\nfail; the \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003esomething\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e might be destroyed, and the substance might still\r\nsubsist. Thus, a father must be the father \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eof\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e something, and so far resembles\r\nan attribute, in being referred to something besides himself: if there were\r\nno child, there would be no father: but this, when we look into the matter,\r\nonly means that we should not call him father. The man called father\r\nmight still exist though there were no child, as he existed before there was\r\na child; and there would be no contradiction in supposing him to exist,\r\nthough the whole universe except himself were destroyed. But destroy\r\nall white substances, and where would be the attribute whiteness? Whiteness,\r\nwithout any white thing, is a contradiction in terms.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThis is the nearest approach to a solution of the difficulty, that will be\r\nfound in the common treatises on logic. It will scarcely be thought to be\r\na satisfactory one. If an attribute is distinguished from a substance by\r\nbeing the attribute \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eof\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e something, it seems highly necessary to understand\r\nwhat is meant by \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eof\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e; a particle which needs explanation too much itself,\r\nto be placed in front of the explanation of any thing else. And as for the\r\nself-existence of substance, it is very true that a substance may be conceived\r\nto exist without any other substance, but so also may an attribute\r\nwithout any other attribute: and we can no more imagine a substance\r\nwithout attributes than we can imagine attributes without a substance.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nMetaphysicians, however, have probed the question deeper, and given an\r\naccount of Substance considerably more satisfactory than this. Substances\r\nare usually distinguished as Bodies or Minds. Of each of these, philosophers\r\nhave at length provided us with a definition which seems unexceptionable.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 7. A body, according to the received doctrine of modern metaphysicians,\r\nmay be defined, the external cause to which we ascribe our sensations.\r\nWhen I see and touch a piece of gold, I am conscious of a sensation\r\nof yellow color, and sensations of hardness and weight; and by varying\r\nthe mode of handling, I may add to these sensations many others completely\r\ndistinct from them. The sensations are all of which I am directly\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page053\"\u003e[pg 053]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg053\" id=\"Pg053\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nconscious; but I consider them as produced by something not only existing\r\nindependently of my will, but external to my bodily organs and to my\r\nmind. This external something I call a body.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt may be asked, how come we to ascribe our sensations to any external\r\ncause? And is there sufficient ground for so ascribing them? It is\r\nknown, that there are metaphysicians who have raised a controversy on\r\nthe point; maintaining that we are not warranted in referring our sensations\r\nto a cause such as we understand by the word Body, or to any external\r\ncause whatever. Though we have no concern here with this controversy,\r\nnor with the metaphysical niceties on which it turns, one of the\r\nbest ways of showing what is meant by Substance is, to consider what position\r\nit is necessary to take up, in order to maintain its existence against\r\nopponents.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt is certain, then, that a part of our notion of a body consists of the\r\nnotion of a number of sensations of our own, or of other sentient beings,\r\nhabitually occurring simultaneously. My conception of the table at which\r\nI am writing is compounded of its visible form and size, which are complex\r\nsensations of sight; its tangible form and size, which are complex\r\nsensations of our organs of touch and of our muscles; its weight, which\r\nis also a sensation of touch and of the muscles; its color, which is a sensation\r\nof sight; its hardness, which is a sensation of the muscles; its composition,\r\nwhich is another word for all the varieties of sensation which we\r\nreceive under various circumstances from the wood of which it is made,\r\nand so forth. All or most of these various sensations frequently are, and,\r\nas we learn by experience, always might be, experienced simultaneously, or\r\nin many different orders of succession at our own choice: and hence the\r\nthought of any one of them makes us think of the others, and the whole\r\nbecomes mentally amalgamated into one mixed state of consciousness,\r\nwhich, in the language of the school of Locke and Hartley, is termed a\r\nComplex Idea.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nNow, there are philosophers who have argued as follows: If we conceive\r\nan orange to be divested of its natural color without acquiring any\r\nnew one; to lose its softness without becoming hard, its roundness without\r\nbecoming square or pentagonal, or of any other regular or irregular figure\r\nwhatever; to be deprived of size, of weight, of taste, of smell; to lose all\r\nits mechanical and all its chemical properties, and acquire no new ones; to\r\nbecome, in short, invisible, intangible, imperceptible not only by all our\r\nsenses, but by the senses of all other sentient beings, real or possible;\r\nnothing, say these thinkers, would remain. For of what nature, they ask,\r\ncould be the residuum? and by what token could it manifest its presence?\r\nTo the unreflecting its existence seems to rest on the evidence of the senses.\r\nBut to the senses nothing is apparent except the sensations. We know,\r\nindeed, that these sensations are bound together by some law; they do not\r\ncome together at random, but according to a systematic order, which is\r\npart of the order established in the universe. When we experience one of\r\nthese sensations, we usually experience the others also, or know that we\r\nhave it in our power to experience them. But a fixed law of connection,\r\nmaking the sensations occur together, does not, say these philosophers,\r\nnecessarily require what is called a substratum to support them. The conception\r\nof a substratum is but one of many possible forms in which that\r\nconnection presents itself to our imagination; a mode of, as it were, realizing\r\nthe idea. If there be such a substratum, suppose it at this instant\r\nmiraculously annihilated, and let the sensations continue to occur in the\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page054\"\u003e[pg 054]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg054\" id=\"Pg054\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nsame order, and how would the substratum be missed? By what signs\r\nshould we be able to discover that its existence had terminated? Should\r\nwe not have as much reason to believe that it still existed as we now have?\r\nAnd if we should not then be warranted in believing it, how can we be so\r\nnow? A body, therefore, according to these metaphysicians, is not any\r\nthing intrinsically different from the sensations which the body is said to\r\nproduce in us; it is, in short, a set of sensations, or rather, of possibilities\r\nof sensation, joined together according to a fixed law.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe controversies to which these speculations have given rise, and the\r\ndoctrines which have been developed in the attempt to find a conclusive\r\nanswer to them, have been fruitful of important consequences to the Science\r\nof Mind. The sensations (it was answered) which we are conscious of, and\r\nwhich we receive, not at random, but joined together in a certain uniform\r\nmanner, imply not only a law or laws of connection, but a cause external to\r\nour mind, which cause, by its own laws, determines the laws according to\r\nwhich the sensations are connected and experienced. The schoolmen used\r\nto call this external cause by the name we have already employed, a\r\n\u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003esubstratum\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e;\r\nand its attributes (as they expressed themselves) \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003einhered\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e, literally\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003estuck\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e, in it. To this substratum the name Matter is usually given in\r\nphilosophical discussions. It was soon, however, acknowledged by all who reflected\r\non the subject, that the existence of matter can not be proved by extrinsic\r\nevidence. The answer, therefore, now usually made to Berkeley and\r\nhis followers, is, that the belief is intuitive; that mankind, in all ages, have\r\nfelt themselves compelled, by a necessity of their nature, to refer their sensations\r\nto an external cause: that even those who deny it in theory, yield\r\nto the necessity in practice, and both in speech, thought, and feeling, do,\r\nequally with the vulgar, acknowledge their sensations to be the effects of\r\nsomething external to them: this knowledge, therefore, it is affirmed, is as\r\nevidently intuitive as our knowledge of our sensations themselves is intuitive.\r\nAnd here the question merges in the fundamental problem of metaphysics\r\nproperly so called: to which science we leave it.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nBut although the extreme doctrine of the Idealist metaphysicians, that\r\nobjects are nothing but our sensations and the laws which connect them,\r\nhas not been generally adopted by subsequent thinkers; the point of most\r\nreal importance is one on which those metaphysicians are now very generally\r\nconsidered to have made out their case: viz., that \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eall we know\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e of objects\r\nis the sensations which they give us, and the order of the occurrence\r\nof those sensations. Kant himself, on this point, is as explicit as Berkeley\r\nor Locke. However firmly convinced that there exists a universe of\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Things in themselves,”\u003c/span\u003e totally distinct from the universe of phenomena,\r\nor of things as they appear to our senses; and even when bringing into\r\nuse a technical expression (\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-foreign\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eNoumenon\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e) to denote what the\r\nthing is in itself, as contrasted with the \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003erepresentation\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e of it in our\r\nminds; he allows that this representation (the matter of which, he says, consists of our\r\nsensations, though the form is given by the laws of the mind itself) is all we\r\nknow of the object: and that the real nature of the Thing is, and by the constitution of\r\nour faculties ever must remain, at least in the present state of existence, an\r\nimpenetrable mystery to us. \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Of things absolutely or in themselves,”\u003c/span\u003e says Sir\r\nWilliam Hamilton,\u003ca id=\"noteref_19\" name=\"noteref_19\" href=\"#note_19\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e19\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“be they external, be they internal,\r\nwe know nothing, or know them only as incognizable; and become\r\naware of their incomprehensible existence, only as this is indirectly and\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page055\"\u003e[pg 055]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg055\" id=\"Pg055\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\naccidentally revealed to us, through certain qualities related to our faculties\r\nof knowledge, and which qualities, again, we can not think as unconditional,\r\nirrelative, existent in and of ourselves. All that we know is therefore\r\nphenomenal—phenomenal of the unknown.”\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca id=\"noteref_20\" name=\"noteref_20\" href=\"#note_20\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e20\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The same doctrine is laid\r\ndown in the clearest and strongest terms by M. Cousin, whose observations\r\non the subject are the more worthy of attention, as, in consequence of the\r\nultra-German and ontological character of his philosophy in other respects,\r\nthey may be regarded as the admissions of an opponent.\u003ca id=\"noteref_21\" name=\"noteref_21\" href=\"#note_21\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e21\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThere is not the slightest reason for believing that what we call the sensible\r\nqualities of the object are a type of any thing inherent in itself, or\r\nbear any affinity to its own nature. A cause does not, as such, resemble\r\nits effects; an east wind is not like the feeling of cold, nor heat like the\r\nsteam of boiling water. Why then should matter resemble our sensations?\r\nWhy should the inmost nature of fire or water resemble the impressions\r\nmade by those objects upon our senses?\u003ca id=\"noteref_22\" name=\"noteref_22\" href=\"#note_22\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e22\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nOr on what principle are we\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page056\"\u003e[pg 056]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg056\" id=\"Pg056\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nauthorized to deduce from the effects, any thing concerning the cause, except\r\nthat it is a cause adequate to produce those effects? It may, therefore,\r\nsafely be laid down as a truth both obvious in itself, and admitted by\r\nall whom it is at present necessary to take into consideration, that, of the\r\noutward world, we know and can know absolutely nothing, except the sensations\r\nwhich we experience from it.\u003ca id=\"noteref_23\" name=\"noteref_23\" href=\"#note_23\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e23\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 8. Body having now been defined the external cause, and (according\r\nto the more reasonable opinion) the unknown external cause, to which we\r\nrefer our sensations; it remains to frame a definition of Mind. Nor, after\r\nthe preceding observations, will this be difficult. For, as our conception\r\nof a body is that of an unknown exciting cause of sensations, so our conception\r\nof a mind is that of an unknown recipient or percipient, of them;\r\nand not of them alone, but of all our other feelings. As body is understood\r\nto be the mysterious something which excites the mind to feel, so\r\nmind is the mysterious something which feels and thinks. It is unnecessary\r\nto give in the case of mind, as we gave in the case of matter, a particular\r\nstatement of the skeptical system by which its existence as a Thing\r\nin itself, distinct from the series of what are denominated its states, is called\r\nin question. But it is necessary to remark, that on the inmost nature\r\n(whatever be meant by inmost nature) of the thinking principle, as well\r\nas on the inmost nature of matter, we are, and with our faculties must always\r\nremain, entirely in the dark. All which we are aware of, even in our\r\nown minds, is (in the words of James Mill) a certain \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“thread of consciousness;”\u003c/span\u003e\r\na series of feelings, that is, of sensations, thoughts, emotions, and\r\nvolitions, more or less numerous and complicated. There is a something\r\nI call Myself, or, by another form of expression, my mind, which I consider\r\nas distinct from these sensations, thoughts, etc.; a something which I conceive\r\nto be not the thoughts, but the being that has the thoughts, and\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page057\"\u003e[pg 057]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg057\" id=\"Pg057\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nwhich I can conceive as existing forever in a state of quiescence, without\r\nany thoughts at all. But what this being is, though it is myself, I have no\r\nknowledge, other than the series of its states of consciousness. As bodies\r\nmanifest themselves to me only through the sensations of which I regard\r\nthem as the causes, so the thinking principle, or mind, in my own nature,\r\nmakes itself known to me only by the feelings of which it is conscious. I\r\nknow nothing about myself, save my capacities of feeling or being conscious\r\n(including, of course, thinking and willing): and were I to learn\r\nany thing new concerning my own nature, I can not with my present faculties\r\nconceive this new information to be any thing else, than that I have\r\nsome additional capacities, as yet unknown to me, of feeling, thinking, or\r\nwilling.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThus, then, as body is the unsentient cause to which we are naturally\r\nprompted to refer a certain portion of our feelings, so mind may be described\r\nas the sentient \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003esubject\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e (in the scholastic sense of the term) of all\r\nfeelings; that which has or feels them. But of the nature of either body\r\nor mind, further than the feelings which the former excites, and which the\r\nlatter experiences, we do not, according to the best existing doctrine, know\r\nany thing; and if any thing, logic has nothing to do with it, or with the\r\nmanner in which the knowledge is acquired. With this result we may\r\nconclude this portion of our subject, and pass to the third and only remaining\r\nclass or division of Namable Things.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-div\" style=\"margin-bottom: 3.00em; margin-top: 3.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003ch4 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: left; margin-bottom: 2.40em; margin-top: 2.40em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 120%\"\u003eIII. Attributes: and, first, Qualities.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 9. From what has already been said of Substance, what is to be said\r\nof Attribute is easily deducible. For if we know not, and can not know,\r\nany thing of bodies but the sensations which they excite in us or in others,\r\nthose sensations must be all that we can, at bottom, mean by their attributes;\r\nand the distinction which we verbally make between the properties\r\nof things and the sensations we receive from them, must originate in the\r\nconvenience of discourse rather than in the nature of what is signified by\r\nthe terms.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAttributes are usually distributed under the three heads of Quality,\r\nQuantity, and Relation. We shall come to the two latter presently: in the\r\nfirst place we shall confine ourselves to the former.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nLet us take, then, as our example, one of what are termed the sensible\r\nqualities of objects, and let that example be whiteness. When we ascribe\r\nwhiteness to any substance, as, for instance, snow; when we say that snow\r\nhas the quality whiteness, what do we really assert? Simply, that when\r\nsnow is present to our organs, we have a particular sensation, which we\r\nare accustomed to call the sensation of white. But how do I know that\r\nsnow is present? Obviously by the sensations which I derive from it, and\r\nnot otherwise. I infer that the object is present, because it gives me a\r\ncertain assemblage or series of sensations. And when I ascribe to it the\r\nattribute whiteness, my meaning is only, that, of the sensations composing\r\nthis group or series, that which I call the sensation of white color is one.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThis is one view which may be taken of the subject. But there is also\r\nanother and a different view. It may be said, that it is true we \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eknow\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e nothing\r\nof sensible objects, except the sensations they excite in us; that the\r\nfact of our receiving from snow the particular sensation which is called a\r\nsensation of white, is the \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eground\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e on which we ascribe to that substance the\r\nquality whiteness; the sole proof of its possessing that quality. But because\r\none thing may be the sole evidence of the existence of another thing,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page058\"\u003e[pg 058]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg058\" id=\"Pg058\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nit does not follow that the two are one and the same. The attribute whiteness\r\n(it may be said) is not the fact of receiving the sensation, but something in the\r\nobject itself; a \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003epower\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e inherent in it; something \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ein virtue\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e of\r\nwhich the object produces the sensation. And when we affirm that snow\r\npossesses the attribute whiteness, we do not merely assert that the presence\r\nof snow produces in us that sensation, but that it does so through,\r\nand by reason of, that power or quality.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nFor the purposes of logic it is not of material importance which of these\r\nopinions we adopt. The full discussion of the subject belongs to the other\r\ndepartment of scientific inquiry, so often alluded to under the name of metaphysics;\r\nbut it may be said here, that for the doctrine of the existence of\r\na peculiar species of entities called qualities, I can see no foundation except\r\nin a tendency of the human mind which is the cause of many delusions.\r\nI mean, the disposition, wherever we meet with two names which\r\nare not precisely synonymous, to suppose that they must be the names of\r\ntwo different things; whereas in reality they may be names of the same\r\nthing viewed in two different lights, or under different suppositions as to surrounding\r\ncircumstances. Because \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003equality\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e and \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003esensation\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e can not be put\r\nindiscriminately one for the other, it is supposed that they can not both\r\nsignify the same thing, namely, the impression or feeling with which we\r\nare affected through our senses by the presence of an object; though there\r\nis at least no absurdity in supposing that this identical impression or feeling\r\nmay be called a sensation when considered merely in itself, and a quality\r\nwhen looked at in relation to any one of the numerous objects, the presence\r\nof which to our organs excites in our minds that among various other\r\nsensations or feelings. And if this be admissible as a supposition, it rests\r\nwith those who contend for an entity \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-foreign\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eper se\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e called a\r\nquality, to show that their opinion is preferable, or is any thing in fact but a\r\nlingering remnant of the old doctrine of occult causes; the very absurdity which Molière\r\nso happily ridiculed when he made one of his pedantic physicians account for\r\nthe fact that opium produces sleep by the maxim, Because it has a soporific\r\nvirtue.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt is evident that when the physician stated that opium has a soporific\r\nvirtue, he did not account for, but merely asserted over again, the fact that\r\nit produces sleep. In like manner, when we say that snow is white because\r\nit has the quality of whiteness, we are only re-asserting in more technical\r\nlanguage the fact that it excites in us the sensation of white. If it be said\r\nthat the sensation must have some cause, I answer, its cause is the presence\r\nof the assemblage of phenomena which is termed the object. When we\r\nhave asserted that as often as the object is present, and our organs in their\r\nnormal state, the sensation takes place, we have stated all that we know\r\nabout the matter. There is no need, after assigning a certain and intelligible\r\ncause, to suppose an occult cause besides, for the purpose of enabling\r\nthe real cause to produce its effect. If I am asked, why does the presence\r\nof the object cause this sensation in me, I can not tell: I can only say that\r\nsuch is my nature, and the nature of the object; that the fact forms a part\r\nof the constitution of things. And to this we must at last come, even after\r\ninterpolating the imaginary entity. Whatever number of links the chain\r\nof causes and effects may consist of, how any one link produces the one\r\nwhich is next to it, remains equally inexplicable to us. It is as easy to\r\ncomprehend that the object should produce the sensation directly and at\r\nonce, as that it should produce the same sensation by the aid of something\r\nelse called the \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003epower\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e of producing it.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page059\"\u003e[pg 059]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg059\" id=\"Pg059\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nBut, as the difficulties which may be felt in adopting this view of the\r\nsubject can not be removed without discussions transcending the bounds\r\nof our science, I content myself with a passing indication, and shall, for the\r\npurposes of logic, adopt a language compatible with either view of the nature\r\nof qualities. I shall say—what at least admits of no dispute—that\r\nthe quality of whiteness ascribed to the object snow, is \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003egrounded\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\non its exciting in us the sensation of white; and adopting the language already\r\nused by the school logicians in the case of the kind of attributes called\r\nRelations, I shall term the sensation of white the \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003efoundation\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e of\r\nthe quality whiteness. For logical purposes the sensation is the only essential part of\r\nwhat is meant by the word; the only part which we ever can be concerned\r\nin proving. When that is proved, the quality is proved; if an object excites\r\na sensation, it has, of course, the power of exciting it.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-div\" style=\"margin-bottom: 3.00em; margin-top: 3.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003ch4 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: left; margin-bottom: 2.40em; margin-top: 2.40em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 120%\"\u003eIV. Relations.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 10. The \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003equalities\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e of a body, we have said, are the attributes grounded\r\non the sensations which the presence of that particular body to our organs\r\nexcites in our minds. But when we ascribe to any object the kind of attribute\r\ncalled a Relation, the foundation of the attribute must be something\r\nin which other objects are concerned besides itself and the percipient.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAs there may with propriety be said to be a relation between any two\r\nthings to which two correlative names are or may be given, we may expect\r\nto discover what constitutes a relation in general, if we enumerate the\r\nprincipal cases in which mankind have imposed correlative names, and observe\r\nwhat these cases have in common.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWhat, then, is the character which is possessed in common by states of\r\ncircumstances so heterogeneous and discordant as these: one thing \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003elike\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e\r\nanother; one thing \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eunlike\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e another; one thing \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003enear\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e another; one\r\nthing \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003efar from\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e another; one thing \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ebefore\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eafter\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e,\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ealong with\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e another; one thing \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003egreater\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eequal\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e,\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eless\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e, than another; one thing the \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ecause\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e of another, the\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eeffect\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e of another; one person the \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003emaster\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eservant\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e,\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003echild\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eparent\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003edebtor\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ecreditor\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e,\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003esovereign\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003esubject\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eattorney\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e, \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eclient\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e,\r\nof another, and so on?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nOmitting, for the present, the case of Resemblance, (a relation which requires\r\nto be considered separately,) there seems to be one thing common\r\nto all these cases, and only one; that in each of them there exists or occurs,\r\nor has existed or occurred, or may be expected to exist or occur, some fact\r\nor phenomenon, into which the two things which are said to be related to\r\neach other, both enter as parties concerned. This fact, or phenomenon, is\r\nwhat the Aristotelian logicians called the \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003efundamentum\r\nrelationis\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e. Thus in the relation of greater and less between two magnitudes,\r\nthe \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003efundamentum relationis\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e is the fact that\r\none of the two magnitudes could, under certain conditions, be included in, without\r\nentirely filling, the space occupied by the other magnitude. In the relation of master\r\nand servant, the \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003efundamentum\r\nrelationis\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e is the fact that the one has undertaken, or is compelled,\r\nto perform certain services for the benefit and at the bidding of the\r\nother. Examples might be indefinitely multiplied; but it is already obvious\r\nthat whenever two things are said to be related, there is some fact, or\r\nseries of facts, into which they both enter; and that whenever any two\r\nthings are involved in some one fact, or series of facts, we may ascribe to\r\nthose two things a mutual relation grounded on the fact. Even if they\r\nhave nothing in common but what is common to all things, that they are\r\nmembers of the universe, we call that a relation, and denominate them\r\nfellow-creatures, fellow-beings, or fellow-denizens of the universe. But in\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page060\"\u003e[pg 060]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg060\" id=\"Pg060\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nproportion as the fact into which the two objects enter as parts is of a\r\nmore special and peculiar, or of a more complicated nature, so also is the\r\nrelation grounded upon it. And there are as many conceivable relations\r\nas there are conceivable kinds of fact in which two things can be jointly\r\nconcerned.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIn the same manner, therefore, as a quality is an attribute grounded on\r\nthe fact that a certain sensation or sensations are produced in us by the\r\nobject, so an attribute grounded on some fact into which the object enters\r\njointly with another object, is a relation between it and that other object.\r\nBut the fact in the latter case consists of the very same kind of elements\r\nas the fact in the former; namely, states of consciousness. In the case,\r\nfor example, of any legal relation, as debtor and creditor, principal and\r\nagent, guardian and ward, the \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003efundamentum\r\nrelationis\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e consists entirely of\r\nthoughts, feelings, and volitions (actual or contingent), either of the persons\r\nthemselves or of other persons concerned in the same series of transactions;\r\nas, for instance, the intentions which would be formed by a judge, in case\r\na complaint were made to his tribunal of the infringement of any of the\r\nlegal obligations imposed by the relation; and the acts which the judge\r\nwould perform in consequence; acts being (as we have already seen) another\r\nword for intentions followed by an effect, and that effect being but\r\nanother word for sensations, or some other feelings, occasioned either to\r\nthe agent himself or to somebody else. There is no part of what the names\r\nexpressive of the relation imply, that is not resolvable into states of consciousness;\r\noutward objects being, no doubt, supposed throughout as the\r\ncauses by which some of those states of consciousness are excited, and\r\nminds as the subjects by which all of them are experienced, but neither\r\nthe external objects nor the minds making their existence known otherwise\r\nthan by the states of consciousness.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nCases of relation are not always so complicated as those to which we\r\nlast alluded. The simplest of all cases of relation are those expressed by\r\nthe words antecedent and consequent, and by the word simultaneous. If\r\nwe say, for instance, that dawn preceded sunrise, the fact in which the two\r\nthings, dawn and sunrise, were jointly concerned, consisted only of the two\r\nthings themselves; no third thing entered into the fact or phenomenon at\r\nall. Unless, indeed, we choose to call the succession of the two objects a\r\nthird thing; but their succession is not something added to the things\r\nthemselves; it is something involved in them. Dawn and sunrise announce\r\nthemselves to our consciousness by two successive sensations. Our consciousness\r\nof the succession of these sensations is not a third sensation or\r\nfeeling added to them; we have not first the two feelings, and then a feeling\r\nof their succession. To have two feelings at all, implies having them\r\neither successively, or else simultaneously. Sensations, or other feelings,\r\nbeing given, succession and simultaneousness are the two conditions, to the\r\nalternative of which they are subjected by the nature of our faculties; and\r\nno one has been able, or needs expect, to analyze the matter any further.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 11. In a somewhat similar position are two other sorts of relations,\r\nLikeness and Unlikeness. I have two sensations; we will suppose them\r\nto be simple ones; two sensations of white, or one sensation of white and\r\nanother of black. I call the first two sensations \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003elike\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e; the last\r\ntwo \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eunlike\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e. What is the fact or phenomenon constituting the\r\n\u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003efundamentum\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e of this\r\nrelation? The two sensations first, and then what we call a feeling of resemblance,\r\nor of want of resemblance. Let us confine ourselves to the former\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page061\"\u003e[pg 061]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg061\" id=\"Pg061\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\ncase. Resemblance is evidently a feeling; a state of the consciousness\r\nof the observer. Whether the feeling of the resemblance of the two colors\r\nbe a third state of consciousness, which I have \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eafter\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e having the two\r\nsensations of color, or whether (like the feeling of their succession) it is involved\r\nin the sensations themselves, may be a matter of discussion. But in either\r\ncase, these feelings of resemblance, and of its opposite dissimilarity, are\r\nparts of our nature; and parts so far from being capable of analysis, that\r\nthey are presupposed in every attempt to analyze any of our other feelings.\r\nLikeness and unlikeness, therefore, as well as antecedence, sequence, and\r\nsimultaneousness, must stand apart among relations, as things \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003esui generis\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e.\r\nThey are attributes grounded on facts, that is, on states of consciousness,\r\nbut on states which are peculiar, unresolvable, and inexplicable.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nBut, though likeness or unlikeness can not be resolved into any thing\r\nelse, complex cases of likeness or unlikeness can be resolved into simpler\r\nones. When we say of two things which consist of parts, that they are\r\nlike one another, the likeness of the wholes does admit of analysis; it is\r\ncompounded of likenesses between the various parts respectively, and of\r\nlikeness in their arrangement. Of how vast a variety of resemblances of\r\nparts must that resemblance be composed, which induces us to say that a\r\nportrait, or a landscape, is like its original. If one person mimics another\r\nwith any success, of how many simple likenesses must the general or complex\r\nlikeness be compounded: likeness in a succession of bodily postures;\r\nlikeness in voice, or in the accents and intonations of the voice; likeness\r\nin the choice of words, and in the thoughts or sentiments expressed, whether\r\nby word, countenance, or gesture.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAll likeness and unlikeness of which we have any cognizance, resolve\r\nthemselves into likeness and unlikeness between states of our own, or some\r\nother, mind. When we say that one body is like another, (since we know\r\nnothing of bodies but the sensations which they excite,) we mean really\r\nthat there is a resemblance between the sensations excited by the two\r\nbodies, or between some portions at least of those sensations. If we say\r\nthat two attributes are like one another (since we know nothing of attributes\r\nexcept the sensations or states of feeling on which they are grounded),\r\nwe mean really that those sensations, or states of feeling, resemble each\r\nother. We may also say that two relations are alike. The fact of resemblance\r\nbetween relations is sometimes called \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eanalogy\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, forming one of the\r\nnumerous meanings of that word. The relation in which Priam stood to\r\nHector, namely, that of father and son, resembles the relation in which\r\nPhilip stood to Alexander; resembles it so closely that they are called the\r\nsame relation. The relation in which Cromwell stood to England resembles\r\nthe relation in which Napoleon stood to France, though not so closely\r\nas to be called the same relation. The meaning in both these instances\r\nmust be, that a resemblance existed between the facts which constituted\r\nthe \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003efundamentum relationis\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThis resemblance may exist in all conceivable gradations, from perfect\r\nundistinguishableness to something extremely slight. When we say, that\r\na thought suggested to the mind of a person of genius is like a seed cast\r\ninto the ground, because the former produces a multitude of other thoughts,\r\nand the latter a multitude of other seeds, this is saying that between the\r\nrelation of an inventive mind to a thought contained in it, and the relation\r\nof a fertile soil to a seed contained in it, there exists a resemblance: the\r\nreal resemblance being in the two \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003efundamenta\r\nrelationis\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, in each of which\r\nthere occurs a germ, producing by its development a multitude of other\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page062\"\u003e[pg 062]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg062\" id=\"Pg062\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nthings similar to itself. And as, whenever two objects are jointly concerned\r\nin a phenomenon, this constitutes a relation between those objects, so,\r\nif we suppose a second pair of objects concerned in a second phenomenon,\r\nthe slightest resemblance between the two phenomena is sufficient to admit\r\nof its being said that the two relations resemble; provided, of course,\r\nthe points of resemblance are found in those portions of the two phenomena\r\nrespectively which are connoted by the relative names.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWhile speaking of resemblance, it is necessary to take notice of an ambiguity\r\nof language, against which scarcely any one is sufficiently on his\r\nguard. Resemblance, when it exists in the highest degree of all, amounting\r\nto undistinguishableness, is often called identity, and the two similar\r\nthings are said to be the same. I say often, not always; for we do not say\r\nthat two visible objects, two persons, for instance, are the same, because\r\nthey are so much alike that one might be mistaken for the other: but we\r\nconstantly use this mode of expression when speaking of feelings; as when\r\nI say that the sight of any object gives me the \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003esame\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e sensation or emotion\r\nto-day that it did yesterday, or the \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003esame\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e which it gives to some other person.\r\nThis is evidently an incorrect application of the word \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003esame\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e; for the\r\nfeeling which I had yesterday is gone, never to return; what I have to-day\r\nis another feeling, exactly like the former, perhaps, but distinct from it;\r\nand it is evident that two different persons can not be experiencing the\r\nsame feeling, in the sense in which we say that they are both sitting at the\r\nsame table. By a similar ambiguity we say, that two persons are ill of the\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003esame\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e disease; that two persons hold the \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003esame\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e office; not in the\r\nsense in which we say that they are engaged in the same adventure, or sailing in\r\nthe same ship, but in the sense that they fill offices exactly similar, though,\r\nperhaps, in distant places. Great confusion of ideas is often produced, and\r\nmany fallacies engendered, in otherwise enlightened understandings, by\r\nnot being sufficiently alive to the fact (in itself not always to be avoided),\r\nthat they use the same name to express ideas so different as those of identity\r\nand undistinguishable resemblance. Among modern writers, Archbishop\r\nWhately stands almost alone in having drawn attention to this distinction,\r\nand to the ambiguity connected with it.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nSeveral relations, generally called by other names, are really cases of\r\nresemblance. As, for example, equality; which is but another word for\r\nthe exact resemblance commonly called identity, considered as subsisting\r\nbetween things in respect of their \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003equantity\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e. And this example forms a\r\nsuitable transition to the third and last of the three heads under which, as\r\nalready remarked, Attributes are commonly arranged.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-div\" style=\"margin-bottom: 3.00em; margin-top: 3.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003ch4 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: left; margin-bottom: 2.40em; margin-top: 2.40em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 120%\"\u003eV. Quantity.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 12. Let us imagine two things, between which there is no difference\r\n(that is, no dissimilarity), except in quantity alone; for instance, a gallon\r\nof water, and more than a gallon of water. A gallon of water, like any\r\nother external object, makes its presence known to us by a set of sensations\r\nwhich it excites. Ten gallons of water are also an external object,\r\nmaking its presence known to us in a similar manner; and as we do not\r\nmistake ten gallons of water for a gallon of water, it is plain that the set\r\nof sensations is more or less different in the two cases. In like manner,\r\na gallon of water, and a gallon of wine, are two external objects, making\r\ntheir presence known by two sets of sensations, which sensations are different\r\nfrom each other. In the first case, however, we say that the difference\r\nis in quantity; in the last there is a difference in quality, while the\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page063\"\u003e[pg 063]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg063\" id=\"Pg063\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nquantity of the water and of the wine is the same. What is the real distinction\r\nbetween the two cases? It is not within the province of Logic to\r\nanalyze it; nor to decide whether it is susceptible of analysis or not. For\r\nus the following considerations are sufficient: It is evident that the sensations\r\nI receive from the gallon of water, and those I receive from the\r\ngallon of wine, are not the same, that is, not precisely alike; neither are\r\nthey altogether unlike: they are partly similar, partly dissimilar; and that\r\nin which they resemble is precisely that in which alone the gallon of water\r\nand the ten gallons do not resemble. That in which the gallon of water\r\nand the gallon of wine are like each other, and in which the gallon\r\nand the ten gallons of water are unlike each other, is called their quantity.\r\nThis likeness and unlikeness I do not pretend to explain, no more\r\nthan any other kind of likeness or unlikeness. But my object is to show,\r\nthat when we say of two things that they differ in quantity, just as when\r\nwe say that they differ in quality, the assertion is always grounded on a\r\ndifference in the sensations which they excite. Nobody, I presume, will\r\nsay, that to see, or to lift, or to drink, ten gallons of water, does not include\r\nin itself a different set of sensations from those of seeing, lifting, or drinking\r\none gallon; or that to see or handle a foot-rule, and to see or handle a\r\nyard-measure made exactly like it, are the same sensations. I do not undertake\r\nto say what the difference in the sensations is. Every body knows,\r\nand nobody can tell; no more than any one could tell what white is to a\r\nperson who had never had the sensation. But the difference, so far as\r\ncognizable by our faculties, lies in the sensations. Whatever difference\r\nwe say there is in the things themselves, is, in this as in all other cases,\r\ngrounded, and grounded exclusively, on a difference in the sensations excited\r\nby them.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-div\" style=\"margin-bottom: 3.00em; margin-top: 3.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003ch4 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: left; margin-bottom: 2.40em; margin-top: 2.40em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 120%\"\u003eVI. Attributes Concluded.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 13. Thus, then, all the attributes of bodies which are classed under\r\nQuality or Quantity, are grounded on the sensations which we receive from\r\nthose bodies, and may be defined, the powers which the bodies have of exciting\r\nthose sensations. And the same general explanation has been found\r\nto apply to most of the attributes usually classed under the head of Relation.\r\nThey, too, are grounded on some fact or phenomenon into which the\r\nrelated objects enter as parts; that fact or phenomenon having no meaning\r\nand no existence to us, except the series of sensations or other states\r\nof consciousness by which it makes itself known; and the relation being\r\nsimply the power or capacity which the object possesses of taking part\r\nalong with the correlated object in the production of that series of sensations\r\nor states of consciousness. We have been obliged, indeed, to recognize\r\na somewhat different character in certain peculiar relations, those of\r\nsuccession and simultaneity, of likeness and unlikeness. These, not being\r\ngrounded on any fact or phenomenon distinct from the related objects\r\nthemselves, do not admit of the same kind of analysis. But these relations,\r\nthough not, like other relations, grounded on states of consciousness, are\r\nthemselves states of consciousness: resemblance is nothing but our feeling\r\nof resemblance; succession is nothing but our feeling of succession. Or,\r\nif this be disputed (and we can not, without transgressing the bounds of\r\nour science, discuss it here), at least our knowledge of these relations, and\r\neven our possibility of knowledge, is confined to those which subsist between\r\nsensations, or other states of consciousness; for, though we ascribe\r\nresemblance, or succession, or simultaneity, to objects and to attributes, it\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page064\"\u003e[pg 064]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg064\" id=\"Pg064\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nis always in virtue of resemblance or succession or simultaneity in the sensations\r\nor states of consciousness which those objects excite, and on which\r\nthose attributes are grounded.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 14. In the preceding investigation we have, for the sake of simplicity,\r\nconsidered bodies only, and omitted minds. But what we have said, is applicable,\r\n\u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003emutatis mutandis\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, to the latter. The\r\nattributes of minds, as well as those of bodies, are grounded on states of feeling or\r\nconsciousness. But in the case of a mind, we have to consider its own states, as well as\r\nthose which it produces in other minds. Every attribute of a mind consists either\r\nin being itself affected in a certain way, or affecting other minds in a certain\r\nway. Considered in itself, we can predicate nothing of it but the series\r\nof its own feelings. When we say of any mind, that it is devout, or superstitious,\r\nor meditative, or cheerful, we mean that the ideas, emotions, or\r\nvolitions implied in those words, form a frequently recurring part of the\r\nseries of feelings, or states of consciousness, which fill up the sentient existence\r\nof that mind.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIn addition, however, to those attributes of a mind which are grounded\r\non its own states of feeling, attributes may also be ascribed to it, in the\r\nsame manner as to a body, grounded on the feelings which it excites in\r\nother minds. A mind does not, indeed, like a body, excite sensations, but\r\nit may excite thoughts or emotions. The most important example of attributes\r\nascribed on this ground, is the employment of terms expressive of\r\napprobation or blame. When, for example, we say of any character, or (in\r\nother words) of any mind, that it is admirable, we mean that the contemplation\r\nof it excites the sentiment of admiration; and indeed somewhat\r\nmore, for the word implies that we not only feel admiration, but approve\r\nthat sentiment in ourselves. In some cases, under the semblance of a single\r\nattribute, two are really predicated: one of them, a state of the mind\r\nitself; the other, a state with which other minds are affected by thinking\r\nof it. As when we say of any one that he is generous. The word generosity\r\nexpresses a certain state of mind, but being a term of praise, it also\r\nexpresses that this state of mind excites in us another mental state, called\r\napprobation. The assertion made, therefore, is twofold, and of the following\r\npurport: Certain feelings form habitually a part of this person’s sentient\r\nexistence; and the idea of those feelings of his, excites the sentiment\r\nof approbation in ourselves or others.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAs we thus ascribe attributes to minds on the ground of ideas and emotions,\r\nso may we to bodies on similar grounds, and not solely on the ground\r\nof sensations: as in speaking of the beauty of a statue; since this attribute\r\nis grounded on the peculiar feeling of pleasure which the statue produces\r\nin our minds; which is not a sensation, but an emotion.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-div\" style=\"margin-bottom: 3.00em; margin-top: 3.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003ch4 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: left; margin-bottom: 2.40em; margin-top: 2.40em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 120%\"\u003eVII. General Results.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h4\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 15. Our survey of the varieties of Things which have been, or which\r\nare capable of being, named—which have been, or are capable of being,\r\neither predicated of other Things, or themselves made the subject of predications—is\r\nnow concluded.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nOur enumeration commenced with Feelings. These we scrupulously distinguished\r\nfrom the objects which excite them, and from the organs by\r\nwhich they are, or may be supposed to be, conveyed. Feelings are of four\r\nsorts: Sensations, Thoughts, Emotions, and Volitions. What are called\r\nPerceptions are merely a particular case of Belief, and Belief is a kind of\r\nthought. Actions are merely volitions followed by an effect.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page065\"\u003e[pg 065]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg065\" id=\"Pg065\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAfter Feelings we proceeded to Substances. These are either Bodies or\r\nMinds. Without entering into the grounds of the metaphysical doubts\r\nwhich have been raised concerning the existence of Matter and Mind as objective\r\nrealities, we stated as sufficient for us the conclusion in which the\r\nbest thinkers are now for the most part agreed, that all we can know of\r\nMatter is the sensations which it gives us, and the order of occurrence of\r\nthose sensations; and that while the substance Body is the unknown cause\r\nof our sensations, the substance Mind is the unknown recipient.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe only remaining class of Namable Things is Attributes; and these\r\nare of three kinds, Quality, Relation, and Quantity. Qualities, like substances,\r\nare known to us no otherwise than by the sensations or other\r\nstates of consciousness which they excite: and while, in compliance with\r\ncommon usage, we have continued to speak of them as a distinct class of\r\nThings, we showed that in predicating them no one means to predicate any\r\nthing but those sensations or states of consciousness, on which they may be\r\nsaid to be grounded, and by which alone they can be defined or described.\r\nRelations, except the simple cases of likeness and unlikeness, succession\r\nand simultaneity, are similarly grounded on some fact or phenomenon, that\r\nis, on some series of sensations or states of consciousness, more or less\r\ncomplicated. The third species of Attribute, Quantity, is also manifestly\r\ngrounded on something in our sensations or states of feeling, since there is\r\nan indubitable difference in the sensations excited by a larger and a smaller\r\nbulk, or by a greater or a less degree of intensity, in any object of sense or\r\nof consciousness. All attributes, therefore, are to us nothing but either\r\nour sensations and other states of feeling, or something inextricably involved\r\ntherein; and to this even the peculiar and simple relations just adverted\r\nto are not exceptions. Those peculiar relations, however, are so important,\r\nand, even if they might in strictness be classed among states of\r\nconsciousness, are so fundamentally distinct from any other of those states,\r\nthat it would be a vain subtlety to bring them under that common description,\r\nand it is necessary that they should be classed apart.\u003ca id=\"noteref_24\" name=\"noteref_24\" href=\"#note_24\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e24\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAs the result, therefore, of our analysis, we obtain the following as an\r\nenumeration and classification of all Namable Things:\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n1st. Feelings, or States of Consciousness.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n2d. The Minds which experience those feelings.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n3d. The Bodies, or external objects which excite certain of those feelings,\r\ntogether with the powers or properties whereby they excite them; these\r\nlatter (at least) being included rather in compliance with common opinion,\r\nand because their existence is taken for granted in the common language\r\nfrom which I can not prudently deviate, than because the recognition of\r\nsuch powers or properties as real existences appears to be warranted by a\r\nsound philosophy.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n4th, and last. The Successions and Co-existences, the Likenesses and Unlikenesses,\r\nbetween feelings or states of consciousness. Those relations,\r\nwhen considered as subsisting between other things, exist in reality only\r\nbetween the states of consciousness which those things, if bodies, excite, if\r\nminds, either excite or experience.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page066\"\u003e[pg 066]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg066\" id=\"Pg066\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThis, until a better can be suggested, may serve as a substitute for the\r\nCategories of Aristotle considered as a classification of Existences. The\r\npractical application of it will appear when we commence the inquiry into\r\nthe Import of Propositions; in other words, when we inquire what it is\r\nwhich the mind actually believes, when it gives what is called its assent to\r\na proposition.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThese four classes comprising, if the classification be correct, all Namable\r\nThings, these or some of them must of course compose the signification of\r\nall names: and of these, or some of them, is made up whatever we call a\r\nfact.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nFor distinction’s sake, every fact which is solely composed of feelings or\r\nstates of consciousness considered as such, is often called a Psychological\r\nor Subjective fact; while every fact which is composed, either wholly or in\r\npart, of something different from these, that is, of substances and attributes,\r\nis called an Objective fact. We may say, then, that every objective\r\nfact is grounded on a corresponding subjective one; and has no meaning\r\nto us (apart from the subjective fact which corresponds to it), except as a\r\nname for the unknown and inscrutable process by which that subjective or\r\npsychological fact is brought to pass.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-div\" style=\"margin-bottom: 4.00em; margin-top: 4.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"toc15\" id=\"toc15\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"pdf16\" id=\"pdf16\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: center; margin-bottom: 2.40em; margin-top: 2.40em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 120%\"\u003eChapter IV.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: left; margin-bottom: 2.88em; margin-top: 2.88em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 144%\"\u003eOf Propositions.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 1. In treating of Propositions, as already in treating of Names, some\r\nconsiderations of a comparatively elementary nature respecting their form\r\nand varieties must be premised, before entering upon that analysis of the\r\nimport conveyed by them, which is the real subject and purpose of this\r\npreliminary book.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nA proposition, we have before said, is a portion of discourse in which a\r\npredicate is affirmed or denied of a subject. A predicate and a subject are\r\nall that is necessarily required to make up a proposition: but as we can not\r\nconclude from merely seeing two names put together, that they are a predicate\r\nand a subject, that is, that one of them is intended to be affirmed or\r\ndenied of the other, it is necessary that there should be some mode or form\r\nof indicating that such is the intention; some sign to distinguish a predication\r\nfrom any other kind of discourse. This is sometimes done by a\r\nslight alteration of one of the words, called an \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003einflection\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e; as when we say,\r\nFire burns; the change of the second word from \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eburn\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e to\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eburns\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e showing that we mean to affirm the predicate burn of the\r\nsubject fire. But this function is more commonly fulfilled by the word\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eis\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, when an affirmation is intended, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eis\r\nnot\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, when a negation; or by some other part of the verb \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eto\r\nbe\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e. The word which thus serves the purpose of a sign of predication is called,\r\nas we formerly observed, the \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ecopula\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e. It is important that there\r\nshould be no indistinctness in our conception of the nature and office of the copula;\r\nfor confused notions respecting it are among the causes which have spread\r\nmysticism over the field of logic, and perverted its speculations into logomachies.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt is apt to be supposed that the copula is something more than a mere\r\nsign of predication; that it also signifies existence. In the proposition,\r\nSocrates is just, it may seem to be implied not only that the quality\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ejust\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e can be affirmed of Socrates, but moreover that Socrates\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eis\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, that is to say,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page067\"\u003e[pg 067]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg067\" id=\"Pg067\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nexists. This, however, only shows that there is an ambiguity in the word\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eis\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e; a word which not only performs the function of the copula in\r\naffirmations, but has also a meaning of its own, in virtue of which it may itself be\r\nmade the predicate of a proposition. That the employment of it as a copula\r\ndoes not necessarily include the affirmation of existence, appears from\r\nsuch a proposition as this, A centaur is a fiction of the poets; where it can\r\nnot possibly be implied that a centaur exists, since the proposition itself expressly\r\nasserts that the thing has no real existence.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nMany volumes might be filled with the frivolous speculations concerning\r\nthe nature of Being (το ὄν, οὐσία, Ens, Entitas, Essentia, and the like), which\r\nhave arisen from overlooking this double meaning of the word \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eto\r\nbe\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e; from supposing that when it signifies \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eto exist\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, and when\r\nit signifies to \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ebe\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e some specified thing, as to\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ebe\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e a man, to \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ebe\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e Socrates, to\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ebe\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e seen or spoken of, to \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ebe\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\na phantom, even to \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ebe\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e a nonentity, it must still, at bottom,\r\nanswer to the same idea; and that a meaning must be found for it which shall suit all\r\nthese cases. The fog which rose from this narrow spot diffused itself at\r\nan early period over the whole surface of metaphysics. Yet it becomes\r\nus not to triumph over the great intellects of Plato and Aristotle because\r\nwe are now able to preserve ourselves from many errors into which they,\r\nperhaps inevitably, fell. The fire-teazer of a modern steam-engine produces\r\nby his exertions far greater effects than Milo of Crotona could, but he is\r\nnot therefore a stronger man. The Greeks seldom knew any language but\r\ntheir own. This rendered it far more difficult for them than it is for us, to\r\nacquire a readiness in detecting ambiguities. One of the advantages of\r\nhaving accurately studied a plurality of languages, especially of those languages\r\nwhich eminent thinkers have used as the vehicle of their thoughts,\r\nis the practical lesson we learn respecting the ambiguities of words, by finding\r\nthat the same word in one language corresponds, on different occasions,\r\nto different words in another. When not thus exercised, even the strongest\r\nunderstandings find it difficult to believe that things which have a common\r\nname, have not in some respect or other a common nature; and often\r\nexpend much labor very unprofitably (as was frequently done by the two\r\nphilosophers just mentioned) in vain attempts to discover in what this common\r\nnature consists. But, the habit once formed, intellects much inferior\r\nare capable of detecting even ambiguities which are common to many languages:\r\nand it is surprising that the one now under consideration, though\r\nit exists in the modern languages as well as in the ancient, should have\r\nbeen overlooked by almost all authors. The quantity of futile speculation\r\nwhich had been caused by a misapprehension of the nature of the copula,\r\nwas hinted at by Hobbes; but Mr. James Mill\u003ca id=\"noteref_25\" name=\"noteref_25\" href=\"#note_25\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e25\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e was, I believe, the first who\r\ndistinctly characterized the ambiguity, and pointed out how many errors in\r\nthe received systems of philosophy it has had to answer for. It has, indeed,\r\nmisled the moderns scarcely less than the ancients, though their mistakes,\r\nbecause our understandings are not yet so completely emancipated from\r\ntheir influence, do not appear equally irrational.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWe shall now briefly review the principal distinctions which exist among\r\npropositions, and the technical terms most commonly in use to express\r\nthose distinctions.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 2. A proposition being a portion of discourse in which something is\r\naffirmed or denied of something, the first division of propositions is into\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page068\"\u003e[pg 068]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg068\" id=\"Pg068\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\naffirmative and negative. An affirmative proposition is that in which the\r\npredicate is \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eaffirmed\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e of the subject; as, Cæsar is dead. A\r\nnegative proposition is that in which the predicate is \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003edenied\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e of the\r\nsubject; as, Cæsar is not dead. The copula, in this last species of proposition,\r\nconsists of the words \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eis not\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, which are the sign of negation;\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eis\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e being the sign of affirmation.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nSome logicians, among whom may be mentioned Hobbes, state this distinction\r\ndifferently; they recognize only one form of copula, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eis\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, and\r\nattach the negative sign to the predicate. \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Cæsar is dead,”\u003c/span\u003e and \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Cæsar is not\r\ndead,”\u003c/span\u003e according to these writers, are propositions agreeing not in the subject\r\nand predicate, but in the subject only. They do not consider \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“dead,”\u003c/span\u003e\r\nbut \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“not dead,”\u003c/span\u003e to be the predicate of the second proposition, and they accordingly\r\ndefine a negative proposition to be one in which the predicate is\r\na negative name. The point, though not of much practical moment, deserves\r\nnotice as an example (not unfrequent in logic) where by means of\r\nan apparent simplification, but which is merely verbal, matters are made\r\nmore complex than before. The notion of these writers was, that they\r\ncould get rid of the distinction between affirming and denying, by treating\r\nevery case of denying as the affirming of a negative name. But what is\r\nmeant by a negative name? A name expressive of the \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eabsence\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e of an attribute.\r\nSo that when we affirm a negative name, what we are really predicating\r\nis absence and not presence; we are asserting not that any thing is,\r\nbut that something is not; to express which operation no word seems so\r\nproper as the word denying. The fundamental distinction is between a\r\nfact and the non-existence of that fact; between seeing something and\r\nnot seeing it, between Cæsar’s being dead and his not being dead; and if\r\nthis were a merely verbal distinction, the generalization which brings both\r\nwithin the same form of assertion would be a real simplification: the distinction,\r\nhowever, being real, and in the facts, it is the generalization confounding\r\nthe distinction that is merely verbal; and tends to obscure the\r\nsubject, by treating the difference between two kinds of truths as if it were\r\nonly a difference between two kinds of words. To put things together,\r\nand to put them or keep them asunder, will remain different operations,\r\nwhatever tricks we may play with language.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nA remark of a similar nature may be applied to most of those distinctions\r\namong propositions which are said to have reference to their \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003emodality\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e;\r\nas, difference of tense or time; the sun \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003edid\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e rise, the sun \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eis\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e\r\nrising, the sun \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ewill\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e rise. These differences, like that between affirmation\r\nand negation, might be glossed over by considering the incident of time as a mere\r\nmodification of the predicate: thus, The sun is \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ean object having risen\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e, The\r\nsun is \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ean object now rising\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e, The sun is \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ean object to rise\r\nhereafter\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e. But the simplification would be merely verbal. Past, present, and\r\nfuture, do not constitute so many different kinds of rising; they are designations\r\nbelonging to the event asserted, to the \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003esun’s\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e rising to-day. They affect,\r\nnot the predicate, but the applicability of the predicate to the particular subject.\r\nThat which we affirm to be past, present, or future, is not what the subject\r\nsignifies, nor what the predicate signifies, but specifically and expressly\r\nwhat the predication signifies; what is expressed only by the proposition\r\nas such, and not by either or both of the terms. Therefore the circumstance\r\nof time is properly considered as attaching to the copula, which is\r\nthe sign of predication, and not to the predicate. If the same can not be\r\nsaid of such modifications as these, Cæsar \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003emay\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e be dead; Cæsar is\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eperhaps\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e dead; it is \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003epossible\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e that Cæsar is dead; it is only\r\nbecause these fall altogether\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page069\"\u003e[pg 069]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg069\" id=\"Pg069\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nunder another head, being properly assertions not of any thing relating\r\nto the fact itself, but of the state of our own mind in regard to it;\r\nnamely, our absence of disbelief of it. Thus \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Cæsar may be dead”\u003c/span\u003e means\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“I am not sure that Cæsar is alive.”\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 3. The next division of propositions is into Simple and Complex; more\r\naptly (by Professor Bain\u003ca id=\"noteref_26\" name=\"noteref_26\" href=\"#note_26\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e26\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e) termed Compound. A simple proposition is\r\nthat in which one predicate is affirmed or denied of one subject. A compound\r\nproposition is that in which there is more than one predicate, or\r\nmore than one subject, or both.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAt first sight this division has the air of an absurdity; a solemn distinction\r\nof things into one and more than one; as if we were to divide horses\r\ninto single horses and teams of horses. And it is true that what is called\r\na complex (or compound) proposition is often not a proposition at all, but\r\nseveral propositions, held together by a conjunction. Such, for example, is\r\nthis: Cæsar is dead, and Brutus is alive: or even this, Cæsar is dead, \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ebut\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e\r\nBrutus is alive. There are here two distinct assertions; and we might as\r\nwell call a street a complex house, as these two propositions a complex\r\nproposition. It is true that the syncategorematic words \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eand\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e and\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ebut\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e have a meaning; but that meaning is so far from making the\r\ntwo propositions one, that it adds a third proposition to them. All particles are\r\nabbreviations, and generally abbreviations of propositions; a kind of short-hand,\r\nwhereby something which, to be expressed fully, would have required a\r\nproposition or a series of propositions, is suggested to the mind at once.\r\nThus the words, Cæsar is dead and Brutus is alive, are equivalent to these:\r\nCæsar is dead; Brutus is alive; it is desired that the two preceding propositions\r\nshould be thought of together. If the words were, Cæsar is dead,\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ebut\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e Brutus is alive, the sense would be equivalent to the same three\r\npropositions together with a fourth; \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“between the two preceding propositions\r\nthere exists a contrast:”\u003c/span\u003e viz., either between the two facts themselves, or\r\nbetween the feelings with which it is desired that they should be regarded.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIn the instances cited the two propositions are kept visibly distinct, each\r\nsubject having its separate predicate, and each predicate its separate subject.\r\nFor brevity, however, and to avoid repetition, the propositions are\r\noften blended together: as in this, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Peter and James preached at Jerusalem\r\nand in Galilee,”\u003c/span\u003e which contains four propositions: Peter preached at\r\nJerusalem, Peter preached in Galilee, James preached at Jerusalem, James\r\npreached in Galilee.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWe have seen that when the two or more propositions comprised in\r\nwhat is called a complex proposition are stated absolutely, and not under\r\nany condition or proviso, it is not a proposition at all, but a plurality of\r\npropositions; since what it expresses is not a single assertion, but several\r\nassertions, which, if true when joined, are true also when separated. But\r\nthere is a kind of proposition which, though it contains a plurality of subjects\r\nand of predicates, and may be said in one sense of the word to consist\r\nof several propositions, contains but one assertion; and its truth does\r\nnot at all imply that of the simple propositions which compose it. An example\r\nof this is, when the simple propositions are connected by the particle\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eor\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e; as, either A is B or C is D; or by the particle\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eif\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e; as, A is B if C is D. In the former case, the proposition is\r\ncalled \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003edisjunctive\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, in the latter,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003econditional\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e: the name \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ehypothetical\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e was\r\noriginally common to both.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page070\"\u003e[pg 070]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg070\" id=\"Pg070\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAs has been well remarked by Archbishop Whately and others, the disjunctive\r\nform is resolvable into the conditional; every disjunctive proposition\r\nbeing equivalent to two or more conditional ones. \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Either A is B or\r\nC is D,”\u003c/span\u003e means, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“if A is not B, C is D; and if C is not D, A is B.”\u003c/span\u003e All\r\nhypothetical propositions, therefore, though disjunctive in form, are conditional\r\nin meaning; and the words hypothetical and conditional may be, as\r\nindeed they generally are, used synonymously. Propositions in which the\r\nassertion is not dependent on a condition, are said, in the language of logicians,\r\nto be \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ecategorical\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nA hypothetical proposition is not, like the pretended complex propositions\r\nwhich we previously considered, a mere aggregation of simple propositions.\r\nThe simple propositions which form part of the words in which\r\nit is couched, form no part of the assertion which it conveys. When we\r\nsay, If the Koran comes from God, Mohammed is the prophet of God, we\r\ndo not intend to affirm either that the Koran does come from God, or that\r\nMohammed is really his prophet. Neither of these simple propositions may\r\nbe true, and yet the truth of the hypothetical proposition may be indisputable.\r\nWhat is asserted is not the truth of either of the propositions,\r\nbut the inferribility of the one from the other. What, then, is the subject,\r\nand what the predicate of the hypothetical proposition? \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“The Koran”\u003c/span\u003e\r\nis not the subject of it, nor is \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Mohammed:”\u003c/span\u003e for nothing is affirmed or denied\r\neither of the Koran or of Mohammed. The real subject of the predication\r\nis the entire proposition, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Mohammed is the prophet of God;”\u003c/span\u003e and\r\nthe affirmation is, that this is a legitimate inference from the proposition,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“The Koran comes from God.”\u003c/span\u003e The subject and predicate, therefore,\r\nof a hypothetical proposition are names of propositions. The subject is\r\nsome one proposition. The predicate is a general relative name applicable\r\nto propositions; of this form—\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“an inference from so and so.”\u003c/span\u003e A fresh\r\ninstance is here afforded of the remark, that particles are abbreviations;\r\nsince \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eIf\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e A is B, C is D,”\u003c/span\u003e is found to be an abbreviation of the\r\nfollowing: \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“The proposition C is D, is a legitimate inference from the proposition\r\nA is B.”\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe distinction, therefore, between hypothetical and categorical propositions\r\nis not so great as it at first appears. In the conditional, as well as in\r\nthe categorical form, one predicate is affirmed of one subject, and no more:\r\nbut a conditional proposition is a proposition concerning a proposition;\r\nthe subject of the assertion is itself an assertion. Nor is this a property\r\npeculiar to hypothetical propositions. There are other classes of assertions\r\nconcerning propositions. Like other things, a proposition has attributes\r\nwhich may be predicated of it. The attribute predicated of it in a hypothetical\r\nproposition, is that of being an inference from a certain other proposition.\r\nBut this is only one of many attributes that might be predicated.\r\nWe may say, That the whole is greater than its part, is an axiom in mathematics:\r\nThat the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father alone, is a tenet\r\nof the Greek Church: The doctrine of the divine right of kings was renounced\r\nby Parliament at the Revolution: The infallibility of the Pope\r\nhas no countenance from Scripture. In all these cases the subject of the\r\npredication is an entire proposition. That which these different predicates\r\nare affirmed of, is \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ethe proposition\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“the whole is greater than\r\nits part;”\u003c/span\u003e \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ethe proposition\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“the Holy Ghost proceeds from\r\nthe Father alone;”\u003c/span\u003e \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ethe proposition\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“kings have a divine\r\nright;”\u003c/span\u003e \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ethe proposition\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“the Pope is infallible.”\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nSeeing, then, that there is much less difference between hypothetical\r\npropositions and any others, than one might be led to imagine from their\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page071\"\u003e[pg 071]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg071\" id=\"Pg071\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nform, we should be at a loss to account for the conspicuous position which\r\nthey have been selected to fill in treatises on logic, if we did not remember\r\nthat what they predicate of a proposition, namely, its being an inference\r\nfrom something else, is precisely that one of its attributes with which most\r\nof all a logician is concerned.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 4. The next of the common divisions of Propositions is into Universal,\r\nParticular, Indefinite, and Singular: a distinction founded on the degree\r\nof generality in which the name, which is the subject of the proposition,\r\nis to be understood. The following are examples:\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eAll men\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e are mortal—Universal.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eSome men\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e are mortal—Particular.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eMan\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e is mortal—Indefinite.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eJulius Cæsar\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e is mortal—Singular.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe proposition is Singular, when the subject is an individual name.\r\nThe individual name needs not be a proper name. \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“The Founder of\r\nChristianity was crucified,”\u003c/span\u003e is as much a singular proposition as \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Christ\r\nwas crucified.”\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWhen the name which is the subject of the proposition is a general\r\nname, we may intend to affirm or deny the predicate, either of all the\r\nthings that the subject denotes, or only of some. When the predicate is\r\naffirmed or denied of all and each of the things denoted by the subject,\r\nthe proposition is universal; when of some undefined portion of them only,\r\nit is particular. Thus, All men are mortal; Every man is mortal; are universal\r\npropositions. No man is immortal, is also a universal proposition,\r\nsince the predicate, immortal, is denied of each and every individual denoted\r\nby the term man; the negative proposition being exactly equivalent\r\nto the following, Every man is not-immortal. But \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“some men are wise,”\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“some men are not wise,”\u003c/span\u003e are particular propositions; the predicate\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ewise\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e being in the one case affirmed and in the other denied not of\r\neach and every individual denoted by the term man, but only of each and every one\r\nof some portion of those individuals, without specifying what portion; for\r\nif this were specified, the proposition would be changed either into a singular\r\nproposition, or into a universal proposition with a different subject;\r\nas, for instance, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“all \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eproperly instructed\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e men are wise.”\u003c/span\u003e There are\r\nother forms of particular propositions; as, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eMost\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e men are imperfectly\r\neducated:”\u003c/span\u003e it being immaterial how large a portion of the subject the predicate is\r\nasserted of, as long as it is left uncertain how that portion is to be distinguished\r\nfrom the rest.\u003ca id=\"noteref_27\" name=\"noteref_27\" href=\"#note_27\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e27\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWhen the form of the expression does not clearly show whether the\r\ngeneral name which is the subject of the proposition is meant to stand for\r\nall the individuals denoted by it, or only for some of them, the proposition\r\nis, by some logicians, called Indefinite; but this, as Archbishop Whately observes,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page072\"\u003e[pg 072]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg072\" id=\"Pg072\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nis a solecism, of the same nature as that committed by some grammarians\r\nwhen in their list of genders they enumerate the \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003edoubtful\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e gender.\r\nThe speaker must mean to assert the proposition either as a universal or\r\nas a particular proposition, though he has failed to declare which: and it\r\noften happens that though the words do not show which of the two he intends,\r\nthe context, or the custom of speech, supplies the deficiency. Thus,\r\nwhen it is affirmed that \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Man is mortal,”\u003c/span\u003e nobody doubts that the assertion\r\nis intended of all human beings; and the word indicative of universality\r\nis commonly omitted, only because the meaning is evident without it.\r\nIn the proposition, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Wine is good,”\u003c/span\u003e it is understood with equal readiness,\r\nthough for somewhat different reasons, that the assertion is not intended\r\nto be universal, but particular.\u003ca id=\"noteref_28\" name=\"noteref_28\" href=\"#note_28\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e28\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e As is observed\r\nby Professor Bain,\u003ca id=\"noteref_29\" name=\"noteref_29\" href=\"#note_29\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e29\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e the\r\nchief examples of Indefinite propositions occur \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“with names of material,\r\nwhich are the subjects sometimes of universal, and at other times of particular\r\npredication. \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e‘Food is chemically constituted by carbon, oxygen, etc.,’\u003c/span\u003e\r\nis a proposition of universal quantity; the meaning is all food—all kinds\r\nof food. \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e‘Food is necessary to animal life’\u003c/span\u003e is a case of particular quantity;\r\nthe meaning is some sort of food, not necessarily all sorts. \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e‘Metal\r\nis requisite in order to strength’\u003c/span\u003e does not mean all kinds of metal. \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e‘Gold\r\nwill make a way,’\u003c/span\u003e means a portion of gold.”\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWhen a general name stands for each and every individual which it is a\r\nname of, or in other words, which it denotes, it is said by logicians to be\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003edistributed\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, or taken distributively. Thus, in the proposition,\r\nAll men are mortal, the subject, Man, is distributed, because mortality is affirmed of\r\neach and every man. The predicate, Mortal, is not distributed, because\r\nthe only mortals who are spoken of in the proposition are those who happen\r\nto be men; while the word may, for aught that appears, and in fact\r\ndoes, comprehend within it an indefinite number of objects besides men.\r\nIn the proposition, Some men are mortal, both the predicate and the subject\r\nare undistributed. In the following, No men have wings, both the\r\npredicate and the subject are distributed. Not only is the attribute of\r\nhaving wings denied of the entire class Man, but that class is severed and\r\ncast out from the whole of the class Winged, and not merely from some\r\npart of that class.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThis phraseology, which is of great service in stating and demonstrating\r\nthe rules of the syllogism, enables us to express very concisely the definitions\r\nof a universal and a particular proposition. A universal proposition\r\nis that of which the subject is distributed; a particular proposition is that\r\nof which the subject is undistributed.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThere are many more distinctions among propositions than those we\r\nhave here stated, some of them of considerable importance. But, for explaining\r\nand illustrating these, more suitable opportunities will occur in the\r\nsequel.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page073\"\u003e[pg 073]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg073\" id=\"Pg073\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-div\" style=\"margin-bottom: 4.00em; margin-top: 4.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"toc17\" id=\"toc17\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"pdf18\" id=\"pdf18\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"Book_I_Chapter_V\" id=\"Book_I_Chapter_V\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: center; margin-bottom: 2.40em; margin-top: 2.40em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 120%\"\u003eChapter V.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: left; margin-bottom: 2.88em; margin-top: 2.88em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 144%\"\u003eOf The Import Of Propositions.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ca name=\"Book_I_Chapter_V_Section_1\" id=\"Book_I_Chapter_V_Section_1\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 1. An inquiry into the nature of propositions must have one of two\r\nobjects: to analyze the state of mind called Belief, or to analyze what is\r\nbelieved. All language recognizes a difference between a doctrine or opinion,\r\nand the fact of entertaining the opinion; between assent, and what is\r\nassented to.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nLogic, according to the conception here formed of it, has no concern\r\nwith the nature of the act of judging or believing; the consideration of\r\nthat act, as a phenomenon of the mind, belongs to another science. Philosophers,\r\nhowever, from Descartes downward, and especially from the era\r\nof Leibnitz and Locke, have by no means observed this distinction; and\r\nwould have treated with great disrespect any attempt to analyze the import\r\nof Propositions, unless founded on an analysis of the act of Judgment.\r\nA proposition, they would have said, is but the expression in words of a\r\nJudgment. The thing expressed, not the mere verbal expression, is the\r\nimportant matter. When the mind assents to a proposition, it judges.\r\nLet us find out what the mind does when it judges, and we shall know\r\nwhat propositions mean, and not otherwise.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nConformably to these views, almost all the writers on Logic in the last\r\ntwo centuries, whether English, German, or French, have made their theory\r\nof Propositions, from one end to the other, a theory of Judgments.\r\nThey considered a Proposition, or a Judgment, for they used the two\r\nwords indiscriminately, to consist in affirming or denying one \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eidea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e of\r\nanother. To judge, was to put two ideas together, or to bring one idea under\r\nanother, or to compare two ideas, or to perceive the agreement or disagreement\r\nbetween two ideas: and the whole doctrine of Propositions, together\r\nwith the theory of Reasoning (always necessarily founded on the\r\ntheory of Propositions), was stated as if Ideas, or Conceptions, or whatever\r\nother term the writer preferred as a name for mental representations generally,\r\nconstituted essentially the subject-matter and substance of those operations.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt is, of course, true, that in any case of judgment, as for instance when\r\nwe judge that gold is yellow, a process takes place in our minds, of which\r\nsome one or other of these theories is a partially correct account. We\r\nmust have the idea of gold and the idea of yellow, and these two ideas\r\nmust be brought together in our mind. But in the first place, it is evident\r\nthat this is only a part of what takes place; for we may put two ideas together\r\nwithout any act of belief; as when we merely imagine something,\r\nsuch as a golden mountain; or when we actually disbelieve: for in order\r\neven to disbelieve that Mohammed was an apostle of God, we must put the\r\nidea of Mohammed and that of an apostle of God together. To determine\r\nwhat it is that happens in the case of assent or dissent besides putting two\r\nideas together, is one of the most intricate of metaphysical problems. But\r\nwhatever the solution may be, we may venture to assert that it can have\r\nnothing whatever to do with the import of propositions; for this reason,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page074\"\u003e[pg 074]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg074\" id=\"Pg074\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nthat propositions (except sometimes when the mind itself is the subject\r\ntreated of) are not assertions respecting our ideas of things, but assertions\r\nrespecting the things themselves. In order to believe that gold is yellow,\r\nI must, indeed, have the idea of gold, and the idea of yellow, and something\r\nhaving reference to those ideas must take place in my mind; but\r\nmy belief has not reference to the ideas, it has reference to the things.\r\nWhat I believe, is a fact relating to the outward thing, gold, and to the\r\nimpression made by that outward thing upon the human organs; not a\r\nfact relating to my conception of gold, which would be a fact in my mental\r\nhistory, not a fact of external nature. It is true, that in order to believe\r\nthis fact in external nature, another fact must take place in my mind, a\r\nprocess must be performed upon my ideas; but so it must in every thing\r\nelse that I do. I can not dig the ground unless I have the idea of the\r\nground, and of a spade, and of all the other things I am operating upon,\r\nand unless I put those ideas together.\u003ca id=\"noteref_30\" name=\"noteref_30\" href=\"#note_30\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e30\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e But it would be a very ridiculous\r\ndescription of digging the ground to say that it is putting one idea into another.\r\nDigging is an operation which is performed upon the things themselves,\r\nthough it can not be performed unless I have in my mind the ideas\r\nof them. And in like manner, believing is an act which has for its subject\r\nthe facts themselves, though a previous mental conception of the facts is\r\nan indispensable condition. When I say that fire causes heat, do I mean\r\nthat my idea of fire causes my idea of heat? No: I mean that the natural\r\nphenomenon, fire, causes the natural phenomenon, heat. When I mean to\r\nassert any thing respecting the ideas, I give them their proper name, I\r\ncall them ideas: as when I say, that a child’s idea of a battle is unlike the\r\nreality, or that the ideas entertained of the Deity have a great effect on the\r\ncharacters of mankind.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe notion that what is of primary importance to the logician in a proposition,\r\nis the relation between the two \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eideas\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e corresponding to the subject\r\nand predicate (instead of the relation between the two \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ephenomena\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e which\r\nthey respectively express), seems to me one of the most fatal errors ever\r\nintroduced into the philosophy of Logic; and the principal cause why the\r\ntheory of the science has made such inconsiderable progress during the last\r\ntwo centuries. The treatises on Logic, and on the branches of Mental Philosophy\r\nconnected with Logic, which have been produced since the intrusion\r\nof this cardinal error, though sometimes written by men of extraordinary\r\nabilities and attainments, almost always tacitly imply a theory that\r\nthe investigation of truth consists in contemplating and handling our ideas,\r\nor conceptions of things, instead of the things themselves: a doctrine tantamount\r\nto the assertion, that the only mode of acquiring knowledge of\r\nnature is to study it at second hand, as represented in our own minds.\r\nMeanwhile, inquiries into every kind of natural phenomena were incessantly\r\nestablishing great and fruitful truths on most important subjects, by\r\nprocesses upon which these views of the nature of Judgment and Reasoning\r\nthrew no light, and in which they afforded no assistance whatever. No\r\nwonder that those who knew by practical experience how truths are arrived\r\nat, should deem a science futile, which consisted chiefly of such speculations.\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page075\"\u003e[pg 075]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg075\" id=\"Pg075\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nWhat has been done for the advancement of Logic since these\r\ndoctrines came into vogue, has been done not by professed logicians, but\r\nby discoverers in the other sciences; in whose methods of investigation\r\nmany principles of logic, not previously thought of, have successively come\r\nforth into light, but who have generally committed the error of supposing\r\nthat nothing whatever was known of the art of philosophizing by the old\r\nlogicians, because their modern interpreters have written to so little purpose\r\nrespecting it.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWe have to inquire, then, on the present occasion, not into Judgment,\r\nbut judgments; not into the act of believing, but into the thing believed.\r\nWhat is the immediate object of belief in a Proposition? What is the\r\nmatter of fact signified by it? What is it to which, when I assert the\r\nproposition, I give my assent, and call upon others to give theirs? What is\r\nthat which is expressed by the form of discourse called a Proposition, and\r\nthe conformity of which to fact constitutes the truth of the proposition?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 2. One of the clearest and most consecutive thinkers whom this country\r\nor the world has produced, I mean Hobbes, has given the following answer\r\nto this question. In every proposition (says he) what is signified is,\r\nthe belief of the speaker that the predicate is a name of the same thing of\r\nwhich the subject is a name; and if it really is so, the proposition is true.\r\nThus the proposition, All men are living beings (he would say) is true,\r\nbecause \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eliving being\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e is a name of every thing of which\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eman\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e is a name. All men are six feet high, is not true, because\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003esix feet high\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e is not a name of every thing (though it is of\r\nsome things) of which \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eman\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e is a name.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWhat is stated in this theory as the definition of a true proposition, must\r\nbe allowed to be a property which all true propositions possess. The subject\r\nand predicate being both of them names of things, if they were names\r\nof quite different things the one name could not, consistently with its signification,\r\nbe predicated of the other. If it be true that some men are copper-colored,\r\nit must be true—and the proposition does really assert—that\r\namong the individuals denoted by the name man, there are some who are\r\nalso among those denoted by the name copper-colored. If it be true that\r\nall oxen ruminate, it must be true that all the individuals denoted by the\r\nname ox are also among those denoted by the name ruminating; and whoever\r\nasserts that all oxen ruminate, undoubtedly does assert that this relation\r\nsubsists between the two names.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe assertion, therefore, which, according to Hobbes, is the only one\r\nmade in any proposition, really is made in every proposition: and his analysis\r\nhas consequently one of the requisites for being the true one. We\r\nmay go a step further; it is the only analysis that is rigorously true of all\r\npropositions without exception. What he gives as the meaning of propositions,\r\nis part of the meaning of all propositions, and the whole meaning\r\nof some. This, however, only shows what an extremely minute fragment\r\nof meaning it is quite possible to include within the logical formula of a\r\nproposition. It does not show that no proposition means more. To warrant\r\nus in putting together two words with a copula between them, it is\r\nreally enough that the thing or things denoted by one of the names should\r\nbe capable, without violation of usage, of being called by the other name also.\r\nIf, then, this be all the meaning necessarily implied in the form of discourse\r\ncalled a Proposition, why do I object to it as the scientific definition of what\r\na proposition means? Because, though the mere collocation which makes\r\nthe proposition a proposition, conveys no more than this scanty amount of\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page076\"\u003e[pg 076]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg076\" id=\"Pg076\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nmeaning, that same collocation combined with other circumstances, that\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eform\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e combined with other \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ematter\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e, does convey more, and\r\nthe proposition in those other circumstances does assert more, than merely that relation\r\nbetween the two names.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe only propositions of which Hobbes’s principle is a sufficient account,\r\nare that limited and unimportant class in which both the predicate and\r\nthe subject are proper names. For, as has already been remarked, proper\r\nnames have strictly no meaning; they are mere marks for individual objects:\r\nand when a proper name is predicated of another proper name, all\r\nthe signification conveyed is, that both the names are marks for the same\r\nobject. But this is precisely what Hobbes produces as a theory of predication\r\nin general. His doctrine is a full explanation of such predications\r\nas these: Hyde was Clarendon, or, Tully is Cicero. It exhausts the meaning\r\nof those propositions. But it is a sadly inadequate theory of any others.\r\nThat it should ever have been thought of as such, can be accounted\r\nfor only by the fact, that Hobbes, in common with the other Nominalists,\r\nbestowed little or no attention upon the \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003econnotation\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e of words; and sought\r\nfor their meaning exclusively in what they \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003edenote\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e: as if all names had been\r\n(what none but proper names really are) marks put upon individuals; and\r\nas if there were no difference between a proper and a general name, except\r\nthat the first denotes only one individual, and the last a greater number.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt has been seen, however, that the meaning of all names, except proper\r\nnames and that portion of the class of abstract names which are not connotative,\r\nresides in the connotation. When, therefore, we are analyzing the\r\nmeaning of any proposition in which the predicate and the subject, or\r\neither of them, are connotative names, it is to the connotation of those\r\nterms that we must exclusively look, and not to what they \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003edenote\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e, or in the\r\nlanguage of Hobbes (language so far correct) are names of.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIn asserting that the truth of a proposition depends on the conformity of\r\nimport between its terms, as, for instance, that the proposition, Socrates is\r\nwise, is a true proposition, because Socrates and wise are names applicable\r\nto, or, as he expresses it, names of, the same person; it is very remarkable\r\nthat so powerful a thinker should not have asked himself the question, But\r\nhow came they to be names of the same person? Surely not because such\r\nwas the intention of those who invented the words. When mankind fixed\r\nthe meaning of the word wise, they were not thinking of Socrates, nor,\r\nwhen his parents gave him the name of Socrates, were they thinking of\r\nwisdom. The names \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ehappen\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e to fit the same person because of a certain\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003efact\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e, which fact was not known, nor in being, when the names were invented.\r\nIf we want to know what the fact is, we shall find the clue to it\r\nin the \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003econnotation\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e of the names.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nA bird or a stone, a man, or a wise man, means simply, an object having\r\nsuch and such attributes. The real meaning of the word man, is those attributes,\r\nand not Smith, Brown, and the remainder of the individuals. The\r\nword \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003emortal\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, in like manner connotes a certain attribute or\r\nattributes; and when we say, All men are mortal, the meaning of the proposition is, that\r\nall beings which possess the one set of attributes, possess also the other. If,\r\nin our experience, the attributes connoted by \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eman\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e are always\r\naccompanied by the attribute connoted by \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003emortal\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, it will follow\r\nas a consequence, that the class \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eman\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e will be wholly included in\r\nthe class \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003emortal\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, and that \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003emortal\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwill be a name of all things of which \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eman\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e is a name: but why? Those\r\nobjects are brought under the name, by possessing the attributes connoted\r\nby it: but their possession of the attributes is the real condition on which\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page077\"\u003e[pg 077]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg077\" id=\"Pg077\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nthe truth of the proposition depends; not their being called by the name.\r\nConnotative names do not precede, but follow, the attributes which they\r\nconnote. If one attribute happens to be always found in conjunction with\r\nanother attribute, the concrete names which answer to those attributes will\r\nof course be predicable of the same subjects, and may be said, in Hobbes’s\r\nlanguage (in the propriety of which on this occasion I fully concur), to be\r\ntwo names for the same things. But the possibility of a concurrent application\r\nof the two names, is a mere consequence of the conjunction between\r\nthe two attributes, and was, in most cases, never thought of when the\r\nnames were introduced and their signification fixed. That the diamond is\r\ncombustible, was a proposition certainly not dreamed of when the words\r\nDiamond and Combustible first received their meaning; and could not\r\nhave been discovered by the most ingenious and refined analysis of the signification\r\nof those words. It was found out by a very different process,\r\nnamely, by exerting the senses, and learning from them, that the attribute\r\nof combustibility existed in the diamonds upon which the experiment was\r\ntried; the number or character of the experiments being such, that what\r\nwas true of those individuals might be concluded to be true of all substances\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“called by the name,”\u003c/span\u003e that is, of all substances possessing the attributes\r\nwhich the name connotes. The assertion, therefore, when analyzed,\r\nis, that wherever we find certain attributes, there will be found a certain\r\nother attribute: which is not a question of the signification of names,\r\nbut of laws of nature; the order existing among phenomena.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 3. Although Hobbes’s theory of Predication has not, in the terms in\r\nwhich he stated it, met with a very favorable reception from subsequent\r\nthinkers, a theory virtually identical with it, and not by any means so perspicuously\r\nexpressed, may almost be said to have taken the rank of an established\r\nopinion. The most generally received notion of Predication decidedly\r\nis that it consists in referring something to a class, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\neither placing an individual under a class, or placing one class under another class.\r\nThus, the proposition, Man is mortal, asserts, according to this view of it,\r\nthat the class man is included in the class mortal. \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Plato is a philosopher,”\u003c/span\u003e\r\nasserts that the individual Plato is one of those who compose the\r\nclass philosopher. If the proposition is negative, then instead of placing\r\nsomething in a class, it is said to exclude something from a class. Thus,\r\nif the following be the proposition, The elephant is not carnivorous; what\r\nis asserted (according to this theory) is, that the elephant is excluded from\r\nthe class carnivorous, or is not numbered among the things comprising that\r\nclass. There is no real difference, except in language, between this theory\r\nof Predication and the theory of Hobbes. For a class \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eis\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e absolutely nothing\r\nbut an indefinite number of individuals denoted by a general name.\r\nThe name given to them in common, is what makes them a class. To refer\r\nany thing to a class, therefore, is to look upon it as one of the things\r\nwhich are to be called by that common name. To exclude it from a class,\r\nis to say that the common name is not applicable to it.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nHow widely these views of predication have prevailed, is evident from\r\nthis, that they are the basis of the celebrated \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003edictum de omni et nullo\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e.\r\nWhen the syllogism is resolved, by all who treat of it, into an inference\r\nthat what is true of a class is true of all things whatever that belong to the\r\nclass; and when this is laid down by almost all professed logicians as the\r\nultimate principle to which all reasoning owes its validity; it is clear that\r\nin the general estimation of logicians, the propositions of which reasonings\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page078\"\u003e[pg 078]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg078\" id=\"Pg078\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nare composed can be the expression of nothing but the process of dividing\r\nthings into classes, and referring every thing to its proper class.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThis theory appears to me a signal example of a logical error very often\r\ncommitted in logic, that of ὕστερον προτέρον, or explaining a thing by something\r\nwhich presupposes it. When I say that snow is white, I may and\r\nought to be thinking of snow as a class, because I am asserting a proposition\r\nas true of all snow: but I am certainly not thinking of white objects\r\nas a class; I am thinking of no white object whatever except snow, but\r\nonly of that, and of the sensation of white which it gives me. When, indeed,\r\nI have judged, or assented to the propositions, that snow is white,\r\nand that several other things are also white, I gradually begin to think of\r\nwhite objects as a class, including snow and those other things. But this\r\nis a conception which followed, not preceded, those judgments, and therefore\r\ncan not be given as an explanation of them. Instead of explaining the\r\neffect by the cause, this doctrine explains the cause by the effect, and is, I\r\nconceive, founded on a latent misconception of the nature of classification.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThere is a sort of language very generally prevalent in these discussions,\r\nwhich seems to suppose that classification is an arrangement and grouping\r\nof definite and known individuals: that when names were imposed, mankind\r\ntook into consideration all the individual objects in the universe, distributed\r\nthem into parcels or lists, and gave to the objects of each list a\r\ncommon name, repeating this operation \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003etoties\r\nquoties\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e until they had invented\r\nall the general names of which language consists; which having been\r\nonce done, if a question subsequently arises whether a certain general\r\nname can be truly predicated of a certain particular object, we have only\r\n(as it were) to read the roll of the objects upon which that name was conferred,\r\nand see whether the object about which the question arises is to be\r\nfound among them. The framers of language (it would seem to be supposed)\r\nhave predetermined all the objects that are to compose each class,\r\nand we have only to refer to the record of an antecedent decision.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nSo absurd a doctrine will be owned by nobody when thus nakedly stated;\r\nbut if the commonly received explanations of classification and naming do\r\nnot imply this theory, it requires to be shown how they admit of being reconciled\r\nwith any other.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nGeneral names are not marks put upon definite objects; classes are not\r\nmade by drawing a line round a given number of assignable individuals.\r\nThe objects which compose any given class are perpetually fluctuating.\r\nWe may frame a class without knowing the individuals, or even any of the\r\nindividuals, of which it may be composed; we may do so while believing\r\nthat no such individuals exist. If by the \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003emeaning\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e of a general name are\r\nto be understood the things which it is the name of, no general name, except\r\nby accident, has a fixed meaning at all, or ever long retains the same\r\nmeaning. The only mode in which any general name has a definite meaning,\r\nis by being a name of an indefinite variety of things; namely, of all\r\nthings, known or unknown, past, present, or future, which possess certain\r\ndefinite attributes. When, by studying not the meaning of words, but the\r\nphenomena of nature, we discover that these attributes are possessed by\r\nsome object not previously known to possess them (as when chemists\r\nfound that the diamond was combustible), we include this new object in\r\nthe class; but it did not already belong to the class. We place the individual\r\nin the class because the proposition is true; the proposition is not\r\ntrue because the object is placed in the class.\u003ca id=\"noteref_31\" name=\"noteref_31\" href=\"#note_31\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e31\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page079\"\u003e[pg 079]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg079\" id=\"Pg079\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt will appear hereafter, in treating of reasoning, how much the theory\r\nof that intellectual process has been vitiated by the influence of these erroneous\r\nnotions, and by the habit which they exemplify of assimilating all\r\nthe operations of the human understanding which have truth for their object,\r\nto processes of mere classification and naming. Unfortunately, the\r\nminds which have been entangled in this net are precisely those which have\r\nescaped the other cardinal error commented upon in the beginning of the\r\npresent chapter. Since the revolution which dislodged Aristotle from the\r\nschools, logicians may almost be divided into those who have looked upon\r\nreasoning as essentially an affair of Ideas, and those who have looked upon\r\nit as essentially an affair of Names.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAlthough, however, Hobbes’s theory of Predication, according to the\r\nwell-known remark of Leibnitz, and the avowal of Hobbes\r\nhimself,\u003ca id=\"noteref_32\" name=\"noteref_32\" href=\"#note_32\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e32\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e renders\r\ntruth and falsity completely arbitrary, with no standard but the will of\r\nmen, it must not be concluded that either Hobbes, or any of the other\r\nthinkers who have in the main agreed with him, did in fact consider the\r\ndistinction between truth and error as less real, or attached less importance\r\nto it, than other people. To suppose that they did so would argue total\r\nunacquaintance with their other speculations. But this shows how little\r\nhold their doctrine possessed over their own minds. No person, at bottom,\r\never imagined that there was nothing more in truth than propriety of\r\nexpression; than using language in conformity to a previous convention.\r\nWhen the inquiry was brought down from generals to a particular case, it\r\nhas always been acknowledged that there is a distinction between verbal\r\nand real questions; that some false propositions are uttered from ignorance\r\nof the meaning of words, but that in others the source of the error is a\r\nmisapprehension of things; that a person who has not the use of language\r\nat all may form propositions mentally, and that they may be untrue—that\r\nis, he may believe as matters of fact what are not really so. This last admission\r\ncan not be made in stronger terms than it is by Hobbes himself,\u003ca id=\"noteref_33\" name=\"noteref_33\" href=\"#note_33\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e33\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nthough he will not allow such erroneous belief to be called falsity, but only\r\nerror. And he has himself laid down, in other places, doctrines in which\r\nthe true theory of predication is by implication contained. He distinctly\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page080\"\u003e[pg 080]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg080\" id=\"Pg080\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nsays that general names are given to things on account of their attributes,\r\nand that abstract names are the names of those attributes. \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Abstract is\r\nthat which in any subject denotes the cause of the concrete name…. And\r\nthese causes of names are the same with the causes of our conceptions,\r\nnamely, some power of action, or affection, of the thing conceived, which\r\nsome call the manner by which any thing works upon our senses, but by\r\nmost men they are called \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eaccidents\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e.”\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca id=\"noteref_34\" name=\"noteref_34\" href=\"#note_34\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e34\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e It is strange that having gone so\r\nfar, he should not have gone one step further, and seen that what he calls\r\nthe cause of the concrete name, is in reality the meaning of it; and that\r\nwhen we predicate of any subject a name which is given \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ebecause\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e of an\r\nattribute (or, as he calls it, an accident), our object is not to affirm the name,\r\nbut, by means of the name, to affirm the attribute.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 4. Let the predicate be, as we have said, a connotative term; and to\r\ntake the simplest case first, let the subject be a proper name: \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“The summit\r\nof Chimborazo is white.”\u003c/span\u003e The word white connotes an attribute which\r\nis possessed by the individual object designated by the words \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“summit of\r\nChimborazo;”\u003c/span\u003e which attribute consists in the physical fact, of its exciting\r\nin human beings the sensation which we call a sensation of white. It will\r\nbe admitted that, by asserting the proposition, we wish to communicate information\r\nof that physical fact, and are not thinking of the names, except\r\nas the necessary means of making that communication. The meaning of\r\nthe proposition, therefore, is, that the individual thing denoted by the subject,\r\nhas the attributes connoted by the predicate.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIf we now suppose the subject also to be a connotative name, the meaning\r\nexpressed by the proposition has advanced a step further in complication.\r\nLet us first suppose the proposition to be universal, as well as affirmative:\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“All men are mortal.”\u003c/span\u003e In this case, as in the last, what the proposition\r\nasserts (or expresses a belief of) is, of course, that the objects denoted\r\nby the subject (man) possess the attributes connoted by the predicate\r\n(mortal). But the characteristic of this case is, that the objects are\r\nno longer \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eindividually\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e designated. They are pointed out only by some of\r\ntheir attributes: they are the objects called men, that is, possessing the attributes\r\nconnoted by the name man; and the only thing known of them\r\nmay be those attributes: indeed, as the proposition is general, and the objects\r\ndenoted by the subject are therefore indefinite in number, most of\r\nthem are not known individually at all. The assertion, therefore, is not, as\r\nbefore, that the attributes which the predicate connotes are possessed by\r\nany given individual, or by any number of individuals previously known as\r\nJohn, Thomas, etc., but that those attributes are possessed by each and every\r\nindividual possessing certain other attributes; that whatever has the\r\nattributes connoted by the subject, has also those connoted by the predicate;\r\nthat the latter set of attributes \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003econstantly accompany\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e the former set.\r\nWhatever has the attributes of man has the attribute of mortality; mortality\r\nconstantly accompanies the attributes of man.\u003ca id=\"noteref_35\" name=\"noteref_35\" href=\"#note_35\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e35\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page081\"\u003e[pg 081]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg081\" id=\"Pg081\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIf it be remembered that every attribute is \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003egrounded\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e on some fact or\r\nphenomenon, either of outward sense or of inward consciousness, and that\r\nto \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003epossess\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e an attribute is another phrase for being the cause of, or forming\r\npart of, the fact or phenomenon upon which the attribute is grounded; we\r\nmay add one more step to complete the analysis. The proposition which\r\nasserts that one attribute always accompanies another attribute, really asserts\r\nthereby no other thing than this, that one phenomenon always accompanies\r\nanother phenomenon; insomuch that where we find the latter, we\r\nhave assurance of the existence of the former. Thus, in the proposition,\r\nAll men are mortal, the word man connotes the attributes which we ascribe\r\nto a certain kind of living creatures, on the ground of certain phenomena\r\nwhich they exhibit, and which are partly physical phenomena, namely the\r\nimpressions made on our senses by their bodily form and structure, and\r\npartly mental phenomena, namely the sentient and intellectual life which\r\nthey have of their own. All this is understood when we utter the word\r\nman, by any one to whom the meaning of the word is known. Now, when\r\nwe say, Man is mortal, we mean that wherever these various physical and\r\nmental phenomena are all found, there we have assurance that the other\r\nphysical and mental phenomenon, called death, will not fail to take place.\r\nThe proposition does not affirm \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ewhen\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e; for the connotation of the word\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003emortal\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e goes no further than to the occurrence of the phenomenon\r\nat some time or other, leaving the particular time undecided.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 5. We have already proceeded far enough, not only to demonstrate the\r\nerror of Hobbes, but to ascertain the real import of by far the most numerous\r\nclass of propositions. The object of belief in a proposition, when it\r\nasserts any thing more than the meaning of words, is generally, as in the\r\ncases which we have examined, either the co-existence or the sequence of\r\ntwo phenomena. At the very commencement of our inquiry, we found that\r\nevery act of belief implied two Things: we have now ascertained what, in\r\nthe most frequent case, these two things are, namely, two Phenomena; in\r\nother words, two states of consciousness; and what it is which the proposition\r\naffirms (or denies) to subsist between them, namely, either succession\r\nor co-existence. And this case includes innumerable instances which no\r\none, previous to reflection, would think of referring to it. Take the following\r\nexample: A generous person is worthy of honor. Who would expect\r\nto recognize here a case of co-existence between phenomena? But so it is.\r\nThe attribute which causes a person to be termed generous, is ascribed to\r\nhim on the ground of states of his mind, and particulars of his conduct:\r\nboth are phenomena: the former are facts of internal consciousness; the\r\nlatter, so far as distinct from the former, are physical facts, or perceptions\r\nof the senses. Worthy of honor admits of a similar analysis. Honor, as\r\nhere used, means a state of approving and admiring emotion, followed on\r\noccasion by corresponding outward acts. \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Worthy of honor”\u003c/span\u003e connotes all\r\nthis, together with our approval of the act of showing honor. All these\r\nare phenomena; states of internal consciousness, accompanied or followed\r\nby physical facts. When we say, A generous person is worthy of honor,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page082\"\u003e[pg 082]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg082\" id=\"Pg082\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nwe affirm co-existence between the two complicated phenomena connoted\r\nby the two terms respectively. We affirm, that wherever and whenever\r\nthe inward feelings and outward facts implied in the word generosity\r\nhave place, then and there the existence and manifestation of an inward\r\nfeeling, honor, would be followed in our minds by another inward feeling,\r\napproval.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAfter the analysis, in a former chapter, of the import of names, many\r\nexamples are not needed to illustrate the import of propositions. When\r\nthere is any obscurity, or difficulty, it does not lie in the meaning of the\r\nproposition, but in the meaning of the names which compose it; in the\r\nextremely complicated connotation of many words; the immense multitude\r\nand prolonged series of facts which often constitute the phenomenon connoted\r\nby a name. But where it is seen what the phenomenon is, there is\r\nseldom any difficulty in seeing that the assertion conveyed by the proposition\r\nis, the co-existence of one such phenomenon with another; or the succession\r\nof one such phenomenon to another: so that where the one is found,\r\nwe may calculate on finding the other, though perhaps not conversely.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThis, however, though the most common, is not the only meaning which\r\npropositions are ever intended to convey. In the first place, sequences and\r\nco-existences are not only asserted respecting Phenomena; we make propositions\r\nalso respecting those hidden causes of phenomena, which are named\r\nsubstances and attributes. A substance, however, being to us nothing but\r\neither that which causes, or that which is conscious of, phenomena; and the\r\nsame being true, \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003emutatis mutandis\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, of\r\nattributes; no assertion can be made,\r\nat least with a meaning, concerning these unknown and unknowable entities,\r\nexcept in virtue of the Phenomena by which alone they manifest\r\nthemselves to our faculties. When we say Socrates was contemporary with\r\nthe Peloponnesian war, the foundation of this assertion, as of all assertions\r\nconcerning substances, is an assertion concerning the phenomena which\r\nthey exhibit—namely, that the series of facts by which Socrates manifested\r\nhimself to mankind, and the series of mental states which constituted his\r\nsentient existence, went on simultaneously with the series of facts known\r\nby the name of the Peloponnesian war. Still, the proposition as commonly\r\nunderstood does not assert that alone; it asserts that the Thing in itself,\r\nthe \u003cspan lang=\"el\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"el\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003enoumenon\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e Socrates, was existing, and\r\ndoing or experiencing those various\r\nfacts during the same time. Co-existence and sequence, therefore, may\r\nbe affirmed or denied not only between phenomena, but between noumena,\r\nor between a noumenon and phenomena. And both of noumena and of\r\nphenomena we may affirm simple existence. But what is a noumenon?\r\nAn unknown cause. In affirming, therefore, the existence of a noumenon,\r\nwe affirm causation. Here, therefore, are two additional kinds of fact,\r\ncapable of being asserted in a proposition. Besides the propositions which\r\nassert Sequence or Co-existence, there are some which assert\r\nsimple Existence;\u003ca id=\"noteref_36\" name=\"noteref_36\" href=\"#note_36\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e36\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nand others assert Causation, which, subject to the explanations\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page083\"\u003e[pg 083]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg083\" id=\"Pg083\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nwhich will follow in the Third Book, must be considered provisionally as a\r\ndistinct and peculiar kind of assertion.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 6. To these four kinds of matter-of-fact or assertion, must be added\r\na fifth, Resemblance. This was a species of attribute which we found it\r\nimpossible to analyze; for which no \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003efundamentum\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, distinct from the objects\r\nthemselves, could be assigned. Besides propositions which assert a\r\nsequence or co-existence between two phenomena, there are therefore also\r\npropositions which assert resemblance between them; as, This color is like\r\nthat color; The heat of to-day is \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eequal\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e to the heat of yesterday. It is\r\ntrue that such an assertion might with some plausibility be brought within\r\nthe description of an affirmation of sequence, by considering it as an assertion\r\nthat the simultaneous contemplation of the two colors is \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003efollowed\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e by\r\na specific feeling termed the feeling of resemblance. But there would be\r\nnothing gained by incumbering ourselves, especially in this place, with a\r\ngeneralization which may be looked upon as strained. Logic does not undertake\r\nto analyze mental facts into their ultimate elements. Resemblance\r\nbetween two phenomena is more intelligible in itself than any explanation\r\ncould make it, and under any classification must remain specifically distinct\r\nfrom the ordinary cases of sequence and co-existence.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt is sometimes said, that all propositions whatever, of which the predicate\r\nis a general name, do, in point of fact, affirm or deny resemblance. All\r\nsuch propositions affirm that a thing belongs to a class; but things being\r\nclassed together according to their resemblance, every thing is of course\r\nclassed with the things which it is supposed to resemble most; and thence,\r\nit may be said, when we affirm that Gold is a metal, or that Socrates is a\r\nman, the affirmation intended is, that gold resembles other metals, and Socrates\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page084\"\u003e[pg 084]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg084\" id=\"Pg084\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nother men, more nearly than they resemble the objects contained in\r\nany other of the classes co-ordinate with these.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThere is some slight degree of foundation for this remark, but no more\r\nthan a slight degree. The arrangement of things into classes, such as the\r\nclass \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003emetal\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, or the class \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eman\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\nis grounded indeed on a resemblance among\r\nthe things which are placed in the same class, but not on a mere general\r\nresemblance: the resemblance it is grounded on consists in the possession\r\nby all those things, of certain common peculiarities; and those peculiarities\r\nit is which the terms connote, and which the propositions consequently assert;\r\nnot the resemblance. For though when I say, Gold is a metal, I say\r\nby implication that if there be any other metals it must resemble them, yet\r\nif there were no other metals I might still assert the proposition with the\r\nsame meaning as at present, namely, that gold has the various properties\r\nimplied in the word metal; just as it might be said, Christians are men,\r\neven if there were no men who were not Christians. Propositions, therefore,\r\nin which objects are referred to a class because they possess the attributes\r\nconstituting the class, are so far from asserting nothing but resemblance,\r\nthat they do not, properly speaking, assert resemblance at all.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nBut we remarked some time ago (and the reasons of the remark will be\r\nmore fully entered into in a subsequent Book\u003ca id=\"noteref_37\" name=\"noteref_37\" href=\"#note_37\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e37\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e) that there is sometimes a\r\nconvenience in extending the boundaries of a class so as to include things\r\nwhich possess in a very inferior degree, if in any, some of the characteristic\r\nproperties of the class—provided they resemble that class more than\r\nany other, insomuch that the general propositions which are true of the\r\nclass, will be nearer to being true of those things than any other equally\r\ngeneral propositions. For instance, there are substances called metals\r\nwhich have very few of the properties by which metals are commonly recognized;\r\nand almost every great family of plants or animals has a few anomalous\r\ngenera or species on its borders, which are admitted into it by a sort\r\nof courtesy, and concerning which it has been matter of discussion to what\r\nfamily they properly belonged. Now when the class-name is predicated of\r\nany object of this description, we do, by so predicating it, affirm resemblance\r\nand nothing more. And in order to be scrupulously correct it ought\r\nto be said, that in every case in which we predicate a general name, we affirm,\r\nnot absolutely that the object possesses the properties designated by\r\nthe name, but that it \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eeither\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e possesses those properties, or if it does not,\r\nat any rate resembles the things which do so, more than it resembles any other\r\nthings. In most cases, however, it is unnecessary to suppose any such\r\nalternative, the latter of the two grounds being very seldom that on which\r\nthe assertion is made: and when it is, there is generally some slight difference\r\nin the form of the expression, as, This species (or genus) is \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003econsidered\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e,\r\nor \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003emay be ranked\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e, as belonging to such and such a family: we should\r\nhardly say positively that it does belong to it, unless it possessed unequivocally\r\nthe properties of which the class-name is scientifically significant.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThere is still another exceptional case, in which, though the predicate is\r\nthe name of a class, yet in predicating it we affirm nothing but resemblance,\r\nthe class being founded not on resemblance in any given particular, but on\r\ngeneral unanalyzable resemblance. The classes in question are those into\r\nwhich our simple sensations, or other simple feelings, are divided. Sensations\r\nof white, for instance, are classed together, not because we can take\r\nthem to pieces, and say they are alike in this, and not alike in that, but because\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page085\"\u003e[pg 085]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg085\" id=\"Pg085\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nwe feel them to be alike altogether, though in different degrees.\r\nWhen, therefore, I say, The color I saw yesterday was a white color, or,\r\nThe sensation I feel is one of tightness, in both cases the attribute I affirm\r\nof the color or of the other sensation is mere resemblance—simple\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003elikeness\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e to sensations which I have had before, and which have had those\r\nnames bestowed upon them. The names of feelings, like other concrete general\r\nnames, are connotative; but they connote a mere resemblance. When\r\npredicated of any individual feeling, the information they convey is that of\r\nits likeness to the other feelings which we have been accustomed to call by\r\nthe same name. Thus much may suffice in illustration of the kind of propositions\r\nin which the matter-of-fact asserted (or denied) is simple Resemblance.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nExistence, Co-existence, Sequence, Causation, Resemblance: one or other\r\nof these is asserted (or denied) in every proposition which is not merely\r\nverbal. This five-fold division is an exhaustive classification of matters-of-fact;\r\nof all things that can be believed, or tendered for belief; of all questions\r\nthat can be propounded, and all answers that can be returned to them.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nProfessor Bain\u003ca id=\"noteref_38\" name=\"noteref_38\" href=\"#note_38\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e38\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e distinguishes two kinds of Propositions of Co-existence.\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“In the one kind, account is taken of Place; they may be described as\r\npropositions of Order in Place.”\u003c/span\u003e In the other kind, the co-existence which\r\nis predicated is termed by Mr. Bain Co-inherence of Attributes. \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“This is a\r\ndistinct variety of Propositions of Co-existence. Instead of an arrangement\r\nin place with numerical intervals, we have the concurrence of two or more\r\nattributes or powers in the same part or locality. A mass of gold contains,\r\nin every atom, the concurring attributes that mark the substance—weight,\r\nhardness, color, lustre, incorrosibility, etc. An animal, besides having parts\r\nsituated in place, has co-inhering functions in the same parts, exerted by\r\nthe very same masses and molecules of its substance…. The Mind,\r\nwhich affords no Propositions of Order in Place, has co-inhering functions.\r\nWe affirm mind to contain Feeling, Will, and Thought, not in local separation,\r\nbut in commingling exercise. The concurring properties of minerals,\r\nof plants, and of the bodily and the mental structure of animals, are united\r\nin affirmations of co-inherence.”\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe distinction is real and important. But, as has been seen, an Attribute,\r\nwhen it is any thing but a simple unanalyzable Resemblance between\r\nthe subject and some other things, consists in causing impressions of some\r\nsort on consciousness. Consequently, the co-inherence of two attributes\r\nis but the co-existence of the two states of consciousness implied in their\r\nmeaning: with the difference, however, that this co-existence is sometimes\r\npotential only, the attribute being considered as in existence, though the\r\nfact on which it is grounded may not be actually, but only potentially present.\r\nSnow, for instance, is, with great convenience, said to be white even\r\nin a state of total darkness, because, though we are not now conscious of\r\nthe color, we shall be conscious of it as soon as morning breaks. Co-inherence\r\nof attributes is therefore still a case, though a complex one, of\r\nco-existence of states of consciousness; a totally different thing, however,\r\nfrom Order in Place. Being a part of simultaneity, it belongs not to Place\r\nbut to Time.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWe may therefore (and we shall sometimes find it a convenience) instead\r\nof Co-existence and Sequence, say, for greater particularity, Order in Place\r\nand Order in Time: Order in Place being a specific mode of co-existence,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page086\"\u003e[pg 086]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg086\" id=\"Pg086\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nnot necessary to be more particularly analyzed here; while the mere fact of\r\nco-existence, whether between actual sensations, or between the potentialities\r\nof causing them, known by the name of attributes, may be classed, together\r\nwith Sequence, under the head of Order in Time.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 7. In the foregoing inquiry into the import of propositions, we have\r\nthought it necessary to analyze directly those alone, in which the terms of\r\nthe proposition (or the predicate at least) are concrete terms. But, in doing\r\nso, we have indirectly analyzed those in which the terms are abstract.\r\nThe distinction between an abstract term and its corresponding concrete,\r\ndoes not turn upon any difference in what they are appointed to signify;\r\nfor the real signification of a concrete general name is, as we have so often\r\nsaid, its connotation; and what the concrete term connotes, forms the entire\r\nmeaning of the abstract name. Since there is nothing in the import\r\nof an abstract name which is not in the import of the corresponding concrete,\r\nit is natural to suppose that neither can there be any thing in the import\r\nof a proposition of which the terms are abstract, but what there is in\r\nsome proposition which can be framed of concrete terms.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAnd this presumption a closer examination will confirm. An abstract\r\nname is the name of an attribute, or combination of attributes. The corresponding\r\nconcrete is a name given to things, because of, and in order to\r\nexpress, their possessing that attribute, or that combination of attributes.\r\nWhen, therefore, we predicate of any thing a concrete name, the attribute\r\nis what we in reality predicate of it. But it has now been shown that in\r\nall propositions of which the predicate is a concrete name, what is really\r\npredicated is one of five things: Existence, Co-existence, Causation, Sequence,\r\nor Resemblance. An attribute, therefore, is necessarily either an\r\nexistence, a co-existence, a causation, a sequence, or a resemblance. When\r\na proposition consists of a subject and predicate which are abstract terms,\r\nit consists of terms which must necessarily signify one or other of these\r\nthings. When we predicate of any thing an abstract name, we affirm\r\nof the thing that it is one or other of these five things; that it is a case of\r\nExistence, or of Co-existence, or of Causation, or of Sequence, or of Resemblance.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt is impossible to imagine any proposition expressed in abstract terms,\r\nwhich can not be transformed into a precisely equivalent proposition in\r\nwhich the terms are concrete; namely, either the concrete names which\r\nconnote the attributes themselves, or the names of the \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003efundamenta\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e of those\r\nattributes; the facts or phenomena on which they are grounded. To illustrate\r\nthe latter case, let us take this proposition, of which the subject\r\nonly is an abstract name, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Thoughtlessness is dangerous.”\u003c/span\u003e Thoughtlessness\r\nis an attribute, grounded on the facts which we call thoughtless actions;\r\nand the proposition is equivalent to this, Thoughtless actions are\r\ndangerous. In the next example the predicate as well as the subject are\r\nabstract names: \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Whiteness is a color;”\u003c/span\u003e or \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“The color of snow is a whiteness.”\u003c/span\u003e\r\nThese attributes being grounded on sensations, the equivalent propositions\r\nin the concrete would be, The sensation of white is one of the sensations\r\ncalled those of color—The sensation of sight, caused by looking at\r\nsnow, is one of the sensations called sensations of white. In these propositions,\r\nas we have before seen, the matter-of-fact asserted is a Resemblance.\r\nIn the following examples, the concrete terms are those which directly correspond\r\nto the abstract names; connoting the attribute which these denote.\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Prudence is a virtue:”\u003c/span\u003e this may be rendered, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“All prudent persons,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page087\"\u003e[pg 087]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg087\" id=\"Pg087\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ein so far as\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e prudent, are virtuous:”\u003c/span\u003e \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Courage is deserving of\r\nhonor;”\u003c/span\u003e thus, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“All courageous persons are deserving of honor \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ein so\r\nfar\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e as they are courageous:”\u003c/span\u003e which is equivalent to this—\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“All\r\ncourageous persons deserve an addition to the honor, or a diminution of the disgrace,\r\nwhich would attach to them on other grounds.”\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIn order to throw still further light upon the import of propositions of\r\nwhich the terms are abstract, we will subject one of the examples given\r\nabove to a minuter analysis. The proposition we shall select is the following:\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Prudence is a virtue.”\u003c/span\u003e Let us substitute for the word virtue an\r\nequivalent but more definite expression, such as \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“a mental quality beneficial\r\nto society,”\u003c/span\u003e or \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“a mental quality pleasing to God,”\u003c/span\u003e or whatever else we\r\nadopt as the definition of virtue. What the proposition asserts is a sequence,\r\naccompanied with causation; namely, that benefit to society, or\r\nthat the approval of God, is consequent on, and caused by, prudence. Here\r\nis a sequence; but between what? We understand the consequent of the\r\nsequence, but we have yet to analyze the antecedent. Prudence is an attribute;\r\nand, in connection with it, two things besides itself are to be considered;\r\nprudent persons, who are the \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003esubjects\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e of the attribute, and prudential\r\nconduct, which may be called the \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003efoundation\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e of it. Now is either\r\nof these the antecedent? and, first, is it meant, that the approval of God,\r\nor benefit to society, is attendant upon all prudent \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003epersons\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e? No; except\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ein so far\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e as they are prudent; for prudent persons who are scoundrels can\r\nseldom, on the whole, be beneficial to society, nor can they be acceptable to\r\na good being. Is it upon prudential \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003econduct\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e, then, that divine approbation\r\nand benefit to mankind are supposed to be invariably consequent? Neither\r\nis this the assertion meant, when it is said that prudence is a virtue; except\r\nwith the same reservation as before, and for the same reason, namely,\r\nthat prudential conduct, although in \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eso far as\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e it is prudential it is\r\nbeneficial to society, may yet, by reason of some other of its qualities, be productive\r\nof an injury outweighing the benefit, and deserve a displeasure exceeding\r\nthe approbation which would be due to the prudence. Neither the\r\nsubstance, therefore (viz., the person), nor the phenomenon (the conduct),\r\nis an antecedent on which the other term of the sequence is universally\r\nconsequent. But the proposition, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Prudence is a virtue,”\u003c/span\u003e is a universal\r\nproposition. What is it, then, upon which the proposition affirms the effects\r\nin question to be universally consequent? Upon that in the person,\r\nand in the conduct, which causes them to be called prudent, and which is\r\nequally in them when the action, though prudent, is wicked; namely, a correct\r\nforesight of consequences, a just estimation of their importance to the\r\nobject in view, and repression of any unreflecting impulse at variance with\r\nthe deliberate purpose. These, which are states of the person’s mind, are\r\nthe real antecedent in the sequence, the real cause in the causation, asserted\r\nby the proposition. But these are also the real ground, or foundation, of\r\nthe attribute Prudence; since wherever these states of mind exist we may\r\npredicate prudence, even before we know whether any conduct has followed.\r\nAnd in this manner every assertion respecting an attribute, may\r\nbe transformed into an assertion exactly equivalent respecting the fact or\r\nphenomenon which is the ground of the attribute. And no case can be\r\nassigned, where that which is predicated of the fact or phenomenon, does\r\nnot belong to one or other of the five species formerly enumerated: it is\r\neither simple Existence, or it is some Sequence, Co-existence, Causation, or\r\nResemblance.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAnd as these five are the only things which can be affirmed, so are they\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page088\"\u003e[pg 088]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg088\" id=\"Pg088\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nthe only things which can be denied. \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“No horses are web-footed”\u003c/span\u003e denies\r\nthat the attributes of a horse ever co-exist with web-feet. It is scarcely\r\nnecessary to apply the same analysis to Particular affirmations and negations.\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Some birds are web-footed,”\u003c/span\u003e affirms that, with the attributes connoted\r\nby \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ebird\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, the phenomenon web-feet is sometimes co-existent: \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Some\r\nbirds are not web-footed,”\u003c/span\u003e asserts that there are other instances in which\r\nthis co-existence does not have place. Any further explanation of a thing\r\nwhich, if the previous exposition has been assented to, is so obvious, may\r\nhere be spared.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-div\" style=\"margin-bottom: 4.00em; margin-top: 4.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"toc19\" id=\"toc19\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"pdf20\" id=\"pdf20\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: center; margin-bottom: 2.40em; margin-top: 2.40em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 120%\"\u003eChapter VI.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: left; margin-bottom: 2.88em; margin-top: 2.88em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 144%\"\u003eOf Propositions Merely Verbal.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 1. As a preparation for the inquiry which is the proper object of\r\nLogic, namely, in what manner propositions are to be proved, we have\r\nfound it necessary to inquire what they contain which requires, or is susceptible\r\nof, proof; or (which is the same thing) what they assert. In the\r\ncourse of this preliminary investigation into the import of Propositions,\r\nwe examined the opinion of the Conceptualists, that a proposition is the\r\nexpression of a relation between two ideas; and the doctrine of the extreme\r\nNominalists, that it is the expression of an agreement or disagreement\r\nbetween the meanings of two names. We decided that, as general\r\ntheories, both of these are erroneous; and that, though propositions may\r\nbe made both respecting names and respecting ideas, neither the one nor\r\nthe other are the subject-matter of Propositions considered generally. We\r\nthen examined the different kinds of Propositions, and found that, with the\r\nexception of those which are merely verbal, they assert five different kinds\r\nof matters of fact, namely, Existence, Order in Place, Order in Time, Causation,\r\nand Resemblance; that in every proposition one of these five is either\r\naffirmed, or denied, of some fact or phenomenon, or of some object the unknown\r\nsource of a fact or phenomenon.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIn distinguishing, however, the different kinds of matters of fact asserted\r\nin propositions, we reserved one class of propositions, which do not relate\r\nto any matter of fact, in the proper sense of the term at all, but to the\r\nmeaning of names. Since names and their signification are entirely arbitrary,\r\nsuch propositions are not, strictly speaking, susceptible of truth or\r\nfalsity, but only of conformity or disconformity to usage or convention;\r\nand all the proof they are capable of, is proof of usage; proof that the\r\nwords have been employed by others in the acceptation in which the speaker\r\nor writer desires to use them. These propositions occupy, however, a\r\nconspicuous place in philosophy; and their nature and characteristics are\r\nof as much importance in logic, as those of any of the other classes of propositions\r\npreviously adverted to.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIf all propositions respecting the signification of words were as simple\r\nand unimportant as those which served us for examples when examining\r\nHobbes’s theory of predication, viz., those of which the subject and predicate\r\nare proper names, and which assert only that those names have, or\r\nthat they have not, been conventionally assigned to the same individual,\r\nthere would be little to attract to such propositions the attention of philosophers.\r\nBut the class of merely verbal propositions embraces not only\r\nmuch more than these, but much more than any propositions which at first\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page089\"\u003e[pg 089]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg089\" id=\"Pg089\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nsight present themselves as verbal; comprehending a kind of assertions\r\nwhich have been regarded not only as relating to things, but as having\r\nactually a more intimate relation with them than any other propositions\r\nwhatever. The student in philosophy will perceive that I allude to the\r\ndistinction on which so much stress was laid by the schoolmen, and which\r\nhas been retained either under the same or under other names by most\r\nmetaphysicians to the present day, viz., between what were called\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eessential\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, and what were called\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eaccidental\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, propositions, and between essential and\r\naccidental properties or attributes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 2. Almost all metaphysicians prior to Locke, as well as many since his\r\ntime, have made a great mystery of Essential Predication, and of predicates\r\nwhich are said to be of the \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eessence\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e of the subject. The essence\r\nof a thing, they said, was that without which the thing could neither be, nor\r\nbe conceived to be. Thus, rationality was of the essence of man, because\r\nwithout rationality, man could not be conceived to exist. The different\r\nattributes which made up the essence of the thing were called its essential\r\nproperties; and a proposition in which any of these were predicated of it\r\nwas called an Essential Proposition, and was considered to go deeper into\r\nthe nature of the thing, and to convey more important information respecting\r\nit, than any other proposition could do. All properties, not of the essence\r\nof the thing, were called its accidents; were supposed to have nothing\r\nat all, or nothing comparatively, to do with its inmost nature; and the\r\npropositions in which any of these were predicated of it were called Accidental\r\nPropositions. A connection may be traced between this distinction,\r\nwhich originated with the schoolmen, and the well-known dogmas of\r\n\u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003esubstantiæ secundæ\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e or general\r\nsubstances, and \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003esubstantial forms\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, doctrines\r\nwhich under varieties of language pervaded alike the Aristotelian and the\r\nPlatonic schools, and of which more of the spirit has come down to modern\r\ntimes than might be conjectured from the disuse of the phraseology.\r\nThe false views of the nature of classification and generalization which prevailed\r\namong the schoolmen, and of which these dogmas were the technical\r\nexpression, afford the only explanation which can be given of their having\r\nmisunderstood the real nature of those Essences which held so conspicuous\r\na place in their philosophy. They said, truly, that \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eman\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e can not be conceived\r\nwithout rationality. But though \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eman\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e can not, a being may be conceived\r\nexactly like a man in all points except that one quality, and those\r\nothers which are the conditions or consequences of it. All, therefore, which\r\nis really true in the assertion that man can not be conceived without rationality,\r\nis only, that if he had not rationality, he would not be reputed a man.\r\nThere is no impossibility in conceiving the \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ething\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e, nor, for aught we know,\r\nin its existing: the impossibility is in the conventions of language, which\r\nwill not allow the thing, even if it exist, to be called by the name which is\r\nreserved for rational beings. Rationality, in short, is involved in the meaning\r\nof the word man: is one of the attributes connoted by the name. The\r\nessence of man, simply means the whole of the attributes connoted by the\r\nword; and any one of those attributes taken singly, is an essential property\r\nof man.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nBut these reflections, so easy to us, would have been difficult to persons\r\nwho thought, as most of the later Aristotelians did, that objects were made\r\nwhat they were called, that gold (for instance) was made gold, not by the\r\npossession of certain properties to which mankind have chosen to attach\r\nthat name, but by participation in the nature of a general substance, called\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page090\"\u003e[pg 090]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg090\" id=\"Pg090\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\ngold in general, which substance, together with all the properties that belonged\r\nto it, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003einhered\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e in every individual piece of\r\ngold.\u003ca id=\"noteref_39\" name=\"noteref_39\" href=\"#note_39\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e39\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e As they did not\r\nconsider these universal substances to be attached to all general names, but\r\nonly to some, they thought that an object borrowed only a part of its properties\r\nfrom a universal substance, and that the rest belonged to it individually:\r\nthe former they called its essence, and the latter its accidents. The\r\nscholastic doctrine of essences long survived the theory on which it rested,\r\nthat of the existence of real entities corresponding to general terms; and it\r\nwas reserved for Locke, at the end of the seventeenth century, to convince\r\nphilosophers that the supposed essences of classes were merely the signification\r\nof their names; nor, among the signal services which his writings\r\nrendered to philosophy, was there one more needful or more valuable.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nNow, as the most familiar of the general names by which an object is\r\ndesignated usually connotes not one only, but several attributes of the object,\r\neach of which attributes separately forms also the bond of union of\r\nsome class, and the meaning of some general name; we may predicate of a\r\nname which connotes a variety of attributes, another name which connotes\r\nonly one of these attributes, or some smaller number of them than all. In\r\nsuch cases, the universal affirmative proposition will be true; since whatever\r\npossesses the whole of any set of attributes, must possess any part of\r\nthat same set. A proposition of this sort, however, conveys no information\r\nto any one who previously understood the whole meaning of the terms.\r\nThe propositions, Every man is a corporeal being, Every man is a living\r\ncreature, Every man is rational, convey no knowledge to any one who was\r\nalready aware of the entire meaning of the word \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eman\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, for the\r\nmeaning of the word includes all this: and that every \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eman\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nhas the attributes connoted\r\nby all these predicates, is already asserted when he is called a man. Now,\r\nof this nature are all the propositions which have been called essential.\r\nThey are, in fact, identical propositions.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt is true that a proposition which predicates any attribute, even though\r\nit be one implied in the name, is in most cases understood to involve a tacit\r\nassertion that there \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eexists\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e a thing corresponding to the name, and possessing\r\nthe attributes connoted by it; and this implied assertion may convey\r\ninformation, even to those who understood the meaning of the name. But\r\nall information of this sort, conveyed by all the essential propositions of\r\nwhich man can be made the subject, is included in the assertion, Men exist.\r\nAnd this assumption of real existence is, after all, the result of an imperfection\r\nof language. It arises from the ambiguity of the copula, which, in\r\naddition to its proper office of a mark to show that an assertion is made, is\r\nalso, as formerly remarked, a concrete word connoting existence. The actual\r\nexistence of the subject of the proposition is therefore only apparently,\r\nnot really, implied in the predication, if an essential one: we may say, A\r\nghost is a disembodied spirit, without believing in ghosts. But an accidental,\r\nor non-essential, affirmation, does imply the real existence of the\r\nsubject, because in the case of a non-existent subject there is nothing for\r\nthe proposition to assert. Such a proposition as, The ghost of a murdered\r\nperson haunts the couch of the murderer, can only have a meaning if understood\r\nas implying a belief in ghosts; for since the signification of the\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page091\"\u003e[pg 091]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg091\" id=\"Pg091\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nword ghost implies nothing of the kind, the speaker either means nothing,\r\nor means to assert a thing which he wishes to be believed to have really\r\ntaken place.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt will be hereafter seen that when any important consequences seem to\r\nfollow, as in mathematics, from an essential proposition, or, in other words,\r\nfrom a proposition involved in the meaning of a name, what they really\r\nflow from is the tacit assumption of the real existence of the objects so\r\nnamed. Apart from this assumption of real existence, the class of propositions\r\nin which the predicate is of the essence of the subject (that is, in\r\nwhich the predicate connotes the whole or part of what the subject connotes,\r\nbut nothing besides) answer no purpose but that of unfolding the\r\nwhole or some part of the meaning of the name, to those who did not previously\r\nknow it. Accordingly, the most useful, and in strictness the only\r\nuseful kind of essential propositions, are Definitions: which, to be complete,\r\nshould unfold the whole of what is involved in the meaning of the\r\nword defined; that is (when it is a connotative word), the whole of what it\r\nconnotes. In defining a name, however, it is not usual to specify its entire\r\nconnotation, but so much only as is sufficient to mark out the objects usually\r\ndenoted by it from all other known objects. And sometimes a merely\r\naccidental property, not involved in the meaning of the name, answers this\r\npurpose equally well. The various kinds of definition which these distinctions\r\ngive rise to, and the purposes to which they are respectively subservient,\r\nwill be minutely considered in the proper place.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 3. According to the above view of essential propositions, no proposition\r\ncan be reckoned such which relates to an individual by name, that is,\r\nin which the subject is a proper name. Individuals have no essences.\r\nWhen the schoolmen talked of the essence of an individual, they did not\r\nmean the properties implied in its name, for the names of individuals imply\r\nno properties. They regarded as of the essence of an individual, whatever\r\nwas of the essence of the species in which they were accustomed to place\r\nthat individual; \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, of the class to which it was most\r\nfamiliarly referred, and to which, therefore, they conceived that it by nature belonged.\r\nThus, because the proposition Man is a rational being, was an essential proposition,\r\nthey affirmed the same thing of the proposition, Julius Cæsar is a\r\nrational being. This followed very naturally if genera and species were to\r\nbe considered as entities, distinct from, but \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003einhering\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e in, the individuals\r\ncomposing them. If \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eman\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e was a substance inhering in each individual\r\nman, the \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eessence\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e of man (whatever that might mean) was naturally supposed\r\nto accompany it; to inhere in John Thompson, and to form the\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ecommon essence\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e of Thompson and Julius Cæsar. It might then be fairly\r\nsaid, that rationality, being of the essence of Man, was of the essence also\r\nof Thompson. But if Man altogether be only the individual men and a\r\nname bestowed upon them in consequence of certain common properties,\r\nwhat becomes of John Thompson’s essence?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nA fundamental error is seldom expelled from philosophy by a single victory.\r\nIt retreats slowly, defends every inch of ground, and often, after it\r\nhas been driven from the open country, retains a footing in some remote\r\nfastness. The essences of individuals were an unmeaning figment arising\r\nfrom a misapprehension of the essences of classes, yet even Locke, when he\r\nextirpated the parent error, could not shake himself free from that which\r\nwas its fruit. He distinguished two sorts of essences, Real and Nominal.\r\nHis nominal essences were the essences of classes, explained nearly as we\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page092\"\u003e[pg 092]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg092\" id=\"Pg092\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nhave now explained them. Nor is any thing wanting to render the third\r\nbook of Locke’s Essay a nearly unexceptional treatise on the connotation\r\nof names, except to free its language from the assumption of what are\r\ncalled Abstract Ideas, which unfortunately is involved in the phraseology,\r\nthough not necessarily connected with the thoughts contained in that immortal\r\nThird Book.\u003ca id=\"noteref_40\" name=\"noteref_40\" href=\"#note_40\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e40\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nBut besides nominal essences, he admitted real essences,\r\nor essences of individual objects, which he supposed to be the causes\r\nof the sensible properties of those objects. We know not (said he) what\r\nthese are (and this acknowledgment rendered the fiction comparatively innocuous);\r\nbut if we did, we could, from them alone, demonstrate the sensible\r\nproperties of the object, as the properties of the triangle are demonstrated\r\nfrom the definition of the triangle. I shall have occasion to revert\r\nto this theory in treating of Demonstration, and of the conditions under\r\nwhich one property of a thing admits of being demonstrated from another\r\nproperty. It is enough here to remark that, according to this definition,\r\nthe real essence of an object has, in the progress of physics, come to be\r\nconceived as nearly equivalent, in the case of bodies, to their corpuscular\r\nstructure: what it is now supposed to mean in the case of any other entities,\r\nI would not take upon myself to define.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 4. An essential proposition, then, is one which is purely verbal; which\r\nasserts of a thing under a particular name, only what is asserted of it in\r\nthe fact of calling it by that name; and which, therefore, either gives no\r\ninformation, or gives it respecting the name, not the thing. Non-essential,\r\nor accidental propositions, on the contrary, may be called Real Propositions,\r\nin opposition to Verbal. They predicate of a thing some fact not\r\ninvolved in the signification of the name by which the proposition speaks\r\nof it; some attribute not connoted by that name. Such are all propositions\r\nconcerning things individually designated, and all general or particular\r\npropositions in which the predicate connotes any attribute not connoted\r\nby the subject. All these, if true, add to our knowledge: they convey\r\ninformation, not already involved in the names employed. When I\r\nam told that all, or even that some objects, which have certain qualities, or\r\nwhich stand in certain relations, have also certain other qualities, or stand\r\nin certain other relations, I learn from this proposition a new fact; a fact\r\nnot included in my knowledge of the meaning of the words, nor even of\r\nthe existence of Things answering to the signification of those words. It\r\nis this class of propositions only which are in themselves instructive, or\r\nfrom which any instructive propositions can be inferred.\u003ca id=\"noteref_41\" name=\"noteref_41\" href=\"#note_41\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e41\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nNothing has probably contributed more to the opinion so long prevalent\r\nof the futility of the school logic, than the circumstance that almost all the\r\nexamples used in the common school books to illustrate the doctrine of\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page093\"\u003e[pg 093]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg093\" id=\"Pg093\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\npredication and that of the syllogism, consist of essential propositions.\r\nThey were usually taken either from the branches or from the main trunk\r\nof the Predicamental Tree, which included nothing but what was of the \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eessence\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e\r\nof the species: \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eOmne corpus est substantia\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\n\u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eOmne animal est corpus\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\n\u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eOmnis homo est corpus\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\n\u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eOmnis homo est animal\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\n\u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eOmnis homo est rationalis\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\nand so forth. It is far from wonderful that the syllogistic art should have\r\nbeen thought to be of no use in assisting correct reasoning, when almost\r\nthe only propositions which, in the hands of its professed teachers, it was\r\nemployed to prove, were such as every one assented to without proof the\r\nmoment he comprehended the meaning of the words; and stood exactly\r\non a level, in point of evidence, with the premises from which they were\r\ndrawn. I have, therefore, throughout this work, avoided the employment\r\nof essential propositions as examples, except where the nature of the principle\r\nto be illustrated specifically required them.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 5. With respect to propositions which do convey information—which\r\nassert something of a Thing, under a name that does not already presuppose\r\nwhat is about to be asserted; there are two different aspects in which\r\nthese, or rather such of them as are general propositions, may be considered:\r\nwe may either look at them as portions of speculative truth, or as\r\nmemoranda for practical use. According as we consider propositions in\r\none or the other of these lights, their import may be conveniently expressed\r\nin one or in the other of two formulas.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAccording to the formula which we have hitherto employed, and which\r\nis best adapted to express the import of the proposition as a portion of\r\nour theoretical knowledge, All men are mortal, means that the attributes\r\nof man are always accompanied by the attribute mortality: No men are\r\ngods, means that the attributes of man are never accompanied by the attributes,\r\nor at least never by all the attributes, signified by the word god.\r\nBut when the proposition is considered as a memorandum for practical use,\r\nwe shall find a different mode of expressing the same meaning better adapted\r\nto indicate the office which the proposition performs. The practical use\r\nof a proposition is, to apprise or remind us what we have to expect, in any\r\nindividual case which comes within the assertion contained in the proposition.\r\nIn reference to this purpose, the proposition, All men are mortal,\r\nmeans that the attributes of man are \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eevidence of\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e, are a \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003emark\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e\r\nof, mortality; an indication by which the presence of that attribute is made manifest.\r\nNo men are gods, means that the attributes of man are a mark or evidence\r\nthat some or all of the attributes understood to belong to a god are not\r\nthere; that where the former are, we need not expect to find the latter.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThese two forms of expression are at bottom equivalent; but the one\r\npoints the attention more directly to what a proposition means, the latter\r\nto the manner in which it is to be used.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nNow it is to be observed that Reasoning (the subject to which we are\r\nnext to proceed) is a process into which propositions enter not as ultimate\r\nresults, but as means to the establishment of other propositions. We may\r\nexpect, therefore, that the mode of exhibiting the import of a general proposition\r\nwhich shows it in its application to practical use, will best express\r\nthe function which propositions perform in Reasoning. And accordingly,\r\nin the theory of Reasoning, the mode of viewing the subject which considers\r\na Proposition as asserting that one fact or phenomenon is a \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003emark\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e or\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eevidence\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e of another fact or phenomenon, will be found almost indispensable.\r\nFor the purposes of that Theory, the best mode of defining the import of\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page094\"\u003e[pg 094]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg094\" id=\"Pg094\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\na proposition is not the mode which shows most clearly what it is in itself,\r\nbut that which most distinctly suggests the manner in which it may be\r\nmade available for advancing from it to other propositions.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-div\" style=\"margin-bottom: 4.00em; margin-top: 4.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"toc21\" id=\"toc21\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"pdf22\" id=\"pdf22\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"Book_I_Chapter_VII\" id=\"Book_I_Chapter_VII\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: center; margin-bottom: 2.40em; margin-top: 2.40em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 120%\"\u003eChapter VII.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: left; margin-bottom: 2.88em; margin-top: 2.88em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 144%\"\u003eOf The Nature Of Classification, And The Five Predicables.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 1. In examining into the nature of general propositions, we have adverted\r\nmuch less than is usual with logicians to the ideas of a Class, and\r\nClassification; ideas which, since the Realist doctrine of General Substances\r\nwent out of vogue, have formed the basis of almost every attempt at a\r\nphilosophical theory of general terms and general propositions. We have\r\nconsidered general names as having a meaning, quite independently of their\r\nbeing the names of classes. That circumstance is in truth accidental, it\r\nbeing wholly immaterial to the signification of the name whether there are\r\nmany objects, or only one, to which it happens to be applicable, or whether\r\nthere be any at all. God is as much a general term to the Christian or\r\nJew as to the Polytheist; and dragon, hippogriff, chimera, mermaid, ghost,\r\nare as much so as if real objects existed, corresponding to those names.\r\nEvery name the signification of which is constituted by attributes, is potentially\r\na name of an indefinite number of objects; but it needs not be\r\nactually the name of any; and if of any, it may be the name of only one.\r\nAs soon as we employ a name to connote attributes, the things, be they\r\nmore or fewer, which happen to possess those attributes, are constituted\r\n\u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eipso facto\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e a class. But in\r\npredicating the name we predicate only the attributes;\r\nand the fact of belonging to a class does not, in many cases, come\r\ninto view at all.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAlthough, however, Predication does not presuppose Classification, and\r\nthough the theory of Names and of Propositions is not cleared up, but only\r\nencumbered, by intruding the idea of classification into it, there is nevertheless\r\na close connection between Classification and the employment of\r\nGeneral Names. By every general name which we introduce, we create a\r\nclass, if there be any things, real or imaginary, to compose it; that is, any\r\nThings corresponding to the signification of the name. Classes, therefore,\r\nmostly owe their existence to general language. But general language,\r\nalso, though that is not the most common case, sometimes owes its existence\r\nto classes. A general, which is as much as to say a significant, name,\r\nis indeed mostly introduced because we have a signification to express by\r\nit; because we need a word by means of which to predicate the attributes\r\nwhich it connotes. But it is also true that a name is sometimes introduced\r\nbecause we have found it convenient to create a class; because we have\r\nthought it useful for the regulation of our mental operations, that a certain\r\ngroup of objects should be thought of together. A naturalist, for purposes\r\nconnected with his particular science, sees reason to distribute the animal\r\nor vegetable creation into certain groups rather than into any others, and\r\nhe requires a name to bind, as it were, each of his groups together. It\r\nmust not, however, be supposed that such names, when introduced, differ\r\nin any respect, as to their mode of signification, from other connotative\r\nnames. The classes which they denote are, as much as any other classes,\r\nconstituted by certain common attributes, and their names are significant\r\nof those attributes, and of nothing else. The names of Cuvier’s classes and\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page095\"\u003e[pg 095]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg095\" id=\"Pg095\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\norders, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ePlantigrades\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eDigitigrades\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, etc.,\r\nare as much the expression of attributes\r\nas if those names had preceded, instead of grown out of, his classification\r\nof animals. The only peculiarity of the case is, that the convenience\r\nof classification was here the primary motive for introducing the\r\nnames; while in other cases the name is introduced as a means of predication,\r\nand the formation of a class denoted by it is only an indirect consequence.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe principles which ought to regulate Classification, as a logical process\r\nsubservient to the investigation of truth, can not be discussed to any purpose\r\nuntil a much later stage of our inquiry. But, of Classification as resulting\r\nfrom, and implied in, the fact of employing general language, we\r\ncan not forbear to treat here, without leaving the theory of general names,\r\nand of their employment in predication, mutilated and formless.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 2. This portion of the theory of general language is the subject of\r\nwhat is termed the doctrine of the Predicables; a set of distinctions handed\r\ndown from Aristotle, and his follower Porphyry, many of which have\r\ntaken a firm root in scientific, and some of them even in popular, phraseology.\r\nThe predicables are a fivefold division of General Names, not grounded\r\nas usual on a difference in their meaning, that is, in the attribute which\r\nthey connote, but on a difference in the kind of class which they denote.\r\nWe may predicate of a thing five different varieties of class-name:\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nA \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003egenus\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e of the thing: (γὲνος).\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nA \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003especies\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e: (εἶσος).\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nA \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003edifferentia\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e: (διαφορὰ).\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nA \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eproprium\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e: (ἰδιών).\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nAn \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eaccidens\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e: (συμβεβηκός).\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt is to be remarked of these distinctions, that they express, not what the\r\npredicate is in its own meaning, but what relation it bears to the subject\r\nof which it happens on the particular occasion to be predicated. There\r\nare not some names which are exclusively genera, and others which are exclusively\r\nspecies, or differentiæ; but the same name is referred to one or\r\nanother predicable, according to the subject of which it is predicated on\r\nthe particular occasion. \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eAnimal\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, for\r\ninstance, is a genus with respect to man, or John; a species with\r\nrespect to Substance, or Being. \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eRectangular\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nis one of the Differentiæ of a geometrical square; it is merely one of\r\nthe Accidentia of the table at which I am writing. The words genus, species,\r\netc., are therefore relative terms; they are names applied to certain\r\npredicates, to express the relation between them and some given subject: a\r\nrelation grounded, as we shall see, not on what the predicate connotes, but\r\non the class which it denotes, and on the place which, in some given classification,\r\nthat class occupies relatively to the particular subject.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 3. Of these five names, two, Genus and Species, are not only used by\r\nnaturalists in a technical acceptation not precisely agreeing with their philosophical\r\nmeaning, but have also acquired a popular acceptation, much\r\nmore general than either. In this popular sense any two classes, one of\r\nwhich includes the whole of the other and more, may be called a Genus\r\nand a Species. Such, for instance, are Animal and Man; Man and Mathematician.\r\nAnimal is a Genus; Man and Brute are its two species; or we\r\nmay divide it into a greater number of species, as man, horse, dog, etc.\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eBiped\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, or \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003etwo-footed animal\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\nmay also be considered a genus, of which\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page096\"\u003e[pg 096]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg096\" id=\"Pg096\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nman and bird are two species. \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eTaste\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e is a genus, of\r\nwhich sweet taste, sour taste, salt taste, etc., are species.\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eVirtue\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e is a genus; justice, prudence,\r\ncourage, fortitude, generosity, etc., are its species.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe same class which is a genus with reference to the sub-classes or\r\nspecies included in it, may be itself a species with reference to a more\r\ncomprehensive, or, as it is often called, a superior genus. Man is a species\r\nwith reference to animal, but a genus with reference to the species Mathematician.\r\nAnimal is a genus, divided into two species, man and brute; but\r\nanimal is also a species, which, with another species, vegetable, makes up\r\nthe genus, organized being. Biped is a genus with reference to man and\r\nbird, but a species with respect to the superior genus, animal. Taste is a\r\ngenus divided into species, but also a species of the genus sensation. Virtue,\r\na genus with reference to justice, temperance, etc., is one of the species\r\nof the genus, mental quality.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIn this popular sense the words Genus and Species have passed into\r\ncommon discourse. And it should be observed that in ordinary parlance,\r\nnot the name of the class, but the class itself, is said to be the genus or\r\nspecies; not, of course, the class in the sense of each individual of the\r\nclass, but the individuals collectively, considered as an aggregate whole;\r\nthe name by which the class is designated being then called not the genus\r\nor species, but the generic or specific name. And this is an admissible\r\nform of expression; nor is it of any importance which of the two modes\r\nof speaking we adopt, provided the rest of our language is consistent with\r\nit; but, if we call the class itself the genus, we must not talk of predicating\r\nthe genus. We predicate of man the \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ename\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e mortal; and by predicating\r\nthe name, we may be said, in an intelligible sense, to predicate what\r\nthe name expresses, the \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eattribute\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e mortality; but in no allowable sense of\r\nthe word predication do we predicate of man the \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eclass\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e mortal. We predicate\r\nof him the fact of belonging to the class.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nBy the Aristotelian logicians, the terms genus and species were used in\r\na more restricted sense. They did not admit every class which could be\r\ndivided into other classes to be a genus, or every class which could be included\r\nin a larger class to be a species. Animal was by them considered\r\na genus; man and brute co-ordinate species under that genus:\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ebiped\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, however, would not have been admitted to be a genus with\r\nreference to man, but a \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eproprium\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e or\r\n\u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eaccidens\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e only. It was requisite, according to\r\ntheir theory, that genus and species should be of the \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eessence\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e of the subject.\r\nAnimal was of the essence of man; biped was not. And in every classification\r\nthey considered some one class as the lowest or \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003einfima\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e species.\r\nMan, for instance, was a lowest species. Any further divisions into which\r\nthe class might be capable of being broken down, as man into white, black,\r\nand red man, or into priest and layman, they did not admit to be species.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt has been seen, however, in the preceding chapter, that the distinction\r\nbetween the essence of a class, and the attributes or properties which are\r\nnot of its essence—a distinction which has given occasion to so much abstruse\r\nspeculation, and to which so mysterious a character was formerly,\r\nand by many writers is still, attached—amounts to nothing more than the\r\ndifference between those attributes of the class which are, and those which\r\nare not, involved in the signification of the class-name. As applied to individuals,\r\nthe word Essence, we found, has no meaning, except in connection\r\nwith the exploded tenets of the Realists; and what the schoolmen\r\nchose to call the essence of an individual, was simply the essence of the\r\nclass to which that individual was most familiarly referred.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page097\"\u003e[pg 097]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg097\" id=\"Pg097\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIs there no difference, then, save this merely verbal one, between the\r\nclasses which the schoolmen admitted to be genera or species, and those to\r\nwhich they refused the title? Is it an error to regard some of the differences\r\nwhich exist among objects as differences \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ein kind\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e (\u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003egenere\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e or \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003especie\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e),\r\nand others only as differences in the accidents? Were the schoolmen right\r\nor wrong in giving to some of the classes into which things may be divided,\r\nthe name of \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ekinds\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e, and considering others as secondary divisions, grounded\r\non differences of a comparatively superficial nature? Examination will\r\nshow that the Aristotelians did mean something by this distinction, and\r\nsomething important; but which, being but indistinctly conceived, was inadequately\r\nexpressed by the phraseology of essences, and the various other\r\nmodes of speech to which they had recourse.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 4. It is a fundamental principle in logic, that the power of framing\r\nclasses is unlimited, as long as there is any (even the smallest) difference to\r\nfound a distinction upon. Take any attribute whatever, and if some things\r\nhave it, and others have not, we may ground on the attribute a division of\r\nall things into two classes; and we actually do so, the moment we create a\r\nname which connotes the attribute. The number of possible classes, therefore,\r\nis boundless; and there are as many actual classes (either of real or\r\nof imaginary things) as there are general names, positive and negative together.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nBut if we contemplate any one of the classes so formed, such as the class\r\nanimal or plant, or the class sulphur or phosphorus, or the class white or\r\nred, and consider in what particulars the individuals included in the class\r\ndiffer from those which do not come within it, we find a very remarkable\r\ndiversity in this respect between some classes and others. There are some\r\nclasses, the things contained in which differ from other things only in certain\r\nparticulars which may be numbered, while others differ in more than\r\ncan be numbered, more even than we need ever expect to know. Some\r\nclasses have little or nothing in common to characterize them by, except\r\nprecisely what is connoted by the name: white things, for example, are not\r\ndistinguished by any common properties except whiteness; or if they are,\r\nit is only by such as are in some way dependent on, or connected with,\r\nwhiteness. But a hundred generations have not exhausted the common\r\nproperties of animals or of plants, of sulphur or of phosphorus; nor do we\r\nsuppose them to be exhaustible, but proceed to new observations and experiments,\r\nin the full confidence of discovering new properties which were\r\nby no means implied in those we previously knew. While, if any one were\r\nto propose for investigation the common properties of all things which are\r\nof the same color, the same shape, or the same specific gravity, the absurdity\r\nwould be palpable. We have no ground to believe that any such common\r\nproperties exist, except such as may be shown to be involved in the\r\nsupposition itself, or to be derivable from it by some law of causation. It\r\nappears, therefore, that the properties, on which we ground our classes,\r\nsometimes exhaust all that the class has in common, or contain it all by\r\nsome mode of implication; but in other instances we make a selection of a\r\nfew properties from among not only a greater number, but a number inexhaustible\r\nby us, and to which as we know no bounds, they may, so far as\r\nwe are concerned, be regarded as infinite.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThere is no impropriety in saying that, of these two classifications, the\r\none answers to a much more radical distinction in the things themselves,\r\nthan the other does. And if any one even chooses to say that the one classification\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page098\"\u003e[pg 098]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg098\" id=\"Pg098\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nis made by nature, the other by us for our convenience, he will be\r\nright; provided he means no more than this: Where a certain apparent\r\ndifference between things (though perhaps in itself of little moment) answers\r\nto we know not what number of other differences, pervading not\r\nonly their known properties, but properties yet undiscovered, it is not optional\r\nbut imperative to recognize this difference as the foundation of a\r\nspecific distinction; while, on the contrary, differences that are merely finite\r\nand determinate, like those designated by the words white, black, or red,\r\nmay be disregarded if the purpose for which the classification is made does\r\nnot require attention to those particular properties. The differences, however,\r\nare made by nature, in both cases; while the recognition of those differences\r\nas grounds of classification and of naming, is, equally in both cases,\r\nthe act of man: only in the one case, the ends of language and of classification\r\nwould be subverted if no notice were taken of the difference, while in\r\nthe other case, the necessity of taking notice of it depends on the importance\r\nor unimportance of the particular qualities in which the difference\r\nhappens to consist.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nNow, these classes, distinguished by unknown multitudes of properties,\r\nand not solely by a few determinate ones—which are parted off from one\r\nanother by an unfathomable chasm, instead of a mere ordinary ditch with\r\na visible bottom—are the only classes which, by the Aristotelian logicians,\r\nwere considered as genera or species. Differences which extended only to\r\na certain property or properties, and there terminated, they considered as\r\ndifferences only in the \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eaccidents\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e of things; but where any class differed\r\nfrom other things by an infinite series of differences, known and unknown,\r\nthey considered the distinction as one of \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ekind\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e, and spoke of it as being an\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eessential\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e difference, which is also one of the current meanings of that vague\r\nexpression at the present day.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nConceiving the schoolmen to have been justified in drawing a broad line\r\nof separation between these two kinds of classes and of class-distinctions, I\r\nshall not only retain the division itself, but continue to express it in their\r\nlanguage. According to that language, the proximate (or lowest) Kind to\r\nwhich any individual is referrible, is called its species. Conformably to\r\nthis, Isaac Newton would be said to be of the species man. There are\r\nindeed numerous sub-classes included in the class man, to which Newton\r\nalso belongs; for example, Christian, and Englishman, and Mathematician.\r\nBut these, though distinct classes, are not, in our sense of the term, distinct\r\nKinds of men. A Christian, for example, differs from other human beings;\r\nbut he differs only in the attribute which the word expresses, namely,\r\nbelief in Christianity, and whatever else that implies, either as involved in\r\nthe fact itself, or connected with it through some law of cause and effect.\r\nWe should never think of inquiring what properties, unconnected with\r\nChristianity, either as cause or effect, are common to all Christians and peculiar\r\nto them; while in regard to all Men, physiologists are perpetually\r\ncarrying on such an inquiry; nor is the answer ever likely to be completed.\r\nMan, therefore, we may call a species; Christian, or Mathematician, we\r\ncan not.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nNote here, that it is by no means intended to imply that there may not\r\nbe different Kinds, or logical species, of man. The various races and temperaments,\r\nthe two sexes, and even the various ages, may be differences of\r\nkind, within our meaning of the term. I do not say that they are so. For\r\nin the progress of physiology it may almost be said to be made out, that\r\nthe differences which really exist between different races, sexes, etc., follow\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page099\"\u003e[pg 099]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg099\" id=\"Pg099\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nas consequences, under laws of nature, from a small number of primary\r\ndifferences which can be precisely determined, and which, as the phrase is,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eaccount for\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e all the rest. If this be so, these are not\r\ndistinctions in kind;\r\nno more than Christian, Jew, Mussulman, and Pagan, a difference which\r\nalso carries many consequences along with it. And in this way classes are\r\noften mistaken for real Kinds, which are afterward proved not to be so.\r\nBut if it turned out that the differences were not capable of being thus accounted\r\nfor, then Caucasian, Mongolian, Negro, etc., would be really different\r\nKinds of human beings, and entitled to be ranked as species by the\r\nlogician; though not by the naturalist. For (as already noticed) the word\r\nspecies is used in a different signification in logic and in natural history.\r\nBy the naturalist, organized beings are not usually said to be of different\r\nspecies, if it is supposed that they have descended from the same stock.\r\nThat, however, is a sense artificially given to the word, for the technical\r\npurposes of a particular science. To the logician, if a negro and a white\r\nman differ in the same manner (however less in degree) as a horse and a\r\ncamel do, that is, if their differences are inexhaustible, and not referrible to\r\nany common cause, they are different species, whether they are descended\r\nfrom common ancestors or not. But if their differences can all be traced\r\nto climate and habits, or to some one or a few special differences in structure,\r\nthey are not, in the logician’s view, specifically distinct.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWhen the \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003einfima species\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\nor proximate Kind, to which an individual\r\nbelongs, has been ascertained, the properties common to that Kind include\r\nnecessarily the whole of the common properties of every other real Kind\r\nto which the individual can be referrible. Let the individual, for example,\r\nbe Socrates, and the proximate Kind, man. Animal, or living creature, is\r\nalso a real kind, and includes Socrates; but, since it likewise includes man,\r\nor in other words, since all men are animals, the properties common to animals\r\nform a portion of the common properties of the sub-class, man. And\r\nif there be any class which includes Socrates without including man, that\r\nclass is not a real Kind. Let the class, for example,\r\nbe \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eflat-nosed\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e; that\r\nbeing a class which includes Socrates, without including all men. To determine\r\nwhether it is a real Kind, we must ask ourselves this question:\r\nHave all flat-nosed animals, in addition to whatever is implied in their flat\r\nnoses, any common properties, other than those which are common to all\r\nanimals whatever? If they had; if a flat nose were a mark or index to an\r\nindefinite number of other peculiarities, not deducible from the former by\r\nan ascertainable law, then out of the class man we might cut another class,\r\nflat-nosed man, which, according to our definition, would be a Kind. But\r\nif we could do this, man would not be, as it was assumed to be, the proximate\r\nKind. Therefore, the properties of the proximate Kind do comprehend\r\nthose (whether known or unknown) of all other Kinds to which the\r\nindividual belongs; which was the point we undertook to prove. And\r\nhence, every other Kind which is predicable of the individual, will be to\r\nthe proximate Kind in the relation of a genus, according to even the popular\r\nacceptation of the terms genus and species; that is, it will be a larger\r\nclass, including it and more.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWe are now able to fix the logical meaning of these terms. Every class\r\nwhich is a real Kind, that is, which is distinguished from all other classes\r\nby an indeterminate multitude of properties not derivable from one another,\r\nis either a genus or a species. A Kind which is not divisible into\r\nother Kinds, can not be a genus, because it has no species under it; but it\r\nis itself a species, both with reference to the individuals below and to the\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page100\"\u003e[pg 100]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg100\" id=\"Pg100\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\ngenera above (Species Prædicabilis and Species Subjicibilis). But every\r\nKind which admits of division into real Kinds (as animal into mammal,\r\nbird, fish, etc., or bird into various species of birds) is a genus to all below\r\nit, a species to all genera in which it is itself included. And here we may\r\nclose this part of the discussion, and pass to the three remaining predicables,\r\nDifferentia, Proprium, and Accidens.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 5. To begin with Differentia. This word is correlative with the words\r\ngenus and species, and as all admit, it signifies the attribute which distinguishes\r\na given species from every other species of the same genus. This\r\nis so far clear: but we may still ask, which of the distinguishing attributes\r\nit signifies. For we have seen that every Kind (and a species must be a\r\nKind) is distinguished from other Kinds, not by any one attribute, but by\r\nan indefinite number. Man, for instance, is a species of the genus animal:\r\nRational (or rationality, for it is of no consequence here whether we use\r\nthe concrete or the abstract form) is generally assigned by logicians as the\r\nDifferentia; and doubtless this attribute serves the purpose of distinction:\r\nbut it has also been remarked of man, that he is a cooking animal; the\r\nonly animal that dresses its food. This, therefore, is another of the attributes\r\nby which the species man is distinguished from other species of\r\nthe same genus: would this attribute serve equally well for a differentia?\r\nThe Aristotelians say No; having laid it down that the differentia must,\r\nlike the genus and species, be of the \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eessence\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e of the subject.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAnd here we lose even that vestige of a meaning grounded in the nature\r\nof the things themselves, which may be supposed to be attached to the\r\nword essence when it is said that genus and species must be of the essence\r\nof the thing. There can be no doubt that when the schoolmen talked of\r\nthe essences of things as opposed to their accidents, they had confusedly\r\nin view the distinction between differences of kind, and the differences\r\nwhich are not of kind; they meant to intimate that genera and species\r\nmust be Kinds. Their notion of the essence of a thing was a vague notion\r\nof a something which makes it what it is, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\nwhich makes it the Kind of\r\nthing that it is—which causes it to have all that variety of properties which\r\ndistinguish its Kind. But when the matter came to be looked at more\r\nclosely, nobody could discover what caused the thing to have all those properties,\r\nnor even that there was any thing which caused it to have them.\r\nLogicians, however, not liking to admit this, and being unable to detect\r\nwhat made the thing to be what it was, satisfied themselves with what\r\nmade it to be what it was called. Of the innumerable properties, known\r\nand unknown, that are common to the class man, a portion only, and of\r\ncourse a very small portion, are connoted by its name; these few, however,\r\nwill naturally have been thus distinguished from the rest either for their\r\ngreater obviousness, or for greater supposed importance. These properties,\r\nthen, which were connoted by the name, logicians seized upon, and\r\ncalled them the essence of the species; and not stopping there, they affirmed\r\nthem, in the case of the \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003einfima species\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\nto be the essence of the individual\r\ntoo; for it was their maxim, that the species contained the \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“whole\r\nessence”\u003c/span\u003e of the thing. Metaphysics, that fertile field of delusion propagated\r\nby language, does not afford a more signal instance of such delusion.\r\nOn this account it was that rationality, being connoted by the name man,\r\nwas allowed to be a differentia of the class; but the peculiarity of cooking\r\ntheir food, not being connoted, was relegated to the class of accidental\r\nproperties.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page101\"\u003e[pg 101]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg101\" id=\"Pg101\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe distinction, therefore, between Differentia, Proprium, and Accidens,\r\nis not grounded in the nature of things, but in the connotation of names;\r\nand we must seek it there, if we wish to find what it is.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nFrom the fact that the genus includes the species, in other words\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ede\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003enotes\r\nmore than the species, or is predicable of a greater number of individuals,\r\nit follows that the species must connote more than the genus. It must\r\nconnote all the attributes which the genus connotes, or there would be\r\nnothing to prevent it from denoting individuals not included in the genus.\r\nAnd it must connote something besides, otherwise it would include the\r\nwhole genus. Animal denotes all the individuals denoted by man, and\r\nmany more. Man, therefore, must connote all that animal connotes, otherwise\r\nthere might be men who are not animals; and it must connote something\r\nmore than animal connotes, otherwise all animals would be men.\r\nThis surplus of connotation—this which the species connotes over and\r\nabove the connotation of the genus—is the Differentia, or specific difference;\r\nor, to state the same proposition in other words, the Differentia is\r\nthat which must be added to the connotation of the genus, to complete the\r\nconnotation of the species.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe word man, for instance, exclusively of what it connotes in common\r\nwith animal, also connotes rationality, and at least some approximation to\r\nthat external form which we all know, but which as we have no name for\r\nit considered in itself, we are content to call the human. The Differentia,\r\nor specific difference, therefore, of man, as referred to the genus animal, is\r\nthat outward form and the possession of reason. The Aristotelians said,\r\nthe possession of reason, without the outward form. But if they adhered\r\nto this, they would have been obliged to call the Houyhnhnms men. The\r\nquestion never arose, and they were never called upon to decide how such\r\na case would have affected their notion of essentiality. However this may\r\nbe, they were satisfied with taking such a portion of the differentia as sufficed\r\nto distinguish the species from all other \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eexisting\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e things, though by so\r\ndoing they might not exhaust the connotation of the name.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 6. And here, to prevent the notion of differentia from being restricted\r\nwithin too narrow limits, it is necessary to remark, that a species, even as\r\nreferred to the same genus, will not always have the same differentia, but\r\na different one, according to the principle and purpose which preside over\r\nthe particular classification. For example, a naturalist surveys the various\r\nkinds of animals, and looks out for the classification of them most in accordance\r\nwith the order in which, for zoological purposes, he considers it\r\ndesirable that we should think of them. With this view he finds it advisable\r\nthat one of his fundamental divisions should be into warm-blooded and\r\ncold-blooded animals; or into animals which breathe with lungs and those\r\nwhich breathe with gills; or into carnivorous, and frugivorous or graminivorous;\r\nor into those which walk on the flat part and those which walk on\r\nthe extremity of the foot, a distinction on which two of Cuvier’s families are\r\nfounded. In doing this, the naturalist creates as many new classes; which\r\nare by no means those to which the individual animal is familiarly and spontaneously\r\nreferred; nor should we ever think of assigning to them so prominent\r\na position in our arrangement of the animal kingdom, unless for a preconceived\r\npurpose of scientific convenience. And to the liberty of doing\r\nthis there is no limit. In the examples we have given, most of the classes\r\nare real Kinds, since each of the peculiarities is an index to a multitude\r\nof properties belonging to the class which it characterizes: but even if the\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page102\"\u003e[pg 102]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg102\" id=\"Pg102\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\ncase were otherwise—if the other properties of those classes could all be\r\nderived, by any process known to us, from the one peculiarity on which the\r\nclass is founded—even then, if these derivative properties were of primary\r\nimportance for the purposes of the naturalist, he would be warranted in\r\nfounding his primary divisions on them.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIf, however, practical convenience is a sufficient warrant for making the\r\nmain demarcations in our arrangement of objects run in lines not coinciding\r\nwith any distinction of Kind, and so creating genera and species in\r\nthe popular sense which are not genera or species in the rigorous sense at\r\nall; \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eà fortiori\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e must\r\nwe be warranted, when our genera and species \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eare\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e real\r\ngenera and species, in marking the distinction between them by those of\r\ntheir properties which considerations of practical convenience most strongly\r\nrecommend. If we cut a species out of a given genus—the species man,\r\nfor instance, out of the genus animal—with an intention on our part that\r\nthe peculiarity by which we are to be guided in the application of the\r\nname man should be rationality, then rationality is the differentia of the\r\nspecies man. Suppose, however, that being naturalists, we, for the purposes\r\nof our particular study, cut out of the genus animal the same species\r\nman, but with an intention that the distinction between man and all other\r\nspecies of animal should be, not rationality, but the possession of \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“four\r\nincisors in each jaw, tusks solitary, and erect posture.”\u003c/span\u003e It is evident that\r\nthe word man, when used by us as naturalists, no longer connotes rationality,\r\nbut connotes the three other properties specified; for that which we\r\nhave expressly in view when we impose a name, assuredly forms part of\r\nthe meaning of that name. We may, therefore, lay it down as a maxim,\r\nthat wherever there is a Genus, and a Species marked out from that genus\r\nby an assignable differentia, the name of the species must be connotative,\r\nand must connote the differentia; but the connotation may be special—not\r\ninvolved in the signification of the term as ordinarily used, but given to it\r\nwhen employed as a term of art or science. The word Man in common\r\nuse, connotes rationality and a certain form, but does not connote the number\r\nor character of the teeth; in the Linnæan system it connotes the number\r\nof incisor and canine teeth, but does not connote rationality nor any\r\nparticular form. The word \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eman\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e has,\r\ntherefore, two different meanings; though not commonly considered\r\nas ambiguous, because it happens in both\r\ncases to \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ede\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003enote the same individual objects.\r\nBut a case is conceivable in\r\nwhich the ambiguity would become evident: we have only to imagine that\r\nsome new kind of animal were discovered, having Linnæus’s three characteristics\r\nof humanity, but not rational, or not of the human form. In\r\nordinary parlance, these animals would not be called men; but in natural\r\nhistory they must still be called so by those, if any there should be, who\r\nadhere to the Linnæan classification; and the question would arise, whether\r\nthe word should continue to be used in two senses, or the classification be\r\ngiven up, and the technical sense of the term be abandoned along with it.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWords not otherwise connotative may, in the mode just adverted to,\r\nacquire a special or technical connotation. Thus the word whiteness, as\r\nwe have so often remarked, connotes nothing; it merely denotes the attribute\r\ncorresponding to a certain sensation: but if we are making a classification\r\nof colors, and desire to justify, or even merely to point out, the\r\nparticular place assigned to whiteness in our arrangement, we may define\r\nit \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“the color produced by the mixture of all the simple rays;”\u003c/span\u003e and this\r\nfact, though by no means implied in the meaning of the word whiteness\r\nas ordinarily used, but only known by subsequent scientific investigation,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page103\"\u003e[pg 103]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg103\" id=\"Pg103\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nis part of its meaning in the particular essay or treatise, and becomes the\r\ndifferentia of the species.\u003ca id=\"noteref_42\" name=\"noteref_42\" href=\"#note_42\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e42\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe differentia, therefore, of a species may be defined to be, that part of\r\nthe connotation of the specific name, whether ordinary or special and technical,\r\nwhich distinguishes the species in question from all other species of\r\nthe genus to which on the particular occasion we are referring it.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 7. Having disposed of Genus, Species, and Differentia, we shall not find\r\nmuch difficulty in attaining a clear conception of the distinction between\r\nthe other two predicables, as well as between them and the first three.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIn the Aristotelian phraseology, Genus and Differentia are of the \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eessence\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e\r\nof the subject; by which, as we have seen, is really meant that the properties\r\nsignified by the genus and those signified by the differentia, form part\r\nof the connotation of the name denoting the species. Proprium and Accidens,\r\non the other hand, form no part of the essence, but are predicated\r\nof the species only \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eaccidentally\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e. Both are Accidents, in the wider sense in\r\nwhich the accidents of a thing are opposed to its essence; though, in the\r\ndoctrine of the Predicables, Accidens is used for one sort of accident only,\r\nProprium being another sort. Proprium, continue the schoolmen, is predicated\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eaccidentally\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e, indeed, but \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003enecessarily\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e; or, as they further\r\nexplain it, signifies an attribute which is not indeed part of the essence, but which\r\nflows from, or is a consequence of, the essence, and is, therefore, inseparably\r\nattached to the species; \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ee.g.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, the various properties of a\r\ntriangle, which, though no part of its definition, must necessarily be possessed by\r\nwhatever comes under that definition. Accidens, on the contrary, has no connection\r\nwhatever with the essence, but may come and go, and the species still remain\r\nwhat it was before. If a species could exist without its Propria, it\r\nmust be capable of existing without that on which its Propria are necessarily\r\nconsequent, and therefore without its essence, without that which constitutes\r\nit a species. But an Accidens, whether separable or inseparable\r\nfrom the species in actual experience, may be supposed separated, without\r\nthe necessity of supposing any other alteration; or at least, without supposing\r\nany of the essential properties of the species to be altered, since\r\nwith them an Accidens has no connection.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nA Proprium, therefore, of the species, may be defined, any attribute which\r\nbelongs to all the individuals included in the species, and which, though\r\nnot connoted by the specific name (either ordinarily if the classification we\r\nare considering be for ordinary purposes, or specially if it be for a special\r\npurpose), yet follows from some attribute which the name either ordinarily\r\nor specially connotes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nOne attribute may follow from another in two ways; and there are consequently\r\ntwo kinds of Proprium. It may follow as a conclusion follows\r\npremises, or it may follow as an effect follows a cause. Thus, the attribute\r\nof having the opposite sides equal, which is not one of those connoted by\r\nthe word Parallelogram, nevertheless follows from those connoted by it,\r\nnamely, from having the opposite sides straight lines and parallel, and the\r\nnumber of sides four. The attribute, therefore, of having the opposite\r\nsides equal, is a Proprium of the class parallelogram; and a Proprium of\r\nthe first kind, which follows from the connoted attributes by way of\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003edemonstration\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e.\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page104\"\u003e[pg 104]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg104\" id=\"Pg104\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nThe attribute of being capable of understanding language, is\r\na Proprium of the species man, since without being connoted by the word,\r\nit follows from an attribute which the word does connote, viz., from the\r\nattribute of rationality. But this is a Proprium of the second kind, which\r\nfollows by way of \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ecausation\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e. How it is that one property of a thing follows,\r\nor can be inferred, from another; under what conditions this is possible,\r\nand what is the exact meaning of the phrase; are among the questions\r\nwhich will occupy us in the two succeeding Books. At present it\r\nneeds only be said, that whether a Proprium follows by demonstration or\r\nby causation, it follows \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003enecessarily\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e; that is to say, its not following would\r\nbe inconsistent with some law which we regard as a part of the constitution\r\neither of our thinking faculty or of the universe.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 8. Under the remaining predicable, Accidens, are included all attributes\r\nof a thing which are neither involved in the signification of the name\r\n(whether ordinarily or as a term of art), nor have, so far as we know,\r\nany necessary connection with attributes which are so involved. They are\r\ncommonly divided into Separable and Inseparable Accidents. Inseparable\r\naccidents are those which—although we know of no connection between\r\nthem and the attributes constitutive of the species, and although, therefore,\r\nso far as we are aware, they might be absent without making the name inapplicable\r\nand the species a different species—are yet never in fact known\r\nto be absent. A concise mode of expressing the same meaning is, that inseparable\r\naccidents are properties which are universal to the species, but\r\nnot necessary to it. Thus, blackness is an attribute of a crow, and, as far\r\nas we know, a universal one. But if we were to discover a race of white\r\nbirds, in other respects resembling crows, we should not say, These are\r\nnot crows; we should say, These are white crows. Crow, therefore, does\r\nnot connote blackness; nor, from any of the attributes which it does connote,\r\nwhether as a word in popular use or as a term of art, could blackness\r\nbe inferred. Not only, therefore, can we conceive a white crow, but we\r\nknow of no reason why such an animal should not exist. Since, however,\r\nnone but black crows are known to exist, blackness, in the present\r\nstate of our knowledge, ranks as an accident, but an inseparable accident,\r\nof the species crow.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nSeparable Accidents are those which are found, in point of fact, to be\r\nsometimes absent from the species; which are not only not necessary, but\r\nnot even universal. They are such as do not belong to every individual\r\nof the species, but only to some individuals; or if to all, not at all times.\r\nThus the color of a European is one of the separable accidents of the species\r\nman, because it is not an attribute of all human creatures. Being\r\nborn, is also (speaking in the logical sense) a separable accident of the species\r\nman, because, though an attribute of all human beings, it is so only at\r\none particular time. \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eA fortiori\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthose attributes which are not constant\r\neven in the same individual, as, to be in one or in another place, to be hot\r\nor cold, sitting or walking, must be ranked as separable accidents.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page105\"\u003e[pg 105]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg105\" id=\"Pg105\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-div\" style=\"margin-bottom: 4.00em; margin-top: 4.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"toc23\" id=\"toc23\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"pdf24\" id=\"pdf24\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: center; margin-bottom: 2.40em; margin-top: 2.40em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 120%\"\u003eChapter VIII.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: left; margin-bottom: 2.88em; margin-top: 2.88em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 144%\"\u003eOf Definition.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 1. One necessary part of the theory of Names and of Propositions remains\r\nto be treated of in this place: the theory of Definitions. As being\r\nthe most important of the class of propositions which we have characterized\r\nas purely verbal, they have already received some notice in the chapter\r\npreceding the last. But their fuller treatment was at that time postponed,\r\nbecause definition is so closely connected with classification, that, until the\r\nnature of the latter process is in some measure understood, the former can\r\nnot be discussed to much purpose.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe simplest and most correct notion of a Definition is, a proposition\r\ndeclaratory of the meaning of a word; namely, either the meaning which\r\nit bears in common acceptation, or that which the speaker or writer, for\r\nthe particular purposes of his discourse, intends to annex to it.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe definition of a word being the proposition which enunciates its\r\nmeaning, words which have no meaning are unsusceptible of definition.\r\nProper names, therefore, can not be defined. A proper name being a mere\r\nmark put upon an individual, and of which it is the characteristic property\r\nto be destitute of meaning, its meaning can not of course be declared;\r\nthough we may indicate by language, as we might indicate still more conveniently\r\nby pointing with the finger, upon what individual that particular\r\nmark has been, or is intended to be, put. It is no definition of \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“John\r\nThomson”\u003c/span\u003e to say he is \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“the son of General Thomson;”\u003c/span\u003e for the name John\r\nThomson does not express this. Neither is it any definition of \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“John\r\nThomson”\u003c/span\u003e to say he is \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“the man now crossing the street.”\u003c/span\u003e These propositions\r\nmay serve to make known who is the particular man to whom the\r\nname belongs, but that may be done still more unambiguously by pointing\r\nto him, which, however, has not been esteemed one of the modes of definition.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIn the case of connotative names, the meaning, as has been so often observed,\r\nis the connotation; and the definition of a connotative name, is the\r\nproposition which declares its connotation. This might be done either directly\r\nor indirectly. The direct mode would be by a proposition in this\r\nform: \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Man”\u003c/span\u003e (or whatsoever the word may be) \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“is a name connoting such\r\nand such attributes,”\u003c/span\u003e or \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“is a name which, when predicated of any thing,\r\nsignifies the possession of such and such attributes by that thing.”\u003c/span\u003e Or\r\nthus: Man is every thing which possesses such and such attributes: Man\r\nis every thing which possesses corporeity, organization, life, rationality, and\r\ncertain peculiarities of external form.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThis form of definition is the most precise and least equivocal of any;\r\nbut it is not brief enough, and is besides too technical for common discourse.\r\nThe more usual mode of declaring the connotation of a name, is to predicate\r\nof it another name or names of known signification, which connote the\r\nsame aggregation of attributes. This may be done either by predicating\r\nof the name intended to be defined, another connotative name exactly synonymous,\r\nas, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Man is a human being,”\u003c/span\u003e which is not commonly accounted a\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page106\"\u003e[pg 106]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg106\" id=\"Pg106\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\ndefinition at all; or by predicating two or more connotative names, which\r\nmake up among them the whole connotation of the name to be defined. In\r\nthis last case, again, we may either compose our definition of as many connotative\r\nnames as there are attributes, each attribute being connoted by\r\none, as, Man is a corporeal, organized, animated, rational being, shaped so\r\nand so; or we employ names which connote several of the attributes at\r\nonce, as, Man is a rational \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eanimal\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e, shaped so and so.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe definition of a name, according to this view of it, is the sum total\r\nof all the \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eessential\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e propositions which can be framed with that name for\r\ntheir subject. All propositions the truth of which is implied in the name,\r\nall those which we are made aware of by merely hearing the name, are included\r\nin the definition, if complete, and may be evolved from it without\r\nthe aid of any other premises; whether the definition expresses them in\r\ntwo or three words, or in a larger number. It is, therefore, not without\r\nreason that Condillac and other writers have affirmed a definition to be an\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eanalysis\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e. To resolve any complex whole into the elements of which it is\r\ncompounded, is the meaning of analysis: and this we do when we replace\r\none word which connotes a set of attributes collectively, by two or more\r\nwhich connote the same attributes singly, or in smaller groups.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 2. From this, however, the question naturally arises, in what manner\r\nare we to define a name which connotes only a single attribute: for instance,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“white,”\u003c/span\u003e which connotes nothing but whiteness; \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“rational,”\u003c/span\u003e which\r\nconnotes nothing but the possession of reason. It might seem that the\r\nmeaning of such names could only be declared in two ways; by a synonymous\r\nterm, if any such can be found; or in the direct way already alluded\r\nto: \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“White is a name connoting the attribute whiteness.”\u003c/span\u003e Let us see,\r\nhowever, whether the analysis of the meaning of the name, that is, the\r\nbreaking down of that meaning into several parts, admits of being carried\r\nfarther. Without at present deciding this question as to the word\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ewhite\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, it is obvious that in the case of\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003erational\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e some further explanation may be\r\ngiven of its meaning than is contained in the proposition, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Rational is that\r\nwhich possesses the attribute of reason;”\u003c/span\u003e since the attribute reason itself\r\nadmits of being defined. And here we must turn our attention to the definitions\r\nof attributes, or rather of the names of attributes, that is, of abstract\r\nnames.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIn regard to such names of attributes as are connotative, and express\r\nattributes of those attributes, there is no difficulty: like other connotative\r\nnames, they are defined by declaring their connotation. Thus the word\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003efault\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e may be defined, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“a quality productive of evil or\r\ninconvenience.”\u003c/span\u003e\r\nSometimes, again, the attribute to be defined is not one attribute, but a\r\nunion of several: we have only, therefore, to put together the names of all\r\nthe attributes taken separately, and we obtain the definition of the name\r\nwhich belongs to them all taken together; a definition which will correspond\r\nexactly to that of the corresponding concrete name. For, as we define\r\na concrete name by enumerating the attributes which it connotes, and\r\nas the attributes connoted by a concrete name form the entire signification\r\nof the corresponding abstract name, the same enumeration will serve for\r\nthe definition of both. Thus, if the definition of a \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ehuman being\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nbe this, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“a being, corporeal, animated, rational, shaped so and so,”\u003c/span\u003e the definition\r\nof \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ehumanity\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e will be corporeity and animal life, combined with\r\nrationality, and with such and such a shape.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWhen, on the other hand, the abstract name does not express a complication\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page107\"\u003e[pg 107]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg107\" id=\"Pg107\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nof attributes, but a single attribute, we must remember that every\r\nattribute is grounded on some fact or phenomenon, from which, and which\r\nalone, it derives its meaning. To that fact or phenomenon, called in a former\r\nchapter the foundation of the attribute, we must, therefore, have recourse\r\nfor its definition. Now, the foundation of the attribute may be\r\na phenomenon of any degree of complexity, consisting of many different\r\nparts, either co-existent or in succession. To obtain a definition of the attribute,\r\nwe must analyze the phenomenon into these parts. Eloquence, for\r\nexample, is the name of one attribute only; but this attribute is grounded\r\non external effects of a complicated nature, flowing from acts of the person\r\nto whom we ascribe the attribute; and by resolving this phenomenon of\r\ncausation into its two parts, the cause and the effect, we obtain a definition\r\nof eloquence, viz. the power of influencing the feelings by speech or writing.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nA name, therefore, whether concrete or abstract, admits of definition,\r\nprovided we are able to analyze, that is, to distinguish into parts, the attribute\r\nor set of attributes which constitute the meaning both of the concrete\r\nname and of the corresponding abstract: if a set of attributes, by enumerating\r\nthem; if a single attribute, by dissecting the fact or phenomenon\r\n(whether of perception or of internal consciousness) which is the foundation\r\nof the attribute. But, further, even when the fact is one of our simple\r\nfeelings or states of consciousness, and therefore unsusceptible of analysis,\r\nthe names both of the object and of the attribute still admit of definition;\r\nor rather, would do so if all our simple feelings had names. Whiteness\r\nmay be defined, the property or power of exciting the sensation of\r\nwhite. A white object may be defined, an object which excites the sensation\r\nof white. The only names which are unsusceptible of definition, because\r\ntheir meaning is unsusceptible of analysis, are the names of the simple feelings\r\nthemselves. These are in the same condition as proper names. They\r\nare not indeed, like proper names, unmeaning; for the words \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003esensation\r\nof white\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e signify, that the sensation which I so denominate resembles other\r\nsensations which I remember to have had before, and to have called by that\r\nname. But as we have no words by which to recall those former sensations,\r\nexcept the very word which we seek to define, or some other which, being\r\nexactly synonymous with it, requires definition as much, words can not unfold\r\nthe signification of this class of names; and we are obliged to make a\r\ndirect appeal to the personal experience of the individual whom we address.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 3. Having stated what seems to be the true idea of a Definition, I proceed\r\nto examine some opinions of philosophers, and some popular conceptions\r\non the subject, which conflict more or less with that idea.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe only adequate definition of a name is, as already remarked, one which\r\ndeclares the facts, and the whole of the facts, which the name involves in\r\nits signification. But with most persons the object of a definition does not\r\nembrace so much; they look for nothing more, in a definition, than a guide\r\nto the correct use of the term—a protection against applying it in a manner\r\ninconsistent with custom and convention. Any thing, therefore, is to\r\nthem a sufficient definition of a term, which will serve as a correct index\r\nto what the term \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ede\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003enotes; though not embracing the whole, and\r\nsometimes, perhaps, not even any part, of what it connotes. This gives rise to\r\ntwo sorts of imperfect, or unscientific definition; Essential but incomplete\r\nDefinitions, and Accidental Definitions, or Descriptions. In the former, a\r\nconnotative name is defined by a part only of its connotation; in the latter,\r\nby something which forms no part of the connotation at all.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page108\"\u003e[pg 108]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg108\" id=\"Pg108\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAn example of the first kind of imperfect definitions is the following:\r\nMan is a rational animal. It is impossible to consider this as a complete\r\ndefinition of the word Man, since (as before remarked) if we adhered to it\r\nwe should be obliged to call the Houyhnhnms men; but as there happen to\r\nbe no Houyhnhnms, this imperfect definition is sufficient to mark out and\r\ndistinguish from all other things, the objects at present denoted by \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“man;”\u003c/span\u003e\r\nall the beings actually known to exist, of whom the name is predicable.\r\nThough the word is defined by some only among the attributes which it\r\nconnotes, not by all, it happens that all known objects which possess the\r\nenumerated attributes, possess also those which are omitted; so that the\r\nfield of predication which the word covers, and the employment of it which\r\nis conformable to usage, are as well indicated by the inadequate definition\r\nas by an adequate one. Such definitions, however, are always liable to be\r\noverthrown by the discovery of new objects in nature.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nDefinitions of this kind are what logicians have had in view, when they\r\nlaid down the rule, that the definition of a species should be \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eper genus et differentiam\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e. Differentia being\r\nseldom taken to mean the whole of the peculiarities constitutive of the species, but\r\nsome one of those peculiarities only, a complete definition would be\r\n\u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eper genus et differentias\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, rather than\r\n\u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003edifferentiam\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e. It would include,\r\nwith the name of the superior genus, not merely \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003esome\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e\r\nattribute which distinguishes the species intended to be defined\r\nfrom all other species of the same genus, but \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eall\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e the attributes implied\r\nin the name of the species, which the name of the superior genus\r\nhas not already implied. The assertion, however, that a definition must\r\nof necessity consist of a genus and differentiæ, is not tenable. It was early\r\nremarked by logicians, that the \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003esummum genus\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nin any classification, having\r\nno genus superior to itself, could not be defined in this manner. Yet\r\nwe have seen that all names, except those of our elementary feelings, are\r\nsusceptible of definition in the strictest sense; by setting forth in words\r\nthe constituent parts of the fact or phenomenon, of which the connotation\r\nof every word is ultimately composed.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 4. Although the first kind of imperfect definition (which defines a connotative\r\nterm by a part only of what it connotes, but a part sufficient to\r\nmark out correctly the boundaries of its denotation), has been considered\r\nby the ancients, and by logicians in general, as a complete definition; it has\r\nalways been deemed necessary that the attributes employed should really\r\nform part of the connotation; for the rule was that the definition must be\r\ndrawn from the \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eessence\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e of the class; and this would not have been the case\r\nif it had been in any degree made up of attributes not connoted by the\r\nname. The second kind of imperfect definition, therefore, in which the\r\nname of a class is defined by any of its accidents—that is, by attributes\r\nwhich are not included in its connotation—has been rejected from the rank\r\nof genuine Definition by all logicians, and has been termed Description.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThis kind of imperfect definition, however, takes its rise from the same\r\ncause as the other, namely, the willingness to accept as a definition any thing\r\nwhich, whether it expounds the meaning of the name or not, enables us to\r\ndiscriminate the things denoted by the name from all other things, and consequently\r\nto employ the term in predication without deviating from established\r\nusage. This purpose is duly answered by stating any (no matter\r\nwhat) of the attributes which are common to the whole of the class, and\r\npeculiar to it; or any combination of attributes which happens to be peculiar\r\nto it, though separately each of those attributes may be common to\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page109\"\u003e[pg 109]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg109\" id=\"Pg109\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nit with some other things. It is only necessary that the definition (or description)\r\nthus formed, should be \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003econvertible\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e with the name which it professes\r\nto define; that is, should be exactly co-extensive with it, being predicable\r\nof every thing of which it is predicable, and of nothing of which it\r\nis not predicable; though the attributes specified may have no connection\r\nwith those which mankind had in view when they formed or recognized the\r\nclass, and gave it a name. The following are correct definitions of Man,\r\naccording to this test: Man is a mammiferous animal, having (by nature)\r\ntwo hands (for the human species answers to this description, and no other\r\nanimal does): Man is an animal who cooks his food: Man is a featherless\r\nbiped.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWhat would otherwise be a mere description, may be raised to the rank\r\nof a real definition by the peculiar purpose which the speaker or writer\r\nhas in view. As was seen in the preceding chapter, it may, for the ends\r\nof a particular art or science, or for the more convenient statement of an\r\nauthor’s particular doctrines, be advisable to give to some general name,\r\nwithout altering its denotation, a special connotation, different from its ordinary\r\none. When this is done, a definition of the name by means of the\r\nattributes which make up the special connotation, though in general a mere\r\naccidental definition or description, becomes on the particular occasion and\r\nfor the particular purpose a complete and genuine definition. This actually\r\noccurs with respect to one of the preceding examples, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Man is a mammiferous\r\nanimal having two hands,”\u003c/span\u003e which is the scientific definition of\r\nman, considered as one of the species in Cuvier’s distribution of the animal\r\nkingdom.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIn cases of this sort, though the definition is still a declaration of the\r\nmeaning which in the particular instance the name is appointed to convey,\r\nit can not be said that to state the meaning of the word is the purpose of\r\nthe definition. The purpose is not to expound a name, but a classification.\r\nThe special meaning which Cuvier assigned to the word Man (quite foreign\r\nto its ordinary meaning, though involving no change in the denotation of\r\nthe word), was incidental to a plan of arranging animals into classes on a\r\ncertain principle, that is, according to a certain set of distinctions. And\r\nsince the definition of Man according to the ordinary connotation of the\r\nword, though it would have answered every other purpose of a definition,\r\nwould not have pointed out the place which the species ought to occupy\r\nin that particular classification; he gave the word a special connotation,\r\nthat he might be able to define it by the kind of attributes on which, for\r\nreasons of scientific convenience, he had resolved to found his division of\r\nanimated nature.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nScientific definitions, whether they are definitions of scientific terms, or\r\nof common terms used in a scientific sense, are almost always of the kind\r\nlast spoken of: their main purpose is to serve as the landmarks of scientific\r\nclassification. And since the classifications in any science are continually\r\nmodified as scientific knowledge advances, the definitions in the\r\nsciences are also constantly varying. A striking instance is afforded by\r\nthe words Acid and Alkali, especially the former. As experimental discovery\r\nadvanced, the substances classed with acids have been constantly\r\nmultiplying, and by a natural consequence the attributes connoted by the\r\nword have receded and become fewer. At first it connoted the attributes,\r\nof combining with an alkali to form a neutral substance (called a salt);\r\nbeing compounded of a base and oxygen; causticity to the taste and touch;\r\nfluidity, etc. The true analysis of muriatic acid, into chlorine and hydrogen,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page110\"\u003e[pg 110]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg110\" id=\"Pg110\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\ncaused the second property, composition from a base and oxygen, to\r\nbe excluded from the connotation. The same discovery fixed the attention\r\nof chemists upon hydrogen as an important element in acids; and more\r\nrecent discoveries having led to the recognition of its presence in sulphuric,\r\nnitric, and many other acids, where its existence was not previously suspected,\r\nthere is now a tendency to include the presence of this element in\r\nthe connotation of the word. But carbonic acid, silica, sulphurous acid,\r\nhave no hydrogen in their composition; that property can not, therefore,\r\nbe connoted by the term, unless those substances are no longer to be considered\r\nacids. Causticity and fluidity have long since been excluded from\r\nthe characteristics of the class, by the inclusion of silica and many other\r\nsubstances in it; and the formation of neutral bodies by combination with\r\nalkalis, together with such electro-chemical peculiarities as this is supposed\r\nto imply, are now the only \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003edifferentiæ\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwhich form the fixed connotation of\r\nthe word Acid, as a term of chemical science.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWhat is true of the definition of any term of science, is of course true of\r\nthe definition of a science itself; and accordingly (as observed in the Introductory\r\nChapter of this work), the definition of a science must necessarily\r\nbe progressive and provisional. Any extension of knowledge or alteration\r\nin the current opinions respecting the subject-matter, may lead to\r\na change more or less extensive in the particulars included in the science;\r\nand its composition being thus altered, it may easily happen that a different\r\nset of characteristics will be found better adapted as differentiæ for defining\r\nits name.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIn the same manner in which a special or technical definition has for its\r\nobject to expound the artificial classification out of which it grows; the\r\nAristotelian logicians seem to have imagined that it was also the business\r\nof ordinary definition to expound the ordinary, and what they deemed the\r\nnatural, classification of things, namely, the division of them into Kinds;\r\nand to show the place which each Kind occupies, as superior, collateral, or\r\nsubordinate, among other Kinds. This notion would account for the rule\r\nthat all definition must necessarily be \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eper genus et differentiam\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, and would\r\nalso explain why a single differentia was deemed sufficient. But to expound,\r\nor express in words, a distinction of Kind, has already been shown\r\nto be an impossibility: the very meaning of a Kind is, that the properties\r\nwhich distinguish it do not grow out of one another, and can not therefore\r\nbe set forth in words, even by implication, otherwise than by enumerating\r\nthem all: and all are not known, nor are ever likely to be so. It is idle,\r\ntherefore, to look to this as one of the purposes of a definition: while, if it\r\nbe only required that the definition of a Kind should indicate what kinds\r\ninclude it or are included by it, any definitions which expound the connotation\r\nof the names will do this: for the name of each class must necessarily\r\nconnote enough of its properties to fix the boundaries of the class. If the\r\ndefinition, therefore, be a full statement of the connotation, it is all that a\r\ndefinition can be required to be.\u003ca id=\"noteref_43\" name=\"noteref_43\" href=\"#note_43\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e43\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page111\"\u003e[pg 111]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg111\" id=\"Pg111\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 5. Of the two incomplete and popular modes of definition, and in what\r\nthey differ from the complete or philosophical mode, enough has now been\r\nsaid. We shall next examine an ancient doctrine, once generally prevalent\r\nand still by no means exploded, which I regard as the source of a great part\r\nof the obscurity hanging over some of the most important processes of the\r\nunderstanding in the pursuit of truth. According to this, the definitions\r\nof which we have now treated are only one of two sorts into which definitions\r\nmay be divided, viz., definitions of names, and definitions of things.\r\nThe former are intended to explain the meaning of a term; the latter, the\r\nnature of a thing; the last being incomparably the most important.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThis opinion was held by the ancient philosophers, and by their followers,\r\nwith the exception of the Nominalists; but as the spirit of modern\r\nmetaphysics, until a recent period, has been on the whole a Nominalist\r\nspirit, the notion of definitions of things has been to a certain extent in\r\nabeyance, still continuing, however, to breed confusion in logic, by its consequences\r\nindeed rather than by itself. Yet the doctrine in its own proper\r\nform now and then breaks out, and has appeared (among other places)\r\nwhere it was scarcely to be expected, in a justly admired word, Archbishop\r\nWhately’s \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eLogic\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e.\u003ca id=\"noteref_44\" name=\"noteref_44\" href=\"#note_44\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e44\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nIn a review of that work published by me in the \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eWestminster\r\n\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page112\"\u003e[pg 112]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg112\" id=\"Pg112\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003e\r\nReview\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e for January, 1828, and containing some opinions which I\r\nno longer entertain, I find the following observations on the question now\r\nbefore us; observations with which my present view of that question is\r\nstill sufficiently in accordance.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“The distinction between nominal and real definitions, between definitions\r\nof words and what are called definitions of things, though conformable\r\nto the ideas of most of the Aristotelian logicians, can not, as it appears\r\nto us, be maintained. We apprehend that no definition is ever intended to\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e‘explain and unfold the nature of a thing.’\u003c/span\u003e It is some confirmation of our\r\nopinion, that none of those writers who have thought that there were definitions\r\nof things, have ever succeeded in discovering any criterion by which\r\nthe definition of a thing can be distinguished from any other proposition\r\nrelating to the thing. The definition, they say, unfolds the nature of the\r\nthing: but no definition can unfold its whole nature; and every proposition\r\nin which any quality whatever is predicated of the thing, unfolds some\r\npart of its nature. The true state of the case we take to be this. All\r\ndefinitions are of names, and of names only; but, in some definitions, it is\r\nclearly apparent, that nothing is intended except to explain the meaning of\r\nthe word; while in others, besides explaining the meaning of the word, it\r\nis intended to be implied that there exists a thing, corresponding to the\r\nword. Whether this be or be not implied in any given case, can not be\r\ncollected from the mere form of the expression. \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e‘A centaur is an animal\r\nwith the upper parts of a man and the lower parts of a horse,’\u003c/span\u003e and \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e‘A triangle\r\nis a rectilineal figure with three sides,’\u003c/span\u003e are, in form, expressions precisely\r\nsimilar; although in the former it is not implied that any \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ething\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e, conformable\r\nto the term, really exists, while in the latter it is; as may be seen\r\nby substituting in both definitions, the word \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003emeans\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e for\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eis\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e. In the first expression, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e‘A centaur means an animal,’\u003c/span\u003e etc.,\r\nthe sense would remain unchanged:\r\nin the second, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e‘A triangle means,’\u003c/span\u003e etc., the meaning would be altered,\r\nsince it would be obviously impossible to deduce any of the truths\r\nof geometry from a proposition expressive only of the manner in which we\r\nintend to employ a particular sign.\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“There are, therefore, expressions, commonly passing for definitions,\r\nwhich include in themselves more than the mere explanation of the meaning\r\nof a term. But it is not correct to call an expression of this sort a peculiar\r\nkind of definition. Its difference from the other kind consists in this, that\r\nit is not a definition, but a definition and something more. The definition\r\nabove given of a triangle, obviously comprises not one, but two propositions,\r\nperfectly distinguishable. The one is, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e‘There may exist a figure,\r\nbounded by three straight lines;’\u003c/span\u003e the other, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e‘And this figure may be termed\r\na triangle.’\u003c/span\u003e The former of these propositions is not a definition at all: the\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page113\"\u003e[pg 113]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg113\" id=\"Pg113\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nlatter is a mere nominal definition, or explanation of the use and application\r\nof a term. The first is susceptible of truth or falsehood, and may\r\ntherefore be made the foundation of a train of reasoning. The latter can\r\nneither be true nor false; the only character it is susceptible of is that of\r\nconformity or disconformity to the ordinary usage of language.”\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThere is a real distinction, then, between definitions of names, and what\r\nare erroneously called definitions of things; but it is, that the latter, along\r\nwith the meaning of a name, covertly asserts a matter of fact. This covert\r\nassertion is not a definition, but a postulate. The definition is a mere identical\r\nproposition, which gives information only about the use of language,\r\nand from which no conclusions affecting matters of fact can possibly be\r\ndrawn. The accompanying postulate, on the other hand, affirms a fact,\r\nwhich may lead to consequences of every degree of importance. It affirms\r\nthe actual or possible existence of Things possessing the combination of\r\nattributes set forth in the definition; and this, if true, may be foundation\r\nsufficient on which to build a whole fabric of scientific truth.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWe have already made, and shall often have to repeat, the remark, that\r\nthe philosophers who overthrew Realism by no means got rid of the consequences\r\nof Realism, but retained long afterward, in their own philosophy,\r\nnumerous propositions which could only have a rational meaning as part\r\nof a Realistic system. It had been handed down from Aristotle, and probably\r\nfrom earlier times, as an obvious truth, that the science of Geometry\r\nis deduced from definitions. This, so long as a definition was considered\r\nto be a proposition \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“unfolding the nature of the thing,”\u003c/span\u003e did well enough.\r\nBut Hobbes followed, and rejected utterly the notion that a definition declares\r\nthe nature of the thing, or does any thing but state the meaning of\r\na name; yet he continued to affirm as broadly as any of his predecessors,\r\nthat the ἀρχαὶ, \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eprincipia\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\nor original premises of mathematics, and even of\r\nall science, are definitions; producing the singular paradox, that systems\r\nof scientific truth, nay, all truths whatever at which we arrive by reasoning,\r\nare deduced from the arbitrary conventions of mankind concerning the signification\r\nof words.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nTo save the credit of the doctrine that definitions are the premises of\r\nscientific knowledge, the proviso is sometimes added, that they are so only\r\nunder a certain condition, namely, that they be framed conformably to the\r\nphenomena of nature; that is, that they ascribe such meanings to terms as\r\nshall suit objects actually existing. But this is only an instance of the attempt\r\nso often made, to escape from the necessity of abandoning old language\r\nafter the ideas which it expresses have been exchanged for contrary\r\nones. From the meaning of a name (we are told) it is possible to infer\r\nphysical facts, provided the name has corresponding to it an existing thing.\r\nBut if this proviso be necessary, from which of the two is the inference\r\nreally drawn? From the existence of a thing having the properties, or\r\nfrom the existence of a name meaning them?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nTake, for instance, any of the definitions laid down as premises in Euclid’s\r\nElements; the definition, let us say, of a circle. This, being analyzed, consists\r\nof two propositions; the one an assumption with respect to a matter\r\nof fact, the other a genuine definition. \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“A figure may exist, having all the\r\npoints in the line which bounds it equally distant from a single point within\r\nit:”\u003c/span\u003e \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Any figure possessing this property is called a circle.”\u003c/span\u003e Let us\r\nlook at one of the demonstrations which are said to depend on this definition,\r\nand observe to which of the two propositions contained in it the demonstration\r\nreally appeals. \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“About the centre A, describe the circle B C D.”\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page114\"\u003e[pg 114]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg114\" id=\"Pg114\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nHere is an assumption that a figure, such as the definition expresses, \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003emay\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e\r\nbe described; which is no other than the postulate, or covert assumption,\r\ninvolved in the so-called definition. But whether that figure be called a\r\ncircle or not is quite immaterial. The purpose would be as well answered,\r\nin all respects except brevity, were we to say, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Through the point B, draw\r\na line returning into itself, of which every point shall be at an equal distance\r\nfrom the point A.”\u003c/span\u003e By this the definition of a circle would be got\r\nrid of, and rendered needless; but not the postulate implied in it; without\r\nthat the demonstration could not stand. The circle being now described,\r\nlet us proceed to the consequence. \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Since B C D is a circle, the radius\r\nB A is equal to the radius C A.”\u003c/span\u003e B A is equal to C A, not because B C D\r\nis a circle, but because B C D is a figure with the radii equal. Our warrant\r\nfor assuming that such a figure about the centre A, with the radius\r\nB A, may be made to exist, is the postulate. Whether the admissibility\r\nof these postulates rests on intuition, or on proof, may be a matter of dispute;\r\nbut in either case they are the premises on which the theorems depend;\r\nand while these are retained it would make no difference in the certainty\r\nof geometrical truths, though every definition in Euclid, and every\r\ntechnical term therein defined, were laid aside.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt is, perhaps, superfluous to dwell at so much length on what is so nearly\r\nself-evident; but when a distinction, obvious as it may appear, has been\r\nconfounded, and by powerful intellects, it is better to say too much than\r\ntoo little for the purpose of rendering such mistakes impossible in future.\r\nI will, therefore detain the reader while I point out one of the absurd consequences\r\nflowing from the supposition that definitions, as such, are the\r\npremises in any of our reasonings, except such as relate to words only. If\r\nthis supposition were true, we might argue correctly from true premises,\r\nand arrive at a false conclusion. We should only have to assume as a\r\npremise the definition of a nonentity; or rather of a name which has no\r\nentity corresponding to it. Let this, for instance, be our definition:\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"block tei tei-quote\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.80em; margin-left: 3.60em; margin-top: 1.80em; margin-right: 3.60em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-lg\" style=\"margin-bottom: 0.90em; margin-top: 0.90em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-l\" style=\"text-align: left\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003eA dragon is a serpent breathing flame.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThis proposition, considered only as a definition, is indisputably correct.\r\nA dragon \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eis\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e a serpent breathing flame: the word \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003emeans\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e that.\r\nThe tacit assumption, indeed (if there were any such understood assertion), of the\r\nexistence of an object with properties corresponding to the definition, would,\r\nin the present instance, be false. Out of this definition we may carve the\r\npremises of the following syllogism:\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"block tei tei-quote\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.80em; margin-left: 3.60em; margin-top: 1.80em; margin-right: 3.60em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-lg\" style=\"margin-bottom: 0.90em; margin-top: 0.90em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-l\" style=\"text-align: left\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003eA dragon is a thing which breathes flame:\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-l\" style=\"text-align: left\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003eA dragon is a serpent:\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nFrom which the conclusion is,\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"block tei tei-quote\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.80em; margin-left: 3.60em; margin-top: 1.80em; margin-right: 3.60em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-lg\" style=\"margin-bottom: 0.90em; margin-top: 0.90em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-l\" style=\"text-align: left\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003eTherefore some serpent or serpents breathe flame:\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nan unexceptionable syllogism in the first mode of the third figure, in which\r\nboth premises are true and yet the conclusion false; which every logician\r\nknows to be an absurdity. The conclusion being false and the syllogism\r\ncorrect, the premises can not be true. But the premises, considered as\r\nparts of a definition, are true. Therefore, the premises considered as parts\r\nof a definition can not be the real ones. The real premises must be—\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"block tei tei-quote\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.80em; margin-left: 3.60em; margin-top: 1.80em; margin-right: 3.60em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-lg\" style=\"margin-bottom: 0.90em; margin-top: 0.90em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-l\" style=\"text-align: left\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003eA dragon is a \u003c/span\u003e\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\" style=\"text-align: left\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%; font-style: italic\"\u003ereally existing\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e thing which breathes flame:\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-l\" style=\"text-align: left\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003eA dragon is a \u003c/span\u003e\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\" style=\"text-align: left\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%; font-style: italic\"\u003ereally existing\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e serpent:\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nwhich implied premises being false, the falsity of the conclusion presents\r\nno absurdity.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIf we would determine what conclusion follows from the same ostensible\r\npremises when the tacit assumption of real existence is left out, let us, according\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page115\"\u003e[pg 115]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg115\" id=\"Pg115\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nto the recommendation in a previous page, substitute \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003emeans\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nfor \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eis\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e.\r\nWe then have—\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"block tei tei-quote\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.80em; margin-left: 3.60em; margin-top: 1.80em; margin-right: 3.60em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-lg\" style=\"margin-bottom: 0.90em; margin-top: 0.90em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-l\" style=\"text-align: left\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003eDragon is \u003c/span\u003e\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\" style=\"text-align: left\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%; font-style: italic\"\u003ea word meaning\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e a thing which breathes flame:\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-l\" style=\"text-align: left\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003eDragon is \u003c/span\u003e\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\" style=\"text-align: left\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%; font-style: italic\"\u003ea word meaning\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e a serpent:\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nFrom which the conclusion is,\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"block tei tei-quote\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.80em; margin-left: 3.60em; margin-top: 1.80em; margin-right: 3.60em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e\r\nSome \u003c/span\u003e\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%; font-style: italic\"\u003eword or words which mean\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e a serpent, also mean a thing which\r\nbreathes flame:\r\n\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nwhere the conclusion (as well as the premises) is true, and is the only kind\r\nof conclusion which can ever follow from a definition, namely, a proposition\r\nrelating to the meaning of words.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThere is still another shape into which we may transform this syllogism.\r\nWe may suppose the middle term to be the designation neither of a thing\r\nnor of a name, but of an idea. We then have—\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"block tei tei-quote\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.80em; margin-left: 3.60em; margin-top: 1.80em; margin-right: 3.60em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-lg\" style=\"margin-bottom: 0.90em; margin-top: 0.90em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-l\" style=\"text-align: left\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003eThe \u003c/span\u003e\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\" style=\"text-align: left\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%; font-style: italic\"\u003eidea of\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e a dragon is \u003c/span\u003e\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\" style=\"text-align: left\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%; font-style: italic\"\u003ean idea of\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e a thing which breathes\r\nflame:\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-l\" style=\"text-align: left\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003eThe \u003c/span\u003e\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\" style=\"text-align: left\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%; font-style: italic\"\u003eidea of\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e a dragon is \u003c/span\u003e\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\" style=\"text-align: left\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%; font-style: italic\"\u003ean idea of\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e a serpent:\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-l\" style=\"text-align: left\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003eTherefore, there is \u003c/span\u003e\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\" style=\"text-align: left\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%; font-style: italic\"\u003ean idea of\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e a serpent, which is \u003c/span\u003e\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\" style=\"text-align: left\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%; font-style: italic\"\u003ean idea\r\nof\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e a thing breathing flame.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nHere the conclusion is true, and also the premises; but the premises are\r\nnot definitions. They are propositions affirming that an idea existing in\r\nthe mind, includes certain ideal elements. The truth of the conclusion follows\r\nfrom the existence of the psychological phenomenon called the idea of\r\na dragon; and therefore still from the tacit assumption of a matter of\r\nfact.\u003ca id=\"noteref_45\" name=\"noteref_45\" href=\"#note_45\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e45\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWhen, as in this last syllogism, the conclusion is a proposition respecting\r\nan idea, the assumption on which it depends may be merely that of the existence\r\nof an idea. But when the conclusion is a proposition concerning a\r\nThing, the postulate involved in the definition which stands as the apparent\r\npremise, is the existence of a thing conformable to the definition, and not\r\nmerely of an idea conformable to it. This assumption of real existence we\r\nalways convey the impression that we intend to make, when we profess to\r\ndefine any name which is already known to be a name of really existing\r\nobjects. On this account it is, that the assumption was not necessarily\r\nimplied in the definition of a dragon, while there was no doubt of its being\r\nincluded in the definition of a circle.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page116\"\u003e[pg 116]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg116\" id=\"Pg116\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 6. One of the circumstances which have contributed to keep up the\r\nnotion, that demonstrative truths follow from definitions rather than from\r\nthe postulates implied in those definitions, is, that the postulates, even in\r\nthose sciences which are considered to surpass all others in demonstrative\r\ncertainty, are not always exactly true. It is not true that a circle exists, or\r\ncan be described, which has all its radii \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eexactly\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e equal. Such accuracy is\r\nideal only; it is not found in nature, still less can it be realized by art.\r\nPeople had a difficulty, therefore, in conceiving that the most certain of all\r\nconclusions could rest on premises which, instead of being certainly true,\r\nare certainly not true to the full extent asserted. This apparent paradox\r\nwill be examined when we come to treat of Demonstration; where we shall\r\nbe able to show that as much of the postulate is true, as is required to support\r\nas much as is true of the conclusion. Philosophers, however, to whom\r\nthis view had not occurred, or whom it did not satisfy, have thought it indispensable\r\nthat there should be found in definitions something \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003emore\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e certain,\r\nor at least more accurately true, than the implied postulate of the real\r\nexistence of a corresponding object. And this something they flattered\r\nthemselves they had found, when they laid it down that a definition is a\r\nstatement and analysis not of the mere meaning of a word, nor yet of the\r\nnature of a thing, but of an idea. Thus, the proposition, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“A circle is a\r\nplane figure bounded by a line all the points of which are at an equal distance\r\nfrom a given point within it,”\u003c/span\u003e was considered by them, not as an assertion\r\nthat any real circle has that property (which would not be exactly\r\ntrue), but that we \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003econceive\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e a circle as having it; that our abstract idea of\r\na circle is an idea of a figure with its radii exactly equal.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nConformably to this it is said, that the subject-matter of mathematics,\r\nand of every other demonstrative science, is not things as they really exist,\r\nbut abstractions of the mind. A geometrical line is a line without breadth;\r\nbut no such line exists in nature; it is a notion merely suggested to the\r\nmind by its experience of nature. The definition (it is said) is a definition\r\nof this mental line, not of any actual line: and it is only of the mental line,\r\nnot of any line existing in nature, that the theorems of geometry are accurately\r\ntrue.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAllowing this doctrine respecting the nature of demonstrative truth to\r\nbe correct (which, in a subsequent place, I shall endeavor to prove that it\r\nis not); even on that supposition, the conclusions which seem to follow\r\nfrom a definition, do not follow from the definition as such, but from an\r\nimplied postulate. Even if it be true that there is no object in nature answering\r\nto the definition of a line, and that the geometrical properties of\r\nlines are not true of any lines in nature, but only of the idea of a line; the\r\ndefinition, at all events, postulates the real existence of such an idea: it assumes\r\nthat the mind can frame, or rather has framed, the notion of length\r\nwithout breadth, and without any other sensible property whatever. To\r\nme, indeed, it appears that the mind can not form any such notion; it can\r\nnot conceive length without breadth; it can only, in contemplating objects,\r\nattend to their length, exclusively of their other sensible qualities, and so\r\ndetermine what properties may be predicated of them in virtue of their\r\nlength alone. If this be true, the postulate involved in the geometrical\r\ndefinition of a line, is the real existence, not of length without breadth, but\r\nmerely of length, that is, of long objects. This is quite enough to support\r\nall the truths of geometry, since every property of a geometrical line is\r\nreally a property of all physical objects in so far as possessing length. But\r\neven what I hold to be the false doctrine on the subject, leaves the conclusion\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page117\"\u003e[pg 117]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg117\" id=\"Pg117\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nthat our reasonings are grounded on the matters of fact postulated in\r\ndefinitions, and not on the definitions themselves, entirely unaffected; and\r\naccordingly this conclusion is one which I have in common with Dr. Whewell,\r\nin his \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ePhilosophy of the Inductive Sciences\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e: though, on the nature\r\nof demonstrative truth, Dr. Whewell’s opinions are greatly at variance with\r\nmine. And here, as in many other instances, I gladly acknowledge that his\r\nwritings are eminently serviceable in clearing from confusion the initial\r\nsteps in the analysis of the mental processes, even where his views respecting\r\nthe ultimate analysis are such as (though with unfeigned respect) I can\r\nnot but regard as fundamentally erroneous.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 7. Although, according to the opinion here presented, Definitions are\r\nproperly of names only, and not of things, it does not follow from this that\r\ndefinitions are arbitrary. How to define a name, may not only be an inquiry\r\nof considerable difficulty and intricacy, but may involve considerations\r\ngoing deep into the nature of the things which are denoted by the\r\nname. Such, for instance, are the inquiries which form the subjects of the\r\nmost important of Plato’s Dialogues; as, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“What is rhetoric?”\u003c/span\u003e the topic of\r\nthe Gorgias, or, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“What is justice?”\u003c/span\u003e that of the Republic. Such, also, is\r\nthe question scornfully asked by Pilate, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“What is truth?”\u003c/span\u003e and the fundamental\r\nquestion with speculative moralists in all ages, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“What is virtue?”\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt would be a mistake to represent these difficult and noble inquiries as\r\nhaving nothing in view beyond ascertaining the conventional meaning of\r\na name. They are inquiries not so much to determine what is, as what\r\nshould be, the meaning of a name; which, like other practical questions of\r\nterminology, requires for its solution that we should enter, and sometimes\r\nenter very deeply, into the properties not merely of names but of the\r\nthings named.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAlthough the meaning of every concrete general name resides in the attributes\r\nwhich it connotes, the objects were named before the attributes;\r\nas appears from the fact that in all languages, abstract names are mostly\r\ncompounds or other derivatives of the concrete names which correspond to\r\nthem. Connotative names, therefore, were, after proper names, the first\r\nwhich were used: and in the simpler cases, no doubt, a distinct connotation\r\nwas present to the minds of those who first used the name, and was distinctly\r\nintended by them to be conveyed by it. The first person who used\r\nthe word white, as applied to snow or to any other object, knew, no doubt,\r\nvery well what quality he intended to predicate, and had a perfectly distinct\r\nconception in his mind of the attribute signified by the name.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nBut where the resemblances and differences on which our classifications\r\nare founded are not of this palpable and easily determinable kind; especially\r\nwhere they consist not in any one quality but in a number of qualities,\r\nthe effects of which, being blended together, are not very easily discriminated,\r\nand referred each to its true source; it often happens that names\r\nare applied to namable objects, with no distinct connotation present to the\r\nminds of those who apply them. They are only influenced by a general\r\nresemblance between the new object and all or some of the old familiar\r\nobjects which they have been accustomed to call by that name. This, as\r\nwe have seen, is the law which even the mind of the philosopher must follow,\r\nin giving names to the simple elementary feelings of our nature: but,\r\nwhere the things to be named are complex wholes, a philosopher is not\r\ncontent with noticing a general resemblance; he examines what the resemblance\r\nconsists in: and he only gives the same name to things which resemble\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page118\"\u003e[pg 118]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg118\" id=\"Pg118\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\none another in the same definite particulars. The philosopher,\r\ntherefore, habitually employs his general names with a definite connotation.\r\nBut language was not made, and can only in some small degree be\r\nmended, by philosophers. In the minds of the real arbiters of language,\r\ngeneral names, especially where the classes they denote can not be brought\r\nbefore the tribunal of the outward senses to be identified and discriminated,\r\nconnote little more than a vague gross resemblance to the things which\r\nthey were earliest, or have been most, accustomed to call by those names.\r\nWhen, for instance, ordinary persons predicate the words \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ejust\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nor \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eunjust\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e of any action,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003enoble\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e or \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003emean\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e of any sentiment,\r\nexpression, or demeanor, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003estatesman\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e or\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003echarlatan\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e of any personage figuring in politics, do they mean\r\nto affirm of those various subjects any determinate attributes, of whatever\r\nkind? No: they merely recognize, as they think, some likeness, more or\r\nless vague and loose, between these and some other things which they\r\nhave been accustomed to denominate or to hear denominated by those appellations.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nLanguage, as Sir James Mackintosh used to say of governments, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“is not\r\nmade, but grows.”\u003c/span\u003e A name is not imposed at once and by previous purpose\r\nupon a \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eclass\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e of objects, but is first applied to one thing, and then extended\r\nby a series of transitions to another and another. By this process\r\n(as has been remarked by several writers, and illustrated with great force\r\nand clearness by Dugald Stewart in his Philosophical Essays) a name not\r\nunfrequently passes by successive links of resemblance from one object to\r\nanother, until it becomes applied to things having nothing in common with\r\nthe first things to which the name was given; which, however, do not, for\r\nthat reason, drop the name; so that it at last denotes a confused huddle of\r\nobjects, having nothing whatever in common; and connotes nothing, not\r\neven a vague and general resemblance. When a name has fallen into this\r\nstate, in which by predicating it of any object we assert literally nothing\r\nabout the object, it has become unfit for the purposes either of thought or\r\nof the communication of thought; and can only be made serviceable by\r\nstripping it of some part of its multifarious denotation, and confining it to\r\nobjects possessed of some attributes in common, which it may be made to\r\nconnote. Such are the inconveniences of a language which \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“is not made,\r\nbut grows.”\u003c/span\u003e Like the governments which are in a similar case, it may be\r\ncompared to a road which is not made but has made itself: it requires continual\r\nmending in order to be passable.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nFrom this it is already evident, why the question respecting the definition\r\nof an abstract name is often one of so much difficulty. The question,\r\nWhat is justice? is, in other words, What is the attribute which mankind\r\nmean to predicate when they call an action just? To which the first answer\r\nis, that having come to no precise agreement on the point, they do\r\nnot mean to predicate distinctly any attribute at all. Nevertheless, all believe\r\nthat there is some common attribute belonging to all the actions which\r\nthey are in the habit of calling just. The question then must be, whether\r\nthere is any such common attribute? and, in the first place, whether mankind\r\nagree sufficiently with one another as to the particular actions which\r\nthey do or do not call just, to render the inquiry, what quality those actions\r\nhave in common, a possible one: if so, whether the actions really have\r\nany quality in common; and if they have, what it is. Of these three, the\r\nfirst alone is an inquiry into usage and convention; the other two are inquiries\r\ninto matters of fact. And if the second question (whether the actions\r\nform a class at all) has been answered negatively, there remains a fourth,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page119\"\u003e[pg 119]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg119\" id=\"Pg119\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\noften more arduous than all the rest, namely, how best to form a class artificially,\r\nwhich the name may denote.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAnd here it is fitting to remark, that the study of the spontaneous growth\r\nof languages is of the utmost importance to those who would logically remodel\r\nthem. The classifications rudely made by established language, when\r\nretouched, as they almost all require to be, by the hands of the logician,\r\nare often themselves excellently suited to his purposes. As compared with\r\nthe classifications of a philosopher, they are like the customary law of a\r\ncountry, which has grown up as it were spontaneously, compared with laws\r\nmethodized and digested into a code: the former are a far less perfect instrument\r\nthan the latter; but being the result of a long, though unscientific,\r\ncourse of experience, they contain a mass of materials which may be\r\nmade very usefully available in the formation of the systematic body of\r\nwritten law. In like manner, the established grouping of objects under a\r\ncommon name, even when founded only on a gross and general resemblance,\r\nis evidence, in the first place, that the resemblance is obvious, and therefore\r\nconsiderable; and, in the next place, that it is a resemblance which has\r\nstruck great numbers of persons during a series of years and ages. Even\r\nwhen a name, by successive extensions, has come to be applied to things\r\namong which there does not exist this gross resemblance common to them\r\nall, still at every step in its progress we shall find such a resemblance. And\r\nthese transitions of the meaning of words are often an index to real connections\r\nbetween the things denoted by them, which might otherwise escape\r\nthe notice of thinkers; of those at least who, from using a different language,\r\nor from any difference in their habitual associations, have fixed their\r\nattention in preference on some other aspect of the things. The history of\r\nphilosophy abounds in examples of such oversights, committed for want of\r\nperceiving the hidden link that connected together the seemingly disparate\r\nmeanings of some ambiguous word.\u003ca id=\"noteref_46\" name=\"noteref_46\" href=\"#note_46\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e46\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWhenever the inquiry into the definition of the name of any real object\r\nconsists of any thing else than a mere comparison of authorities, we tacitly\r\nassume that a meaning must be found for the name, compatible with its\r\ncontinuing to denote, if possible all, but at any rate the greater or the more\r\nimportant part, of the things of which it is commonly predicated. The inquiry,\r\ntherefore, into the definition, is an inquiry into the resemblances and\r\ndifferences among those things: whether there be any resemblance running\r\nthrough them all; if not, through what portion of them such a general resemblance\r\ncan be traced: and finally, what are the common attributes, the\r\npossession of which gives to them all, or to that portion of them, the character\r\nof resemblance which has led to their being classed together. When\r\nthese common attributes have been ascertained and specified, the name\r\nwhich belongs in common to the resembling objects acquires a distinct instead\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page120\"\u003e[pg 120]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg120\" id=\"Pg120\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nof a vague connotation; and by possessing this distinct connotation,\r\nbecomes susceptible of definition.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIn giving a distinct connotation to the general name, the philosopher will\r\nendeavor to fix upon such attributes as, while they are common to all the\r\nthings usually denoted by the name, are also of greatest importance in themselves;\r\neither directly, or from the number, the conspicuousness, or the interesting\r\ncharacter, of the consequences to which they lead. He will select,\r\nas far as possible, such \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003edifferentiæ\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nas lead to the greatest number of interesting\r\n\u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003epropria\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e. For these,\r\nrather than the more obscure and recondite\r\nqualities on which they often depend, give that general character and aspect\r\nto a set of objects, which determine the groups into which they naturally\r\nfall. But to penetrate to the more hidden agreement on which these\r\nobvious and superficial agreements depend, is often one of the most difficult\r\nof scientific problems. As it is among the most difficult, so it seldom\r\nfails to be among the most important. And since upon the result of this\r\ninquiry respecting the causes of the properties of a class of things, there incidentally\r\ndepends the question what shall be the meaning of a word; some\r\nof the most profound and most valuable investigations which philosophy\r\npresents to us, have been introduced by, and have offered themselves under\r\nthe guise of, inquiries into the definition of a name.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page121\"\u003e[pg 121]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg121\" id=\"Pg121\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"page\" /\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-div\" style=\"margin-bottom: 5.00em; margin-top: 5.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"toc25\" id=\"toc25\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"pdf26\" id=\"pdf26\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\u0027chapter\u0027 /\u003e\u003ch2 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: center; margin-bottom: 2.88em; margin-top: 2.88em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 144%\"\u003eBook II.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\u0027chapter\u0027 /\u003e\u003ch2 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: left; margin-bottom: 3.46em; margin-top: 3.46em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 173%\"\u003eOf Reasoning.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"block tei tei-quote\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.80em; margin-left: 3.60em; margin-top: 1.80em; margin-right: 3.60em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e\r\nΔιωρισμένων δε τούτων λέγωμεν ἤδη, διά τίνων, καὶ πότε, καὶ πῶς γίνεται πᾶς συλλογισμός\r\nὕστερον δὲ λεκτέον περὶ ἀποδείξεως. Πρότερον γὰρ περὶ συλλογισμοῦ λεκτέον, ἥ περὶ\r\nἀποδείξεως, διὰ τὸ καθόλου μᾶλλον εἰναὶ τὸν συλλογισμόν. Ἡ μέν γὰρ ἀπόδειξις,\r\nσυλλογισμός τις; ὁ συλλογισμός δὲ ού πᾶς,\r\nἀπόδειξις.—\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%; font-variant: small-caps\"\u003eArist.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e, \u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%; font-style: italic\"\u003eAnalyt.\r\nPrior.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e, l. i., cap. 4.\r\n\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-div\" style=\"margin-bottom: 4.00em; margin-top: 4.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"toc27\" id=\"toc27\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"pdf28\" id=\"pdf28\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: center; margin-bottom: 2.40em; margin-top: 2.40em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 120%\"\u003eChapter I.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: left; margin-bottom: 2.88em; margin-top: 2.88em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 144%\"\u003eOf Inference, Or Reasoning, In General.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 1. In the preceding Book, we have been occupied not with the nature\r\nof Proof, but with the nature of Assertion: the import conveyed by a Proposition,\r\nwhether that Proposition be true or false; not the means by which\r\nto discriminate true from false Propositions. The proper subject, however,\r\nof Logic is Proof. Before we could understand what Proof is, it was necessary\r\nto understand what that is to which proof is applicable; what that\r\nis which can be a subject of belief or disbelief, of affirmation or denial;\r\nwhat, in short, the different kinds of Propositions assert.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThis preliminary inquiry we have prosecuted to a definite result. Assertion,\r\nin the first place, relates either to the meaning of words, or to some\r\nproperty of the things which words signify. Assertions respecting the\r\nmeaning of words, among which definitions are the most important, hold a\r\nplace, and an indispensable one, in philosophy; but as the meaning of words\r\nis essentially arbitrary, this class of assertions are not susceptible of truth\r\nor falsity, nor therefore of proof or disproof. Assertions respecting Things,\r\nor what may be called Real Propositions, in contradistinction to verbal\r\nones, are of various sorts. We have analyzed the import of each sort, and\r\nhave ascertained the nature of the things they relate to, and the nature of\r\nwhat they severally assert respecting those things. We found that whatever\r\nbe the form of the proposition, and whatever its nominal subject or\r\npredicate, the real subject of every proposition is some one or more facts\r\nor phenomena of consciousness, or some one or more of the hidden causes\r\nor powers to which we ascribe those facts; and that what is predicated or\r\nasserted, either in the affirmative or negative, of those phenomena or those\r\npowers, is always either Existence, Order in Place, Order in Time, Causation,\r\nor Resemblance. This, then, is the theory of the Import of Propositions,\r\nreduced to its ultimate elements: but there is another and a less abstruse\r\nexpression for it, which, though stopping short in an earlier stage of\r\nthe analysis, is sufficiently scientific for many of the purposes for which\r\nsuch a general expression is required. This expression recognizes the commonly\r\nreceived distinction between Subject and Attribute, and gives the\r\nfollowing as the analysis of the meaning of propositions:—Every Proposition\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page122\"\u003e[pg 122]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg122\" id=\"Pg122\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nasserts, that some given subject does or does not possess some attribute;\r\nor that some attribute is or is not (either in all or in some portion\r\nof the subjects in which it is met with) conjoined with some other attribute.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWe shall now for the present take our leave of this portion of our inquiry,\r\nand proceed to the peculiar problem of the Science of Logic, namely,\r\nhow the assertions, of which we have analyzed the import, are proved\r\nor disproved; such of them, at least, as, not being amenable to direct consciousness\r\nor intuition, are appropriate subjects of proof.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWe say of a fact or statement, that it is proved, when we believe its truth\r\nby reason of some other fact or statement from which it is said to\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003efollow\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e.\r\nMost of the propositions, whether affirmative or negative, universal, particular,\r\nor singular, which we believe, are not believed on their own evidence,\r\nbut on the ground of something previously assented to, from which they\r\nare said to be \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003einferred\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e. To infer a proposition from a previous\r\nproposition or propositions; to give credence to it, or claim credence for it, as a\r\nconclusion from something else; is to \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ereason\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, in the most\r\nextensive sense of the term. There is a narrower sense, in which the name reasoning is\r\nconfined to the form of inference which is termed ratiocination, and of\r\nwhich the syllogism is the general type. The reasons for not conforming\r\nto this restricted use of the term were stated in an earlier stage of our inquiry,\r\nand additional motives will be suggested by the considerations on\r\nwhich we are now about to enter.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 2. In proceeding to take into consideration the cases in which inferences\r\ncan legitimately be drawn, we shall first mention some cases in which\r\nthe inference is apparent, not real; and which require notice chiefly that\r\nthey may not be confounded with cases of inference properly so called.\r\nThis occurs when the proposition ostensibly inferred from another, appears\r\non analysis to be merely a repetition of the same, or part of the same, assertion,\r\nwhich was contained in the first. All the cases mentioned in books\r\nof Logic as examples of equipollency or equivalence of propositions, are\r\nof this nature. Thus, if we were to argue, No man is incapable of reason,\r\nfor every man is rational; or, All men are mortal, for no man is exempt\r\nfrom death; it would be plain that we were not proving the proposition,\r\nbut only appealing to another mode of wording it, which may or may not\r\nbe more readily comprehensible by the hearer, or better adapted to suggest\r\nthe real proof, but which contains in itself no shadow of proof.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAnother case is where, from a universal proposition, we affect to infer\r\nanother which differs from it only in being particular: as All A is B, therefore\r\nSome A is B: No A is B, therefore Some A is not B. This, too, is not\r\nto conclude one proposition from another, but to repeat a second time something\r\nwhich had been asserted at first; with the difference, that we do not\r\nhere repeat the whole of the previous assertion, but only an indefinite part\r\nof it.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nA third case is where, the antecedent having affirmed a predicate of a\r\ngiven subject, the consequent affirms of the same subject something already\r\nconnoted by the former predicate: as, Socrates is a man, therefore Socrates\r\nis a living creature; where all that is connoted by living creature was affirmed\r\nof Socrates when he was asserted to be a man. If the propositions\r\nare negative, we must invert their order, thus: Socrates is not a living creature,\r\ntherefore he is not a man; for if we deny the less, the greater, which\r\nincludes it, is already denied by implication. These, therefore, are not really\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page123\"\u003e[pg 123]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg123\" id=\"Pg123\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\ncases of inference; and yet the trivial examples by which, in manuals of\r\nLogic, the rules of the syllogism are illustrated, are often of this ill-chosen\r\nkind; formal demonstrations of conclusions to which whoever understands\r\nthe terms used in the statement of the data, has already, and consciously,\r\nassented.\u003ca id=\"noteref_47\" name=\"noteref_47\" href=\"#note_47\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e47\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe most complex case of this sort of apparent inference is what is called\r\nthe Conversion of propositions; which consists in turning the predicate\r\ninto a subject, and the subject into a predicate, and framing out of the same\r\nterms thus reversed, another proposition, which must be true if the former\r\nis true. Thus, from the particular affirmative proposition, Some A is B,\r\nwe may infer that Some B is A. From the universal negative, No A is B,\r\nwe may conclude that No B is A. From the universal affirmative proposition,\r\nAll A is B, it can not be inferred that all B is A; though all water is\r\nliquid, it is not implied that all liquid is water; but it is implied that some\r\nliquid is so; and hence the proposition, All A is B, is legitimately convertible\r\ninto Some B is A. This process, which converts a universal proposition\r\ninto a particular, is termed conversion \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eper\r\naccidens\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e. From the proposition,\r\nSome A is not B, we can not even infer that some B is not A;\r\nthough some men are not Englishmen, it does not follow that some Englishmen\r\nare not men. The only mode usually recognized of converting a particular\r\nnegative proposition, is in the form, Some A is not B, therefore\r\nsomething which is not B is A; and this is termed conversion by contraposition.\r\nIn this case, however, the predicate and subject are not merely\r\nreversed, but one of them is changed. Instead of [A] and [B], the terms\r\nof the new proposition are [a thing which is not B], and [A]. The original\r\nproposition, Some A \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eis not\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e B, is first changed into a proposition equipollent\r\nwith it, Some A \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eis\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“a thing which is not B;”\u003c/span\u003e and the proposition,\r\nbeing now no longer a particular negative, but a particular affirmative, admits\r\nof conversion in the first mode, or as it is called, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003esimple\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nconversion.\u003ca id=\"noteref_48\" name=\"noteref_48\" href=\"#note_48\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e48\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIn all these cases there is not really any inference; there is in the conclusion\r\nno new truth, nothing but what was already asserted in the premises,\r\nand obvious to whoever apprehends them. The fact asserted in the\r\nconclusion is either the very same fact, or part of the fact, asserted in the\r\noriginal proposition. This follows from our previous analysis of the Import\r\nof Propositions. When we say, for example, that some lawful sovereigns\r\nare tyrants, what is the meaning of the assertion? That the attributes\r\nconnoted by the term \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“lawful sovereign,”\u003c/span\u003e and the attributes connoted\r\nby the term \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“tyrant,”\u003c/span\u003e sometimes co-exist in the same individual. Now this\r\nis also precisely what we mean, when we say that some tyrants are lawful\r\nsovereigns; which, therefore, is not a second proposition inferred from the\r\nfirst, any more than the English translation of Euclid’s Elements is a collection\r\nof theorems different from and consequences of, those contained in\r\nthe Greek original. Again, if we assert that no great general is a rash\r\nman, we mean that the attributes connoted by \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“great general,”\u003c/span\u003e and those\r\nconnoted by \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“rash,”\u003c/span\u003e never co-exist in the same subject; which is also the\r\nexact meaning which would be expressed by saying, that no rash man is a\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page124\"\u003e[pg 124]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg124\" id=\"Pg124\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\ngreat general. When we say that all quadrupeds are warm-blooded, we\r\nassert, not only that the attributes connoted by \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“quadruped”\u003c/span\u003e and those\r\nconnoted by \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“warm-blooded”\u003c/span\u003e sometimes co-exist, but that the former never\r\nexist without the latter: now the proposition, Some warm-blooded creatures\r\nare quadrupeds, expresses the first half of this meaning, dropping the\r\nlatter half; and therefore has been already affirmed in the antecedent proposition,\r\nAll quadrupeds are warm-blooded. But that \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eall\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e warm-blooded\r\ncreatures are quadrupeds, or, in other words, that the attributes connoted\r\nby \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“warm-blooded”\u003c/span\u003e never exist without those connoted by \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“quadruped,”\u003c/span\u003e\r\nhas not been asserted, and can not be inferred. In order to re-assert, in an\r\ninverted form, the whole of what was affirmed in the proposition, All quadrupeds\r\nare warm-blooded, we must convert it by contraposition, thus, Nothing\r\nwhich is not warm-blooded is a quadruped. This proposition, and the\r\none from which it is derived, are exactly equivalent, and either of them may\r\nbe substituted for the other; for, to say that when the attributes of a quadruped\r\nare present, those of a warm-blooded creature are present, is to say\r\nthat when the latter are absent the former are absent.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIn a manual for young students, it would be proper to dwell at greater\r\nlength on the conversion and equipollency of propositions. For though\r\nthat can not be called reasoning or inference which is a mere re-assertion in\r\ndifferent words of what had been asserted before, there is no more important\r\nintellectual habit, nor any the cultivation of which falls more strictly\r\nwithin the province of the art of logic, than that of discerning rapidly and\r\nsurely the identity of an assertion when disguised under diversity of language.\r\nThat important chapter in logical treatises which relates to the Opposition\r\nof Propositions, and the excellent technical language which logic\r\nprovides for distinguishing the different kinds or modes of opposition, are\r\nof use chiefly for this purpose. Such considerations as these, that contrary\r\npropositions may both be false, but can not both be true; that subcontrary\r\npropositions may both be true, but can not both be false; that of two contradictory\r\npropositions one must be true and the other false; that of two\r\nsubalternate propositions the truth of the universal proves the truth of the\r\nparticular, and the falsity of the particular proves the falsity of the universal,\r\nbut not \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003evicè versa\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e;\u003ca id=\"noteref_49\" name=\"noteref_49\" href=\"#note_49\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e49\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e are apt to appear, at first sight, very technical and\r\nmysterious, but when explained, seem almost too obvious to require so formal\r\na statement, since the same amount of explanation which is necessary\r\nto make the principles intelligible, would enable the truths which they convey\r\nto be apprehended in any particular case which can occur. In this\r\nrespect, however, these axioms of logic are on a level with those of mathematics.\r\nThat things which are equal to the same thing are equal to one\r\nanother, is as obvious in any particular case as it is in the general statement:\r\nand if no such general maxim had ever been laid down, the demonstrations\r\nin Euclid would never have halted for any difficulty in stepping\r\nacross the gap which this axiom at present serves to bridge over. Yet no\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page125\"\u003e[pg 125]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg125\" id=\"Pg125\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\none has ever censured writers on geometry, for placing a list of these elementary\r\ngeneralizations at the head of their treatises, as a first exercise to\r\nthe learner of the faculty which will be required in him at every step, that\r\nof apprehending a \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003egeneral\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e truth. And the student of logic, in the discussion\r\neven of such truths as we have cited above, acquires habits of circumspect\r\ninterpretation of words, and of exactly measuring the length and\r\nbreadth of his assertions, which are among the most indispensable conditions\r\nof any considerable mental attainment, and which it is one of the\r\nprimary objects of logical discipline to cultivate.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 3. Having noticed, in order to exclude from the province of Reasoning\r\nor Inference properly so called, the cases in which the progression from one\r\ntruth to another is only apparent, the logical consequent being a mere repetition\r\nof the logical antecedent; we now pass to those which are cases of\r\ninference in the proper acceptation of the term, those in which we set out\r\nfrom known truths, to arrive at others really distinct from them.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nReasoning, in the extended sense in which I use the term, and in which\r\nit is synonymous with Inference, is popularly said to be of two kinds: reasoning\r\nfrom particulars to generals, and reasoning from generals to particulars;\r\nthe former being called Induction, the latter Ratiocination or Syllogism.\r\nIt will presently be shown that there is a third species of reasoning,\r\nwhich falls under neither of these descriptions, and which, nevertheless, is\r\nnot only valid, but is the foundation of both the others.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt is necessary to observe, that the expressions, reasoning from particulars\r\nto generals, and reasoning from generals to particulars, are recommended\r\nby brevity rather than by precision, and do not adequately mark,\r\nwithout the aid of a commentary, the distinction between Induction (in the\r\nsense now adverted to) and Ratiocination. The meaning intended by these\r\nexpressions is, that Induction is inferring a proposition from propositions\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eless general\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e than itself, and Ratiocination is inferring a proposition from\r\npropositions \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eequally\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e or \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003emore\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e general. When, from the\r\nobservation of a number of individual instances, we ascend to a general proposition, or\r\nwhen, by combining a number of general propositions, we conclude from them\r\nanother proposition still more general, the process, which is substantially\r\nthe same in both instances, is called Induction. When from a general proposition,\r\nnot alone (for from a single proposition nothing can be concluded\r\nwhich is not involved in the terms), but by combining it with other propositions,\r\nwe infer a proposition of the same degree of generality with itself,\r\nor a less general proposition, or a proposition merely individual, the process\r\nis Ratiocination. When, in short, the conclusion is more general than the\r\nlargest of the premises, the argument is commonly called Induction; when\r\nless general, or equally general, it is Ratiocination.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAs all experience begins with individual cases, and proceeds from them\r\nto generals, it might seem most conformable to the natural order of thought\r\nthat Induction should be treated of before we touch upon Ratiocination.\r\nIt will, however, be advantageous, in a science which aims at tracing our\r\nacquired knowledge to its sources, that the inquirer should commence with\r\nthe latter rather than with the earlier stages of the process of constructing\r\nour knowledge; and should trace derivative truths backward to the truths\r\nfrom which they are deduced, and on which they depend for their evidence,\r\nbefore attempting to point out the original spring from which both ultimately\r\ntake their rise. The advantages of this order of proceeding in the\r\npresent instance will manifest themselves as we advance, in a manner superseding\r\nthe necessity of any further justification or explanation.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page126\"\u003e[pg 126]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg126\" id=\"Pg126\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nOf Induction, therefore, we shall say no more at present, than that it at\r\nleast is, without doubt, a process of real inference. The conclusion in an\r\ninduction embraces more than is contained in the premises. The principle\r\nor law collected from particular instances, the general proposition in which\r\nwe embody the result of our experience, covers a much larger extent of\r\nground than the individual experiments which form its basis. A principle\r\nascertained by experience, is more than a mere summing up of what has\r\nbeen specifically observed in the individual cases which have been examined;\r\nit is a generalization grounded on those cases, and expressive of our\r\nbelief, that what we there found true is true in an indefinite number of\r\ncases which we have not examined, and are never likely to examine. The\r\nnature and grounds of this inference, and the conditions necessary to make\r\nit legitimate, will be the subject of discussion in the Third Book: but that\r\nsuch inference really takes place is not susceptible of question. In every\r\ninduction we proceed from truths which we knew, to truths which we did\r\nnot know; from facts certified by observation, to facts which we have not\r\nobserved, and even to facts not capable of being now observed; future\r\nfacts, for example; but which we do not hesitate to believe on the sole evidence\r\nof the induction itself.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nInduction, then, is a real process of Reasoning or Inference. Whether,\r\nand in what sense, as much can be said of the Syllogism, remains to be determined\r\nby the examination into which we are about to enter.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-div\" style=\"margin-bottom: 4.00em; margin-top: 4.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"toc29\" id=\"toc29\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"pdf30\" id=\"pdf30\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: center; margin-bottom: 2.40em; margin-top: 2.40em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 120%\"\u003eChapter II.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: left; margin-bottom: 2.88em; margin-top: 2.88em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 144%\"\u003eOf Ratiocination, Or Syllogism.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 1. The analysis of the Syllogism has been so accurately and fully performed\r\nin the common manuals of Logic, that in the present work, which\r\nis not designed as a manual, it is sufficient to recapitulate,\r\n\u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ememoriæ causâ\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\nthe leading results of that analysis, as a foundation for the remarks to be\r\nafterward made on the functions of the Syllogism, and the place which it\r\nholds in science.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nTo a legitimate syllogism it is essential that there should be three, and\r\nno more than three, propositions, namely, the conclusion, or proposition to\r\nbe proved, and two other propositions which together prove it, and which\r\nare called the premises. It is essential that there should be three, and no\r\nmore than three, terms, namely, the subject and predicate of the conclusion,\r\nand another called the middle term, which must be found in both\r\npremises, since it is by means of it that the other two terms are to be connected\r\ntogether. The predicate of the conclusion is called the major term\r\nof the syllogism; the subject of the conclusion is called the minor term.\r\nAs there can be but three terms, the major and minor terms must each be\r\nfound in one, and only one, of the premises, together with the middle term\r\nwhich is in them both. The premise which contains the middle term and\r\nthe major term is called the major premise; that which contains the middle\r\nterm and the minor term is called the minor premise.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nSyllogisms are divided by some logicians into three \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003efigures\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\nby others into four, according to the position of the middle term, which may either\r\nbe the subject in both premises, the predicate in both, or the subject in\r\none and the predicate in the other. The most common case is that in which\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page127\"\u003e[pg 127]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg127\" id=\"Pg127\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nthe middle term is the subject of the major premise and the predicate of\r\nthe minor. This is reckoned as the first figure. When the middle term is\r\nthe predicate in both premises, the syllogism belongs to the second figure;\r\nwhen it is the subject in both, to the third. In the fourth figure the middle\r\nterm is the subject of the minor premise and the predicate of the major.\r\nThose writers who reckon no more than three figures, include this case in\r\nthe first.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nEach figure is divided into \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003emoods\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\naccording to what are called the \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003equantity\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nand \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003equality\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e of the propositions,\r\nthat is, according as they are universal\r\nor particular, affirmative or negative. The following are examples of all\r\nthe legitimate moods, that is, all those in which the conclusion correctly\r\nfollows from the premises. A is the minor term, C the major, B the middle\r\nterm.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-variant: small-caps\"\u003eFirst Figure.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctable summary=\"This is a table\" cellspacing=\"0\" class=\"tei tei-table\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\u003ccolgroup span=\"4\"\u003e\u003c/colgroup\u003e\u003ctbody\u003e\u003ctr class=\"tei tei-row\"\u003e\u003ctd class=\"tei tei-cell\"\u003eAll B is C\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"tei tei-cell\"\u003eNo B is C\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tei tei-cell\"\u003eAll B is C\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"tei tei-cell\"\u003eNo B is C\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr class=\"tei tei-row\"\u003e\u003ctd class=\"tei tei-cell\"\u003eAll A is B\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"tei tei-cell\"\u003eAll A is B\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tei tei-cell\"\u003eSome A is B\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"tei tei-cell\"\u003eSome A is B\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr class=\"tei tei-row\"\u003e\u003ctd class=\"tei tei-cell\"\u003etherefore\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"tei tei-cell\"\u003etherefore\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tei tei-cell\"\u003etherefore\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"tei tei-cell\"\u003etherefore\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr class=\"tei tei-row\"\u003e\u003ctd class=\"tei tei-cell\"\u003eAll A is C\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"tei tei-cell\"\u003eNo A is C\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tei tei-cell\"\u003eSome A is C\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"tei tei-cell\"\u003eSome A is not C\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/tbody\u003e\u003c/table\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-variant: small-caps\"\u003eSecond Figure.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctable summary=\"This is a table\" cellspacing=\"0\" class=\"tei tei-table\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\u003ccolgroup span=\"4\"\u003e\u003c/colgroup\u003e\u003ctbody\u003e\u003ctr class=\"tei tei-row\"\u003e\u003ctd class=\"tei tei-cell\"\u003eNo C is B\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"tei tei-cell\"\u003eAll C is B\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tei tei-cell\"\u003eNo C is B\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"tei tei-cell\"\u003eAll C is B\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr class=\"tei tei-row\"\u003e\u003ctd class=\"tei tei-cell\"\u003eAll A is B\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"tei tei-cell\"\u003eNo A is B\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tei tei-cell\"\u003eSome A is B\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"tei tei-cell\"\u003eSome A is not B\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr class=\"tei tei-row\"\u003e\u003ctd class=\"tei tei-cell\"\u003etherefore\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"tei tei-cell\"\u003etherefore\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tei tei-cell\"\u003etherefore\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"tei tei-cell\"\u003etherefore\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr class=\"tei tei-row\"\u003e\u003ctd class=\"tei tei-cell\"\u003eNo A is C\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"tei tei-cell\"\u003eNo A is C\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tei tei-cell\"\u003eSome A is not C\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"tei tei-cell\"\u003eSome A is not C\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/tbody\u003e\u003c/table\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-variant: small-caps\"\u003eThird Figure.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctable summary=\"This is a table\" cellspacing=\"0\" class=\"tei tei-table\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\u003ccolgroup span=\"6\"\u003e\u003c/colgroup\u003e\u003ctbody\u003e\u003ctr class=\"tei tei-row\"\u003e\u003ctd class=\"tei tei-cell\"\u003eAll B is C\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"tei tei-cell\"\u003eNo B is C\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"tei tei-cell\"\u003eSome B is C\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tei tei-cell\"\u003eAll B is C\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"tei tei-cell\"\u003eSome B is not C\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"tei tei-cell\"\u003eNo B is C\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr class=\"tei tei-row\"\u003e\u003ctd class=\"tei tei-cell\"\u003eAll B is A\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"tei tei-cell\"\u003eAll B is A\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"tei tei-cell\"\u003eAll B is A\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tei tei-cell\"\u003eSome B is A\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"tei tei-cell\"\u003eAll B is A\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"tei tei-cell\"\u003eSome B is A\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr class=\"tei tei-row\"\u003e\u003ctd class=\"tei tei-cell\"\u003etherefore\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"tei tei-cell\"\u003etherefore\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"tei tei-cell\"\u003etherefore\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tei tei-cell\"\u003etherefore\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"tei tei-cell\"\u003etherefore\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"tei tei-cell\"\u003etherefore\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr class=\"tei tei-row\"\u003e\u003ctd class=\"tei tei-cell\"\u003eSome A is C\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"tei tei-cell\"\u003eSome A is not C\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"tei tei-cell\"\u003eSome A is C\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tei tei-cell\"\u003eSome A is C\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"tei tei-cell\"\u003eSome A is not C\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"tei tei-cell\"\u003eSome A is not C\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/tbody\u003e\u003c/table\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-variant: small-caps\"\u003eFourth Figure.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctable summary=\"This is a table\" cellspacing=\"0\" class=\"tei tei-table\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\u003ccolgroup span=\"5\"\u003e\u003c/colgroup\u003e\u003ctbody\u003e\u003ctr class=\"tei tei-row\"\u003e\u003ctd class=\"tei tei-cell\"\u003eAll C is B\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"tei tei-cell\"\u003eAll C is B\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"tei tei-cell\"\u003eSome C is B\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tei tei-cell\"\u003eNo C is B\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"tei tei-cell\"\u003eNo C is B\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr class=\"tei tei-row\"\u003e\u003ctd class=\"tei tei-cell\"\u003eAll B is A\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"tei tei-cell\"\u003eNo B is A\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"tei tei-cell\"\u003eAll B is A\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tei tei-cell\"\u003eAll B is A\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"tei tei-cell\"\u003eSome B is A\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr class=\"tei tei-row\"\u003e\u003ctd class=\"tei tei-cell\"\u003etherefore\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"tei tei-cell\"\u003etherefore\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"tei tei-cell\"\u003etherefore\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tei tei-cell\"\u003etherefore\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"tei tei-cell\"\u003etherefore\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr class=\"tei tei-row\"\u003e\u003ctd class=\"tei tei-cell\"\u003eSome A is C\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"tei tei-cell\"\u003eSome A is not C\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"tei tei-cell\"\u003eSome A is C\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003ctd class=\"tei tei-cell\"\u003eSome A is not C\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"tei tei-cell\"\u003eSome A is not C\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/tbody\u003e\u003c/table\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIn these exemplars, or blank forms for making syllogisms, no place is\r\nassigned to \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003esingular\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e propositions;\r\nnot, of course, because such propositions\r\nare not used in ratiocination, but because, their predicate being affirmed\r\nor denied of the whole of the subject, they are ranked, for the purposes\r\nof the syllogism, with universal propositions. Thus, these two syllogisms—\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctable summary=\"This is a table\" cellspacing=\"0\" class=\"tei tei-table\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\u003ccolgroup span=\"2\"\u003e\u003c/colgroup\u003e\u003ctbody\u003e\u003ctr class=\"tei tei-row\"\u003e\u003ctd class=\"tei tei-cell\"\u003eAll men are mortal,\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"tei tei-cell\"\u003eAll men are mortal,\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr class=\"tei tei-row\"\u003e\u003ctd class=\"tei tei-cell\"\u003eAll kings are men,\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"tei tei-cell\"\u003eSocrates is a man,\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr class=\"tei tei-row\"\u003e\u003ctd class=\"tei tei-cell\"\u003etherefore\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"tei tei-cell\"\u003etherefore\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr class=\"tei tei-row\"\u003e\u003ctd class=\"tei tei-cell\"\u003eAll kings are mortal,\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"tei tei-cell\"\u003eSocrates is mortal,\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/tbody\u003e\u003c/table\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nare arguments precisely similar, and are both ranked in the first mood of\r\nthe first figure.\u003ca id=\"noteref_50\" name=\"noteref_50\" href=\"#note_50\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e50\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page128\"\u003e[pg 128]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg128\" id=\"Pg128\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe reasons why syllogisms in any of the above forms are legitimate,\r\nthat is, why, if the premises are true, the conclusion must inevitably be so,\r\nand why this is not the case in any other possible mood (that is, in any\r\nother combination of universal and particular, affirmative and negative\r\npropositions), any person taking interest in these inquiries may be presumed\r\nto have either learned from the common-school books of the syllogistic\r\nlogic, or to be capable of discovering for himself. The reader may,\r\nhowever, be referred, for every needful explanation, to Archbishop Whately’s\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eElements of Logic\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, where he will find stated with philosophical\r\nprecision, and explained with remarkable perspicuity, the whole of the common\r\ndoctrine of the syllogism.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAll valid ratiocination; all reasoning by which, from general propositions\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page129\"\u003e[pg 129]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg129\" id=\"Pg129\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\npreviously admitted, other propositions equally or less general are inferred;\r\nmay be exhibited in some of the above forms. The whole of Euclid, for\r\nexample, might be thrown without difficulty into a series of syllogisms,\r\nregular in mood and figure.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThough a syllogism framed according to any of these formulæ is a valid\r\nargument, all correct ratiocination admits of being stated in syllogisms of\r\nthe first figure alone. The rules for throwing an argument in any of the\r\nother figures into the first figure, are called rules for the\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ereduction\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e of syllogisms. It is done by the\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003econversion\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e of one or other, or both, of the premises.\r\nThus an argument in the first mood of the second figure, as—\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nNo C is B\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nAll A is B\u003cbr /\u003e\r\ntherefore\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nNo A is C,\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nmay be reduced as follows. The proposition, No C is B, being a universal\r\nnegative, admits of simple conversion, and may be changed into No B is\r\nC, which, as we showed, is the very same assertion in other words—the\r\nsame fact differently expressed. This transformation having been effected,\r\nthe argument assumes the following form:\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nNo B is C\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nAll A is B\u003cbr /\u003e\r\ntherefore\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nNo A is C,\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nwhich is a good syllogism in the second mood of the first figure. Again,\r\nan argument in the first mood of the third figure must resemble the following:\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAll B is C\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nAll B is A\u003cbr /\u003e\r\ntherefore\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nSome A is C,\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nwhere the minor premise, All B is A, conformably to what was laid down\r\nin the last chapter respecting universal affirmatives, does not admit of simple\r\nconversion, but may be converted \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eper\r\naccidens\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, thus, Some A is B;\r\nwhich, though it does not express the whole of what is asserted in the\r\nproposition All B is A, expresses, as was formerly shown, part of it, and\r\nmust therefore be true if the whole is true. We have, then, as the result\r\nof the reduction, the following syllogism in the third mood of the first\r\nfigure:\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAll B is C\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nSome A is B,\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nfrom which it obviously follows, that\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nSome A is C.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIn the same manner, or in a manner on which after these examples it is\r\nnot necessary to enlarge, every mood of the second, third, and fourth figures\r\nmay be reduced to some one of the four moods of the first. In other\r\nwords, every conclusion which can be proved in any of the last three figures,\r\nmay be proved in the first figure from the same premises, with a\r\nslight alteration in the mere manner of expressing them. Every valid ratiocination,\r\ntherefore, may be stated in the first figure, that is, in one of the\r\nfollowing forms:\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page130\"\u003e[pg 130]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg130\" id=\"Pg130\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctable summary=\"This is a table\" cellspacing=\"0\" class=\"tei tei-table\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\u003ccolgroup span=\"2\"\u003e\u003c/colgroup\u003e\u003ctbody\u003e\u003ctr class=\"tei tei-row\"\u003e\u003ctd class=\"tei tei-cell\"\u003eEvery B is C\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"tei tei-cell\"\u003eNo B is C\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr class=\"tei tei-row\"\u003e\u003ctd class=\"tei tei-cell\"\u003eAll A is B,\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"tei tei-cell\"\u003eAll A is B,\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr class=\"tei tei-row\"\u003e\u003ctd class=\"tei tei-cell\"\u003eSome A is B,\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"tei tei-cell\"\u003eSome A is B,\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr class=\"tei tei-row\"\u003e\u003ctd class=\"tei tei-cell\"\u003etherefore\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"tei tei-cell\"\u003etherefore\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr class=\"tei tei-row\"\u003e\u003ctd class=\"tei tei-cell\"\u003eAll A is C.\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"tei tei-cell\"\u003eNo A is C.\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003ctr class=\"tei tei-row\"\u003e\u003ctd class=\"tei tei-cell\"\u003eSome A is C.\u003c/td\u003e\u003ctd class=\"tei tei-cell\"\u003eSome A is not C.\u003c/td\u003e\u003c/tr\u003e\u003c/tbody\u003e\u003c/table\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nOr, if more significant symbols are preferred:\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nTo prove an affirmative, the argument must admit of being stated in this\r\nform:\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAll animals are mortal;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nAll men/Some men/Socrates are animals;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\ntherefore\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nAll men/Some men/Socrates are mortal.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nTo prove a negative, the argument must be capable of being expressed\r\nin this form:\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nNo one who is capable of self-control is necessarily vicious;\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nNo one who is capable of self-control is necessarily vicious;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nAll negroes/Some negroes/Mr. A’s negro are capable of self-control;\u003cbr /\u003e\r\ntherefore\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nNo negroes are/Some negroes are not/Mr. A’s negro is not necessarily vicious.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThough all ratiocination admits of being thrown into one or the other of\r\nthese forms, and sometimes gains considerably by the transformation, both\r\nin clearness and in the obviousness of its consequence; there are, no doubt,\r\ncases in which the argument falls more naturally into one of the other three\r\nfigures, and in which its conclusiveness is more apparent at the first glance\r\nin those figures, than when reduced to the first. Thus, if the proposition\r\nwere that pagans may be virtuous, and the evidence to prove it were the\r\nexample of Aristides; a syllogism in the third figure,\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAristides was virtuous,\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nAristides was a pagan,\u003cbr /\u003e\r\ntherefore\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nSome pagan was virtuous,\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nwould be a more natural mode of stating the argument, and would carry\r\nconviction more instantly home, than the same ratiocination strained into\r\nthe first figure, thus—\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAristides was virtuous,\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nSome pagan was Aristides,\u003cbr /\u003e\r\ntherefore\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nSome pagan was virtuous.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nA German philosopher, Lambert, whose \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eNeues Organon\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e (published in\r\nthe year 1764) contains among other things one of the most elaborate and\r\ncomplete expositions which had ever been made of the syllogistic doctrine,\r\nhas expressly examined what sort of arguments fall most naturally and suitably\r\ninto each of the four figures; and his investigation is characterized by\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page131\"\u003e[pg 131]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg131\" id=\"Pg131\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\ngreat ingenuity and clearness of thought.\u003ca id=\"noteref_51\" name=\"noteref_51\" href=\"#note_51\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e51\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nThe argument, however, is one\r\nand the same, in whichever figure it is expressed; since, as we have already\r\nseen, the premises of a syllogism in the second, third, or fourth figure, and\r\nthose of the syllogism in the first figure to which it may be reduced, are\r\nthe same premises in every thing except language, or, at least, as much of\r\nthem as contributes to the proof of the conclusion is the same. We are\r\ntherefore at liberty, in conformity with the general opinion of logicians, to\r\nconsider the two elementary forms of the first figure as the universal types\r\nof all correct ratiocination; the one, when the conclusion to be proved is\r\naffirmative, the other, when it is negative; even though certain arguments\r\nmay have a tendency to clothe themselves in the forms of the second, third,\r\nand fourth figures; which, however, can not possibly happen with the only\r\nclass of arguments which are of first-rate scientific importance, those in\r\nwhich the conclusion is a universal affirmative, such conclusions being susceptible\r\nof proof in the first figure alone.\u003ca id=\"noteref_52\" name=\"noteref_52\" href=\"#note_52\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e52\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page132\"\u003e[pg 132]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg132\" id=\"Pg132\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 2. On examining, then, these two general formulæ, we find that in\r\nboth of them, one premise, the major, is a universal proposition; and according\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page133\"\u003e[pg 133]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg133\" id=\"Pg133\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nas this is affirmative or negative, the conclusion is so too. All\r\nratiocination, therefore, starts from a \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003egeneral\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e proposition, principle, or\r\nassumption: a proposition in which a predicate is affirmed or denied of an\r\nentire class; that is, in which some attribute, or the negation of some\r\nattribute, is asserted of an indefinite number of objects distinguished\r\nby a common characteristic, and designated, in consequence, by a common\r\nname.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe other premise is always affirmative, and asserts that something (which\r\nmay be either an individual, a class, or part of a class) belongs to, or is included\r\nin, the class respecting which something was affirmed or denied in\r\nthe major premise. It follows that the attribute affirmed or denied of the\r\nentire class may (if that affirmation or denial was correct) be affirmed or\r\ndenied of the object or objects alleged to be included in the class: and this\r\nis precisely the assertion made in the conclusion.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWhether or not the foregoing is an adequate account of the constituent\r\nparts of the syllogism, will be presently considered; but as far as it goes it\r\nis a true account. It has accordingly been generalized, and erected into a\r\nlogical maxim, on which all ratiocination is said to be founded, insomuch\r\nthat to reason, and to apply the maxim, are supposed to be one and the\r\nsame thing. The maxim is, That whatever can be affirmed (or denied) of\r\na class, may be affirmed (or denied) of every thing included in the class.\r\nThis axiom, supposed to be the basis of the syllogistic theory, is termed by\r\nlogicians the \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003edictum de omni et nullo\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThis maxim, however, when considered as a principle of reasoning, appears\r\nsuited to a system of metaphysics once indeed generally received, but\r\nwhich for the last two centuries has been considered as finally abandoned,\r\nthough there have not been wanting in our own day attempts at its revival.\r\nSo long as what are termed Universals were regarded as a peculiar kind of\r\nsubstances, having an objective existence distinct from the individual objects\r\nclassed under them, the \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003edictum de omni\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nconveyed an important meaning;\r\nbecause it expressed the intercommunity of nature, which it was necessary\r\non that theory that we should suppose to exist between those general\r\nsubstances and the particular substances which were subordinated to\r\nthem. That every thing predicable of the universal was predicable of the\r\nvarious individuals contained under it, was then no identical proposition,\r\nbut a statement of what was conceived as a fundamental law of the universe.\r\nThe assertion that the entire nature and properties of the \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003esubstantia secunda\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e formed part of the nature and properties of\r\neach of the individual substances called by the same name; that the properties of Man, for\r\nexample, were properties of all men; was a proposition of real significance\r\nwhen man did not \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003emean\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e all men, but something inherent in men, and vastly\r\nsuperior to them in dignity. Now, however, when it is known that a\r\nclass, a universal, a genus or species, is not an entity \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eper se\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\nbut neither more nor less than the individual substances themselves which are placed\r\nin the class, and that there is nothing real in the matter except those objects,\r\na common name given to them, and common attributes indicated by the\r\nname; what, I should be glad to know, do we learn by being told, that\r\nwhatever can be affirmed of a class, may be affirmed of every object contained\r\nin the class? The class \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eis\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e nothing but the objects contained in it:\r\nand the \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003edictum de omni\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nmerely amounts to the identical proposition, that\r\nwhatever is true of certain objects, is true of each of those objects. If all\r\nratiocination were no more than the application of this maxim to particular\r\ncases, the syllogism would indeed be, what it has so often been declared to\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page134\"\u003e[pg 134]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg134\" id=\"Pg134\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nbe, solemn trifling. The \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003edictum de omni\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nis on a par with another truth,\r\nwhich in its time was also reckoned of great importance, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Whatever is,\r\nis.”\u003c/span\u003e To give any real meaning to the \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003edictum\r\nde omni\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, we must consider\r\nit not as an axiom, but as a definition; we must look upon it as intended\r\nto explain, in a circuitous and paraphrastic manner, the meaning of the\r\nword \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eclass\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAn error which seemed finally refuted and dislodged from thought, often\r\nneeds only put on a new suit of phrases, to be welcomed back to its old\r\nquarters, and allowed to repose unquestioned for another cycle of ages.\r\nModern philosophers have not been sparing in their contempt for the scholastic\r\ndogma that genera and species are a peculiar kind of substances, which\r\ngeneral substances being the only permanent things, while the individual\r\nsubstances comprehended under them are in a perpetual flux, knowledge,\r\nwhich necessarily imports stability, can only have relation to those general\r\nsubstances or universals, and not to the facts or particulars included under\r\nthem. Yet, though nominally rejected, this very doctrine, whether disguised\r\nunder the Abstract Ideas of Locke (whose speculations, however, it\r\nhas less vitiated than those of perhaps any other writer who has been infected\r\nwith it), under the ultra-nominalism of Hobbes and Condillac, or the\r\nontology of the later German schools, has never ceased to poison philosophy.\r\nOnce accustomed to consider scientific investigation as essentially consisting\r\nin the study of universals, men did not drop this habit of thought when\r\nthey ceased to regard universals as possessing an independent existence:\r\nand even those who went the length of considering them as mere names,\r\ncould not free themselves from the notion that the investigation of truth\r\nconsisted entirely or partly in some kind of conjuration or juggle with those\r\nnames. When a philosopher adopted fully the Nominalist view of the\r\nsignification of general language, retaining along with it the\r\n\u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003edictum de omni\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nas the foundation of all reasoning, two such premises fairly put together\r\nwere likely, if he was a consistent thinker, to land him in rather\r\nstartling conclusions. Accordingly it has been seriously held, by writers\r\nof deserved celebrity, that the process of arriving at new truths by reasoning\r\nconsists in the mere substitution of one set of arbitrary signs for another;\r\na doctrine which they suppose to derive irresistible confirmation\r\nfrom the example of algebra. If there were any process in sorcery or\r\nnecromancy more preternatural than this, I should be much surprised.\r\nThe culminating point of this philosophy is the noted aphorism of Condillac,\r\nthat a science is nothing, or scarcely any thing, but \u003cspan lang=\"fr\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"fr\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eune langue bien faite\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e;\r\nin other words, that the one sufficient rule for discovering the nature\r\nand properties of objects is to name them properly: as if the reverse were\r\nnot the truth, that it is impossible to name them properly except in proportion\r\nas we are already acquainted with their nature and properties. Can\r\nit be necessary to say, that none, not even the most trivial knowledge with\r\nrespect to Things, ever was or could be originally got at by any conceivable\r\nmanipulation of mere names, as such; and that what can be learned from\r\nnames, is only what somebody who used the names knew before? Philosophical\r\nanalysis confirms the indication of common sense, that the function\r\nof names is but that of enabling us to \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eremember\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e and to\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ecommunicate\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e our thoughts. That they also strengthen, even to an\r\nincalculable extent, the power of thought itself, is most true: but they do this by no\r\nintrinsic and peculiar virtue; they do it by the power inherent in an artificial memory,\r\nan instrument of which few have adequately considered the immense\r\npotency. As an artificial memory, language truly is, what it has so often\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page135\"\u003e[pg 135]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg135\" id=\"Pg135\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nbeen called, an instrument of thought; but it is one thing to be the instrument,\r\nand another to be the exclusive subject upon which the instrument\r\nis exercised. We think, indeed, to a considerable extent, by means of\r\nnames, but what we think of, are the things called by those names; and\r\nthere can not be a greater error than to imagine that thought can be carried\r\non with nothing in our mind but names, or that we can make the\r\nnames think for us.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ca name=\"Book_II_Chapter_II_Section_3\" id=\"Book_II_Chapter_II_Section_3\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 3. Those who considered the \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003edictum de omni\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nas the foundation of the\r\nsyllogism, looked upon arguments in a manner corresponding to the erroneous\r\nview which Hobbes took of propositions. Because there are some\r\npropositions which are merely verbal, Hobbes, in order apparently that his\r\ndefinition might be rigorously universal, defined a proposition as if no\r\npropositions declared any thing except the meaning of words. If Hobbes\r\nwas right; if no further account than this could be given of the import of\r\npropositions; no theory could be given but the commonly received one,\r\nof the combination of propositions in a syllogism. If the minor premise\r\nasserted nothing more than that something belongs to a class, and if the\r\nmajor premise asserted nothing of that class except that it is included in\r\nanother class, the conclusion would only be that what was included in the\r\nlower class is included in the higher, and the result, therefore, nothing except\r\nthat the classification is consistent with itself. But we have seen that\r\nit is no sufficient account of the meaning of a proposition, to say that it\r\nrefers something to, or excludes something from, a class. Every proposition\r\nwhich conveys real information asserts a matter of fact, dependent on\r\nthe laws of nature, and not on classification. It asserts that a given object\r\ndoes or does not possess a given attribute; or it asserts that two attributes,\r\nor sets of attributes, do or do not (constantly or occasionally) co-exist.\r\nSince such is the purport of all propositions which convey any real\r\nknowledge, and since ratiocination is a mode of acquiring real knowledge,\r\nany theory of ratiocination which does not recognize this import of propositions,\r\ncan not, we may be sure, be the true one.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nApplying this view of propositions to the two premises of a syllogism,\r\nwe obtain the following results. The major premise, which, as already\r\nremarked, is always universal, asserts, that all things which have a certain\r\nattribute (or attributes) have or have not along with it, a certain other attribute\r\n(or attributes). The minor premise asserts that the thing or set\r\nof things which are the subject of that premise, have the first-mentioned\r\nattribute; and the conclusion is, that they have (or that they have not), the\r\nsecond. Thus in our former example,\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAll men are mortal,\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nSocrates is a man,\u003cbr /\u003e\r\ntherefore\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nSocrates is mortal,\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nthe subject and predicate of the major premise are connotative terms, denoting\r\nobjects and connoting attributes. The assertion in the major premise\r\nis, that along with one of the two sets of attributes, we always find\r\nthe other: that the attributes connoted by \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“man”\u003c/span\u003e never exist unless conjoined\r\nwith the attribute called mortality. The assertion in the minor premise\r\nis that the individual named Socrates possesses the former attributes;\r\nand it is concluded that he possesses also the attribute mortality. Or, if\r\nboth the premises are general propositions, as\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page136\"\u003e[pg 136]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg136\" id=\"Pg136\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAll men are mortal,\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nAll kings are men,\u003cbr /\u003e\r\ntherefore\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nAll kings are mortal,\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nthe minor premise asserts that the attributes denoted by kingship only\r\nexist in conjunction with those signified by the word man. The major\r\nasserts as before, that the last-mentioned attributes are never found without\r\nthe attribute of mortality. The conclusion is, that wherever the attributes\r\nof kingship are found, that of mortality is found also.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIf the major premise were negative, as, No men are omnipotent, it would\r\nassert, not that the attributes connoted by \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“man”\u003c/span\u003e never exist without, but\r\nthat they never exist with, those connoted by \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“omnipotent:”\u003c/span\u003e from which,\r\ntogether with the minor premise, it is concluded, that the same incompatibility\r\nexists between the attribute omnipotence and those constituting a\r\nking. In a similar manner we might analyze any other example of the\r\nsyllogism.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIf we generalize this process, and look out for the principle or law involved\r\nin every such inference, and presupposed in every syllogism, the\r\npropositions of which are any thing more than merely verbal; we find, not\r\nthe unmeaning \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003edictum de omni et\r\nnullo\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, but a fundamental principle, or\r\nrather two principles, strikingly resembling the axioms of mathematics.\r\nThe first, which is the principle of affirmative syllogisms, is, that things\r\nwhich co-exist with the same thing, co-exist with one another: or (still more\r\nprecisely) a thing which co-exists with another thing, which other co-exists\r\nwith a third thing, also co-exists with that third thing. The second is the\r\nprinciple of negative syllogisms, and is to this effect: that a thing which\r\nco-exists with another thing, with which other a third thing does not co-exist,\r\nis not co-existent with that third thing. These axioms manifestly relate\r\nto facts, and not to conventions; and one or other of them is the ground of\r\nthe legitimacy of every argument in which facts and not conventions are\r\nthe matter treated of.\u003ca id=\"noteref_53\" name=\"noteref_53\" href=\"#note_53\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e53\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page137\"\u003e[pg 137]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg137\" id=\"Pg137\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 4. It remains to translate this exposition of the syllogism from the\r\none into the other of the two languages in which we formerly\r\nremarked\u003ca id=\"noteref_54\" name=\"noteref_54\" href=\"#note_54\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e54\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nthat all propositions, and of course therefore all combinations of propositions,\r\nmight be expressed. We observed that a proposition might be considered\r\nin two different lights; as a portion of our knowledge of nature,\r\nor as a memorandum for our guidance. Under the former, or speculative\r\naspect, an affirmative general proposition is an assertion of a speculative\r\ntruth, viz., that whatever has a certain attribute has a certain other attribute.\r\nUnder the other aspect, it is to be regarded not as a part of our knowledge,\r\nbut as an aid for our practical exigencies, by enabling us, when we see or\r\nlearn that an object possesses one of the two attributes, to infer that it possesses\r\nthe other; thus employing the first attribute as a mark or evidence\r\nof the second. Thus regarded, every syllogism comes within the following\r\ngeneral formula:\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAttribute A is a mark of attribute B,\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nThe given object has the mark A,\u003cbr /\u003e\r\ntherefore\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nThe given object has the attribute B.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nReferred to this type, the arguments which we have lately cited as\r\nspecimens of the syllogism, will express themselves in the following\r\nmanner:\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe attributes of man are a mark of the attribute mortality,\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nSocrates has the attributes of man,\u003cbr /\u003e\r\ntherefore\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nSocrates has the attribute mortality.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page138\"\u003e[pg 138]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg138\" id=\"Pg138\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAnd again,\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe attributes of man are a mark of the attribute mortality,\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nThe attributes of a king are a mark of the attributes of man,\u003cbr /\u003e\r\ntherefore\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nThe attributes of a king are a mark of the attribute mortality.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAnd, lastly,\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe attributes of man are a mark of the absence of the attribute omnipotence,\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nThe attributes of a king are a mark of the attributes of man,\u003cbr /\u003e\r\ntherefore\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nThe attributes of a king are a mark of the absence of the attribute signified by the\r\nword omnipotent (or, are evidence of the absence of that attribute).\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nTo correspond with this alteration in the form of the syllogisms, the axioms\r\non which the syllogistic process is founded must undergo a corresponding\r\ntransformation. In this altered phraseology, both those axioms\r\nmay be brought under one general expression; namely, that whatever has\r\nany mark, has that which it is a mark of. Or, when the minor premise as\r\nwell as the major is universal, we may state it thus: Whatever is a mark\r\nof any mark, is a mark of that which this last is a mark of. To trace the\r\nidentity of these axioms with those previously laid down, may be left to the\r\nintelligent reader. We shall find, as we proceed, the great convenience of\r\nthe phraseology into which we have last thrown them, and which is better\r\nadapted than any I am acquainted with, to express with precision and force\r\nwhat is aimed at, and actually accomplished, in every case of the ascertainment\r\nof a truth by ratiocination.\u003ca id=\"noteref_55\" name=\"noteref_55\" href=\"#note_55\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e55\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page139\"\u003e[pg 139]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg139\" id=\"Pg139\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-div\" style=\"margin-bottom: 4.00em; margin-top: 4.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"toc31\" id=\"toc31\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"pdf32\" id=\"pdf32\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"Book_II_Chapter_III\" id=\"Book_II_Chapter_III\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: center; margin-bottom: 2.40em; margin-top: 2.40em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 120%\"\u003eChapter III.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: left; margin-bottom: 2.88em; margin-top: 2.88em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 144%\"\u003eOf The Functions And Logical Value Of The Syllogism.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 1. We have shown what is the real nature of the truths with which\r\nthe Syllogism is conversant, in contradistinction to the more superficial\r\nmanner in which their import is conceived in the common theory; and\r\nwhat are the fundamental axioms on which its probative force or conclusiveness\r\ndepends. We have now to inquire, whether the syllogistic process,\r\nthat of reasoning from generals to particulars, is, or is not, a process\r\nof inference; a progress from the known to the unknown: a means of coming\r\nto a knowledge of something which we did not know before.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nLogicians have been remarkably unanimous in their mode of answering\r\nthis question. It is universally allowed that a syllogism is vicious if there\r\nbe any thing more in the conclusion than was assumed in the premises.\r\nBut this is, in fact, to say, that nothing ever was, or can be, proved by syllogism,\r\nwhich was not known, or assumed to be known, before. Is ratiocination,\r\nthen, not a process of inference? And is the syllogism, to which\r\nthe word reasoning has so often been represented to be exclusively appropriate,\r\nnot really entitled to be called reasoning at all? This seems an inevitable\r\nconsequence of the doctrine, admitted by all writers on the subject,\r\nthat a syllogism can prove no more than is involved in the premises.\r\nYet the acknowledgment so explicitly made, has not prevented one set of\r\nwriters from continuing to represent the syllogism as the correct analysis\r\nof what the mind actually performs in discovering and proving the larger\r\nhalf of the truths, whether of science or of daily life, which we believe;\r\nwhile those who have avoided this inconsistency, and followed out the general\r\ntheorem respecting the logical value of the syllogism to its legitimate\r\ncorollary, have been led to impute uselessness and frivolity to the syllogistic\r\ntheory itself, on the ground of the \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003epetitio\r\nprincipii\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e which they allege\r\nto be inherent in every syllogism. As I believe both these opinions to be\r\nfundamentally erroneous, I must request the attention of the reader to certain\r\nconsiderations, without which any just appreciation of the true character\r\nof the syllogism, and the functions it performs in philosophy, appears\r\nto me impossible; but which seem to have been either overlooked, or insufficiently\r\nadverted to, both by the defenders of the syllogistic theory and\r\nby its assailants.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 2. It must be granted that in every syllogism, considered as an\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page140\"\u003e[pg 140]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg140\" id=\"Pg140\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nargument to prove the conclusion, there is a \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003epetitio principii\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e. When\r\nwe say,\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAll men are mortal,\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nSocrates is a man,\u003cbr /\u003e\r\ntherefore\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nSocrates is mortal;\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nit is unanswerably urged by the adversaries of the syllogistic theory, that\r\nthe proposition, Socrates is mortal, is presupposed in the more general assumption,\r\nAll men are mortal: that we can not be assured of the mortality\r\nof all men, unless we are already certain of the mortality of every individual\r\nman: that if it be still doubtful whether Socrates, or any other individual\r\nwe choose to name, be mortal or not, the same degree of uncertainty\r\nmust hang over the assertion, All men are mortal: that the general\r\nprinciple, instead of being given as evidence of the particular case, can not\r\nitself be taken for true without exception, until every shadow of doubt\r\nwhich could affect any case comprised with it, is dispelled by evidence\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-foreign\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ealiundè\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e; and then\r\nwhat remains for the syllogism to prove? That, in\r\nshort, no reasoning from generals to particulars can, as such, prove any\r\nthing: since from a general principle we can not infer any particulars, but\r\nthose which the principle itself assumes as known.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThis doctrine appears to me irrefragable; and if logicians, though unable\r\nto dispute it, have usually exhibited a strong disposition to explain it\r\naway, this was not because they could discover any flaw in the argument\r\nitself, but because the contrary opinion seemed to rest on arguments equally\r\nindisputable. In the syllogism last referred to, for example, or in any of\r\nthose which we previously constructed, is it not evident that the conclusion\r\nmay, to the person to whom the syllogism is presented, be actually\r\nand \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ebona fide\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\na new truth? Is it not matter of daily experience that\r\ntruths previously unthought of, facts which have not been, and can not be,\r\ndirectly observed, are arrived at by way of general reasoning? We believe\r\nthat the Duke of Wellington is mortal. We do not know this by direct\r\nobservation, so long as he is not yet dead. If we were asked how,\r\nthis being the case, we know the duke to be mortal, we should probably\r\nanswer, Because all men are so. Here, therefore, we arrive at the knowledge\r\nof a truth not (as yet) susceptible of observation, by a reasoning\r\nwhich admits of being exhibited in the following syllogism:\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAll men are mortal,\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nThe Duke of Wellington is a man,\u003cbr /\u003e\r\ntherefore\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nThe Duke of Wellington is mortal.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAnd since a large portion of our knowledge is thus acquired, logicians\r\nhave persisted in representing the syllogism as a process of inference or\r\nproof; though none of them has cleared up the difficulty which arises from\r\nthe inconsistency between that assertion, and the principle, that if there be\r\nany thing in the conclusion which was not already asserted in the premises,\r\nthe argument is vicious. For it is impossible to attach any serious\r\nscientific value to such a mere salvo, as the distinction drawn between being\r\ninvolved \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eby implication\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e in the premises, and being directly asserted in\r\nthem. When Archbishop Whately says\u003ca id=\"noteref_56\" name=\"noteref_56\" href=\"#note_56\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e56\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e that the object of reasoning is\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“merely to expand and unfold the assertions wrapped up, as it were, and\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page141\"\u003e[pg 141]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg141\" id=\"Pg141\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nimplied in those with which we set out, and to bring a person to perceive\r\nand acknowledge the full force of that which he has admitted,”\u003c/span\u003e he does\r\nnot, I think, meet the real difficulty requiring to be explained, namely, how\r\nit happens that a science, like geometry, \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ecan\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e be all \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“wrapped up”\u003c/span\u003e in a\r\nfew definitions and axioms. Nor does this defense of the syllogism differ\r\nmuch from what its assailants urge against it as an accusation, when they\r\ncharge it with being of no use except to those who seek to press the consequences\r\nof an admission into which a person has been entrapped without\r\nhaving considered and understood its full force. When you admitted the\r\nmajor premise, you asserted the conclusion; but, says Archbishop Whately,\r\nyou asserted it by implication merely: this, however, can here only\r\nmean that you asserted it unconsciously; that you did not know you were\r\nasserting it; but, if so, the difficulty revives in this shape—Ought you not\r\nto have known? Were you warranted in asserting the general proposition\r\nwithout having satisfied yourself of the truth of every thing which it\r\nfairly includes? And if not, is not the syllogistic art \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eprima facie\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e what its\r\nassailants affirm it to be, a contrivance for catching you in a trap, and holding\r\nyou fast in it?\u003ca id=\"noteref_57\" name=\"noteref_57\" href=\"#note_57\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e57\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 3. From this difficulty there appears to be but one issue. The proposition\r\nthat the Duke of Wellington is mortal, is evidently an inference; it\r\nis got at as a conclusion from something else; but do we, in reality, conclude\r\nit from the proposition, All men are mortal? I answer, no.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe error committed is, I conceive, that of overlooking the distinction between\r\ntwo parts of the process of philosophizing, the inferring part, and the\r\nregistering part; and ascribing to the latter the functions of the former.\r\nThe mistake is that of referring a person to his own notes for the origin of\r\nhis knowledge. If a person is asked a question, and is at the moment unable\r\nto answer it, he may refresh his memory by turning to a memorandum\r\nwhich he carries about with him. But if he were asked, how the fact came\r\nto his knowledge, he would scarcely answer, because it was set down in his\r\nnote-book: unless the book was written, like the Koran, with a quill from\r\nthe wing of the angel Gabriel.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAssuming that the proposition, The Duke of Wellington is mortal, is\r\nimmediately an inference from the proposition, All men are mortal; whence\r\ndo we derive our knowledge of that general truth? Of course from observation.\r\nNow, all which man can observe are individual cases. From\r\nthese all general truths must be drawn, and into these they may be again\r\nresolved; for a general truth is but an aggregate of particular truths; a\r\ncomprehensive expression, by which an indefinite number of individual\r\nfacts are affirmed or denied at once. But a general proposition is not\r\nmerely a compendious form for recording and preserving in the memory a\r\nnumber of particular facts, all of which have been observed. Generalization\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page142\"\u003e[pg 142]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg142\" id=\"Pg142\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nis not a process of mere naming, it is also a process of inference.\r\nFrom instances which we have observed, we feel warranted in concluding,\r\nthat what we found true in those instances, holds in all similar ones, past,\r\npresent, and future, however numerous they may be. We then, by that\r\nvaluable contrivance of language which enables us to speak of many as if\r\nthey were one, record all that we have observed, together with all that we\r\ninfer from our observations, in one concise expression; and have thus only\r\none proposition, instead of an endless number, to remember or to communicate.\r\nThe results of many observations and inferences, and instructions\r\nfor making innumerable inferences in unforeseen cases, are compressed\r\ninto one short sentence.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWhen, therefore, we conclude from the death of John and Thomas, and\r\nevery other person we ever heard of in whose case the experiment had\r\nbeen fairly tried, that the Duke of Wellington is mortal like the rest; we\r\nmay, indeed, pass through the generalization, All men are mortal, as an intermediate\r\nstage; but it is not in the latter half of the process, the descent\r\nfrom all men to the Duke of Wellington, that the \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003einference\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e resides.\r\nThe inference is finished when we have asserted that all men are mortal.\r\nWhat remains to be performed afterward is merely deciphering our own\r\nnotes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nArchbishop Whately has contended that syllogizing, or reasoning from\r\ngenerals to particulars, is not, agreeably to the vulgar idea, a peculiar\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003emode\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e of reasoning, but the philosophical analysis of\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ethe\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e mode in which all men\r\nreason, and must do so if they reason at all. With the deference due to so\r\nhigh an authority, I can not help thinking that the vulgar notion is, in this\r\ncase, the more correct. If, from our experience of John, Thomas, etc., who\r\nonce were living, but are now dead, we are entitled to conclude that all human\r\nbeings are mortal, we might surely without any logical inconsequence\r\nhave concluded at once from those instances, that the Duke of Wellington\r\nis mortal. The mortality of John, Thomas, and others is, after all, the\r\nwhole evidence we have for the mortality of the Duke of Wellington. Not\r\none iota is added to the proof by interpolating a general proposition.\r\nSince the individual cases are all the evidence we can possess, evidence\r\nwhich no logical form into which we choose to throw it can make greater\r\nthan it is; and since that evidence is either sufficient in itself, or, if insufficient\r\nfor the one purpose, can not be sufficient for the other; I am unable\r\nto see why we should be forbidden to take the shortest cut from these\r\nsufficient premises to the conclusion, and constrained to travel the \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“high\r\npriori road,”\u003c/span\u003e by the arbitrary fiat of logicians. I can not perceive why it\r\nshould be impossible to journey from one place to another unless we\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“march up a hill, and then march down again.”\u003c/span\u003e It may be the safest\r\nroad, and there may be a resting-place at the top of the hill, affording a\r\ncommanding view of the surrounding country; but for the mere purpose\r\nof arriving at our journey’s end, our taking that road is perfectly optional;\r\nit is a question of time, trouble, and danger.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nNot only \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003emay\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e we reason from particulars to particulars without passing\r\nthrough generals, but we perpetually do so reason. All our earliest inferences\r\nare of this nature. From the first dawn of intelligence we draw inferences,\r\nbut years elapse before we learn the use of general language.\r\nThe child, who, having burned his fingers, avoids to thrust them again into\r\nthe fire, has reasoned or inferred, though he has never thought of the general\r\nmaxim, Fire burns. He knows from memory that he has been burned,\r\nand on this evidence believes, when he sees a candle, that if he puts his\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page143\"\u003e[pg 143]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg143\" id=\"Pg143\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nfinger into the flame of it, he will be burned again. He believes this in every\r\ncase which happens to arise; but without looking, in each instance, beyond\r\nthe present case. He is not generalizing; he is inferring a particular\r\nfrom particulars. In the same way, also, brutes reason. There is\r\nno ground for attributing to any of the lower animals the use of signs, of\r\nsuch a nature as to render general propositions possible. But those animals\r\nprofit by experience, and avoid what they have found to cause them\r\npain, in the same manner, though not always with the same skill, as a\r\nhuman creature. Not only the burned child, but the burned dog, dreads\r\nthe fire.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nI believe that, in point of fact, when drawing inferences from our personal\r\nexperience, and not from maxims handed down to us by books or\r\ntradition, we much oftener conclude from particulars to particulars directly,\r\nthan through the intermediate agency of any general proposition. We are\r\nconstantly reasoning from ourselves to other people, or from one person to\r\nanother, without giving ourselves the trouble to erect our observations into\r\ngeneral maxims of human or external nature. When we conclude that some\r\nperson will, on some given occasion, feel or act so and so, we sometimes\r\njudge from an enlarged consideration of the manner in which human beings\r\nin general, or persons of some particular character, are accustomed to feel\r\nand act; but much oftener from merely recollecting the feelings and conduct\r\nof the same person in some previous instance, or from considering\r\nhow we should feel or act ourselves. It is not only the village matron,\r\nwho, when called to a consultation upon the case of a neighbor’s child, pronounces\r\non the evil and its remedy simply on the recollection and authority\r\nof what she accounts the similar case of her Lucy. We all, where we have\r\nno definite maxims to steer by, guide ourselves in the same way: and if we\r\nhave an extensive experience, and retain its impressions strongly, we may\r\nacquire in this manner a very considerable power of accurate judgment,\r\nwhich we may be utterly incapable of justifying or of communicating to\r\nothers. Among the higher order of practical intellects there have been\r\nmany of whom it was remarked how admirably they suited their means to\r\ntheir ends, without being able to give any sufficient reasons for what they\r\ndid; and applied, or seemed to apply, recondite principles which they were\r\nwholly unable to state. This is a natural consequence of having a mind\r\nstored with appropriate particulars, and having been long accustomed to\r\nreason at once from these to fresh particulars, without practicing the habit\r\nof stating to one’s self or to others the corresponding general propositions.\r\nAn old warrior, on a rapid glance at the outlines of the ground, is able at\r\nonce to give the necessary orders for a skillful arrangement of his troops;\r\nthough if he has received little theoretical instruction, and has seldom been\r\ncalled upon to answer to other people for his conduct, he may never have\r\nhad in his mind a single general theorem respecting the relation between\r\nground and array. But his experience of encampments, in circumstances\r\nmore or less similar, has left a number of vivid, unexpressed, ungeneralized\r\nanalogies in his mind, the most appropriate of which, instantly suggesting\r\nitself, determines him to a judicious arrangement.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe skill of an uneducated person in the use of weapons, or of tools, is\r\nof a precisely similar nature. The savage who executes unerringly the exact\r\nthrow which brings down his game, or his enemy, in the manner most\r\nsuited to his purpose, under the operation of all the conditions necessarily\r\ninvolved, the weight and form of the weapon, the direction and distance of\r\nthe object, the action of the wind, etc., owes this power to a long series of\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page144\"\u003e[pg 144]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg144\" id=\"Pg144\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nprevious experiments, the results of which he certainly never framed into\r\nany verbal theorems or rules. The same thing may generally be said of\r\nany other extraordinary manual dexterity. Not long ago a Scotch manufacturer\r\nprocured from England, at a high rate of wages, a working dyer,\r\nfamous for producing very fine colors, with the view of teaching to his\r\nother workmen the same skill. The workman came; but his mode of proportioning\r\nthe ingredients, in which lay the secret of the effects he produced,\r\nwas by taking them up in handfuls, while the common method was\r\nto weigh them. The manufacturer sought to make him turn his handling\r\nsystem into an equivalent weighing system, that the general principle of\r\nhis peculiar mode of proceeding might be ascertained. This, however, the\r\nman found himself quite unable to do, and therefore could impart his skill\r\nto nobody. He had, from the individual cases of his own experience, established\r\na connection in his mind between fine effects of color, and tactual\r\nperceptions in handling his dyeing materials; and from these perceptions\r\nhe could, in any particular case, infer the means to be employed, and the\r\neffects which would be produced, but could not put others in possession of\r\nthe grounds on which he proceeded, from having never generalized them\r\nin his own mind, or expressed them in language.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAlmost every one knows Lord Mansfield’s advice to a man of practical\r\ngood sense, who, being appointed governor of a colony, had to preside in\r\nits courts of justice, without previous judicial practice or legal education.\r\nThe advice was to give his decision boldly, for it would probably be right;\r\nbut never to venture on assigning reasons, for they would almost infallibly\r\nbe wrong. In cases like this, which are of no uncommon occurrence, it\r\nwould be absurd to suppose that the bad reason was the source of the\r\ngood decision. Lord Mansfield knew that if any reason were assigned it\r\nwould be necessarily an afterthought, the judge being \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ein fact\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e guided by\r\nimpressions from past experience, without the circuitous process of framing\r\ngeneral principles from them, and that if he attempted to frame any\r\nsuch he would assuredly fail. Lord Mansfield, however, would not have\r\ndoubted that a man of equal experience who had also a mind stored with\r\ngeneral propositions derived by legitimate induction from that experience,\r\nwould have been greatly preferable as a judge, to one, however sagacious,\r\nwho could not be trusted with the explanation and justification of his own\r\njudgments. The cases of men of talent performing wonderful things they\r\nknow not how, are examples of the rudest and most spontaneous form of\r\nthe operations of superior minds. It is a defect in them, and often a\r\nsource of errors, not to have generalized as they went on; but generalization,\r\nthough a help, the most important indeed of all helps, is not an\r\nessential.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nEven the scientifically instructed, who possess, in the form of general\r\npropositions, a systematic record of the results of the experience of mankind,\r\nneed not always revert to those general propositions in order to apply\r\nthat experience to a new case. It is justly remarked by Dugald Stewart,\r\nthat though the reasonings in mathematics depend entirely on the\r\naxioms, it is by no means necessary to our seeing the conclusiveness of\r\nthe proof, that the axioms should be expressly adverted to. When it is\r\ninferred that AB is equal to CD because each of them is equal to EF, the\r\nmost uncultivated understanding, as soon as the propositions were understood,\r\nwould assent to the inference, without having ever heard of the general\r\ntruth that \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“things which are equal to the same thing are equal to one\r\nanother.”\u003c/span\u003e This remark of Stewart, consistently followed out, goes to the\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page145\"\u003e[pg 145]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg145\" id=\"Pg145\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nroot, as I conceive, of the philosophy of ratiocination; and it is to be regretted\r\nthat he himself stopped short at a much more limited application\r\nof it. He saw that the general propositions on which a reasoning is said\r\nto depend, may, in certain cases, be altogether omitted, without impairing\r\nits probative force. But he imagined this to be a peculiarity belonging\r\nto axioms; and argued from it, that axioms are not the foundations or first\r\nprinciples of geometry, from which all the other truths of the science are\r\nsynthetically deduced (as the laws of motion and of the composition of\r\nforces in dynamics, the equal mobility of fluids in hydrostatics, the laws of\r\nreflection and refraction in optics, are the first principles of those sciences);\r\nbut are merely necessary assumptions, self-evident indeed, and the denial\r\nof which would annihilate all demonstration, but from which, as premises,\r\nnothing can be demonstrated. In the present, as in many other instances,\r\nthis thoughtful and elegant writer has perceived an important truth, but\r\nonly by halves. Finding, in the case of geometrical axioms, that general\r\nnames have not any talismanic virtue for conjuring new truths out of the\r\nwell where they lie hid, and not seeing that this is equally true in every\r\nother case of generalization, he contended that axioms are in their nature\r\nbarren of consequences, and that the really fruitful truths, the real first\r\nprinciples of geometry, are the definitions; that the definition, for example,\r\nof the circle is to the properties of the circle, what the laws of equilibrium\r\nand of the pressure of the atmosphere are to the rise of the mercury\r\nin the Torricellian tube. Yet all that he had asserted respecting the\r\nfunction to which the axioms are confined in the demonstrations of geometry,\r\nholds equally true of the definitions. Every demonstration in Euclid\r\nmight be carried on without them. This is apparent from the ordinary\r\nprocess of proving a proposition of geometry by means of a diagram.\r\nWhat assumption, in fact, do we set out from, to demonstrate by a diagram\r\nany of the properties of the circle? Not that in all circles the radii\r\nare equal, but only that they are so in the circle ABC. As our warrant\r\nfor assuming this, we appeal, it is true, to the definition of a circle in general;\r\nbut it is only necessary that the assumption be granted in the case of\r\nthe particular circle supposed. From this, which is not a general but a singular\r\nproposition, combined with other propositions of a similar kind, some\r\nof which \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ewhen generalized\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e are called definitions, and other axioms, we\r\nprove that a certain conclusion is true, not of all circles, but of the particular\r\ncircle ABC; or at least would be so, if the facts precisely accorded\r\nwith our assumptions. The enunciation, as it is called, that is, the general\r\ntheorem which stands at the head of the demonstration, is not the proposition\r\nactually demonstrated. One instance only is demonstrated: but the\r\nprocess by which this is done, is a process which, when we consider its\r\nnature, we perceive might be exactly copied in an indefinite number of other\r\ninstances; in every instance which conforms to certain conditions. The\r\ncontrivance of general language furnishing us with terms which connote\r\nthese conditions, we are able to assert this indefinite multitude of truths\r\nin a single expression, and this expression is the general theorem. By\r\ndropping the use of diagrams, and substituting, in the demonstrations,\r\ngeneral phrases for the letters of the alphabet, we might prove the general\r\ntheorem directly, that is, we might demonstrate all the cases at once; and\r\nto do this we must, of course, employ as our premises, the axioms and\r\ndefinitions in their general form. But this only means, that if we can\r\nprove an individual conclusion by assuming an individual fact, then in\r\nwhatever case we are warranted in making an exactly similar assumption,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page146\"\u003e[pg 146]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg146\" id=\"Pg146\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nwe may draw an exactly similar conclusion. The definition is a sort of\r\nnotice to ourselves and others, what assumptions we think ourselves entitled\r\nto make. And so in all cases, the general propositions, whether\r\ncalled definitions, axioms, or laws of nature, which we lay down at the\r\nbeginning of our reasonings, are merely abridged statements, in a kind of\r\nshort-hand, of the particular facts, which, as occasion arises, we either\r\nthink we may proceed on as proved, or intend to assume. In any one\r\ndemonstration it is enough if we assume for a particular case suitably selected,\r\nwhat by the statement of the definition or principle we announce\r\nthat we intend to assume in all cases which may arise. The definition of\r\nthe circle, therefore, is to one of Euclid’s demonstrations, exactly what, according\r\nto Stewart, the axioms are; that is, the demonstration does not\r\ndepend on it, but yet if we deny it the demonstration fails. The proof\r\ndoes not rest on the general assumption, but on a similar assumption confined\r\nto the particular case: that case, however, being chosen as a specimen\r\nor paradigm of the whole class of cases included in the theorem, there\r\ncan be no ground for making the assumption in that case which does not\r\nexist in every other; and to deny the assumption as a general truth, is to\r\ndeny the right of making it in the particular instance.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThere are, undoubtedly, the most ample reasons for stating both the\r\nprinciples and the theorems in their general form, and these will be explained\r\npresently, so far as explanation is requisite. But, that unpracticed\r\nlearners, even in making use of one theorem to demonstrate another, reason\r\nrather from particular to particular than from the general proposition,\r\nis manifest from the difficulty they find in applying a theorem to a case in\r\nwhich the configuration of the diagram is extremely unlike that of the diagram\r\nby which the original theorem was demonstrated. A difficulty\r\nwhich, except in cases of unusual mental power, long practice can alone remove,\r\nand removes chiefly by rendering us familiar with all the configurations\r\nconsistent with the general conditions of the theorem.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 4. From the considerations now adduced, the following conclusions\r\nseem to be established. All inference is from particulars to particulars:\r\nGeneral propositions are merely registers of such inferences already made,\r\nand short formulæ for making more: The major premise of a syllogism,\r\nconsequently, is a formula of this description: and the conclusion is not an\r\ninference drawn \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003efrom\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e the formula, but an inference drawn\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eaccording\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e to\r\nthe formula: the real logical antecedent, or premise, being the particular\r\nfacts from which the general proposition was collected by induction.\r\nThose facts, and the individual instances which supplied them, may have\r\nbeen forgotten: but a record remains, not indeed descriptive of the facts\r\nthemselves, but showing how those cases may be distinguished, respecting\r\nwhich, the facts, when known, were considered to warrant a given inference.\r\nAccording to the indications of this record we draw our conclusion:\r\nwhich is, to all intents and purposes, a conclusion from the forgotten facts.\r\nFor this it is essential that we should read the record correctly: and the\r\nrules of the syllogism are a set of precautions to insure our doing so.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThis view of the functions of the syllogism is confirmed by the consideration\r\nof precisely those cases which might be expected to be least favorable\r\nto it, namely, those in which ratiocination is independent of any previous\r\ninduction. We have already observed that the syllogism, in the ordinary\r\ncourse of our reasoning, is only the latter half of the process of\r\ntraveling from premises to a conclusion. There are, however, some peculiar\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page147\"\u003e[pg 147]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg147\" id=\"Pg147\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\ncases in which it is the whole process. Particulars alone are capable\r\nof being subjected to observation; and all knowledge which is derived\r\nfrom observation, begins, therefore, of necessity, in particulars; but our\r\nknowledge may, in cases of certain descriptions, be conceived as coming to\r\nus from other sources than observation. It may present itself as coming\r\nfrom testimony, which, on the occasion and for the purpose in hand, is accepted\r\nas of an authoritative character: and the information thus communicated,\r\nmay be conceived to comprise not only particular facts but general\r\npropositions, as when a scientific doctrine is accepted without examination\r\non the authority of writers, or a theological doctrine on that of Scripture.\r\nOr the generalization may not be, in the ordinary sense, an assertion at all,\r\nbut a command; a law, not in the philosophical, but in the moral and political\r\nsense of the term: an expression of the desire of a superior, that we,\r\nor any number of other persons, shall conform our conduct to certain general\r\ninstructions. So far as this asserts a fact, namely, a volition of the\r\nlegislator, that fact is an individual fact, and the proposition, therefore, is\r\nnot a general proposition. But the description therein contained of the\r\nconduct which it is the will of the legislator that his subjects should observe,\r\nis general. The proposition asserts, not that all men \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eare\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e any thing,\r\nbut that all men \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eshall\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e do something.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIn both these cases the generalities are the original data, and the particulars\r\nare elicited from them by a process which correctly resolves itself\r\ninto a series of syllogisms. The real nature, however, of the supposed deductive\r\nprocess, is evident enough. The only point to be determined is,\r\nwhether the authority which declared the general proposition, intended to\r\ninclude this case in it; and whether the legislator intended his command\r\nto apply to the present case among others, or not. This is ascertained by\r\nexamining whether the case possesses the marks by which, as those authorities\r\nhave signified, the cases which they meant to certify or to influence\r\nmay be known. The object of the inquiry is to make out the witness’s or\r\nthe legislator’s intention, through the indication given by their words.\r\nThis is a question, as the Germans express it, of hermeneutics. The operation\r\nis not a process of inference, but a process of interpretation.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIn this last phrase we have obtained an expression which appears to me\r\nto characterize, more aptly than any other, the functions of the syllogism\r\nin all cases. When the premises are given by authority, the function of\r\nReasoning is to ascertain the testimony of a witness, or the will of a\r\nlegislator, by interpreting the signs in which the one has intimated his assertion\r\nand the other his command. In like manner, when the premises\r\nare derived from observation, the function of Reasoning is to ascertain\r\nwhat we (or our predecessors) formerly thought might be inferred from\r\nthe observed facts, and to do this by interpreting a memorandum of ours,\r\nor of theirs. The memorandum reminds us, that from evidence, more or\r\nless carefully weighed, it formerly appeared that a certain attribute might\r\nbe inferred wherever we perceive a certain mark. The proposition, All\r\nmen are mortal (for instance) shows that we have had experience from\r\nwhich we thought it followed that the attributes connoted by the term man,\r\nare a mark of mortality. But when we conclude that the Duke of Wellington\r\nis mortal, we do not infer this from the memorandum, but from\r\nthe former experience. All that we infer from the memorandum is our\r\nown previous belief, (or that of those who transmitted to us the proposition),\r\nconcerning the inferences which that former experience would warrant.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page148\"\u003e[pg 148]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg148\" id=\"Pg148\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThis view of the nature of the syllogism renders consistent and intelligible\r\nwhat otherwise remains obscure and confused in the theory of\r\nArchbishop Whately and other enlightened defenders of the syllogistic\r\ndoctrine, respecting the limits to which its functions are confined. They\r\naffirm in as explicit terms as can be used, that the sole office of general\r\nreasoning is to prevent inconsistency in our opinions; to prevent us from\r\nassenting to any thing, the truth of which would contradict something to\r\nwhich we had previously on good grounds given our assent. And they\r\ntell us, that the sole ground which a syllogism affords for assenting to the\r\nconclusion, is that the supposition of its being false, combined with the\r\nsupposition that the premises are true, would lead to a contradiction in\r\nterms. Now this would be but a lame account of the real grounds which\r\nwe have for believing the facts which we learn from reasoning, in contradistinction\r\nto observation. The true reason why we believe that the Duke\r\nof Wellington will die, is that his fathers, and our fathers, and all other\r\npersons who were contemporary with them, have died. Those facts are the\r\nreal premises of the reasoning. But we are not led to infer the conclusion\r\nfrom those premises, by the necessity of avoiding any verbal inconsistency.\r\nThere is no contradiction in supposing that all those persons have died,\r\nand that the Duke of Wellington may, notwithstanding, live forever. But\r\nthere would be a contradiction if we first, on the ground of those same\r\npremises, made a general assertion including and covering the case of the\r\nDuke of Wellington, and then refused to stand to it in the individual case.\r\nThere is an inconsistency to be avoided between the memorandum we\r\nmake of the inferences which may be justly drawn in future cases, and\r\nthe inferences we actually draw in those cases when they arise. With\r\nthis view we interpret our own formula, precisely as a judge interprets a\r\nlaw: in order that we may avoid drawing any inferences not conformable\r\nto our former intention, as a judge avoids giving any decision not conformable\r\nto the legislator’s intention. The rules for this interpretation are the\r\nrules of the syllogism: and its sole purpose is to maintain consistency between\r\nthe conclusions we draw in every particular case, and the previous\r\ngeneral directions for drawing them; whether those general directions\r\nwere framed by ourselves as the result of induction, or were received\r\nby us from an authority competent to give them.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 5. In the above observations it has, I think, been shown, that, though\r\nthere is always a process of reasoning or inference where a syllogism is\r\nused, the syllogism is not a correct analysis of that process of reasoning or\r\ninference; which is, on the contrary (when not a mere inference from testimony),\r\nan inference from particulars to particulars; authorized by a previous\r\ninference from particulars to generals, and substantially the same with\r\nit; of the nature, therefore, of Induction. But while these conclusions appear\r\nto me undeniable, I must yet enter a protest, as strong as that of Archbishop\r\nWhately himself, against the doctrine that the syllogistic art is useless\r\nfor the purposes of reasoning. The reasoning lies in the act of generalization,\r\nnot in interpreting the record of that act; but the syllogistic form\r\nis an indispensable collateral security for the correctness of the generalization\r\nitself.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt has already been seen, that if we have a collection of particulars sufficient\r\nfor grounding an induction, we need not frame a general proposition;\r\nwe may reason at once from those particulars to other particulars. But it\r\nis to be remarked withal, that whenever, from a set of particular cases, we\r\ncan legitimately draw any inference, we may legitimately make our inference\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page149\"\u003e[pg 149]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg149\" id=\"Pg149\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\na general one. If, from observation and experiment, we can conclude\r\nto one new case, so may we to an indefinite number. If that which has\r\nheld true in our past experience will therefore hold in time to come, it will\r\nhold not merely in some individual case, but in all cases of some given\r\ndescription. Every induction, therefore, which suffices to prove one fact,\r\nproves an indefinite multitude of facts: the experience which justifies a single\r\nprediction must be such as will suffice to bear out a general theorem.\r\nThis theorem it is extremely important to ascertain and declare, in its\r\nbroadest form of generality; and thus to place before our minds, in its full\r\nextent, the whole of what our evidence must prove if it proves any thing.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThis throwing of the whole body of possible inferences from a given set\r\nof particulars, into one general expression, operates as a security for their\r\nbeing just inferences, in more ways than one. First, the general principle\r\npresents a larger object to the imagination than any of the singular propositions\r\nwhich it contains. A process of thought which leads to a comprehensive\r\ngenerality, is felt as of greater importance than one which terminates\r\nin an insulated fact; and the mind is, even unconsciously, led to\r\nbestow greater attention upon the process, and to weigh more carefully\r\nthe sufficiency of the experience appealed to, for supporting the inference\r\ngrounded upon it. There is another, and a more important, advantage.\r\nIn reasoning from a course of individual observations to some new and unobserved\r\ncase, which we are but imperfectly acquainted with (or we should\r\nnot be inquiring into it), and in which, since we are inquiring into it, we\r\nprobably feel a peculiar interest; there is very little to prevent us from\r\ngiving way to negligence, or to any bias which may affect our wishes or\r\nour imagination, and, under that influence, accepting insufficient evidence\r\nas sufficient. But if, instead of concluding straight to the particular case,\r\nwe place before ourselves an entire class of facts—the whole contents of a\r\ngeneral proposition, every tittle of which is legitimately inferable from our\r\npremises, if that one particular conclusion is so; there is then a considerable\r\nlikelihood that if the premises are insufficient, and the general inference\r\ntherefore, groundless, it will comprise within it some fact or facts the reverse\r\nof which we already know to be true; and we shall thus discover\r\nthe error in our generalization by a \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ereductio\r\nad impossibile\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThus if, during the reign of Marcus Aurelius, a subject of the Roman\r\nempire, under the bias naturally given to the imagination and expectations\r\nby the lives and characters of the Antonines, had been disposed to expect\r\nthat Commodus would be a just ruler; supposing him to stop there, he\r\nmight only have been undeceived by sad experience. But if he reflected\r\nthat this expectation could not be justifiable unless from the same evidence\r\nhe was warranted in concluding some general proposition, as, for instance,\r\nthat all Roman emperors are just rulers; he would immediately have\r\nthought of Nero, Domitian, and other instances, which, showing the falsity\r\nof the general conclusion, and therefore the insufficiency of the premises,\r\nwould have warned him that those premises could not prove in the instance\r\nof Commodus, what they were inadequate to prove in any collection of\r\ncases in which his was included.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe advantage, in judging whether any controverted inference is legitimate,\r\nof referring to a parallel case, is universally acknowledged. But by\r\nascending to the general proposition, we bring under our view not one parallel\r\ncase only, but all possible parallel cases at once; all cases to which the\r\nsame set of evidentiary considerations are applicable.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWhen, therefore, we argue from a number of known cases to another case\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page150\"\u003e[pg 150]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg150\" id=\"Pg150\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nsupposed to be analogous, it is always possible, and generally advantageous,\r\nto divert our argument into the circuitous channel of an induction from\r\nthose known cases to a general proposition, and a subsequent application\r\nof that general proposition to the unknown case. This second part of the\r\noperation, which, as before observed, is essentially a process of interpretation,\r\nwill be resolvable into a syllogism or a series of syllogisms, the majors\r\nof which will be general propositions embracing whole classes of cases;\r\nevery one of which propositions must be true in all its extent, if the argument\r\nis maintainable. If, therefore, any fact fairly coming within the\r\nrange of one of these general propositions, and consequently asserted by it,\r\nis known or suspected to be other than the proposition asserts it to be, this\r\nmode of stating the argument causes us to know or to suspect that the\r\noriginal observations, which are the real grounds of our conclusion, are not\r\nsufficient to support it. And in proportion to the greater chance of our\r\ndetecting the inconclusiveness of our evidence, will be the increased reliance\r\nwe are entitled to place in it if no such evidence of defect shall appear.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe value, therefore, of the syllogistic form, and of the rules for using it\r\ncorrectly, does not consist in their being the form and the rules according\r\nto which our reasonings are necessarily, or even usually, made; but in their\r\nfurnishing us with a mode in which those reasonings may always be represented,\r\nand which is admirably calculated, if they are inconclusive, to bring\r\ntheir inconclusiveness to light. An induction from particulars to generals,\r\nfollowed by a syllogistic process from those generals to other particulars, is\r\na form in which we may always state our reasonings if we please. It is\r\nnot a form in which we \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003emust\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e reason, but it\r\nis a form in which we \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003emay\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e reason,\r\nand into which it is indispensable to throw our reasoning, when there\r\nis any doubt of its validity: though when the case is familiar and little\r\ncomplicated, and there is no suspicion of error, we may, and do, reason at\r\nonce from the known particular cases to unknown ones.\u003ca id=\"noteref_58\" name=\"noteref_58\" href=\"#note_58\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e58\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThese are the uses of syllogism, as a mode of verifying any given argument.\r\nIts ulterior uses, as respects the general course of our intellectual\r\noperations, hardly require illustration, being in fact the acknowledged uses\r\nof general language. They amount substantially to this, that the inductions\r\nmay be made once for all: a single careful interrogation of experience\r\nmay suffice, and the result may be registered in the form of a general\r\nproposition, which is committed to memory or to writing, and from which\r\nafterward we have only to syllogize. The particulars of our experiments\r\nmay then be dismissed from the memory, in which it would be impossible\r\nto retain so great a multitude of details; while the knowledge which those\r\ndetails afforded for future use, and which would otherwise be lost as soon\r\nas the observations were forgotten, or as their record became too bulky for\r\nreference, is retained in a commodious and immediately available shape by\r\nmeans of general language.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAgainst this advantage is to be set the countervailing inconvenience, that\r\ninferences originally made on insufficient evidence become consecrated, and,\r\nas it were, hardened into general maxims; and the mind cleaves to them\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page151\"\u003e[pg 151]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg151\" id=\"Pg151\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nfrom habit, after it has outgrown any liability to be misled by similar fallacious\r\nappearances if they were now for the first time presented; but having\r\nforgotten the particulars, it does not think of revising its own former\r\ndecision. An inevitable drawback, which, however considerable in itself,\r\nforms evidently but a small set-off against the immense benefits of general\r\nlanguage.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe use of the syllogism is in truth no other than the use of general\r\npropositions in reasoning. We \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ecan\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e reason without them; in simple and\r\nobvious cases we habitually do so; minds of great sagacity can do it in\r\ncases not simple and obvious, provided their experience supplies them with\r\ninstances essentially similar to every combination of circumstances likely\r\nto arise. But other minds, and the same minds where they have not the\r\nsame pre-eminent advantages of personal experience, are quite helpless\r\nwithout the aid of general propositions, wherever the case presents the\r\nsmallest complication; and if we made no general propositions, few persons\r\nwould get much beyond those simple inferences which are drawn by\r\nthe more intelligent of the brutes. Though not necessary to reasoning,\r\ngeneral propositions are necessary to any considerable progress in reasoning.\r\nIt is, therefore, natural and indispensable to separate the process of\r\ninvestigation into two parts; and obtain general formulæ for determining\r\nwhat inferences may be drawn, before the occasion arises for drawing the\r\ninferences. The work of drawing them is then that of applying the formulæ;\r\nand the rules of syllogism are a system of securities for the correctness\r\nof the application.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 6. To complete the series of considerations connected with the philosophical\r\ncharacter of the syllogism, it is requisite to consider, since the syllogism\r\nis not the universal type of the reasoning process, what is the real\r\ntype. This resolves itself into the question, what is the nature of the minor\r\npremise, and in what manner it contributes to establish the conclusion:\r\nfor as to the major, we now fully understand, that the place which it nominally\r\noccupies in our reasonings, properly belongs to the individual facts\r\nor observations of which it expresses the general result; the major itself\r\nbeing no real part of the argument, but an intermediate halting-place for\r\nthe mind, interposed by an artifice of language between the real premises\r\nand the conclusion, by way of a security, which it is in a most material degree,\r\nfor the correctness of the process. The minor, however, being an indispensable\r\npart of the syllogistic expression of an argument, without\r\ndoubt either is, or corresponds to, an equally indispensable part of the argument\r\nitself, and we have only to inquire what part.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt is perhaps worth while to notice here a speculation of a philosopher\r\nto whom mental science is much indebted, but who, though a very penetrating,\r\nwas a very hasty thinker, and whose want of due circumspection\r\nrendered him fully as remarkable for what he did not see, as for what he\r\nsaw. I allude to Dr. Thomas Brown, whose theory of ratiocination is peculiar.\r\nHe saw the \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003epetitio\r\nprincipii\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e which is inherent in every syllogism,\r\nif we consider the major to be itself the evidence by which the conclusion\r\nis proved, instead of being, what in fact it is, an assertion of the existence\r\nof evidence sufficient to prove any conclusion of a given description. Seeing\r\nthis, Dr. Brown not only failed to see the immense advantage, in point\r\nof security for correctness, which is gained by interposing this step between\r\nthe real evidence and the conclusion; but he thought it incumbent\r\non him to strike out the major altogether from the reasoning process, without\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page152\"\u003e[pg 152]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg152\" id=\"Pg152\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nsubstituting any thing else, and maintained that our reasonings consist\r\nonly of the minor premise and the conclusion, Socrates is a man, therefore\r\nSocrates is mortal: thus actually suppressing, as an unnecessary step in\r\nthe argument, the appeal to former experience. The absurdity of this was\r\ndisguised from him by the opinion he adopted, that reasoning is merely analyzing\r\nour own general notions, or abstract ideas; and that the proposition,\r\nSocrates is mortal, is evolved from the proposition, Socrates is a man,\r\nsimply by recognizing the notion of mortality as already contained in the\r\nnotion we form of a man.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAfter the explanations so fully entered into on the subject of propositions,\r\nmuch further discussion can not be necessary to make the radical\r\nerror of this view of ratiocination apparent. If the word man connoted\r\nmortality; if the meaning of \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“mortal”\u003c/span\u003e were involved in the meaning of\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“man;”\u003c/span\u003e we might, undoubtedly, evolve the conclusion from the minor\r\nalone, because the minor would have already asserted it. But if, as is in\r\nfact the case, the word man does not connote mortality, how does it appear\r\nthat in the mind of every person who admits Socrates to be a man, the\r\nidea of man must include the idea of mortality? Dr. Brown could not\r\nhelp seeing this difficulty, and in order to avoid it, was led, contrary to his\r\nintention, to re-establish, under another name, that step in the argument\r\nwhich corresponds to the major, by affirming the necessity of \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003epreviously\r\nperceiving\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e the relation between the idea of man and the idea of mortal. If\r\nthe reasoner has not previously perceived this relation, he will not, says Dr.\r\nBrown, infer because Socrates is a man, that Socrates is mortal. But even\r\nthis admission, though amounting to a surrender of the doctrine that an\r\nargument consists of the minor and the conclusion alone, will not save the\r\nremainder of Dr. Brown’s theory. The failure of assent to the argument\r\ndoes not take place merely because the reasoner, for want of due analysis,\r\ndoes not perceive that his idea of man includes the idea of mortality; it\r\ntakes place, much more commonly, because in his mind that relation between\r\nthe two ideas has never existed. And in truth it never does exist,\r\nexcept as the result of experience. Consenting, for the sake of the argument,\r\nto discuss the question on a supposition of which we have recognized\r\nthe radical incorrectness, namely, that the meaning of a proposition\r\nrelates to the ideas of the things spoken of, and not to the things themselves;\r\nI must yet observe, that the idea of man, as a universal idea, the\r\ncommon property of all rational creatures, can not involve any thing but\r\nwhat is strictly implied in the name. If any one includes in his own private\r\nidea of man, as no doubt is always the case, some other attributes, such\r\nfor instance as mortality, he does so only as the consequence of experience,\r\nafter having satisfied himself that all men possess that attribute: so that\r\nwhatever the idea contains, in any person’s mind, beyond what is included\r\nin the conventional signification of the word, has been added to it as the\r\nresult of assent to a proposition; while Dr. Brown’s theory requires us to\r\nsuppose, on the contrary, that assent to the proposition is produced by\r\nevolving, through an analytic process, this very element out of the idea.\r\nThis theory, therefore, may be considered as sufficiently refuted; and the\r\nminor premise must be regarded as totally insufficient to prove the conclusion,\r\nexcept with the assistance of the major, or of that which the major\r\nrepresents, namely, the various singular propositions expressive of the series\r\nof observations, of which the generalization called the major premise is\r\nthe result.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIn the argument, then, which proves that Socrates is mortal, one indispensable\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page153\"\u003e[pg 153]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg153\" id=\"Pg153\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\npart of the premises will be as follows: \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“My father, and my father’s\r\nfather, A, B, C, and an indefinite number of other persons, were mortal;”\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwhich is only an expression in different words of the observed fact\r\nthat they have died. This is the major premise divested of the \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003epetitio principii\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\nand cut down to as much as is really known by direct evidence.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIn order to connect this proposition with the conclusion Socrates is mortal,\r\nthe additional link necessary is such a proposition as the following:\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Socrates resembles my father, and my father’s father, and the other individuals\r\nspecified.”\u003c/span\u003e This proposition we assert when we say that Socrates\r\nis a man. By saying so we likewise assert in what respect he resembles\r\nthem, namely, in the attributes connoted by the word man. And we conclude\r\nthat he further resembles them in the attribute mortality.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 7. We have thus obtained what we were seeking, a universal type of\r\nthe reasoning process. We find it resolvable in all cases into the following\r\nelements: Certain individuals have a given attribute; an individual or\r\nindividuals resemble the former in certain other attributes; therefore they\r\nresemble them also in the given attribute. This type of ratiocination does\r\nnot claim, like the syllogism, to be conclusive from the mere form of the\r\nexpression; nor can it possibly be so. That one proposition does or does\r\nnot assert the very fact which was already asserted in another, may appear\r\nfrom the form of the expression, that is, from a comparison of the language;\r\nbut when the two propositions assert facts which are\r\n\u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ebona fide\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ndifferent, whether the one fact proves the other or not can never appear\r\nfrom the language, but must depend on other considerations. Whether,\r\nfrom the attributes in which Socrates resembles those men who have heretofore\r\ndied, it is allowable to infer that he resembles them also in being\r\nmortal, is a question of Induction; and is to be decided by the principles\r\nor canons which we shall hereafter recognize as tests of the correct performance\r\nof that great mental operation.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nMeanwhile, however, it is certain, as before remarked, that if this inference\r\ncan be drawn as to Socrates, it can be drawn as to all others who resemble\r\nthe observed individuals in the same attributes in which he resembles\r\nthem; that is (to express the thing concisely) of all mankind. If,\r\ntherefore, the argument be admissible in the case of Socrates, we are at liberty,\r\nonce for all, to treat the possession of the attributes of man as a mark,\r\nor satisfactory evidence, of the attribute of mortality. This we do by laying\r\ndown the universal proposition, All men are mortal, and interpreting\r\nthis, as occasion arises, in its application to Socrates and others. By this\r\nmeans we establish a very convenient division of the entire logical operation\r\ninto two steps; first, that of ascertaining what attributes are marks\r\nof mortality; and, secondly, whether any given individuals possess those\r\nmarks. And it will generally be advisable, in our speculations on the reasoning\r\nprocess, to consider this double operation as in fact taking place,\r\nand all reasoning as carried on in the form into which it must necessarily\r\nbe thrown to enable us to apply to it any test of its correct performance.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAlthough, therefore, all processes of thought in which the ultimate premises\r\nare particulars, whether we conclude from particulars to a general formula,\r\nor from particulars to other particulars according to that formula, are\r\nequally Induction; we shall yet, conformably to usage, consider the name\r\nInduction as more peculiarly belonging to the process of establishing the\r\ngeneral proposition, and the remaining operation, which is substantially\r\nthat of interpreting the general proposition, we shall call by its usual name,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page154\"\u003e[pg 154]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg154\" id=\"Pg154\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nDeduction. And we shall consider every process by which any thing is\r\ninferred respecting an unobserved case, as consisting of an Induction followed\r\nby a Deduction; because, although the process needs not necessarily\r\nbe carried on in this form, it is always susceptible of the form, and must\r\nbe thrown into it when assurance of scientific accuracy is needed and desired.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 8. The theory of the syllogism laid down in the preceding pages, has\r\nobtained, among other important adhesions, three of peculiar value: those\r\nof Sir John Herschel,\u003ca id=\"noteref_59\" name=\"noteref_59\" href=\"#note_59\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e59\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Dr.\r\nWhewell,\u003ca id=\"noteref_60\" name=\"noteref_60\" href=\"#note_60\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e60\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e and Mr. Bailey;\u003ca id=\"noteref_61\" name=\"noteref_61\" href=\"#note_61\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e61\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Sir John Herschel\r\nconsidering the doctrine, though not strictly \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“a discovery,”\u003c/span\u003e having been\r\nanticipated by Berkeley,\u003ca id=\"noteref_62\" name=\"noteref_62\" href=\"#note_62\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e62\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nto be \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“one of the greatest steps which have yet\r\nbeen made in the philosophy of Logic.”\u003c/span\u003e \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“When we consider”\u003c/span\u003e (to quote\r\nthe further words of the same authority) \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“the inveteracy of the habits and\r\nprejudices which it has cast to the winds,”\u003c/span\u003e there is no cause for misgiving\r\nin the fact that other thinkers, no less entitled to consideration, have formed\r\na very different estimate of it. Their principal objection can not be better\r\nor more succinctly stated than by borrowing a sentence from Archbishop\r\nWhately.\u003ca id=\"noteref_63\" name=\"noteref_63\" href=\"#note_63\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e63\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“In every case where an inference is drawn from Induction\r\n(unless that name is to be given to a mere random guess without any\r\ngrounds at all) we must form a judgment that the instance or instances adduced are\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003esufficient\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e to authorize the conclusion; that it is \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eallowable\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e\r\nto take these instances as a sample warranting an inference respecting the whole\r\nclass;”\u003c/span\u003e and the expression of this judgment in words (it has been said by\r\nseveral of my critics) \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eis\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e the major premise.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nI quite admit that the major is an affirmation of the sufficiency of the\r\nevidence on which the conclusion rests. That it is so, is the very essence\r\nof my own theory. And whoever admits that the major premise is \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eonly\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e\r\nthis, adopts the theory in its essentials.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nBut I can not concede that this recognition of the sufficiency of the evidence—that\r\nis, of the correctness of the induction—is a part of the induction\r\nitself; unless we ought to say that it is a part of every thing we do,\r\nto satisfy ourselves that it has been done rightly. We conclude from\r\nknown instances to unknown by the impulse of the generalizing propensity;\r\nand (until after a considerable amount of practice and mental discipline)\r\nthe question of the sufficiency of the evidence is only raised by a retrospective\r\nact, turning back upon our own footsteps, and examining whether\r\nwe were warranted in doing what we have provisionally done. To\r\nspeak of this reflex operation as part of the original one, requiring to be\r\nexpressed in words in order that the verbal formula may correctly represent\r\nthe psychological process, appears to me false psychology.\u003ca id=\"noteref_64\" name=\"noteref_64\" href=\"#note_64\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e64\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e We review\r\nour syllogistic as well as our inductive processes, and recognize that\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page155\"\u003e[pg 155]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg155\" id=\"Pg155\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nthey have been correctly performed; but logicians do not add a third\r\npremise to the syllogism, to express this act of recognition. A careful\r\ncopyist verifies his transcript by collating it with the original; and if no\r\nerror appears, he recognizes that the transcript has been correctly made.\r\nBut we do not call the examination of the copy a part of the act of copying.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe conclusion in an induction is inferred from the evidence itself, and\r\nnot from a recognition of the sufficiency of the evidence; as I infer that\r\nmy friend is walking toward me because I see him, and not because I recognize\r\nthat my eyes are open, and that eyesight is a means of knowledge.\r\nIn all operations which require care, it is good to assure ourselves that\r\nthe process has been performed accurately; but the testing of the process\r\nis not the process itself; and, besides, may have been omitted altogether,\r\nand yet the process be correct. It is precisely because that operation\r\nis omitted in ordinary unscientific reasoning, that there is any thing\r\ngained in certainty by throwing reasoning into the syllogistic form. To\r\nmake sure, as far as possible, that it shall not be omitted, we make the testing\r\noperation a part of the reasoning process itself. We insist that the\r\ninference from particulars to particulars shall pass through a general proposition.\r\nBut this is a security for good reasoning, not a condition of all reasoning;\r\nand in some cases not even a security. Our most familiar inferences\r\nare all made before we learn the use of general propositions; and a\r\nperson of untutored sagacity will skillfully apply his acquired experience\r\nto adjacent cases, though he would bungle grievously in fixing the limits\r\nof the appropriate general theorem. But though he may conclude rightly,\r\nhe never, properly speaking, knows whether he has done so or not; he has\r\nnot tested his reasoning. Now, this is precisely what forms of reasoning\r\ndo for us. We do not need them to enable us to reason, but to enable us\r\nto know whether we reason correctly.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIn still further answer to the objection, it may be added that—even when\r\nthe test has been applied, and the sufficiency of the evidence recognized—if\r\nit is sufficient to support the general proposition, it is sufficient also to\r\nsupport an inference from particulars to particulars without passing\r\nthrough the general proposition. The inquirer who has logically satisfied\r\nhimself that the conditions of legitimate induction were realized in the\r\ncases A, B, C, would be as much justified in concluding directly to the\r\nDuke of Wellington as in concluding to all men. The general conclusion\r\nis never legitimate, unless the particular one would be so too; and in no\r\nsense, intelligible to me, can the particular conclusion be said to be drawn\r\nfrom the general one. Whenever there is ground for drawing any conclusion\r\nat all from particular instances, there is ground for a general conclusion;\r\nbut that this general conclusion should be actually drawn, however\r\nuseful, can not be an indispensable condition of the validity of the inference\r\nin the particular case. A man gives away sixpence by the same power by\r\nwhich he disposes of his whole fortune; but it is not necessary to the legality\r\nof the smaller act, that he should make a formal assertion of his right\r\nto the greater one.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nSome additional remarks, in reply to minor objections, are\r\nappended.\u003ca id=\"noteref_65\" name=\"noteref_65\" href=\"#note_65\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e65\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page156\"\u003e[pg 156]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg156\" id=\"Pg156\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ca name=\"Book_II_Chapter_III_Section_9\" id=\"Book_II_Chapter_III_Section_9\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 9. The preceding considerations enable us to understand the true nature\r\nof what is termed, by recent writers, Formal Logic, and the relation\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page157\"\u003e[pg 157]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg157\" id=\"Pg157\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nbetween it and Logic in the widest sense. Logic, as I conceive it, is the\r\nentire theory of the ascertainment of reasoned or inferred truth. Formal\r\nLogic, therefore, which Sir William Hamilton from his own point of view,\r\nand Archbishop Whately from his, have represented as the whole of Logic\r\nproperly so called, is really a very subordinate part of it, not being directly\r\nconcerned with the process of Reasoning or Inference in the sense in\r\nwhich that process is a part of the Investigation of Truth. What, then,\r\nis Formal Logic? The name seems to be properly applied to all that portion\r\nof doctrine which relates to the equivalence of different modes of expression;\r\nthe rules for determining when assertions in a given form imply\r\nor suppose the truth or falsity of other assertions. This includes the theory\r\nof the Import of Propositions, and of their Conversion, Æquipollence,\r\nand Opposition; of those falsely called Inductions (to be hereafter spoken\r\nof)\u003ca id=\"noteref_66\" name=\"noteref_66\" href=\"#note_66\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e66\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e, in which the apparent generalization is a mere abridged\r\nstatement of cases known individually; and finally, of the syllogism: while the theory\r\nof Naming, and of (what is inseparably connected with it) Definition, though\r\nbelonging still more to the other and larger kind of logic than to this, is a\r\nnecessary preliminary to this. The end aimed at by Formal Logic, and\r\nattained by the observance of its precepts, is not truth, but consistency.\r\nIt has been seen that this is the only direct purpose of the rules of the\r\nsyllogism; the intention and effect of which is simply to keep our inferences\r\nor conclusions in complete consistency with our general formulæ or\r\ndirections for drawing them. The Logic of Consistency is a necessary\r\nauxiliary to the logic of truth, not only because what is inconsistent with\r\nitself or with other truths can not be true, but also because truth can only\r\nbe successfully pursued by drawing inferences from experience, which, if\r\nwarrantable at all, admit of being generalized, and, to test their warrantableness,\r\nrequire to be exhibited in a generalized form; after which the\r\ncorrectness of their application to particular cases is a question which specially\r\nconcerns the Logic of Consistency. This Logic, not requiring any\r\npreliminary knowledge of the processes or conclusions of the various sciences,\r\nmay be studied with benefit in a much earlier stage of education\r\nthan the Logic of Truth: and the practice which has empirically obtained\r\nof teaching it apart, through elementary treatises which do not attempt to\r\ninclude any thing else, though the reasons assigned for the practice are in\r\ngeneral very far from philosophical, admits of philosophical justification.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page158\"\u003e[pg 158]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg158\" id=\"Pg158\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-div\" style=\"margin-bottom: 4.00em; margin-top: 4.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"toc33\" id=\"toc33\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"pdf34\" id=\"pdf34\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: center; margin-bottom: 2.40em; margin-top: 2.40em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 120%\"\u003eChapter IV.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: left; margin-bottom: 2.88em; margin-top: 2.88em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 144%\"\u003eOf Trains Of Reasoning, And Deductive Sciences.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 1. In our analysis of the syllogism, it appeared that the minor premise\r\nalways affirms a resemblance between a new case and some cases previously\r\nknown; while the major premise asserts something which, having been\r\nfound true of those known cases, we consider ourselves warranted in holding\r\ntrue of any other case resembling the former in certain given particulars.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIf all ratiocinations resembled, as to the minor premise, the examples\r\nwhich were exclusively employed in the preceding chapter; if the resemblance,\r\nwhich that premise asserts, were obvious to the senses, as in the\r\nproposition \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Socrates is a man,”\u003c/span\u003e or were at once ascertainable by direct\r\nobservation; there would be no necessity for trains of reasoning, and Deductive\r\nor Ratiocinative Sciences would not exist. Trains of reasoning\r\nexist only for the sake of extending an induction founded, as all inductions\r\nmust be, on observed cases, to other cases in which we not only can not directly\r\nobserve the fact which is to be proved, but can not directly observe\r\neven the mark which is to prove it.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 2. Suppose the syllogism to be, All cows ruminate, the animal which\r\nis before me is a cow, therefore it ruminates. The minor, if true at all, is\r\nobviously so: the only premise the establishment of which requires any\r\nanterior process of inquiry, is the major; and provided the induction of\r\nwhich that premise is the expression was correctly performed, the conclusion\r\nrespecting the animal now present will be instantly drawn; because,\r\nas soon as she is compared with the formula, she will be identified as being\r\nincluded in it. But suppose the syllogism to be the following: All arsenic\r\nis poisonous, the substance which is before me is arsenic, therefore it is poisonous.\r\nThe truth of the minor may not here be obvious at first sight;\r\nit may not be intuitively evident, but may itself be known only by inference.\r\nIt may be the conclusion of another argument, which, thrown into\r\nthe syllogistic form, would stand thus: Whatever when lighted produces\r\na dark spot on a piece of white porcelain held in the flame, which spot is\r\nsoluble in hypochloride of calcium, is arsenic; the substance before me conforms\r\nto this condition; therefore it is arsenic. To establish, therefore,\r\nthe ultimate conclusion, The substance before me is poisonous, requires a\r\nprocess, which, in order to be syllogistically expressed, stands in need of\r\ntwo syllogisms; and we have a Train of Reasoning.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWhen, however, we thus add syllogism to syllogism, we are really adding\r\ninduction to induction. Two separate inductions must have taken\r\nplace to render this chain of inference possible; inductions founded, probably,\r\non different sets of individual instances, but which converge in their\r\nresults, so that the instance which is the subject of inquiry comes within\r\nthe range of them both. The record of these inductions is contained in\r\nthe majors of the two syllogisms. First, we, or others for us, have examined\r\nvarious objects which yielded under the given circumstances a dark\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page159\"\u003e[pg 159]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg159\" id=\"Pg159\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nspot with the given property, and found that they possessed the properties\r\nconnoted by the word arsenic; they were metallic, volatile, their vapor had\r\na smell of garlic, and so forth. Next, we, or others for us, have examined\r\nvarious specimens which possessed this metallic and volatile character,\r\nwhose vapor had this smell, etc., and have invariably found that they were\r\npoisonous. The first observation we judge that we may extend to all substances\r\nwhatever which yield that particular kind of dark spot; the second,\r\nto all metallic and volatile substances resembling those we examined; and\r\nconsequently, not to those only which are seen to be such, but to those\r\nwhich are concluded to be such by the prior induction. The substance\r\nbefore us is only seen to come within one of these inductions; but by\r\nmeans of this one, it is brought within the other. We are still, as before,\r\nconcluding from particulars to particulars; but we are now concluding\r\nfrom particulars observed, to other particulars which are not, as in the\r\nsimple case, \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eseen\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e to resemble them in material points, but\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003einferred\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e to do so, because resembling them in something else, which we\r\nhave been led by quite a different set of instances to consider as a mark of the former\r\nresemblance.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThis first example of a train of reasoning is still extremely simple, the\r\nseries consisting of only two syllogisms. The following is somewhat more\r\ncomplicated: No government, which earnestly seeks the good of its subjects,\r\nis likely to be overthrown; some particular government earnestly seeks\r\nthe good of its subjects, therefore it is not likely to be overthrown. The major\r\npremise in this argument we shall suppose not to be derived from considerations\r\n\u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea priori\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, but to be a generalization from\r\nhistory, which, whether correct or erroneous, must have been founded on observation of\r\ngovernments concerning whose desire of the good of their subjects there was no\r\ndoubt. It has been found, or thought to be found, that these were not\r\neasily overthrown, and it has been deemed that those instances warranted\r\nan extension of the same predicate to any and every government which\r\nresembles them in the attribute of desiring earnestly the good of its subjects.\r\nBut \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003edoes\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e the government in question thus resemble them? This\r\nmay be debated \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003epro\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e and \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003econ\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e by many\r\narguments, and must, in any case, be\r\nproved by another induction; for we can not directly observe the sentiments\r\nand desires of the persons who carry on the government. To prove\r\nthe minor, therefore, we require an argument in this form: Every government\r\nwhich acts in a certain manner, desires the good of its subjects; the\r\nsupposed government acts in that particular manner, therefore it desires\r\nthe good of its subjects. But is it true that the government acts in the\r\nmanner supposed? This minor also may require proof; still another induction,\r\nas thus: What is asserted by intelligent and disinterested witnesses,\r\nmay be believed to be true; that the government acts in this manner,\r\nis asserted by such witnesses, therefore it may be believed to be true. The\r\nargument hence consists of three steps. Having the evidence of our senses\r\nthat the case of the government under consideration resembles a number\r\nof former cases, in the circumstance of having something asserted respecting\r\nit by intelligent and disinterested witnesses, we infer, first, that, as in\r\nthose former instances, so in this instance, the assertion is true. Secondly,\r\nwhat was asserted of the government being that it acts in a particular\r\nmanner, and other governments or persons having been observed to act\r\nin the same manner, the government in question is brought into known resemblance\r\nwith those other governments or persons; and since they were\r\nknown to desire the good of the people, it is thereupon, by a second induction,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page160\"\u003e[pg 160]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg160\" id=\"Pg160\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\ninferred that the particular government spoken of, desires the good of\r\nthe people. This brings that government into known resemblance with the\r\nother governments which were thought likely to escape revolution, and\r\nthence, by a third induction, it is concluded that this particular government\r\nis also likely to escape. This is still reasoning from particulars to\r\nparticulars, but we now reason to the new instance from three distinct sets\r\nof former instances: to one only of those sets of instances do we directly\r\nperceive the new one to be similar; but from that similarity we inductively\r\ninfer that it has the attribute by which it is assimilated to the next\r\nset, and brought within the corresponding induction; after which by a\r\nrepetition of the same operation we infer it to be similar to the third set,\r\nand hence a third induction conducts us to the ultimate conclusion.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 3. Notwithstanding the superior complication of these examples, compared\r\nwith those by which in the preceding chapter we illustrated the\r\ngeneral theory of reasoning, every doctrine which we then laid down holds\r\nequally true in these more intricate cases. The successive general propositions\r\nare not steps in the reasoning, are not intermediate links in the chain\r\nof inference, between the particulars observed and those to which we apply\r\nthe observation. If we had sufficiently capacious memories, and a sufficient\r\npower of maintaining order among a huge mass of details, the reasoning\r\ncould go on without any general propositions; they are mere formulæ\r\nfor inferring particulars from particulars. The principle of general\r\nreasoning is (as before explained), that if, from observation of certain\r\nknown particulars, what was seen to be true of them can be inferred to be\r\ntrue of any others, it may be inferred of all others which are of a certain\r\ndescription. And in order that we may never fail to draw this conclusion\r\nin a new case when it can be drawn correctly, and may avoid drawing it\r\nwhen it can not, we determine once for all what are the distinguishing marks\r\nby which such cases may be recognized. The subsequent process is merely\r\nthat of identifying an object, and ascertaining it to have those marks;\r\nwhether we identify it by the very marks themselves, or by others which\r\nwe have ascertained (through another and a similar process) to be marks\r\nof those marks. The real inference is always from particulars to particulars,\r\nfrom the observed instances to an unobserved one: but in drawing\r\nthis inference, we conform to a formula which we have adopted for our\r\nguidance in such operations, and which is a record of the criteria by which\r\nwe thought we had ascertained that we might distinguish when the inference\r\ncould, and when it could not, be drawn. The real premises are the individual\r\nobservations, even though they may have been forgotten, or, being\r\nthe observations of others and not of ourselves, may, to us, never have been\r\nknown: but we have before us proof that we or others once thought them\r\nsufficient for an induction, and we have marks to show whether any new\r\ncase is one of those to which, if then known, the induction would have been\r\ndeemed to extend. These marks we either recognize at once, or by the\r\naid of other marks, which by another previous induction we collected to be\r\nmarks of the first. Even these marks of marks may only be recognized\r\nthrough a third set of marks; and we may have a train of reasoning, of\r\nany length, to bring a new case within the scope of an induction grounded\r\non particulars its similarity to which is only ascertained in this indirect\r\nmanner.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThus, in the preceding example, the ultimate inductive inference was,\r\nthat a certain government was not likely to be overthrown; this inference\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page161\"\u003e[pg 161]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg161\" id=\"Pg161\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nwas drawn according to a formula in which desire of the public good was\r\nset down as a mark of not being likely to be overthrown; a mark of this\r\nmark was, acting in a particular manner; and a mark of acting in that\r\nmanner was, being asserted to do so by intelligent and disinterested witnesses:\r\nthis mark, the government under discussion was recognized by the\r\nsenses as possessing. Hence that government fell within the last induction,\r\nand by it was brought within all the others. The perceived resemblance\r\nof the case to one set of observed particular cases, brought it into\r\nknown resemblance with another set, and that with a third.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIn the more complex branches of knowledge, the deductions seldom consist,\r\nas in the examples hitherto exhibited, of a single chain, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e a\r\nmark of \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eb, b\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e of \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ec, c\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e of\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ed\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, therefore \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e a mark of\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ed\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e. They consist (to carry on the same metaphor) of several\r\nchains united at the extremity, as thus: \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e a mark of\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ed, b\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e of \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ee, c\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e of \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ef, d e\r\nf\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e of \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003en\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, therefore \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea b c\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e a mark of\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003en\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e. Suppose, for example,\r\nthe following combination of circumstances: 1st, rays of light impinging\r\non a reflecting surface; 2d, that surface parabolic; 3d, those rays\r\nparallel to each other and to the axis of the surface. It is to be proved\r\nthat the concourse of these three circumstances is a mark that the reflected\r\nrays will pass through the focus of the parabolic surface. Now, each of\r\nthe three circumstances is singly a mark of something material to the case.\r\nRays of light impinging on a reflecting surface are a mark that those rays\r\nwill be reflected at an angle equal to the angle of incidence. The parabolic\r\nform of the surface, is a mark that, from any point of it, a line drawn to\r\nthe focus and a line parallel to the axis will make equal angles with the\r\nsurface. And finally, the parallelism of the rays to the axis is a mark that\r\ntheir angle of incidence coincides with one of these equal angles. The\r\nthree marks taken together are therefore a mark of all these three things\r\nunited. But the three united are evidently a mark that the angle of reflection\r\nmust coincide with the other of the two equal angles, that formed\r\nby a line drawn to the focus; and this again, by the fundamental axiom\r\nconcerning straight lines, is a mark that the reflected rays pass through\r\nthe focus. Most chains of physical deduction are of this more complicated\r\ntype; and even in mathematics such are abundant, as in all propositions\r\nwhere the hypothesis includes numerous conditions: \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eIf\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e a circle be taken,\r\nand \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eif\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e within that circle a point be taken, not the centre, and\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eif\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e straight lines be drawn from that point to the circumference, then,”\u003c/span\u003e\r\netc.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 4. The considerations now stated remove a serious difficulty from the\r\nview we have taken of reasoning; which view might otherwise have\r\nseemed not easily reconcilable with the fact that there are Deductive or\r\nRatiocinative Sciences. It might seem to follow, if all reasoning be induction,\r\nthat the difficulties of philosophical investigation must lie in the inductions\r\nexclusively, and that when these were easy, and susceptible of no\r\ndoubt or hesitation, there could be no science, or, at least, no difficulties in\r\nscience. The existence, for example, of an extensive Science of Mathematics,\r\nrequiring the highest scientific genius in those who contributed to its\r\ncreation, and calling for a most continued and vigorous exertion of intellect\r\nin order to appropriate it when created, may seem hard to be accounted\r\nfor on the foregoing theory. But the considerations more recently adduced\r\nremove the mystery, by showing, that even when the inductions themselves\r\nare obvious, there may be much difficulty in finding whether the particular\r\ncase which is the subject of inquiry comes within them; and ample room\r\nfor scientific ingenuity in so combining various inductions, as, by means of\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page162\"\u003e[pg 162]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg162\" id=\"Pg162\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\none within which the case evidently falls, to bring it within others in which\r\nit can not be directly seen to be included.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWhen the more obvious of the inductions which can be made in any\r\nscience from direct observations, have been made, and general formulas\r\nhave been framed, determining the limits within which these inductions\r\nare applicable; as often as a new case can be at once seen to come within\r\none of the formulas, the induction is applied to the new case, and the business\r\nis ended. But new cases are continually arising, which do not obviously\r\ncome within any formula whereby the question we want solved in\r\nrespect of them could be answered. Let us take an instance from geometry:\r\nand as it is taken only for illustration, let the reader concede to us\r\nfor the present, what we shall endeavor to prove in the next chapter, that\r\nthe first principles of geometry are results of induction. Our example\r\nshall be the fifth proposition of the first book of Euclid. The inquiry is,\r\nAre the angles at the base of an isosceles triangle equal or unequal? The\r\nfirst thing to be considered is, what inductions we have, from which we can\r\ninfer equality or inequality. For inferring equality we have the following\r\nformulæ: Things which being applied to each other coincide, are equals.\r\nThings which are equal to the same thing are equals. A whole and the\r\nsum of its parts are equals. The sums of equal things are equals. The\r\ndifferences of equal things are equals. There are no other original formulæ\r\nto prove equality. For inferring inequality we have the following: A\r\nwhole and its parts are unequals. The sums of equal things and unequal\r\nthings are unequals. The differences of equal things and unequal things\r\nare unequals. In all, eight formulæ. The angles at the base of an isosceles\r\ntriangle do not obviously come within any of these. The formulæ\r\nspecify certain marks of equality and of inequality, but the angles can not\r\nbe perceived intuitively to have any of those marks. On examination it\r\nappears that they have; and we ultimately succeed in bringing them within\r\nthe formula, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“The differences of equal things are equal.”\u003c/span\u003e Whence comes\r\nthe difficulty of recognizing these angles as the differences of equal things?\r\nBecause each of them is the difference not of one pair only, but of innumerable\r\npairs of angles; and out of these we had to imagine and select two,\r\nwhich could either be intuitively perceived to be equals, or possessed some\r\nof the marks of equality set down in the various formulæ. By an exercise\r\nof ingenuity, which, on the part of the first inventor, deserves to be regarded\r\nas considerable, two pairs of angles were hit upon, which united\r\nthese requisites. First, it could be perceived intuitively that their differences\r\nwere the angles at the base; and, secondly, they possessed one of the\r\nmarks of equality, namely, coincidence when applied to one another. This\r\ncoincidence, however, was not perceived intuitively,\r\nbut inferred, in conformity to another\r\nformula.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nFor greater clearness, I subjoin an analysis\r\nof the demonstration. Euclid, it will be remembered,\r\ndemonstrates his fifth proposition\r\nby means of the fourth. This it is not allowable\r\nfor us to do, because we are undertaking\r\nto trace deductive truths not to prior deductions,\r\nbut to their original inductive foundation.\r\nWe must, therefore, use the premises of\r\nthe fourth proposition instead of its conclusion, and prove the fifth directly\r\nfrom first principles. To do so requires six formulas.\r\n(We presuppose an equilateral triangle, whose vertices are\r\nA, D, E, with point B on the side AD, and point C on the side AE, such that\r\nBC is parallel to DE.\r\nWe must begin, as\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page163\"\u003e[pg 163]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg163\" id=\"Pg163\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nin Euclid, by prolonging the equal sides AB, AC, to equal distances, and\r\njoining the extremities BE, DC.)\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-variant: small-caps\"\u003eFirst Formula.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e—\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eThe sums of equals\r\nare equal.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAD and AE are sums of equals by the supposition. Having that mark\r\nof equality, they are concluded by this formula to be equal.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-variant: small-caps\"\u003eSecond Formula.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e—\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eEqual straight\r\nlines or angles, being applied to one\r\nanother, coincide.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAC, AB, are within this formula by supposition; AD, AE, have been\r\nbrought within it by the preceding step. The angle at A considered as an\r\nangle of the triangle ABE, and the same angle considered as an angle of\r\nthe triangle ACD, are of course within the formula. All these pairs, therefore,\r\npossess the property which, according to the second formula, is a\r\nmark that when applied to one another they will coincide. Conceive\r\nthem, then, applied to one another, by turning over the triangle ABE, and\r\nlaying it on the triangle ACD in such a manner that AB of the one shall\r\nlie upon AC of the other. Then, by the equality of the angles, AE will lie\r\non AD. But AB and AC, AE and AD are equals; therefore they will coincide\r\naltogether, and of course at their extremities, D, E, and B, C.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-variant: small-caps\"\u003eThird Formula.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e—\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eStraight lines,\r\nhaving their extremities coincident,\r\ncoincide.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nBE and CD have been brought within this formula by the preceding induction;\r\nthey will, therefore, coincide.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-variant: small-caps\"\u003eFourth Formula.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e—\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eAngles, having\r\ntheir sides coincident, coincide.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe third induction having shown that BE and CD coincide, and the\r\nsecond that AB, AC, coincide, the angles ABE and ACD are thereby\r\nbrought within the fourth formula, and accordingly coincide.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-variant: small-caps\"\u003eFifth Formula.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e—\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eThings which\r\ncoincide are equal.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe angles ABE and ACD are brought within this formula by the induction\r\nimmediately preceding. This train of reasoning being also applicable,\r\n\u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003emutatis mutandis\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\nto the angles EBC, DCB, these also are brought\r\nwithin the fifth formula. And, finally,\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-variant: small-caps\"\u003eSixth Formula.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e—\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eThe differences of\r\nequals are equal.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe angle ABC being the difference of ABE, CBE, and the angle ACB\r\nbeing the difference of ACD, DCB; which have been proved to be equals;\r\nABC and ACB are brought within the last formula by the whole of the\r\nprevious process.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe difficulty here encountered is chiefly that of figuring to ourselves\r\nthe two angles at the base of the triangle ABC as remainders made by cutting\r\none pair of angles out of another, while each pair shall be corresponding\r\nangles of triangles which have two sides and the intervening angle\r\nequal. It is by this happy contrivance that so many different inductions\r\nare brought to bear upon the same particular case. And this not being\r\nat all an obvious thought, it may be seen from an example so near the\r\nthreshold of mathematics, how much scope there may well be for scientific\r\ndexterity in the higher branches of that and other sciences, in order so to\r\ncombine a few simple inductions, as to bring within each of them innumerable\r\ncases which are not obviously included in it; and how long, and numerous,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page164\"\u003e[pg 164]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg164\" id=\"Pg164\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nand complicated may be the processes necessary for bringing the\r\ninductions together, even when each induction may itself be very easy and\r\nsimple. All the inductions involved in all geometry are comprised in those\r\nsimple ones, the formulæ of which are the Axioms, and a few of the so-called\r\nDefinitions. The remainder of the science is made up of the processes\r\nemployed for bringing unforeseen cases within these inductions; or (in syllogistic\r\nlanguage) for proving the minors necessary to complete the syllogisms;\r\nthe majors being the definitions and axioms. In those definitions\r\nand axioms are laid down the whole of the marks, by an artful combination\r\nof which it has been found possible to discover and prove all that is\r\nproved in geometry. The marks being so few, and the inductions which\r\nfurnish them being so obvious and familiar; the connecting of several of\r\nthem together, which constitutes Deductions, or Trains of Reasoning,\r\nforms the whole difficulty of the science, and, with a trifling exception, its\r\nwhole bulk; and hence Geometry is a Deductive Science.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 5. It will be seen hereafter\u003ca id=\"noteref_67\" name=\"noteref_67\" href=\"#note_67\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e67\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e that there are weighty scientific reasons\r\nfor giving to every science as much of the character of a Deductive Science\r\nas possible; for endeavoring to construct the science from the fewest\r\nand the simplest possible inductions, and to make these, by any combinations\r\nhowever complicated, suffice for proving even such truths, relating\r\nto complex cases, as could be proved, if we chose, by inductions from specific\r\nexperience. Every branch of natural philosophy was originally experimental;\r\neach generalization rested on a special induction, and was derived\r\nfrom its own distinct set of observations and experiments. From being\r\nsciences of pure experiment, as the phrase is, or, to speak more correctly,\r\nsciences in which the reasonings mostly consist of no more than one step,\r\nand are expressed by single syllogisms, all these sciences have become to\r\nsome extent, and some of them in nearly the whole of their extent, sciences\r\nof pure reasoning; whereby multitudes of truths, already known by induction\r\nfrom as many different sets of experiments, have come to be exhibited\r\nas deductions or corollaries from inductive propositions of a simpler and\r\nmore universal character. Thus mechanics, hydrostatics, optics, acoustics,\r\nthermology, have successively been rendered mathematical; and astronomy\r\nwas brought by Newton within the laws of general mechanics. Why it is\r\nthat the substitution of this circuitous mode of proceeding for a process\r\napparently much easier and more natural, is held, and justly, to be the\r\ngreatest triumph of the investigation of nature, we are not, in this stage\r\nof our inquiry, prepared to examine. But it is necessary to remark, that\r\nalthough, by this progressive transformation, all sciences tend to become\r\nmore and more Deductive, they are not, therefore, the less Inductive; every\r\nstep in the Deduction is still an Induction. The opposition is not between\r\nthe terms Deductive and Inductive, but between Deductive and Experimental.\r\nA science is experimental, in proportion as every new case, which\r\npresents any peculiar features, stands in need of a new set of observations\r\nand experiments—a fresh induction. It is deductive, in proportion as it\r\ncan draw conclusions, respecting cases of a new kind, by processes which\r\nbring those cases under old inductions; by ascertaining that cases which\r\ncan not be observed to have the requisite marks, have, however, marks of\r\nthose marks.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWe can now, therefore, perceive what is the generic distinction between\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page165\"\u003e[pg 165]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg165\" id=\"Pg165\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nsciences which can be made Deductive, and those which must as yet remain\r\nExperimental. The difference consists in our having been able, or\r\nnot yet able, to discover marks of marks. If by our various inductions we\r\nhave been able to proceed no further than to such propositions as these,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e a mark of \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eb\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, or\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e and \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eb\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e marks of one another,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ec\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e a mark of \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ed\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, or c and\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ed\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e marks of one another, without any thing to connect\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e or \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eb\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e with \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ec\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e or\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ed\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e; we have a science of detached and mutually independent\r\ngeneralizations, such as these, that acids redden vegetable blues, and that alkalies\r\ncolor them green; from neither of which propositions could we, directly or indirectly,\r\ninfer the other: and a science, so far as it is composed of such propositions,\r\nis purely experimental. Chemistry, in the present state of our\r\nknowledge, has not yet thrown off this character. There are other sciences,\r\nhowever, of which the propositions are of this kind: \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e a mark of\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eb, b\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e a mark of \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ec, c\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e of\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ed, d\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e of \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ee\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, etc. In these sciences we can\r\nmount the ladder from \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e to \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ee\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e by a process\r\nof ratiocination; we can conclude that \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e is a\r\nmark of \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ee\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, and that every object which has the mark\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e has the property \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ee\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\nalthough, perhaps, we never were able to observe \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e and\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ee\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e together, and although even \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ed\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, our only\r\ndirect mark of \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ee\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, may not be perceptible in those\r\nobjects, but only inferable. Or, varying the first metaphor, we may be\r\nsaid to get from \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e to \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ee\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e underground: the\r\nmarks \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eb\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ec\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ed\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\nwhich indicate the route, must all be possessed somewhere by the objects concerning\r\nwhich we are inquiring; but they are below the surface: \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e is the\r\nonly mark that is visible, and by it we are able to trace in succession all the rest.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 6. We can now understand how an experimental may transform itself\r\ninto a deductive science by the mere progress of experiment. In an experimental\r\nscience, the inductions, as we have said, lie detached, as, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e a\r\nmark of \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eb, c\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e a mark of \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ed\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ee\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e a mark of \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ef\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, and so on: now, a new set\r\nof instances, and a consequent new induction, may at any time bridge over the interval\r\nbetween two of these unconnected arches; \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eb\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, for example, may be\r\nascertained to be a mark of \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ec\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, which enables us thenceforth to\r\nprove deductively that \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e is a mark of \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ec\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e.\r\nOr, as sometimes happens, some comprehensive induction\r\nmay raise an arch high in the air, which bridges over hosts of them\r\nat once; \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eb\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ed\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ef\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\nand all the rest, turning out to be marks of some one thing,\r\nor of things between which a connection has already been traced. As\r\nwhen Newton discovered that the motions, whether regular or apparently\r\nanomalous, of all the bodies of the solar system (each of which motions\r\nhad been inferred by a separate logical operation, from separate marks),\r\nwere all marks of moving round a common centre, with a centripetal force\r\nvarying directly as the mass, and inversely as the square of the distance\r\nfrom that centre. This is the greatest example which has yet occurred of\r\nthe transformation, at one stroke, of a science which was still to a great degree\r\nmerely experimental, into a deductive science.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nTransformations of the same nature, but on a smaller scale, continually\r\ntake place in the less advanced branches of physical knowledge, without\r\nenabling them to throw off the character of experimental sciences. Thus\r\nwith regard to the two unconnected propositions before cited, namely,\r\nAcids redden vegetable blues, Alkalies make them green; it is remarked by\r\nLiebig, that all blue coloring matters which are reddened by acids (as well\r\nas, reciprocally, all red coloring matters which are rendered blue by alkalies)\r\ncontain nitrogen: and it is quite possible that this circumstance may\r\none day furnish a bond of connection between the two propositions in\r\nquestion, by showing that the antagonistic action of acids and alkalies in\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page166\"\u003e[pg 166]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg166\" id=\"Pg166\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nproducing or destroying the color blue, is the result of some one, more\r\ngeneral, law. Although this connecting of detached generalizations is so\r\nmuch gain, it tends but little to give a deductive character to any science\r\nas a whole; because the new courses of observation and experiment, which\r\nthus enable us to connect together a few general truths, usually make\r\nknown to us a still greater number of unconnected new ones. Hence\r\nchemistry, though similar extensions and simplifications of its generalizations\r\nare continually taking place, is still in the main an experimental science;\r\nand is likely so to continue unless some comprehensive induction\r\nshould be hereafter arrived at, which, like Newton’s, shall connect a vast\r\nnumber of the smaller known inductions together, and change the whole\r\nmethod of the science at once. Chemistry has already one great generalization,\r\nwhich, though relating to one of the subordinate aspects of chemical\r\nphenomena, possesses within its limited sphere this comprehensive character;\r\nthe principle of Dalton, called the atomic theory, or the doctrine of\r\nchemical equivalents: which by enabling us to a certain extent to foresee\r\nthe proportions in which two substances will combine, before the experiment\r\nhas been tried, constitutes undoubtedly a source of new chemical\r\ntruths obtainable by deduction, as well as a connecting principle for all\r\ntruths of the same description previously obtained by experiment.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 7. The discoveries which change the method of a science from experimental\r\nto deductive, mostly consist in establishing, either by deduction or\r\nby direct experiment, that the varieties of a particular phenomenon uniformly\r\naccompany the varieties of some other phenomenon better known.\r\nThus the science of sound, which previously stood in the lowest rank of\r\nmerely experimental science, became deductive when it was proved by experiment\r\nthat every variety of sound was consequent on, and therefore a\r\nmark of, a distinct and definable variety of oscillatory motion among the\r\nparticles of the transmitting medium. When this was ascertained, it followed\r\nthat every relation of succession or co-existence which obtained between\r\nphenomena of the more known class, obtained also between the\r\nphenomena which correspond to them in the other class. Every sound,\r\nbeing a mark of a particular oscillatory motion, became a mark of every\r\nthing which, by the laws of dynamics, was known to be inferable from\r\nthat motion; and every thing which by those same laws was a mark of any\r\noscillatory motion among the particles of an elastic medium, became a mark\r\nof the corresponding sound. And thus many truths, not before suspected,\r\nconcerning sound, become deducible from the known laws of the propagation\r\nof motion through an elastic medium; while facts already empirically\r\nknown respecting sound, become an indication of corresponding properties\r\nof vibrating bodies, previously undiscovered.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nBut the grand agent for transforming experimental into deductive sciences,\r\nis the science of number. The properties of number, alone among\r\nall known phenomena, are, in the most rigorous sense, properties of all\r\nthings whatever. All things are not colored, or ponderable, or even extended;\r\nbut all things are numerable. And if we consider this science in\r\nits whole extent, from common arithmetic up to the calculus of variations,\r\nthe truths already ascertained seem all but infinite, and admit of indefinite\r\nextension.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThese truths, though affirmable of all things whatever, of course apply\r\nto them only in respect of their quantity. But if it comes to be discovered\r\nthat variations of quality in any class of phenomena, correspond regularly\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page167\"\u003e[pg 167]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg167\" id=\"Pg167\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nto variations of quantity either in those same or in some other phenomena;\r\nevery formula of mathematics applicable to quantities which vary in that\r\nparticular manner, becomes a mark of a corresponding general truth, respecting\r\nthe variations in quality which accompany them: and the science\r\nof quantity being (as far as any science can be) altogether deductive,\r\nthe theory of that particular kind of qualities becomes, to this extent, deductive\r\nlikewise.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe most striking instance in point which history affords (though not\r\nan example of an experimental science rendered deductive, but of an unparalleled\r\nextension given to the deductive process in a science which was\r\ndeductive already), is the revolution in geometry which originated with\r\nDescartes, and was completed by Clairaut. These great mathematicians\r\npointed out the importance of the fact, that to every variety of position in\r\npoints, direction in lines, or form in curves or surfaces (all of which are\r\nQualities), there corresponds a peculiar relation of quantity between either\r\ntwo or three rectilineal co-ordinates; insomuch that if the law were known\r\naccording to which those co-ordinates vary relatively to one another, every\r\nother geometrical property of the line or surface in question, whether relating\r\nto quantity or quality, would be capable of being inferred. Hence\r\nit followed that every geometrical question could be solved, if the corresponding\r\nalgebraical one could; and geometry received an accession (actual\r\nor potential) of new truths, corresponding to every property of numbers\r\nwhich the progress of the calculus had brought, or might in future\r\nbring, to light. In the same general manner, mechanics, astronomy, and in\r\na less degree, every branch of natural philosophy commonly so called, have\r\nbeen made algebraical. The varieties of physical phenomena with which\r\nthose sciences are conversant, have been found to answer to determinable\r\nvarieties in the quantity of some circumstance or other; or at least to varieties\r\nof form or position, for which corresponding equations of quantity\r\nhad already been, or were susceptible of being, discovered by geometers.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIn these various transformations, the propositions of the science of number\r\ndo but fulfill the function proper to all propositions forming a train of\r\nreasoning, viz., that of enabling us to arrive in an indirect method, by\r\nmarks of marks, at such of the properties of objects as we can not directly\r\nascertain (or not so conveniently) by experiment. We travel from a\r\ngiven visible or tangible fact, through the truths of numbers, to the facts\r\nsought. The given fact is a mark that a certain relation subsists between\r\nthe quantities of some of the elements concerned; while the fact sought\r\npresupposes a certain relation between the quantities of some other elements:\r\nnow, if these last quantities are dependent in some known manner upon the former,\r\nor \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003evicè versa\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, we can argue from the numerical relation\r\nbetween the one set of quantities, to determine that which subsists between\r\nthe other set; the theorems of the calculus affording the intermediate\r\nlinks. And thus one of the two physical facts becomes a mark of the\r\nother, by being a mark of a mark of a mark of it.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page168\"\u003e[pg 168]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg168\" id=\"Pg168\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-div\" style=\"margin-bottom: 4.00em; margin-top: 4.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"toc35\" id=\"toc35\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"pdf36\" id=\"pdf36\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: center; margin-bottom: 2.40em; margin-top: 2.40em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 120%\"\u003eChapter V.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: left; margin-bottom: 2.88em; margin-top: 2.88em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 144%\"\u003eOf Demonstration, And Necessary Truths.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 1. If, as laid down in the two preceding chapters, the foundation of\r\nall sciences, even deductive or demonstrative sciences, is Induction; if\r\nevery step in the ratiocinations even of geometry is an act of induction;\r\nand if a train of reasoning is but bringing many inductions to bear upon\r\nthe same subject of inquiry, and drawing a case within one induction by\r\nmeans of another; wherein lies the peculiar certainty always ascribed to\r\nthe sciences which are entirely, or almost entirely, deductive? Why are\r\nthey called the Exact Sciences? Why are mathematical certainty, and the\r\nevidence of demonstration, common phrases to express the very highest\r\ndegree of assurance attainable by reason? Why are mathematics by almost\r\nall philosophers, and (by some) even those branches of natural philosophy\r\nwhich, through the medium of mathematics, have been converted\r\ninto deductive sciences, considered to be independent of the evidence of\r\nexperience and observation, and characterized as systems of Necessary\r\nTruth?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe answer I conceive to be, that this character of necessity, ascribed to\r\nthe truths of mathematics, and (even with some reservations to be hereafter\r\nmade) the peculiar certainty attributed to them, is an illusion; in order\r\nto sustain which, it is necessary to suppose that those truths relate to,\r\nand express the properties of, purely imaginary objects. It is acknowledged\r\nthat the conclusions of geometry are deduced, partly at least, from\r\nthe so-called Definitions, and that those definitions are assumed to be correct\r\nrepresentations, as far as they go, of the objects with which geometry\r\nis conversant. Now we have pointed out that, from a definition as such,\r\nno proposition, unless it be one concerning the meaning of a word, can ever\r\nfollow; and that what apparently follows from a definition, follows in reality\r\nfrom an implied assumption that there exists a real thing conformable\r\nthereto. This assumption, in the case of the definitions of geometry, is not\r\nstrictly true: there exist no real things exactly conformable to the definitions.\r\nThere exist no points without magnitude; no lines without breadth,\r\nnor perfectly straight; no circles with all their radii exactly equal, nor\r\nsquares with all their angles perfectly right. It will perhaps be said that\r\nthe assumption does not extend to the actual, but only to the possible, existence\r\nof such things. I answer that, according to any test we have of possibility,\r\nthey are not even possible. Their existence, so far as we can form\r\nany judgment, would seem to be inconsistent with the physical constitution\r\nof our planet at least, if not of the universe. To get rid of this difficulty,\r\nand at the same time to save the credit of the supposed system of\r\nnecessary truth, it is customary to say that the points, lines, circles, and\r\nsquares which are the subject of geometry, exist in our conceptions merely,\r\nand are part of our minds; which minds, by working on their own materials, construct\r\nan \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea priori\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e science, the evidence of which is\r\npurely mental, and has nothing whatever to do with outward experience. By howsoever\r\nhigh authorities this doctrine may have been sanctioned, it appears\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page169\"\u003e[pg 169]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg169\" id=\"Pg169\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nto me psychologically incorrect. The points, lines, circles, and squares\r\nwhich any one has in his mind, are (I apprehend) simply copies of the\r\npoints, lines, circles, and squares which he has known in his experience.\r\nOur idea of a point, I apprehend to be simply our idea of the \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eminimum\r\nvisibile\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e, the smallest portion of surface which we can see. A line, as defined\r\nby geometers, is wholly inconceivable. We can reason about a line\r\nas if it had no breadth; because we have a power, which is the foundation\r\nof all the control we can exercise over the operations of our minds; the\r\npower, when a perception is present to our senses, or a conception to our intellects,\r\nof \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eattending\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e to a part only of that perception or conception, instead\r\nof the whole. But we can not \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003econceive\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e a line without breadth; we\r\ncan form no mental picture of such a line: all the lines which we have in\r\nour minds are lines possessing breadth. If any one doubts this, we may\r\nrefer him to his own experience. I much question if any one who fancies\r\nthat he can conceive what is called a mathematical line, thinks so from the\r\nevidence of his consciousness: I suspect it is rather because he supposes\r\nthat unless such a conception were possible, mathematics could not exist as\r\na science: a supposition which there will be no difficulty in showing to be\r\nentirely groundless.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nSince, then, neither in nature, nor in the human mind, do there exist any\r\nobjects exactly corresponding to the definitions of geometry, while yet that\r\nscience can not be supposed to be conversant about nonentities; nothing\r\nremains but to consider geometry as conversant with such lines, angles,\r\nand figures, as really exist; and the definitions, as they are called, must be\r\nregarded as some of our first and most obvious generalizations concerning\r\nthose natural objects. The correctness of those generalizations, as generalizations,\r\nis without a flaw: the equality of all the radii of a circle is true\r\nof all circles, so far as it is true of any one: but it is not exactly true of\r\nany circle; it is only nearly true; so nearly that no error of any importance\r\nin practice will be incurred by feigning it to be exactly true. When\r\nwe have occasion to extend these inductions, or their consequences, to cases\r\nin which the error would be appreciable—to lines of perceptible breadth\r\nor thickness, parallels which deviate sensibly from equidistance, and the\r\nlike—we correct our conclusions, by combining with them a fresh set of\r\npropositions relating to the aberration; just as we also take in propositions\r\nrelating to the physical or chemical properties of the material, if those\r\nproperties happen to introduce any modification into the result; which\r\nthey easily may, even with respect to figure and magnitude, as in the case,\r\nfor instance, of expansion by heat. So long, however, as there exists no\r\npractical necessity for attending to any of the properties of the object except\r\nits geometrical properties, or to any of the natural irregularities in\r\nthose, it is convenient to neglect the consideration of the other properties\r\nand of the irregularities, and to reason as if these did not exist: accordingly,\r\nwe formally announce in the definitions, that we intend to proceed on\r\nthis plan. But it is an error to suppose, because we resolve to confine our\r\nattention to a certain number of the properties of an object, that we therefore\r\nconceive, or have an idea of, the object, denuded of its other properties.\r\nWe are thinking, all the time, of precisely such objects as we have\r\nseen and touched, and with all the properties which naturally belong to\r\nthem; but, for scientific convenience, we feign them to be divested of all\r\nproperties, except those which are material to our purpose, and in regard\r\nto which we design to consider them.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe peculiar accuracy, supposed to be characteristic of the first principles\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page170\"\u003e[pg 170]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg170\" id=\"Pg170\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nof geometry, thus appears to be fictitious. The assertions on which\r\nthe reasonings of the science are founded, do not, any more than in other\r\nsciences, exactly correspond with the fact; but we suppose that they do\r\nso, for the sake of tracing the consequences which follow from the supposition.\r\nThe opinion of Dugald Stewart respecting the foundations of geometry,\r\nis, I conceive, substantially correct; that it is built on hypotheses;\r\nthat it owes to this alone the peculiar certainty supposed to distinguish it;\r\nand that in any science whatever, by reasoning from a set of hypotheses,\r\nwe may obtain a body of conclusions as certain as those of geometry, that\r\nis, as strictly in accordance with the hypotheses, and as irresistibly compelling\r\nassent, \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eon condition\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e that those hypotheses are true.\u003ca id=\"noteref_68\" name=\"noteref_68\" href=\"#note_68\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e68\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWhen, therefore, it is affirmed that the conclusions of geometry are necessary\r\ntruths, the necessity consists in reality only in this, that they correctly\r\nfollow from the suppositions from which they are deduced. Those\r\nsuppositions are so far from being necessary, that they are not even true;\r\nthey purposely depart, more or less widely, from the truth. The only sense\r\nin which necessity can be ascribed to the conclusions of any scientific investigation,\r\nis that of legitimately following from some assumption, which,\r\nby the conditions of the inquiry, is not to be questioned. In this relation,\r\nof course, the derivative truths of every deductive science must stand to\r\nthe inductions, or assumptions, on which the science is founded, and which,\r\nwhether true or untrue, certain or doubtful in themselves, are always supposed\r\ncertain for the purposes of the particular science. And therefore\r\nthe conclusions of all deductive sciences were said by the ancients to be\r\nnecessary propositions. We have observed already that to be predicated\r\nnecessarily was characteristic of the predicable Proprium, and that a proprium\r\nwas any property of a thing which could be deduced from its essence,\r\nthat is, from the properties included in its definition.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 2. The important doctrine of Dugald Stewart, which I have endeavored\r\nto enforce, has been contested by Dr. Whewell, both in the dissertation\r\nappended to his excellent \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eMechanical Euclid\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, and in his elaborate\r\nwork on the \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ePhilosophy of the Inductive Sciences\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e; in which last\r\nhe also replies to an article in the Edinburgh Review (ascribed to a writer of\r\ngreat scientific eminence), in which Stewart’s opinion was defended against\r\nhis former strictures. The supposed refutation of Stewart consists in\r\nproving against him (as has also been done in this work) that the premises\r\nof geometry are not definitions, but assumptions of the real existence of\r\nthings corresponding to those definitions. This, however, is doing little for\r\nDr. Whewell’s purpose; for it is these very assumptions which are asserted\r\nto be hypotheses, and which he, if he denies that geometry is founded\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page171\"\u003e[pg 171]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg171\" id=\"Pg171\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\non hypotheses, must show to be absolute truths. All he does, however, is\r\nto observe, that they, at any rate, are not \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003earbitrary\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e hypotheses; that we\r\nshould not be at liberty to substitute other hypotheses for them; that not\r\nonly \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“a definition, to be admissible, must necessarily refer to and agree\r\nwith some conception which we can distinctly frame in our thoughts,”\u003c/span\u003e but\r\nthat the straight lines, for instance, which we define, must be \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“those by\r\nwhich angles are contained, those by which triangles are bounded, those of\r\nwhich parallelism may be predicated, and the\r\nlike.”\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca id=\"noteref_69\" name=\"noteref_69\" href=\"#note_69\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e69\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e And this is true;\r\nbut this has never been contradicted. Those who say that the premises\r\nof geometry are hypotheses, are not bound to maintain them to be hypotheses\r\nwhich have no relation whatever to fact. Since an hypothesis framed\r\nfor the purpose of scientific inquiry must relate to something which has\r\nreal existence (for there can be no science respecting nonentities), it follows\r\nthat any hypothesis we make respecting an object, to facilitate our\r\nstudy of it, must not involve any thing which is distinctly false, and repugnant\r\nto its real nature: we must not ascribe to the thing any property\r\nwhich it has not; our liberty extends only to slightly exaggerating some\r\nof those which it has (by assuming it to be completely what it really is\r\nvery nearly), and suppressing others, under the indispensable obligation of\r\nrestoring them whenever, and in as far as, their presence or absence would\r\nmake any material difference in the truth of our conclusions. Of this nature,\r\naccordingly, are the first principles involved in the definitions of geometry.\r\nThat the hypotheses should be of this particular character, is,\r\nhowever, no further necessary, than inasmuch as no others could enable us\r\nto deduce conclusions which, with due corrections, would be true of real\r\nobjects: and in fact, when our aim is only to illustrate truths, and not to\r\ninvestigate them, we are not under any such restriction. We might suppose\r\nan imaginary animal, and work out by deduction, from the known\r\nlaws of physiology, its natural history; or an imaginary commonwealth,\r\nand from the elements composing it, might argue what would be its fate.\r\nAnd the conclusions which we might thus draw from purely arbitrary hypotheses,\r\nmight form a highly useful intellectual exercise: but as they could\r\nonly teach us what \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ewould\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e be the properties of objects which do not really\r\nexist, they would not constitute any addition to our knowledge of nature:\r\nwhile, on the contrary, if the hypothesis merely divests a real object of\r\nsome portion of its properties, without clothing it in false ones, the conclusions\r\nwill always express, under known liability to correction, actual truth.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 3. But though Dr. Whewell has not shaken Stewart’s doctrine as to\r\nthe hypothetical character of that portion of the first principles of geometry\r\nwhich are involved in the so-called definitions, he has, I conceive, greatly\r\nthe advantage of Stewart on another important point in the theory of\r\ngeometrical reasoning; the necessity of admitting, among those first principles,\r\naxioms as well as definitions. Some of the axioms of Euclid might,\r\nno doubt, be exhibited in the form of definitions, or might be deduced, by\r\nreasoning, from propositions similar to what are so called. Thus, if instead\r\nof the axiom, Magnitudes which can be made to coincide are equal, we introduce\r\na definition, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Equal magnitudes are those which may be so applied\r\nto one another as to coincide;”\u003c/span\u003e the three axioms which follow (Magnitudes\r\nwhich are equal to the same are equal to one another—If equals\r\nare added to equals, the sums are equal—If equals are taken from equals,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page172\"\u003e[pg 172]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg172\" id=\"Pg172\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nthe remainders are equal), may be proved by an imaginary superposition,\r\nresembling that by which the fourth proposition of the first book of Euclid\r\nis demonstrated. But though these and several others may be struck out\r\nof the list of first principles, because, though not requiring demonstration,\r\nthey are susceptible of it; there will be found in the list of axioms two or\r\nthree fundamental truths, not capable of being demonstrated: among which\r\nmust be reckoned the proposition that two straight lines can not inclose a\r\nspace (or its equivalent, Straight lines which coincide in two points coincide\r\naltogether), and some property of parallel lines, other than that which\r\nconstitutes their definition: one of the most suitable for the purpose being\r\nthat selected by Professor Playfair: \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Two straight lines which intersect\r\neach other can not both of them be parallel to a third straight\r\nline.”\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca id=\"noteref_70\" name=\"noteref_70\" href=\"#note_70\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e70\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe axioms, as well those which are indemonstrable as those which admit\r\nof being demonstrated, differ from that other class of fundamental\r\nprinciples which are involved in the definitions, in this, that they are true\r\nwithout any mixture of hypothesis. That things which are equal to the\r\nsame thing are equal to one another, is as true of the lines and figures in\r\nnature, as it would be of the imaginary ones assumed in the definitions.\r\nIn this respect, however, mathematics are only on a par with most other\r\nsciences. In almost all sciences there are some general propositions which\r\nare exactly true, while the greater part are only more or less distant approximations\r\nto the truth. Thus in mechanics, the first law of motion (the\r\ncontinuance of a movement once impressed, until stopped or slackened by\r\nsome resisting force) is true without qualification or error. The rotation\r\nof the earth in twenty-four hours, of the same length as in our time, has\r\ngone on since the first accurate observations, without the increase or diminution\r\nof one second in all that period. These are inductions which\r\nrequire no fiction to make them be received as accurately true: but along\r\nwith them there are others, as for instance the propositions respecting the\r\nfigure of the earth, which are but approximations to the truth; and in order\r\nto use them for the further advancement of our knowledge, we must\r\nfeign that they are exactly true, though they really want something of being\r\nso.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 4. It remains to inquire, what is the ground of our belief in axioms—what\r\nis the evidence on which they rest? I answer, they are experimental\r\ntruths; generalizations from observation. The proposition, Two\r\nstraight lines can not inclose a space—or, in other words, Two straight\r\nlines which have once met, do not meet again, but continue to diverge—is\r\nan induction from the evidence of our senses.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThis opinion runs counter to a scientific prejudice of long standing and\r\ngreat strength, and there is probably no proposition enunciated in this\r\nwork for which a more unfavorable reception is to be expected. It is,\r\nhowever, no new opinion; and even if it were so, would be entitled to be\r\njudged, not by its novelty, but by the strength of the arguments by which\r\nit can be supported. I consider it very fortunate that so eminent a champion\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page173\"\u003e[pg 173]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg173\" id=\"Pg173\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nof the contrary opinion as Dr. Whewell has found occasion for a most\r\nelaborate treatment of the whole theory of axioms, in attempting to construct\r\nthe philosophy of the mathematical and physical sciences on the\r\nbasis of the doctrine against which I now contend. Whoever is anxious\r\nthat a discussion should go to the bottom of the subject, must rejoice to\r\nsee the opposite side of the question worthily represented. If what is\r\nsaid by Dr. Whewell, in support of an opinion which he has made the\r\nfoundation of a systematic work, can be shown not to be conclusive, enough\r\nwill have been done, without going elsewhere in quest of stronger arguments\r\nand a more powerful adversary.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt is not necessary to show that the truths which we call axioms are\r\noriginally \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003esuggested\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e by observation, and that we should never have known\r\nthat two straight lines can not inclose a space if we had never seen a\r\nstraight line: thus much being admitted by Dr. Whewell, and by all, in\r\nrecent times, who have taken his view of the subject. But they contend,\r\nthat it is not experience which \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eproves\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e the axiom; but that its truth is\r\nperceived \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea priori\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, by the constitution of\r\nthe mind itself, from the first moment when the meaning of the proposition is\r\napprehended; and without any necessity for verifying it by repeated trials, as is\r\nrequisite in the case of truths really ascertained by observation.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThey can not, however, but allow that the truth of the axiom, Two\r\nstraight lines can not inclose a space, even if evident independently of experience,\r\nis also evident from experience. Whether the axiom needs confirmation\r\nor not, it receives confirmation in almost every instant of our\r\nlives; since we can not look at any two straight lines which intersect one\r\nanother, without seeing that from that point they continue to diverge more\r\nand more. Experimental proof crowds in upon us in such endless profusion,\r\nand without one instance in which there can be even a suspicion of\r\nan exception to the rule, that we should soon have stronger ground for believing\r\nthe axiom, even as an experimental truth, than we have for almost\r\nany of the general truths which we confessedly learn from the evidence of our senses.\r\nIndependently of \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea priori\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e evidence, we should\r\ncertainly believe it with an intensity of conviction far greater than we accord to any\r\nordinary physical truth: and this too at a time of life much earlier than\r\nthat from which we date almost any part of our acquired knowledge, and\r\nmuch too early to admit of our retaining any recollection of the history of\r\nour intellectual operations at that period. Where then is the necessity for\r\nassuming that our recognition of these truths has a different origin from\r\nthe rest of our knowledge, when its existence is perfectly accounted for by\r\nsupposing its origin to be the same? when the causes which produce belief\r\nin all other instances, exist in this instance, and in a degree of strength\r\nas much superior to what exists in other cases, as the intensity of the belief\r\nitself is superior? The burden of proof lies on the advocates of the\r\ncontrary opinion: it is for them to point out some fact, inconsistent with\r\nthe supposition that this part of our knowledge of nature is derived from\r\nthe same sources as every other part.\u003ca id=\"noteref_71\" name=\"noteref_71\" href=\"#note_71\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e71\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page174\"\u003e[pg 174]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg174\" id=\"Pg174\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThis, for instance, they would be able to do, if they could prove chronologically\r\nthat we had the conviction (at least practically) so early in infancy\r\nas to be anterior to those impressions on the senses, upon which, on the\r\nother theory, the conviction is founded. This, however, can not be proved:\r\nthe point being too far back to be within the reach of memory, and too obscure\r\nfor external observation. The advocates of the \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea priori\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e theory are\r\nobliged to have recourse to other arguments. These are reducible to two,\r\nwhich I shall endeavor to state as clearly and as forcibly as possible.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ca name=\"Book_II_Chapter_V_Section_5\" id=\"Book_II_Chapter_V_Section_5\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 5. In the first place it is said, that if our assent to the proposition that\r\ntwo straight lines can not inclose a space, were derived from the senses,\r\nwe could only be convinced of its truth by actual trial, that is, by seeing or\r\nfeeling the straight lines; whereas, in fact, it is seen to be true by merely\r\nthinking of them. That a stone thrown into water goes to the bottom,\r\nmay be perceived by our senses, but mere thinking of a stone thrown into\r\nthe water would never have led us to that conclusion: not so, however,\r\nwith the axioms relating to straight lines: if I could be made to conceive\r\nwhat a straight line is, without having seen one, I should at once recognize\r\nthat two such lines can not inclose a space. Intuition is \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“imaginary\r\nlooking;”\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca id=\"noteref_72\" name=\"noteref_72\" href=\"#note_72\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e72\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nbut experience must be real looking: if we see a property of\r\nstraight lines to be true by merely fancying ourselves to be looking at\r\nthem, the ground of our belief can not be the senses, or experience; it\r\nmust be something mental.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nTo this argument it might be added in the case of this particular axiom\r\n(for the assertion would not be true of all axioms), that the evidence of it\r\nfrom actual ocular inspection is not only unnecessary, but unattainable.\r\nWhat says the axiom? That two straight lines \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ecan not\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e inclose a space;\r\nthat after having once intersected, if they are prolonged to infinity they do\r\nnot meet, but continue to diverge from one another. How can this, in any\r\nsingle case, be proved by actual observation? We may follow the lines to\r\nany distance we please; but we can not follow them to infinity: for aught\r\nour senses can testify, they may, immediately beyond the farthest point to\r\nwhich we have traced them, begin to approach, and at last meet. Unless,\r\ntherefore, we had some other proof of the impossibility than observation\r\naffords us, we should have no ground for believing the axiom at all.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nTo these arguments, which I trust I can not be accused of understating,\r\na satisfactory answer will, I conceive, be found, if we advert to one of the\r\ncharacteristic properties of geometrical forms—their capacity of being\r\npainted in the imagination with a distinctness equal to reality: in other\r\nwords, the exact resemblance of our ideas of form to the sensations which\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page175\"\u003e[pg 175]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg175\" id=\"Pg175\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nsuggest them. This, in the first place, enables us to make (at least with a\r\nlittle practice) mental pictures of all possible combinations of lines and angles,\r\nwhich resemble the realities quite as well as any which we could make\r\non paper; and in the next place, make those pictures just as fit subjects of\r\ngeometrical experimentation as the realities themselves; inasmuch as pictures,\r\nif sufficiently accurate, exhibit of course all the properties which\r\nwould be manifested by the realities at one given instant, and on simple\r\ninspection: and in geometry we are concerned only with such properties,\r\nand not with that which pictures could not exhibit, the mutual action of\r\nbodies one upon another. The foundations of geometry would therefore\r\nbe laid in direct experience, even if the experiments (which in this case\r\nconsist merely in attentive contemplation) were practiced solely upon\r\nwhat we call our ideas, that is, upon the diagrams in our minds, and not\r\nupon outward objects. For in all systems of experimentation we take\r\nsome objects to serve as representatives of all which resemble them; and\r\nin the present case the conditions which qualify a real object to be the representative\r\nof its class, are completely fulfilled by an object existing only\r\nin our fancy. Without denying, therefore, the possibility of satisfying ourselves\r\nthat two straight lines can not inclose a space, by merely thinking\r\nof straight lines without actually looking at them; I contend, that we do\r\nnot believe this truth on the ground of the imaginary intuition simply, but\r\nbecause we know that the imaginary lines exactly resemble real ones, and\r\nthat we may conclude from them to real ones with quite as much certainty\r\nas we could conclude from one real line to another. The conclusion, therefore,\r\nis still an induction from observation. And we should not be authorized\r\nto substitute observation of the image in our mind, for observation\r\nof the reality, if we had not learned by long-continued experience that the\r\nproperties of the reality are faithfully represented in the image; just as\r\nwe should be scientifically warranted in describing an animal which we\r\nhave never seen, from a picture made of it with a daguerreotype; but not\r\nuntil we had learned by ample experience, that observation of such a picture\r\nis precisely equivalent to observation of the original.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThese considerations also remove the objection arising from the impossibility\r\nof ocularly following the lines in their prolongation to infinity.\r\nFor though, in order actually to see that two given lines never meet, it\r\nwould be necessary to follow them to infinity; yet without doing so we\r\nmay know that if they ever do meet, or if, after diverging from one another,\r\nthey begin again to approach, this must take place not at an infinite,\r\nbut at a finite distance. Supposing, therefore, such to be the case, we can\r\ntransport ourselves thither in imagination, and can frame a mental image\r\nof the appearance which one or both of the lines must present at that point,\r\nwhich we may rely on as being precisely similar to the reality. Now,\r\nwhether we fix our contemplation upon this imaginary picture, or call to\r\nmind the generalizations we have had occasion to make from former ocular\r\nobservation, we learn by the evidence of experience, that a line which, after\r\ndiverging from another straight line, begins to approach to it, produces\r\nthe impression on our senses which we describe by the expression, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“a bent\r\nline,”\u003c/span\u003e not by the expression, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“a straight line.”\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca id=\"noteref_73\" name=\"noteref_73\" href=\"#note_73\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e73\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page176\"\u003e[pg 176]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg176\" id=\"Pg176\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe preceding argument, which is, to my mind unanswerable, merges,\r\nhowever, in a still more comprehensive one, which is stated most clearly\r\nand conclusively by Professor Bain. The psychological reason why axioms,\r\nand indeed many propositions not ordinarily classed as such, may be\r\nlearned from the idea only without referring to the fact, is that in the process\r\nof acquiring the idea we have learned the fact. The proposition is\r\nassented to as soon as the terms are understood, because in learning to understand\r\nthe terms we have acquired the experience which proves the proposition\r\nto be true. \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“We required,”\u003c/span\u003e says Mr.\r\nBain,\u003ca id=\"noteref_74\" name=\"noteref_74\" href=\"#note_74\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e74\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“concrete experience in\r\nthe first instance, to attain to the notion of whole and part; but the notion,\r\nonce arrived at, implies that the whole is greater. In fact, we could not\r\nhave the notion without an experience tantamount to this conclusion….\r\nWhen we have mastered the notion of straightness, we have also mastered\r\nthat aspect of it expressed by the affirmation that two straight lines can\r\nnot inclose a space. No intuitive or innate powers or perceptions are\r\nneeded in such case…. We can not have the full meaning of Straightness,\r\nwithout going through a comparison of straight objects among themselves,\r\nand with their opposites, bent or crooked objects. The result of this comparison is,\r\n\u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003einter alia\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, that straightness in two lines\r\nis seen to be incompatible with inclosing a space; the inclosure of space involves\r\ncrookedness in at least one of the lines.”\u003c/span\u003e And similarly, in the case of every\r\nfirst principle,\u003ca id=\"noteref_75\" name=\"noteref_75\" href=\"#note_75\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e75\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“the same knowledge that makes\r\nit understood, suffices to verify it.”\u003c/span\u003e The more this observation is considered the\r\nmore (I am convinced) it will be felt to go to the very root of the controversy.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ca name=\"Book_II_Chapter_V_Section_6\" id=\"Book_II_Chapter_V_Section_6\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 6. The first of the two arguments in support of the theory that axioms\r\nare \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea priori\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e truths, having, I think, been\r\nsufficiently answered; I proceed\r\nto the second, which is usually the most relied on. Axioms (it is asserted)\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page177\"\u003e[pg 177]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg177\" id=\"Pg177\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nare conceived by us not only as true, but as universally and necessarily\r\ntrue. Now, experience can not possibly give to any proposition this character.\r\nI may have seen snow a hundred times, and may have seen that it\r\nwas white, but this can not give me entire assurance even that all snow is\r\nwhite; much less that snow \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003emust\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e be white. \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“However many instances\r\nwe may have observed of the truth of a proposition, there is nothing to\r\nassure us that the next case shall not be an exception to the rule. If it\r\nbe strictly true that every ruminant animal yet known has cloven hoofs,\r\nwe still can not be sure that some creature will not hereafter be discovered\r\nwhich has the first of these attributes, without having the other….\r\nExperience must always consist of a limited number of observations; and,\r\nhowever numerous these may be, they can show nothing with regard to\r\nthe infinite number of cases in which the experiment has not been made.”\u003c/span\u003e\r\nBesides, Axioms are not only universal, they are also necessary. Now \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“experience\r\ncan not offer the smallest ground for the necessity of a proposition.\r\nShe can observe and record what has happened; but she can not\r\nfind, in any case, or in any accumulation of cases, any reason for what\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003emust\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e happen. She may see objects side by side; but she can not see a reason\r\nwhy they must ever be side by side. She finds certain events to occur in\r\nsuccession; but the succession supplies, in its occurrence, no reason for its\r\nrecurrence. She contemplates external objects; but she can not detect any\r\ninternal bond, which indissolubly connects the future with the past, the possible\r\nwith the real. To learn a proposition by experience, and to see it to\r\nbe necessarily true, are two altogether different processes of\r\nthought.”\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca id=\"noteref_76\" name=\"noteref_76\" href=\"#note_76\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e76\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nAnd Dr. Whewell adds, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“If any one does not clearly comprehend this distinction\r\nof necessary and contingent truths, he will not be able to go along\r\nwith us in our researches into the foundations of human knowledge; nor,\r\nindeed, to pursue with success any speculation on the\r\nsubject.”\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca id=\"noteref_77\" name=\"noteref_77\" href=\"#note_77\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e77\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIn the following passage, we are told what the distinction is, the non-recognition\r\nof which incurs this denunciation. \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Necessary truths are\r\nthose in which we not only learn that the proposition \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eis\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e true, but see that\r\nit \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003emust be\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e true; in which the negation of the truth is not only false, but\r\nimpossible; in which we can not, even by an effort of imagination, or in\r\na supposition, conceive the reverse of that which is asserted. That there\r\nare such truths can not be doubted. We may take, for example, all relations\r\nof number. Three and Two added together make Five. We can\r\nnot conceive it to be otherwise. We can not, by any freak of thought,\r\nimagine Three and Two to make Seven.”\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca id=\"noteref_78\" name=\"noteref_78\" href=\"#note_78\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e78\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAlthough Dr. Whewell has naturally and properly employed a variety\r\nof phrases to bring his meaning more forcibly home, he would, I presume,\r\nallow that they are all equivalent; and that what he means by a necessary\r\ntruth, would be sufficiently defined, a proposition the negation of which is\r\nnot only false but inconceivable. I am unable to find in any of his expressions,\r\nturn them what way you will, a meaning beyond this, and I do not\r\nbelieve he would contend that they mean any thing more.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThis, therefore, is the principle asserted: that propositions, the negation\r\nof which is inconceivable, or in other words, which we can not figure to\r\nourselves as being false, must rest on evidence of a higher and more cogent\r\ndescription than any which experience can afford.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nNow I can not but wonder that so much stress should be laid on the circumstance\r\nof inconceivableness, when there is such ample experience to\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page178\"\u003e[pg 178]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg178\" id=\"Pg178\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nshow, that our capacity or incapacity of conceiving a thing has very little\r\nto do with the possibility of the thing in itself; but is in truth very much\r\nan affair of accident, and depends on the past history and habits of our\r\nown minds. There is no more generally acknowledged fact in human nature,\r\nthan the extreme difficulty at first felt in conceiving any thing as possible,\r\nwhich is in contradiction to long established and familiar experience;\r\nor even to old familiar habits of thought. And this difficulty is a necessary\r\nresult of the fundamental laws of the human mind. When we have often\r\nseen and thought of two things together, and have never in any one instance\r\neither seen or thought of them separately, there is by the primary\r\nlaw of association an increasing difficulty, which may in the end become\r\ninsuperable, of conceiving the two things apart. This is most of all conspicuous\r\nin uneducated persons, who are in general utterly unable to separate\r\nany two ideas which have once become firmly associated in their\r\nminds; and if persons of cultivated intellect have any advantage on the\r\npoint, it is only because, having seen and heard and read more, and being\r\nmore accustomed to exercise their imagination, they have experienced their\r\nsensations and thoughts in more varied combinations, and have been prevented\r\nfrom forming many of these inseparable associations. But this advantage\r\nhas necessarily its limits. The most practiced intellect is not exempt\r\nfrom the universal laws of our conceptive faculty. If daily habit\r\npresents to any one for a long period two facts in combination, and if he is\r\nnot led during that period either by accident or by his voluntary mental\r\noperations to think of them apart, he will probably in time become incapable\r\nof doing so even by the strongest effort; and the supposition that the\r\ntwo facts can be separated in nature, will at last present itself to his mind\r\nwith all the characters of an inconceivable phenomenon.\u003ca id=\"noteref_79\" name=\"noteref_79\" href=\"#note_79\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e79\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e There are remarkable\r\ninstances of this in the history of science: instances in which the\r\nmost instructed men rejected as impossible, because inconceivable, things\r\nwhich their posterity, by earlier practice and longer perseverance in the attempt,\r\nfound it quite easy to conceive, and which every body now knows\r\nto be true. There was a time when men of the most cultivated intellects,\r\nand the most emancipated from the dominion of early prejudice, could not\r\ncredit the existence of antipodes; were unable to conceive, in opposition\r\nto old association, the force of gravity acting upward instead of downward.\r\nThe Cartesians long rejected the Newtonian doctrine of the gravitation of\r\nall bodies toward one another, on the faith of a general proposition, the reverse\r\nof which seemed to them to be inconceivable—the proposition that a\r\nbody can not act where it is not. All the cumbrous machinery of imaginary\r\nvortices, assumed without the smallest particle of evidence, appeared\r\nto these philosophers a more rational mode of explaining the heavenly motions,\r\nthan one which involved what seemed to them so great an absurdity.\u003ca id=\"noteref_80\" name=\"noteref_80\" href=\"#note_80\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e80\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page179\"\u003e[pg 179]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg179\" id=\"Pg179\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAnd they no doubt found it as impossible to conceive that a body should\r\nact upon the earth from the distance of the sun or moon, as we find it to\r\nconceive an end to space or time, or two straight lines inclosing a space.\r\nNewton himself had not been able to realize the conception, or we should\r\nnot have had his hypothesis of a subtle ether, the occult cause of gravitation;\r\nand his writings prove, that though he deemed the particular nature\r\nof the intermediate agency a matter of conjecture, the necessity of \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003esome\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e\r\nsuch agency appeared to him indubitable.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIf, then, it be so natural to the human mind, even in a high state of culture,\r\nto be incapable of conceiving, and on that ground to believe impossible,\r\nwhat is afterward not only found to be conceivable but proved to be\r\ntrue; what wonder if in cases where the association is still older, more confirmed,\r\nand more familiar, and in which nothing ever occurs to shake our\r\nconviction, or even suggest to us any conception at variance with the association,\r\nthe acquired incapacity should continue, and be mistaken for a natural\r\nincapacity? It is true, our experience of the varieties in nature enables\r\nus, within certain limits, to conceive other varieties analogous to them.\r\nWe can conceive the sun or moon falling; for though we never saw them\r\nfall, nor ever, perhaps, imagined them falling, we have seen so many other\r\nthings fall, that we have innumerable familiar analogies to assist the conception;\r\nwhich, after all, we should probably have some difficulty in framing,\r\nwere we not well accustomed to see the sun and moon move (or appear\r\nto move), so that we are only called upon to conceive a slight change\r\nin the direction of motion, a circumstance familiar to our experience. But\r\nwhen experience affords no model on which to shape the new conception,\r\nhow is it possible for us to form it? How, for example, can we imagine\r\nan end to space or time? We never saw any object without something\r\nbeyond it, nor experienced any feeling without something following it.\r\nWhen, therefore, we attempt to conceive the last point of space, we have\r\nthe idea irresistibly raised of other points beyond it. When we try to imagine\r\nthe last instant of time, we can not help conceiving another instant\r\nafter it. Nor is there any necessity to assume, as is done by a modern\r\nschool of metaphysicians, a peculiar fundamental law of the mind to account\r\nfor the feeling of infinity inherent in our conceptions of space and\r\ntime; that apparent infinity is sufficiently accounted for by simpler and\r\nuniversally acknowledged laws.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nNow, in the case of a geometrical axiom, such, for example, as that two\r\nstraight lines can not inclose a space—a truth which is testified to us by\r\nour very earliest impressions of the external world—how is it possible\r\n(whether those external impressions be or be not the ground of our belief)\r\nthat the reverse of the proposition \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ecould\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e be otherwise than inconceivable\r\nto us? What analogy have we, what similar order of facts in any other\r\nbranch of our experience, to facilitate to us the conception of two straight\r\nlines inclosing a space? Nor is even this all. I have already called attention\r\nto the peculiar property of our impressions of form, that the ideas or\r\nmental images exactly resemble their prototypes, and adequately represent\r\nthem for the purposes of scientific observation. From this, and from the\r\nintuitive character of the observation, which in this case reduces itself to\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page180\"\u003e[pg 180]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg180\" id=\"Pg180\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nsimple inspection, we can not so much as call up in our imagination two\r\nstraight lines, in order to attempt to conceive them inclosing a space, without\r\nby that very act repeating the scientific experiment which establishes\r\nthe contrary. Will it really be contended that the inconceivableness of the\r\nthing, in such circumstances, proves any thing against the experimental origin\r\nof the conviction? Is it not clear that in whichever mode our belief\r\nin the proposition may have originated, the impossibility of our conceiving\r\nthe negative of it must, on either hypothesis, be the same? As, then, Dr.\r\nWhewell exhorts those who have any difficulty in recognizing the distinction\r\nheld by him between necessary and contingent truths, to study geometry—a\r\ncondition which I can assure him I have conscientiously fulfilled—I,\r\nin return, with equal confidence, exhort those who agree with him, to\r\nstudy the general laws of association; being convinced that nothing more\r\nis requisite than a moderate familiarity with those laws, to dispel the illusion\r\nwhich ascribes a peculiar necessity to our earliest inductions from experience,\r\nand measures the possibility of things in themselves, by the human\r\ncapacity of conceiving them.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nI hope to be pardoned for adding, that Dr. Whewell himself has both\r\nconfirmed by his testimony the effect of habitual association in giving to\r\nan experimental truth the appearance of a necessary one, and afforded a\r\nstriking instance of that remarkable law in his own person. In his\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ePhilosophy of the Inductive Sciences\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e he continually asserts, that\r\npropositions which not only are not self-evident, but which we know to have been\r\ndiscovered gradually, and by great efforts of genius and patience, have, when\r\nonce established, appeared so self-evident that, but for historical proof, it\r\nwould have been impossible to conceive that they had not been recognized\r\nfrom the first by all persons in a sound state of their faculties. \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“We now\r\ndespise those who, in the Copernican controversy, could not conceive the\r\napparent motion of the sun on the heliocentric hypothesis; or those who,\r\nin opposition to Galileo, thought that a uniform force might be that which\r\ngenerated a velocity proportional to the space; or those who held there\r\nwas something absurd in Newton’s doctrine of the different refrangibility\r\nof differently colored rays; or those who imagined that when elements\r\ncombine, their sensible qualities must be manifest in the compound; or\r\nthose who were reluctant to give up the distinction of vegetables into herbs,\r\nshrubs, and trees. We can not help thinking that men must have been\r\nsingularly dull of comprehension, to find a difficulty in admitting what is\r\nto us so plain and simple. We have a latent persuasion that we in their\r\nplace should have been wiser and more clear-sighted; that we should have\r\ntaken the right side, and given our assent at once to the truth. Yet in reality\r\nsuch a persuasion is a mere delusion. The persons who, in such instances\r\nas the above, were on the losing side, were very far, in most cases,\r\nfrom being persons more prejudiced, or stupid, or narrow-minded, than the\r\ngreater part of mankind now are; and the cause for which they fought\r\nwas far from being a manifestly bad one, till it had been so decided by the\r\nresult of the war…. So complete has been the victory of truth in most\r\nof these instances, that at present we can hardly imagine the struggle to\r\nhave been necessary. \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eThe very essence of these triumphs is, that they lead\r\nus to regard the views we reject as not only false but\r\ninconceivable.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e”\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca id=\"noteref_81\" name=\"noteref_81\" href=\"#note_81\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e81\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThis last proposition is precisely what I contend for; and I ask no more,\r\nin order to overthrow the whole theory of its author on the nature of the\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page181\"\u003e[pg 181]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg181\" id=\"Pg181\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nevidence of axioms. For what is that theory? That the truth of axioms\r\ncan not have been learned from experience, because their falsity is inconceivable.\r\nBut Dr. Whewell himself says, that we are continually led, by\r\nthe natural progress of thought, to regard as inconceivable what our forefathers\r\nnot only conceived but believed, nay even (he might have added)\r\nwere unable to conceive the reverse of. He can not intend to justify this\r\nmode of thought: he can not mean to say, that we can be right in regarding\r\nas inconceivable what others have conceived, and as self-evident what\r\nto others did not appear evident at all. After so complete an admission\r\nthat inconceivableness is an accidental thing, not inherent in the phenomenon\r\nitself, but dependent on the mental history of the person who\r\ntries to conceive it, how can he ever call upon us to reject a proposition as\r\nimpossible on no other ground than its inconceivableness? Yet he not\r\nonly does so, but has unintentionally afforded some of the most remarkable\r\nexamples which can be cited of the very illusion which he has himself so\r\nclearly pointed out. I select as specimens, his remarks on the evidence of\r\nthe three laws of motion, and of the atomic theory.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWith respect to the laws of motion, Dr. Whewell says: \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“No one can\r\ndoubt that, in historical fact, these laws were collected from experience.\r\nThat such is the case, is no matter of conjecture. We know the time, the\r\npersons, the circumstances, belonging to each step of each\r\ndiscovery.”\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca id=\"noteref_82\" name=\"noteref_82\" href=\"#note_82\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e82\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nAfter this testimony, to adduce evidence of the fact would be superfluous.\r\nAnd not only were these laws by no means intuitively evident, but some\r\nof them were originally paradoxes. The first law was especially so. That\r\na body, once in motion, would continue forever to move in the same direction\r\nwith undiminished velocity unless acted upon by some new force, was\r\na proposition which mankind found for a long time the greatest difficulty\r\nin crediting. It stood opposed to apparent experience of the most familiar\r\nkind, which taught that it was the nature of motion to abate gradually,\r\nand at last terminate of itself. Yet when once the contrary doctrine was\r\nfirmly established, mathematicians, as Dr. Whewell observes, speedily began\r\nto believe that laws, thus contradictory to first appearances, and which,\r\neven after full proof had been obtained, it had required generations to render\r\nfamiliar to the minds of the scientific world, were under \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“a demonstrable\r\nnecessity, compelling them to be such as they are and no other;”\u003c/span\u003e and\r\nhe himself, though not venturing \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“absolutely to pronounce”\u003c/span\u003e that \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eall\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e\r\nthese laws \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“can be rigorously traced to an absolute necessity in the nature of\r\nthings,”\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca id=\"noteref_83\" name=\"noteref_83\" href=\"#note_83\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e83\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e does actually so think of the law\r\njust mentioned; of which he says: \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Though the discovery of the first law of motion was\r\nmade, historically speaking, by means of experiment, we have now attained a point of\r\nview in which we see that it might have been certainly known to be true,\r\nindependently of experience.”\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca id=\"noteref_84\" name=\"noteref_84\" href=\"#note_84\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e84\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Can there be a\r\nmore striking exemplification than is here afforded, of the effect of association which\r\nwe have described? Philosophers, for generations, have the most extraordinary difficulty\r\nin putting certain ideas together; they at last succeed in doing so;\r\nand after a sufficient repetition of the process, they first fancy a natural\r\nbond between the ideas, then experience a growing difficulty, which at last,\r\nby the continuation of the same progress, becomes an impossibility, of severing\r\nthem from one another. If such be the progress of an experimental\r\nconviction of which the date is of yesterday, and which is in opposition to\r\nfirst appearances, how must it fare with those which are conformable to\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page182\"\u003e[pg 182]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg182\" id=\"Pg182\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nappearances familiar from the first dawn of intelligence, and of the conclusiveness\r\nof which, from the earliest records of human thought, no skeptic\r\nhas suggested even a momentary doubt?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe other instance which I shall quote is a truly astonishing one, and\r\nmay be called the \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ereductio ad absurdum\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e of the\r\ntheory of inconceivableness. Speaking of the laws of chemical composition, Dr. Whewell\r\nsays:\u003ca id=\"noteref_85\" name=\"noteref_85\" href=\"#note_85\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e85\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“That they could never have been clearly understood, and therefore never\r\nfirmly established, without laborious and exact experiments, is certain; but yet\r\nwe may venture to say, that being once known, they possess an evidence\r\nbeyond that of mere experiment. \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eFor how in fact can we conceive combinations,\r\notherwise than as definite in kind and quality?\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e If we were to\r\nsuppose each element ready to combine with any other indifferently, and\r\nindifferently in any quantity, we should have a world in which all would be\r\nconfusion and indefiniteness. There would be no fixed kinds of bodies.\r\nSalts, and stones, and ores, would approach to and graduate into each other\r\nby insensible degrees. Instead of this, we know that the world consists of\r\nbodies distinguishable from each other by definite differences, capable of\r\nbeing classified and named, and of having general propositions asserted\r\nconcerning them. And as \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ewe can not conceive a world in which this\r\nshould not be the case\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e, it would appear that we can not conceive a state of\r\nthings in which the laws of the combination of elements should not be of\r\nthat definite and measured kind which we have above asserted.”\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThat a philosopher of Dr. Whewell’s eminence should gravely assert\r\nthat we can not conceive a world in which the simple elements should combine\r\nin other than definite proportions; that by dint of meditating on a\r\nscientific truth, the original discoverer of which was still living, he should\r\nhave rendered the association in his own mind between the idea of combination\r\nand that of constant proportions so familiar and intimate as to be\r\nunable to conceive the one fact without the other; is so signal an instance\r\nof the mental law for which I am contending, that one word more in illustration\r\nmust be superfluous.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIn the latest and most complete elaboration of his metaphysical system\r\n(the \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ePhilosophy of Discovery\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e), as well as in the earlier\r\ndiscourse on the \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eFundamental Antithesis of Philosophy\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, reprinted\r\nas an appendix to that work, Dr. Whewell, while very candidly admitting that his\r\nlanguage was open to misconception, disclaims having intended to say that mankind in\r\ngeneral can \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003enow\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e perceive the law of definite proportions in chemical\r\ncombination to be a necessary truth. All he meant was that philosophical\r\nchemists in a future generation may possibly see this. \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Some truths may\r\nbe seen by intuition, but yet the intuition of them may be a rare and a difficult\r\nattainment.”\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca id=\"noteref_86\" name=\"noteref_86\" href=\"#note_86\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e86\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e And he explains that the inconceivableness which, according\r\nto his theory, is the test of axioms, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“depends entirely upon the\r\nclearness of the Ideas which the axioms involve. So long as those ideas\r\nare vague and indistinct, the contrary of an axiom may be assented to,\r\nthough it can not be distinctly conceived. It may be assented to, not because\r\nit is possible, but because we do not see clearly what is possible. To\r\na person who is only beginning to think geometrically, there may appear\r\nnothing absurd in the assertion that two straight lines may inclose a space.\r\nAnd in the same manner, to a person who is only beginning to think of\r\nmechanical truths, it may not appear to be absurd, that in mechanical processes,\r\nReaction should be greater or less than Action; and so, again, to a\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page183\"\u003e[pg 183]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg183\" id=\"Pg183\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nperson who has not thought steadily about Substance, it may not appear\r\ninconceivable, that by chemical operations, we should generate new matter,\r\nor destroy matter which already exists.”\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca id=\"noteref_87\" name=\"noteref_87\" href=\"#note_87\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e87\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Necessary truths, therefore, are\r\nnot those of which we can not conceive, but \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“those of which we can not\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003edistinctly\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e conceive, the contrary.”\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca id=\"noteref_88\" name=\"noteref_88\" href=\"#note_88\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e88\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e So long as our ideas are indistinct altogether,\r\nwe do not know what is or is not capable of being distinctly\r\nconceived; but, by the ever increasing distinctness with which scientific\r\nmen apprehend the general conceptions of science, they in time come to\r\nperceive that there are certain laws of nature, which, though historically\r\nand as a matter of fact they were learned from experience, we can not,\r\nnow that we know them, distinctly conceive to be other than they are.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe account which I should give of this progress of the scientific mind\r\nis somewhat different. After a general law of nature has been ascertained,\r\nmen’s minds do not at first acquire a complete facility of familiarly representing\r\nto themselves the phenomena of nature in the character which that\r\nlaw assigns to them. The habit which constitutes the scientific cast of\r\nmind, that of conceiving facts of all descriptions conformably to the laws\r\nwhich regulate them—phenomena of all descriptions according to the relations\r\nwhich have been ascertained really to exist between them; this habit,\r\nin the case of newly-discovered relations, comes only by degrees. So\r\nlong as it is not thoroughly formed, no necessary character is ascribed to\r\nthe new truth. But in time, the philosopher attains a state of mind in\r\nwhich his mental picture of nature spontaneously represents to him all the\r\nphenomena with which the new theory is concerned, in the exact light in\r\nwhich the theory regards them: all images or conceptions derived from\r\nany other theory, or from the confused view of the facts which is anterior\r\nto any theory, having entirely disappeared from his mind. The mode of\r\nrepresenting facts which results from the theory, has now become, to his\r\nfaculties, the only natural mode of conceiving them. It is a known truth,\r\nthat a prolonged habit of arranging phenomena in certain groups, and explaining\r\nthem by means of certain principles, makes any other arrangement\r\nor explanation of these facts be felt as unnatural: and it may at last become\r\nas difficult to him to represent the facts to himself in any other mode,\r\nas it often was, originally, to represent them in that mode.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nBut, further (if the theory is true, as we are supposing it to be), any\r\nother mode in which he tries, or in which he was formerly accustomed,\r\nto represent the phenomena, will be seen by him to be inconsistent with\r\nthe facts that suggested the new theory—facts which now form a part of\r\nhis mental picture of nature. And since a contradiction is always inconceivable,\r\nhis imagination rejects these false theories, and declares itself incapable\r\nof conceiving them. Their inconceivableness to him does not, however,\r\nresult from any thing in the theories themselves, intrinsically and \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea priori\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e repugnant to the human faculties; it results from the\r\nrepugnance between them and a portion of the facts; which facts as long as he did\r\nnot know, or did not distinctly realize in his mental representations, the\r\nfalse theory did not appear other than conceivable; it becomes inconceivable,\r\nmerely from the fact that contradictory elements can not be combined\r\nin the same conception. Although, then, his real reason for rejecting theories\r\nat variance with the true one, is no other than that they clash with his\r\nexperience, he easily falls into the belief, that he rejects them because they\r\nare inconceivable, and that he adopts the true theory because it is self-evident,\r\nand does not need the evidence of experience at all.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page184\"\u003e[pg 184]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg184\" id=\"Pg184\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThis I take to be the real and sufficient explanation of the paradoxical\r\ntruth, on which so much stress is laid by Dr. Whewell, that a scientifically\r\ncultivated mind is actually, in virtue of that cultivation, unable to conceive\r\nsuppositions which a common man conceives without the smallest difficulty.\r\nFor there is nothing inconceivable in the suppositions themselves; the\r\nimpossibility is in combining them with facts inconsistent with them, as\r\npart of the same mental picture; an obstacle of course only felt by those\r\nwho know the facts, and are able to perceive the inconsistency. As far as\r\nthe suppositions themselves are concerned, in the case of many of Dr. Whewell’s\r\nnecessary truths the negative of the axiom is, and probably will be\r\nas long as the human race lasts, as easily conceivable as the affirmative.\r\nThere is no axiom (for example) to which Dr. Whewell ascribes a more\r\nthorough character of necessity and self-evidence, than that of the indestructibility\r\nof matter. That this is a true law of nature I fully admit;\r\nbut I imagine there is no human being to whom the opposite supposition\r\nis inconceivable—who has any difficulty in imagining a portion of matter\r\nannihilated: inasmuch as its apparent annihilation, in no respect distinguishable\r\nfrom real by our unassisted senses, takes place every time that\r\nwater dries up, or fuel is consumed. Again, the law that bodies combine\r\nchemically in definite proportions is undeniably true; but few besides Dr.\r\nWhewell have reached the point which he seems personally to have arrived\r\nat (though he only dares prophesy similar success to the multitude after\r\nthe lapse of generations), that of being unable to conceive a world in which\r\nthe elements are ready to combine with one another \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“indifferently in any\r\nquantity;”\u003c/span\u003e nor is it likely that we shall ever rise to this sublime height of\r\ninability, so long as all the mechanical mixtures in our planet, whether solid,\r\nliquid, or aëriform, exhibit to our daily observation the very phenomenon\r\ndeclared to be inconceivable.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAccording to Dr. Whewell, these and similar laws of nature can not be\r\ndrawn from experience, inasmuch as they are, on the contrary, assumed in\r\nthe interpretation of experience. Our inability to \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“add to or diminish the\r\nquantity of matter in the world,”\u003c/span\u003e is a truth which \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“neither is nor can be\r\nderived from experience; for the experiments which we make to verify it\r\npresuppose its truth…. When men began to use the balance in chemical\r\nanalysis, they did not prove by trial, but took for granted, as self-evident,\r\nthat the weight of the whole must be found in the aggregate weight\r\nof the elements.”\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca id=\"noteref_89\" name=\"noteref_89\" href=\"#note_89\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e89\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e True, it is assumed; but, I apprehend, no otherwise\r\nthan as all experimental inquiry assumes provisionally some theory or hypothesis,\r\nwhich is to be finally held true or not, according as the experiments\r\ndecide. The hypothesis chosen for this purpose will naturally be\r\none which groups together some considerable number of facts already\r\nknown. The proposition that the material of the world, as estimated by\r\nweight, is neither increased nor diminished by any of the processes of nature\r\nor art, had many appearances in its favor to begin with. It expressed\r\ntruly a great number of familiar facts. There were other facts which it\r\nhad the appearance of conflicting with, and which made its truth, as a\r\nuniversal law of nature, at first doubtful. Because it was doubtful, experiments\r\nwere devised to verify it. Men assumed its truth hypothetically,\r\nand proceeded to try whether, on more careful examination, the phenomena\r\nwhich apparently pointed to a different conclusion, would not be found to\r\nbe consistent with it. This turned out to be the case; and from that time\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page185\"\u003e[pg 185]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg185\" id=\"Pg185\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nthe doctrine took its place as a universal truth, but as one proved to be\r\nsuch by experience. That the theory itself preceded the proof of its truth—that\r\nit had to be conceived before it could be proved, and in order that\r\nit might be proved—does not imply that it was self-evident, and did not\r\nneed proof. Otherwise all the true theories in the sciences are necessary\r\nand self-evident; for no one knows better than Dr. Whewell that they all\r\nbegan by being assumed, for the purpose of connecting them by deductions\r\nwith those facts of experience on which, as evidence, they now confessedly\r\nrest.\u003ca id=\"noteref_90\" name=\"noteref_90\" href=\"#note_90\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e90\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page187\"\u003e[pg 187]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg187\" id=\"Pg187\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-div\" style=\"margin-bottom: 4.00em; margin-top: 4.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"toc37\" id=\"toc37\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"pdf38\" id=\"pdf38\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: center; margin-bottom: 2.40em; margin-top: 2.40em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 120%\"\u003eChapter VI.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: left; margin-bottom: 2.88em; margin-top: 2.88em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 144%\"\u003eThe Same Subject Continued.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 1. In the examination which formed the subject of the last chapter,\r\ninto the nature of the evidence of those deductive sciences which are commonly\r\nrepresented to be systems of necessary truth, we have been led to\r\nthe following conclusions. The results of those sciences are indeed necessary,\r\nin the sense of necessarily following from certain first principles,\r\ncommonly called axioms and definitions; that is, of being certainly true\r\nif those axioms and definitions are so; for the word necessity, even in this\r\nacceptation of it, means no more than certainty. But their claim to the\r\ncharacter of necessity in any sense beyond this, as implying an evidence\r\nindependent of and superior to observation and experience, must depend\r\non the previous establishment of such a claim in favor of the definitions\r\nand axioms themselves. With regard to axioms, we found that, considered\r\nas experimental truths, they rest on superabundant and obvious evidence.\r\nWe inquired, whether, since this is the case, it be imperative to\r\nsuppose any other evidence of those truths than experimental evidence, any\r\nother origin for our belief of them than an experimental origin. We decided,\r\nthat the burden of proof lies with those who maintain the affirmative,\r\nand we examined, at considerable length, such arguments as they have\r\nproduced. The examination having led to the rejection of those arguments,\r\nwe have thought ourselves warranted in concluding that axioms are but a\r\nclass, the most universal class, of inductions from experience; the simplest\r\nand easiest cases of generalization from the facts furnished to us by our\r\nsenses or by our internal consciousness.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWhile the axioms of demonstrative sciences thus appeared to be experimental\r\ntruths, the definitions, as they are incorrectly called, in those sciences,\r\nwere found by us to be generalizations from experience which are\r\nnot even, accurately speaking, truths; being propositions in which, while\r\nwe assert of some kind of object, some property or properties which observation\r\nshows to belong to it, we at the same time deny that it possesses\r\nany other properties, though in truth other properties do in every individual\r\ninstance accompany, and in almost all instances modify, the property\r\nthus exclusively predicated. The denial, therefore, is a mere fiction, or supposition,\r\nmade for the purpose of excluding the consideration of those modifying\r\ncircumstances, when their influence is of too trifling amount to be\r\nworth considering, or adjourning it, when important to a more convenient\r\nmoment.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nFrom these considerations it would appear that Deductive or Demonstrative\r\nSciences are all, without exception, Inductive Sciences; that their\r\nevidence is that of experience; but that they are also, in virtue of the peculiar\r\ncharacter of one indispensable portion of the general formulæ according\r\nto which their inductions are made, Hypothetical Sciences. Their\r\nconclusions are only true on certain suppositions, which are, or ought to\r\nbe, approximations to the truth, but are seldom, if ever, exactly true; and\r\nto this hypothetical character is to be ascribed the peculiar certainty, which\r\nis supposed to be inherent in demonstration.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page188\"\u003e[pg 188]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg188\" id=\"Pg188\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWhat we have now asserted, however, cannot be received as universally\r\ntrue of Deductive or Demonstrative Sciences, until verified by being applied\r\nto the most remarkable of all those sciences, that of Numbers; the\r\ntheory of the Calculus; Arithmetic and Algebra. It is harder to believe\r\nof the doctrines of this science than of any other, either that they are not\r\ntruths \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea priori\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, but experimental truths, or\r\nthat their peculiar certainty is\r\nowing to their being not absolute but only conditional truths. This, therefore,\r\nis a case which merits examination apart; and the more so, because\r\non this subject we have a double set of doctrines to contend with; that of\r\nthe \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea priori\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e philosophers on one side; and on\r\nthe other, a theory the most\r\nopposite to theirs, which was at one time very generally received, and is\r\nstill far from being altogether exploded, among metaphysicians.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 2. This theory attempts to solve the difficulty apparently inherent in\r\nthe case, by representing the propositions of the science of numbers as\r\nmerely verbal, and its processes as simple transformations of language, substitutions\r\nof one expression for another. The proposition, Two and one is\r\nequal to three, according to these writers, is not a truth, is not the assertion\r\nof a really existing fact, but a definition of the word three; a statement\r\nthat mankind have agreed to use the name three as a sign exactly equivalent\r\nto two and one; to call by the former name whatever is called by the\r\nother more clumsy phrase. According to this doctrine, the longest process\r\nin algebra is but a succession of changes in terminology, by which equivalent\r\nexpressions are substituted one for another; a series of translations of\r\nthe same fact, from one into another language; though how, after such a\r\nseries of translations, the fact itself comes out changed (as when we demonstrate\r\na new geometrical theorem by algebra), they have not explained;\r\nand it is a difficulty which is fatal to their theory.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt must be acknowledged that there are peculiarities in the processes of\r\narithmetic and algebra which render the theory in question very plausible,\r\nand have not unnaturally made those sciences the stronghold of Nominalism.\r\nThe doctrine that we can discover facts, detect the hidden processes\r\nof nature, by an artful manipulation of language, is so contrary to common\r\nsense, that a person must have made some advances in philosophy to believe\r\nit: men fly to so paradoxical a belief to avoid, as they think, some\r\neven greater difficulty, which the vulgar do not see. What has led many\r\nto believe that reasoning is a mere verbal process, is, that no other theory\r\nseemed reconcilable with the nature of the Science of Numbers. For we\r\ndo not carry any ideas along with us when we use the symbols of arithmetic\r\nor of algebra. In a geometrical demonstration we have a mental diagram,\r\nif not one on paper; AB, AC, are present to our imagination as lines,\r\nintersecting other lines, forming an angle with one another, and the like;\r\nbut not so \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e and \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eb\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e. These may represent\r\nlines or any other magnitudes, but those magnitudes are never thought of; nothing is\r\nrealized in our imagination but \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e and \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eb\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e.\r\nThe ideas which, on the particular occasion, they\r\nhappen to represent, are banished from the mind during every intermediate\r\npart of the process, between the beginning, when the premises are translated\r\nfrom things into signs, and the end, when the conclusion is translated\r\nback from signs into things. Nothing, then, being in the reasoner’s mind\r\nbut the symbols, what can seem more inadmissible than to contend that the\r\nreasoning process has to do with any thing more? We seem to have come\r\nto one of Bacon’s Prerogative Instances; an\r\n\u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eexperimentum crucis\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e on the\r\nnature of reasoning itself.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page189\"\u003e[pg 189]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg189\" id=\"Pg189\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nNevertheless, it will appear on consideration, that this apparently so decisive\r\ninstance is no instance at all; that there is in every step of an arithmetical\r\nor algebraical calculation a real induction, a real inference of facts\r\nfrom facts; and that what disguises the induction is simply its comprehensive\r\nnature, and the consequent extreme generality of the language.\r\nAll numbers must be numbers of something: there are no such things as\r\nnumbers in the abstract. \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eTen\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e must mean ten bodies, or ten sounds,\r\nor ten beatings of the pulse. But though numbers must be numbers of something,\r\nthey may be numbers of any thing. Propositions, therefore, concerning\r\nnumbers, have the remarkable peculiarity that they are propositions\r\nconcerning all things whatever; all objects, all existences of every\r\nkind, known to our experience. All things possess quantity; consist of\r\nparts which can be numbered; and in that character possess all the properties\r\nwhich are called properties of numbers. That half of four is two,\r\nmust be true whatever the word four represents, whether four hours, four\r\nmiles, or four pounds weight. We need only conceive a thing divided into\r\nfour equal parts (and all things may be conceived as so divided), to be able\r\nto predicate of it every property of the number four, that is, every arithmetical\r\nproposition in which the number four stands on one side of the\r\nequation. Algebra extends the generalization still farther: every number\r\nrepresents that particular number of all things without distinction, but every\r\nalgebraical symbol does more, it represents all numbers without distinction.\r\nAs soon as we conceive a thing divided into equal parts, without\r\nknowing into what number of parts, we may call it \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e or\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ex\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, and apply to it,\r\nwithout danger of error, every algebraical formula in the books. The\r\nproposition, 2 (\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e + \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eb\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e)= 2\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e + 2 \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eb\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, is a truth co-extensive with all\r\nnature. Since then algebraical truths are true of all things whatever, and not, like\r\nthose of geometry, true of lines only or of angles only, it is no wonder that\r\nthe symbols should not excite in our minds ideas of any things in particular.\r\nWhen we demonstrate the forty-seventh proposition of Euclid, it is\r\nnot necessary that the words should raise in us an image of all right-angled\r\ntriangles, but only of some one right-angled triangle: so in algebra we\r\nneed not, under the symbol \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, picture to ourselves all things\r\nwhatever, but only some one thing; why not, then, the letter itself? The mere written\r\ncharacters, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eb\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ex\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ey\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ez\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, serve as well for representatives of\r\nThings in general, as any more complex and apparently more concrete conception. That we\r\nare conscious of them, however, in their character of things, and not of mere\r\nsigns, is evident from the fact that our whole process of reasoning is carried\r\non by predicating of them the properties of things. In resolving an\r\nalgebraic equation, by what rules do we proceed? By applying at each step to\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eb\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, and \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ex\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, the\r\nproposition that equals added to equals make equals;\r\nthat equals taken from equals leave equals; and other propositions founded\r\non these two. These are not properties of language, or of signs as such,\r\nbut of magnitudes, which is as much as to say, of all things. The inferences,\r\ntherefore, which are successively drawn, are inferences concerning\r\nthings, not symbols; though as any Things whatever will serve the turn,\r\nthere is no necessity for keeping the idea of the Thing at all distinct, and\r\nconsequently the process of thought may, in this case, be allowed without\r\ndanger to do what all processes of thought, when they have been performed\r\noften, will do if permitted, namely, to become entirely mechanical. Hence\r\nthe general language of algebra comes to be used familiarly without exciting\r\nideas, as all other general language is prone to do from mere habit,\r\nthough in no other case than this can it be done with complete safety.\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page190\"\u003e[pg 190]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg190\" id=\"Pg190\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nBut when we look back to see from whence the probative force of the\r\nprocess is derived, we find that at every single step, unless we suppose ourselves\r\nto be thinking and talking of the things, and not the mere symbols,\r\nthe evidence fails.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThere is another circumstance, which, still more than that which we have\r\nnow mentioned, gives plausibility to the notion that the propositions of\r\narithmetic and algebra are merely verbal. That is, that when considered\r\nas propositions respecting Things, they all have the appearance of being\r\nidentical propositions. The assertion, Two and one is equal to three, considered\r\nas an assertion respecting objects, as for instance, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Two pebbles\r\nand one pebble are equal to three pebbles,”\u003c/span\u003e does not affirm equality between\r\ntwo collections of pebbles, but absolute identity. It affirms that if\r\nwe put one pebble to two pebbles, those very pebbles are three. The objects,\r\ntherefore, being the very same, and the mere assertion that \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“objects\r\nare themselves”\u003c/span\u003e being insignificant, it seems but natural to consider the\r\nproposition, Two and one is equal to three, as asserting mere identity of\r\nsignification between the two names.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThis, however, though it looks so plausible, will not bear examination.\r\nThe expression \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“two pebbles and one pebble,”\u003c/span\u003e and the expression \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“three\r\npebbles,”\u003c/span\u003e stand indeed for the same aggregation of objects, but they by no\r\nmeans stand for the same physical fact. They are names of the same objects,\r\nbut of those objects in two different states: though they \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ede\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003enote\r\nthe same things, their \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003econ\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003enotation is different. Three pebbles in\r\ntwo separate parcels, and three pebbles in one parcel, do not make the same impression\r\non our senses; and the assertion that the very same pebbles may by an alteration\r\nof place and arrangement be made to produce either the one set of\r\nsensations or the other, though a very familiar proposition, is not an identical\r\none. It is a truth known to us by early and constant experience: an\r\ninductive truth; and such truths are the foundation of the science of Number.\r\nThe fundamental truths of that science all rest on the evidence of\r\nsense; they are proved by showing to our eyes and our fingers that any\r\ngiven number of objects—ten balls, for example—may by separation and\r\nre-arrangement exhibit to our senses all the different sets of numbers the\r\nsums of which is equal to ten. All the improved methods of teaching\r\narithmetic to children proceed on a knowledge of this fact. All who wish\r\nto carry the child’s \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003emind\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e along with them in learning arithmetic; all who\r\nwish to teach numbers, and not mere ciphers—now teach it through the evidence\r\nof the senses, in the manner we have described.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWe may, if we please, call the proposition, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Three is two and one,”\u003c/span\u003e a\r\ndefinition of the number three, and assert that arithmetic, as it has been\r\nasserted that geometry, is a science founded on definitions. But they are\r\ndefinitions in the geometrical sense, not the logical; asserting not the meaning\r\nof a term only, but along with it an observed matter of fact. The\r\nproposition, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“A circle is a figure bounded by a line which has all its points\r\nequally distant from a point within it,”\u003c/span\u003e is called the definition of a circle;\r\nbut the proposition from which so many consequences follow, and which\r\nis really a first principle in geometry, is, that figures answering to this description\r\nexist. And thus we may call \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Three is two and one”\u003c/span\u003e a definition\r\nof three; but the calculations which depend on that proposition do\r\nnot follow from the definition itself, but from an arithmetical theorem presupposed\r\nin it, namely, that collections of objects exist, which while they\r\nimpress the senses thus, [Symbol: three circles, two above one], may be separated into\r\ntwo parts, thus, [Symbol: two circles, a space, and a third circle].\r\nThis proposition being granted, we term all such parcels Threes, after\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page191\"\u003e[pg 191]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg191\" id=\"Pg191\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nwhich the enunciation of the above-mentioned physical fact will serve also\r\nfor a definition of the word Three.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe Science of Number is thus no exception to the conclusion we previously\r\narrived at, that the processes even of deductive sciences are altogether\r\ninductive, and that their first principles are generalizations from experience.\r\nIt remains to be examined whether this science resembles geometry\r\nin the further circumstance, that some of its inductions are not exactly\r\ntrue; and that the peculiar certainty ascribed to it, on account of which its\r\npropositions are called Necessary Truths, is fictitious and hypothetical, being\r\ntrue in no other sense than that those propositions legitimately follow\r\nfrom the hypothesis of the truth of premises which are avowedly mere approximations\r\nto truth.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 3. The inductions of arithmetic are of two sorts: first, those which we\r\nhave just expounded, such as One and one are two, Two and one are three,\r\netc., which may be called the definitions of the various numbers, in the improper\r\nor geometrical sense of the word Definition; and secondly, the two\r\nfollowing axioms: The sums of equals are equal, The differences of equals\r\nare equal. These two are sufficient; for the corresponding propositions respecting\r\nunequals may be proved from these by a \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ereductio ad\r\nabsurdum\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThese axioms, and likewise the so-called definitions, are, as has already\r\nbeen said, results of induction; true of all objects whatever, and, as it may\r\nseem, exactly true, without the hypothetical assumption of unqualified truth\r\nwhere an approximation to it is all that exists. The conclusions, therefore,\r\nit will naturally be inferred, are exactly true, and the science of number is\r\nan exception to other demonstrative sciences in this, that the categorical\r\ncertainty which is predicable of its demonstrations is independent of all\r\nhypothesis.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nOn more accurate investigation, however, it will be found that, even in\r\nthis case, there is one hypothetical element in the ratiocination. In all\r\npropositions concerning numbers, a condition is implied, without which\r\nnone of them would be true; and that condition is an assumption which\r\nmay be false. The condition is, that 1=1; that all the numbers are numbers\r\nof the same or of equal units. Let this be doubtful, and not one of\r\nthe propositions of arithmetic will hold true. How can we know that one\r\npound and one pound make two pounds, if one of the pounds may be troy,\r\nand the other avoirdupois? They may not make two pounds of either, or\r\nof any weight. How can we know that a forty-horse power is always equal\r\nto itself, unless we assume that all horses are of equal strength? It is certain\r\nthat 1 is always equal in \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003enumber\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e to 1; and where the mere number of\r\nobjects, or of the parts of an object, without supposing them to be equivalent\r\nin any other respect, is all that is material, the conclusions of arithmetic,\r\nso far as they go to that alone, are true without mixture of hypothesis.\r\nThere are such cases in statistics; as, for instance, an inquiry into\r\nthe amount of the population of any country. It is indifferent to that inquiry\r\nwhether they are grown people or children, strong or weak, tall or\r\nshort; the only thing we want to ascertain is their number. But whenever,\r\nfrom equality or inequality of number, equality or inequality in any\r\nother respect is to be inferred, arithmetic carried into such inquiries becomes\r\nas hypothetical a science as geometry. All units must be assumed\r\nto be equal in that other respect; and this is never accurately true, for one\r\nactual pound weight is not exactly equal to another, nor one measured mile’s\r\nlength to another; a nicer balance, or more accurate measuring instruments,\r\nwould always detect some difference.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page192\"\u003e[pg 192]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg192\" id=\"Pg192\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"block tei tei-quote\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.80em; margin-left: 3.60em; margin-top: 1.80em; margin-right: 3.60em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e\r\nWhat is commonly called mathematical certainty, therefore, which comprises\r\nthe twofold conception of unconditional truth and perfect accuracy,\r\nis not an attribute of all mathematical truths, but of those only which relate\r\nto pure Number, as distinguished from Quantity in the more enlarged\r\nsense; and only so long as we abstain from supposing that the numbers\r\nare a precise index to actual quantities. The certainty usually ascribed to\r\nthe conclusions of geometry, and even to those of mechanics, is nothing\r\nwhatever but certainty of inference. We can have full assurance of particular\r\nresults under particular suppositions, but we can not have the same\r\nassurance that these suppositions are accurately true, nor that they include\r\nall the data which may exercise an influence over the result in any given\r\ninstance.\r\n\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 4. It appears, therefore, that the method of all Deductive Sciences is\r\nhypothetical. They proceed by tracing the consequences of certain assumptions;\r\nleaving for separate consideration whether the assumptions\r\nare true or not, and if not exactly true, whether they are a sufficiently near\r\napproximation to the truth. The reason is obvious. Since it is only in\r\nquestions of pure number that the assumptions are exactly true, and even\r\nthere only so long as no conclusions except purely numerical ones are to\r\nbe founded on them; it must, in all other cases of deductive investigation,\r\nform a part of the inquiry, to determine how much the assumptions want\r\nof being exactly true in the case in hand. This is generally a matter of\r\nobservation, to be repeated in every fresh case; or if it has to be settled\r\nby argument instead of observation, may require in every different case\r\ndifferent evidence, and present every degree of difficulty, from the lowest\r\nto the highest. But the other part of the process—namely, to determine\r\nwhat else may be concluded if we find, and in proportion as we find, the\r\nassumptions to be true—may be performed once for all, and the results\r\nheld ready to be employed as the occasions turn up for use. We thus do\r\nall beforehand that can be so done, and leave the least possible work to be\r\nperformed when cases arise and press for a decision. This inquiry into the\r\ninferences which can be drawn from assumptions, is what properly constitutes\r\nDemonstrative Science.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt is of course quite as practicable to arrive at new conclusions from\r\nfacts assumed, as from facts observed; from fictitious, as from real, inductions.\r\nDeduction, as we have seen, consists of a series of inferences in this\r\nform—\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e is a mark of \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eb\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eb\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e of \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ec\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ec\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e of\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ed\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, therefore \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e is a mark of\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ed\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, which last may be a truth inaccessible to direct observation.\r\nIn like manner it is allowable to say, \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003esuppose\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e that a were a mark of\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eb\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eb\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e of \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ec\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, and\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ec\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e of \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ed\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwould be a mark of \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ed\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, which last conclusion was not thought of by\r\nthose who laid down the premises. A system of propositions as complicated as\r\ngeometry might be deduced from assumptions which are false; as was\r\ndone by Ptolemy, Descartes, and others, in their attempts to explain synthetically\r\nthe phenomena of the solar system on the supposition that the\r\napparent motions of the heavenly bodies were the real motions, or were\r\nproduced in some way more or less different from the true one. Sometimes\r\nthe same thing is knowingly done, for the purpose of showing the\r\nfalsity of the assumption; which is called a \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ereductio\r\nad absurdum\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e. In such cases, the reasoning is as follows:\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e is a mark of \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eb\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, and\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eb\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e of \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ec\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e; now\r\nif c were also a mark of \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ed, a\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e would be a mark of\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ed\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e; but \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ed\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e is known to be\r\na mark of the absence of \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e; consequently \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwould be a mark of its own absence, which is a contradiction; therefore\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ec\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e is not a mark of \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ed\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page193\"\u003e[pg 193]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg193\" id=\"Pg193\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 5. It has even been held by some writers, that all ratiocination rests\r\nin the last resort on a \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ereductio ad absurdum\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e;\r\nsince the way to enforce assent\r\nto it, in case of obscurity, would be to show that if the conclusion be\r\ndenied we must deny some one at least of the premises, which, as they are\r\nall supposed true, would be a contradiction. And in accordance with this,\r\nmany have thought that the peculiar nature of the evidence of ratiocination\r\nconsisted in the impossibility of admitting the premises and rejecting\r\nthe conclusion without a contradiction in terms. This theory, however, is\r\ninadmissible as an explanation of the grounds on which ratiocination itself\r\nrests. If any one denies the conclusion notwithstanding his admission of\r\nthe premises, he is not involved in any direct and express contradiction until\r\nhe is compelled to deny some premise; and he can only be forced to do\r\nthis by a \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ereductio ad absurdum\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\nthat is, by another ratiocination: now, if\r\nhe denies the validity of the reasoning process itself, he can no more be\r\nforced to assent to the second syllogism than to the first. In truth, therefore,\r\nno one is ever forced to a contradiction in terms: he can only be\r\nforced to a contradiction (or rather an infringement) of the fundamental\r\nmaxim of ratiocination, namely, that whatever has a mark, has what it is\r\na mark of; or (in the case of universal propositions), that whatever is a\r\nmark of any thing, is a mark of whatever else that thing is a mark of. For\r\nin the case of every correct argument, as soon as thrown into the syllogistic\r\nform, it is evident without the aid of any other syllogism, that he who,\r\nadmitting the premises, fails to draw the conclusion, does not conform to\r\nthe above axiom.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWe have now proceeded as far in the theory of Deduction as we can advance\r\nin the present stage of our inquiry. Any further insight into the\r\nsubject requires that the foundation shall have been laid of the philosophic\r\ntheory of Induction itself; in which theory that of Deduction, as a mode\r\nof Induction, which we have now shown it to be, will assume spontaneously\r\nthe place which belongs to it, and will receive its share of whatever light\r\nmay be thrown upon the great intellectual operation of which it forms so\r\nimportant a part.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-div\" style=\"margin-bottom: 4.00em; margin-top: 4.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"toc39\" id=\"toc39\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"pdf40\" id=\"pdf40\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"Book_II_Chapter_VII\" id=\"Book_II_Chapter_VII\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: center; margin-bottom: 2.40em; margin-top: 2.40em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 120%\"\u003eChapter VII.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: left; margin-bottom: 2.88em; margin-top: 2.88em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 144%\"\u003eExamination Of Some Opinions Opposed To The Preceding Doctrines.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ca name=\"Book_II_Chapter_VII_Section_1\" id=\"Book_II_Chapter_VII_Section_1\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 1. Polemical discussion is foreign to the plan of this work. But an\r\nopinion which stands in need of much illustration, can often receive it most\r\neffectually, and least tediously, in the form of a defense against objections.\r\nAnd on subjects concerning which speculative minds are still divided, a\r\nwriter does but half his duty by stating his own doctrine, if he does not\r\nalso examine, and to the best of his ability judge, those of other thinkers.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIn the dissertation which Mr. Herbert Spencer has prefixed to his, in\r\nmany respects, highly philosophical treatise on the Mind,\u003ca id=\"noteref_91\" name=\"noteref_91\" href=\"#note_91\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e91\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e he criticises some\r\nof the doctrines of the two preceding chapters, and propounds a theory of\r\nhis own on the subject of first principles. Mr. Spencer agrees with me in\r\nconsidering axioms to be \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“simply our earliest inductions from experience.”\u003c/span\u003e\r\nBut he differs from me \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“widely as to the worth of the test of inconceivableness.”\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page194\"\u003e[pg 194]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg194\" id=\"Pg194\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nHe thinks that it is the ultimate test of all beliefs. He arrives\r\nat this conclusion by two steps. First, we never can have any stronger\r\nground for believing any thing, than that the belief of it \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“invariably exists.”\u003c/span\u003e\r\nWhenever any fact or proposition is invariably believed; that is, if I understand\r\nMr. Spencer rightly, believed by all persons, and by one’s self at all\r\ntimes; it is entitled to be received as one of the primitive truths, or original\r\npremises of our knowledge. Secondly, the criterion by which we decide\r\nwhether any thing is invariably believed to be true, is our inability to\r\nconceive it as false. \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“The inconceivability of its negation is the test by\r\nwhich we ascertain whether a given belief invariably exists or not.”\u003c/span\u003e \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“For\r\nour primary beliefs, the fact of invariable existence, tested by an abortive\r\neffort to cause their non-existence, is the only reason assignable.”\u003c/span\u003e He\r\nthinks this the sole ground of our belief in our own sensations. If I believe\r\nthat I feel cold, I only receive this as true because I can not conceive that\r\nI am not feeling cold. \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“While the proposition remains true, the negation\r\nof it remains inconceivable.”\u003c/span\u003e There are numerous other beliefs which Mr.\r\nSpencer considers to rest on the same basis; being chiefly those, or a part\r\nof those, which the metaphysicians of the Reid and Stewart school consider\r\nas truths of immediate intuition. That there exists a material world;\r\nthat this is the very world which we directly and immediately perceive,\r\nand not merely the hidden cause of our perceptions; that Space, Time,\r\nForce, Extension, Figure, are not modes of our consciousness, but objective\r\nrealities; are regarded by Mr. Spencer as truths known by the inconceivableness\r\nof their negatives. We can not, he says, by any effort, conceive\r\nthese objects of thought as mere states of our mind; as not having an existence\r\nexternal to us. Their real existence is, therefore, as certain as our\r\nsensations themselves. The truths which are the subject of direct knowledge,\r\nbeing, according to this doctrine, known to be truths only by the inconceivability\r\nof their negation; and the truths which are not the object\r\nof direct knowledge, being known as inferences from those which are; and\r\nthose inferences being believed to follow from the premises, only because\r\nwe can not conceive them not to follow; inconceivability is thus the ultimate\r\nground of all assured beliefs.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThus far, there is no very wide difference between Mr. Spencer’s doctrine\r\nand the ordinary one of philosophers of the intuitive school, from Descartes\r\nto Dr. Whewell; but at this point Mr. Spencer diverges from them. For\r\nhe does not, like them, set up the test of inconceivability as infallible. On\r\nthe contrary, he holds that it may be fallacious, not from any fault in the\r\ntest itself, but because \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“men have mistaken for inconceivable things, some\r\nthings which were not inconceivable.”\u003c/span\u003e And he himself, in this very book,\r\ndenies not a few propositions usually regarded as among the most marked\r\nexamples of truths whose negations are inconceivable. But occasional failure,\r\nhe says, is incident to all tests. If such failure vitiates \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“the test of\r\ninconceivableness,”\u003c/span\u003e it \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“must similarly vitiate all tests whatever. We consider\r\nan inference logically drawn from established premises to be true.\r\nYet in millions of cases men have been wrong in the inferences they have\r\nthought thus drawn. Do we therefore argue that it is absurd to consider\r\nan inference true on no other ground than that it is logically drawn from\r\nestablished premises? No: we say that though men may have taken for\r\nlogical inferences, inferences that were not logical, there nevertheless \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eare\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e\r\nlogical inferences, and that we are justified in assuming the truth of what\r\nseem to us such, until better instructed. Similarly, though men may have\r\nthought some things inconceivable which were not so, there may still be inconceivable\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page195\"\u003e[pg 195]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg195\" id=\"Pg195\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nthings; and the inability to conceive the negation of a thing,\r\nmay still be our best warrant for believing it…. Though occasionally\r\nit may prove an imperfect test, yet, as our most certain beliefs are capable\r\nof no better, to doubt any one belief because we have no higher guarantee\r\nfor it, is really to doubt all beliefs.”\u003c/span\u003e Mr. Spencer’s doctrine, therefore,\r\ndoes not erect the curable, but only the incurable limitations of the\r\nhuman conceptive faculty, into laws of the outward universe.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ca name=\"Book_II_Chapter_VII_Section_2\" id=\"Book_II_Chapter_VII_Section_2\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 2. The doctrine, that \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“a belief which is proved by the inconceivableness\r\nof its negation to invariably exist, is true,”\u003c/span\u003e Mr. Spencer enforces by\r\ntwo arguments, one of which may be distinguished as positive, and the\r\nother as negative.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe positive argument is, that every such belief represents the aggregate\r\nof all past experience. \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Conceding the entire truth of”\u003c/span\u003e the \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“position,\r\nthat during any phase of human progress, the ability or inability to form\r\na specific conception wholly depends on the experiences men have had;\r\nand that, by a widening of their experiences, they may, by and by, be enabled\r\nto conceive things before inconceivable to them, it may still be argued\r\nthat as, at any time, the best warrant men can have for a belief is the perfect\r\nagreement of all pre-existing experience in support of it, it follows that,\r\nat any time, the inconceivableness of its negation is the deepest test any\r\nbelief admits of…. Objective facts are ever impressing themselves upon\r\nus; our experience is a register of these objective facts; and the inconceivableness\r\nof a thing implies that it is wholly at variance with the register.\r\nEven were this all, it is not clear how, if every truth is primarily inductive,\r\nany better test of truth could exist. But it must be remembered\r\nthat while many of these facts, impressing themselves upon us, are occasional;\r\nwhile others again are very general; some are universal and unchanging.\r\nThese universal and unchanging facts are, by the hypothesis,\r\ncertain to establish beliefs of which the negations are inconceivable; while\r\nthe others are not certain to do this; and if they do, subsequent facts will\r\nreverse their action. Hence if, after an immense accumulation of experiences,\r\nthere remain beliefs of which the negations are still inconceivable,\r\nmost, if not all of them, must correspond to universal objective facts. If\r\nthere be … certain absolute uniformities in nature; if these uniformities\r\nproduce, as they must, absolute uniformities in our experience; and\r\nif … these absolute uniformities in our experience disable us from conceiving\r\nthe negations of them; then answering to each absolute uniformity\r\nin nature which we can cognize, there must exist in us a belief of which\r\nthe negation is inconceivable, and which is absolutely true. In this wide\r\nrange of cases subjective inconceivableness must correspond to objective\r\nimpossibility. Further experience will produce correspondence where it\r\nmay not yet exist; and we may expect the correspondence to become ultimately\r\ncomplete. In nearly all cases this test of inconceivableness must be\r\nvalid now”\u003c/span\u003e (I wish I could think we were so nearly arrived at omniscience);\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“and where it is not, it still expresses the net result of our experience\r\nup to the present time; which is the most that any test can do.”\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nTo this I answer, first, that it is by no means true that the inconceivability,\r\nby us, of the negative of a proposition proves all, or even any, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“pre-existing\r\nexperience”\u003c/span\u003e to be in favor of the affirmative. There may have been\r\nno such pre-existing experiences, but only a mistaken supposition of experience.\r\nHow did the inconceivability of antipodes prove that experience\r\nhad given any testimony against their possibility? How did the incapacity\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page196\"\u003e[pg 196]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg196\" id=\"Pg196\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nmen felt of conceiving sunset otherwise than as a motion of the sun,\r\nrepresent any \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“net result”\u003c/span\u003e of experience in support of its being the sun\r\nand not the earth that moves? It is not experience that is represented, it\r\nis only a superficial semblance of experience. The only thing proved with\r\nregard to real experience, is the negative fact, that men have \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003enot had\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e it\r\nof the kind which would have made the inconceivable proposition conceivable.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nNext: Even if it were true that inconceivableness represents the net result\r\nof all past experience, why should we stop at the representative when\r\nwe can get at the thing represented? If our incapacity to conceive the\r\nnegation of a given supposition is proof of its truth, because proving that\r\nour experience has hitherto been uniform in its favor, the real evidence for\r\nthe supposition is not the inconceivableness, but the uniformity of experience.\r\nNow this, which is the substantial and only proof, is directly accessible.\r\nWe are not obliged to presume it from an incidental consequence.\r\nIf all past experience is in favor of a belief, let this be stated, and the belief\r\nopenly rested on that ground: after which the question arises, what\r\nthat fact may be worth as evidence of its truth? For uniformity of experience\r\nis evidence in very different degrees: in some cases it is strong evidence,\r\nin others weak, in others it scarcely amounts to evidence at all.\r\nThat all metals sink in water, was a uniform experience, from the origin\r\nof the human race to the discovery of potassium in the present century\r\nby Sir Humphry Davy. That all swans are white, was a uniform experience\r\ndown to the discovery of Australia. In the few cases in which uniformity\r\nof experience does amount to the strongest possible proof, as with\r\nsuch propositions as these, Two straight lines can not inclose a space, Every\r\nevent has a cause, it is not because their negations are inconceivable,\r\nwhich is not always the fact; but because the experience, which has been\r\nthus uniform, pervades all nature. It will be shown in the following Book\r\nthat none of the conclusions either of induction or of deduction can be\r\nconsidered certain, except as far as their truth is shown to be inseparably\r\nbound up with truths of this class.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nI maintain then, first, that uniformity of past experience is very far from\r\nbeing universally a criterion of truth. But secondly, inconceivableness is\r\nstill further from being a test even of that test. Uniformity of contrary\r\nexperience is only one of many causes of inconceivability. Tradition\r\nhanded down from a period of more limited knowledge, is one of the commonest.\r\nThe mere familiarity of one mode of production of a phenomenon\r\noften suffices to make every other mode appear inconceivable. Whatever\r\nconnects two ideas by a strong association may, and continually does,\r\nrender their separation in thought impossible; as Mr. Spencer, in other\r\nparts of his speculations, frequently recognizes. It was not for want of experience\r\nthat the Cartesians were unable to conceive that one body could\r\nproduce motion in another without contact. They had as much experience\r\nof other modes of producing motion as they had of that mode. The planets\r\nhad revolved, and heavy bodies had fallen, every hour of their lives.\r\nBut they fancied these phenomena to be produced by a hidden machinery\r\nwhich they did not see, because without it they were unable to conceive\r\nwhat they did see. The inconceivableness, instead of representing their\r\nexperience, dominated and overrode their experience. Without dwelling\r\nfurther on what I have termed the positive argument of Mr. Spencer in\r\nsupport of his criterion of truth, I pass to his negative argument, on which\r\nhe lays more stress.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page197\"\u003e[pg 197]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg197\" id=\"Pg197\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ca name=\"Book_II_Chapter_VII_Section_3\" id=\"Book_II_Chapter_VII_Section_3\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 3. The negative argument is, that, whether inconceivability be good\r\nevidence or bad, no stronger evidence is to be obtained. That what is inconceivable\r\ncan not be true, is postulated in every act of thought. It is\r\nthe foundation of all our original premises. Still more it is assumed in all\r\nconclusions from those premises. The invariability of belief, tested by the\r\ninconceivableness of its negation, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“is our sole warrant for every demonstration.\r\nLogic is simply a systematization of the process by which we indirectly\r\nobtain this warrant for beliefs that do not directly possess it. To\r\ngain the strongest conviction possible respecting any complex fact, we either\r\nanalytically descend from it by successive steps, each of which we unconsciously\r\ntest by the inconceivableness of its negation, until we reach\r\nsome axiom or truth which we have similarly tested; or we synthetically\r\nascend from such axiom or truth by such steps. In either case we connect\r\nsome isolated belief, with a belief which invariably exists, by a series of\r\nintermediate beliefs which invariably exist.”\u003c/span\u003e The following passage sums\r\nup the theory: \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“When we perceive that the negation of the belief is inconceivable,\r\nwe have all possible warrant for asserting the invariability of\r\nits existence: and in asserting this, we express alike our logical justification\r\nof it, and the inexorable necessity we are under of holding it…. We\r\nhave seen that this is the assumption on which every conclusion whatever\r\nultimately rests. We have no other guarantee for the reality of consciousness,\r\nof sensations, of personal existence; we have no other guarantee\r\nfor any axiom; we have no other guarantee for any step in a demonstration.\r\nHence, as being taken for granted in every act of the understanding,\r\nit must be regarded as the Universal Postulate.”\u003c/span\u003e But as this\r\npostulate, which we are under an \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“inexorable necessity”\u003c/span\u003e of holding true, is\r\nsometimes false; as \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“beliefs that once were shown by the inconceivableness\r\nof their negations to invariably exist, have since been found untrue,”\u003c/span\u003e\r\nand as \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“beliefs that now possess this character may some day share the\r\nsame fate;”\u003c/span\u003e the canon of belief laid down by Mr. Spencer is, that \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“the\r\nmost certain conclusion”\u003c/span\u003e is that \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“which involves the postulate the fewest\r\ntimes.”\u003c/span\u003e Reasoning, therefore, never ought to prevail against one of the\r\nimmediate beliefs (the belief in Matter, in the outward reality of Extension,\r\nSpace, and the like), because each of these involves the postulate only once;\r\nwhile an argument, besides involving it in the premises, involves it again in\r\nevery step of the ratiocination, no one of the successive acts of inference\r\nbeing recognized as valid except because we can not conceive the conclusion\r\nnot to follow from the premises.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt will be convenient to take the last part of this argument first. In every\r\nreasoning, according to Mr. Spencer, the assumption of the postulate is\r\nrenewed at every step. At each inference we judge that the conclusion\r\nfollows from the premises, our sole warrant for that judgment being that\r\nwe can not conceive it not to follow. Consequently if the postulate is fallible,\r\nthe conclusions of reasoning are more vitiated by that uncertainty\r\nthan direct intuitions; and the disproportion is greater, the more numerous\r\nthe steps of the argument.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nTo test this doctrine, let us first suppose an argument consisting only of\r\na single step, which would be represented by one syllogism. This argument\r\ndoes rest on an assumption, and we have seen in the preceding chapters\r\nwhat the assumption is. It is, that whatever has a mark, has what it\r\nis a mark of. The evidence of this axiom I shall not consider at\r\npresent;\u003ca id=\"noteref_92\" name=\"noteref_92\" href=\"#note_92\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e92\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page198\"\u003e[pg 198]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg198\" id=\"Pg198\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nlet us suppose it (with Mr. Spencer) to be the inconceivableness of its reverse.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nLet us now add a second step to the argument: we require, what? Another\r\nassumption? No: the same assumption a second time; and so on\r\nto a third, and a fourth. I confess I do not see how, on Mr. Spencer’s own\r\nprinciples, the repetition of the assumption at all weakens the force of the\r\nargument. If it were necessary the second time to assume some other axiom,\r\nthe argument would no doubt be weakened, since it would be necessary\r\nto its validity that both axioms should be true, and it might happen that\r\none was true and not the other: making two chances of error instead of\r\none. But since it is the \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003esame\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e axiom, if it is true once it is true every\r\ntime; and if the argument, being of a hundred links, assumed the axiom a\r\nhundred times, these hundred assumptions would make but one chance of\r\nerror among them all. It is satisfactory that we are not obliged to suppose\r\nthe deductions of pure mathematics to be among the most uncertain\r\nof argumentative processes, which on Mr. Spencer’s theory they could\r\nhardly fail to be, since they are the longest. But the number of steps in\r\nan argument does not subtract from its reliableness, if no new \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003epremises\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e, of\r\nan uncertain character, are taken up by the way.\u003ca id=\"noteref_93\" name=\"noteref_93\" href=\"#note_93\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e93\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nTo speak next of the premises. Our assurance of their truth, whether\r\nthey be generalities or individual facts, is grounded, in Mr. Spencer’s opinion,\r\non the inconceivableness of their being false. It is necessary to advert\r\nto a double meaning of the word inconceivable, which Mr. Spencer is aware\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page199\"\u003e[pg 199]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg199\" id=\"Pg199\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nof, and would sincerely disclaim founding an argument upon, but from\r\nwhich his case derives no little advantage notwithstanding. By inconceivableness\r\nis sometimes meant, inability to form or get rid of an \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eidea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e; sometimes,\r\ninability to form or get rid of a \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ebelief\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e. The former meaning is the\r\nmost conformable to the analogy of language; for a conception always\r\nmeans an idea, and never a belief. The wrong meaning of \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“inconceivable”\u003c/span\u003e\r\nis, however, fully as frequent in philosophical discussion as the right meaning,\r\nand the intuitive school of metaphysicians could not well do without\r\neither. To illustrate the difference, we will take two contrasted examples.\r\nThe early physical speculators considered antipodes incredible, because inconceivable.\r\nBut antipodes were not inconceivable in the primitive sense\r\nof the word. An idea of them could be formed without difficulty: they\r\ncould be completely pictured to the mental eye. What was difficult, and,\r\nas it then seemed, impossible, was to apprehend them as believable. The\r\nidea could be put together, of men sticking on by their feet to the under\r\nside of the earth; but the belief \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ewould\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e follow, that they must fall off.\r\nAntipodes were not unimaginable, but they were unbelievable.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nOn the other hand, when I endeavor to conceive an end to extension, the\r\ntwo ideas refuse to come together. When I attempt to form a conception\r\nof the last point of space, I can not help figuring to myself a vast space\r\nbeyond that last point. The combination is, under the conditions of our\r\nexperience, unimaginable. This double meaning of inconceivable it is very\r\nimportant to bear in mind, for the argument from inconceivableness almost\r\nalways turns on the alternate substitution of each of those meanings for\r\nthe other.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIn which of these two senses does Mr. Spencer employ the term, when\r\nhe makes it a test of the truth of a proposition that its negation is inconceivable?\r\nUntil Mr. Spencer expressly stated the contrary, I inferred from\r\nthe course of his argument, that he meant unbelievable. He has, however,\r\nin a paper published in the fifth number of the \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eFortnightly\r\nReview\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, disclaimed this meaning, and declared that by an inconceivable proposition\r\nhe means, now and always, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“one of which the terms can not, by any effort,\r\nbe brought before consciousness in that relation which the proposition asserts\r\nbetween them—a proposition of which the subject and predicate offer\r\nan insurmountable resistance to union in thought.”\u003c/span\u003e We now, therefore,\r\nknow positively that Mr. Spencer always endeavors to use the word inconceivable\r\nin this, its proper, sense: but it may yet be questioned whether\r\nhis endeavor is always successful; whether the other, and popular use of\r\nthe word, does not sometimes creep in with its associations, and prevent\r\nhim from maintaining a clear separation between the two. When, for\r\nexample, he says, that when I feel cold, I can not conceive that I am not\r\nfeeling cold, this expression can not be translated into \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“I can not conceive\r\nmyself not feeling cold,”\u003c/span\u003e for it is evident that I can: the word\r\nconceive, therefore, is here used to express the recognition of a matter of\r\nfact—the perception of truth or falsehood; which I apprehend to be exactly\r\nthe meaning of an act of belief, as distinguished from simple conception.\r\nAgain, Mr. Spencer calls the attempt to conceive something\r\nwhich is inconceivable \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“an abortive effort to cause the non-existence,”\u003c/span\u003e\r\nnot of a conception or mental representation, but of a belief. There is\r\nneed, therefore, to revise a considerable part of Mr. Spencer’s language, if\r\nit is to be kept always consistent with his definition of inconceivability.\r\nBut in truth the point is of little importance; since inconceivability, in\r\nMr. Spencer’s theory, is only a test of truth, inasmuch as it is a test of\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page200\"\u003e[pg 200]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg200\" id=\"Pg200\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nbelievability. The inconceivableness of a supposition is the extreme case\r\nof its unbelievability. This is the very foundation of Mr. Spencer’s doctrine.\r\nThe invariability of the belief is with him the real guarantee.\r\nThe attempt to conceive the negative is made in order to test the inevitableness\r\nof the belief. It should be called, an attempt to \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ebelieve\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e the negative.\r\nWhen Mr. Spencer says that while looking at the sun a man can not\r\nconceive that he is looking into darkness, he should have said that a man\r\ncan not \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ebelieve\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e that he is doing so. For it is surely possible, in broad\r\ndaylight, to \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eimagine\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e one’s self looking into darkness.\u003ca id=\"noteref_94\" name=\"noteref_94\" href=\"#note_94\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e94\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e As Mr. Spencer himself\r\nsays, speaking of the belief of our own existence, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“That he \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003emight\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e not\r\nexist, he can conceive well enough; but that he \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003edoes\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e not exist, he finds it\r\nimpossible to conceive,”\u003c/span\u003e \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, to believe. So that the\r\nstatement resolves itself\r\ninto this: That I exist, and that I have sensations, I believe, because I\r\ncan not believe otherwise. And in this case every one will admit that the\r\nimpossibility is real. Any one’s present sensations, or other states of subjective\r\nconsciousness, that one person inevitably believes. They are facts\r\nknown \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eper se\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e: it is impossible to\r\nascend beyond them. Their negative is\r\nreally unbelievable, and therefore there is never any question about believing\r\nit. Mr. Spencer’s theory is not needed for these truths.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nBut according to Mr. Spencer there are other beliefs, relating to other\r\nthings than our own subjective feelings, for which we have the same guarantee—which\r\nare, in a similar manner, invariable and necessary. With regard\r\nto these other beliefs, they can not be necessary, since they do not always\r\nexist. There have been, and are, many persons who do not believe\r\nthe reality of an external world, still less the reality of extension and figure\r\nas the forms of that external world; who do not believe that space and time\r\nhave an existence independent of the mind—nor any other of Mr. Spencer’s\r\nobjective intuitions. The negations of these alleged invariable beliefs are\r\nnot unbelievable, for they are believed. It may be maintained, without obvious\r\nerror, that we can not \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eimagine\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e tangible objects as mere states of our\r\nown and other people’s consciousness; that the perception of them irresistibly\r\nsuggests to us the \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eidea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e of something external to ourselves: and I am\r\nnot in a condition to say that this is not the fact (though I do not think\r\nany one is entitled to affirm it of any person besides himself). But many\r\nthinkers have believed, whether they could conceive it or not, that what we\r\nrepresent to ourselves as material objects, are mere modifications of consciousness;\r\ncomplex feelings of touch and of muscular action. Mr. Spencer\r\nmay think the inference correct from the unimaginable to the unbelievable,\r\nbecause he holds that belief itself is but the persistence of an idea, and that\r\nwhat we can succeed in imagining we can not at the moment help apprehending\r\nas believable. But of what consequence is it what we apprehend\r\nat the moment, if the moment is in contradiction to the permanent state of\r\nour mind? A person who has been frightened when an infant by stories\r\nof ghosts, though he disbelieves them in after years (and perhaps never believed\r\nthem), may be unable all his life to be in a dark place, in circumstances\r\nstimulating to the imagination, without mental discomposure. The\r\nidea of ghosts, with all its attendant terrors, is irresistibly called up in his\r\nmind by the outward circumstances. Mr. Spencer may say, that while he\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page201\"\u003e[pg 201]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg201\" id=\"Pg201\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nis under the influence of this terror he does not disbelieve in ghosts, but\r\nhas a temporary and uncontrollable belief in them. Be it so; but allowing\r\nit to be so, which would it be truest to say of this man on the whole—that\r\nhe believes in ghosts, or that he does not believe in them? Assuredly that\r\nhe does not believe in them. The case is similar with those who disbelieve\r\na material world. Though they can not get rid of the idea; though while\r\nlooking at a solid object they can not help having the conception, and therefore,\r\naccording to Mr. Spencer’s metaphysics, the momentary belief, of its\r\nexternality; even at that moment they would sincerely deny holding that\r\nbelief: and it would be incorrect to call them other than disbelievers of the\r\ndoctrine. The belief therefore is not invariable; and the test of inconceivableness\r\nfails in the only cases to which there could ever be any occasion to\r\napply it.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThat a thing may be perfectly believable, and yet may not have become\r\nconceivable, and that we may habitually believe one side of an alternative,\r\nand conceive only in the other, is familiarly exemplified in the state of mind\r\nof educated persons respecting sunrise and sunset. All educated persons\r\neither know by investigation, or believe on the authority of science, that\r\nit is the earth and not the sun which moves: but there are probably few\r\nwho habitually \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003econceive\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e the phenomenon otherwise than as the ascent or\r\ndescent of the sun. Assuredly no one can do so without a prolonged trial;\r\nand it is probably not easier now than in the first generation after Copernicus.\r\nMr. Spencer does not say, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“In looking at sunrise it is impossible\r\nnot to conceive that it is the sun which moves, therefore this is what every\r\nbody believes, and we have all the evidence for it that we can have for any\r\ntruth.”\u003c/span\u003e Yet this would be an exact parallel to his doctrine about the belief\r\nin matter.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe existence of matter, and other Noumena, as distinguished from the\r\nphenomenal world, remains a question of argument, as it was before; and\r\nthe very general, but neither necessary nor universal, belief in them, stands\r\nas a psychological phenomenon to be explained, either on the hypothesis of\r\nits truth, or on some other. The belief is not a conclusive proof of its own\r\ntruth, unless there are no such things as \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-foreign\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eidola tribûs\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e;\r\nbut being a fact, it calls on antagonists to show, from what except the real existence\r\nof the thing believed, so general and apparently spontaneous a belief can have\r\noriginated. And its opponents have never hesitated to accept this\r\nchallenge.\u003ca id=\"noteref_95\" name=\"noteref_95\" href=\"#note_95\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e95\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nThe amount of their success in meeting it will probably determine\r\nthe ultimate verdict of philosophers on the question.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ca name=\"Book_II_Chapter_VII_Section_4\" id=\"Book_II_Chapter_VII_Section_4\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 4. In the revision, or rather reconstruction, of his \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Principles of Psychology,”\u003c/span\u003e\r\nas one of the stages or platforms in the imposing structure of\r\nhis System of Philosophy, Mr. Spencer has resumed what he justly\r\nterms\u003ca id=\"noteref_96\" name=\"noteref_96\" href=\"#note_96\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e96\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nthe \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“amicable controversy that has been long pending between us;”\u003c/span\u003e expressing\r\nat the same time a regret, which I cordially share, that \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“this\r\nlengthened exposition of a single point of difference, unaccompanied by\r\nan exposition of the numerous points of concurrence, unavoidably produces\r\nan appearance of dissent very far greater than that which exists.”\u003c/span\u003e I believe,\r\nwith Mr. Spencer, that the difference between us, if measured by our\r\nconclusions, is \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“superficial rather than substantial;”\u003c/span\u003e and the value I attach\r\nto so great an amount of agreement, in the field of analytic psychology,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page202\"\u003e[pg 202]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg202\" id=\"Pg202\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nwith a thinker of his force and depth, is such as I can hardly overstate.\r\nBut I also agree with him that the difference which exists in our premises\r\nis one of \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“profound importance, philosophically considered;”\u003c/span\u003e and not to\r\nbe dismissed while any part of the case of either of us has not been fully\r\nexamined and discussed.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIn his present statement of the Universal Postulate, Mr. Spencer has exchanged\r\nhis former expression, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“beliefs which invariably exist,”\u003c/span\u003e for the\r\nfollowing: \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“cognitions of which the predicates invariably exist along with\r\ntheir subjects.”\u003c/span\u003e And he says that \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“an abortive effort to conceive the negation\r\nof a proposition, shows that the cognition expressed is one of which\r\nthe predicate invariably exists along with its subject; and the discovery\r\nthat the predicate invariably exists along with its subject, is the discovery\r\nthat this cognition is one we are compelled to accept.”\u003c/span\u003e Both these premises\r\nof Mr. Spencer’s syllogism I am able to assent to, but in different senses\r\nof the middle term. If the invariable existence of the predicate along\r\nwith its subject, is to be understood in the most obvious meaning, as an\r\nexistence in actual Nature, or in other words, in our objective, or sensational,\r\nexperience, I of course admit that this, once ascertained, compels us\r\nto accept the proposition: but then I do not admit that the failure of an attempt\r\nto conceive the negative, proves the predicate to be always co-existent\r\nwith the subject in actual Nature. If, on the other hand (which I believe\r\nto be Mr. Spencer’s meaning) the invariable existence of the predicate along\r\nwith the subject is to be understood only of our conceptive faculty,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, that the one is inseparable from the other in our thoughts;\r\nthen, indeed, the inability to separate the two ideas proves their inseparable\r\nconjunction, here and now, in the mind which has failed in the attempt; but this\r\ninseparability in thought does not prove a corresponding inseparability in\r\nfact; nor even in the thoughts of other people, or of the same person in a\r\npossible future.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“That some propositions have been wrongly accepted as true, because\r\ntheir negations were supposed inconceivable when they were not,”\u003c/span\u003e does\r\nnot, in Mr. Spencer’s opinion, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“disprove the validity of the test;”\u003c/span\u003e not only\r\nbecause any test whatever \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“is liable to yield untrue results, either from incapacity\r\nor from carelessness in those who use it,”\u003c/span\u003e but because the propositions\r\nin question \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“were complex propositions, not to be established by a\r\ntest applicable to propositions no further decomposable.”\u003c/span\u003e \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“A test legitimately\r\napplicable to a simple proposition, the subject and predicate of which\r\nare in direct relation, can not be legitimately applied to a complex proposition,\r\nthe subject and predicate of which are indirectly related through the\r\nmany simple propositions implied.”\u003c/span\u003e \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“That things which are equal to the\r\nsame thing are equal to one another, is a fact which can be known by direct\r\ncomparison of actual or ideal relations…. But that the square of\r\nthe hypothenuse of a right-angled triangle equals the sum of the squares\r\nof the other two sides, can not be known immediately by comparison of\r\ntwo states of consciousness: here the truth can be reached only mediately,\r\nthrough a series of simple judgments respecting the likenesses or unlikenesses\r\nof certain relations.”\u003c/span\u003e Moreover, even when the proposition admits\r\nof being tested by immediate consciousness, people often neglect to do it.\r\nA school-boy, in adding up a column of figures, will say \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“35 and 9 are 46,”\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthough this is contrary to the verdict which consciousness gives when 35\r\nand 9 are really called up before it; but this is not done. And not only\r\nschool-boys, but men and thinkers, do not always \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“distinctly translate into\r\ntheir equivalent states of consciousness the words they use.”\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page203\"\u003e[pg 203]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg203\" id=\"Pg203\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt is but just to give Mr. Spencer’s doctrine the benefit of the limitation\r\nhe claims—viz., that it is only applicable to propositions which are assented\r\nto on simple inspection, without any intervening media of proof. But this\r\nlimitation does not exclude some of the most marked instances of propositions\r\nnow known to be false or groundless, but whose negative was once\r\nfound inconceivable: such as, that in sunrise and sunset it is the sun which\r\nmoves; that gravitation may exist without an intervening medium; and\r\neven the case of antipodes. The distinction drawn by Mr. Spencer is real;\r\nbut, in the case of the propositions classed by him as complex, consciousness,\r\nuntil the media of proof are supplied, gives no verdict at all: it neither\r\ndeclares the equality of the square of the hypothenuse with the sum\r\nof the squares of the sides to be inconceivable, nor their inequality to be\r\ninconceivable. But in all the three cases which I have just cited, the inconceivability\r\nseems to be apprehended directly; no train of argument was\r\nneeded, as in the case of the square of the hypothenuse, to obtain the verdict\r\nof consciousness on the point. Neither is any of the three a case like\r\nthat of the school-boy’s mistake, in which the mind was never really brought\r\ninto contact with the proposition. They are cases in which one of two opposite\r\npredicates, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-foreign\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003emero adspectu\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, seemed to be\r\nincompatible with the subject, and the other, therefore, to be proved always to exist\r\nwith it.\u003ca id=\"noteref_97\" name=\"noteref_97\" href=\"#note_97\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e97\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAs now limited by Mr. Spencer, the ultimate cognitions fit to be submitted\r\nto his test are only those of so universal and elementary a character as\r\nto be represented in the earliest and most unvarying experience, or apparent\r\nexperience, of all mankind. In such cases the inconceivability of the\r\nnegative, if real, is accounted for by the experience: and why (I have asked)\r\nshould the truth be tested by the inconceivability, when we can go further\r\nback for proof—namely, to the experience itself? To this Mr. Spencer\r\nanswers, that the experiences can not be all recalled to mind, and if recalled,\r\nwould be of unmanageable multitude. To test a proposition by experience\r\nseems to him to mean that \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“before accepting as certain the proposition\r\nthat any rectilineal figure must have as many angles as it has sides,”\u003c/span\u003e\r\nI have \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“to think of every triangle, square, pentagon, hexagon, etc., which I\r\nhave ever seen, and to verify the asserted relation in each case.”\u003c/span\u003e I can\r\nonly say, with surprise, that I do not understand this to be the meaning of\r\nan appeal to experience. It is enough to know that one has been seeing\r\nthe fact all one’s life, and has never remarked any instance to the contrary,\r\nand that other people, with every opportunity of observation, unanimously\r\ndeclare the same thing. It is true, even this experience may be insufficient,\r\nand so it might be even if I could recall to mind every instance of it; but\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page204\"\u003e[pg 204]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg204\" id=\"Pg204\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nits insufficiency, instead of being brought to light, is disguised, if instead of\r\nsifting the experience itself, I appeal to a test which bears no relation to\r\nthe sufficiency of the experience, but, at the most, only to its familiarity.\r\nThese remarks do not lose their force even if we believe, with Mr. Spencer,\r\nthat mental tendencies originally derived from experience impress themselves\r\npermanently on the cerebral structure and are transmitted by inheritance,\r\nso that modes of thinking which are acquired by the race become\r\ninnate and \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea priori\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e in the\r\nindividual, thus representing, in Mr. Spencer’s\r\nopinion, the experience of his progenitors, in addition to his own. All that\r\nwould follow from this is, that a conviction might be really innate,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, prior to individual experience, and yet not be true, since\r\nthe inherited tendency to accept it may have been originally the result of other causes\r\nthan its truth.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nMr. Spencer would have a much stronger case, if he could really show\r\nthat the evidence of Reasoning rests on the Postulate, or, in other words,\r\nthat we believe that a conclusion follows from premises only because we\r\ncan not conceive it not to follow. But this statement seems to me to be\r\nof the same kind as one I have previously commented on, viz., that I believe\r\nI see light, because I can not, while the sensation remains, conceive that I\r\nam looking into darkness. Both these statements seem to me incompatible\r\nwith the meaning (as very rightly limited by Mr. Spencer) of the verb to\r\nconceive. To say that when I apprehend that A is B and that B is C, I\r\ncan not conceive that A is not C, is to my mind merely to say that I am\r\ncompelled to \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ebelieve\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e that A is C. If to conceive be taken in its proper\r\nmeaning, viz., to form a mental representation, I \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003emay\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e be able to conceive A\r\nas not being C. After assenting, with full understanding, to the Copernican\r\nproof that it is the earth and not the sun that moves, I not only can\r\nconceive, or represent to myself, sunset as a motion of the sun, but almost\r\nevery one finds this conception of sunset easier to form, than that which\r\nthey nevertheless know to be the true one.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 5. Sir William Hamilton holds as I do, that inconceivability is no criterion\r\nof impossibility. \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“There is no ground for inferring a certain fact to be\r\nimpossible, merely from our inability to conceive its possibility.”\u003c/span\u003e \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Things\r\nthere are which \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003emay\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e, nay \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003emust\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e, be true, of which the\r\nunderstanding is wholly unable to construe to itself the\r\npossibility.”\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca id=\"noteref_98\" name=\"noteref_98\" href=\"#note_98\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e98\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Sir William Hamilton is, however, a firm believer in the\r\n\u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea priori\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e character of many axioms,\r\nand of the sciences deduced from them; and is so far from considering\r\nthose axioms to rest on the evidence of experience, that he declares certain\r\nof them to be true even of Noumena—of the Unconditioned—of which it\r\nis one of the principal aims of his philosophy to prove that the nature of\r\nour faculties debars us from having any knowledge. The axioms to which\r\nhe attributes this exceptional emancipation from the limits which confine\r\nall our other possibilities of knowledge; the chinks through which, as he\r\nrepresents, one ray of light finds its way to us from behind the curtain\r\nwhich veils from us the mysterious world of Things in themselves—are\r\nthe two principles, which he terms, after the school-men, the Principle of\r\nContradiction, and the Principle of Excluded Middle: the first, that two\r\ncontradictory propositions can not both be true; the second, that they can\r\nnot both be false. Armed with these logical weapons, we may boldly face\r\nThings in themselves, and tender to them the double alternative, sure that\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page205\"\u003e[pg 205]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg205\" id=\"Pg205\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nthey must absolutely elect one or the other side, though we may be forever\r\nprecluded from discovering which. To take his favorite example, we can\r\nnot conceive the infinite divisibility of matter, and we can not conceive a\r\nminimum, or end to divisibility: yet one or the other must be true.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAs I have hitherto said nothing of the two axioms in question, those of\r\nContradiction and of Excluded Middle, it is not unseasonable to consider\r\nthem here. The former asserts that an affirmative proposition and the corresponding\r\nnegative proposition can not both be true; which has generally\r\nbeen held to be intuitively evident. Sir William Hamilton and the Germans\r\nconsider it to be the statement in words of a form or law of our\r\nthinking faculty. Other philosophers, not less deserving of consideration,\r\ndeem it to be an identical proposition; an assertion involved in the meaning\r\nof terms; a mode of defining Negation, and the word Not.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nI am able to go one step with these last. An affirmative assertion and\r\nits negative are not two independent assertions, connected with each other\r\nonly as mutually incompatible. That if the negative be true, the affirmative\r\nmust be false, really is a mere identical proposition; for the negative proposition\r\nasserts nothing but the falsity of the affirmative, and has no other\r\nsense or meaning whatever. The Principium Contradictionis should therefore\r\nput off the ambitious phraseology which gives it the air of a fundamental\r\nantithesis pervading nature, and should be enunciated in the simpler\r\nform, that the same proposition can not at the same time be false and true.\r\nBut I can go no further with the Nominalists; for I can not look upon this\r\nlast as a merely verbal proposition. I consider it to be, like other axioms,\r\none of our first and most familiar generalizations from experience. The\r\noriginal foundation of it I take to be, that Belief and Disbelief are two different\r\nmental states, excluding one another. This we know by the simplest\r\nobservation of our own minds. And if we carry our observation outward,\r\nwe also find that light and darkness, sound and silence, motion and quiescence,\r\nequality and inequality, preceding and following, succession and simultaneousness,\r\nany positive phenomenon whatever and its negative, are\r\ndistinct phenomena, pointedly contrasted, and the one always absent where\r\nthe other is present. I consider the maxim in question to be a generalization\r\nfrom all these facts.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIn like manner as the Principle of Contradiction (that one of two contradictories\r\nmust be false) means that an assertion can not be \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eboth\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e true and\r\nfalse, so the Principle of Excluded Middle, or that one of two contradictories\r\nmust be true, means that an assertion must be \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eeither\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e true or false:\r\neither the affirmative is true, or otherwise the negative is true, which means\r\nthat the affirmative is false. I can not help thinking this principle a surprising\r\nspecimen of a so-called necessity of Thought, since it is not even\r\ntrue, unless with a large qualification. A proposition must be either true\r\nor false, \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eprovided\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e that the predicate be one which can in any intelligible\r\nsense be attributed to the subject; (and as this is always assumed to be the\r\ncase in treatises on logic, the axiom is always laid down there as of absolute\r\ntruth). \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Abracadabra is a second intention”\u003c/span\u003e is neither true nor false. Between\r\nthe true and the false there is a third possibility, the Unmeaning:\r\nand this alternative is fatal to Sir William Hamilton’s extension of the maxim\r\nto Noumena. That Matter must either have a minimum of divisibility\r\nor be infinitely divisible, is more than we can ever know. For in the first\r\nplace, Matter, in any other than the phenomenal sense of the term, may not\r\nexist: and it will scarcely be said that a nonentity must be either infinitely\r\nor finitely divisible. In the second place, though matter, considered as\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page206\"\u003e[pg 206]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg206\" id=\"Pg206\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nthe occult cause of our sensations, do really exist, yet what we call divisibility\r\nmay be an attribute only of our sensations of sight and touch, and\r\nnot of their uncognizable cause. Divisibility may not be predicable at all,\r\nin any intelligible sense, of Things in themselves, nor therefore of Matter\r\nin itself; and the assumed necessity of being either infinitely or finitely divisible,\r\nmay be an inapplicable alternative.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nOn this question I am happy to have the full concurrence of Mr. Herbert\r\nSpencer, from whose paper in the \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eFortnightly Review\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e I extract the\r\nfollowing passage. The germ of an idea identical with that of Mr. Spencer may\r\nbe found in the present chapter, on a preceding page; but in Mr. Spencer\r\nit is not an undeveloped thought, but a philosophical theory.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“When remembering a certain thing as in a certain place, the place and\r\nthe thing are mentally represented together; while to think of the non-existence\r\nof the thing in that place implies a consciousness in which the place\r\nis represented, but not the thing. Similarly, if instead of thinking of an\r\nobject as colorless, we think of its having color, the change consists in the\r\naddition to the concept of an element that was before absent from it—the\r\nobject can not be thought of first as red and then as not red, without one\r\ncomponent of the thought being totally expelled from the mind by another.\r\nThe law of the Excluded Middle, then, is simply a generalization of the universal\r\nexperience that some mental states are directly destructive of other\r\nstates. It formulates a certain absolutely constant law, that the appearance\r\nof any positive mode of consciousness can not occur without excluding a\r\ncorrelative negative mode; and that the negative mode can not occur without\r\nexcluding the correlative positive mode: the antithesis of positive and\r\nnegative being, indeed, merely an expression of this experience. Hence it\r\nfollows that if consciousness is not in one of the two modes it must be in\r\nthe other.”\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca id=\"noteref_99\" name=\"noteref_99\" href=\"#note_99\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e99\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nI must here close this supplementary chapter, and with it the Second\r\nBook. The theory of Induction, in the most comprehensive sense of the\r\nterm, will form the subject of the Third.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page207\"\u003e[pg 207]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg207\" id=\"Pg207\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"page\" /\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-div\" style=\"margin-bottom: 5.00em; margin-top: 5.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"toc41\" id=\"toc41\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"pdf42\" id=\"pdf42\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\u0027chapter\u0027 /\u003e\u003ch2 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: center; margin-bottom: 2.88em; margin-top: 2.88em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 144%\"\u003eBook III.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\u0027chapter\u0027 /\u003e\u003ch2 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: left; margin-bottom: 3.46em; margin-top: 3.46em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 173%\"\u003eOf Induction.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"block tei tei-quote\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.80em; margin-left: 3.60em; margin-top: 1.80em; margin-right: 3.60em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 0.90em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e“\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003eAccording to the doctrine now stated, the highest, or rather the only proper object of\r\nphysics, is to ascertain those established conjunctions of successive events, which\r\nconstitute the order of the universe; to record the phenomena which it exhibits to our\r\nobservations, or which it discloses to our experiments; and to refer these phenomena to\r\ntheir general laws.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e”\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e—\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%; font-variant: small-caps\"\u003eD. Stewart\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e,\r\n\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%; font-style: italic\"\u003eElements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e, vol. ii., chap.\r\niv., sect. 1.\r\n\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 0.90em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e“\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003eIn such cases the inductive and deductive methods of inquiry may be said to go hand in\r\nhand, the one verifying the conclusions deduced by the other; and the combination of\r\nexperiment and theory, which may thus be brought to bear in such cases, forms an engine\r\nof discovery infinitely more powerful than either taken separately. This state of any\r\ndepartment of science is perhaps of all others the most interesting, and that which\r\npromises the most to research.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e”\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e—\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%; font-variant: small-caps\"\u003eSir J. Herschel\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e,\r\n\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%; font-style: italic\"\u003eDiscourse on the Study of Natural Philosophy\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e.\r\n\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-div\" style=\"margin-bottom: 4.00em; margin-top: 4.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"toc43\" id=\"toc43\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"pdf44\" id=\"pdf44\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: center; margin-bottom: 2.40em; margin-top: 2.40em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 120%\"\u003eChapter I.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: left; margin-bottom: 2.88em; margin-top: 2.88em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 144%\"\u003ePreliminary Observations On Induction In General.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 1. The portion of the present inquiry upon which we are now about\r\nto enter, may be considered as the principal, both from its surpassing in\r\nintricacy all the other branches, and because it relates to a process which\r\nhas been shown in the preceding Book to be that in which the investigation\r\nof nature essentially consists. We have found that all Inference, consequently\r\nall Proof, and all discovery of truths not self-evident, consists of\r\ninductions, and the interpretation of inductions: that all our knowledge,\r\nnot intuitive, comes to us exclusively from that source. What Induction\r\nis, therefore, and what conditions render it legitimate, can not but be deemed\r\nthe main question of the science of logic—the question which includes\r\nall others. It is, however, one which professed writers on logic have almost\r\nentirely passed over. The generalities of the subject have not been\r\naltogether neglected by metaphysicians; but, for want of sufficient acquaintance\r\nwith the processes by which science has actually succeeded in\r\nestablishing general truths, their analysis of the inductive operation, even\r\nwhen unexceptionable as to correctness, has not been specific enough to be\r\nmade the foundation of practical rules, which might be for induction itself\r\nwhat the rules of the syllogism are for the interpretation of induction:\r\nwhile those by whom physical science has been carried to its present state\r\nof improvement—and who, to arrive at a complete theory of the process,\r\nneeded only to generalize, and adapt to all varieties of problems, the methods\r\nwhich they themselves employed in their habitual pursuits—never until\r\nvery lately made any serious attempt to philosophize on the subject, nor\r\nregarded the mode in which they arrived at their conclusions as deserving\r\nof study, independently of the conclusions themselves.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page208\"\u003e[pg 208]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg208\" id=\"Pg208\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 2. For the purposes of the present inquiry, Induction may be defined,\r\nthe operation of discovering and proving general propositions. It is true\r\nthat (as already shown) the process of indirectly ascertaining individual\r\nfacts, is as truly inductive as that by which we establish general truths.\r\nBut it is not a different kind of induction; it is a form of the very same\r\nprocess: since, on the one hand, generals are but collections of particulars,\r\ndefinite in kind but indefinite in number; and on the other hand, whenever\r\nthe evidence which we derive from observation of known cases justifies us\r\nin drawing an inference respecting even one unknown case, we should on\r\nthe same evidence be justified in drawing a similar inference with respect\r\nto a whole class of cases. The inference either does not hold at all, or it\r\nholds in all cases of a certain description; in all cases which, in certain definable\r\nrespects, resemble those we have observed.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIf these remarks are just; if the principles and rules of inference are the\r\nsame whether we infer general propositions or individual facts; it follows\r\nthat a complete logic of the sciences would be also a complete logic of practical\r\nbusiness and common life. Since there is no case of legitimate inference\r\nfrom experience, in which the conclusion may not legitimately be a\r\ngeneral proposition; an analysis of the process by which general truths are\r\narrived at, is virtually an analysis of all induction whatever. Whether we\r\nare inquiring into a scientific principle or into an individual fact, and whether\r\nwe proceed by experiment or by ratiocination, every step in the train of\r\ninferences is essentially inductive, and the legitimacy of the induction depends\r\nin both cases on the same conditions.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nTrue it is that in the case of the practical inquirer, who is endeavoring\r\nto ascertain facts not for the purposes of science but for those of business,\r\nsuch, for instance, as the advocate or the judge, the chief difficulty is one in\r\nwhich the principles of induction will afford him no assistance. It lies not\r\nin making his inductions, but in the selection of them; in choosing from\r\namong all general propositions ascertained to be true, those which furnish\r\nmarks by which he may trace whether the given subject possesses or not\r\nthe predicate in question. In arguing a doubtful question of fact before\r\na jury, the general propositions or principles to which the advocate appeals\r\nare mostly, in themselves, sufficiently trite, and assented to as soon as\r\nstated: his skill lies in bringing his case under those propositions or principles;\r\nin calling to mind such of the known or received maxims of probability\r\nas admit of application to the case in hand, and selecting from among\r\nthem those best adapted to his object. Success is here dependent on natural\r\nor acquired sagacity, aided by knowledge of the particular subject, and\r\nof subjects allied with it. Invention, though it can be cultivated, can not\r\nbe reduced to rule; there is no science which will enable a man to bethink\r\nhimself of that which will suit his purpose.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nBut when he \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ehas\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e thought of something, science can tell him whether\r\nthat which he has thought of will suit his purpose or not. The inquirer\r\nor arguer must be guided by his own knowledge and sagacity in the choice\r\nof the inductions out of which he will construct his argument. But the\r\nvalidity of the argument when constructed, depends on principles, and must\r\nbe tried by tests which are the same for all descriptions of inquiries,\r\nwhether the result be to give A an estate, or to enrich science with a new\r\ngeneral truth. In the one case and in the other, the senses, or testimony,\r\nmust decide on the individual facts; the rules of the syllogism will determine\r\nwhether, those facts being supposed correct, the case really falls within\r\nthe formulæ of the different inductions under which it has been successively\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page209\"\u003e[pg 209]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg209\" id=\"Pg209\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nbrought; and finally, the legitimacy of the inductions themselves\r\nmust be decided by other rules, and these it is now our purpose to investigate.\r\nIf this third part of the operation be, in many of the questions of\r\npractical life, not the most, but the least arduous portion of it, we have\r\nseen that this is also the case in some great departments of the field of science;\r\nin all those which are principally deductive, and most of all in mathematics;\r\nwhere the inductions themselves are few in number, and so obvious\r\nand elementary that they seem to stand in no need of the evidence of\r\nexperience, while to combine them so as to prove a given theorem or solve\r\na problem, may call for the utmost powers of invention and contrivance\r\nwith which our species is gifted.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIf the identity of the logical processes which prove particular facts and\r\nthose which establish general scientific truths, required any additional confirmation,\r\nit would be sufficient to consider that in many branches of science,\r\nsingle facts have to be proved, as well as principles; facts as completely\r\nindividual as any that are debated in a court of justice; but which\r\nare proved in the same manner as the other truths of the science, and without\r\ndisturbing in any degree the homogeneity of its method. A remarkable\r\nexample of this is afforded by astronomy. The individual facts on\r\nwhich that science grounds its most important deductions, such facts as\r\nthe magnitudes of the bodies of the solar system, their distances from one\r\nanother, the figure of the earth, and its rotation, are scarcely any of them\r\naccessible to our means of direct observation: they are proved indirectly,\r\nby the aid of inductions founded on other facts which we can more easily\r\nreach. For example, the distance of the moon from the earth was determined\r\nby a very circuitous process. The share which direct observation\r\nhad in the work consisted in ascertaining, at one and the same instant, the\r\nzenith distances of the moon, as seen from two points very remote from\r\none another on the earth’s surface. The ascertainment of these angular\r\ndistances ascertained their supplements; and since the angle at the earth’s\r\ncentre subtended by the distance between the two places of observation\r\nwas deducible by spherical trigonometry from the latitude and longitude\r\nof those places, the angle at the moon subtended by the same line\r\nbecame the fourth angle of a quadrilateral of which the other three\r\nangles were known. The four angles being thus ascertained, and two\r\nsides of the quadrilateral being radii of the earth; the two remaining\r\nsides and the diagonal, or, in other words, the moon’s distance from the\r\ntwo places of observation and from the centre of the earth, could be ascertained,\r\nat least in terms of the earth’s radius, from elementary theorems\r\nof geometry. At each step in this demonstration a new induction\r\nis taken in, represented in the aggregate of its results by a general proposition.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nNot only is the process by which an individual astronomical fact was\r\nthus ascertained, exactly similar to those by which the same science establishes\r\nits general truths, but also (as we have shown to be the case in all\r\nlegitimate reasoning) a general proposition might have been concluded instead\r\nof a single fact. In strictness, indeed, the result of the reasoning \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eis\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e\r\na general proposition; a theorem respecting the distance, not of the moon\r\nin particular, but of any inaccessible object; showing in what relation that\r\ndistance stands to certain other quantities. And although the moon is almost\r\nthe only heavenly body the distance of which from the earth can really\r\nbe thus ascertained, this is merely owing to the accidental circumstances\r\nof the other heavenly bodies, which render them incapable of affording such\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page210\"\u003e[pg 210]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg210\" id=\"Pg210\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\ndata as the application of the theorem requires; for the theorem itself is\r\nas true of them as it is of the moon.\u003ca id=\"noteref_100\" name=\"noteref_100\" href=\"#note_100\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e100\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWe shall fall into no error, then, if in treating of Induction, we limit our\r\nattention to the establishment of general propositions. The principles and\r\nrules of Induction as directed to this end, are the principles and rules of\r\nall Induction; and the logic of Science is the universal Logic, applicable to\r\nall inquiries in which man can engage.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-div\" style=\"margin-bottom: 4.00em; margin-top: 4.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"toc45\" id=\"toc45\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"pdf46\" id=\"pdf46\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"Book_III_Chapter_II\" id=\"Book_III_Chapter_II\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: center; margin-bottom: 2.40em; margin-top: 2.40em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 120%\"\u003eChapter II.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: left; margin-bottom: 2.88em; margin-top: 2.88em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 144%\"\u003eOf Inductions Improperly So Called.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 1. Induction, then, is that operation of the mind, by which we infer\r\nthat what we know to be true in a particular case or cases, will be true in\r\nall cases which resemble the former in certain assignable respects. In other\r\nwords, Induction is the process by which we conclude that what is true of\r\ncertain individuals of a class is true of the whole class, or that what is true\r\nat certain times will be true in similar circumstances at all times.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThis definition excludes from the meaning of the term Induction, various\r\nlogical operations, to which it is not unusual to apply that name.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nInduction, as above defined, is a process of inference; it proceeds from\r\nthe known to the unknown; and any operation involving no inference, any\r\nprocess in which what seems the conclusion is no wider than the premises\r\nfrom which it is drawn, does not fall within the meaning of the term. Yet\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page211\"\u003e[pg 211]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg211\" id=\"Pg211\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nin the common books of Logic we find this laid down as the most perfect,\r\nindeed the only quite perfect, form of induction. In those books, every\r\nprocess which sets out from a less general and terminates in a more general\r\nexpression—which admits of being stated in the form, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“This and that\r\nA are B, therefore every A is B”\u003c/span\u003e—is called an induction, whether any\r\nthing be really concluded or not: and the induction is asserted not to be\r\nperfect, unless every single individual of the class A is included in the\r\nantecedent, or premise: that is, unless what we affirm of the class has\r\nalready been ascertained to be true of every individual in it, so that the\r\nnominal conclusion is not really a conclusion, but a mere re-assertion of the\r\npremises. If we were to say, All the planets shine by the sun’s light, from\r\nobservation of each separate planet, or All the Apostles were Jews, because\r\nthis is true of Peter, Paul, John, and every other apostle—these, and such\r\nas these, would, in the phraseology in question, be called perfect, and the\r\nonly perfect, Inductions. This, however, is a totally different kind of induction\r\nfrom ours; it is not an inference from facts known to facts unknown,\r\nbut a mere short-hand registration of facts known. The two simulated\r\narguments which we have quoted, are not generalizations; the propositions\r\npurporting to be conclusions from them, are not really general\r\npropositions. A general proposition is one in which the predicate is affirmed\r\nor denied of an unlimited number of individuals; namely, all, whether\r\nfew or many, existing or capable of existing, which possess the properties\r\nconnoted by the subject of the proposition. \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“All men are mortal”\u003c/span\u003e does\r\nnot mean all now living, but all men past, present, and to come. When the\r\nsignification of the term is limited so as to render it a name not for any\r\nand every individual falling under a certain general description, but only\r\nfor each of a number of individuals, designated as such, and as it were\r\ncounted off individually, the proposition, though it may be general in its\r\nlanguage, is no general proposition, but merely that number of singular\r\npropositions, written in an abridged character. The operation may be very\r\nuseful, as most forms of abridged notation are; but it is no part of the investigation\r\nof truth, though often bearing an important part in the preparation\r\nof the materials for that investigation.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAs we may sum up a definite number of singular propositions in one\r\nproposition, which will be apparently, but not really, general, so we may\r\nsum up a definite number of general propositions in one proposition, which\r\nwill be apparently, but not really, more general. If by a separate induction\r\napplied to every distinct species of animals, it has been established\r\nthat each possesses a nervous system, and we affirm thereupon that all animals\r\nhave a nervous system; this looks like a generalization, though as\r\nthe conclusion merely affirms of all what has already been affirmed of each,\r\nit seems to tell us nothing but what we knew before. A distinction, however,\r\nmust be made. If in concluding that all animals have a nervous system,\r\nwe mean the same thing and no more as if we had said \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“all known\r\nanimals,”\u003c/span\u003e the proposition is not general, and the process by which it is arrived\r\nat is not induction. But if our meaning is that the observations\r\nmade of the various species of animals have discovered to us a law of animal\r\nnature, and that we are in a condition to say that a nervous system\r\nwill be found even in animals yet undiscovered, this indeed is an induction;\r\nbut in this case the general proposition contains more than the sum\r\nof the special propositions from which it is inferred. The distinction is\r\nstill more forcibly brought out when we consider, that if this real generalization\r\nbe legitimate at all, its legitimacy probably does not require that\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page212\"\u003e[pg 212]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg212\" id=\"Pg212\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nwe should have examined without exception every known species. It is\r\nthe number and nature of the instances, and not their being the whole of\r\nthose which happen to be known, that makes them sufficient evidence to\r\nprove a general law: while the more limited assertion, which stops at all\r\nknown animals, can not be made unless we have rigorously verified it in\r\nevery species. In like manner (to return to a former example) we might\r\nhave inferred, not that all \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ethe\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e planets, but\r\nthat all \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eplanets\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e, shine by reflected\r\nlight: the former is no induction; the latter is an induction, and a bad\r\none, being disproved by the case of double stars—self-luminous bodies\r\nwhich are properly planets, since they revolve round a centre.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 2. There are several processes used in mathematics which require to\r\nbe distinguished from Induction, being not unfrequently called by that\r\nname, and being so far similar to Induction properly so called, that the\r\npropositions they lead to are really general propositions. For example,\r\nwhen we have proved with respect to the circle, that a straight line can\r\nnot meet it in more than two points, and when the same thing has been\r\nsuccessively proved of the ellipse, the parabola, and the hyperbola, it may\r\nbe laid down as a universal property of the sections of the cone. The\r\ndistinction drawn in the two previous examples can have no place here,\r\nthere being no difference between all \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eknown\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e sections\r\nof the cone and \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eall\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e\r\nsections, since a cone demonstrably can not be intersected by a plane except\r\nin one of these four lines. It would be difficult, therefore, to refuse\r\nto the proposition arrived at, the name of a generalization, since there is\r\nno room for any generalization beyond it. But there is no induction, because\r\nthere is no inference: the conclusion is a mere summing up of what\r\nwas asserted in the various propositions from which it is drawn. A case\r\nsomewhat, though not altogether, similar, is the proof of a geometrical theorem\r\nby means of a diagram. Whether the diagram be on paper or only\r\nin the imagination, the demonstration (as formerly observed\u003ca id=\"noteref_101\" name=\"noteref_101\" href=\"#note_101\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e101\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e) does not\r\nprove directly the general theorem; it proves only that the conclusion,\r\nwhich the theorem asserts generally, is true of the particular triangle or\r\ncircle exhibited in the diagram; but since we perceive that in the same\r\nway in which we have proved it of that circle, it might also be proved of\r\nany other circle, we gather up into one general expression all the singular\r\npropositions susceptible of being thus proved, and embody them in a universal\r\nproposition. Having shown that the three angles of the triangle\r\nABC are together equal to two right angles, we conclude that this is true\r\nof every other triangle, not because it is true of ABC, but for the same\r\nreason which proved it to be true of ABC. If this were to be called Induction,\r\nan appropriate name for it would be, induction by parity of reasoning.\r\nBut the term can not properly belong to it; the characteristic\r\nquality of Induction is wanting, since the truth obtained, though really\r\ngeneral, is not believed on the evidence of particular instances. We do not\r\nconclude that all triangles have the property because some triangles have,\r\nbut from the ulterior demonstrative evidence which was the ground of our\r\nconviction in the particular instances.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThere are nevertheless, in mathematics, some examples of so-called Induction,\r\nin which the conclusion does bear the appearance of a generalization\r\ngrounded on some of the particular cases included in it. A mathematician,\r\nwhen he has calculated a sufficient number of the terms of an algebraical\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page213\"\u003e[pg 213]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg213\" id=\"Pg213\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nor arithmetical series to have ascertained what is called the \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003elaw\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof the series, does not hesitate to fill up any number of the succeeding terms\r\nwithout repeating the calculations. But I apprehend he only does so when\r\nit is apparent from \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea priori\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nconsiderations (which might be exhibited in\r\nthe form of demonstration) that the mode of formation of the subsequent\r\nterms, each from that which preceded it, must be similar to the formation\r\nof the terms which have been already calculated. And when the attempt\r\nhas been hazarded without the sanction of such general considerations, there\r\nare instances on record in which it has led to false results.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt is said that Newton discovered the binomial theorem by induction;\r\nby raising a binomial successively to a certain number of powers, and\r\ncomparing those powers with one another until he detected the relation in\r\nwhich the algebraic formula of each power stands to the exponent of that\r\npower, and to the two terms of the binomial. The fact is not improbable:\r\nbut a mathematician like Newton, who seemed to arrive \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eper saltum\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e at\r\nprinciples and conclusions that ordinary mathematicians only reached by a\r\nsuccession of steps, certainly could not have performed the comparison in\r\nquestion without being led by it to the \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\r\npriori\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e ground of the law; since\r\nany one who understands sufficiently the nature of multiplication to venture\r\nupon multiplying several lines of symbols at one operation, can not\r\nbut perceive that in raising a binomial to a power, the co-efficients must\r\ndepend on the laws of permutation and combination: and as soon as this\r\nis recognized, the theorem is demonstrated. Indeed, when once it was seen\r\nthat the law prevailed in a few of the lower powers, its identity with the\r\nlaw of permutation would at once suggest the considerations which prove\r\nit to obtain universally. Even, therefore, such cases as these, are but examples\r\nof what I have called Induction by parity of reasoning, that is, not\r\nreally Induction, because not involving inference of a general proposition\r\nfrom particular instances.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ca name=\"Book_III_Chapter_II_Section_3\" id=\"Book_III_Chapter_II_Section_3\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 3. There remains a third improper use of the term Induction, which it\r\nis of real importance to clear up, because the theory of Induction has been,\r\nin no ordinary degree, confused by it, and because the confusion is exemplified\r\nin the most recent and elaborate treatise on the inductive philosophy\r\nwhich exists in our language. The error in question is that of confounding\r\na mere description, by general terms, of a set of observed phenomena,\r\nwith an induction from them.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nSuppose that a phenomenon consists of parts, and that these parts are\r\nonly capable of being observed separately, and as it were piecemeal.\r\nWhen the observations have been made, there is a convenience (amounting\r\nfor many purposes to a necessity) in obtaining a representation of the phenomenon\r\nas a whole, by combining, or as we may say, piecing these detached\r\nfragments together. A navigator sailing in the midst of the ocean\r\ndiscovers land: he can not at first, or by any one observation, determine\r\nwhether it is a continent or an island; but he coasts along it, and after a\r\nfew days finds himself to have sailed completely round it: he then pronounces\r\nit an island. Now there was no particular time or place of observation\r\nat which he could perceive that this land was entirely surrounded\r\nby water: he ascertained the fact by a succession of partial observations,\r\nand then selected a general expression which summed up in two or three\r\nwords the whole of what he so observed. But is there any thing of the\r\nnature of an induction in this process? Did he infer any thing that had\r\nnot been observed, from something else which had? Certainly not. He\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page214\"\u003e[pg 214]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg214\" id=\"Pg214\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nhad observed the whole of what the proposition asserts. That the land in\r\nquestion is an island, is not an inference from the partial facts which the\r\nnavigator saw in the course of his circumnavigation; it is the facts themselves;\r\nit is a summary of those facts; the description of a complex fact,\r\nto which those simpler ones are as the parts of a whole.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nNow there is, I conceive, no difference in kind between this simple operation,\r\nand that by which Kepler ascertained the nature of the planetary\r\norbits: and Kepler’s operation, all at least that was characteristic in it, was\r\nnot more an inductive act than that of our supposed navigator.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe object of Kepler was to determine the real path described by each\r\nof the planets, or let us say by the planet Mars (since it was of that body\r\nthat he first established the two of his three laws which did not require a\r\ncomparison of planets). To do this there was no other mode than that of\r\ndirect observation: and all which observation could do was to ascertain a\r\ngreat number of the successive places of the planet; or rather, of its apparent\r\nplaces. That the planet occupied successively all these positions, or\r\nat all events, positions which produced the same impressions on the eye,\r\nand that it passed from one of these to another insensibly, and without any\r\napparent breach of continuity; thus much the senses, with the aid of the\r\nproper instruments, could ascertain. What Kepler did more than this, was\r\nto find what sort of a curve these different points would make, supposing\r\nthem to be all joined together. He expressed the whole series of the observed\r\nplaces of Mars by what Dr. Whewell calls the general conception of\r\nan ellipse. This operation was far from being as easy as that of the navigator\r\nwho expressed the series of his observations on successive points of\r\nthe coast by the general conception of an island. But it is the very same\r\nsort of operation; and if the one is not an induction but a description, this\r\nmust also be true of the other.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe only real induction concerned in the case, consisted in inferring that\r\nbecause the observed places of Mars were correctly represented by points\r\nin an imaginary ellipse, therefore Mars would continue to revolve in that\r\nsame ellipse; and in concluding (before the gap had been filled up by further\r\nobservations) that the positions of the planet during the time which\r\nintervened between two observations, must have coincided with the intermediate\r\npoints of the curve. For these were facts which had not been directly\r\nobserved. They were inferences from the observations; facts inferred,\r\nas distinguished from facts seen. But these inferences were so far\r\nfrom being a part of Kepler’s philosophical operation, that they had been\r\ndrawn long before he was born. Astronomers had long known that the\r\nplanets periodically returned to the same places. When this had been ascertained,\r\nthere was no induction left for Kepler to make, nor did he make\r\nany further induction. He merely applied his new conception to the facts\r\ninferred, as he did to the facts observed. Knowing already that the planets\r\ncontinued to move in the same paths; when he found that an ellipse\r\ncorrectly represented the past path, he knew that it would represent the\r\nfuture path. In finding a compendious expression for the one set of facts,\r\nhe found one for the other: but he found the expression only, not the inference;\r\nnor did he (which is the true test of a general truth) add any\r\nthing to the power of prediction already possessed.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ca name=\"Book_III_Chapter_II_Section_4\" id=\"Book_III_Chapter_II_Section_4\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 4. The descriptive operation which enables a number of details to be\r\nsummed up in a single proposition, Dr. Whewell, by an aptly chosen expression,\r\nhas termed the Colligation of Facts. In most of his observations\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page215\"\u003e[pg 215]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg215\" id=\"Pg215\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nconcerning that mental process I fully agree, and would gladly transfer all\r\nthat portion of his book into my own pages. I only think him mistaken\r\nin setting up this kind of operation, which according to the old and received\r\nmeaning of the term, is not induction at all, as the type of induction generally;\r\nand laying down, throughout his work, as principles of induction, the\r\nprinciples of mere colligation.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nDr. Whewell maintains that the general proposition which binds together\r\nthe particular facts, and makes them, as it were, one fact, is not the mere\r\nsum of those facts, but something more, since there is introduced a conception\r\nof the mind, which did not exist in the facts themselves. \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“The particular\r\nfacts,”\u003c/span\u003e says he,\u003ca id=\"noteref_102\" name=\"noteref_102\" href=\"#note_102\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e102\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“are not merely brought together, but there is a\r\nnew element added to the combination by the very act of thought by which\r\nthey are combined…. When the Greeks, after long observing the motions\r\nof the planets, saw that these motions might be rightly considered as\r\nproduced by the motion of one wheel revolving in the inside of another\r\nwheel, these wheels were creations of their minds, added to the facts which\r\nthey perceived by sense. And even if the wheels were no longer supposed\r\nto be material, but were reduced to mere geometrical spheres or circles, they\r\nwere not the less products of the mind alone—something additional to the\r\nfacts observed. The same is the case in all other discoveries. The facts\r\nare known, but they are insulated and unconnected, till the discoverer supplies\r\nfrom his own store a principle of connection. The pearls are there,\r\nbut they will not hang together till some one provides the string.”\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nLet me first remark that Dr. Whewell, in this passage, blends together,\r\nindiscriminately, examples of both the processes which I am endeavoring\r\nto distinguish from one another. When the Greeks abandoned the supposition\r\nthat the planetary motions were produced by the revolution of material\r\nwheels, and fell back upon the idea of \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“mere geometrical spheres or\r\ncircles,”\u003c/span\u003e there was more in this change of opinion than the mere substitution\r\nof an ideal curve for a physical one. There was the abandonment of\r\na theory, and the replacement of it by a mere description. No one would\r\nthink of calling the doctrine of material wheels a mere description. That\r\ndoctrine was an attempt to point out the force by which the planets were\r\nacted upon, and compelled to move in their orbits. But when, by a great\r\nstep in philosophy, the materiality of the wheels was discarded, and the geometrical\r\nforms alone retained, the attempt to account for the motions was\r\ngiven up, and what was left of the theory was a mere description of the\r\norbits. The assertion that the planets were carried round by wheels revolving\r\nin the inside of other wheels, gave place to the proposition, that\r\nthey moved in the same lines which would be traced by bodies so carried:\r\nwhich was a mere mode of representing the sum of the observed facts; as\r\nKepler’s was another and a better mode of representing the same observations.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt is true that for these simply descriptive operations, as well as for the\r\nerroneous inductive one, a conception of the mind was required. The conception\r\nof an ellipse must have presented itself to Kepler’s mind, before he\r\ncould identify the planetary orbits with it. According to Dr. Whewell,\r\nthe conception was something added to the facts. He expresses himself\r\nas if Kepler had put something into the facts by his mode of conceiving\r\nthem. But Kepler did no such thing. The ellipse was in the facts before\r\nKepler recognized it; just as the island was an island before it had been\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page216\"\u003e[pg 216]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg216\" id=\"Pg216\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nsailed round. Kepler did not \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eput\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e what he had conceived into the facts,\r\nbut \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003esaw\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e it in them. A conception implies, and corresponds to, something\r\nconceived: and though the conception itself is not in the facts, but in our\r\nmind, yet if it is to convey any knowledge relating to them, it must be a conception\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eof\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e something which really is in the facts, some property which they\r\nactually possess, and which they would manifest to our senses, if our senses\r\nwere able to take cognizance of it. If, for instance, the planet left behind\r\nit in space a visible track, and if the observer were in a fixed position at\r\nsuch a distance from the plane of the orbit as would enable him to see the\r\nwhole of it at once, he would see it to be an ellipse; and if gifted with appropriate\r\ninstruments and powers of locomotion, he could prove it to be\r\nsuch by measuring its different dimensions. Nay, further: if the track\r\nwere visible, and he were so placed that he could see all parts of it in succession,\r\nbut not all of them at once, he might be able, by piecing together\r\nhis successive observations, to discover both that it was an ellipse and that\r\nthe planet moved in it. The case would then exactly resemble that of the\r\nnavigator who discovers the land to be an island by sailing round it. If\r\nthe path was visible, no one I think would dispute that to identify it with\r\nan ellipse is to describe it: and I can not see why any difference should be\r\nmade by its not being directly an object of sense, when every point in it is\r\nas exactly ascertained as if it were so.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nSubject to the indispensable condition which has just been stated, I do\r\nnot conceive that the part which conceptions have in the operation of\r\nstudying facts, has ever been overlooked or undervalued. No one ever disputed\r\nthat in order to reason about any thing we must have a conception\r\nof it; or that when we include a multitude of things under a general expression,\r\nthere is implied in the expression a conception of something common\r\nto those things. But it by no means follows that the conception is\r\nnecessarily pre-existent, or constructed by the mind out of its own materials.\r\nIf the facts are rightly classed under the conception, it is because\r\nthere is in the facts themselves something of which the conception is itself\r\na copy; and which if we can not directly perceive, it is because of the limited\r\npower of our organs, and not because the thing itself is not there.\r\nThe conception itself is often obtained by abstraction from the very facts\r\nwhich, in Dr. Whewell’s language, it is afterward called in to connect.\r\nThis he himself admits, when he observes (which he does on several occasions),\r\nhow great a service would be rendered to the science of physiology\r\nby the philosopher \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“who should establish a precise, tenable, and consistent\r\nconception of life.”\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca id=\"noteref_103\" name=\"noteref_103\" href=\"#note_103\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e103\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Such a conception can only be abstracted from the\r\nphenomena of life itself; from the very facts which it is put in requisition\r\nto connect. In other cases, no doubt, instead of collecting the conception\r\nfrom the very phenomena which we are attempting to colligate, we select\r\nit from among those which have been previously collected by abstraction\r\nfrom other facts. In the instance of Kepler’s laws, the latter was the\r\ncase. The facts being out of the reach of being observed, in any such\r\nmanner as would have enabled the senses to identify directly the path of\r\nthe planet, the conception requisite for framing a general description of\r\nthat path could not be collected by abstraction from the observations\r\nthemselves; the mind had to supply hypothetically, from among the conceptions\r\nit had obtained from other portions of its experience, some one\r\nwhich would correctly represent the series of the observed facts. It had\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page217\"\u003e[pg 217]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg217\" id=\"Pg217\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nto frame a supposition respecting the general course of the phenomenon,\r\nand ask itself, If this be the general description, what will the details be?\r\nand then compare these with the details actually observed. If they agreed,\r\nthe hypothesis would serve for a description of the phenomenon: if not, it\r\nwas necessarily abandoned, and another tried. It is such a case as this\r\nwhich gives rise to the doctrine that the mind, in framing the descriptions,\r\nadds something of its own which it does not find in the facts.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nYet it is a fact surely, that the planet does describe an ellipse; and a fact\r\nwhich we could see, if we had adequate visual organs and a suitable position.\r\nNot having these advantages, but possessing the conception of an ellipse,\r\nor (to express the meaning in less technical language) knowing what\r\nan ellipse was, Kepler tried whether the observed places of the planet were\r\nconsistent with such a path. He found they were so; and he, consequently,\r\nasserted as a fact that the planet moved in an ellipse. But this fact,\r\nwhich Kepler did not add to, but found in, the motions of the planet, namely,\r\nthat it occupied in succession the various points in the circumference of\r\na given ellipse, was the very fact, the separate parts of which had been separately\r\nobserved; it was the sum of the different observations.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nHaving stated this fundamental difference between my opinion and that\r\nof Dr. Whewell, I must add, that his account of the manner in which a\r\nconception is selected, suitable to express the facts, appears to me perfectly\r\njust. The experience of all thinkers will, I believe, testify that the process\r\nis tentative; that it consists of a succession of guesses; many being rejected,\r\nuntil one at last occurs fit to be chosen. We know from Kepler himself\r\nthat before hitting upon the \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“conception”\u003c/span\u003e of an ellipse, he tried nineteen\r\nother imaginary paths, which, finding them inconsistent with the observations,\r\nhe was obliged to reject. But as Dr. Whewell truly says, the\r\nsuccessful hypothesis, though a guess, ought generally to be called, not a\r\nlucky, but a skillful guess. The guesses which serve to give mental unity\r\nand wholeness to a chaos of scattered particulars, are accidents which rarely\r\noccur to any minds but those abounding in knowledge and disciplined in\r\nintellectual combinations.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nHow far this tentative method, so indispensable as a means to the colligation\r\nof facts for purposes of description, admits of application to Induction\r\nitself, and what functions belong to it in that department, will be considered\r\nin the chapter of the present Book which relates to Hypotheses.\r\nOn the present occasion we have chiefly to distinguish this process of Colligation\r\nfrom Induction properly so called; and that the distinction may be\r\nmade clearer, it is well to advert to a curious and interesting remark, which\r\nis as strikingly true of the former operation, as it appears to me unequivocally\r\nfalse of the latter.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIn different stages of the progress of knowledge, philosophers have employed,\r\nfor the colligation of the same order of facts, different conceptions.\r\nThe early rude observations of the heavenly bodies, in which minute precision\r\nwas neither attained nor sought, presented nothing inconsistent with\r\nthe representation of the path of a planet as an exact circle, having the earth\r\nfor its centre. As observations increased in accuracy, facts were disclosed\r\nwhich were not reconcilable with this simple supposition: for the colligation\r\nof those additional facts, the supposition was varied; and varied again\r\nand again as facts became more numerous and precise. The earth was removed\r\nfrom the centre to some other point within the circle; the planet\r\nwas supposed to revolve in a smaller circle called an epicycle, round an imaginary\r\npoint which revolved in a circle round the earth: in proportion as\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page218\"\u003e[pg 218]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg218\" id=\"Pg218\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nobservation elicited fresh facts contradictory to these representations, other\r\nepicycles and other eccentrics were added, producing additional complication;\r\nuntil at last Kepler swept all these circles away, and substituted the\r\nconception of an exact ellipse. Even this is found not to represent with\r\ncomplete correctness the accurate observations of the present day, which\r\ndisclose many slight deviations from an orbit exactly elliptical. Now Dr.\r\nWhewell has remarked that these successive general expressions, though\r\napparently so conflicting, were all correct: they all answered the purpose\r\nof colligation; they all enabled the mind to represent to itself with facility,\r\nand by a simultaneous glance, the whole body of facts at the time ascertained:\r\neach in its turn served as a correct description of the phenomena,\r\nso far as the senses had up to that time taken cognizance of them. If a\r\nnecessity afterward arose for discarding one of these general descriptions\r\nof the planet’s orbit, and framing a different imaginary line, by which to\r\nexpress the series of observed positions, it was because a number of new\r\nfacts had now been added, which it was necessary to combine with the old\r\nfacts into one general description. But this did not affect the correctness\r\nof the former expression, considered as a general statement of the only facts\r\nwhich it was intended to represent. And so true is this, that, as is well remarked\r\nby M. Comte, these ancient generalizations, even the rudest and\r\nmost imperfect of them, that of uniform movement in a circle, are so far\r\nfrom being entirely false, that they are even now habitually employed by\r\nastronomers when only a rough approximation to correctness is required.\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“L’astronomie moderne, en détruisant sans retour les hypothèses primitives,\r\nenvisagées comme lois réelles du monde, a soigneusement maintenu\r\nleur valeur positive et permanente, la propriété de représenter commodément\r\nles phénomènes quand il s’agit d’une première ébauche. Nos ressources\r\nà cet égard sont même bien plus étendues, précisément à cause\r\nque nous ne nous faisons aucune illusion sur la réalité des hypothèses; ce\r\nqui nous permet d’employer sans scrupule, en chaque cas, celle que nous\r\njugeons la plus avantageuse.”\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca id=\"noteref_104\" name=\"noteref_104\" href=\"#note_104\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e104\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nDr. Whewell’s remark, therefore, is philosophically correct. Successive\r\nexpressions for the colligation of observed facts, or, in other words, successive\r\ndescriptions of a phenomenon as a whole, which has been observed\r\nonly in parts, may, though conflicting, be all correct as far as they go. But\r\nit would surely be absurd to assert this of conflicting inductions.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe scientific study of facts may be undertaken for three different purposes:\r\nthe simple description of the facts; their explanation; or their prediction:\r\nmeaning by prediction, the determination of the conditions under\r\nwhich similar facts may be expected again to occur. To the first of these\r\nthree operations the name of Induction does not properly belong: to the\r\nother two it does. Now, Dr. Whewell’s observation is true of the first\r\nalone. Considered as a mere description, the circular theory of the heavenly\r\nmotions represents perfectly well their general features: and by adding\r\nepicycles without limit, those motions, even as now known to us, might be\r\nexpressed with any degree of accuracy that might be required. The elliptical\r\ntheory, as a mere description, would have a great advantage in point\r\nof simplicity, and in the consequent facility of conceiving it and reasoning\r\nabout it; but it would not really be more true than the other. Different\r\ndescriptions, therefore, may be all true: but not, surely, different explanations.\r\nThe doctrine that the heavenly bodies moved by a virtue inherent\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page219\"\u003e[pg 219]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg219\" id=\"Pg219\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nin their celestial nature; the doctrine that they were moved by impact\r\n(which led to the hypothesis of vortices as the only impelling force capable\r\nof whirling bodies in circles), and the Newtonian doctrine, that they are\r\nmoved by the composition of a centripetal with an original projectile\r\nforce; all these are explanations, collected by real induction from supposed\r\nparallel cases; and they were all successively received by philosophers, as\r\nscientific truths on the subject of the heavenly bodies. Can it be said of\r\nthese, as was said of the different descriptions, that they are all true as far\r\nas they go? Is it not clear that only one can be true in any degree, and\r\nthe other two must be altogether false? So much for explanations: let us\r\nnow compare different predictions: the first, that eclipses will occur when\r\none planet or satellite is so situated as to cast its shadow upon another;\r\nthe second, that they will occur when some great calamity is impending\r\nover mankind. Do these two doctrines only differ in the degree of their\r\ntruth, as expressing real facts with unequal degrees of accuracy? Assuredly\r\nthe one is true, and the other absolutely false.\u003ca id=\"noteref_105\" name=\"noteref_105\" href=\"#note_105\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e105\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page220\"\u003e[pg 220]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg220\" id=\"Pg220\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIn every way, therefore, it is evident that to explain induction as the\r\ncolligation of facts by means of appropriate conceptions, that is, conceptions\r\nwhich will really express them, is to confound mere description of the\r\nobserved facts with inference from those facts, and ascribe to the latter\r\nwhat is a characteristic property of the former.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThere is, however, between Colligation and Induction, a real correlation,\r\nwhich it is important to conceive correctly. Colligation is not always induction;\r\nbut induction is always colligation. The assertion that the planets\r\nmove in ellipses, was but a mode of representing observed facts; it was\r\nbut a colligation; while the assertion that they are drawn, or tend, toward\r\nthe sun, was the statement of a new fact, inferred by induction. But the\r\ninduction, once made, accomplishes the purposes of colligation likewise. It\r\nbrings the same facts, which Kepler had connected by his conception of an\r\nellipse, under the additional conception of bodies acted upon by a central\r\nforce, and serves, therefore, as a new bond of connection for those facts; a\r\nnew principle for their classification.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nFurther, the descriptions which are improperly confounded with induction,\r\nare nevertheless a necessary preparation for induction; no less necessary\r\nthan correct observation of the facts themselves. Without the previous\r\ncolligation of detached observations by means of one general conception,\r\nwe could never have obtained any basis for an induction, except in\r\nthe case of phenomena of very limited compass. We should not be able\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page221\"\u003e[pg 221]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg221\" id=\"Pg221\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nto affirm any predicates at all, of a subject incapable of being observed\r\notherwise than piecemeal: much less could we extend those predicates by\r\ninduction to other similar subjects. Induction, therefore, always presupposes,\r\nnot only that the necessary observations are made with the necessary\r\naccuracy, but also that the results of these observations are, so far as practicable,\r\nconnected together by general descriptions, enabling the mind to\r\nrepresent to itself as wholes whatever phenomena are capable of being so\r\nrepresented.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ca name=\"Book_III_Chapter_II_Section_5\" id=\"Book_III_Chapter_II_Section_5\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 5. Dr. Whewell has replied at some length to the preceding observations,\r\nrestating his opinions, but without (as far as I can perceive) adding\r\nany thing material to his former arguments. Since, however, mine have\r\nnot had the good fortune to make any impression upon him, I will subjoin\r\na few remarks, tending to show more clearly in what our difference of\r\nopinion consists, as well as, in some measure, to account for it.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nNearly all the definitions of induction, by writers of authority, make it\r\nconsist in drawing inferences from known cases to unknown; affirming of\r\na class, a predicate which has been found true of some cases belonging to\r\nthe class; concluding because some things have a certain property, that\r\nother things which resemble them have the same property—or because a\r\nthing has manifested a property at a certain time, that it has and will have\r\nthat property at other times.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt will scarcely be contended that Kepler’s operation was an Induction\r\nin this sense of the term. The statement, that Mars moves in an elliptical\r\norbit, was no generalization from individual cases to a class of cases. Neither\r\nwas it an extension to all time, of what had been found true at some\r\nparticular time. The whole amount of generalization which the case admitted\r\nof, was already completed, or might have been so. Long before\r\nthe elliptic theory was thought of, it had been ascertained that the planets\r\nreturned periodically to the same apparent places; the series of these\r\nplaces was, or might have been, completely determined, and the apparent\r\ncourse of each planet marked out on the celestial globe in an uninterrupted\r\nline. Kepler did not extend an observed truth to other cases than those in\r\nwhich it had been observed: he did not widen the \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003esubject\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e of the proposition\r\nwhich expressed the observed facts. The alteration he made was in\r\nthe predicate. Instead of saying, the successive places of Mars are so and\r\nso, he summed them up in the statement, that the successive places of Mars\r\nare points in an ellipse. It is true, this statement, as Dr. Whewell says,\r\nwas not the sum of the observations \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003emerely\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e; it was the sum of the\r\nobservations \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eseen under a new point of\r\nview\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e.\u003ca id=\"noteref_106\" name=\"noteref_106\" href=\"#note_106\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e106\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nBut it was not the sum of \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003emore\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e\r\nthan the observations, as a real induction is. It took in no cases but those\r\nwhich had been actually observed, or which could have been inferred from\r\nthe observations before the new point of view presented itself. There was\r\nnot that transition from known cases to unknown, which constitutes Induction\r\nin the original and acknowledged meaning of the term.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nOld definitions, it is true, can not prevail against new knowledge: and if\r\nthe Keplerian operation, as a logical process, be really identical with what\r\ntakes place in acknowledged induction, the definition of induction ought to\r\nbe so widened as to take it in; since scientific language ought to adapt itself\r\nto the true relations which subsist between the things it is employed\r\nto designate. Here then it is that I am at issue with Dr. Whewell. He\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page222\"\u003e[pg 222]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg222\" id=\"Pg222\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\ndoes think the operations identical. He allows of no logical process in any\r\ncase of induction, other than what there was in Kepler’s case, namely,\r\nguessing until a guess is found which tallies with the facts; and accordingly,\r\nas we shall see hereafter, he rejects all canons of induction, because\r\nit is not by means of them that we guess. Dr. Whewell’s theory of the\r\nlogic of science would be very perfect if it did not pass over altogether the\r\nquestion of Proof. But in my apprehension there is such a thing as proof,\r\nand inductions differ altogether from descriptions in their relation to that\r\nelement. Induction is proof; it is inferring something unobserved from\r\nsomething observed: it requires, therefore, an appropriate test of proof;\r\nand to provide that test, is the special purpose of inductive logic. When,\r\non the contrary, we merely collate known observations, and, in Dr. Whewell’s\r\nphraseology, connect them by means of a new conception; if the\r\nconception does serve to connect the observations, we have all we want.\r\nAs the proposition in which it is embodied pretends to no other truth than\r\nwhat it may share with many other modes of representing the same facts,\r\nto be consistent with the facts is all it requires: it neither needs nor admits\r\nof proof; though it may serve to prove other things, inasmuch as, by\r\nplacing the facts in mental connection with other facts, not previously seen\r\nto resemble them, it assimilates the case to another class of phenomena,\r\nconcerning which real Inductions have already been made. Thus Kepler’s\r\nso-called law brought the orbit of Mars into the class ellipse, and by doing\r\nso, proved all the properties of an ellipse to be true of the orbit: but in this\r\nproof Kepler’s law supplied the minor premise, and not (as is the case with\r\nreal Inductions) the major.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nDr. Whewell calls nothing Induction where there is not a new mental\r\nconception introduced, and every thing induction where there is. But this\r\nis to confound two very different things, Invention and Proof. The introduction\r\nof a new conception belongs to Invention: and invention may be\r\nrequired in any operation, but is the essence of none. A new conception\r\nmay be introduced for descriptive purposes, and so it may for inductive\r\npurposes. But it is so far from constituting induction, that induction does\r\nnot necessarily stand in need of it. Most inductions require no conception\r\nbut what was present in every one of the particular instances on which the\r\ninduction is grounded. That all men are mortal is surely an inductive\r\nconclusion; yet no new conception is introduced by it. Whoever knows\r\nthat any man has died, has all the conceptions involved in the inductive\r\ngeneralization. But Dr. Whewell considers the process of invention which\r\nconsists in framing a new conception consistent with the facts, to be not\r\nmerely a necessary part of all induction, but the whole of it.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe mental operation which extracts from a number of detached observations\r\ncertain general characters in which the observed phenomena resemble\r\none another, or resemble other known facts, is what Bacon, Locke, and\r\nmost subsequent metaphysicians, have understood by the word Abstraction.\r\nA general expression obtained by abstraction, connecting known\r\nfacts by means of common characters, but without concluding from them\r\nto unknown, may, I think, with strict logical correctness, be termed a Description;\r\nnor do I know in what other way things can ever be described.\r\nMy position, however, does not depend on the employment of that particular\r\nword; I am quite content to use Dr. Whewell’s term Colligation, or\r\nthe more general phrases, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“mode of representing, or of expressing, phenomena:”\u003c/span\u003e\r\nprovided it be clearly seen that the process is not Induction, but\r\nsomething radically different.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page223\"\u003e[pg 223]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg223\" id=\"Pg223\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWhat more may usefully be said on the subject of Colligation, or of the\r\ncorrelative expression invented by Dr. Whewell, the Explication of Conceptions,\r\nand generally on the subject of ideas and mental representations\r\nas connected with the study of facts, will find a more appropriate place in\r\nthe Fourth Book, on the Operations Subsidiary to Induction: to which I\r\nmust refer the reader for the removal of any difficulty which the present\r\ndiscussion may have left.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-div\" style=\"margin-bottom: 4.00em; margin-top: 4.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"toc47\" id=\"toc47\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"pdf48\" id=\"pdf48\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: center; margin-bottom: 2.40em; margin-top: 2.40em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 120%\"\u003eChapter III.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: left; margin-bottom: 2.88em; margin-top: 2.88em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 144%\"\u003eOf The Ground Of Induction.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ca name=\"Book_III_Chapter_III_Section_1\" id=\"Book_III_Chapter_III_Section_1\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 1. Induction properly so called, as distinguished from those mental\r\noperations, sometimes, though improperly, designated by the name, which I\r\nhave attempted in the preceding chapter to characterize, may, then, be summarily\r\ndefined as Generalization from Experience. It consists in inferring\r\nfrom some individual instances in which a phenomenon is observed to occur,\r\nthat it occurs in all instances of a certain class; namely, in all which\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eresemble\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e the former, in what are regarded as the material circumstances.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIn what way the material circumstances are to be distinguished from\r\nthose which are immaterial, or why some of the circumstances are material\r\nand others not so, we are not yet ready to point out. We must first observe,\r\nthat there is a principle implied in the very statement of what Induction\r\nis; an assumption with regard to the course of nature and the order\r\nof the universe; namely, that there are such things in nature as parallel\r\ncases; that what happens once, will, under a sufficient degree of similarity\r\nof circumstances, happen again, and not only again, but as often as the\r\nsame circumstances recur. This, I say, is an assumption, involved in every\r\ncase of induction. And, if we consult the actual course of nature, we find\r\nthat the assumption is warranted. The universe, so far as known to us, is\r\nso constituted, that whatever is true in any one case, is true in all cases of\r\na certain description; the only difficulty is, to find what description.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThis universal fact, which is our warrant for all inferences from experience,\r\nhas been described by different philosophers in different forms of language:\r\nthat the course of nature is uniform; that the universe is governed\r\nby general laws; and the like. One of the most usual of these modes of\r\nexpression, but also one of the most inadequate, is that which has been\r\nbrought into familiar use by the metaphysicians of the school of Reid\r\nand Stewart. The disposition of the human mind to generalize from experience—a\r\npropensity considered by these philosophers as an instinct of\r\nour nature—they usually describe under some such name as \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“our intuitive\r\nconviction that the future will resemble the past.”\u003c/span\u003e Now it has been well\r\npointed out by Mr. Bailey,\u003ca id=\"noteref_107\" name=\"noteref_107\" href=\"#note_107\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e107\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e that (whether the tendency be or not an original\r\nand ultimate element of our nature), Time, in its modifications of past,\r\npresent, and future, has no concern either with the belief itself, or with the\r\ngrounds of it. We believe that fire will burn to-morrow, because it burned\r\nto-day and yesterday; but we believe, on precisely the same grounds, that\r\nit burned before we were born, and that it burns this very day in Cochin-China.\r\nIt is not from the past to the future, as past and future, that we\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page224\"\u003e[pg 224]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg224\" id=\"Pg224\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\ninfer, but from the known to the unknown; from facts observed to facts\r\nunobserved; from what we have perceived, or been directly conscious of,\r\nto what has not come within our experience. In this last predicament is\r\nthe whole region of the future; but also the vastly greater portion of the\r\npresent and of the past.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWhatever be the most proper mode of expressing it, the proposition that\r\nthe course of nature is uniform, is the fundamental principle, or general axiom\r\nof Induction. It would yet be a great error to offer this large generalization\r\nas any explanation of the inductive process. On the contrary, I\r\nhold it to be itself an instance of induction, and induction by no means of\r\nthe most obvious kind. Far from being the first induction we make, it is\r\none of the last, or at all events one of those which are latest in attaining\r\nstrict philosophical accuracy. As a general maxim, indeed, it has scarcely\r\nentered into the minds of any but philosophers; nor even by them, as we\r\nshall have many opportunities of remarking, have its extent and limits been\r\nalways very justly conceived. The truth is, that this great generalization\r\nis itself founded on prior generalizations. The obscurer laws of nature\r\nwere discovered by means of it, but the more obvious ones must have\r\nbeen understood and assented to as general truths before it was ever heard\r\nof. We should never have thought of affirming that all phenomena take\r\nplace according to general laws, if we had not first arrived, in the case of a\r\ngreat multitude of phenomena, at some knowledge of the laws themselves;\r\nwhich could be done no otherwise than by induction. In what sense, then,\r\ncan a principle, which is so far from being our earliest induction, be regarded\r\nas our warrant for all the others? In the only sense, in which (as\r\nwe have already seen) the general propositions which we place at the head\r\nof our reasonings when we throw them into syllogisms, ever really contribute\r\nto their validity. As Archbishop Whately remarks, every induction is\r\na syllogism with the major premise suppressed; or (as I prefer expressing\r\nit) every induction may be thrown into the form of a syllogism, by supplying\r\na major premise. If this be actually done, the principle which we are\r\nnow considering, that of the uniformity of the course of nature, will appear\r\nas the ultimate major premise of all inductions, and will, therefore, stand to\r\nall inductions in the relation in which, as has been shown at so much length,\r\nthe major proposition of a syllogism always stands to the conclusion; not\r\ncontributing at all to prove it, but being a necessary condition of its being\r\nproved; since no conclusion is proved, for which there can not be found a\r\ntrue major premise.\u003ca id=\"noteref_108\" name=\"noteref_108\" href=\"#note_108\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e108\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page225\"\u003e[pg 225]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg225\" id=\"Pg225\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe statement, that the uniformity of the course of nature is the ultimate\r\nmajor premise in all cases of induction, may be thought to require\r\nsome explanation. The immediate major premise in every inductive argument,\r\nit certainly is not. Of that, Archbishop Whately’s must be held to\r\nbe the correct account. The induction, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“John, Peter, etc., are mortal, therefore\r\nall mankind are mortal,”\u003c/span\u003e may, as he justly says, be thrown into a syllogism\r\nby prefixing as a major premise (what is at any rate a necessary\r\ncondition of the validity of the argument), namely, that what is true of\r\nJohn, Peter, etc., is true of all mankind. But how came we by this major\r\npremise? It is not self-evident; nay, in all cases of unwarranted generalization,\r\nit is not true. How, then, is it arrived at? Necessarily either\r\nby induction or ratiocination; and if by induction, the process, like all other\r\ninductive arguments, may be thrown into the form of a syllogism. This\r\nprevious syllogism it is, therefore, necessary to construct. There is, in the\r\nlong run, only one possible construction. The real proof that what is true\r\nof John, Peter, etc., is true of all mankind, can only be, that a different supposition\r\nwould be inconsistent with the uniformity which we know to exist\r\nin the course of nature. Whether there would be this inconsistency or not,\r\nmay be a matter of long and delicate inquiry; but unless there would, we\r\nhave no sufficient ground for the major of the inductive syllogism. It\r\nhence appears, that if we throw the whole course of any inductive argument\r\ninto a series of syllogisms, we shall arrive by more or fewer steps at\r\nan ultimate syllogism, which will have for its major premise the principle,\r\nor axiom, of the uniformity of the course of nature.\u003ca id=\"noteref_109\" name=\"noteref_109\" href=\"#note_109\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e109\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt was not to be expected that in the case of this axiom, any more than\r\nof other axioms, there should be unanimity among thinkers with respect to\r\nthe grounds on which it is to be received as true. I have already stated\r\nthat I regard it as itself a generalization from experience. Others hold it\r\nto be a principle which, antecedently to any verification by experience, we\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page226\"\u003e[pg 226]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg226\" id=\"Pg226\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nare compelled by the constitution of our thinking faculty to assume as true.\r\nHaving so recently, and at so much length, combated a similar doctrine as\r\napplied to the axioms of mathematics, by arguments which are in a great\r\nmeasure applicable to the present case, I shall defer the more particular\r\ndiscussion of this controverted point in regard to the fundamental axiom\r\nof induction, until a more advanced period of our inquiry.\u003ca id=\"noteref_110\" name=\"noteref_110\" href=\"#note_110\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e110\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e At present it\r\nis of more importance to understand thoroughly the import of the axiom\r\nitself. For the proposition, that the course of nature is uniform, possesses\r\nrather the brevity suitable to popular, than the precision requisite in philosophical\r\nlanguage: its terms require to be explained, and a stricter than\r\ntheir ordinary signification given to them, before the truth of the assertion\r\ncan be admitted.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 2. Every person’s consciousness assures him that he does not always\r\nexpect uniformity in the course of events; he does not always believe that\r\nthe unknown will be similar to the known, that the future will resemble the\r\npast. Nobody believes that the succession of rain and fine weather will be\r\nthe same in every future year as in the present. Nobody expects to have\r\nthe same dreams repeated every night. On the contrary, every body mentions\r\nit as something extraordinary, if the course of nature is constant, and\r\nresembles itself, in these particulars. To look for constancy where constancy\r\nis not to be expected, as for instance that a day which has once\r\nbrought good fortune will always be a fortunate day, is justly accounted\r\nsuperstition.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe course of nature, in truth, is not only uniform, it is also infinitely various.\r\nSome phenomena are always seen to recur in the very same combinations\r\nin which we met with them at first; others seem altogether capricious;\r\nwhile some, which we had been accustomed to regard as bound\r\ndown exclusively to a particular set of combinations, we unexpectedly find\r\ndetached from some of the elements with which we had hitherto found\r\nthem conjoined, and united to others of quite a contrary description. To\r\nan inhabitant of Central Africa, fifty years ago, no fact probably appeared\r\nto rest on more uniform experience than this, that all human beings are\r\nblack. To Europeans, not many years ago, the proposition, All swans are\r\nwhite, appeared an equally unequivocal instance of uniformity in the course\r\nof nature. Further experience has proved to both that they were mistaken;\r\nbut they had to wait fifty centuries for this experience. During that long\r\ntime, mankind believed in a uniformity of the course of nature where no\r\nsuch uniformity really existed.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAccording to the notion which the ancients entertained of induction, the\r\nforegoing were cases of as legitimate inference as any inductions whatever.\r\nIn these two instances, in which, the conclusion being false, the ground of\r\ninference must have been insufficient, there was, nevertheless, as much\r\nground for it as this conception of induction admitted of. The induction\r\nof the ancients has been well described by Bacon, under the name of \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Inductio\r\nper enumerationem simplicem, ubi non reperitur instantia contradictoria.”\u003c/span\u003e\r\nIt consists in ascribing the character of general truths to all propositions\r\nwhich are true in every instance that we happen to know of. This\r\nis the kind of induction which is natural to the mind when unaccustomed\r\nto scientific methods. The tendency, which some call an instinct, and\r\nwhich others account for by association, to infer the future from the past,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page227\"\u003e[pg 227]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg227\" id=\"Pg227\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nthe known from the unknown, is simply a habit of expecting that what has\r\nbeen found true once or several times, and never yet found false, will be\r\nfound true again. Whether the instances are few or many, conclusive or\r\ninconclusive, does not much affect the matter: these are considerations\r\nwhich occur only on reflection; the unprompted tendency of the mind is to\r\ngeneralize its experience, provided this points all in one direction; provided\r\nno other experience of a conflicting character comes unsought. The notion\r\nof seeking it, of experimenting for it, of \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003einterrogating\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e nature (to use\r\nBacon’s expression) is of much later growth. The observation of nature, by\r\nuncultivated intellects, is purely passive: they accept the facts which present\r\nthemselves, without taking the trouble of searching for more: it is a\r\nsuperior mind only which asks itself what facts are needed to enable it to\r\ncome to a safe conclusion, and then looks out for these.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nBut though we have always a propensity to generalize from unvarying\r\nexperience, we are not always warranted in doing so. Before we can be\r\nat liberty to conclude that something is universally true because we have\r\nnever known an instance to the contrary, we must have reason to believe\r\nthat if there were in nature any instances to the contrary, we should have\r\nknown of them. This assurance, in the great majority of cases, we can not\r\nhave, or can have only in a very moderate degree. The possibility of having\r\nit, is the foundation on which we shall see hereafter that induction by\r\nsimple enumeration may in some remarkable cases amount practically to\r\nproof.\u003ca id=\"noteref_111\" name=\"noteref_111\" href=\"#note_111\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e111\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e No such assurance, however, can\r\nbe had, on any of the ordinary subjects of scientific inquiry. Popular notions are\r\nusually founded on induction\r\nby simple enumeration; in science it carries us but a little way.\r\nWe are forced to begin with it; we must often rely on it provisionally, in\r\nthe absence of means of more searching investigation. But, for the accurate\r\nstudy of nature, we require a surer and a more potent instrument.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt was, above all, by pointing out the insufficiency of this rude and loose\r\nconception of Induction, that Bacon merited the title so generally awarded\r\nto him, of Founder of the Inductive Philosophy. The value of his own contributions\r\nto a more philosophical theory of the subject has certainly been\r\nexaggerated. Although (along with some fundamental errors) his writings\r\ncontain, more or less fully developed, several of the most important principles\r\nof the Inductive Method, physical investigation has now far outgrown\r\nthe Baconian conception of Induction. Moral and political inquiry, indeed,\r\nare as yet far behind that conception. The current and approved modes\r\nof reasoning on these subjects are still of the same vicious description\r\nagainst which Bacon protested; the method almost exclusively employed\r\nby those professing to treat such matters inductively, is the very \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003einductio per enumerationem simplicem\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwhich he condemns; and the experience\r\nwhich we hear so confidently appealed to by all sects, parties, and interests,\r\nis still, in his own emphatic words, \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003emera palpatio\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 3. In order to a better understanding of the problem which the logician\r\nmust solve if he would establish a scientific theory of Induction, let us\r\ncompare a few cases of incorrect inductions with others which are acknowledged\r\nto be legitimate. Some, we know, which were believed for centuries\r\nto be correct, were nevertheless incorrect. That all swans are white, can\r\nnot have been a good induction, since the conclusion has turned out erroneous.\r\nThe experience, however, on which the conclusion rested, was genuine.\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page228\"\u003e[pg 228]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg228\" id=\"Pg228\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nFrom the earliest records, the testimony of the inhabitants of the\r\nknown world was unanimous on the point. The uniform experience, therefore,\r\nof the inhabitants of the known world, agreeing in a common result,\r\nwithout one known instance of deviation from that result, is not always\r\nsufficient to establish a general conclusion.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nBut let us now turn to an instance apparently not very dissimilar to this.\r\nMankind were wrong, it seems, in concluding that all swans were white:\r\nare we also wrong, when we conclude that all men’s heads grow above their\r\nshoulders, and never below, in spite of the conflicting testimony of the naturalist\r\nPliny? As there were black swans, though civilized people had existed\r\nfor three thousand years on the earth without meeting with them, may\r\nthere not also be \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“men whose heads do grow beneath their shoulders,”\u003c/span\u003e notwithstanding\r\na rather less perfect unanimity of negative testimony from\r\nobservers? Most persons would answer No; it was more credible that a\r\nbird should vary in its color, than that men should vary in the relative position\r\nof their principal organs. And there is no doubt that in so saying\r\nthey would be right: but to say why they are right, would be impossible,\r\nwithout entering more deeply than is usually done, into the true theory of\r\nInduction.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAgain, there are cases in which we reckon with the most unfailing confidence\r\nupon uniformity, and other cases in which we do not count upon it\r\nat all. In some we feel complete assurance that the future will resemble the\r\npast, the unknown be precisely similar to the known. In others, however\r\ninvariable may be the result obtained from the instances which have been\r\nobserved, we draw from them no more than a very feeble presumption that\r\nthe like result will hold in all other cases. That a straight line is the shortest\r\ndistance between two points, we do not doubt to be true even in the region\r\nof the fixed stars.\u003ca id=\"noteref_112\" name=\"noteref_112\" href=\"#note_112\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e112\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e When a chemist announces the existence and\r\nproperties of a newly-discovered substance, if we confide in his accuracy,\r\nwe feel assured that the conclusions he has arrived at will hold universally,\r\nthough the induction be founded but on a single instance. We do not\r\nwithhold our assent, waiting for a repetition of the experiment; or if we\r\ndo, it is from a doubt whether the one experiment was properly made, not\r\nwhether if properly made it would be conclusive. Here, then, is a general\r\nlaw of nature, inferred without hesitation from a single instance; a universal\r\nproposition from a singular one. Now mark another case, and contrast\r\nit with this. Not all the instances which have been observed since\r\nthe beginning of the world, in support of the general proposition that all\r\ncrows are black, would be deemed a sufficient presumption of the truth of\r\nthe proposition, to outweigh the testimony of one unexceptionable witness\r\nwho should affirm that in some region of the earth not fully explored, he\r\nhad caught and examined a crow, and had found it to be gray.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWhy is a single instance, in some cases, sufficient for a complete induction,\r\nwhile in others, myriads of concurring instances, without a single exception\r\nknown or presumed, go such a very little way toward establishing\r\na universal proposition? Whoever can answer this question knows more\r\nof the philosophy of logic than the wisest of the ancients, and has solved\r\nthe problem of induction.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page229\"\u003e[pg 229]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg229\" id=\"Pg229\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-div\" style=\"margin-bottom: 4.00em; margin-top: 4.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"toc49\" id=\"toc49\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"pdf50\" id=\"pdf50\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: center; margin-bottom: 2.40em; margin-top: 2.40em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 120%\"\u003eChapter IV.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: left; margin-bottom: 2.88em; margin-top: 2.88em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 144%\"\u003eOf Laws Of Nature.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 1. In the contemplation of that uniformity in the course of nature,\r\nwhich is assumed in every inference from experience, one of the first observations\r\nthat present themselves is, that the uniformity in question is not\r\nproperly uniformity, but uniformities. The general regularity results from\r\nthe co-existence of partial regularities. The course of nature in general is\r\nconstant, because the course of each of the various phenomena that compose\r\nit is so. A certain fact invariably occurs whenever certain circumstances\r\nare present, and does not occur when they are absent; the like is\r\ntrue of another fact; and so on. From these separate threads of connection\r\nbetween parts of the great whole which we term nature, a general tissue\r\nof connection unavoidably weaves itself, by which the whole is held together.\r\nIf A is always accompanied by D, B by E, and C by F, it follows\r\nthat A B is accompanied by D E, A C by D F, B C by E F, and finally A\r\nB C by D E F; and thus the general character of regularity is produced,\r\nwhich, along with and in the midst of infinite diversity, pervades all nature.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe first point, therefore, to be noted in regard to what is called the uniformity\r\nof the course of nature, is, that it is itself a complex fact, compounded\r\nof all the separate uniformities which exist in respect to single\r\nphenomena. These various uniformities, when ascertained by what is regarded\r\nas a sufficient induction, we call, in common parlance, Laws of Nature.\r\nScientifically speaking, that title is employed in a more restricted\r\nsense, to designate the uniformities when reduced to their most simple expression.\r\nThus in the illustration already employed, there were seven uniformities;\r\nall of which, if considered sufficiently certain, would, in the more\r\nlax application of the term, be called laws of nature. But of the seven,\r\nthree alone are properly distinct and independent: these being presupposed,\r\nthe others follow of course. The first three, therefore, according to\r\nthe stricter acceptation, are called laws of nature; the remainder not; because\r\nthey are in truth mere \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ecases\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e of the first three; virtually\r\nincluded in them; said, therefore, to \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eresult\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e from them: whoever\r\naffirms those three has already affirmed all the rest.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nTo substitute real examples for symbolical ones, the following are three\r\nuniformities, or call them laws of nature: the law that air has weight, the\r\nlaw that pressure on a fluid is propagated equally in all directions, and the\r\nlaw that pressure in one direction, not opposed by equal pressure in the\r\ncontrary direction, produces motion, which does not cease until equilibrium\r\nis restored. From these three uniformities we should be able to predict\r\nanother uniformity, namely, the rise of the mercury in the Torricellian\r\ntube. This, in the stricter use of the phrase, is not a law of nature. It is\r\nthe result of laws of nature. It is a \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ecase\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e of each and every one\r\nof the three laws: and is the only occurrence by which they could all be fulfilled.\r\nIf the mercury were not sustained in the barometer, and sustained at such\r\na height that the column of mercury were equal in weight to a column of\r\nthe atmosphere of the same diameter; here would be a case, either of the\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page230\"\u003e[pg 230]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg230\" id=\"Pg230\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nair not pressing upon the surface of the mercury with the force which is\r\ncalled its weight, or of the downward pressure on the mercury not being\r\npropagated equally in an upward direction, or of a body pressed in one direction\r\nand not in the direction opposite, either not moving in the direction\r\nin which it is pressed, or stopping before it had attained equilibrium. If\r\nwe knew, therefore, the three simple laws, but had never tried the Torricellian\r\nexperiment, we might \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ededuce\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e its result from those laws. The known\r\nweight of the air, combined with the position of the apparatus, would\r\nbring the mercury within the first of the three inductions; the first induction\r\nwould bring it within the second, and the second within the third, in\r\nthe manner which we characterized in treating of Ratiocination. We should\r\nthus come to know the more complex uniformity, independently of specific\r\nexperience, through our knowledge of the simpler ones from which it results;\r\nthough, for reasons which will appear hereafter, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003everification\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e by\r\nspecific experience would still be desirable, and might possibly be indispensable.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nComplex uniformities which, like this, are mere cases of simpler ones,\r\nand have, therefore, been virtually affirmed in affirming those, may with\r\npropriety be called \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003elaws\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, but can scarcely, in the strictness of\r\nscientific speech, be termed Laws of Nature. It is the custom in science, wherever\r\nregularity of any kind can be traced, to call the general proposition which\r\nexpresses the nature of that regularity, a law; as when, in mathematics,\r\nwe speak of the law of decrease of the successive terms of a converging\r\nseries. But the expression \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003elaw of nature\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e has generally been\r\nemployed with a sort of tacit reference to the original sense of the word law, namely,\r\nthe expression of the will of a superior. When, therefore, it appeared that\r\nany of the uniformities which were observed in nature, would result spontaneously\r\nfrom certain other uniformities, no separate act of creative will\r\nbeing supposed necessary for the production of the derivative uniformities,\r\nthese have not usually been spoken of as laws of nature. According to\r\none mode of expression, the question, What are the laws of nature? may\r\nbe stated thus: What are the fewest and simplest assumptions, which being\r\ngranted, the whole existing order of nature would result? Another\r\nmode of stating it would be thus: What are the fewest general propositions\r\nfrom which all the uniformities which exist in the universe might be\r\ndeductively inferred?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nEvery great advance which marks an epoch in the progress of science,\r\nhas consisted in a step made toward the solution of this problem. Even a\r\nsimple colligation of inductions already made, without any fresh extension\r\nof the inductive inference, is already an advance in that direction. When\r\nKepler expressed the regularity which exists in the observed motions of\r\nthe heavenly bodies, by the three general propositions called his laws, he,\r\nin so doing, pointed out three simple suppositions which, instead of a much\r\ngreater number, would suffice to construct the whole scheme of the heavenly\r\nmotions, so far as it was known up to that time. A similar and still\r\ngreater step was made when these laws, which at first did not seem to be\r\nincluded in any more general truths, were discovered to be cases of the\r\nthree laws of motion, as obtaining among bodies which mutually tend toward\r\none another with a certain force, and have had a certain instantaneous\r\nimpulse originally impressed upon them. After this great discovery, Kepler’s\r\nthree propositions, though still called laws, would hardly, by any person\r\naccustomed to use language with precision, be termed laws of nature:\r\nthat phrase would be reserved for the simpler and more general laws into\r\nwhich Newton is said to have resolved them.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page231\"\u003e[pg 231]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg231\" id=\"Pg231\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAccording to this language, every well-grounded inductive generalization\r\nis either a law of nature, or a result of laws of nature, capable, if those\r\nlaws are known, of being predicted from them. And the problem of Inductive\r\nLogic may be summed up in two questions: how to ascertain the\r\nlaws of nature; and how, after having ascertained them, to follow them\r\ninto their results. On the other hand, we must not suffer ourselves to imagine\r\nthat this mode of statement amounts to a real analysis, or to any\r\nthing but a mere verbal transformation of the problem; for the expression,\r\nLaws of Nature, \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003emeans\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e nothing but the uniformities which exist among\r\nnatural phenomena (or, in other words, the results of induction), when reduced\r\nto their simplest expression. It is, however, something to have advanced\r\nso far, as to see that the study of nature is the study of laws, not \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e\r\nlaw; of uniformities, in the plural number: that the different natural phenomena\r\nhave their separate rules or modes of taking place, which, though\r\nmuch intermixed and entangled with one another, may, to a certain extent,\r\nbe studied apart: that (to resume our former metaphor) the regularity\r\nwhich exists in nature is a web composed of distinct threads, and only to\r\nbe understood by tracing each of the threads separately; for which purpose\r\nit is often necessary to unravel some portion of the web, and exhibit\r\nthe fibres apart. The rules of experimental inquiry are the contrivances\r\nfor unraveling the web.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 2. In thus attempting to ascertain the general order of nature by ascertaining\r\nthe particular order of the occurrence of each one of the phenomena\r\nof nature, the most scientific proceeding can be no more than an improved\r\nform of that which was primitively pursued by the human understanding,\r\nwhile undirected by science. When mankind first formed the\r\nidea of studying phenomena according to a stricter and surer method than\r\nthat which they had in the first instance spontaneously adopted, they did\r\nnot, conformably to the well-meant but impracticable precept of Descartes,\r\nset out from the supposition that nothing had been already ascertained.\r\nMany of the uniformities existing among phenomena are so constant, and\r\nso open to observation, as to force themselves upon involuntary recognition.\r\nSome facts are so perpetually and familiarly accompanied by certain others,\r\nthat mankind learned, as children learn, to expect the one where they\r\nfound the other, long before they knew how to put their expectation into\r\nwords by asserting, in a proposition, the existence of a connection between\r\nthose phenomena. No science was needed to teach that food nourishes,\r\nthat water drowns, or quenches thirst, that the sun gives light and heat,\r\nthat bodies fall to the ground. The first scientific inquirers assumed these\r\nand the like as known truths, and set out from them to discover others\r\nwhich were unknown: nor were they wrong in so doing, subject, however,\r\nas they afterward began to see, to an ulterior revision of these spontaneous\r\ngeneralizations themselves, when the progress of knowledge pointed out\r\nlimits to them, or showed their truth to be contingent on some circumstance\r\nnot originally attended to. It will appear, I think, from the subsequent\r\npart of our inquiry, that there is no logical fallacy in this mode of\r\nproceeding; but we may see already that any other mode is rigorously impracticable:\r\nsince it is impossible to frame any scientific method of induction,\r\nor test of the correctness of inductions, unless on the hypothesis that\r\nsome inductions deserving of reliance have been already made.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nLet us revert, for instance, to one of our former illustrations, and consider\r\nwhy it is that, with exactly the same amount of evidence, both negative\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page232\"\u003e[pg 232]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg232\" id=\"Pg232\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nand positive, we did not reject the assertion that there are black\r\nswans, while we should refuse credence to any testimony which asserted\r\nthat there were men wearing their heads underneath their shoulders. The\r\nfirst assertion was more credible than the latter. But why more credible?\r\nSo long as neither phenomenon had been actually witnessed, what reason\r\nwas there for finding the one harder to be believed than the other? Apparently\r\nbecause there is less constancy in the colors of animals, than in\r\nthe general structure of their anatomy. But how do we know this?\r\nDoubtless, from experience. It appears, then, that we need experience to\r\ninform us, in what degree, and in what cases, or sorts of cases, experience\r\nis to be relied on. Experience must be consulted in order to learn from it\r\nunder what circumstances arguments from it will be valid. We have no\r\nulterior test to which we subject experience in general; but we make experience\r\nits own test. Experience testifies, that among the uniformities\r\nwhich it exhibits or seems to exhibit, some are more to be relied on than\r\nothers; and uniformity, therefore, may be presumed, from any given number\r\nof instances, with a greater degree of assurance, in proportion as the\r\ncase belongs to a class in which the uniformities have hitherto been found\r\nmore uniform.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThis mode of correcting one generalization by means of another, a narrower\r\ngeneralization by a wider, which common sense suggests and adopts\r\nin practice, is the real type of scientific Induction. All that art can do is\r\nbut to give accuracy and precision to this process, and adapt it to all varieties\r\nof cases, without any essential alteration in its principle.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThere are of course no means of applying such a test as that above described,\r\nunless we already possess a general knowledge of the prevalent\r\ncharacter of the uniformities existing throughout nature. The indispensable\r\nfoundation, therefore, of a scientific formula of induction, must be a\r\nsurvey of the inductions to which mankind have been conducted in unscientific\r\npractice; with the special purpose of ascertaining what kinds of\r\nuniformities have been found perfectly invariable, pervading all nature,\r\nand what are those which have been found to vary with difference of time,\r\nplace, or other changeable circumstances.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ca name=\"Book_III_Chapter_IV_Section_3\" id=\"Book_III_Chapter_IV_Section_3\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 3. The necessity of such a survey is confirmed by the consideration,\r\nthat the stronger inductions are the touch-stone to which we always endeavor\r\nto bring the weaker. If we find any means of deducing one of\r\nthe less strong inductions from stronger ones, it acquires, at once, all the\r\nstrength of those from which it is deduced; and even adds to that strength;\r\nsince the independent experience on which the weaker induction previously\r\nrested, becomes additional evidence of the truth of the better established\r\nlaw in which it is now found to be included. We may have inferred, from\r\nhistorical evidence, that the uncontrolled power of a monarch, of an aristocracy,\r\nor of the majority, will often be abused: but we are entitled to\r\nrely on this generalization with much greater assurance when it is shown\r\nto be a corollary from still better established facts; the very low degree\r\nof elevation of character ever yet attained by the average of mankind, and\r\nthe little efficacy, for the most part, of the modes of education hitherto\r\npracticed, in maintaining the predominance of reason and conscience over\r\nthe selfish propensities. It is at the same time obvious that even these\r\nmore general facts derive an accession of evidence from the testimony\r\nwhich history bears to the effects of despotism. The strong induction becomes\r\nstill stronger when a weaker one has been bound up with it.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nOn the other hand, if an induction conflicts with stronger inductions,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page233\"\u003e[pg 233]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg233\" id=\"Pg233\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nor with conclusions capable of being correctly deduced from them, then,\r\nunless on reconsideration it should appear that some of the stronger inductions\r\nhave been expressed with greater universality than their evidence\r\nwarrants, the weaker one must give way. The opinion so long prevalent\r\nthat a comet, or any other unusual appearance in the heavenly regions, was\r\nthe precursor of calamities to mankind, or to those at least who witnessed\r\nit; the belief in the veracity of the oracles of Delphi or Dodona; the reliance\r\non astrology, or on the weather-prophecies in almanacs, were doubtless\r\ninductions supposed to be grounded on experience:\u003ca id=\"noteref_113\" name=\"noteref_113\" href=\"#note_113\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e113\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e and faith in such\r\ndelusions seems quite capable of holding out against a great multitude of\r\nfailures, provided it be nourished by a reasonable number of casual coincidences\r\nbetween the prediction and the event. What has really put an end\r\nto these insufficient inductions, is their inconsistency with the stronger inductions\r\nsubsequently obtained by scientific inquiry, respecting the causes\r\non which terrestrial events really depend; and where those scientific truths\r\nhave not yet penetrated, the same or similar delusions still prevail.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt may be affirmed as a general principle, that all inductions, whether\r\nstrong or weak, which can be connected by ratiocination, are confirmatory\r\nof one another; while any which lead deductively to consequences that are\r\nincompatible, become mutually each other’s test, showing that one or other\r\nmust be given up, or at least more guardedly expressed. In the case of\r\ninductions which confirm each other, the one which becomes a conclusion\r\nfrom ratiocination rises to at least the level of certainty of the weakest of\r\nthose from which it is deduced; while in general all are more or less increased\r\nin certainty. Thus the Torricellian experiment, though a mere\r\ncase of three more general laws, not only strengthened greatly the evidence\r\non which those laws rested, but converted one of them (the weight of the\r\natmosphere) from a still doubtful generalization into a completely established\r\ndoctrine.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIf, then, a survey of the uniformities which have been ascertained to exist\r\nin nature, should point out some which, as far as any human purpose requires\r\ncertainty, may be considered quite certain and quite universal; then\r\nby means of these uniformities we may be able to raise multitudes of other\r\ninductions to the same point in the scale. For if we can show, with respect\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page234\"\u003e[pg 234]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg234\" id=\"Pg234\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nto any inductive inference, that either it must be true, or one of these\r\ncertain and universal inductions must admit of an exception; the former\r\ngeneralization will attain the same certainty, and indefeasibleness within\r\nthe bounds assigned to it, which are the attributes of the latter. It will\r\nbe proved to be a law; and if not a result of other and simpler laws, it will\r\nbe a law of nature.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThere are such certain and universal inductions; and it is because there\r\nare such, that a Logic of Induction is possible.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-div\" style=\"margin-bottom: 4.00em; margin-top: 4.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"toc51\" id=\"toc51\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"pdf52\" id=\"pdf52\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: center; margin-bottom: 2.40em; margin-top: 2.40em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 120%\"\u003eChapter V.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: left; margin-bottom: 2.88em; margin-top: 2.88em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 144%\"\u003eOf The Law Of Universal Causation.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 1. The phenomena of nature exist in two distinct relations to one another;\r\nthat of simultaneity, and that of succession. Every phenomenon is\r\nrelated, in a uniform manner, to some phenomena that co-exist with it, and\r\nto some that have preceded and will follow it.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nOf the uniformities which exist among synchronous phenomena, the most\r\nimportant, on every account, are the laws of number; and next to them\r\nthose of space, or, in other words, of extension and figure. The laws of\r\nnumber are common to synchronous and successive phenomena. That two\r\nand two make four, is equally true whether the second two follow the first\r\ntwo or accompany them. It is as true of days and years as of feet and\r\ninches. The laws of extension and figure (in other words, the theorems\r\nof geometry, from its lowest to its highest branches) are, on the contrary,\r\nlaws of simultaneous phenomena only. The various parts of space, and of\r\nthe objects which are said to fill space, co-exist; and the unvarying laws\r\nwhich are the subject of the science of geometry, are an expression of the\r\nmode of their co-existence.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThis is a class of laws, or in other words, of uniformities, for the comprehension\r\nand proof of which it is not necessary to suppose any lapse of\r\ntime, any variety of facts or events succeeding one another. The propositions\r\nof geometry are independent of the succession of events. All things\r\nwhich possess extension, or, in other words, which fill space, are subject to\r\ngeometrical laws. Possessing extension, they possess figure; possessing\r\nfigure, they must possess some figure in particular, and have all the properties\r\nwhich geometry assigns to that figure. If one body be a sphere and\r\nanother a cylinder, of equal height and diameter, the one will be exactly\r\ntwo-thirds of the other, let the nature and quality of the material be what\r\nit will. Again, each body, and each point of a body, must occupy some\r\nplace or position among other bodies; and the position of two bodies relatively\r\nto each other, of whatever nature the bodies be, may be unerringly\r\ninferred from the position of each of them relatively to any third body.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIn the laws of number, then, and in those of space, we recognize in the\r\nmost unqualified manner, the rigorous universality of which we are in\r\nquest. Those laws have been in all ages the type of certainty, the standard\r\nof comparison for all inferior degrees of evidence. Their invariability is so\r\nperfect, that it renders us unable even to conceive any exception to them;\r\nand philosophers have been led, though (as I have endeavored to show) erroneously,\r\nto consider their evidence as lying not in experience, but in the\r\noriginal constitution of the intellect. If, therefore, from the laws of space\r\nand number, we were able to deduce uniformities of any other description,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page235\"\u003e[pg 235]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg235\" id=\"Pg235\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nthis would be conclusive evidence to us that those other uniformities possessed\r\nthe same rigorous certainty. But this we can not do. From laws\r\nof space and number alone, nothing can be deduced but laws of space and\r\nnumber.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nOf all truths relating to phenomena, the most valuable to us are those\r\nwhich relate to the order of their succession. On a knowledge of these is\r\nfounded every reasonable anticipation of future facts, and whatever power\r\nwe possess of influencing those facts to our advantage. Even the laws of\r\ngeometry are chiefly of practical importance to us as being a portion of the\r\npremises from which the order of the succession of phenomena may be inferred.\r\nInasmuch as the motion of bodies, the action of forces, and the\r\npropagation of influences of all sorts, take place in certain lines and over\r\ndefinite spaces, the properties of those lines and spaces are an important\r\npart of the laws to which those phenomena are themselves subject. Again,\r\nmotions, forces, or other influences, and times, are numerable quantities;\r\nand the properties of number are applicable to them as to all other things.\r\nBut though the laws of number and space are important elements in the\r\nascertainment of uniformities of succession, they can do nothing toward it\r\nwhen taken by themselves. They can only be made instrumental to that\r\npurpose when we combine with them additional premises, expressive of\r\nuniformities of succession already known. By taking, for instance, as\r\npremises these propositions, that bodies acted upon by an instantaneous\r\nforce move with uniform velocity in straight lines; that bodies acted upon\r\nby a continuous force move with accelerated velocity in straight lines; and\r\nthat bodies acted upon by two forces in different directions move in the\r\ndiagonal of a parallelogram, whose sides represent the direction and quantity\r\nof those forces; we may by combining these truths with propositions\r\nrelating to the properties of straight lines and of parallelograms (as that a\r\ntriangle is half a parallelogram of the same base and altitude), deduce another\r\nimportant uniformity of succession, viz., that a body moving round\r\na centre of force describes areas proportional to the times. But unless\r\nthere had been laws of succession in our premises, there could have been\r\nno truths of succession in our conclusions. A similar remark might be\r\nextended to every other class of phenomena really peculiar; and, had it\r\nbeen attended to, would have prevented many chimerical attempts at demonstrations\r\nof the indemonstrable, and explanations which do not explain.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt is not, therefore, enough for us that the laws of space, which are only\r\nlaws of simultaneous phenomenon, and the laws of number, which though\r\ntrue of successive phenomena do not relate to their succession, possess the\r\nrigorous certainty and universality of which we are in search. We must\r\nendeavor to find some law of succession which has those same attributes,\r\nand is therefore fit to be made the foundation of processes for discovering,\r\nand of a test for verifying, all other uniformities of succession. This fundamental\r\nlaw must resemble the truths of geometry in their most remarkable\r\npeculiarity, that of never being, in any instance whatever, defeated or\r\nsuspended by any change of circumstances.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nNow among all those uniformities in the succession of phenomena, which\r\ncommon observation is sufficient to bring to light, there are very few which\r\nhave any, even apparent, pretension to this rigorous indefeasibility: and of\r\nthose few, one only has been found capable of completely sustaining it. In\r\nthat one, however, we recognize a law which is universal also in another\r\nsense; it is co-extensive with the entire field of successive phenomena, all\r\ninstances whatever of succession being examples of it. This law is the\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page236\"\u003e[pg 236]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg236\" id=\"Pg236\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nLaw of Causation. The truth that every fact which has a beginning has a\r\ncause, is co-extensive with human experience.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThis generalization may appear to some minds not to amount to much,\r\nsince after all it asserts only this: \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“it is a law, that every event depends\r\non some law:”\u003c/span\u003e \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“it is a law, that there is a law for every thing.”\u003c/span\u003e We must\r\nnot, however, conclude that the generality of the principle is merely verbal;\r\nit will be found on inspection to be no vague or unmeaning assertion, but\r\na most important and really fundamental truth.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 2. The notion of Cause being the root of the whole theory of Induction,\r\nit is indispensable that this idea should, at the very outset of our inquiry,\r\nbe, with the utmost practicable degree of precision, fixed and determined.\r\nIf, indeed, it were necessary for the purpose of inductive logic\r\nthat the strife should be quelled, which has so long raged among the different\r\nschools of metaphysicians, respecting the origin and analysis of our idea\r\nof causation; the promulgation, or at least the general reception, of a true\r\ntheory of induction, might be considered desperate for a long time to come.\r\nBut the science of the Investigation of Truth by means of Evidence, is\r\nhappily independent of many of the controversies which perplex the science\r\nof the ultimate constitution of the human mind, and is under no necessity\r\nof pushing the analysis of mental phenomenon to that extreme\r\nlimit which alone ought to satisfy a metaphysician.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nI premise, then, that when in the course of this inquiry I speak of the\r\ncause of any phenomenon, I do not mean a cause which is not itself a phenomenon;\r\nI make no research into the ultimate or ontological cause of\r\nany thing. To adopt a distinction familiar in the writings of the Scotch\r\nmetaphysicians, and especially of Reid, the causes with which I concern\r\nmyself are not \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eefficient\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e, but \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ephysical\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e causes. They are causes\r\nin that sense alone, in which one physical fact is said to be the cause of another. Of\r\nthe efficient causes of phenomena, or whether any such causes exist at all,\r\nI am not called upon to give an opinion. The notion of causation is deemed,\r\nby the schools of metaphysics most in vogue at the present moment, to\r\nimply a mysterious and most powerful tie, such as can not, or at least does\r\nnot, exist between any physical fact and that other physical fact on which\r\nit is invariably consequent, and which is popularly termed its cause: and\r\nthence is deduced the supposed necessity of ascending higher, into the essences\r\nand inherent constitution of things, to find the true cause, the cause\r\nwhich is not only followed by, but actually produces, the effect. No such\r\nnecessity exists for the purposes of the present inquiry, nor will any such\r\ndoctrine be found in the following pages. The only notion of a cause,\r\nwhich the theory of induction requires, is such a notion as can be gained\r\nfrom experience. The Law of Causation, the recognition of which is the\r\nmain pillar of inductive science, is but the familiar truth, that invariability\r\nof succession is found by observation to obtain between every fact in nature\r\nand some other fact which has preceded it; independently of all considerations\r\nrespecting the ultimate mode of production of phenomena, and\r\nof every other question regarding the nature of \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Things in themselves.”\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nBetween the phenomena, then, which exist at any instant, and the phenomena\r\nwhich exist at the succeeding instant, there is an invariable order\r\nof succession; and, as we said in speaking of the general uniformity of the\r\ncourse of nature, this web is composed of separate fibres; this collective\r\norder is made up of particular sequences, obtaining invariably among the\r\nseparate parts. To certain facts, certain facts always do, and, as we believe,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page237\"\u003e[pg 237]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg237\" id=\"Pg237\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nwill continue to, succeed. The invariable antecedent is termed the\r\ncause; the invariable consequent, the effect. And the universality of the\r\nlaw of causation consists in this, that every consequent is connected in this\r\nmanner with some particular antecedent, or set of antecedents. Let the\r\nfact be what it may, if it has begun to exist, it was preceded by some fact\r\nor facts, with which it is invariably connected. For every event there exists\r\nsome combination of objects or events, some given concurrence of circumstances,\r\npositive and negative, the occurrence of which is always followed\r\nby that phenomenon. We may not have found out what this concurrence\r\nof circumstances may be; but we never doubt that there is such\r\na one, and that it never occurs without having the phenomenon in question\r\nas its effect or consequence. On the universality of this truth depends the\r\npossibility of reducing the inductive process to rules. The undoubted assurance\r\nwe have that there is a law to be found if we only knew how to\r\nfind it, will be seen presently to be the source from which the canons of\r\nthe Inductive Logic derive their validity.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 3. It is seldom, if ever, between a consequent and a single antecedent,\r\nthat this invariable sequence subsists. It is usually between a consequent\r\nand the sum of several antecedents; the concurrence of all of them being\r\nrequisite to produce, that is, to be certain of being followed by, the consequent.\r\nIn such cases it is very common to single out one only of the antecedents\r\nunder the denomination of Cause, calling the others merely Conditions.\r\nThus, if a person eats of a particular dish, and dies in consequence,\r\nthat is, would not have died if he had not eaten of it, people would be apt\r\nto say that eating of that dish was the cause of his death. There needs\r\nnot, however, be any invariable connection between eating of the dish and\r\ndeath; but there certainly is, among the circumstances which took place,\r\nsome combination or other on which death is invariably consequent: as,\r\nfor instance, the act of eating of the dish, combined with a particular bodily\r\nconstitution, a particular state of present health, and perhaps even a\r\ncertain state of the atmosphere; the whole of which circumstances perhaps\r\nconstituted in this particular case the \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003econditions\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e of the phenomenon,\r\nor, in other words, the set of antecedents which determined it, and but for\r\nwhich it would not have happened. The real Cause, is the whole of these\r\nantecedents; and we have, philosophically speaking, no right to give the\r\nname of cause to one of them, exclusively of the others. What, in the\r\ncase we have supposed, disguises the incorrectness of the expression, is\r\nthis: that the various conditions, except the single one of eating the food,\r\nwere not \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eevents\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e (that is, instantaneous changes, or successions of\r\ninstantaneous changes) but \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003estates\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e, possessing more or less of permanency; and\r\nmight therefore have preceded the effect by an indefinite length of duration,\r\nfor want of the event which was requisite to complete the required\r\nconcurrence of conditions: while as soon as that event, eating the food,\r\noccurs, no other cause is waited for, but the effect begins immediately to\r\ntake place: and hence the appearance is presented of a more immediate\r\nand close connection between the effect and that one antecedent, than between\r\nthe effect and the remaining conditions. But though we may think\r\nproper to give the name of cause to that one condition, the fulfillment of\r\nwhich completes the tale, and brings about the effect without further delay;\r\nthis condition has really no closer relation to the effect than any of\r\nthe other conditions has. All the conditions were equally indispensable to\r\nthe production of the consequent; and the statement of the cause is incomplete,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page238\"\u003e[pg 238]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg238\" id=\"Pg238\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nunless in some shape or other we introduce them all. A man takes\r\nmercury, goes out-of-doors, and catches cold. We say, perhaps, that the\r\ncause of his taking cold was exposure to the air. It is clear, however,\r\nthat his having taken mercury may have been a necessary condition of\r\nhis catching cold; and though it might consist with usage to say that the\r\ncause of his attack was exposure to the air, to be accurate we ought to\r\nsay that the cause was exposure to the air while under the effect of mercury.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIf we do not, when aiming at accuracy, enumerate all the conditions, it\r\nis only because some of them will in most cases be understood without\r\nbeing expressed, or because for the purpose in view they may without\r\ndetriment be overlooked. For example, when we say, the cause of a man’s\r\ndeath was that his foot slipped in climbing a ladder, we omit as a thing\r\nunnecessary to be stated the circumstance of his weight, though quite as\r\nindispensable a condition of the effect which took place. When we say\r\nthat the assent of the crown to a bill makes it law, we mean that the assent,\r\nbeing never given until all the other conditions are fulfilled, makes up\r\nthe sum of the conditions, though no one now regards it as the principal\r\none. When the decision of a legislative assembly has been determined\r\nby the casting vote of the chairman, we sometimes say that this one person\r\nwas the cause of all the effects which resulted from the enactment. Yet\r\nwe do not really suppose that his single vote contributed more to the result\r\nthan that of any other person who voted in the affirmative; but, for\r\nthe purpose we have in view, which is to insist on his individual responsibility,\r\nthe part which any other person had in the transaction is not material.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIn all these instances the fact which was dignified with the name of\r\ncause, was the one condition which came last into existence. But it must\r\nnot be supposed that in the employment of the term this or any other rule\r\nis always adhered to. Nothing can better show the absence of any scientific\r\nground for the distinction between the cause of a phenomenon and its\r\nconditions, than the capricious manner in which we select from among the\r\nconditions that which we choose to denominate the cause. However numerous\r\nthe conditions may be, there is hardly any of them which may not,\r\naccording to the purpose of our immediate discourse, obtain that nominal\r\npre-eminence. This will be seen by analyzing the conditions of some one\r\nfamiliar phenomenon. For example, a stone thrown into water falls to the\r\nbottom. What are the conditions of this event? In the first place there\r\nmust be a stone, and water, and the stone must be thrown into the water;\r\nbut these suppositions forming part of the enunciation of the phenomenon\r\nitself, to include them also among the conditions would be a vicious tautology;\r\nand this class of conditions, therefore, have never received the name of cause\r\nfrom any but the Aristotelians, by whom they were called the \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ematerial\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e\r\ncause, \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ecausa materialis\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e. The next condition\r\nis, there must be an earth: and accordingly it is often said, that the fall of a stone is\r\ncaused by the earth; or by a power or property of the earth, or a force exerted by the\r\nearth, all of which are merely roundabout ways of saying that it is caused\r\nby the earth; or, lastly, the earth’s attraction; which also is only a technical\r\nmode of saying that the earth causes the motion, with the additional particularity\r\nthat the motion is toward the earth, which is not a character of\r\nthe cause, but of the effect. Let us now pass to another condition. It is\r\nnot enough that the earth should exist; the body must be within that distance\r\nfrom it, in which the earth’s attraction preponderates over that of any\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page239\"\u003e[pg 239]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg239\" id=\"Pg239\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nother body. Accordingly we may say, and the expression would be confessedly\r\ncorrect, that the cause of the stone’s falling is its being \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ewithin the\r\nsphere\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e of the earth’s attraction. We proceed to a further condition. The\r\nstone is immersed in water: it is therefore a condition of its reaching the\r\nground, that its specific gravity exceed that of the surrounding fluid, or in\r\nother words that it surpass in weight an equal volume of water. Accordingly\r\nany one would be acknowledged to speak correctly who said, that the\r\ncause of the stone’s going to the bottom is its exceeding in specific gravity\r\nthe fluid in which it is immersed.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThus we see that each and every condition of the phenomenon may be\r\ntaken in its turn, and, with equal propriety in common parlance, but with\r\nequal impropriety in scientific discourse, may be spoken of as if it were the\r\nentire cause. And in practice, that particular condition is usually styled\r\nthe cause, whose share in the matter is superficially the most conspicuous,\r\nor whose requisiteness to the production of the effect we happen to be insisting\r\non at the moment. So great is the force of this last consideration,\r\nthat it sometimes induces us to give the name of cause even to one of the\r\nnegative conditions. We say, for example, The army was surprised because\r\nthe sentinel was off his post. But since the sentinel’s absence was\r\nnot what created the enemy, or put the soldiers asleep, how did it cause\r\nthem to be surprised? All that is really meant is, that the event would\r\nnot have happened if he had been at his duty. His being off his post was\r\nno producing cause, but the mere absence of a preventing cause: it was\r\nsimply equivalent to his non-existence. From nothing, from a mere negation,\r\nno consequences can proceed. All effects are connected, by the law\r\nof causation, with some set of \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003epositive\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e conditions; negative ones, it is\r\ntrue, being almost always required in addition. In other words, every fact or\r\nphenomenon which has a beginning, invariably arises when some certain\r\ncombination of positive facts exists, provided certain other positive facts\r\ndo not exist.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThere is, no doubt, a tendency (which our first example, that of death\r\nfrom taking a particular food, sufficiently illustrates) to associate the idea\r\nof causation with the proximate antecedent \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eevent\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e, rather than with any of\r\nthe antecedent \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003estates\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e, or permanent facts, which may happen also to be\r\nconditions of the phenomenon; the reason being that the event not only\r\nexists, but begins to exist immediately previous; while the other conditions\r\nmay have pre-existed for an indefinite time. And this tendency\r\nshows itself very visibly in the different logical fictions which are resorted\r\nto, even by men of science, to avoid the necessity of giving the name of\r\ncause to any thing which had existed for an indeterminate length of time\r\nbefore the effect. Thus, rather than say that the earth causes the fall of\r\nbodies, they ascribe it to a \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eforce\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e exerted by the earth, or an\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eattraction\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e by\r\nthe earth, abstractions which they can represent to themselves as exhausted\r\nby each effort, and therefore constituting at each successive instant a fresh\r\nfact, simultaneous with, or only immediately preceding, the effect. Inasmuch\r\nas the coming of the circumstance which completes the assemblage\r\nof conditions, is a change or event, it thence happens that an event is always\r\nthe antecedent in closest apparent proximity to the consequent: and\r\nthis may account for the illusion which disposes us to look upon the proximate\r\nevent as standing more peculiarly in the position of a cause than any\r\nof the antecedent states. But even this peculiarity, of being in closer proximity\r\nto the effect than any other of its conditions, is, as we have already\r\nseen, far from being necessary to the common notion of a cause; with\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page240\"\u003e[pg 240]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg240\" id=\"Pg240\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nwhich notion, on the contrary, any one of the conditions, either positive or\r\nnegative, is found, on occasion, completely to accord.\u003ca id=\"noteref_114\" name=\"noteref_114\" href=\"#note_114\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e114\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page241\"\u003e[pg 241]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg241\" id=\"Pg241\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe cause, then, philosophically speaking, is the sum total of the conditions,\r\npositive and negative taken together; the whole of the contingencies\r\nof every description, which being realized, the consequent invariably follows.\r\nThe negative conditions, however, of any phenomenon, a special\r\nenumeration of which would generally be very prolix, may be all summed\r\nup under one head, namely, the absence of preventing or counteracting\r\ncauses. The convenience of this mode of expression is mainly grounded\r\non the fact, that the effects of any cause in counteracting another cause\r\nmay in most cases be, with strict scientific exactness, regarded as a mere\r\nextension of its own proper and separate effects. If gravity retards the\r\nupward motion of a projectile, and deflects it into a parabolic trajectory,\r\nit produces, in so doing, the very same kind of effect, and even (as mathematicians\r\nknow) the same quantity of effect, as it does in its ordinary operation\r\nof causing the fall of bodies when simply deprived of their support.\r\nIf an alkaline solution mixed with an acid destroys its sourness, and prevents\r\nit from reddening vegetable blues, it is because the specific effect of\r\nthe alkali is to combine with the acid, and form a compound with totally\r\ndifferent qualities. This property, which causes of all descriptions possess,\r\nof preventing the effects of other causes by virtue (for the most part) of\r\nthe same laws according to which they produce their own,\u003ca id=\"noteref_115\" name=\"noteref_115\" href=\"#note_115\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e115\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e enables us, by\r\nestablishing the general axiom that all causes are liable to be counteracted\r\nin their effects by one another, to dispense with the consideration of negative\r\nconditions entirely, and limit the notion of cause to the assemblage of\r\nthe positive conditions of the phenomenon: one negative condition invariably\r\nunderstood, and the same in all instances (namely, the absence of counteracting\r\ncauses) being sufficient, along with the sum of the positive conditions,\r\nto make up the whole set of circumstances on which the phenomenon\r\nis dependent.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 4. Among the positive conditions, as we have seen that there are some\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page242\"\u003e[pg 242]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg242\" id=\"Pg242\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nto which, in common parlance, the term cause is more readily and frequently\r\nawarded, so there are others to which it is, in ordinary circumstances,\r\nrefused. In most cases of causation a distinction is commonly drawn between\r\nsomething which acts, and some other thing which is acted upon;\r\nbetween an \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eagent\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e and a \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003epatient\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e.\r\nBoth of these, it would be universally allowed,\r\nare conditions of the phenomenon; but it would be thought absurd\r\nto call the latter the cause, that title being reserved for the former. The\r\ndistinction, however, vanishes on examination, or rather is found to be only\r\nverbal; arising from an incident of mere expression, namely, that the object\r\nsaid to be acted upon, and which is considered as the scene in which\r\nthe effect takes place, is commonly included in the phrase by which the effect\r\nis spoken of, so that if it were also reckoned as part of the cause, the\r\nseeming incongruity would arise of its being supposed to cause itself. In\r\nthe instance which we have already had, of falling bodies, the question was\r\nthus put: What is the cause which makes a stone fall? and if the answer\r\nhad been \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“the stone itself,”\u003c/span\u003e the expression would have been in apparent\r\ncontradiction to the meaning of the word cause. The stone, therefore, is\r\nconceived as the patient, and the earth (or, according to the common and\r\nmost unphilosophical practice, an occult quality of the earth) is represented\r\nas the agent or cause. But that there is nothing fundamental in the distinction\r\nmay be seen from this, that it is quite possible to conceive the\r\nstone as causing its own fall, provided the language employed be such as\r\nto save the mere verbal incongruity. We might say that the stone moves\r\ntoward the earth by the properties of the matter composing it; and according\r\nto this mode of presenting the phenomenon, the stone itself might\r\nwithout impropriety be called the agent; though, to save the established\r\ndoctrine of the inactivity of matter, men usually prefer here also to ascribe\r\nthe effect to an occult quality, and say that the cause is not the stone itself,\r\nbut the \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eweight\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e or \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003egravitation\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e of the stone.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThose who have contended for a radical distinction between agent and\r\npatient, have generally conceived the agent as that which causes some state\r\nof, or some change in the state of, another object which is called the patient.\r\nBut a little reflection will show that the license we assume of speaking\r\nof phenomena as \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003estates\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e of the various objects which take part in\r\nthem (an artifice of which so much use has been made by some philosophers,\r\nBrown in particular, for the apparent explanation of phenomena), is simply\r\na sort of logical fiction, useful sometimes as one among several modes\r\nof expression, but which should never be supposed to be the enunciation\r\nof a scientific truth. Even those attributes of an object which might\r\nseem with greatest propriety to be called states of the object itself, its sensible\r\nqualities, its color, hardness, shape, and the like, are in reality (as no\r\none has pointed out more clearly than Brown himself) phenomena of causation,\r\nin which the substance is distinctly the agent, or producing cause,\r\nthe patient being our own organs, and those of other sentient beings.\r\nWhat we call states of objects, are always sequences into which the objects\r\nenter, generally as antecedents or causes; and things are never more active\r\nthan in the production of those phenomena in which they are said to be\r\nacted upon. Thus, in the example of a stone falling to the earth, according\r\nto the theory of gravitation the stone is as much an agent as the earth,\r\nwhich not only attracts, but is itself attracted by, the stone. In the case of\r\na sensation produced in our organs, the laws of our organization, and even\r\nthose of our minds, are as directly operative in determining the effect produced,\r\nas the laws of the outward object. Though we call prussic acid\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page243\"\u003e[pg 243]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg243\" id=\"Pg243\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nthe agent of a person’s death, the whole of the vital and organic properties\r\nof the patient are as actively instrumental as the poison, in the chain of effects\r\nwhich so rapidly terminates his sentient existence. In the process of\r\neducation, we may call the teacher the agent, and the scholar only the material\r\nacted upon; yet in truth all the facts which pre-existed in the scholar’s\r\nmind exert either co-operating or counteracting agencies in relation to\r\nthe teacher’s efforts. It is not light alone which is the agent in vision, but\r\nlight coupled with the active properties of the eye and brain, and with\r\nthose of the visible object. The distinction between agent and patient is\r\nmerely verbal: patients are always agents; in a great proportion, indeed,\r\nof all natural phenomena, they are so to such a degree as to react forcibly\r\non the causes which acted upon them: and even when this is not the case,\r\nthey contribute, in the same manner as any of the other conditions, to the\r\nproduction of the effect of which they are vulgarly treated as the mere theatre.\r\nAll the positive conditions of a phenomenon are alike agents, alike\r\nactive; and in any expression of the cause which professes to be complete,\r\nnone of them can with reason be excluded, except such as have already\r\nbeen implied in the words used for describing the effect; nor by including\r\neven these would there be incurred any but a merely verbal impropriety.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 5. There is a case of causation which calls for separate notice, as it\r\npossesses a peculiar feature, and presents a greater degree of complexity\r\nthan the common case. It often happens that the effect, or one of the effects,\r\nof a cause, is, not to produce of itself a certain phenomenon, but to\r\nfit something else for producing it. In other words, there is a case of causation\r\nin which the effect is to invest an object with a certain property.\r\nWhen sulphur, charcoal, and nitre are put together in certain proportions\r\nand in a certain manner, the effect is, not an explosion, but that the mixture\r\nacquires a property by which, in given circumstances, it will explode. The\r\nvarious causes, natural and artificial, which educate the human body or the\r\nhuman mind, have for their principal effect, not to make the body or mind\r\nimmediately do any thing, but to endow it with certain properties—in other\r\nwords, to give assurance that in given circumstances certain results will\r\ntake place in it, or as consequences of it. Physiological agencies often\r\nhave for the chief part of their operation to \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003epredispose\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e the constitution to\r\nsome mode of action. To take a simpler instance than all these: putting\r\na coat of white paint upon a wall does not merely produce in those who\r\nsee it done, the sensation of white; it confers on the wall the permanent\r\nproperty of giving that kind of sensation. Regarded in reference to the\r\nsensation, the putting on of the paint is a condition of a condition; it is a\r\ncondition of the wall’s causing that particular fact. The wall may have\r\nbeen painted years ago, but it has acquired a property which has lasted till\r\nnow, and will last longer; the antecedent condition necessary to enable the\r\nwall to become in its turn a condition, has been fulfilled once for all. In a\r\ncase like this, where the immediate consequent in the sequence is a property\r\nproduced in an object, no one now supposes the property to be a substantive\r\nentity \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“inherent”\u003c/span\u003e in the object. What has been produced is what,\r\nin other language, may be called a state of preparation in an object for producing\r\nan effect. The ingredients of the gunpowder have been brought into\r\na state of preparation for exploding as soon as the other conditions of an\r\nexplosion shall have occurred. In the case of the gunpowder, this state of\r\npreparation consists in a certain collocation of its particles relatively to one\r\nanother. In the example of the wall, it consists in a new collocation of two\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page244\"\u003e[pg 244]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg244\" id=\"Pg244\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nthings relatively to each other—the wall and the paint. In the example of\r\nthe molding influences on the human mind, its being a collocation at all is\r\nonly conjectural; for, even on the materialistic hypothesis, it would remain\r\nto be proved that the increased facility with which the brain sums up a\r\ncolumn of figures when it has been long trained to calculation, is the result\r\nof a permanent new arrangement of some of its material particles. We\r\nmust, therefore, content ourselves with what we know, and must include\r\namong the effects of causes, the capacities given to objects of being causes\r\nof other effects. This capacity is not a real thing existing in the objects;\r\nit is but a name for our conviction that they will act in a particular manner\r\nwhen certain new circumstances arise. We may invest this assurance\r\nof future events with a fictitious objective existence, by calling it a state of\r\nthe object. But unless the state consists, as in the case of the gunpowder\r\nit does, in a collocation of particles, it expresses no present fact; it is but\r\nthe contingent future fact brought back under another name.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt may be thought that this form of causation requires us to admit an\r\nexception to the doctrine that the conditions of a phenomenon—the antecedents\r\nrequired for calling it into existence—must all be found among the\r\nfacts immediately, not remotely, preceding its commencement. But what\r\nwe have arrived at is not a correction, it is only an explanation, of that doctrine.\r\nIn the enumeration of the conditions required for the occurrence of\r\nany phenomenon, it always has to be included that objects must be present,\r\npossessed of given properties. It is a condition of the phenomenon explosion\r\nthat an object should be present, of one or other of certain kinds,\r\nwhich for that reason are called explosive. The presence of one of these\r\nobjects is a condition immediately precedent to the explosion. The condition\r\nwhich is not immediately precedent is the cause which produced, not\r\nthe explosion, but the explosive property. The conditions of the explosion\r\nitself were all present immediately before it took place, and the general law,\r\ntherefore, remains intact.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 6. It now remains to advert to a distinction which is of first-rate importance\r\nboth for clearing up the notion of cause, and for obviating a very\r\nspecious objection often made against the view which we have taken of the\r\nsubject.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWhen we define the cause of any thing (in the only sense in which the\r\npresent inquiry has any concern with causes) to be \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“the antecedent which\r\nit invariably follows,”\u003c/span\u003e we do not use this phrase as exactly synonymous\r\nwith \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“the antecedent which it invariably \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ehas\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e followed in our past\r\nexperience.”\u003c/span\u003e Such a mode of conceiving causation would be liable to the objection\r\nvery plausibly urged by Dr. Reid, namely, that according to this\r\ndoctrine night must be the cause of day, and day the cause of night; since\r\nthese phenomena have invariably succeeded one another from the beginning\r\nof the world. But it is necessary to our using the word cause, that\r\nwe should believe not only that the antecedent always \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ehas\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e been followed by\r\nthe consequent, but that, as long as the present constitution of\r\nthings\u003ca id=\"noteref_116\" name=\"noteref_116\" href=\"#note_116\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e116\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e endures,\r\nit always \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ewill\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e be so. And this would not be true of day and night.\r\nWe do not believe that night will be followed by day under all imaginable\r\ncircumstances, but only that it will be so \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eprovided\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e the sun rises above the\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page245\"\u003e[pg 245]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg245\" id=\"Pg245\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nhorizon. If the sun ceased to rise, which, for aught we know, may be perfectly\r\ncompatible with the general laws of matter, night would be, or might\r\nbe, eternal. On the other hand, if the sun is above the horizon, his light\r\nnot extinct, and no opaque body between us and him, we believe firmly that\r\nunless a change takes place in the properties of matter, this combination of\r\nantecedents will be followed by the consequent, day; that if the combination\r\nof antecedents could be indefinitely prolonged, it would be always day;\r\nand that if the same combination had always existed, it would always have\r\nbeen day, quite independently of night as a previous condition. Therefore\r\nis it that we do not call night the cause, nor even a condition, of day. The\r\nexistence of the sun (or some such luminous body), and there being no\r\nopaque medium in a straight line\u003ca id=\"noteref_117\" name=\"noteref_117\" href=\"#note_117\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e117\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e between that body and the part of the\r\nearth where we are situated, are the sole conditions; and the union of\r\nthese, without the addition of any superfluous circumstance, constitutes the\r\ncause. This is what writers mean when they say that the notion of cause\r\ninvolves the idea of necessity. If there be any meaning which confessedly\r\nbelongs to the term necessity, it is \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eunconditionalness\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e. That which is\r\nnecessary, that which \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003emust\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e be, means that which will be, whatever supposition\r\nwe may make in regard to all other things. The succession of day and\r\nnight evidently is not necessary in this sense. It is conditional on the occurrence\r\nof other antecedents. That which will be followed by a given\r\nconsequent when, and only when, some third circumstance also exists, is not\r\nthe cause, even though no case should ever have occurred in which the phenomenon\r\ntook place without it.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nInvariable sequence, therefore, is not synonymous with causation, unless\r\nthe sequence, besides being invariable, is unconditional. There are sequences,\r\nas uniform in past experience as any others whatever, which yet\r\nwe do not regard as cases of causation, but as conjunctions in some sort\r\naccidental. Such, to an accurate thinker, is that of day and night. The one\r\nmight have existed for any length of time, and the other not have followed\r\nthe sooner for its existence; it follows only if certain other antecedents\r\nexist; and where those antecedents existed, it would follow in any case.\r\nNo one, probably, ever called night the cause of day; mankind must so\r\nsoon have arrived at the very obvious generalization, that the state of general\r\nillumination which we call day would follow from the presence of a\r\nsufficiently luminous body, whether darkness had preceded or not.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWe may define, therefore, the cause of a phenomenon, to be the antecedent,\r\nor the concurrence of antecedents, on which it is invariably and\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eunconditionally\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e consequent. Or if we adopt the convenient modification\r\nof the meaning of the word cause, which confines it to the assemblage of\r\npositive conditions without the negative, then instead of \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“unconditionally,”\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwe must say, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“subject to no other than negative conditions.”\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nTo some it may appear, that the sequence between night and day being\r\ninvariable in our experience, we have as much ground in this case as experience\r\ncan give in any case, for recognizing the two phenomena as cause\r\nand effect; and that to say that more is necessary—to require a belief that\r\nthe succession is unconditional, or, in other words, that it would be invariable\r\nunder all changes of circumstances, is to acknowledge in causation an\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page246\"\u003e[pg 246]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg246\" id=\"Pg246\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nelement of belief not derived from experience. The answer to this is, that\r\nit is experience itself which teaches us that one uniformity of sequence is\r\nconditional and another unconditional. When we judge that the succession\r\nof night and day is a derivative sequence, depending on something\r\nelse, we proceed on grounds of experience. It is the evidence of experience\r\nwhich convinces us that day could equally exist without being followed\r\nby night, and that night could equally exist without being followed\r\nby day. To say that these beliefs are \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“not generated by our mere observation\r\nof sequence,”\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca id=\"noteref_118\" name=\"noteref_118\" href=\"#note_118\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e118\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e is to forget that twice in every twenty-four hours,\r\nwhen the sky is clear, we have an \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eexperimentum\r\ncrucis\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e that the cause of\r\nday is the sun. We have an experimental knowledge of the sun which\r\njustifies us on experimental grounds in concluding, that if the sun were\r\nalways above the horizon there would be day, though there had been no\r\nnight, and that if the sun were always below the horizon there would be\r\nnight, though there had been no day. We thus know from experience\r\nthat the succession of night and day is not unconditional. Let me add,\r\nthat the antecedent which is only conditionally invariable, is not the invariable\r\nantecedent. Though a fact may, in experience, have always been\r\nfollowed by another fact, yet if the remainder of our experience teaches\r\nus that it might not always be so followed, or if the experience itself is\r\nsuch as leaves room for a possibility that the known cases may not correctly\r\nrepresent all possible cases, the hitherto invariable antecedent is not\r\naccounted the cause; but why? Because we are not sure that it \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eis\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e the\r\ninvariable antecedent.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nSuch cases of sequence as that of day and night not only do not contradict\r\nthe doctrine which resolves causation into invariable sequence, but are\r\nnecessarily implied in that doctrine. It is evident, that from a limited\r\nnumber of unconditional sequences, there will result a much greater number\r\nof conditional ones. Certain causes being given, that is, certain antecedents\r\nwhich are unconditionally followed by certain consequents; the\r\nmere co-existence of these causes will give rise to an unlimited number\r\nof additional uniformities. If two causes exist together, the effects of both\r\nwill exist together; and if many causes co-exist, these causes (by what we\r\nshall term hereafter the intermixture of their laws) will give rise to new effects,\r\naccompanying or succeeding one another in some particular order,\r\nwhich order will be invariable while the causes continue to co-exist, but no\r\nlonger. The motion of the earth in a given orbit round the sun, is a series\r\nof changes which follow one another as antecedents and consequents, and\r\nwill continue to do so while the sun’s attraction, and the force with which\r\nthe earth tends to advance in a direct line through space, continue to co-exist\r\nin the same quantities as at present. But vary either of these causes,\r\nand this particular succession of motions would cease to take place. The\r\nseries of the earth’s motions, therefore, though a case of sequence invariable\r\nwithin the limits of human experience, is not a case of causation. It\r\nis not unconditional.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThis distinction between the relations of succession which, so far as we\r\nknow, are unconditional, and those relations, whether of succession or of\r\nco-existence, which, like the earth’s motions, or the succession of day and\r\nnight, depend on the existence or on the co-existence of other antecedent\r\nfacts—corresponds to the great division which Dr. Whewell and other\r\nwriters have made of the field of science, into the investigation of what\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page247\"\u003e[pg 247]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg247\" id=\"Pg247\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nthey term the Laws of Phenomena, and the investigation of causes; a\r\nphraseology, as I conceive, not philosophically sustainable, inasmuch as the\r\nascertainment of causes, such causes as the human faculties can ascertain,\r\nnamely, causes which are themselves phenomena, is, therefore, merely the\r\nascertainment of other and more universal Laws of Phenomena. And let\r\nme here observe, that Dr. Whewell, and in some degree even Sir John\r\nHerschel, seem to have misunderstood the meaning of those writers who,\r\nlike M. Comté, limit the sphere of scientific investigation to Laws of Phenomena,\r\nand speak of the inquiry into causes as vain and futile. The\r\ncauses which M. Comté designates as inaccessible, are efficient causes. The\r\ninvestigation of physical, as opposed to efficient, causes (including the study\r\nof all the active forces in Nature, considered as facts of observation) is as\r\nimportant a part of M. Comté’s conception of science as of Dr. Whewell’s.\r\nHis objection to the \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eword\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e cause is a mere matter of nomenclature, in which,\r\nas a matter of nomenclature, I consider him to be entirely wrong. \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Those,”\u003c/span\u003e\r\nit is justly remarked by Mr. Bailey,\u003ca id=\"noteref_119\" name=\"noteref_119\" href=\"#note_119\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e119\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“who, like\r\nM. Comté, object to designate \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eevents\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e as causes, are objecting without\r\nany real ground to a mere but\r\nextremely convenient generalization, to a very useful common name, the\r\nemployment of which involves, or needs involve, no particular theory.”\u003c/span\u003e To\r\nwhich it may be added, that by rejecting this form of expression, M. Comté\r\nleaves himself without any term for marking a distinction which, however\r\nincorrectly expressed, is not only real, but is one of the fundamental distinctions\r\nin science; indeed it is on this alone, as we shall hereafter find,\r\nthat the possibility rests of framing a rigorous Canon of Induction. And\r\nas things left without a name are apt to be forgotten, a Canon of that description\r\nis not one of the many benefits which the philosophy of Induction\r\nhas received from M. Comté’s great powers.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ca name=\"Book_III_Chapter_V_Section_7\" id=\"Book_III_Chapter_V_Section_7\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 7. Does a cause always stand with its effect in the relation of antecedent\r\nand consequent? Do we not often say of two simultaneous facts that\r\nthey are cause and effect—as when we say that fire is the cause of warmth,\r\nthe sun and moisture the cause of vegetation, and the like? Since a cause\r\ndoes not necessarily perish because its effect has been produced, the two\r\nthings do very generally co-exist; and there are some appearances, and\r\nsome common expressions, seeming to imply not only that causes may, but\r\nthat they must, be contemporaneous with their effects. \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eCessante causâ cessat et effectus\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\nhas been a dogma of the schools: the necessity for the\r\ncontinued existence of the cause in order to the continuance of the effect,\r\nseems to have been once a generally received doctrine. Kepler’s numerous\r\nattempts to account for the motions of the heavenly bodies on mechanical\r\nprinciples, were rendered abortive by his always supposing that the agency\r\nwhich set those bodies in motion must continue to operate in order to keep\r\nup the motion which it at first produced. Yet there were at all times\r\nmany familiar instances of the continuance of effects, long after their causes\r\nhad ceased. A \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-foreign\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ecoup de soleil\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ngives a person brain-fever: will the fever go\r\noff as soon as he is moved out of the sunshine? A sword is run through\r\nhis body: must the sword remain in his body in order that he may continue\r\ndead? A plowshare once made, remains a plowshare, without any\r\ncontinuance of heating and hammering, and even after the man who heated\r\nand hammered it has been gathered to his fathers. On the other hand,\r\nthe pressure which forces up the mercury in an exhausted tube must be\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page248\"\u003e[pg 248]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg248\" id=\"Pg248\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\ncontinued in order to sustain it in the tube. This (it may be replied) is\r\nbecause another force is acting without intermission, the force of gravity,\r\nwhich would restore it to its level, unless counterpoised by a force equally\r\nconstant. But again: a tight bandage causes pain, which pain will sometimes\r\ngo off as soon as the bandage is removed. The illumination which\r\nthe sun diffuses over the earth ceases when the sun goes down.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThere is, therefore, a distinction to be drawn. The conditions which are\r\nnecessary for the first production of a phenomenon, are occasionally also\r\nnecessary for its continuance; though more commonly its continuance requires\r\nno condition except negative ones. Most things, once produced, continue\r\nas they are, until something changes or destroys them; but some require\r\nthe permanent presence of the agencies which produced them at first.\r\nThese may, if we please, be considered as instantaneous phenomena, requiring\r\nto be renewed at each instant by the cause by which they were at\r\nfirst generated. Accordingly, the illumination of any given point of space\r\nhas always been looked upon as an instantaneous fact, which perishes and\r\nis perpetually renewed as long as the necessary conditions subsist. If we\r\nadopt this language we avoid the necessity of admitting that the continuance\r\nof the cause is ever required to maintain the effect. We may say, it\r\nis not required to maintain, but to reproduce, the effect, or else to counteract\r\nsome force tending to destroy it. And this may be a convenient\r\nphraseology. But it is only a phraseology. The fact remains, that in\r\nsome cases (though those are a minority) the continuance of the conditions\r\nwhich produced an effect is necessary to the continuance of the effect.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAs to the ulterior question, whether it is strictly necessary that the\r\ncause, or assemblage of conditions, should precede, by ever so short an instant,\r\nthe production of the effect (a question raised and argued with much\r\ningenuity by Sir John Herschel in an Essay already\r\nquoted),\u003ca id=\"noteref_120\" name=\"noteref_120\" href=\"#note_120\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e120\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e the inquiry\r\nis of no consequence for our present purpose. There certainly are cases\r\nin which the effect follows without any interval perceptible by our faculties;\r\nand when there is an interval, we can not tell by how many intermediate\r\nlinks imperceptible to us that interval may really be filled up. But even\r\ngranting that an effect may commence simultaneously with its cause, the\r\nview I have taken of causation is in no way practically affected. Whether\r\nthe cause and its effect be necessarily successive or not, the beginning\r\nof a phenomenon is what implies a cause, and causation is the law of\r\nthe succession of phenomena. If these axioms be granted, we can afford,\r\nthough I see no necessity for doing so, to drop the words antecedent and\r\nconsequent as applied to cause and effect. I have no objection to define a\r\ncause, the assemblage of phenomena, which occurring, some other phenomenon\r\ninvariably commences, or has its origin. Whether the effect coincides\r\nin point of time with, or immediately follows, the hindmost of its\r\nconditions, is immaterial. At all events, it does not precede it; and when\r\nwe are in doubt, between two co-existent phenomena, which is cause and\r\nwhich effect, we rightly deem the question solved if we can ascertain which\r\nof them preceded the other.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 8. It continually happens that several different phenomena, which are\r\nnot in the slightest degree dependent or conditional on one another, are\r\nfound all to depend, as the phrase is, on one and the same agent; in other\r\nwords, one and the same phenomenon is seen to be followed by several\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page249\"\u003e[pg 249]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg249\" id=\"Pg249\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nsorts of effects quite heterogeneous, but which go on simultaneously one\r\nwith another; provided, of course, that all other conditions requisite for\r\neach of them also exist. Thus, the sun produces the celestial motions; it\r\nproduces daylight, and it produces heat. The earth causes the fall of heavy\r\nbodies, and it also, in its capacity of a great magnet, causes the phenomena\r\nof the magnetic needle. A crystal of galena causes the sensations of hardness,\r\nof weight, of cubical form, of gray color, and many others between\r\nwhich we can trace no interdependence. The purpose to which the phraseology\r\nof Properties and Powers is specially adapted, is the expression of\r\nthis sort of cases. When the same phenomenon is followed (either subject\r\nor not to the presence of other conditions) by effects of different and\r\ndissimilar orders, it is usual to say that each different sort of effect is produced\r\nby a different property of the cause. Thus we distinguish the attractive\r\nor gravitative property of the earth, and its magnetic property:\r\nthe gravitative, luminiferous, and calorific properties of the sun: the color,\r\nshape, weight, and hardness of a crystal. These are mere phrases, which\r\nexplain nothing, and add nothing to our knowledge of the subject; but,\r\nconsidered as abstract names denoting the connection between the different\r\neffects produced and the object which produces them, they are a very\r\npowerful instrument of abridgment, and of that acceleration of the process\r\nof thought which abridgment accomplishes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThis class of considerations leads to a conception which we shall find to\r\nbe of great importance, that of a Permanent Cause, or original natural\r\nagent. There exist in nature a number of permanent causes, which have\r\nsubsisted ever since the human race has been in existence, and for an indefinite\r\nand probably an enormous length of time previous. The sun, the\r\nearth, and planets, with their various constituents, air, water, and other distinguishable\r\nsubstances, whether simple or compound, of which nature is\r\nmade up, are such Permanent Causes. These have existed, and the effects\r\nor consequences which they were fitted to produce have taken place (as\r\noften as the other conditions of the production met), from the very beginning\r\nof our experience. But we can give no account of the origin of the\r\nPermanent Causes themselves. Why these particular natural agents existed\r\noriginally and no others, or why they are commingled in such and\r\nsuch proportions, and distributed in such and such a manner throughout\r\nspace, is a question we can not answer. More than this: we can discover\r\nnothing regular in the distribution itself; we can reduce it to no uniformity,\r\nto no law. There are no means by which, from the distribution of these\r\ncauses or agents in one part of space, we could conjecture whether a similar\r\ndistribution prevails in another. The co-existence, therefore, of Primeval\r\nCauses ranks, to us, among merely casual concurrences: and all those\r\nsequences or co-existences among the effects of several such causes, which,\r\nthough invariable while those causes co-exist, would, if the co-existence terminated,\r\nterminate along with it, we do not class as cases of causation, or\r\nlaws of nature: we can only calculate on finding these sequences or co-existences\r\nwhere we know by direct evidence, that the natural agents on the\r\nproperties of which they ultimately depend, are distributed in the requisite\r\nmanner. These Permanent Causes are not always objects; they are sometimes\r\nevents, that is to say, periodical cycles of events, that being the only\r\nmode in which events can possess the property of permanence. Not only,\r\nfor instance, is the earth itself a permanent cause, or primitive natural\r\nagent, but the earth’s rotation is so too: it is a cause which has produced,\r\nfrom the earliest period (by the aid of other necessary conditions), the succession\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page250\"\u003e[pg 250]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg250\" id=\"Pg250\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nof day and night, the ebb and flow of the sea, and many other effects,\r\nwhile, as we can assign no cause (except conjecturally) for the rotation\r\nitself, it is entitled to be ranked as a primeval cause. It is, however,\r\nonly the \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eorigin\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e of the rotation which is mysterious to us: once begun, its\r\ncontinuance is accounted for by the first law of motion (that of the permanence\r\nof rectilinear motion once impressed) combined with the gravitation\r\nof the parts of the earth toward one another.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAll phenomena without exception which begin to exist, that is, all except\r\nthe primeval causes, are effects either immediate or remote of those primitive\r\nfacts, or of some combination of them. There is no Thing produced,\r\nno event happening, in the known universe, which is not connected by a\r\nuniformity, or invariable sequence, with some one or more of the phenomena\r\nwhich preceded it; insomuch that it will happen again as often as\r\nthose phenomena occur again, and as no other phenomenon having the\r\ncharacter of a counteracting cause shall co-exist. These antecedent phenomena,\r\nagain, were connected in a similar manner with some that preceded\r\nthem; and so on, until we reach, as the ultimate step attainable by\r\nus, either the properties of some one primeval cause, or the conjunction of\r\nseveral. The whole of the phenomena of nature were therefore the necessary,\r\nor, in other words, the unconditional, consequences of some former collocation\r\nof the Permanent Causes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe state of the whole universe at any instant, we believe to be the consequence\r\nof its state at the previous instant; insomuch that one who knew\r\nall the agents which exist at the present moment, their collocation in space,\r\nand all their properties, in other words, the laws of their agency, could predict\r\nthe whole subsequent history of the universe, at least unless some new\r\nvolition of a power capable of controlling the universe should\r\nsupervene.\u003ca id=\"noteref_121\" name=\"noteref_121\" href=\"#note_121\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e121\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nAnd if any particular state of the entire universe could ever recur a second\r\ntime, all subsequent states would return too, and history would, like a circulating\r\ndecimal of many figures, periodically repeat itself:\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"block tei tei-quote\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.80em; margin-left: 3.60em; margin-top: 1.80em; margin-right: 3.60em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-lg\" style=\"margin-bottom: 0.90em; margin-top: 0.90em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-l\" style=\"text-align: left\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003eJam redit et virgo, redeunt Saturnia regna….\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-l\" style=\"text-align: left\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003eAlter erit tum Tiphys, et altera quæ vehat Argo\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-l\" style=\"text-align: left\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003eDelectos heroas; erunt quoque altera bella,\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-l\" style=\"text-align: left\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003eAtque iterum ad Trojam magnus mittetur Achilles.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAnd though things do not really revolve in this eternal round, the whole\r\nseries of events in the history of the universe, past and future, is not the\r\nless capable, in its own nature, of being constructed \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea priori\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e by any one\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page251\"\u003e[pg 251]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg251\" id=\"Pg251\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nwhom we can suppose acquainted with the original distribution of all natural\r\nagents, and with the whole of their properties, that is, the laws of succession\r\nexisting between them and their effects: saving the far more than\r\nhuman powers of combination and calculation which would be required,\r\neven in one possessing the data, for the actual performance of the task.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 9. Since every thing which occurs is determined by laws of causation\r\nand collocations of the original causes, it follows that the co-existences\r\nwhich are observable among effects can not be themselves the subject of\r\nany similar set of laws, distinct from laws of causation. Uniformities\r\nthere are, as well of co-existence as of succession, among effects; but these\r\nmust in all cases be a mere result either of the identity or of the co-existence\r\nof their causes: if the causes did not co-exist, neither could the effects.\r\nAnd these causes being also effects of prior causes, and these of\r\nothers, until we reach the primeval causes, it follows that (except in the\r\ncase of effects which can be traced immediately or remotely to one and\r\nthe same cause) the co-existences of phenomena can in no case be universal,\r\nunless the co-existences of the primeval causes to which the effects are\r\nultimately traceable can be reduced to a universal law: but we have seen\r\nthat they can not. There are, accordingly, no original and independent, in\r\nother words no unconditional, uniformities of co-existence, between effects\r\nof different causes; if they co-exist, it is only because the causes have casually\r\nco-existed. The only independent and unconditional co-existences\r\nwhich are sufficiently invariable to have any claim to the character of\r\nlaws, are between different and mutually independent effects of the same\r\ncause; in other words, between different properties of the same natural\r\nagent. This portion of the Laws of Nature will be treated of in the latter\r\npart of the present Book, under the name of the Specific Properties of\r\nKinds.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 10. Since the first publication of the present treatise, the sciences of\r\nphysical nature have made a great advance in generalization, through the\r\ndoctrine known as the Conservation or Persistence of Force. This imposing\r\nedifice of theory, the building and laying out of which has for some\r\ntime been the principal occupation of the most systematic minds among\r\nphysical inquirers, consists of two stages: one, of ascertained fact, the other\r\ncontaining a large element of hypothesis.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nTo begin with the first. It is proved by numerous facts, both natural\r\nand of artificial production, that agencies which had been regarded as distinct\r\nand independent sources of force—heat, electricity, chemical action,\r\nnervous and muscular action, momentum of moving bodies—are interchangeable,\r\nin definite and fixed quantities, with one another. It had long\r\nbeen known that these dissimilar phenomena had the power, under certain\r\nconditions, of producing one another: what is new in the theory is a more\r\naccurate estimation of what this production consists in. What happens is,\r\nthat the whole or part of the one kind of phenomena disappears, and is replaced\r\nby phenomena of one of the other descriptions, and that there is an\r\nequivalence in quantity between the phenomena that have disappeared and\r\nthose which have been produced, insomuch that if the process be reversed,\r\nthe very same quantity which had disappeared will re-appear, without increase\r\nor diminution. Thus the amount of heat which will raise the temperature\r\nof a pound of water one degree of the thermometer, will, if expended,\r\nsay in the expansion of steam, lift a weight of 772 pounds one\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page252\"\u003e[pg 252]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg252\" id=\"Pg252\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nfoot, or a weight of one pound 772 feet: and the same exact quantity of\r\nheat can, by certain means, be recovered, through the expenditure of exactly\r\nthat amount of mechanical motion.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe establishment of this comprehensive law has led to a change in the\r\nlanguage in which the scientific world had been accustomed to speak of\r\nwhat are called the Forces of nature. Before this correlation between phenomena\r\nmost unlike one another had been ascertained, their unlikeness had\r\ncaused them to be referred to so many distinct forces. Now that they are\r\nknown to be convertible into one another without loss, they are spoken of\r\nas all of them results of one and the same force, manifesting itself in different\r\nmodes. This force (it is said) can only produce a limited and definite\r\nquantity of effect, but always does produce that definite quantity; and\r\nproduces it, according to circumstances, in one or another of the forms, or\r\ndivides it among several, but so as (according to a scale of numerical\r\nequivalents established by experiment) always to make up the same sum;\r\nand no one of the manifestations can be produced, save by the disappearance\r\nof the equivalent quantity of another, which in its turn, in appropriate\r\ncircumstances, will re-appear undiminished. This mutual interchangeability\r\nof the forces of nature, according to fixed numerical equivalents, is the\r\npart of the new doctrine which rests on irrefragable fact.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nTo make the statement true, however, it is necessary to add, that an indefinite\r\nand perhaps immense interval of time may elapse between the disappearance\r\nof the force in one form and its re-appearance in another. A\r\nstone thrown up into the air with a given force, and falling back immediately,\r\nwill, by the time it reaches the earth, recover the exact amount of mechanical\r\nmomentum which was expended in throwing it up, deduction being\r\nmade of a small portion of motion which has been communicated to\r\nthe air. But if the stone has lodged on a height, it may not fall back for\r\nyears, or perhaps ages, and until it does, the force expended in raising it is\r\ntemporarily lost, being represented only by what, in the language of the\r\nnew theory, is called potential energy. The coal imbedded in the earth is\r\nconsidered by the theory as a vast reservoir of force, which has remained\r\ndormant for many geological periods, and will so remain until, by being\r\nburned, it gives out the stored-up force in the form of heat. Yet it is\r\nnot supposed that this force is a material thing which can be confined by\r\nbounds, as used to be thought of latent heat when that important phenomenon\r\nwas first discovered. What is meant is that when the coal does at\r\nlast, by combustion, generate a quantity of heat (transformable like all other\r\nheat into mechanical momentum, and the other forms of force), this extrication\r\nof heat is the re-appearance of a force derived from the sun’s rays,\r\nexpended myriads of ages ago in the vegetation of the organic substances\r\nwhich were the material of the coal.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nLet us now pass to the higher stage of the theory of Conservation of\r\nForce; the part which is no longer a generalization of proved fact, but a\r\ncombination of fact and hypothesis. Stated in few words, it is as follows:\r\nThat the Conservation of Force is really the Conservation of Motion; that\r\nin the various interchanges between the forms of force, it is always motion\r\nthat is transformed into motion. To establish this, it is necessary to assume\r\nmotions which are hypothetical. The supposition is, that there are\r\nmotions which manifest themselves to our senses only as heat, electricity,\r\netc., being molecular motions; oscillations, invisible to us, among the minute\r\nparticles of bodies; and that these molecular motions are transmutable\r\ninto molar motions (motions of masses), and molar motions into molecular.\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page253\"\u003e[pg 253]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg253\" id=\"Pg253\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nNow there is a real basis of fact for this supposition: we have positive evidence\r\nof the existence of molecular motion in these manifestations of force.\r\nIn the case of chemical action, for instance, the particles separate and form\r\nnew combinations, often with a great visible disturbance of the mass. In\r\nthe case of heat, the evidence is equally conclusive, since heat expands bodies\r\n(that is, causes their particles to move \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003efrom\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e one another); and if of\r\nsufficient amount, changes their mode of aggregation from solid to liquid,\r\nor from liquid to gaseous. Again, the mechanical actions which produce\r\nheat—friction, and the collision of bodies—must from the nature of the\r\ncase produce a shock, that is, an internal motion of particles, which indeed,\r\nwe find, is often so violent as to break them permanently asunder. Such\r\nfacts are thought to warrant the inference, that it is not, as was supposed,\r\nheat that causes the motion of particles, but the motion of particles that\r\ncauses heat; the original cause of both being the previous motion (whether\r\nmolar or molecular—collision of bodies or combustion of fuel) which formed\r\nthe heating agency. This inference already contains hypothesis; but at\r\nleast the supposed cause, the intestine motion of molecules, is a\r\n\u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003evera causa\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e.\r\nBut in order to reduce the Conservation of Force to Conservation of Motion,\r\nit was necessary to attribute to motion the heat propagated, through\r\napparently empty space, from the sun. This required the supposition\r\n(already made for the explanation of the laws of light) of a subtle ether\r\npervading space, which, though impalpable to us, must have the property\r\nwhich constitutes matter, that of resistance, since waves are propagated\r\nthrough it by an impulse from a given point. The ether must be supposed\r\n(a supposition not required by the theory of light) to penetrate into the\r\nminute interstices of all bodies. The vibratory motion supposed to be taking\r\nplace in the heated mass of the sun, is considered as imparted from\r\nthat mass to the particles of the surrounding ether, and through them to\r\nthe particles of the same ether in the interstices of terrestrial bodies; and\r\nthis, too, with a sufficient mechanical force to throw the particles of those\r\nbodies into a state of similar vibration, producing the expansion of their\r\nmass, and the sensation of heat in sentient creatures. All this is hypothesis,\r\nthough, of its legitimacy as hypothesis, I do not mean to express any\r\ndoubt. It would seem to follow as a consequence from this theory, that\r\nForce may and should be defined, matter in motion. This definition, however,\r\nwill not stand, for, as has already been seen, the matter needs not be\r\nin \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eactual\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e motion. It is not necessary to suppose that the motion afterward\r\nmanifested, is actually taking place among the molecules of the coal\r\nduring its sojourn in the earth;\u003ca id=\"noteref_122\" name=\"noteref_122\" href=\"#note_122\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e122\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\ncertainly not in the stone which is at rest\r\non the eminence to which it has been raised. The true definition of Force\r\nmust be, not motion, but Potentiality of Motion; and what the doctrine,\r\nif established, amounts to, is, not that there is at all times the same quantity\r\nof actual motion in the universe; but that the possibilities of motion\r\nare limited to a definite quantity, which can not be added to, but which\r\ncan not be exhausted; and that all actual motion which takes place in Nature\r\nis a draft upon this limited stock. It needs not all of it have ever existed\r\nas actual motion. There is a vast amount of potential motion in the\r\nuniverse in the form of gravitation, which it would be a great abuse of\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page254\"\u003e[pg 254]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg254\" id=\"Pg254\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nhypothesis to suppose to have been stored up by the expenditure of an\r\nequal amount of actual motion in some former state of the universe. Nor\r\ndoes the motion produced by gravity take place, so far as we know, at the\r\nexpense of any other motion, either molar or molecular.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt is proper to consider whether the adoption of this theory as a scientific\r\ntruth, involving as it does a change in the conception hitherto entertained\r\nof the most general physical agencies, requires any modification in\r\nthe view I have taken of Causation as a law of nature. As it appears to\r\nme, none whatever. The manifestations which the theory regards as\r\nmodes of motion, are as much distinct and separate phenomena when referred\r\nto a single force, as when attributed to several. Whether the phenomenon\r\nis called a transformation of force or the generation of one, it has\r\nits own set or sets of antecedents, with which it is connected by invariable\r\nand unconditional sequence; and that set, or those sets, of antecedents are\r\nits cause. The relation of the Conservation theory to the principle of\r\nCausation is discussed in much detail, and very instructively, by Professor\r\nBain, in the second volume of his Logic. The chief practical conclusion\r\ndrawn by him, bearing on Causation, is, that we must distinguish in the\r\nassemblage of conditions which constitutes the Cause of a phenomenon,\r\ntwo elements: one, the presence of a force; the other, the collocation or\r\nposition of objects which is required in order that the force may undergo\r\nthe particular transmutation which constitutes the phenomenon. Now, it\r\nmight always have been said with acknowledged correctness, that a force\r\nand a collocation were both of them necessary to produce any phenomenon.\r\nThe law of causation is, that change can only be produced by change.\r\nAlong with any number of stationary antecedents, which are collocations,\r\nthere must be at least one changing antecedent, which is a force. To produce\r\na bonfire, there must not only be fuel, and air, and a spark, which are\r\ncollocations, but chemical action between the air and the materials, which\r\nis a force. To grind corn, there must be a certain collocation of the parts\r\ncomposing a mill, relatively to one another and to the corn; but there must\r\nalso be the gravitation of water, or the motion of wind, to supply a force.\r\nBut as the force in these cases was regarded as a property of the objects\r\nin which it is embodied, it seemed tautology to say that there must be the\r\ncollocation \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eand\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e the force. As the collocation must be a collocation of\r\nobjects possessing the force-giving property, the collocation, so understood,\r\nincluded the force.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nHow, then, shall we have to express these facts, if the theory be finally\r\nsubstantiated that all Force is reducible to a previous Motion? We shall\r\nhave to say, that one of the conditions of every phenomenon is an antecedent\r\nMotion. But it will have to be explained that this needs not be\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eactual\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e motion. The coal which supplies the force exerted in combustion\r\nis not shown to have been exerting that force in the form of molecular\r\nmotion in the pit; it was not even exerting pressure. The stone on the\r\neminence \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eis\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e exerting a pressure, but only equivalent to its weight, not to\r\nthe additional momentum it would acquire by falling. The antecedent,\r\ntherefore, is not a force in action; and we can still only call it a property\r\nof the objects, by which they would exert a force on the occurrence of a\r\nfresh collocation. The collocation, therefore, still includes the force. The\r\nforce said to be stored up, is simply a particular property which the object\r\nhas acquired. The cause we are in search of, is a collocation of objects\r\npossessing that particular property. When, indeed, we inquire further into\r\nthe cause from which they derive that property, the new conception introduced\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page255\"\u003e[pg 255]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg255\" id=\"Pg255\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nby the Conservation theory comes in: the property is itself an effect,\r\nand its cause, according to the theory, is a former motion of exactly\r\nequivalent amount, which has been impressed on the particles of the body,\r\nperhaps at some very distant period. But the case is simply one of those\r\nwe have already considered, in which the efficacy of a cause consists in its\r\ninvesting an object with a property. The force said to be laid up, and\r\nmerely potential, is no more a really existing thing than any other properties\r\nof objects are really existing things. The expression is a mere artifice\r\nof language, convenient for describing the phenomena: it is unnecessary\r\nto suppose that any thing has been in continuous existence except an\r\nabstract potentiality. A force suspended in its operation, neither manifesting\r\nitself by motion nor by pressure, is not an existing fact, but a name\r\nfor our conviction that in appropriate circumstances a fact would take\r\nplace. We know that a pound weight, were it to fall from the earth into\r\nthe sun, would acquire in falling a momentum equal to millions of pounds;\r\nbut we do not credit the pound weight with more of actually existing force\r\nthan is equal to the pressure it is now exerting on the earth, and that is\r\nexactly a pound. We might as well say that a force of millions of pounds\r\nexists in a pound, as that the force which will manifest itself when the\r\ncoal is burned is a real thing existing in the coal. What is fixed in the coal\r\nis only a certain property: it has become fit to be the antecedent of an effect\r\ncalled combustion, which partly consists in giving out, under certain\r\nconditions, a given definite quantity of heat.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWe thus see that no new general conception of Causation is introduced\r\nby the Conservation theory. The indestructibility of Force no more interferes\r\nwith the theory of Causation than the indestructibility of Matter,\r\nmeaning by matter the element of resistance in the sensible world. It\r\nonly enables us to understand better than before the nature and laws of\r\nsome of the sequences.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThis better understanding, however, enables us, with Mr. Bain, to admit,\r\nas one of the tests for distinguishing causation from mere concomitance,\r\nthe expenditure or transfer of energy. If the effect, or any part of the\r\neffect, to be accounted for, consists in putting matter in motion, then any\r\nof the objects present which has lost motion has contributed to the effect;\r\nand this is the true meaning of the proposition that the cause is that one\r\nof the antecedents which exerts active force.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 11. It is proper in this place to advert to a rather ancient doctrine respecting\r\ncausation, which has been revived during the last few years in\r\nmany quarters, and at present gives more signs of life than any other theory\r\nof causation at variance with that set forth in the preceding pages.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAccording to the theory in question, Mind, or to speak move precisely,\r\nWill, is the only cause of phenomena. The type of Causation, as well as\r\nthe exclusive source from which we derive the idea, is our own voluntary\r\nagency. Here, and here only (it is said), we have direct evidence of causation.\r\nWe know that we can move our bodies. Respecting the phenomena\r\nof inanimate nature, we have no other direct knowledge than that of\r\nantecedence and sequence. But in the case of our voluntary actions, it is\r\naffirmed that we are conscious of power before we have experience of results.\r\nAn act of volition, whether followed by an effect or not, is accompanied\r\nby a consciousness of effort, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“of force exerted, of power in action,\r\nwhich is necessarily causal, or causative.”\u003c/span\u003e This feeling of energy or\r\nforce, inherent in an act of will, is knowledge \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea priori\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e; assurance, prior to\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page256\"\u003e[pg 256]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg256\" id=\"Pg256\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nexperience, that we have the power of causing effects. Volition, therefore,\r\nit is asserted, is something more than an unconditional antecedent; it is a\r\ncause, in a different sense from that in which physical phenomena are said\r\nto cause one another: it is an Efficient Cause. From this the transition is\r\neasy to the further doctrine, that Volition is the \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003esole\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e Efficient Cause of\r\nall phenomena. \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“It is inconceivable that dead force could continue unsupported\r\nfor a moment beyond its creation. We can not even conceive of\r\nchange or phenomena without the energy of a mind.”\u003c/span\u003e \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“The word\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eaction\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e”\u003c/span\u003e\r\nitself, says another writer of the same school, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“has no real significance except\r\nwhen applied to the doings of an intelligent agent. Let any one conceive,\r\nif he can, of any power, energy, or force inherent in a lump of matter.”\u003c/span\u003e\r\nPhenomena may have the semblance of being produced by physical\r\ncauses, but they are in reality produced, say these writers, by the immediate\r\nagency of mind. All things which do not proceed from a human\r\n(or, I suppose, an animal) will proceed, they say, directly from divine will.\r\nThe earth is not moved by the combination of a centripetal and a projectile\r\nforce; this is but a mode of speaking, which serves to facilitate our\r\nconceptions. It is moved by the direct volition of an omnipotent Being, in\r\na path coinciding with that which we deduce from the hypothesis of these\r\ntwo forces.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAs I have so often observed, the general question of the existence of Efficient\r\nCauses does not fall within the limits of our subject; but a theory\r\nwhich represents them as capable of being subjects of human knowledge,\r\nand which passes off as efficient causes what are only physical or phenomenal\r\ncauses, belongs as much to Logic as to metaphysics, and is a fit subject\r\nfor discussion here.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nTo my apprehension, a volition is not an efficient, but simply a physical\r\ncause. Our will causes our bodily actions in the same sense, and in no\r\nother, in which cold causes ice, or a spark causes an explosion of gunpowder.\r\nThe volition, a state of our mind, is the antecedent; the motion of\r\nour limbs in conformity to the volition, is the consequent. This sequence\r\nI conceive to be not a subject of direct consciousness, in the sense intended\r\nby the theory. The antecedent, indeed, and the consequent, are subjects\r\nof consciousness. But the connection between them is a subject of\r\nexperience. I can not admit that our consciousness of the volition contains\r\nin itself any \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea priori\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nknowledge that the muscular motion will follow.\r\nIf our nerves of motion were paralyzed, or our muscles stiff and inflexible,\r\nand had been so all our lives, I do not see the slightest ground for\r\nsupposing that we should ever (unless by information from other people)\r\nhave known any thing of volition as a physical power, or been conscious of\r\nany tendency in feelings of our mind to produce motions of our body, or of\r\nother bodies. I will not undertake to say whether we should in that case\r\nhave had the physical feeling which I suppose is meant when these writers\r\nspeak of \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“consciousness of effort:”\u003c/span\u003e I see no reason why we should not;\r\nsince that physical feeling is probably a state of nervous sensation beginning\r\nand ending in the brain, without involving the motory apparatus:\r\nbut we certainly should not have designated it by any term equivalent to\r\neffort, since effort implies consciously aiming at an end, which we should\r\nnot only in that case have had no reason to do, but could not even have\r\nhad the idea of doing. If conscious at all of this peculiar sensation, we\r\nshould have been conscious of it, I conceive, only as a kind of uneasiness,\r\naccompanying our feelings of desire.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt is well argued by Sir William Hamilton against the theory in question,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page257\"\u003e[pg 257]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg257\" id=\"Pg257\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nthat it \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“is refuted by the consideration that between the overt fact of corporeal\r\nmovement of which we are cognizant, and the internal act of mental\r\ndetermination of which we are also cognizant, there intervenes a numerous\r\nseries of intermediate agencies of which we have no knowledge; and, consequently,\r\nthat we can have no consciousness of any causal connection between\r\nthe extreme links of this chain, the volition to move and the limb\r\nmoving, as this hypothesis asserts. No one is immediately conscious, for\r\nexample, of moving his arm through his volition. Previously to this ultimate\r\nmovement, muscles, nerves, a multitude of solid and fluid parts, must\r\nbe set in motion by the will, but of this motion we know, from consciousness,\r\nabsolutely nothing. A person struck with paralysis is conscious of\r\nno inability in his limb to fulfill the determinations of his will; and it is\r\nonly after having willed, and finding that his limbs do not obey his volition,\r\nthat he learns by this experience, that the external movement does not follow\r\nthe internal act. But as the paralytic learns after the volition that his\r\nlimbs do not obey his mind; so it is only after volition that the man in\r\nhealth learns, that his limbs do obey the mandates of his\r\nwill.”\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca id=\"noteref_123\" name=\"noteref_123\" href=\"#note_123\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e123\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThose against whom I am contending have never produced, and do not\r\npretend to produce, any positive evidence\u003ca id=\"noteref_124\" name=\"noteref_124\" href=\"#note_124\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e124\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e that the power of our will to\r\nmove our bodies would be known to us independently of experience. What\r\nthey have to say on the subject is, that the production of physical events\r\nby a will seems to carry its own explanation with it, while the action of\r\nmatter upon matter seems to require something else to explain it; and is\r\neven, according to them, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“inconceivable”\u003c/span\u003e on any other supposition than\r\nthat some will intervenes between the apparent cause and its apparent\r\neffect. They thus rest their case on an appeal to the inherent laws of our conceptive\r\nfaculty; mistaking, as I apprehend, for the laws of that faculty its\r\nacquired habits, grounded on the spontaneous tendencies of its uncultured\r\nstate. The succession between the will to move a limb and the actual motion\r\nis one of the most direct and instantaneous of all sequences which\r\ncome under our observation, and is familiar to every moment’s experience\r\nfrom our earliest infancy; more familiar than any succession of events exterior\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page258\"\u003e[pg 258]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg258\" id=\"Pg258\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nto our bodies, and especially more so than any other case of the apparent\r\norigination (as distinguished from the mere communication) of motion.\r\nNow, it is the natural tendency of the mind to be always attempting\r\nto facilitate its conception of unfamiliar facts by assimilating them to others\r\nwhich are familiar. Accordingly, our voluntary acts, being the most\r\nfamiliar to us of all cases of causation, are, in the infancy and early youth\r\nof the human race, spontaneously taken as the type of causation in general,\r\nand all phenomena are supposed to be directly produced by the will of\r\nsome sentient being. This original Fetichism I shall not characterize in\r\nthe words of Hume, or of any follower of Hume, but in those of a religious\r\nmetaphysician, Dr. Reid, in order more effectually to show the unanimity\r\nwhich exists on the subject among all competent thinkers.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“When we turn our attention to external objects, and begin to exercise\r\nour rational faculties about them, we find that there are some motions and\r\nchanges in them which we have power to produce, and that there are many\r\nwhich must have some other cause. Either the objects must have life and\r\nactive power, as we have, or they must be moved or changed by something\r\nthat has life and active power, as external objects are moved by us.\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Our first thoughts seem to be, that the objects in which we perceive\r\nsuch motion have understanding and active power as we have. \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e‘Savages,’\u003c/span\u003e\r\nsays the Abbé Raynal, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e‘wherever they see motion which they can not account\r\nfor, there they suppose a soul.’\u003c/span\u003e All men may be considered as savages\r\nin this respect, until they are capable of instruction, and of using their\r\nfaculties in a more perfect manner than savages do.\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“The Abbé Raynal’s observation is sufficiently confirmed, both from\r\nfact, and from the structure of all languages.\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Rude nations do really believe sun, moon, and stars, earth, sea, and air,\r\nfountains, and lakes, to have understanding and active power. To pay\r\nhomage to them, and implore their favor, is a kind of idolatry natural to\r\nsavages.\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“All languages carry in their structure the marks of their being formed\r\nwhen this belief prevailed. The distinction of verbs and participles into\r\nactive and passive, which is found in all languages, must have been originally\r\nintended to distinguish what is really active from what is merely passive;\r\nand in all languages, we find active verbs applied to those objects, in\r\nwhich, according to the Abbé Raynal’s observation, savages suppose a soul.\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Thus we say the sun rises and sets, and comes to the meridian, the\r\nmoon changes, the sea ebbs and flows, the winds blow. Languages were\r\nformed by men who believed these objects to have life and active power\r\nin themselves. It was therefore proper and natural to express their motions\r\nand changes by active verbs.\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“There is no surer way of tracing the sentiments of nations before they\r\nhave records, than by the structure of their language, which, notwithstanding\r\nthe changes produced in it by time, will always retain some signatures of\r\nthe thoughts of those by whom it was invented. When we find the same\r\nsentiments indicated in the structure of all languages, those sentiments must\r\nhave been common to the human species when languages were invented.\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“When a few, of superior intellectual abilities, find leisure for\r\nspeculation, they begin to philosophize, and soon discover, that many of those objects\r\nwhich at first they believed to be intelligent and active are really\r\nlifeless and passive. This is a very important discovery. It elevates the\r\nmind, emancipates from many vulgar superstitions, and invites to further\r\ndiscoveries of the same kind.\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page259\"\u003e[pg 259]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg259\" id=\"Pg259\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“As philosophy advances, life and activity in natural objects retires, and\r\nleaves them dead and inactive. Instead of moving voluntarily, we find\r\nthem to be moved necessarily; instead of acting, we find them to be acted\r\nupon; and Nature appears as one great machine, where one wheel is turned\r\nby another, that by a third; and how far this necessary succession may\r\nreach, the philosopher does not know.”\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca id=\"noteref_125\" name=\"noteref_125\" href=\"#note_125\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e125\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThere is, then, a spontaneous tendency of the intellect to account to itself\r\nfor all cases of causation by assimilating them to the intentional acts\r\nof voluntary agents like itself. This is the instinctive philosophy of the\r\nhuman mind in its earliest stage, before it has become familiar with any\r\nother invariable sequences than those between its own volitions or those\r\nof other human beings and their voluntary acts. As the notion of fixed\r\nlaws of succession among external phenomena gradually establishes itself,\r\nthe propensity to refer all phenomena to voluntary agency slowly gives\r\nway before it. The suggestions, however, of daily life continuing to be\r\nmore powerful than those of scientific thought, the original instinctive philosophy\r\nmaintains its ground in the mind, underneath the growths obtained\r\nby cultivation, and keeps up a constant resistance to their throwing\r\ntheir roots deep into the soil. The theory against which I am contending\r\nderives its nourishment from that substratum. Its strength does not\r\nlie in argument, but in its affinity to an obstinate tendency of the infancy\r\nof the human mind.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThat this tendency, however, is not the result of an inherent mental law,\r\nis proved by superabundant evidence. The history of science, from its\r\nearliest dawn, shows that mankind have not been unanimous in thinking\r\neither that the action of matter upon matter was not conceivable, or that\r\nthe action of mind upon matter was. To some thinkers, and some schools\r\nof thinkers, both in ancient and in modern times, this last has appeared\r\nmuch more inconceivable than the former. Sequences entirely physical\r\nand material, as soon as they had become sufficiently familiar to the human\r\nmind, came to be thought perfectly natural, and were regarded not only as\r\nneeding no explanation themselves, but as being capable of affording it to\r\nothers, and even of serving as the ultimate explanation of things in general.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nOne of the ablest recent supporters of the Volitional theory has furnished\r\nan explanation, at once historically true and philosophically acute, of\r\nthe failure of the Greek philosophers in physical inquiry, in which, as I\r\nconceive, he unconsciously depicts his own state of mind. \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Their stumbling-block\r\nwas one as to the nature of the evidence they had to expect\r\nfor their conviction…. They had not seized the idea that they must not\r\nexpect to understand the processes of outward causes, but only their results;\r\nand consequently, the whole physical philosophy of the Greeks was\r\nan attempt to identify mentally the effect with its cause, to feel after some\r\nnot only necessary but natural connection, where they meant by natural\r\nthat which would \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eper se\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ncarry some presumption to their own mind….\r\nThey wanted to see some \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ereason\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e why the physical antecedent should\r\nproduce this particular consequent, and their only attempts were in directions\r\nwhere they could find such reasons.”\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca id=\"noteref_126\" name=\"noteref_126\" href=\"#note_126\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e126\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e In other words, they were\r\nnot content merely to know that one phenomenon was always followed by\r\nanother; they thought that they had not attained the true aim of science,\r\nunless they could perceive something in the nature of the one phenomenon\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page260\"\u003e[pg 260]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg260\" id=\"Pg260\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nfrom which it might have been known or presumed \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eprevious to trial\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e that\r\nit would be followed by the other: just what the writer, who has so clearly\r\npointed out their error, thinks that he perceives in the nature of the\r\nphenomenon Volition. And to complete the statement of the case, he\r\nshould have added that these early speculators not only made this their\r\naim, but were quite satisfied with their success in it; not only sought for\r\ncauses which should carry in their mere statement evidence of their efficiency,\r\nbut fully believed that they had found such causes. The reviewer\r\ncan see plainly that this was an error, because \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ehe\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e does not believe that\r\nthere exist any relations between material phenomena which can account\r\nfor their producing one another; but the very fact of the persistency of\r\nthe Greeks in this error, shows that their minds were in a very different\r\nstate: they were able to derive from the assimilation of physical facts to\r\nother physical facts, the kind of mental satisfaction which we connect with\r\nthe word explanation, and which the reviewer would have us think can\r\nonly be found in referring phenomena to a will. When Thales and Hippo\r\nheld that moisture was the universal cause, and external element, of which\r\nall other things were but the infinitely various sensible manifestations;\r\nwhen Anaximenes predicated the same thing of air, Pythagoras of numbers,\r\nand the like, they all thought that they had found a real explanation; and\r\nwere content to rest in this explanation as ultimate. The ordinary sequences\r\nof the external universe appeared to them, no less than to their\r\ncritic, to be inconceivable without the supposition of some universal agency\r\nto connect the antecedents with the consequents; but they did not\r\nthink that Volition, exerted by minds, was the only agency which fulfilled\r\nthis requirement. Moisture, or air, or numbers, carried to their minds a\r\nprecisely similar impression of making intelligible what was otherwise inconceivable,\r\nand gave the same full satisfaction to the demands of their\r\nconceptive faculty.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt was not the Greeks alone, who \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“wanted to see some reason why the\r\nphysical antecedent should produce this particular consequent,”\u003c/span\u003e some connection\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“which would \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eper se\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e carry some presumption\r\nto their own mind.”\u003c/span\u003e\r\nAmong modern philosophers, Leibnitz laid it down as a self-evident principle\r\nthat all physical causes without exception must contain in their own\r\nnature something which makes it intelligible that they should be able to\r\nproduce the effects which they do produce. Far from admitting Volition\r\nas the only kind of cause which carried internal evidence of its own power,\r\nand as the real bond of connection between physical antecedents and\r\ntheir consequents, he demanded some naturally and \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eper se\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e efficient physical\r\nantecedent as the bond of connection between Volition itself and its effects.\r\nHe distinctly refused to admit the will of God as a sufficient explanation\r\nof any thing except miracles; and insisted upon finding something\r\nthat would account \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ebetter\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e for the phenomena of nature than a mere\r\nreference to divine volition.\u003ca id=\"noteref_127\" name=\"noteref_127\" href=\"#note_127\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e127\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAgain, and conversely, the action of mind upon matter (which, we are\r\nnow told, not only needs no explanation itself, but is the explanation of all\r\nother effects), has appeared to some thinkers to be itself the grand inconceivability.\r\nIt was to get over this very difficulty that the Cartesians invented\r\nthe system of Occasional Causes. They could not conceive that\r\nthoughts in a mind could produce movements in a body, or that bodily\r\nmovements could produce thoughts. They could see no necessary connection,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page261\"\u003e[pg 261]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg261\" id=\"Pg261\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nno relation \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea priori\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\nbetween a motion and a thought. And as the\r\nCartesians, more than any other school of philosophical speculation before\r\nor since, made their own minds the measure of all things, and refused, on\r\nprinciple, to believe that Nature had done what they were unable to see\r\nany reason why she must do, they affirmed it to be impossible that a material\r\nand a mental fact could be causes one of another. They regarded\r\nthem as mere Occasions on which the real agent, God, thought fit to exert\r\nhis power as a Cause. When a man wills to move his foot, it is not his\r\nwill that moves it, but God (they said) moves it on the occasion of his\r\nwill. God, according to this system, is the only efficient cause, not\r\n\u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003equâ\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e mind, or\r\n\u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003equâ\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e endowed with volition, but\r\n\u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003equâ\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e omnipotent. This hypothesis\r\nwas, as I said, originally suggested by the supposed inconceivability\r\nof any real mutual action between Mind and Matter; but it was afterward\r\nextended to the action of Matter upon Matter, for on a nicer examination\r\nthey found this inconceivable too, and therefore, according to their logic,\r\nimpossible. The \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003edeus ex machinâ\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwas ultimately called in to produce a\r\nspark on the occasion of a flint and steel coming together, or to break an\r\negg on the occasion of its falling on the ground.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAll this, undoubtedly, shows that it is the disposition of mankind in general,\r\nnot to be satisfied with knowing that one fact is invariably antecedent\r\nand another consequent, but to look out for something which may seem\r\nto explain their being so. But we also see that this demand may be completely\r\nsatisfied by an agency purely physical, provided it be much more\r\nfamiliar than that which it is invoked to explain. To Thales and Anaximenes,\r\nit appeared inconceivable that the antecedents which we see in nature\r\nshould produce the consequents; but perfectly natural that water, or air,\r\nshould produce them. The writers whom I oppose declare this inconceivable,\r\nbut can conceive that mind, or volition, is \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eper\r\nse\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e an efficient cause:\r\nwhile the Cartesians could not conceive even that, but peremptorily declared\r\nthat no mode of production of any fact whatever was conceivable,\r\nexcept the direct agency of an omnipotent being; thus giving additional\r\nproof of what finds new confirmation in every stage of the history of science:\r\nthat both what persons can, and what they can not, conceive, is very\r\nmuch an affair of accident, and depends altogether on their experience, and\r\ntheir habits of thought; that by cultivating the requisite associations of\r\nideas, people may make themselves unable to conceive any given thing;\r\nand may make themselves able to conceive most things, however inconceivable\r\nthese may at first appear; and the same facts in each person’s mental\r\nhistory which determine what is or is not conceivable to him, determine\r\nalso which among the various sequences in nature will appear to him so\r\nnatural and plausible, as to need no other proof of their existence; to be\r\nevident by their own light, independent equally of experience and of explanation.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nBy what rule is any one to decide between one theory of this description\r\nand another? The theorists do not direct us to any external evidence;\r\nthey appeal each to his own subjective feelings. One says, the succession\r\nC B appears to me more natural, conceivable, and credible\r\n\u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eper se\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, than the\r\nsuccession A B; you are therefore mistaken in thinking that B depends\r\nupon A; I am certain, though I can give no other evidence of it, that C\r\ncomes in between A and B, and is the real and only cause of B. The other\r\nanswers, the successions C B and A B appear to me equally natural and\r\nconceivable, or the latter more so than the former: A is quite capable of\r\nproducing B without any other intervention. A third agrees with the first\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page262\"\u003e[pg 262]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg262\" id=\"Pg262\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nin being unable to conceive that A can produce B, but finds the sequence\r\nD B still more natural than C B, or of nearer kin to the subject-matter, and\r\nprefers his D theory to the C theory. It is plain that there is no universal\r\nlaw operating here, except the law that each person’s conceptions are governed\r\nand limited by his individual experiences and habits of thought.\r\nWe are warranted in saying of all three, what each of them already believes\r\nof the other two, namely, that they exalt into an original law of the\r\nhuman intellect and of outward nature one particular sequence of phenomena,\r\nwhich appears to them more natural and more conceivable than\r\nother sequences, only because it is more familiar. And from this judgment\r\nI am unable to except the theory, that Volition is an Efficient Cause.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nI am unwilling to leave the subject without adverting to the additional\r\nfallacy contained in the corollary from this theory; in the inference that\r\nbecause Volition is an efficient cause, therefore it is the only cause, and the\r\ndirect agent in producing even what is apparently produced by something\r\nelse. Volitions are not known to produce any thing directly except nervous\r\naction, for the will influences even the muscles only through the nerves.\r\nThough it were granted, then, that every phenomenon has an efficient, and\r\nnot merely a phenomenal cause, and that volition, in the case of the peculiar\r\nphenomena which are known to be produced by it, is that efficient\r\ncause; are we therefore to say, with these writers, that since we know of\r\nno other efficient cause, and ought not to assume one without evidence,\r\nthere \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eis\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e no other, and volition is the direct cause of all phenomena? A\r\nmore outrageous stretch of inference could hardly be made. Because\r\namong the infinite variety of the phenomena of nature there is one, namely,\r\na particular mode of action of certain nerves, which has for its cause, and\r\nas we are now supposing for its efficient cause, a state of our mind; and\r\nbecause this is the only efficient cause of which we are conscious, being the\r\nonly one of which in the nature of the case we \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ecan\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e be conscious, since it is\r\nthe only one which exists within ourselves; does this justify us in concluding\r\nthat all other phenomena must have the same kind of efficient cause\r\nwith that one eminently special, narrow, and peculiarly human or animal,\r\nphenomenon? The nearest parallel to this specimen of generalization is\r\nsuggested by the recently revived controversy on the old subject of Plurality\r\nof Worlds, in which the contending parties have been so conspicuously\r\nsuccessful in overthrowing one another. Here also we have experience\r\nonly of a single case, that of the world in which we live, but that this is inhabited\r\nwe know absolutely, and without possibility of doubt. Now if on\r\nthis evidence any one were to infer that every heavenly body without exception,\r\nsun, planet, satellite, comet, fixed star or nebula, is inhabited, and\r\nmust be so from the inherent constitution of things, his inference would\r\nexactly resemble that of the writers who conclude that because volition is\r\nthe efficient cause of our own bodily motions, it must be the efficient cause\r\nof every thing else in the universe. It is true there are cases in which,\r\nwith acknowledged propriety, we generalize from a single instance to a\r\nmultitude of instances. But they must be instances which resemble the\r\none known instance, and not such as have no circumstance in common with\r\nit except that of being instances. I have, for example, no direct evidence\r\nthat any creature is alive except myself, yet I attribute, with full assurance,\r\nlife and sensation to other human beings and animals. But I do not\r\nconclude that all other things are alive merely because I am. I ascribe to\r\ncertain other creatures a life like my own, because they manifest it by the\r\nsame sort of indications by which mine is manifested. I find that their\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page263\"\u003e[pg 263]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg263\" id=\"Pg263\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nphenomena and mine conform to the same laws, and it is for this reason\r\nthat I believe both to arise from a similar cause. Accordingly I do not\r\nextend the conclusion beyond the grounds for it. Earth, fire, mountains,\r\ntrees, are remarkable agencies, but their phenomena do not conform to the\r\nsame laws as my actions do, and I therefore do not believe earth or fire,\r\nmountains or trees, to possess animal life. But the supporters of the Volition\r\nTheory ask us to infer that volition causes every thing, for no reason\r\nexcept that it causes one particular thing; although that one phenomenon,\r\nfar from being a type of all natural phenomena, is eminently peculiar; its\r\nlaws bearing scarcely any resemblance to those of any other phenomenon,\r\nwhether of inorganic or of organic nature.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nNOTE SUPPLEMENTARY TO THE PRECEDING CHAPTER.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"block tei tei-quote\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.80em; margin-left: 3.60em; margin-top: 1.80em; margin-right: 3.60em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 0.90em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e\r\nThe author of the Second Burnett Prize Essay (Dr. Tulloch), who has employed a\r\nconsiderable number of pages in controverting the doctrines of the preceding chapter,\r\nhas somewhat surprised me by denying a fact, which I imagined too well known to require\r\nproof—that there have been philosophers who found in physical explanations of\r\nphenomena the same complete mental satisfaction which we are told is only given by\r\nvolitional explanation, and others who denied the Volitional Theory on the same ground\r\nof inconceivability on which it is defended. The assertion of the Essayist is\r\ncountersigned still more positively by an able reviewer of the\r\nEssay:\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca id=\"noteref_128\" name=\"noteref_128\" href=\"#note_128\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e128\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e“\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003eTwo illustrations,\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e”\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e says the reviewer, \u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e“\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003eare advanced by Mr. Mill:\r\nthe case of Thales and Anaximenes, stated by him to have maintained, the one Moisture\r\nand the other Air to be the origin of all things; and that of Descartes and Leibnitz,\r\nwhom he asserts to have found the action of Mind upon Matter the grand inconceivability.\r\nIn counter-statement as to the first of these cases the author shows—what we\r\nbelieve now hardly admits of doubt—that the Greek philosophers distinctly\r\nrecognized as beyond and above their primal material source, the νοῦς, or Divine\r\nIntelligence, as the efficient and originating Source of all; and as to the second, by\r\nproof that it was the \u003c/span\u003e\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%; font-style: italic\"\u003emode\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e, not the \u003c/span\u003e\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%; font-style: italic\"\u003efact\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e, of that action on\r\nmatter, which was represented as inconceivable.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e”\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 0.90em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e\r\nA greater quantity of historical error has seldom been comprised in a single sentence.\r\nWith regard to Thales, the assertion that he considered water as a mere material in the\r\nhands of νοῦς rests on a passage of Cicero \u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%; font-style: italic\"\u003ede Naturâ Deorum\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e; and\r\nwhoever will refer to any of the accurate historians of philosophy, will find that they\r\ntreat this as a mere fancy of Cicero, resting on no authority, opposed to all the\r\nevidence; and make surmises as to the manner in which Cicero may have been led into the\r\nerror. (See Rutter, vol. i., p. 211, 2d ed.; Brandis, vol. i., pp. 118-9, 1st ed.;\r\nPreller, \u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%; font-style: italic\"\u003eHistoria Philosophiæ Græco-Romanæ\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e, p. 10. \u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e“\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003eSchiefe\r\nAnsicht, durchaus zu verwerfen;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e”\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e“\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003eaugenscheinlich folgernd statt zu berichten;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e”\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e“\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003equibus vera sententia Thaletis plane detorquetur,\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e”\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e are the expressions of these\r\nwriters.) As for Anaximenes, he even according to Cicero, maintained, not that air was\r\nthe material out of which God made the world, but that the air was a god: \u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e“\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003eAnaximenes\r\naëra deum statuit;\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e”\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e or, according to St. Augustine, that it was the material out of\r\nwhich the gods were made; \u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e“\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003enon tamen ab ipsis [Diis] aërem factum, sed ipsos ex aëre\r\nortos credidit.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e”\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e Those who are not familiar with the metaphysical terminology of\r\nantiquity, must not be misled by finding it stated that Anaximenes attributed ψυχὴ\r\n(translated \u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%; font-style: italic\"\u003esoul\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e, or \u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%; font-style: italic\"\u003elife\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e) to his\r\nuniversal element, the air. The Greek philosophers acknowledged several kinds of ψυχὴ,\r\nthe nutritive, the sensitive, and the intellective.\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca id=\"noteref_129\" name=\"noteref_129\" href=\"#note_129\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e129\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e Even the moderns, with\r\nadmitted correctness, attribute life to plants. As far as we can make out the meaning of\r\nAnaximenes, he made choice of Air as the universal agent, on the ground that it is\r\nperpetually in motion, without any apparent cause external to itself: so that he\r\nconceived it as exercising spontaneous force, and as the principle of life and\r\nactivity in all things, men and gods inclusive. If this be not representing it as the\r\nEfficient Cause the dispute altogether has no meaning.\r\n\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 0.90em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e\r\nIf either Anaximenes, or Thales, or any of their contemporaries, had held the doctrine\r\nthat νοῦς was the Efficient Cause, that doctrine could not have been reputed, as it was\r\nthroughout antiquity, to have originated with Anaxagoras. The testimony of Aristotle,\r\nin the first book of his Metaphysics, is perfectly decisive with respect to these early\r\nspeculations. After enumerating four kinds of causes, or rather four different meanings\r\nof the word Cause, viz., the Essence of a thing, the Matter of it, the Origin of Motion\r\n(Efficient Cause), and the End or\r\n\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page264\"\u003e[pg 264]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg264\" id=\"Pg264\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e\r\nFinal Cause, he proceeds to say, that most of the early philosophers recognized only the\r\nsecond kind of Cause, the Matter of a thing, τὰς ἐν ὕλης εἶδει μόνας ᾠήθησαν ἀρχὰς εἷναι\r\nπάντων. As his first example he specifies Thales, whom he describes as taking the lead\r\nin this view of the subject, ὁ τῆς τοιαύτης ἀρχηγὸς φιλοσοφίας, and goes on to Hippon,\r\nAnaximenes, Diogenes (of Apollonia), Hippasus of Metapontum, Heraclitus, and Empedocles.\r\nAnaxagoras, however (he proceeds to say), taught a different doctrine, as we\r\n\u003c/span\u003e\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%; font-style: italic\"\u003eknow\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e, and it is \u003c/span\u003e\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%; font-style: italic\"\u003ealleged\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e that Hermotimus of Clazomenæ taught it\r\nbefore him. Anaxagoras represented, that even if these various theories of the universal\r\nmaterial were true, there would be need of some other cause to account for the\r\ntransformations of the materials, since the material can not originate its own changes:\r\nοὐ γὰρ δὴ τό γε ὑποκείμενον αὐτὸ ποιεὶ μεταβάλλειν ἑαῦτο; λέγω δ᾽ οἰον οὐτε τὸ ξύλον οὔτε\r\nὁ χαλκὸς αἴτιος τοῦ μεταβάλλειν ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν, οὐδὲ ποιεῖ τὸ μὲν ξύλον κλίνην\r\nὁ δέ χαλκὸς ἀνδριάντα, ἀλλ᾽ ἑτερόν τι τῆς μεταβολῆς αἴτιον, viz., the other kind of\r\ncause, ὄθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως—an Efficient Cause. Aristotle expresses great\r\napprobation of this doctrine (which he says made its author appear the only sober man\r\namong persons raving, οἰον νήφων ἐφάνη παρ᾽ εἰκῆ λέγοντας τοῦς πρότερον); but while\r\ndescribing the influence which it exercised over subsequent speculation, he remarks that\r\nthe philosophers against whom this, as he thinks, insuperable difficulty was urged, had\r\nnot felt it to be any difficulty: οὐδέν ἐδυσχεράναν ἐν ἑαυτοῖς. It is surely unnecessary\r\nto say more in proof of the matter of fact which Dr. Tulloch and his reviewer disbelieve.\r\n\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 0.90em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e\r\nHaving pointed out what he thinks the error of these early speculators in not recognizing\r\nthe need of an efficient cause, Aristotle goes on to mention two other efficient causes\r\nto which they might have had recourse, instead of intelligence: τύχη, chance, and τὸ\r\nαὐτομάτον, spontaneity. He indeed puts these aside as not sufficiently worthy causes for\r\nthe order in the universe, οὐδ᾽ αὑ τωῷ αὐτομάτῳ καὶ τῇ τύχῃ τοσοῦτον ἐπιτρέψαι πρᾶγμα\r\nκαλῶς εἰχεν; but he does not reject them as incapable of producing \u003c/span\u003e\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%; font-style: italic\"\u003eany\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e\r\neffect, but only as incapable of producing \u003c/span\u003e\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%; font-style: italic\"\u003ethat\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e effect. He himself\r\nrecognizes τύχη and τὸ αὐτομάτον as co-ordinate agents with Mind in producing\r\nthe phenomena of the universe; the department allotted to them being composed of\r\nall the classes of phenomena which are not supposed to follow any uniform law. By thus\r\nincluding Chance among efficient causes, Aristotle fell into an error which philosophy\r\nhas now outgrown, but which is by no means so alien to the spirit even of modern\r\nspeculation as it may at first sight appear. Up to quite a recent period philosophers\r\nwent on ascribing, and many of them have not yet ceased to ascribe, a real existence to\r\nthe results of abstraction. Chance could make out as good a title to that dignity as\r\nmany other of the mind’s abstract creations: it had had a name given to it, and why\r\nshould it not be a reality? As for τὸ αὐτομάτον, it is recognized even yet as one of the\r\nmodes of origination of phenomena by all those thinkers who maintain what is called the\r\nFreedom of the Will. The same self-determining power which that doctrine attributes to\r\nvolitions, was supposed by the ancients to be possessed also by some other natural\r\nphenomena: a circumstance which throws considerable light on more than one of the\r\nsupposed invincible necessities of belief. I have introduced it here, because this\r\nbelief of Aristotle, or rather of the Greek philosophers generally, is as fatal\r\nas the doctrines of Thales and the Ionic school to the theory that the human mind is\r\ncompelled by its constitution to conceive volition as the origin of all force, and the\r\nefficient cause of all phenomena.\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca id=\"noteref_130\" name=\"noteref_130\" href=\"#note_130\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e130\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page265\"\u003e[pg 265]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg265\" id=\"Pg265\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 0.90em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e\r\nWith regard to the modern philosophers (Leibnitz and the Cartesians) whom I had cited as\r\nhaving maintained that the action of mind upon matter, so far from being the only\r\nconceivable origin of material phenomena, is itself inconceivable; the attempt to rebut\r\nthis argument by asserting that the mode, not the fact, of the action of mind on matter\r\nwas represented as inconceivable, is an abuse of the privilege of writing confidently\r\nabout authors without reading them; for any knowledge whatever of Leibnitz would have\r\ntaught those who thus speak of him, that the inconceivability of the mode, and the\r\nimpossibility of the thing, were in his mind convertible expressions. What was his\r\nfamous Principle of the Sufficient Reason, the very corner-stone of his Philosophy, from\r\nwhich the Pre-established Harmony, the doctrine of Monads, and all the opinions most\r\ncharacteristic of Leibnitz, were corollaries? It was, that nothing exists, the existence\r\nof which is not capable of being proved and explained \u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%; font-style: italic\"\u003ea\r\npriori\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e; the proof and explanation in the case of contingent facts being\r\nderived from the nature of their causes; which could not be the causes unless there was\r\nsomething in their nature showing them to be capable of producing those particular\r\neffects. And this \u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e“\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003esomething\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e”\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e which accounts for the production of physical effects,\r\nhe was able to find in many physical causes, but could not find it in any finite minds,\r\nwhich therefore he unhesitatingly asserted to be incapable of producing any physical\r\neffects whatever. \u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e“\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003eOn ne saurait concevoir,\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e”\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e he says, \u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e“\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003eune action réciproque de\r\nla matière et de l’intelligence l’une sur l’autre,\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e”\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e and there is therefore\r\n(he contends) no choice but between the Occasional Causes of the Cartesians and his\r\nown Pre-established Harmony, according to which there is no more connection between our\r\nvolitions and our muscular actions than there is between two clocks which are wound up\r\nto strike at the same instant. But he felt no similar difficulty as to physical causes;\r\nand throughout his speculations, as in the passage I have already cited respecting\r\ngravitation, he distinctly refuses to consider as part of the order of nature any fact\r\nwhich is not explicable from the nature of its physical cause.\r\n\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 0.90em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e\r\nWith regard to the Cartesians (not Descartes; I did not make that mistake, though the\r\nreviewer of Dr. Tulloch’s Essay attributes it to me) I take a passage almost at random\r\nfrom Malebranche, who is the best known of the Cartesians, and, though not the inventor\r\nof the system of Occasional Causes, is its principal expositor. In Part II., chap. iii.,\r\nof his Sixth Book, having first said that matter can not have the power of moving itself,\r\nhe proceeds to argue that neither can mind have the power of moving it. \u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e“\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003eQuand on\r\nexamine l’idée que l’on a de tous les esprits finis, on ne voit point de liaison\r\nnécessaire entre leur volonté et le mouvement de quelque corps que ce soit, on voit au\r\ncontraire qu’il n’y en a point, et qu’il n’y en peut avoir\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e”\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e (there is nothing in the\r\nidea of finite mind which can account for its causing the motion of a\r\nbody); \u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e“\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003eon doit aussi conclure, si on vent raisonner selon ses lumières, qu’il n’y a\r\naucun esprit créé qui puisse remuer quelque corps que ce soit comme cause véritable on\r\nprincipale, de même que l’on a dit qu’aucun corps ne se pouvait remuer soi-même:\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e”\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e\r\nthus the idea of Mind is according to him as incompatible as the idea of Matter with the\r\nexercise of active force. But when, he continues, we consider not a created but a Divine\r\nMind, the case is altered; for the idea of a Divine Mind includes omnipotence; and the\r\nidea of omnipotence does contain the idea of being able to move bodies. Thus it is the\r\nnature of omnipotence which renders the motion of bodies even by the Divine Mind\r\ncredible or conceivable, while, so far as depended on the mere nature of mind, it would\r\nhave been inconceivable and incredible. If Malebranche had not believed in an omnipotent\r\nBeing, he would have held all action of mind on body to be a demonstrated\r\nimpossibility.\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca id=\"noteref_131\" name=\"noteref_131\" href=\"#note_131\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e131\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 0.90em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e\r\nA doctrine more precisely the reverse of the Volitional theory of causation can not well\r\nbe imagined. The Volitional theory is, that we know by intuition or by direct experience\r\nthe action of our own mental volitions on matter; that we may hence infer all other\r\naction upon matter to be that of volition, and might thus know, without any other\r\nevidence, that matter is under the government of a Divine Mind. Leibnitz and the\r\nCartesians, on the contrary, maintain that our volitions do not and can not act upon\r\nmatter, and that it is only the existence of an all-governing Being, and that Being\r\nomnipotent, which can account for the sequence between our volitions and our bodily\r\nactions. When we consider that each of these two theories, which, as theories of\r\ncausation, stand at the opposite extremes of possible divergence\r\n\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page266\"\u003e[pg 266]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg266\" id=\"Pg266\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e\r\nfrom one another, invokes not only as its evidence, but as its sole evidence, the\r\nabsolute inconceivability of any theory but itself, we are enabled to measure the worth\r\nof this kind of evidence: and when we find the Volitional theory entirely built upon the\r\nassertion that by our mental constitution we are compelled to recognize our volitions as\r\nefficient causes, and then find other thinkers maintaining that we know that they are\r\nnot and can not be such causes, and can not conceive them to be so, I think we have a\r\nright to say that this supposed law of our mental constitution does not exist.\r\n\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 0.90em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e\r\nDr. Tulloch (pp. 45-47) thinks it a sufficient answer to this, that Leibnitz and the\r\nCartesians were Theists, and believed the will of God to be an efficient cause.\r\nDoubtless they did, and the Cartesians even believed (though Leibnitz did not) that it\r\nis the only such cause. Dr. Tulloch mistakes the nature of the question. I was not\r\nwriting on Theism, as Dr. Tulloch is, but against a particular theory of causation,\r\nwhich, if it be unfounded, can give no effective support to Theism or to any thing else.\r\nI found it asserted that volition is the only efficient cause, on the ground that no\r\nother efficient cause is conceivable. To this assertion I oppose the instances of\r\nLeibnitz and of the Cartesians, who affirmed with equal positiveness that volition as an\r\nefficient cause is itself not conceivable, and that omnipotence, which renders\r\nall things conceivable, can alone take away the impossibility. This I thought, and think,\r\na conclusive answer to the argument on which this theory of causation avowedly depends.\r\nBut I certainly did not imagine that Theism was bound up with that theory; nor expected\r\nto be charged with denying Leibnitz and the Cartesians to be Theists because I denied that\r\nthey held the theory.\r\n\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-div\" style=\"margin-bottom: 4.00em; margin-top: 4.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"toc53\" id=\"toc53\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"pdf54\" id=\"pdf54\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: center; margin-bottom: 2.40em; margin-top: 2.40em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 120%\"\u003eChapter VI.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: left; margin-bottom: 2.88em; margin-top: 2.88em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 144%\"\u003eOn The Composition Of Causes.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 1. To complete the general notion of causation on which the rules of\r\nexperimental inquiry into the laws of nature must be founded, one distinction\r\nstill remains to be pointed out: a distinction so radical, and of so\r\nmuch importance, as to require a chapter to itself.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe preceding discussions have rendered us familiar with the case in\r\nwhich several agents, or causes, concur as conditions to the production of\r\nan effect; a case, in truth, almost universal, there being very few effects to\r\nthe production of which no more than one agent contributes. Suppose,\r\nthen, that two different agents, operating jointly, are followed, under a\r\ncertain set of collateral conditions, by a given effect. If either of these\r\nagents, instead of being joined with the other, had operated alone, under\r\nthe same set of conditions in all other respects, some effect would probably\r\nhave followed, which would have been different from the joint effect of\r\nthe two, and more or less dissimilar to it. Now, if we happen to know\r\nwhat would be the effect of each cause when acting separately from the\r\nother, we are often able to arrive deductively, or \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\r\npriori\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, at a correct prediction\r\nof what will arise from their conjunct agency. To render this possible,\r\nit is only necessary that the same law which expresses the effect of\r\neach cause acting by itself, shall also correctly express the part due to that\r\ncause of the effect which follows from the two together. This condition is\r\nrealized in the extensive and important class of phenomena commonly called\r\nmechanical, namely the phenomena of the communication of motion (or\r\nof pressure, which is tendency to motion) from one body to another. In\r\nthis important class of cases of causation, one cause never, properly speaking,\r\ndefeats or frustrates another; both have their full effect. If a body is\r\npropelled in two directions by two forces, one tending to drive it to the\r\nnorth and the other to the east, it is caused to move in a given time exactly\r\nas far in both directions as the two forces would separately have carried\r\nit; and is left precisely where it would have arrived if it had been acted\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page267\"\u003e[pg 267]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg267\" id=\"Pg267\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nupon first by one of the two forces, and afterward by the other. This law\r\nof nature is called, in dynamics, the principle of the Composition of Forces;\r\nand in imitation of that well-chosen expression, I shall give the name of the\r\nComposition of Causes to the principle which is exemplified in all cases in\r\nwhich the joint effect of several causes is identical with the sum of their\r\nseparate effects.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThis principle, however, by no means prevails in all departments of the\r\nfield of nature. The chemical combination of two substances produces, as\r\nis well known, a third substance, with properties different from those of\r\neither of the two substances separately, or of both of them taken together.\r\nNot a trace of the properties of hydrogen or of oxygen is observable in\r\nthose of their compound, water. The taste of sugar of lead is not the\r\nsum of the tastes of its component elements, acetic acid and lead or its\r\noxide; nor is the color of blue vitriol a mixture of the colors of sulphuric\r\nacid and copper. This explains why mechanics is a deductive or demonstrative\r\nscience, and chemistry not. In the one, we can compute the effects\r\nof combinations of causes, whether real or hypothetical, from the\r\nlaws which we know to govern those causes when acting separately, because\r\nthey continue to observe the same laws when in combination which\r\nthey observe when separate: whatever would have happened in consequence\r\nof each cause taken by itself, happens when they are together,\r\nand we have only to cast up the results. Not so in the phenomena which\r\nare the peculiar subject of the science of chemistry. There most of the\r\nuniformities to which the causes conform when separate, cease altogether\r\nwhen they are conjoined; and we are not, at least in the present state of\r\nour knowledge, able to foresee what result will follow from any new combination\r\nuntil we have tried the specific experiment.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIf this be true of chemical combinations, it is still more true of those far\r\nmore complex combinations of elements which constitute organized bodies;\r\nand in which those extraordinary new uniformities arise which are called\r\nthe laws of life. All organized bodies are composed of parts similar to\r\nthose composing inorganic nature, and which have even themselves existed\r\nin an inorganic state; but the phenomena of life, which result from the\r\njuxtaposition of those parts in a certain manner, bear no analogy to any\r\nof the effects which would be produced by the action of the component\r\nsubstances considered as mere physical agents. To whatever degree we\r\nmight imagine our knowledge of the properties of the several ingredients\r\nof a living body to be extended and perfected, it is certain that no mere\r\nsumming up of the separate actions of those elements will ever amount to\r\nthe action of the living body itself. The tongue, for instance, is, like all\r\nother parts of the animal frame, composed of gelatine, fibrine, and other\r\nproducts of the chemistry of digestion; but from no knowledge of the\r\nproperties of those substances could we ever predict that it could taste, unless\r\ngelatine or fibrine could themselves taste; for no elementary fact can\r\nbe in the conclusion which was not in the premises.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThere are thus two different modes of the conjunct action of causes;\r\nfrom which arise two modes of conflict, or mutual interference, between\r\nlaws of nature. Suppose, at a given point of time and space, two or more\r\ncauses, which, if they acted separately, would produce effects contrary, or\r\nat least conflicting with each other; one of them tending to undo, wholly\r\nor partially, what the other tends to do. Thus the expansive force of the\r\ngases generated by the ignition of gunpowder tends to project a bullet\r\ntoward the sky, while its gravity tends to make it fall to the ground. A\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page268\"\u003e[pg 268]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg268\" id=\"Pg268\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nstream running into a reservoir at one end tends to fill it higher and higher,\r\nwhile a drain at the other extremity tends to empty it. Now, in such\r\ncases as these, even if the two causes which are in joint action exactly annul\r\none another, still the laws of both are fulfilled; the effect is the same\r\nas if the drain had been open for half an hour first,\u003ca id=\"noteref_132\" name=\"noteref_132\" href=\"#note_132\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e132\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nand the stream had\r\nflowed in for as long afterward. Each agent produces the same amount of\r\neffect as if it had acted separately, though the contrary effect which was\r\ntaking place during the same time obliterated it as fast as it was produced.\r\nHere, then, are two causes, producing by their joint operations an effect\r\nwhich at first seems quite dissimilar to those which they produce separately,\r\nbut which on examination proves to be really the sum of those separate\r\neffects. It will be noticed that we here enlarge the idea of the sum of two\r\neffects, so as to include what is commonly called their difference, but which\r\nis in reality the result of the addition of opposites; a conception to which\r\nmankind are indebted for that admirable extension of the algebraical calculus,\r\nwhich has so vastly increased its powers as an instrument of discovery,\r\nby introducing into its reasonings (with the sign of subtraction prefixed,\r\nand under the name of Negative Quantities) every description whatever\r\nof positive phenomena, provided they are of such a quality in reference\r\nto those previously introduced, that to add the one is equivalent to subtracting\r\nan equal quantity of the other.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThere is, then, one mode of the mutual interference of laws of nature, in\r\nwhich, even when the concurrent causes annihilate each other’s effects, each\r\nexerts its full efficacy according to its own law—its law as a separate agent.\r\nBut in the other description of cases, the agencies which are brought together\r\ncease entirely, and a totally different set of phenomena arise: as in\r\nthe experiment of two liquids which, when mixed in certain proportions,\r\ninstantly become, not a larger amount of liquid, but a solid mass.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 2. This difference between the case in which the joint effect of causes\r\nis the sum of their separate effects, and the case in which it is heterogeneous\r\nto them—between laws which work together without alteration, and\r\nlaws which, when called upon to work together, cease and give place to others—is\r\none of the fundamental distinctions in nature. The former case,\r\nthat of the Composition of Causes, is the general one; the other is always\r\nspecial and exceptional. There are no objects which do not, as to some of\r\ntheir phenomena, obey the principle of the Composition of Causes; none\r\nthat have not some laws which are rigidly fulfilled in every combination\r\ninto which the objects enter. The weight of a body, for instance, is a\r\nproperty which it retains in all the combinations in which it is placed.\r\nThe weight of a chemical compound, or of an organized body, is equal to\r\nthe sum of the weights of the elements which compose it. The weight\r\neither of the elements or of the compound will vary, if they be carried farther\r\nfrom their centre of attraction, or brought nearer to it; but whatever\r\neffects the one effects the other. They always remain precisely equal. So,\r\nagain, the component parts of a vegetable or animal substance do not lose\r\ntheir mechanical and chemical properties as separate agents, when, by a\r\npeculiar mode of juxtaposition, they, as an aggregate whole, acquire physiological\r\nor vital properties in addition. Those bodies continue, as before,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page269\"\u003e[pg 269]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg269\" id=\"Pg269\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nto obey mechanical and chemical laws, in so far as the operation of those\r\nlaws is not counteracted by the new laws which govern them as organized\r\nbeings; when, in short, a concurrence of causes takes place which calls into\r\naction new laws bearing no analogy to any that we can trace in the separate\r\noperation of the causes, the new laws, while they supersede one portion\r\nof the previous laws, may co-exist with another portion, and may even compound\r\nthe effect of those previous laws with their own.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAgain, laws which were themselves generated in the second mode, may\r\ngenerate others in the first. Though there are laws which, like those of\r\nchemistry and physiology, owe their existence to a breach of the principle\r\nof Composition of Causes, it does not follow that these peculiar, or, as they\r\nmight be termed, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eheteropathic\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nlaws, are not capable of composition with\r\none another. The causes which by one combination have had their laws\r\naltered, may carry their new laws with them unaltered into their ulterior\r\ncombinations. And hence there is no reason to despair of ultimately raising\r\nchemistry and physiology to the condition of deductive sciences; for though\r\nit is impossible to deduce all chemical and physiological truths from the\r\nlaws or properties of simple substances or elementary agents, they may\r\npossibly be deducible from laws which commence when these elementary\r\nagents are brought together into some moderate number of not very complex\r\ncombinations. The Laws of Life will never be deducible from the\r\nmere laws of the ingredients, but the prodigiously complex Facts of Life\r\nmay all be deducible from comparatively simple laws of life; which laws\r\n(depending indeed on combinations, but on comparatively simple combinations,\r\nof antecedents) may, in more complex circumstances, be strictly\r\ncompounded with one another, and with the physical and chemical laws of\r\nthe ingredients. The details of the vital phenomena, even now, afford innumerable\r\nexemplifications of the Composition of Causes; and in proportion\r\nas these phenomena are more accurately studied, there appears more reason\r\nto believe that the same laws which operate in the simpler combinations\r\nof circumstances do, in fact, continue to be observed in the more complex.\r\nThis will be found equally true in the phenomena of mind; and even in\r\nsocial and political phenomena, the results of the laws of mind. It is in\r\nthe case of chemical phenomena that the least progress has yet been made\r\nin bringing the special laws under general ones from which they may be\r\ndeduced; but there are even in chemistry many circumstances to encourage\r\nthe hope that such general laws will hereafter be discovered. The different\r\nactions of a chemical compound will never, undoubtedly, be found to\r\nbe the sums of the actions of its separate elements; but there may exist,\r\nbetween the properties of the compound and those of its elements, some\r\nconstant relation, which, if discoverable by a sufficient induction, would enable\r\nus to foresee the sort of compound which will result from a new combination\r\nbefore we have actually tried it, and to judge of what sort of elements\r\nsome new substance is compounded before we have analyzed it.\r\nThe law of definite proportions, first discovered in its full generality by\r\nDalton, is a complete solution of this problem in one, though but a secondary\r\naspect, that of quantity; and in respect to quality, we have already\r\nsome partial generalizations, sufficient to indicate the possibility of ultimately\r\nproceeding farther. We can predicate some common properties\r\nof the kind of compounds which result from the combination, in each of the\r\nsmall number of possible proportions, of any acid whatever with any base.\r\nWe have also the curious law, discovered by Berthollet, that two soluble\r\nsalts mutually decompose one another whenever the new combinations\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page270\"\u003e[pg 270]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg270\" id=\"Pg270\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nwhich result produce an insoluble compound, or one less soluble than the\r\ntwo former. Another uniformity is that called the law of isomorphism;\r\nthe identity of the crystalline forms of substances which possess in common\r\ncertain peculiarities of chemical composition.\u003ca id=\"noteref_133\" name=\"noteref_133\" href=\"#note_133\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e133\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Thus it appears that even\r\nheteropathic laws, such laws of combined agency as are not compounded\r\nof the laws of the separate agencies, are yet, at least in some cases, derived\r\nfrom them according to a fixed principle. There may, therefore, be laws\r\nof the generation of laws from others dissimilar to them; and in chemistry,\r\nthese undiscovered laws of the dependence of the properties of the\r\ncompound on the properties of its elements, may, together with the laws of\r\nthe elements themselves, furnish the premises by which the science is perhaps\r\ndestined one day to be rendered deductive.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt would seem, therefore, that there is no class of phenomena in which\r\nthe Composition of Causes does not obtain: that as a general rule, causes\r\nin combination produce exactly the same effects as when acting singly: but\r\nthat this rule, though general, is not universal: that in some instances, at\r\nsome particular points in the transition from separate to united action, the\r\nlaws change, and an entirely new set of effects are either added to, or take\r\nthe place of, those which arise from the separate agency of the same causes:\r\nthe laws of these new effects being again susceptible of composition, to an\r\nindefinite extent, like the laws which they superseded.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 3. That effects are proportional to their causes is laid down by some\r\nwriters as an axiom in the theory of causation; and great use is sometimes\r\nmade of this principle in reasonings respecting the laws of nature, though it\r\nis encumbered with many difficulties and apparent exceptions, which much\r\ningenuity has been expended in showing not to be real ones. This proposition,\r\nin so far as it is true, enters as a particular case into the general\r\nprinciple of the Composition of Causes; the causes compounded being, in\r\nthis instance, homogeneous; in which case, if in any, their joint effect might\r\nbe expected to be identical with the sum of their separate effects. If a\r\nforce equal to one hundred weight will raise a certain body along an inclined\r\nplane, a force equal to two hundred weight will raise two bodies exactly\r\nsimilar, and thus the effect is proportional to the cause. But does\r\nnot a force equal to two hundred weight actually contain in itself two forces\r\neach equal to one hundred weight, which, if employed apart, would separately\r\nraise the two bodies in question? The fact, therefore, that when exerted\r\njointly they raise both bodies at once, results from the Composition\r\nof Causes, and is a mere instance of the general fact that mechanical forces\r\nare subject to the law of Composition. And so in every other case which\r\ncan be supposed. For the doctrine of the proportionality of effects to their\r\ncauses can not of course be applicable to cases in which the augmentation\r\nof the cause alters the kind of effect; that is, in which the surplus quantity\r\nsuperadded to the cause does not become compounded with it, but the\r\ntwo together generate an altogether new phenomenon. Suppose that the\r\napplication of a certain quantity of heat to a body merely increases its\r\nbulk, that a double quantity melts it, and a triple quantity decomposes it:\r\nthese three effects being heterogeneous, no ratio, whether corresponding\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page271\"\u003e[pg 271]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg271\" id=\"Pg271\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nor not to that of the quantities of heat applied, can be established between\r\nthem. Thus the supposed axiom of the proportionality of effects to their\r\ncauses fails at the precise point where the principle of the Composition of\r\nCauses also fails; viz., where the concurrence of causes is such as to determine\r\na change in the properties of the body generally, and render it subject\r\nto new laws, more or less dissimilar to those to which it conformed in\r\nits previous state. The recognition, therefore, of any such law of proportionality\r\nis superseded by the more comprehensive principle, in which as\r\nmuch of it as is true is implicitly asserted.\u003ca id=\"noteref_134\" name=\"noteref_134\" href=\"#note_134\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e134\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe general remarks on causation, which seemed necessary as an introduction\r\nto the theory of the inductive process, may here terminate. That\r\nprocess is essentially an inquiry into cases of causation. All the uniformities\r\nwhich exist in the succession of phenomena, and most of the uniformities\r\nin their co-existence, are either, as we have seen, themselves laws of\r\ncausation, or consequences resulting from, and corollaries capable of being\r\ndeduced from, such laws. If we could determine what causes are correctly\r\nassigned to what effects, and what effects to what causes, we should be\r\nvirtually acquainted with the whole course of nature. All those uniformities\r\nwhich are mere results of causation might then be explained and accounted\r\nfor; and every individual fact or event might be predicted, provided\r\nwe had the requisite data, that is, the requisite knowledge of the circumstances\r\nwhich, in the particular instance, preceded it.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nTo ascertain, therefore, what are the laws of causation which exist in nature;\r\nto determine the effect of every cause, and the causes of all effects,\r\nis the main business of Induction; and to point out how this is done is the\r\nchief object of Inductive Logic.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page272\"\u003e[pg 272]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg272\" id=\"Pg272\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-div\" style=\"margin-bottom: 4.00em; margin-top: 4.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"toc55\" id=\"toc55\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"pdf56\" id=\"pdf56\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: center; margin-bottom: 2.40em; margin-top: 2.40em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 120%\"\u003eChapter VII.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: left; margin-bottom: 2.88em; margin-top: 2.88em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 144%\"\u003eOn Observation And Experiment.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ca name=\"Book_III_Chapter_VII_Section_1\" id=\"Book_III_Chapter_VII_Section_1\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 1. It results from the preceding exposition, that the process of ascertaining\r\nwhat consequents, in nature, are invariably connected with what\r\nantecedents, or in other words what phenomena are related to each other\r\nas causes and effects, is in some sort a process of analysis. That every\r\nfact which begins to exist has a cause, and that this cause must be found\r\nin some fact or concourse of facts which immediately preceded the occurrence,\r\nmay be taken for certain. The whole of the present facts are the\r\ninfallible result of all past facts, and more immediately of all the facts\r\nwhich existed at the moment previous. Here, then, is a great sequence,\r\nwhich we know to be uniform. If the whole prior state of the entire universe\r\ncould again recur, it would again be followed by the present state.\r\nThe question is, how to resolve this complex uniformity into the simpler\r\nuniformities which compose it, and assign to each portion of the vast antecedent\r\nthe portion of the consequent which is attendant on it.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThis operation, which we have called analytical, inasmuch as it is the\r\nresolution of a complex whole into the component elements, is more than\r\na merely mental analysis. No mere contemplation of the phenomena, and\r\npartition of them by the intellect alone, will of itself accomplish the end we\r\nhave now in view. Nevertheless, such a mental partition is an indispensable\r\nfirst step. The order of nature, as perceived at a first glance, presents\r\nat every instant a chaos followed by another chaos. We must decompose\r\neach chaos into single facts. We must learn to see in the chaotic antecedent\r\na multitude of distinct antecedents, in the chaotic consequent a multitude\r\nof distinct consequents. This, supposing it done, will not of itself\r\ntell us on which of the antecedents each consequent is invariably attendant.\r\nTo determine that point, we must endeavor to effect a separation of the\r\nfacts from one another, not in our minds only, but in nature. The mental\r\nanalysis, however, must take place first. And every one knows that in the\r\nmode of performing it, one intellect differs immensely from another. It is\r\nthe essence of the act of observing; for the observer is not he who merely\r\nsees the thing which is before his eyes, but he who sees what parts that\r\nthing is composed of. To do this well is a rare talent. One person, from\r\ninattention, or attending only in the wrong place, overlooks half of what he\r\nsees; another sets down much more than he sees, confounding it with what\r\nhe imagines, or with what he infers; another takes note of the \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ekind\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e of all\r\nthe circumstances, but being inexpert in estimating their degree, leaves the\r\nquantity of each vague and uncertain; another sees indeed the whole, but\r\nmakes such an awkward division of it into parts, throwing things into one\r\nmass which require to be separated, and separating others which might\r\nmore conveniently be considered as one, that the result is much the same,\r\nsometimes even worse, than if no analysis had been attempted at all. It\r\nwould be possible to point out what qualities of mind, and modes of mental\r\nculture, fit a person for being a good observer: that, however, is a\r\nquestion not of Logic, but of the Theory of Education, in the most enlarged\r\nsense of the term. There is not properly an Art of Observing.\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page273\"\u003e[pg 273]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg273\" id=\"Pg273\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nThere may be rules for observing. But these, like rules for inventing, are\r\nproperly instructions for the preparation of one’s own mind; for putting\r\nit into the state in which it will be most fitted to observe, or most likely\r\nto invent. They are, therefore, essentially rules of self-education, which is\r\na different thing from Logic. They do not teach how to do the thing, but\r\nhow to make ourselves capable of doing it. They are an art of strengthening\r\nthe limbs, not an art of using them.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe extent and minuteness of observation which may be requisite, and\r\nthe degree of decomposition to which it may be necessary to carry the\r\nmental analysis, depend on the particular purpose in view. To ascertain\r\nthe state of the whole universe at any particular moment is impossible, but\r\nwould also be useless. In making chemical experiments, we do not think\r\nit necessary to note the position of the planets; because experience has\r\nshown, as a very superficial experience is sufficient to show, that in such\r\ncases that circumstance is not material to the result: and accordingly, in\r\nthe ages when men believed in the occult influences of the heavenly bodies,\r\nit might have been unphilosophical to omit ascertaining the precise condition\r\nof those bodies at the moment of the experiment. As to the degree\r\nof minuteness of the mental subdivision, if we were obliged to break down\r\nwhat we observe into its very simplest elements, that is, literally into single\r\nfacts, it would be difficult to say where we should find them; we can\r\nhardly ever affirm that our divisions of any kind have reached the ultimate\r\nunit. But this, too, is fortunately unnecessary. The only object of the\r\nmental separation is to suggest the requisite physical separation, so that\r\nwe may either accomplish it ourselves, or seek for it in nature; and we\r\nhave done enough when we have carried the subdivision as far as the point\r\nat which we are able to see what observations or experiments we require.\r\nIt is only essential, at whatever point our mental decomposition of facts\r\nmay for the present have stopped, that we should hold ourselves ready and\r\nable to carry it further as occasion requires, and should not allow the freedom\r\nof our discriminating faculty to be imprisoned by the swathes and\r\nbands of ordinary classification; as was the case with all early speculative\r\ninquirers, not excepting the Greeks, to whom it seldom occurred that what\r\nwas called by one abstract name might, in reality, be several phenomena,\r\nor that there was a possibility of decomposing the facts of the universe into\r\nany elements but those which ordinary language already recognized.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 2. The different antecedents and consequents being, then, supposed to\r\nbe, so far as the case requires, ascertained and discriminated from one another,\r\nwe are to inquire which is connected with which. In every instance\r\nwhich comes under our observation, there are many antecedents and many\r\nconsequents. If those antecedents could not be severed from one another\r\nexcept in thought, or if those consequents never were found apart, it would\r\nbe impossible for us to distinguish (\u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\r\nposteriori\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e at least) the real laws, or\r\nto assign to any cause its effect, or to any effect its cause. To do so, we\r\nmust be able to meet with some of the antecedents apart from the rest, and\r\nobserve what follows from them; or some of the consequents, and observe\r\nby what they are preceded. We must, in short, follow the Baconian rule\r\nof \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003evarying the circumstances\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e. This is, indeed, only the first rule of\r\nphysical inquiry, and not, as some have thought, the sole rule; but it is the\r\nfoundation of all the rest.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nFor the purpose of varying the circumstances, we may have recourse\r\n(according to a distinction commonly made) either to observation or to experiment;\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page274\"\u003e[pg 274]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg274\" id=\"Pg274\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nwe may either \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003efind\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e an instance in nature suited to our purposes,\r\nor, by an artificial arrangement of circumstances, \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003emake\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e one. The value of\r\nthe instance depends on what it is in itself, not on the mode in which it is\r\nobtained: its employment for the purposes of induction depends on the\r\nsame principles in the one case and in the other; as the uses of money are\r\nthe same whether it is inherited or acquired. There is, in short, no difference\r\nin kind, no real logical distinction, between the two processes of investigation.\r\nThere are, however, practical distinctions to which it is of\r\nconsiderable importance to advert.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 3. The first and most obvious distinction between Observation and\r\nExperiment is, that the latter is an immense extension of the former. It\r\nnot only enables us to produce a much greater number of variations in the\r\ncircumstances than nature spontaneously offers, but also, in thousands of\r\ncases, to produce the precise \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003esort\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e of variation which we are in want of for\r\ndiscovering the law of the phenomenon; a service which nature, being constructed\r\non a quite different scheme from that of facilitating our studies,\r\nis seldom so friendly as to bestow upon us. For example, in order to ascertain\r\nwhat principle in the atmosphere enables it to sustain life, the\r\nvariation we require is that a living animal should be immersed in each\r\ncomponent element of the atmosphere separately. But nature does not\r\nsupply either oxygen or azote in a separate state. We are indebted to artificial\r\nexperiment for our knowledge that it is the former, and not the latter,\r\nwhich supports respiration; and for our knowledge of the very existence\r\nof the two ingredients.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThus far the advantage of experimentation over simple observation is\r\nuniversally recognized: all are aware that it enables us to obtain innumerable\r\ncombinations of circumstances which are not to be found in nature,\r\nand so add to nature’s experiments a multitude of experiments of our own.\r\nBut there is another superiority (or, as Bacon would have expressed it, another\r\nprerogative) of instances artificially obtained over spontaneous instances—of\r\nour own experiments over even the same experiments when\r\nmade by nature—which is not of less importance, and which is far from\r\nbeing felt and acknowledged in the same degree.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWhen we can produce a phenomenon artificially, we can take it, as it\r\nwere, home with us, and observe it in the midst of circumstances with\r\nwhich in all other respects we are accurately acquainted. If we desire to\r\nknow what are the effects of the cause A, and are able to produce A by\r\nmeans at our disposal, we can generally determine at our own discretion, so\r\nfar as is compatible with the nature of the phenomenon A, the whole of\r\nthe circumstances which shall be present along with it: and thus, knowing\r\nexactly the simultaneous state of every thing else which is within the reach\r\nof A’s influence, we have only to observe what alteration is made in that\r\nstate by the presence of A.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nFor example, by the electric machine we can produce, in the midst of\r\nknown circumstances, the phenomena which nature exhibits on a grander\r\nscale in the form of lightning and thunder. Now let any one consider\r\nwhat amount of knowledge of the effects and laws of electric agency mankind\r\ncould have obtained from the mere observation of thunder-storms, and\r\ncompare it with that which they have gained, and may expect to gain, from\r\nelectrical and galvanic experiments. This example is the more striking,\r\nnow that we have reason to believe that electric action is of all natural\r\nphenomena (except heat) the most pervading and universal, which, therefore,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page275\"\u003e[pg 275]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg275\" id=\"Pg275\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nit might antecedently have been supposed could stand least in need of\r\nartificial means of production to enable it to be studied; while the fact is\r\nso much the contrary, that without the electric machine, the Leyden jar,\r\nand the voltaic battery, we probably should never have suspected the existence\r\nof electricity as one of the great agents in nature; the few electric\r\nphenomena we should have known of would have continued to be regarded\r\neither as supernatural, or as a sort of anomalies and eccentricities in the\r\norder of the universe.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWhen we have succeeded in insulating the phenomenon which is the\r\nsubject of inquiry, by placing it among known circumstances, we may produce\r\nfurther variations of circumstances to any extent, and of such kinds\r\nas we think best calculated to bring the laws of the phenomenon into a\r\nclear light. By introducing one well-defined circumstance after another\r\ninto the experiment, we obtain assurance of the manner in which the phenomenon\r\nbehaves under an indefinite variety of possible circumstances.\r\nThus, chemists, after having obtained some newly-discovered substance in\r\na pure state (that is, having made sure that there is nothing present which\r\ncan interfere with and modify its agency), introduce various other substances,\r\none by one, to ascertain whether it will combine with them, or decompose\r\nthem, and with what result; and also apply heat, or electricity, or\r\npressure, to discover what will happen to the substance under each of these\r\ncircumstances.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nBut if, on the other hand, it is out of our power to produce the phenomenon,\r\nand we have to seek for instances in which nature produces it, the\r\ntask before us is very different.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nInstead of being able to choose what the concomitant circumstances\r\nshall be, we now have to discover what they are; which, when we go beyond\r\nthe simplest and most accessible cases, it is next to impossible to do\r\nwith any precision and completeness. Let us take, as an exemplification of\r\na phenomenon which we have no means of fabricating artificially, a human\r\nmind. Nature produces many; but the consequence of our not being able\r\nto produce them by art is, that in every instance in which we see a human\r\nmind developing itself, or acting upon other things, we see it surrounded\r\nand obscured by an indefinite multitude of unascertainable circumstances,\r\nrendering the use of the common experimental methods almost delusive.\r\nWe may conceive to what extent this is true, if we consider, among\r\nother things, that whenever Nature produces a human mind, she produces,\r\nin close connection with it, a body; that is, a vast complication of physical\r\nfacts, in no two cases perhaps exactly similar, and most of which (except\r\nthe mere structure, which we can examine in a sort of coarse way after it\r\nhas ceased to act), are radically out of the reach of our means of exploration.\r\nIf, instead of a human mind, we suppose the subject of investigation\r\nto be a human society or State, all the same difficulties recur in a greatly\r\naugmented degree.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWe have thus already come within sight of a conclusion, which the progress\r\nof the inquiry will, I think, bring before us with the clearest evidence:\r\nnamely, that in the sciences which deal with phenomena in which\r\nartificial experiments are impossible (as in the case of astronomy), or in\r\nwhich they have a very limited range (as in mental philosophy, social\r\nscience, and even physiology), induction from direct experience is practiced\r\nat a disadvantage in most cases equivalent to impracticability; from which\r\nit follows that the methods of those sciences, in order to accomplish any\r\nthing worthy of attainment, must be to a great extent, if not principally,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page276\"\u003e[pg 276]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg276\" id=\"Pg276\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\ndeductive. This is already known to be the case with the first of the sciences\r\nwe have mentioned, astronomy; that it is not generally recognized\r\nas true of the others, is probably one of the reasons why they are not in a\r\nmore advanced state.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ca name=\"Book_III_Chapter_VII_Section_4\" id=\"Book_III_Chapter_VII_Section_4\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 4. If what is called pure observation is at so great a disadvantage,\r\ncompared with artificial experimentation, in one department of the direct\r\nexploration of phenomena, there is another branch in which the advantage\r\nis all on the side of the former.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nInductive inquiry having for its object to ascertain what causes are connected\r\nwith what effects, we may begin this search at either end of the road\r\nwhich leads from the one point to the other: we may either inquire into\r\nthe effects of a given cause or into the causes of a given effect. The fact\r\nthat light blackens chloride of silver might have been discovered either by\r\nexperiments on light, trying what effect it would produce on various substances,\r\nor by observing that portions of the chloride had repeatedly become\r\nblack, and inquiring into the circumstances. The effect of the urali\r\npoison might have become known either by administering it to animals,\r\nor by examining how it happened that the wounds which the Indians of\r\nGuiana inflict with their arrows prove so uniformly mortal. Now it is\r\nmanifest from the mere statement of the examples, without any theoretical\r\ndiscussion, that artificial experimentation is applicable only to the former of\r\nthese modes of investigation. We can take a cause, and try what it will\r\nproduce; but we can not take an effect, and try what it will be produced\r\nby. We can only watch till we see it produced, or are enabled to produce\r\nit by accident.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThis would be of little importance, if it always depended on our choice\r\nfrom which of the two ends of the sequence we would undertake our inquiries.\r\nBut we have seldom any option. As we can only travel from\r\nthe known to the unknown, we are obliged to commence at whichever end\r\nwe are best acquainted with. If the agent is more familiar to us than its\r\neffects, we watch for, or contrive, instances of the agent, under such varieties\r\nof circumstances as are open to us, and observe the result. If, on the\r\ncontrary, the conditions on which a phenomenon depends are obscure, but\r\nthe phenomenon itself familiar, we must commence our inquiry from the\r\neffect. If we are struck with the fact that chloride of silver has been\r\nblackened, and have no suspicion of the cause, we have no resource but to\r\ncompare instances in which the fact has chanced to occur, until by that\r\ncomparison we discover that in all those instances the substances had been\r\nexposed to light. If we knew nothing of the Indian arrows but their fatal\r\neffect, accident alone could turn our attention to experiments on the\r\nurali; in the regular course of investigation, we could only inquire, or try\r\nto observe, what had been done to the arrows in particular instances.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWherever, having nothing to guide us to the cause, we are obliged to\r\nset out from the effect, and to apply the rule of varying the circumstances\r\nto the consequents, not the antecedents, we are necessarily destitute of the\r\nresource of artificial experimentation. We can not, at our choice, obtain\r\nconsequents, as we can antecedents, under any set of circumstances compatible\r\nwith their nature. There are no means of producing effects but\r\nthrough their causes, and by the supposition the causes of the effect in question\r\nare not known to us. We have, therefore, no expedient but to study it\r\nwhere it offers itself spontaneously. If nature happens to present us with\r\ninstances sufficiently varied in their circumstances, and if we are able to discover,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page277\"\u003e[pg 277]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg277\" id=\"Pg277\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\neither among the proximate antecedents or among some other order\r\nof antecedents, something which is always found when the effect is found,\r\nhowever various the circumstances, and never found when it is not, we\r\nmay discover, by mere observation without experiment, a real uniformity\r\nin nature.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nBut though this is certainly the most favorable case for sciences of pure\r\nobservation, as contrasted with those in which artificial experiments are\r\npossible, there is in reality no case which more strikingly illustrates the\r\ninherent imperfection of direct induction when not founded on experimentation.\r\nSuppose that, by a comparison of cases of the effect, we have found\r\nan antecedent which appears to be, and perhaps is, invariably connected\r\nwith it: we have not yet proved that antecedent to be the cause until we\r\nhave reversed the process, and produced the effect by means of that antecedent.\r\nIf we can produce the antecedent artificially, and if, when we do\r\nso, the effect follows, the induction is complete; that antecedent is the\r\ncause of that consequent.\u003ca id=\"noteref_135\" name=\"noteref_135\" href=\"#note_135\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e135\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e But we have then added the evidence of experiment\r\nto that of simple observation. Until we had done so, we had\r\nonly proved \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003einvariable\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e antecedence within the limits of experience, but\r\nnot \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eunconditional\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e antecedence, or causation. Until it had been shown by\r\nthe actual production of the antecedent under known circumstances, and\r\nthe occurrence thereupon of the consequent, that the antecedent was really\r\nthe condition on which it depended; the uniformity of succession which\r\nwas proved to exist between them might, for aught we knew, be (like the\r\nsuccession of day and night) not a case of causation at all; both antecedent\r\nand consequent might be successive stages of the effect of an ulterior cause.\r\nObservation, in short, without experiment (supposing no aid from deduction)\r\ncan ascertain sequences and co-existences, but can not prove causation.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIn order to see these remarks verified by the actual state of the sciences,\r\nwe have only to think of the condition of natural history. In zoology, for\r\nexample, there is an immense number of uniformities ascertained, some of\r\nco-existence, others of succession, to many of which, notwithstanding considerable\r\nvariations of the attendant circumstances, we know not any exception:\r\nbut the antecedents, for the most part, are such as we can not\r\nartificially produce; or if we can, it is only by setting in motion the exact\r\nprocess by which nature produces them; and this being to us a mysterious\r\nprocess, of which the main circumstances are not only unknown but\r\nunobservable, we do not succeed in obtaining the antecedents under known\r\ncircumstances. What is the result? That on this vast subject, which affords\r\nso much and such varied scope for observation, we have made most\r\nscanty progress in ascertaining any laws of causation. We know not with\r\ncertainty, in the case of most of the phenomena that we find conjoined,\r\nwhich is the condition of the other; which is cause, and which effect, or\r\nwhether either of them is so, or they are not rather conjunct effects of\r\ncauses yet to be discovered, complex results of laws hitherto unknown.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAlthough some of the foregoing observations may be, in technical strictness\r\nof arrangement, premature in this place, it seemed that a few general\r\nremarks on the difference between sciences of mere observation and sciences\r\nof experimentation, and the extreme disadvantage under which directly inductive\r\ninquiry is necessarily carried on in the former, were the best preparation\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page278\"\u003e[pg 278]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg278\" id=\"Pg278\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nfor discussing the methods of direct induction; a preparation rendering\r\nsuperfluous much that must otherwise have been introduced, with\r\nsome inconvenience, into the heart of that discussion. To the consideration\r\nof these methods we now proceed.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-div\" style=\"margin-bottom: 4.00em; margin-top: 4.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"toc57\" id=\"toc57\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"pdf58\" id=\"pdf58\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: center; margin-bottom: 2.40em; margin-top: 2.40em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 120%\"\u003eChapter VIII.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: left; margin-bottom: 2.88em; margin-top: 2.88em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 144%\"\u003eOf The Four Methods Of Experimental Inquiry.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 1. The simplest and most obvious modes of singling out from among\r\nthe circumstances which precede or follow a phenomenon, those with which\r\nit is really connected by an invariable law, are two in number. One is, by\r\ncomparing together different instances in which the phenomenon occurs.\r\nThe other is, by comparing instances in which the phenomenon does occur,\r\nwith instances in other respects similar in which it does not. These two\r\nmethods may be respectively denominated, the Method of Agreement, and\r\nthe Method of Difference.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIn illustrating these methods, it will be necessary to bear in mind the\r\ntwofold character of inquiries into the laws of phenomena; which may\r\nbe either inquiries into the cause of a given effect, or into the effects or\r\nproperties of a given cause. We shall consider the methods in their application\r\nto either order of investigation, and shall draw our examples\r\nequally from both.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWe shall denote antecedents by the large letters of the alphabet, and\r\nthe consequents corresponding to them by the small. Let A, then, be an\r\nagent or cause, and let the object of our inquiry be to ascertain what are\r\nthe effects of this cause. If we can either find, or produce, the agent A in\r\nsuch varieties of circumstances that the different cases have no circumstance\r\nin common except A; then whatever effect we find to be produced in all\r\nour trials, is indicated as the effect of A. Suppose, for example, that A is\r\ntried along with B and C, and that the effect is \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea b c\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e; and\r\nsuppose that A is next tried with D and E, but without B and C, and that the effect is\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea d e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e. Then we may reason thus: \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eb\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e and\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ec\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e are not effects of A, for they were\r\nnot produced by it in the second experiment; nor are \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ed\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e and\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ee\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, for they were not produced in the first. Whatever is really\r\nthe effect of A must have been produced in both instances; now this condition is\r\nfulfilled by no circumstance except \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e. The phenomenon\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e can not have been the effect\r\nof B or C, since it was produced where they were not; nor of D or E,\r\nsince it was produced where they were not. Therefore it is the effect\r\nof A.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nFor example, let the antecedent A be the contact of an alkaline substance\r\nand an oil. This combination being tried under several varieties\r\nof circumstances, resembling each other in nothing else, the results agree in\r\nthe production of a greasy and detersive or saponaceous substance: it is\r\ntherefore concluded that the combination of an oil and an alkali causes the\r\nproduction of a soap. It is thus we inquire, by the Method of Agreement,\r\ninto the effect of a given cause.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIn a similar manner we may inquire into the cause of a given effect.\r\nLet \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e be the effect. Here, as shown in the last chapter, we have\r\nonly the resource of observation without experiment: we can not take a phenomenon\r\nof which we know not the origin, and try to find its mode of production\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page279\"\u003e[pg 279]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg279\" id=\"Pg279\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nby producing it: if we succeeded in such a random trial it could only\r\nbe by accident. But if we can observe a in two different combinations,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea b c\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e and \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea d e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e; and if we know, or can\r\ndiscover, that the antecedent circumstances\r\nin these cases respectively were A B C and A D E, we may\r\nconclude by a reasoning similar to that in the preceding example, that A is\r\nthe antecedent connected with the consequent \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e by a law of\r\ncausation. B and C, we may say, can not be causes of \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, since on\r\nits second occurrence they were not present; nor are D and E, for they were not present\r\non its first occurrence. A, alone of the five circumstances, was found among\r\nthe antecedents of \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e in both instances.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nFor example, let the effect \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e be crystallization. We compare\r\ninstances in which bodies are known to assume crystalline structure, but which have\r\nno other point of agreement; and we find them to have one, and as far as\r\nwe can observe, only one, antecedent in common: the deposition of a solid\r\nmatter from a liquid state, either a state of fusion or of solution. We\r\nconclude, therefore, that the solidification of a substance from a liquid state\r\nis an invariable antecedent of its crystallization.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIn this example we may go further, and say, it is not only the invariable\r\nantecedent but the cause; or at least the proximate event which completes\r\nthe cause. For in this case we are able, after detecting the antecedent A,\r\nto produce it artificially, and by finding that \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e follows it,\r\nverify the result of our induction. The importance of thus reversing the proof was\r\nstrikingly manifested when, by keeping a phial of water charged with siliceous\r\nparticles undisturbed for years, a chemist (I believe Dr. Wollaston) succeeded\r\nin obtaining crystals of quartz; and in the equally interesting experiment\r\nin which Sir James Hall produced artificial marble by the cooling\r\nof its materials from fusion under immense pressure: two admirable\r\nexamples of the light which may be thrown upon the most secret processes\r\nof Nature by well-contrived interrogation of her.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nBut if we can not artificially produce the phenomenon A, the conclusion\r\nthat it is the cause of \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e remains subject to very considerable\r\ndoubt. Though an invariable, it may not be the unconditional antecedent of\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, but may precede it as day precedes night or night day. This\r\nuncertainty arises from the impossibility of assuring ourselves that A is the\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eonly\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e immediate antecedent common to both the instances. If we could be\r\ncertain of having ascertained all the invariable antecedents, we might be sure that the\r\nunconditional invariable antecedent, or cause, must be found somewhere\r\namong them. Unfortunately it is hardly ever possible to ascertain all the\r\nantecedents, unless the phenomenon is one which we can produce artificially.\r\nEven then, the difficulty is merely lightened, not removed: men knew\r\nhow to raise water in pumps long before they adverted to what was really\r\nthe operating circumstance in the means they employed, namely, the pressure\r\nof the atmosphere on the open surface of the water. It is, however,\r\nmuch easier to analyze completely a set of arrangements made by ourselves,\r\nthan the whole complex mass of the agencies which nature happens\r\nto be exerting at the moment of the production of a given phenomenon.\r\nWe may overlook some of the material circumstances in an experiment\r\nwith an electrical machine; but we shall, at the worst, be better acquainted\r\nwith them than with those of a thunder-storm.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe mode of discovering and proving laws of nature, which we have\r\nnow examined, proceeds on the following axiom: Whatever circumstances\r\ncan be excluded, without prejudice to the phenomenon, or can be absent\r\nnotwithstanding its presence, is not connected with it in the way of causation.\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page280\"\u003e[pg 280]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg280\" id=\"Pg280\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nThe casual circumstances being thus eliminated, if only one remains,\r\nthat one is the cause which we are in search of: if more than one, they either\r\nare, or contain among them, the cause; and so, \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003emutatis mutandis\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, of\r\nthe effect. As this method proceeds by comparing different instances to\r\nascertain in what they agree, I have termed it the Method of Agreement;\r\nand we may adopt as its regulating principal the following canon:\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-variant: small-caps\"\u003eFirst Canon.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eIf two or more instances of the phenomenon under investigation have\r\nonly one circumstance in common, the circumstance in which alone all\r\nthe instances agree, is the cause (or effect) of the given phenomenon.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nQuitting for the present the Method of Agreement, to which we shall\r\nalmost immediately return, we proceed to a still more potent instrument\r\nof the investigation of nature, the Method of Difference.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 2. In the Method of Agreement, we endeavored to obtain instances\r\nwhich agreed in the given circumstance but differed in every other: in the\r\npresent method we require, on the contrary, two instances resembling one\r\nanother in every other respect, but differing in the presence or absence of\r\nthe phenomenon we wish to study. If our object be to discover the effects\r\nof an agent A, we must procure A in some set of ascertained circumstances,\r\nas A B C, and having noted the effects produced, compare them\r\nwith the effect of the remaining circumstances B C, when A is absent. If\r\nthe effect of A B C is \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea b c\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, and the effect of B C\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eb c\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, it is evident that the\r\neffect of A is \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e. So again, if we begin at the other end, and\r\ndesire to investigate the cause of an effect \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, we must select\r\nan instance, as \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea b c\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, in\r\nwhich the effect occurs, and in which the antecedents were A B C, and we\r\nmust look out for another instance in which the remaining circumstances,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eb c\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, occur without \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e. If the antecedents,\r\nin that instance, are B C, we know that the cause of \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e must be A:\r\neither A alone, or A in conjunction with some of the other circumstances present.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt is scarcely necessary to give examples of a logical process to which\r\nwe owe almost all the inductive conclusions we draw in daily life. When\r\na man is shot through the heart, it is by this method we know that it was\r\nthe gunshot which killed him: for he was in the fullness of life immediately\r\nbefore, all circumstances being the same, except the wound.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe axioms implied in this method are evidently the following. Whatever\r\nantecedent can not be excluded without preventing the phenomenon,\r\nis the cause, or a condition, of that phenomenon: whatever consequent\r\ncan be excluded, with no other difference in the antecedents than the absence\r\nof a particular one, is the effect of that one. Instead of comparing\r\ndifferent instances of a phenomenon, to discover in what they agree, this\r\nmethod compares an instance of its occurrence with an instance of its non-occurrence,\r\nto discover in what they differ. The canon which is the regulating\r\nprinciple of the Method of Difference may be expressed as follows:\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-variant: small-caps\"\u003eSecond Canon.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eIf an instance in which the phenomenon under investigation occurs,\r\nand an instance in which it does not occur, have every circumstance in\r\ncommon save one, that one occurring only in the former; the circumstance\r\nin which alone the two instances differ, is the effect, or the cause, or\r\nan indispensable part of the cause, of the phenomenon.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page281\"\u003e[pg 281]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg281\" id=\"Pg281\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 3. The two methods which we have now stated have many features\r\nof resemblance, but there are also many distinctions between them. Both\r\nare methods of \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eelimination\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e. This term (employed in the theory of\r\nequations to denote the process by which one after another of the elements of\r\na question is excluded, and the solution made to depend on the relation\r\nbetween the remaining elements only) is well suited to express the operation,\r\nanalogous to this, which has been understood since the time of Bacon\r\nto be the foundation of experimental inquiry: namely, the successive exclusion\r\nof the various circumstances which are found to accompany a phenomenon\r\nin a given instance, in order to ascertain what are those among\r\nthem which can be absent consistently with the existence of the phenomenon.\r\nThe Method of Agreement stands on the ground that whatever can\r\nbe eliminated, is not connected with the phenomenon by any law. The\r\nMethod of Difference has for its foundation, that whatever can not be\r\neliminated, is connected with the phenomenon by a law.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nOf these methods, that of Difference is more particularly a method of\r\nartificial experiment; while that of Agreement is more especially the resource\r\nemployed where experimentation is impossible. A few reflections\r\nwill prove the fact, and point out the reason of it.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt is inherent in the peculiar character of the Method of Difference, that\r\nthe nature of the combinations which it requires is much more strictly defined\r\nthan in the Method of Agreement. The two instances which are to\r\nbe compared with one another must be exactly similar, in all circumstances\r\nexcept the one which we are attempting to investigate: they must be in\r\nthe relation of A B C and B C, or of \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea b c\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e and\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eb c\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e. It is true that this\r\nsimilarity of circumstances needs not extend to such as are already known\r\nto be immaterial to the result. And in the case of most phenomena we\r\nlearn at once, from the commonest experience, that most of the co-existent\r\nphenomena of the universe may be either present or absent without affecting\r\nthe given phenomenon; or, if present, are present indifferently when\r\nthe phenomenon does not happen and when it does. Still, even limiting\r\nthe identity which is required between the two instances, A B C and B C,\r\nto such circumstances as are not already known to be indifferent, it is\r\nvery seldom that nature affords two instances, of which we can be assured\r\nthat they stand in this precise relation to one another. In the spontaneous\r\noperations of nature there is generally such complication and such obscurity,\r\nthey are mostly either on so overwhelmingly large or on so inaccessibly\r\nminute a scale, we are so ignorant of a great part of the facts\r\nwhich really take place, and even those of which we are not ignorant are\r\nso multitudinous, and therefore so seldom exactly alike in any two cases,\r\nthat a spontaneous experiment, of the kind required by the Method of Difference,\r\nis commonly not to be found. When, on the contrary, we obtain\r\na phenomenon by an artificial experiment, a pair of instances such as the\r\nmethod requires is obtained almost as a matter of course, provided the\r\nprocess does not last a long time. A certain state of surrounding circumstances\r\nexisted before we commenced the experiment; this is B C. We\r\nthen introduce A; say, for instance, by merely bringing an object from\r\nanother part of the room, before there has been time for any change in the\r\nother elements. It is, in short (as M. Comté observes), the very nature of\r\nan experiment, to introduce into the pre-existing state of circumstances a\r\nchange perfectly definite. We choose a previous state of things with\r\nwhich we are well acquainted, so that no unforeseen alteration in that state\r\nis likely to pass unobserved; and into this we introduce, as rapidly as possible,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page282\"\u003e[pg 282]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg282\" id=\"Pg282\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nthe phenomenon which we wish to study; so that in general we are\r\nentitled to feel complete assurance that the pre-existing state, and the state\r\nwhich we have produced, differ in nothing except the presence or absence\r\nof that phenomenon. If a bird is taken from a cage, and instantly plunged\r\ninto carbonic acid gas, the experimentalist may be fully assured (at all\r\nevents after one or two repetitions) that no circumstance capable of causing\r\nsuffocation had supervened in the interim, except the change from immersion\r\nin the atmosphere to immersion in carbonic acid gas. There is\r\none doubt, indeed, which may remain in some cases of this description;\r\nthe effect may have been produced not by the change, but by the means\r\nemployed to produce the change. The possibility, however, of this last\r\nsupposition generally admits of being conclusively tested by other experiments.\r\nIt thus appears that in the study of the various kinds of phenomena\r\nwhich we can, by our voluntary agency, modify or control, we can in\r\ngeneral satisfy the requisitions of the Method of Difference; but that by\r\nthe spontaneous operations of nature those requisitions are seldom fulfilled.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe reverse of this is the case with the Method of Agreement. We do\r\nnot here require instances of so special and determinate a kind. Any instances\r\nwhatever, in which nature presents us with a phenomenon, may be\r\nexamined for the purposes of this method; and if all such instances agree\r\nin any thing, a conclusion of considerable value is already attained. We\r\ncan seldom, indeed, be sure that the one point of agreement is the only\r\none; but this ignorance does not, as in the Method of Difference, vitiate\r\nthe conclusion; the certainty of the result, as far as it goes, is not affected.\r\nWe have ascertained one invariable antecedent or consequent, however\r\nmany other invariable antecedents or consequents may still remain unascertained.\r\nIf A B C, A D E, A F G, are all equally followed by a, then a is an\r\ninvariable consequent of A. If \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea b c\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea d e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea f g\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, all number A among their\r\nantecedents, then A is connected as an antecedent, by some invariable law,\r\nwith \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e. But to determine whether this invariable antecedent is a\r\ncause, or this invariable consequent an effect, we must be able, in addition, to\r\nproduce the one by means of the other; or, at least, to obtain that which\r\nalone constitutes our assurance of having produced any thing, namely, an\r\ninstance in which the effect, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, has come into existence, with no\r\nother change in the pre-existing circumstances than the addition of A. And\r\nthis, if we can do it, is an application of the Method of Difference, not of\r\nthe Method of Agreement.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt thus appears to be by the Method of Difference alone that we can\r\never, in the way of direct experience, arrive with certainty at causes. The\r\nMethod of Agreement leads only to laws of phenomena (as some writers\r\ncall them, but improperly, since laws of causation are also laws of phenomena):\r\nthat is, to uniformities, which either are not laws of causation, or in\r\nwhich the question of causation must for the present remain undecided.\r\nThe Method of Agreement is chiefly to be resorted to, as a means of suggesting\r\napplications of the Method of Difference (as in the last example\r\nthe comparison of A B C, A D E, A F G, suggested that A was the antecedent\r\non which to try the experiment whether it could produce \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e); or\r\nas an inferior resource, in case the Method of Difference is impracticable;\r\nwhich, as we before showed, generally arises from the impossibility of artificially\r\nproducing the phenomena. And hence it is that the Method of\r\nAgreement, though applicable in principle to either case, is more emphatically\r\nthe method of investigation on those subjects where artificial experimentation\r\nis impossible; because on those it is, generally, our only resource\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page283\"\u003e[pg 283]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg283\" id=\"Pg283\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nof a directly inductive nature; while, in the phenomena which we can\r\nproduce at pleasure, the Method of Difference generally affords a more\r\nefficacious process, which will ascertain causes as well as mere laws.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 4. There are, however, many cases in which, though our power of\r\nproducing the phenomenon is complete, the Method of Difference either\r\ncan not be made available at all, or not without a previous employment of\r\nthe Method of Agreement. This occurs when the agency by which we\r\ncan produce the phenomenon is not that of one single antecedent, but a\r\ncombination of antecedents, which we have no power of separating from\r\neach other, and exhibiting apart. For instance, suppose the subject of\r\ninquiry to be the cause of the double refraction of light. We can produce\r\nthis phenomenon at pleasure, by employing any one of the many substances\r\nwhich are known to refract light in that peculiar manner. But if, taking\r\none of those substances, as Iceland spar, for example, we wish to determine\r\non which of the properties of Iceland spar this remarkable phenomenon\r\ndepends, we can make no use, for that purpose, of the Method of Difference;\r\nfor we can not find another substance precisely resembling Iceland\r\nspar except in some one property. The only mode, therefore, of prosecuting\r\nthis inquiry is that afforded by the Method of Agreement; by which,\r\nin fact, through a comparison of all the known substances which have the\r\nproperty of doubly refracting light, it was ascertained that they agree in\r\nthe circumstance of being crystalline substances; and though the converse\r\ndoes not hold, though all crystalline substances have not the property of\r\ndouble refraction, it was concluded, with reason, that there is a real connection\r\nbetween these two properties; that either crystalline structure, or\r\nthe cause which gives rise to that structure, is one of the conditions of\r\ndouble refraction.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nOut of this employment of the Method of Agreement arises a peculiar\r\nmodification of that method, which is sometimes of great avail in the investigation\r\nof nature. In cases similar to the above, in which it is not\r\npossible to obtain the precise pair of instances which our second canon\r\nrequires—instances agreeing in every antecedent except A, or in every\r\nconsequent except \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, we may yet be able, by a double employment\r\nof the Method of Agreement, to discover in what the instances which contain A\r\nor \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e differ from those which do not.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIf we compare various instances in which \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e occurs, and find that\r\nthey all have in common the circumstance A, and (as far as can be observed) no\r\nother circumstance, the Method of Agreement, so far, bears testimony to a\r\nconnection between A and \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e. In order to convert this evidence of\r\nconnection into proof of causation by the direct Method of Difference, we ought\r\nto be able, in some one of these instances, as for example, A B C, to leave\r\nout A, and observe whether by doing so, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e is prevented. Now\r\nsupposing (what is often the case) that we are not able to try this decisive experiment;\r\nyet, provided we can by any means discover what would be its result\r\nif we could try it, the advantage will be the same. Suppose, then,\r\nthat as we previously examined a variety of instances in which \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\noccurred, and found them to agree in containing A, so we now observe a variety of\r\ninstances in which \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e does not occur, and find them agree in not\r\ncontaining A; which establishes, by the Method of Agreement, the same connection\r\nbetween the absence of A and the absence of \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, which was before\r\nestablished between their presence. As, then, it had been shown that whenever\r\nA is present \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e is present, so, it being now shown that when A is\r\ntaken\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page284\"\u003e[pg 284]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg284\" id=\"Pg284\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\naway a is removed along with it, we have by the one proposition A B C,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea b c\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, by the other B C, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eb c\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, the positive\r\nand negative instances which the Method of Difference requires.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThis method may be called the Indirect Method of Difference, or the\r\nJoint Method of Agreement and Difference; and consists in a double employment\r\nof the Method of Agreement, each proof being independent of\r\nthe other, and corroborating it. But it is not equivalent to a proof by\r\nthe direct Method of Difference. For the requisitions of the Method of\r\nDifference are not satisfied, unless we can be quite sure either that the instances\r\naffirmative of \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e agree in no antecedent whatever but A, or that\r\nthe instances negative of \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e agree in nothing but the negation of\r\nA. Now, if it were possible, which it never is, to have this assurance, we should not\r\nneed the joint method; for either of the two sets of instances separately would\r\nthen be sufficient to prove causation. This indirect method, therefore, can\r\nonly be regarded as a great extension and improvement of the Method of\r\nAgreement, but not as participating in the more cogent nature of the Method\r\nof Difference. The following may be stated as its canon:\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-variant: small-caps\"\u003eThird Canon.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eIf two or more instances in which the phenomenon occurs have only\r\none circumstance in common, while two or more instances in which it does\r\nnot occur have nothing in common save the absence of that circumstance,\r\nthe circumstance in which alone the two sets of instances differ, is the\r\neffect, or the cause, or an indispensable part of the cause, of the phenomenon.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWe shall presently see that the Joint Method of Agreement and Difference\r\nconstitutes, in another respect not yet adverted to, an improvement\r\nupon the common Method of Agreement, namely, in being unaffected by\r\na characteristic imperfection of that method, the nature of which still remains\r\nto be pointed out. But as we can not enter into this exposition\r\nwithout introducing a new element of complexity into this long and intricate\r\ndiscussion, I shall postpone it to a subsequent chapter, and shall at\r\nonce proceed to a statement of two other methods, which will complete\r\nthe enumeration of the means which mankind possess for exploring the\r\nlaws of nature by specific observation and experience.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 5. The first of these has been aptly denominated the Method of Residues.\r\nIts principle is very simple. Subducting from any given phenomenon\r\nall the portions which, by virtue of preceding inductions, can be assigned\r\nto known causes, the remainder will be the effect of the antecedents which\r\nhad been overlooked, or of which the effect was as yet an unknown quantity.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nSuppose, as before, that we have the antecedents A B C, followed by the\r\nconsequents \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea b c\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, and that by previous inductions (founded, we\r\nwill suppose, on the Method of Difference) we have ascertained the causes of some\r\nof these effects, or the effects of some of these causes; and are thence apprised\r\nthat the effect of A is \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, and that the effect of B is\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eb\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e. Subtracting the sum of these effects from the total\r\nphenomenon, there remains \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ec\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, which\r\nnow, without any fresh experiments, we may know to be the effect of C.\r\nThis Method of Residues is in truth a peculiar modification of the Method\r\nof Difference. If the instance A B C, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea b c\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, could have been\r\ncompared with a single instance A B, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea b\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, we should have proved\r\nC to be the cause of \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ec\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, by the common process of the Method of\r\nDifference. In the present case, however, instead of a single instance A B, we have had\r\nto study separately\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page285\"\u003e[pg 285]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg285\" id=\"Pg285\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nthe causes A and B, and to infer from the effects which they produce\r\nseparately what effect they must produce in the case A B C, where\r\nthey act together. Of the two instances, therefore, which the Method of\r\nDifference requires—the one positive, the other negative—the negative\r\none, or that in which the given phenomenon is absent, is not the direct result\r\nof observation and experiment, but has been arrived at by deduction.\r\nAs one of the forms of the Method of Difference, the Method of Residues\r\npartakes of its rigorous certainty, provided the previous inductions, those\r\nwhich gave the effects of A and B, were obtained by the same infallible\r\nmethod, and provided we are certain that C is the \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eonly\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e antecedent to\r\nwhich the residual phenomenon \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ec\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e can be referred; the only agent\r\nof which we had not already calculated and subducted the effect. But as we can\r\nnever be quite certain of this, the evidence derived from the Method of\r\nResidues is not complete unless we can obtain C artificially, and try it separately,\r\nor unless its agency, when once suggested, can be accounted for,\r\nand proved deductively from known laws.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nEven with these reservations, the Method of Residues is one of the most\r\nimportant among our instruments of discovery. Of all the methods of investigating\r\nlaws of nature, this is the most fertile in unexpected results:\r\noften informing us of sequences in which neither the cause nor the effect\r\nwere sufficiently conspicuous to attract of themselves the attention of observers.\r\nThe agent C may be an obscure circumstance, not likely to have\r\nbeen perceived unless sought for, nor likely to have been sought for until\r\nattention had been awakened by the insufficiency of the obvious causes to\r\naccount for the whole of the effect. And \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ec\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e may be so disguised by\r\nits intermixture with \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e and \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eb\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, that it\r\nwould scarcely have presented itself spontaneously\r\nas a subject of separate study. Of these uses of the method, we\r\nshall presently cite some remarkable examples. The canon of the Method\r\nof Residues is as follows:\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-variant: small-caps\"\u003eFourth Canon.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eSubduct from any phenomenon such part as is known by previous\r\ninductions to be the effect of certain antecedents, and the residue of the phenomenon\r\nis the effect of the remaining antecedents.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 6. There remains a class of laws which it is impracticable to ascertain\r\nby any of the three methods which I have attempted to characterize:\r\nnamely, the laws of those Permanent Causes, or indestructible natural\r\nagents, which it is impossible either to exclude or to isolate; which we can\r\nneither hinder from being present, nor contrive that they shall be present\r\nalone. It would appear at first sight that we could by no means separate\r\nthe effects of these agents from the effects of those other phenomena with\r\nwhich they can not be prevented from co-existing. In respect, indeed, to\r\nmost of the permanent causes, no such difficulty exists; since, though we\r\ncan not eliminate them as co-existing facts, we can eliminate them as influencing\r\nagents, by simply trying our experiment in a local situation beyond\r\nthe limits of their influence. The pendulum, for example, has its oscillations\r\ndisturbed by the vicinity of a mountain: we remove the pendulum to\r\na sufficient distance from the mountain, and the disturbance ceases: from\r\nthese data we can determine by the Method of Difference, the amount of effect\r\ndue to the mountain; and beyond a certain distance every thing goes\r\non precisely as it would do if the mountain exercised no influence whatever,\r\nwhich, accordingly, we, with sufficient reason, conclude to be the fact.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page286\"\u003e[pg 286]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg286\" id=\"Pg286\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe difficulty, therefore, in applying the methods already treated of to\r\ndetermine the effects of Permanent Causes, is confined to the cases in\r\nwhich it is impossible for us to get out of the local limits of their influence.\r\nThe pendulum can be removed from the influence of the mountain,\r\nbut it can not be removed from the influence of the earth: we can not take\r\naway the earth from the pendulum, nor the pendulum from the earth, to\r\nascertain whether it would continue to vibrate if the action which the\r\nearth exerts upon it were withdrawn. On what evidence, then, do we\r\nascribe its vibrations to the earth’s influence? Not on any sanctioned by\r\nthe Method of Difference; for one of the two instances, the negative instance,\r\nis wanting. Nor by the Method of Agreement; for though all\r\npendulums agree in this, that during their oscillations the earth is always\r\npresent, why may we not as well ascribe the phenomenon to the sun, which\r\nis equally a co-existent fact in all the experiments? It is evident that to\r\nestablish even so simple a fact of causation as this, there was required\r\nsome method over and above those which we have yet examined.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAs another example, let us take the phenomenon Heat. Independently\r\nof all hypothesis as to the real nature of the agency so called, this fact is\r\ncertain, that we are unable to exhaust any body of the whole of its heat.\r\nIt is equally certain that no one ever perceived heat not emanating from a\r\nbody. Being unable, then, to separate Body and Heat, we can not effect\r\nsuch a variation of circumstances as the foregoing three methods require;\r\nwe can not ascertain, by those methods, what portion of the phenomena\r\nexhibited by any body is due to the heat contained in it. If we could observe\r\na body with its heat, and the same body entirely divested of heat,\r\nthe Method of Difference would show the effect due to the heat, apart\r\nfrom that due to the body. If we could observe heat under circumstances\r\nagreeing in nothing but heat, and therefore not characterized also by the\r\npresence of a body, we could ascertain the effects of heat, from an instance\r\nof heat with a body and an instance of heat without a body, by the Method\r\nof Agreement; or we could determine by the Method of Difference\r\nwhat effect was due to the body, when the remainder which was due to the\r\nheat would be given by the Method of Residues. But we can do none of\r\nthese things; and without them the application of any of the three methods\r\nto the solution of this problem would be illusory. It would be idle,\r\nfor instance, to attempt to ascertain the effect of heat by subtracting from\r\nthe phenomena exhibited by a body all that is due to its other properties;\r\nfor as we have never been able to observe any bodies without a portion of\r\nheat in them, effects due to that heat might form a part of the very results\r\nwhich we were affecting to subtract, in order that the effect of heat\r\nmight be shown by the residue.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIf, therefore, there were no other methods of experimental investigation\r\nthan these three, we should be unable to determine the effects due to heat\r\nas a cause. But we have still a resource. Though we can not exclude an\r\nantecedent altogether, we may be able to produce, or nature may produce\r\nfor us some modification in it. By a modification is here meant, a change\r\nin it not amounting to its total removal. If some modification in the antecedent\r\nA is always followed by a change in the consequent \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, the other\r\nconsequents \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eb\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e and \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ec\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e remaining the same; or\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003evicè versa\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, if every change in\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e is found to have been preceded by some modification in A, none\r\nbeing observable in any of the other antecedents, we may safely conclude that\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e is, wholly or in part, an effect traceable to A, or at least in\r\nsome way connected with it through causation. For example, in the case of heat, though\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page287\"\u003e[pg 287]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg287\" id=\"Pg287\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nwe can not expel it altogether from any body, we can modify it in quantity,\r\nwe can increase or diminish it; and doing so, we find by the various methods\r\nof experimentation or observation already treated of, that such increase\r\nor diminution of heat is followed by expansion or contraction of the body.\r\nIn this manner we arrive at the conclusion, otherwise unattainable by us,\r\nthat one of the effects of heat is to enlarge the dimensions of bodies; or,\r\nwhat is the same thing in other words, to widen the distances between their\r\nparticles.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nA change in a thing, not amounting to its total removal, that is, a change\r\nwhich leaves it still the same thing it was, must be a change either in its\r\nquantity, or in some of its variable relations to other things, of which variable\r\nrelations the principal is its position in space. In the previous example,\r\nthe modification which was produced in the antecedent was an alteration\r\nin its quantity. Let us now suppose the question to be, what influence\r\nthe moon exerts on the surface of the earth. We can not try an\r\nexperiment in the absence of the moon, so as to observe what terrestrial\r\nphenomena her annihilation would put an end to; but when we find that\r\nall the variations in the \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eposition\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e of the moon are followed by corresponding\r\nvariations in the time and place of high water, the place being always\r\neither the part of the earth which is nearest to, or that which is most remote\r\nfrom, the moon, we have ample evidence that the moon is, wholly or\r\npartially, the cause which determines the tides. It very commonly happens,\r\nas it does in this instance, that the variations of an effect are correspondent,\r\nor analogous, to those of its cause; as the moon moves farther\r\ntoward the east, the high-water point does the same: but this is not an indispensable\r\ncondition, as may be seen in the same example, for along with\r\nthat high-water point there is at the same instant another high-water point\r\ndiametrically opposite to it, and which, therefore, of necessity, moves toward\r\nthe west, as the moon, followed by the nearer of the tide waves, advances\r\ntoward the east: and yet both these motions are equally effects of the\r\nmoon’s motion.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThat the oscillations of the pendulum are caused by the earth, is proved\r\nby similar evidence. Those oscillations take place between equidistant\r\npoints on the two sides of a line, which, being perpendicular to the earth,\r\nvaries with every variation in the earth’s position, either in space or relatively\r\nto the object. Speaking accurately, we only know by the method\r\nnow characterized, that all terrestrial bodies tend to the earth, and not to\r\nsome unknown fixed point lying in the same direction. In every twenty-four\r\nhours, by the earth’s rotation, the line drawn from the body at right\r\nangles to the earth coincides successively with all the radii of a circle, and\r\nin the course of six months the place of that circle varies by nearly two\r\nhundred millions of miles; yet in all these changes of the earth’s position,\r\nthe line in which bodies tend to fall continues to be directed toward it:\r\nwhich proves that terrestrial gravity is directed to the earth, and not, as\r\nwas once fancied by some, to a fixed point of space.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe method by which these results were obtained may be termed the\r\nMethod of Concomitant Variations; it is regulated by the following canon:\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-variant: small-caps\"\u003eFifth Canon.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eWhatever phenomenon varies in any manner whenever another phenomenon\r\nvaries in some particular manner, is either a cause or an effect\r\nof that phenomenon, or is connected with it through some fact of causation.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page288\"\u003e[pg 288]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg288\" id=\"Pg288\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe last clause is subjoined, because it by no means follows when two\r\nphenomena accompany each other in their variations, that the one is cause\r\nand the other effect. The same thing may, and indeed must happen, supposing\r\nthem to be two different effects of a common cause: and by this\r\nmethod alone it would never be possible to ascertain which of the suppositions\r\nis the true one. The only way to solve the doubt would be that\r\nwhich we have so often adverted to, viz., by endeavoring to ascertain whether\r\nwe can produce the one set of variations by means of the other. In the\r\ncase of heat, for example, by increasing the temperature of a body we increase\r\nits bulk, but by increasing its bulk we do not increase its temperature;\r\non the contrary (as in the rarefaction of air under the receiver\r\nof an air-pump), we generally diminish it: therefore heat is not an effect,\r\nbut a cause, of increase of bulk. If we can not ourselves produce the variations,\r\nwe must endeavor, though it is an attempt which is seldom successful,\r\nto find them produced by nature in some case in which the pre-*existing\r\ncircumstances are perfectly known to us.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt is scarcely necessary to say, that in order to ascertain the uniform concomitance\r\nof variations in the effect with variations in the cause, the same\r\nprecautions must be used as in any other case of the determination of an\r\ninvariable sequence. We must endeavor to retain all the other antecedents\r\nunchanged, while that particular one is subjected to the requisite series\r\nof variations; or, in other words, that we may be warranted in inferring\r\ncausation from concomitance of variations, the concomitance itself\r\nmust be proved by the Method of Difference.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt might at first appear that the Method of Concomitant Variations assumes\r\na new axiom, or law of causation in general, namely, that every modification\r\nof the cause is followed by a change in the effect. And it does\r\nusually happen that when a phenomenon A causes a phenomenon \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\nany variation in the quantity or in the various relations of A, is uniformly followed\r\nby a variation in the quantity or relations of \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e. To take a\r\nfamiliar instance, that of gravitation. The sun causes a certain tendency to motion\r\nin the earth; here we have cause and effect; but that tendency is \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003etoward\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e\r\nthe sun, and therefore varies in direction as the sun varies in the relation\r\nof position; and, moreover, the tendency varies in intensity, in a certain\r\nnumerical correspondence to the sun’s distance from the earth, that is, according\r\nto another relation of the sun. Thus we see that there is not\r\nonly an invariable connection between the sun and the earth’s gravitation,\r\nbut that two of the relations of the sun, its position with respect to the\r\nearth and its distance from the earth, are invariably connected as antecedents\r\nwith the quantity and direction of the earth’s gravitation. The cause\r\nof the earth’s gravitating at all, is simply the sun; but the cause of its\r\ngravitating with a given intensity and in a given direction, is the existence\r\nof the sun in a given direction and at a given distance. It is not strange\r\nthat a modified cause, which is in truth a different cause, should produce a\r\ndifferent effect.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAlthough it is for the most part true that a modification of the cause is\r\nfollowed by a modification of the effect, the Method of Concomitant Variations\r\ndoes not, however, presuppose this as an axiom. It only requires\r\nthe converse proposition: that any thing on whose modifications, modifications\r\nof an effect are invariably consequent, must be the cause (or connected\r\nwith the cause) of that effect; a proposition, the truth of which is\r\nevident; for if the thing itself had no influence on the effect, neither could\r\nthe modifications of the thing have any influence. If the stars have no\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page289\"\u003e[pg 289]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg289\" id=\"Pg289\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\npower over the fortunes of mankind, it is implied in the very terms that\r\nthe conjunctions or oppositions of different stars can have no such power.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAlthough the most striking applications of the Method of Concomitant\r\nVariations take place in the cases in which the Method of Difference,\r\nstrictly so called, is impossible, its use is not confined to those cases; it\r\nmay often usefully follow after the Method of Difference, to give additional\r\nprecision to a solution which that has found. When by the Method of\r\nDifference it has first been ascertained that a certain object produces a\r\ncertain effect, the Method of Concomitant Variations may be usefully called\r\nin, to determine according to what law the quantity or the different relations\r\nof the effect follow those of the cause.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 7. The case in which this method admits of the most extensive employment,\r\nis that in which the variations of the cause are variations of\r\nquantity. Of such variations we may in general affirm with safety, that\r\nthey will be attended not only with variations, but with similar variations,\r\nof the effect: the proposition that more of the cause is followed by more\r\nof the effect, being a corollary from the principle of the Composition of\r\nCauses, which, as we have seen, is the general rule of causation; cases of\r\nthe opposite description, in which causes change their properties on being\r\nconjoined with one another, being, on the contrary, special and exceptional.\r\nSuppose, then, that when A changes in quantity, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e also changes in\r\nquantity, and in such a manner that we can trace the numerical relation which the\r\nchanges of the one bear to such changes of the other as take place within\r\nour limits of observation. We may then, with certain precautions, safely\r\nconclude that the same numerical relation will hold beyond those limits.\r\nIf, for instance, we find that when A is double, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e is double;\r\nthat when A is treble or quadruple, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e is treble or quadruple; we\r\nmay conclude that if A were a half or a third, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e would be a half\r\nor a third, and finally, that if A were annihilated, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e would be\r\nannihilated; and that \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e is wholly the effect of\r\nA, or wholly the effect of the same cause with A. And so with any other\r\nnumerical relation according to which A and \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e would vanish\r\nsimultaneously; as, for instance, if \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e were proportional to the\r\nsquare of A. If, on the other hand, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e is not wholly the effect of\r\nA, but yet varies when A varies, it is probably a mathematical function not of A alone,\r\nbut of A and something else: its changes, for example, may be such as would occur if\r\npart of it remained constant, or varied on some other principle, and the remainder\r\nvaried in some numerical relations to the variations of A. In that case, when\r\nA diminishes, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e will be seen to approach not toward zero, but\r\ntoward some other limit; and when the series of variations is such as to indicate what\r\nthat limit is, if constant, or the law of its variation, if variable, the limit\r\nwill exactly measure how much of \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e is the effect of some other\r\nand independent cause, and the remainder will be the effect of A (or of the cause\r\nof A).\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThese conclusions, however, must not be drawn without certain precautions.\r\nIn the first place, the possibility of drawing them at all, manifestly\r\nsupposes that we are acquainted not only with the variations, but with the\r\nabsolute quantities both of A and \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e. If we do not know the total\r\nquantities, we can not, of course, determine the real numerical relation according\r\nto which those quantities vary. It is, therefore, an error to conclude, as\r\nsome have concluded, that because increase of heat expands bodies, that\r\nis, increases the distance between their particles, therefore the distance is\r\nwholly the effect of heat, and that if we could entirely exhaust the body of\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page290\"\u003e[pg 290]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg290\" id=\"Pg290\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nits heat, the particles would be in complete contact. This is no more than\r\na guess, and of the most hazardous sort, not a legitimate induction: for\r\nsince we neither know how much heat there is in any body, nor what is\r\nthe real distance between any two of its particles, we can not judge whether\r\nthe contraction of the distance does or does not follow the diminution of\r\nthe quantity of heat according to such a numerical relation that the two\r\nquantities would vanish simultaneously.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIn contrast with this, let us consider a case in which the absolute quantities\r\nare known; the case contemplated in the first law of motion: viz.,\r\nthat all bodies in motion continue to move in a straight line with uniform\r\nvelocity until acted upon by some new force. This assertion is in open opposition\r\nto first appearances; all terrestrial objects, when in motion, gradually\r\nabate their velocity, and at last stop; which accordingly the ancients,\r\nwith their \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003einductio per enumerationem\r\nsimplicem\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, imagined to be the law.\r\nEvery moving body, however, encounters various obstacles, as friction, the\r\nresistance of the atmosphere, etc., which we know by daily experience to\r\nbe causes capable of destroying motion. It was suggested that the whole\r\nof the retardation might be owing to these causes. How was this inquired\r\ninto? If the obstacles could have been entirely removed, the case\r\nwould have been amenable to the Method of Difference. They could not\r\nbe removed, they could only be diminished, and the case, therefore, admitted\r\nonly of the Method of Concomitant Variations. This accordingly\r\nbeing employed, it was found that every diminution of the obstacles diminished\r\nthe retardation of the motion: and inasmuch as in this case (unlike\r\nthe case of heat) the total quantities both of the antecedent and of the\r\nconsequent were known, it was practicable to estimate, with an approach\r\nto accuracy, both the amount of the retardation and the amount of the\r\nretarding causes, or resistances, and to judge how near they both were to\r\nbeing exhausted; and it appeared that the effect dwindled as rapidly, and\r\nat each step was as far on the road toward annihilation, as the cause was.\r\nThe simple oscillation of a weight suspended from a fixed point, and\r\nmoved a little out of the perpendicular, which in ordinary circumstances\r\nlasts but a few minutes, was prolonged in Borda’s experiments to more than\r\nthirty hours, by diminishing as much as possible the friction at the point\r\nof suspension, and by making the body oscillate in a space exhausted as\r\nnearly as possible of its air. There could therefore be no hesitation in assigning\r\nthe whole of the retardation of motion to the influence of the obstacles;\r\nand since, after subducting this retardation from the total phenomenon,\r\nthe remainder was a uniform velocity, the result was the proposition\r\nknown as the first law of motion.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThere is also another characteristic uncertainty affecting the inference\r\nthat the law of variation which the quantities observe within our limits of\r\nobservation, will hold beyond those limits. There is, of course, in the first\r\ninstance, the possibility that beyond the limits, and in circumstances therefore\r\nof which we have no direct experience, some counteracting cause\r\nmight develop itself; either a new agent or a new property of the agents\r\nconcerned, which lies dormant in the circumstances we are able to observe.\r\nThis is an element of uncertainty which enters largely into all our predictions\r\nof effects; but it is not peculiarly applicable to the Method of Concomitant\r\nVariations. The uncertainty, however, of which I am about to\r\nspeak, is characteristic of that method; especially in the cases in which\r\nthe extreme limits of our observation are very narrow, in comparison with\r\nthe possible variations in the quantities of the phenomena. Any one who\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page291\"\u003e[pg 291]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg291\" id=\"Pg291\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nhas the slightest acquaintance with mathematics, is aware that very different\r\nlaws of variation may produce numerical results which differ but slightly\r\nfrom one another within narrow limits; and it is often only when the\r\nabsolute amounts of variation are considerable, that the difference between\r\nthe results given by one law and by another becomes appreciable. When,\r\ntherefore, such variations in the quantity of the antecedents as we have the\r\nmeans of observing are small in comparison with the total quantities, there\r\nis much danger lest we should mistake the numerical law, and be led to\r\nmiscalculate the variations which would take place beyond the limits; a\r\nmiscalculation which would vitiate any conclusion respecting the dependence\r\nof the effect upon the cause, that could be founded on those variations.\r\nExamples are not wanting of such mistakes. \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“The formulæ,”\u003c/span\u003e says\r\nSir John Herschel,\u003ca id=\"noteref_136\" name=\"noteref_136\" href=\"#note_136\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e136\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“which have been empirically deduced for the\r\nelasticity of steam (till very recently), and those for the resistance of fluids, and\r\nother similar subjects,”\u003c/span\u003e when relied on beyond the limits of the observations\r\nfrom which they were deduced, “have almost invariably failed to support\r\nthe theoretical structures which have been erected on them.”\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIn this uncertainty, the conclusion we may draw from the concomitant\r\nvariations of \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e and A, to the existence of an invariable and\r\nexclusive connection between them, or to the permanency of the same numerical relation\r\nbetween their variations when the quantities are much greater or smaller\r\nthan those which we have had the means of observing, can not be considered\r\nto rest on a complete induction. All that in such a case can be regarded\r\nas proved on the subject of causation is, that there is some connection\r\nbetween the two phenomena; that A, or something which can influence A,\r\nmust be \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eone\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e of the causes which collectively determine\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e. We may, however,\r\nfeel assured that the relation which we have observed to exist between\r\nthe variations of A and \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, will hold true in all cases which fall\r\nbetween the same extreme limits; that is, wherever the utmost increase or\r\ndiminution in which the result has been found by observation to coincide\r\nwith the law, is not exceeded.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe four methods which it has now been attempted to describe, are the\r\nonly possible modes of experimental inquiry—of direct induction\r\n\u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea posteriori\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\nas distinguished from deduction: at least, I know not, nor am able to\r\nimagine any others. And even of these, the Method of Residues, as we\r\nhave seen, is not independent of deduction; though, as it also requires\r\nspecific experience, it may, without impropriety, be included among methods\r\nof direct observation and experiment.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThese, then, with such assistance as can be obtained from Deduction,\r\ncompose the available resources of the human mind for ascertaining the\r\nlaws of the succession of phenomena. Before proceeding to point out certain\r\ncircumstances by which the employment of these methods is subjected\r\nto an immense increase of complication and of difficulty, it is expedient to\r\nillustrate the use of the methods, by suitable examples drawn from actual\r\nphysical investigations. These, accordingly, will form the subject of the\r\nsucceeding chapter.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page292\"\u003e[pg 292]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg292\" id=\"Pg292\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-div\" style=\"margin-bottom: 4.00em; margin-top: 4.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"toc59\" id=\"toc59\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"pdf60\" id=\"pdf60\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: center; margin-bottom: 2.40em; margin-top: 2.40em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 120%\"\u003eChapter IX.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: left; margin-bottom: 2.88em; margin-top: 2.88em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 144%\"\u003eMiscellaneous Examples Of The Four Methods.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 1. I shall select, as a first example, an interesting speculation of one\r\nof the most eminent of theoretical chemists, Baron Liebig. The object in\r\nview is to ascertain the immediate cause of the death produced by metallic\r\npoisons.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nArsenious acid, and the salts of lead, bismuth, copper, and mercury, if\r\nintroduced into the animal organism, except in the smallest doses, destroy\r\nlife. These facts have long been known, as insulated truths of the lowest\r\norder of generalization; but it was reserved for Liebig, by an apt employment\r\nof the first two of our methods of experimental inquiry, to connect\r\nthese truths together by a higher induction, pointing out what property,\r\ncommon to all these deleterious substances, is the really operating cause of\r\ntheir fatal effect.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWhen solutions of these substances are placed in sufficiently close contact\r\nwith many animal products, albumen, milk, muscular fibre, and animal\r\nmembranes, the acid or salt leaves the water in which it was dissolved,\r\nand enters into combination with the animal substance, which substance,\r\nafter being thus acted upon, is found to have lost its tendency to spontaneous\r\ndecomposition, or putrefaction.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nObservation also shows, in cases where death has been produced by\r\nthese poisons, that the parts of the body with which the poisonous substances\r\nhave been brought into contact, do not afterward putrefy.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAnd, finally, when the poison has been supplied in too small a quantity\r\nto destroy life, eschars are produced, that is, certain superficial portions of\r\nthe tissues are destroyed, which are afterward thrown off by the reparative\r\nprocess taking place in the healthy parts.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThese three sets of instances admit of being treated according to the\r\nMethod of Agreement. In all of them the metallic compounds are\r\nbrought into contact with the substances which compose the human or animal\r\nbody; and the instances do not seem to agree in any other circumstance.\r\nThe remaining antecedents are as different, and even opposite, as\r\nthey could possibly be made; for in some the animal substances exposed\r\nto the action of the poisons are in a state of life, in others only in a state\r\nof organization, in others not even in that. And what is the result which\r\nfollows in all the cases? The conversion of the animal substance (by combination\r\nwith the poison) into a chemical compound, held together by so\r\npowerful a force as to resist the subsequent action of the ordinary causes\r\nof decomposition. Now, organic life (the necessary condition of sensitive\r\nlife) consisting in a continual state of decomposition and recomposition of\r\nthe different organs and tissues, whatever incapacitates them for this decomposition\r\ndestroys life. And thus the proximate cause of the death produced\r\nby this description of poisons is ascertained, as far as the Method\r\nof Agreement can ascertain it.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nLet us now bring our conclusion to the test of the Method of Difference.\r\nSetting out from the cases already mentioned, in which the antecedent is\r\nthe presence of substances forming with the tissues a compound incapable\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page293\"\u003e[pg 293]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg293\" id=\"Pg293\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nof putrefaction, (and \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea fortiori\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e incapable\r\nof the chemical actions which constitute life), and the consequent is death, either of\r\nthe whole organism, or of some portion of it; let us compare with these cases other\r\ncases, as much resembling them as possible, but in which that effect is not produced.\r\nAnd, first, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“many insoluble basic salts of arsenious acid are known not to\r\nbe poisonous. The substance called alkargen, discovered by Bunsen, which\r\ncontains a very large quantity of arsenic, and approaches very closely in\r\ncomposition to the organic arsenious compounds found in the body, has\r\nnot the slightest injurious action upon the organism.”\u003c/span\u003e Now when these\r\nsubstances are brought into contact with the tissues in any way, they do\r\nnot combine with them; they do not arrest their progress to decomposition.\r\nAs far, therefore, as these instances go, it appears that when the\r\neffect is absent, it is by reason of the absence of that antecedent which we\r\nhad already good ground for considering as the proximate cause.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nBut the rigorous conditions of the Method of Difference are not yet satisfied;\r\nfor we can not be sure that these unpoisonous bodies agree with\r\nthe poisonous substances in every property, except the particular one of\r\nentering into a difficultly decomposable compound with the animal tissues.\r\nTo render the method strictly applicable, we need an instance, not of a\r\ndifferent substance, but of one of the very same substances, in circumstances\r\nwhich would prevent it from forming, with the tissues, the sort\r\nof compound in question; and then, if death does not follow, our case is\r\nmade out. Now such instances are afforded by the antidotes to these poisons.\r\nFor example, in case of poisoning by arsenious acid, if hydrated\r\nperoxide of iron is administered, the destructive agency is instantly checked.\r\nNow this peroxide is known to combine with the acid, and form a\r\ncompound, which, being insoluble, can not act at all on animal tissues. So,\r\nagain, sugar is a well-known antidote to poisoning by salts of copper; and\r\nsugar reduces those salts either into metallic copper, or into the red sub-oxide,\r\nneither of which enters into combination with animal matter. The\r\ndisease called painter’s colic, so common in manufactories of white-lead, is\r\nunknown where the workmen are accustomed to take, as a preservative,\r\nsulphuric acid lemonade (a solution of sugar rendered acid by sulphuric\r\nacid). Now diluted sulphuric acid has the property of decomposing all\r\ncompounds of lead with organic matter, or of preventing them from being\r\nformed.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThere is another class of instances, of the nature required by the Method\r\nof Difference, which seem at first sight to conflict with the theory. Soluble\r\nsalts of silver, such for instance as the nitrate, have the same stiffening\r\nantiseptic effect on decomposing animal substances as corrosive sublimate\r\nand the most deadly metallic poisons; and when applied to the external\r\nparts of the body, the nitrate is a powerful caustic, depriving those parts of\r\nall active vitality, and causing them to be thrown off by the neighboring\r\nliving structures, in the form of an eschar. The nitrate and the other\r\nsalts of silver ought, then, it would seem, if the theory be correct, to be\r\npoisonous; yet they may be administered internally with perfect impunity.\r\nFrom this apparent exception arises the strongest confirmation which the\r\ntheory has yet received. Nitrate of silver, in spite of its chemical properties,\r\ndoes not poison when introduced into the stomach; but in the stomach,\r\nas in all animal liquids, there is common salt; and in the stomach\r\nthere is also free muriatic acid. These substances operate as natural antidotes,\r\ncombining with the nitrate, and if its quantity is not too great, immediately\r\nconverting it into chloride of silver, a substance very slightly\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page294\"\u003e[pg 294]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg294\" id=\"Pg294\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nsoluble, and therefore incapable of combining with the tissues, although to\r\nthe extent of its solubility it has a medicinal influence, though an entirely\r\ndifferent class of organic actions.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe preceding instances have afforded an induction of a high order of\r\nconclusiveness, illustrative of the two simplest of our four methods; though\r\nnot rising to the maximum of certainty which the Method of Difference,\r\nin its most perfect exemplification, is capable of affording. For (let us\r\nnot forget) the positive instance and the negative one which the rigor of\r\nthat method requires, ought to differ only in the presence or absence of\r\none single circumstance. Now, in the preceding argument, they differ in\r\nthe presence or absence not of a single \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ecircumstance\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e, but of a single\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003esubstance\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e: and as every substance has innumerable properties, there is no\r\nknowing what number of real differences are involved in what is nominally\r\nand apparently only one difference. It is conceivable that the antidote,\r\nthe peroxide of iron for example, may counteract the poison through some\r\nother of its properties than that of forming an insoluble compound with it;\r\nand if so, the theory would fall to the ground, so far as it is supported by\r\nthat instance. This source of uncertainty, which is a serious hinderance to\r\nall extensive generalizations in chemistry, is, however, reduced in the present\r\ncase to almost the lowest degree possible, when we find that not only\r\none substance, but many substances, possess the capacity of acting as antidotes\r\nto metallic poisons, and that all these agree in the property of forming\r\ninsoluble compounds with the poisons, while they can not be ascertained\r\nto agree in any other property whatsoever. We have thus, in favor\r\nof the theory, all the evidence which can be obtained by what we termed\r\nthe Indirect Method of Difference, or the Joint Method of Agreement and\r\nDifference; the evidence of which, though it never can amount to that of\r\nthe Method of Difference properly so called, may approach indefinitely near\r\nto it.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 2. Let the object be\u003ca id=\"noteref_137\" name=\"noteref_137\" href=\"#note_137\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e137\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e to ascertain\r\nthe law of what is termed \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003einduced\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nelectricity; to find under what conditions any electrified body, whether\r\npositively or negatively electrified, gives rise to a contrary electric state in\r\nsome other body adjacent to it.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe most familiar exemplification of the phenomenon to be investigated\r\nis the following. Around the prime conductors of an electrical machine\r\nthe atmosphere to some distance, or any conducting surface suspended in\r\nthat atmosphere, is found to be in an electric condition opposite to that of\r\nthe prime conductor itself. Near and around the positive prime conductor\r\nthere is negative electricity, and near and around the negative prime conductor\r\nthere is positive electricity. When pith balls are brought near to\r\neither of the conductors, they become electrified with the opposite electricity\r\nto it; either receiving a share from the already electrified atmosphere\r\nby conduction, or acted upon by the direct inductive influence of the conductor\r\nitself: they are then attracted by the conductor to which they are\r\nin opposition; or, if withdrawn in their electrified state, they will be attracted\r\nby any other oppositely charged body. In like manner the hand,\r\nif brought near enough to the conductor, receives or gives an electric discharge;\r\nnow we have no evidence that a charged conductor can be suddenly\r\ndischarged unless by the approach of a body oppositely electrified.\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page295\"\u003e[pg 295]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg295\" id=\"Pg295\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nIn the case, therefore, of the electric machine, it appears that the accumulation\r\nof electricity in an insulated conductor is always accompanied by the\r\nexcitement of the contrary electricity in the surrounding atmosphere, and\r\nin every conductor placed near the former conductor. It does not seem\r\npossible, in this case, to produce one electricity by itself.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nLet us now examine all the other instances which we can obtain, resembling\r\nthis instance in the given consequent, namely, the evolution of an opposite\r\nelectricity in the neighborhood of an electrified body. As one remarkable\r\ninstance we have the Leyden jar; and after the splendid experiments\r\nof Faraday in complete and final establishment of the substantial\r\nidentity of magnetism and electricity, we may cite the magnet, both the\r\nnatural and the electro-magnet, in neither of which it is possible to produce\r\none kind of electricity by itself, or to charge one pole without charging an\r\nopposite pole with the contrary electricity at the same time. We can not\r\nhave a magnet with one pole: if we break a natural loadstone into a thousand\r\npieces, each piece will have its two oppositely electrified poles complete\r\nwithin itself. In the voltaic circuit, again, we can not have one current\r\nwithout its opposite. In the ordinary electric machine, the glass cylinder\r\nor plate, and the rubber, acquire opposite electricities.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nFrom all these instances, treated by the Method of Agreement, a general\r\nlaw appears to result. The instances embrace all the known modes in\r\nwhich a body can become charged with electricity; and in all of them\r\nthere is found, as a concomitant or consequent, the excitement of the opposite\r\nelectric state in some other body or bodies. It seems to follow that\r\nthe two facts are invariably connected, and that the excitement of electricity\r\nin any body has for one of its necessary conditions the possibility of\r\na simultaneous excitement of the opposite electricity in some neighboring\r\nbody.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAs the two contrary electricities can only be produced together, so they\r\ncan only cease together. This may be shown by an application of the Method\r\nof Difference to the example of the Leyden jar. It needs scarcely be\r\nhere remarked that in the Leyden jar, electricity can be accumulated and\r\nretained in considerable quantity, by the contrivance of having two conducting\r\nsurfaces of equal extent, and parallel to each other through the whole\r\nof that extent, with a non-conducting substance such as glass between them.\r\nWhen one side of the jar is charged positively, the other is charged negatively,\r\nand it was by virtue of this fact that the Leyden jar served just now\r\nas an instance in our employment of the Method of Agreement. Now it\r\nis impossible to discharge one of the coatings unless the other can be discharged\r\nat the same time. A conductor held to the positive side can not convey\r\naway any electricity unless an equal quantity be allowed to pass from\r\nthe negative side: if one coating be perfectly insulated, the charge is safe.\r\nThe dissipation of one must proceed \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003epari\r\npassu\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e with that of the other.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe law thus strongly indicated admits of corroboration by the Method\r\nof Concomitant Variations. The Leyden jar is capable of receiving a much\r\nhigher charge than can ordinarily be given to the conductor of an electrical\r\nmachine. Now in the case of the Leyden jar, the metallic surface which\r\nreceives the induced electricity is a conductor exactly similar to that which\r\nreceives the primary charge, and is therefore as susceptible of receiving\r\nand retaining the one electricity, as the opposite surface of receiving and\r\nretaining the other; but in the machine, the neighboring body which is to\r\nbe oppositely electrified is the surrounding atmosphere, or any body casually\r\nbrought near to the conductor; and as these are generally much inferior\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page296\"\u003e[pg 296]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg296\" id=\"Pg296\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nin their capacity of becoming electrified, to the conductor itself, their\r\nlimited power imposes a corresponding limit to the capacity of the conductor\r\nfor being charged. As the capacity of the neighboring body for\r\nsupporting the opposition increases, a higher charge becomes possible: and\r\nto this appears to be owing the great superiority of the Leyden jar.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nA further and most decisive confirmation by the Method of Difference,\r\nis to be found in one of Faraday’s experiments in the course of his researches\r\non the subject of Induced Electricity.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nSince common or machine electricity, and voltaic electricity, may be considered\r\nfor the present purpose to be identical, Faraday wished to know\r\nwhether, as the prime conductor develops opposite electricity upon a conductor\r\nin its vicinity, so a voltaic current running along a wire would induce\r\nan opposite current upon another wire laid parallel to it at a short\r\ndistance. Now this case is similar to the cases previously examined, in\r\nevery circumstance except the one to which we have ascribed the effect.\r\nWe found in the former instances that whenever electricity of one kind\r\nwas excited in one body, electricity of the opposite kind must be excited\r\nin a neighboring body. But in Faraday’s experiment this indispensable\r\nopposition exists within the wire itself. From the nature of a voltaic\r\ncharge, the two opposite currents necessary to the existence of each other\r\nare both accommodated in one wire; and there is no need of another wire\r\nplaced beside it to contain one of them, in the same way as the Leyden jar\r\nmust have a positive and a negative surface. The exciting cause can and\r\ndoes produce all the effect which its laws require, independently of any\r\nelectric excitement of a neighboring body. Now the result of the experiment\r\nwith the second wire was, that no opposite current was produced.\r\nThere was an instantaneous effect at the closing and breaking of the voltaic\r\ncircuit; electric inductions appeared when the two wires were moved\r\nto and from one another; but these are phenomena of a different class.\r\nThere was no induced electricity in the sense in which this is predicated\r\nof the Leyden jar; there was no sustained current running up the one\r\nwire while an opposite current ran down the neighboring wire; and this\r\nalone would have been a true parallel case to the other.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt thus appears by the combined evidence of the Method of Agreement,\r\nthe Method of Concomitant Variations, and the most rigorous form of the\r\nMethod of Difference, that neither of the two kinds of electricity can be\r\nexcited without an equal excitement of the other and opposite kind: that\r\nboth are effects of the same cause; that the possibility of the one is a condition\r\nof the possibility of the other, and the quantity of the one an impassable\r\nlimit to the quantity of the other. A scientific result of considerable\r\ninterest in itself, and illustrating those three methods in a manner\r\nboth characteristic and easily intelligible.\u003ca id=\"noteref_138\" name=\"noteref_138\" href=\"#note_138\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e138\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 3. Our third example shall be extracted from Sir John Herschel’s\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eDiscourse\r\n\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page297\"\u003e[pg 297]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg297\" id=\"Pg297\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003e\r\ncourse on the Study of Natural Philosophy\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, a work replete with happily-selected\r\nexemplifications of inductive processes from almost every department\r\nof physical science, and in which alone, of all books which I have met\r\nwith, the four methods of induction are distinctly recognized, though not\r\nso clearly characterized and defined, nor their correlation so fully shown,\r\nas has appeared to me desirable. The present example is described by\r\nSir John Herschel as \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“one of the most beautiful specimens”\u003c/span\u003e which can be\r\ncited \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“of inductive experimental inquiry lying within a moderate compass;”\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe theory of dew, first promulgated by the late Dr. Wells, and now\r\nuniversally adopted by scientific authorities. The passages in inverted\r\ncommas are extracted verbatim from the Discourse.\u003ca id=\"noteref_139\" name=\"noteref_139\" href=\"#note_139\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e139\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Suppose \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003edew\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e were the phenomenon proposed, whose cause we would\r\nknow. In the first place”\u003c/span\u003e we must determine precisely what we mean by\r\ndew: what the fact really is whose cause we desire to investigate. \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“We\r\nmust separate dew from rain, and the moisture of fogs, and limit the application\r\nof the term to what is really meant, which is the spontaneous appearance\r\nof moisture on substances exposed in the open air when no rain\r\nor \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003evisible\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e wet is falling.”\u003c/span\u003e This answers to a preliminary operation which\r\nwill be characterized in the ensuing book, treating of operations subsidiary\r\nto induction.\u003ca id=\"noteref_140\" name=\"noteref_140\" href=\"#note_140\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e140\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Now, here we have analogous phenomena in the moisture which bedews\r\na cold metal or stone when we breathe upon it; that which appears\r\non a glass of water fresh from the well in hot weather; that which appears\r\non the inside of windows when sudden rain or hail chills the external air;\r\nthat which runs down our walls when, after a long frost, a warm, moist\r\nthaw comes on.”\u003c/span\u003e Comparing these cases, we find that they all contain the\r\nphenomenon which was proposed as the subject of investigation. Now\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“all these instances agree in one point, the coldness of the object dewed,\r\nin comparison with the air in contact with it.”\u003c/span\u003e But there still remains the\r\nmost important case of all, that of nocturnal dew: does the same circumstance\r\nexist in this case? \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Is it a fact that the object dewed \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eis\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e colder\r\nthan the air? Certainly not, one would at first be inclined to say; for\r\nwhat is to \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003emake\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e it so? But … the experiment is easy: we have only to\r\nlay a thermometer in contact with the dewed substance, and hang one at a\r\nlittle distance above it, out of reach of its influence. The experiment has\r\nbeen therefore made, the question has been asked, and the answer has been\r\ninvariably in the affirmative. Whenever an object contracts dew, it \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eis\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e\r\ncolder than the air.”\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nHere, then, is a complete application of the Method of Agreement, establishing\r\nthe fact of an invariable connection between the deposition of dew\r\non a surface, and the coldness of that surface compared with the external\r\nair. But which of these is cause, and which effect? or are they both effects\r\nof something else? On this subject the Method of Agreement can\r\nafford us no light: we must call in a more potent method. \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“We must\r\ncollect more facts, or, which comes to the same thing, vary the circumstances;\r\nsince every instance in which the circumstances differ is a fresh\r\nfact: and especially, we must note the contrary or negative cases,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, where no dew is produced:”\u003c/span\u003e a comparison between\r\ninstances of dew and instances of no dew, being the condition necessary to bring the\r\nMethod of Difference into play.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Now, first, no dew is produced on the surface of polished metals, but\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page298\"\u003e[pg 298]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg298\" id=\"Pg298\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nit \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eis\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e very copiously on glass, both exposed with their faces upward, and in\r\nsome cases the under side of a horizontal plate of glass is also dewed.”\u003c/span\u003e\r\nHere is an instance in which the effect is produced, and another instance in\r\nwhich it is not produced; but we can not yet pronounce, as the canon of\r\nthe Method of Difference requires, that the latter instance agrees with the\r\nformer in all its circumstances except one; for the differences between\r\nglass and polished metals are manifold, and the only thing we can as yet\r\nbe sure of is, that the cause of dew will be found among the circumstances\r\nby which the former substance is distinguished from the latter. But if\r\nwe could be sure that glass, and the various other substances on which dew\r\nis deposited, have only one quality in common, and that polished metals\r\nand the other substances on which dew is not deposited, have also nothing\r\nin common but the one circumstance of not having the one quality which\r\nthe others have; the requisitions of the Method of Difference would be\r\ncompletely satisfied, and we should recognize, in that quality of the substances,\r\nthe cause of dew. This, accordingly, is the path of inquiry which\r\nis next to be pursued.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“In the cases of polished metal and polished glass, the contrast shows\r\nevidently that the \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003esubstance\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e has much to do with the phenomenon; therefore\r\nlet the substance \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ealone\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e be diversified as much as possible, by exposing\r\npolished surfaces of various kinds. This done, a \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003escale of intensity\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e becomes\r\nobvious. Those polished substances are found to be most strongly dewed\r\nwhich conduct heat worst; while those which conduct heat well, resist dew\r\nmost effectually.”\u003c/span\u003e The complication increases; here is the Method of\r\nConcomitant Variations called to our assistance; and no other method was\r\npracticable on this occasion; for the quality of conducting heat could not\r\nbe excluded, since all substances conduct heat in some degree. The conclusion\r\nobtained is, that \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ecæteris paribus\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e the\r\ndeposition of dew is in some proportion\r\nto the power which the body possesses of resisting the passage of\r\nheat; and that this, therefore (or something connected with this), must be\r\nat least one of the causes which assist in producing the deposition of dew\r\non the surface.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“But if we expose rough surfaces instead of polished, we sometimes find\r\nthis law interfered with. Thus, roughened iron, especially if painted over\r\nor blackened, becomes dewed sooner than varnished paper; the kind of\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003esurface\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e, therefore, has a great influence. Expose, then, the\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003esame\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e material in very diversified states, as to surface”\u003c/span\u003e (that is,\r\nemploy the Method of Difference to ascertain concomitance of variations), \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“and another\r\nscale of intensity becomes at once apparent; those \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003esurfaces\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e which\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003epart with their heat\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e most readily by radiation are found to contract dew\r\nmost copiously.”\u003c/span\u003e Here, therefore, are the requisites for a second employment of the\r\nMethod of Concomitant Variations; which in this case also is the only method\r\navailable, since all substances radiate heat in some degree or other. The\r\nconclusion obtained by this new application of the method is, that \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ecæteris paribus\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e the deposition of dew is also in some proportion\r\nto the power of radiating heat; and that the quality of doing this abundantly (or some\r\ncause on which that quality depends) is another of the causes which promote\r\nthe deposition of dew on the substance.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Again, the influence ascertained to exist of \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003esubstance\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e and\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003esurface\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e leads us to consider that of \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003etexture\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e: and here, again,\r\nwe are presented on trial with remarkable differences, and with a third scale of\r\nintensity, pointing out substances of a close, firm texture, such as stones, metals,\r\netc., as unfavorable, but those of a loose one, as cloth, velvet, wool, eider-down,\r\ncotton,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page299\"\u003e[pg 299]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg299\" id=\"Pg299\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\netc., as eminently favorable to the contraction of dew.“ The Method@\r\nof Concomitant Variations is here, for the third time, had recourse to;\r\nand, as before, from necessity, since the texture of no substance is absolutely\r\nfirm or absolutely loose. Looseness of texture, therefore, or something\r\nwhich is the cause of that quality, is another circumstance which promotes\r\nthe deposition of dew; but this third course resolves itself into the first,\r\nviz., the quality of resisting the passage of heat: for substances of loose\r\ntexture ”are precisely those which are best adapted for clothing, or for impeding@@\r\nthe free passage of heat from the skin into the air, so as to allow\r\ntheir outer surfaces to be very cold, while they remain warm within;”\u003c/span\u003e and\r\nthis last is, therefore, an induction (from fresh instances) simply\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ecorroborative\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e of a former induction.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt thus appears that the instances in which much dew is deposited, which\r\nare very various, agree in this, and, so far as we are able to observe, in this\r\nonly, that they either radiate heat rapidly or conduct it slowly: qualities\r\nbetween which there is no other circumstance of agreement than that by\r\nvirtue of either, the body tends to lose heat from the surface more rapidly\r\nthan it can be restored from within. The instances, on the contrary, in\r\nwhich no dew, or but a small quantity of it, is formed, and which are also\r\nextremely various, agree (as far as we can observe) in nothing except in\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003enot\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e having this same property. We seem, therefore, to have detected the\r\ncharacteristic difference between the substances on which dew is produced\r\nand those on which it is not produced. And thus have been realized\r\nthe requisitions of what we have termed the Indirect Method of Difference,\r\nor the Joint Method of Agreement and Difference. The example\r\nafforded of this indirect method, and of the manner in which the data are\r\nprepared for it by the Methods of Agreement and of Concomitant Variations,\r\nis the most important of all the illustrations of induction afforded by\r\nthis interesting speculation.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWe might now consider the question, on what the deposition of dew depends,\r\nto be completely solved, if we could be quite sure that the substances\r\non which dew is produced differ from those on which it is not, in\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003enothing\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e but in the property of losing heat from the surface faster than the\r\nloss can be repaired from within. And though we never can have that\r\ncomplete certainty, this is not of so much importance as might at first be\r\nsupposed; for we have, at all events, ascertained that even if there be any\r\nother quality hitherto unobserved which is present in all the substances\r\nwhich contract dew, and absent in those which do not, this other property\r\nmust be one which, in all that great number of substances, is present or absent\r\nexactly where the property of being a better radiator than conductor\r\nis present or absent; an extent of coincidence which affords a strong presumption\r\nof a community of cause, and a consequent invariable co-existence\r\nbetween the two properties; so that the property of being a better radiator\r\nthan conductor, if not itself the cause, almost certainly always accompanies\r\nthe cause, and for purposes of prediction, no error is likely to be committed\r\nby treating it as if it were really such.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nReverting now to an earlier stage of the inquiry, let us remember that\r\nwe had ascertained that, in every instance where dew is formed, there is\r\nactual coldness of the surface below the temperature of the surrounding\r\nair; but we were not sure whether this coldness was the cause of dew, or\r\nits effect. This doubt we are now able to resolve. We have found that, in\r\nevery such instance, the substance is one which, by its own properties or\r\nlaws, would, if exposed in the night, become colder than the surrounding\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page300\"\u003e[pg 300]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg300\" id=\"Pg300\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nair. The coldness, therefore, being accounted for independently of the dew,\r\nwhile it is proved that there is a connection between the two, it must be\r\nthe dew which depends on the coldness; or, in other words, the coldness is\r\nthe cause of the dew.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThis law of causation, already so amply established, admits, however, of\r\nefficient additional corroboration in no less than three ways. First, by deduction\r\nfrom the known laws of aqueous vapor when diffused through air\r\nor any other gas; and though we have not yet come to the Deductive\r\nMethod, we will not omit what is necessary to render this speculation complete.\r\nIt is known by direct experiment that only a limited quantity of\r\nwater can remain suspended in the state of vapor at each degree of temperature,\r\nand that this maximum grows less and less as the temperature\r\ndiminishes. From this it follows, deductively, that if there is already as\r\nmuch vapor suspended as the air will contain at its existing temperature,\r\nany lowering of that temperature will cause a portion of the vapor to be\r\ncondensed, and become water. But again, we know deductively, from the\r\nlaws of heat, that the contact of the air with a body colder than itself will\r\nnecessarily lower the temperature of the stratum of air immediately applied\r\nto its surface; and will, therefore, cause it to part with a portion of\r\nits water, which accordingly will, by the ordinary laws of gravitation or\r\ncohesion, attach itself to the surface of the body, thereby constituting dew.\r\nThis deductive proof, it will have been seen, has the advantage of at once\r\nproving causation as well as co-existence; and it has the additional advantage\r\nthat it also accounts for the exceptions to the occurrence of the phenomenon,\r\nthe cases in which, although the body is colder than the air, yet\r\nno dew is deposited; by showing that this will necessarily be the case\r\nwhen the air is so under-supplied with aqueous vapor, comparatively to its\r\ntemperature, that even when somewhat cooled by the contact of the colder\r\nbody it can still continue to hold in suspension all the vapor which was\r\npreviously suspended in it: thus in a very dry summer there are no dews,\r\nin a very dry winter no hoar-frost. Here, therefore, is an additional condition\r\nof the production of dew, which the methods we previously made\r\nuse of failed to detect, and which might have remained still undetected, if\r\nrecourse had not been had to the plan of deducing the effect from the ascertained\r\nproperties of the agents known to be present.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe second corroboration of the theory is by direct experiment, according\r\nto the canon of the Method of Difference. We can, by cooling the surface\r\nof any body, find in all cases some temperature (more or less inferior\r\nto that of the surrounding air, according to its hygrometric condition) at\r\nwhich dew will begin to be deposited. Here, too, therefore, the causation\r\nis directly proved. We can, it is true, accomplish this only on a small\r\nscale, but we have ample reason to conclude that the same operation, if\r\nconducted in nature’s great laboratory, would equally produce the effect.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAnd, finally, even on that great scale we are able to verify the result.\r\nThe case is one of those rare cases, as we have shown them to be, in which\r\nnature works the experiment for us in the same manner in which we ourselves\r\nperform it; introducing into the previous state of things a single\r\nand perfectly definite new circumstance, and manifesting the effect so rapidly\r\nthat there is not time for any other material change in the pre-existing\r\ncircumstances. \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“It is observed that dew is never copiously deposited in\r\nsituations much screened from the open sky, and not at all in a cloudy\r\nnight; but \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eif the clouds withdraw even for a few minutes, and leave a\r\nclear opening, a deposition of dew presently begins\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e, and goes on increasing…\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page301\"\u003e[pg 301]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg301\" id=\"Pg301\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nDew formed in clear intervals will often even evaporate again\r\nwhen the sky becomes thickly overcast.”\u003c/span\u003e The proof, therefore, is complete,\r\nthat the presence or absence of an uninterrupted communication with the\r\nsky causes the deposition or non-deposition of dew. Now, since a clear sky\r\nis nothing but the absence of clouds, and it is a known property of clouds, as\r\nof all other bodies between which and any given object nothing intervenes\r\nbut an elastic fluid, that they tend to raise or keep up the superficial temperature\r\nof the object by radiating heat to it, we see at once that the disappearance\r\nof clouds will cause the surface to cool; so that nature, in this\r\ncase, produces a change in the antecedent by definite and known means,\r\nand the consequent follows accordingly: a natural experiment which satisfies\r\nthe requisitions of the Method of Difference.\u003ca id=\"noteref_141\" name=\"noteref_141\" href=\"#note_141\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e141\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe accumulated proof of which the Theory of Dew has been found\r\nsusceptible, is a striking instance of the fullness of assurance which the inductive\r\nevidence of laws of causation may attain, in cases in which the invariable\r\nsequence is by no means obvious to a superficial view.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 4. The admirable physiological investigations of Dr. Brown-Séquard\r\nafford brilliant examples of the application of the Inductive Methods to a\r\nclass of inquiries in which, for reasons which will presently be given, direct\r\ninduction takes place under peculiar difficulties and disadvantages.\r\nAs one of the most apt instances, I select his speculation (in the proceedings\r\nof the Royal Society for May 16, 1861) on the relations between muscular\r\nirritability, cadaveric rigidity, and putrefaction.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe law which Dr. Brown-Séquard’s investigation tends to establish, is\r\nthe following: \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“The greater the degree of muscular irritability at the time of\r\ndeath, the later the cadaveric rigidity sets in, and the longer it lasts, and the\r\nlater also putrefaction appears, and the slower it progresses.”\u003c/span\u003e One would\r\nsay at first sight that the method here required must be that of Concomitant\r\nVariations. But this is a delusive appearance, arising from the circumstance\r\nthat the conclusion to be tested is itself a fact of concomitant variations.\r\nFor the establishment of that fact any of the Methods may be put\r\nin requisition, and it will be found that the fourth Method, though really\r\nemployed, has only a subordinate place in this particular investigation.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe evidences by which Dr. Brown-Séquard establishes the law may be\r\nenumerated as follows:\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n1st. Paralyzed muscles have greater irritability than healthy muscles.\r\nNow, paralyzed muscles are later in assuming the cadaveric rigidity than\r\nhealthy muscles, the rigidity lasts longer, and putrefaction sets in later, and\r\nproceeds more slowly.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page302\"\u003e[pg 302]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg302\" id=\"Pg302\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nBoth these propositions had to be proved by experiment; and for the\r\nexperiments which prove them, science is also indebted to Dr. Brown-Séquard.\r\nThe former of the two—that paralyzed muscles have greater irritability\r\nthan healthy muscles—he ascertained in various ways, but most\r\ndecisively by \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“comparing the duration of irritability in a paralyzed muscle\r\nand in the corresponding healthy one of the opposite side, while they are\r\nboth submitted to the same excitation.”\u003c/span\u003e He \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“often found, in experimenting\r\nin that way, that the paralyzed muscle remained irritable twice, three\r\ntimes, or even four times as long as the healthy one.”\u003c/span\u003e This is a case of induction\r\nby the Method of Difference. The two limbs, being those of the\r\nsame animal, were presumed to differ in no circumstance material to the\r\ncase except the paralysis, to the presence and absence of which, therefore,\r\nthe difference in the muscular irritability was to be attributed. This assumption\r\nof complete resemblance in all material circumstances save one,\r\nevidently could not be safely made in any one pair of experiments, because\r\nthe two legs of any given animal might be accidentally in very different\r\npathological conditions; but if, besides taking pains to avoid any such difference,\r\nthe experiment was repeated sufficiently often in different animals\r\nto exclude the supposition that any abnormal circumstance could be present\r\nin them all, the conditions of the Method of Difference were adequately\r\nsecured.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIn the same manner in which Dr. Brown-Séquard proved that paralyzed\r\nmuscles have greater irritability, he also proved the correlative proposition\r\nrespecting cadaveric rigidity and putrefaction. Having, by section of the\r\nroots of the sciatic nerve, and again of a lateral half of the spinal cord,\r\nproduced paralysis in one hind leg of an animal while the other remained\r\nhealthy, he found that not only did muscular irritability last much longer\r\nin the paralyzed limb, but rigidity set in later and ended later, and putrefaction\r\nbegan later and was less rapid than on the healthy side. This is a\r\ncommon case of the Method of Difference, requiring no comment. A further\r\nand very important corroboration was obtained by the same method.\r\nWhen the animal was killed, not shortly after the section of the nerve, but\r\na month later, the effect was reversed; rigidity set in sooner, and lasted a\r\nshorter time, than in the healthy muscles. But after this lapse of time, the\r\nparalyzed muscles, having been kept by the paralysis in a state of rest, had\r\nlost a great part of their irritability, and instead of more, had become less\r\nirritable than those on the healthy side. This gives the A B C,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea b c\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, and\r\nB C, b c, of the Method of Difference. One antecedent, increased irritability,\r\nbeing changed, and the other circumstances being the same, the consequence\r\ndid not follow; and, moreover, when a new antecedent, contrary\r\nto the first, was supplied, it was followed by a contrary consequent. This\r\ninstance is attended with the special advantage of proving that the retardation\r\nand prolongation of the rigidity do not depend directly on the\r\nparalysis, since that was the same in both the instances; but specifically on\r\none effect of the paralysis, namely, the increased irritability; since they\r\nceased when it ceased, and were reversed when it was reversed.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n2d. Diminution of the temperature of muscles before death increases\r\ntheir irritability. But diminution of their temperature also retards cadaveric\r\nrigidity and putrefaction.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nBoth these truths were first made known by Dr. Brown-Séquard himself,\r\nthrough experiments which conclude according to the Method of Difference.\r\nThere is nothing in the nature of the process requiring specific\r\nanalysis.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page303\"\u003e[pg 303]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg303\" id=\"Pg303\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n3d. Muscular exercise, prolonged to exhaustion, diminishes the muscular\r\nirritability. This is a well-known truth, dependent on the most general\r\nlaws of muscular action, and proved by experiments under the Method\r\nof Difference, constantly repeated. Now, it has been shown by observation\r\nthat overdriven cattle, if killed before recovery from their fatigue,\r\nbecome rigid and putrefy in a surprisingly short time. A similar fact has\r\nbeen observed in the case of animals hunted to death; cocks killed during\r\nor shortly after a fight; and soldiers slain in the field of battle. These various\r\ncases agree in no circumstance, directly connected with the muscles,\r\nexcept that these have just been subjected to exhausting exercise. Under\r\nthe canon, therefore, of the Method of Agreement, it may be inferred that\r\nthere is a connection between the two facts. The Method of Agreement,\r\nindeed, as has been shown, is not competent to prove causation. The present\r\ncase, however, is already known to be a case of causation, it being certain\r\nthat the state of the body after death must somehow depend upon its\r\nstate at the time of death. We are, therefore, warranted in concluding that\r\nthe single circumstance in which all the instances agree, is the part of the\r\nantecedent which is the cause of that particular consequent.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n4th. In proportion as the nutrition of muscles is in a good state, their\r\nirritability is high. This fact also rests on the general evidence of the\r\nlaws of physiology, grounded on many familiar applications of the Method\r\nof Difference. Now, in the case of those who die from accident or violence,\r\nwith their muscles in a good state of nutrition, the muscular irritability\r\ncontinues long after death, rigidity sets in late, and persists long\r\nwithout the putrefactive change. On the contrary, in cases of disease in\r\nwhich nutrition has been diminished for a long time before death, all these\r\neffects are reversed. These are the conditions of the Joint Method of\r\nAgreement and Difference. The cases of retarded and long continued\r\nrigidity here in question agree only in being preceded by a high state of\r\nnutrition of the muscles; the cases of rapid and brief rigidity agree only\r\nin being preceded by a low state of muscular nutrition; a connection is,\r\ntherefore, inductively proved between the degree of the nutrition, and the\r\nslowness and prolongation of the rigidity.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n5th. Convulsions, like exhausting exercise, but in a still greater degree,\r\ndiminish the muscular irritability. Now, when death follows violent and\r\nprolonged convulsions, as in tetanus, hydrophobia, some cases of cholera,\r\nand certain poisons, rigidity sets in very rapidly, and after a very brief duration,\r\ngives place to putrefaction. This is another example of the Method\r\nof Agreement, of the same character with No. 3.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n6th. The series of instances which we shall take last, is of a more complex\r\ncharacter, and requires a more minute analysis.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt has long been observed that in some cases of death by lightning, cadaveric\r\nrigidity either does not take place at all, or is of such extremely\r\nbrief duration as to escape notice, and that in these cases putrefaction is\r\nvery rapid. In other cases, however, the usual cadaveric rigidity appears.\r\nThere must be some difference in the cause, to account for this difference\r\nin the effect. Now, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“death by lightning may be the result of, 1st, a syncope\r\nby fright, or in consequence of a direct or reflex influence of lightning\r\non the par vagum; 2d, hemorrhage in or around the brain, or in the\r\nlungs, the pericardium, etc.; 3d, concussion, or some other alteration in\r\nthe brain;”\u003c/span\u003e none of which phenomena have any known property capable of\r\naccounting for the suppression, or almost suppression, of the cadaveric rigidity.\r\nBut the cause of death may also be that the lightning produces\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page304\"\u003e[pg 304]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg304\" id=\"Pg304\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“a violent convulsion of every muscle in the body,”\u003c/span\u003e of which, if of sufficient\r\nintensity, the known effect would be that \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“muscular irritability\r\nceases almost at once.”\u003c/span\u003e If Dr. Brown-Séquard’s generalization is a true\r\nlaw, these will be the very cases in which rigidity is so much abridged as\r\nto escape notice; and the cases in which, on the contrary, rigidity takes\r\nplace as usual, will be those in which the stroke of lightning operates in\r\nsome of the other modes which have been enumerated. How, then, is this\r\nbrought to the test? By experiments, not on lightning, which can not be\r\ncommanded at pleasure, but on the same natural agency in a manageable\r\nform, that of artificial galvanism. Dr. Brown-Séquard galvanized the entire\r\nbodies of animals immediately after death. Galvanism can not operate\r\nin any of the modes in which the stroke of lightning may have operated,\r\nexcept the single one of producing muscular convulsions. If, therefore, after\r\nthe bodies have been galvanized, the duration of rigidity is much shortened\r\nand putrefaction much accelerated, it is reasonable to ascribe the\r\nsame effects when produced by lightning to the property which galvanism\r\nshares with lightning, and not to those which it does not. Now this Dr.\r\nBrown-Séquard found to be the fact. The galvanic experiment was tried\r\nwith charges of very various degrees of strength; and the more powerful the\r\ncharge, the shorter was found to be the duration of rigidity, and the more\r\nspeedy and rapid the putrefaction. In the experiment in which the charge\r\nwas strongest, and the muscular irritability most promptly destroyed, the\r\nrigidity only lasted fifteen minutes. On the principle, therefore, of the\r\nMethod of Concomitant Variations, it may be inferred that the duration\r\nof the rigidity depends on the degree of the irritability; and that if the\r\ncharge had been as much stronger than Dr. Brown-Séquard’s strongest, as\r\na stroke of lightning must be stronger than any electric shock which we\r\ncan produce artificially, the rigidity would have been shortened in a corresponding\r\nratio, and might have disappeared altogether. This conclusion\r\nhaving been arrived at, the case of an electric shock, whether natural or\r\nartificial, becomes an instance, in addition to all those already ascertained,\r\nof correspondence between the irritability of the muscle and the duration\r\nof rigidity.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAll these instances are summed up in the following statement: \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“That\r\nwhen the degree of muscular irritability at the time of death is considerable,\r\neither in consequence of a good state of nutrition, as in persons who\r\ndie in full health from an accidental cause, or in consequence of rest, as in\r\ncases of paralysis, or on account of the influence of cold, cadaveric rigidity\r\nin all these cases sets in late and lasts long, and putrefaction appears late,\r\nand progresses slowly;”\u003c/span\u003e but \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“that when the degree of muscular irritability\r\nat the time of death is slight, either in consequence of a bad state of nutrition,\r\nor of exhaustion from overexertion, or from convulsions caused by\r\ndisease or poison, cadaveric rigidity sets in and ceases soon, and putrefaction\r\nappears and progresses quickly.”\u003c/span\u003e These facts present, in all their\r\ncompleteness, the conditions of the Joint Method of Agreement and Difference.\r\nEarly and brief rigidity takes place in cases which agree only in\r\nthe circumstance of a low state of muscular irritability. Rigidity begins\r\nlate and lasts long in cases which agree only in the contrary circumstance,\r\nof a muscular irritability high and unusually prolonged. It follows that\r\nthere is a connection through causation between the degree of muscular irritability\r\nafter death, and the tardiness and prolongation of the cadaveric\r\nrigidity.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThis investigation places in a strong light the value and efficacy of the\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page305\"\u003e[pg 305]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg305\" id=\"Pg305\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nJoint Method. For, as we have already seen, the defect of that Method is,\r\nthat like the Method of Agreement, of which it is only an improved form,\r\nit can not prove causation. But in the present case (as in one of the steps\r\nin the argument which led up to it) causation is already proved; since\r\nthere could never be any doubt that the rigidity altogether, and the putrefaction\r\nwhich follows it, are caused by the fact of death: the observations\r\nand experiments on which this rests are too familiar to need analysis, and\r\nfall under the Method of Difference. It being, therefore, beyond doubt\r\nthat the aggregate antecedent, the death, is the actual cause of the whole\r\ntrain of consequents, whatever of the circumstances attending the death\r\ncan be shown to be followed in all its variations by variations in the effect\r\nunder investigation, must be the particular feature of the fact of death on\r\nwhich that effect depends. The degree of muscular irritability at the\r\ntime of death fulfills this condition. The only point that could be brought\r\ninto question, would be whether the effect depended on the irritability itself,\r\nor on something which always accompanied the irritability: and this\r\ndoubt is set at rest by establishing, as the instances do, that by whatever\r\ncause the high or low irritability is produced, the effect equally follows;\r\nand can not, therefore, depend upon the causes of irritability, nor upon the\r\nother effects of those causes, which are as various as the causes themselves,\r\nbut upon the irritability, solely.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 5. The last two examples will have conveyed to any one by whom\r\nthey have been duly followed, so clear a conception of the use and practical\r\nmanagement of three of the four methods of experimental inquiry, as\r\nto supersede the necessity of any further exemplification of them. The\r\nremaining method, that of Residues, not having found a place in any of\r\nthe preceding investigations, I shall quote from Sir John Herschel some\r\nexamples of that method, with the remarks by which they are introduced.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“It is by this process, in fact, that science, in its present advanced\r\nstate, is chiefly promoted. Most of the phenomena which Nature presents are\r\nvery complicated; and when the effects of all known causes are estimated\r\nwith exactness, and subducted, the residual facts are constantly appearing\r\nin the form of phenomena altogether new, and leading to the most important\r\nconclusions.\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“For example: the return of the comet predicted by Professor Eucke a\r\ngreat many times in succession, and the general good agreement of its calculated\r\nwith its observed place during any one of its periods of visibility,\r\nwould lead us to say that its gravitation toward the sun and planets is the\r\nsole and sufficient cause of all the phenomena of its orbitual motion; but\r\nwhen the effect of this cause is strictly calculated and subducted from the\r\nobserved motion, there is found to remain behind a \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eresidual phenomenon\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e,\r\nwhich would never have been otherwise ascertained to exist, which is a\r\nsmall anticipation of the time of its re-appearance, or a diminution of its\r\nperiodic time, which can not be accounted for by gravity, and whose cause\r\nis therefore to be inquired into. Such an anticipation would be caused by\r\nthe resistance of a medium disseminated through the celestial regions;\r\nand as there are other good reasons for believing this to be a\r\n\u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003evera causa\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e”\u003c/span\u003e\r\n(an actually existing antecedent), \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“it has therefore been ascribed to such a\r\nresistance.\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca id=\"noteref_142\" name=\"noteref_142\" href=\"#note_142\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e142\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“M. Arago, having suspended a magnetic needle by a silk thread, and set\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page306\"\u003e[pg 306]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg306\" id=\"Pg306\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nit in vibration, observed, that it came much sooner to a state of rest when\r\nsuspended over a plate of copper, than when no such plate was beneath it.\r\nNow, in both cases there were two \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003everæ\r\ncausæ\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e”\u003c/span\u003e (antecedents known to exist) \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“why it \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eshould\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e come at\r\nlength to rest, viz., the resistance of the air,\r\nwhich opposes, and at length destroys, all motions performed in it; and the\r\nwant of perfect mobility in the silk thread. But the effect of these causes\r\nbeing exactly known by the observation made in the absence of the copper,\r\nand being thus allowed for and subducted, a residual phenomenon\r\nappeared, in the fact that a retarding influence was exerted by the copper\r\nitself; and this fact, once ascertained, speedily led to the knowledge of\r\nan entirely new and unexpected class of relations.”\u003c/span\u003e This example belongs,\r\nhowever, not to the Method of Residues but to the Method of Difference,\r\nthe law being ascertained by a direct comparison of the results of two experiments,\r\nwhich differed in nothing but the presence or absence of the\r\nplate of copper. To have made it exemplify the Method of Residues, the\r\neffect of the resistance of the air and that of the rigidity of the silk should\r\nhave been calculated \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea priori\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\nfrom the laws obtained by separate and foregone experiments.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Unexpected and peculiarly striking confirmations of inductive laws\r\nfrequently occur in the form of residual phenomena, in the course of investigations\r\nof a widely different nature from those which gave rise to the\r\ninductions themselves. A very elegant example may be cited in the unexpected\r\nconfirmation of the law of the development of heat in elastic fluids\r\nby compression, which is afforded by the phenomena of sound. The inquiry\r\ninto the cause of sound had led to conclusions respecting its mode\r\nof propagation, from which its velocity in the air could be precisely calculated.\r\nThe calculations were performed; but, when compared with\r\nfact, though the agreement was quite sufficient to show the general correctness\r\nof the cause and mode of propagation assigned, yet the \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ewhole\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e velocity\r\ncould not be shown to arise from this theory. There was still a\r\nresidual velocity to be accounted for, which placed dynamical philosophers\r\nfor a long time in great dilemma. At length Laplace struck on the happy\r\nidea, that this might arise from the \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eheat\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e developed in the act of that\r\ncondensation which necessarily takes place at every vibration by which sound\r\nis conveyed. The matter was subjected to exact calculation, and the result\r\nwas at once the complete explanation of the residual phenomenon, and a\r\nstriking confirmation of the general law of the development of heat by\r\ncompression, under circumstances beyond artificial imitation.”\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Many of the new elements of chemistry have been detected in the\r\ninvestigation of residual phenomena. Thus Arfwedson discovered lithia\r\nby perceiving an excess of weight in the sulphate produced from a small\r\nportion of what he considered as magnesia present in a mineral he had analyzed.\r\nIt is on this principle, too, that the small concentrated residues of\r\ngreat operations in the arts are almost sure to be the lurking-places of new\r\nchemical ingredients: witness iodine, brome, selenium, and the new metals\r\naccompanying platina in the experiments of Wollaston and Tennant. It\r\nwas a happy thought of Glauber to examine what every body else threw\r\naway.”\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca id=\"noteref_143\" name=\"noteref_143\" href=\"#note_143\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e143\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Almost all the greatest discoveries in Astronomy,”\u003c/span\u003e says the same\r\nauthor,\u003ca id=\"noteref_144\" name=\"noteref_144\" href=\"#note_144\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e144\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“have resulted from the consideration of residual phenomena of a\r\nquantitative or numerical kind…. It was thus that the grand discovery\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page307\"\u003e[pg 307]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg307\" id=\"Pg307\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nof the precession of the equinoxes resulted as a residual phenomenon, from\r\nthe imperfect explanation of the return of the seasons by the return of the\r\nsun to the same apparent place among the fixed stars. Thus, also, aberration\r\nand nutation resulted as residual phenomena from that portion of the\r\nchanges of the apparent places of the fixed stars which was left unaccounted\r\nfor by precession. And thus again the apparent proper motions of the stars\r\nare the observed residues of their apparent movements outstanding and\r\nunaccounted for by strict calculation of the effects of precession, nutation,\r\nand aberration. The nearest approach which human theories can make to\r\nperfection is to diminish this residue, this \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ecaput\r\nmortuum\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e of observation,\r\nas it may be considered, as much as practicable, and, if possible, to reduce\r\nit to nothing, either by showing that something has been neglected in our\r\nestimation of known causes, or by reasoning upon it as a new fact, and on\r\nthe principle of the inductive philosophy ascending from the effect to its\r\ncause or causes.”\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe disturbing effects mutually produced by the earth and planets upon\r\neach other’s motions were first brought to light as residual phenomena, by the\r\ndifference which appeared between the observed places of those bodies, and\r\nthe places calculated on a consideration solely of their gravitation toward the\r\nsun. It was this which determined astronomers to consider the law of gravitation\r\nas obtaining between all bodies whatever, and therefore between all\r\nparticles of matter; their first tendency having been to regard it as a force\r\nacting only between each planet or satellite and the central body to whose\r\nsystem it belonged. Again, the catastrophists, in geology, be their opinion\r\nright or wrong, support it on the plea, that after the effect of all causes now\r\nin operation has been allowed for, there remains in the existing constitution\r\nof the earth a large residue of facts, proving the existence at former\r\nperiods either of other forces, or of the same forces in a much greater degree\r\nof intensity. To add one more example: those who assert, what no\r\none has shown any real ground for believing, that there is in one human\r\nindividual, one sex, or one race of mankind over another, an inherent and\r\ninexplicable superiority in mental faculties, could only substantiate their\r\nproposition by subtracting from the differences of intellect which we in\r\nfact see, all that can be traced by known laws either to the ascertained\r\ndifferences of physical organization, or to the differences which have existed\r\nin the outward circumstances in which the subjects of the comparison\r\nhave hitherto been placed. What these causes might fail to account for\r\nwould constitute a residual phenomenon, which and which alone would be\r\nevidence of an ulterior original distinction, and the measure of its amount.\r\nBut the asserters of such supposed differences have not provided themselves\r\nwith these necessary logical conditions of the establishment of their\r\ndoctrine.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe spirit of the Method of Residues being, it is hoped, sufficiently intelligible\r\nfrom these examples, and the other three methods having already\r\nbeen so fully exemplified, we may here close our exposition of the four\r\nmethods, considered as employed in the investigation of the simpler and\r\nmore elementary order of the combinations of phenomena.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 6. Dr. Whewell has expressed a very unfavorable opinion of the utility\r\nof the Four Methods, as well as of the aptness of the examples by which\r\nI have attempted to illustrate them. His words are\r\nthese:\u003ca id=\"noteref_145\" name=\"noteref_145\" href=\"#note_145\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e145\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page308\"\u003e[pg 308]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg308\" id=\"Pg308\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Upon these methods, the obvious thing to remark is, that they take for\r\ngranted the very thing which is most difficult to discover, the reduction of\r\nthe phenomena to formulæ such as are here presented to us. When we\r\nhave any set of complex facts offered to us; for instance, those which were\r\noffered in the cases of discovery which I have mentioned—the facts of the\r\nplanetary paths, of falling bodies, of refracted rays, of cosmical motions, of\r\nchemical analysis; and when, in any of these cases, we would discover the\r\nlaw of nature which governs them, or, if any one chooses so to term it, the\r\nfeature in which all the cases agree, where are we to look for our A, B, C,\r\nand \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eb\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ec\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e? Nature\r\ndoes not present to us the cases in this form; and\r\nhow are we to reduce them to this form? You say \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ewhen\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e we find the combination\r\nof A B C with \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea b c\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e and A B D with \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea b d\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\nthen we may draw our inference. Granted; but when and where are we to find such\r\ncombinations? Even now that the discoveries are made, who will point out to us\r\nwhat are the A, B, C, and \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eb\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ec\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, elements of the cases which have just been\r\nenumerated? Who will tell us which of the methods of inquiry those\r\nhistorically real and successful inquiries exemplify? Who will carry these\r\nformulæ through the history of the sciences, as they have really grown up,\r\nand show us that these four methods have been operative in their formation;\r\nor that any light is thrown upon the steps of their progress by reference\r\nto these formulæ?”\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nHe adds that, in this work, the methods have not been applied \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“to a\r\nlarge body of conspicuous and undoubted examples of discovery, extending\r\nalong the whole history of science;”\u003c/span\u003e which ought to have been done in order\r\nthat the methods might be shown to possess the \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“advantage”\u003c/span\u003e (which\r\nhe claims as belonging to his own) of being those \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“by which all great discoveries\r\nin science have really been made.”\u003c/span\u003e—(P. 277.)\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThere is a striking similarity between the objections here made against\r\nCanons of Induction, and what was alleged, in the last century, by as able\r\nmen as Dr. Whewell, against the acknowledged Canon of Ratiocination.\r\nThose who protested against the Aristotelian Logic said of the Syllogism,\r\nwhat Dr. Whewell says of the Inductive Methods, that it \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“takes for granted\r\nthe very thing which is most difficult to discover, the reduction of the\r\nargument to formulæ such as are here presented to us.”\u003c/span\u003e The grand difficulty,\r\nthey said, is to obtain your syllogism, not to judge of its correctness\r\nwhen obtained. On the matter of fact, both they and Dr. Whewell are\r\nright. The greatest difficulty in both cases is, first, that of obtaining the\r\nevidence, and next, of reducing it to the form which tests its conclusiveness.\r\nBut if we try to reduce it without knowing what it is to be reduced\r\nto, we are not likely to make much progress. It is a more difficult thing\r\nto solve a geometrical problem, than to judge whether a proposed solution\r\nis correct: but if people were not able to judge of the solution when found,\r\nthey would have little chance of finding it. And it can not be pretended\r\nthat to judge of an induction when found is perfectly easy, is a thing for\r\nwhich aids and instruments are superfluous; for erroneous inductions, false\r\ninferences from experience, are quite as common, on some subjects much\r\ncommoner than true ones. The business of Inductive Logic is to provide\r\nrules and models (such as the Syllogism and its rules are for ratiocination)\r\nto which if inductive arguments conform, those arguments are conclusive,\r\nand not otherwise. This is what the Four Methods profess to be, and\r\nwhat I believe they are universally considered to be by experimental philosophers,\r\nwho had practiced all of them long before any one sought to reduce\r\nthe practice to theory.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page309\"\u003e[pg 309]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg309\" id=\"Pg309\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe assailants of the Syllogism had also anticipated Dr. Whewell in the\r\nother branch of his argument. They said that no discoveries were ever\r\nmade by syllogism; and Dr. Whewell says, or seems to say, that none were\r\never made by the Four Methods of Induction. To the former objectors,\r\nArchbishop Whately very pertinently answered, that their argument, if\r\ngood at all, was good against the reasoning process altogether; for whatever\r\ncan not be reduced to syllogism, is not reasoning. And Dr. Whewell’s\r\nargument, if good at all, is good against all inferences from experience. In\r\nsaying that no discoveries were ever made by the Four Methods, he affirms\r\nthat none were ever made by observation and experiment; for assuredly if\r\nany were, it was by processes reducible to one or other of those methods.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThis difference between us accounts for the dissatisfaction which my examples\r\ngive him; for I did not select them with a view to satisfy any one\r\nwho required to be convinced that observation and experiment are modes\r\nof acquiring knowledge: I confess that in the choice of them I thought\r\nonly of illustration, and of facilitating the \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003econception\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e of the Methods by\r\nconcrete instances. If it had been my object to justify the processes themselves\r\nas means of investigation, there would have been no need to look\r\nfar off, or make use of recondite or complicated instances. As a specimen\r\nof a truth ascertained by the Method of Agreement, I might have chosen\r\nthe proposition, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Dogs bark.”\u003c/span\u003e This dog, and that dog, and the other dog,\r\nanswer to A B C, A D E, A F G. The circumstance of being a dog answers\r\nto A. Barking answers to \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e. As a truth made known by the Method\r\nof Difference, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Fire burns”\u003c/span\u003e might have sufficed. Before I touch the\r\nfire I am not burned; this is B C: I touch it, and am burned; this is A B\r\nC, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e B C.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nSuch familiar experimental processes are not regarded as inductions by\r\nDr. Whewell; but they are perfectly homogeneous with those by which,\r\neven on his own showing, the pyramid of science is supplied with its base.\r\nIn vain he attempts to escape from this conclusion by laying the most arbitrary\r\nrestrictions on the choice of examples admissible as instances of\r\nInduction: they must neither be such as are still matter of discussion\r\n(p. 265), nor must any of them be drawn from mental and social subjects\r\n(p. 269), nor from ordinary observation and practical life (pp. 241-247).\r\nThey must be taken exclusively from the generalizations by which scientific\r\nthinkers have ascended to great and comprehensive laws of natural phenomena.\r\nNow it is seldom possible, in these complicated inquiries, to go\r\nmuch beyond the initial steps, without calling in the instrument of Deduction,\r\nand the temporary aid of hypothesis; as I myself, in common with\r\nDr. Whewell, have maintained against the purely empirical school. Since,\r\ntherefore, such cases could not conveniently be selected to illustrate the\r\nprinciples of mere observation and experiment, Dr. Whewell is misled by\r\ntheir absence into representing the Experimental Methods as serving no\r\npurpose in scientific investigation; forgetting that if those methods had\r\nnot supplied the first generalizations, there would have been no materials\r\nfor his own conception of Induction to work upon.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nHis challenge, however, to point out which of the four methods are exemplified\r\nin certain important cases of scientific inquiry, is easily answered.\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“The planetary paths,”\u003c/span\u003e as far as they are a case of induction at\r\nall,\u003ca id=\"noteref_146\" name=\"noteref_146\" href=\"#note_146\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e146\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nfall under the Method of Agreement. The law of \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“falling bodies,”\u003c/span\u003e namely,\r\nthat they describe spaces proportional to the squares of the times, was historically\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page310\"\u003e[pg 310]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg310\" id=\"Pg310\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\na deduction from the first law of motion; but the experiments by\r\nwhich it was verified, and by which it might have been discovered, were\r\nexamples of the Method of Agreement; and the apparent variation from\r\nthe true law, caused by the resistance of the air, was cleared up by experiments\r\n\u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ein vacuo\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, constituting an application of the\r\nMethod of Difference. The law of \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“refracted rays”\u003c/span\u003e (the constancy of the ratio\r\nbetween the sines of incidence and of refraction for each refracting substance) was\r\nascertained by direct measurement, and therefore by the Method of Agreement. The\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“cosmical motions”\u003c/span\u003e were determined by highly complex processes of\r\nthought, in which Deduction was predominant, but the Methods of Agreement\r\nand of Concomitant Variations had a large part in establishing the\r\nempirical laws. Every case without exception of \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“chemical analysis”\u003c/span\u003e constitutes\r\na well-marked example of the Method of Difference. To any one\r\nacquainted with the subjects—to Dr. Whewell himself, there would not be\r\nthe smallest difficulty in setting out \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“the A B C and \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea b c\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nelements”\u003c/span\u003e of these cases.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIf discoveries are ever made by observation and experiment without Deduction,\r\nthe four methods are methods of discovery: but even if they were\r\nnot methods of discovery, it would not be the less true that they are the\r\nsole methods of Proof; and in that character, even the results of deduction\r\nare amenable to them. The great generalizations which begin as Hypotheses,\r\nmust end by being proved, and are in reality (as will be shown\r\nhereafter) proved, by the Four Methods. Now it is with Proof, as such,\r\nthat Logic is principally concerned. This distinction has indeed no chance\r\nof finding favor with Dr. Whewell; for it is the peculiarity of his system,\r\nnot to recognize, in cases of Induction, any necessity for proof. If, after\r\nassuming an hypothesis and carefully collating it with facts, nothing is\r\nbrought to light inconsistent with it, that is, if experience does not\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003edis\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003eprove it, he is content: at least until a simpler hypothesis,\r\nequally consistent with experience, presents itself. If this be Induction, doubtless\r\nthere is no necessity for the four methods. But to suppose that it is so, appears to me\r\na radical misconception of the nature of the evidence of physical truths.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nSo real and practical is the need of a test for induction, similar to the\r\nsyllogistic test of ratiocination, that inferences which bid defiance to the\r\nmost elementary notions of inductive logic are put forth without misgiving\r\nby persons eminent in physical science, as soon as they are off the\r\nground on which they are conversant with the facts, and not reduced to\r\njudge only by the arguments; and as for educated persons in general, it\r\nmay be doubted if they are better judges of a good or a bad induction\r\nthan they were before Bacon wrote. The improvement in the results of\r\nthinking has seldom extended to the processes; or has reached, if any process,\r\nthat of investigation only, not that of proof. A knowledge of many\r\nlaws of nature has doubtless been arrived at, by framing hypotheses and\r\nfinding that the facts corresponded to them; and many errors have been\r\ngot rid of by coming to a knowledge of facts which were inconsistent with\r\nthem, but not by discovering that the mode of thought which led to the\r\nerrors was itself faulty, and might have been known to be such independently\r\nof the facts which disproved the specific conclusion. Hence it is,\r\nthat while the thoughts of mankind have on many subjects worked themselves\r\npractically right, the thinking power remains as weak as ever: and\r\non all subjects on which the facts which would check the result are not accessible,\r\nas in what relates to the invisible world, and even, as has been\r\nseen lately, to the visible world of the planetary regions, men of the greatest\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page311\"\u003e[pg 311]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg311\" id=\"Pg311\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nscientific acquirements argue as pitiably as the merest ignoramus. For\r\nthough they have made many sound inductions, they have not learned from\r\nthem (and Dr. Whewell thinks there is no necessity that they should learn)\r\nthe principles of inductive \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eevidence\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-div\" style=\"margin-bottom: 4.00em; margin-top: 4.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"toc61\" id=\"toc61\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"pdf62\" id=\"pdf62\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: center; margin-bottom: 2.40em; margin-top: 2.40em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 120%\"\u003eChapter X.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: left; margin-bottom: 2.88em; margin-top: 2.88em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 144%\"\u003eOf Plurality Of Causes, And Of The Intermixture Of Effects.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 1. In the preceding exposition of the four methods of observation\r\nand experiment, by which we contrive to distinguish among a mass of co-existent\r\nphenomena the particular effect due to a given cause, or the particular\r\ncause which gave birth to a given effect, it has been necessary to\r\nsuppose, in the first instance, for the sake of simplification, that this analytical\r\noperation is encumbered by no other difficulties than what are essentially\r\ninherent in its nature; and to represent to ourselves, therefore, every\r\neffect, on the one hand as connected exclusively with a single cause, and\r\non the other hand as incapable of being mixed and confounded with any\r\nother co-existent effect. We have regarded \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea b c d e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, the\r\naggregate of the phenomena existing at any moment, as consisting of dissimilar facts,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eb\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ec\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ed\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, and \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ee\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, for each of which one, and only\r\none, cause needs be sought; the difficulty being only that of singling out this one\r\ncause from the multitude of antecedent circumstances, A, B, C, D, and E. The cause indeed\r\nmay not be simple; it may consist of an assemblage of conditions; but we\r\nhave supposed that there was only one possible assemblage of conditions\r\nfrom which the given effect could result.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIf such were the fact, it would be comparatively an easy task to investigate\r\nthe laws of nature. But the supposition does not hold in either of\r\nits parts. In the first place, it is not true that the same phenomenon is\r\nalways produced by the same cause: the effect \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e may sometimes\r\narise from A, sometimes from B. And, secondly, the effects of different causes\r\nare often not dissimilar, but homogeneous, and marked out by no assignable\r\nboundaries from one another: A and B may produce not \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e and\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eb\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, but different portions of an effect \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e.\r\nThe obscurity and difficulty of the investigation\r\nof the laws of phenomena is singularly increased by the necessity\r\nof adverting to these two circumstances: Intermixture of Effects, and\r\nPlurality of Causes. To the latter, being the simpler of the two considerations,\r\nwe shall first direct our attention.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt is not true, then, that one effect must be connected with only one\r\ncause, or assemblage of conditions; that each phenomenon can be produced\r\nonly in one way. There are often several independent modes in\r\nwhich the same phenomenon could have originated. One fact may be the\r\nconsequent in several invariable sequences; it may follow, with equal uniformity,\r\nany one of several antecedents, or collections of antecedents.\r\nMany causes may produce mechanical motion; many causes may produce\r\nsome kinds of sensation; many causes may produce death. A given effect\r\nmay really be produced by a certain cause, and yet be perfectly capable of\r\nbeing produced without it.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ca name=\"Book_III_Chapter_X_Section_2\" id=\"Book_III_Chapter_X_Section_2\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 2. One of the principal consequences of this fact of Plurality of Causes\r\nis, to render the first of the inductive methods, that of Agreement, uncertain.\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page312\"\u003e[pg 312]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg312\" id=\"Pg312\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nTo illustrate that method, we supposed two instances, A B C followed\r\nby \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea b c\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, and A D E followed by \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea d e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e.\r\nFrom these instances it might apparently be concluded that A is an invariable antecedent\r\nof \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, and even that it is the unconditional invariable\r\nantecedent, or cause, if we could be sure that there is no other antecedent common to\r\nthe two cases. That this difficulty may not stand in the way, let us suppose the two\r\ncases positively ascertained to have no antecedent in common except A. The moment,\r\nhowever, that we let in the possibility of a plurality of causes, the conclusion\r\nfails. For it involves a tacit supposition, that \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e must have been\r\nproduced in both instances by the same cause. If there can possibly have\r\nbeen two causes, those two may, for example, be C and E: the one may\r\nhave been the cause of \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e in the former of the instances, the\r\nother in the latter, A having no influence in either case.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nSuppose, for example, that two great artists or great philosophers, that\r\ntwo extremely selfish or extremely generous characters, were compared\r\ntogether as to the circumstances of their education and history, and the\r\ntwo cases were found to agree only in one circumstance: would it follow\r\nthat this one circumstance was the cause of the quality which characterized\r\nboth those individuals? Not at all; for the causes which may produce\r\nany type of character are very numerous; and the two persons might\r\nequally have agreed in their character, though there had been no manner\r\nof resemblance in their previous history.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThis, therefore, is a characteristic imperfection of the Method of Agreement,\r\nfrom which imperfection the Method of Difference is free. For if\r\nwe have two instances, A B C and B C, of which B C gives \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eb c\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, and\r\nA being added converts it into \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea b c\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, it is certain that in this\r\ninstance at least, A was either the cause of \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, or an\r\nindispensable portion of its cause, even though\r\nthe cause which produces it in other instances may be altogether different.\r\nPlurality of Causes, therefore, not only does not diminish the reliance due\r\nto the Method of Difference, but does not even render a greater number\r\nof observations or experiments necessary: two instances, the one positive\r\nand the other negative, are still sufficient for the most complete and rigorous\r\ninduction. Not so, however, with the Method of Agreement. The\r\nconclusions which that yields, when the number of instances compared is\r\nsmall, are of no real value, except as, in the character of suggestions, they\r\nmay lead either to experiments bringing them to the test of the Method\r\nof Difference, or to reasonings which may explain and verify them deductively.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt is only when the instances, being indefinitely multiplied and varied,\r\ncontinue to suggest the same result, that this result acquires any high degree\r\nof independent value. If there are but two instances, A B C and\r\nA D E, though these instances have no antecedent in common except A, yet\r\nas the effect may possibly have been produced in the two cases by different\r\ncauses, the result is at most only a slight probability in favor of A;\r\nthere may be causation, but it is almost equally probable that there was\r\nonly a coincidence. But the oftener we repeat the observation, varying\r\nthe circumstances, the more we advance toward a solution of this doubt.\r\nFor if we try A F G, A H K, etc., all unlike one another except in containing\r\nthe circumstance A, and if we find the effect \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e entering into the\r\nresult in all these cases, we must suppose one of two things, either that it is\r\ncaused by A, or that it has as many different causes as there are instances.\r\nWith each addition, therefore, to the number of instances, the presumption\r\nis strengthened in favor of A. The inquirer, of course, will not neglect,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page313\"\u003e[pg 313]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg313\" id=\"Pg313\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nif an opportunity present itself, to exclude A from some one of these\r\ncombinations, from A H K for instance, and by trying H K separately, appeal\r\nto the Method of Difference in aid of the Method of Agreement. By\r\nthe Method of Difference alone can it be ascertained that A is the cause\r\nof \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e; but that it is either the cause, or another effect of the\r\nsame cause, may be placed beyond any reasonable doubt by the Method of Agreement,\r\nprovided the instances are very numerous as well as sufficiently various.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAfter how great a multiplication, then, of varied instances, all agreeing\r\nin no other antecedent except A, is the supposition of a plurality of causes\r\nsufficiently rebutted, and the conclusion that \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e is connected\r\nwith A divested of the characteristic imperfection, and reduced to a virtual certainty?\r\nThis is a question which we can not be exempted from answering: but\r\nthe consideration of it belongs to what is called the Theory of Probability,\r\nwhich will form the subject of a chapter hereafter. It is seen, however, at\r\nonce, that the conclusion does amount to a practical certainty after a sufficient\r\nnumber of instances, and that the method, therefore, is not radically\r\nvitiated by the characteristic imperfection. The result of these considerations\r\nis only, in the first place, to point out a new source of inferiority in\r\nthe Method of Agreement as compared with other modes of investigation,\r\nand new reasons for never resting contented with the results obtained by\r\nit, without attempting to confirm them either by the Method of Difference,\r\nor by connecting them deductively with some law or laws already ascertained\r\nby that superior method. And, in the second place, we learn from\r\nthis the true theory of the value of mere \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003enumber\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e of instances in inductive\r\ninquiry. The Plurality of Causes is the only reason why mere number is\r\nof any importance. The tendency of unscientific inquirers is to rely too\r\nmuch on number, without analyzing the instances; without looking closely\r\nenough into their nature to ascertain what circumstances are or are not\r\neliminated by means of them. Most people hold their conclusions with a\r\ndegree of assurance proportioned to the mere \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003emass\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e of the experience on\r\nwhich they appear to rest; not considering that by the addition of instances\r\nto instances, all of the same kind, that is, differing from one another\r\nonly in points already recognized as immaterial, nothing whatever is added\r\nto the evidence of the conclusion. A single instance eliminating some\r\nantecedent which existed in all the other cases, is of more value than the\r\ngreatest multitude of instances which are reckoned by their number alone.\r\nIt is necessary, no doubt, to assure ourselves, by repetition of the observation\r\nor experiment, that no error has been committed concerning the individual\r\nfacts observed; and until we have assured ourselves of this, instead\r\nof varying the circumstances, we can not too scrupulously repeat the same\r\nexperiment or observation without any change. But when once this assurance\r\nhas been obtained, the multiplication of instances which do not exclude\r\nany more circumstances is entirely useless, provided there have been\r\nalready enough to exclude the supposition of Plurality of Causes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt is of importance to remark, that the peculiar modification of the\r\nMethod of Agreement, which, as partaking in some degree of the nature\r\nof the Method of Difference, I have called the Joint Method of Agreement\r\nand Difference, is not affected by the characteristic imperfection now\r\npointed out. For, in the joint method, it is supposed not only that the instances\r\nin which \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e is, agree only in containing A, but also that the\r\ninstances in which \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e is not, agree only in not containing A. Now,\r\nif this be so, A must be not only the cause of \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, but the only\r\npossible cause: for if there were another, as for example B, then in the instances in\r\nwhich \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e is\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page314\"\u003e[pg 314]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg314\" id=\"Pg314\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nnot, B must have been absent as well as A, and it would not be true that\r\nthese instances agree \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eonly\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e in not containing A. This, therefore,\r\nconstitutes an immense advantage of the joint method over the simple Method\r\nof Agreement. It may seem, indeed, that the advantage does not belong\r\nso much to the joint method, as to one of its two premises (if they may be\r\nso called), the negative premise. The Method of Agreement, when applied\r\nto negative instances, or those in which a phenomenon does \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003enot\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e take place,\r\nis certainly free from the characteristic imperfection which affects it in the\r\naffirmative case. The negative premise, it might therefore be supposed,\r\ncould be worked as a simple case of the Method of Agreement, without requiring\r\nan affirmative premise to be joined with it. But though this is\r\ntrue in principle, it is generally altogether impossible to work the Method\r\nof Agreement by negative instances without positive ones; it is so much\r\nmore difficult to exhaust the field of negation than that of affirmation.\r\nFor instance, let the question be what is the cause of the transparency of\r\nbodies; with what prospect of success could we set ourselves to inquire\r\ndirectly in what the multifarious substances which are \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003enot\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e transparent\r\nagree? But we might hope much sooner to seize some point of resemblance\r\namong the comparatively few and definite species of objects which\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eare\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e transparent; and this being attained, we should quite naturally be put\r\nupon examining whether the \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eabsence\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e of this one circumstance be not precisely\r\nthe point in which all opaque substances will be found to resemble.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe Joint Method of Agreement and Difference, therefore, or as I have\r\notherwise called it, the Indirect Method of Difference (because, like the\r\nMethod of Difference properly so-called, it proceeds by ascertaining how and\r\nin what the cases where the phenomenon is present differ from those in which\r\nit is absent) is, after the Direct Method of Difference, the most powerful\r\nof the remaining instruments of inductive investigation; and in the sciences\r\nwhich depend on pure observation, with little or no aid from experiment,\r\nthis method, so well exemplified in the speculation on the cause of dew, is\r\nthe primary resource, so far as direct appeals to experience are concerned.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 3. We have thus far treated Plurality of Causes only as a possible supposition,\r\nwhich, until removed, renders our inductions uncertain; and have\r\nonly considered by what means, where the plurality does not really exist,\r\nwe may be enabled to disprove it. But we must also consider it as a case\r\nactually occurring in nature, and which, as often as it does occur, our\r\nmethods of induction ought to be capable of ascertaining and establishing.\r\nFor this, however, there is required no peculiar method. When an effect\r\nis really producible by two or more causes, the process for detecting them\r\nis in no way different from that by which we discover single causes. They\r\nmay (first) be discovered as separate sequences, by separate sets of instances.\r\nOne set of observations or experiments shows that the sun is a\r\ncause of heat, another that friction is a source of it, another that percussion,\r\nanother that electricity, another that chemical action is such a source.\r\nOr (secondly) the plurality may come to light in the course of collating a\r\nnumber of instances, when we attempt to find some circumstance in which\r\nthey all agree, and fail in doing so. We find it impossible to trace, in all\r\nthe cases in which the effect is met with, any common circumstance. We\r\nfind that we can eliminate \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eall\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e the antecedents; that no one of them is\r\npresent in all the instances, no one of them indispensable to the effect.\r\nOn closer scrutiny, however, it appears that though no one is always present,\r\none or other of several always is. If, on further analysis, we can detect\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page315\"\u003e[pg 315]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg315\" id=\"Pg315\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nin these any common element, we may be able to ascend from them\r\nto some one cause which is the really operative circumstance in them all.\r\nThus it is now thought that in the production of heat by friction, percussion,\r\nchemical action, etc., the ultimate source is one and the same. But if\r\n(as continually happens) we can not take this ulterior step, the different\r\nantecedents must be set down provisionally as distinct causes, each sufficient\r\nof itself to produce the effect.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWe here close our remarks on the Plurality of Causes, and proceed to\r\nthe still more peculiar and more complex case of the Intermixture of Effects,\r\nand the interference of causes with one another: a case constituting\r\nthe principal part of the complication and difficulty of the study of nature;\r\nand with which the four only possible methods of directly inductive investigation\r\nby observation and experiment, are, for the most part, as will appear\r\npresently, quite unequal to cope. The instrument of Deduction alone\r\nis adequate to unravel the complexities proceeding from this source; and\r\nthe four methods have little more in their power than to supply premises\r\nfor, and a verification of, our deductions.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 4. A concurrence of two or more causes, not separately producing each\r\nits own effect, but interfering with or modifying the effects of one another,\r\ntakes place, as has already been explained in two different ways. In\r\nthe one, which is exemplified by the joint operation of different forces in\r\nmechanics, the separate effects of all the causes continue to be produced,\r\nbut are compounded with one another, and disappear in one total. In the\r\nother, illustrated by the case of chemical action, the separate effects cease\r\nentirely, and are succeeded by phenomena altogether different, and governed\r\nby different laws.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nOf these cases the former is by far the more frequent, and this case it is\r\nwhich, for the most part, eludes the grasp of our experimental methods.\r\nThe other and exceptional case is essentially amenable to them. When the\r\nlaws of the original agents cease entirely, and a phenomenon makes its\r\nappearance, which, with reference to those laws, is quite heterogeneous;\r\nwhen, for example, two gaseous substances, hydrogen and oxygen, on being\r\nbrought together, throw off their peculiar properties, and produce the\r\nsubstance called water; in such cases the new fact may be subjected to\r\nexperimental inquiry, like any other phenomenon; and the elements which\r\nare said to compose it may be considered as the mere agents of its production—the\r\nconditions on which it depends, the facts which make up its\r\ncause.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eeffects\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e of the new phenomenon, the \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eproperties\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e of water,\r\nfor instance, are as easily found by experiment as the effects of any other cause. But\r\nto discover the \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ecause\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e of it, that is, the particular conjunction of agents\r\nfrom which it results, is often difficult enough. In the first place, the origin\r\nand actual production of the phenomenon are most frequently inaccessible\r\nto our observation. If we could not have learned the composition of\r\nwater until we found instances in which it was actually produced from\r\noxygen and hydrogen, we should have been forced to wait until the casual\r\nthought struck some one of passing an electric spark through a mixture\r\nof the two gases, or inserting a lighted taper into it, merely to try what\r\nwould happen. Besides, many substances, though they can be analyzed,\r\ncan not by any known artificial means be recompounded. Further, even\r\nif we could have ascertained, by the Method of Agreement, that oxygen\r\nand hydrogen were both present when water is produced, no experimentation\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page316\"\u003e[pg 316]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg316\" id=\"Pg316\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\non oxygen and hydrogen separately, no knowledge of their laws, could\r\nhave enabled us deductively to infer that they would produce water. We\r\nrequire a specific experiment on the two combined.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nUnder these difficulties, we should generally have been indebted for our\r\nknowledge of the causes of this class of effects, not to any inquiry directed\r\nspecifically toward that end, but either to accident, or to the gradual\r\nprogress of experimentation on the different combinations of which the\r\nproducing agents are susceptible; if it were not for a peculiarity belonging\r\nto effects of this description, that they often, under some particular combination\r\nof circumstances, reproduce their causes. If water results from\r\nthe juxtaposition of hydrogen and oxygen whenever this can be made sufficiently\r\nclose and intimate, so, on the other hand, if water itself be placed\r\nin certain situations, hydrogen and oxygen are reproduced from it: an\r\nabrupt termination is put to the new laws, and the agents re-appear separately\r\nwith their own properties as at first. What is called chemical analysis\r\nis the process of searching for the causes of a phenomenon among its\r\neffects, or rather among the effects produced by the action of some other\r\ncauses upon it.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nLavoisier, by heating mercury to a high temperature in a close vessel\r\ncontaining air, found that the mercury increased in weight, and became\r\nwhat was then called red precipitate, while the air, on being examined\r\nafter the experiment, proved to have lost weight, and to have become incapable\r\nof supporting life or combustion. When red precipitate was exposed\r\nto a still greater heat, it became mercury again, and gave off a gas\r\nwhich did support life and flame. Thus the agents which by their combination\r\nproduced red precipitate, namely, the mercury and the gas, reappear\r\nas effects resulting from that precipitate when acted upon by heat.\r\nSo, if we decompose water by means of iron filings, we produce two effects,\r\nrust and hydrogen. Now rust is already known, by experiments upon the\r\ncomponent substances, to be an effect of the union of iron and oxygen:\r\nthe iron we ourselves supplied, but the oxygen must have been produced\r\nfrom the water. The result, therefore, is that water has disappeared, and\r\nhydrogen and oxygen have appeared in its stead; or, in other words, the\r\noriginal laws of these gaseous agents, which had been suspended by the\r\nsuperinduction of the new laws called the properties of water, have again\r\nstarted into existence, and the causes of water are found among its effects.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWhere two phenomena, between the laws or properties of which, considered\r\nin themselves, no connection can be traced, are thus reciprocally\r\ncause and effect, each capable in its turn of being produced from the other,\r\nand each, when it produces the other, ceasing itself to exist (as water\r\nis produced from oxygen and hydrogen, and oxygen and hydrogen are reproduced\r\nfrom water); this causation of the two phenomena by one another,\r\neach being generated by the other’s destruction, is properly transformation.\r\nThe idea of chemical composition is an idea of transformation,\r\nbut of a transformation which is incomplete; since we consider the oxygen\r\nand hydrogen to be present in the water \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eas\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e oxygen and hydrogen, and\r\ncapable of being discovered in it if our senses were sufficiently keen: a\r\nsupposition (for it is no more) grounded solely on the fact that the weight\r\nof the water is the sum of the separate weights of the two ingredients. If\r\nthere had not been this exception to the entire disappearance, in the compound,\r\nof the laws of the separate ingredients; if the combined agents had\r\nnot, in this one particular of weight, preserved their own laws, and produced\r\na joint result equal to the sum of their separate results; we should never,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page317\"\u003e[pg 317]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg317\" id=\"Pg317\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nprobably, have had the notion now implied by the words chemical composition;\r\nand, in the facts of water produced from hydrogen and oxygen,\r\nand hydrogen and oxygen produced from water, as the transformation\r\nwould have been complete, we should have seen only a transformation.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIn these cases, where the heteropathic effect (as we called it in a former\r\nchapter)\u003ca id=\"noteref_147\" name=\"noteref_147\" href=\"#note_147\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e147\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e is but a transformation of its\r\ncause, or in other words, where the effect and its cause are reciprocally such, and\r\nmutually convertible into each other; the problem of finding the cause resolves itself\r\ninto the far easier one of finding an effect, which is the kind of inquiry that admits of\r\nbeing prosecuted by direct experiment. But there are other cases of\r\nheteropathic effects to which this mode of investigation is not applicable.\r\nTake, for instance, the heteropathic laws of mind; that portion of the phenomena\r\nof our mental nature which are analogous to chemical rather than\r\nto dynamical phenomena; as when a complex passion is formed by the coalition\r\nof several elementary impulses, or a complex emotion by several\r\nsimple pleasures or pains, of which it is the result without being the aggregate,\r\nor in any respect homogeneous with them. The product, in these\r\ncases, is generated by its various factors; but the factors can not be reproduced\r\nfrom the product; just as a youth can grow into an old man,\r\nbut an old man can not grow into a youth. We can not ascertain from\r\nwhat simple feelings any of our complex states of mind are generated, as\r\nwe ascertain the ingredients of a chemical compound, by making it, in its\r\nturn, generate them. We can only, therefore, discover these laws by the\r\nslow process of studying the simple feelings themselves, and ascertaining\r\nsynthetically, by experimenting on the various combinations of which they\r\nare susceptible, what they, by their mutual action upon one another, are\r\ncapable of generating.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 5. It might have been supposed that the other, and apparently simpler\r\nvariety of the mutual interference of causes, where each cause continues\r\nto produce its own proper effect according to the same laws to which it\r\nconforms in its separate state, would have presented fewer difficulties to\r\nthe inductive inquirer than that of which we have just finished the consideration.\r\nIt presents, however, so far as direct induction apart from deduction\r\nis concerned, infinitely greater difficulties. When a concurrence\r\nof causes gives rise to a new effect, bearing no relation to the separate\r\neffects of those causes, the resulting phenomenon stands forth undisguised,\r\ninviting attention to its peculiarity, and presenting no obstacle to our recognizing\r\nits presence or absence among any number of surrounding phenomena.\r\nIt admits, therefore, of being easily brought under the canons of\r\nInduction, provided instances can be obtained such as those canons require;\r\nand the non-occurrence of such instances, or the want of means to produce\r\nthem artificially, is the real and only difficulty in such investigations;\r\na difficulty not logical but in some sort physical. It is otherwise with cases\r\nof what, in a preceding chapter, has been denominated the Composition of\r\nCauses. There, the effects of the separate causes do not terminate and give\r\nplace to others, thereby ceasing to form any part of the phenomenon to be\r\ninvestigated; on the contrary, they still take place, but are intermingled\r\nwith, and disguised by, the homogeneous and closely allied effects of other\r\ncauses. They are no longer \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eb\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ec\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ed\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ee\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, existing\r\nside by side, and continuing to be separately discernible; they are\r\n+\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, -\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, ½\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eb\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003e-b\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, 2\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eb\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, etc.; some of\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page318\"\u003e[pg 318]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg318\" id=\"Pg318\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nwhich cancel one another, while many others do not appear distinguishably,\r\nbut merge in one sum; forming altogether a result, between which\r\nand the causes whereby it was produced there is often an insurmountable\r\ndifficulty in tracing by observation any fixed relation whatever.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe general idea of the Composition of Causes has been seen to be, that\r\nthough two or more laws interfere with one another, and apparently frustrate\r\nor modify one another’s operation, yet in reality all are fulfilled, the\r\ncollective effect being the exact sum of the effects of the causes taken separately.\r\nA familiar instance is that of a body kept in equilibrium by two\r\nequal and contrary forces. One of the forces if acting alone would carry\r\nthe body in a given time a certain distance to the west, the other if acting\r\nalone would carry it exactly as far toward the east; and the result is the\r\nsame as if it had been first carried to the west as far as the one force would\r\ncarry it, and then back toward the east as far as the other would carry\r\nit—that is, precisely the same distance; being ultimately left where it was\r\nfound at first.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAll laws of causation are liable to be in this manner counteracted, and\r\nseemingly frustrated, by coming into conflict with other laws, the separate\r\nresult of which is opposite to theirs, or more or less inconsistent with it.\r\nAnd hence, with almost every law, many instances in which it really is\r\nentirely fulfilled, do not, at first sight, appear to be cases of its operation\r\nat all. It is so in the example just adduced: a force in mechanics means\r\nneither more nor less than a cause of motion, yet the sum of the effects of\r\ntwo causes of motion may be rest. Again, a body solicited by two forces\r\nin directions making an angle with one another, moves in the diagonal;\r\nand it seems a paradox to say that motion in the diagonal is the sum of two\r\nmotions in two other lines. Motion, however, is but change of place, and\r\nat every instant the body is in the exact place it would have been in if the\r\nforces had acted during alternate instants instead of acting in the same\r\ninstant (saving that if we suppose two forces to act successively which are\r\nin truth simultaneous we must of course allow them double the time). It\r\nis evident, therefore, that each force has had, during each instant, all the\r\neffect which belonged to it; and that the modifying influence which one\r\nof two concurrent causes is said to exercise with respect to the other may\r\nbe considered as exerted not over the action of the cause itself, but over\r\nthe effect after it is completed. For all purposes of predicting, calculating,\r\nor explaining their joint result, causes which compound their effects\r\nmay be treated as if they produced simultaneously each of them its own\r\neffect, and all these effects co-existed visibly.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nSince the laws of causes are as really fulfilled when the causes are said\r\nto be counteracted by opposing causes, as when they are left to their own\r\nundisturbed action, we must be cautious not to express the laws in such\r\nterms as would render the assertion of their being fulfilled in those cases a\r\ncontradiction. If, for instance, it were stated as a law of nature that a\r\nbody to which a force is applied moves in the direction of the force, with a\r\nvelocity proportioned to the force directly, and to its own mass inversely;\r\nwhen in point of fact some bodies to which a force is applied do not move\r\nat all, and those which do move (at least in the region of our earth) are,\r\nfrom the very first, retarded by the action of gravity and other resisting\r\nforces, and at last stopped altogether; it is clear that the general proposition,\r\nthough it would be true under a certain hypothesis, would not express\r\nthe facts as they actually occur. To accommodate the expression of\r\nthe law to the real phenomena, we must say, not that the object moves, but\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page319\"\u003e[pg 319]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg319\" id=\"Pg319\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nthat it \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003etends\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e to move, in the direction and with the velocity specified.\r\nWe might, indeed, guard our expression in a different mode, by saying\r\nthat the body moves in that manner unless prevented, or except in so far\r\nas prevented, by some counteracting cause. But the body does not only\r\nmove in that manner unless counteracted; it \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003etends\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e to move in that manner\r\neven when counteracted; it still exerts, in the original direction, the same\r\nenergy of movement as if its first impulse had been undisturbed, and produces,\r\nby that energy, an exactly equivalent quantity of effect. This is\r\ntrue even when the force leaves the body as it found it, in a state of absolute\r\nrest; as when we attempt to raise a body of three tons’ weight with\r\na force equal to one ton. For if, while we are applying this force, wind or\r\nwater or any other agent supplies an additional force just exceeding two\r\ntons, the body will be raised; thus proving that the force we applied exerted\r\nits full effect, by neutralizing an equivalent portion of the weight\r\nwhich it was insufficient altogether to overcome. And if, while we are\r\nexerting this force of one ton upon the object in a direction contrary to\r\nthat of gravity, it be put into a scale and weighed, it will be found to have\r\nlost a ton of its weight, or, in other words, to press downward with a force\r\nonly equal to the difference of the two forces.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThese facts are correctly indicated by the expression \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003etendency\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e. All laws\r\nof causation, in consequence of their liability to be counteracted, require to\r\nbe stated in words affirmative of tendencies only, and not of actual results.\r\nIn those sciences of causation which have an accurate nomenclature, there\r\nare special words which signify a tendency to the particular effect with\r\nwhich the science is conversant; thus \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003epressure\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e, in mechanics, is synonymous\r\nwith tendency to motion, and forces are not reasoned on as causing\r\nactual motion, but as exerting pressure. A similar improvement in terminology\r\nwould be very salutary in many other branches of science.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe habit of neglecting this necessary element in the precise expression\r\nof the laws of nature, has given birth to the popular prejudice that all general\r\ntruths have exceptions; and much unmerited distrust has thence accrued\r\nto the conclusions of science, when they have been submitted to the\r\njudgment of minds insufficiently disciplined and cultivated. The rough\r\ngeneralizations suggested by common observation usually have exceptions;\r\nbut principles of science, or, in other words, laws of causation, have not.\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“What is thought to be an exception to a principle”\u003c/span\u003e (to quote words used\r\non a different occasion), \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“is always some other and distinct principle\r\ncutting into the former; some other force which impinges\u003ca id=\"noteref_148\" name=\"noteref_148\" href=\"#note_148\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e148\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e against the first\r\nforce, and deflects it from its direction. There are not a law and an exception\r\nto that law, the law acting in ninety-nine cases, and the exception in\r\none. There are two laws, each possibly acting in the whole hundred cases,\r\nand bringing about a common effect by their conjunct operation. If the\r\nforce which, being the less conspicuous of the two, is called the\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003edisturbing\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e force, prevails sufficiently over the other force in\r\nsome one case, to constitute that case what is commonly called an exception, the same\r\ndisturbing force probably acts as a modifying cause in many other cases which no one\r\nwill call exceptions.\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Thus if it were stated to be a law of nature that all heavy bodies fall\r\nto the ground, it would probably be said that the resistance of the atmosphere,\r\nwhich prevents a balloon from falling, constitutes the balloon an exception\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page320\"\u003e[pg 320]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg320\" id=\"Pg320\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nto that pretended law of nature. But the real law is, that all heavy\r\nbodies \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003etend\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e to fall; and to this there is no exception, not even the sun and\r\nmoon; for even they, as every astronomer knows, tend toward the earth,\r\nwith a force exactly equal to that with which the earth tends toward them.\r\nThe resistance of the atmosphere might, in the particular case of the balloon,\r\nfrom a misapprehension of what the law of gravitation is, be said to\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eprevail over\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e the law; but its disturbing effect is quite as real in every\r\nother case, since though it does not prevent, it retards the fall of all bodies\r\nwhatever. The rule, and the so-called exception, do not divide the cases\r\nbetween them; each of them is a comprehensive rule extending to all cases.\r\nTo call one of these concurrent principles an exception to the other, is superficial,\r\nand contrary to the correct principles of nomenclature and arrangement.\r\nAn effect of precisely the same kind, and arising from the\r\nsame cause, ought not to be placed in two different categories, merely as\r\nthere does or does not exist another cause preponderating over\r\nit.”\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca id=\"noteref_149\" name=\"noteref_149\" href=\"#note_149\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e149\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 6. We have now to consider according to what method these complex\r\neffects, compounded of the effects of many causes, are to be studied; how\r\nwe are enabled to trace each effect to the concurrence of causes in which\r\nit originated, and ascertain the conditions of its recurrence—the circumstances\r\nin which it may be expected again to occur. The conditions of a\r\nphenomenon which arises from a composition of causes, may be investigated\r\neither deductively or experimentally.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe case, it is evident, is naturally susceptible of the deductive mode of\r\ninvestigation. The law of an effect of this description is a result of the\r\nlaws of the separate causes on the combination of which it depends, and is,\r\ntherefore, in itself capable of being deduced from these laws. This is called\r\nthe method \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea priori\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e. The other, or\r\n\u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea posteriori\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e method, professes to\r\nproceed according to the canons of experimental inquiry. Considering\r\nthe whole assemblage of concurrent causes which produced the phenomenon,\r\nas one single cause, it attempts to ascertain the cause in the ordinary\r\nmanner, by a comparison of instances. This second method subdivides\r\nitself into two different varieties. If it merely collates instances of the\r\neffect, it is a method of pure observation. If it operates upon the causes,\r\nand tries different combinations of them, in hopes of ultimately hitting the\r\nprecise combination which will produce the given total effect, it is a method\r\nof experiment.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIn order more completely to clear up the nature of each of these three\r\nmethods, and determine which of them deserves the preference, it will be\r\nexpedient (conformably to a favorite maxim of Lord Chancellor Eldon, to\r\nwhich, though it has often incurred philosophical ridicule, a deeper philosophy\r\nwill not refuse its sanction) to \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“clothe them in circumstances.”\u003c/span\u003e\r\nWe shall select for this purpose a case which as yet furnishes no very brilliant\r\nexample of the success of any of the three methods, but which is all\r\nthe more suited to illustrate the difficulties inherent in them. Let the subject\r\nof inquiry be, the conditions of health and disease in the human body;\r\nor (for greater simplicity) the conditions of recovery from a given disease;\r\nand in order to narrow the question still more, let it be limited, in the first\r\ninstance, to this one inquiry: Is, or is not, some particular medicament\r\n(mercury, for instance) a remedy for the given disease.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nNow, the deductive method would set out from known properties of\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page321\"\u003e[pg 321]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg321\" id=\"Pg321\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nmercury, and known laws of the human body, and by reasoning from these,\r\nwould attempt to discover whether mercury will act upon the body when\r\nin the morbid condition supposed, in such a manner as would tend to restore\r\nhealth. The experimental method would simply administer mercury\r\nin as many cases as possible, noting the age, sex, temperament, and other\r\npeculiarities of bodily constitution, the particular form or variety of the\r\ndisease, the particular stage of its progress, etc., remarking in which of\r\nthese cases it was attended with a salutary effect, and with what circumstances\r\nit was on those occasions combined. The method of simple observation\r\nwould compare instances of recovery, to find whether they agreed\r\nin having been preceded by the administration of mercury; or would compare\r\ninstances of recovery with instances of failure, to find cases which,\r\nagreeing in all other respects, differed only in the fact that mercury had\r\nbeen administered, or that it had not.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 7. That the last of these three modes of investigation is applicable to\r\nthe case, no one has ever seriously contended. No conclusions of value on\r\na subject of such intricacy ever were obtained in that way. The utmost\r\nthat could result would be a vague general impression for or against the\r\nefficacy of mercury, of no avail for guidance unless confirmed by one of the\r\nother two methods. Not that the results, which this method strives to obtain,\r\nwould not be of the utmost possible value if they could be obtained.\r\nIf all the cases of recovery which presented themselves, in an examination\r\nextending to a great number of instances, were cases in which mercury had\r\nbeen administered, we might generalize with confidence from this experience,\r\nand should have obtained a conclusion of real value. But no such\r\nbasis for generalization can we, in a case of this description, hope to obtain.\r\nThe reason is that which we have spoken of as constituting the characteristic\r\nimperfection of the Method of Agreement, Plurality of Causes. Supposing\r\neven that mercury does tend to cure the disease, so many other\r\ncauses, both natural and artificial, also tend to cure it, that there are sure\r\nto be abundant instances of recovery in which mercury has not been administered,\r\nunless, indeed, the practice be to administer it in all cases; on\r\nwhich supposition it will equally be found in the cases of failure.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWhen an effect results from the union of many causes, the share which\r\neach has in the determination of the effect can not in general be great,\r\nand the effect is not likely, even in its presence or absence, still less in its\r\nvariations, to follow, even approximately, any one of the causes. Recovery\r\nfrom a disease is an event to which, in every case, many influences\r\nmust concur. Mercury may be one such influence; but from the very fact\r\nthat there are many other such, it will necessarily happen that although\r\nmercury is administered, the patient, for want of other concurring influences,\r\nwill often not recover, and that he often will recover when it is\r\nnot administered, the other favorable influences being sufficiently powerful\r\nwithout it. Neither, therefore, will the instances of recovery agree in the\r\nadministration of mercury, nor will the instances of failure agree in its\r\nnon-administration. It is much if, by multiplied and accurate returns\r\nfrom hospitals and the like, we can collect that there are rather more recoveries\r\nand rather fewer failures when mercury is administered than when\r\nit is not; a result of very secondary value even as a guide to practice, and\r\nalmost worthless as a contribution to the theory of the subject.\u003ca id=\"noteref_150\" name=\"noteref_150\" href=\"#note_150\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e150\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page322\"\u003e[pg 322]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg322\" id=\"Pg322\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 8. The inapplicability of the method of simple observation to ascertain\r\nthe conditions of effects dependent on many concurring causes, being thus\r\nrecognized, we shall next inquire whether any greater benefit can be expected\r\nfrom the other branch of the \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea posteriori\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nmethod, that which proceeds by directly trying different combinations of causes, either\r\nartificially produced or found in nature, and taking notice what is their effect; as, for\r\nexample, by actually trying the effect of mercury in as many different circumstances\r\nas possible. This method differs from the one which we have\r\njust examined in turning our attention directly to the causes or agents,\r\ninstead of turning it to the effect, recovery from the disease. And since,\r\nas a general rule, the effects of causes are far more accessible to our study\r\nthan the causes of effects, it is natural to think that this method has a\r\nmuch better chance of proving successful than the former.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe method now under consideration is called the Empirical Method;\r\nand in order to estimate it fairly, we must suppose it to be completely, not\r\nincompletely, empirical. We must exclude from it every thing which partakes\r\nof the nature not of an experimental but of a deductive operation.\r\nIf, for instance, we try experiments with mercury upon a person in health,\r\nin order to ascertain the general laws of its action upon the human body,\r\nand then reason from these laws to determine how it will act upon persons\r\naffected with a particular disease, this may be a really effectual method;\r\nbut this is deduction. The experimental method does not derive the law\r\nof a complex case from the simpler laws which conspire to produce it, but\r\nmakes its experiments directly upon the complex case. We must make\r\nentire abstraction of all knowledge of the simpler tendencies, the \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003emodi operandi\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e of mercury in detail. Our experimentation must aim\r\nat obtaining a direct answer to the specific question, Does or does not mercury tend\r\nto cure the particular disease?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nLet us see, therefore, how far the case admits of the observance of those\r\nrules of experimentation which it is found necessary to observe in other\r\ncases. When we devise an experiment to ascertain the effect of a given\r\nagent, there are certain precautions which we never, if we can help it, omit.\r\nIn the first place, we introduce the agent into the midst of a set of circumstances\r\nwhich we have exactly ascertained. It needs hardly be remarked\r\nhow far this condition is from being realized in any case connected with\r\nthe phenomena of life; how far we are from knowing what are all the circumstances\r\nwhich pre-exist in any instance in which mercury is administered\r\nto a living being. This difficulty, however, though insuperable in\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page323\"\u003e[pg 323]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg323\" id=\"Pg323\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nmost cases, may not be so in all; there are sometimes concurrences of\r\nmany causes, in which we yet know accurately what the causes are. Moreover,\r\nthe difficulty may be attenuated by sufficient multiplication of experiments,\r\nin circumstances rendering it improbable that any of the unknown\r\ncauses should exist in them all. But when we have got clear of this obstacle,\r\nwe encounter another still more serious. In other cases, when we\r\nintend to try an experiment, we do not reckon it enough that there be no\r\ncircumstance in the case the presence of which is unknown to us. We require,\r\nalso, that none of the circumstances which we do know shall have\r\neffects susceptible of being confounded with those of the agents whose\r\nproperties we wish to study. We take the utmost pains to exclude all\r\ncauses capable of composition with the given cause; or, if forced to let in\r\nany such causes, we take care to make them such that we can compute\r\nand allow for their influence, so that the effect of the given cause may, after\r\nthe subduction of those other effects, be apparent as a residual phenomenon.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThese precautions are inapplicable to such cases as we are now considering.\r\nThe mercury of our experiment being tried with an unknown multitude\r\n(or even let it be a known multitude) of other influencing circumstances,\r\nthe mere fact of their being influencing circumstances implies that\r\nthey disguise the effect of the mercury, and preclude us from knowing\r\nwhether it has any effect or not. Unless we already knew what and how\r\nmuch is owing to every other circumstance (that is, unless we suppose the\r\nvery problem solved which we are considering the means of solving), we\r\ncan not tell that those other circumstances may not have produced the\r\nwhole of the effect, independently or even in spite of the mercury. The\r\nMethod of Difference, in the ordinary mode of its use, namely, by comparing\r\nthe state of things following the experiment with the state which\r\npreceded it, is thus, in the case of intermixture of effects, entirely unavailing;\r\nbecause other causes than that whose effect we are seeking to determine\r\nhave been operating during the transition. As for the other mode\r\nof employing the Method of Difference, namely, by comparing, not the\r\nsame case at two different periods, but different cases, this in the present\r\ninstance is quite chimerical. In phenomena so complicated it is questionable\r\nif two cases, similar in all respects but one, ever occurred; and were\r\nthey to occur, we could not possibly know that they were so exactly\r\nsimilar.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAny thing like a scientific use of the method of experiment, in these complicated\r\ncases, is therefore out of the question. We can generally, even in\r\nthe most favorable cases, only discover by a succession of trials, that a certain\r\ncause is \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003every often\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e followed by a certain effect. For, in one of these\r\nconjunct effects, the portion which is determined by any one of the influencing\r\nagents, is usually, as we before remarked, but small; and it must\r\nbe a more potent cause than most, if even the tendency which it really exerts\r\nis not thwarted by other tendencies in nearly as many cases as it is fulfilled.\r\nSome causes indeed there are which are more potent than any\r\ncounteracting causes to which they are commonly exposed; and accordingly\r\nthere are some truths in medicine which are sufficiently proved by direct\r\nexperiment. Of these the most familiar are those that relate to the efficacy\r\nof the substances known as Specifics for particular diseases, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“quinine,\r\ncolchicum, lime-juice, cod-liver oil,”\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca id=\"noteref_151\" name=\"noteref_151\" href=\"#note_151\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e151\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e and a few others. Even these are\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page324\"\u003e[pg 324]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg324\" id=\"Pg324\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nnot invariably followed by success; but they succeed in so large a proportion\r\nof cases, and against such powerful obstacles, that their \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003etendency\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e to\r\nrestore health in the disorders for which they are prescribed may be regarded\r\nas an experimental truth.\u003ca id=\"noteref_152\" name=\"noteref_152\" href=\"#note_152\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e152\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIf so little can be done by the experimental method to determine the\r\nconditions of an effect of many combined causes, in the case of medical\r\nscience; still less is this method applicable to a class of phenomena more\r\ncomplicated than even those of physiology, the phenomena of politics and\r\nhistory. There, Plurality of Causes exists in almost boundless excess, and\r\neffects are, for the most part, inextricably interwoven with one another. To\r\nadd to the embarrassment, most of the inquiries in political science relate\r\nto the production of effects of a most comprehensive description, such as\r\nthe public wealth, public security, public morality, and the like: results\r\nliable to be affected directly or indirectly either in \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eplus\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e or in\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eminus\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e by nearly every fact which exists, or event which occurs, in human\r\nsociety. The vulgar notion, that the safe methods on political subjects are those of\r\nBaconian induction—that the true guide is not general reasoning, but specific\r\nexperience—will one day be quoted as among the most unequivocal\r\nmarks of a low state of the speculative faculties in any age in which it is\r\naccredited. Nothing can be more ludicrous than the sort of parodies on\r\nexperimental reasoning which one is accustomed to meet with, not in popular\r\ndiscussion only, but in grave treatises, when the affairs of nations\r\nare the theme. \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“How,”\u003c/span\u003e it is asked, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“can an institution be bad, when the\r\ncountry has prospered under it?”\u003c/span\u003e \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“How can such or such causes have\r\ncontributed to the prosperity of one country, when another has prospered\r\nwithout them?”\u003c/span\u003e Whoever makes use of an argument of this kind, not intending\r\nto deceive, should be sent back to learn the elements of some one\r\nof the more easy physical sciences. Such reasoners ignore the fact of\r\nPlurality of Causes in the very case which affords the most signal example\r\nof it. So little could be concluded, in such a case, from any possible collation\r\nof individual instances, that even the impossibility, in social phenomena,\r\nof making artificial experiments, a circumstance otherwise so prejudicial to\r\ndirectly inductive inquiry, hardly affords, in this case, additional reason of\r\nregret. For even if we could try experiments upon a nation or upon the\r\nhuman race, with as little scruple as M. Magendie tried them on dogs and\r\nrabbits, we should never succeed in making two instances identical in every\r\nrespect except the presence or absence of some one definite circumstance.\r\nThe nearest approach to an experiment in the philosophical sense, which\r\ntakes place in politics, is the introduction of a new operative element into\r\nnational affairs by some special and assignable measure of government,\r\nsuch as the enactment or repeal of a particular law. But where there are\r\nso many influences at work, it requires some time for the influence of any\r\nnew cause upon national phenomena to become apparent; and as the causes\r\noperating in so extensive a sphere are not only infinitely numerous, but in\r\na state of perpetual alteration, it is always certain that before the effect of\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page325\"\u003e[pg 325]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg325\" id=\"Pg325\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nthe new cause becomes conspicuous enough to be a subject of induction, so\r\nmany of the other influencing circumstances will have changed as to vitiate\r\nthe experiment.\u003ca id=\"noteref_153\" name=\"noteref_153\" href=\"#note_153\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e153\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nTwo, therefore, of the three possible methods for the study of phenomena\r\nresulting from the composition of many causes, being, from the very nature\r\nof the case, inefficient and illusory, there remains only the third—that which\r\nconsiders the causes separately, and infers the effect from the balance of\r\nthe different tendencies which produce it: in short, the deductive, or\r\n\u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea priori\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nmethod. The more particular consideration of this intellectual process\r\nrequires a chapter to itself.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-div\" style=\"margin-bottom: 4.00em; margin-top: 4.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"toc63\" id=\"toc63\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"pdf64\" id=\"pdf64\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"Book_III_Chapter_XI\" id=\"Book_III_Chapter_XI\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: center; margin-bottom: 2.40em; margin-top: 2.40em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 120%\"\u003eChapter XI.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: left; margin-bottom: 2.88em; margin-top: 2.88em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 144%\"\u003eOf The Deductive Method.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 1. The mode of investigation which, from the proved inapplicability\r\nof direct methods of observation and experiment, remains to us as the\r\nmain source of the knowledge we possess or can acquire respecting the\r\nconditions and laws of recurrence, of the more complex phenomena, is\r\ncalled, in its most general expression, the Deductive Method; and consists\r\nof three operations: the first, one of direct induction; the second, of ratiocination;\r\nthe third, of verification.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nI call the first step in the process an inductive operation, because there\r\nmust be a direct induction as the basis of the whole; though in many particular\r\ninvestigations the place of the induction may be supplied by a prior\r\ndeduction; but the premises of this prior deduction must have been derived\r\nfrom induction.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe problem of the Deductive Method is, to find the law of an effect,\r\nfrom the laws of the different tendencies of which it is the joint result.\r\nThe first requisite, therefore, is to know the laws of those tendencies; the\r\nlaw of each of the concurrent causes: and this supposes a previous process\r\nof observation or experiment upon each cause separately; or else a previous\r\ndeduction, which also must depend for its ultimate premises on observation\r\nor experiment. Thus, if the subject be social or historical phenomena,\r\nthe premises of the Deductive Method must be the laws of the\r\ncauses which determine that class of phenomena; and those causes are human\r\nactions, together with the general outward circumstances under the\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page326\"\u003e[pg 326]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg326\" id=\"Pg326\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\ninfluence of which mankind are placed, and which constitute man’s position\r\non the earth. The Deductive Method, applied to social phenomena,\r\nmust begin, therefore, by investigating, or must suppose to have been already\r\ninvestigated, the laws of human action, and those properties of outward\r\nthings by which the actions of human beings in society are determined.\r\nSome of these general truths will naturally be obtained by observation\r\nand experiment, others by deduction: the more complex laws of\r\nhuman action, for example, may be deduced from the simpler ones; but\r\nthe simple or elementary laws will always, and necessarily, have been obtained\r\nby a directly inductive process.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nTo ascertain, then, the laws of each separate cause which takes a share\r\nin producing the effect, is the first desideratum of the Deductive Method.\r\nTo know what the causes are which must be subjected to this process of\r\nstudy, may or may not be difficult. In the case last mentioned, this first\r\ncondition is of easy fulfillment. That social phenomena depend on the acts\r\nand mental impressions of human beings, never could have been a matter\r\nof any doubt, however imperfectly it may have been known either by what\r\nlaws those impressions and actions are governed, or to what social consequences\r\ntheir laws naturally lead. Neither, again, after physical science\r\nhad attained a certain development, could there be any real doubt where to\r\nlook for the laws on which the phenomena of life depend, since they must\r\nbe the mechanical and chemical laws of the solid and fluid substances composing\r\nthe organized body and the medium in which it subsists, together\r\nwith the peculiar vital laws of the different tissues constituting the organic\r\nstructure. In other cases, really far more simple than these, it was much\r\nless obvious in what quarter the causes were to be looked for: as in the\r\ncase of the celestial phenomena. Until, by combining the laws of certain\r\ncauses, it was found that those laws explained all the facts which experience\r\nhad proved concerning the heavenly motions, and led to predictions\r\nwhich it always verified, mankind never knew that those \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ewere\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e the causes.\r\nBut whether we are able to put the question before, or not until after, we\r\nhave become capable of answering it, in either case it must be answered;\r\nthe laws of the different causes must be ascertained, before we can proceed\r\nto deduce from them the conditions of the effect.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe mode of ascertaining those laws neither is, nor can be any other\r\nthan the fourfold method of experimental inquiry, already discussed. A\r\nfew remarks on the application of that method to cases of the Composition\r\nof Causes are all that is requisite.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt is obvious that we can not expect to find the law of a tendency by\r\nan induction from cases in which the tendency is counteracted. The laws\r\nof motion could never have been brought to light from the observation of\r\nbodies kept at rest by the equilibrium of opposing forces. Even where the\r\ntendency is not, in the ordinary sense of the word, counteracted, but only\r\nmodified, by having its effects compounded with the effects arising from\r\nsome other tendency or tendencies, we are still in an unfavorable position\r\nfor tracing, by means of such cases, the law of the tendency itself. It\r\nwould have been scarcely possible to discover the law that every body in\r\nmotion tends to continue moving in a straight line, by an induction from\r\ninstances in which the motion is deflected into a curve, by being compounded\r\nwith the effect of an accelerating force. Notwithstanding the resources\r\nafforded in this description of cases by the Method of Concomitant Variations,\r\nthe principles of a judicious experimentation prescribe that the law\r\nof each of the tendencies should be studied, if possible, in cases in which\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page327\"\u003e[pg 327]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg327\" id=\"Pg327\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nthat tendency operates alone, or in combination with no agencies but those\r\nof which the effect can, from previous knowledge, be calculated and allowed\r\nfor.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAccordingly, in the cases, unfortunately very numerous and important,\r\nin which the causes do not suffer themselves to be separated and observed\r\napart, there is much difficulty in laying down with due certainty the inductive\r\nfoundation necessary to support the deductive method. This difficulty\r\nis most of all conspicuous in the case of physiological phenomena; it being\r\nseldom possible to separate the different agencies which collectively compose\r\nan organized body, without destroying the very phenomena which it\r\nis our object to investigate:\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"block tei tei-quote\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.80em; margin-left: 3.60em; margin-top: 1.80em; margin-right: 3.60em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-lg\" style=\"margin-bottom: 0.90em; margin-top: 0.90em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-l\" style=\"text-align: left\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e——following life, in creatures we dissect,\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-l\" style=\"text-align: left\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003eWe lose it, in the moment we detect.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAnd for this reason I am inclined to the opinion that physiology (greatly\r\nand rapidly progressive as it now is) is embarrassed by greater natural difficulties,\r\nand is probably susceptible of a less degree of ultimate perfection,\r\nthan even the social science; inasmuch as it is possible to study the\r\nlaws and operations of one human mind apart from other minds, much less\r\nimperfectly than we can study the laws of one organ or tissue of the human\r\nbody apart from the other organs or tissues.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt has been judiciously remarked that pathological facts, or, to speak in\r\ncommon language, diseases in their different forms and degrees afford in\r\nthe case of physiological investigation the most valuable equivalent to experimentation\r\nproperly so called; inasmuch as they often exhibit to us a\r\ndefinite disturbance in some one organ or organic function, the remaining\r\norgans and functions being, in the first instance at least, unaffected. It is\r\ntrue that from the perpetual actions and reactions which are going on\r\namong all parts of the organic economy, there can be no prolonged disturbance\r\nin any one function without ultimately involving many of the others;\r\nand when once it has done so, the experiment for the most part loses its\r\nscientific value. All depends on observing the early stages of the derangement;\r\nwhich, unfortunately, are of necessity the least marked. If, however,\r\nthe organs and functions not disturbed in the first instance become\r\naffected in a fixed order of succession, some light is thereby thrown upon\r\nthe action which one organ exercises over another: and we occasionally\r\nobtain a series of effects which we can refer with some confidence to the\r\noriginal local derangement; but for this it is necessary that we should know\r\nthat the original derangement \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ewas\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e local. If it was what is termed\r\nconstitutional; that is, if we do not know in what part of the animal economy it\r\ntook its rise, or the precise nature of the disturbance which took place in\r\nthat part, we are unable to determine which of the various derangements\r\nwas cause and which effect; which of them were produced by one another,\r\nand which by the direct, though perhaps tardy, action of the original cause.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nBesides natural pathological facts, we can produce pathological facts artificially:\r\nwe can try experiments, even in the popular sense of the term,\r\nby subjecting the living being to some external agent, such as the mercury\r\nof our former example, or the section of a nerve to ascertain the functions\r\nof different parts of the nervous system. As this experimentation is not\r\nintended to obtain a direct solution of any practical question, but to discover\r\ngeneral laws, from which afterward the conditions of any particular\r\neffect may be obtained by deduction, the best cases to select are those of\r\nwhich the circumstances can be best ascertained: and such are generally\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page328\"\u003e[pg 328]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg328\" id=\"Pg328\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nnot those in which there is any practical object in view. The experiments\r\nare best tried, not in a state of disease, which is essentially a changeable\r\nstate, but in the condition of health, comparatively a fixed state. In the\r\none, unusual agencies are at work, the results of which we have no means\r\nof predicting: in the other, the course of the accustomed physiological\r\nphenomena would, it may generally be presumed, remain undisturbed, were\r\nit not for the disturbing cause which we introduce.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nSuch, with the occasional aid of the Method of Concomitant Variations\r\n(the latter not less encumbered than the more elementary methods by the\r\npeculiar difficulties of the subject), are our inductive resources for ascertaining\r\nthe laws of the causes considered separately, when we have it not\r\nin our power to make trial of them in a state of actual separation. The\r\ninsufficiency of these resources is so glaring, that no one can be surprised\r\nat the backward state of the science of physiology; in which indeed our\r\nknowledge of causes is so imperfect, that we can neither explain, nor could\r\nwithout specific experience have predicted, many of the facts which are\r\ncertified to us by the most ordinary observation. Fortunately, we are\r\nmuch better informed as to the empirical laws of the phenomena, that is,\r\nthe uniformities respecting which we can not yet decide whether they are\r\ncases of causation, or mere results of it. Not only has the order in which\r\nthe facts of organization and life successively manifest themselves, from\r\nthe first germ of existence to death, been found to be uniform, and very\r\naccurately ascertainable; but, by a great application of the Method of\r\nConcomitant Variations to the entire facts of comparative anatomy and\r\nphysiology, the characteristic organic structure corresponding to each class\r\nof functions has been determined with considerable precision. Whether\r\nthese organic conditions are the whole of the conditions, and in many cases\r\nwhether they are conditions at all, or mere collateral effects of some common\r\ncause, we are quite ignorant; nor are we ever likely to know, unless\r\nwe could construct an organized body and try whether it would live.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nUnder such disadvantages do we, in cases of this description, attempt\r\nthe initial, or inductive step, in the application of the Deductive Method to\r\ncomplex phenomena. But such, fortunately, is not the common case. In\r\ngeneral, the laws of the causes on which the effect depends may be obtained\r\nby an induction from comparatively simple instances, or, at the worst,\r\nby deduction from the laws of simpler causes, so obtained. By simple instances\r\nare meant, of course, those in which the action of each cause was\r\nnot intermixed or interfered with, or not to any great extent, by other\r\ncauses whose laws were unknown. And only when the induction which\r\nfurnished the premises to the Deductive method rested on such instances\r\nhas the application of such a method to the ascertainment of the laws of a\r\ncomplex effect, been attended with brilliant results.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 2. When the laws of the causes have been ascertained, and the first\r\nstage of the great logical operation now under discussion satisfactorily accomplished,\r\nthe second part follows; that of determining from the laws of\r\nthe causes what effect any given combination of those causes will produce.\r\nThis is a process of calculation, in the wider sense of the term; and very\r\noften involves processes of calculation in the narrowest sense. It is a\r\nratiocination; and when our knowledge of the causes is so perfect as to\r\nextend to the exact numerical laws which they observe in producing their\r\neffects, the ratiocination may reckon among its premises the theorems of\r\nthe science of number, in the whole immense extent of that science. Not\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page329\"\u003e[pg 329]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg329\" id=\"Pg329\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nonly are the most advanced truths of mathematics often required to enable\r\nus to compute an effect, the numerical law of which we already know; but,\r\neven by the aid of those most advanced truths, we can go but a little way.\r\nIn so simple a case as the common problem of three bodies gravitating toward\r\none another, with a force directly as their mass and inversely as the\r\nsquare of the distance, all the resources of the calculus have not hitherto\r\nsufficed to obtain any general solution, but an approximate one. In a case\r\na little more complex, but still one of the simplest which arise in practice,\r\nthat of the motion of a projectile, the causes which affect the velocity and\r\nrange (for example) of a cannon-ball may be all known and estimated: the\r\nforce of the gunpowder, the angle of elevation, the density of the air, the\r\nstrength and direction of the wind; but it is one of the most difficult of\r\nmathematical problems to combine all these, so as to determine the effect\r\nresulting from their collective action.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nBesides the theorems of number, those of geometry also come in as\r\npremises, where the effects take place in space, and involve motion and extension,\r\nas in mechanics, optics, acoustics, astronomy. But when the complication\r\nincreases, and the effects are under the influence of so many and\r\nsuch shifting causes as to give no room either for fixed numbers, or for\r\nstraight lines and regular curves (as in the case of physiological, to say\r\nnothing of mental and social phenomena), the laws of number and extension\r\nare applicable, if at all, only on that large scale on which precision of\r\ndetails becomes unimportant. Although these laws play a conspicuous\r\npart in the most striking examples of the investigation of nature by the\r\nDeductive Method, as for example in the Newtonian theory of the celestial\r\nmotions, they are by no means an indispensable part of every such process.\r\nAll that is essential in it is reasoning from a general law to a particular\r\ncase, that is, determining by means of the particular circumstances of that\r\ncase, what result is required in that instance to fulfill the law. Thus in\r\nthe Torricellian experiment, if the fact that air has weight had been previously\r\nknown, it would have been easy, without any numerical data, to\r\ndeduce from the general law of equilibrium, that the mercury would stand\r\nin the tube at such a height that the column of mercury would exactly balance\r\na column of the atmosphere of equal diameter; because, otherwise,\r\nequilibrium would not exist.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nBy such ratiocinations from the separate laws of the causes, we may, to\r\na certain extent, succeed in answering either of the following questions:\r\nGiven a certain combination of causes, what effect will follow? and, What\r\ncombination of causes, if it existed, would produce a given effect? In\r\nthe one case, we determine the effect to be expected in any complex circumstances\r\nof which the different elements are known: in the other case\r\nwe learn, according to what law—under what antecedent conditions—a\r\ngiven complex effect will occur.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 3. But (it may here be asked) are not the same arguments by which\r\nthe methods of direct observation and experiment were set aside as illusory\r\nwhen applied to the laws of complex phenomena, applicable with equal\r\nforce against the Method of Deduction? When in every single instance a\r\nmultitude, often an unknown multitude, of agencies, are clashing and combining,\r\nwhat security have we that in our computation \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea priori\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e we have\r\ntaken all these into our reckoning? How many must we not generally be\r\nignorant of? Among those which we know, how probable that some have\r\nbeen overlooked; and, even were all included, how vain the pretense of\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page330\"\u003e[pg 330]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg330\" id=\"Pg330\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nsumming up the effects of many causes, unless we know accurately the\r\nnumerical law of each—a condition in most cases not to be fulfilled; and\r\neven when it is fulfilled, to make the calculation transcends, in any but\r\nvery simple cases, the utmost power of mathematical science with all its\r\nmost modern improvements.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThese objections have real weight, and would be altogether unanswerable,\r\nif there were no test by which, when we employ the Deductive Method,\r\nwe might judge whether an error of any of the above descriptions had\r\nbeen committed or not. Such a test, however, there is: and its application\r\nforms, under the name of Verification, the third essential component part\r\nof the Deductive Method; without which all the results it can give have\r\nlittle other value than that of conjecture. To warrant reliance on the general\r\nconclusions arrived at by deduction, these conclusions must be found,\r\non careful comparison, to accord with the results of direct observation\r\nwherever it can be had. If, when we have experience to compare with\r\nthem, this experience confirms them, we may safely trust to them in other\r\ncases of which our specific experience is yet to come. But if our deductions\r\nhave led to the conclusion that from a particular combination of\r\ncauses a given effect would result, then in all known cases where that combination\r\ncan be shown to have existed, and where the effect has not followed,\r\nwe must be able to show (or at least to make a probable surmise) what\r\nfrustrated it: if we can not, the theory is imperfect, and not yet to be relied\r\nupon. Nor is the verification complete, unless some of the cases in\r\nwhich the theory is borne out by the observed result are of at least\r\nequal complexity with any other cases in which its application could be\r\ncalled for.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIf direct observation and collation of instances have furnished us with any\r\nempirical laws of the effect (whether true in all observed cases, or only true\r\nfor the most part), the most effectual verification of which the theory could\r\nbe susceptible, would be, that it led deductively to those empirical laws;\r\nthat the uniformities, whether complete or incomplete, which were observed\r\nto exist among the phenomena, were accounted for by the laws of the causes—were\r\nsuch as could not but exist if those be really the causes by which\r\nthe phenomena are produced. Thus it was very reasonably deemed an essential\r\nrequisite of any true theory of the causes of the celestial motions,\r\nthat it should lead by deduction to Kepler’s laws; which, accordingly, the\r\nNewtonian theory did.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIn order, therefore, to facilitate the verification of theories obtained by\r\ndeduction, it is important that as many as possible of the empirical laws\r\nof the phenomena should be ascertained, by a comparison of instances, conformably\r\nto the Method of Agreement: as well as (it must be added) that\r\nthe phenomena themselves should be described, in the most comprehensive\r\nas well as accurate manner possible; by collecting from the observation\r\nof parts, the simplest possible correct expressions for the corresponding\r\nwholes: as when the series of the observed places of a planet was first\r\nexpressed by a circle, then by a system of epicycles, and subsequently by\r\nan ellipse.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt is worth remarking, that complex instances which would have been\r\nof no use for the discovery of the simple laws into which we ultimately\r\nanalyze their phenomena, nevertheless, when they have served to verify the\r\nanalysis, become additional evidence of the laws themselves. Although\r\nwe could not have got at the law from complex cases, still when the law,\r\ngot at otherwise, is found to be in accordance with the result of a complex\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page331\"\u003e[pg 331]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg331\" id=\"Pg331\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\ncase, that case becomes a new experiment on the law, and helps to confirm\r\nwhat it did not assist to discover. It is a new trial of the principle in a\r\ndifferent set of circumstances; and occasionally serves to eliminate some\r\ncircumstance not previously excluded, and the exclusion of which might\r\nrequire an experiment impossible to be executed. This was strikingly\r\nconspicuous in the example formerly quoted, in which the difference between\r\nthe observed and the calculated velocity of sound was ascertained to\r\nresult from the heat extricated by the condensation which takes place in\r\neach sonorous vibration. This was a trial, in new circumstances, of the\r\nlaw of the development of heat by compression; and it added materially\r\nto the proof of the universality of that law. Accordingly, any law of nature\r\nis deemed to have gained in point of certainty, by being found to\r\nexplain some complex case which had not previously been thought of in\r\nconnection with it; and this indeed is a consideration to which it is the\r\nhabit of scientific inquirers to attach rather too much value than too little.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nTo the Deductive Method, thus characterized in its three constituent\r\nparts, Induction, Ratiocination, and Verification, the human mind is indebted\r\nfor its most conspicuous triumphs in the investigation of nature.\r\nTo it we owe all the theories by which vast and complicated phenomena\r\nare embraced under a few simple laws, which, considered as the laws of\r\nthose great phenomena, could never have been detected by their direct\r\nstudy. We may form some conception of what the method has done for\r\nus from the case of the celestial motions: one of the simplest among the\r\ngreater instances of the Composition of Causes, since (except in a few cases\r\nnot of primary importance) each of the heavenly bodies may be considered,\r\nwithout material inaccuracy, to be never at one time influenced by the\r\nattraction of more than two bodies, the sun and one other planet or satellite;\r\nmaking, with the reaction of the body itself, and the force generated\r\nby the body’s own motion and acting in the direction of the tangent, only\r\nfour different agents on the concurrence of which the motions of that body\r\ndepend; a much smaller number, no doubt, than that by which any other\r\nof the great phenomena of nature is determined or modified. Yet how\r\ncould we ever have ascertained the combination of forces on which the\r\nmotions of the earth and planets are dependent, by merely comparing the\r\norbits or velocities of different planets, or the different velocities or positions\r\nof the same planet? Notwithstanding the regularity which manifests\r\nitself in those motions, in a degree so rare among the effects of concurrence\r\nof causes; and although the periodical recurrence of exactly the\r\nsame effect, affords positive proof that all the combinations of causes which\r\noccur at all, recur periodically; we should not have known what the causes\r\nwere, if the existence of agencies precisely similar on our own earth had\r\nnot, fortunately, brought the causes themselves within the reach of experimentation\r\nunder simple circumstances. As we shall have occasion to analyze,\r\nfurther on, this great example of the Method of Deduction, we shall\r\nnot occupy any time with it here, but shall proceed to that secondary application\r\nof the Deductive Method, the result of which is not to prove laws\r\nof phenomena, but to explain them.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page332\"\u003e[pg 332]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg332\" id=\"Pg332\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-div\" style=\"margin-bottom: 4.00em; margin-top: 4.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"toc65\" id=\"toc65\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"pdf66\" id=\"pdf66\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: center; margin-bottom: 2.40em; margin-top: 2.40em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 120%\"\u003eChapter XII.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: left; margin-bottom: 2.88em; margin-top: 2.88em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 144%\"\u003eOf The Explanation Of Laws Of Nature.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 1. The deductive operation by which we derive the law of an effect\r\nfrom the laws of the causes, the concurrence of which gives rise to it, may\r\nbe undertaken either for the purpose of discovering the law, or of explaining\r\na law already discovered. The word \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eexplanation\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e occurs so\r\ncontinually, and holds so important a place in philosophy, that a little time spent in\r\nfixing the meaning of it will be profitably employed.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAn individual fact is said to be explained, by pointing out its cause, that\r\nis, by stating the law or laws of causation, of which its production is an\r\ninstance. Thus, a conflagration is explained, when it is proved to have\r\narisen from a spark falling into the midst of a heap of combustibles. And\r\nin a similar manner, a law or uniformity in nature is said to be explained,\r\nwhen another law or laws are pointed out, of which that law itself is but a\r\ncase, and from which it could be deduced.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 2. There are three distinguishable sets of circumstances in which a law\r\nof causation may be explained from, or, as it also is often expressed, resolved\r\ninto, other laws.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe first is the case already so fully considered; an intermixture of laws,\r\nproducing a joint effect equal to the sum of the effects of the causes taken\r\nseparately. The law of the complex effect is explained, by being resolved\r\ninto the separate laws of the causes which contribute to it. Thus, the law\r\nof the motion of a planet is resolved into the law of the acquired force,\r\nwhich tends to produce a uniform motion in the tangent, and the law of\r\nthe centripetal force, which tends to produce an accelerating motion toward\r\nthe sun; the real motion being a compound of the two.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt is necessary here to remark, that in this resolution of the law of a\r\ncomplex effect, the laws of which it is compounded are not the only elements.\r\nIt is resolved into the laws of the separate causes, together with\r\nthe fact of their co-existence. The one is as essential an ingredient as the\r\nother; whether the object be to discover the law of the effect, or only to\r\nexplain it. To deduce the laws of the heavenly motions, we require not\r\nonly to know the law of a rectilineal and that of a gravitative force, but the\r\nexistence of both these forces in the celestial regions, and even their relative\r\namount. The complex laws of causation are thus resolved into two\r\ndistinct kinds of elements: the one, simpler laws of causation, the other\r\n(in the aptly selected expression of Dr. Chalmers) collocations; the collocations\r\nconsisting in the existence of certain agents or powers, in certain\r\ncircumstances of place and time. We shall hereafter have occasion to return\r\nto this distinction, and to dwell on it at such length as dispenses with\r\nthe necessity of further insisting on it here. The first mode, then, of the\r\nexplanation of Laws of Causation, is when the law of an effect is resolved\r\ninto the various tendencies of which it is the result, together with the laws\r\nof those tendencies.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 3. A second case is when, between what seemed the cause and what\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page333\"\u003e[pg 333]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg333\" id=\"Pg333\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nwas supposed to be its effect, further observation detects an intermediate\r\nlink; a fact caused by the antecedent, and in its turn causing the consequent;\r\nso that the cause at first assigned is but the remote cause, operating\r\nthrough the intermediate phenomenon. A seemed the cause of C, but it\r\nsubsequently appeared that A was only the cause of B, and that it is B\r\nwhich was the cause of C. For example: mankind were aware that the\r\nact of touching an outward object caused a sensation. It was subsequently\r\ndiscovered that after we have touched the object, and before we experience\r\nthe sensation, some change takes place in a kind of thread called\r\na nerve, which extends from our outward organs to the brain. Touching\r\nthe object, therefore, is only the remote cause of our sensation; that is, not\r\nthe cause, properly speaking, but the cause of the cause; the real cause of\r\nthe sensation is the change in the state of the nerve. Future experience\r\nmay not only give us more knowledge than we now have of the particular\r\nnature of this change, but may also interpolate another link: between the\r\ncontact (for example) of the object with our outward organs, and the production\r\nof the change of state in the nerve, there may take place some\r\nelectric phenomenon, or some phenomenon of a nature not resembling the\r\neffects of any known agency. Hitherto, however, no such intermediate\r\nlink has been discovered; and the touch of the object must be considered,\r\nprovisionally, as the proximate cause of the affection of the nerve. The\r\nsequence, therefore, of a sensation of touch on contact with an object is\r\nascertained not to be an ultimate law; it is resolved, as the phrase is, into\r\ntwo other laws—the law that contact with an object produces an affection\r\nof the nerve, and the law that an affection of the nerve produces sensation.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nTo take another example: the more powerful acids corrode or blacken\r\norganic compounds. This is a case of causation, but of remote causation;\r\nand is said to be explained when it is shown that there is an intermediate\r\nlink, namely, the separation of some of the chemical elements of the organic\r\nstructure from the rest, and their entering into combination with the\r\nacid. The acid causes this separation of the elements, and the separation\r\nof the elements causes the disorganization, and often the charring of the\r\nstructure. So, again, chlorine extracts coloring matters (whence its efficacy\r\nin bleaching) and purifies the air from infection. This law is resolved into\r\nthe two following laws: Chlorine has a powerful affinity for bases of all\r\nkinds, particularly metallic bases and hydrogen: such bases are essential\r\nelements of coloring matters and contagious compounds, which substances,\r\ntherefore, are decomposed and destroyed by chlorine.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 4. It is of importance to remark, that when a sequence of phenomena\r\nis thus resolved into other laws, they are always laws more general than\r\nitself. The law that A is followed by C, is less general than either of the\r\nlaws which connect B with C and A with B. This will appear from very\r\nsimple considerations.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAll laws of causation are liable to be counteracted or frustrated, by the\r\nnon-fulfillment of some negative condition; the tendency, therefore, of B\r\nto produce C may be defeated. Now the law that A produces B, is equally\r\nfulfilled whether B is followed by C or not; but the law that A produces\r\nC by means of B, is of course only fulfilled when B is really followed\r\nby C, and is, therefore, less general than the law that A produces B. It is\r\nalso less general than the law that B produces C. For B may have other\r\ncauses besides A; and as A produces C only by means of B, while B produces\r\nC, whether it has itself been produced by A or by any thing else, the\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page334\"\u003e[pg 334]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg334\" id=\"Pg334\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nsecond law embraces a greater number of instances, covers as it were a\r\ngreater space of ground, than the first.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThus, in our former example, the law that the contact of an object\r\ncauses a change in the state of the nerve, is more general than the law\r\nthat contact with an object causes sensation, since, for aught we know, the\r\nchange in the nerve may equally take place when, from a counteracting\r\ncause, as, for instance, strong mental excitement, the sensation does not\r\nfollow; as in a battle, where wounds are sometimes received without any\r\nconsciousness of receiving them. And again, the law that change in the\r\nstate of a nerve produces sensation, is more general than the law that contact\r\nwith an object produces sensation; since the sensation equally follows\r\nthe change in the nerve when not produced by contact with an object, but\r\nby some other cause; as in the well-known case, when a person who has\r\nlost a limb feels the same sensation which he has been accustomed to call\r\na pain in the limb.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nNot only are the laws of more immediate sequence into which the law\r\nof a remote sequence is resolved, laws of greater generality than that law\r\nis, but (as a consequence of, or rather as implied in, their greater generality)\r\nthey are more to be relied on; there are fewer chances of their being\r\nultimately found not to be universally true. From the moment when the\r\nsequence of A and C is shown not to be immediate, but to depend on an\r\nintervening phenomenon, then, however constant and invariable the sequence\r\nof A and C has hitherto been found, possibilities arise of its failure,\r\nexceeding those which can effect either of the more immediate sequences,\r\nA, B, and B, C. The tendency of A to produce C may be defeated by\r\nwhatever is capable of defeating either the tendency of A to produce B,\r\nor the tendency of B to produce C; it is, therefore, twice as liable to failure\r\nas either of those more elementary tendencies; and the generalization that\r\nA is always followed by C, is twice as likely to be found erroneous. And\r\nso of the converse generalization, that C is always preceded and caused by\r\nA; which will be erroneous not only if there should happen to be a second\r\nimmediate mode of production of C itself, but moreover if there be\r\na second mode of production of B, the immediate antecedent of C in the\r\nsequence.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe resolution of the one generalization into the other two, not only\r\nshows that there are possible limitations of the former, from which its two\r\nelements are exempt, but shows also where these are to be looked for. As\r\nsoon as we know that B intervenes between A and C, we also know that\r\nif there be cases in which the sequence of A and C does not hold, these are\r\nmost likely to be found by studying the effects or the conditions of the\r\nphenomenon B.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt appears, then, that in the second of the three modes in which a law\r\nmay be resolved into other laws, the latter are more general, that is, extend\r\nto more cases, and are also less likely to require limitation from subsequent\r\nexperience, than the law which they serve to explain. They are more nearly\r\nunconditional; they are defeated by fewer contingencies; they are a\r\nnearer approach to the universal truth of nature. The same observations\r\nare still more evidently true with regard to the first of the three modes of\r\nresolution. When the law of an effect of combined forces is resolved into\r\nthe separate laws of the causes, the nature of the case implies that the law\r\nof the effect is less general than the law of any of the causes, since it only\r\nholds when they are combined; while the law of any one of the causes\r\nholds good both then, and also when that cause acts apart from the rest.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page335\"\u003e[pg 335]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg335\" id=\"Pg335\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt is also manifest that the complex law is liable to be oftener unfulfilled\r\nthan any one of the simpler laws of which it is the result, since every contingency\r\nwhich defeats any of the laws prevents so much of the effect as\r\ndepends on it, and thereby defeats the complex law. The mere rusting, for\r\nexample, of some small part of a great machine, often suffices entirely to\r\nprevent the effect which ought to result from the joint action of all the\r\nparts. The law of the effect of a combination of causes is always subject\r\nto the whole of the negative conditions which attach to the action of all\r\nthe causes severally.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThere is another and an equally strong reason why the law of a complex\r\neffect must be less general than the laws of the causes which conspire to\r\nproduce it. The same causes, acting according to the same laws, and differing\r\nonly in the proportions in which they are combined, often produce effects\r\nwhich differ not merely in quantity, but in kind. The combination\r\nof a centripetal with a projectile force, in the proportions which obtain in\r\nall the planets and satellites of our solar system, gives rise to an elliptical\r\nmotion; but if the ratio of the two forces to each other were slightly altered,\r\nit is demonstrated that the motion produced would be in a circle, or\r\na parabola, or an hyperbola; and it is thought that in the case of some\r\ncomets one of these is probably the fact. Yet the law of the parabolic motion\r\nwould be resolvable into the very same simple laws into which that of\r\nthe elliptical motion is resolved, namely, the law of the permanence of rectilineal\r\nmotion, and the law of gravitation. If, therefore, in the course of\r\nages, some circumstance were to manifest itself which, without defeating\r\nthe law of either of those forces, should merely alter their proportion to\r\none another (such as the shock of some solid body, or even the accumulating\r\neffect of the resistance of the medium in which astronomers have been\r\nled to surmise that the motions of the heavenly bodies take place), the elliptical\r\nmotion might be changed into a motion in some other conic section;\r\nand the complex law, that the planetary motions take place in ellipses, would\r\nbe deprived of its universality, though the discovery would not at all detract\r\nfrom the universality of the simpler laws into which that complex law\r\nis resolved. The law, in short, of each of the concurrent causes remains\r\nthe same, however their collocations may vary; but the law of their joint\r\neffect varies with every difference in the collocations. There needs no more\r\nto show how much more general the elementary laws must be than any of\r\nthe complex laws which are derived from them.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 5. Besides the two modes which have been treated of, there is a third\r\nmode in which laws are resolved into one another; and in this it is self-evident\r\nthat they are resolved into laws more general than themselves. This\r\nthird mode is the \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003esubsumption\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e (as it has been called) of one law\r\nunder another; or (what comes to the same thing) the gathering up of several laws\r\ninto one more general law which includes them all. The most splendid example\r\nof this operation was when terrestrial gravity and the central force\r\nof the solar system were brought together under the general law of gravitation.\r\nIt had been proved antecedently that the earth and the other planets\r\ntend to the sun; and it had been known from the earliest times that\r\nterrestrial bodies tend toward the earth. These were similar phenomena;\r\nand to enable them both to be subsumed under one law, it was only necessary\r\nto prove that, as the effects were similar in quality so also they, as to\r\nquantity, conform to the same rules. This was first shown to be true of\r\nthe moon, which agreed with terrestrial objects not only in tending to a\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page336\"\u003e[pg 336]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg336\" id=\"Pg336\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\ncentre, but in the fact that this centre was the earth. The tendency of the\r\nmoon toward the earth being ascertained to vary as the inverse square of\r\nthe distance, it was deduced from this, by direct calculation, that if the moon\r\nwere as near to the earth as terrestrial objects are, and the acquired force\r\nin the direction of the tangent were suspended, the moon would fall toward\r\nthe earth through exactly as many feet in a second as those objects do by\r\nvirtue of their weight. Hence the inference was irresistible, that the moon\r\nalso tends to the earth by virtue of its weight: and that the two phenomena,\r\nthe tendency of the moon to the earth and the tendency of terrestrial\r\nobjects to the earth, being not only similar in quality, but, when in the\r\nsame circumstances, identical in quantity, are cases of one and the same\r\nlaw of causation. But the tendency of the moon to the earth, and the tendency\r\nof the earth and planets to the sun, were already known to be cases\r\nof the same law of causation; and thus the law of all these tendencies, and\r\nthe law of terrestrial gravity, were recognized as identical, and were subsumed\r\nunder one general law, that of gravitation.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIn a similar manner, the laws of magnetic phenomena have more recently\r\nbeen subsumed under known laws of electricity. It is thus that the most\r\ngeneral laws of nature are usually arrived at: we mount to them by successive\r\nsteps. For, to arrive by correct induction at laws which hold under\r\nsuch an immense variety of circumstances, laws so general as to be independent\r\nof any varieties of space or time which we are able to observe,\r\nrequires for the most part many distinct sets of experiments or observations,\r\nconducted at different times and by different people. One part of\r\nthe law is first ascertained, afterward another part: one set of observations\r\nteaches us that the law holds good under some conditions, another that it\r\nholds good under other conditions, by combining which observations we\r\nfind that it holds good under conditions much more general, or even universally.\r\nThe general law, in this case, is literally the sum of all the partial\r\nones; it is a recognition of the same sequence in different sets of instances;\r\nand may, in fact, be regarded as merely one step in the process of elimination.\r\nThe tendency of bodies toward one another, which we now call\r\ngravity, had at first been observed only on the earth’s surface, where it\r\nmanifested itself only as a tendency of all bodies toward the earth, and\r\nmight, therefore, be ascribed to a peculiar property of the earth itself: one of\r\nthe circumstances, namely, the proximity of the earth, had not been eliminated.\r\nTo eliminate this circumstance required a fresh set of instances in\r\nother parts of the universe: these we could not ourselves create; and\r\nthough nature had created them for us, we were placed in very unfavorable\r\ncircumstances for observing them. To make these observations, fell naturally\r\nto the lot of a different set of persons from those who studied terrestrial\r\nphenomena; and had, indeed, been a matter of great interest at\r\na time when the idea of explaining celestial facts by terrestrial laws was\r\nlooked upon as the confounding of an indefeasible distinction. When,\r\nhowever, the celestial motions were accurately ascertained, and the deductive\r\nprocesses performed, from which it appeared that their laws and\r\nthose of terrestrial gravity corresponded, those celestial observations became\r\na set of instances which exactly eliminated the circumstance of proximity\r\nto the earth; and proved that in the original case, that of terrestrial\r\nobjects, it was not the earth, as such, that caused the motion or the pressure,\r\nbut the circumstance common to that case with the celestial instances,\r\nnamely, the presence of some great body within certain limits of distance.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page337\"\u003e[pg 337]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg337\" id=\"Pg337\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 6. There are, then, three modes of explaining laws of causation, or,\r\nwhich is the same thing, resolving them into other laws. First, when the\r\nlaw of an effect of combined causes is resolved into the separate laws of\r\nthe causes, together with the fact of their combination. Secondly, when\r\nthe law which connects any two links, not proximate, in a chain of causation,\r\nis resolved into the laws which connect each with the intermediate\r\nlinks. Both of these are cases of resolving one law into two or more; in\r\nthe third, two or more are resolved into one: when, after the law has been\r\nshown to hold good in several different classes of cases, we decide that\r\nwhat is true in each of these classes of cases, is true under some more general\r\nsupposition, consisting of what all those classes of cases have in common.\r\nWe may here remark that this last operation involves none of the\r\nuncertainties attendant on induction by the Method of Agreement, since we\r\nneed not suppose the result to be extended by way of inference to any new class\r\nof cases different from those by the comparison of which it was engendered.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIn all these three processes, laws are, as we have seen, resolved into laws\r\nmore general than themselves; laws extending to all the cases which the\r\nformer extended to, and others besides. In the first two modes they are\r\nalso resolved into laws more certain, in other words, more universally true\r\nthan themselves; they are, in fact, proved not to be themselves laws of nature,\r\nthe character of which is to be universally true, but \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eresults\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e of laws of\r\nnature, which may be only true conditionally, and for the most part. No\r\ndifference of this sort exists in the third case; since here the partial laws\r\nare, in fact, the very same law as the general one, and any exception to\r\nthem would be an exception to it too.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nBy all the three processes, the range of deductive science is extended;\r\nsince the laws, thus resolved, may be thenceforth deduced demonstratively\r\nfrom the laws into which they are resolved. As already remarked, the\r\nsame deductive process which proves a law or fact of causation if unknown,\r\nserves to explain it when known.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe word explanation is here used in its philosophical sense. What is\r\ncalled explaining one law of nature by another, is but substituting one\r\nmystery for another; and does nothing to render the general course of nature\r\nother than mysterious: we can no more assign a \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ewhy\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e for the more\r\nextensive laws than for the partial ones. The explanation may substitute\r\na mystery which has become familiar, and has grown to \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eseem\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e not mysterious,\r\nfor one which is still strange. And this is the meaning of explanation,\r\nin common parlance. But the process with which we are here concerned\r\noften does the very contrary: it resolves a phenomenon with which we are\r\nfamiliar into one of which we previously knew little or nothing; as when\r\nthe common fact of the fall of heavy bodies was resolved into the tendency\r\nof all particles of matter toward one another. It must be kept constantly\r\nin view, therefore, that in science, those who speak of explaining any phenomenon\r\nmean (or should mean) pointing out not some more familiar, but\r\nmerely some more general, phenomenon, of which it is a partial exemplification;\r\nor some laws of causation which produce it by their joint or successive\r\naction, and from which, therefore, its conditions may be determined\r\ndeductively. Every such operation brings us a step nearer toward answering\r\nthe question which was stated in a previous chapter as comprehending\r\nthe whole problem of the investigation of nature, viz.: what are the fewest\r\nassumptions, which being granted, the order of nature as it exists would\r\nbe the result? What are the fewest, general propositions from which all\r\nthe uniformities existing in nature could be deduced?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page338\"\u003e[pg 338]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg338\" id=\"Pg338\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe laws, thus explained or resolved, are sometimes said to be \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eaccounted\r\nfor\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e; but the expression is incorrect, if taken to mean any thing more than\r\nwhat has been already stated. In minds not habituated to accurate thinking,\r\nthere is often a confused notion that the general laws are the \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ecauses\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e of\r\nthe partial ones; that the law of general gravitation, for example, causes\r\nthe phenomenon of the fall of bodies to the earth. But to assert this\r\nwould be a misuse of the word cause: terrestrial gravity is not an effect of\r\ngeneral gravitation, but a \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ecase\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e of it; that is, one kind of the particular\r\ninstances in which that general law obtains. To account for a law of nature\r\nmeans, and can mean, nothing more than to assign other laws more general,\r\ntogether with collocations, which laws and collocations being supposed, the\r\npartial law follows without any additional supposition.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-div\" style=\"margin-bottom: 4.00em; margin-top: 4.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"toc67\" id=\"toc67\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"pdf68\" id=\"pdf68\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: center; margin-bottom: 2.40em; margin-top: 2.40em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 120%\"\u003eChapter XIII.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: left; margin-bottom: 2.88em; margin-top: 2.88em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 144%\"\u003eMiscellaneous Examples Of The Explanation Of Laws Of Nature.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 1. The most striking example which the history of science presents,\r\nof the explanation of laws of causation and other uniformities of sequence\r\namong special phenomena, by resolving them into laws of greater simplicity\r\nand generality, is the great Newtonian generalization; respecting\r\nwhich typical instance, so much having already been said, it is sufficient to\r\ncall attention to the great number and variety of the special observed uniformities,\r\nwhich are in this case accounted for, either as particular cases, or\r\nas consequences, of one very simple law of universal nature. The simple\r\nfact of a tendency of every particle of matter toward every other particle,\r\nvarying inversely as the square of the distance, explains the fall of bodies\r\nto the earth, the revolutions of the planets and satellites, the motions (so\r\nfar as known) of comets, and all the various regularities which have been\r\nobserved in these special phenomena; such as the elliptical orbits, and the\r\nvariations from exact ellipses; the relation between the solar distances of\r\nthe planets and the duration of their revolutions; the precession of the\r\nequinoxes; the tides, and a vast number of minor astronomical truths.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nMention has also been made in the preceding chapter of the explanation\r\nof the phenomena of magnetism from laws of electricity; the special laws\r\nof magnetic agency having been affiliated by deduction to observed laws\r\nof electric action, in which they have ever since been considered to be included\r\nas special cases. An example not so complete in itself, but even\r\nmore fertile in consequences, having been the starting-point of the really\r\nscientific study of physiology, is the affiliation, commenced by Bichat, and\r\ncarried on by subsequent biologists, of the properties of the bodily organs,\r\nto the elementary properties of the tissues into which they are anatomically\r\ndecomposed.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAnother striking instance is afforded by Dalton’s generalization, commonly\r\nknown as the atomic theory. It had been known from the very\r\ncommencement of accurate chemical observation, that any two bodies combine\r\nchemically with one another in only a certain number of proportions;\r\nbut those proportions were in each case expressed by a percentage—so\r\nmany parts (by weight) of each ingredient, in 100 of the compound (say\r\n35 and a fraction of one element, 64 and a fraction of the other); in which\r\nmode of statement no relation was perceived between the proportion in\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page339\"\u003e[pg 339]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg339\" id=\"Pg339\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nwhich a given element combines with one substance, and that in which it\r\ncombines with others. The great step made by Dalton consisted in perceiving\r\nthat a unit of weight might be established for each substance,\r\nsuch that by supposing the substance to enter into all its combinations in\r\nthe ratio either of that unit, or of some low multiple of that unit, all the\r\ndifferent proportions, previously expressed by percentages, were found to\r\nresult. Thus 1 being assumed as the unit of hydrogen, if 8 were then\r\ntaken as that of oxygen, the combination of one unit of hydrogen with one\r\nunit of oxygen would produce the exact proportion of weight between the\r\ntwo substances which is known to exist in water; the combination of one\r\nunit of hydrogen with two units of oxygen would produce the proportion\r\nwhich exists in the other compound of the same two elements, called peroxide\r\nof hydrogen; and the combinations of hydrogen and of oxygen with\r\nall other substances, would correspond with the supposition that those elements\r\nenter into combination by single units, or twos, or threes, of the\r\nnumbers assigned to them, 1 and 8, and the other substances by ones or\r\ntwos or threes of other determinate numbers proper to each. The result\r\nis that a table of the equivalent numbers, or, as they are called, atomic\r\nweights, of all the elementary substances, comprises in itself, and scientifically\r\nexplains, all the proportions in which any substance, elementary or\r\ncompound, is found capable of entering into chemical combination with\r\nany other substance whatever.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 2. Some interesting cases of the explanation of old uniformities by\r\nnewly ascertained laws are afforded by the researches of Professor Graham.\r\nThat eminent chemist was the first who drew attention to the distinction\r\nwhich may be made of all substances into two classes, termed by\r\nhim crystalloids and colloids; or rather, of all states of matter into the\r\ncrystalloid and the colloidal states, for many substances are capable of existing\r\nin either. When in the colloidal state, their sensible properties are\r\nvery different from those of the same substance when crystallized, or when\r\nin a state easily susceptible of crystallization. Colloid substances pass with\r\nextreme difficulty and slowness into the crystalline state, and are extremely\r\ninert in all the ordinary chemical relations. Substances in the colloid\r\nstate are almost always, when combined with water, more or less viscous or\r\ngelatinous. The most prominent examples of the state are certain animal\r\nand vegetable substances, particularly gelatine, albumen, starch, the gums,\r\ncaramel, tannin, and some others. Among substances not of organic origin,\r\nthe most notable instances are hydrated silicic acid, and hydrated alumina,\r\nwith other metallic peroxides of the aluminous class.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nNow it is found, that while colloidal substances are easily penetrated by\r\nwater, and by the solutions of crystalloid substances, they are very little\r\npenetrable by one another: which enabled Professor Graham to introduce\r\na highly effective process (termed dialysis) for separating the crystalloid\r\nsubstances contained in any liquid mixture, by passing them through a\r\nthin septum of colloidal matter, which does not suffer any thing colloidal\r\nto pass, or suffers it only in very minute quantity. This property of colloids\r\nenabled Mr. Graham to account for a number of special results of\r\nobservation, not previously explained.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nFor instance, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“while soluble crystalloids are always highly sapid, soluble\r\ncolloids are singularly insipid,”\u003c/span\u003e as might be expected; for, as the sentient\r\nextremities of the nerves of the palate \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“are probably protected by a colloidal\r\nmembrane,”\u003c/span\u003e impermeable to other colloids, a colloid, when tasted,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page340\"\u003e[pg 340]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg340\" id=\"Pg340\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nprobably never reaches those nerves. Again, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“it has been observed that\r\nvegetable gum is not digested in the stomach; the coats of that organ\r\ndialyse the soluble food, absorbing crystalloids, and rejecting all colloids.”\u003c/span\u003e\r\nOne of the mysterious processes accompanying digestion, the secretion of\r\nfree muriatic acid by the coats of the stomach, obtains a probable hypothetical\r\nexplanation through the same law. Finally, much light is thrown\r\nupon the observed phenomena of osmose (the passage of fluids outward\r\nand inward through animal membranes) by the fact that the membranes\r\nare colloidal. In consequence, the water and saline solutions contained in\r\nthe animal body pass easily and rapidly through the membranes, while the\r\nsubstances directly applicable to nutrition, which are mostly colloidal, are\r\ndetained by them.\u003ca id=\"noteref_154\" name=\"noteref_154\" href=\"#note_154\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e154\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe property which salt possesses of preserving animal substances from\r\nputrefaction is resolved by Liebig into two more general laws, the strong\r\nattraction of salt for water, and the necessity of the presence of water as a\r\ncondition of putrefaction. The intermediate phenomenon which is interpolated\r\nbetween the remote cause and the effect, can here be not merely\r\ninferred but seen; for it is a familiar fact, that flesh upon which salt has\r\nbeen thrown is speedily found swimming in brine.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe second of the two factors (as they may be termed) into which the\r\npreceding law has been resolved, the necessity of water to putrefaction,\r\nitself affords an additional example of the Resolution of Laws. The law\r\nitself is proved by the Method of Difference, since flesh completely dried\r\nand kept in a dry atmosphere does not putrefy; as we see in the case of\r\ndried provisions and human bodies in very dry climates. A deductive\r\nexplanation of this same law results from Liebig’s speculations. The\r\nputrefaction of animal and other azotized bodies is a chemical process, by\r\nwhich they are gradually dissipated in a gaseous form, chiefly in that of\r\ncarbonic acid and ammonia; now to convert the carbon of the animal substance\r\ninto carbonic acid requires oxygen, and to convert the azote into\r\nammonia requires hydrogen, which are the elements of water. The extreme\r\nrapidity of the putrefaction of azotized substances, compared with\r\nthe gradual decay of non-azotized bodies (such as wood and the like) by\r\nthe action of oxygen alone, he explains from the general law that substances\r\nare much more easily decomposed by the action of two different\r\naffinities upon two of their elements than by the action of only one.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 3. Among the many important properties of the nervous system which\r\nhave either been first discovered or strikingly illustrated by Dr. Brown-Séquard,\r\nI select the reflex influence of the nervous system on nutrition\r\nand secretion. By reflex nervous action is meant, action which one part\r\nof the nervous system exerts over another part, without any intermediate\r\naction on the brain, and consequently without consciousness; or which, if\r\nit does pass through the brain, at least produces its effects independently\r\nof the will. There are many experiments which prove that irritation of a\r\nnerve in one part of the body may in this manner excite powerful action\r\nin another part; for example, food injected into the stomach through a\r\ndivided œsophagus, nevertheless produces secretion of saliva; warm water\r\ninjected into the bowels, and various other irritations of the lower intestines,\r\nhave been found to excite secretion of the gastric juice, and so forth.\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page341\"\u003e[pg 341]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg341\" id=\"Pg341\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nThe reality of the power being thus proved, its agency explains a great\r\nvariety of apparently anomalous phenomena; of which I select the following\r\nfrom Dr. Brown-Séquard’s \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eLectures on the Nervous System\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e:\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe production of tears by irritation of the eye, or of the mucous membrane\r\nof the nose;\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe secretions of the eye and nose increased by exposure of other parts\r\nof the body to cold;\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nInflammation of the eye, especially when of traumatic origin, very frequently\r\nexcites a similar affection in the other eye, which may be cured by\r\nsection of the intervening nerve;\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nLoss of sight sometimes produced by neuralgia, and has been known\r\nto be at once cured by the extirpation (for instance) of a carious tooth;\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nEven cataract has been produced in a healthy eye by cataract in the\r\nother eye, or by neuralgia, or by a wound of the frontal nerve;\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe well-known phenomenon of a sudden stoppage of the heart’s action,\r\nand consequent death, produced by irritation of some of the nervous extremities;\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ee.g.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, by drinking very cold water, or by a blow on the abdomen,\r\nor other sudden excitation of the abdominal sympathetic nerve,\r\nthough this nerve may be irritated to any extent without stopping the\r\nheart’s action, if a section be made of the communicating nerves;\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe extraordinary effects produced on the internal organs by an extensive\r\nburn on the surface of the body, consisting in violent inflammation\r\nof the tissues of the abdomen, chest, or head, which, when death ensues\r\nfrom this kind of injury, is one of the most frequent causes of it;\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nParalysis and anæsthesia of one part of the body from neuralgia in another\r\npart; and muscular atrophy from neuralgia, even when there is no\r\nparalysis;\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nTetanus produced by the lesion of a nerve. Dr. Brown-Séquard thinks\r\nit highly probable that hydrophobia is a phenomenon of a similar nature;\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nMorbid changes in the nutrition of the brain and spinal cord, manifesting\r\nthemselves by epilepsy, chorea, hysteria, and other diseases, occasioned\r\nby lesion of some of the nervous extremities in remote places, as by worms,\r\ncalculi, tumors, carious bones, and in some cases even by very slight irritations\r\nof the skin.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 4. From the foregoing and similar instances, we may see the importance,\r\nwhen a law of nature previously unknown has been brought to light,\r\nor when new light has been thrown upon a known law by experiment, of\r\nexamining all cases which present the conditions necessary for bringing\r\nthat law into action; a process fertile in demonstrations of special laws\r\npreviously unsuspected, and explanations of others already empirically\r\nknown.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nFor instance, Faraday discovered by experiment, that voltaic electricity\r\ncould be evolved from a natural magnet, provided a conducting body were\r\nset in motion at right angles to the direction of the magnet; and this he\r\nfound to hold not only of small magnets, but of that great magnet, the\r\nearth. The law being thus established experimentally, that electricity is\r\nevolved, by a magnet, and a conductor moving at right angles to the direction\r\nof its poles, we may now look out for fresh instances in which these\r\nconditions meet. Wherever a conductor moves or revolves at right angles\r\nto the direction of the earth’s magnetic poles, there we may expect an evolution\r\nof electricity. In the northern regions, where the polar direction is\r\nnearly perpendicular to the horizon, all horizontal motions of conductors\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page342\"\u003e[pg 342]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg342\" id=\"Pg342\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nwill produce electricity; horizontal wheels, for example, made of metal;\r\nlikewise all running streams will evolve a current of electricity, which will\r\ncirculate round them; and the air thus charged with electricity may be\r\none of the causes of the Aurora Borealis. In the equatorial regions, on\r\nthe contrary, upright wheels placed parallel to the equator will originate a\r\nvoltaic circuit, and water-falls will naturally become electric.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nFor a second example, it has been proved, chiefly by the researches of\r\nProfessor Graham, that gases have a strong tendency to permeate animal\r\nmembranes, and diffuse themselves through the spaces which such membranes\r\ninclose, notwithstanding the presence of other gases in those spaces.\r\nProceeding from this general law, and reviewing a variety of cases in which\r\ngases lie contiguous to membranes, we are enabled to demonstrate or to\r\nexplain the following more special laws: 1st. The human or animal body,\r\nwhen surrounded with any gas not already contained within the body,\r\nabsorbs it rapidly; such, for instance, as the gases of putrefying matters:\r\nwhich helps to explain malaria. 2d. The carbonic acid gas of effervescing\r\ndrinks, evolved in the stomach, permeates its membranes, and rapidly spreads\r\nthrough the system. 3d. Alcohol taken into the stomach passes into vapor,\r\nand spreads through the system with great rapidity (which, combined with\r\nthe high combustibility of alcohol, or in other words its ready combination\r\nwith oxygen, may perhaps help to explain the bodily warmth immediately\r\nconsequent on drinking spirituous liquors). 4th. In any state of the body\r\nin which peculiar gases are formed within it, these will rapidly exhale\r\nthrough all parts of the body; and hence the rapidity with which, in certain\r\nstates of disease, the surrounding atmosphere becomes tainted. 5th. The\r\nputrefaction of the interior parts of a carcass will proceed as rapidly as\r\nthat of the exterior, from the ready passage outward of the gaseous products.\r\n6th. The exchange of oxygen and carbonic acid in the lungs is not\r\nprevented, but rather promoted, by the intervention of the membrane of\r\nthe lungs and the coats of the blood-vessels between the blood and the air.\r\nIt is necessary, however, that there should be a substance in the blood with\r\nwhich the oxygen of the air may immediately combine; otherwise, instead\r\nof passing into the blood, it would permeate the whole organism: and it is\r\nnecessary that the carbonic acid, as it is formed in the capillaries, should\r\nalso find a substance in the blood with which it can combine; otherwise it\r\nwould leave the body at all points, instead of being discharged through\r\nthe lungs.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 5. The following is a deduction which confirms, by explaining, the empirical\r\ngeneralization, that soda powders weaken the human system. These\r\npowders, consisting of a mixture of tartaric acid with bicarbonate of soda,\r\nfrom which the carbonic acid is set free, must pass into the stomach as\r\ntartrate of soda. Now, neutral tartrates, citrates, and acetates of the alkalis\r\nare found, in their passage through the system, to be changed into\r\ncarbonates; and to convert a tartrate into a carbonate requires an additional\r\nquantity of oxygen, the abstraction of which must lessen the oxygen\r\ndestined for assimilation with the blood, on the quantity of which the\r\nvigorous action of the human system partly depends.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe instances of new theories agreeing with and explaining old empiricisms,\r\nare innumerable. All the just remarks made by experienced persons\r\non human character and conduct, are so many special laws, which\r\nthe general laws of the human mind explain and resolve. The empirical\r\ngeneralizations on which the operations of the arts have usually been\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page343\"\u003e[pg 343]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg343\" id=\"Pg343\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nfounded, are continually justified and confirmed on the one hand, or corrected\r\nand improved on the other, by the discovery of the simpler scientific\r\nlaws on which the efficacy of those operations depends. The effects of the\r\nrotation of crops, of the various manures, and other processes of improved\r\nagriculture, have been for the first time resolved in our own day into known\r\nlaws of chemical and organic action, by Davy, Liebig, and others. The\r\nprocesses of the medical art are even now mostly empirical: their efficacy\r\nis concluded, in each instance, from a special and most precarious experimental\r\ngeneralization: but as science advances in discovering the simple\r\nlaws of chemistry and physiology, progress is made in ascertaining the intermediate\r\nlinks in the series of phenomena, and the more general laws on\r\nwhich they depend; and thus, while the old processes are either exploded,\r\nor their efficacy, in so far as real, explained, better processes, founded on\r\nthe knowledge of proximate causes, are continually suggested and brought\r\ninto use.\u003ca id=\"noteref_155\" name=\"noteref_155\" href=\"#note_155\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e155\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nMany even of the truths of geometry were generalizations from\r\nexperience before they were deduced from first principles. The quadrature\r\nof the cycloid is said to have been first effected by measurement, or\r\nrather by weighing a cycloidal card, and comparing its weight with that\r\nof a piece of similar card of known dimensions.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 6. To the foregoing examples from physical science, let us add another\r\nfrom mental. The following is one of the simple laws of mind: Ideas of\r\na pleasurable or painful character form associations more easily and strongly\r\nthan other ideas, that is, they become associated after fewer repetitions,\r\nand the association is more durable. This is an experimental law, grounded\r\non the Method of Difference. By deduction from this law, many of the\r\nmore special laws which experience shows to exist among particular mental\r\nphenomena may be demonstrated and explained: the ease and rapidity,\r\nfor instance, with which thoughts connected with our passions or our\r\nmore cherished interests are excited, and the firm hold which the facts relating\r\nto them have on our memory; the vivid recollection we retain of\r\nminute circumstances which accompanied any object or event that deeply\r\ninterested us, and of the times and places in which we have been very\r\nhappy or very miserable; the horror with which we view the accidental\r\ninstrument of any occurrence which shocked us, or the locality where it\r\ntook place and the pleasure we derive from any memorial of past enjoyment;\r\nall these effects being proportional to the sensibility of the individual\r\nmind, and to the consequent intensity of the pain or pleasure from\r\nwhich the association originated. It has been suggested by the able writer\r\nof a biographical sketch of Dr. Priestley in a monthly\r\nperiodical,\u003ca id=\"noteref_156\" name=\"noteref_156\" href=\"#note_156\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e156\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e that the\r\nsame elementary law of our mental constitution, suitably followed out,\r\nwould explain a variety of mental phenomena previously inexplicable, and\r\nin particular some of the fundamental diversities of human character and\r\ngenius. Associations being of two sorts, either between synchronous, or\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page344\"\u003e[pg 344]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg344\" id=\"Pg344\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nbetween successive impressions; and the influence of the law which renders\r\nassociations stronger in proportion to the pleasurable or painful character\r\nof the impressions, being felt with peculiar force in the synchronous class\r\nof associations; it is remarked by the writer referred to, that in minds of\r\nstrong organic sensibility synchronous associations will be likely to predominate,\r\nproducing a tendency to conceive things in pictures and in the\r\nconcrete, richly clothed in attributes and circumstances, a mental habit\r\nwhich is commonly called Imagination, and is one of the peculiarities of\r\nthe painter and the poet; while persons of more moderate susceptibility\r\nto pleasure and pain will have a tendency to associate facts chiefly in the\r\norder of their succession, and such persons, if they possess mental superiority,\r\nwill addict themselves to history or science rather than to creative art.\r\nThis interesting speculation the author of the present work has endeavored,\r\non another occasion, to pursue further, and to examine how far it will avail\r\ntoward explaining the peculiarities of the poetical\r\ntemperament.\u003ca id=\"noteref_157\" name=\"noteref_157\" href=\"#note_157\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e157\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e It is\r\nat least an example which may serve, instead of many others, to show the\r\nextensive scope which exists for deductive investigation in the important\r\nand hitherto so imperfect Science of Mind.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 7. The copiousness with which the discovery and explanation of special\r\nlaws of phenomena by deduction from simpler and more general ones has\r\nhere been exemplified, was prompted by a desire to characterize clearly, and\r\nplace in its due position of importance, the Deductive Method; which, in the\r\npresent state of knowledge, is destined henceforth irrevocably to predominate\r\nin the course of scientific investigation. A revolution is peaceably\r\nand progressively effecting itself in philosophy, the reverse of that to which\r\nBacon has attached his name. That great man changed the method of\r\nthe sciences from deductive to experimental, and it is now rapidly reverting\r\nfrom experimental to deductive. But the deductions which Bacon\r\nabolished were from premises hastily snatched up, or arbitrarily assumed.\r\nThe principles were neither established by legitimate canons of experimental\r\ninquiry, nor the results tested by that indispensable element of a\r\nrational Deductive Method, verification by specific experience. Between\r\nthe primitive method of Deduction and that which I have attempted to\r\ncharacterize, there is all the difference which exists between the Aristotelian\r\nphysics and the Newtonian theory of the heavens.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt would, however, be a mistake to expect that those great generalizations,\r\nfrom which the subordinate truths of the more backward sciences\r\nwill probably at some future period be deduced by reasoning (as the\r\ntruths of astronomy are deduced from the generalities of the Newtonian\r\ntheory), will be found in all, or even in most cases, among truths now\r\nknown and admitted. We may rest assured, that many of the most general\r\nlaws of nature are as yet entirely unthought of; and that many others,\r\ndestined hereafter to assume the same character, are known, if at all, only\r\nas laws or properties of some limited class of phenomena; just as electricity,\r\nnow recognized as one of the most universal of natural agencies, was\r\nonce known only as a curious property which certain substances acquired\r\nby friction, of first attracting and then repelling light bodies. If the theories\r\nof heat, cohesion, crystallization, and chemical action are destined, as\r\nthere can be little doubt that they are, to become deductive, the truths\r\nwhich will then be regarded as the \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eprincipia\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof those sciences would probably,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page345\"\u003e[pg 345]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg345\" id=\"Pg345\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nif now announced, appear quite as novel\u003ca id=\"noteref_158\" name=\"noteref_158\" href=\"#note_158\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e158\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e as the law of gravitation\r\nappeared to the contemporaries of Newton; possibly even more so, since\r\nNewton’s law, after all, was but an extension of the law of weight—that is,\r\nof a generalization familiar from of old, and which already comprehended\r\na not inconsiderable body of natural phenomena. The general laws of a\r\nsimilarly commanding character, which we still look forward to the discovery\r\nof, may not always find so much of their foundations already laid.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThese general truths will doubtless make their first appearance in the\r\ncharacter of hypotheses; not proved, nor even admitting of proof, in the\r\nfirst instance, but assumed as premises for the purpose of deducing from\r\nthem the known laws of concrete phenomena. But this, though their initial,\r\ncan not be their final state. To entitle an hypothesis to be received\r\nas one of the truths of nature, and not as a mere technical help to the human\r\nfaculties, it must be capable of being tested by the canons of legitimate\r\ninduction, and must actually have been submitted to that test. When\r\nthis shall have been done, and done successfully, premises will have been\r\nobtained from which all the other propositions of the science will thenceforth\r\nbe presented as conclusions, and the science will, by means of a new\r\nand unexpected Induction, be rendered Deductive.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-div\" style=\"margin-bottom: 4.00em; margin-top: 4.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"toc69\" id=\"toc69\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"pdf70\" id=\"pdf70\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: center; margin-bottom: 2.40em; margin-top: 2.40em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 120%\"\u003eChapter XIV.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: left; margin-bottom: 2.88em; margin-top: 2.88em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 144%\"\u003eOf The Limits To The Explanation Of Laws Of Nature; And Of\r\nHypotheses.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 1. The preceding considerations have led us to recognize a distinction\r\nbetween two kinds of laws, or observed uniformities in nature: ultimate\r\nlaws, and what may be termed derivative laws. Derivative laws are\r\nsuch as are deducible from, and may, in any of the modes which we have\r\npointed out, be resolved into, other and more general ones. Ultimate laws\r\nare those which can not. We are not sure that any of the uniformities\r\nwith which we are yet acquainted are ultimate laws; but we know that\r\nthere must be ultimate laws; and that every resolution of a derivative law\r\ninto more general laws brings us nearer to them.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nSince we are continually discovering that uniformities, not previously\r\nknown to be other than ultimate, are derivative, and resolvable into more\r\ngeneral laws; since (in other words) we are continually discovering the\r\nexplanation of some sequence which was previously known only as a fact;\r\nit becomes an interesting question whether there are any necessary limits\r\nto this philosophical operation, or whether it may proceed until all the uniform\r\nsequences in nature are resolved into some one universal law. For\r\nthis seems, at first sight, to be the ultimatum toward which the progress\r\nof induction by the Deductive Method, resting on a basis of observation\r\nand experiment, is tending. Projects of this kind were universal in the\r\ninfancy of philosophy; any speculations which held out a less brilliant\r\nprospect being in these early times deemed not worth pursuing. And the\r\nidea receives so much apparent countenance from the nature of the most\r\nremarkable achievements of modern science, that speculators are even now\r\nfrequently appearing, who profess either to have solved the problem, or to\r\nsuggest modes in which it may one day be solved. Even where pretensions\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page346\"\u003e[pg 346]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg346\" id=\"Pg346\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nof this magnitude are not made, the character of the solutions which are\r\ngiven or sought of particular classes of phenomena, often involves such\r\nconceptions of what constitutes explanation, as would render the notion of\r\nexplaining all phenomena whatever by means of some one cause or law,\r\nperfectly admissible.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 2. It is, therefore, useful to remark that the ultimate Laws of Nature\r\ncan not possibly be less numerous than the distinguishable sensations or\r\nother feelings of our nature; those, I mean, which are distinguishable\r\nfrom one another in quality, and not merely in quantity or degree. For\r\nexample: since there is a phenomenon \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003esui\r\ngeneris\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, called color, which our\r\nconsciousness testifies to be not a particular degree of some other phenomenon,\r\nas heat or odor or motion, but intrinsically unlike all others, it follows\r\nthat there are ultimate laws of color; that though the facts of color\r\nmay admit of explanation, they never can be explained from laws of heat\r\nor odor alone, or of motion alone, but that, however far the explanation may\r\nbe carried, there will always remain in it a law of color. I do not mean\r\nthat it might not possibly be shown that some other phenomenon, some\r\nchemical or mechanical action, for example, invariably precedes, and is the\r\ncause of, every phenomenon of color. But though this, if proved, would\r\nbe an important extension of our knowledge of nature, it would not explain\r\nhow or why a motion, or a chemical action, can produce a sensation of\r\ncolor; and, however diligent might be our scrutiny of the phenomena,\r\nwhatever number of hidden links we might detect in the chain of causation\r\nterminating in the color, the last link would still be a law of color, not\r\na law of motion, nor of any other phenomenon whatever. Nor does this\r\nobservation apply only to color, as compared with any other of the great\r\nclasses of sensations; it applies to every particular color, as compared with\r\nothers. White color can in no manner be explained exclusively by the\r\nlaws of the production of red color. In any attempt to explain it, we can\r\nnot but introduce, as one element of the explanation, the proposition that\r\nsome antecedent or other produces the sensation of white.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe ideal limit, therefore, of the explanation of natural phenomena (toward\r\nwhich as toward other ideal limits we are constantly tending, without\r\nthe prospect of ever completely attaining it) would be to show that\r\neach distinguishable variety of our sensations, or other states of consciousness,\r\nhas only one sort of cause; that, for example, whenever we perceive\r\na white color, there is some one condition or set of conditions which is always\r\npresent, and the presence of which always produces in us that sensation.\r\nAs long as there are several known modes of production of a phenomenon\r\n(several different substances, for instance, which have the property\r\nof whiteness, and between which we can not trace any other resemblance)\r\nso long it is not impossible that one of these modes of production may\r\nbe resolved into another, or that all of them may be resolved into some\r\nmore general mode of production not hitherto recognized. But when the\r\nmodes of production are reduced to one, we can not, in point of simplification,\r\ngo any further. This one may not, after all, be the ultimate mode;\r\nthere may be other links to be discovered between the supposed cause and\r\nthe effect; but we can only further resolve the known law, by introducing\r\nsome other law hitherto unknown, which will not diminish the number of\r\nultimate laws.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIn what cases, accordingly, has science been most successful in explaining\r\nphenomena, by resolving their complex laws into laws of greater simplicity\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page347\"\u003e[pg 347]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg347\" id=\"Pg347\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nand generality? Hitherto chiefly in cases of the propagation of various\r\nphenomena through space; and, first and principally, the most extensive\r\nand important of all facts of that description, mechanical motion. Now\r\nthis is exactly what might be expected from the principles here laid down.\r\nNot only is motion one of the most universal of all phenomena, it is also\r\n(as might be expected from that circumstance) one of those which, apparently\r\nat least, are produced in the greatest number of ways; but the phenomenon\r\nitself is always, to our sensations, the same in every respect but\r\ndegree. Differences of duration or of velocity, are evidently differences in\r\ndegree only; and differences of direction in space, which alone has any\r\nsemblance of being a distinction in kind, entirely disappear (so far as our\r\nsensations are concerned) by a change in our own position; indeed, the\r\nvery same motion appears to us, according to our position, to take place in\r\nevery variety of direction, and motions in every different direction to take\r\nplace in the same. And again, motion in a straight line and in a curve are\r\nno otherwise distinct than that the one is motion continuing in the same\r\ndirection, the other is motion which at each instant changes its direction.\r\nThere is, therefore, according to the principles I have stated, no absurdity\r\nin supposing that all motion may be produced in one and the same way,\r\nby the same kind of cause. Accordingly, the greatest achievements in physical\r\nscience have consisted in resolving one observed law of the production\r\nof motion into the laws of other known modes of production, or the laws\r\nof several such modes into one more general mode; as when the fall of\r\nbodies to the earth, and the motions of the planets, were brought under\r\nthe one law of the mutual attraction of all particles of matter; when the\r\nmotions said to be produced by magnetism were shown to be produced by\r\nelectricity; when the motions of fluids in a lateral direction, or even contrary\r\nto the direction of gravity, were shown to be produced by gravity;\r\nand the like. There is an abundance of distinct causes of motion still unresolved\r\ninto one another: gravitation, heat, electricity, chemical action,\r\nnervous action, and so forth; but whether the efforts of the present generation\r\nof savants to resolve all these different modes of production into one\r\nare ultimately successful or not, the attempt so to resolve them is perfectly\r\nlegitimate. For, though these various causes produce, in other respects,\r\nsensations intrinsically different, and are not, therefore, capable of being\r\nresolved into one another, yet, in so far as they all produce motion, it is\r\nquite possible that the immediate antecedent of the motion may in all these\r\ndifferent cases be the same; nor is it impossible that these various agencies\r\nthemselves may, as the new doctrines assert, all of them have for their own\r\nimmediate antecedent modes of molecular motion.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWe need not extend our illustration to other cases, as, for instance, to the\r\npropagation of light, sound, heat, electricity, etc., through space, or any of\r\nthe other phenomena which have been found susceptible of explanation by\r\nthe resolution of their observed laws into more general laws. Enough has\r\nbeen said to display the difference between the kind of explanation and\r\nresolution of laws which is chimerical, and that of which the accomplishment\r\nis the great aim of science; and to show into what sort of elements\r\nthe resolution must be effected, if at all.\u003ca id=\"noteref_159\" name=\"noteref_159\" href=\"#note_159\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e159\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page348\"\u003e[pg 348]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg348\" id=\"Pg348\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 3. As, however, there is scarcely any one of the principles of a true\r\nmethod of philosophizing which does not require to be guarded against\r\nerrors on both sides, I must enter a caveat against another misapprehension,\r\nof a kind directly contrary to the preceding. M. Comte, among other\r\noccasions on which he has condemned, with some asperity, any attempt to\r\nexplain phenomena which are \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“evidently primordial”\u003c/span\u003e (meaning, apparently,\r\nno more than that every peculiar phenomenon must have at least one\r\npeculiar and therefore inexplicable law), has spoken of the attempt to furnish\r\nany explanation of the color belonging to each substance, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“la couleur\r\nélémentaire propre à chaque substance,”\u003c/span\u003e as essentially illusory. \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“No one,”\u003c/span\u003e\r\nsays he, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“in our time attempts to explain the particular specific gravity of\r\neach substance or of each structure. Why should it be otherwise as to\r\nthe specific color, the notion of which is undoubtedly no less\r\nprimordial?”\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca id=\"noteref_160\" name=\"noteref_160\" href=\"#note_160\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e160\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nNow although, as he elsewhere observes, a color must always remain a\r\ndifferent thing from a weight or a sound, varieties of color might nevertheless\r\nfollow, or correspond to, given varieties of weight, or sound, or some\r\nother phenomenon as different as these are from color itself. It is one\r\nquestion what a thing is, and another what it depends on; and though to\r\nascertain the conditions of an elementary phenomenon is not to obtain any\r\nnew insight into the nature of the phenomenon itself, that is no reason\r\nagainst attempting to discover the conditions. The interdict against endeavoring\r\nto reduce distinctions of color to any common principle, would\r\nhave held equally good against a like attempt on the subject of distinctions\r\nof sound; which nevertheless have been found to be immediately preceded\r\nand caused by distinguishable varieties in the vibrations of elastic bodies;\r\nthough a sound, no doubt, is quite as different as a color is from any motion\r\nof particles, vibratory or otherwise. We might add, that, in the case\r\nof colors, there are strong positive indications that they are not ultimate\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page349\"\u003e[pg 349]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg349\" id=\"Pg349\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nproperties of the different kinds of substances, but depend on conditions\r\ncapable of being superinduced upon all substances; since there is no substance\r\nwhich can not, according to the kind of light thrown upon it, be\r\nmade to assume almost any color; and since almost every change in the\r\nmode of aggregation of the particles of the same substance is attended\r\nwith alterations in its color, and in its optical properties generally.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe really weak point in the attempts which have been made to account\r\nfor colors by the vibrations of a fluid, is not that the attempt itself is\r\nunphilosophical, but that the existence of the fluid, and the fact of its vibratory\r\nmotion, are not proved, but are assumed, on no other ground than\r\nthe facility they are supposed to afford of explaining the phenomena. And\r\nthis consideration leads to the important question of the proper use of\r\nscientific hypotheses, the connection of which with the subject of the explanation\r\nof the phenomena of nature, and of the necessary limits to that\r\nexplanation, need not be pointed out.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 4. An hypothesis is any supposition which we make (either without\r\nactual evidence, or on evidence avowedly insufficient) in order to endeavor\r\nto deduce from it conclusions in accordance with facts which are known to\r\nbe real; under the idea that if the conclusions to which the hypothesis\r\nleads are known truths, the hypothesis itself either must be, or at least is\r\nlikely to be, true. If the hypothesis relates to the cause or mode of production\r\nof a phenomenon, it will serve, if admitted, to explain such facts as\r\nare found capable of being deduced from it. And this explanation is the\r\npurpose of many, if not most hypotheses. Since explaining, in the scientific\r\nsense, means resolving a uniformity which is not a law of causation,\r\ninto the laws of causation from which it results, or a complex law of causation\r\ninto simpler and more general ones from which it is capable of being\r\ndeductively inferred, if there do not exist any known laws which fulfill\r\nthis requirement, we may feign or imagine some which would fulfill it;\r\nand this is making an hypothesis.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAn hypothesis being a mere supposition, there are no other limits to\r\nhypotheses than those of the human imagination; we may, if we please,\r\nimagine, by way of accounting for an effect, some cause of a kind utterly\r\nunknown, and acting according to a law altogether fictitious. But as hypotheses\r\nof this sort would not have any of the plausibility belonging to\r\nthose which ally themselves by analogy with known laws of nature, and besides\r\nwould not supply the want which arbitrary hypotheses are generally\r\ninvented to satisfy, by enabling the imagination to represent to itself an\r\nobscure phenomenon in a familiar light, there is probably no hypothesis\r\nin the history of science in which both the agent itself and the law of its\r\noperation were fictitious. Either the phenomenon assigned as the cause is\r\nreal, but the law according to which it acts merely supposed; or the cause\r\nis fictitious, but is supposed to produce its effects according to laws similar\r\nto those of some known class of phenomena. An instance of the first kind\r\nis afforded by the different suppositions made respecting the law of the\r\nplanetary central force, anterior to the discovery of the true law, that the\r\nforce varies as the inverse square of the distance; which also suggested\r\nitself to Newton, in the first instance, as an hypothesis, and was verified\r\nby proving that it led deductively to Kepler’s laws. Hypotheses of the\r\nsecond kind are such as the vortices of Descartes, which were fictitious,\r\nbut were supposed to obey the known laws of rotatory motion; or the\r\ntwo rival hypotheses respecting the nature of light, the one ascribing\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page350\"\u003e[pg 350]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg350\" id=\"Pg350\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nthe phenomena to a fluid emitted from all luminous bodies, the other (now\r\ngenerally received) attributing them to vibratory motions among the particles\r\nof an ether pervading all space. Of the existence of either fluid\r\nthere is no evidence, save the explanation they are calculated to afford of\r\nsome of the phenomena; but they are supposed to produce their effects\r\naccording to known laws: the ordinary laws of continued locomotion in\r\nthe one case, and in the other those of the propagation of undulatory\r\nmovements among the particles of an elastic fluid.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAccording to the foregoing remarks, hypotheses are invented to enable\r\nthe Deductive Method to be earlier applied to phenomena. But\u003ca id=\"noteref_161\" name=\"noteref_161\" href=\"#note_161\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e161\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e in order to\r\ndiscover the cause of any phenomenon by the Deductive Method, the process\r\nmust consist of three parts: induction, ratiocination, and verification.\r\nInduction (the place of which, however, may be supplied by a prior deduction),\r\nto ascertain the laws of the causes; ratiocination, to compute from\r\nthose laws how the causes will operate in the particular combination known\r\nto exist in the case in hand; verification, by comparing this calculated effect\r\nwith the actual phenomenon. No one of these three parts of the\r\nprocess can be dispensed with. In the deduction which proves the identity\r\nof gravity with the central force of the solar system, all the three are\r\nfound. First, it is proved from the moon’s motions, that the earth attracts\r\nher with a force varying as the inverse square of the distance. This\r\n(though partly dependent on prior deductions) corresponds to the first, or\r\npurely inductive, step: the ascertainment of the law of the cause. Secondly,\r\nfrom this law, and from the knowledge previously obtained of the\r\nmoon’s mean distance from the earth, and of the actual amount of her deflection\r\nfrom the tangent, it is ascertained with what rapidity the earth’s\r\nattraction would cause the moon to fall, if she were no further off, and no\r\nmore acted upon by extraneous forces, than terrestrial bodies are: that is\r\nthe second step, the ratiocination. Finally, this calculated velocity being\r\ncompared with the observed velocity with which all heavy bodies fall,\r\nby mere gravity, toward the surface of the earth (sixteen feet in the first\r\nsecond, forty-eight in the second, and so forth, in the ratio of the odd numbers,\r\n1, 3, 5, etc.), the two quantities are found to agree. The order in\r\nwhich the steps are here presented was not that of their discovery; but it is\r\ntheir correct logical order, as portions of the proof that the same attraction\r\nof the earth which causes the moon’s motion causes also the fall of heavy\r\nbodies to the earth: a proof which is thus complete in all its parts.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nNow, the Hypothetical Method suppresses the first of the three steps,\r\nthe induction to ascertain the law; and contents itself with the other two\r\noperations, ratiocination and verification; the law which is reasoned from\r\nbeing assumed instead of proved.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThis process may evidently be legitimate on one supposition, namely, if\r\nthe nature of the case be such that the final step, the verification, shall\r\namount to, and fulfill the conditions of, a complete induction. We want\r\nto be assured that the law we have hypothetically assumed is a true one;\r\nand its leading deductively to true results will afford this assurance, provided\r\nthe case be such that a false law can not lead to a true result; provided\r\nno law, except the very one which we have assumed, can lead deductively\r\nto the same conclusions which that leads to. And this proviso is\r\noften realized. For example, in the very complete specimen of deduction\r\nwhich we just cited, the original major premise of the ratiocination, the\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page351\"\u003e[pg 351]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg351\" id=\"Pg351\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nlaw of the attractive force, was ascertained in this mode; by this legitimate\r\nemployment of the Hypothetical Method. Newton began by an assumption\r\nthat the force which at each instant deflects a planet from its rectilineal\r\ncourse, and makes it describe a curve round the sun, is a force tending\r\ndirectly toward the sun. He then proved that if this be so, the planet will\r\ndescribe, as we know by Kepler’s first law that it does describe, equal areas\r\nin equal times; and, lastly, he proved that if the force acted in any other\r\ndirection whatever, the planet would not describe equal areas in equal\r\ntimes. It being thus shown that no other hypothesis would accord with\r\nthe facts, the assumption was proved; the hypothesis became an inductive\r\ntruth. Not only did Newton ascertain by this hypothetical process the\r\ndirection of the deflecting force; he proceeded in exactly the same manner\r\nto ascertain the law of variation of the quantity of that force. He assumed\r\nthat the force varied inversely as the square of the distance; showed that\r\nfrom this assumption the remaining two of Kepler’s laws might be deduced;\r\nand, finally, that any other law of variation would give results inconsistent\r\nwith those laws, and inconsistent, therefore, with the real motions\r\nof the planets, of which Kepler’s laws were known to be a correct\r\nexpression.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nI have said that in this case the verification fulfills the conditions of an\r\ninduction; but an induction of what sort? On examination we find that\r\nit conforms to the canon of the Method of Difference. It affords the two\r\ninstances, A B C, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea b c\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, and B C, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eb c\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e. A\r\nrepresents central force; A B C, the planets \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eplus\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e a central force; B C, the\r\nplanets apart from a central force. The planets with a central force give\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, areas proportional to the times; the planets without a central\r\nforce give \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eb c\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e (a set of motions) without\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, or with something else instead of \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e.\r\nThis is the Method of Difference\r\nin all its strictness. It is true, the two instances which the method\r\nrequires are obtained in this case, not by experiment, but by a prior deduction.\r\nBut that is of no consequence. It is immaterial what is the\r\nnature of the evidence from which we derive the assurance that A B C\r\nwill produce \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea b c\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, and B C only \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eb c\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e;\r\nit is enough that we have that assurance.\r\nIn the present case, a process of reasoning furnished Newton\r\nwith the very instances which, if the nature of the case had admitted of it,\r\nhe would have sought by experiment.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt is thus perfectly possible, and indeed is a very common occurrence,\r\nthat what was an hypothesis at the beginning of the inquiry becomes a\r\nproved law of nature before its close. But in order that this should happen,\r\nwe must be able, either by deduction or experiment, to obtain \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eboth\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e the\r\ninstances which the Method of Difference requires. That we are able from\r\nthe hypothesis to deduce the known facts, gives only the affirmative instance,\r\nA B C, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea b c\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e. It is equally necessary that we should be able to\r\nobtain, as Newton did, the negative instance B C, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eb c\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e; by showing\r\nthat no antecedent, except the one assumed in the hypothesis, would in conjunction\r\nwith B C produce \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nNow it appears to me that this assurance can not be obtained, when the\r\ncause assumed in the hypothesis is an unknown cause imagined solely to\r\naccount for \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e. When we are only seeking to determine the precise\r\nlaw of a cause already ascertained, or to distinguish the particular agent which is\r\nin fact the cause, among several agents of the same kind, one or other of\r\nwhich it is already known to be, we may then obtain the negative instance.\r\nAn inquiry which of the bodies of the solar system causes by its attraction\r\nsome particular irregularity in the orbit or periodic time of some satellite\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page352\"\u003e[pg 352]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg352\" id=\"Pg352\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nor comet, would be a case of the second description. Newton’s was a case\r\nof the first. If it had not been previously known that the planets were\r\nhindered from moving in straight lines by some force tending toward the\r\ninterior of their orbit, though the exact direction was doubtful; or if it\r\nhad not been known that the force increased in some proportion or other\r\nas the distance diminished, and diminished as it increased, Newton’s argument\r\nwould not have proved his conclusion. These facts, however, being\r\nalready certain, the range of admissible suppositions was limited to\r\nthe various possible directions of a line, and the various possible numerical\r\nrelations between the variations of the distance, and the variations of the\r\nattractive force. Now among these it was easily shown that different suppositions\r\ncould not lead to identical consequences.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAccordingly, Newton could not have performed his second great scientific\r\noperation: that of identifying terrestrial gravity with the central force\r\nof the solar system by the same hypothetical method. When the law of\r\nthe moon’s attraction had been proved from the data of the moon itself,\r\nthen, on finding the same law to accord with the phenomena of terrestrial\r\ngravity, he was warranted in adopting it as the law of those phenomena\r\nlikewise; but it would not have been allowable for him, without any lunar\r\ndata, to assume that the moon was attracted toward the earth with a force\r\nas the inverse square of the distance, merely because that ratio would\r\nenable him to account for terrestrial gravity; for it would have been impossible\r\nfor him to prove that the observed law of the fall of heavy bodies\r\nto the earth could not result from any force, save one extending to the\r\nmoon, and proportional to the inverse square.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt appears, then, to be a condition of the most genuinely scientific hypothesis,\r\nthat it be not destined always to remain an hypothesis, but be of\r\nsuch a nature as to be either proved or disproved by comparison with observed\r\nfacts. This condition is fulfilled when the effect is already known to\r\ndepend on the very cause supposed, and the hypothesis relates only to the\r\nprecise mode of dependence; the law of the variation of the effect according\r\nto the variations in the quantity or in the relations of the cause. With these\r\nmay be classed the hypotheses which do not make any supposition with regard\r\nto causation, but only with regard to the law of correspondence between\r\nfacts which accompany each other in their variations, though there may be\r\nno relation of cause and effect between them. Such were the different\r\nfalse hypotheses which Kepler made respecting the law of the refraction\r\nof light. It was known that the direction of the line of refraction varied\r\nwith every variation in the direction of the line of incidence, but it was\r\nnot known how; that is, what changes of the one corresponded to the different\r\nchanges of the other. In this case any law different from the true\r\none must have led to false results. And, lastly, we must add to these all\r\nhypothetical modes of merely representing or \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003edescribing\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e phenomena; such\r\nas the hypothesis of the ancient astronomers that the heavenly bodies\r\nmoved in circles; the various hypotheses of eccentrics, deferents, and epicycles,\r\nwhich were added to that original hypothesis; the nineteen false\r\nhypotheses which Kepler made and abandoned respecting the form of the\r\nplanetary orbits; and even the doctrine in which he finally rested, that\r\nthose orbits are ellipses, which was but an hypothesis like the rest until\r\nverified by facts.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIn all these cases, verification is proof; if the supposition accords with\r\nthe phenomena there needs no other evidence of it. But in order that this\r\nmay be the case, I conceive it to be necessary, when the hypothesis relates\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page353\"\u003e[pg 353]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg353\" id=\"Pg353\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nto causation, that the supposed cause should not only be a real phenomenon,\r\nsomething actually existing in nature, but should be already known to exercise,\r\nor at least to be capable of exercising, an influence of some sort over\r\nthe effect. In any other case, it is no sufficient evidence of the truth of the\r\nhypothesis that we are able to deduce the real phenomena from it.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIs it, then, never allowable, in a scientific hypothesis, to assume a cause,\r\nbut only to ascribe an assumed law to a known cause? I do not assert\r\nthis. I only say, that in the latter case alone can the hypothesis be received\r\nas true merely because it explains the phenomena. In the former case it\r\nmay be very useful by suggesting a line of investigation which may possibly\r\nterminate in obtaining real proof. But for this purpose, as is justly\r\nremarked by M. Comte, it is indispensable that the cause suggested by the\r\nhypothesis should be in its own nature susceptible of being proved by other\r\nevidence. This seems to be the philosophical import of Newton’s maxim,\r\n(so often cited with approbation by subsequent writers), that the cause assigned\r\nfor any phenomenon must not only be such as if admitted would\r\nexplain the phenomenon, but must also be a \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003evera\r\ncausa\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e. What he meant by a \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003evera\r\ncausa\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e Newton did not indeed very explicitly define; and Dr.\r\nWhewell, who dissents from the propriety of any such restriction upon the\r\nlatitude of framing hypotheses, has had little difficulty in\r\nshowing\u003ca id=\"noteref_162\" name=\"noteref_162\" href=\"#note_162\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e162\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e that his\r\nconception of it was neither precise nor consistent with itself; accordingly\r\nhis optical theory was a signal instance of the violation of his own rule.\r\nIt is certainly not necessary that the cause assigned should be a cause already\r\nknown; otherwise we should sacrifice our best opportunities of becoming\r\nacquainted with new causes. But what is true in the maxim is,\r\nthat the cause, though not known previously, should be capable of being\r\nknown thereafter; that its existence should be capable of being detected,\r\nand its connection with the effect ascribed to it should be susceptible of\r\nbeing proved, by independent evidence. The hypothesis, by suggesting\r\nobservations and experiments, puts us on the road to that independent evidence,\r\nif it be really attainable; and till it be attained, the hypothesis\r\nought only to count for a more or less plausible conjecture.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 5. This function, however, of hypotheses, is one which must be reckoned\r\nabsolutely indispensable in science. When Newton said, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Hypotheses\r\nnon fingo,”\u003c/span\u003e he did not mean that he deprived himself of the facilities of\r\ninvestigation afforded by assuming in the first instance what he hoped ultimately\r\nto be able to prove. Without such assumptions, science could\r\nnever have attained its present state; they are necessary steps in the progress\r\nto something more certain; and nearly every thing which is now theory\r\nwas once hypothesis. Even in purely experimental science, some inducement\r\nis necessary for trying one experiment rather than another; and\r\nthough it is abstractedly possible that all the experiments which have been\r\ntried, might have been produced by the mere desire to ascertain what\r\nwould happen in certain circumstances, without any previous conjecture\r\nas to the result; yet, in point of fact, those unobvious, delicate, and often\r\ncumbrous and tedious processes of experiment, which have thrown most\r\nlight upon the general constitution of nature, would hardly ever have been\r\nundertaken by the persons or at the time they were, unless it had seemed\r\nto depend on them whether some general doctrine or theory which had\r\nbeen suggested, but not yet proved, should be admitted or not. If this be\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page354\"\u003e[pg 354]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg354\" id=\"Pg354\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\ntrue even of merely experimental inquiry, the conversion of experimental\r\ninto deductive truths could still less have been effected without large\r\ntemporary assistance from hypotheses. The process of tracing regularity\r\nin any complicated, and at first sight confused, set of appearances, is necessarily\r\ntentative; we begin by making any supposition, even a false one, to\r\nsee what consequences will follow from it; and by observing how these\r\ndiffer from the real phenomena, we learn what corrections to make in our\r\nassumption. The simplest supposition which accords with the more obvious\r\nfacts is the best to begin with; because its consequences are the most\r\neasily traced. This rude hypothesis is then rudely corrected, and the operation\r\nrepeated; and the comparison of the consequences deducible from\r\nthe corrected hypothesis, with the observed facts, suggests still further\r\ncorrection, until the deductive results are at last made to tally with the phenomena.\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Some fact is as yet little understood, or some law is unknown;\r\nwe frame on the subject an hypothesis as accordant as possible with the\r\nwhole of the data already possessed; and the science, being thus enabled\r\nto move forward freely, always ends by leading to new consequences capable\r\nof observation, which either confirm or refute, unequivocally, the\r\nfirst supposition.”\u003c/span\u003e Neither induction nor deduction would enable us to\r\nunderstand even the simplest phenomena, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“if we did not often commence\r\nby anticipating on the results; by making a provisional supposition, at first\r\nessentially conjectural, as to some of the very notions which constitute the\r\nfinal object of the inquiry.”\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca id=\"noteref_163\" name=\"noteref_163\" href=\"#note_163\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e163\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Let any one watch the manner in which he\r\nhimself unravels a complicated mass of evidence; let him observe how, for\r\ninstance, he elicits the true history of any occurrence from the involved\r\nstatements of one or of many witnesses; he will find that he does not take\r\nall the items of evidence into his mind at once, and attempt to weave them\r\ntogether; he extemporizes, from a few of the particulars, a first rude theory\r\nof the mode in which the facts took place, and then looks at the other\r\nstatements one by one, to try whether they can be reconciled with that\r\nprovisional theory, or what alterations or additions it requires to make it\r\nsquare with them. In this way, which has been justly compared to the\r\nMethods of Approximation of mathematicians, we arrive, by means of hypotheses,\r\nat conclusions not hypothetical.\u003ca id=\"noteref_164\" name=\"noteref_164\" href=\"#note_164\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e164\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page355\"\u003e[pg 355]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg355\" id=\"Pg355\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 6. It is perfectly consistent with the spirit of the method, to assume in\r\nthis provisional manner not only an hypothesis respecting the law of what\r\nwe already know to be the cause, but an hypothesis respecting the cause\r\nitself. It is allowable, useful, and often even necessary, to begin by asking\r\nourselves what cause \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003emay\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e have produced the effect, in order that we may\r\nknow in what direction to look out for evidence to determine whether it\r\nactually \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003edid\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e. The vortices of Descartes would have been a perfectly\r\nlegitimate hypothesis, if it had been possible, by any mode of exploration which\r\nwe could entertain the hope of ever possessing, to bring the reality of the\r\nvortices, as a fact in nature, conclusively to the test of observation. The\r\nvice of the hypothesis was that it could not lead to any course of investigation\r\ncapable of converting it from an hypothesis into a proved fact.\r\nIt might chance to be \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003edis\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003eproved, either by some want of\r\ncorrespondence with the phenomena it purported to explain, or (as actually happened) by\r\nsome extraneous fact. \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“The free passage of comets through the spaces in\r\nwhich these vortices should have been, convinced men that these vortices\r\ndid not exist.”\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca id=\"noteref_165\" name=\"noteref_165\" href=\"#note_165\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e165\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e But the hypothesis would have been false, though no\r\nsuch direct evidence of its falsity had been procurable. Direct evidence of its\r\ntruth there could not be.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe prevailing hypothesis of a luminiferous ether, in other respects not\r\nwithout analogy to that of Descartes, is not in its own nature entirely cut\r\noff from the possibility of direct evidence in its favor. It is well known\r\nthat the difference between the calculated and the observed times of the\r\nperiodical return of Encke’s comet, has led to a conjecture that a medium\r\ncapable of opposing resistance to motion is diffused through space. If\r\nthis surmise should be confirmed, in the course of ages, by the gradual accumulation\r\nof a similar variance in the case of the other bodies of the solar\r\nsystem, the luminiferous ether would have made a considerable advance\r\ntoward the character of a \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003evera causa\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, since\r\nthe existence would have been\r\nascertained of a great cosmical agent, possessing some of the attributes\r\nwhich the hypothesis assumes; though there would still remain many difficulties,\r\nand the identification of the ether with the resisting medium\r\nwould even, I imagine, give rise to new ones. At present, however, this\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page356\"\u003e[pg 356]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg356\" id=\"Pg356\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nsupposition can not be looked upon as more than a conjecture; the existence\r\nof the ether still rests on the possibility of deducing from its assumed\r\nlaws a considerable number of actual phenomena; and this evidence\r\nI can not regard as conclusive, because we can not have, in the case of such\r\nan hypothesis, the assurance that if the hypothesis be false it must lead to\r\nresults at variance with the true facts.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAccordingly, most thinkers of any degree of sobriety allow that an hypothesis\r\nof this kind is not to be received as probably true because it accounts\r\nfor all the known phenomena; since this is a condition sometimes\r\nfulfilled tolerably well by two conflicting hypotheses; while there are probably\r\nmany others which are equally possible, but which, for want of any\r\nthing analogous in our experience, our minds are unfitted to conceive. But\r\nit seems to be thought that an hypothesis of the sort in question is entitled\r\nto a more favorable reception, if, besides accounting for all the facts previously\r\nknown, it has led to the anticipation and prediction of others which\r\nexperience afterward verified; as the undulatory theory of light led to the\r\nprediction, subsequently realized by experiment, that two luminous rays\r\nmight meet each other in such a manner as to produce darkness. Such\r\npredictions and their fulfillment are, indeed, well calculated to impress the\r\nuninformed, whose faith in science rests solely on similar coincidences between\r\nits prophecies and what comes to pass. But it is strange that any\r\nconsiderable stress should be laid upon such a coincidence by persons of\r\nscientific attainments. If the laws of the propagation of light accord with\r\nthose of the vibrations of an elastic fluid in as many respects as is necessary\r\nto make the hypothesis afford a correct expression of all or most of the\r\nphenomena known at the time, it is nothing strange that they should accord\r\nwith each other in one respect more. Though twenty such coincidences\r\nshould occur, they would not prove the reality of the undulatory\r\nether; it would not follow that the phenomena of light were results of the\r\nlaws of elastic fluids, but at most that they are governed by laws partially\r\nidentical with these; which, we may observe, is already certain, from the\r\nfact that the hypothesis in question could be for a moment\r\ntenable.\u003ca id=\"noteref_166\" name=\"noteref_166\" href=\"#note_166\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e166\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Cases may be cited, even in our imperfect acquaintance with nature,\r\nwhere agencies that we have good reason to consider as radically distinct produce\r\ntheir effects, or some of their effects, according to laws which are identical.\r\nThe law, for example, of the inverse square of the distance, is the measure\r\nof the intensity not only of gravitation, but (it is believed) of illumination,\r\nand of heat diffused from a centre. Yet no one looks upon this identity\r\nas proving similarity in the mechanism by which the three kinds of phenomena\r\nare produced.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAccording to Dr. Whewell, the coincidence of results predicted from an\r\nhypothesis with facts afterward observed, amounts to a conclusive proof\r\nof the truth of the theory. \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“If I copy a long series of letters, of which\r\nthe last half-dozen are concealed, and if I guess these aright, as is found\r\nto be the case when they are afterward uncovered, this must be because I\r\nhave made out the import of the inscription. To say that because I have\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page357\"\u003e[pg 357]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg357\" id=\"Pg357\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\ncopied all that I could see, it is nothing strange that I should guess those\r\nwhich I can not see, would be absurd, without supposing such a ground for\r\nguessing.”\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca id=\"noteref_167\" name=\"noteref_167\" href=\"#note_167\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e167\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e If any one, from examining the greater part of a long inscription,\r\ncan interpret the characters so that the inscription gives a rational\r\nmeaning in a known language, there is a strong presumption that his interpretation\r\nis correct; but I do not think the presumption much increased\r\nby his being able to guess the few remaining letters without seeing them;\r\nfor we should naturally expect (when the nature of the case excludes\r\nchance) that even an erroneous interpretation which accorded with all the\r\nvisible parts of the inscription would accord also with the small remainder;\r\nas would be the case, for example, if the inscription had been designedly\r\nso contrived as to admit of a double sense. I assume that the uncovered\r\ncharacters afford an amount of coincidence too great to be merely\r\ncasual; otherwise the illustration is not a fair one. No one supposes\r\nthe agreement of the phenomena of light with the theory of undulations\r\nto be merely fortuitous. It must arise from the actual identity of some\r\nof the laws of undulations with some of those of light; and if there be\r\nthat identity, it is reasonable to suppose that its consequences would not\r\nend with the phenomena which first suggested the identification, nor be\r\neven confined to such phenomena as were known at the time. But it does\r\nnot follow, because some of the laws agree with those of undulations, that\r\nthere are any actual undulations; no more than it followed because some\r\n(though not so many) of the same laws agreed with those of the projection\r\nof particles, that there was actual emission of particles. Even the undulatory\r\nhypothesis does not account for all the phenomena of light. The natural\r\ncolors of objects, the compound nature of the solar ray, the absorption\r\nof light, and its chemical and vital action, the hypothesis leaves as mysterious\r\nas it found them; and some of these facts are, at least apparently,\r\nmore reconcilable with the emission theory than with that of Young and\r\nFresnel. Who knows but that some third hypothesis, including all these\r\nphenomena, may in time leave the undulatory theory as far behind as that\r\nhas left the theory of Newton and his successors?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nTo the statement, that the condition of accounting for all the known\r\nphenomena is often fulfilled equally well by two conflicting hypotheses,\r\nDr. Whewell makes answer that he knows \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“of no such case in the history\r\nof science, where the phenomena are at all numerous and\r\ncomplicated.”\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca id=\"noteref_168\" name=\"noteref_168\" href=\"#note_168\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e168\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nSuch an affirmation, by a writer of Dr. Whewell’s minute acquaintance with\r\nthe history of science, would carry great authority, if he had not, a few\r\npages before, taken pains to refute it,\u003ca id=\"noteref_169\" name=\"noteref_169\" href=\"#note_169\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e169\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e by maintaining that even the exploded\r\nscientific hypotheses might always, or almost always, have been so\r\nmodified as to make them correct representations of the phenomena. The\r\nhypothesis of vortices, he tells us, was, by successive modifications, brought\r\nto coincide in its results with the Newtonian theory and with the facts.\r\nThe vortices did not, indeed, explain all the phenomena which the Newtonian\r\ntheory was ultimately found to account for, such as the precession of\r\nthe equinoxes; but this phenomenon was not, at the time, in the contemplation\r\nof either party, as one of the facts to be accounted for. All the\r\nfacts which they did contemplate, we may believe on Dr. Whewell’s authority\r\nto have accorded as accurately with the Cartesian hypothesis, in its\r\nfinally improved state, as with Newton’s.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nBut it is not, I conceive, a valid reason for accepting any given hypothesis,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page358\"\u003e[pg 358]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg358\" id=\"Pg358\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nthat we are unable to imagine any other which will account for the\r\nfacts. There is no necessity for supposing that the true explanation must\r\nbe one which, with only our present experience, we could imagine. Among\r\nthe natural agents with which we are acquainted, the vibrations of an elastic\r\nfluid may be the only one whose laws bear a close resemblance to those\r\nof light; but we can not tell that there does not exist an unknown cause,\r\nother than an elastic ether diffused through space, yet producing effects\r\nidentical in some respects with those which would result from the undulations\r\nof such an ether. To assume that no such cause can exist, appears to\r\nme an extreme case of assumption without evidence. And at the risk of\r\nbeing charged with want of modesty, I can not help expressing astonishment\r\nthat a philosopher of Dr. Whewell’s abilities and attainments should\r\nhave written an elaborate treatise on the philosophy of induction, in which\r\nhe recognizes absolutely no mode of induction except that of trying hypothesis\r\nafter hypothesis until one is found which fits the phenomena;\r\nwhich one, when found, is to be assumed as true, with no other reservation\r\nthan that if, on re-examination, it should appear to assume more than is\r\nneedful for explaining the phenomena, the superfluous part of the assumption\r\nshould be cut off. And this without the slightest distinction between\r\nthe cases in which it may be known beforehand that two different hypotheses\r\ncan not lead to the same result, and those in which, for aught we can\r\never know, the range of suppositions, all equally consistent with the phenomena,\r\nmay be infinite.\u003ca id=\"noteref_170\" name=\"noteref_170\" href=\"#note_170\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e170\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nNevertheless, I do not agree with M. Comte in condemning those who\r\nemploy themselves in working out into detail the application of these hypotheses\r\nto the explanation of ascertained facts, provided they bear in\r\nmind that the utmost they can prove is, not that the hypothesis is, but that\r\nit \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003emay\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e be true. The ether hypothesis has a very strong claim to be so\r\nfollowed out, a claim greatly strengthened since it has been shown to afford\r\na mechanism which would explain the mode of production, not of light\r\nonly, but also of heat. Indeed, the speculation has a smaller element of\r\nhypothesis in its application to heat, than in the case for which it was\r\noriginally framed. We have proof by our senses of the existence of molecular\r\nmovement among the particles of all heated bodies; while we have no\r\nsimilar experience in the case of light. When, therefore, heat is communicated\r\nfrom the sun to the earth across apparently empty space, the chain\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page359\"\u003e[pg 359]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg359\" id=\"Pg359\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nof causation has molecular motion both at the beginning and end. The\r\nhypothesis only makes the motion continuous by extending it to the middle.\r\nNow, motion in a body is known to be capable of being imparted to\r\nanother body contiguous to it; and the intervention of a hypothetical elastic\r\nfluid occupying the space between the sun and the earth, supplies the\r\ncontiguity which is the only condition wanting, and which can be supplied\r\nby no supposition but that of an intervening medium. The supposition,\r\nnotwithstanding, is at best a probable conjecture, not a proved truth. For\r\nthere is no proof that contiguity is absolutely required for the communication\r\nof motion from one body to another. Contiguity does not always exist,\r\nto our senses at least, in the cases in which motion produces motion.\r\nThe forces which go under the name of attraction, especially the greatest\r\nof all, gravitation, are examples of motion producing motion without apparent\r\ncontiguity. When a planet moves, its distant satellites accompany\r\nits motion. The sun carries the whole solar system along with it in the\r\nprogress which it is ascertained to be executing through space. And even\r\nif we were to accept as conclusive the geometrical reasonings (strikingly\r\nsimilar to those by which the Cartesians defended their vortices) by which\r\nit has been attempted to show that the motions of the ether may account\r\nfor gravitation itself, even then it would only have been proved that the\r\nsupposed mode of production may be, but not that no other mode can be,\r\nthe true one.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 7. It is necessary, before quitting the subject of hypotheses, to guard\r\nagainst the appearance of reflecting upon the scientific value of several\r\nbranches of physical inquiry, which, though only in their infancy, I hold to\r\nbe strictly inductive. There is a great difference between inventing agencies\r\nto account for classes of phenomena, and endeavoring, in conformity\r\nwith known laws, to conjecture what former collocations of known agents\r\nmay have given birth to individual facts still in existence. The latter is\r\nthe legitimate operation of inferring from an observed effect the existence,\r\nin time past, of a cause similar to that by which we know it to be produced\r\nin all cases in which we have actual experience of its origin. This, for example,\r\nis the scope of the inquiries of geology; and they are no more illogical\r\nor visionary than judicial inquiries, which also aim at discovering a past\r\nevent by inference from those of its effects which still subsist. As we can\r\nascertain whether a man was murdered or died a natural death, from the\r\nindications exhibited by the corpse, the presence or absence of signs of\r\nstruggling on the ground or on the adjacent objects, the marks of blood,\r\nthe footsteps of the supposed murderers, and so on, proceeding throughout\r\non uniformities ascertained by a perfect induction without any mixture of\r\nhypothesis; so if we find, on and beneath the surface of our planet, masses\r\nexactly similar to deposits from water, or to results of the cooling of matter\r\nmelted by fire, we may justly conclude that such has been their origin;\r\nand if the effects, though similar in kind, are on a far larger scale than any\r\nwhich are now produced, we may rationally, and without hypothesis, conclude\r\neither that the causes existed formerly with greater intensity, or that\r\nthey have operated during an enormous length of time. Further than this\r\nno geologist of authority has, since the rise of the present enlightened\r\nschool of geological speculation, attempted to go.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIn many geological inquiries it doubtless happens that though the laws\r\nto which the phenomena are ascribed are known laws, and the agents\r\nknown agents, those agents are not known to have been present in the particular\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page360\"\u003e[pg 360]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg360\" id=\"Pg360\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\ncase. In the speculation respecting the igneous origin of trap or\r\ngranite, the fact does not admit of direct proof that those substances have\r\nbeen actually subjected to intense heat. But the same thing might be said\r\nof all judicial inquiries which proceed on circumstantial evidence. We can\r\nconclude that a man was murdered, though it is not proved by the testimony\r\nof eye-witnesses that some person who had the intention of murdering him\r\nwas present on the spot. It is enough for most purposes, if no other known\r\ncause could have generated the effects shown to have been produced.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-tb\"\u003e\u003chr style=\"width: 50%\" /\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe celebrated speculation of Laplace concerning the origin of the earth\r\nand planets, participates essentially in the inductive character of modern\r\ngeological theory. The speculation is, that the atmosphere of the sun\r\noriginally extended to the present limits of the solar system; from which,\r\nby the process of cooling, it has contracted to its present dimensions; and\r\nsince, by the general principles of mechanics the rotation of the sun and\r\nof its accompanying atmosphere must increase in rapidity as its volume\r\ndiminishes, the increased centrifugal force generated by the more rapid\r\nrotation, overbalancing the action of gravitation, has caused the sun to\r\nabandon successive rings of vaporous matter, which are supposed to have\r\ncondensed by cooling, and to have become the planets. There is in this\r\ntheory no unknown substance introduced on supposition, nor any unknown\r\nproperty or law ascribed to a known substance. The known laws of matter\r\nauthorize us to suppose that a body which is constantly giving out so\r\nlarge an amount of heat as the sun is, must be progressively cooling, and\r\nthat, by the process of cooling it must contract; if, therefore, we endeavor,\r\nfrom the present state of that luminary, to infer its state in a time long\r\npast, we must necessarily suppose that its atmosphere extended much farther\r\nthan at present, and we are entitled to suppose that it extended as far\r\nas we can trace effects such as it might naturally leave behind it on retiring;\r\nand such the planets are. These suppositions being made, it follows\r\nfrom known laws that successive zones of the solar atmosphere might be\r\nabandoned; that these would continue to revolve round the sun with the\r\nsame velocity as when they formed part of its substance; and that they\r\nwould cool down, long before the sun itself, to any given temperature, and\r\nconsequently to that at which the greater part of the vaporous matter of\r\nwhich they consisted would become liquid or solid. The known law of\r\ngravitation would then cause them to agglomerate in masses, which would\r\nassume the shape our planets actually exhibit; would acquire, each about\r\nits own axis, a rotatory movement; and would in that state revolve, as the\r\nplanets actually do, about the sun, in the same direction with the sun’s rotation,\r\nbut with less velocity, because in the same periodic time which the\r\nsun’s rotation occupied when his atmosphere extended to that point. There\r\nis thus, in Laplace’s theory, nothing, strictly speaking, hypothetical; it is\r\nan example of legitimate reasoning from a present effect to a possible past\r\ncause, according to the known laws of that cause. The theory, therefore,\r\nis, as I have said, of a similar character to the theories of geologists; but\r\nconsiderably inferior to them in point of evidence. Even if it were proved\r\n(which it is not) that the conditions necessary for determining the breaking\r\noff of successive rings would certainly occur, there would still be a\r\nmuch greater chance of error in assuming that the existing laws of nature\r\nare the same which existed at the origin of the solar system, than in merely\r\npresuming (with geologists) that those laws have lasted through a few\r\nrevolutions and transformations of a single one among the bodies of which\r\nthat system is composed.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page361\"\u003e[pg 361]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg361\" id=\"Pg361\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-div\" style=\"margin-bottom: 4.00em; margin-top: 4.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"toc71\" id=\"toc71\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"pdf72\" id=\"pdf72\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: center; margin-bottom: 2.40em; margin-top: 2.40em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 120%\"\u003eChapter XV.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: left; margin-bottom: 2.88em; margin-top: 2.88em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 144%\"\u003eOf Progressive Effects; And Of The Continued Action Of Causes.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 1. In the last four chapters we have traced the general outlines of the\r\ntheory of the generation of derivative laws from ultimate ones. In the\r\npresent chapter our attention will be directed to a particular case of the\r\nderivation of laws from other laws, but a case so general, and so important\r\nas not only to repay, but to require, a separate examination. This is the\r\ncase of a complex phenomenon resulting from one simple law, by the continual\r\naddition of an effect to itself.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThere are some phenomena, some bodily sensations, for example, which\r\nare essentially instantaneous, and whose existence can only be prolonged\r\nby the prolongation of the existence of the cause by which they are produced.\r\nBut most phenomena are in their own nature permanent; having\r\nbegun to exist, they would exist forever unless some cause intervened having\r\na tendency to alter or destroy them. Such, for example, are all the\r\nfacts of phenomena which we call bodies. Water, once produced, will not\r\nof itself relapse into a state of hydrogen and oxygen; such a change requires\r\nsome agent having the power of decomposing the compound. Such,\r\nagain, are the positions in space and the movements of bodies. No object\r\nat rest alters its position without the intervention of some conditions extraneous\r\nto itself; and when once in motion, no object returns to a state\r\nof rest, or alters either its direction or its velocity, unless some new external\r\nconditions are superinduced. It, therefore, perpetually happens that a\r\ntemporary cause gives rise to a permanent effect. The contact of iron\r\nwith moist air for a few hours, produces a rust which may endure for centuries;\r\nor a projectile force which launches a cannon-ball into space, produces\r\na motion which would continue forever unless some other force\r\ncounteracted it.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nBetween the two examples which we have here given, there is a difference\r\nworth pointing out. In the former (in which the phenomenon produced\r\nis a substance, and not a motion of a substance), since the rust remains\r\nforever and unaltered unless some new cause supervenes, we may\r\nspeak of the contact of air a hundred years ago as even the proximate\r\ncause of the rust which has existed from that time until now. But when\r\nthe effect is motion, which is itself a change, we must use a different language.\r\nThe permanency of the effect is now only the permanency of a\r\nseries of changes. The second foot, or inch, or mile of motion is not the\r\nmere prolonged duration of the first foot, or inch, or mile, but another fact\r\nwhich succeeds, and which may in some respects be very unlike the former,\r\nsince it carries the body through a different region of space. Now, the\r\noriginal projectile force which set the body moving is the remote cause of\r\nall its motion, however long continued, but the proximate cause of no motion\r\nexcept that which took place at the first instant. The motion at any\r\nsubsequent instant is proximately caused by the motion which took place\r\nat the instant preceding. It is on that, and not on the original moving\r\ncause, that the motion at any given moment depends. For, suppose that\r\nthe body passes through some resisting medium, which partially counteracts\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page362\"\u003e[pg 362]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg362\" id=\"Pg362\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nthe effect of the original impulse, and retards the motion; this counteraction\r\n(it need scarcely here be repeated) is as strict an example of obedience\r\nto the law of the impulse, as if the body had gone on moving with\r\nits original velocity; but the motion which results is different, being now\r\na compound of the effects of two causes acting in contrary directions, instead\r\nof the single effect of one cause. Now, what cause does the body\r\nobey in its subsequent motion? The original cause of motion, or the actual\r\nmotion at the preceding instant? The latter; for when the object\r\nissues from the resisting medium, it continues moving, not with its original,\r\nbut with its retarded velocity. The motion having once been diminished,\r\nall that which follows is diminished. The effect changes, because\r\nthe cause which it really obeys, the proximate cause, the real cause in fact,\r\nhas changed. This principle is recognized by mathematicians when they\r\nenumerate among the causes by which the motion of a body is at any instant\r\ndetermined the \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eforce generated\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e by the previous motion; an expression\r\nwhich would be absurd if taken to imply that this \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“force”\u003c/span\u003e was an intermediate\r\nlink between the cause and the effect, but which really means\r\nonly the previous motion itself, considered as a cause of further motion.\r\nWe must, therefore, if we would speak with perfect precision, consider\r\neach link in the succession of motions as the effect of the link preceding it.\r\nBut if, for the convenience of discourse, we speak of the whole series as\r\none effect, it must be as an effect produced by the original impelling force;\r\na permanent effect produced by an instantaneous cause, and possessing the\r\nproperty of self-perpetuation.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nLet us now suppose that the original agent or cause, instead of being instantaneous,\r\nis permanent. Whatever effect has been produced up to a\r\ngiven time, would (unless prevented by the intervention of some new cause)\r\nsubsist permanently, even if the cause were to perish. Since, however, the\r\ncause does not perish, but continues to exist and to operate, it must go on\r\nproducing more and more of the effect; and instead of a uniform effect,\r\nwe have a progressive series of effects, arising from the accumulated influence\r\nof a permanent cause. Thus, the contact of iron with the atmosphere\r\ncauses a portion of it to rust; and if the cause ceased, the effect already\r\nproduced would be permanent, but no further effect would be added. If,\r\nhowever, the cause, namely, exposure to moist air, continues, more and\r\nmore of the iron becomes rusted, until all which is exposed is converted\r\ninto a red powder, when one of the conditions of the production of rust,\r\nnamely, the presence of unoxidized iron, has ceased, and the effect can not\r\nany longer be produced. Again, the earth causes bodies to fall toward it;\r\nthat is, the existence of the earth at a given instant causes an unsupported\r\nbody to move toward it at the succeeding instant; and if the earth were\r\nannihilated, as much of the effect as is already produced would continue;\r\nthe object would go on moving in the same direction, with its acquired\r\nvelocity, until intercepted by some body or deflected by some other force.\r\nThe earth, however, not being annihilated, goes on producing in the second\r\ninstant an effect similar and of equal amount with the first, which two\r\neffects being added together, there results an accelerated velocity; and\r\nthis operation being repeated at each successive instant, the mere permanence\r\nof the cause, though without increase, gives rise to a constant progressive\r\nincrease of the effect, so long as all the conditions, negative and\r\npositive, of the production of that effect continue to be realized.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt is obvious that this state of things is merely a case of the Composition\r\nof Causes. A cause which continues in action must on a strict analysis\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page363\"\u003e[pg 363]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg363\" id=\"Pg363\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nbe considered as a number of causes exactly similar, successively introduced,\r\nand producing by their combination the sum of the effects which\r\nthey would severally produce if they acted singly. The progressive rusting\r\nof the iron is in strictness the sum of the effects of many particles of\r\nair acting in succession upon corresponding particles of iron. The continued\r\naction of the earth upon a falling body is equivalent to a series of\r\nforces, applied in successive instants, each tending to produce a certain constant\r\nquantity of motion; and the motion at each instant is the sum of the\r\neffects of the new force applied at the preceding instant, and the motion\r\nalready acquired. In each instant a fresh effect, of which gravity is the\r\nproximate cause, is added to the effect of which it was the remote cause;\r\nor (to express the same thing in another manner), the effect produced by\r\nthe earth’s influence at the instant last elapsed is added to the sum of the\r\neffects of which the remote causes were the influences exerted by the earth\r\nat all the previous instants since the motion began. The case, therefore,\r\ncomes under the principle of a concurrence of causes producing an effect\r\nequal to the sum of their separate effects. But as the causes come into\r\nplay not all at once, but successively, and as the effect at each instant is the\r\nsum of the effects of those causes only which have come into action up to\r\nthat instant, the result assumes the form of an ascending series; a succession\r\nof sums, each greater than that which preceded it; and we have thus\r\na progressive effect from the continued action of a cause.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nSince the continuance of the cause influences the effect only by adding\r\nto its quantity, and since the addition takes place according to a fixed law\r\n(equal quantities in equal times), the result is capable of being computed\r\non mathematical principles. In fact, this case, being that of infinitesimal\r\nincrements, is precisely the case which the differential calculus was invented\r\nto meet. The questions, what effect will result from the continual addition\r\nof a given cause to itself, and what amount of the cause, being continually\r\nadded to itself, will produce a given amount of the effect, are evidently\r\nmathematical questions, and to be treated, therefore, deductively.\r\nIf, as we have seen, cases of the Composition of Causes are seldom adapted\r\nfor any other than deductive investigation, this is especially true in the\r\ncase now examined, the continual composition of a cause with its own previous\r\neffects; since such a case is peculiarly amenable to the deductive\r\nmethod, while the undistinguishable manner in which the effects are blended\r\nwith one another and with the causes, must make the treatment of such\r\nan instance experimentally still more chimerical than in any other case.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 2. We shall next advert to a rather more intricate operation of the\r\nsame principle, namely, when the cause does not merely continue in action,\r\nbut undergoes, during the same time, a progressive change in those of its\r\ncircumstances which contribute to determine the effect. In this case, as\r\nin the former, the total effect goes on accumulating by the continual addition\r\nof a fresh effect to that already produced, but it is no longer by the\r\naddition of equal quantities in equal times; the quantities added are unequal,\r\nand even the quality may now be different. If the change in the\r\nstate of the permanent cause be progressive, the effect will go through a\r\ndouble series of changes, arising partly from the accumulated action of the\r\ncause, and partly from the changes in its action. The effect is still a progressive\r\neffect, produced, however, not by the mere continuance of a cause,\r\nbut by its continuance and its progressiveness combined.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nA familiar example is afforded by the increase of the temperature as\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page364\"\u003e[pg 364]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg364\" id=\"Pg364\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nsummer advances, that is, as the sun draws nearer to a vertical position, and\r\nremains a greater number of hours above the horizon. This instance exemplifies\r\nin a very interesting manner the twofold operation on the effect,\r\narising from the continuance of the cause, and from its progressive change.\r\nWhen once the sun has come near enough to the zenith, and remains above\r\nthe horizon long enough, to give more warmth during one diurnal rotation\r\nthan the counteracting cause, the earth’s radiation, can carry off, the mere\r\ncontinuance of the cause would progressively increase the effect, even if the\r\nsun came no nearer and the days grew no longer; but in addition to this,\r\na change takes place in the accidents of the cause (its series of diurnal positions),\r\ntending to increase the quantity of the effect. When the summer\r\nsolstice has passed, the progressive change in the cause begins to take place\r\nthe reverse way, but, for some time, the accumulating effect of the mere\r\ncontinuance of the cause exceeds the effect of the changes in it, and the\r\ntemperature continues to increase.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAgain, the motion of a planet is a progressive effect, produced by causes\r\nat once permanent and progressive. The orbit of a planet is determined\r\n(omitting perturbations) by two causes: first, the action of the central body,\r\na permanent cause, which alternately increases and diminishes as the planet\r\ndraws nearer to or goes farther from its perihelion, and which acts at every\r\npoint in a different direction; and, secondly, the tendency of the planet to\r\ncontinue moving in the direction and with the velocity which it has already\r\nacquired. This force also grows greater as the planet draws nearer to its\r\nperihelion, because as it does so its velocity increases, and less, as it recedes\r\nfrom its perihelion; and this force as well as the other acts at each point in\r\na different direction, because at every point the action of the central force,\r\nby deflecting the planet from its previous direction, alters the line in which\r\nit tends to continue moving. The motion at each instant is determined by\r\nthe amount and direction of the motion, and the amount and direction of\r\nthe sun’s action, at the previous instant; and if we speak of the entire revolution\r\nof the planet as one phenomenon (which, as it is periodical and\r\nsimilar to itself, we often find it convenient to do), that phenomenon is the\r\nprogressive effect of two permanent and progressive causes, the central\r\nforce and the acquired motion. Those causes happening to be progressive\r\nin the particular way which is called periodical, the effect necessarily is so\r\ntoo; because the quantities to be added together returning in a regular\r\norder, the same sums must also regularly return.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThis example is worthy of consideration also in another respect. Though\r\nthe causes themselves are permanent, and independent of all conditions\r\nknown to us, the changes which take place in the quantities and relations\r\nof the causes are actually caused by the periodical changes in the effects.\r\nThe causes, as they exist at any moment, having produced a certain motion,\r\nthat motion, becoming itself a cause, reacts upon the causes, and produces\r\na change in them. By altering the distance and direction of the central\r\nbody relatively to the planet, and the direction and quantity of the force in\r\nthe direction of the tangent, it alters the elements which determine the motion\r\nat the next succeeding instant. This change renders the next motion\r\nsomewhat different; and this difference, by a fresh reaction upon the causes,\r\nrenders the next motion again different, and so on. The original state of\r\nthe causes might have been such that this series of actions modified by\r\nreactions would not have been periodical. The sun’s action, and the original\r\nimpelling force, might have been in such a ratio to one another, that the\r\nreaction of the effect would have been such as to alter the causes more and\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page365\"\u003e[pg 365]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg365\" id=\"Pg365\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nmore, without ever bringing them back to what they were at any former\r\ntime. The planet would then have moved in a parabola, or an hyperbola,\r\ncurves not returning into themselves. The quantities of the two forces were,\r\nhowever, originally such, that the successive reactions of the effect bring back\r\nthe causes, after a certain time, to what they were before; and from that time\r\nall the variations continued to recur again and again in the same periodical\r\norder, and must so continue while the causes subsist and are not counteracted.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 3. In all cases of progressive effects, whether arising from the accumulation\r\nof unchanging or of changing elements, there is a uniformity of succession\r\nnot merely between the cause and the effect, but between the first\r\nstages of the effect and its subsequent stages. That a body \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ein vacuo\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e falls\r\nsixteen feet in the first second, forty-eight in the second, and so on in the\r\nratio of the odd numbers, is as much a uniform sequence as that when the\r\nsupports are removed the body falls. The sequence of spring and summer\r\nis as regular and invariable as that of the approach of the sun and spring;\r\nbut we do not consider spring to be the cause of summer; it is evident\r\nthat both are successive effects of the heat received from the sun, and that,\r\nconsidered merely in itself, spring might continue forever without having the\r\nslightest tendency to produce summer. As we have so often remarked, not\r\nthe conditional, but the unconditional invariable antecedent is termed the\r\ncause. That which would not be followed by the effect unless something\r\nelse had preceded, and which if that something else had preceded, would\r\nnot have been required, is not the cause, however invaluable the sequence\r\nmay in fact be.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt is in this way that most of those uniformities of succession are generated,\r\nwhich are not cases of causation. When a phenomenon goes on\r\nincreasing, or periodically increases and diminishes, or goes through any\r\ncontinued and unceasing process of variation reducible to a uniform rule\r\nor law of succession, we do not on this account presume that any two successive\r\nterms of the series are cause and effect. We presume the contrary;\r\nwe expect to find that the whole series originates either from the continued\r\naction of fixed causes or from causes which go through a corresponding process\r\nof continuous change. A tree grows from half an inch high to a hundred\r\nfeet; and some trees will generally grow to that height unless prevented\r\nby some counteracting cause. But we do not call the seedling the\r\ncause of the full-grown tree; the invariable antecedent it certainly is, and\r\nwe know very imperfectly on what other antecedents the sequence is contingent,\r\nbut we are convinced that it is contingent on something; because the\r\nhomogeneousness of the antecedent with the consequent, the close resemblance\r\nof the seedling to the tree in all respects except magnitude, and the\r\ngraduality of the growth, so exactly resembling the progressively accumulating\r\neffect produced by the long action of some one cause, leave no possibility\r\nof doubting that the seedling and the tree are two terms in a series\r\nof that description, the first term of which is yet to seek. The conclusion\r\nis further confirmed by this, that we are able to prove by strict induction\r\nthe dependence of the growth of the tree, and even of the continuance of\r\nits existence, upon the continued repetition of certain processes of nutrition,\r\nthe rise of the sap, the absorptions and exhalations by the leaves, etc.;\r\nand the same experiments would probably prove to us that the growth of\r\nthe tree is the accumulated sum of the effects of these continued processes,\r\nwere we not, for want of sufficiently microscopic eyes, unable to observe\r\ncorrectly and in detail what those effects are.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page366\"\u003e[pg 366]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg366\" id=\"Pg366\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThis supposition by no means requires that the effect should not, during\r\nits progress, undergo many modifications besides those of quantity, or that\r\nit should not sometimes appear to undergo a very marked change of character.\r\nThis may be either because the unknown cause consists of several\r\ncomponent elements or agents, whose effects, accumulating according to\r\ndifferent laws, are compounded in different proportions at different periods\r\nin the existence of the organized being; or because, at certain points in its\r\nprogress, fresh causes or agencies come in, or are evolved, which intermix\r\ntheir laws with those of the prime agent.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-div\" style=\"margin-bottom: 4.00em; margin-top: 4.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"toc73\" id=\"toc73\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"pdf74\" id=\"pdf74\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: center; margin-bottom: 2.40em; margin-top: 2.40em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 120%\"\u003eChapter XVI.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: left; margin-bottom: 2.88em; margin-top: 2.88em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 144%\"\u003eOf Empirical Laws.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 1. Scientific inquirers give the name of Empirical Laws to those\r\nuniformities which observation or experiment has shown to exist, but on\r\nwhich they hesitate to rely in cases varying much from those which have\r\nbeen actually observed, for want of seeing any reason \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ewhy\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e such a law\r\nshould exist. It is implied, therefore, in the notion of an empirical law,\r\nthat it is not an ultimate law; that if true at all, its truth is capable of\r\nbeing, and requires to be, accounted for. It is a derivative law, the derivation\r\nof which is not yet known. To state the explanation, the \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ewhy\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e, of the\r\nempirical law, would be to state the laws from which it is derived—the\r\nultimate causes on which it is contingent. And if we knew these, we\r\nshould also know what are its limits; under what conditions it would cease\r\nto be fulfilled.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe periodical return of eclipses, as originally ascertained by the persevering\r\nobservation of the early Eastern astronomers, was an empirical law,\r\nuntil the general laws of the celestial motions had accounted for it. The\r\nfollowing are empirical laws still waiting to be resolved into the simpler\r\nlaws from which they are derived: the local laws of the flux and reflux\r\nof the tides in different places; the succession of certain kinds of weather\r\nto certain appearances of sky; the apparent exceptions to the almost universal\r\ntruth that bodies expand by increase of temperature; the law that\r\nbreeds, both animal and vegetable, are improved by crossing; that gases\r\nhave a strong tendency to permeate animal membranes; that substances\r\ncontaining a very high proportion of nitrogen (such as hydrocyanic acid\r\nand morphia) are powerful poisons; that when different metals are fused\r\ntogether the alloy is harder than the various elements; that the number of\r\natoms of acid required to neutralize one atom of any base is equal to the\r\nnumber of atoms of oxygen in the base; that the solubility of substances\r\nin one another depends,\u003ca id=\"noteref_171\" name=\"noteref_171\" href=\"#note_171\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e171\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e at least in some degree, on the similarity of\r\ntheir elements.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAn empirical law, then, is an observed uniformity, presumed to be resolvable\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page367\"\u003e[pg 367]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg367\" id=\"Pg367\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\ninto simpler laws, but not yet resolved into them. The ascertainment\r\nof the empirical laws of phenomena often precedes by a long interval\r\nthe explanation of those laws by the Deductive Method; and the verification\r\nof a deduction usually consists in the comparison of its results with\r\nempirical laws previously ascertained.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 2. From a limited number of ultimate laws of causation, there are\r\nnecessarily generated a vast number of derivative uniformities, both of\r\nsuccession and co-existence. Some are laws of succession or of co-existence\r\nbetween different effects of the same cause; of these we had examples in\r\nthe last chapter. Some are laws of succession between effects and their\r\nremote causes, resolvable into the laws which connect each with the intermediate\r\nlink. Thirdly, when causes act together and compound their\r\neffects, the laws of those causes generate the fundamental law of the effect,\r\nnamely, that it depends on the co-existence of those causes. And, finally,\r\nthe order of succession or of co-existence which obtains among effects\r\nnecessarily depends on their causes. If they are effects of the same cause,\r\nit depends on the laws of that cause; if on different causes, it depends on\r\nthe laws of those causes severally, and on the circumstances which determine\r\ntheir co-existence. If we inquire further when and how the causes\r\nwill co-exist, that, again, depends on \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003etheir\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e causes; and we may thus trace\r\nback the phenomena higher and higher, until the different series of effects\r\nmeet in a point, and the whole is shown to have depended ultimately on\r\nsome common cause; or until, instead of converging to one point, they terminate\r\nin different points, and the order of the effects is proved to have\r\narisen from the collocation of some of the primeval causes, or natural\r\nagents. For example, the order of succession and of co-existence among\r\nthe heavenly motions, which is expressed by Kepler’s laws, is derived from\r\nthe co-existence of two primeval causes, the sun, and the original impulse\r\nor projectile force belonging to each planet.\u003ca id=\"noteref_172\" name=\"noteref_172\" href=\"#note_172\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e172\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Kepler’s laws are resolved\r\ninto the laws of these causes and the fact of their co-existence.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nDerivative laws, therefore, do not depend solely on the ultimate laws into\r\nwhich they are resolvable; they mostly depend on those ultimate laws, and\r\nan ultimate fact; namely, the mode of co-existence of some of the component\r\nelements of the universe. The ultimate laws of causation might be the\r\nsame as at present, and yet the derivative laws completely different, if the\r\ncauses co-existed in different proportions, or with any difference in those\r\nof their relations by which the effects are influenced. If, for example, the\r\nsun’s attraction, and the original projectile force, had existed in some other\r\nratio to one another than they did (and we know of no reason why this\r\nshould not have been the case), the derivative laws of the heavenly motions\r\nmight have been quite different from what they are. The proportions\r\nwhich exist happen to be such as to produce regular elliptical motions;\r\nany other proportions would have produced different ellipses, or circular,\r\nor parabolic, or hyperbolic motions, but still regular ones; because the effects\r\nof each of the agents accumulate according to a uniform law; and two\r\nregular series of quantities, when their corresponding terms are added, must\r\nproduce a regular series of some sort, whatever the quantities themselves are.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 3. Now this last-mentioned element in the resolution of a derivative\r\nlaw, the element which is not a law of causation, but a collocation of causes,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page368\"\u003e[pg 368]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg368\" id=\"Pg368\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\ncan not itself be reduced to any law. There is, as formerly\r\nremarked,\u003ca id=\"noteref_173\" name=\"noteref_173\" href=\"#note_173\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e173\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e no\r\nuniformity, no \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003enorma\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, principle, or rule,\r\nperceivable in the distribution of\r\nthe primeval natural agents through the universe. The different substances\r\ncomposing the earth, the powers that pervade the universe, stand in no constant\r\nrelation to one another. One substance is more abundant than others,\r\none power acts through a larger extent of space than others, without\r\nany pervading analogy that we can discover. We not only do not\r\nknow of any reason why the sun’s attraction and the force in the direction\r\nof the tangent co-exist in the exact proportion they do, but we can trace\r\nno coincidence between it and the proportions in which any other elementary\r\npowers in the universe are intermingled. The utmost disorder is apparent\r\nin the combination of the causes, which is consistent with the most\r\nregular order in their effects; for when each agent carries on its own operations\r\naccording to a uniform law, even the most capricious combination\r\nof agencies will generate a regularity of some sort; as we see in the kaleidoscope,\r\nwhere any casual arrangement of colored bits of glass produces\r\nby the laws of reflection a beautiful regularity in the effect.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 4. In the above considerations lies the justification of the limited degree of\r\nreliance which scientific inquirers are accustomed to place in empirical laws.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nA derivative law which results wholly from the operation of some one\r\ncause, will be as universally true as the laws of the cause itself; that is,\r\nit will always be true except where some one of those effects of the cause,\r\non which the derivative law depends, is defeated by a counteracting cause.\r\nBut when the derivative law results not from different effects of one cause,\r\nbut from effects of several causes, we can not be certain that it will be true\r\nunder any variation in the mode of co-existence of those causes, or of the\r\nprimitive natural agents on which the causes ultimately depend. The\r\nproposition that coal-beds rest on certain descriptions of strata exclusively,\r\nthough true on the earth, so far as our observation has reached, can not be\r\nextended to the moon or the other planets, supposing coal to exist there;\r\nbecause we can not be assured that the original constitution of any other\r\nplanet was such as to produce the different depositions in the same order\r\nas in our globe. The derivative law in this case depends not solely on\r\nlaws, but on a collocation; and collocations can not be reduced to any law.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nNow it is the very nature of a derivative law which has not yet been resolved\r\ninto its elements, in other words, an empirical law, that we do not\r\nknow whether it results from the different effects of one cause, or from effects\r\nof different causes. We can not tell whether it depends wholly on\r\nlaws, or partly on laws and partly on a collocation. If it depends on a\r\ncollocation, it will be true in all the cases in which that particular collocation\r\nexists. But, since we are entirely ignorant, in case of its depending\r\non a collocation, what the collocation is, we are not safe in extending the\r\nlaw beyond the limits of time and place in which we have actual experience\r\nof its truth. Since within those limits the law has always been found\r\ntrue, we have evidence that the collocations, whatever they are, on which\r\nit depends, do really exist within those limits. But, knowing of no rule or\r\nprinciple to which the collocations themselves conform, we can not conclude\r\nthat because a collocation is proved to exist within certain limits of\r\nplace or time, it will exist beyond those limits. Empirical laws, therefore,\r\ncan only be received as true within the limits of time and place in which\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page369\"\u003e[pg 369]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg369\" id=\"Pg369\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nthey have been found true by observation; and not merely the limits of\r\ntime and place, but of time, place, and circumstance; for, since it is the very\r\nmeaning of an empirical law that we do not know the ultimate laws of causation\r\non which it is dependent, we can not foresee, without actual trial, in\r\nwhat manner or to what extent the introduction of any new circumstance\r\nmay affect it.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 5. But how are we to know that a uniformity ascertained by experience\r\nis only an empirical law? Since, by the supposition, we have not been\r\nable to resolve it into any other laws, how do we know that it is not an\r\nultimate law of causation?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nI answer that no generalization amounts to more than an empirical law\r\nwhen the only proof on which it rests is that of the Method of Agreement.\r\nFor it has been seen that by that method alone we never can arrive at\r\ncauses. The utmost that the Method of Agreement can do is, to ascertain\r\nthe whole of the circumstances common to all cases in which a phenomenon\r\nis produced; and this aggregate includes not only the cause of the\r\nphenomenon, but all phenomena with which it is connected by any derivative\r\nuniformity, whether as being collateral effects of the same cause, or\r\neffects of any other cause which, in all the instances we have been able to\r\nobserve, co-existed with it. The method affords no means of determining\r\nwhich of these uniformities are laws of causation, and which are merely\r\nderivative laws, resulting from those laws of causation and from the collocation\r\nof the causes. None of them, therefore, can be received in any other\r\ncharacter than that of derivative laws, the derivation of which has not\r\nbeen traced; in other words, empirical laws: in which light all results obtained\r\nby the Method of Agreement (and therefore almost all truths obtained\r\nby simple observation without experiment) must be considered, until\r\neither confirmed by the Method of Difference, or explained deductively; in\r\nother words, accounted for \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea priori\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThese empirical laws may be of greater or less authority, according as\r\nthere is reason to presume that they are resolvable into laws only, or into\r\nlaws and collocations together. The sequences which we observe in the\r\nproduction and subsequent life of an animal or a vegetable, resting on the\r\nMethod of Agreement only, are mere empirical laws; but though the antecedents\r\nin those sequences may not be the causes of the consequents, both\r\nthe one and the other are doubtless, in the main, successive stages of a progressive\r\neffect originating in a common cause, and therefore independent\r\nof collocations. The uniformities, on the other hand, in the order of superposition\r\nof strata on the earth, are empirical laws of a much weaker kind,\r\nsince they not only are not laws of causation, but there is no reason to believe\r\nthat they depend on any common cause; all appearances are in favor\r\nof their depending on the particular collocation of natural agents which at\r\nsome time or other existed on our globe, and from which no inference can\r\nbe drawn as to the collocation which exists or has existed in any other portion\r\nof the universe.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 6. Our definition of an empirical law, including not only those uniformities\r\nwhich are not known to be laws of causation, but also those which are,\r\nprovided there be reason to presume that they are not ultimate laws; this\r\nis the proper place to consider by what signs we may judge that even if an\r\nobserved uniformity be a law of causation, it is not an ultimate, but a derivative\r\nlaw.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page370\"\u003e[pg 370]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg370\" id=\"Pg370\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe first sign is, if between the antecedent \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e and the consequent\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eb\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e there\r\nbe evidence of some intermediate link; some phenomenon of which we can\r\nsurmise the existence, though from the imperfection of our senses or of our\r\ninstruments we are unable to ascertain its precise nature and laws. If there\r\nbe such a phenomenon (which may be denoted by the letter \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ex\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e), it\r\nfollows that even if \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e be the cause of \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eb\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\nit is but the remote cause, and that the law, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e causes\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eb\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, is resolvable into at least two laws, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ncauses \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ex\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, and \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ex\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e causes\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eb\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e. This is a very frequent case, since the operations of nature\r\nmostly take place on so minute a scale, that many of the successive steps are either\r\nimperceptible, or very indistinctly perceived.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nTake, for example, the laws of the chemical composition of substances;\r\nas that hydrogen and oxygen being combined, water is produced. All we\r\nsee of the process is, that the two gases being mixed in certain proportions,\r\nand heat or electricity being applied, an explosion takes place, the gases\r\ndisappear, and water remains. There is no doubt about the law, or about\r\nits being a law of causation. But between the antecedent (the gases in a\r\nstate of mechanical mixture, heated or electrified), and the consequent (the\r\nproduction of water), there must be an intermediate process which we do\r\nnot see. For if we take any portion whatever of the water, and subject it\r\nto analysis, we find that it always contains hydrogen and oxygen; nay, the\r\nvery same proportions of them, namely, two-thirds, in volume, of hydrogen,\r\nand one-third oxygen. This is true of a single drop; it is true of the minutest\r\nportion which our instruments are capable of appreciating. Since,\r\nthen, the smallest perceptible portion of the water contains both those substances,\r\nportions of hydrogen and oxygen smaller than the smallest perceptible\r\nmust have come together in every such minute portion of space; must\r\nhave come closer together than when the gases were in a state of mechanical\r\nmixture, since (to mention no other reasons) the water occupies far less\r\nspace than the gases. Now, as we can not see this contact or close approach\r\nof the minute particles, we can not observe with what circumstances\r\nit is attended, or according to what laws it produces its effects. The production\r\nof water, that is, of the sensible phenomena which characterize the\r\ncompound, may be a very remote effect of those laws. There may be innumerable\r\nintervening links; and we are sure that there must be some.\r\nHaving full proof that corpuscular action of some kind takes place previous\r\nto any of the great transformations in the sensible properties of substances,\r\nwe can have no doubt that the laws of chemical action, as at present\r\nknown, are not ultimate, but derivative laws; however ignorant we may\r\nbe, and even though we should forever remain ignorant, of the nature of\r\nthe laws of corpuscular action from which they are derived.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIn like manner, all the processes of vegetative life, whether in the vegetable\r\nproperly so called or in the animal body, are corpuscular processes.\r\nNutrition is the addition of particles to one another, sometimes merely\r\nreplacing other particles separated and excreted, sometimes occasioning\r\nan increase of bulk or weight so gradual that only after a long continuance\r\ndoes it become perceptible. Various organs, by means of peculiar\r\nvessels, secrete from the blood fluids, the component particles of which\r\nmust have been in the blood, but which differ from it most widely both in\r\nmechanical properties and in chemical composition. Here, then, are abundance\r\nof unknown links to be filled up; and there can be no doubt that the\r\nlaws of the phenomena of vegetative or organic life are derivative laws, dependent\r\non properties of the corpuscles, and of those elementary tissues\r\nwhich are comparatively simple combinations of corpuscles.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page371\"\u003e[pg 371]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg371\" id=\"Pg371\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe first sign, then, from which a law of causation, though hitherto unresolved,\r\nmay be inferred to be a derivative law, is any indication of the\r\nexistence of an intermediate link or links between the antecedent and the\r\nconsequent. The second is, when the antecedent is an extremely complex\r\nphenomenon, and its effects, therefore, probably in part at least, compounded\r\nof the effects of its different elements; since we know that the case in\r\nwhich the effect of the whole is not made up of the effects of its parts is\r\nexceptional, the Composition of Causes being by far the more ordinary\r\ncase.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWe will illustrate this by two examples, in one of which the antecedent is\r\nthe sum of many homogeneous, in the other of heterogeneous, parts. The\r\nweight of a body is made up of the weights of its minute particles; a truth\r\nwhich astronomers express in its most general terms when they say that\r\nbodies, at equal distances, gravitate to one another in proportion to their\r\nquantity of matter. All true propositions, therefore, which can be made\r\nconcerning gravity, are derivative laws; the ultimate law into which they\r\nare all resolvable being, that every particle of matter attracts every other.\r\nAs our second example, we may take any of the sequences observed in\r\nmeteorology; for instance, a diminution of the pressure of the atmosphere\r\n(indicated by a fall of the barometer) is followed by rain. The antecedent\r\nis here a complex phenomenon, made up of heterogeneous elements; the\r\ncolumn of the atmosphere over any particular place consisting of two parts,\r\na column of air, and a column of aqueous vapor mixed with it; and the\r\nchange in the two together manifested by a fall of the barometer, and followed\r\nby rain, must be either a change in one of these, or in the other, or\r\nin both. We might, then, even in the absence of any other evidence, form\r\na reasonable presumption, from the invariable presence of both these elements\r\nin the antecedent, that the sequence is probably not an ultimate law,\r\nbut a result of the laws of the two different agents; a presumption only\r\nto be destroyed when we had made ourselves so well acquainted with the\r\nlaws of both, as to be able to affirm that those laws could not by themselves\r\nproduce the observed result.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThere are but few known cases of succession from very complex antecedents\r\nwhich have not either been actually accounted for from simpler\r\nlaws, or inferred with great probability (from the ascertained existence of\r\nintermediate links of causation not yet understood) to be capable of being\r\nso accounted for. It is, therefore, highly probable that all sequences from\r\ncomplex antecedents are thus resolvable, and that ultimate laws are in all\r\ncases comparatively simple. If there were not the other reasons already\r\nmentioned for believing that the laws of organized nature are resolvable\r\ninto simpler laws, it would be almost a sufficient reason that the antecedents\r\nin most of the sequences are so very complex.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 7. In the preceding discussion we have recognized two kinds of empirical\r\nlaws: those known to be laws of causation, but presumed to be resolvable\r\ninto simpler laws; and those not known to be laws of causation\r\nat all. Both these kinds of laws agree in the demand which they make for\r\nbeing explained by deduction, and agree in being the appropriate means\r\nof verifying such deduction, since they represent the experience with which\r\nthe result of the deduction must be compared. They agree, further, in\r\nthis, that until explained, and connected with the ultimate laws from which\r\nthey result, they have not attained the highest degree of certainty of which\r\nlaws are susceptible. It has been shown on a former occasion that laws\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page372\"\u003e[pg 372]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg372\" id=\"Pg372\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nof causation which are derivative, and compounded of simpler laws, are\r\nnot only, as the nature of the case implies, less general, but even less certain,\r\nthan the simpler laws from which they result; not in the same degree\r\nto be relied on as universally true. The inferiority of evidence, however,\r\nwhich attaches to this class of laws, is trifling, compared with that\r\nwhich is inherent in uniformities not known to be laws of causation at\r\nall. So long as these are unresolved, we can not tell on how many collocations,\r\nas well as laws, their truth may be dependent; we can never, therefore,\r\nextend them with any confidence to cases in which we have not assured\r\nourselves, by trial, that the necessary collocation of causes, whatever\r\nit may be, exists. It is to this class of laws alone that the property, which\r\nphilosophers usually consider as characteristic of empirical laws, belongs in\r\nall its strictness—the property of being unfit to be relied on beyond the\r\nlimits of time, place, and circumstance in which the observations have been\r\nmade. These are empirical laws in a more emphatic sense; and when I\r\nemploy that term (except where the context manifestly indicates the reverse)\r\nI shall generally mean to designate those uniformities only, whether\r\nof succession or of co-existence, which are not known to be laws of causation.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-div\" style=\"margin-bottom: 4.00em; margin-top: 4.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"toc75\" id=\"toc75\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"pdf76\" id=\"pdf76\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: center; margin-bottom: 2.40em; margin-top: 2.40em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 120%\"\u003eChapter XVII.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: left; margin-bottom: 2.88em; margin-top: 2.88em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 144%\"\u003eOf Chance And Its Elimination.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 1. Considering, then, as empirical laws only those observed uniformities\r\nrespecting which the question whether they are laws of causation\r\nmust remain undecided until they can be explained deductively, or until\r\nsome means are found of applying the Method of Difference to the case,\r\nit has been shown in the preceding chapter that until a uniformity can,\r\nin one or the other of these modes, be taken out of the class of empirical\r\nlaws, and brought either into that of laws of causation or of the demonstrated\r\nresults of laws of causation, it can not with any assurance be pronounced\r\ntrue beyond the local and other limits within which it has been\r\nfound so by actual observation. It remains to consider how we are to\r\nassure ourselves of its truth even within those limits; after what quantity\r\nof experience a generalization which rests solely on the Method of Agreement\r\ncan be considered sufficiently established, even as an empirical law.\r\nIn a former chapter, when treating of the Methods of Direct Induction, we\r\nexpressly reserved this question,\u003ca id=\"noteref_174\" name=\"noteref_174\" href=\"#note_174\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e174\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nand the time is now come for endeavoring\r\nto solve it.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWe found that the Method of Agreement has the defect of not proving\r\ncausation, and can, therefore, only be employed for the ascertainment of\r\nempirical laws. But we also found that besides this deficiency, it labors\r\nunder a characteristic imperfection, tending to render uncertain even such\r\nconclusions as it is in itself adapted to prove. This imperfection arises\r\nfrom Plurality of Causes. Although two or more cases in which the phenomenon\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e has been met with may have no common antecedent except A,\r\nthis does not prove that there is any connection between \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nand A, since \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nmay have many causes, and may have been produced, in these different\r\ninstances, not by any thing which the instances had in common, but by\r\nsome of those elements in them which were different. We nevertheless\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page373\"\u003e[pg 373]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg373\" id=\"Pg373\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nobserved, that in proportion to the multiplication of instances pointing to A\r\nas the antecedent, the characteristic uncertainty of the method diminishes,\r\nand the existence of a law of connection between A and \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e more\r\nnearly approaches to certainty. It is now to be determined after what amount\r\nof experience this certainty may be deemed to be practically attained, and\r\nthe connection between A and \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e may be received as an empirical law.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThis question may be otherwise stated in more familiar terms: After how\r\nmany and what sort of instances may it be concluded that an observed\r\ncoincidence between two phenomena is not the effect of chance?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt is of the utmost importance for understanding the logic of induction,\r\nthat we should form a distinct conception of what is meant by chance, and\r\nhow the phenomena which common language ascribes to that abstraction\r\nare really produced.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 2. Chance is usually spoken of in direct antithesis to law; whatever, it\r\nis supposed, can not be ascribed to any law is attributed to chance. It is,\r\nhowever, certain that whatever happens is the result of some law; is an\r\neffect of causes, and could have been predicted from a knowledge of the\r\nexistence of those causes, and from their laws. If I turn up a particular\r\ncard, that is a consequence of its place in the pack. Its place in the pack\r\nwas a consequence of the manner in which the cards were shuffled, or of\r\nthe order in which they were played in the last game; which, again, were\r\neffects of prior causes. At every stage, if we had possessed an accurate\r\nknowledge of the causes in existence, it would have been abstractedly possible\r\nto foretell the effect.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAn event occurring by chance may be better described as a coincidence\r\nfrom which we have no ground to infer a uniformity—the occurrence of\r\na phenomenon in certain circumstances, without our having reason on that\r\naccount to infer that it will happen again in those circumstances. This,\r\nhowever, when looked closely into, implies that the enumeration of the circumstances\r\nis not complete. Whatever the fact be, since it has occurred\r\nonce, we may be sure that if \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eall\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e the same circumstances were repeated it\r\nwould occur again; and not only if all, but there is some particular portion\r\nof those circumstances on which the phenomenon is invariably consequent.\r\nWith most of them, however, it is not connected in any permanent manner;\r\nits conjunction with those is said to be the effect of chance, to be\r\nmerely casual. Facts casually conjoined are separately the effects of\r\ncauses, and therefore of laws; but of different causes, and causes not connected\r\nby any law.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt is incorrect, then, to say that any phenomenon is produced by chance;\r\nbut we may say that two or more phenomena are conjoined by chance, that\r\nthey co-exist or succeed one another only by chance; meaning that they\r\nare in no way related through causation; that they are neither cause and\r\neffect, nor effects of the same cause, nor effects of causes between which\r\nthere subsists any law of co-existence, nor even effects of the same collocation\r\nof primeval causes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIf the same casual coincidence never occurred a second time, we should\r\nhave an easy test for distinguishing such from the coincidences which are\r\nthe results of a law. As long as the phenomena had been found together\r\nonly once, so long, unless we knew some more general laws from which the\r\ncoincidence might have resulted, we could not distinguish it from a casual\r\none; but if it occurred twice, we should know that the phenomena so conjoined\r\nmust be in some way connected through their causes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page374\"\u003e[pg 374]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg374\" id=\"Pg374\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThere is, however, no such test. A coincidence may occur again and\r\nagain, and yet be only casual. Nay, it would be inconsistent with what we\r\nknow of the order of nature to doubt that every casual coincidence will\r\nsooner or later be repeated, as long as the phenomena between which it occurred\r\ndo not cease to exist, or to be reproduced. The recurrence, therefore,\r\nof the same coincidence more than once, or even its frequent recurrence,\r\ndoes not prove that it is an instance of any law; does not prove that\r\nit is not casual, or, in common language, the effect of chance.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAnd yet, when a coincidence can not be deduced from known laws, nor\r\nproved by experiment to be itself a case of causation, the frequency of its\r\noccurrence is the only evidence from which we can infer that it is the result\r\nof a law. Not, however, its absolute frequency. The question is not\r\nwhether the coincidence occurs often or seldom, in the ordinary sense of\r\nthose terms; but whether it occurs more often than chance will account\r\nfor; more often than might rationally be expected if the coincidence were\r\ncasual. We have to decide, therefore, what degree of frequency in a coincidence\r\nchance will account for; and to this there can be no general answer.\r\nWe can only state the principle by which the answer must be determined;\r\nthe answer itself will be different in every different case.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nSuppose that one of the phenomena, A, exists always, and the other phenomenon,\r\nB, only occasionally; it follows that every instance of B will be\r\nan instance of its coincidence with A, and yet the coincidence will be merely\r\ncasual, not the result of any connection between them. The fixed stars\r\nhave been constantly in existence since the beginning of human experience,\r\nand all phenomena that have come under human observation have, in every\r\nsingle instance, co-existed with them; yet this coincidence, though equally\r\ninvariable with that which exists between any of those phenomena and its\r\nown cause, does not prove that the stars are its cause, nor that they are in\r\nanywise connected with it. As strong a case of coincidence, therefore, as\r\ncan possibly exist, and a much stronger one in point of mere frequency\r\nthan most of those which prove laws, does not here prove a law; why? because,\r\nsince the stars exist always, they \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003emust\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e co-exist with every other phenomenon,\r\nwhether connected with them by causation or not. The uniformity,\r\ngreat though it be, is no greater than would occur on the supposition\r\nthat no such connection exists.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nOn the other hand, suppose that we were inquiring whether there be any\r\nconnection between rain and any particular wind. Rain, we know, occasionally\r\noccurs with every wind; therefore, the connection, if it exists, can\r\nnot be an actual law; but still rain may be connected with some particular\r\nwind through causation; that is, though they can not be always effects of\r\nthe same cause (for if so they would regularly co-exist), there may be some\r\ncauses common to the two, so that in so far as either is produced by those\r\ncommon causes, they will, from the laws of the causes, be found to co-exist.\r\nHow, then, shall we ascertain this? The obvious answer is, by observing\r\nwhether rain occurs with one wind more frequently than with any other.\r\nThat, however, is not enough; for perhaps that one wind blows more frequently\r\nthan any other; so that its blowing more frequently in rainy\r\nweather is no more than would happen, although it had no connection with\r\nthe causes of rain, provided it were not connected with causes adverse to\r\nrain. In England, westerly winds blow during about twice as great a portion\r\nof the year as easterly. If, therefore, it rains only twice as often with\r\na westerly as with an easterly wind, we have no reason to infer that any\r\nlaw of nature is concerned in the coincidence. If it rains more than twice\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page375\"\u003e[pg 375]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg375\" id=\"Pg375\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nas often, we may be sure that some law is concerned; either there is some\r\ncause in nature which, in this climate, tends to produce both rain and a\r\nwesterly wind, or a westerly wind has itself some tendency to produce rain.\r\nBut if it rains less than twice as often, we may draw a directly opposite inference:\r\nthe one, instead of being a cause, or connected with causes of the\r\nother, must be connected with causes adverse to it, or with the absence of\r\nsome cause which produces it; and though it may still rain much oftener\r\nwith a westerly wind than with an easterly, so far would this be from proving\r\nany connection between the phenomena, that the connection proved\r\nwould be between rain and an easterly wind, to which, in mere frequency\r\nof coincidence, it is less allied.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nHere, then, are two examples: in one, the greatest possible frequency of\r\ncoincidence, with no instance whatever to the contrary, does not prove that\r\nthere is any law; in the other, a much less frequency of coincidence, even\r\nwhen non-coincidence is still more frequent, does prove that there is a law.\r\nIn both cases the principle is the same. In both we consider the positive\r\nfrequency of the phenomena themselves, and how great frequency of coincidence\r\nthat must of itself bring about, without supposing any connection\r\nbetween them, provided there be no repugnance; provided neither be connected\r\nwith any cause tending to frustrate the other. If we find a greater\r\nfrequency of coincidence than this, we conclude that there is some connection;\r\nif a less frequency, that there is some repugnance. In the former\r\ncase, we conclude that one of the phenomena can under some circumstances\r\ncause the other, or that there exists something capable of causing them\r\nboth; in the latter, that one of them, or some cause which produces one of\r\nthem, is capable of counteracting the production of the other. We have\r\nthus to deduct from the observed frequency of coincidence as much as may\r\nbe the effect of chance, that is, of the mere frequency of the phenomena\r\nthemselves; and if any thing remains, what does remain is the residual\r\nfact which proves the existence of a law.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe frequency of the phenomena can only be ascertained within definite\r\nlimits of space and time; depending as it does on the quantity and distribution\r\nof the primeval natural agents, of which we can know nothing beyond\r\nthe boundaries of human observation, since no law, no regularity, can\r\nbe traced in it, enabling us to infer the unknown from the known. But for\r\nthe present purpose this is no disadvantage, the question being confined\r\nwithin the same limits as the data. The coincidences occurred in certain\r\nplaces and times, and within those we can estimate the frequency with\r\nwhich such coincidences would be produced by chance. If, then, we find\r\nfrom observation that A exists in one case out of every two, and B in one\r\ncase out of every three; then, if there be neither connection nor repugnance\r\nbetween them, or between any of their causes, the instances in which A\r\nand B will both exist, that is to say will co-exist, will be one case in every\r\nsix. For A exists in three cases out of six; and B, existing in one case\r\nout of every three without regard to the presence or absence of A, will\r\nexist in one case out of those three. There will therefore be, of the whole\r\nnumber of cases, two in which A exists without B; one case of B without\r\nA; two in which neither B nor A exists, and one case out of six in which\r\nthey both exist. If, then, in point of fact, they are found to co-exist oftener\r\nthan in one case out of six; and, consequently, A does not exist without\r\nB so often as twice in three times, nor B without A so often as once in every\r\ntwice, there is some cause in existence which tends to produce a conjunction\r\nbetween A and B.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page376\"\u003e[pg 376]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg376\" id=\"Pg376\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nGeneralizing the result, we may say that if A occurs in a larger proportion\r\nof the cases where B is than of the cases where B is not, then will\r\nB also occur in a larger proportion of the cases where A is than of the\r\ncases where A is not; and there is some connection, through causation, between\r\nA and B. If we could ascend to the causes of the two phenomena,\r\nwe should find, at some stage, either proximate or remote, some cause or\r\ncauses common to both; and if we could ascertain what these are, we could\r\nframe a generalization which would be true without restriction of place or\r\ntime; but until we can do so, the fact of a connection between the two\r\nphenomena remains an empirical law.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 3. Having considered in what manner it may be determined whether\r\nany given conjunction of phenomena is casual, or the result of some law,\r\nto complete the theory of chance it is necessary that we should now consider\r\nthose effects which are partly the result of chance and partly of law,\r\nor, in other words, in which the effects of casual conjunctions of causes\r\nare habitually blended in one result with the effects of a constant cause.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThis is a case of Composition of Causes; and the peculiarity of it is,\r\nthat instead of two or more causes intermixing their effects in a regular\r\nmanner with those of one another, we have now one constant cause, producing\r\nan effect which is successively modified by a series of variable\r\ncauses. Thus, as summer advances, the approach of the sun to a vertical\r\nposition tends to produce a constant increase of temperature; but with\r\nthis effect of a constant cause, there are blended the effects of many variable\r\ncauses, winds, clouds, evaporation, electric agencies and the like, so\r\nthat the temperature of any given day depends in part on these fleeting\r\ncauses, and only in part on the constant cause. If the effect of the constant\r\ncause is always accompanied and disguised by effects of variable\r\ncauses, it is impossible to ascertain the law of the constant cause in the ordinary\r\nmanner by separating it from all other causes and observing it apart.\r\nHence arises the necessity of an additional rule of experimental inquiry.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWhen the action of a cause A is liable to be interfered with, not steadily\r\nby the same cause or causes, but by different causes at different times,\r\nand when these are so frequent, or so indeterminate, that we can not possibly\r\nexclude all of them from any experiment, though we may vary them;\r\nour resource is, to endeavor to ascertain what is the effect of all the variable\r\ncauses taken together. In order to do this, we make as many trials\r\nas possible, preserving A invariable. The results of these different trials\r\nwill naturally be different, since the indeterminate modifying causes are\r\ndifferent in each; if, then, we do not find these results to be progressive,\r\nbut, on the contrary, to oscillate about a certain point, one experiment giving\r\na result a little greater, another a little less, one a result tending a little\r\nmore in one direction, another a little more in the contrary direction; while\r\nthe average or middle point does not vary, but different sets of experiments\r\n(taken in as great a variety of circumstances as possible) yield the\r\nsame mean, provided only they be sufficiently numerous; then that mean,\r\nor average result, is the part, in each experiment, which is due to the cause\r\nA, and is the effect which would have been obtained if A could have acted\r\nalone; the variable remainder is the effect of chance, that is, of causes the\r\nco-existence of which with the cause A was merely casual. The test of\r\nthe sufficiency of the induction in this case is, when any increase of the\r\nnumber of trials from which the average is struck does not materially\r\nalter the average.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page377\"\u003e[pg 377]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg377\" id=\"Pg377\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThis kind of elimination, in which we do not eliminate any one assignable\r\ncause, but the multitude of floating unassignable ones, may be termed the\r\nElimination of Chance. We afford an example of it when we repeat an experiment,\r\nin order, by taking the mean of different results, to get rid of the\r\neffects of the unavoidable errors of each individual experiment. When there\r\nis no permanent cause, such as would produce a tendency to error peculiarly\r\nin one direction, we are warranted by experience in assuming that the\r\nerrors on one side will, in a certain number of experiments, about balance\r\nthe errors on the contrary side. We therefore repeat the experiment, until\r\nany change which is produced in the average of the whole by further\r\nrepetition, falls within limits of error consistent with the degree of accuracy\r\nrequired by the purpose we have in view.\u003ca id=\"noteref_175\" name=\"noteref_175\" href=\"#note_175\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e175\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 4. In the supposition hitherto made, the effect of the constant cause A\r\nhas been assumed to form so great and conspicuous a part of the general\r\nresult, that its existence never could be a matter of uncertainty, and the object\r\nof the eliminating process was only to ascertain \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ehow much\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e is attributable\r\nto that cause; what is its exact law. Cases, however, occur in which\r\nthe effect of a constant cause is so small, compared with that of some of the\r\nchangeable causes with which it is liable to be casually conjoined, that of itself\r\nit escapes notice, and the very existence of any effect arising from a\r\nconstant cause is first learned by the process which in general serves only for\r\nascertaining the quantity of that effect. This case of induction may be characterized\r\nas follows: A given effect is known to be chiefly, and not known\r\nnot to be wholly, determined by changeable causes. If it be wholly so produced,\r\nthen if the aggregate be taken of a sufficient number of instances, the\r\neffects of these different causes will cancel one another. If, therefore, we\r\ndo not find this to be the case, but, on the contrary, after such a number of\r\ntrials has been made that no further increase alters the average result,\r\nwe find that average to be, not zero, but some other quantity, about which,\r\nthough small in comparison with the total effect, the effect nevertheless\r\noscillates, and which is the middle point in its oscillation; we may conclude\r\nthis to be the effect of some constant cause; which cause, by some of the\r\nmethods already treated of, we may hope to detect. This may be called\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ethe discovery of a residual phenomenon by eliminating the effects of\r\nchance\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt is in this manner, for example, that loaded dice may be discovered.\r\nOf course no dice are so clumsily loaded that they must always throw certain\r\nnumbers; otherwise the fraud would be instantly detected. The loading,\r\na constant cause, mingles with the changeable causes which determine\r\nwhat cast will be thrown in each individual instance. If the dice were not\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page378\"\u003e[pg 378]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg378\" id=\"Pg378\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nloaded, and the throw were left to depend entirely on the changeable causes,\r\nthese in a sufficient number of instances would balance one another, and\r\nthere would be no preponderant number of throws of any one kind. If,\r\ntherefore, after such a number of trials that no further increase of their\r\nnumber has any material effect upon the average, we find a preponderance\r\nin favor of a particular throw; we may conclude with assurance that there\r\nis some constant cause acting in favor of that throw, or, in other words, that\r\nthe dice are not fair; and the exact amount of the unfairness. In a similar\r\nmanner, what is called the diurnal variation of the barometer, which is very\r\nsmall compared with the variations arising from the irregular changes in\r\nthe state of the atmosphere, was discovered by comparing the average\r\nheight of the barometer at different hours of the day. When this comparison\r\nwas made, it was found that there was a small difference, which on the\r\naverage was constant, however the absolute quantities might vary, and which\r\ndifference, therefore, must be the effect of a constant cause. This cause\r\nwas afterward ascertained, deductively, to be the rarefaction of the air,\r\noccasioned by the increase of temperature as the day advances.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 5. After these general remarks on the nature of chance, we are prepared\r\nto consider in what manner assurance may be obtained that a conjunction\r\nbetween two phenomena, which has been observed a certain number\r\nof times, is not casual, but a result of causation, and to be received,\r\ntherefore, as one of the uniformities of nature, though (until accounted for\r\n\u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea priori\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e) only as an empirical law.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWe will suppose the strongest case, namely, that the phenomenon B has\r\nnever been observed except in conjunction with A. Even then, the probability\r\nthat they are connected is not measured by the total number of instances\r\nin which they have been found together, but by the excess of that\r\nnumber above the number due to the absolutely frequency of A. If, for\r\nexample, A exists always, and therefore co-exists with every thing, no number\r\nof instances of its co-existence with B would prove a connection; as in\r\nour example of the fixed stars. If A be a fact of such common occurrence\r\nthat it may be presumed to be present in half of all the cases that occur,\r\nand therefore in half the cases in which B occurs, it is only the proportional\r\nexcess above half that is to be reckoned as evidence toward proving a connection\r\nbetween A and B.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIn addition to the question, What is the number of coincidences which,\r\non an average of a great multitude of trials, may be expected to arise from\r\nchance alone? there is also another question, namely, Of what extent of deviation\r\nfrom that average is the occurrence credible, from chance alone, in\r\nsome number of instances smaller than that required for striking a fair average?\r\nIt is not only to be considered what is the general result of the\r\nchances in the long run, but also what are the extreme limits of variation\r\nfrom the general result, which may occasionally be expected as the result\r\nof some smaller number of instances.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe consideration of the latter question, and any consideration of the\r\nformer beyond that already given to it, belong to what mathematicians\r\nterm the doctrine of chances, or, in a phrase of greater pretension, the Theory\r\nof Probabilities.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page379\"\u003e[pg 379]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg379\" id=\"Pg379\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-div\" style=\"margin-bottom: 4.00em; margin-top: 4.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"toc77\" id=\"toc77\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"pdf78\" id=\"pdf78\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: center; margin-bottom: 2.40em; margin-top: 2.40em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 120%\"\u003eChapter XVIII.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: left; margin-bottom: 2.88em; margin-top: 2.88em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 144%\"\u003eOf The Calculation Of Chances.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 1. \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Probability,”\u003c/span\u003e says Laplace,\u003ca id=\"noteref_176\" name=\"noteref_176\" href=\"#note_176\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e176\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“has reference partly to our ignorance,\r\npartly to our knowledge. We know that among three or more\r\nevents, one, and only one, must happen; but there is nothing leading us to\r\nbelieve that any one of them will happen rather than the others. In this\r\nstate of indecision, it is impossible for us to pronounce with certainty on\r\ntheir occurrence. It is, however, probable that any one of these events,\r\nselected at pleasure, will not take place; because we perceive several cases,\r\nall equally possible, which exclude its occurrence, and only one which favors\r\nit.\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“The theory of chances consists in reducing all events of the same kind\r\nto a certain number of cases equally possible, that is, such that we are\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eequally undecided\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e as to their existence; and in determining the number of\r\nthese cases which are favorable to the event of which the probability is\r\nsought. The ratio of that number to the number of all the possible cases\r\nis the measure of the probability; which is thus a fraction, having for its\r\nnumerator the number of cases favorable to the event, and for its denominator\r\nthe number of all the cases which are possible.”\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nTo a calculation of chances, then, according to Laplace, two things are\r\nnecessary; we must know that of several events some one will certainly\r\nhappen, and no more than one; and we must not know, nor have any reason\r\nto expect, that it will be one of these events rather than another. It\r\nhas been contended that these are not the only requisites, and that Laplace\r\nhas overlooked, in the general theoretical statement, a necessary part of the\r\nfoundation of the doctrine of chances. To be able (it has been said) to\r\npronounce two events equally probable, it is not enough that we should\r\nknow that one or the other must happen, and should have no grounds for\r\nconjecturing which. Experience must have shown that the two events are\r\nof equally frequent occurrence. Why, in tossing up a half-penny, do we reckon\r\nit equally probable that we shall throw cross or pile? Because we know\r\nthat in any great number of throws, cross and pile are thrown about equally\r\noften; and that the more throws we make, the more nearly the equality is\r\nperfect. We may know this if we please by actual experiment, or by the\r\ndaily experience which life affords of events of the same general character,\r\nor, deductively, from the effect of mechanical laws on a symmetrical body\r\nacted upon by forces varying indefinitely in quantity and direction. We\r\nmay know it, in short, either by specific experience, or on the evidence of\r\nour general knowledge of nature. But, in one way or the other, we must\r\nknow it, to justify us in calling the two events equally probable; and if we\r\nknew it not, we should proceed as much at hap-hazard in staking equal sums\r\non the result, as in laying odds.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThis view of the subject was taken in the first edition of the present\r\nwork; but I have since become convinced that the theory of chances, as\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page380\"\u003e[pg 380]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg380\" id=\"Pg380\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nconceived by Laplace and by mathematicians generally, has not the fundamental\r\nfallacy which I had ascribed to it.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWe must remember that the probability of an event is not a quality of\r\nthe event itself, but a mere name for the degree of ground which we, or\r\nsome one else, have for expecting it. The probability of an event to one\r\nperson is a different thing from the probability of the same event to another,\r\nor to the same person after he has acquired additional evidence. The\r\nprobability to me, that an individual of whom I know nothing but his name\r\nwill die within the year, is totally altered by my being told the next minute\r\nthat he is in the last stage of a consumption. Yet this makes no difference\r\nin the event itself, nor in any of the causes on which it depends. Every\r\nevent is in itself certain, not probable; if we knew all, we should either\r\nknow positively that it will happen, or positively that it will not. But its\r\nprobability to us means the degree of expectation of its occurrence, which\r\nwe are warranted in entertaining by our present evidence.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nBearing this in mind, I think it must be admitted, that even when we\r\nhave no knowledge whatever to guide our expectations, except the knowledge\r\nthat what happens must be some one of a certain number of possibilities,\r\nwe may still reasonably judge, that one supposition is more probable\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eto us\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e than another supposition; and if we have any interest at stake, we\r\nshall best provide for it by acting conformably to that judgment.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 2. Suppose that we are required to take a ball from a box, of which\r\nwe only know that it contains balls both black and white, and none of any\r\nother color. We know that the ball we select will be either a black or a\r\nwhite ball; but we have no ground for expecting black rather than white,\r\nor white rather than black. In that case, if we are obliged to make a choice,\r\nand to stake something on one or the other supposition, it will, as a question\r\nof prudence, be perfectly indifferent which; and we shall act precisely as\r\nwe should have acted if we had known beforehand that the box contained\r\nan equal number of black and white balls. But though our conduct would\r\nbe the same, it would not be founded on any surmise that the balls were in\r\nfact thus equally divided; for we might, on the contrary, know by authentic\r\ninformation that the box contained ninety-nine balls of one color,\r\nand only one of the other; still, if we are not told which color has only one,\r\nand which has ninety-nine, the drawing of a white and of a black ball will\r\nbe equally probable to us. We shall have no reason for staking any thing\r\non the one event rather than on the other; the option between the two will\r\nbe a matter of indifference; in other words, it will be an even chance.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nBut let it now be supposed that instead of two there are three colors—white,\r\nblack, and red; and that we are entirely ignorant of the proportion\r\nin which they are mingled. We should then have no reason for expecting\r\none more than another, and if obliged to bet, should venture our stake on\r\nred, white, or black with equal indifference. But should we be indifferent\r\nwhether we betted for or against some one color, as, for instance, white?\r\nSurely not. From the very fact that black and red are each of them separately\r\nequally probable to us with white, the two together must be twice\r\nas probable. We should in this case expect not white rather than white,\r\nand so much rather that we would lay two to one upon it. It is true, there\r\nmight, for aught we knew, be more white balls than black and red together;\r\nand if so, our bet would, if we knew more, be seen to be a disadvantageous\r\none. But so also, for aught we knew, might there be more red balls than\r\nblack and white, or more black balls than white and red, and in such case\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page381\"\u003e[pg 381]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg381\" id=\"Pg381\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nthe effect of additional knowledge would be to prove to us that our bet\r\nwas more advantageous than we had supposed it to be. There is in the\r\nexisting state of our knowledge a rational probability of two to one against\r\nwhite; a probability fit to be made a basis of conduct. No reasonable\r\nperson would lay an even wager in favor of white against black and red;\r\nthough against black alone or red alone he might do so without imprudence.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe common theory, therefore, of the calculation of chances, appears to\r\nbe tenable. Even when we know nothing except the number of the possible\r\nand mutually excluding contingencies, and are entirely ignorant of their\r\ncomparative frequency, we may have grounds, and grounds numerically appreciable,\r\nfor acting on one supposition rather than on another; and this\r\nis the meaning of Probability.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 3. The principle, however, on which the reasoning proceeds, is sufficiently\r\nevident. It is the obvious one that when the cases which exist are\r\nshared among several kinds, it is impossible that \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eeach\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e of those kinds\r\nshould be a majority of the whole: on the contrary, there must be a majority\r\nagainst each kind, except one at most; and if any kind has more\r\nthan its share in proportion to the total number, the others collectively\r\nmust have less. Granting this axiom, and assuming that we have no\r\nground for selecting any one kind as more likely than the rest to surpass\r\nthe average proportion, it follows that we can not rationally presume this\r\nof any, which we should do if we were to bet in favor of it, receiving less\r\nodds than in the ratio of the number of the other kinds. Even, therefore,\r\nin this extreme case of the calculation of probabilities, which does not rest on\r\nspecial experience at all, the logical ground of the process is our knowledge—such\r\nknowledge as we then have—of the laws governing the frequency\r\nof occurrence of the different cases; but in this case the knowledge\r\nis limited to that which, being universal and axiomatic, does not require\r\nreference to specific experience, or to any considerations arising out of the\r\nspecial nature of the problem under discussion.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nExcept, however, in such cases as games of chance, where the very purpose\r\nin view requires ignorance instead of knowledge, I can conceive no\r\ncase in which we ought to be satisfied with such an estimate of chances as\r\nthis—an estimate founded on the absolute minimum of knowledge respecting\r\nthe subject. It is plain that, in the case of the colored balls, a very\r\nslight ground of surmise that the white balls were really more numerous\r\nthan either of the other colors, would suffice to vitiate the whole of the calculations\r\nmade in our previous state of indifference. It would place us in\r\nthat position of more advanced knowledge, in which the probabilities, to us,\r\nwould be different from what they were before; and in estimating these\r\nnew probabilities we should have to proceed on a totally different set of\r\ndata, furnished no longer by mere counting of possible suppositions, but by\r\nspecific knowledge of facts. Such data it should always be our endeavor\r\nto obtain; and in all inquiries, unless on subjects equally beyond the range\r\nof our means of knowledge and our practical uses, they may be obtained,\r\nif not good, at least better than none at all.\u003ca id=\"noteref_177\" name=\"noteref_177\" href=\"#note_177\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e177\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page382\"\u003e[pg 382]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg382\" id=\"Pg382\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt is obvious, too, that even when the probabilities are derived from observation\r\nand experiment, a very slight improvement in the data, by better\r\nobservations, or by taking into fuller consideration the special circumstances\r\nof the case, is of more use than the most elaborate application of the calculus\r\nto probabilities founded on the data in their previous state of inferiority.\r\nThe neglect of this obvious reflection has given rise to misapplications\r\nof the calculus of probabilities which have made it the real opprobrium\r\nof mathematics. It is sufficient to refer to the applications made of\r\nit to the credibility of witnesses, and to the correctness of the verdicts of\r\njuries. In regard to the first, common sense would dictate that it is impossible\r\nto strike a general average of the veracity and other qualifications\r\nfor true testimony of mankind, or of any class of them; and even if it were\r\npossible, the employment of it for such a purpose implies a misapprehension\r\nof the use of averages, which serve, indeed, to protect those whose interest\r\nis at stake, against mistaking the general result of large masses of\r\ninstances, but are of extremely small value as grounds of expectation in any\r\none individual instance, unless the case be one of those in which the great\r\nmajority of individual instances do not differ much from the average. In\r\nthe case of a witness, persons of common sense would draw their conclusions\r\nfrom the degree of consistency of his statements, his conduct under\r\ncross-examination, and the relation of the case itself to his interests, his\r\npartialities, and his mental capacity, instead of applying so rude a standard\r\n(even if it were capable of being verified) as the ratio between the number\r\nof true and the number of erroneous statements which he may be supposed\r\nto make in the course of his life.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAgain, on the subject of juries or other tribunals, some mathematicians\r\nhave set out from the proposition that the judgment of any one judge or\r\njuryman is, at least in some small degree, more likely to be right than\r\nwrong, and have concluded that the chance of a number of persons concurring\r\nin a wrong verdict is diminished the more the number is increased;\r\nso that if the judges are only made sufficiently numerous, the correctness\r\nof the judgment may be reduced almost to certainty. I say nothing of the\r\ndisregard shown to the effect produced on the moral position of the judges\r\nby multiplying their numbers, the virtual destruction of their individual\r\nresponsibility, and weakening of the application of their minds to the subject.\r\nI remark only the fallacy of reasoning from a wide average to cases\r\nnecessarily differing greatly from any average. It may be true that, taking\r\nall causes one with another, the opinion of any one of the judges would be\r\noftener right than wrong; but the argument forgets that in all but the\r\nmore simple cases, in all cases in which it is really of much consequence\r\nwhat the tribunal is, the proposition might probably be reversed; besides\r\nwhich, the cause of error, whether arising from the intricacy of the case or\r\nfrom some common prejudice or mental infirmity, if it acted upon one\r\njudge, would be extremely likely to affect all the others in the same manner,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page383\"\u003e[pg 383]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg383\" id=\"Pg383\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nor at least a majority, and thus render a wrong instead of a right decision\r\nmore probable the more the number was increased.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThese are but samples of the errors frequently committed by men who,\r\nhaving made themselves familiar with the difficult formulæ which algebra\r\naffords for the estimation of chances under suppositions of a complex character,\r\nlike better to employ those formulæ in computing what are the probabilities\r\nto a person half informed about a case than to look out for means\r\nof being better informed. Before applying the doctrine of chances to any\r\nscientific purpose, the foundation must be laid for an evaluation of the\r\nchances, by possessing ourselves of the utmost attainable amount of positive\r\nknowledge. The knowledge required is that of the comparative frequency\r\nwith which the different events in fact occur. For the purposes,\r\ntherefore, of the present work, it is allowable to suppose that conclusions\r\nrespecting the probability of a fact of a particular kind rest on our knowledge\r\nof the proportion between the cases in which facts of that kind occur,\r\nand those in which they do not occur; this knowledge being either derived\r\nfrom specific experiment, or deduced from our knowledge of the\r\ncauses in operation which tend to produce, compared with those which\r\ntend to prevent, the fact in question.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nSuch calculation of chances is grounded on an induction; and to render\r\nthe calculation legitimate, the induction must be a valid one. It is not\r\nless an induction, though it does not prove that the event occurs in all\r\ncases of a given description, but only that out of a given number of such\r\ncases it occurs in about so many. The fraction which mathematicians use\r\nto designate the probability of an event is the ratio of these two numbers;\r\nthe ascertained proportion between the number of cases in which the event\r\noccurs and the sum of all the cases, those in which it occurs and in which\r\nit does not occur, taken together. In playing at cross and pile, the description\r\nof cases concerned are throws, and the probability of cross is one-half,\r\nbecause if we throw often enough cross is thrown about once in every two\r\nthrows. In the cast of a die, the probability of ace is one-sixth; not simply\r\nbecause there are six possible throws, of which ace is one, and because\r\nwe do not know any reason why one should turn up rather than another—though\r\nI have admitted the validity of this ground in default of a better—but\r\nbecause we do actually know, either by reasoning or by experience,\r\nthat in a hundred or a million of throws ace is thrown in about one-sixth\r\nof that number, or once in six times.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 4. I say, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“either by reasoning or by experience,”\u003c/span\u003e meaning specific experience.\r\nBut in estimating probabilities, it is not a matter of indifference\r\nfrom which of these two sources we derive our assurance. The probability\r\nof events, as calculated from their mere frequency in past experience,\r\naffords a less secure basis for practical guidance than their probability as\r\ndeduced from an equally accurate knowledge of the frequency of occurrence\r\nof their causes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe generalization that an event occurs in ten out of every hundred cases\r\nof a given description, is as real an induction as if the generalization were\r\nthat it occurs in all cases. But when we arrive at the conclusion by merely\r\ncounting instances in actual experience, and comparing the number of\r\ncases in which A has been present with the number in which it has been\r\nabsent, the evidence is only that of the Method of Agreement, and the conclusion\r\namounts only to an empirical law. We can make a step beyond\r\nthis when we can ascend to the causes on which the occurrence of A or its\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page384\"\u003e[pg 384]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg384\" id=\"Pg384\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nnon-occurrence will depend, and form an estimate of the comparative frequency\r\nof the causes favorable and of those unfavorable to the occurrence.\r\nThese are data of a higher order, by which the empirical law derived from\r\na mere numerical comparison of affirmative and negative instances will be\r\neither corrected or confirmed, and in either case we shall obtain a more\r\ncorrect measure of probability than is given by that numerical comparison.\r\nIt has been well remarked that in the kind of examples by which the doctrine\r\nof chances is usually illustrated, that of balls in a box, the estimate\r\nof probabilities is supported by reasons of causation, stronger than specific\r\nexperience. \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“What is the reason that in a box where there are nine black\r\nballs and one white, we expect to draw a black ball nine times as much (in\r\nother words, nine times as often, frequency being the gauge of intensity in\r\nexpectation) as a white? Obviously because the local conditions are nine\r\ntimes as favorable; because the hand may alight in nine places and get a\r\nblack ball, while it can only alight in one place and find a white ball; just\r\nfor the same reason that we do not expect to succeed in finding a friend\r\nin a crowd, the conditions in order that we and he should come together\r\nbeing many and difficult. This of course would not hold to the same extent\r\nwere the white balls of smaller size than the black, neither would the\r\nprobability remain the same; the larger ball would be much more likely\r\nto meet the hand.”\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca id=\"noteref_178\" name=\"noteref_178\" href=\"#note_178\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e178\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt is, in fact, evident that when once causation is admitted as a universal\r\nlaw, our expectation of events can only be rationally grounded on that law.\r\nTo a person who recognizes that every event depends on causes, a thing’s\r\nhaving happened once is a reason for expecting it to happen again, only because\r\nproving that there exists, or is liable to exist, a cause adequate to\r\nproduce it.\u003ca id=\"noteref_179\" name=\"noteref_179\" href=\"#note_179\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e179\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nThe frequency of the particular event, apart from all surmise\r\nrespecting its cause, can give rise to no other induction than that\r\n\u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eper enumerationem simplicem\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e;\r\nand the precarious inferences derived from this are\r\nsuperseded, and disappear from the field as soon as the principle of causation\r\nmakes its appearance there.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nNotwithstanding, however, the abstract superiority of an estimate of\r\nprobability grounded on causes, it is a fact that in almost all cases in\r\nwhich chances admit of estimation sufficiently precise to render their\r\nnumerical appreciation of any practical value, the numerical data are not\r\ndrawn from knowledge of the causes, but from experience of the events\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page385\"\u003e[pg 385]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg385\" id=\"Pg385\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nthemselves. The probabilities of life at different ages or in different climates;\r\nthe probabilities of recovery from a particular disease; the chances\r\nof the birth of male or female offspring; the chances of the destruction of\r\nhouses or other property by fire; the chances of the loss of a ship in a\r\nparticular voyage, are deduced from bills of mortality, returns from hospitals,\r\nregisters of births, of shipwrecks, etc., that is, from the observed\r\nfrequency not of the causes, but of the effects. The reason is, that in all\r\nthese classes of facts the causes are either not amenable to direct observation\r\nat all, or not with the requisite precision, and we have no means of\r\njudging of their frequency except from the empirical law afforded by the\r\nfrequency of the effects. The inference does not the less depend on causation\r\nalone. We reason from an effect to a similar effect by passing\r\nthrough the cause. If the actuary of an insurance office infers from his\r\ntables that among a hundred persons now living of a particular age, five\r\non the average will attain the age of seventy, his inference is legitimate,\r\nnot for the simple reason that this is the proportion who have lived till\r\nseventy in times past, but because the fact of their having so lived shows\r\nthat this is the proportion existing, at that place and time, between the\r\ncauses which prolong life to the age of seventy and those tending to bring\r\nit to an earlier close.\u003ca id=\"noteref_180\" name=\"noteref_180\" href=\"#note_180\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e180\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 5. From the preceding principles it is easy to deduce the demonstration\r\nof that theorem of the doctrine of probabilities which is the foundation\r\nof its application to inquiries for ascertaining the occurrence of a\r\ngiven event, or the reality of an individual fact. The signs or evidences by\r\nwhich a fact is usually proved are some of its consequences; and the inquiry\r\nhinges upon determining what cause is most likely to have produced\r\na given effect. The theorem applicable to such investigations is the Sixth\r\nPrinciple in Laplace’s \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“\u003cspan lang=\"fr\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"fr\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eEssai Philosophique sur les\r\nProbabilités\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,”\u003c/span\u003e which is described by him as the \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“fundamental principle\r\nof that branch of the Analysis of Chances which consists in ascending from events\r\nto their causes.”\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca id=\"noteref_181\" name=\"noteref_181\" href=\"#note_181\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e181\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nGiven an effect to be accounted for, and there being several causes which\r\nmight have produced it, but of the presence of which in the particular case\r\nnothing is known; the probability that the effect was produced by any one\r\nof these causes \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eis as the antecedent probability of the cause, multiplied by\r\nthe probability that the cause, if it existed, would have produced the given\r\neffect\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nLet M be the effect, and A, B, two causes, by either of which it might\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page386\"\u003e[pg 386]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg386\" id=\"Pg386\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nhave been produced. To find the probability that it was produced by the\r\none and not by the other, ascertain which of the two is most likely to have\r\nexisted, and which of them, if it did exist, was most likely to produce the\r\neffect M: the probability sought is a compound of these two probabilities.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-variant: small-caps\"\u003eCase I.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e Let the causes be both alike in the second respect:\r\neither A or B, when it exists, being supposed equally likely (or equally certain) to\r\nproduce M; but let A be in itself twice as likely as B to exist, that is, twice\r\nas frequent a phenomenon. Then it is twice as likely to have existed in\r\nthis case, and to have been the cause which produced M.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nFor, since A exists in nature twice as often as B, in any 300 cases in\r\nwhich one or other existed, A has existed 200 times and B 100. But either\r\nA or B must have existed wherever M is produced; therefore, in 300\r\ntimes that M is produced, A was the producing cause 200 times, B only\r\n100, that is, in the ratio of 2 to 1. Thus, then, if the causes are alike in\r\ntheir capacity of producing the effect, the probability as to which actually\r\nproduced it is in the ratio of their antecedent probabilities.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-variant: small-caps\"\u003eCase II.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e Reversing the last hypothesis, let us suppose that\r\nthe causes are equally frequent, equally likely to have existed, but not equally\r\nlikely, if they did exist, to produce M; that in three times in which A occurs, it\r\nproduces that effect twice, while B, in three times, produces it only once.\r\nSince the two causes are equally frequent in their occurrence; in every six\r\ntimes that either one or the other exists, A exists three times and B three\r\ntimes. A, of its three times, produces M in two; B, of its three times,\r\nproduces M in one. Thus, in the whole six times, M is only produced\r\nthrice; but of that thrice it is produced twice by A, once only by B. Consequently,\r\nwhen the antecedent probabilities of the causes are equal, the\r\nchances that the effect was produced by them are in the ratio of the probabilities\r\nthat if they did exist they would produce the effect.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-variant: small-caps\"\u003eCase III.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e The third case, that in which the causes are unlike\r\nin both respects, is solved by what has preceded. For, when a quantity depends on\r\ntwo other quantities, in such a manner that while either of them remains\r\nconstant it is proportional to the other, it must necessarily be proportional\r\nto the product of the two quantities, the product being the only function\r\nof the two which obeys that law of variation. Therefore, the probability\r\nthat M was produced by either cause, is as the antecedent probability of\r\nthe cause, multiplied by the probability that if it existed it would produce\r\nM. Which was to be demonstrated.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nOr we may prove the third case as we proved the first and second. Let\r\nA be twice as frequent as B, and let them also be unequally likely, when\r\nthey exist, to produce M; let A produce it twice in four times, B thrice in\r\nfour times. The antecedent probability of A is to that of B as 2 to 1;\r\nthe probabilities of their producing M are as 2 to 3; the product of these\r\nratios is the ratio of 4 to 3; and this will be the ratio of the probabilities\r\nthat A or B was the producing cause in the given instance. For, since A\r\nis twice as frequent as B, out of twelve cases in which one or other exists,\r\nA exists in 8 and B in 4. But of its eight cases, A, by the supposition,\r\nproduces M in only 4, while B of its four cases produces M in 3. M, therefore,\r\nis only produced at all in seven of the twelve cases; but in four of\r\nthese it is produced by A, in three by B; hence the probabilities of its being\r\nproduced by A and by B are as 4 to 3, and are expressed by the fractions\r\n⁴⁄₇ and ³⁄₇. Which was to be demonstrated.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 6. It remains to examine the bearing of the doctrine of chances on\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page387\"\u003e[pg 387]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg387\" id=\"Pg387\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nthe peculiar problem which occupied us in the preceding chapter, namely,\r\nhow to distinguish coincidences which are casual from those which are the\r\nresult of law; from those in which the facts which accompany or follow\r\none another are somehow connected through causation.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe doctrine of chances affords means by which, if we knew the \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eaverage\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e\r\nnumber of coincidences to be looked for between two phenomena connected\r\nonly casually, we could determine how often any given deviation from that\r\naverage will occur by chance. If the probability of any casual coincidence,\r\nconsidered in itself, be 1/\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003em\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, the probability that the same\r\ncoincidence will be repeated \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003en\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e times in succession is\r\n1/\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003em\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"vertical-align: super\"\u003en\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e.\r\nFor example, in one throw of a\r\ndie the probability of ace being ⅙; the probability of throwing ace twice\r\nin succession will be 1 divided by the square of 6, or ¹⁄₃₆. For ace is thrown\r\nat the first throw once in six, or six in thirty-six times, and of those six, the\r\ndie being cast again, ace will be thrown but once; being altogether once in\r\nthirty-six times. The chance of the same cast three times successively is,\r\nby a similar reasoning, ⅙\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"vertical-align: super\"\u003e3\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nor ¹⁄₂₁₆; that is, the event will happen, on a large\r\naverage, only once in two hundred and sixteen throws.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWe have thus a rule by which to estimate the probability that any given\r\nseries of coincidences arises from chance, provided we can measure correctly\r\nthe probability of a single coincidence. If we can obtain an equally\r\nprecise expression for the probability that the same series of coincidences\r\narises from causation, we should only have to compare the numbers. This,\r\nhowever, can rarely be done. Let us see what degree of approximation\r\ncan practically be made to the necessary precision.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe question falls within Laplace’s sixth principle, just demonstrated.\r\nThe given fact, that is to say, the series of coincidences, may have originated\r\neither in a casual conjunction of causes or in a law of nature. The\r\nprobabilities, therefore, that the fact originated in these two modes, are as\r\ntheir antecedent probabilities, multiplied by the probabilities that if they\r\nexisted they would produce the effect. But the particular combination of\r\nchances, if it occurred, or the law of nature if real, would certainly produce\r\nthe series of coincidences. The probabilities, therefore, that the coincidences\r\nare produced by the two causes in question are as the antecedent\r\nprobabilities of the causes. One of these, the antecedent probability of the\r\ncombination of mere chances which would produce the given result, is an\r\nappreciable quantity. The antecedent probability of the other supposition\r\nmay be susceptible of a more or less exact estimation, according to the nature\r\nof the case.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIn some cases, the coincidence, supposing it to be the result of causation\r\nat all, must be the result of a known cause; as the succession of aces, if not\r\naccidental, must arise from the loading of the die. In such cases we may\r\nbe able to form a conjecture as to the antecedent probability of such a circumstance\r\nfrom the characters of the parties concerned, or other such evidence;\r\nbut it would be impossible to estimate that probability with any\r\nthing like numerical precision. The counter-probability, however, that of\r\nthe accidental origin of the coincidence, dwindling so rapidly as it does at\r\neach new trial, the stage is soon reached at which the chance of unfairness\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page388\"\u003e[pg 388]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg388\" id=\"Pg388\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nin the die, however small in itself, must be greater than that of a casual\r\ncoincidence; and on this ground, a practical decision can generally be come\r\nto without much hesitation, if there be the power of repeating the experiment.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWhen, however, the coincidence is one which can not be accounted for\r\nby any known cause, and the connection between the two phenomena, if\r\nproduced by causation, must be the result of some law of nature hitherto\r\nunknown; which is the case we had in view in the last chapter; then,\r\nthough the probability of a casual coincidence may be capable of appreciation,\r\nthat of the counter-supposition, the existence of an undiscovered law\r\nof nature, is clearly unsusceptible of even an approximate valuation. In\r\norder to have the data which such a case would require, it would be necessary\r\nto know what proportion of all the individual sequences or co-existences\r\noccurring in nature are the result of law, and what proportion are\r\nmere casual coincidences. It being evident that we can not form any\r\nplausible conjecture as to this proportion, much less appreciate it numerically,\r\nwe can not attempt any precise estimation of the comparitive probabilities.\r\nBut of this we are sure, that the detection of an unknown law of\r\nnature—of some previously unrecognized constancy of conjunction among\r\nphenomena—is no uncommon event. If, therefore, the number of instances\r\nin which a coincidence is observed, over and above that which would arise\r\non the average from the mere concurrence of chances, be such that so great\r\nan amount of coincidences from accident alone would be an extremely uncommon\r\nevent; we have reason to conclude that the coincidence is the effect\r\nof causation, and may be received (subject to correction from further\r\nexperience) as an empirical law. Further than this, in point of precision,\r\nwe can not go; nor, in most cases, is greater precision required, for the\r\nsolution of any practical doubt.\u003ca id=\"noteref_182\" name=\"noteref_182\" href=\"#note_182\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e182\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-div\" style=\"margin-bottom: 4.00em; margin-top: 4.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"toc79\" id=\"toc79\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"pdf80\" id=\"pdf80\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: center; margin-bottom: 2.40em; margin-top: 2.40em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 120%\"\u003eChapter XIX.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: left; margin-bottom: 2.88em; margin-top: 2.88em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 144%\"\u003eOf The Extension Of Derivative Laws To Adjacent Cases.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 1. We have had frequent occasion to notice the inferior generality of\r\nderivative laws, compared with the ultimate laws from which they are derived.\r\nThis inferiority, which affects not only the extent of the propositions\r\nthemselves, but their degree of certainty within that extent, is most\r\nconspicuous in the uniformities of co-existence and sequence obtaining between\r\neffects which depend ultimately on different primeval causes. Such\r\nuniformities will only obtain where there exists the same collocation of\r\nthose primeval causes. If the collocation varies, though the laws themselves\r\nremain the same, a totally different set of derivative uniformities\r\nmay, and generally will, be the result.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nEven where the derivative uniformity is between different effects of the\r\nsame cause, it will by no means obtain as universally as the law of the\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page389\"\u003e[pg 389]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg389\" id=\"Pg389\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\ncause itself. If \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e and \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eb\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e accompany or\r\nsucceed one another as effects of the\r\ncause A, it by no means follows that A is the only cause which can produce them, or that\r\nif there be another cause, as B, capable of producing \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\nit must produce \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eb\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e likewise. The conjunction, therefore, of\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e and \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eb\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e perhaps\r\ndoes not hold universally, but only in the instances in which \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\narises from A. When it is produced by \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e cause other than A,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e and \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eb\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e may be dissevered.\r\nDay (for example) is always in our experience followed by night;\r\nbut day is not the cause of night; both are successive effects of\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e common\r\ncause, the periodical passage of the spectator into and out of the earth’s\r\nshadow, consequent on the earth’s rotation, and on the illuminating property\r\nof the sun. If, therefore, day is ever produced by a different cause\r\nor set of causes from this, day will not, or at least may not, be followed by\r\nnight. On the sun’s own surface, for instance, this may be the case.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nFinally, even when the derivative uniformity is itself a law of causation\r\n(resulting from the combination of several causes), it is not altogether independent\r\nof collocations. If a cause supervenes, capable of wholly or partially\r\ncounteracting the effect of any one of the conjoined causes, the effect\r\nwill no longer conform to the derivative law. While, therefore, each ultimate\r\nlaw is only liable to frustration from one set of counteracting causes,\r\nthe derivative law is liable to it from several. Now, the possibility of the\r\noccurrence of counteracting causes which do not arise from any of the conditions\r\ninvolved in the law itself depends on the original collocations.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt is true that, as we formerly remarked, laws of causation, whether ultimate\r\nor derivative, are, in most cases, fulfilled even when counteracted;\r\nthe cause produces its effect, though that effect is destroyed by something\r\nelse. That the effect may be frustrated, is, therefore, no objection to the\r\nuniversality of laws of causation. But it is fatal to the universality of the\r\nsequences or co-existences of effects, which compose the greater part of the\r\nderivative laws flowing from laws of causation. When, from the law of a\r\ncertain combination of causes, there results a certain order in the effects;\r\nas from the combination of a single sun with the rotation of an opaque\r\nbody round its axis, there results, on the whole surface of that opaque\r\nbody, an alternation of day and night; then, if we suppose one of the combined\r\ncauses counteracted, the rotation stopped, the sun extinguished, or a\r\nsecond sun superadded, the truth of that particular law of causation is in\r\nno way affected; it is still true that one sun shining on an opaque revolving\r\nbody will alternately produce day and night; but since the sun no\r\nlonger does shine on such a body, the derivative uniformity, the succession\r\nof day and night on the given planet, is no longer true. Those derivative\r\nuniformities, therefore, which are not laws of causation, are (except in the\r\nrare case of their depending on one cause alone, not on a combination of\r\ncauses) always more or less contingent on collocations; and are hence subject\r\nto the characteristic infirmity of empirical laws—that of being admissible\r\nonly where the collocations are known by experience to be such as\r\nare requisite for the truth of the law; that is, only within the conditions\r\nof time and place confirmed by actual observation.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 2. This principle, when stated in general terms, seems clear and indisputable;\r\nyet many of the ordinary judgments of mankind, the propriety\r\nof which is not questioned, have at least the semblance of being inconsistent\r\nwith it. On what grounds, it may be asked, do we expect that the\r\nsun will rise to-morrow? To-morrow is beyond the limits of time comprehended\r\nin our observations. They have extended over some thousands of\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page390\"\u003e[pg 390]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg390\" id=\"Pg390\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nyears past, but they do not include the future. Yet we infer with confidence\r\nthat the sun will rise to-morrow; and nobody doubts that we are\r\nentitled to do so. Let us consider what is the warrant for this confidence.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIn the example in question, we know the causes on which the derivative\r\nuniformity depends. They are: the sun giving out light, the earth in a\r\nstate of rotation and intercepting light. The induction which shows these\r\nto be the real causes, and not merely prior effects of a common cause, being\r\ncomplete, the only circumstances which could defeat the derivative law\r\nare such as would destroy or counteract one or other of the combined\r\ncauses. While the causes exist and are not counteracted, the effect will\r\ncontinue. If they exist and are not counteracted to-morrow, the sun will\r\nrise to-morrow.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nSince the causes, namely, the sun and the earth, the one in the state of\r\ngiving out light, the other in a state of rotation, will exist until something\r\ndestroys them, all depends on the probabilities of their destruction, or of\r\ntheir counteraction. We know by observation (omitting the inferential\r\nproofs of an existence for thousands of ages anterior) that these phenomena\r\nhave continued for (say) five thousand years. Within that time there has\r\nexisted no cause sufficient to diminish them appreciably, nor which has\r\ncounteracted their effect in any appreciable degree. The chance, therefore,\r\nthat the sun may not rise to-morrow amounts to the chance that some\r\ncause, which has not manifested itself in the smallest degree during five\r\nthousand years, will exist to-morrow in such intensity as to destroy the\r\nsun or the earth, the sun’s light or the earth’s rotation, or to produce an\r\nimmense disturbance in the effect resulting from those causes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nNow, if such a cause will exist to-morrow, or at any future time, some\r\ncause, proximate or remote, of that cause must exist now, and must have existed\r\nduring the whole of the five thousand years. If, therefore, the sun do\r\nnot rise to-morrow, it will be because some cause has existed, the effects of\r\nwhich, though during five thousand years they have not amounted to a perceptible\r\nquantity, will in one day become overwhelming. Since this cause\r\nhas not been recognized during such an interval of time by observers stationed\r\non our earth, it must, if it be a single agent, be either one whose\r\neffects develop themselves gradually and very slowly, or one which existed\r\nin regions beyond our observation, and is now on the point of arriving in\r\nour part of the universe. Now all causes which we have experience of act\r\naccording to laws incompatible with the supposition that their effects, after\r\naccumulating so slowly as to be imperceptible for five thousand years,\r\nshould start into immensity in a single day. No mathematical law of proportion\r\nbetween an effect and the quantity or relations of its cause could\r\nproduce such contradictory results. The sudden development of an effect\r\nof which there was no previous trace always arises from the coming together\r\nof several distinct causes, not previously conjoined; but if such sudden\r\nconjunction is destined to take place, the causes, or \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003etheir\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e causes, must\r\nhave existed during the entire five thousand years; and their not having\r\nonce come together during that period shows how rare that particular combination\r\nis. We have, therefore, the warrant of a rigid induction for considering\r\nit probable, in a degree undistinguishable from certainty, that the\r\nknown conditions requisite for the sun’s rising will exist to-morrow.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 3. But this extension of derivative laws, not causative, beyond the limits\r\nof observation can only be to \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eadjacent\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e cases. If, instead of to-morrow,\r\nwe had said this day twenty thousand years, the inductions would have\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page391\"\u003e[pg 391]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg391\" id=\"Pg391\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nbeen any thing but conclusive. That a cause which, in opposition to very\r\npowerful causes, produced no perceptible effect during five thousand years,\r\nshould produce a very considerable one by the end of twenty thousand, has\r\nnothing in it which is not in conformity with our experience of causes.\r\nWe know many agents, the effect of which in a short period does not\r\namount to a perceptible quantity, but by accumulating for a much longer\r\nperiod becomes considerable. Besides, looking at the immense multitude\r\nof the heavenly bodies, their vast distances, and the rapidity of the motion\r\nof such of them as are known to move, it is a supposition not at all contradictory\r\nto experience that some body may be in motion toward us, or we\r\ntoward it, within the limits of whose influence we have not come during\r\nfive thousand years, but which in twenty thousand more may be producing\r\neffects upon us of the most extraordinary kind. Or the fact which is capable\r\nof preventing sunrise may be, not the cumulative effect of one cause,\r\nbut some new combination of causes; and the chances favorable to that\r\ncombination, though they have not produced it once in five thousand years,\r\nmay produce it once in twenty thousand. So that the inductions which\r\nauthorize us to expect future events, grow weaker and weaker the further\r\nwe look into the future, and at length become inappreciable.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWe have considered the probabilities of the sun’s rising to-morrow, as\r\nderived from the real laws; that is, from the laws of the causes on which\r\nthat uniformity is dependent. Let us now consider how the matter would\r\nhave stood if the uniformity had been known only as an empirical law; if\r\nwe had not been aware that the sun’s light and the earth’s rotation (or the\r\nsun’s motion) were the causes on which the periodical occurrence of daylight\r\ndepends. We could have extended this empirical law to cases adjacent\r\nin time, though not to so great a distance of time as we can now.\r\nHaving evidence that the effects had remained unaltered and been punctually\r\nconjoined for five thousand years, we could infer that the unknown\r\ncauses on which the conjunction is dependent had existed undiminished and\r\nuncounteracted during the same period. The same conclusions, therefore,\r\nwould follow as in the preceding case, except that we should only know\r\nthat during five thousand years nothing had occurred to defeat perceptibly\r\nthis particular effect; while, when we know the causes, we have the additional\r\nassurance that during that interval no such change has been noticeable\r\nin the causes themselves as by any degree of multiplication or length\r\nof continuance could defeat the effect.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nTo this must be added, that when we know the causes, we may be able\r\nto judge whether there exists any known cause capable of counteracting\r\nthem, while as long as they are unknown, we can not be sure but that if we\r\ndid know them, we could predict their destruction from causes actually in\r\nexistence. A bed-ridden savage, who had never seen the cataract of Niagara,\r\nbut who lived within hearing of it, might imagine that the sound he\r\nheard would endure forever; but if he knew it to be the effect of a rush of\r\nwaters over a barrier of rock which is progressively wearing away, he would\r\nknow that within a number of ages which may be calculated it will be heard\r\nno more. In proportion, therefore, to our ignorance of the causes on which\r\nthe empirical law depends, we can be less assured that it will continue to\r\nhold good; and the further we look into futurity, the less improbable is it\r\nthat some one of the causes, whose co-existence gives rise to the derivative\r\nuniformity, may be destroyed or counteracted. With every prolongation\r\nof time the chances multiply of such an event; that is to say, its non-occurrence\r\nhitherto becomes a less guarantee of its not occurring within the\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page392\"\u003e[pg 392]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg392\" id=\"Pg392\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\ngiven time. If, then, it is only to cases which in point of time are adjacent\r\n(or nearly adjacent) to those which we have actually observed, that \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eany\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e\r\nderivative law, not of causation, can be extended with an assurance equivalent\r\nto certainty, much more is this true of a merely empirical law. Happily,\r\nfor the purposes of life it is to such cases alone that we can almost\r\never have occasion to extend them.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIn respect of place, it might seem that a merely empirical law could not\r\nbe extended even to adjacent cases; that we could have no assurance of its\r\nbeing true in any place where it has not been specially observed. The past\r\nduration of a cause is a guarantee for its future existence, unless something\r\noccurs to destroy it; but the existence of a cause in one or any number of\r\nplaces is no guarantee for its existence in any other place, since there is no\r\nuniformity in the collocations of primeval causes. When, therefore, an empirical\r\nlaw is extended beyond the local limits within which it has been\r\nfound true by observation, the cases to which it is thus extended must be\r\nsuch as are presumably within the influence of the same individual agents.\r\nIf we discover a new planet within the known bounds of the solar system\r\n(or even beyond those bounds, but indicating its connection with the system\r\nby revolving round the sun), we may conclude, with great probability, that\r\nit revolves on its axis. For all the known planets do so; and this uniformity\r\npoints to some common cause, antecedent to the first records of astronomical\r\nobservation; and though the nature of this cause can only be matter\r\nof conjecture, yet if it be, as is not unlikely, and as Laplace’s theory\r\nsupposes, not merely the same kind of cause, but the same individual cause\r\n(such as an impulse given to all the bodies at once), that cause, acting at\r\nthe extreme points of the space occupied by the sun and planets, is likely,\r\nunless defeated by some counteracting cause, to have acted at every intermediate\r\npoint, and probably somewhat beyond; and therefore acted, in all\r\nprobability, upon the supposed newly-discovered planet.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWhen, therefore, effects which are always found conjoined can be traced\r\nwith any probability to an identical (and not merely a similar) origin, we\r\nmay with the same probability extend the empirical law of their conjunction\r\nto all places within the extreme local boundaries within which the fact\r\nhas been observed, subject to the possibility of counteracting causes in some\r\nportion of the field. Still more confidently may we do so when the law is\r\nnot merely empirical; when the phenomena which we find conjoined are\r\neffects of ascertained causes, from the laws of which the conjunction of their\r\neffects is deducible. In that case, we may both extend the derivative uniformity\r\nover a larger space, and with less abatement for the chance of\r\ncounteracting causes. The first, because instead of the local boundaries of\r\nour observation of the fact itself, we may include the extreme boundaries\r\nof the ascertained influence of its causes. Thus the succession of day and\r\nnight, we know, holds true of all the bodies of the solar system except the\r\nsun itself; but we know this only because we are acquainted with the\r\ncauses. If we were not, we could not extend the proposition beyond the\r\norbits of the earth and moon, at both extremities of which we have the\r\nevidence of observation for its truth. With respect to the probability of\r\ncounteracting causes, it has been seen that this calls for a greater abatement\r\nof confidence, in proportion to our ignorance of the causes on which the\r\nphenomena depend. On both accounts, therefore, a derivative law which\r\nwe know how to resolve, is susceptible of a greater extension to cases adjacent\r\nin place, than a merely empirical law.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page393\"\u003e[pg 393]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg393\" id=\"Pg393\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-div\" style=\"margin-bottom: 4.00em; margin-top: 4.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"toc81\" id=\"toc81\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"pdf82\" id=\"pdf82\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: center; margin-bottom: 2.40em; margin-top: 2.40em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 120%\"\u003eChapter XX.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: left; margin-bottom: 2.88em; margin-top: 2.88em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 144%\"\u003eOf Analogy.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 1. The word Analogy, as the name of a mode of reasoning, is generally\r\ntaken for some kind of argument supposed to be of an inductive nature,\r\nbut not amounting to a complete induction. There is no word, however,\r\nwhich is used more loosely, or in a greater variety of senses, than Analogy.\r\nIt sometimes stands for arguments which may be examples of the most\r\nrigorous induction. Archbishop Whately, for instance, following Ferguson\r\nand other writers, defines Analogy conformably to its primitive acceptation,\r\nthat which was given to it by mathematicians: Resemblance of Relations.\r\nIn this sense, when a country which has sent out colonies is termed\r\nthe mother country, the expression is analogical, signifying that the colonies\r\nof a country stand in the same \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003erelation\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e to her in which children\r\nstand to their parents. And if any inference be drawn from this resemblance\r\nof relations, as, for instance, that obedience or affection is due from\r\ncolonies to the mother country, this is called reasoning by analogy. Or, if\r\nit be argued that a nation is most beneficially governed by an assembly\r\nelected by the people, from the admitted fact that other associations for a\r\ncommon purpose, such as joint-stock companies, are best managed by a\r\ncommittee chosen by the parties interested; this, too, is an argument from\r\nanalogy in the preceding sense, because its foundation is, not that a nation\r\nis like a joint-stock company, or Parliament like a board of directors, but\r\nthat Parliament stands in the same \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003erelation\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e to the nation in which a board\r\nof directors stands to a joint-stock company. Now, in an argument of this\r\nnature, there is no inherent inferiority of conclusiveness. Like other arguments\r\nfrom resemblance, it may amount to nothing, or it may be a perfect\r\nand conclusive induction. The circumstance in which the two cases resemble,\r\nmay be capable of being shown to be the \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ematerial\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e circumstance;\r\nto be that on which all the consequences, necessary to be taken into account\r\nin the particular discussion, depend. In the example last given, the\r\nresemblance is one of relation; the \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003efundamentum\r\nrelationis\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e being the\r\nmanagement, by a few persons, of affairs in which a much greater number\r\nare interested along with them. Now, some may contend that this circumstance\r\nwhich is common to the two cases, and the various consequences\r\nwhich follow from it, have the chief share in determining all the effects\r\nwhich make up what we term good or bad administration. If they can establish\r\nthis, their argument has the force of a rigorous induction; if they\r\ncan not, they are said to have failed in proving the analogy between the\r\ntwo cases; a mode of speech which implies that when the analogy can be\r\nproved, the argument founded on it can not be resisted.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 2. It is on the whole more usual, however, to extend the name of analogical\r\nevidence to arguments from any sort of resemblance, provided they\r\ndo not amount to a complete induction; without peculiarly distinguishing\r\nresemblance of relations. Analogical reasoning, in this sense, may be reduced\r\nto the following formula: Two things resemble each other in one or\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page394\"\u003e[pg 394]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg394\" id=\"Pg394\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nmore respects; a certain proposition is true of the one; therefore it is true\r\nof the other. But we have nothing here by which to discriminate analogy\r\nfrom induction, since this type will serve for all reasoning from experience.\r\nIn the strictest induction, equally with the faintest analogy, we conclude\r\nbecause A resembles B in one or more properties, that it does so in a certain\r\nother property. The difference is, that in the case of a complete induction\r\nit has been previously shown, by due comparison of instances, that\r\nthere is an invariable conjunction between the former property or properties\r\nand the latter property; but in what is called analogical reasoning, no\r\nsuch conjunction has been made out. There have been no opportunities of\r\nputting in practice the Method of Difference, or even the Method of Agreement;\r\nbut we conclude (and that is all which the argument of analogy\r\namounts to) that a fact \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003em\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, known to be true of A, is more likely\r\nto be true of B if B agrees with A in some of its properties (even though no connection\r\nis known to exist between \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003em\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e and those properties), than if no\r\nresemblance at all could be traced between B and any other thing known to possess\r\nthe attribute \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003em\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nTo this argument it is of course requisite that the properties common to\r\nA with B shall be merely not known to be connected with \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003em\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e; they\r\nmust not be properties known to be unconnected with it. If, either by processes\r\nof elimination, or by deduction from previous knowledge of the laws of the\r\nproperties in question, it can be concluded that they have nothing to do\r\nwith \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003em\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, the argument of analogy is put out of court. The\r\nsupposition must be that \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003em\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e is an effect really dependent on some\r\nproperty of A, but we know not on which. We can not point out any of the properties of A,\r\nwhich is the cause of \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003em\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, or united with it by any law. After\r\nrejecting all which we know to have nothing to do with it, there remain several between\r\nwhich we are unable to decide; of which remaining properties, B possesses\r\none or more. This, accordingly, we consider as affording grounds, of more\r\nor less strength, for concluding by analogy that B possesses the attribute\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003em\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThere can be no doubt that every such resemblance which can be pointed\r\nout between B and A, affords some degree of probability, beyond what\r\nwould otherwise exist, in favor of the conclusion drawn from it. If B resembled\r\nA in all its ultimate properties, its possessing the attribute \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003em\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwould be a certainty, not a probability; and every resemblance which can be\r\nshown to exist between them, places it by so much the nearer to that point.\r\nIf the resemblance be in an ultimate property, there will be resemblance in\r\nall the derivative properties dependent on that ultimate property, and of\r\nthese \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003em\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e may be one. If the resemblance be in a derivative\r\nproperty, there is reason to expect resemblance in the ultimate property on which it\r\ndepends, and in the other derivative properties dependent on the same ultimate\r\nproperty. Every resemblance which can be shown to exist, affords ground\r\nfor expecting an indefinite number of other resemblances; the particular\r\nresemblance sought will, therefore, be oftener found among things thus\r\nknown to resemble, than among things between which we know of no resemblance.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nFor example, I might infer that there are probably inhabitants in the\r\nmoon, because there are inhabitants on the earth, in the sea, and in the air:\r\nand this is the evidence of analogy. The circumstance of having inhabitants\r\nis here assumed not to be an ultimate property, but (as is reasonable\r\nto suppose) a consequence of other properties; and depending, therefore,\r\nin the case of the earth, on some of its properties as a portion of the universe,\r\nbut on which of those properties we know not. Now the moon resembles\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page395\"\u003e[pg 395]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg395\" id=\"Pg395\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nthe earth in being a solid, opaque, nearly spherical substance, appearing\r\nto contain, or to have contained, active volcanoes; receiving heat\r\nand light from the sun, in about the same quantity as our earth; revolving\r\non its axis; composed of materials which gravitate, and obeying all the various\r\nlaws resulting from that property. And I think no one will deny\r\nthat if this were all that was known of the moon, the existence of inhabitants\r\nin that luminary would derive from these various resemblances to\r\nthe earth, a greater degree of probability than it would otherwise have;\r\nthough the amount of the augmentation it would be useless to attempt to\r\nestimate.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIf, however, every resemblance proved between B and A, in any point\r\nnot known to be immaterial with respect to \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003em\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, forms some\r\nadditional reason for presuming that B has the attribute \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003em\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e; it is\r\nclear, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-foreign\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eè contra\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, that every\r\ndissimilarity which can be proved between them furnishes a counter-probability\r\nof the same nature on the other side. It is not, indeed, unusual\r\nthat different ultimate properties should, in some particular instances, produce\r\nthe same derivative property; but on the whole it is certain that\r\nthings which differ in their ultimate properties, will differ at least as much\r\nin the aggregate of their derivative properties, and that the differences\r\nwhich are unknown will, on the average of cases, bear some proportion to\r\nthose which are known. There will, therefore, be a competition between\r\nthe known points of agreement and the known points of difference in A\r\nand B; and according as the one or the other may be deemed to preponderate,\r\nthe probability derived from analogy will be for or against B’s having\r\nthe property \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003em\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e. The moon, for instance, agrees with the earth in\r\nthe circumstances already mentioned; but differs in being smaller, in having\r\nits surface more unequal, and apparently volcanic throughout, in having, at\r\nleast on the side next the earth, no atmosphere sufficient to refract light, no\r\nclouds, and (it is therefore concluded) no water. These differences, considered\r\nmerely as such, might perhaps balance the resemblances, so that analogy\r\nwould afford no presumption either way. But considering that some\r\nof the circumstances which are wanting on the moon are among those\r\nwhich, on the earth, are found to be indispensable conditions of animal life,\r\nwe may conclude that if that phenomenon does exist in the moon (or at all\r\nevents on the nearer side), it must be as an effect of causes totally different\r\nfrom those on which it depends here; as a consequence, therefore, of the\r\nmoon’s differences from the earth, not of the points of agreement. Viewed\r\nin this light, all the resemblances which exist become presumptions against,\r\nnot in favor of, the moon’s being inhabited. Since life can not exist there\r\nin the manner in which it exists here, the greater the resemblance of the\r\nlunar world to the terrestrial in other respects, the less reason we have to\r\nbelieve that it can contain life.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThere are, however, other bodies in our system, between which and the\r\nearth there is a much closer resemblance; which possess an atmosphere,\r\nclouds, consequently water (or some fluid analogous to it), and even give\r\nstrong indications of snow in their polar regions; while the cold, or heat,\r\nthough differing greatly on the average from ours, is, in some parts at least\r\nof those planets, possibly not more extreme than in some regions of our\r\nown which are habitable. To balance these agreements, the ascertained\r\ndifferences are chiefly in the average light and heat, velocity of rotation,\r\ndensity of material, intensity of gravity, and similar circumstances of a secondary\r\nkind. With regard to these planets, therefore, the argument of\r\nanalogy gives a decided preponderance in favor of their resembling the\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page396\"\u003e[pg 396]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg396\" id=\"Pg396\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nearth in any of its derivative properties, such as that of having inhabitants;\r\nthough when we consider how immeasurably multitudinous are those of\r\ntheir properties which we are entirely ignorant of, compared with the few\r\nwhich we know, we can attach but trifling weight to any considerations of\r\nresemblance in which the known elements bear so inconsiderable a proportion\r\nto the unknown.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nBesides the competition between analogy and diversity, there may be a\r\ncompetition of conflicting analogies. The new case may be similar in some\r\nof its circumstances to cases in which the fact \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003em\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e exists, but in\r\nothers to cases in which it is known not to exist. Amber has some properties in\r\ncommon with vegetable, others with mineral products. A painting of unknown\r\norigin may resemble, in certain of its characters, known works of a\r\nparticular master, but in others it may as strikingly resemble those of some\r\nother painter. A vase may bear some analogy to works of Grecian, and\r\nsome to those of Etruscan, or Egyptian art. We are of course supposing\r\nthat it does not possess any quality which has been ascertained, by a sufficient\r\ninduction, to be a conclusive mark either of the one or of the other.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 3. Since the value of an analogical argument inferring one resemblance\r\nfrom other resemblances without any antecedent evidence of a connection\r\nbetween them, depends on the extent of ascertained resemblance, compared\r\nfirst with the amount of ascertained difference, and next with the extent of\r\nthe unexplored region of unascertained properties; it follows that where\r\nthe resemblance is very great, the ascertained difference very small, and our\r\nknowledge of the subject-matter tolerably extensive, the argument from\r\nanalogy may approach in strength very near to a valid induction. If, after\r\nmuch observation of B, we find that it agrees with A in nine out of ten of\r\nits known properties, we may conclude with a probability of nine to one,\r\nthat it will possess any given derivative property of A. If we discover,\r\nfor example, an unknown animal or plant, resembling closely some known\r\none in the greater number of the properties we observe in it, but differing\r\nin some few, we may reasonably expect to find in the unobserved remainder\r\nof its properties, a general agreement with those of the former; but\r\nalso a difference corresponding proportionately to the amount of observed\r\ndiversity.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt thus appears that the conclusions derived from analogy are only of\r\nany considerable value, when the case to which we reason is an adjacent\r\ncase; adjacent, not as before, in place or time, but in circumstances. In\r\nthe case of effects of which the causes are imperfectly or not at all known,\r\nwhen consequently the observed order of their occurrence amounts only to\r\nan empirical law, it often happens that the conditions which have co-existed\r\nwhenever the effect was observed, have been very numerous. Now if\r\na new case presents itself, in which all these conditions do not exist, but\r\nthe far greater part of them do, some one or a few only being wanting, the\r\ninference that the effect will occur, notwithstanding this deficiency of complete\r\nresemblance to the cases in which it has been observed, may, though\r\nof the nature of analogy, possess a high degree of probability. It is hardly\r\nnecessary to add that, however considerable this probability may be, no\r\ncompetent inquirer into nature will rest satisfied with it when a complete\r\ninduction is attainable; but will consider the analogy as a mere guide-post,\r\npointing out the direction in which more rigorous investigations\r\nshould be prosecuted.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt is in this last respect that considerations of analogy have the highest\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page397\"\u003e[pg 397]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg397\" id=\"Pg397\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nscientific value. The cases in which analogical evidence affords in itself\r\nany very high degree of probability, are, as we have observed, only those\r\nin which the resemblance is very close and extensive; but there is no analogy,\r\nhowever faint, which may not be of the utmost value in suggesting\r\nexperiments or observations that may lead to more positive conclusions.\r\nWhen the agents and their effects are out of the reach of further observation\r\nand experiment, as in the speculations already alluded to respecting\r\nthe moon and planets, such slight probabilities are no more than an interesting\r\ntheme for the pleasant exercise of imagination; but any suspicion,\r\nhowever slight, that sets an ingenious person at work to contrive an experiment,\r\nor affords a reason for trying one experiment rather than another,\r\nmay be of the greatest benefit to science.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nOn this ground, though I can not accept as positive truths any of those\r\nscientific hypotheses which are unsusceptible of being ultimately brought\r\nto the test of actual induction, such, for instance, as the two theories of\r\nlight, the emission theory of the last century, and the undulatory theory\r\nwhich predominates in the present, I am yet unable to agree with those\r\nwho consider such hypotheses to be worthy of entire disregard. As is well\r\nsaid by Hartley (and concurred in by a thinker in general so diametrically\r\nopposed to Hartley’s opinions as Dugald Stewart), \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“any hypothesis which\r\nhas so much plausibility as to explain a considerable number of facts, helps\r\nus to digest these facts in proper order, to bring new ones to light, and\r\nmake \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eexperimenta crucis\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e for the sake of\r\nfuture inquirers.”\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca id=\"noteref_183\" name=\"noteref_183\" href=\"#note_183\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e183\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e If an hypothesis\r\nboth explains known facts, and has led to the prediction of others\r\npreviously unknown, and since verified by experience, the laws of the phenomenon\r\nwhich is the subject of inquiry must bear at least a great similarity\r\nto those of the class of phenomena to which the hypothesis assimilates\r\nit; and since the analogy which extends so far may probably extend\r\nfurther, nothing is more likely to suggest experiments tending to throw\r\nlight upon the real properties of the phenomenon, than the following out\r\nsuch an hypothesis. But to this end it is by no means necessary that the\r\nhypothesis be mistaken for a scientific truth. On the contrary, that illusion\r\nis in this respect, as in every other, an impediment to the progress of\r\nreal knowledge, by leading inquirers to restrict themselves arbitrarily to\r\nthe particular hypothesis which is most accredited at the time, instead of\r\nlooking out for every class of phenomena between the laws of which and\r\nthose of the given phenomenon any analogy exists, and trying all such experiments\r\nas may tend to the discovery of ulterior analogies pointing in\r\nthe same direction.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-div\" style=\"margin-bottom: 4.00em; margin-top: 4.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"toc83\" id=\"toc83\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"pdf84\" id=\"pdf84\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"Book_III_Chapter_XXI\" id=\"Book_III_Chapter_XXI\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: center; margin-bottom: 2.40em; margin-top: 2.40em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 120%\"\u003eChapter XXI.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: left; margin-bottom: 2.88em; margin-top: 2.88em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 144%\"\u003eOf The Evidence Of The Law Of Universal Causation.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 1. We have now completed our review of the logical processes by\r\nwhich the laws, or uniformities, of the sequence of phenomena, and those\r\nuniformities in their co-existence which depend on the laws of their sequence,\r\nare ascertained or tested. As we recognized in the commencement,\r\nand have been enabled to see more clearly in the progress of the investigation,\r\nthe basis of all these logical operations is the law of causation.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page398\"\u003e[pg 398]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg398\" id=\"Pg398\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe validity of all the Inductive Methods depends on the assumption that\r\nevery event, or the beginning of every phenomenon, must have some cause;\r\nsome antecedent, on the existence of which it is invariably and unconditionally\r\nconsequent. In the Method of Agreement this is obvious; that\r\nmethod avowedly proceeding on the supposition that we have found the\r\ntrue cause as soon as we have negatived every other. The assertion is\r\nequally true of the Method of Difference. That method authorizes us to\r\ninfer a general law from two instances; one, in which A exists together\r\nwith a multitude of other circumstances, and B follows; another, in which,\r\nA being removed, and all other circumstances remaining the same, B is\r\nprevented. What, however, does this prove? It proves that B, in the\r\nparticular instance, can not have had any other cause than A; but to conclude\r\nfrom this that A was the cause, or that A will on other occasions be\r\nfollowed by B, is only allowable on the assumption that B must have some\r\ncause; that among its antecedents in any single instance in which it occurs,\r\nthere must be one which has the capacity of producing it at other\r\ntimes. This being admitted, it is seen that in the case in question that\r\nantecedent can be no other than A; but that if it be no other than A it\r\nmust be A, is not proved, by these instances at least, but taken for granted.\r\nThere is no need to spend time in proving that the same thing is true of\r\nthe other Inductive Methods. The universality of the law of causation is\r\nassumed in them all.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nBut is this assumption warranted? Doubtless (it may be said) \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003emost\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e\r\nphenomena are connected as effects with some antecedent or cause, that is,\r\nare never produced unless some assignable fact has preceded them; but the\r\nvery circumstance that complicated processes of induction are sometimes\r\nnecessary, shows that cases exist in which this regular order of succession\r\nis not apparent to our unaided apprehension. If, then, the processes which\r\nbring these cases within the same category with the rest, require that we\r\nshould assume the universality of the very law which they do not at first\r\nsight appear to exemplify, is not this a \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003epetitio\r\nprincipii\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e? Can we prove a\r\nproposition, by an argument which takes it for granted? And if not so\r\nproved, on what evidence does it rest?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nFor this difficulty, which I have purposely stated in the strongest terms\r\nit will admit of, the school of metaphysicians who have long predominated\r\nin this country find a ready salvo. They affirm, that the universality of\r\ncausation is a truth which we can not help believing; that the belief in it\r\nis an instinct, one of the laws of our believing faculty. As the proof of\r\nthis, they say, and they have nothing else to say, that every body does believe\r\nit; and they number it among the propositions, rather numerous in\r\ntheir catalogue, which may be logically argued against, and perhaps can\r\nnot be logically proved, but which are of higher authority than logic, and\r\nso essentially inherent in the human mind, that even he who denies them\r\nin speculation, shows by his habitual practice that his arguments make no\r\nimpression upon himself.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nInto the merits of this question, considered as one of psychology, it\r\nwould be foreign to my purpose to enter here; but I must protest against\r\nadducing, as evidence of the truth of a fact in external nature, the disposition,\r\nhowever strong or however general, of the human mind to believe it.\r\nBelief is not proof, and does not dispense with the necessity of proof. I\r\nam aware, that to ask for evidence of a proposition which we are supposed\r\nto believe instinctively, is to expose one’s self to the charge of rejecting the\r\nauthority of the human faculties; which of course no one can consistently\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page399\"\u003e[pg 399]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg399\" id=\"Pg399\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\ndo, since the human faculties are all which any one has to judge by; and\r\ninasmuch as the meaning of the word evidence is supposed to be, something\r\nwhich when laid before the mind, induces it to believe; to demand evidence\r\nwhen the belief is insured by the mind’s own laws, is supposed to be appealing\r\nto the intellect against the intellect. But this, I apprehend, is a\r\nmisunderstanding of the nature of evidence. By evidence is not meant\r\nany thing and every thing which produces belief. There are many things\r\nwhich generate belief besides evidence. A mere strong association of ideas\r\noften causes a belief so intense as to be unshakable by experience or argument.\r\nEvidence is not that which the mind does or must yield to, but\r\nthat which it ought to yield to, namely, that, by yielding to which its belief\r\nis kept conformable to fact. There is no appeal from the human faculties\r\ngenerally, but there is an appeal from one human faculty to another; from\r\nthe judging faculty, to those which take cognizance of fact, the faculties of\r\nsense and consciousness. The legitimacy of this appeal is admitted whenever\r\nit is allowed that our judgments ought to be conformable to fact.\r\nTo say that belief suffices for its own justification is making opinion the\r\ntest of opinion; it is denying the existence of any outward standard, the\r\nconformity of an opinion to which constitutes its truth. We call one mode\r\nof forming opinions right and another wrong, because the one does, and the\r\nother does not, tend to make the opinion agree with the fact—to make\r\npeople believe what really is, and expect what really will be. Now a mere\r\ndisposition to believe, even if supposed instinctive, is no guarantee for the\r\ntruth of the thing believed. If, indeed, the belief ever amounted to an irresistible\r\nnecessity, there would then be no \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003euse\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e in appealing from it, because\r\nthere would be no possibility of altering it. But even then the truth\r\nof the belief would not follow; it would only follow that mankind were\r\nunder a permanent necessity of believing what might possibly not be true;\r\nin other words, that a case might occur in which our senses or consciousness,\r\nif they could be appealed to, might testify one thing, and our reason\r\nbelieve another. But in fact there is no such permanent necessity. There\r\nis no proposition of which it can be asserted that every human mind must\r\neternally and irrevocably believe it. Many of the propositions of which\r\nthis is most confidently stated, great numbers of human beings have disbelieved.\r\nThe things which it has been supposed that nobody could possibly\r\nhelp believing, are innumerable; but no two generations would make out\r\nthe same catalogue of them. One age or nation believes implicitly what\r\nto another seems incredible and inconceivable; one individual has not a\r\nvestige of a belief which another deems to be absolutely inherent in humanity.\r\nThere is not one of these supposed instinctive beliefs which is\r\nreally inevitable. It is in the power of every one to cultivate habits of\r\nthought which make him independent of them. The habit of philosophical\r\nanalysis (of which it is the surest effect to enable the mind to command,\r\ninstead of being commanded by, the laws of the merely passive part of its\r\nown nature), by showing to us that things are not necessarily connected in\r\nfact because their ideas are connected in our minds, is able to loosen innumerable\r\nassociations which reign despotically over the undisciplined or\r\nearly-prejudiced mind. And this habit is not without power even over\r\nthose associations which the school of which I have been speaking regard\r\nas connate and instinctive. I am convinced that any one accustomed to\r\nabstraction and analysis, who will fairly exert his faculties for the purpose,\r\nwill, when his imagination has once learned to entertain the notion, find\r\nno difficulty in conceiving that in some one, for instance, of the many firmaments\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page400\"\u003e[pg 400]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg400\" id=\"Pg400\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\ninto which sidereal astronomy now divides the universe, events\r\nmay succeed one another at random, without any fixed law; nor can any\r\nthing in our experience, or in our mental nature, constitute a sufficient, or\r\nindeed any, reason for believing that this is nowhere the case.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWere we to suppose (what it is perfectly possible to imagine) that the\r\npresent order of the universe were brought to an end, and that a chaos succeeded\r\nin which there was no fixed succession of events, and the past gave\r\nno assurance of the future; if a human being were miraculously kept alive\r\nto witness this change, he surely would soon cease to believe in any uniformity,\r\nthe uniformity itself no longer existing. If this be admitted, the\r\nbelief in uniformity either is not an instinct, or it is an instinct conquerable,\r\nlike all other instincts, by acquired knowledge.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nBut there is no need to speculate on what might be, when we have positive\r\nand certain knowledge of what has been. It is not true, as a matter\r\nof fact, that mankind have always believed that all the successions of events\r\nwere uniform and according to fixed laws. The Greek philosophers, not\r\neven excepting Aristotle, recognized Chance and Spontaneity (τύχη and τὸ\r\nαὐτομάτον) as among the agents in nature; in other words, they believed\r\nthat to that extent there was no guarantee that the past had been similar\r\nto itself, or that the future would resemble the past. Even now a full half\r\nof the philosophical world, including the very same metaphysicians who\r\ncontend most for the instinctive character of the belief in uniformity, consider\r\none important class of phenomena, volitions, to be an exception to\r\nthe uniformity, and not governed by a fixed law.\u003ca id=\"noteref_184\" name=\"noteref_184\" href=\"#note_184\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e184\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 2. As was observed in a former place,\u003ca id=\"noteref_185\" name=\"noteref_185\" href=\"#note_185\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e185\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nthe belief we entertain in the\r\nuniversality, throughout nature, of the law of cause and effect, is itself an\r\ninstance of induction; and by no means one of the earliest which any of\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page401\"\u003e[pg 401]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg401\" id=\"Pg401\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nus, or which mankind in general, can have made. We arrive at this universal\r\nlaw, by generalization from many laws of inferior generality. We\r\nshould never have had the notion of causation (in the philosophical meaning\r\nof the term) as a condition of all phenomena, unless many cases of causation,\r\nor in other words, many partial uniformities of sequence, had previously become\r\nfamiliar. The more obvious of the particular uniformities suggest,\r\nand give evidence of, the general uniformity, and the general uniformity, once\r\nestablished, enables us to prove the remainder of the particular uniformities\r\nof which it is made up. As, however, all rigorous processes of induction\r\npresuppose the general uniformity, our knowledge of the particular uniformities\r\nfrom which it was first inferred was not, of course, derived from rigorous\r\ninduction, but from the loose and uncertain mode of induction \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eper enumerationem simplicem\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e; and the law of universal\r\ncausation, being collected from results so obtained, can not itself rest\r\non any better foundation.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt would seem, therefore, that induction \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eper\r\nenumerationem simplicem\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nnot only is not necessarily an illicit logical process, but is in reality the only\r\nkind of induction possible; since the more elaborate process depends for\r\nits validity on a law, itself obtained in that inartificial mode. Is there not\r\nthen an inconsistency in contrasting the looseness of one method with the\r\nrigidity of another, when that other is indebted to the looser method for\r\nits own foundation?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe inconsistency, however, is only apparent. Assuredly, if induction\r\nby simple enumeration were an invalid process, no process grounded on\r\nit could be valid; just as no reliance could be placed on telescopes, if we\r\ncould not trust our eyes. But though a valid process, it is a fallible one,\r\nand fallible in very different degrees: if, therefore, we can substitute for\r\nthe more fallible forms of the process, an operation grounded on the same\r\nprocess in a less fallible form, we shall have effected a very material improvement.\r\nAnd this is what scientific induction does.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nA mode of concluding from experience must be pronounced untrustworthy\r\nwhen subsequent experience refuses to confirm it. According to\r\nthis criterion, induction by simple enumeration—in other words, generalization\r\nof an observed fact from the mere absence of any known instance to\r\nthe contrary—affords in general a precarious and unsafe ground of assurance;\r\nfor such generalizations are incessantly discovered, on further experience,\r\nto be false. Still, however, it affords some assurance, sufficient, in\r\nmany cases, for the ordinary guidance of conduct. It would be absurd to\r\nsay, that the generalizations arrived at by mankind in the outset of their\r\nexperience, such as these—food nourishes, fire burns, water drowns—were\r\nunworthy of reliance.\u003ca id=\"noteref_186\" name=\"noteref_186\" href=\"#note_186\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e186\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nThere is a scale of trustworthiness in the results\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page402\"\u003e[pg 402]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg402\" id=\"Pg402\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nof the original unscientific induction; and on this diversity (as observed in\r\nthe fourth chapter of the present book) depend the rules for the improvement\r\nof the process. The improvement consists in correcting one of these\r\ninartificial generalizations by means of another. As has been already pointed\r\nout, this is all that art can do. To test a generalization, by showing\r\nthat it either follows from, or conflicts with, some stronger induction, some\r\ngeneralization resting on a broader foundation of experience, is the beginning\r\nand end of the logic of induction.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 3. Now the precariousness of the method of simple enumeration is in\r\nan inverse ratio to the largeness of the generalization. The process is\r\ndelusive and insufficient, exactly in proportion as the subject-matter of the\r\nobservation is special and limited in extent. As the sphere widens, this\r\nunscientific method becomes less and less liable to mislead; and the most\r\nuniversal class of truths, the law of causation, for instance, and the principles\r\nof number and of geometry, are duly and satisfactorily proved by that\r\nmethod alone, nor are they susceptible of any other proof.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWith respect to the whole class of generalizations of which we have recently\r\ntreated, the uniformities which depend on causation, the truth of\r\nthe remark just made follows by obvious inference from the principles laid\r\ndown in the preceding chapters. When a fact has been observed a certain\r\nnumber of times to be true, and is not in any instance known to be\r\nfalse, if we at once affirm that fact as a universal truth or law of nature,\r\nwithout either testing it by any of the four methods of induction, or deducing\r\nit from other known laws, we shall in general err grossly; but we\r\nare perfectly justified in affirming it as an empirical law, true within certain\r\nlimits of time, place, and circumstance, provided the number of coincidences\r\nbe greater than can with any probability be ascribed to chance.\r\nThe reason for not extending it beyond those limits is, that the fact of its\r\nholding true within them may be a consequence of collocations, which can\r\nnot be concluded to exist in one place because they exist in another; or\r\nmay be dependent on the accidental absence of counteracting agencies,\r\nwhich any variation of time, or the smallest change of circumstances, may\r\npossibly bring into play. If we suppose, then, the subject-matter of any\r\ngeneralization to be so widely diffused that there is no time, no place, and\r\nno combination of circumstances, but must afford an example either of its\r\ntruth or of its falsity, and if it be never found otherwise than true, its\r\ntruth can not be contingent on any collocations, unless such as exist at all\r\ntimes and places; nor can it be frustrated by any counteracting agencies,\r\nunless by such as never actually occur. It is, therefore, an empirical law\r\nco-extensive with all human experience; at which point the distinction between\r\nempirical laws and laws of nature vanishes, and the proposition\r\ntakes its place among the most firmly established as well as largest truths\r\naccessible to science.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nNow, the most extensive in its subject-matter of all generalizations\r\nwhich experience warrants, respecting the sequences and co-existences of\r\nphenomena, is the law of causation. It stands at the head of all observed\r\nuniformities, in point of universality, and therefore (if the preceding observations\r\nare correct) in point of certainty. And if we consider, not what\r\nmankind would have been justified in believing in the infancy of their\r\nknowledge, but what may rationally be believed in its present more advanced\r\nstate, we shall find ourselves warranted in considering this fundamental\r\nlaw, though itself obtained by induction from particular laws of causation,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page403\"\u003e[pg 403]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg403\" id=\"Pg403\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nas not less certain, but on the contrary, more so, than any of those from\r\nwhich it was drawn. It adds to them as much proof as it receives from\r\nthem. For there is probably no one even of the best established laws of\r\ncausation which is not sometimes counteracted, and to which, therefore,\r\napparent exceptions do not present themselves, which would have necessarily\r\nand justly shaken the confidence of mankind in the universality of\r\nthose laws, if inductive processes founded on the universal law had not\r\nenabled us to refer those exceptions to the agency of counteracting causes,\r\nand thereby reconcile them with the law with which they apparently conflict.\r\nErrors, moreover, may have slipped into the statement of any one\r\nof the special laws, through inattention to some material circumstance: and\r\ninstead of the true proposition, another may have been enunciated, false as\r\na universal law, though leading, in all cases hitherto observed, to the same\r\nresult. To the law of causation, on the contrary, we not only do not know\r\nof any exception, but the exceptions which limit or apparently invalidate\r\nthe special laws, are so far from contradicting the universal one, that they\r\nconfirm it; since in all cases which are sufficiently open to our observation,\r\nwe are able to trace the difference of result, either to the absence of a cause\r\nwhich had been present in ordinary cases, or to the presence of one which\r\nhad been absent.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe law of cause and effect, being thus certain, is capable of imparting\r\nits certainty to all other inductive propositions which can be deduced from\r\nit; and the narrower inductions may be regarded as receiving their ultimate\r\nsanction from that law, since there is no one of them which is not\r\nrendered more certain than it was before, when we are able to connect it\r\nwith that larger induction, and to show that it can not be denied, consistently\r\nwith the law that every thing which begins to exist has a cause.\r\nAnd hence we are justified in the seeming inconsistency, of holding induction\r\nby simple enumeration to be good for proving this general truth, the\r\nfoundation of scientific induction, and yet refusing to rely on it for any of\r\nthe narrower inductions. I fully admit that if the law of causation were\r\nunknown, generalization in the more obvious cases of uniformity in phenomena\r\nwould nevertheless be possible, and though in all cases more or\r\nless precarious, and in some extremely so, would suffice to constitute a certain\r\nmeasure of probability; but what the amount of this probability might\r\nbe, we are dispensed from estimating, since it never could amount to the\r\ndegree of assurance which the proposition acquires, when, by the application\r\nto it of the Four Methods, the supposition of its falsity is shown to\r\nbe inconsistent with the Law of Causation. We are therefore logically\r\nentitled, and, by the necessities of scientific induction, required, to disregard\r\nthe probabilities derived from the early rude method of generalizing,\r\nand to consider no minor generalization as proved except so far as the law\r\nof causation confirms it, nor probable except so far as it may reasonably\r\nbe expected to be so confirmed.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 4. The assertion, that our inductive processes assume the law of causation,\r\nwhile the law of causation is itself a case of induction, is a paradox,\r\nonly on the old theory of reasoning, which supposes the universal truth, or\r\nmajor premise, in a ratiocination, to be the real proof of the particular\r\ntruths which are ostensibly inferred from it. According to the doctrine\r\nmaintained in the present\r\ntreatise,\u003ca id=\"noteref_187\" name=\"noteref_187\" href=\"#note_187\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e187\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e the major premise is not the proof of\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page404\"\u003e[pg 404]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg404\" id=\"Pg404\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nthe conclusion, but is itself proved, along with the conclusion from the\r\nsame evidence. \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“All men are mortal”\u003c/span\u003e is not the proof that Lord Palmerston\r\nis mortal; but our past experience of mortality authorizes us to infer\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eboth\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e the general truth and the particular fact, and the one with exactly the\r\nsame degree of assurance as the other. The mortality of Lord Palmerston\r\nis not an inference from the mortality of all men, but from the experience\r\nwhich proves the mortality of all men; and is a correct inference from experience,\r\nif that general truth is so too. This relation between our general\r\nbeliefs and their particular applications holds equally true in the more comprehensive\r\ncase which we are now discussing. Any new fact of causation\r\ninferred by induction, is rightly inferred, if no other objection can be made\r\nto the inference than can be made to the general truth that every event has\r\na cause. The utmost certainty which can be given to a conclusion arrived\r\nat in the way of inference, stops at this point. When we have ascertained\r\nthat the particular conclusion must stand or fall with the general uniformity\r\nof the laws of nature—that it is liable to no doubt except the doubt\r\nwhether every event has a cause—we have done all that can be done for it.\r\nThe strongest assurance we can obtain of any theory respecting the cause\r\nof a given phenomenon, is that the phenomenon has either that cause or\r\nnone.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe latter supposition might have been an admissible one in a very early\r\nperiod of our study of nature. But we have been able to perceive that in\r\nthe stage which mankind have now reached, the generalization which gives\r\nthe Law of Universal Causation has grown into a stronger and better induction,\r\none deserving of greater reliance, than any of the subordinate generalizations.\r\nWe may even, I think, go a step further than this, and regard\r\nthe certainty of that great induction as not merely comparative, but, for all\r\npractical purposes, complete.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe considerations, which, as I apprehend, give, at the present day, to the\r\nproof of the law of uniformity of succession as true of all phenomena without\r\nexception, this character of completeness and conclusiveness, are the\r\nfollowing: First, that we now know it directly to be true of far the greatest\r\nnumber of phenomena; that there are none of which we know it not to\r\nbe true, the utmost that can be said being, that of some we can not positively\r\nfrom direct evidence affirm its truth; while phenomenon after phenomenon,\r\nas they become better known to us, are constantly passing from the\r\nlatter class into the former; and in all cases in which that transition has\r\nnot yet taken place, the absence of direct proof is accounted for by the rarity\r\nor the obscurity of the phenomena, our deficient means of observing\r\nthem, or the logical difficulties arising from the complication of the circumstances\r\nin which they occur; insomuch that, notwithstanding as rigid a\r\ndependence on given conditions as exists in the case of any other phenomenon,\r\nit was not likely that we should be better acquainted with those conditions\r\nthan we are. Besides this first class of considerations, there is a\r\nsecond, which still further corroborates the conclusion. Although there are\r\nphenomena the production and changes of which elude all our attempts to\r\nreduce them universally to any ascertained law; yet in every such case, the\r\nphenomenon, or the objects concerned in it, are found in some instances to\r\nobey the known laws of nature. The wind, for example, is the type of uncertainty\r\nand caprice, yet we find it in some cases obeying with as much\r\nconstancy as any phenomenon in nature the law of the tendency of fluids\r\nto distribute themselves so as to equalize the pressure on every side of each\r\nof their particles; as in the case of the trade-winds and the monsoons.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page405\"\u003e[pg 405]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg405\" id=\"Pg405\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nLightning might once have been supposed to obey no laws; but since it\r\nhas been ascertained to be identical with electricity, we know that the very\r\nsame phenomenon in some of its manifestations is implicitly obedient to the\r\naction of fixed causes. I do not believe that there is now one object or\r\nevent in all our experience of nature, within the bounds of the solar system\r\nat least, which has not either been ascertained by direct observation to follow\r\nlaws of its own, or been proved to be closely similar to objects and\r\nevents which, in more familiar manifestations, or on a more limited scale,\r\nfollow strict laws; our inability to trace the same laws on a larger scale and\r\nin the more recondite instances, being accounted for by the number and\r\ncomplication of the modifying causes, or by their inaccessibility to observation.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe progress of experience, therefore, has dissipated the doubt which\r\nmust have rested on the universality of the law of causation while there\r\nwere phenomena which seemed to be \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003esui\r\ngeneris\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, not subject to the same\r\nlaws with any other class of phenomena, and not as yet ascertained to have\r\npeculiar laws of their own. This great generalization, however, might reasonably\r\nhave been, as it in fact was, acted on as a probability of the highest\r\norder, before there were sufficient grounds for receiving it as a certainty.\r\nIn matters of evidence, as in all other human things, we neither require, nor\r\ncan attain, the absolute. We must hold even our strongest convictions\r\nwith an opening left in our minds for the reception of facts which contradict\r\nthem; and only when we have taken this precaution, have we earned\r\nthe right to act upon our convictions with complete confidence when no\r\nsuch contradiction appears. Whatever has been found true in innumerable\r\ninstances, and never found to be false after due examination in any, we are\r\nsafe in acting on as universal provisionally, until an undoubted exception\r\nappears; provided the nature of the case be such that a real exception\r\ncould scarcely have escaped notice. When every phenomenon that we ever\r\nknew sufficiently well to be able to answer the question, had a cause on\r\nwhich it was invariably consequent, it was more rational to suppose that\r\nour inability to assign the causes of other phenomena arose from our ignorance,\r\nthan that there were phenomena which were uncaused, and which\r\nhappened to be exactly those which we had hitherto had no sufficient opportunity\r\nof studying.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt must, at the same time, be remarked, that the reasons for this reliance\r\ndo not hold in circumstances unknown to us, and beyond the possible range\r\nof our experience. In distant parts of the stellar regions, where the phenomena\r\nmay be entirely unlike those with which we are acquainted, it\r\nwould be folly to affirm confidently that this general law prevails, any more\r\nthan those special ones which we have found to hold universally on our\r\nown planet. The uniformity in the succession of events, otherwise called\r\nthe law of causation, must be received not as a law of the universe, but of\r\nthat portion of it only which is within the range of our means of sure observation,\r\nwith a reasonable degree of extension to adjacent cases. To extend\r\nit further is to make a supposition without evidence, and to which, in\r\nthe absence of any ground from experience for estimating its degree of\r\nprobability, it would be idle to attempt to assign any.\u003ca id=\"noteref_188\" name=\"noteref_188\" href=\"#note_188\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e188\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page406\"\u003e[pg 406]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg406\" id=\"Pg406\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-div\" style=\"margin-bottom: 4.00em; margin-top: 4.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"toc85\" id=\"toc85\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"pdf86\" id=\"pdf86\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"Book_III_Chapter_XXII\" id=\"Book_III_Chapter_XXII\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: center; margin-bottom: 2.40em; margin-top: 2.40em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 120%\"\u003eChapter XXII.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: left; margin-bottom: 2.88em; margin-top: 2.88em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 144%\"\u003eOf Uniformities Of Co-Existence Not Dependent On Causation.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 1. The order of the occurrence of phenomena in time, is either successive\r\nor simultaneous; the uniformities, therefore, which obtain in their occurrence,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page407\"\u003e[pg 407]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg407\" id=\"Pg407\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nare either uniformities of succession or of co-existence. Uniformities\r\nof succession are all comprehended under the law of causation and\r\nits consequences. Every phenomenon has a cause, which it invariably follows;\r\nand from this are derived other invariable sequences among the successive\r\nstages of the same effect, as well as between the effects resulting\r\nfrom causes which invariably succeed one another.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIn the same manner with these derivative uniformities of succession, a\r\ngreat variety of uniformities of co-existence also take their rise. Co-ordinate\r\neffects of the same cause naturally co-exist with one another. High\r\nwater at any point on the earth’s surface, and high water at the point diametrically\r\nopposite to it, are effects uniformly simultaneous, resulting from\r\nthe direction in which the combined attractions of the sun and moon act\r\nupon the waters of the ocean. An eclipse of the sun to us, and an eclipse\r\nof the earth to a spectator situated in the moon, are in like manner phenomena\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page408\"\u003e[pg 408]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg408\" id=\"Pg408\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\ninvariably co-existent; and their co-existence can equally be deduced\r\nfrom the laws of their production.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt is an obvious question, therefore, whether all the uniformities of co-existence\r\namong phenomena may not be accounted for in this manner. And\r\nit can not be doubted that between phenomena which are themselves effects,\r\nthe co-existences must necessarily depend on the causes of those phenomena.\r\nIf they are effects immediately or remotely of the same cause,\r\nthey can not co-exist except by virtue of some laws or properties of that\r\ncause; if they are effects of different causes, they can not co-exist unless it\r\nbe because their causes co-exist; and the uniformity of co-existence, if such\r\nthere be, between the effects, proves that those particular causes, within the\r\nlimits of our observation, have uniformly been co-existent.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 2. But these same considerations compel us to recognize that there\r\nmust be one class of co-existences which can not depend on causation: the\r\nco-existences between the ultimate properties of things—those properties\r\nwhich are the causes of all phenomena, but are not themselves caused by\r\nany phenomenon, and a cause for which could only be sought by ascending\r\nto the origin of all things. Yet among these ultimate properties there are\r\nnot only co-existences, but uniformities of co-existence. General propositions\r\nmay be, and are, formed, which assert that whenever certain properties\r\nare found, certain others are found along with them. We perceive an\r\nobject; say, for instance, water. We recognize it to be water, of course by\r\ncertain of its properties. Having recognized it, we are able to affirm of it\r\ninnumerable other properties; which we could not do unless it were a general\r\ntruth, a law or uniformity in nature, that the set of properties by\r\nwhich we identify the substance as water always have those other properties\r\nconjoined with them.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIn a former place\u003ca id=\"noteref_189\" name=\"noteref_189\" href=\"#note_189\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e189\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e it has been explained, in some detail, what is meant\r\nby the Kinds of objects; those classes which differ from one another not\r\nby a limited and definite, but by an indefinite and unknown, number of distinctions.\r\nTo this we have now to add, that every proposition by which\r\nany thing is asserted of a Kind, affirms a uniformity of co-existence.\r\nSince we know nothing of Kinds but their properties, the Kind, to us, \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eis\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e\r\nthe set of properties by which it is identified, and which must of course be\r\nsufficient to distinguish it from every other kind.\u003ca id=\"noteref_190\" name=\"noteref_190\" href=\"#note_190\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e190\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e In affirming any thing,\r\ntherefore, of a Kind, we are affirming something to be uniformly co-existent\r\nwith the properties by which the kind is recognized; and that is the\r\nsole meaning of the assertion.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAmong the uniformities of co-existence which exist in nature, may hence\r\nbe numbered all the properties of Kinds. The whole of these, however,\r\nare not independent of causation, but only a portion of them. Some are\r\nultimate properties, others derivative: of some, no cause can be assigned,\r\nbut others are manifestly dependent on causes. Thus, pure oxygen gas is\r\na Kind, and one of its most unequivocal properties is its gaseous form;\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page409\"\u003e[pg 409]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg409\" id=\"Pg409\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nthis property, however, has for its cause the presence of a certain quantity\r\nof latent heat; and if that heat could be taken away (as has been done from\r\nso many gases in Faraday’s experiments), the gaseous form would doubtless\r\ndisappear, together with numerous other properties which depend on,\r\nor are caused by, that property.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIn regard to all substances which are chemical compounds, and which\r\ntherefore may be regarded as products of the juxtaposition of substances\r\ndifferent in Kind from themselves, there is considerable reason to presume\r\nthat the specific properties of the compound are consequent, as effects, on\r\nsome of the properties of the elements, though little progress has yet been\r\nmade in tracing any invariable relation between the latter and the former.\r\nStill more strongly will a similar presumption exist, when the object itself,\r\nas in the case of organized beings, is no primeval agent, but an effect, which\r\ndepends on a cause or causes for its very existence. The Kinds, therefore,\r\nwhich are called in chemistry simple substances, or elementary natural\r\nagents, are the only ones, any of whose properties can with certainty be\r\nconsidered ultimate; and of these the ultimate properties are probably\r\nmuch more numerous than we at present recognize, since every successful\r\ninstance of the resolution of the properties of their compounds into simpler\r\nlaws, generally leads to the recognition of properties in the elements distinct\r\nfrom any previously known. The resolution of the laws of the heavenly\r\nmotions established the previously unknown ultimate property of a\r\nmutual attraction between all bodies; the resolution, so far as it has yet\r\nproceeded, of the laws of crystallization, of chemical composition, electricity,\r\nmagnetism, etc., points to various polarities, ultimately inherent in the particles\r\nof which bodies are composed; the comparative atomic weights of\r\ndifferent kinds of bodies were ascertained by resolving into more general\r\nlaws the uniformities observed in the proportions in which substances combine\r\nwith one another, and so forth. Thus, although every resolution of a\r\ncomplex uniformity into simpler and more elementary laws has an apparent\r\ntendency to diminish the number of the ultimate properties, and really\r\ndoes remove many properties from the list; yet (since the result of this\r\nsimplifying process is to trace up an ever greater variety of different effects\r\nto the same agents) the further we advance in this direction, the\r\ngreater number of distinct properties we are forced to recognize in one\r\nand the same object; the co-existences of which properties must accordingly\r\nbe ranked among the ultimate generalities of nature.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 3. There are, therefore, only two kinds of propositions which assert\r\nuniformity of co-existence between properties. Either the properties depend\r\non causes or they do not. If they do, the proposition which affirms\r\nthem to be co-existent is a derivative law of co-existence between effects,\r\nand, until resolved into the laws of causation on which it depends, is an\r\nempirical law, and to be tried by the principles of induction to which such\r\nlaws are amenable. If, on the other hand, the properties do not depend\r\non causes, but are ultimate properties, then, if it be true that they invariably\r\nco-exist, they must all be ultimate properties of one and the same\r\nKind; and it is of these only that the co-existences can be classed as a\r\npeculiar sort of laws of nature.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWhen we affirm that all crows are black, or that all negroes have woolly\r\nhair, we assert a uniformity of co-existence. We assert that the property\r\nof blackness or of having woolly hair invariably co-exists with the properties\r\nwhich, in common language, or in the scientific classification that we\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page410\"\u003e[pg 410]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg410\" id=\"Pg410\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nadopt, are taken to constitute the class crow, or the class negro. Now,\r\nsupposing blackness to be an ultimate property of black objects, or woolly\r\nhair an ultimate property of the animals which possess it; supposing that\r\nthese properties are not results of causation, are not connected with antecedent\r\nphenomena by any law; then if all crows are black, and all negroes\r\nhave woolly hair, these must be ultimate properties of the kind\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ecrow\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, or \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003enegro\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, or of some kind which\r\nincludes them. If, on the contrary, blackness\r\nor woolly hair be an effect depending on causes, these general propositions\r\nare manifestly empirical laws; and all that has already been said\r\nrespecting that class of generalizations may be applied without modification\r\nto these.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nNow, we have seen that in the case of all compounds—of all things, in\r\nshort, except the elementary substances and primary powers of nature—the\r\npresumption is, that the properties do really depend upon causes; and\r\nit is impossible in any case whatever to be certain that they do not. We\r\ntherefore should not be safe in claiming for any generalization respecting\r\nthe co-existence of properties, a degree of certainty to which, if the properties\r\nshould happen to be the result of causes, it would have no claim.\r\nA generalization respecting co-existence, or, in other words, respecting the\r\nproperties of kinds, may be an ultimate truth, but it may also be merely a\r\nderivative one; and since, if so, it is one of those derivative laws which\r\nare neither laws of causation nor have been resolved into the laws of causation\r\non which they depend, it can possess no higher degree of evidence\r\nthan belongs to an empirical law.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 4. This conclusion will be confirmed by the consideration of one great\r\ndeficiency, which precludes the application to the ultimate uniformities of\r\nco-existence, of a system of rigorous scientific induction, such as the uniformities\r\nin the succession of phenomena have been found to admit of.\r\nThe basis of such a system is wanting; there is no general axiom standing\r\nin the same relation to the uniformities of co-existence as the law of causation\r\ndoes to those of succession. The Methods of Induction applicable to\r\nthe ascertainment of causes and effects are grounded on the principle that\r\nevery thing which has a beginning must have some cause or other; that\r\namong the circumstances which actually existed at the time of its commencement,\r\nthere is certainly some one combination, on which the effect\r\nin question is unconditionally consequent, and on the repetition of which\r\nit would certainly again recur. But in an inquiry whether some kind (as\r\ncrow) universally possesses a certain property (as blackness), there is no\r\nroom for any assumption analogous to this. We have no previous certainty\r\nthat the property must have something which constantly co-exists with\r\nit; must have an invariable co-existent, in the same manner as an event\r\nmust have an invariable antecedent. When we feel pain, we must be in\r\nsome circumstances under which, if exactly repeated, we should always feel\r\npain. But when we are conscious of blackness, it does not follow that\r\nthere is something else present of which blackness is a constant accompaniment.\r\nThere is, therefore, no room for elimination; no method of Agreement\r\nor Difference, or of Concomitant Variations (which is but a modification\r\neither of the Method of Agreement or of the Method of Difference).\r\nWe can not conclude that the blackness we see in crows must be an invariable\r\nproperty of crows merely because there is nothing else present of\r\nwhich it can be an invariable property. We therefore inquire into the\r\ntruth of a proposition like \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“All crows are black,”\u003c/span\u003e under the same disadvantage\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page411\"\u003e[pg 411]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg411\" id=\"Pg411\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nas if, in our inquiries into causation, we were compelled to let in, as\r\none of the possibilities, that the effect may in that particular instance have\r\narisen without any cause at all.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nTo overlook this grand distinction was, as it seems to me, the capital\r\nerror in Bacon’s view of inductive philosophy. The principle of elimination,\r\nthat great logical instrument which he had the immense merit of first\r\nbringing into general use, he deemed applicable in the same sense, and in\r\nas unqualified a manner, to the investigation of the co-existences, as to that\r\nof the successions of phenomena. He seems to have thought that as every\r\nevent has a cause, or invariable antecedent, so every property of an object\r\nhas an invariable co-existent, which he called its form; and the examples\r\nhe chiefly selected for the application and illustration of his method, were\r\ninquiries into such forms; attempts to determine in what else all those\r\nobjects resembled, which agreed in some one general property, as hardness\r\nor softness, dryness or moistness, heat or coldness. Such inquiries could\r\nlead to no result. The objects seldom have any such circumstances in\r\ncommon. They usually agree in the one point inquired into, and in nothing\r\nelse. A great proportion of the properties which, so far as we can\r\nconjecture, are the likeliest to be really ultimate, would seem to be inherently\r\nproperties of many different kinds of things not allied in any other\r\nrespect. And as for the properties which, being effects of causes, we are\r\nable to give some account of, they have generally nothing to do with the\r\nultimate resemblances or diversities in the objects themselves, but depend\r\non some outward circumstances, under the influence of which any objects\r\nwhatever are capable of manifesting those properties; as is emphatically\r\nthe case with those favorite subjects of Bacon’s scientific inquiries, hotness\r\nand coldness, as well as with hardness and softness, solidity and fluidity,\r\nand many other conspicuous qualities.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIn the absence, then, of any universal law of co-existence similar to the\r\nuniversal law of causation which regulates sequence, we are thrown back\r\nupon the unscientific induction of the ancients, \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eper\r\nenumerationem simplicem, ubi non reperitur instantia contradictoria\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e. The\r\nreason we have for believing that all crows are black, is simply that we have seen and\r\nheard of many black crows, and never one of any other color. It remains to be\r\nconsidered how far this evidence can reach, and how we are to measure its\r\nstrength in any given case.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 5. It sometimes happens that a mere change in the mode of verbally\r\nenunciating a question, though nothing is really added to the meaning expressed,\r\nis of itself a considerable step toward its solution. This, I think,\r\nhappens in the present instance. The degree of certainty of any generalization\r\nwhich rests on no other evidence than the agreement, so far as it goes,\r\nof all past observation, is but another phrase for the degree of improbability\r\nthat an exception, if any existed, could have hitherto remained unobserved.\r\nThe reason for believing that all crows are black, is measured by the improbability\r\nthat crows of any other color should have existed to the present\r\ntime without our being aware of it. Let us state the question in this\r\nlast mode, and consider what is implied in the supposition that there may\r\nbe crows which are not black, and under what conditions we can be justified\r\nin regarding this as incredible.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIf there really exist crows which are not black, one of two things must\r\nbe the fact. Either the circumstance of blackness, in all crows hitherto\r\nobserved, must be, as it were, an accident, not connected with any distinction\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page412\"\u003e[pg 412]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg412\" id=\"Pg412\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nof Kind; or if it be a property of Kind, the crows which are not\r\nblack must be a new Kind, a Kind hitherto overlooked, though coming\r\nunder the same general description by which crows have hitherto been\r\ncharacterized. The first supposition would be proved true if we were to\r\ndiscover casually a white crow among black ones, or if it were found that\r\nblack crows sometimes turn white. The second would be shown to be the\r\nfact if in Australia or Central Africa a species or a race of white or gray\r\ncrows were found to exist.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 6. The former of these suppositions necessarily implies that the color\r\nis an effect of causation. If blackness, in the crows in which it has been\r\nobserved, be not a property of Kind, but can be present or absent without\r\nany difference generally in the properties of the object, then it is not an\r\nultimate fact in the individuals themselves, but is certainly dependent on a\r\ncause. There are, no doubt, many properties which vary from individual\r\nto individual of the same Kind, even the same \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-foreign\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003einfima\r\nspecies\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, or lowest Kind. Some flowers may be either white or red, without\r\ndiffering in any other respect. But these properties are not ultimate; they depend on\r\ncauses. So far as the properties of a thing belong to its own nature, and\r\ndo not arise from some cause extrinsic to it, they are always the same in\r\nthe same Kind. Take, for instance, all simple substances and elementary\r\npowers; the only things of which we are certain that some at least of their\r\nproperties are really ultimate. Color is generally esteemed the most variable\r\nof all properties: yet we do not find that sulphur is sometimes yellow\r\nand sometimes white, or that it varies in color at all, except so far as color\r\nis the effect of some extrinsic cause, as of the sort of light thrown upon it,\r\nthe mechanical arrangement of the particles (as after fusion), etc. We do\r\nnot find that iron is sometimes fluid and sometimes solid at the same temperature;\r\ngold sometimes malleable and sometimes brittle; that hydrogen\r\nwill sometimes combine with oxygen and sometimes not; or the like. If\r\nfrom simple substances we pass to any of their definite compounds, as\r\nwater, lime, or sulphuric acid, there is the same constancy in their properties.\r\nWhen properties vary from individual to individual, it is either in\r\nthe case of miscellaneous aggregations, such as atmospheric air or rock,\r\ncomposed of heterogeneous substances, and not constituting or belonging\r\nto any real Kind,\u003ca id=\"noteref_191\" name=\"noteref_191\" href=\"#note_191\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e191\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nor it is in the case of organic beings. In them, indeed,\r\nthere is variability in a high degree. Animals of the same species and\r\nrace, human beings of the same age, sex, and country, will be most different,\r\nfor example, in face and figure. But organized beings (from the extreme\r\ncomplication of the laws by which they are regulated) being more\r\neminently modifiable, that is, liable to be influenced by a greater number\r\nand variety of causes, than any other phenomena whatever; having also\r\nthemselves had a beginning, and therefore a cause; there is reason to believe\r\nthat none of their properties are ultimate, but all of them derivative,\r\nand produced by causation. And the presumption is confirmed, by\r\nthe fact that the properties which vary from one individual to another, also\r\ngenerally vary more or less at different times in the same individual; which\r\nvariation, like any other event, supposes a cause, and implies, consequently,\r\nthat the properties are not independent of causation.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIf, therefore, blackness be merely accidental in crows, and capable of\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page413\"\u003e[pg 413]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg413\" id=\"Pg413\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nvarying while the Kind remains the same, its presence or absence is doubtless\r\nno ultimate fact, but the effect of some unknown cause: and in that\r\ncase the universality of the experience that all crows are black is sufficient\r\nproof of a common cause, and establishes the generalization as an empirical\r\nlaw. Since there are innumerable instances in the affirmative, and hitherto\r\nnone at all in the negative, the causes on which the property depends must\r\nexist everywhere in the limits of the observations which have been made;\r\nand the proposition may be received as universal within those limits, and\r\nwith the allowable degree of extension to adjacent cases.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 7. If, in the second place, the property, in the instances in which it has\r\nbeen observed, is not an effect of causation, it is a property of Kind; and\r\nin that case the generalization can only be set aside by the discovery of a\r\nnew Kind of crow. That, however, a peculiar Kind not hitherto discovered\r\nshould exist in nature, is a supposition so often realized that it can not\r\nbe considered at all improbable. We have nothing to authorize us in attempting\r\nto limit the Kinds of things which exist in nature. The only\r\nunlikelihood would be that a new Kind should be discovered in localities\r\nwhich there was previously reason to believe had been thoroughly explored;\r\nand even this improbability depends on the degree of conspicuousness\r\nof the difference between the newly-discovered Kind and all others,\r\nsince new kinds of minerals, plants, and even animals, previously overlooked\r\nor confounded with known species, are still continually detected in the\r\nmost frequented situations. On this second ground, therefore, as well as\r\non the first, the observed uniformity of co-existence can only hold good as\r\nan empirical law, within the limits not only of actual observation, but of an\r\nobservation as accurate as the nature of the case required. And hence it\r\nis that (as remarked in an early chapter of the present book) we so often\r\ngive up generalizations of this class at the first summons. If any credible\r\nwitness stated that he had seen a white crow, under circumstances which\r\nmade it not incredible that it should have escaped notice previously, we\r\nshould give full credence to the statement.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt appears, then, that the uniformities which obtain in the co-existence of\r\nphenomena—those which we have reason to consider as ultimate, no less\r\nthan those which arise from the laws of causes yet undetected—are entitled\r\nto reception only as empirical laws; are not to be presumed true except\r\nwithin the limits of time, place, and circumstance, in which the observations\r\nwere made, or except in cases strictly adjacent.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 8. We have seen in the last chapter that there is a point of generality\r\nat which empirical laws become as certain as laws of nature, or, rather, at\r\nwhich there is no longer any distinction between empirical laws and laws\r\nof nature. As empirical laws approach this point, in other words, as they\r\nrise in their degree of generality, they become more certain; their universality\r\nmay be more strongly relied on. For, in the first place, if they are\r\nresults of causation (which, even in the class of uniformities treated of in\r\nthe present chapter, we never can be certain that they are not) the more\r\ngeneral they are, the greater is proved to be the space over which the\r\nnecessary collocations prevail, and within which no causes exist capable of\r\ncounteracting the unknown causes on which the empirical law depends.\r\nTo say that any thing is an invariable property of some very limited class\r\nof objects, is to say that it invariably accompanies some very numerous\r\nand complex group of distinguishing properties; which, if causation be at\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page414\"\u003e[pg 414]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg414\" id=\"Pg414\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nall concerned in the matter, argues a combination of many causes, and\r\ntherefore a great liability to counteraction; while the comparatively narrow\r\nrange of the observations renders it impossible to predict to what extent\r\nunknown counteracting causes may be distributed throughout nature.\r\nBut when a generalization has been found to hold good of a very large\r\nproportion of all things whatever, it is already proved that nearly all the\r\ncauses which exist in nature have no power over it; that very few changes\r\nin the combination of causes can affect it; since the greater number of\r\npossible combinations must have already existed in some one or other of\r\nthe instances in which it has been found true. If, therefore, any empirical\r\nlaw is a result of causation, the more general it is, the more it may be depended\r\non. And even if it be no result of causation, but an ultimate co-existence,\r\nthe more general it is, the greater amount of experience it is derived\r\nfrom, and the greater therefore is the probability that if exceptions\r\nhad existed, some would already have presented themselves.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nFor these reasons, it requires much more evidence to establish an exception\r\nto one of the more general empirical laws than to the more special\r\nones. We should not have any difficulty in believing that there might be\r\na new Kind of crow; or a new kind of bird resembling a crow in the\r\nproperties hitherto considered distinctive of that Kind. But it would require\r\nstronger proof to convince us of the existence of a Kind of crow having\r\nproperties at variance with any generally recognized universal property\r\nof birds; and a still higher degree if the properties conflict with any recognized\r\nuniversal property of animals. And this is conformable to the\r\nmode of judgment recommended by the common sense and general practice\r\nof mankind, who are more incredulous as to any novelties in nature,\r\naccording to the degree of generality of the experience which these novelties\r\nseem to contradict.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 9. It is conceivable that the alleged properties might conflict with\r\nsome recognized universal property of all matter. In that case their improbability\r\nwould be at the highest, but would not even then amount to\r\nincredibility. There are only two known properties common to all matter;\r\nin other words, there is but one known uniformity of co-existence of\r\nproperties co-extensive with all physical nature, namely, that whatever opposes\r\nresistance to movement gravitates, or, as Professor Bain expresses it,\r\nInertia and Gravity are co-existent through all matter, and proportionate\r\nin their amount. These properties, as he truly says, are not mutually implicated;\r\nfrom neither of them could we, on grounds of causation, presume\r\nthe other. But, for this very reason, we are never certain that a Kind may\r\nnot be discovered possessing one of the properties without the other. The\r\nhypothetical ether, if it exists, may be such a Kind. Our senses can not\r\nrecognize in it either resistance or gravity; but if the reality of a resisting\r\nmedium should eventually be proved (by alteration, for example, in the\r\ntimes of revolution of periodic comets, combined with the evidences afforded\r\nby the phenomena of light and heat), it would be rash to conclude from\r\nthis alone, without other proofs, that it must gravitate.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nFor even the greater generalizations, which embrace comprehensive Kinds\r\ncontaining under them a great number and variety of \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-foreign\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003einfimæ\r\nspecies\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, are\r\nonly empirical laws, resting on induction by simple enumeration merely, and\r\nnot on any process of elimination—a process wholly inapplicable to this\r\nsort of case. Such generalizations, therefore, ought to be grounded on an\r\nexamination of all the \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-foreign\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003einfimæ species\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e comprehended in\r\nthem, and not of a\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page415\"\u003e[pg 415]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg415\" id=\"Pg415\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nportion only. We can not conclude (where causation is not concerned),\r\nbecause a proposition is true of a number of things resembling one another\r\nonly in being animals, that it is therefore true of all animals. If, indeed,\r\nany thing be true of species which differ more from one another than either\r\ndiffers from a third, especially if that third species occupies in most of its\r\nknown properties a position between the two former, there is some probability\r\nthat the same thing will also be true of that intermediate species; for\r\nit is often, though by no means universally, found, that there is a sort of\r\nparallelism in the properties of different Kinds, and that their degree of\r\nunlikeness in one respect bears some proportion to their unlikeness in others.\r\nWe see this parallelism in the properties of the different metals; in\r\nthose of sulphur, phosphorus, and carbon; of chlorine, iodine, and bromine;\r\nin the natural orders of plants and animals, etc. But there are innumerable\r\nanomalies and exceptions to this sort of conformity; if indeed the conformity\r\nitself be any thing but an anomaly and an exception in nature.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nUniversal propositions, therefore, respecting the properties of superior\r\nKinds, unless grounded on proved or presumed connection by causation,\r\nought not to be hazarded except after separately examining every known\r\nsub-kind included in the larger Kind. And even then such generalizations\r\nmust be held in readiness to be given up on the occurrence of some new\r\nanomaly, which, when the uniformity is not derived from causation, can\r\nnever, even in the case of the most general of these empirical laws, be considered\r\nvery improbable. Thus, all the universal propositions which it has\r\nbeen attempted to lay down respecting simple substances, or concerning\r\nany of the classes which have been formed among simple substances (and\r\nthe attempt has been often made), have, with the progress of experience,\r\neither faded into inanity, or been proved to be erroneous; and each Kind\r\nof simple substance remains, with its own collection of properties apart\r\nfrom the rest, saving a certain parallelism with a few other Kinds, the most\r\nsimilar to itself. In organized beings, indeed, there are abundance of\r\npropositions ascertained to be universally true of superior genera, to many\r\nof which the discovery hereafter of any exceptions must be regarded as\r\nextremely improbable. But these, as already observed, are, we have every\r\nreason to believe, properties dependent on causation.\u003ca id=\"noteref_192\" name=\"noteref_192\" href=\"#note_192\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e192\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page416\"\u003e[pg 416]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg416\" id=\"Pg416\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nUniformities of co-existence, then, not only when they are consequences\r\nof laws of succession, but also when they are ultimate truths, must be\r\nranked, for the purpose of logic, among empirical laws; and are amenable\r\nin every respect to the same rules with those unresolved uniformities which\r\nare known to be dependent on causation.\u003ca id=\"noteref_193\" name=\"noteref_193\" href=\"#note_193\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e193\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-div\" style=\"margin-bottom: 4.00em; margin-top: 4.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"toc87\" id=\"toc86\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"pdf88\" id=\"pdf88\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: center; margin-bottom: 2.40em; margin-top: 2.40em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 120%\"\u003eChapter XXIII.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: left; margin-bottom: 2.88em; margin-top: 2.88em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 144%\"\u003eOf Approximate Generalizations, And Probable Evidence.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 1. In our inquiries into the nature of the inductive process, we must\r\nnot confine our notice to such generalizations from experience as profess to\r\nbe universally true. There is a class of inductive truths avowedly not universal;\r\nin which it is not pretended that the predicate is always true of\r\nthe subject; but the value of which, as generalizations, is nevertheless extremely\r\ngreat. An important portion of the field of inductive knowledge\r\ndoes not consist of universal truths, but of approximations to such truths;\r\nand when a conclusion is said to rest on probable evidence, the premises it\r\nis drawn from are usually generalizations of this sort.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAs every certain inference respecting a particular case implies that there\r\nis ground for a general proposition of the form, every A is B; so does every\r\nprobable inference suppose that there is ground for a proposition of the\r\nform, Most A are B; and the degree of probability of the inference in an average\r\ncase will depend on the proportion between the number of instances\r\nexisting in nature which accord with the generalization, and the number of\r\nthose which conflict with it.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 2. Propositions in the form, Most A are B, are of a very different degree\r\nof importance in science, and in the practice of life. To the scientific\r\ninquirer they are valuable chiefly as materials for, and steps toward universal\r\ntruths. The discovery of these is the proper end of science; its work\r\nis not done if it stops at the proposition that a majority of A are B, without\r\ncircumscribing that majority by some common character, fitted to distinguish\r\nthem from the minority. Independently of the inferior precision\r\nof such imperfect generalizations, and the inferior assurance with which\r\nthey can be applied to individual cases, it is plain that, compared with exact\r\ngeneralizations, they are almost useless as means of discovering ulterior\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page417\"\u003e[pg 417]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg417\" id=\"Pg417\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\ntruths by way of deduction. We may, it is true, by combining the proposition\r\nMost A are B, with a universal proposition, Every B is C, arrive\r\nat the conclusion that Most A are C. But when a second proposition of\r\nthe approximate kind is introduced—or even when there is but one, if that\r\none be the major premise—nothing can, in general, be positively concluded.\r\nWhen the major is Most B are D, then, even if the minor be Every A is B,\r\nwe can not infer that most A are D, or with any certainty that even some\r\nA are D. Though the majority of the class B have the attribute signified\r\nby D, the whole of the sub-class A may belong to the minority.\u003ca id=\"noteref_194\" name=\"noteref_194\" href=\"#note_194\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e194\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThough so little use can be made, in science, of approximate generalizations,\r\nexcept as a stage on the road to something better, for practical guidance\r\nthey are often all we have to rely on. Even when science has really\r\ndetermined the universal laws of any phenomenon, not only are those laws\r\ngenerally too much encumbered with conditions to be adapted for everyday\r\nuse, but the cases which present themselves in life are too complicated,\r\nand our decisions require to be taken too rapidly, to admit of waiting till\r\nthe existence of a phenomenon can be proved by what have been scientifically\r\nascertained to be universal marks of it. To be indecisive and reluctant\r\nto act, because we have not evidence of a perfectly conclusive character\r\nto act on, is a defect sometimes incident to scientific minds, but which,\r\nwherever it exists, renders them unfit for practical emergencies. If we\r\nwould succeed in action, we must judge by indications which, though they\r\ndo not generally mislead us, sometimes do, and must make up, as far as\r\npossible, for the incomplete conclusiveness of any one indication, by obtaining\r\nothers to corroborate it. The principles of induction applicable to\r\napproximate generalization are therefore a not less important subject of inquiry\r\nthan the rules for the investigation of universal truths; and might\r\nreasonably be expected to detain us almost as long, were it not that these\r\nprinciples are mere corollaries from those which have been already treated\r\nof.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 3. There are two sorts of cases in which we are forced to guide ourselves\r\nby generalizations of the imperfect form, Most A are B. The first\r\nis, when we have no others; when we have not been able to carry our investigation\r\nof the laws of the phenomena any further; as in the following\r\npropositions—Most dark-eyed persons have dark hair; Most springs contain\r\nmineral substances; Most stratified formations contain fossils. The\r\nimportance of this class of generalizations is not very great; for, though it\r\nfrequently happens that we see no reason why that which is true of most\r\nindividuals of a class is not true of the remainder, nor are able to bring the\r\nformer under any general description which can distinguish them from the\r\nlatter, yet if we are willing to be satisfied with propositions of a less degree\r\nof generality, and to break down the class A into sub-classes, we may\r\ngenerally obtain a collection of propositions exactly true. We do not know\r\nwhy most wood is lighter than water, nor can we point out any general\r\nproperty which discriminates wood that is lighter than water from that\r\nwhich is heavier. But we know exactly what species are the one and\r\nwhat the other. And if we meet with a specimen not conformable to any\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page418\"\u003e[pg 418]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg418\" id=\"Pg418\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nknown species (the only case in which our previous knowledge affords no\r\nother guidance than the approximate generalization), we can generally\r\nmake a specific experiment, which is a surer resource.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt often happens, however, that the proposition, Most A are B, is not\r\nthe ultimatum of our scientific attainments, though the knowledge we possess\r\nbeyond it can not conveniently be brought to bear upon the particular\r\ninstance. We may know well enough what circumstances distinguish the\r\nportion of A which has the attribute B from the portion which has it not,\r\nbut may have no means, or may not have time, to examine whether those\r\ncharacteristic circumstances exist or not in the individual case. This is\r\nthe situation we are generally in when the inquiry is of the kind called\r\nmoral, that is, of the kind which has in view to predict human actions.\r\nTo enable us to affirm any thing universally concerning the actions of\r\nclasses of human beings, the classification must be grounded on the circumstances\r\nof their mental culture and habits, which in an individual case are\r\nseldom exactly known; and classes grounded on these distinctions would\r\nnever precisely accord with those into which mankind are divided for social\r\npurposes. All propositions which can be framed respecting the actions\r\nof human beings as ordinarily classified, or as classified according to any\r\nkind of outward indications, are merely approximate. We can only say,\r\nMost persons of a particular age, profession, country, or rank in society,\r\nhave such and such qualities; or, Most persons, when placed in certain\r\ncircumstances, act in such and such a way. Not that we do not often\r\nknow well enough on what causes the qualities depend, or what sort of\r\npersons they are who act in that particular way; but we have seldom the\r\nmeans of knowing whether any individual person has been under the influence\r\nof those causes, or is a person of that particular sort. We could replace\r\nthe approximate generalizations by propositions universally true;\r\nbut these would hardly ever be capable of being applied to practice. We\r\nshould be sure of our majors, but we should not be able to get minors to\r\nfit; we are forced, therefore, to draw our conclusions from coarser and\r\nmore fallible indications.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 4. Proceeding now to consider what is to be regarded as sufficient evidence\r\nof an approximate generalization, we can have no difficulty in at\r\nonce recognizing that, when admissible at all, it is admissible only as an\r\nempirical law. Propositions of the form, Every A is B, are not necessarily\r\nlaws of causation, or ultimate uniformities of co-existence; propositions\r\nlike Most A are B, \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ecan not\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e be so. Propositions hitherto found true in every\r\nobserved instance may yet be no necessary consequence of laws of causation,\r\nor of ultimate uniformities, and unless they are so, may, for aught\r\nwe know, be false beyond the limits of actual observation; still more evidently\r\nmust this be the case with propositions which are only true in a\r\nmere majority of the observed instances.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThere is some difference, however, in the degree of certainty of the\r\nproposition, Most A are B, according as that approximate generalization\r\ncomposes the whole of our knowledge of the subject, or not. Suppose,\r\nfirst, that the former is the case. We know only that most A are B, not\r\nwhy they are so, nor in what respect those which are differ from those\r\nwhich are not. How, then, did we learn that most A are B? Precisely\r\nin the manner in which we should have learned, had such happened to be\r\nthe fact that all A are B. We collected a number of instances sufficient\r\nto eliminate chance, and, having done so, compared the number of instances\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page419\"\u003e[pg 419]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg419\" id=\"Pg419\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nin the affirmative with the number in the negative. The result, like other\r\nunresolved derivative laws, can be relied on solely within the limits not\r\nonly of place and time, but also of circumstance, under which its truth has\r\nbeen actually observed; for, as we are supposed to be ignorant of the\r\ncauses which make the proposition true, we can not tell in what manner\r\nany new circumstance might perhaps affect it. The proposition, Most\r\njudges are inaccessible to bribes, would probably be found true of Englishmen,\r\nFrenchmen, Germans, North Americans, and so forth; but if on this\r\nevidence alone we extended the assertion to Orientals, we should step beyond\r\nthe limits, not only of place but of circumstance, within which the\r\nfact had been observed, and should let in possibilities of the absence of the\r\ndetermining causes, or the presence of counteracting ones, which might be\r\nfatal to the approximate generalization.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIn the case where the approximate proposition is not the ultimatum of\r\nour scientific knowledge, but only the most available form of it for practical\r\nguidance; where we know, not only that most A have the attribute B,\r\nbut also the causes of B, or some properties by which the portion of A\r\nwhich has that attribute is distinguished from the portion which has it\r\nnot, we are rather more favorably situated than in the preceding case.\r\nFor we have now a double mode of ascertaining whether it be true that\r\nmost A are B; the direct mode, as before, and an indirect one, that of examining\r\nwhether the proposition admits of being deduced from the known\r\ncause, or from any known criterion, of B. Let the question, for example,\r\nbe whether most Scotchmen can read? We may not have observed, or\r\nreceived the testimony of others respecting, a sufficient number and variety\r\nof Scotchmen to ascertain this fact; but when we consider that the cause\r\nof being able to read is the having been taught it, another mode of determining\r\nthe question presents itself, namely, by inquiring whether most\r\nScotchmen have been sent to schools where reading is effectually taught.\r\nOf these two modes, sometimes one and sometimes the other is the more\r\navailable. In some cases, the frequency of the effect is the more accessible\r\nto that extensive and varied observation which is indispensable to the\r\nestablishment of an empirical law; at other times, the frequency of the\r\ncauses, or of some collateral indications. It commonly happens that neither\r\nis susceptible of so satisfactory an induction as could be desired, and\r\nthat the grounds on which the conclusion is received are compounded of\r\nboth. Thus a person may believe that most Scotchmen can read, because,\r\nso far as his information extends, most Scotchmen have been sent to school,\r\nand most Scotch schools teach reading effectually; and also because most\r\nof the Scotchmen whom he has known or heard of could read; though neither\r\nof these two sets of observations may by itself fulfill the necessary\r\nconditions of extent and variety.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAlthough the approximate generalization may in most cases be indispensable\r\nfor our guidance, even when we know the cause, or some certain\r\nmark, of the attribute predicated, it needs hardly be observed that we may\r\nalways replace the uncertain indication by a certain one, in any case in\r\nwhich we can actually recognize the existence of the cause or mark. For\r\nexample, an assertion is made by a witness, and the question is whether to\r\nbelieve it. If we do not look to any of the individual circumstances of the\r\ncase, we have nothing to direct us but the approximate generalization,\r\nthat truth is more common than falsehood, or, in other words, that most\r\npersons, on most occasions, speak truth. But if we consider in what circumstances\r\nthe cases where truth is spoken differ from those in which it is\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page420\"\u003e[pg 420]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg420\" id=\"Pg420\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nnot, we find, for instance, the following: the witness’s being an honest person\r\nor not; his being an accurate observer or not; his having an interest\r\nto serve in the matter or not. Now, not only may we be able to obtain\r\nother approximate generalizations respecting the degree of frequency of\r\nthese various possibilities, but we may know which of them is positively\r\nrealized in the individual case. That the witness has or has not an interest\r\nto serve, we perhaps know directly; and the other two points indirectly,\r\nby means of marks; as, for example, from his conduct on some former\r\noccasion; or from his reputation, which, though a very uncertain mark, affords\r\nan approximate generalization (as, for instance, Most persons who\r\nare believed to be honest by those with whom they have had frequent dealings,\r\nare really so), which approaches nearer to a universal truth than the\r\napproximate general proposition with which we set out, viz., Most persons\r\non most occasions speak truth.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAs it seems unnecessary to dwell further on the question of the evidence\r\nof approximate generalizations, we shall proceed to a not less important\r\ntopic, that of the cautions to be observed in arguing from these incompletely\r\nuniversal propositions to particular cases.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 5. So far as regards the direct application of an approximate generalization\r\nto an individual instance, this question presents no difficulty. If the\r\nproposition, Most A are B, has been established, by a sufficient induction,\r\nas an empirical law, we may conclude that any particular A is B with a\r\nprobability proportioned to the preponderance of the number of affirmative\r\ninstances over the number of exceptions. If it has been found practicable\r\nto attain numerical precision in the data, a corresponding degree of precision\r\nmay be given to the evaluation of the chances of error in the conclusion.\r\nIf it can be established as an empirical law that nine out of every ten\r\nA are B, there will be one chance in ten of error in assuming that any A,\r\nnot individually known to us, is a B: but this of course holds only within\r\nthe limits of time, place, and circumstance, embraced in the observations,\r\nand therefore can not be counted on for any sub-class or variety of A (or\r\nfor A in any set of external circumstances) which were not included in the\r\naverage. It must be added, that we can guide ourselves by the proposition,\r\nNine out of every ten A are B, only in cases of which we know nothing except\r\nthat they fall within the class A. For if we know, of any particular\r\ninstances \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ei\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, not only that it falls under A, but to what species\r\nor variety of A it belongs, we shall generally err in applying to\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ei\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e the average struck for the whole genus, from which the average\r\ncorresponding to that species alone would, in all probability, materially differ. And so\r\nif \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ei\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, instead of being\r\na particular sort of instance, is an instance known to be under the influence\r\nof a particular set of circumstances, the presumption drawn from\r\nthe numerical proportions in the whole genus would probably, in such a\r\ncase, only mislead. A general average should only be applied to cases which\r\nare neither known, nor can be presumed, to be other than average cases.\r\nSuch averages, therefore, are commonly of little use for the practical guidance\r\nof any affairs but those which concern large numbers. Tables of the\r\nchances of life are useful to insurance offices, but they go a very little way\r\ntoward informing any one of the chances of his own life, or any other life\r\nin which he is interested, since almost every life is either better or worse\r\nthan the average. Such averages can only be considered as supplying the\r\nfirst term in a series of approximations; the subsequent terms proceeding\r\non an appreciation of the circumstances belonging to the particular case.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page421\"\u003e[pg 421]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg421\" id=\"Pg421\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 6. From the application of a single approximate generalization to individual\r\ncases, we proceed to the application of two or more of them together\r\nto the same case.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWhen a judgment applied to an individual instance is grounded on two\r\napproximate generalizations taken in conjunction, the propositions may cooperate\r\ntoward the result in two different ways. In the one, each proposition\r\nis separately applicable to the case in hand, and our object in combining\r\nthem is to give to the conclusion in that particular case the double\r\nprobability arising from the two propositions separately. This may be\r\ncalled joining two probabilities by way of Addition; and the result is a\r\nprobability greater than either. The other mode is, when only one of the\r\npropositions is directly applicable to the case, the second being only applicable\r\nto it by virtue of the application of the first. This is joining two\r\nprobabilities by way of Ratiocination or Deduction; the result of which is\r\na less probability than either. The type of the first argument is, Most A\r\nare B; most C are B; this thing is both an A and a C; therefore it is\r\nprobably a B. The type of the second is, Most A are B; most C are A;\r\nthis is a C; therefore it is probably an A, therefore it is probably a B.\r\nThe first is exemplified when we prove a fact by the testimony of two unconnected\r\nwitnesses; the second, when we adduce only the testimony of one\r\nwitness that he has heard the thing asserted by another. Or again, in the\r\nfirst mode it may be argued that the accused committed the crime, because\r\nhe concealed himself, and because his clothes were stained with blood; in\r\nthe second, that he committed it because he washed or destroyed his clothes,\r\nwhich is supposed to render it probable that they were stained with blood.\r\nInstead of only two links, as in these instances, we may suppose chains of\r\nany length. A chain of the former kind was termed by\r\nBentham\u003ca id=\"noteref_195\" name=\"noteref_195\" href=\"#note_195\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e195\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e a self-corroborative\r\nchain of evidence; the second, a self-infirmative chain.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWhen approximate generalizations are joined by way of addition, we may\r\ndeduce from the theory of probabilities laid down in a former chapter, in\r\nwhat manner each of them adds to the probability of a conclusion which\r\nhas the warrant of them all.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIf, on an average, two of every three As are Bs, and three of every four\r\nCs are Bs, the probability that something which is both an A and a C is a\r\nB, will be more than two in three, or than three in four. Of every twelve\r\nthings which are As, all except four are Bs by the supposition; and if the\r\nwhole twelve, and consequently those four, have the characters of C likewise,\r\nthree of these will be Bs on that ground. Therefore, out of twelve\r\nwhich are both As and Cs, eleven are Bs. To state the argument in another\r\nway; a thing which is both an A and a C, but which is not a B, is found\r\nin only one of three sections of the class A, and in only one of four sections\r\nof the class C; but this fourth of C being spread over the whole of A indiscriminately,\r\nonly one-third part of it (or one-twelfth of the whole number)\r\nbelongs to the third section of A; therefore a thing which is not a B\r\noccurs only once, among twelve things which are both As and Cs. The\r\nargument would, in the language of the doctrine of chances, be thus expressed:\r\nthe chance that an A is not a B is ⅓, the chance that a C is not a\r\nB is ¼; hence if the thing be both an A and a C, the chance is ⅓ of ¼ =\r\n¹⁄₁₂.\u003ca id=\"noteref_196\" name=\"noteref_196\" href=\"#note_196\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e196\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page422\"\u003e[pg 422]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg422\" id=\"Pg422\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIn this computation it is of course supposed that the probabilities arising\r\nfrom A and C are independent of each other. There must not be any such\r\nconnection between A and C, that when a thing belongs to the one class it\r\nwill therefore belong to the other, or even have a greater chance of doing\r\nso. Otherwise the not-Bs which are Cs may be, most or even all of them,\r\nidentical with the not-Bs which are As; in which last case the probability\r\narising from A and C together will be no greater than that arising from A\r\nalone.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWhen approximate generalizations are joined together in the other mode,\r\nthat of deduction, the degree of probability of the inference, instead of increasing,\r\ndiminishes at each step. From two such premises as Most A are\r\nB, Most B are C, we can not with certainty conclude that even a single A\r\nis C; for the whole of the portion of A which in any way falls under B,\r\nmay perhaps be comprised in the exceptional part of it. Still, the two\r\npropositions in question afford an appreciable probability that any given A\r\nis C, provided the average on which the second proposition is grounded\r\nwas taken fairly with reference to the first; provided the proposition, Most\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page423\"\u003e[pg 423]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg423\" id=\"Pg423\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nB are C, was arrived at in a manner leaving no suspicion that the probability\r\narising from it is otherwise than fairly distributed over the section of B\r\nwhich belongs to A. For though the instances which are A \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003emay\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e be all in\r\nthe minority, they may, also, be all in the majority; and the one possibility\r\nis to be set against the other. On the whole, the probability arising from\r\nthe two propositions taken together, will be correctly measured by the probability\r\narising from the one, abated in the ratio of that arising from the\r\nother. If nine out of ten Swedes have light hair, and eight out of nine inhabitants\r\nof Stockholm are Swedes, the probability arising from these two\r\npropositions, that any given inhabitant of Stockholm is light-haired, will\r\namount to eight in ten; though it is rigorously possible that the whole\r\nSwedish population of Stockholm might belong to that tenth section of the\r\npeople of Sweden who are an exception to the rest.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIf the premises are known to be true not of a bare majority, but of nearly\r\nthe whole, of their respective subjects, we may go on joining one such\r\nproposition to another for several steps, before we reach a conclusion not\r\npresumably true even of a majority. The error of the conclusion will\r\namount to the aggregate of the errors of all the premises. Let the proposition,\r\nmost A are B, be true of nine in ten; Most B are C, of eight in\r\nnine; then not only will one A in ten not be C, because not B, but even of\r\nthe nine-tenths which are B, only eight-ninths will be C; that is, the cases\r\nof A which are C will be only ⁸⁄₉ of ⁹⁄₁₀, or four-fifths. Let us now add\r\nMost C are D, and suppose this to be true of seven cases out of eight;\r\nthe proportion of A which is D will be only ⅞ of ⁸⁄₉ of ⁹⁄₁₀, or ⁷⁄₁₀. Thus the\r\nprobability progressively dwindles. The experience, however, on which our\r\napproximate generalizations are grounded, has so rarely been subjected to,\r\nor admits of, accurate numerical estimation, that we can not in general apply\r\nany measurement to the diminution of probability which takes place at\r\neach illation; but must be content with remembering that it does diminish\r\nat every step, and that unless the premises approach very nearly indeed to\r\nbeing universally true, the conclusion after a very few steps is worth nothing.\r\nA hearsay of a hearsay, or an argument from presumptive evidence\r\ndepending not on immediate marks but on marks of marks, is worthless at\r\na very few removes from the first stage.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 7. There are, however, two cases in which reasonings depending on approximate\r\ngeneralizations may be carried to any length we please with as\r\nmuch assurance, and are as strictly scientific, as if they were composed of\r\nuniversal laws of nature. But these cases are exceptions of the sort which\r\nare currently said to prove the rule. The approximate generalizations are\r\nas suitable, in the cases in question, for purposes of ratiocination, as if they\r\nwere complete generalizations, because they are capable of being transformed\r\ninto complete generalizations exactly equivalent.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nFirst: If the approximate generalization is of the class in which our reason\r\nfor stopping at the approximation is not the impossibility, but only the\r\ninconvenience, of going further; if we are cognizant of the character which\r\ndistinguishes the cases that accord with the generalization from those\r\nwhich are exceptions to it; we may then substitute for the approximate\r\nproposition, a universal proposition with a proviso. The proposition,\r\nMost persons who have uncontrolled power employ it ill, is a generalization\r\nof this class, and may be transformed into the following: All persons who\r\nhave uncontrolled power employ it ill, provided they are not persons of unusual\r\nstrength of judgment and rectitude of purpose. The proposition,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page424\"\u003e[pg 424]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg424\" id=\"Pg424\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\ncarrying the hypothesis or proviso with it, may then be dealt with no longer\r\nas an approximate, but as a universal proposition; and to whatever number\r\nof steps the reasoning may reach, the hypothesis, being carried forward\r\nto the conclusion, will exactly indicate how far that conclusion is from being\r\napplicable universally. If in the course of the argument other approximate\r\ngeneralizations are introduced, each of them being in like manner\r\nexpressed as a universal proposition with a condition annexed, the sum of\r\nall the conditions will appear at the end as the sum of all the errors which\r\naffect the conclusion. Thus, to the proposition last cited, let us add the\r\nfollowing: All absolute monarchs have uncontrolled power, unless their position\r\nis such that they need the active support of their subjects (as was\r\nthe case with Queen Elizabeth, Frederick of Prussia, and others). Combining\r\nthese two propositions, we can deduce from them a universal conclusion,\r\nwhich will be subject to both the hypotheses in the premises; All\r\nabsolute monarchs employ their power ill, unless their position makes them\r\nneed the active support of their subjects, or unless they are persons of unusual\r\nstrength of judgment and rectitude of purpose. It is of no consequence\r\nhow rapidly the errors in our premises accumulate, if we are able\r\nin this manner to record each error, and keep an account of the aggregate\r\nas it swells up.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nSecondly: there is a case in which approximate propositions, even without\r\nour taking note of the conditions under which they are not true of individual\r\ncases, are yet, for the purposes of science, universal ones; namely, in\r\nthe inquiries which relate to the properties not of individuals, but of multitudes.\r\nThe principal of these is the science of politics, or of human society.\r\nThis science is principally concerned with the actions not of solitary\r\nindividuals, but of masses; with the fortunes not of single persons, but\r\nof communities. For the statesman, therefore, it is generally enough to\r\nknow that \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003emost\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e persons act or are acted upon in a particular way; since\r\nhis speculations and his practical arrangements refer almost exclusively\r\nto cases in which the whole community, or some large portion of it, is\r\nacted upon at once, and in which, therefore, what is done or felt by \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003emost\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e\r\npersons determines the result produced by or upon the body at large. He\r\ncan get on well enough with approximate generalizations on human nature,\r\nsince what is true approximately of all individuals is true absolutely of all\r\nmasses. And even when the operations of individual men have a part to\r\nplay in his deductions, as when he is reasoning of kings, or other single\r\nrulers, still, as he is providing for indefinite duration, involving an indefinite\r\nsuccession of such individuals, he must in general both reason and act as\r\nif what is true of most persons were true of all.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe two kinds of considerations above adduced are a sufficient refutation\r\nof the popular error, that speculations on society and government, as\r\nresting on merely probable evidence, must be inferior in certainty and\r\nscientific accuracy to the conclusions of what are called the exact sciences,\r\nand less to be relied on in practice. There are reasons enough why the\r\nmoral sciences must remain inferior to at least the more perfect of the physical;\r\nwhy the laws of their more complicated phenomena can not be so\r\ncompletely deciphered, nor the phenomena predicted with the same degree\r\nof assurance. But though we can not attain to so many truths, there is no\r\nreason that those we can attain should deserve less reliance, or have less\r\nof a scientific character. Of this topic, however, I shall treat more systematically\r\nin the concluding Book, to which place any further consideration\r\nof it must be deferred.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page425\"\u003e[pg 425]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg425\" id=\"Pg425\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-div\" style=\"margin-bottom: 4.00em; margin-top: 4.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"toc89\" id=\"toc89\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"pdf90\" id=\"pdf90\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: center; margin-bottom: 2.40em; margin-top: 2.40em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 120%\"\u003eChapter XXIV.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: left; margin-bottom: 2.88em; margin-top: 2.88em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 144%\"\u003eOf The Remaining Laws Of Nature.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 1. In the First Book we found that all the assertions which can be\r\nconveyed by language, express some one or more of five different things:\r\nExistence; Order in Place; Order in Time; Causation; and\r\nResemblance.\u003ca id=\"noteref_197\" name=\"noteref_197\" href=\"#note_197\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e197\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nOf these, Causation, in our view of the subject, not being fundamentally\r\ndifferent from Order in Time, the five species of possible assertions are\r\nreduced to four. The propositions which affirm Order in Time in either\r\nof its two modes, Co-existence and Succession, have formed, thus far, the\r\nsubject of the present Book. And we have now concluded the exposition,\r\nso far as it falls within the limits assigned to this work, of the nature of\r\nthe evidence on which these propositions rest, and the processes of investigation\r\nby which they are ascertained and proved. There remain three\r\nclasses of facts: Existence, Order in Place, and Resemblance; in regard to\r\nwhich the same questions are now to be resolved.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nRegarding the first of these, very little needs be said. Existence in\r\ngeneral, is a subject not for our science, but for metaphysics. To determine\r\nwhat things can be recognized as really existing, independently of our\r\nown sensible or other impressions, and in what meaning the term is, in that\r\ncase, predicated of them, belongs to the consideration of \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Things in themselves,”\u003c/span\u003e\r\nfrom which, throughout this work, we have as much as possible\r\nkept aloof. Existence, so far as Logic is concerned about it, has reference\r\nonly to phenomena; to actual, or possible, states of external or internal\r\nconsciousness, in ourselves or others. Feelings of sensitive beings, or possibilities\r\nof having such feelings, are the only things the existence of which\r\ncan be a subject of logical induction, because the only things of which the\r\nexistence in individual cases can be a subject of experience.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt is true that a thing is said by us to exist, even when it is absent, and\r\ntherefore is not and can not be perceived. But even then, its existence is\r\nto us only another word for our conviction that we should perceive it on a\r\ncertain supposition; namely, if we were in the needful circumstances of\r\ntime and place, and endowed with the needful perfection of organs. My\r\nbelief that the Emperor of China exists, is simply my belief that if I were\r\ntransported to the imperial palace or some other locality in Pekin, I should\r\nsee him. My belief that Julius Cæsar existed, is my belief that I should\r\nhave seen him if I had been present in the field of Pharsalia, or in the\r\nsenate-house at Rome. When I believe that stars exist beyond the utmost\r\nrange of my vision, though assisted by the most powerful telescopes yet\r\ninvented, my belief, philosophically expressed, is, that with still better telescopes,\r\nif such existed, I could see them, or that they may be perceived by\r\nbeings less remote from them in space, or whose capacities of perception\r\nare superior to mine.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe existence, therefore, of a phenomenon, is but another word for its\r\nbeing perceived, or for the inferred possibility of perceiving it. When the\r\nphenomenon is within the range of present observation, by present observation\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page426\"\u003e[pg 426]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg426\" id=\"Pg426\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nwe assure ourselves of its existence; when it is beyond that range,\r\nand is therefore said to be absent, we infer its existence from marks or evidences.\r\nBut what can these evidences be? Other phenomena; ascertained\r\nby induction to be connected with the given phenomenon, either in the\r\nway of succession or of co-existence. The simple existence, therefore, of an\r\nindividual phenomenon, when not directly perceived, is inferred from some\r\ninductive law of succession or co-existence; and is consequently not amenable\r\nto any peculiar inductive principles. We prove the existence of a\r\nthing, by proving that it is connected by succession or co-existence with\r\nsome known thing.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWith respect to \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003egeneral\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e propositions of this class, that is, which affirm the\r\nbare fact of existence, they have a peculiarity which renders the logical\r\ntreatment of them a very easy matter; they are generalizations which are\r\nsufficiently proved by a single instance. That ghosts, or unicorns, or sea-serpents\r\nexist, would be fully established if it could be ascertained positively\r\nthat such things had been even once seen. Whatever has once happened,\r\nis capable of happening again; the only question relates to the conditions\r\nunder which it happens.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nSo far, therefore, as relates to simple existence, the Inductive Logic has\r\nno knots to untie. And we may proceed to the remaining two of the great\r\nclasses into which facts have been divided; Resemblance, and Order in\r\nPlace.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 2. Resemblance and its opposite, except in the case in which they assume\r\nthe names of Equality and Inequality, are seldom regarded as subjects\r\nof science; they are supposed to be perceived by simple apprehension;\r\nby merely applying our senses or directing our attention to the two\r\nobjects at once, or in immediate succession. And this simultaneous, or\r\nvirtually simultaneous, application of our faculties to the two things which\r\nare to be compared, does necessarily constitute the ultimate appeal, wherever\r\nsuch application is practicable. But, in most cases, it is not practicable:\r\nthe objects can not be brought so close together that the feeling of\r\ntheir resemblance (at least a complete feeling of it) directly arises in the\r\nmind. We can only compare each of them with some third object, capable\r\nof being transported from one to the other. And besides, even when\r\nthe objects can be brought into immediate juxtaposition, their resemblance\r\nor difference is but imperfectly known to us, unless we have compared\r\nthem minutely, part by part. Until this has been done, things in reality\r\nvery dissimilar often appear undistinguishably alike. Two lines of very\r\nunequal length will appear about equal when lying in different directions;\r\nbut place them parallel with their farther extremities even, and if we look\r\nat the nearer extremities, their inequality becomes a matter of direct perception.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nTo ascertain whether, and in what, two phenomena resemble or differ, is\r\nnot always, therefore, so easy a thing as it might at first appear. When\r\nthe two can not be brought into juxtaposition, or not so that the observer\r\nis able to compare their several parts in detail, he must employ the indirect\r\nmeans of reasoning and general propositions. When we can not bring\r\ntwo straight lines together, to determine whether they are equal, we do it\r\nby the physical aid of a foot-rule applied first to one and then to the other,\r\nand the logical aid of the general proposition or formula, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Things which\r\nare equal to the same thing are equal to one another.”\u003c/span\u003e The comparison\r\nof two things through the intervention of a third thing, when their direct\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page427\"\u003e[pg 427]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg427\" id=\"Pg427\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\ncomparison is impossible, is the appropriate scientific process for ascertaining\r\nresemblances and dissimilarities, and is the sum total of what Logic\r\nhas to teach on the subject.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAn undue extension of this remark induced Locke to consider reasoning\r\nitself as nothing but the comparison of two ideas through the medium of\r\na third, and knowledge as the perception of the agreement or disagreement\r\nof two ideas; doctrines which the Condillac school blindly adopted, without\r\nthe qualifications and distinctions with which they were studiously\r\nguarded by their illustrious author. Where, indeed, the agreement or disagreement\r\n(otherwise called resemblance or dissimilarity) of any two things\r\nis the very matter to be determined, as is the case particularly in the sciences\r\nof quantity and extension; there, the process by which a solution, if\r\nnot attainable by direct perception, must be indirectly sought, consists in\r\ncomparing these two things through the medium of a third. But this is\r\nfar from being true of all inquiries. The knowledge that bodies fall to the\r\nground is not a perception of agreement or disagreement, but of a series\r\nof physical occurrences, a succession of sensations. Locke’s definitions of\r\nknowledge and of reasoning required to be limited to our knowledge of,\r\nand reasoning about, resemblances. Nor, even when thus restricted, are the\r\npropositions strictly correct; since the comparison is not made, as he represents,\r\nbetween the ideas of the two phenomena, but between the phenomena\r\nthemselves. This mistake has been pointed out in an earlier part of our\r\ninquiry,\u003ca id=\"noteref_198\" name=\"noteref_198\" href=\"#note_198\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e198\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e and we traced it to an imperfect conception of what takes place in\r\nmathematics, where very often the comparison is really made between the\r\nideas, without any appeal to the outward senses; only, however, because\r\nin mathematics a comparison of the ideas is strictly equivalent to a comparison\r\nof the phenomena themselves. Where, as in the case of numbers,\r\nlines, and figures, our idea of an object is a complete picture of the object,\r\nso far as respects the matter in hand; we can, of course, learn from the\r\npicture, whatever could be learned from the object itself by mere contemplation\r\nof it as it exists at the particular instant when the picture is taken.\r\nNo mere contemplation of gunpowder would ever teach us that a spark\r\nwould make it explode, nor, consequently, would the contemplation of the\r\nidea of gunpowder do so; but the mere contemplation of a straight line\r\nshows that it can not inclose a space; accordingly the contemplation of the\r\nidea of it will show the same. What takes place in mathematics is thus\r\nno argument that the comparison is between the ideas only. It is always,\r\neither indirectly or directly, a comparison of the phenomena.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIn cases in which we can not bring the phenomena to the test of direct\r\ninspection at all, or not in a manner sufficiently precise, but must judge of\r\ntheir resemblance by inference from other resemblances or dissimilarities\r\nmore accessible to observation, we of course require, as in all cases of ratiocination,\r\ngeneralizations or formulæ applicable to the subject. We must\r\nreason from laws of nature; from the uniformities which are observable in\r\nthe fact of likeness or unlikeness.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 3. Of these laws or uniformities, the most comprehensive are those supplied\r\nby mathematics; the axioms relating to equality, inequality, and proportionality,\r\nand the various theorems thereon founded. And these are the\r\nonly Laws of Resemblance which require to be, or which can be, treated apart.\r\nIt is true there are innumerable other theorems which affirm resemblances\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page428\"\u003e[pg 428]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg428\" id=\"Pg428\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\namong phenomena; as that the angle of the reflection of light is \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eequal\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e\r\nto its angle of incidence (equality being merely exact resemblance in magnitude).\r\nAgain, that the heavenly bodies describe \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eequal\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e areas in equal\r\ntimes; and that their periods of revolution are \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eproportional\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e (another species\r\nof resemblance) to the sesquiplicate powers of their distances from the\r\ncentre of force. These and similar propositions affirm resemblances, of the\r\nsame nature with those asserted in the theorems of mathematics; but the\r\ndistinction is, that the propositions of mathematics are true of all phenomena\r\nwhatever, or at least without distinction of origin; while the truths\r\nin question are affirmed only of special phenomena, which originate in a\r\ncertain way; and the equalities, proportionalities, or other resemblances,\r\nwhich exist between such phenomena, must necessarily be either derived\r\nfrom, or identical with, the law of their origin—the law of causation on\r\nwhich they depend. The equality of the areas described in equal times by\r\nthe planets, is \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ederived\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e from the laws of the causes; and, until its\r\nderivation was shown, it was an empirical law. The equality of the angles of reflection\r\nand incidence is \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eidentical\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e with the law of the cause; for the cause is\r\nthe incidence of a ray of light upon a reflecting surface, and the equality\r\nin question is the very law according to which that cause produces its effects.\r\nThis class, therefore, of the uniformities of resemblance between\r\nphenomena, are inseparable, in fact and in thought, from the laws of the\r\nproduction of those phenomena; and the principles of induction applicable\r\nto them are no other than those of which we have treated in the preceding\r\nchapters of this Book.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt is otherwise with the truths of mathematics. The laws of equality\r\nand inequality between spaces, or between numbers, have no connection\r\nwith laws of causation. That the angle of reflection is equal to the angle\r\nof incidence, is a statement of the mode of action of a particular cause; but\r\nthat when two straight lines intersect each other the opposite angles are\r\nequal, is true of all such lines and angles, by whatever cause produced.\r\nThat the squares of the periodic times of the planets are proportional to\r\nthe cubes of their distances from the sun, is a uniformity derived from\r\nthe laws of the causes (or forces) which produce the planetary motions;\r\nbut that the square of any number is four times the square of half the\r\nnumber, is true independently of any cause. The only laws of resemblance,\r\ntherefore, which we are called upon to consider independently of causation,\r\nbelong to the province of mathematics.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 4. The same thing is evident with respect to the only one remaining\r\nof our five categories, Order in Place. The order in place, of the effects\r\nof a cause, is (like every thing else belonging to the effects) a consequence\r\nof the laws of that cause. The order in place, or, as we have termed it,\r\nthe collocation, of the primeval causes, is (as well as their resemblance) in\r\neach instance an ultimate fact, in which no laws or uniformities are traceable.\r\nThe only remaining general propositions respecting order in place,\r\nand the only ones which have nothing to do with causation, are some of\r\nthe truths of geometry; laws through which we are able, from the order\r\nin place of certain points, lines, or spaces, to infer the order in place of\r\nothers which are connected with the former in some known mode; quite\r\nindependently of the particular nature of those points, lines, or spaces, in\r\nany other respect than position or magnitude, as well as independently of\r\nthe physical cause from which in any particular case they happen to derive\r\ntheir origin.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page429\"\u003e[pg 429]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg429\" id=\"Pg429\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt thus appears that mathematics is the only department of science into\r\nthe methods of which it still remains to inquire. And there is the less necessity\r\nthat this inquiry should occupy us long, as we have already, in the\r\nSecond Book, made considerable progress in it. We there remarked, that\r\nthe directly inductive truths of mathematics are few in number; consisting\r\nof the axioms, together with certain propositions concerning existence,\r\ntacitly involved in most of the so-called definitions. And we gave what\r\nappeared conclusive reasons for affirming that these original premises, from\r\nwhich the remaining truths of the science are deduced, are, notwithstanding\r\nall appearances to the contrary, results of observation and experience;\r\nfounded, in short, on the evidence of the senses. That things equal to the\r\nsame thing are equal to one another, and that two straight lines which\r\nhave once intersected one another continue to diverge, are inductive truths;\r\nresting, indeed, like the law of universal causation, only on induction\r\n\u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eper enumerationem simplicem\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e; on the fact that\r\nthey have been perpetually perceived to be true, and never once found to be false. But,\r\nas we have seen in a recent chapter that this evidence, in the case of a law so\r\ncompletely universal as the law of causation, amounts to the fullest proof, so is this\r\neven more evidently true of the general propositions to which we are now\r\nadverting; because, as a perception of their truth in any individual case\r\nwhatever, requires only the simple act of looking at the objects in a proper\r\nposition, there never could have been in their case (what, for a long period,\r\nthere were in the case of the law of causation) instances which were apparently,\r\nthough not really, exceptions to them. Their infallible truth was\r\nrecognized from the very dawn of speculation; and as their extreme familiarity\r\nmade it impossible for the mind to conceive the objects under any\r\nother law, they were, and still are, generally considered as truths recognized\r\nby their own evidence, or by instinct.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 5. There is something which seems to require explanation, in the fact\r\nthat the immense multitude of truths (a multitude still as far from being\r\nexhausted as ever) comprised in the mathematical sciences, can be elicited\r\nfrom so small a number of elementary laws. One sees not, at first, how it\r\nis that there can be room for such an infinite variety of true propositions,\r\non subjects apparently so limited.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nTo begin with the science of number. The elementary or ultimate truths\r\nof this science are the common axioms concerning equality, namely, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Things\r\nwhich are equal to the same thing are equal to one another,”\u003c/span\u003e and \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Equals\r\nadded to equals make equal sums”\u003c/span\u003e (no other axioms are\r\nrequired),\u003ca id=\"noteref_199\" name=\"noteref_199\" href=\"#note_199\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e199\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e together\r\nwith the definitions of the various numbers. Like other so-called\r\ndefinitions, these are composed of two things, the explanation of a name,\r\nand the assertion of a fact; of which the latter alone can form a first principle\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page430\"\u003e[pg 430]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg430\" id=\"Pg430\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nor premise of a science. The fact asserted in the definition of a number\r\nis a physical fact. Each of the numbers two, three, four, etc., denotes\r\nphysical phenomena, and connotes a physical property of those phenomena.\r\nTwo, for instance, denotes all pairs of things, and twelve all dozens of\r\nthings, connoting what makes them pairs, or dozens; and that which\r\nmakes them so is something physical; since it can not be denied that two\r\napples are physically distinguishable from three apples, two horses from\r\none horse, and so forth; that they are a different visible and tangible phenomenon.\r\nI am not undertaking to say what the difference is; it is\r\nenough that there is a difference of which the senses can take cognizance.\r\nAnd although a hundred and two horses are not so easily distinguished\r\nfrom a hundred and three, as two horses are from three—though in most\r\npositions the senses do not perceive any difference—yet they may be so\r\nplaced that a difference will be perceptible, or else we should never have\r\ndistinguished them, and given them different names. Weight is confessedly\r\na physical property of things; yet small differences between great\r\nweights are as imperceptible to the senses in most situations, as small differences\r\nbetween great numbers; and are only put in evidence by placing\r\nthe two objects in a peculiar position—namely, in the opposite scales of a\r\ndelicate balance.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWhat, then, is that which is connoted by a name of number? Of\r\ncourse, some property belonging to the agglomeration of things which we\r\ncall by the name; and that property is, the characteristic manner in which\r\nthe agglomeration is made up of, and may be separated into, parts. I will\r\nendeavor to make this more intelligible by a few explanations.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWhen we call a collection of objects \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003etwo\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ethree\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, or \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003efour\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, they are not\r\ntwo, three, or four in the abstract; they are two, three, or four things of\r\nsome particular kind; pebbles, horses, inches, pounds’ weight. What the\r\nname of number connotes is, the manner in which single objects of the\r\ngiven kind must be put together, in order to produce that particular aggregate.\r\nIf the aggregate be of pebbles, and we call it \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003etwo\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, the name\r\nimplies that, to compose the aggregate, one pebble must be joined to one pebble.\r\nIf we call it \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ethree\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, one and one and one pebble must be brought\r\ntogether to produce it, or else one pebble must be joined to an aggregate of the\r\nkind called \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003etwo\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, already existing. The aggregate which we call\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003efour\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, has a still greater number of characteristic modes of\r\nformation. One and one and one and one pebble may be brought together; or two aggregates\r\nof the kind called \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003etwo\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e may be united; or one pebble may be added\r\nto an aggregate of the kind called \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ethree\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e. Every succeeding number\r\nin the ascending series, may be formed by the junction of smaller numbers in a\r\nprogressively greater variety of ways. Even limiting the parts to two, the number\r\nmay be formed, and consequently may be divided, in as many different\r\nways as there are numbers smaller than itself; and, if we admit of threes,\r\nfours, etc., in a still greater variety. Other modes of arriving at the same\r\naggregate present themselves, not by the union of smaller, but by the dismemberment\r\nof larger aggregates. Thus, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ethree pebbles\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e may be formed by\r\ntaking away one pebble from an aggregate of four; \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003etwo pebbles\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, by\r\nan equal division of a similar aggregate; and so on.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nEvery arithmetical proposition; every statement of the result of an\r\narithmetical operation; is a statement of one of the modes of formation\r\nof a given number. It affirms that a certain aggregate might have been\r\nformed by putting together certain other aggregates, or by withdrawing\r\ncertain portions of some aggregate; and that, by consequence, we might\r\nreproduce those aggregates from it, by reversing the process.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page431\"\u003e[pg 431]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg431\" id=\"Pg431\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThus, when we say that the cube of 12 is 1728, what we affirm is this:\r\nthat if, having a sufficient number of pebbles or of any other objects, we\r\nput them together into the particular sort of parcels or aggregates called\r\ntwelves; and put together these twelves again into similar collections;\r\nand, finally, make up twelve of these largest parcels; the aggregate thus\r\nformed will be such a one as we call 1728; namely, that which (to take\r\nthe most familiar of its modes of formation) may be made by joining the\r\nparcel called a thousand pebbles, the parcel called seven hundred pebbles,\r\nthe parcel called twenty pebbles, and the parcel called eight pebbles.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe converse proposition that the cube root of 1728 is 12, asserts that\r\nthis large aggregate may again be decomposed into the twelve twelves of\r\ntwelves of pebbles which it consists of.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe modes of formation of any number are innumerable; but when we\r\nknow one mode of formation of each, all the rest may be determined deductively.\r\nIf we know that \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e is formed from \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eb\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e and\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ec\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eb\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e from \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e and\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ee\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ec\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e from \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ed\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e and\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ef\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, and so forth, until we have included all the numbers of any\r\nscale we choose to select (taking care that for each number the mode of\r\nformation be really a distinct one, not bringing us round again to the former\r\nnumbers, but introducing a new number), we have a set of propositions\r\nfrom which we may reason to all the other modes of formation of those\r\nnumbers from one another. Having established a chain of inductive truths\r\nconnecting together all the numbers of the scale, we can ascertain the formation\r\nof any one of those numbers from any other by merely traveling from\r\none to the other along the chain. Suppose that we know only the following\r\nmodes of formation: 6=4+2, 4=7-3, 7=5+2, 5=9-4. We could\r\ndetermine how 6 may be formed from 9. For 6=4+2=7-3+2=5+2-3+2=9-4+2-3+2.\r\nIt may therefore be formed by taking away 4 and\r\n3, and adding 2 and 2. If we know besides that 2+2=4, we obtain 6 from\r\n9 in a simpler mode, by merely taking away 3.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt is sufficient, therefore, to select one of the various modes of formation\r\nof each number, as a means of ascertaining all the rest. And since things\r\nwhich are uniform, and therefore simple, are most easily received and retained\r\nby the understanding, there is an obvious advantage in selecting a\r\nmode of formation which shall be alike for all; in fixing the connotation\r\nof names of number on one uniform principle. The mode in which our\r\nexisting numerical nomenclature is contrived possesses this advantage, with\r\nthe additional one, that it happily conveys to the mind two of the modes\r\nof formation of every number. Each number is considered as formed by\r\nthe addition of a unit to the number next below it in magnitude, and this\r\nmode of formation is conveyed by the place which it occupies in the series.\r\nAnd each is also considered as formed by the addition of a number of\r\nunits less than ten, and a number of aggregates each equal to one of the\r\nsuccessive powers of ten; and this mode of its formation is expressed by\r\nits spoken name, and by its numerical character.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWhat renders arithmetic the type of a deductive science, is the fortunate\r\napplicability to it of a law so comprehensive as \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“The sums of equals are\r\nequals:”\u003c/span\u003e or (to express the same principle in less familiar but more characteristic\r\nlanguage), Whatever is made up of parts, is made up of the parts\r\nof those parts. This truth, obvious to the senses in all cases which can be\r\nfairly referred to their decision, and so general as to be co-extensive with\r\nnature itself, being true of all sorts of phenomena (for all admit of being\r\nnumbered), must be considered an inductive truth, or law of nature, of the\r\nhighest order. And every arithmetical operation is an application of this\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page432\"\u003e[pg 432]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg432\" id=\"Pg432\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nlaw, or of other laws capable of being deduced from it. This is our warrant\r\nfor all calculations. We believe that five and two are equal to seven,\r\non the evidence of this inductive law, combined with the definitions of those\r\nnumbers. We arrive at that conclusion (as all know who remember how\r\nthey first learned it) by adding a single unit at a time: 5 + 1=6, therefore\r\n5+1+1=6+1=7; and again 2=1+1, therefore 5+2=5+1+1=7.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 6. Innumerable as are the true propositions which can be formed concerning\r\nparticular numbers, no adequate conception could be gained, from\r\nthese alone, of the extent of the truths composing the science of number.\r\nSuch propositions as we have spoken of are the least general of all numerical\r\ntruths. It is true that even these are co-extensive with all nature; the\r\nproperties of the number four are true of all objects that are divisible into\r\nfour equal parts, and all objects are either actually or ideally so divisible.\r\nBut the propositions which compose the science of algebra are true, not of\r\na particular number, but of all numbers; not of all things under the condition\r\nof being divided in a particular way, but of all things under the condition\r\nof being divided in any way—of being designated by a number at all.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nSince it is impossible for different numbers to have any of their modes\r\nof formation completely in common, it is a kind of paradox to say, that all\r\npropositions which can be made concerning numbers relate to their modes\r\nof formation from other numbers, and yet that there are propositions which\r\nare true of all numbers. But this very paradox leads to the real principle\r\nof generalization concerning the properties of numbers. Two different\r\nnumbers can not be formed in the same manner from the same numbers;\r\nbut they may be formed in the same manner from different numbers; as\r\nnine is formed from three by multiplying it into itself, and sixteen is formed\r\nfrom four by the same process. Thus there arises a classification of\r\nmodes of formation, or in the language commonly used by mathematicians,\r\na classification of Functions. Any number, considered as formed from any\r\nother number, is called a function of it; and there are as many kinds of\r\nfunctions as there are modes of formation. The simple functions are by no\r\nmeans numerous, most functions being formed by the combination of several\r\nof the operations which form simple functions, or by successive repetitions\r\nof some one of those operations. The simple functions of any number\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ex\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e are all reducible to the following forms:\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ex\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e+\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ex\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e-\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eax\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ex\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e/\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\nlog. \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ex\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e (to the base \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e), and the same\r\nexpressions varied by putting \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ex\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e for \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nand \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e for \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ex\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, wherever that substitution\r\nwould alter the value: to which, perhaps, ought to be added sin \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ex\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\nand arc (sin=\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ex\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e). All other functions of\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ex\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e are formed by putting some one or more of the simple functions\r\nin the place of \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ex\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e or \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, and subjecting\r\nthem to the same elementary operations.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIn order to carry on general reasonings on the subject of Functions, we\r\nrequire a nomenclature enabling us to express any two numbers by names\r\nwhich, without specifying what particular numbers they are, shall show\r\nwhat function each is of the other; or, in other words, shall put in evidence\r\ntheir mode of formation from one another. The system of general\r\nlanguage called algebraical notation does this. The expressions \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nand a\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"vertical-align: super\"\u003e2\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e+3a denote, the one any number, the other\r\nthe number formed from it in a particular manner. The expressions\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eb\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003en\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, and\r\n(\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea+b\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e)\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"vertical-align: super\"\u003en\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, denote any\r\nthree numbers, and a fourth which is formed from them in a certain mode.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe following may be stated as the general problem of the algebraical\r\ncalculus: F being a certain function of a given number, to find what function\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page433\"\u003e[pg 433]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg433\" id=\"Pg433\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nF will be of any function of that number. For example, a binomial\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea + b\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e is a function of its two parts \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e and\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eb\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, and the parts are, in their turn, functions of\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea + b\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e: now (\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea +\r\nb\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e)\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"vertical-align: super\"\u003en\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e is a certain function of the binomial;\r\nwhat function will this be of \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e and \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eb\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, the\r\ntwo parts? The answer to this question is the binomial theorem. The formula\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003e(a + b)\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic; vertical-align: super\"\u003en\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003e =\r\na\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic; vertical-align: super\"\u003en\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003e + n/1 a\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic; vertical-align: super\"\u003en-1\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003e\r\nb + n.n-1/1.2 a\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic; vertical-align: super\"\u003en-2\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003e\r\nb\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic; vertical-align: super\"\u003e2\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, etc., shows in what manner the number\r\nwhich is formed by multiplying \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea + b\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e into itself\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003en\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e times, might be formed without that process,\r\ndirectly from \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea, b\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, and \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003en\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e. And of this\r\nnature are all the theorems of the science of number. They assert the identity of the\r\nresult of different modes of formation. They affirm that some mode of formation from\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ex\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, and some mode of formation from a certain function of\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ex\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, produce the same number.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nSuch, as above described, is the aim and end of the calculus. As for its\r\nprocesses, every one knows that they are simply deductive. In demonstrating\r\nan algebraical theorem, or in resolving an equation, we travel from\r\nthe \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003edatum\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e to the\r\n\u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003equæsitum\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e by pure ratiocination; in which the\r\nonly premises introduced, besides the original hypotheses, are the fundamental axioms\r\nalready mentioned—that things equal to the same thing are equal to\r\none another, and that the sums of equal things are equal. At each step in\r\nthe demonstration or in the calculation, we apply one or other of these\r\ntruths, or truths deducible from them, as, that the differences, products,\r\netc., of equal numbers are equal.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt would be inconsistent with the scale of this work, and not necessary\r\nto its design, to carry the analysis of the truths and processes of algebra\r\nany further; which is also the less needful, as the task has been, to a very\r\ngreat extent, performed by other writers. Peacock’s Algebra, and Dr.\r\nWhewell’s \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eDoctrine of Limits\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, are full of instruction on the\r\nsubject. The profound treatises of a truly philosophical mathematician, Professor De\r\nMorgan, should be studied by every one who desires to comprehend the\r\nevidence of mathematical truths, and the meaning of the obscurer processes\r\nof the calculus, and the speculations of M. Comte, in his \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eCours de\r\nPhilosophie Positive\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, on the philosophy of the higher branches of mathematics,\r\nare among the many valuable gifts for which philosophy is indebted\r\nto that eminent thinker.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 7. If the extreme generality, and remoteness not so much from sense\r\nas from the visual and tactual imagination, of the laws of number, renders\r\nit a somewhat difficult effort of abstraction to conceive those laws as being\r\nin reality physical truths obtained by observation; the same difficulty does\r\nnot exist with regard to the laws of extension. The facts of which those\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page434\"\u003e[pg 434]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg434\" id=\"Pg434\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nlaws are expressions, are of a kind peculiarly accessible to the senses, and\r\nsuggesting eminently distinct images to the fancy. That geometry is a\r\nstrictly physical science would doubtless have been recognized in all ages,\r\nhad it not been for the illusions produced by two circumstances. One of\r\nthese is the characteristic property, already noticed, of the facts of geometry,\r\nthat they may be collected from our ideas or mental pictures of objects\r\nas effectually as from the objects themselves. The other is, the demonstrative\r\ncharacter of geometrical truths; which was at one time supposed\r\nto constitute a radical distinction between them and physical truths;\r\nthe latter, as resting on merely probable evidence, being deemed essentially\r\nuncertain and unprecise. The advance of knowledge has, however, made\r\nit manifest that physical science, in its better understood branches, is quite\r\nas demonstrative as geometry. The task of deducing its details from a\r\nfew comparatively simple principles is found to be any thing but the impossibility\r\nit was once supposed to be; and the notion of the superior certainty\r\nof geometry is an illusion, arising from the ancient prejudice which,\r\nin that science, mistakes the ideal data from which we reason, for a peculiar\r\nclass of realities, while the corresponding ideal data of any deductive\r\nphysical science are recognized as what they really are, hypotheses.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nEvery theorem in geometry is a law of external nature, and might have\r\nbeen ascertained by generalizing from observation and experiment, which\r\nin this case resolve themselves into comparison and measurement. But it\r\nwas found practicable, and, being practicable, was desirable, to deduce these\r\ntruths by ratiocination from a small number of general laws of nature, the\r\ncertainty and universality of which are obvious to the most careless observer,\r\nand which compose the first principles and ultimate premises of the\r\nscience. Among these general laws must be included the same two which\r\nwe have noticed as ultimate principles of the Science of Number also, and\r\nwhich are applicable to every description of quantity; viz., The sums of\r\nequals are equal, and Things which are equal to the same thing are equal\r\nto one another; the latter of which may be expressed in a manner more\r\nsuggestive of the inexhaustible multitude of its consequences, by the following\r\nterms: Whatever is equal to any one of a number of equal magnitudes,\r\nis equal to any other of them. To these two must be added, in geometry,\r\na third law of equality, namely, that lines, surfaces, or solid spaces,\r\nwhich can be so applied to one another as to coincide, are equal. Some\r\nwriters have asserted that this law of nature is a mere verbal definition;\r\nthat the expression \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“equal magnitudes”\u003c/span\u003e \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003emeans\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e nothing but magnitudes\r\nwhich can be so applied to one another as to coincide. But in this opinion\r\nI can not agree. The equality of two geometrical magnitudes can not differ\r\nfundamentally in its nature from the equality of two weights, two degrees\r\nof heat, or two portions of duration, to none of which would this\r\ndefinition of equality be suitable. None of these things can be so applied\r\nto one another as to coincide, yet we perfectly understand what we mean\r\nwhen we call them equal. Things are equal in magnitude, as things are\r\nequal in weight, when they are felt to be exactly similar in respect of the\r\nattribute in which we compare them: and the application of the objects to\r\neach other in the one case, like the balancing them with a pair of scales in\r\nthe other, is but a mode of bringing them into a position in which our\r\nsenses can recognize deficiencies of exact resemblance that would otherwise\r\nescape our notice.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAlong with these three general principles or axioms, the remainder of\r\nthe premises of geometry consists of the so-called definitions: that is to\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page435\"\u003e[pg 435]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg435\" id=\"Pg435\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nsay, propositions asserting the real existence of the various objects therein\r\ndesignated, together with some one property of each. In some cases more\r\nthan one property is commonly assumed, but in no case is more than one\r\nnecessary. It is assumed that there are such things in nature as straight\r\nlines, and that any two of them setting out from the same point, diverge\r\nmore and more without limit. This assumption (which includes and goes\r\nbeyond Euclid’s axiom that two straight lines can not inclose a space) is\r\nas indispensable in geometry, and as evident, resting on as simple, familiar,\r\nand universal observation, as any of the other axioms. It is also assumed\r\nthat straight lines diverge from one another in different degrees; in other\r\nwords, that there are such things as angles, and that they are capable of\r\nbeing equal or unequal. It is assumed that there is such a thing as a\r\ncircle, and that all its radii are equal; such things as ellipses, and that\r\nthe sums of the focal distances are equal for every point in an ellipse;\r\nsuch things as parallel lines, and that those lines are everywhere equally\r\ndistant.\u003ca id=\"noteref_200\" name=\"noteref_200\" href=\"#note_200\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e200\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 8. It is a matter of more than curiosity to consider, to what peculiarity\r\nof the physical truths which are the subject of geometry, it is owing that\r\nthey can all be deduced from so small a number of original premises; why\r\nit is that we can set out from only one characteristic property of each kind\r\nof phenomenon, and with that and two or three general truths relating to\r\nequality, can travel from mark to mark until we obtain a vast body of derivative\r\ntruths, to all appearance extremely unlike those elementary ones.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe explanation of this remarkable fact seems to lie in the following circumstances.\r\nIn the first place, all questions of position and figure may be\r\nresolved into questions of magnitude. The position and figure of any object\r\nare determined by determining the position of a sufficient number of\r\npoints in it; and the position of any point may be determined by the magnitude\r\nof three rectangular co-ordinates, that is, of the perpendiculars drawn\r\nfrom the point to three planes at right angles to one another, arbitrarily\r\nselected. By this transformation of all questions of quality into questions\r\nonly of quantity, geometry is reduced to the single problem of the measurement\r\nof magnitudes, that is, the ascertainment of the equalities which\r\nexist between them. Now when we consider that by one of the general\r\naxioms, any equality, when ascertained, is proof of as many other equalities\r\nas there are other things equal to either of the two equals; and that by\r\nanother of those axioms, any ascertained equality is proof of the equality\r\nof as many pairs of magnitudes as can be formed by the numerous operations\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page436\"\u003e[pg 436]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg436\" id=\"Pg436\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nwhich resolve themselves into the addition of the equals to themselves\r\nor to other equals; we cease to wonder that in proportion as a science\r\nis conversant about equality, it should afford a more copious supply\r\nof marks of marks; and that the sciences of number and extension, which\r\nare conversant with little else than equality, should be the most deductive\r\nof all the sciences.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThere are also two or three of the principal laws of space or extension\r\nwhich are unusually fitted for rendering one position or magnitude a mark\r\nof another, and thereby contributing to render the science largely deductive.\r\nFirst, the magnitudes of inclosed spaces, whether superficial or solid,\r\nare completely determined by the magnitudes of the lines and angles which\r\nbound them. Secondly, the length of any line, whether straight or curve,\r\nis measured (certain other things being given) by the angle which it subtends,\r\nand \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003evicè versa\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e. Lastly, the angle which any two\r\nstraight lines make with each other at an inaccessible point, is measured by the angles\r\nthey severally make with any third line we choose to select. By means of these\r\ngeneral laws, the measurement of all lines, angles, and spaces whatsoever\r\nmight be accomplished by measuring a single straight line and a sufficient\r\nnumber of angles; which is the plan actually pursued in the trigonometrical\r\nsurvey of a country; and fortunate it is that this is practicable, the exact\r\nmeasurement of long straight lines being always difficult, and often impossible,\r\nbut that of angles very easy. Three such generalizations as the foregoing\r\nafford such facilities for the indirect measurement of magnitudes\r\n(by supplying us with known lines or angles which are marks of the magnitude\r\nof unknown ones, and thereby of the spaces which they inclose),\r\nthat it is easily intelligible how from a few data we can go on to ascertain\r\nthe magnitude of an indefinite multitude of lines, angles, and spaces, which\r\nwe could not easily, or could not at all, measure by any more direct process.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 9. Such are the remarks which it seems necessary to make in this\r\nplace, respecting the laws of nature which are the peculiar subject of the\r\nsciences of number and extension. The immense part which those laws\r\ntake in giving a deductive character to the other departments of physical\r\nscience, is well known; and is not surprising, when we consider that all\r\ncauses operate according to mathematical laws. The effect is always dependent\r\non, or is a function of, the quantity of the agent; and generally of\r\nits position also. We can not, therefore, reason respecting causation, without\r\nintroducing considerations of quantity and extension at every step;\r\nand if the nature of the phenomena admits of our obtaining numerical data\r\nof sufficient accuracy, the laws of quantity become the grand instrument for\r\ncalculating forward to an effect, or backward to a cause. That in all other\r\nsciences, as well as in geometry, questions of quality are scarcely ever independent\r\nof questions of quantity, may be seen from the most familiar phenomena.\r\nEven when several colors are mixed on a painter’s palette, the\r\ncomparative quantity of each entirely determines the color of the mixture.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWith this mere suggestion of the general causes which render mathematical\r\nprinciples and processes so predominant in those deductive sciences\r\nwhich afford precise numerical data, I must, on the present occasion, content\r\nmyself; referring the reader who desires a more thorough acquaintance\r\nwith the subject, to the first two volumes of M. Comte’s systematic\r\nwork.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIn the same work, and more particularly in the third volume, are also\r\nfully discussed the limits of the applicability of mathematical principles to\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page437\"\u003e[pg 437]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg437\" id=\"Pg437\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nthe improvement of other sciences. Such principles are manifestly inapplicable,\r\nwhere the causes on which any class of phenomena depend are so\r\nimperfectly accessible to our observation, that we can not ascertain, by a\r\nproper induction, their numerical laws; or where the causes are so numerous,\r\nand intermixed in so complex a manner with one another, that even\r\nsupposing their laws known, the computation of the aggregate effect transcends\r\nthe powers of the calculus as it is, or is likely to be; or, lastly, where\r\nthe causes themselves are in a state of perpetual fluctuation; as in physiology,\r\nand still more, if possible, in the social science. The mathematical solutions\r\nof physical questions become progressively more difficult and imperfect,\r\nin proportion as the questions divest themselves of their abstract\r\nand hypothetical character, and approach nearer to the degree of complication\r\nactually existing in nature; insomuch that beyond the limits of astronomical\r\nphenomena, and of those most nearly analogous to them, mathematical\r\naccuracy is generally obtained \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“at the expense of the reality of the\r\ninquiry:”\u003c/span\u003e while even in astronomical questions, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“notwithstanding the admirable\r\nsimplicity of their mathematical elements, our feeble intelligence\r\nbecomes incapable of following out effectually the logical combinations of\r\nthe laws on which the phenomena are dependent, as soon as we attempt to\r\ntake into simultaneous consideration more than two or three essential\r\ninfluences.”\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca id=\"noteref_201\" name=\"noteref_201\" href=\"#note_201\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e201\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nOf this, the problem of the Three Bodies has already been cited,\r\nmore than once, as a remarkable instance; the complete solution of so comparatively\r\nsimple a question having vainly tried the skill of the most profound\r\nmathematicians. We may conceive, then, how chimerical would be\r\nthe hope that mathematical principles could be advantageously applied to\r\nphenomena dependent on the mutual action of the innumerable minute particles\r\nof bodies, as those of chemistry, and still more, of physiology; and\r\nfor similar reasons those principles remain inapplicable to the still more\r\ncomplex inquiries, the subjects of which are phenomena of society and\r\ngovernment.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe value of mathematical instruction as a preparation for those more\r\ndifficult investigations, consists in the applicability not of its doctrines, but\r\nof its method. Mathematics will ever remain the most perfect type of the\r\nDeductive Method in general; and the applications of mathematics to the\r\ndeductive branches of physics, furnish the only school in which philosophers\r\ncan effectually learn the most difficult and important portion of their art,\r\nthe employment of the laws of simpler phenomena for explaining and predicting\r\nthose of the more complex. These grounds are quite sufficient for\r\ndeeming mathematical training an indispensable basis of real scientific education,\r\nand regarding (according to the \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003edictum\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e which an old but\r\nunauthentic tradition ascribes to Plato) one who is ἀγεωμέτρητος, as wanting in\r\none of the most essential qualifications for the successful cultivation of the\r\nhigher branches of philosophy.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page438\"\u003e[pg 438]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg438\" id=\"Pg438\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-div\" style=\"margin-bottom: 4.00em; margin-top: 4.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"toc91\" id=\"toc91\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"pdf92\" id=\"pdf92\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: center; margin-bottom: 2.40em; margin-top: 2.40em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 120%\"\u003eChapter XXV.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: left; margin-bottom: 2.88em; margin-top: 2.88em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 144%\"\u003eOf The Grounds Of Disbelief.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 1. The method of arriving at general truths, or general propositions\r\nfit to be believed, and the nature of the evidence on which they are grounded,\r\nhave been discussed, as far as space and the writer’s faculties permitted,\r\nin the twenty-four preceding chapters. But the result of the examination\r\nof evidence is not always belief, nor even suspension of judgment;\r\nit is sometimes disbelief. The philosophy, therefore, of induction and experimental\r\ninquiry is incomplete, unless the grounds not only of belief, but\r\nof disbelief, are treated of; and to this topic we shall devote one, and the\r\nfinal, chapter.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nBy disbelief is not here to be understood the mere absence of belief.\r\nThe ground for abstaining from belief is simply the absence or insufficiency\r\nof proof; and in considering what is sufficient evidence to support any\r\ngiven conclusion, we have already, by implication, considered what evidence\r\nis not sufficient for the same purpose. By disbelief is here meant, not the\r\nstate of mind in which we form no opinion concerning a subject, but that\r\nin which we are fully persuaded that some opinion is not true; insomuch\r\nthat if evidence, even of great apparent strength (whether grounded on\r\nthe testimony of others or on our own supposed perceptions), were produced\r\nin favor of the opinion, we should believe that the witnesses spoke\r\nfalsely, or that they, or we ourselves if we were the direct percipients, were\r\nmistaken.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThat there are such cases, no one is likely to dispute. Assertions for\r\nwhich there is abundant positive evidence are often disbelieved, on account\r\nof what is called their improbability, or impossibility. And the question\r\nfor consideration is what, in the present case, these words mean, and how\r\nfar and in what circumstances the properties which they express are sufficient\r\ngrounds for disbelief.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 2. It is to be remarked, in the first place, that the positive evidence\r\nproduced in support of an assertion which is nevertheless rejected on the\r\nscore of impossibility or improbability, is never such as amounts to full\r\nproof. It is always grounded on some approximate generalization. The\r\nfact may have been asserted by a hundred witnesses; but there are many\r\nexceptions to the universality of the generalization that what a hundred\r\nwitnesses affirm is true. We may seem to ourselves to have actually seen\r\nthe fact; but that we really see what we think we see, is by no means a\r\nuniversal truth; our organs may have been in a morbid state; or we may\r\nhave inferred something, and imagined that we perceived it. The evidence,\r\nthen, in the affirmative being never more than an approximate generalization,\r\nall will depend on what the evidence in the negative is. If that\r\nalso rests on an approximate generalization, it is a case for comparison of\r\nprobabilities. If the approximate generalizations leading to the affirmative\r\nare, when added together, less strong, or, in other words, farther from being\r\nuniversal, than the approximate generalizations which support the negative\r\nside of the question, the proposition is said to be improbable, and is\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page439\"\u003e[pg 439]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg439\" id=\"Pg439\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nto be disbelieved provisionally. If, however, an alleged fact be in contradiction,\r\nnot to any number of approximate generalizations, but to a completed\r\ngeneralization grounded on a rigorous induction, it is said to be impossible,\r\nand is to be disbelieved totally.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThis last principle, simple and evident as it appears, is the doctrine\r\nwhich, on the occasion of an attempt to apply it to the question of the credibility\r\nof miracles, excited so violent a controversy. Hume’s celebrated\r\ndoctrine, that nothing is credible which is contradictory to experience, or\r\nat variance with laws of nature, is merely this very plain and harmless\r\nproposition, that whatever is contradictory to a complete induction is incredible.\r\nThat such a maxim as this should either be accounted a dangerous\r\nheresy, or mistaken for a great and recondite truth, speaks ill for the\r\nstate of philosophical speculation on such subjects.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nBut does not (it may be asked) the very statement of the proposition\r\nimply a contradiction? An alleged fact, according to this theory, is not to\r\nbe believed if it contradict a complete induction. But it is essential to\r\nthe completeness of an induction that it shall not contradict any known\r\nfact. Is it not, then, a \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003epetitio principii\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e to\r\nsay, that the fact ought to be\r\ndisbelieved because the induction opposed to it is complete? How can\r\nwe have a right to declare the induction complete, while facts, supported\r\nby credible evidence, present themselves in opposition to it?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nI answer, we have that right whenever the scientific canons of induction\r\ngive it to us; that is, whenever the induction \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ecan\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e be complete. We have\r\nit, for example, in a case of causation in which there has been an\r\n\u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eexperimentum crucis\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e. If an antecedent A,\r\nsuperadded to a set of antecedents in all other respects unaltered, is followed by an\r\neffect B which did not exist before, A is, in that instance at least, the cause of B, or\r\nan indispensable part of its cause; and if A be tried again with many totally different\r\nsets of antecedents and B still follows, then it is the whole cause. If these\r\nobservations or experiments have been repeated so often, and by so many\r\npersons, as to exclude all supposition of error in the observer, a law of nature\r\nis established; and so long as this law is received as such, the assertion\r\nthat on any particular occasion A took place, and yet B did not follow,\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ewithout any counteracting cause\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e, must be disbelieved. Such an assertion\r\nis not to be credited on any less evidence than what would suffice to overturn\r\nthe law. The general truths, that whatever has a beginning has a\r\ncause, and that when none but the same causes exist, the same effects follow,\r\nrest on the strongest inductive evidence possible; the proposition that\r\nthings affirmed by even a crowd of respectable witnesses are true, is but an\r\napproximate generalization; and—even if we fancy we actually saw or felt\r\nthe fact which is in contradiction to the law—what a human being can see\r\nis no more than a set of appearances; from which the real nature of the\r\nphenomenon is merely an inference, and in this inference approximate generalizations\r\nusually have a large share. If, therefore, we make our election\r\nto hold by the law, no quantity of evidence whatever ought to persuade us\r\nthat there has occurred any thing in contradiction to it. If, indeed, the\r\nevidence produced is such that it is more likely that the set of observations\r\nand experiments on which the law rests should have been inaccurately performed\r\nor incorrectly interpreted, than that the evidence in question should\r\nbe false, we may believe the evidence; but then we must abandon the law.\r\nAnd since the law was received on what seemed a complete induction, it\r\ncan only be rejected on evidence equivalent; namely, as being inconsistent\r\nnot with any number of approximate generalizations, but with some other\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page440\"\u003e[pg 440]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg440\" id=\"Pg440\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nand better established law of nature. This extreme case, of a conflict between\r\ntwo supposed laws of nature, has probably never actually occurred\r\nwhere, in the process of investigating both the laws, the true canons of\r\nscientific induction had been kept in view; but if it did occur, it must terminate\r\nin the total rejection of one of the supposed laws. It would prove\r\nthat there must be a flaw in the logical process by which either one or the\r\nother was established; and if there be so, that supposed general truth is\r\nno truth at all. We can not admit a proposition as a law of nature, and\r\nyet believe a fact in real contradiction to it. We must disbelieve the alleged\r\nfact, or believe that we were mistaken in admitting the supposed law.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nBut in order that any alleged fact should be contradictory to a law of\r\ncausation, the allegation must be, not simply that the cause existed without\r\nbeing followed by the effect, for that would be no uncommon occurrence;\r\nbut that this happened in the absence of any adequate counteracting\r\ncause. Now in the case of an alleged miracle, the assertion is the exact\r\nopposite of this. It is, that the effect was defeated, not in the absence,\r\nbut in consequence of a counteracting cause, namely, a direct interposition\r\nof an act of the will of some being who has power over nature; and in\r\nparticular of a Being, whose will being assumed to have endowed all the\r\ncauses with the powers by which they produce their effects, may well be\r\nsupposed able to counteract them. A miracle (as was justly remarked by\r\nBrown)\u003ca id=\"noteref_202\" name=\"noteref_202\" href=\"#note_202\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e202\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nis no contradiction to the law of cause and effect; it is a new effect,\r\nsupposed to be produced by the introduction of a new cause. Of the\r\nadequacy of that cause, if present, there can be no doubt; and the only\r\nantecedent improbability which can be ascribed to the miracle, is the improbability\r\nthat any such cause existed.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAll, therefore, which Hume has made out, and this he must be considered\r\nto have made out, is, that (at least in the imperfect state of our knowledge\r\nof natural agencies, which leaves it always possible that some of the\r\nphysical antecedents may have been hidden from us) no evidence can prove\r\na miracle to any one who did not previously believe the existence of a being\r\nor beings with supernatural power; or who believes himself to have\r\nfull proof that the character of the Being whom he recognizes is inconsistent\r\nwith his having seen fit to interfere on the occasion in question.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIf we do not already believe in supernatural agencies, no miracle can\r\nprove to us their existence. The miracle itself, considered merely as an\r\nextraordinary fact, may be satisfactorily certified by our senses or by testimony;\r\nbut nothing can ever prove that it is a miracle; there is still another\r\npossible hypothesis, that of its being the result of some unknown natural\r\ncause; and this possibility can not be so completely shut out, as to\r\nleave no alternative but that of admitting the existence and intervention of\r\na being superior to nature. Those, however, who already believe in such\r\na being have two hypotheses to choose from, a supernatural and an unknown\r\nnatural agency; and they have to judge which of the two is the\r\nmost probable in the particular case. In forming this judgment, an important\r\nelement of the question will be the conformity of the result to the\r\nlaws of the supposed agent, that is, to the character of the Deity as they\r\nconceive it. But with the knowledge which we now possess of the general\r\nuniformity of the course of nature, religion, following in the wake of\r\nscience, has been compelled to acknowledge the government of the universe\r\nas being on the whole carried on by general laws, and not by special\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page441\"\u003e[pg 441]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg441\" id=\"Pg441\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\ninterpositions. To whoever holds this belief, there is a general presumption\r\nagainst any supposition of divine agency not operating through general\r\nlaws, or, in other words, there is an antecedent improbability in every\r\nmiracle, which, in order to outweigh it, requires an extraordinary strength\r\nof antecedent probability derived from the special circumstances of the case.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 3. It appears from what has been said, that the assertion that a cause\r\nhas been defeated of an effect which is connected with it by a completely\r\nascertained law of causation, is to be disbelieved or not, according to the\r\nprobability or improbability that there existed in the particular instance an\r\nadequate counteracting cause. To form an estimate of this, is not more\r\ndifficult than of other probabilities. With regard to all \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eknown\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e causes\r\ncapable of counteracting the given causes, we have generally some previous\r\nknowledge of the frequency or rarity of their occurrence, from which we\r\nmay draw an inference as to the antecedent improbability of their having\r\nbeen present in any particular case. And neither in respect to known nor\r\nunknown causes are we required to pronounce on the probability of their\r\nexisting in nature, but only of their having existed at the time and place at\r\nwhich the transaction is alleged to have happened. We are seldom, therefore,\r\nwithout the means (when the circumstances of the case are at all\r\nknown to us) of judging how far it is likely that such a cause should have\r\nexisted at that time and place without manifesting its presence by some\r\nother marks, and (in the case of an unknown cause) without having hitherto\r\nmanifested its existence in any other instance. According as this circumstance,\r\nor the falsity of the testimony, appears more improbable—that\r\nis, conflicts with an approximate generalization of a higher order—we believe\r\nthe testimony, or disbelieve it; with a stronger or a weaker degree of\r\nconviction, according to the preponderance; at least until we have sifted\r\nthe matter further.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nSo much, then, for the case in which the alleged fact conflicts, or appears\r\nto conflict, with a real law of causation. But a more common case, perhaps,\r\nis that of its conflicting with uniformities of mere co-existence, not\r\nproved to be dependent on causation; in other words, with the properties\r\nof Kinds. It is with these uniformities principally that the marvelous\r\nstories related by travelers are apt to be at variance; as of men with tails,\r\nor with wings, and (until confirmed by experience) of flying fish; or of ice,\r\nin the celebrated anecdote of the Dutch travelers and the King of Siam.\r\nFacts of this description, facts previously unheard of, but which could not\r\nfrom any known law of causation be pronounced impossible, are what\r\nHume characterizes as not contrary to experience, but merely unconformable\r\nto it; and Bentham, in his treatise on Evidence, denominates them facts\r\ndisconformable \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-foreign\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ein specie\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, as distinguished from such as\r\nare disconformable \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-foreign\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ein toto\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e or in \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003edegree\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIn a case of this description, the fact asserted is the existence of a new\r\nKind; which in itself is not in the slightest degree incredible, and only to be\r\nrejected if the improbability that any variety of object existing at the particular\r\nplace and time should not have been discovered sooner, be greater\r\nthan that of error or mendacity in the witnesses. Accordingly, such assertions,\r\nwhen made by credible persons, and of unexplored places, are not disbelieved,\r\nbut at most regarded as requiring confirmation from subsequent\r\nobservers; unless the alleged properties of the supposed new Kind are at\r\nvariance with known properties of some larger kind which includes it; or,\r\nin other words, unless, in the new Kind which is asserted to exist, some\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page442\"\u003e[pg 442]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg442\" id=\"Pg442\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nproperties are said to have been found disjoined from others which have\r\nalways been known to accompany them; as in the case of Pliny’s men, or\r\nany other kind of animal of a structure different from that which has always\r\nbeen found to co-exist with animal life. On the mode of dealing with\r\nany such case, little needs be added to what has been said on the same topic\r\nin the twenty-second chapter.\u003ca id=\"noteref_203\" name=\"noteref_203\" href=\"#note_203\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e203\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e When the uniformities of co-existence\r\nwhich the alleged fact would violate, are such as to raise a strong presumption\r\nof their being the result of causation, the fact which conflicts with\r\nthem is to be disbelieved; at least provisionally, and subject to further investigation.\r\nWhen the presumption amounts to a virtual certainty, as in\r\nthe case of the general structure of organized beings, the only question requiring\r\nconsideration is whether, in phenomena so little understood, there\r\nmay not be liabilities to counteraction from causes hitherto unknown; or\r\nwhether the phenomena may not be capable of originating in some other\r\nway, which would produce a different set of derivative uniformities. Where\r\n(as in the case of the flying fish, or the ornithorhynchus) the generalization\r\nto which the alleged fact would be an exception is very special and of limited\r\nrange, neither of the above suppositions can be deemed very improbable;\r\nand it is generally, in the case of such alleged anomalies, wise to suspend\r\nour judgment, pending the subsequent inquiries which will not fail\r\nto confirm the assertion if it be true. But when the generalization is very\r\ncomprehensive, embracing a vast number and variety of observations, and\r\ncovering a considerable province of the domain of nature; then, for reasons\r\nwhich have been fully explained, such an empirical law comes near to the\r\ncertainty of an ascertained law of causation; and any alleged exception to\r\nit can not be admitted, unless on the evidence of some law of causation\r\nproved by a still more complete induction.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nSuch uniformities in the course of nature as do not bear marks of being\r\nthe results of causation are, as we have already seen, admissible as\r\nuniversal truths with a degree of credence proportioned to their generality.\r\nThose which are true of all things whatever, or at least which are\r\ntotally independent of the varieties of Kinds, namely, the laws of number\r\nand extension, to which we may add the law of causation itself, are probably\r\nthe only ones, an exception to which is absolutely and permanently incredible.\r\nAccordingly, it is to assertions supposed to be contradictory to\r\nthese laws, or to some others coming near to them in generality, that the\r\nword impossibility (at least \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003etotal\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e impossibility) seems to be generally\r\nconfined. Violations of other laws, of special laws of causation, for instance,\r\nare said, by persons studious of accuracy in expression, to be impossible\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ein the circumstances of the case\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e; or impossible unless some cause had existed\r\nwhich did not exist in the particular case.\u003ca id=\"noteref_204\" name=\"noteref_204\" href=\"#note_204\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e204\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nOf no assertion, not in\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page443\"\u003e[pg 443]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg443\" id=\"Pg443\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\ncontradiction to some of these very general laws, will more than improbability\r\nbe asserted by any cautious person; and improbability not of the\r\nhighest degree, unless the time and place in which the fact is said to have\r\noccurred, render it almost certain that the anomaly, if real, could not have\r\nbeen overlooked by other observers. Suspension of judgment is in all\r\nother cases the resource of the judicious inquirer; provided the testimony\r\nin favor of the anomaly presents, when well sifted, no suspicious circumstances.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nBut the testimony is scarcely ever found to stand that test, in cases in\r\nwhich the anomaly is not real. In the instances on record in which a great\r\nnumber of witnesses, of good reputation and scientific acquirements, have\r\ntestified to the truth of something which has turned out untrue, there have\r\nalmost always been circumstances which, to a keen observer who had taken\r\ndue pains to sift the matter, would have rendered the testimony untrustworthy.\r\nThere have generally been means of accounting for the impression\r\non the senses or minds of the alleged percipients, by fallacious appearances;\r\nor some epidemic delusion, propagated by the contagious influence\r\nof popular feeling, has been concerned in the case; or some strong interest\r\nhas been implicated—religious zeal, party feeling, vanity, or at least the\r\npassion for the marvelous, in persons strongly susceptible of it. When\r\nnone of these or similar circumstances exist to account for the apparent\r\nstrength of the testimony; and where the assertion is not in contradiction\r\neither to those universal laws which know no counteraction or anomaly, or\r\nto the generalizations next in comprehensiveness to them, but would only\r\namount, if admitted, to the existence of an unknown cause or an anomalous\r\nKind, in circumstances not so thoroughly explored but that it is credible\r\nthat things hitherto unknown may still come to light; a cautious person\r\nwill neither admit nor reject the testimony, but will wait for confirmation\r\nat other times and from other unconnected sources. Such ought to have\r\nbeen the conduct of the King of Siam when the Dutch travelers affirmed\r\nto him the existence of ice. But an ignorant person is as obstinate in his\r\ncontemptuous incredulity as he is unreasonably credulous. Any thing unlike\r\nhis own narrow experience he disbelieves, if it flatters no propensity;\r\nany nursery tale is swallowed implicitly by him if it does.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 4. I shall now advert to a very serious misapprehension of the principles\r\nof the subject, which has been committed by some of the writers\r\nagainst Hume’s Essay on Miracles, and by Bishop Butler before them, in\r\ntheir anxiety to destroy what appeared to them a formidable weapon of\r\nassault against the Christian religion; and the effect of which is entirely\r\nto confound the doctrine of the Grounds of Disbelief. The mistake consists\r\nin overlooking the distinction between (what may be called) improbability\r\nbefore the fact and improbability after it; or (since, as Mr. Venn\r\nremarks, the distinction of past and future is not the material circumstance)\r\nbetween the improbability of a mere guess being right, and the improbability\r\nof an alleged fact being true.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nMany events are altogether improbable to us, before they have happened,\r\nor before we are informed of their happening, which are not in the least\r\nincredible when we are informed of them, because not contrary to any,\r\neven approximate, induction. In the cast of a perfectly fair die, the\r\nchances are five to one against throwing ace, that is, ace will be thrown\r\non an average only once in six throws. But this is no reason against believing\r\nthat ace was thrown on a given occasion, if any credible witness\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page444\"\u003e[pg 444]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg444\" id=\"Pg444\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nasserts it; since though ace is only thrown once in six times, \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003esome\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e number\r\nwhich is only thrown once in six times must have been thrown if the die\r\nwas thrown at all. The improbability, then, or, in other words, the unusualness,\r\nof any fact, is no reason for disbelieving it, if the nature of the case\r\nrenders it certain that either that or something equally improbable, that\r\nis, equally unusual, did happen. Nor is this all; for even if the other five\r\nsides of the die were all twos, or all threes, yet as ace would still, on the\r\naverage, come up once in every six throws, its coming up in a given throw\r\nwould be not in any way contradictory to experience. If we disbelieved\r\nall facts which had the chances against them beforehand, we should believe\r\nhardly any thing. We are told that A. B. died yesterday; the moment\r\nbefore we were so told, the chances against his having died on that day\r\nmay have been ten thousand to one; but since he was certain to die at\r\nsome time or other, and when he died must necessarily die on some particular\r\nday, while the preponderance of chances is very great against every\r\nday in particular, experience affords no ground for discrediting any testimony\r\nwhich may be produced to the event’s having taken place on a given\r\nday.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nYet it has been considered by Dr. Campbell and others, as a complete\r\nanswer to Hume’s doctrine (that things are incredible which are \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003econtrary\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e\r\nto the uniform course of experience), that we do not disbelieve, merely\r\nbecause the chances were against them, things in strict \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003econformity\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e to the\r\nuniform course of experience; that we do not disbelieve an alleged fact\r\nmerely because the combination of causes on which it depends occurs only\r\nonce in a certain number of times. It is evident that whatever is shown\r\nby observation, or can be proved from laws of nature, to occur in a certain\r\nproportion (however small) of the whole number of possible cases, is not\r\ncontrary to experience; though we are right in disbelieving it, if some\r\nother supposition respecting the matter in question involves, on the whole,\r\na less departure from the ordinary course of events. Yet on such grounds\r\nas this have able writers been led to the extraordinary conclusion, that\r\nnothing supported by credible testimony ought ever to be disbelieved.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 5. We have considered two species of events, commonly said to be improbable;\r\none kind which are in no way extraordinary, but which, having\r\nan immense preponderance of chances against them, are improbable until\r\nthey are affirmed, but no longer; another kind which, being contrary to\r\nsome recognized law of nature, are incredible on any amount of testimony\r\nexcept such as would be sufficient to shake our belief in the law itself.\r\nBut between these two classes of events, there is an intermediate class, consisting\r\nof what are commonly termed Coincidences: in other words, those\r\ncombinations of chances which present some peculiar and unexpected regularity,\r\nassimilating them, in so far, to the results of law. As if, for example,\r\nin a lottery of a thousand tickets, the numbers should be drawn in the\r\nexact order of what are called the natural numbers, 1, 2, 3, etc. We have\r\nstill to consider the principles of evidence applicable to this case: whether\r\nthere is any difference between coincidences and ordinary events, in the\r\namount of testimony or other evidence necessary to render them credible.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt is certain that on every rational principle of expectation, a combination\r\nof this peculiar sort may be expected quite as often as any other given\r\nseries of a thousand numbers; that with perfectly fair dice, sixes will be\r\nthrown twice, thrice, or any number of times in succession, quite as often\r\nin a thousand or a million throws, as any other succession of numbers fixed\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page445\"\u003e[pg 445]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg445\" id=\"Pg445\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nupon beforehand; and that no judicious player would give greater odds\r\nagainst the one series than against the other. Notwithstanding this, there\r\nis a general disposition to regard the one as much more improbable than\r\nthe other, and as requiring much stronger evidence to make it credible.\r\nSuch is the force of this impression, that it has led some thinkers to the\r\nconclusion, that nature has greater difficulty in producing regular combinations\r\nthan irregular ones; or in other words, that there is some general\r\ntendency of things, some law, which prevents regular combinations from\r\noccurring, or at least from occurring so often as others. Among these\r\nthinkers may be numbered D’Alembert; who, in an Essay on Probabilities\r\nto be found in the fifth volume of his \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eMélanges\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, contends that\r\nregular combinations, though equally probable according to the mathematical theory\r\nwith any others, are physically less probable. He appeals to common\r\nsense, or, in other words, to common impressions; saying, if dice thrown\r\nrepeatedly in our presence gave sixes every time, should we not, before the\r\nnumber of throws had reached ten (not to speak of thousands of millions),\r\nbe ready to affirm, with the most positive conviction, that the dice were\r\nfalse?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe common and natural impression is in favor of D’Alembert: the regular\r\nseries would be thought much more unlikely than an irregular. But\r\nthis common impression is, I apprehend, merely grounded on the fact, that\r\nscarcely any body remembers to have ever seen one of these peculiar coincidences:\r\nthe reason of which is simply that no one’s experience extends to\r\nany thing like the number of trials, within which that or any other given\r\ncombination of events can be expected to happen. The chance of sixes on\r\na single throw of two dice being ¹⁄₃₆, the chance of sixes ten times in succession\r\nis 1 divided by the tenth power of 36; in other words, such a concurrence\r\nis only likely to happen once in 3,656,158,440,062,976 trials, a\r\nnumber which no dice-player’s experience comes up to a millionth part of.\r\nBut if, instead of sixes ten times, any other given succession of ten throws\r\nhad been fixed upon, it would have been exactly as unlikely that in any\r\nindividual’s experience that particular succession had ever occurred; although\r\nthis does not \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eseem\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e equally improbable, because no one would be\r\nlikely to have remembered whether it had occurred or not, and because the\r\ncomparison is tacitly made, not between sixes ten times and any one particular\r\nseries of throws, but between all regular and all irregular successions\r\ntaken together.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThat (as D’Alembert says) if the succession of sixes was actually thrown\r\nbefore our eyes, we should ascribe it not to chance, but to unfairness in the\r\ndice, is unquestionably true. But this arises from a totally different principle.\r\nWe should then be considering, not the probability of the fact in\r\nitself, but the comparative probability with which, when it is known to\r\nhave happened, it may be referred to one or to another cause. The regular\r\nseries is not at all less likely than the irregular one to be brought about\r\nby chance, but it is much more likely than the irregular one to be produced\r\nby design; or by some general cause operating through the structure\r\nof the dice. It is the nature of casual combinations to produce a\r\nrepetition of the same event, as often and no oftener than any other series\r\nof events. But it is the nature of general causes to reproduce, in the same\r\ncircumstances, always the same event. Common sense and science alike\r\ndictate that, all other things being the same, we should rather attribute the\r\neffect to a cause which if real would be very likely to produce it, than to a\r\ncause which would be very unlikely to produce it. According to Laplace’s\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page446\"\u003e[pg 446]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg446\" id=\"Pg446\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nsixth theorem, which we demonstrated in a former chapter, the difference\r\nof probability arising from the superior \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eefficacy\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e of the constant cause,\r\nunfairness in the dice, would after a very few throws far outweigh any antecedent\r\nprobability which there could be against its existence.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nD’Alembert should have put the question in another manner. He should\r\nhave supposed that we had ourselves previously tried the dice, and knew\r\nby ample experience that they were fair. Another person then tries them\r\nin our absence, and assures us that he threw sixes ten times in succession.\r\nIs the assertion credible or not? Here the effect to be accounted for is\r\nnot the occurrence itself, but the fact of the witness’s asserting it. This\r\nmay arise either from its having really happened, or from some other\r\ncause. What we have to estimate is the comparative probability of these\r\ntwo suppositions.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIf the witness affirmed that he had thrown any other series of numbers,\r\nsupposing him to be a person of veracity, and tolerable accuracy, and to\r\nprofess that he took particular notice, we should believe him. But the\r\nten sixes are exactly as likely to have been really thrown as the other series.\r\nIf, therefore, this assertion is less credible than the other, the reason\r\nmust be, not that it is less likely than the other to be made truly, but that\r\nit is more likely than the other to be made falsely.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nOne reason obviously presents itself why what is called a coincidence,\r\nshould be oftener asserted falsely than an ordinary combination. It excites\r\nwonder. It gratifies the love of the marvelous. The motives, therefore,\r\nto falsehood, one of the most frequent of which is the desire to astonish,\r\noperate more strongly in favor of this kind of assertion than of the\r\nother kind. Thus far there is evidently more reason for discrediting an\r\nalleged coincidence, than a statement in itself not more probable, but\r\nwhich if made would not be thought remarkable. There are cases, however,\r\nin which the presumption on this ground would be the other way.\r\nThere are some witnesses who, the more extraordinary an occurrence\r\nmight appear, would be the more anxious to verify it by the utmost carefulness\r\nof observation before they would venture to believe it, and still\r\nmore before they would assert it to others.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 6. Independently, however, of any peculiar chances of mendacity arising\r\nfrom the nature of the assertion, Laplace contends, that merely on the\r\ngeneral ground of the fallibility of testimony, a coincidence is not credible\r\non the same amount of testimony on which we should be warranted in believing\r\nan ordinary combination of events. In order to do justice to his\r\nargument, it is necessary to illustrate it by the example chosen by himself.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIf, says Laplace, there were one thousand tickets in a box, and one only\r\nhas been drawn out, then if an eye-witness affirms that the number drawn\r\nwas 79, this, though the chances were 999 in 1000 against it, is not on that\r\naccount the less credible; its credibility is equal to the antecedent probability\r\nof the witness’s veracity. But if there were in the box 999 black\r\nballs and only one white, and the witness affirms that the white ball was\r\ndrawn, the case according to Laplace is very different: the credibility of\r\nhis assertion is but a small fraction of what it was in the former case; the\r\nreason of the difference being as follows:\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe witnesses of whom we are speaking must, from the nature of the\r\ncase, be of a kind whose credibility falls materially short of certainty; let\r\nus suppose, then, the credibility of the witness in the case in question to\r\nbe ⁹⁄₁₀; that is, let us suppose that in every ten statements which the witness\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page447\"\u003e[pg 447]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg447\" id=\"Pg447\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nmakes, nine on an average are correct, and one incorrect. Let us\r\nnow suppose that there have taken place a sufficient number of drawings\r\nto exhaust all the possible combinations, the witness deposing in every one.\r\nIn one case out of every ten in all these drawings he will actually have\r\nmade a false announcement. But in the case of the thousand tickets these\r\nfalse announcements will have been distributed impartially over all the\r\nnumbers, and of the 999 cases in which No. 79 was not drawn, there will\r\nhave been only one case in which it was announced. On the contrary, in\r\nthe case of the thousand balls (the announcement being always either\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“black”\u003c/span\u003e or \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“white”\u003c/span\u003e), if white was not drawn, and there was a false announcement,\r\nthat false announcement \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003emust\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e have been white; and since by\r\nthe supposition there was a false announcement once in every ten times,\r\nwhite will have been announced falsely in one-tenth part of all the cases in\r\nwhich it was not drawn, that is, in one-tenth part of 999 cases out of every\r\nthousand. White, then, is drawn, on an average, exactly as often as\r\nNo. 79, but it is announced, without having been really drawn, 999 times\r\nas often as No. 79; the announcement, therefore, requires a much greater\r\namount of testimony to render it credible.\u003ca id=\"noteref_205\" name=\"noteref_205\" href=\"#note_205\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e205\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nTo make this argument valid it must of course be supposed, that the\r\nannouncements made by the witness are average specimens of his general\r\nveracity and accuracy; or, at least, that they are neither more nor less so\r\nin the case of the black and white balls, than in the case of the thousand\r\ntickets. This assumption, however, is not warranted. A person is far less\r\nlikely to mistake, who has only one form of error to guard against, than if\r\nhe had 999 different errors to avoid. For instance, in the example chosen,\r\na messenger who might make a mistake once in ten times in reporting the\r\nnumber drawn in a lottery, might not err once in a thousand times if sent\r\nsimply to observe whether a ball was black or white. Laplace’s argument,\r\ntherefore, is faulty even as applied to his own case. Still less can that case\r\nbe received as completely representing all cases of coincidence. Laplace\r\nhas so contrived his example, that though black answers to 999 distinct\r\npossibilities, and white only to one, the witness has nevertheless no bias\r\nwhich can make him prefer black to white. The witness did not know\r\nthat there were 999 black balls in the box and only one white; or if he\r\ndid, Laplace has taken care to make all the 999 cases so undistinguishably\r\nalike, that there is hardly a possibility of any cause of falsehood or error\r\noperating in favor of any of them, which would not operate in the same\r\nmanner if there were only one. Alter this supposition, and the whole argument\r\nfalls to the ground. Let the balls, for instance, be numbered, and\r\nlet the white ball be No. 79. Considered in respect of their color, there\r\nare but two things which the witness can be interested in asserting, or can\r\nhave dreamed or hallucinated, or has to choose from if he answers at random,\r\nviz., black and white; but considered in respect of the numbers attached\r\nto them, there are a thousand; and if his interest or error happens\r\nto be connected with the numbers, though the only assertion he makes is\r\nabout the color, the case becomes precisely assimilated to that of the thousand\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page448\"\u003e[pg 448]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg448\" id=\"Pg448\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\ntickets. Or instead of the balls suppose a lottery, with 1000 tickets\r\nand but one prize, and that I hold No. 79, and being interested only in that,\r\nask the witness not what was the number drawn, but whether it was 79 or\r\nsome other. There are now only two cases, as in Laplace’s example; yet\r\nhe surely would not say that if the witness answered 79, the assertion\r\nwould be in an enormous proportion less credible, than if he made the same\r\nanswer to the same question asked in the other way. If, for instance (to\r\nput a case supposed by Laplace himself), he has staked a large sum on one\r\nof the chances, and thinks that by announcing its occurrence he shall increase\r\nhis credit; he is equally likely to have betted on any one of the 999\r\nnumbers which are attached to black balls, and so far as the chances of\r\nmendacity from this cause are concerned, there will be 999 times as many\r\nchances of his announcing black falsely as white.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nOr suppose a regiment of 1000 men, 999 Englishmen and one Frenchman,\r\nand that of these one man has been killed, and it is not known\r\nwhich. I ask the question, and the witness answers, the Frenchman. This\r\nwas not only as improbable \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea priori\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, but is\r\nin itself as singular a circumstance,\r\nas remarkable a coincidence, as the drawing of the white ball; yet\r\nwe should believe the statement as readily, as if the answer had been John\r\nThompson. Because, though the 999 Englishmen were all alike in the\r\npoint in which they differed from the Frenchman, they were not, like the\r\n999 black balls, undistinguishable in every other respect; but being all different,\r\nthey admitted as many chances of interest or error, as if each man\r\nhad been of a different nation; and if a lie was told or a mistake made, the\r\nmisstatement was as likely to fall on any Jones or Thompson of the set, as\r\non the Frenchman.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe example of a coincidence selected by D’Alembert, that of sixes\r\nthrown on a pair of dice ten times in succession, belongs to this sort of\r\ncases rather than to such as Laplace’s. The coincidence is here far more\r\nremarkable, because of far rarer occurrence, than the drawing of the white\r\nball. But though the improbability of its really occurring is greater, the\r\nsuperior probability of its being announced falsely can not be established\r\nwith the same evidence. The announcement \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“black”\u003c/span\u003e represented 999\r\ncases, but the witness may not have known this, and if he did, the 999\r\ncases are so exactly alike, that there is really only one set of possible causes\r\nof mendacity corresponding to the whole. The announcement \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“sixes \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003enot\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e\r\ndrawn ten times,”\u003c/span\u003e represents, and is known by the witness to represent,\r\na great multitude of contingencies, every one of which being unlike every\r\nother, there may be a different and a fresh set of causes of mendacity corresponding\r\nto each.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt appears to me, therefore, that Laplace’s doctrine is not strictly true of\r\nany coincidences, and is wholly inapplicable to most; and that to know\r\nwhether a coincidence does or does not require more evidence to render it\r\ncredible than an ordinary event, we must refer, in every instance, to first\r\nprinciples, and estimate afresh what is the probability that the given testimony\r\nwould have been delivered in that instance, supposing the fact which\r\nit asserts not to be true.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWith these remarks we close the discussion of the Grounds of Disbelief;\r\nand along with it, such exposition as space admits, and as the writer has it\r\nin his power to furnish, of the Logic of Induction.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page449\"\u003e[pg 449]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg449\" id=\"Pg449\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"page\" /\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-div\" style=\"margin-bottom: 5.00em; margin-top: 5.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"toc93\" id=\"toc93\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"pdf94\" id=\"pdf94\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\u0027chapter\u0027 /\u003e\u003ch2 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: center; margin-bottom: 2.88em; margin-top: 2.88em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 144%\"\u003eBook IV.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\u0027chapter\u0027 /\u003e\u003ch2 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: left; margin-bottom: 3.46em; margin-top: 3.46em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 173%\"\u003eOf Operations Subsidiary To Induction.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"block tei tei-quote\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.80em; margin-left: 3.60em; margin-top: 1.80em; margin-right: 3.60em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 0.90em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e“\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003eClear and distinct ideas are terms which, though familiar and frequent in men’s mouths,\r\nI have reason to think every one who uses does not perfectly understand. And possibly it\r\nis but here and there one who gives himself the trouble to consider them so far as to\r\nknow what he himself or others precisely mean by them; I have, therefore, in most places,\r\nchose to put determinate or determined, instead of clear and distinct, as more likely to\r\ndirect men’s thoughts to my meaning in this\r\nmatter.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e”\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e—\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%; font-variant: small-caps\"\u003eLocke’s\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%; font-style: italic\"\u003eEssay on the Human\r\nUnderstanding\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e; Epistle to the Reader.\r\n\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 0.90em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e“\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003eIl ne peut y avoir qu’une méthode parfaite, qui est la \u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%; font-style: italic\"\u003eméthode\r\nnaturelle\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e; on nomme ainsi un arrangement dans lequel les êtres du même genre\r\nseraient plus voisins entre eux que ceux de tous les autres genres; les genres du même\r\nordre, plus que ceux de tous les autres ordres; et ainsi de suite. Cette méthode est\r\nl’idéal auquel l’histoire naturelle doit tendre; car il est évident que si l’on y\r\nparvenait, l’on aurait l’expression exacte et complète de la nature\r\nentière.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e”\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e—\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%; font-variant: small-caps\"\u003eCuvier\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e, \u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%; font-style: italic\"\u003eRègne\r\nAnimal\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e, Introduction.\r\n\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 0.90em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e“\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003eDeux grandes notions philosophiques dominent la théorie fondamentale de la méthode\r\nnaturelle proprement dite, savoir la formation des groupes naturels, et ensuite leur\r\nsuccession hiérarchique.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e”\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e—\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%; font-variant: small-caps\"\u003eComte\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e,\r\n\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%; font-style: italic\"\u003eCours de Philosophie Positive\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e, 42me leçon.\r\n\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-div\" style=\"margin-bottom: 4.00em; margin-top: 4.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"toc95\" id=\"toc95\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"pdf96\" id=\"pdf96\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: center; margin-bottom: 2.40em; margin-top: 2.40em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 120%\"\u003eChapter I.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: left; margin-bottom: 2.88em; margin-top: 2.88em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 144%\"\u003eOf Observation And Description.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 1. The inquiry which occupied us in the two preceding Books, has\r\nconducted us to what appears a satisfactory solution of the principal problem\r\nof Logic, according to the conception I have formed of the science.\r\nWe have found, that the mental process with which Logic is conversant,\r\nthe operation of ascertaining truths by means of evidence, is always, even\r\nwhen appearances point to a different theory of it, a process of induction.\r\nAnd we have particularized the various modes of induction, and obtained\r\na clear view of the principles to which it must conform, in order to lead to\r\nresults which can be relied on.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe consideration of Induction, however, does not end with the direct\r\nrules for its performance. Something must be said of those other operations\r\nof the mind, which are either necessarily presupposed in all induction,\r\nor are instrumental to the more difficult and complicated inductive processes.\r\nThe present Book will be devoted to the consideration of these subsidiary\r\noperations; among which our attention must first be given to those,\r\nwhich are indispensable preliminaries to all induction whatsoever.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nInduction being merely the extension to a class of cases, of something\r\nwhich has been observed to be true in certain individual instances of the\r\nclass; the first place among the operations subsidiary to induction, is\r\nclaimed by Observation. This is not, however, the place to lay down rules\r\nfor making good observers; nor is it within the competence of Logic to do\r\nso, but of the art of intellectual Education. Our business with observation\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page450\"\u003e[pg 450]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg450\" id=\"Pg450\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nis only in its connection with the appropriate problem of logic, the estimation\r\nof evidence. We have to consider, not how or what to observe, but\r\nunder what conditions observation is to be relied on; what is needful, in\r\norder that the fact, supposed to be observed, may safely be received as\r\ntrue.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 2. The answer to this question is very simple, at least in its first aspect.\r\nThe sole condition is, that what is supposed to have been observed\r\nshall really have been observed; that it be an observation, not an inference.\r\nFor in almost every act of our perceiving faculties, observation and inference\r\nare intimately blended. What we are said to observe is usually a\r\ncompound result, of which one-tenth may be observation, and the remaining\r\nnine-tenths inference.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nI affirm, for example, that I hear a man’s voice. This would pass, in common\r\nlanguage, for a direct perception. All, however, which is really perception,\r\nis that I hear a sound. That the sound is a voice, and that voice\r\nthe voice of a man, are not perceptions but inferences. I affirm, again, that\r\nI saw my brother at a certain hour this morning. If any proposition concerning\r\na matter of fact would commonly be said to be known by the direct\r\ntestimony of the senses, this surely would be so. The truth, however,\r\nis far otherwise. I only saw a certain colored surface; or rather I had the\r\nkind of visual sensations which are usually produced by a colored surface;\r\nand from these as marks, known to be such by previous experience, I concluded\r\nthat I saw my brother. I might have had sensations precisely similar,\r\nwhen my brother was not there. I might have seen some other person\r\nso nearly resembling him in appearance, as, at the distance, and, with\r\nthe degree of attention which I bestowed, to be mistaken for him. I might\r\nhave been asleep, and have dreamed that I saw him; or in a state of nervous\r\ndisorder, which brought his image before me in a waking hallucination.\r\nIn all these modes, many have been led to believe that they saw persons\r\nwell known to them, who were dead or far distant. If any of these\r\nsuppositions had been true, the affirmation that I saw my brother would\r\nhave been erroneous; but whatever was matter of direct perception, namely\r\nthe visual sensations, would have been real. The inference only would\r\nhave been ill grounded; I should have ascribed those sensations to a wrong\r\ncause.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nInnumerable instances might be given, and analyzed in the same manner,\r\nof what are vulgarly called errors of sense. There are none of them properly\r\nerrors of sense; they are erroneous inferences from sense. When I\r\nlook at a candle through a multiplying glass, I see what seems a dozen\r\ncandles instead of one; and if the real circumstances of the case were skillfully\r\ndisguised, I might suppose that there were really that number; there\r\nwould be what is called an optical deception. In the kaleidoscope there\r\nreally is that deception; when I look through the instrument, instead of\r\nwhat is actually there, namely a casual arrangement of colored fragments,\r\nthe appearance presented is that of the same combination several times repeated\r\nin symmetrical arrangement round a point. The delusion is of course\r\neffected by giving me the same sensations which I should have had if such a\r\nsymmetrical combination had really been presented to me. If I cross two\r\nof my fingers, and bring any small object, a marble for instance, into contact\r\nwith both, at points not usually touched simultaneously by one object,\r\nI can hardly, if my eyes are shut, help believing that there are two marbles\r\ninstead of one. But it is not my touch in this case, nor my sight in the\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page451\"\u003e[pg 451]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg451\" id=\"Pg451\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nother, which is deceived; the deception, whether durable or only momentary,\r\nis in my judgment. From my senses I have only the sensations, and those\r\nare genuine. Being accustomed to have those or similar sensations when,\r\nand only when, a certain arrangement of outward objects is present to my\r\norgans, I have the habit of instantly, when I experience the sensations, inferring\r\nthe existence of that state of outward things. This habit has become\r\nso powerful, that the inference, performed with the speed and certainty\r\nof an instinct, is confounded with intuitive perceptions. When it is correct,\r\nI am unconscious that it ever needed proof; even when I know it to\r\nbe incorrect, I can not without considerable effort abstain from making it.\r\nIn order to be aware that it is not made by instinct but by an acquired habit,\r\nI am obliged to reflect on the slow process through which I learned to\r\njudge by the eye of many things which I now appear to perceive directly\r\nby sight; and on the reverse operation performed by persons learning to\r\ndraw, who with difficulty and labor divest themselves of their acquired\r\nperceptions, and learn afresh to see things as they appear to the eye.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt would be easy to prolong these illustrations, were there any need to expatiate\r\non a topic so copiously exemplified in various popular works. From\r\nthe examples already given, it is seen sufficiently, that the individual facts\r\nfrom which we collect our inductive generalizations are scarcely ever obtained\r\nby observation alone. Observation extends only to the sensations by which\r\nwe recognize objects; but the propositions which we make use of, either\r\nin science or in common life, relate mostly to the objects themselves. In\r\nevery act of what is called observation, there is at least one inference—from\r\nthe sensations to the presence of the object; from the marks or diagnostics,\r\nto the entire phenomenon. And hence, among other consequences, follows\r\nthe seeming paradox, that a general proposition collected from particulars\r\nis often more certainly true than any one of the particular propositions\r\nfrom which, by an act of induction, it was inferred. For, each of\r\nthose particular (or rather singular) propositions involved an inference,\r\nfrom the impression on the senses to the fact which caused that impression;\r\nand this inference may have been erroneous in any one of the instances,\r\nbut can not well have been erroneous in all of them, provided their number\r\nwas sufficient to eliminate chance. The conclusion, therefore, that is, the\r\ngeneral proposition, may deserve more complete reliance than it would be\r\nsafe to repose in any one of the inductive premises.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe logic of observation, then, consists solely in a correct discrimination\r\nbetween that, in a result of observation, which has really been perceived,\r\nand that which is an inference from the perception. Whatever portion is\r\ninference, is amenable to the rules of induction already treated of, and requires\r\nno further notice here; the question for us in this place is, when all\r\nwhich is inference is taken away what remains? There remains, in the first\r\nplace, the mind’s own feelings or states of consciousness, namely, its outward\r\nfeelings or sensations, and its inward feelings—its thoughts, emotions, and\r\nvolitions. Whether any thing else remains, or all else is inference from\r\nthis; whether the mind is capable of directly perceiving or apprehending\r\nany thing except states of its own consciousness—is a problem of metaphysics\r\nnot to be discussed in this place. But after excluding all questions\r\non which metaphysicians differ, it remains true, that for most purposes the\r\ndiscrimination we are called upon practically to exercise is that between\r\nsensations or other feelings, of our own or of other people, and inferences\r\ndrawn from them. And on the theory of Observation this is all which\r\nseems necessary to be said for the purposes of the present work.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page452\"\u003e[pg 452]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg452\" id=\"Pg452\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 3. If, in the simplest observation, or in what passes for such, there is a\r\nlarge part which is not observation but something else; so in the simplest\r\ndescription of an observation, there is, and must always be, much more asserted\r\nthan is contained in the perception itself. We can not describe a\r\nfact, without implying more than the fact. The perception is only of one\r\nindividual thing; but to describe it is to affirm a connection between it\r\nand every other thing which is either denoted or connoted by any of the\r\nterms used. To begin with an example, than which none can be conceived\r\nmore elementary: I have a sensation of sight, and I endeavor to describe\r\nit by saying that I see something white. In saying this, I do not solely affirm\r\nmy sensation; I also class it. I assert a resemblance between the\r\nthing I see, and all things which I and others are accustomed to call white.\r\nI assert that it resembles them in the circumstance in which they all\r\nresemble one another, in that which is the ground of their being called by\r\nthe name. This is not merely one way of describing an observation, but\r\nthe only way. If I would either register my observation for my own future\r\nuse, or make it known for the benefit of others, I must assert a resemblance\r\nbetween the fact which I have observed and something else. It is\r\ninherent in a description, to be the statement of a resemblance, or resemblances.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWe thus see that it is impossible to express in words any result of observation,\r\nwithout performing an act possessing what Dr. Whewell considers\r\nto be characteristic of Induction. There is always something introduced\r\nwhich was not included in the observation itself; some conception\r\ncommon to the phenomenon with other phenomena to which it is compared.\r\nAn observation can not be spoken of in language at all without\r\ndeclaring more than that one observation; without assimilating it to other\r\nphenomena already observed and classified. But this identification of an\r\nobject—this recognition of it as possessing certain known characteristics—has\r\nnever been confounded with Induction. It is an operation which precedes\r\nall induction, and supplies it with its materials. It is a perception of\r\nresemblances, obtained by comparison.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThese resemblances are not always apprehended directly, by merely comparing\r\nthe object observed with some other present object, or with our\r\nrecollection of an object which is absent. They are often ascertained\r\nthrough intermediate marks, that is, deductively. In describing some new\r\nkind of animal, suppose me to say that it measures ten feet in length, from\r\nthe forehead to the extremity of the tail. I did not ascertain this by the\r\nunassisted eye. I had a two-foot rule which I applied to the object, and,\r\nas we commonly say, measured it; an operation which was not wholly manual,\r\nbut partly also mathematical, involving the two propositions, Five\r\ntimes two is ten, and Things which are equal to the same thing are equal\r\nto one another. Hence, the fact that the animal is ten feet long is not an\r\nimmediate perception, but a conclusion from reasoning; the minor premises\r\nalone being furnished by observation of the object. Nevertheless, this\r\nis called an observation, or a description of the animal, not an induction respecting\r\nit.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nTo pass at once from a very simple to a very complex example: I affirm\r\nthat the earth is globular. The assertion is not grounded on direct perception;\r\nfor the figure of the earth can not, by us, be directly perceived, though\r\nthe assertion would not be true unless circumstances could be supposed\r\nunder which its truth could be so perceived. That the form of the earth\r\nis globular is inferred from certain marks, as for instance from this, that its\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page453\"\u003e[pg 453]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg453\" id=\"Pg453\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nshadow thrown upon the moon is circular; or this, that on the sea, or any\r\nextensive plain, our horizon is always a circle; either of which marks is incompatible\r\nwith any other than a globular form. I assert further, that the\r\nearth is that particular kind of a globe which is termed an oblate spheroid;\r\nbecause it is found by measurement in the direction of the meridian, that\r\nthe length on the surface of the earth which subtends a given angle at its\r\ncentre, diminishes as we recede from the equator and approach the poles.\r\nBut these propositions, that the earth is globular, and that it is an oblate\r\nspheroid, assert, each of them, an individual fact; in its own nature capable\r\nof being perceived by the senses when the requisite organs and the necessary\r\nposition are supposed, and only not actually perceived because those\r\norgans and that position are wanting. This identification of the earth,\r\nfirst as a globe, and next as an oblate spheroid, which, if the fact could have\r\nbeen seen, would have been called a description of the figure of the earth,\r\nmay without impropriety be so called when, instead of being seen, it is inferred.\r\nBut we could not without impropriety call either of these assertions\r\nan induction from facts respecting the earth. They are not general\r\npropositions collected from particular facts, but particular facts deduced\r\nfrom general propositions. They are conclusions obtained deductively,\r\nfrom premises originating in induction: but of these premises some were\r\nnot obtained by observation of the earth, nor had any peculiar reference\r\nto it.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIf, then, the truth respecting the figure of the earth is not an induction,\r\nwhy should the truth respecting the figure of the earth’s orbit be so? The\r\ntwo cases only differ in this, that the form of the orbit was not, like the\r\nform of the earth itself, deduced by ratiocination from facts which were\r\nmarks of ellipticity, but was got at by boldly guessing that the path was\r\nan ellipse, and finding afterward, on examination, that the observations were\r\nin harmony with the hypothesis. According to Dr. Whewell, however, this\r\nprocess of guessing and verifying our guesses is not only induction, but the\r\nwhole of induction: no other exposition can be given of that logical operation.\r\nThat he is wrong in the latter assertion, the whole of the preceding\r\nbook has, I hope, sufficiently proved; and that the process by which the\r\nellipticity of the planetary orbits was ascertained, is not induction at all,\r\nwas attempted to be shown in the second chapter of the same\r\nBook.\u003ca id=\"noteref_206\" name=\"noteref_206\" href=\"#note_206\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e206\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e We\r\nare now, however, prepared to go more into the heart of the matter than at\r\nthat earlier period of our inquiry, and to show, not merely what the operation\r\nin question is not, but what it is.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 4. We observed, in the second chapter, that the proposition \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“the earth\r\nmoves in an ellipse,”\u003c/span\u003e so far as it only serves for the colligation or connecting\r\ntogether of actual observations (that is, as it only affirms that the observed\r\npositions of the earth may be correctly represented by as many\r\npoints in the circumference of an imaginary ellipse), is not an induction,\r\nbut a description: it is an induction, only when it affirms that the intermediate\r\npositions, of which there has been no direct observation, would be\r\nfound to correspond to the remaining points of the same elliptic circumference.\r\nNow, though this real induction is one thing, and the description\r\nanother, we are in a very different condition for making the induction before\r\nwe have obtained the description, and after it. For inasmuch as the\r\ndescription, like all other descriptions, contains the assertion of a resemblance\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page454\"\u003e[pg 454]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg454\" id=\"Pg454\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nbetween the phenomenon described and something else; in pointing\r\nout something which the series of observed places of a planet resembles, it\r\npoints out something in which the several places themselves agree. If the\r\nseries of places correspond to as many points of an ellipse, the places themselves\r\nagree in being situated in that ellipse. We have, therefore, by the\r\nsame process which gave us the description, obtained the requisites for an\r\ninduction by the Method of Agreement. The successive observed places\r\nof the earth being considered as effects, and its motion as the cause which\r\nproduces them, we find that those effects, that is, those places, agree in the\r\ncircumstance of being in an ellipse. We conclude that the remaining effects,\r\nthe places which have not been observed, agree in the same circumstance,\r\nand that the \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003elaw\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e of the motion of the earth is motion in an ellipse.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe Colligation of Facts, therefore, by means of hypotheses, or, as Dr.\r\nWhewell prefers to say, by means of Conceptions, instead of being, as he\r\nsupposes, Induction itself, takes its proper place among operations subsidiary\r\nto Induction. All Induction supposes that we have previously compared\r\nthe requisite number of individual instances, and ascertained in what\r\ncircumstances they agree. The Colligation of Facts is no other than this\r\npreliminary operation. When Kepler, after vainly endeavoring to connect\r\nthe observed places of a planet by various hypotheses of circular motion,\r\nat last tried the hypotheses of an ellipse and found it answer to the phenomena;\r\nwhat he really attempted, first unsuccessfully and at last successfully,\r\nwas to discover the circumstance in which all the observed positions\r\nof the planet agreed. And when he in like manner connected another set\r\nof observed facts, the periodic times of the different planets, by the proposition\r\nthat the squares of the times are proportional to the cubes of the\r\ndistances, what he did was simply to ascertain the property in which the\r\nperiodic times of all the different planets agreed.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nSince, therefore, all that is true and to the purpose in Dr. Whewell’s\r\ndoctrine of Conceptions might be fully expressed by the more familiar\r\nterm Hypothesis; and since his Colligation of Facts by means of appropriate\r\nConceptions, is but the ordinary process of finding by a comparison\r\nof phenomena, in what consists their agreement or resemblance; I would\r\nwillingly have confined myself to those better understood expressions, and\r\npersevered to the end in the same abstinence which I have hitherto observed\r\nfrom ideological discussions; considering the mechanism of our\r\nthoughts to be a topic distinct from and irrelevant to the principles and\r\nrules by which the trustworthiness of the results of thinking is to be estimated.\r\nSince, however, a work of such high pretensions, and, it must also\r\nbe said, of so much real merit, has rested the whole theory of Induction\r\nupon such ideological considerations, it seems necessary for others who\r\nfollow to claim for themselves and their doctrines whatever position may\r\nproperly belong to them on the same metaphysical ground. And this is\r\nthe object of the succeeding chapter.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page455\"\u003e[pg 455]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg455\" id=\"Pg455\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-div\" style=\"margin-bottom: 4.00em; margin-top: 4.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"toc97\" id=\"toc97\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"pdf98\" id=\"pdf98\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"Book_IV_Chapter_II\" id=\"Book_IV_Chapter_II\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: center; margin-bottom: 2.40em; margin-top: 2.40em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 120%\"\u003eChapter II.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: left; margin-bottom: 2.88em; margin-top: 2.88em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 144%\"\u003eOf Abstraction, Or The Formation Of Conceptions.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 1. The metaphysical inquiry into the nature and composition of what\r\nhave been called Abstract Ideas, or, in other words, of the notions which\r\nanswer in the mind to classes and to general names, belongs not to Logic,\r\nbut to a different science, and our purpose does not require that we should\r\nenter upon it here. We are only concerned with the universally acknowledged\r\nfact, that such notions or conceptions do exist. The mind can conceive\r\na multitude of individual things as one assemblage or class; and general\r\nnames do really suggest to us certain ideas or mental representations,\r\notherwise we could not use the names with consciousness of a meaning.\r\nWhether the idea called up by a general name is composed of the various\r\ncircumstances in which all the individuals denoted by the name agree, and\r\nof no others (which is the doctrine of Locke, Brown, and the Conceptualists);\r\nor whether it be the idea of some one of those individuals, clothed in\r\nits individualizing peculiarities, but with the accompanying knowledge that\r\nthose peculiarities are not properties of the class (which is the doctrine of\r\nBerkeley, Mr. Bailey,\u003ca id=\"noteref_207\" name=\"noteref_207\" href=\"#note_207\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e207\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nand the modern Nominalists); or whether (as held by\r\nMr. James Mill) the idea of the class is that of a miscellaneous assemblage\r\nof individuals belonging to the class; or whether, finally, it be any one or\r\nany other of all these, according to the accidental circumstances of the\r\ncase; certain it is, that \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003esome\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e idea or mental conception is suggested by a\r\ngeneral name, whenever we either hear it or employ it with consciousness\r\nof a meaning. And this, which we may call, if we please, a general idea,\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003erepresents\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e in our minds the whole class of things to which the name is\r\napplied. Whenever we think or reason concerning the class, we do so by\r\nmeans of this idea. And the voluntary power which the mind has, of attending\r\nto one part of what is present to it at any moment, and neglecting\r\nanother part, enables us to keep our reasonings and conclusions respecting\r\nthe class unaffected by any thing in the idea or mental image which is not\r\nreally, or at least which we do not really believe to be common, to the\r\nwhole class.\u003ca id=\"noteref_208\" name=\"noteref_208\" href=\"#note_208\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e208\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThere are, then, such things as general conceptions, or conceptions by\r\nmeans of which we can think generally; and when we form a set of phenomena\r\ninto a class, that is, when we compare them with one another to\r\nascertain in what they agree, some general conception is implied in this\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page456\"\u003e[pg 456]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg456\" id=\"Pg456\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nmental operation. And inasmuch as such a comparison is a necessary preliminary\r\nto Induction, it is most true that Induction could not go on without\r\ngeneral conceptions.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 2. But it does not therefore follow that these general conceptions must\r\nhave existed in the mind previously to the comparison. It is not a law of\r\nour intellect, that in comparing things with each other and taking note\r\nof their agreement we merely recognize as realized in the outward world\r\nsomething that we already had in our minds. The conception originally\r\nfound its way to us as the \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eresult\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e of such a comparison. It was obtained\r\n(in metaphysical phrase) by \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eabstraction\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e from individual things. These\r\nthings may be things which we perceived or thought of on former occasions,\r\nbut they may also be the things which we are perceiving or thinking\r\nof on the very occasion. When Kepler compared the observed places of\r\nthe planet Mars, and found that they agreed in being points of an elliptic\r\ncircumference, he applied a general conception which was already in his\r\nmind, having been derived from his former experience. But this is by no\r\nmeans universally the case. When we compare several objects and find\r\nthem to agree in being white, or when we compare the various species of\r\nruminating animals and find them to agree in being cloven-footed, we have\r\njust as much a general conception in our minds as Kepler had in his: we\r\nhave the conception of \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“a white thing,”\u003c/span\u003e or the conception of \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“a cloven-footed\r\nanimal.”\u003c/span\u003e But no one supposes that we necessarily bring these conceptions\r\nwith us, and \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003esuperinduce\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e them (to adopt Dr. Whewell’s expression)\r\nupon the facts: because in these simple cases every body sees that\r\nthe very act of comparison which ends in our connecting the facts by\r\nmeans of the conception, may be the source from which we derive the conception\r\nitself. If we had never seen any white object or had never seen\r\nany cloven-footed animal before, we should at the same time and by the\r\nsame mental act acquire the idea, and employ it for the colligation of the\r\nobserved phenomena. Kepler, on the contrary, really had to bring the\r\nidea with him, and superinduce it upon the facts; he could not evolve it\r\nout of them: if he had not already had the idea, he would not have been\r\nable to acquire it by a comparison of the planet’s positions. But this inability\r\nwas a mere accident; the idea of an ellipse could have been acquired\r\nfrom the paths of the planets as effectually as from any thing else,\r\nif the paths had not happened to be invisible. If the planet had left a\r\nvisible track, and we had been so placed that we could see it at the proper\r\nangle, we might have abstracted our original idea of an ellipse from the\r\nplanetary orbit. Indeed, every conception which can be made the instrument\r\nfor connecting a set of facts, might have been originally evolved from\r\nthose very facts. The conception is a conception \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eof\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e something; and that\r\nwhich it is a conception of, is really \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ein\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e the facts, and might, under some\r\nsupposable circumstances, or by some supposable extension of the faculties\r\nwhich we actually possess, have been detected in them. And not only is\r\nthis always in itself possible, but it actually happens in almost all cases in\r\nwhich the obtaining of the right conception is a matter of any considerable\r\ndifficulty. For if there be no new conception required; if one of those\r\nalready familiar to mankind will serve the purpose, the accident of being\r\nthe first to whom the right one occurs, may happen to almost any body;\r\nat least in the case of a set of phenomena which the whole scientific world\r\nare engaged in attempting to connect. The honor, in Kepler’s case, was\r\nthat of the accurate, patient, and toilsome calculations by which he compared\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page457\"\u003e[pg 457]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg457\" id=\"Pg457\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nthe results that followed from his different guesses, with the observations\r\nof Tycho Brahe; but the merit was very small of guessing an\r\nellipse; the only wonder is that men had not guessed it before, nor could\r\nthey have failed to do so if there had not existed an obstinate\r\n\u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea priori\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nprejudice that the heavenly bodies must move, if not in a circle, in some\r\ncombination of circles.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe really difficult cases are those in which the conception destined to\r\ncreate light and order out of darkness and confusion has to be sought for\r\namong the very phenomena which it afterward serves to arrange. Why,\r\naccording to Dr. Whewell himself, did the ancients fail in discovering the\r\nlaws of mechanics, that is, of equilibrium and of the communication of motion?\r\nBecause they had not, or at least had not clearly, the ideas or conceptions\r\nof pressure and resistance, momentum, and uniform and accelerating\r\nforce. And whence could they have obtained these ideas except from\r\nthe very facts of equilibrium and motion? The tardy development of several\r\nof the physical sciences, for example, of optics, electricity, magnetism,\r\nand the higher generalizations of chemistry, he ascribes to the fact that\r\nmankind had not yet possessed themselves of the Idea of Polarity, that is,\r\nthe idea of opposite properties in opposite directions. But what was there\r\nto suggest such an idea, until, by a separate examination of several of these\r\ndifferent branches of knowledge, it was shown that the facts of each of them\r\ndid present, in some instances at least, the curious phenomenon of opposite\r\nproperties in opposite directions? The thing was superficially manifest\r\nonly in two cases, those of the magnet and of electrified bodies; and there\r\nthe conception was encumbered with the circumstance of material poles,\r\nor fixed points in the body itself, in which points this opposition of properties\r\nseemed to be inherent. The first comparison and abstraction had led\r\nonly to this conception of poles; and if any thing corresponding to that conception\r\nhad existed in the phenomena of chemistry or optics, the difficulty\r\nnow justly considered so great, would have been extremely small. The obscurity\r\narose from the fact, that the polarities in chemistry and optics were\r\ndistinct species, though of the same genus, with the polarities in electricity\r\nand magnetism; and that in order to assimilate the phenomena to one another,\r\nit was necessary to compare a polarity without poles, such for instance as\r\nis exemplified in the polarization of light, and the polarity with (apparent)\r\npoles, which we see in the magnet; and to recognize that these polarities,\r\nwhile different in many other respects, agree in the one character which is\r\nexpressed by the phrase, opposite properties in opposite directions. From\r\nthe result of such a comparison it was that the minds of scientific men\r\nformed this new general conception; between which, and the first confused\r\nfeeling of an analogy between some of the phenomena of light and those of\r\nelectricity and magnetism, there is a long interval, filled up by the labors\r\nand more or less sagacious suggestions of many superior minds.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe conceptions, then, which we employ for the colligation and methodization\r\nof facts, do not develop themselves from within, but are impressed\r\nupon the mind from without; they are never obtained otherwise than by\r\nway of comparison and abstraction, and, in the most important and the\r\nmost numerous cases, are evolved by abstraction from the very phenomena\r\nwhich it is their office to colligate. I am far, however, from wishing to imply\r\nthat it is not often a very difficult thing to perform this process of abstraction\r\nwell, or that the success of an inductive operation does not, in many\r\ncases, principally depend on the skill with which we perform it. Bacon\r\nwas quite justified in designating as one of the principal obstacles to good\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page458\"\u003e[pg 458]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg458\" id=\"Pg458\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\ninduction, general conceptions wrongly formed, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“notiones temerè à rebus\r\nabstractæ;”\u003c/span\u003e to which Dr. Whewell adds, that not only does bad abstraction\r\nmake bad induction, but that, in order to perform induction well, we must\r\nhave abstracted well; our general conceptions must be \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“clear”\u003c/span\u003e and \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“appropriate”\u003c/span\u003e\r\nto the matter in hand.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 3. In attempting to show what the difficulty in this matter really is,\r\nand how it is surmounted, I must beg the reader, once for all, to bear this\r\nin mind; that although, in discussing the opinions of a different school of\r\nphilosophy, I am willing to adopt their language, and to speak, therefore,\r\nof connecting facts through the instrumentality of a conception, this technical\r\nphraseology means neither more nor less than what is commonly called\r\ncomparing the facts with one another and determining in what they\r\nagree. Nor has the technical expression even the advantage of being metaphysically\r\ncorrect. The facts are not \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003econnected\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e, except in a merely metaphorical\r\nacceptation of the term. The \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eideas\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e of the facts may become\r\nconnected, that is, we may be led to think of them together; but this consequence\r\nis no more than what may be produced by any casual association.\r\nWhat really takes place, is, I conceive, more philosophically expressed by\r\nthe common word Comparison, than by the phrases \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“to connect”\u003c/span\u003e or \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“to\r\nsuperinduce.”\u003c/span\u003e For, as the general conception is itself obtained by a comparison\r\nof particular phenomena, so, when obtained, the mode in which we\r\napply it to other phenomena is again by comparison. We compare phenomena\r\nwith each other to get the conception, and we then compare those\r\nand other phenomena \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ewith\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e the conception. We get the conception of an\r\nanimal (for instance) by comparing different animals, and when we afterward\r\nsee a creature resembling an animal, we compare it with our general\r\nconception of an animal; and if it agrees with that general conception, we\r\ninclude it in the class. The conception becomes the type of comparison.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAnd we need only consider what comparison is, to see that where the\r\nobjects are more than two, and still more when they are an indefinite number,\r\na type of some sort is an indispensable condition of the comparison.\r\nWhen we have to arrange and classify a great number of objects according\r\nto their agreements and differences, we do not make a confused attempt to\r\ncompare all with all. We know that two things are as much as the mind\r\ncan easily attend to at a time, and we therefore fix upon one of the objects,\r\neither at hazard or because it offers in a peculiarly striking manner some\r\nimportant character, and, taking this as our standard, compare it with one\r\nobject after another. If we find a second object which presents a remarkable\r\nagreement with the first, inducing us to class them together, the question\r\ninstantly arises, in what particular circumstances do they agree? and\r\nto take notice of these circumstances is already a first stage of abstraction,\r\ngiving rise to a general conception. Having advanced thus far, when we\r\nnow take in hand a third object we naturally ask ourselves the question,\r\nnot merely whether this third object agrees with the first, but whether it\r\nagrees with it in the same circumstances in which the second did? in other\r\nwords, whether it agrees with the general conception which has been obtained\r\nby abstraction from the first and second? Thus we see the tendency\r\nof general conceptions, as soon as formed, to substitute themselves as\r\ntypes, for whatever individual objects previously answered that purpose in\r\nour comparisons. We may, perhaps, find that no considerable number of\r\nother objects agree with this first general conception; and that we must\r\ndrop the conception, and beginning again with a different individual case,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page459\"\u003e[pg 459]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg459\" id=\"Pg459\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nproceed by fresh comparisons to a different general conception. Sometimes,\r\nagain, we find that the same conception will serve, by merely leaving\r\nout some of its circumstances; and by this higher effort of abstraction, we\r\nobtain a still more general conception; as in the case formerly referred to,\r\nthe scientific world rose from the conception of poles to the general conception\r\nof opposite properties in opposite directions; or as those South-Sea\r\nislanders, whose conception of a quadruped had been abstracted from hogs\r\n(the only animals of that description which they had seen), when they afterward\r\ncompared that conception with other quadrupeds, dropped some of\r\nthe circumstances, and arrived at the more general conception which Europeans\r\nassociate with the term.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThese brief remarks contain, I believe, all that is well grounded in the\r\ndoctrine, that the conception by which the mind arranges and gives unity\r\nto phenomena must be furnished by the mind itself, and that we find the\r\nright conception by a tentative process, trying first one and then another\r\nuntil we hit the mark. The conception is not furnished \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eby\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e the mind until\r\nit has been furnished \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eto\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e the mind; and the facts which supply it are\r\nsometimes extraneous facts, but more often the very facts which we are attempting\r\nto arrange by it. It is quite true, however, that in endeavoring to\r\narrange the facts, at whatever point we begin, we never advance three\r\nsteps without forming a general conception, more or less distinct and precise;\r\nand that this general conception becomes the clue which we instantly\r\nendeavor to trace through the rest of the facts, or rather, becomes the\r\nstandard with which we thenceforth compare them. If we are not satisfied\r\nwith the agreements which we discover among the phenomena by comparing\r\nthem with this type, or with some still more general conception\r\nwhich by an additional stage of abstraction we can form from the type;\r\nwe change our path, and look out for other agreements; we recommence\r\nthe comparison from a different starting-point, and so generate a different\r\nset of general conceptions. This is the tentative process which Dr. Whewell\r\nspeaks of; and which has not unnaturally suggested the theory, that\r\nthe conception is supplied by the mind itself; since the different conceptions\r\nwhich the mind successively tries, it either already possessed from\r\nits previous experience, or they were supplied to it in the first stage of the\r\ncorresponding act of comparison; so that, in the subsequent part of the\r\nprocess, the conception manifested itself as something compared with the\r\nphenomena, not evolved from them.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 4. If this be a correct account of the instrumentality of general conceptions\r\nin the comparison which necessarily precedes Induction, we are\r\nnow able to translate into our own language what Dr. Whewell means by\r\nsaying that conceptions, to be subservient to Induction, must be \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“clear”\u003c/span\u003e\r\nand \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“appropriate.”\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIf the conception corresponds to a real agreement among the phenomena;\r\nif the comparison which we have made of a set of objects has led us to\r\nclass them according to real resemblances and differences; the conception\r\nwhich does this can not fail to be appropriate, for some purpose or other.\r\nThe question of appropriateness is relative to the particular object we\r\nhave in view. As soon as, by our comparison, we have ascertained some\r\nagreement, something which can be predicated in common of a number of\r\nobjects; we have obtained a basis on which an inductive process is capable\r\nof being founded. But the agreements, or the ulterior consequences\r\nto which those agreements lead, may be of very different degrees of importance.\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page460\"\u003e[pg 460]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg460\" id=\"Pg460\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nIf, for instance, we only compare animals according to their color,\r\nand class those together which are colored alike, we form the general conceptions\r\nof a white animal, a black animal, etc., which are conceptions legitimately\r\nformed; and if an induction were to be attempted concerning\r\nthe causes of the colors of animals, this comparison would be the proper\r\nand necessary preparation for such an induction, but would not help us toward\r\na knowledge of the laws of any other of the properties of animals;\r\nwhile if, with Cuvier, we compare and class them according to the structure\r\nof the skeleton, or, with Blainville, according to the nature of their\r\noutward integuments, the agreements and differences which are observable\r\nin these respects are not only of much greater importance in themselves,\r\nbut are marks of agreements and differences in many other important particulars\r\nof the structure and mode of life of the animals. If, therefore, the\r\nstudy of their structure and habits be our object, the conceptions generated\r\nby these last comparisons are far more \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“appropriate”\u003c/span\u003e than those generated\r\nby the former. Nothing, other than this, can be meant by the appropriateness\r\nof a conception.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWhen Dr. Whewell says that the ancients, or the school-men, or any\r\nmodern inquirers, missed discovering the real law of a phenomenon because\r\nthey applied to it an inappropriate instead of an appropriate conception;\r\nhe can only mean that in comparing various instances of the phenomenon,\r\nto ascertain in what those instances agreed, they missed the important\r\npoints of agreement; and fastened upon such as were either imaginary,\r\nand not agreements at all, or, if real agreements, were comparatively trifling,\r\nand had no connection with the phenomenon, the law of which was\r\nsought.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAristotle, philosophizing on the subject of motion, remarked that certain\r\nmotions apparently take place spontaneously; bodies fall to the ground,\r\nflame ascends, bubbles of air rise in water, etc.; and these he called natural\r\nmotions; while others not only never take place without external incitement,\r\nbut even when such incitement is applied, tend spontaneously to\r\ncease; which, to distinguish them from the former, he called violent motions.\r\nNow, in comparing the so-called natural motions with one another,\r\nit appeared to Aristotle that they agreed in one circumstance, namely, that\r\nthe body which moved (or seemed to move) spontaneously, was moving\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003etoward its own place\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e; meaning thereby the place from whence it originally\r\ncame, or the place where a great quantity of matter similar to itself was\r\nassembled. In the other class of motions, as when bodies are thrown up in\r\nthe air, they are, on the contrary, moving \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003efrom\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e their own place. Now,\r\nthis conception of a body moving toward its own place may justly be considered\r\ninappropriate; because, though it expresses a circumstance really\r\nfound in some of the most familiar instances of motion apparently spontaneous,\r\nyet, first, there are many other cases of such motion, in which that\r\ncircumstance is absent; the motion, for instance, of the earth and planets.\r\nSecondly, even when it is present, the motion, on closer examination, would\r\noften be seen not to be spontaneous; as, when air rises in water, it does\r\nnot rise by its own nature, but is pushed up by the superior weight of the\r\nwater which presses upon it. Finally, there are many cases in which the\r\nspontaneous motion takes place in the contrary direction to what the theory\r\nconsiders as the body’s own place; for instance, when a fog rises from a\r\nlake, or when water dries up. The agreement, therefore, which Aristotle\r\nselected as his principle of classification, did not extend to all cases of the\r\nphenomenon he wanted to study, spontaneous motion; while it did include\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page461\"\u003e[pg 461]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg461\" id=\"Pg461\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\ncases of the absence of the phenomenon, cases of motion not spontaneous.\r\nThe conception was hence \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“inappropriate.”\u003c/span\u003e We may add that, in the case\r\nin question, no conception would be appropriate; there is no agreement\r\nwhich runs through all the cases of spontaneous or apparently spontaneous\r\nmotion and no others; they can not be brought under one law; it is a case\r\nof Plurality of Causes.\u003ca id=\"noteref_209\" name=\"noteref_209\" href=\"#note_209\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e209\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 5. So much for the first of Dr. Whewell’s conditions, that conceptions\r\nmust be appropriate. The second is, that they shall be \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“clear:”\u003c/span\u003e and let us\r\nconsider what this implies. Unless the conception corresponds to a real\r\nagreement, it has a worse defect than that of not being clear: it is not applicable\r\nto the case at all. Among the phenomena, therefore, which we are\r\nattempting to connect by means of the conception, we must suppose that\r\nthere really is an agreement, and that the conception is a conception of\r\nthat agreement. In order, then, that it may be clear, the only requisite is,\r\nthat we shall know exactly in what the agreement consists; that it shall\r\nhave been carefully observed, and accurately remembered. We are said\r\nnot to have a clear conception of the resemblance among a set of objects,\r\nwhen we have only a general feeling that they resemble, without having\r\nanalyzed their resemblance, or perceived in what points it consists, and\r\nfixed in our memory an exact recollection of those points. This want of\r\nclearness, or, as it may be otherwise called, this vagueness in the general\r\nconception, may be owing either to our having no accurate knowledge of\r\nthe objects themselves, or merely to our not having carefully compared\r\nthem. Thus a person may have no clear idea of a ship because he has\r\nnever seen one, or because he remembers but little, and that faintly, of\r\nwhat he has seen. Or he may have a perfect knowledge and remembrance\r\nof many ships of various kinds, frigates among the rest, but he may have\r\nno clear but only a confused idea of a frigate, because he has never been\r\ntold, and has not compared them sufficiently to have remarked and remembered,\r\nin what particular points a frigate differs from some other kind of\r\nship.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt is not, however, necessary, in order to have clear ideas, that we should\r\nknow all the common properties of the things which we class together.\r\nThat would be to have our conception of the class complete as well as\r\nclear. It is sufficient if we never class things together without knowing\r\nexactly why we do so—without having ascertained exactly what agreements\r\nwe are about to include in our conception; and if, after having thus\r\nfixed our conception, we never vary from it, never include in the class any\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page462\"\u003e[pg 462]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg462\" id=\"Pg462\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nthing which has not those common properties, nor exclude from it any\r\nthing which has. A clear conception means a determinate conception;\r\none which does not fluctuate, which is not one thing to-day and another\r\nto-morrow, but remains fixed and invariable, except when, from the progress\r\nof our knowledge, or the correction of some error, we consciously add\r\nto it or alter it. A person of clear ideas is a person who always knows in\r\nvirtue of what properties his classes are constituted; what attributes are\r\nconnoted by his general names.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe principal requisites, therefore, of clear conceptions, are habits of attentive\r\nobservation, an extensive experience, and a memory which receives\r\nand retains an exact image of what is observed. And in proportion as\r\nany one has the habit of observing minutely and comparing carefully a\r\nparticular class of phenomena, and an accurate memory for the results of\r\nthe observation and comparison, so will his conceptions of that class of\r\nphenomena be clear; provided he has the indispensable habit (naturally,\r\nhowever, resulting from those other endowments), of never using general\r\nnames without a precise connotation.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAs the clearness of our conceptions chiefly depends on the \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ecarefulness\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e\r\nand \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eaccuracy\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e of our observing and comparing faculties, so their\r\nappropriateness, or rather the chance we have of hitting upon the appropriate conception\r\nin any case, mainly depends on the \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eactivity\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e of the same faculties.\r\nHe who by habit, grounded on sufficient natural aptitude, has acquired a\r\nreadiness in accurately observing and comparing phenomena, will perceive\r\nso many more agreements, and will perceive them so much more rapidly\r\nthan other people, that the chances are much greater of his perceiving, in\r\nany instance, the agreement on which the important consequences depend.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 6. It is of so much importance that the part of the process of investigating\r\ntruth, discussed in this chapter, should be rightly understood, that\r\nI think it is desirable to restate the results we have arrived at, in a somewhat\r\ndifferent mode of expression.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWe can not ascertain general truths, that is, truths applicable to classes,\r\nunless we have formed the classes in such a manner that general truths\r\ncan be affirmed of them. In the formation of any class, there is involved\r\na conception of it as a class, that is, a conception of certain circumstances\r\nas being those which characterize the class, and distinguish the objects\r\ncomposing it from all other things. When we know exactly what these\r\ncircumstances are, we have a clear idea (or conception) of the class, and of\r\nthe meaning of the general name which designates it. The primary condition\r\nimplied in having this clear idea, is that the class be really a class;\r\nthat it correspond to a real distinction; that the things it includes really\r\ndo agree with one another in certain particulars, and differ, in those same\r\nparticulars, from all other things. A person without clear ideas is one\r\nwho habitually classes together, under the same general names, things\r\nwhich have no common properties, or none which are not possessed also\r\nby other things; or who, if the usage of other people prevents him from\r\nactually misclassing things, is unable to state to himself the common properties\r\nin virtue of which he classes them rightly.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nBut is it not the sole requisite of classification that the classes should be\r\nreal classes, framed by a legitimate mental process? Some modes of classing\r\nthings are more valuable than others for human uses, whether of speculation\r\nor of practice; and our classifications are not well made, unless the\r\nthings which they bring together not only agree with each other in something\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page463\"\u003e[pg 463]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg463\" id=\"Pg463\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nwhich distinguishes them from all other things, but agree with each\r\nother and differ from other things in the very circumstances which are of\r\nprimary importance for the purpose (theoretical or practical) which we\r\nhave in view, and which constitutes the problem before us. In other\r\nwords, our conceptions, though they may be clear, are not \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eappropriate\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e for\r\nour purpose, unless the properties we comprise in them are those which\r\nwill help us toward what we wish to understand—\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, either\r\nthose which go deepest into the nature of the things, if our object be to understand that,\r\nor those which are most closely connected with the particular property\r\nwhich we are endeavoring to investigate.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWe can not, therefore, frame good general conceptions beforehand.\r\nThat the conception we have obtained is the one we want, can only be\r\nknown when we have done the work for the sake of which we wanted it;\r\nwhen we completely understand the general character of the phenomena,\r\nor the conditions of the particular property with which we concern ourselves.\r\nGeneral conceptions formed without this thorough knowledge, are\r\nBacon’s \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“notiones temerè à rebus abstractæ.”\u003c/span\u003e Yet such premature conceptions\r\nwe must be continually making up, in our progress to something\r\nbetter. They are an impediment to the progress of knowledge, only when\r\nthey are permanently acquiesced in. When it has become our habit to\r\ngroup things in wrong classes—in groups which either are not really classes,\r\nhaving no distinctive points of agreement (absence of \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eclear\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e ideas), or\r\nwhich are not classes of which any thing important to our purpose can be\r\npredicated (absence of \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eappropriate\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e ideas); and when, in the belief that\r\nthese badly made classes are those sanctioned by nature, we refuse to exchange\r\nthem for others, and can not or will not make up our general conceptions\r\nfrom any other elements; in that case all the evils which Bacon\r\nascribes to his \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“notiones temerè abstractæ”\u003c/span\u003e really occur. This was what\r\nthe ancients did in physics, and what the world in general does in morals\r\nand politics to the present day.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt would thus, in my view of the matter, be an inaccurate mode of expression\r\nto say, that obtaining appropriate conceptions is a condition precedent\r\nto generalization. Throughout the whole process of comparing\r\nphenomena with one another for the purpose of generalization, the mind is\r\ntrying to make up a conception; but the conception which it is trying to\r\nmake up is that of the really important point of agreement in the phenomena.\r\nAs we obtain more knowledge of the phenomena themselves, and of\r\nthe conditions on which their important properties depend, our views on\r\nthis subject naturally alter; and thus we advance from a less to a more\r\n“appropriate” general conception, in the progress of our investigations.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWe ought not, at the same time, to forget that the really important\r\nagreement can not always be discovered by mere comparison of the very\r\nphenomena in question, without the aid of a conception acquired elsewhere;\r\nas in the case, so often referred to, of the planetary orbits.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe search for the agreement of a set of phenomena is in truth very\r\nsimilar to the search for a lost or hidden object. At first we place ourselves\r\nin a sufficiently commanding position, and cast our eyes round us,\r\nand if we can see the object it is well; if not, we ask ourselves mentally\r\nwhat are the places in which it may be hid, in order that we may there\r\nsearch for it: and so on, until we imagine the place where it really is. And\r\nhere too we require to have had a previous conception, or knowledge, of\r\nthose different places. As in this familiar process, so in the philosophical\r\noperation which it illustrates, we first endeavor to find the lost object or\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page464\"\u003e[pg 464]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg464\" id=\"Pg464\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nrecognize the common attribute, without conjecturally invoking the aid of\r\nany previously acquired conception, or, in other words, of any hypothesis.\r\nHaving failed in this, we call upon our imagination for some hypothesis of\r\na possible place, or a possible point of resemblance, and then look to see\r\nwhether the facts agree with the conjecture.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nFor such cases something more is required than a mind accustomed to\r\naccurate observation and comparison. It must be a mind stored with general\r\nconceptions, previously acquired, of the sorts which bear affinity to the\r\nsubject of the particular inquiry. And much will also depend on the natural\r\nstrength and acquired culture of what has been termed the scientific\r\nimagination; on the faculty possessed of mentally arranging known elements\r\ninto new combinations, such as have not yet been observed in nature,\r\nthough not contradictory to any known laws.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nBut the variety of intellectual habits, the purposes which they serve, and\r\nthe modes in which they may be fostered and cultivated, are considerations\r\nbelonging to the Art of Education: a subject far wider than Logic, and\r\nwhich this treatise does not profess to discuss. Here, therefore, the present\r\nchapter may properly close.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-div\" style=\"margin-bottom: 4.00em; margin-top: 4.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"toc99\" id=\"toc99\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"pdf100\" id=\"pdf100\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: center; margin-bottom: 2.40em; margin-top: 2.40em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 120%\"\u003eChapter III.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: left; margin-bottom: 2.88em; margin-top: 2.88em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 144%\"\u003eOf Naming, As Subsidiary To Induction.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 1. It does not belong to the present undertaking to dwell on the importance\r\nof language as a medium of human intercourse, whether for purposes\r\nof sympathy or of information. Nor does our design admit of more\r\nthan a passing allusion to that great property of names, on which their functions\r\nas an intellectual instrument are, in reality, ultimately dependent;\r\ntheir potency as a means of forming, and of riveting, associations among\r\nour other ideas; a subject on which an able thinker\u003ca id=\"noteref_210\" name=\"noteref_210\" href=\"#note_210\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e210\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e has thus written:\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Names are impressions of sense, and as such take the strongest hold on\r\nthe mind, and of all other impressions can be most easily recalled and retained\r\nin view. They therefore serve to give a point of attachment to all\r\nthe more volatile objects of thought and feeling. Impressions that when\r\npassed might be dissipated forever, are, by their connection with language,\r\nalways within reach. Thoughts, of themselves, are perpetually slipping out\r\nof the field of immediate mental vision; but the name abides with us, and\r\nthe utterance of it restores them in a moment. Words are the custodiers\r\nof every product of mind less impressive than themselves. All extensions\r\nof human knowledge, all new generalizations, are fixed and spread, even unintentionally,\r\nby the use of words. The child growing up learns, along\r\nwith the vocables of his mother-tongue, that things which he would have\r\nbelieved to be different are, in important points, the same. Without any\r\nformal instruction, the language in which we grow up teaches us all the\r\ncommon philosophy of the age. It directs us to observe and know things\r\nwhich we should have overlooked; it supplies us with classifications ready\r\nmade, by which things are arranged (as far as the light of by-gone generations\r\nadmits) with the objects to which they bear the greatest total resemblance.\r\nThe number of general names in a language, and the degree of\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page465\"\u003e[pg 465]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg465\" id=\"Pg465\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\ngenerality of those names, afford a test of the knowledge of the era, and of\r\nthe intellectual insight which is the birthright of any one born into it.”\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt is not, however, of the functions of Names, considered generally, that\r\nwe have here to treat, but only of the manner and degree in which they are\r\ndirectly instrumental to the investigation of truth; in other words, to the\r\nprocess of induction.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 2. Observation and Abstraction, the operations which formed the subject\r\nof the two foregoing chapters, are conditions indispensable to induction;\r\nthere can be no induction where they are not. It has been imagined\r\nthat Naming is also a condition equally indispensable. There are thinkers\r\nwho have held that language is not solely, according to a phrase generally\r\ncurrent, \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ean\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e instrument of thought, but \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ethe\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e instrument; that\r\nnames, or something equivalent to them, some species of artificial signs, are necessary to\r\nreasoning; that there could be no inference, and consequently no induction,\r\nwithout them. But if the nature of reasoning was correctly explained in\r\nthe earlier part of the present work, this opinion must be held to be an exaggeration,\r\nthough of an important truth. If reasoning be from particulars\r\nto particulars, and if it consist in recognizing one fact as a mark of another,\r\nor a mark of a mark of another, nothing is required to render reasoning\r\npossible, except senses and association; senses to perceive that two facts\r\nare conjoined; association, as the law by which one of those two facts raises\r\nup the idea of the other.\u003ca id=\"noteref_211\" name=\"noteref_211\" href=\"#note_211\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e211\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e For these mental phenomena, as well as for the\r\nbelief or expectation which follows, and by which we recognize as having\r\ntaken place, or as about to take place, that of which we have perceived a\r\nmark, there is evidently no need of language. And this inference of one\r\nparticular fact from another is a case of induction. It is of this sort of induction\r\nthat brutes are capable; it is in this shape that uncultivated minds\r\nmake almost all their inductions, and that we all do so in the cases in which\r\nfamiliar experience forces our conclusions upon us without any active process\r\nof inquiry on our part, and in which the belief or expectation follows\r\nthe suggestion of the evidence with the promptitude and certainty of an\r\ninstinct.\u003ca id=\"noteref_212\" name=\"noteref_212\" href=\"#note_212\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e212\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 3. But though inference of an inductive character is possible without\r\nthe use of signs, it could never, without them, be carried much beyond the\r\nvery simple cases which we have just described, and which form, in all\r\nprobability, the limit of the reasonings of those animals to whom conventional\r\nlanguage is unknown. Without language, or something equivalent\r\nto it, there could only be as much reasoning from experience as can take\r\nplace without the aid of general propositions. Now, though in strictness\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page466\"\u003e[pg 466]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg466\" id=\"Pg466\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nwe may reason from past experience to a fresh individual case without the\r\nintermediate stage of a general proposition, yet without general propositions\r\nwe should seldom remember what past experience we have had, and scarcely\r\never what conclusions that experience will warrant. The division of the\r\ninductive process into two parts, the first ascertaining what is a mark of\r\nthe given fact, the second whether in the new case that mark exists, is\r\nnatural, and scientifically indispensable. It is, indeed, in a majority of\r\ncases, rendered necessary by mere distance of time. The experience by\r\nwhich we are to guide our judgments may be other people’s experience,\r\nlittle of which can be communicated to us otherwise than by language;\r\nwhen it is our own, it is generally experience long past; unless, therefore,\r\nit were recorded by means of artificial signs, little of it (except in cases involving\r\nour intenser sensations or emotions, or the subjects of our daily and\r\nhourly contemplation) would be retained in the memory. It is hardly necessary\r\nto add, that when the inductive inference is of any but the most\r\ndirect and obvious nature—when it requires several observations or experiments,\r\nin varying circumstances, and the comparison of one of these with\r\nanother—it is impossible to proceed a step, without the artificial memory\r\nwhich words bestow. Without words, we should, if we had often seen A\r\nand B in immediate and obvious conjunction, expect B whenever we saw\r\nA; but to discover their conjunction when not obvious, or to determine\r\nwhether it is really constant or only casual, and whether there is reason to\r\nexpect it under any given change of circumstances, is a process far too complex\r\nto be performed without some contrivance to make our remembrance\r\nof our own mental operations accurate. Now, language is such a contrivance.\r\nWhen that instrument is called to our aid, the difficulty is reduced\r\nto that of making our remembrance of the meaning of words accurate.\r\nThis being secured, whatever passes through our minds may be remembered\r\naccurately, by putting it carefully into words, and committing the\r\nwords either to writing or to memory.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe function of Naming, and particularly of General Names, in Induction,\r\nmay be recapitulated as follows. Every inductive inference which is\r\ngood at all, is good for a whole class of cases; and, that the inference may\r\nhave any better warrant of its correctness than the mere clinging together\r\nof two ideas, a process of experimentation and comparison is necessary; in\r\nwhich the whole class of cases must be brought to view, and some uniformity\r\nin the course of nature evolved and ascertained, since the existence\r\nof such a uniformity is required as a justification for drawing the inference\r\nin even a single case. This uniformity, therefore, may be ascertained\r\nonce for all; and if, being ascertained, it can be remembered, it will serve\r\nas a formula for making, in particular cases, all such inferences as the previous\r\nexperience will warrant. But we can only secure its being remembered,\r\nor give ourselves even a chance of carrying in our memory any considerable\r\nnumber of such uniformities, by registering them through the\r\nmedium of permanent signs; which (being, from the nature of the case,\r\nsigns not of an individual fact, but of a uniformity, that is, of an indefinite\r\nnumber of facts similar to one another) are general signs; universals; general\r\nnames, and general propositions.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 4. And here I can not omit to notice an oversight committed by some\r\neminent thinkers; who have said that the cause of our using general names\r\nis the infinite multitude of individual objects, which, making it impossible\r\nto have a name for each, compels us to make one name serve for many.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page467\"\u003e[pg 467]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg467\" id=\"Pg467\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThis is a very limited view of the function of general names. Even if\r\nthere were a name for every individual object, we should require general\r\nnames as much as we now do. Without them we could not express the\r\nresult of a single comparison, nor record any one of the uniformities existing\r\nin nature; and should be hardly better off in respect to Induction\r\nthan if we had no names at all. With none but names of individuals (or,\r\nin other words, proper names), we might, by pronouncing the name, suggest\r\nthe idea of the object, but we could not assert any proposition; except\r\nthe unmeaning ones formed by predicating two proper names one of\r\nanother. It is only by means of general names that we can convey any\r\ninformation, predicate any attribute, even of an individual, much more of\r\na class. Rigorously speaking, we could get on without any other general\r\nnames than the abstract names of attributes; all our propositions might\r\nbe of the form \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“such an individual object possesses such an attribute,”\u003c/span\u003e or\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“such an attribute is always (or never) conjoined with such another attribute.”\u003c/span\u003e\r\nIn fact, however, mankind have always given general names to\r\nobjects as well as attributes, and indeed before attributes: but the general\r\nnames given to objects imply attributes, derive their whole meaning from\r\nattributes; and are chiefly useful as the language by means of which we\r\npredicate the attributes which they connote.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt remains to be considered what principles are to be adhered to in\r\ngiving general names, so that these names, and the general propositions in\r\nwhich they fill a place, may conduce most to the purposes of Induction.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-div\" style=\"margin-bottom: 4.00em; margin-top: 4.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"toc101\" id=\"toc101\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"pdf102\" id=\"pdf102\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: center; margin-bottom: 2.40em; margin-top: 2.40em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 120%\"\u003eChapter IV.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: left; margin-bottom: 2.88em; margin-top: 2.88em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 144%\"\u003eOf The Requisites Of A Philosophical Language,\r\nAnd The Principles Of Definition.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 1. In order that we may possess a language perfectly suitable for the\r\ninvestigation and expression of general truths, there are two principal, and\r\nseveral minor requisites. The first is, that every general name should\r\nhave a meaning, steadily fixed, and precisely determined. When, by the\r\nfulfillment of this condition, such names as we possess are fitted for the\r\ndue performance of their functions, the next requisite, and the second in\r\norder of importance, is that we should possess a name wherever one is\r\nneeded; wherever there is any thing to be designated by it, which it is of\r\nimportance to express.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe former of these requisites is that to which our attention will be exclusively\r\ndirected in the present chapter.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 2. Every general name, then, must have a certain and knowable meaning.\r\nNow the meaning (as has so often been explained) of a general connotative\r\nname, resides in the connotation; in the attribute on account of\r\nwhich, and to express which, the name is given. Thus, the name animal\r\nbeing given to all things which possess the attributes of sensation and\r\nvoluntary motion, the word connotes those attributes exclusively, and they\r\nconstitute the whole of its meaning. If the name be abstract, its denotation\r\nis the same with the connotation of the corresponding concrete; it\r\ndesignates directly the attribute, which the concrete term implies. To give\r\na precise meaning to general names is, then, to fix with steadiness the\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page468\"\u003e[pg 468]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg468\" id=\"Pg468\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nattribute or attributes connoted by each concrete general name, and denoted\r\nby the corresponding abstract. Since abstract names, in the order\r\nof their creation, do not precede but follow concrete ones, as is proved by\r\nthe etymological fact that they are almost always derived from them; we\r\nmay consider their meaning as determined by, and dependent on, the meaning\r\nof their concrete; and thus the problem of giving a distinct meaning\r\nto general language, is all included in that of giving a precise connotation\r\nto all concrete general names.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThis is not difficult in the case of new names; of the technical terms\r\ncreated by scientific inquirers for the purposes of science or art. But\r\nwhen a name is in common use, the difficulty is greater; the problem in\r\nthis case not being that of choosing a convenient connotation for the name,\r\nbut of ascertaining and fixing the connotation with which it is already\r\nused. That this can ever be a matter of doubt, is a sort of paradox. But\r\nthe vulgar (including in that term all who have not accurate habits of\r\nthought) seldom know exactly what assertion they intend to make, what\r\ncommon property they mean to express, when they apply the same name to\r\na number of different things. All which the name expresses with them,\r\nwhen they predicate it of an object, is a confused feeling of resemblance\r\nbetween that object and some of the other things which they have been\r\naccustomed to denote by the name. They have applied the name Stone\r\nto various objects previously seen; they see a new object, which appears\r\nto them somewhat like the former, and they call it a stone, without asking\r\nthemselves in what respect it is like, or what mode or degree of resemblance\r\nthe best authorities, or even they themselves, require as a warrant\r\nfor using the name. This rough general impression of resemblance is,\r\nhowever, made up of particular circumstances of resemblance; and into\r\nthese it is the business of the logician to analyze it; to ascertain what\r\npoints of resemblance among the different things commonly called by the\r\nname, have produced in the common mind this vague feeling of likeness;\r\nhave given to the things the similarity of aspect, which has made them a\r\nclass, and has caused the same name to be bestowed upon them.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nBut though general names are imposed by the vulgar without any more\r\ndefinite connotation than that of a vague resemblance; general propositions\r\ncome in time to be made, in which predicates are applied to those\r\nnames, that is, general assertions are made concerning the \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ewhole\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e of the\r\nthings which are denoted by the name. And since by each of these propositions\r\nsome attribute, more or less precisely conceived, is of course predicated,\r\nthe ideas of these various attributes thus become associated with\r\nthe name, and in a sort of uncertain way it comes to connote them; there\r\nis a hesitation to apply the name in any new case in which any of the attributes\r\nfamiliarly predicated of the class do not exist. And thus, to\r\ncommon minds, the propositions which they are in the habit of hearing or\r\nuttering concerning a class make up in a loose way a sort of connotation\r\nfor the class name. Let us take, for instance, the word Civilized. How\r\nfew could be found, even among the most educated persons, who would\r\nundertake to say exactly what the term Civilized connotes. Yet there is\r\na feeling in the minds of all who use it, that they are using it with a meaning;\r\nand this meaning is made up, in a confused manner, of every thing\r\nwhich they have heard or read that civilized men or civilized communities\r\nare, or may be expected to be.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt is at this stage, probably, in the progress of a concrete name, that the\r\ncorresponding abstract name generally comes into use. Under the notion\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page469\"\u003e[pg 469]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg469\" id=\"Pg469\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nthat the concrete name must of course convey a meaning, or, in other words,\r\nthat there is some property common to all things which it denotes, people\r\ngive a name to this common property; from the concrete Civilized, they\r\nform the abstract Civilization. But since most people have never compared\r\nthe different things which are called by the concrete name, in such a\r\nmanner as to ascertain what properties these things have in common, or\r\nwhether they have any; each is thrown back upon the marks by which he\r\nhimself has been accustomed to be guided in his application of the term;\r\nand these, being merely vague hearsays and current phrases, are not the\r\nsame in any two persons, nor in the same person at different times. Hence\r\nthe word (as Civilization, for example) which professes to be the designation\r\nof the unknown common property, conveys scarcely to any two minds\r\nthe same idea. No two persons agree in the things they predicate of it;\r\nand when it is itself predicated of any thing, no other person knows, nor\r\ndoes the speaker himself know with precision, what he means to assert.\r\nMany other words which could be named, as the word \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ehonor\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, or the\r\nword \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003egentleman\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, exemplify this uncertainty still more strikingly.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt needs scarcely be observed, that general propositions of which no\r\none can tell exactly what they assert, can not possibly have been brought\r\nto the test of a correct induction. Whether a name is to be used as\r\nan instrument of thinking, or as a means of communicating the result of\r\nthought, it is imperative to determine exactly the attribute or attributes\r\nwhich it is to express; to give it, in short, a fixed and ascertained connotation.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 3. It would, however, be a complete misunderstanding of the proper office\r\nof a logician in dealing with terms already in use, if we were to think\r\nthat because a name has not at present an ascertained connotation, it is\r\ncompetent to any one to give it such a connotation at his own choice. The\r\nmeaning of a term actually in use is not an arbitrary quantity to be fixed,\r\nbut an unknown quantity to be sought.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIn the first place, it is obviously desirable to avail ourselves, as far as\r\npossible, of the associations already connected with the name; not enjoining\r\nthe employment of it in a manner which conflicts with all previous\r\nhabits, and especially not so as to require the rupture of those strongest\r\nof all associations between names, which are created by familiarity with\r\npropositions in which they are predicated of one another. A philosopher\r\nwould have little chance of having his example followed, if he were to give\r\nsuch a meaning to his terms as should require us to call the North American\r\nIndians a civilized people, or the higher classes in Europe savages; or\r\nto say that civilized people live by hunting, and savages by agriculture.\r\nWere there no other reason, the extreme difficulty of effecting so complete\r\na revolution in speech would be more than a sufficient one. The endeavor\r\nshould be, that all generally received propositions into which the term enters,\r\nshould be at least as true after its meaning is fixed, as they were before;\r\nand that the concrete name, therefore, should not receive such a connotation\r\nas shall prevent it from denoting things which, in common language,\r\nit is currently affirmed of. The fixed and precise connotation which\r\nit receives should not be in deviation from, but in agreement (as far as it\r\ngoes) with, the vague and fluctuating connotation which the term already\r\nhad.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nTo fix the connotation of a concrete name, or the denotation of the corresponding\r\nabstract, is to define the name. When this can be done without\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page470\"\u003e[pg 470]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg470\" id=\"Pg470\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nrendering any received assertions inadmissible, the name can be defined\r\nin accordance with its received use, which is vulgarly called defining\r\nnot the name but the thing. What is meant by the improper expression\r\nof defining a thing (or rather a class of things—for nobody talks of defining\r\nan individual), is to define the name, subject to the condition that it\r\nshall denote those things. This, of course, supposes a comparison of the\r\nthings, feature by feature and property by property, to ascertain what attributes\r\nthey agree in; and not unfrequently an operation strictly inductive,\r\nfor the purpose of ascertaining some unobvious agreement, which is\r\nthe cause of the obvious agreements.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nFor, in order to give a connotation to a name, consistently with its denoting\r\ncertain objects, we have to make our selection from among the various\r\nattributes in which those objects agree. To ascertain in what they do\r\nagree is, therefore, the first logical operation requisite. When this has\r\nbeen done as far as is necessary or practicable, the question arises, which\r\nof these common attributes shall be selected to be associated with the\r\nname. For if the class which the name denotes be a Kind, the common\r\nproperties are innumerable; and even if not, they are often extremely numerous.\r\nOur choice is first limited by the preference to be given to properties\r\nwhich are well known, and familiarly predicated of the class; but\r\neven these are often too numerous to be all included in the definition, and,\r\nbesides, the properties most generally known may not be those which serve\r\nbest to mark out the class from all others. We should therefore select\r\nfrom among the common properties (if among them any such are to be\r\nfound) those on which it has been ascertained by experience, or proved by\r\ndeduction, that many others depend; or at least which are sure marks of\r\nthem, and from whence, therefore, many others will follow by inference.\r\nWe thus see that to frame a good definition of a name already in use, is\r\nnot a matter of choice but of discussion, and discussion not merely respecting\r\nthe usage of language, but respecting the properties of things, and\r\neven the origin of those properties. And hence every enlargement of\r\nour knowledge of the objects to which the name is applied, is liable to\r\nsuggest an improvement in the definition. It is impossible to frame a perfect\r\nset of definitions on any subject, until the theory of the subject is perfect;\r\nand as science makes progress, its definitions are also progressive.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 4. The discussion of Definitions, in so far as it does not turn on the\r\nuse of words but on the properties of things, Dr. Whewell calls the Explication\r\nof Conceptions. The act of ascertaining, better than before, in what\r\nparticulars any phenomena which are classed together agree, he calls in his\r\ntechnical phraseology, unfolding the general conception in virtue of which\r\nthey are so classed. Making allowance for what appears to me the darkening\r\nand misleading tendency of this mode of expression, several of his\r\nremarks are so much to the purpose, that I shall take the liberty of transcribing\r\nthem.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nHe observes,\u003ca id=\"noteref_213\" name=\"noteref_213\" href=\"#note_213\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e213\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e that many of the controversies which have had an important\r\nshare in the formation of the existing body of science, have \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“assumed\r\nthe form of a battle of Definitions. For example, the inquiry concerning\r\nthe laws of falling bodies led to the question whether the proper definition\r\nof a \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003euniform force\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e is that it generates a velocity proportional\r\nto the \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003espace\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e from rest, or to the \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003etime\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e.\r\nThe controversy of the \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-foreign\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003evis viva\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e was what was\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page471\"\u003e[pg 471]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg471\" id=\"Pg471\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nthe proper definition of the \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003emeasure of force\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e. A principal\r\nquestion in the classification of minerals is, what is the definition of a\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003emineral species\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e. Physiologists have endeavored to throw light on\r\ntheir subject by defining \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eorganization\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, or some similar term.”\u003c/span\u003e\r\nQuestions of the same nature were\r\nlong open and are not yet completely closed, respecting the definitions of\r\nSpecific Heat, Latent Heat, Chemical Combination, and Solution.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“It is very important for us to observe, that these controversies have\r\nnever been questions of insulated and \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003earbitrary\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e definitions, as men seem\r\noften tempted to imagine them to have been. In all cases there is a tacit\r\nassumption of some proposition which is to be expressed by means of the\r\ndefinition, and which gives it its importance. The dispute concerning the\r\ndefinition thus acquires a real value, and becomes a question concerning\r\ntrue and false. Thus, in the discussion of the question, What is a uniform\r\nforce? it was taken for granted that gravity is a uniform force. In the\r\ndebate of the \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-foreign\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003evis viva\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, it was assumed that in the\r\nmutual action of bodies\r\nthe whole effect of the force is unchanged. In the zoological definition of\r\nspecies (that it consists of individuals which have, or may have, sprung\r\nfrom the same parents), it is presumed that individuals so related resemble\r\neach other more than those which are excluded by such a definition; or,\r\nperhaps, that species so defined have permanent and definite differences.\r\nA definition of organization, or of some other term which was not employed\r\nto express some principle, would be of no value.\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“The establishment, therefore, of a right definition of a term, may be a\r\nuseful step in the explication of our conceptions; but this will be the case\r\nthen only when we have under our consideration some proposition in which\r\nthe term is employed. For then the question really is, how the conception\r\nshall be understood and defined in order that the proposition may be true.\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“To unfold our conceptions by means of definitions has never been serviceable\r\nto science, except when it has been associated with an immediate\r\nuse of the definitions. The endeavor to define a Uniform Force was combined\r\nwith the assertion that gravity is a uniform force; the attempt to\r\ndefine Accelerating Force was immediately followed by the doctrine that\r\naccelerating forces may be compounded; the process of defining Momentum\r\nwas connected with the principle that momenta gained and lost are\r\nequal; naturalists would have given in vain the definition of Species which\r\nwe have quoted, if they had not also given the characters of species so separated….\r\nDefinition may be the best mode of explaining our conception,\r\nbut that which alone makes it worth while to explain it in any mode, is the\r\nopportunity of using it in the expression of truth. When a definition is\r\npropounded to us as a useful step in knowledge, we are always entitled to\r\nask what principle it serves to enunciate.”\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIn giving, then, an exact connotation to the phrase, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“a uniform force,”\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe condition was understood, that the phrase should continue to denote\r\ngravity. The discussion, therefore, respecting the definition, resolved itself\r\ninto this question, What is there of a uniform nature in the motions produced\r\nby gravity? By observations and comparisons, it was found that\r\nwhat was uniform in those motions was the ratio of the velocity acquired\r\nto the time elapsed; equal velocities being added in equal times. A uniform\r\nforce, therefore, was defined a force which adds equal velocities in\r\nequal times. So, again, in defining momentum. It was already a received\r\ndoctrine that, when two objects impinge upon one another, the momentum\r\nlost by the one is equal to that gained by the other. This proposition it\r\nwas deemed necessary to preserve, not from the motive (which operates in\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page472\"\u003e[pg 472]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg472\" id=\"Pg472\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nmany other cases) that it was firmly fixed in popular belief; for the proposition\r\nin question had never been heard of by any but the scientifically instructed.\r\nBut it was felt to contain a truth; even a superficial observation\r\nof the phenomena left no doubt that in the propagation of motion from\r\none body to another, there was something of which the one body gained\r\nprecisely what the other lost; and the word momentum had been invented\r\nto express this unknown something. The settlement, therefore, of the definition\r\nof momentum, involved the determination of the question, What is\r\nthat of which a body, when it sets another body in motion, loses exactly\r\nas much as it communicates? And when experiment had shown that this\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003esomething\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e was the product of the velocity of the body by its mass, or\r\nquantity of matter, this became the definition of momentum.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe following remarks,\u003ca id=\"noteref_214\" name=\"noteref_214\" href=\"#note_214\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e214\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e therefore, are perfectly just: \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“The business of\r\ndefinition is part of the business of discovery…. To define, so that our\r\ndefinition shall have any scientific value, requires no small portion of that\r\nsagacity by which truth is detected…. When it has been clearly seen\r\nwhat ought to be our definition, it must be pretty well known what truth\r\nwe have to state. The definition, as well as the discovery, supposes a decided\r\nstep in our knowledge to have been made. The writers on Logic,\r\nin the Middle Ages, made Definition the last stage in the progress of knowledge;\r\nand in this arrangement at least, the history of science, and the philosophy\r\nderived from the history, confirm their speculative views.”\u003c/span\u003e For\r\nin order to judge finally how the name which denotes a class may best be\r\ndefined, we must know all the properties common to the class, and all the\r\nrelations of causation or dependence among those properties.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIf the properties which are fittest to be selected as marks of other common\r\nproperties are also obvious and familiar, and especially if they bear a\r\ngreat part in producing that general air of resemblance which was the\r\noriginal inducement to the formation of the class, the definition will then\r\nbe most felicitous. But it is often necessary to define the class by some\r\nproperty not familiarly known, provided that property be the best mark of\r\nthose which are known. M. De Blainville, for instance, founded his definition\r\nof life on the process of decomposition and recomposition which incessantly\r\ntakes place in every living body, so that the particles composing\r\nit are never for two instants the same. This is by no means one of the\r\nmost obvious properties of living bodies; it might escape altogether the\r\nnotice of an unscientific observer. Yet great authorities (independently of\r\nM. De Blainville, who is himself a first-rate authority) have thought that no\r\nother property so well answers the conditions required for the definition.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 5. Having laid down the principles which ought for the most part to\r\nbe observed in attempting to give a precise connotation to a term in use,\r\nI must now add, that it is not always practicable to adhere to those principles,\r\nand that even when practicable, it is occasionally not desirable.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nCases in which it is impossible to comply with all the conditions of a\r\nprecise definition of a name in agreement with usage, occur very frequently.\r\nThere is often no one connotation capable of being given to a word,\r\nso that it shall still denote every thing it is accustomed to denote; or that\r\nall the propositions into which it is accustomed to enter, and which have\r\nany foundation in truth, shall remain true. Independently of accidental\r\nambiguities, in which the different meanings have no connection with one\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page473\"\u003e[pg 473]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg473\" id=\"Pg473\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nanother; it continually happens that a word is used in two or more senses\r\nderived from each other, but yet radically distinct. So long as a term is\r\nvague, that is, so long as its connotation is not ascertained and permanently\r\nfixed, it is constantly liable to be applied by \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eextension\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e from one thing to\r\nanother, until it reaches things which have little, or even no, resemblance\r\nto those which were first designated by it.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Suppose,”\u003c/span\u003e says Dugald Stewart, in his \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ePhilosophical\r\nEssays\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\u003ca id=\"noteref_215\" name=\"noteref_215\" href=\"#note_215\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e215\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“that\r\nthe letters A, B, C, D, E, denote a series of objects; that A possesses some\r\none quality in common with B; B a quality in common with C; C a quality\r\nin common with D; D a quality in common with E; while at the same\r\ntime, no quality can be found which belongs in common to any \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ethree\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e objects\r\nin the series. Is it not conceivable, that the affinity between A and B\r\nmay produce a transference of the name of the first to the second; and\r\nthat, in consequence of the other affinities which connect the remaining objects\r\ntogether, the same name may pass in succession from B to C; from\r\nC to D; and from D to E? In this manner, a common appellation will\r\narise between A and E, although the two objects may, in their nature and\r\nproperties, be so widely distant from each other, that no stretch of imagination\r\ncan conceive how the thoughts were led from the former to the\r\nlatter. The transitions, nevertheless, may have been all so easy and gradual,\r\nthat, were they successfully detected by the fortunate ingenuity of a\r\ntheorist, we should instantly recognize, not only the verisimilitude, but the\r\ntruth of the conjecture: in the same way as we admit, with the confidence\r\nof intuitive conviction, the certainty of the well-known etymological process\r\nwhich connects the Latin preposition \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ee\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e or\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eex\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e with the English substantive\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003estranger\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, the moment that the intermediate links of the chain are\r\nsubmitted to our examination.”\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca id=\"noteref_216\" name=\"noteref_216\" href=\"#note_216\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e216\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe applications which a word acquires by this gradual extension of it\r\nfrom one set of objects to another, Stewart, adopting an expression from\r\nMr. Payne Knight, calls its \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003etransitive\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e applications; and after\r\nbriefly illustrating such of them as are the result of local or casual associations, he\r\nproceeds as follows:\u003ca id=\"noteref_217\" name=\"noteref_217\" href=\"#note_217\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e217\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“But although by far the greater part of the transitive or derivative applications\r\nof words depend on casual and unaccountable caprices of the\r\nfeelings or the fancy, there are certain cases in which they open a very interesting\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page474\"\u003e[pg 474]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg474\" id=\"Pg474\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nfield of philosophical speculation. Such are those, in which an\r\nanalogous transference of the corresponding term may be remarked universally,\r\nor very generally, in other languages; and in which, of course, the\r\nuniformity of the result must be ascribed to the essential principles of the\r\nhuman frame. Even in such cases, however, it will by no means be always\r\nfound, on examination, that the various applications of the same term have\r\narisen from any common quality or qualities in the objects to which they\r\nrelate. In the greater number of instances, they may be traced to some\r\nnatural and universal associations of ideas, founded in the common faculties,\r\ncommon organs, and common condition of the human race…. According\r\nto the different degrees of intimacy and strength in the associations\r\non which the \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003etransitions\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e of language are founded, very different effects\r\nmay be expected to arise. Where the association is slight and casual,\r\nthe several meanings will remain distinct from each other, and will often,\r\nin process of time, assume the appearance of capricious varieties in the use\r\nof the same arbitrary sign. \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eWhere the association is so natural and habitual\r\nas to become virtually indissoluble, the transitive meanings will coalesce\r\nin one complex conception; and every new transition will become a\r\nmore comprehensive generalization of the term in question.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e”\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nI solicit particular attention to the law of mind expressed in the last sentence,\r\nand which is the source of the perplexity so often experienced in detecting\r\nthese transitions of meaning. Ignorance of that law is the shoal on\r\nwhich some of the most powerful intellects which have adorned the human\r\nrace have been stranded. The inquiries of Plato into the definitions of\r\nsome of the most general terms of moral speculation are characterized by\r\nBacon as a far nearer approach to a true inductive method than is elsewhere\r\nto be found among the ancients, and are, indeed, almost perfect examples\r\nof the preparatory process of comparison and abstraction; but,\r\nfrom being unaware of the law just mentioned, he often wasted the powers\r\nof this great logical instrument on inquiries in which it could realize no result,\r\nsince the phenomena, whose common properties he so elaborately endeavored\r\nto detect, had not really any common properties. Bacon himself\r\nfell into the same error in his speculations on the nature of heat, in which\r\nhe evidently confounded under the name hot, classes of phenomena which\r\nhave no property in common. Stewart certainly overstates the matter\r\nwhen he speaks of \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“a prejudice which has descended to modern times from\r\nthe scholastic ages, that when a word admits of a variety of significations,\r\nthese different significations must all be species of the same genus, and\r\nmust consequently include some essential idea common to every individual\r\nto which the generic term can be\r\napplied;”\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca id=\"noteref_218\" name=\"noteref_218\" href=\"#note_218\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e218\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e for both\r\nAristotle and his followers were well aware that there are such things as ambiguities of\r\nlanguage, and delighted in distinguishing them. But they never suspected\r\nambiguity in the cases where (as Stewart remarks) the association on which\r\nthe transition of meaning was founded is so natural and habitual, that the\r\ntwo meanings blend together in the mind, and a real transition becomes an\r\napparent generalization. Accordingly they wasted infinite pains in endeavoring\r\nto find a definition which would serve for several distinct meanings\r\nat once; as in an instance noticed by Stewart himself, that of \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“causation;\r\nthe ambiguity of the word which, in the Greek language corresponds to\r\nthe English word \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ecause\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, having suggested to them the vain attempt\r\nof tracing the common idea which, in the case of any \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eeffect\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e, belongs to the\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eefficient\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page475\"\u003e[pg 475]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg475\" id=\"Pg475\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nto the \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ematter\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, to the \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eform\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, and to the\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eend\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e. The idle generalities”\u003c/span\u003e\r\n(he adds) \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“we meet with in other philosophers, about the ideas of the\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003egood\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, the \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003efit\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, and the\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ebecoming\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, have taken their rise from the same undue influence\r\nof popular epithets on the speculations of the\r\nlearned.”\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca id=\"noteref_219\" name=\"noteref_219\" href=\"#note_219\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e219\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAmong the words which have undergone so many successive transitions\r\nof meaning that every trace of a property common to all the things they\r\nare applied to, or at least common and also peculiar to those things, has\r\nbeen lost, Stewart considers the word Beautiful to be one. And (without\r\nattempting to decide a question which in no respect belongs to logic) I can\r\nnot but feel, with him, considerable doubt whether the word beautiful connotes\r\nthe same property when we speak of a beautiful color, a beautiful\r\nface, a beautiful scene, a beautiful character, and a beautiful poem. The\r\nword was doubtless extended from one of these objects to another on account\r\nof a resemblance between them, or, more probably, between the emotions\r\nthey excited; and, by this progressive extension, it has at last reached\r\nthings very remote from those objects of sight to which there is no\r\ndoubt that it was first appropriated; and it is at least questionable whether\r\nthere is now any property common to all the things which, consistently\r\nwith usage, may be called beautiful, except the property of agreeableness,\r\nwhich the term certainly does connote, but which can not be all that people\r\nusually intend to express by it, since there are many agreeable things which\r\nare never called beautiful. If such be the case, it is impossible to give to\r\nthe word Beautiful any fixed connotation, such that it shall denote all the\r\nobjects which in common use it now denotes, but no others. A fixed connotation,\r\nhowever, it ought to have; for, so long as it has not, it is unfit to\r\nbe used as a scientific term, and is a perpetual source of false analogies and\r\nerroneous generalizations.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThis, then, constitutes a case in exemplification of our remark, that even\r\nwhen there is a property common to all the things denoted by a name, to\r\nerect that property into the definition and exclusive connotation of the name\r\nis not always desirable. The various things called beautiful unquestionably\r\nresemble one another in being agreeable; but to make this the definition of\r\nbeauty, and so extend the word Beautiful to all agreeable things, would be\r\nto drop altogether a portion of meaning which the word really, though indistinctly,\r\nconveys, and to do what depends on us toward causing those\r\nqualities of the objects which the word previously, though vaguely, pointed\r\nat, to be overlooked and forgotten. It is better, in such a case, to give a\r\nfixed connotation to the term by restricting, than by extending its use;\r\nrather excluding from the epithet Beautiful some things to which it is commonly\r\nconsidered applicable, than leaving out of its connotation any of the\r\nqualities by which, though occasionally lost sight of, the general mind may\r\nhave been habitually guided in the commonest and most interesting applications\r\nof the term. For there is no question that when people call any\r\nthing beautiful, they think they are asserting more than that it is merely\r\nagreeable. They think they are ascribing a peculiar \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003esort\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e of agreeableness,\r\nanalogous to that which they find in some other of the things to which they\r\nare accustomed to apply the same name. If, therefore, there be any peculiar\r\nsort of agreeableness which is common though not to all, yet to the\r\nprincipal things which are called beautiful, it is better to limit the denotation\r\nof the term to those things, than to leave that kind of quality without\r\na term to connote it, and thereby divert attention from its peculiarities.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page476\"\u003e[pg 476]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg476\" id=\"Pg476\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 6. The last remark exemplifies a rule of terminology, which is of great\r\nimportance, and which has hardly yet been recognized as a rule, but by a\r\nfew thinkers of the present century. In attempting to rectify the use of a\r\nvague term by giving it a fixed connotation, we must take care not to discard\r\n(unless advisedly, and on the ground of a deeper knowledge of the\r\nsubject) any portion of the connotation which the word, in however indistinct\r\na manner, previously carried with it. For otherwise language loses\r\none of its inherent and most valuable properties, that of being the conservator\r\nof ancient experience; the keeper-alive of those thoughts and observations\r\nof former ages, which may be alien to the tendencies of the passing\r\ntime. This function of language is so often overlooked or undervalued,\r\nthat a few observations on it appear to be extremely required.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nEven when the connotation of a term has been accurately fixed, and still\r\nmore if it has been left in the state of a vague unanalyzed feeling of resemblance;\r\nthere is a constant tendency in the word, through familiar use, to\r\npart with a portion of its connotation. It is a well-known law of the mind,\r\nthat a word originally associated with a very complex cluster of ideas, is\r\nfar from calling up all those ideas in the mind, every time the word is used;\r\nit calls up only one or two, from which the mind runs on by fresh associations\r\nto another set of ideas, without waiting for the suggestion of the remainder\r\nof the complex cluster. If this were not the case, processes of\r\nthought could not take place with any thing like the rapidity which we\r\nknow they possess. Very often, indeed, when we are employing a word in\r\nour mental operations, we are so far from waiting until the complex idea\r\nwhich corresponds to the meaning of the word is consciously brought before\r\nus in all its parts, that we run on to new trains of ideas by the other\r\nassociations which the mere word excites, without having realized in our\r\nimagination any part whatever of the meaning; thus using the word, and\r\neven using it well and accurately, and carrying on important processes of\r\nreasoning by means of it, in an almost mechanical manner; so much so,\r\nthat some metaphysicians, generalizing from an extreme case, have fancied\r\nthat all reasoning is but the mechanical use of a set of terms according to\r\na certain form. We may discuss and settle the most important interests\r\nof towns or nations, by the application of general theorems or practical\r\nmaxims previously laid down, without having had consciously suggested to\r\nus, once in the whole process, the houses and green fields, the thronged\r\nmarket-places and domestic hearths, of which not only those towns and nations\r\nconsist, but which the words town and nation confessedly mean.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nSince, then, general names come in this manner to be used (and even to\r\ndo a portion of their work well) without suggesting to the mind the whole\r\nof their meaning, and often with the suggestion of a very small, or no part\r\nat all of that meaning; we can not wonder that words so used come in time\r\nto be no longer capable of suggesting any other of the ideas appropriated\r\nto them, than those with which the association is most immediate and\r\nstrongest, or most kept up by the incidents of life; the remainder being\r\nlost altogether; unless the mind, by often consciously dwelling on them,\r\nkeeps up the association. Words naturally retain much more of their\r\nmeaning to persons of active imagination, who habitually represent to themselves\r\nthings in the concrete, with the detail which belongs to them in the\r\nactual world. To minds of a different description, the only antidote to this\r\ncorruption of language is predication. The habit of predicating of the\r\nname, all the various properties which it originally connoted, keeps up the\r\nassociation between the name and those properties.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page477\"\u003e[pg 477]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg477\" id=\"Pg477\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nBut in order that it may do so, it is necessary that the predicates should\r\nthemselves retain their association with the properties which they severally\r\nconnote. For the propositions can not keep the meaning of the words\r\nalive, if the meaning of the propositions themselves should die. And nothing\r\nis more common than for propositions to be mechanically repeated,\r\nmechanically retained in the memory, and their truth undoubtingly assented\r\nto and relied on, while yet they carry no meaning distinctly home to the\r\nmind; and while the matter of fact or law of nature which they originally\r\nexpressed is as much lost sight of, and practically disregarded, as if it never\r\nhad been heard of at all. In those subjects which are at the same time\r\nfamiliar and complicated, and especially in those which are so in as great a\r\ndegree as moral and social subjects are, it is a matter of common remark\r\nhow many important propositions are believed and repeated from habit,\r\nwhile no account could be given, and no sense is practically manifested, of\r\nthe truths which they convey. Hence it is, that the traditional maxims of\r\nold experience, though seldom questioned, have often so little effect on the\r\nconduct of life; because their meaning is never, by most persons, really felt,\r\nuntil personal experience has brought it home. And thus also it is that so\r\nmany doctrines of religion, ethics, and even politics, so full of meaning and\r\nreality to first converts, have manifested (after the association of that meaning\r\nwith the verbal formulas has ceased to be kept up by the controversies\r\nwhich accompanied their first introduction) a tendency to degenerate rapidly\r\ninto lifeless dogmas; which tendency, all the efforts of an education\r\nexpressly and skillfully directed to keeping the meaning alive, are barely\r\nsufficient to counteract.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nConsidering, then, that the human mind, in different generations, occupies\r\nitself with different things, and in one age is led by the circumstances\r\nwhich surround it to fix more of its attention upon one of the properties\r\nof a thing, in another age upon another; it is natural and inevitable that\r\nin every age a certain portion of our recorded and traditional knowledge,\r\nnot being continually suggested by the pursuits and inquiries with which\r\nmankind are at that time engrossed, should fall asleep, as it were, and fade\r\nfrom the memory. It would be in danger of being totally lost, if the propositions\r\nor formulas, the results of the previous experience, did not remain,\r\nas forms of words it may be, but of words that once really conveyed, and\r\nare still supposed to convey, a meaning: which meaning, though suspended,\r\nmay be historically traced, and when suggested, may be recognized by\r\nminds of the necessary endowments as being still matter of fact, or truth.\r\nWhile the formulas remain, the meaning may at any time revive; and as,\r\non the one hand, the formulas progressively lose the meaning they were intended\r\nto convey, so, on the other, when this forgetfulness has reached its\r\nheight and begun to produce obvious consequences, minds arise which from\r\nthe contemplation of the formulas rediscover the truth, when truth it was,\r\nwhich was contained in them, and announce it again to mankind, not as a\r\ndiscovery, but as the meaning of that which they have been taught, and\r\nstill profess to believe.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThus there is a perpetual oscillation in spiritual truths, and in spiritual\r\ndoctrines of any significance, even when not truths. Their meaning is\r\nalmost always in a process either of being lost or of being recovered.\r\nWhoever has attended to the history of the more serious convictions of\r\nmankind—of the opinions by which the general conduct of their lives is,\r\nor as they conceive ought to be, more especially regulated—is aware that\r\neven when recognizing verbally the same doctrines, they attach to them at\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page478\"\u003e[pg 478]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg478\" id=\"Pg478\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\ndifferent periods a greater or a less quantity, and even a different kind of\r\nmeaning. The words in their original acceptation connoted, and the propositions\r\nexpressed, a complication of outward facts and inward feelings, to\r\ndifferent portions of which the general mind is more particularly alive in different\r\ngenerations of mankind. To common minds, only that portion of the\r\nmeaning is in each generation suggested, of which that generation possesses\r\nthe counterpart in its own habitual experience. But the words and propositions\r\nlie ready to suggest to any mind duly prepared the remainder of\r\nthe meaning. Such individual minds are almost always to be found; and\r\nthe lost meaning, revived by them, again by degrees works its way into the\r\ngeneral mind.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe arrival of this salutary reaction may, however, be materially retarded\r\nby the shallow conceptions and incautious proceedings of mere logicians.\r\nIt sometimes happens that toward the close of the downward period, when\r\nthe words have lost part of their significance, and have not yet begun to\r\nrecover it, persons arise whose leading and favorite idea is the importance\r\nof clear conceptions and precise thought, and the necessity, therefore, of\r\ndefinite language. These persons, in examining the old formulas, easily\r\nperceive that words are used in them without a meaning; and if they are\r\nnot the sort of persons who are capable of rediscovering the lost signification,\r\nthey naturally enough dismiss the formula, and define the name without\r\nreference to it. In so doing they fasten down the name to what it\r\nconnotes in common use at the time when it conveys the smallest quantity\r\nof meaning; and introduce the practice of employing it, consistently and\r\nuniformly, according to that connotation. The word in this way acquires\r\nan extent of denotation far beyond what it had before; it becomes extended\r\nto many things to which it was previously, in appearance capriciously,\r\nrefused. Of the propositions in which it was formerly used, those which\r\nwere true in virtue of the forgotten part of its meaning are now, by the\r\nclearer light which the definition diffuses, seen not to be true according to\r\nthe definition; which, however, is the recognized and sufficiently correct\r\nexpression of all that is perceived to be in the mind of any one by whom\r\nthe term is used at the present day. The ancient formulas are consequently\r\ntreated as prejudices; and people are no longer taught as before, though\r\nnot to understand them, yet to believe that there is truth in them. They\r\nno longer remain in the general mind surrounded by respect, and ready at\r\nany time to suggest their original meaning. Whatever truths they contain\r\nare not only, in these circumstances, rediscovered far more slowly, but,\r\nwhen rediscovered, the prejudice with which novelties are regarded is now,\r\nin some degree at least, against them, instead of being on their side.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAn example may make these remarks more intelligible. In all ages, except\r\nwhere moral speculation has been silenced by outward compulsion, or\r\nwhere the feelings which prompt to it still continue to be satisfied by the\r\ntraditional doctrines of an established faith, one of the subjects which have\r\nmost occupied the minds of thinking persons is the inquiry, What is virtue?\r\nor, What is a virtuous character? Among the different theories on\r\nthe subject which have, at different times, grown up and obtained partial\r\ncurrency, every one of which reflected as in the clearest mirror the express\r\nimage of the age which gave it birth; there was one, according to which\r\nvirtue consists in a correct calculation of our own personal interests, either\r\nin this world only, or also in another. To make this theory plausible, it\r\nwas of course necessary that the only beneficial actions which people in\r\ngeneral were accustomed to see, or were therefore accustomed to praise,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page479\"\u003e[pg 479]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg479\" id=\"Pg479\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nshould be such as were, or at least might without contradicting obvious\r\nfacts be supposed to be, the result of a prudential regard to self-interest;\r\nso that the words really connoted no more, in common acceptation, than\r\nwas set down in the definition.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nSuppose, now, that the partisans of this theory had contrived to introduce\r\na consistent and undeviating use of the term according to this definition.\r\nSuppose that they had seriously endeavored, and had succeeded in the endeavor,\r\nto banish the word disinterestedness from the language; had obtained\r\nthe disuse of all expressions attaching odium to selfishness or commendation\r\nto self-sacrifice, or which implied generosity or kindness to be\r\nany thing but doing a benefit in order to receive a greater personal advantage\r\nin return. Need we say that this abrogation of the old formulas for\r\nthe sake of preserving clear ideas and consistency of thought, would have\r\nbeen a great evil? while the very inconsistency incurred by the co-existence\r\nof the formulas with philosophical opinions which seemed to condemn\r\nthem as absurdities, operated as a stimulus to the re-examination of the\r\nsubject and thus the very doctrines originating in the oblivion into which\r\na part of the truth had fallen, were rendered indirectly, but powerfully,\r\ninstrumental to its revival.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe doctrine of the Coleridge school, that the language of any people\r\namong whom culture is of old date, is a sacred deposit, the property of all\r\nages, and which no one age should consider itself empowered to alter—borders\r\nindeed, as thus expressed, on an extravagance; but it is grounded\r\non a truth, frequently overlooked by that class of logicians who think more\r\nof having a clear than of having a comprehensive meaning; and who perceive\r\nthat every age is adding to the truths which it has received from its\r\npredecessors, but fail to see that a counter process of losing truths already\r\npossessed, is also constantly going on, and requiring the most sedulous\r\nattention to counteract it. Language is the depository of the accumulated\r\nbody of experience to which all former ages have contributed their\r\npart, and which is the inheritance of all yet to come. We have no right to\r\nprevent ourselves from transmitting to posterity a larger portion of this\r\ninheritance than we may ourselves have profited by. However much we\r\nmay be able to improve on the conclusions of our forefathers, we ought to\r\nbe careful not inadvertently to let any of their premises slip through our\r\nfingers. It may be good to alter the meaning of a word, but it is bad to let\r\nany part of the meaning drop. Whoever seeks to introduce a more correct\r\nuse of a term with which important associations are connected, should be required\r\nto possess an accurate acquaintance with the history of the particular\r\nword, and of the opinions which in different stages of its progress it served\r\nto express. To be qualified to define the name, we must know all that has\r\never been known of the properties of the class of objects which are, or\r\noriginally were, denoted by it. For if we give it a meaning according to\r\nwhich any proposition will be false which has ever been generally held to\r\nbe true, it is incumbent on us to be sure that we know and have considered\r\nall which those who believed the proposition understood by it.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page480\"\u003e[pg 480]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg480\" id=\"Pg480\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-div\" style=\"margin-bottom: 4.00em; margin-top: 4.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"toc103\" id=\"toc103\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"pdf104\" id=\"pdf104\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: center; margin-bottom: 2.40em; margin-top: 2.40em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 120%\"\u003eChapter V.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: left; margin-bottom: 2.88em; margin-top: 2.88em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 144%\"\u003eOn The Natural History Of The Variations In The\r\nMeaning Of Terms.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 1. It is not only in the mode which has now been pointed out, namely\r\nby gradual inattention to a portion of the ideas conveyed, that words in\r\ncommon use are liable to shift their connotation. The truth is, that the\r\nconnotation of such words is perpetually varying; as might be expected\r\nfrom the manner in which words in common use acquire their connotation.\r\nA technical term, invented for purposes of art or science, has, from the first,\r\nthe connotation given to it by its inventor; but a name which is in every\r\none’s mouth before any one thinks of defining it, derives its connotation\r\nonly from the circumstances which are habitually brought to mind when it\r\nis pronounced. Among these circumstances, the properties common to the\r\nthings denoted by the name, have naturally a principal place; and would\r\nhave the sole place, if language were regulated by convention rather than\r\nby custom and accident. But besides these common properties, which if\r\nthey exist are \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ecertainly\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e present whenever the name is employed, any other\r\ncircumstance may \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ecasually\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e be found along with it, so frequently as to become\r\nassociated with it in the same manner, and as strongly, as the common\r\nproperties themselves. In proportion as this association forms itself, people\r\ngive up using the name in cases in which those casual circumstances do\r\nnot exist. They prefer using some other name, or the same name with\r\nsome adjunct, rather than employ an expression which will call up an idea\r\nthey do not want to excite. The circumstance originally casual, thus becomes\r\nregularly a part of the connotation of the word.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt is this continual incorporation of circumstances originally accidental,\r\ninto the permanent signification of words, which is the cause that there\r\nare so few exact synonyms. It is this also which renders the dictionary\r\nmeaning of a word, by universal remark so imperfect an exponent of its\r\nreal meaning. The dictionary meaning is marked out in a broad, blunt\r\nway, and probably includes all that was originally necessary for the correct\r\nemployment of the term; but in process of time so many collateral associations\r\nadhere to words, that whoever should attempt to use them with\r\nno other guide than the dictionary, would confound a thousand nice distinctions\r\nand subtle shades of meaning which dictionaries take no account\r\nof; as we notice in the use of a language in conversation or writing by a\r\nforeigner not thoroughly master of it. The history of a word, by showing\r\nthe causes which determine its use, is in these cases a better guide to its\r\nemployment than any definition; for definitions can only show its meaning\r\nat the particular time, or at most the series of its successive meanings, but\r\nits history may show the law by which the succession was produced. The\r\nword \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003egentleman\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, for instance, to the correct employment of which\r\na dictionary would be no guide, originally meant simply a man born in a certain\r\nrank. From this it came by degrees to connote all such qualities or adventitious\r\ncircumstances as were usually found to belong to persons of that\r\nrank. This consideration at once explains why in one of its vulgar acceptations\r\nit means any one who lives without labor, in another without manual\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page481\"\u003e[pg 481]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg481\" id=\"Pg481\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nlabor, and in its more elevated signification it has in every age signified\r\nthe conduct, character, habits, and outward appearance, in whomsoever\r\nfound, which, according to the ideas of that age, belonged or were expected\r\nto belong to persons born and educated in a high social position.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt continually happens that of two words, whose dictionary meanings\r\nare either the same or very slightly different, one will be the proper word\r\nto use in one set of circumstances, another in another, without its being\r\npossible to show how the custom of so employing them originally grew up.\r\nThe accident that one of the words was used and not the other on a particular\r\noccasion or in a particular social circle, will be sufficient to produce\r\nso strong an association between the word and some specialty of circumstances,\r\nthat mankind abandon the use of it in any other case, and the\r\nspecialty becomes part of its signification. The tide of custom first drifts\r\nthe word on the shore of a particular meaning, then retires and leaves it\r\nthere.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAn instance in point is the remarkable change which, in the English language\r\nat least, has taken place in the signification of the word \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eloyalty\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e.\r\nThat word originally meant in English, as it still means in the language\r\nfrom whence it came, fair, open dealing, and fidelity to engagements; in\r\nthat sense the quality it expressed was part of the ideal chivalrous or\r\nknightly character. By what process, in England, the term became restricted\r\nto the single case of fidelity to the throne, I am not sufficiently\r\nversed in the history of courtly language to be able to pronounce. The\r\ninterval between a \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eloyal chevalier\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e and a loyal subject is\r\ncertainly great. I can only suppose that the word was, at some period, the favorite term\r\nat court to express fidelity to the oath of allegiance; until at length those who\r\nwished to speak of any other, and as it was probably deemed, inferior sort\r\nof fidelity, either did not venture to use so dignified a term, or found it\r\nconvenient to employ some other in order to avoid being misunderstood.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 2. Cases are not unfrequent in which a circumstance, at first casually\r\nincorporated into the connotation of a word which originally had no reference\r\nto it, in time wholly supersedes the original meaning, and becomes\r\nnot merely a part of the connotation, but the whole of it. This is exemplified\r\nin the word pagan, \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003epaganus\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e; which originally,\r\nas its etymology imports, was equivalent to \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003evillager\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e; the\r\ninhabitant of a \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003epagus\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, or village.\r\nAt a particular era in the extension of Christianity over the Roman empire,\r\nthe adherents of the old religion, and the villagers or country people,\r\nwere nearly the same body of individuals, the inhabitants of the towns having\r\nbeen earliest converted; as in our own day, and at all times, the greater\r\nactivity of social intercourse renders them the earliest recipients of new\r\nopinions and modes, while old habits and prejudices linger longest among\r\nthe country people; not to mention that the towns were more immediately\r\nunder the direct influence of the Government, which at that time had\r\nembraced Christianity. From this casual coincidence, the word\r\n\u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003epaganus\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ncarried with it, and began more and more steadily to suggest, the idea of\r\na worshiper of the ancient divinities; until at length it suggested that\r\nidea so forcibly that people who did not desire to suggest the idea avoided\r\nusing the word. But when \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003epaganus\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nhad come to connote heathenism, the\r\nvery unimportant circumstance, with reference to that fact, of the place of\r\nresidence, was soon disregarded in the employment of the word. As there\r\nwas seldom any occasion for making separate assertions respecting heathens\r\nwho lived in the country, there was no need for a separate word to\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page482\"\u003e[pg 482]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg482\" id=\"Pg482\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\ndenote them; and pagan came not only to mean heathen, but to mean that\r\nexclusively.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nA case still more familiar to most readers is that of the word\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003evillain\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e or\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003evillein\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e. This term, as every body knows, had in the Middle Ages a\r\nconnotation as strictly defined as a word could have, being the proper legal designation\r\nfor those persons who were the subjects of the less onerous forms\r\nof feudal bondage. The scorn of the semi-barbarous military aristocracy\r\nfor these their abject dependants, rendered the act of likening any person\r\nto this class of people a mark of the greatest contumely; the same scorn\r\nled them to ascribe to the same people all manner of hateful qualities, which\r\ndoubtless also, in the degrading situation in which they were held, were\r\noften not unjustly imputed to them. These circumstances combined to attach\r\nto the term villain ideas of crime and guilt, in so forcible a manner\r\nthat the application of the epithet even to those to whom it legally belonged\r\nbecame an affront, and was abstained from whenever no affront was intended.\r\nFrom that time guilt was part of the connotation; and soon became\r\nthe whole of it, since mankind were not prompted by any urgent motive\r\nto continue making a distinction in their language between bad men\r\nof servile station and bad men of any other rank in life.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThese and similar instances in which the original signification of a term\r\nis totally lost—another and an entirely distinct meaning being first ingrafted\r\nupon the former, and finally substituted for it—afford examples of the\r\ndouble movement which is always taking place in language: two counter-movements,\r\none of Generalization, by which words are perpetually losing\r\nportions of their connotation, and becoming of less meaning and more general\r\nacceptation; the other of Specialization, by which other, or even these\r\nsame words, are continually taking on fresh connotation; acquiring additional\r\nmeaning by being restricted in their employment to a part only of\r\nthe occasions on which they might properly be used before. This double\r\nmovement is of sufficient importance in the natural history of language\r\n(to which natural history the artificial modifications ought always to have\r\nsome degree of reference), to justify our dwelling a little longer on the\r\nnature of the twofold phenomenon, and the causes to which it owes its\r\nexistence.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 3. To begin with the movement of generalization. It might seem unnecessary\r\nto dwell on the changes in the meaning of names which take\r\nplace merely from their being used ignorantly, by persons who, not having\r\nproperly mastered the received connotation of a word, apply it in a looser\r\nand wider sense than belongs to it. This, however, is a real source of alterations\r\nin the language; for when a word, from being often employed in\r\ncases where one of the qualities which it connotes does not exist, ceases to\r\nsuggest that quality with certainty, then even those who are under no mistake\r\nas to the proper meaning of the word, prefer expressing that meaning\r\nin some other way, and leave the original word to its fate. The word\r\n’Squire, as standing for an owner of a landed estate; Parson, as denoting\r\nnot the rector of the parish, but clergymen in general; Artist, to denote\r\nonly a painter or sculptor; are cases in point. Such cases give a clear insight\r\ninto the process of the degeneration of languages in periods of history\r\nwhen literary culture was suspended; and we are now in danger of\r\nexperiencing a similar evil through the superficial extension of the same\r\nculture. So many persons without any thing deserving the name of education\r\nhave become writers by profession, that written language may almost\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page483\"\u003e[pg 483]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg483\" id=\"Pg483\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nbe said to be principally wielded by persons ignorant of the proper\r\nuse of the instrument, and who are spoiling it more and more for those\r\nwho understand it. Vulgarisms, which creep in nobody knows how, are\r\ndaily depriving the English language of valuable modes of expressing\r\nthought. To take a present instance: the verb \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003etranspire\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e formerly\r\nconveyed very expressively its correct meaning, viz., to \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ebecome\r\nknown\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e through unnoticed channels—to exhale, as it were, into publicity through\r\ninvisible pores, like a vapor or gas disengaging itself. But of late a practice has\r\ncommenced of employing this word, for the sake of finery, as a mere synonym\r\nof \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eto happen\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e: \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“the events which have\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003etranspired\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e in the Crimea,”\u003c/span\u003e\r\nmeaning the incidents of the war. This vile specimen of bad English is\r\nalready seen in the dispatches of noblemen and viceroys; and the time is\r\napparently not far distant when nobody will understand the word if used\r\nin its proper sense. In other cases it is not the love of finery, but simple\r\nwant of education, which makes writers employ words in senses unknown\r\nto genuine English. The use of \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“aggravating”\u003c/span\u003e for \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“provoking,”\u003c/span\u003e in my\r\nboyhood a vulgarism of the nursery, has crept into almost all newspapers,\r\nand into many books; and when the word is used in its proper sense, as\r\nwhen writers on criminal law speak of aggravating and extenuating circumstances,\r\ntheir meaning, it is probable, is already misunderstood. It is\r\na great error to think that these corruptions of language do no harm.\r\nThose who are struggling with the difficulty (and who know by experience\r\nhow great it already is) of expressing one’s self clearly with precision, find\r\ntheir resources continually narrowed by illiterate writers, who seize and\r\ntwist from its purpose some form of speech which once served to convey\r\nbriefly and compactly an unambiguous meaning. It would hardly be believed\r\nhow often a writer is compelled to a circumlocution by the single\r\nvulgarism, introduced during the last few years, of using the word\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ealone\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e as an adverb, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eonly\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e not being fine\r\nenough for the rhetoric of ambitious ignorance.\r\nA man will say \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“to which I am not alone bound by honor but\r\nalso by law,”\u003c/span\u003e unaware that what he has unintentionally said is, that he is\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003enot alone\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e bound, some other person being bound with him. Formerly,\r\nif any one said, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“I am not alone responsible for this,”\u003c/span\u003e he was understood to\r\nmean (what alone his words mean in correct English), that he is not the\r\nsole person responsible; but if he now used such an expression, the reader\r\nwould be confused between that and two other meanings: that he is not\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eonly responsible\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e but something more; or that he is responsible\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003enot only for this\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e but for something besides. The time is coming when\r\nTennyson’s Œnone could not say, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“I will not die alone,”\u003c/span\u003e lest she should be supposed\r\nto mean that she would not only die but do something else.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe blunder of writing \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003epredicate\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e for\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003epredict\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e has become so widely diffused\r\nthat it bids fair to render one of the most useful terms in the scientific\r\nvocabulary of Logic unintelligible. The mathematical and logical\r\nterm \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“to eliminate”\u003c/span\u003e is undergoing a similar destruction. All who are acquainted\r\neither with the proper use of the word or with its etymology\r\nknow that to eliminate a thing is to thrust it out: but those who know\r\nnothing about it, except that it is a fine-looking phrase, use it in a sense\r\nprecisely the reverse, to denote, not turning any thing out, but bringing it\r\nin. They talk of \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eeliminating\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e some truth, or other useful result,\r\nfrom a mass of details.\u003ca id=\"noteref_220\" name=\"noteref_220\" href=\"#note_220\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e220\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nA similar permanent deterioration in the language is\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page484\"\u003e[pg 484]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg484\" id=\"Pg484\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nin danger of being produced by the blunders of translators. The writers\r\nof telegrams, and the foreign correspondents of newspapers, have gone on\r\nso long translating \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003edemander\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e by \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“to demand,”\u003c/span\u003e without a\r\nsuspicion that it means only to ask, that (the context generally showing that nothing\r\nelse is meant) English readers are gradually associating the English word demand\r\nwith simple asking, thus leaving the language without a term to\r\nexpress a demand in its proper sense. In like manner, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“transaction,”\u003c/span\u003e the\r\nFrench word for a compromise, is translated into the English word transaction;\r\nwhile, curiously enough, the inverse change is taking place in\r\nFrance, where the word \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“compromis”\u003c/span\u003e has lately begun to be used for expressing\r\nthe same idea. If this continues, the two countries will have exchanged\r\nphrases.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIndependently, however, of the generalization of names through their\r\nignorant misuse, there is a tendency in the same direction consistently\r\nwith a perfect knowledge of their meaning; arising from the fact, that the\r\nnumber of things known to us, and of which we feel a desire to speak,\r\nmultiply faster than the names for them. Except on subjects for which\r\nthere has been constructed a scientific terminology, with which unscientific\r\npersons do not meddle, great difficulty is generally found in bringing a\r\nnew name into use; and independently of that difficulty, it is natural to\r\nprefer giving to a new object a name which at least expresses its resemblance\r\nto something already known, since by predicating of it a name entirely\r\nnew we at first convey no information. In this manner the name of\r\na species often becomes the name of a genus; as \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003esalt\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, for\r\nexample, or \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eoil\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e;\r\nthe former of which words originally denoted only the muriate of soda,\r\nthe latter, as its etymology indicates, only olive-oil; but which now denote\r\nlarge and diversified classes of substances resembling these in some\r\nof their qualities, and connote only those common qualities, instead of\r\nthe whole of the distinctive properties of olive-oil and sea-salt. The words\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eglass\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e and \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003esoap\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e are used by modern chemists\r\nin a similar manner, to denote genera of which the substances vulgarly so called are\r\nsingle species. And it often happens, as in those instances, that the term keeps its\r\nspecial signification in addition to its more general one, and becomes ambiguous, that\r\nis, two names instead of one.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThese changes, by which words in ordinary use become more and more\r\ngeneralized, and less and less expressive, take place in a still greater degree\r\nwith the words which express the complicated phenomena of mind and society.\r\nHistorians, travelers, and in general those who speak or write concerning\r\nmoral and social phenomena with which they are not familiarly acquainted,\r\nare the great agents in this modification of language. The vocabulary\r\nof all except unusually instructed as well as thinking persons, is,\r\non such subjects, eminently scanty. They have a certain small set of words\r\nto which they are accustomed, and which they employ to express phenomena\r\nthe most heterogeneous, because they have never sufficiently analyzed\r\nthe facts to which those words correspond in their own country, to have\r\nattached perfectly definite ideas to the words. The first English conquerors\r\nof Bengal, for example, carried with them the phrase \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003elanded\r\nproprietor\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e into a country where the rights of individuals over the soil were\r\nextremely different in degree, and even in nature, from those recognized in England.\r\nApplying the term with all its English associations in such a state of\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page485\"\u003e[pg 485]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg485\" id=\"Pg485\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nthings; to one who had only a limited right they gave an absolute right,\r\nfrom another because he had not an absolute right they took away all\r\nright, drove whole classes of people to ruin and despair, filled the country\r\nwith banditti, created a feeling that nothing was secure, and produced, with\r\nthe best intentions, a disorganization of society which had not been produced\r\nin that country by the most ruthless of its barbarian invaders. Yet\r\nthe usage of persons capable of so gross a misapprehension determines the\r\nmeaning of language; and the words they thus misuse grow in generality,\r\nuntil the instructed are obliged to acquiesce; and to employ those words\r\n(first freeing them from vagueness by giving them a definite connotation)\r\nas generic terms, subdividing the genera into species.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 4. While the more rapid growth of ideas than of names thus creates a\r\nperpetual necessity for making the same names serve, even if imperfectly,\r\non a greater number of occasions; a counter-operation is going on, by\r\nwhich names become on the contrary restricted to fewer occasions, by taking\r\non, as it were, additional connotation, from circumstances not originally\r\nincluded in the meaning, but which have become connected with it in the\r\nmind by some accidental cause. We have seen above, in the words\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003epagan\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e and \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003evillain\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, remarkable examples of\r\nthe specialization of the meaning of\r\nwords from casual associations, as well as of the generalization of it in a\r\nnew direction, which often follows.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nSimilar specializations are of frequent occurrence in the history even of\r\nscientific nomenclature. \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“It is by no means uncommon,”\u003c/span\u003e says Dr. Paris,\r\nin his\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ePharmacologia\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\u003ca id=\"noteref_221\" name=\"noteref_221\" href=\"#note_221\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e221\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“to find a word which is used to express\r\ngeneral characters subsequently become the name of a specific substance in which\r\nsuch characters are predominant; and we shall find that some important\r\nanomalies in nomenclature may be thus explained. The term Αρσενίκον,\r\nfrom which the word Arsenic is derived, was an ancient epithet applied to\r\nthose natural substances which possessed strong and acrimonious properties;\r\nand as the poisonous quality of arsenic was found to be remarkably\r\npowerful, the term was especially applied to Orpiment, the form in which\r\nthis metal most usually occurred. So the term \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eVerbena\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e (quasi\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eHerbena\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e) originally denoted all those herbs that were held sacred\r\non account of their being employed in the rites of sacrifice, as we learn from the poets;\r\nbut as \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eone\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e herb was usually adopted upon these occasions, the word Verbena\r\ncame to denote that particular herb \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eonly\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e, and it is transmitted to us to\r\nthis day under the same title, viz., Verbena or Vervain, and indeed until lately it\r\nenjoyed the medical reputation which its sacred origin conferred upon it, for\r\nit was worn suspended around the neck as an amulet. \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eVitriol\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, in\r\nthe original application of the word, denoted \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eany\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e crystalline body with a\r\ncertain degree of transparency (\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003evitrum\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e); it is hardly necessary\r\nto observe that the term is now appropriated to a particular species: in the same manner,\r\nBark, which is a general term, is applied to express \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eone\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e genus, and by way\r\nof eminence it has the article \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eThe\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e prefixed, as\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eThe\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e bark; the same observation\r\nwill apply to the word Opium, which, in its primitive sense, signifies\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eany\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e juice (ὀπὸς, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eSuccus\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e), while it now only denotes\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eone\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e species, viz., that of the poppy. So, again,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eElaterium\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e was used by Hippocrates to signify various\r\ninternal applications, especially purgatives, of a violent and drastic nature\r\n(from the word ἐλαύνω, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eagito\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003emoveo\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003estimulo\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e), but by succeeding authors\r\nit was exclusively applied to denote the active matter which subsides\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page486\"\u003e[pg 486]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg486\" id=\"Pg486\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nfrom the juice of the wild cucumber. The word \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eFecula\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, again,\r\noriginally meant to imply \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eany\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e substance which was derived by spontaneous\r\nsubsidence from a liquid (from \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003efæx\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, the grounds or settlement of\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eany\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e liquor); afterward it was applied to Starch, which is deposited in this\r\nmanner by agitating the flour of wheat in water; and, lastly, it has been applied to a\r\npeculiar vegetable principle, which, like starch, is insoluble in cold, but completely\r\nsoluble in boiling water, with which it forms a gelatinous solution.\r\nThis indefinite meaning of the word \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003efecula\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e has created numerous\r\nmistakes in pharmaceutic chemistry; Elaterium, for instance, is said to be\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003efecula\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, and, in the original sense of the word, it is properly so\r\ncalled, inasmuch as it is procured from a vegetable juice by spontaneous subsidence, but\r\nin the limited and modern acceptation of the term it conveys an erroneous idea;\r\nfor instead of the active principle of the juice residing in\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003efecula\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, it is a peculiar proximate principle,\r\n\u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003esui generis\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, to which I have ventured to bestow\r\nthe name of \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eElatin\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e. For the same reason, much doubt and obscurity\r\ninvolve the meaning of the word \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eExtract\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, because it is applied\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003egenerally\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e to any substance obtained by the evaporation of a vegetable\r\nsolution, and \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003especifically\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e to a peculiar proximate principle, possessed of\r\ncertain characters, by which it is distinguished from every other elementary body.”\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nA generic term is always liable to become thus limited to a single species,\r\nor even individual, if people have occasion to think and speak of that\r\nindividual or species much oftener than of any thing else which is contained\r\nin the genus. Thus by cattle, a stage-coachman will understand horses;\r\nbeasts, in the language of agriculturists, stands for oxen; and birds, with\r\nsome sportsmen, for partridges only. The law of language which operates\r\nin these trivial instances is the very same in conformity to which the terms\r\nΘεός, Deus, and God, were adopted from Polytheism by Christianity, to express\r\nthe single object of its own adoration. Almost all the terminology\r\nof the Christian Church is made up of words originally used in a much\r\nmore general acceptation: \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eEcclesia\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, Assembly;\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eBishop\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, Episcopus, Overseer;\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ePriest\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, Presbyter, Elder; \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eDeacon\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\nDiaconus, Administrator; \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eSacrament\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, a\r\nvow of allegiance; \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eEvangelium\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, good tidings; and some words, as\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eMinister\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, are still used both in the general and in the limited\r\nsense. It would be interesting to trace the progress by which\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eauthor\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e came, in its most familiar\r\nsense, to signify a writer, and ποίητης, or maker, a poet.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nOf the incorporation into the meaning of a term, of circumstances accidentally\r\nconnected with it at some particular period, as in the case of Pagan,\r\ninstances might easily be multiplied. Physician (φυσίκος, or naturalist)\r\nbecame, in England, synonymous with a healer of diseases, because\r\nuntil a comparatively late period medical practitioners were the only naturalists.\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eClerc\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, or clericus, a scholar, came to signify an ecclesiastic,\r\nbecause the clergy were for many centuries the only scholars.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nOf all ideas, however, the most liable to cling by association to any thing\r\nwith which they have ever been connected by proximity, are those of our\r\npleasures and pains, or of the things which we habitually contemplate as\r\nsources of our pleasures or pains. The additional connotation, therefore,\r\nwhich a word soonest and most readily takes on, is that of agreeableness\r\nor painfulness, in their various kinds and degrees; of being a good or bad\r\nthing; desirable or to be avoided; an object of hatred, of dread, contempt,\r\nadmiration, hope, or love. Accordingly there is hardly a single name, expressive\r\nof any moral or social fact calculated to call forth strong affections\r\neither of a favorable or of a hostile nature, which does not carry with it decidedly\r\nand irresistibly a connotation of those strong affections, or, at the\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page487\"\u003e[pg 487]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg487\" id=\"Pg487\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nleast, of approbation or censure; insomuch that to employ those names in\r\nconjunction with others by which the contrary sentiments were expressed,\r\nwould produce the effect of a paradox, or even a contradiction in terms.\r\nThe baneful influence of a connotation thus acquired, on the prevailing habits\r\nof thought, especially in morals and politics, has been well pointed out\r\non many occasions by Bentham. It gives rise to the fallacy of \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“question-begging\r\nnames.”\u003c/span\u003e The very property which we are inquiring whether a thing\r\npossesses or not, has become so associated with the name of the thing as to\r\nbe part of its meaning, insomuch that by merely uttering the name we assume\r\nthe point which was to be made out; one of the most frequent sources\r\nof apparently self-evident propositions.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWithout any further multiplication of examples to illustrate the changes\r\nwhich usage is continually making in the signification of terms, I shall add,\r\nas a practical rule, that the logician, not being able to prevent such transformations,\r\nshould submit to them with a good grace when they are irrevocably\r\neffected, and if a definition is necessary, define the word according to its new\r\nmeaning; retaining the former as a second signification, if it is needed, and\r\nif there is any chance of being able to preserve it either in the language of\r\nphilosophy or in common use. Logicians can not \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003emake\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e the meaning of any\r\nbut scientific terms; that of all other words is made by the collective human\r\nrace. But logicians can ascertain clearly what it is which, working\r\nobscurely, has guided the general mind to a particular employment of a\r\nname; and when they have found this, they can clothe it in such distinct\r\nand permanent terms, that mankind shall see the meaning which before\r\nthey only felt, and shall not suffer it to be afterward forgotten or misapprehended.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-div\" style=\"margin-bottom: 4.00em; margin-top: 4.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"toc105\" id=\"toc105\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"pdf106\" id=\"pdf106\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: center; margin-bottom: 2.40em; margin-top: 2.40em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 120%\"\u003eChapter VI.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: left; margin-bottom: 2.88em; margin-top: 2.88em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 144%\"\u003eThe Principles Of A Philosophical Language\r\nFurther Considered.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 1. We have, thus far, considered only one of the requisites of a language\r\nadapted for the investigation of truth; that its terms shall each of\r\nthem convey a determinate and unmistakable meaning. There are, however,\r\nas we have already remarked, other requisites; some of them important\r\nonly in the second degree, but one which is fundamental, and barely yields\r\nin point of importance, if it yields at all, to the quality which we have already\r\ndiscussed at so much length. That the language may be fitted for\r\nits purposes, not only should every word perfectly express its meaning, but\r\nthere should be no important meaning without its word. Whatever we\r\nhave occasion to think of often, and for scientific purposes, ought to have\r\na name appropriated to it.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThis requisite of philosophical language may be considered under three\r\ndifferent heads; that number of separate conditions being involved in it.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 2. First, there ought to be all such names, as are needful for making\r\nsuch a record of individual observations that the words of the record shall\r\nexactly show what fact it is which has been observed. In other words,\r\nthere should be an accurate Descriptive Terminology.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe only things which we can observe directly being our own sensations,\r\nor other feelings, a complete descriptive language would be one in which\r\nthere should be a name for every variety of elementary sensation or feeling.\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page488\"\u003e[pg 488]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg488\" id=\"Pg488\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nCombinations of sensations or feelings may always be described, if\r\nwe have a name for each of the elementary feelings which compose them;\r\nbut brevity of description, and clearness (which often depends very much\r\non brevity), are greatly promoted by giving distinctive names not to the\r\nelements alone, but also to all combinations which are of frequent recurrence.\r\nOn this occasion I can not do better than quote from Dr.\r\nWhewell\u003ca id=\"noteref_222\" name=\"noteref_222\" href=\"#note_222\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e222\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nsome of the excellent remarks which he has made on this important\r\nbranch of our subject.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“The meaning of [descriptive] technical terms can be fixed in the first\r\ninstance only by convention, and can be made intelligible only by presenting\r\nto the senses that which the terms are to signify. The knowledge of\r\na color by its name can only be taught through the eye. No description\r\ncan convey to a hearer what we mean by \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eapple-green\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e or\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eFrench gray\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e. It might, perhaps, be supposed that, in the first\r\nexample, the term \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eapple\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\nreferring to so familiar an object, sufficiently suggests the color intended.\r\nBut it may easily be seen that this is not true; for apples are of many different\r\nhues of green, and it is only by a conventional selection that we can\r\nappropriate the term to one special shade. When this appropriation is\r\nonce made, the term refers to the sensation, and not to the parts of the\r\nterm; for these enter into the compound merely as a help to the memory,\r\nwhether the suggestion be a natural connection as in \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e‘apple-green,’\u003c/span\u003e or a\r\ncasual one as in \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e‘French gray.’\u003c/span\u003e In order to derive due advantage from\r\ntechnical terms of the kind, they must be associated \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eimmediately\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e with the\r\nperception to which they belong; and not connected with it through the\r\nvague usages of common language. The memory must retain the sensation;\r\nand the technical word must be understood as directly as the most\r\nfamiliar word, and more distinctly. When we find such terms as\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003etin-white\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e or \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003epinchbeck-brown\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, the metallic\r\ncolor so denoted ought to start up in our memory without delay or search.\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“This, which it is most important to recollect with respect to the simpler\r\nproperties of bodies, as color and form, is no less true with respect to\r\nmore compound notions. In all cases the term is fixed to a peculiar meaning\r\nby convention; and the student, in order to use the word, must be completely\r\nfamiliar with the convention, so that he has no need to frame conjectures\r\nfrom the word itself. Such conjectures would always be insecure,\r\nand often erroneous. Thus the term \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003epapilionaceous\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e applied to a\r\nflower is employed to indicate, not only a resemblance to a butterfly, but a resemblance\r\narising from five petals of a certain-peculiar shape and arrangement;\r\nand even if the resemblance were much stronger than it is in such cases,\r\nyet, if it were produced in a different way, as, for example, by one petal, or\r\ntwo only, instead of a \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e‘standard,’\u003c/span\u003e two \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e‘wings,’\u003c/span\u003e and a \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e‘keel’\u003c/span\u003e consisting of\r\ntwo parts more or less united into one, we should be no longer justified in\r\nspeaking of it as a \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e‘papilionaceous’\u003c/span\u003e flower.”\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWhen, however, the thing named is, as in this last case, a combination\r\nof simple sensations, it is not necessary, in order to learn the meaning of\r\nthe word, that the student should refer back to the sensations themselves;\r\nit may be communicated to him through the medium of other words; the\r\nterms, in short, may be defined. But the names of elementary sensations,\r\nor elementary feelings of any sort, can not be defined; nor is there any\r\nmode of making their signification known but by making the learner experience\r\nthe sensation, or referring him, through some known mark, to his\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page489\"\u003e[pg 489]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg489\" id=\"Pg489\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nremembrance of having experienced it before. Hence it is only the impressions\r\non the outward senses, or those inward feelings which are connected\r\nin a very obvious and uniform manner with outward objects, that\r\nare really susceptible of an exact descriptive language. The countless variety\r\nof sensations which arise, for instance, from disease, or from peculiar\r\nphysiological states, it would be in vain to attempt to name; for as no one\r\ncan judge whether the sensation I have is the same with his, the name can\r\nnot have, to us two, real community of meaning. The same may be said,\r\nto a considerable extent, of purely mental feelings. But in some of the\r\nsciences which are conversant with external objects, it is scarcely possible\r\nto surpass the perfection to which this quality of a philosophical language\r\nhas been carried.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“The formation\u003ca id=\"noteref_223\" name=\"noteref_223\" href=\"#note_223\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e223\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e of an exact and extensive descriptive language for\r\nbotany has been executed with a degree of skill and felicity, which, before\r\nit was attained, could hardly have been dreamed of as attainable. Every\r\npart of a plant has been named; and the form of every part, even the most\r\nminute, has had a large assemblage of descriptive terms appropriated to\r\nit, by means of which the botanist can convey and receive knowledge of\r\nform and structure, as exactly as if each minute part were presented to\r\nhim vastly magnified. This acquisition was part of the Linnæan reform….\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e‘Tournefort,’\u003c/span\u003e says Decandolle, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e‘appears to have been the first\r\nwho really perceived the utility of fixing the sense of terms in such a way\r\nas always to employ the same word in the same sense, and always to express\r\nthe same idea by the same words; but it was Linnæus who really\r\ncreated and fixed this botanical language, and this is his fairest claim to\r\nglory, for by this fixation of language he has shed clearness and precision\r\nover all parts of the science.’\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“It is not necessary here to give any detailed account of the terms of\r\nbotany. The fundamental ones have been gradually introduced, as the\r\nparts of plants were more carefully and minutely examined. Thus the\r\nflower was necessarily distinguished into the \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ecalyx\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, the\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ecorolla\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, the \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003estamens\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\nand the \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003epistils\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e; the sections of the corolla were termed\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003epetals\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e by Columna; those of the calyx were called\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003esepals\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e by Necker. Sometimes terms of greater generality were\r\ndevised; as \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eperianth\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, to include the calyx\r\nand corolla, whether one or both of these were present; \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003epericarp\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\nfor the part inclosing the grain, of whatever kind it be, fruit, nut, pod, etc. And\r\nit may easily be imagined, that descriptive terms may, by definition and\r\ncombination, become very numerous and distinct. Thus leaves may be\r\ncalled \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003epinnatifid\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003epinnatipartite\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003epinnatisect\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003epinnatilobate\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003epalmatifid\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003epalmatipartite\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\netc., and each of these words designates different combinations\r\nof the modes and extent of the divisions of the leaf with the divisions of\r\nits outline. In some cases, arbitrary numerical relations are introduced\r\ninto the definition: thus, a leaf is called \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ebilobate\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, when it is\r\ndivided into two parts by a notch; but if the notch go to the middle of its length, it\r\nis \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ebifid\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e; if it go near the base of the leaf, it is\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ebipartite\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e; if to the base, it is \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ebisect\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e.\r\nThus, too, a pod of a cruciferous plant is a \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003esiliqua\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, if it is\r\nfour times as long as it is broad, but if it be shorter than this it is a\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003esilicula\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e. Such terms being established, the form of the very\r\ncomplex leaf or frond of a fern (Hymenophyllum Wilsoni) is exactly conveyed by the\r\nfollowing phrase: \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e‘fronds rigid pinnate, pinnæ recurved subunilateral, pinnatifid, the\r\nsegments linear undivided or bifid, spinuloso-serrate.’\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page490\"\u003e[pg 490]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg490\" id=\"Pg490\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Other characters, as well as form, are conveyed with the like precision:\r\nColor by means of a classified scale of colors…. This was done with\r\nmost precision by Werner, and his scale of colors is still the most usual\r\nstandard of naturalists. Werner also introduced a more exact terminology\r\nwith regard to other characters which are important in mineralogy, as lustre,\r\nhardness. But Mohs improved upon this step by giving a numerical scale\r\nof hardness, in which talc is 1, gypsum 2, calc spar 3, and so on…. Some\r\nproperties, as specific gravity, by their definition give at once a numerical\r\nmeasure; and others, as crystalline form, require a very considerable array\r\nof mathematical calculation and reasoning, to point out their relations and\r\ngradations.”\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 3. Thus far of Descriptive Terminology, or of the language requisite\r\nfor placing on record our observation of individual instances. But when\r\nwe proceed from this to Induction, or rather to that comparison of observed\r\ninstances which is the preparatory step toward it, we stand in need\r\nof an additional and a different sort of general names.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWhenever, for purposes of Induction, we find it necessary to introduce\r\n(in Dr. Whewell’s phraseology) some new general conception; that is,\r\nwhenever the comparison of a set of phenomena leads to the recognition\r\nin them of some common circumstance, which, our attention not having\r\nbeen directed to it on any former occasion, is to us a new phenomenon; it\r\nis of importance that this new conception, or this new result of abstraction,\r\nshould have a name appropriated to it; especially if the circumstance it\r\ninvolves be one which leads to many consequences, or which is likely to\r\nbe found also in other classes of phenomena. No doubt, in most cases of\r\nthe kind, the meaning might be conveyed by joining together several\r\nwords already in use. But when a thing has to be often spoken of, there\r\nare more reasons than the saving of time and space, for speaking of it in\r\nthe most concise manner possible. What darkness would be spread over\r\ngeometrical demonstrations, if wherever the word \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ecircle\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e is used,\r\nthe definition of a circle were inserted instead of it. In mathematics and its\r\napplications, where the nature of the processes demands that the attention\r\nshould be strongly concentrated, but does not require that it should be\r\nwidely diffused, the importance of concentration also in the expressions\r\nhas always been duly felt; and a mathematician no sooner finds that he\r\nshall often have occasion to speak of the same two things together, than he\r\nat once creates a term to express them whenever combined: just as, in his\r\nalgebraical operations, he substitutes for\r\n(\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"vertical-align: super\"\u003em\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e +\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eb\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"vertical-align: super\"\u003en\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e) p/q, or for\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e/\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eb\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e +\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eb\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e/\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ec\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e +\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ec\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e/\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ed\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e + etc.,\r\nthe single letter P, Q, or S; not solely to shorten his symbolical expressions,\r\nbut to simplify the purely intellectual part of his operations, by\r\nenabling the mind to give its exclusive attention to the relation between\r\nthe quantity S and the other quantities which enter into the equation,\r\nwithout being distracted by thinking unnecessarily of the parts of which\r\nS is itself composed.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nBut there is another reason, in addition to that of promoting perspicuity,\r\nfor giving a brief and compact name to each of the more considerable\r\nresults of abstraction which are obtained in the course of our intellectual\r\nphenomena. By naming them, we fix our attention upon them; we keep\r\nthem more constantly before the mind. The names are remembered, and\r\nbeing remembered, suggest their definition; while if instead of specific\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page491\"\u003e[pg 491]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg491\" id=\"Pg491\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nand characteristic names, the meaning had been expressed by putting together\r\na number of other names, that particular combination of words already\r\nin common use for other purposes would have had nothing to make\r\nitself remembered by. If we want to render a particular combination of\r\nideas permanent in the mind, there is nothing which clinches it like a\r\nname specially devoted to express it. If mathematicians had been obliged\r\nto speak of \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“that to which a quantity, in increasing or diminishing, is always\r\napproaching nearer, so that the difference becomes less than any assignable\r\nquantity, but to which it never becomes exactly equal,”\u003c/span\u003e instead\r\nof expressing all this by the simple phrase, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“the limit of a quantity,”\u003c/span\u003e we\r\nshould probably have long remained without most of the important truths\r\nwhich have been discovered by means of the relation between quantities of\r\nvarious kinds and their limits. If instead of speaking of \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003emomentum\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\nit had been necessary to say, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“the product of the number of units of velocity\r\nin the velocity by the number of units of mass in the mass,”\u003c/span\u003e many of the\r\ndynamical truths now apprehended by means of this complex idea would\r\nprobably have escaped notice, for want of recalling the idea itself with\r\nsufficient readiness and familiarity. And on subjects less remote from the\r\ntopics of popular discussion, whoever wishes to draw attention to some\r\nnew or unfamiliar distinction among things, will find no way so sure as to\r\ninvent or select suitable names for the express purpose of marking it.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nA volume devoted to explaining what the writer means by civilization,\r\ndoes not raise so vivid a conception of it as the single expression, that Civilization\r\nis a different thing from Cultivation; the compactness of that\r\nbrief designation for the contrasted quality being an equivalent for a long\r\ndiscussion. So, if we would impress forcibly upon the understanding and\r\nmemory the distinction between the two different conceptions of a representative\r\ngovernment, we can not more effectually do so than by saying\r\nthat Delegation is not Representation. Hardly any original thoughts on\r\nmental or social subjects ever make their way among mankind, or assume\r\ntheir proper importance in the minds even of their inventors, until aptly-selected\r\nwords or phrases have, as it were, nailed them down and held\r\nthem fast.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 4. Of the three essential parts of a philosophical language, we have\r\nnow mentioned two: a terminology suited for describing with precision\r\nthe individual facts observed; and a name for every common property of\r\nany importance or interest, which we detect by comparing those facts; including\r\n(as the concretes corresponding to those abstract terms) names for\r\nthe classes which we artificially construct in virtue of those properties, or\r\nas many of them, at least, as we have frequent occasion to predicate any\r\nthing of.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nBut there is a sort of classes, for the recognition of which no such elaborate\r\nprocess is necessary; because each of them is marked out from all\r\nothers not by some one property, the detection of which may depend on a\r\ndifficult act of abstraction, but by its properties generally. I mean, the\r\nKinds of things, in the sense which, in this treatise, has been specially attached\r\nto that term. By a Kind, it will be remembered, we mean one of\r\nthose classes which are distinguished from all others not by one or a few\r\ndefinite properties, but by an unknown multitude of them; the combination\r\nof properties on which the class is grounded, being a mere index to\r\nan indefinite number of other distinctive attributes. The class horse is a\r\nKind, because the things which agree in possessing the characters by which\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page492\"\u003e[pg 492]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg492\" id=\"Pg492\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nwe recognize a horse, agree in a great number of other properties, as we\r\nknow, and, it can not be doubted, in many more than we know. Animal,\r\nagain, is a Kind, because no definition that could be given of the name\r\nanimal could either exhaust the properties common to all animals, or supply\r\npremises from which the remainder of those properties could be inferred.\r\nBut a combination of properties which does not give evidence of\r\nthe existence of any other independent peculiarities, does not constitute a\r\nKind. White horse, therefore, is not a Kind; because horses which agree\r\nin whiteness, do not agree in any thing else, except the qualities common\r\nto all horses, and whatever may be the causes or effects of that particular\r\ncolor.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nOn the principle that there should be a name for every thing which we\r\nhave frequent occasion to make assertions about, there ought evidently to\r\nbe a name for every Kind; for as it is the very meaning of a Kind that\r\nthe individuals composing it have an indefinite multitude of properties in\r\ncommon, it follows that, if not with our present knowledge, yet with that\r\nwhich we may hereafter acquire, the Kind is a subject to which there will\r\nhave to be applied many predicates. The third component element of a\r\nphilosophical language, therefore, is that there shall be a name for every\r\nKind. In other words, there must not only be a terminology, but also a\r\nnomenclature.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe words Nomenclature and Terminology are employed by most authors\r\nalmost indiscriminately; Dr. Whewell being, as far as I am aware,\r\nthe first writer who has regularly assigned to the two words different\r\nmeanings. The distinction, however, which he has drawn between them\r\nbeing real and important, his example is likely to be followed; and (as is\r\napt to be the case when such innovations in language are felicitously made)\r\na vague sense of the distinction is found to have influenced the employment\r\nof the terms in common practice, before the expediency had been\r\npointed out of discriminating them philosophically. Every one would say\r\nthat the reform effected by Lavoisier and Guyton-Morveau in the language\r\nof chemistry consisted in the introduction of a new nomenclature, not of a\r\nnew terminology. Linear, lanceolate, oval, or oblong, serrated, dentate, or\r\ncrenate leaves, are expressions forming part of the terminology of botany,\r\nwhile the names \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Viola odorata,”\u003c/span\u003e and \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Ulex Europæus,”\u003c/span\u003e belong to its\r\nnomenclature.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nA nomenclature may be defined, the collection of the names of all the\r\nKinds with which any branch of knowledge is conversant; or more properly,\r\nof all the lowest Kinds, or \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003einfirmæ\r\nspecies\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e—those which may be subdivided\r\nindeed, but not into Kinds, and which generally accord with what\r\nin natural history are termed simply species. Science possesses two splendid\r\nexamples of a systematic nomenclature; that of plants and animals,\r\nconstructed by Linnæus and his successors, and that of chemistry, which\r\nwe owe to the illustrious group of chemists who flourished in France toward\r\nthe close of the eighteenth century. In these two departments, not\r\nonly has every known species, or lowest Kind, a name assigned to it, but\r\nwhen new lowest Kinds are discovered, names are at once given to them\r\non a uniform principle. In other sciences the nomenclature is not at present\r\nconstructed on any system, either because the species to be named are\r\nnot numerous enough to require one (as in geometry, for example), or because\r\nno one has yet suggested a suitable principle for such a system, as\r\nin mineralogy; in which the want of a scientifically constructed nomenclature\r\nis now the principal cause which retards the progress of the science.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page493\"\u003e[pg 493]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg493\" id=\"Pg493\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 5. A word which carries on its face that it belongs to a nomenclature,\r\nseems at first sight to differ from other concrete general names in this—that\r\nits meaning does not reside in its connotation, in the attributes implied\r\nin it, but in its denotation, that is, in the particular group of things\r\nwhich it is appointed to designate; and can not, therefore, be unfolded by\r\nmeans of a definition, but must be made known in another way. This\r\nopinion, however, appears to me erroneous. Words belonging to a nomenclature\r\ndiffer, I conceive, from other words mainly in this, that besides\r\nthe ordinary connotation, they have a peculiar one of their own: besides\r\nconnoting certain attributes, they also connote that those attributes are\r\ndistinctive of a Kind. The term \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“peroxide of iron,”\u003c/span\u003e for example, belonging\r\nby its form to the systematic nomenclature of chemistry, bears on its\r\nface that it is the name of a peculiar Kind of substance. It moreover connotes,\r\nlike the name of any other class, some portion of the properties\r\ncommon to the class; in this instance the property of being a compound\r\nof iron and the largest dose of oxygen with which iron will combine.\r\nThese two things, the fact of being such a compound, and the fact of being\r\na Kind, constitute the connotation of the name peroxide of iron. When\r\nwe say of the substance before us, that it is the peroxide of iron, we thereby\r\nassert, first, that it is a compound of iron and a maximum of oxygen,\r\nand next, that the substance so composed is a peculiar Kind of substance.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nNow, this second part of the connotation of any word belonging to a\r\nnomenclature is as essential a portion of its meaning as the first part, while\r\nthe definition only declares the first; and hence the appearance that the\r\nsignification of such terms can not be conveyed by a definition: which appearance,\r\nhowever, is fallacious. The name Viola odorata denotes a Kind,\r\nof which a certain number of characters, sufficient to distinguish it, are\r\nenunciated in botanical works. This enumeration of characters is surely,\r\nas in other cases, a definition of the name. No, say some, it is not a definition,\r\nfor the name Viola odorata does not mean those characters; it means\r\nthat particular group of plants, and the characters are selected from among\r\na much greater number, merely as marks by which to recognize the group.\r\nBut to this I reply, that the name does not mean that group, for it would\r\nbe applied to that group no longer than while the group is believed to be\r\nan \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003einfima species\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e; if it were to be\r\ndiscovered that several distinct Kinds have been confounded under this one name, no one\r\nwould any longer apply the name Viola odorata to the whole of the group, but would apply\r\nit, if retained at all, to one only of the Kinds retained therein. What is imperative,\r\ntherefore, is not that the name shall denote one particular collection\r\nof objects, but that it shall denote a Kind, and a lowest Kind. The\r\nform of the name declares that, happen what will, it is to denote an\r\n\u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003einfima species\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e; and that, therefore, the\r\nproperties which it connotes, and which\r\nare expressed in the definition, are to be connoted by it no longer than\r\nwhile we continue to believe that those properties, when found together,\r\nindicate a Kind, and that the whole of them are found in no more than one\r\nKind.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWith the addition of this peculiar connotation, implied in the form of\r\nevery word which belongs to a systematic nomenclature; the set of characters\r\nwhich is employed to discriminate each Kind from all other Kinds\r\n(and which is a real definition) constitutes as completely as in any other\r\ncase the whole meaning of the term. It is no objection to say that\r\n(as is often the case in natural history) the set of characters may be\r\nchanged, and another substituted as being better suited for the purpose\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page494\"\u003e[pg 494]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg494\" id=\"Pg494\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nof distinction, while the word, still continuing to denote the same group or\r\nthings, is not considered to have changed its meaning. For this is no more\r\nthan may happen in the case of any other general name: we may, in reforming\r\nits connotation, leave its denotation untouched; and it is generally\r\ndesirable to do so. The connotation, however, is not the less for this\r\nthe real meaning, for we at once apply the name wherever the characters\r\nset down in the definition are found; and that which exclusively guides\r\nus in applying the term, must constitute its signification. If we find, contrary\r\nto our previous belief, that the characters are not peculiar to one species,\r\nwe cease to use the term co-extensively with the characters; but then\r\nit is because the other portion of the connotation fails; the condition that\r\nthe class must be a Kind. The connotation, therefore, is still the meaning;\r\nthe set of descriptive characters is a true definition; and the meaning is\r\nunfolded, not indeed (as in other cases) by the definition alone, but by the\r\ndefinition and the form of the word taken together.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 6. We have now analyzed what is implied in the two principal requisites\r\nof a philosophical language; first, precision, or definiteness; and, secondly,\r\ncompleteness. Any further remarks on the mode of constructing a nomenclature\r\nmust be deferred until we treat of Classification; the mode of naming\r\nthe Kinds of things being necessarily subordinate to the mode of arranging\r\nthose Kinds into larger classes. With respect to the minor requisites of\r\nterminology, some of them are well stated and illustrated in the \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Aphorisms\r\nconcerning the Language of Science,”\u003c/span\u003e included in Dr. Whewell’s\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ePhilosophy of the Inductive Sciences\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e. These, as being of secondary\r\nimportance in the peculiar point of view of Logic, I shall not further refer to, but\r\nshall confine my observations to one more quality, which, next to the two already treated\r\nof, appears to be the most valuable which the language of science can\r\npossess. Of this quality a general notion may be conveyed by the following\r\naphorism:\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWhenever the nature of the subject permits our reasoning processes to\r\nbe, without danger, carried on mechanically, the language should be constructed\r\non as mechanical principles as possible; while, in the contrary\r\ncase, it should be so constructed that there shall be the greatest possible obstacles\r\nto a merely mechanical use of it.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nI am aware that this maxim requires much explanation, which I shall at\r\nonce proceed to give. At first, as to what is meant by using a language\r\nmechanically. The complete or extreme case of the mechanical use of language,\r\nis when it is used without any consciousness of a meaning, and with\r\nonly the consciousness of using certain visible or audible marks in conformity\r\nto technical rules previously laid down. This extreme case is nowhere\r\nrealized except in the figures of arithmetic, and still more the symbols\r\nof algebra, a language unique in its kind, and approaching as nearly to\r\nperfection, for the purposes to which it is destined, as can, perhaps, be\r\nsaid of any creation of the human mind. Its perfection consists in the\r\ncompleteness of its adaptation to a purely mechanical use. The symbols are\r\nmere counters, without even the semblance of a meaning apart from the\r\nconvention which is renewed each time they are employed, and which is altered\r\nat each renewal, the same symbol \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e or \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ex\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nbeing used on different occasions\r\nto represent things which (except that, like all things, they are susceptible\r\nof being numbered) have no property in common. There is nothing,\r\ntherefore, to distract the mind from the set of mechanical operations\r\nwhich are to be performed upon the symbols, such as squaring both sides\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page495\"\u003e[pg 495]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg495\" id=\"Pg495\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nof the equation, multiplying or dividing them by the same or by equivalent\r\nsymbols, and so forth. Each of these operations, it is true, corresponds to\r\na syllogism; represents one step of a ratiocination relating not to the symbols,\r\nbut to the things signified by them. But as it has been found practicable\r\nto frame a technical form, by conforming to which we can make sure\r\nof finding the conclusion of the ratiocination, our end can be completely attained\r\nwithout our ever thinking of any thing but the symbols. Being\r\nthus intended to work merely as mechanism, they have the qualities which\r\nmechanism ought to have. They are of the least possible bulk, so that they\r\ntake up scarcely any room, and waste no time in their manipulation; they\r\nare compact, and fit so closely together that the eye can take in the whole\r\nat once of almost every operation which they are employed to perform.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThese admirable properties of the symbolical language of mathematics\r\nhave made so strong an impression on the minds of many thinkers, as to\r\nhave led them to consider the symbolical language in question as the ideal\r\ntype of philosophical language generally; to think that names in general, or\r\n(as they are fond of calling them) signs, are fitted for the purposes of\r\nthought in proportion as they can be made to approximate to the compactness,\r\nthe entire unmeaningness, and the capability of being used as counters\r\nwithout a thought of what they represent, which are characteristic of the\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e and \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eb\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, the \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ex\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e and\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ey\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, of algebra. This notion has led to sanguine views of\r\nthe acceleration of the progress of science by means which, I conceive, can\r\nnot possibly conduce to that end, and forms part of that exaggerated estimate\r\nof the influence of signs, which has contributed in no small degree to\r\nprevent the real laws of our intellectual operations from being rightly understood.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIn the first place, a set of signs by which we reason without consciousness\r\nof their meaning, can be serviceable, at most, only in our deductive operations.\r\nIn our direct inductions we can not for a moment dispense with a\r\ndistinct mental image of the phenomena, since the whole operation turns\r\non a perception of the particulars in which those phenomena agree and differ.\r\nBut, further, this reasoning by counters is only suitable to a very limited\r\nportion even of our deductive processes. In our reasonings respecting\r\nnumbers, the only general principles which we ever have occasion to introduce\r\nare these, Things which are equal to the same thing are equal to one\r\nanother, and The sums or differences of equal things are equal; with their\r\nvarious corollaries. Not only can no hesitation ever arise respecting the applicability\r\nof these principles, since they are true of all magnitudes whatever;\r\nbut every possible application of which they are susceptible, may be\r\nreduced to a technical rule; and such, in fact, the rules of the calculus are.\r\nBut if the symbols represent any other things than mere numbers, let us\r\nsay even straight or curve lines, we have then to apply theorems of geometry\r\nnot true of all lines without exception, and to select those which are\r\ntrue of the lines we are reasoning about. And how can we do this unless\r\nwe keep completely in mind what particular lines these are? Since additional\r\ngeometrical truths may be introduced into the ratiocination in any\r\nstage of its progress, we can not suffer ourselves, during even the smallest\r\npart of it, to use the names mechanically (as we use algebraical symbols)\r\nwithout an image annexed to them. It is only after ascertaining that the\r\nsolution of a question concerning lines can be made to depend on a previous\r\nquestion concerning numbers, or, in other words, after the question has been\r\n(to speak technically) reduced to an equation, that the unmeaning signs become\r\navailable, and that the nature of the facts themselves to which the investigation\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page496\"\u003e[pg 496]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg496\" id=\"Pg496\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nrelates can be dismissed from the mind. Up to the establishment\r\nof the equation, the language in which mathematicians carry on their\r\nreasoning does not differ in character from that employed by close reasoners\r\non any other kind of subject.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nI do not deny that every correct ratiocination, when thrown into the syllogistic\r\nshape, is conclusive from the mere form of the expression, provided\r\nnone of the terms used be ambiguous; and this is one of the circumstances\r\nwhich have led some writers to think that if all names were so judiciously\r\nconstructed and so carefully defined as not to admit of any ambiguity,\r\nthe improvement thus made in language would not only give to the conclusions\r\nof every deductive science the same certainty with those of mathematics,\r\nbut would reduce all reasonings to the application of a technical\r\nform, and enable their conclusiveness to be rationally assented to after a\r\nmerely mechanical process, as is undoubtedly the case in algebra. But, if\r\nwe except geometry, the conclusions of which are already as certain and\r\nexact as they can be made, there is no science but that of number, in which\r\nthe practical validity of a reasoning can be apparent to any person who has\r\nlooked only at the reasoning itself. Whoever has assented to what was\r\nsaid in the last Book concerning the case of the Composition of Causes,\r\nand the still stronger case of the entire supersession of one set of laws by\r\nanother, is aware that geometry and algebra are the only sciences of which\r\nthe propositions are categorically true; the general propositions of all other\r\nsciences are true only hypothetically, supposing that no counteracting\r\ncause happens to interfere. A conclusion, therefore, however correctly deduced,\r\nin point of form, from admitted laws of nature, will have no other\r\nthan an hypothetical certainty. At every step we must assure ourselves\r\nthat no other law of nature has superseded, or intermingled its operation\r\nwith, those which are the premises of the reasoning; and how can this be\r\ndone by merely looking at the words? We must not only be constantly\r\nthinking of the phenomena themselves, but we must be constantly studying\r\nthem; making ourselves acquainted with the peculiarities of every case to\r\nwhich we attempt to apply our general principles.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe algebraic notation, considered as a philosophical language, is perfect\r\nin its adaptation to the subjects for which it is commonly employed,\r\nnamely those of which the investigations have already been reduced\r\nto the ascertainment of a relation between numbers. But, admirable as\r\nit is for its own purpose, the properties by which it is rendered such\r\nare so far from constituting it the ideal model of philosophical language\r\nin general, that the more nearly the language of any other branch of\r\nscience approaches to it, the less fit that language is for its own proper\r\nfunctions. On all other subjects, instead of contrivances to prevent our attention\r\nfrom being distracted by thinking of the meaning of our signs, we\r\nought to wish for contrivances to make it impossible that we should ever\r\nlose sight of that meaning even for an instant.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWith this view, as much meaning as possible should be thrown into the\r\nformation of the word itself; the aids of derivation and analogy being\r\nmade available to keep alive a consciousness of all that is signified by it.\r\nIn this respect those languages have an immense advantage which form their\r\ncompounds and derivatives from native roots, like the German, and not from\r\nthose of a foreign or dead language, as is so much the case with English,\r\nFrench, and Italian; and the best are those which form them according to\r\nfixed analogies, corresponding to the relations between the ideas to be expressed.\r\nAll languages do this more or less, but especially, among modern\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page497\"\u003e[pg 497]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg497\" id=\"Pg497\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nEuropean languages, the German; while even that is inferior to the Greek,\r\nin which the relation between the meaning of a derivative word and that\r\nof its primitive is in general clearly marked by its mode of formation, except\r\nin the case of words compounded with prepositions, which are often,\r\nin both those languages, extremely anomalous.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nBut all that can be done, by the mode of constructing words, to prevent\r\nthem from degenerating into sounds passing through the mind without any\r\ndistinct apprehension of what they signify, is far too little for the necessity\r\nof the case. Words, however well constructed originally, are always tending,\r\nlike coins, to have their inscription worn off by passing from hand to\r\nhand; and the only possible mode of reviving it is to be ever stamping\r\nit afresh, by living in the habitual contemplation of the phenomena themselves,\r\nand not resting in our familiarity with the words that express them.\r\nIf any one, having possessed himself of the laws of phenomena as recorded\r\nin words, whether delivered to him originally by others, or even found out\r\nby himself, is content from thenceforth to live among these formulæ, to\r\nthink exclusively of them, and of applying them to cases as they arise, without\r\nkeeping up his acquaintance with the realities from which these laws\r\nwere collected—not only will he continually fail in his practical efforts, because\r\nhe will apply his formulæ without duly considering whether, in this\r\ncase and in that, other laws of nature do not modify or supersede them;\r\nbut the formulæ themselves will progressively lose their meaning to him,\r\nand he will cease at last even to be capable of recognizing with certainty\r\nwhether a case falls within the contemplation of his formula or not. It is,\r\nin short, as necessary, on all subjects not mathematical, that the things on\r\nwhich we reason should be conceived by us in the concrete, and \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“clothed\r\nin circumstances,”\u003c/span\u003e as it is in algebra that we should keep all individualizing\r\npeculiarities sedulously out of view.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWith this remark we close our observations on the Philosophy of Language.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-div\" style=\"margin-bottom: 4.00em; margin-top: 4.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"toc107\" id=\"toc107\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"pdf108\" id=\"pdf108\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"Book_IV_Chapter_VII\" id=\"Book_IV_Chapter_VII\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: center; margin-bottom: 2.40em; margin-top: 2.40em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 120%\"\u003eChapter VII.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: left; margin-bottom: 2.88em; margin-top: 2.88em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 144%\"\u003eOf Classification, As Subsidiary To Induction.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 1. There is, as has been frequently remarked in this work, a classification\r\nof things, which is inseparable from the fact of giving them general\r\nnames. Every name which connotes an attribute, divides, by that very\r\nfact, all things whatever into two classes, those which have the attribute\r\nand those which have it not; those of which the name can be predicated,\r\nand those of which it can not. And the division thus made is not merely\r\na division of such things as actually exist, or are known to exist, but of all\r\nsuch as may hereafter be discovered, and even of all which can be imagined.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nOn this kind of Classification we have nothing to add to what has previously\r\nbeen said. The Classification which requires to be discussed as a separate\r\nact of the mind, is altogether different. In the one, the arrangement\r\nof objects in groups, and distribution of them into compartments, is a mere\r\nincidental effect consequent on the use of names given for another purpose,\r\nnamely that of simply expressing some of their qualities. In the other, the\r\narrangement and distribution are the main object, and the naming is secondary\r\nto, and purposely conforms itself to, instead of governing, that\r\nmore important operation.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page498\"\u003e[pg 498]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg498\" id=\"Pg498\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nClassification, thus regarded, is a contrivance for the best possible ordering\r\nof the ideas of objects in our minds; for causing the ideas to accompany\r\nor succeed one another in such a way as shall give us the greatest\r\ncommand over our knowledge already acquired, and lead most directly to\r\nthe acquisition of more. The general problem of Classification, in reference\r\nto these purposes, may be stated as follows: To provide that things\r\nshall be thought of in such groups, and those groups in such an order, as\r\nwill best conduce to the remembrance and to the ascertainment of their\r\nlaws.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nClassification thus considered, differs from classification in the wider\r\nsense, in having reference to real objects exclusively, and not to all that are\r\nimaginable: its object being the due co-ordination in our minds of those\r\nthings only, with the properties of which we have actually occasion to make\r\nourselves acquainted. But, on the other hand, it embraces \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eall\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e really existing\r\nobjects. We can not constitute any one class properly, except in\r\nreference to a general division of the whole of nature; we can not determine\r\nthe group in which any one object can most conveniently be placed,\r\nwithout taking into consideration all the varieties of existing objects, all at\r\nleast which have any degree of affinity with it. No one family of plants\r\nor animals could have been rationally constituted, except as part of a systematic\r\narrangement of all plants or animals; nor could such a general arrangement\r\nhave been properly made, without first determining the exact\r\nplace of plants and animals in a general division of nature.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 2. There is no property of objects which may not be taken, if we\r\nplease, as the foundation for a classification or mental grouping of those\r\nobjects; and in our first attempts we are likely to select for that purpose\r\nproperties which are simple, easily conceived, and perceptible on a first\r\nview, without any previous process of thought. Thus Tournefort’s arrangement\r\nof plants was founded on the shape and divisions of the corolla;\r\nand that which is commonly called the Linnæan (though Linnæus also suggested\r\nanother and more scientific arrangement) was grounded chiefly on\r\nthe number of the stamens and pistils.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nBut these classifications, which are at first recommended by the facility\r\nthey afford of ascertaining to what class any individual belongs, are seldom\r\nmuch adapted to the ends of that Classification which is the subject of our\r\npresent remarks. The Linnæan arrangement answers the purpose of making\r\nus think together of all those kinds of plants which possess the same\r\nnumber of stamens and pistils; but to think of them in that manner is of\r\nlittle use, since we seldom have any thing to affirm in common of the plants\r\nwhich have a given number of stamens and pistils. If plants of the class\r\nPentandria, order Monogynia, agreed in any other properties, the habit of\r\nthinking and speaking of the plants under a common designation would\r\nconduce to our remembering those common properties so far as they were\r\nascertained, and would dispose us to be on the lookout for such of them\r\nas were not yet known. But since this is not the case, the only purpose of\r\nthought which the Linnæan classification serves is that of causing us to remember,\r\nbetter than we should otherwise have done, the exact number of\r\nstamens and pistils of every species of plants. Now, as this property is of\r\nlittle importance or interest, the remembering it with any particular accuracy\r\nis of no moment. And, inasmuch as, by habitually thinking of plants\r\nin those groups, we are prevented from habitually thinking of them in\r\ngroups which have a greater number of properties in common, the effect of\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page499\"\u003e[pg 499]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg499\" id=\"Pg499\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nsuch a classification, when systematically adhered to, upon our habits of\r\nthought, must be regarded as mischievous.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe ends of scientific classification are best answered, when the objects\r\nare formed into groups respecting which a greater number of general propositions\r\ncan be made, and those propositions more important, than could\r\nbe made respecting any other groups into which the same things could be\r\ndistributed. The properties, therefore, according to which objects are\r\nclassified, should, if possible, be those which are causes of many other properties;\r\nor, at any rate, which are sure marks of them. Causes are preferable,\r\nboth as being the surest and most direct of marks, and as being themselves\r\nthe properties on which it is of most use that our attention should\r\nbe strongly fixed. But the property which is the cause of the chief peculiarities\r\nof a class, is unfortunately seldom fitted to serve also as the diagnostic\r\nof the class. Instead of the cause, we must generally select some of\r\nits more prominent effects, which may serve as marks of the other effects\r\nand of the cause.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nA classification thus formed is properly scientific or philosophical, and\r\nis commonly called a Natural, in contradistinction to a Technical or Artificial,\r\nclassification or arrangement. The phrase Natural Classification\r\nseems most peculiarly appropriate to such arrangements as correspond, in\r\nthe groups which they form, to the spontaneous tendencies of the mind,\r\nby placing together the objects most similar in their general aspect; in opposition\r\nto those technical systems which, arranging things according to\r\ntheir agreement in some circumstance arbitrarily selected, often throw into\r\nthe same group objects which in the general aggregate of their properties\r\npresent no resemblance, and into different and remote groups, others which\r\nhave the closest similarity. It is one of the most valid recommendations\r\nof any classification to the character of a scientific one, that it shall be a\r\nnatural classification in this sense also; for the test of its scientific character\r\nis the number and importance of the properties which can be asserted\r\nin common of all objects included in a group; and properties on which the\r\ngeneral aspect of the things depends are, if only on that ground, important,\r\nas well as, in most cases, numerous. But, though a strong recommendation,\r\nthis circumstance is not a \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003esine qua non\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e; since\r\nthe most obvious properties of things may be of trifling importance compared with others\r\nthat are not obvious. I have seen it mentioned as a great absurdity in\r\nthe Linnæan classification, that it places (which by-the-way it does not)\r\nthe violet by the side of the oak; it certainly dissevers natural affinities,\r\nand brings together things quite as unlike as the oak and the violet are.\r\nBut the difference, apparently so wide, which renders the juxtaposition of\r\nthose two vegetables so suitable an illustration of a bad arrangement, depends,\r\nto the common eye, mainly on mere size and texture; now if we\r\nmade it our study to adopt the classification which would involve the least\r\nperil of similar \u003cspan lang=\"fr\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"fr\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003erapprochements\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, we should\r\nreturn to the obsolete division into trees, shrubs, and herbs, which though of primary\r\nimportance with regard to mere general aspect, yet (compared even with so petty and\r\nunobvious a distinction as that into dicotyledons and monocotyledons) answers\r\nto so few differences in the other properties of plants, that a classification\r\nfounded on it (independently of the indistinctness of the lines of demarcation)\r\nwould be as completely artificial and technical as the Linnæan.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nOur natural groups, therefore, must often be founded not on the obvious\r\nbut on the unobvious properties of things, when these are of greater\r\nimportance. But in such cases it is essential that there should be some\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page500\"\u003e[pg 500]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg500\" id=\"Pg500\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nother property or set of properties, more readily recognizable by the observer,\r\nwhich co-exist with, and may be received as marks of, the properties\r\nwhich are the real groundwork of the classification. A natural arrangement,\r\nfor example, of animals, must be founded in the main on their\r\ninternal structure, but (as M. Comte remarks) it would be absurd that we\r\nshould not be able to determine the genus and species of an animal without\r\nfirst killing it. On this ground, the preference, among zoological classifications,\r\nis probably due to that of M. De Blainville, founded on the differences\r\nin the external integuments; differences which correspond, much\r\nmore accurately than might be supposed, to the really important varieties,\r\nboth in the other parts of the structure, and in the habits and history of\r\nthe animals.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThis shows, more strongly than ever, how extensive a knowledge of the\r\nproperties of objects is necessary for making a good classification of them.\r\nAnd as it is one of the uses of such a classification that by drawing attention\r\nto the properties on which it is founded, and which, if the classification\r\nbe good, are marks of many others, it facilitates the discovery of those\r\nothers; we see in what manner our knowledge of things, and our classification\r\nof them, tend mutually and indefinitely to the improvement of each\r\nother.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWe said just now that the classification of objects should follow those\r\nof their properties which indicate not only the most numerous, but also\r\nthe most important peculiarities. What is here meant by importance?\r\nIt has reference to the particular end in view; and the same objects, therefore,\r\nmay admit with propriety of several different classifications. Each\r\nscience or art forms its classification of things according to the properties\r\nwhich fall within its special cognizance, or of which it must take account\r\nin order to accomplish its peculiar practical end. A farmer does not divide\r\nplants, like a botanist, into dicotyledonous and monocotyledonous, but\r\ninto useful plants and weeds. A geologist divides fossils, not like a zoologist,\r\ninto families corresponding to those of living species, but into fossils\r\nof the paleozoic, mesozoic, and tertiary periods, above the coal and below\r\nthe coal, etc. Whales are or are not fish according to the purpose for\r\nwhich we are considering them. \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“If we are speaking of the internal structure\r\nand physiology of the animal, we must not call them fish; for in these\r\nrespects they deviate widely from fishes; they have warm blood, and produce\r\nand suckle their young as land quadrupeds do. But this would not\r\nprevent our speaking of the \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ewhale-fishery\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, and calling such\r\nanimals \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003efish\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e on all occasions connected with this employment; for\r\nthe relations thus arising depend upon the animal’s living in the water, and being caught\r\nin a manner similar to other fishes. A plea that human laws which mention fish do\r\nnot apply to whales, would be rejected at once by an intelligent\r\njudge.”\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca id=\"noteref_224\" name=\"noteref_224\" href=\"#note_224\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e224\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThese different classifications are all good, for the purposes of their own\r\nparticular departments of knowledge or practice. But when we are studying\r\nobjects not for any special practical end, but for the sake of extending\r\nour knowledge of the whole of their properties and relations, we must consider\r\nas the most important attributes those which contribute most, either\r\nby themselves or by their effects, to render the things like one another, and\r\nunlike other things; which give to the class composed of them the most\r\nmarked individuality; which fill, as it were, the largest space in their existence,\r\nand would most impress the attention of a spectator who knew all\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page501\"\u003e[pg 501]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg501\" id=\"Pg501\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\ntheir properties but was not specially interested in any. Classes formed\r\non this principle may be called, in a more emphatic manner than any others,\r\nnatural groups.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 3. On the subject of these groups Dr. Whewell lays down a theory,\r\ngrounded on an important truth, which he has, in some respects, expressed\r\nand illustrated very felicitously, but also, as it appears to me, with some\r\nadmixture of error. It will be advantageous, for both these reasons, to\r\nextract the statement of his doctrine in the very words he has used.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Natural groups,”\u003c/span\u003e according to this\r\ntheory,\u003ca id=\"noteref_225\" name=\"noteref_225\" href=\"#note_225\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e225\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e are \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“given by Type, not\r\nby Definition.”\u003c/span\u003e And this consideration accounts for that \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“indefiniteness\r\nand indecision which we frequently find in the descriptions of such groups,\r\nand which must appear so strange and inconsistent to any one who does\r\nnot suppose these descriptions to assume any deeper ground of connection\r\nthan an arbitrary choice of the botanist. Thus in the family of the rose-tree,\r\nwe are told that the \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eovules\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e are \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003every rarely\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e erect,\r\nthe \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003estigmata usually\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e simple. Of what use, it might be asked, can\r\nsuch loose accounts be? To which the answer is, that they are not inserted in order to\r\ndistinguish the species, but in order to describe the family, and the total relations of\r\nthe ovules and the stigmata of the family are better known by this general\r\nstatement. A similar observation may be made with regard to the Anomalies\r\nof each group, which occur so commonly, that Dr. Lindley, in his\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eIntroduction to the Natural System of Botany\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, makes the\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e‘Anomalies’\u003c/span\u003e an article in each family. Thus, part of the character of the Rosaceæ\r\nis, that they have alternate \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003estipulate\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e leaves, and that the\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ealbumen\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e is \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eobliterated\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e;\r\nbut yet in \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eLowea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, one of the genera of this family, the stipulæ\r\nare \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eabsent\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e; and the albumen is \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003epresent\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e in\r\nanother, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eNeillia\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e. This implies, as we have\r\nalready seen, that the artificial character (or \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ediagnosis\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, as Mr.\r\nLindley calls it) is imperfect. It is, though very nearly, yet not exactly, commensurate\r\nwith the natural group; and hence in certain cases this character is made\r\nto yield to the general weight of natural affinities.\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“These views—of classes determined by characters which can not be\r\nexpressed in words—of propositions which state, not what happens in all\r\ncases, but only usually—of particulars which are included in a class, though\r\nthey transgress the definition of it, may probably surprise the reader.\r\nThey are so contrary to many of the received opinions respecting the use\r\nof definitions, and the nature of scientific propositions, that they will probably\r\nappear to many persons highly illogical and unphilosophical. But a\r\ndisposition to such a judgment arises in a great measure from this, that\r\nthe mathematical and mathematico-physical sciences have, in a great degree,\r\ndetermined men’s views of the general nature and form of scientific\r\ntruth; while Natural History has not yet had time or opportunity to exert\r\nits due influence upon the current habits of philosophizing. The apparent\r\nindefiniteness and inconsistency of the classifications and definitions of\r\nNatural History belongs, in a far higher degree, to all other except mathematical\r\nspeculations; and the modes in which approximations to exact distinctions\r\nand general truths have been made in Natural History, may be\r\nworthy our attention, even for the light they throw upon the best modes\r\nof pursuing truth of all kinds.\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Though in a Natural group of objects a definition can no longer be of\r\nany use as a regulative principle, classes are not therefore left quite loose,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page502\"\u003e[pg 502]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg502\" id=\"Pg502\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nwithout any certain standard or guide. The class is steadily fixed, though\r\nnot precisely limited; it is given, though not circumscribed; it is determined,\r\nnot by a boundary-line without, but by a central point within; not\r\nby what it strictly excludes, but by what it eminently includes; by an example,\r\nnot by a precept; in short, instead of a Definition we have a Type\r\nfor our director.\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“A Type is an example of any class, for instance a species of a genus,\r\nwhich is considered as eminently possessing the character of the class. All\r\nthe species which have a greater affinity with this type-species than with\r\nany others, form the genus, and are arranged about it, deviating from it\r\nin various directions and different degrees. Thus a genus may consist of\r\nseveral species which approach very near the type, and of which the claim\r\nto a place with it is obvious; while there may be other species which\r\nstraggle farther from this central knot, and which yet are clearly more\r\nconnected with it than with any other. And even if there should be some\r\nspecies of which the place is dubious, and which appear to be equally\r\nbound to two generic types, it is easily seen that this would not destroy\r\nthe reality of the generic groups, any more than the scattered trees of the\r\nintervening plain prevent our speaking intelligibly of the distinct forests\r\nof two separate hills.\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“The type-species of every genus, the type-genus of every family, is then,\r\none which possesses all the characters and properties of the genus in a\r\nmarked and prominent manner. The type of the Rose family has alternate\r\nstipulate leaves, wants the albumen, has the ovules not erect, has the\r\nstigmata simple, and besides these features, which distinguish it from the\r\nexceptions or varieties of its class, it has the features which make it prominent\r\nin its class. It is one of those which possess clearly several leading\r\nattributes; and thus, though we can not say of any one genus that it \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003emust\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e\r\nbe the type of the family, or of any one species that it \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003emust\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e be the type of\r\nthe genus, we are still not wholly to seek; the type must be connected by\r\nmany affinities with most of the others of its group; it must be near the\r\ncentre of the crowd, and not one of the stragglers.”\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIn this passage (the latter part of which especially I can not help noticing\r\nas an admirable example of philosophic style) Dr. Whewell has\r\nstated very clearly and forcibly, but (I think) without making all necessary\r\ndistinctions, one of the principles of a Natural Classification. What this\r\nprinciple is, what are its limits, and in what manner he seems to me to\r\nhave overstepped them, will appear when we have laid down another rule\r\nof Natural Arrangement, which appears to me still more fundamental.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 4. The reader is by this time familiar with the general truth (which I\r\nrestate so often on account of the great confusion in which it is commonly\r\ninvolved), that there are in nature distinctions of Kind; distinctions\r\nnot consisting in a given number of definite properties \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eplus\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e the effects\r\nwhich follow from those properties, but running through the whole nature,\r\nthrough the attributes generally, of the things so distinguished. Our\r\nknowledge of the properties of a Kind is never complete. We are always\r\ndiscovering, and expecting to discover, new ones. Where the distinction\r\nbetween two classes of things is not one of Kind, we expect to find their\r\nproperties alike, except where there is some reason for their being different.\r\nOn the contrary, when the distinction is in Kind, we expect to find\r\nthe properties different unless there be some cause for their being the\r\nsame. All knowledge of a Kind must be obtained by observation and\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page503\"\u003e[pg 503]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg503\" id=\"Pg503\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nexperiment upon the Kind itself; no inference respecting its properties\r\nfrom the properties of things not connected with it by Kind, goes for\r\nmore than the sort of presumption usually characterized as an analogy,\r\nand generally in one of its fainter degrees.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nSince the common properties of a true Kind, and consequently the general\r\nassertions which can be made respecting it, or which are certain to\r\nbe made hereafter as our knowledge extends, are indefinite and inexhaustible;\r\nand since the very first principle of natural classification is that of\r\nforming the classes so that the objects composing each may have the greatest\r\nnumber of properties in common; this principle prescribes that every\r\nsuch classification shall recognize and adopt into itself all distinctions of\r\nKind, which exist among the objects it professes to classify. To pass over\r\nany distinctions of Kind, and substitute definite distinctions, which, however\r\nconsiderable they may be, do not point to ulterior unknown differences,\r\nwould be to replace classes with more by classes with fewer attributes\r\nin common; and would be subversive of the Natural Method of\r\nClassification.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAccordingly all natural arrangements, whether the reality of the distinction\r\nof Kinds was felt or not by their framers, have been led, by the mere\r\npursuit of their own proper end, to conform themselves to the distinctions\r\nof Kind, so far as these have been ascertained at the time. The species\r\nof Plants are not only real Kinds, but are probably, all of them, real lowest\r\nKinds, Infimæ Species; which, if we were to subdivide, as of course it is\r\nopen to us to do, into sub-classes, the subdivision would necessarily be\r\nfounded on \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003edefinite\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e distinctions, not pointing (apart from what may be\r\nknown of their causes or effects) to any difference beyond themselves.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIn so far as a natural classification is grounded on real Kinds, its groups\r\nare certainly not conventional: it is perfectly true that they do not depend\r\nupon an arbitrary choice of the naturalist. But it does not follow, nor, I\r\nconceive, is it true, that these classes are determined by a type, and not by\r\ncharacters. To determine them by a type would be as sure a way of missing\r\nthe Kind, as if we were to select a set of characters arbitrarily. They\r\nare determined by characters, but these are not arbitrary. The problem\r\nis, to find a few definite characters which point to the multitude of indefinite\r\nones. Kinds are Classes between which there is an impassable barrier;\r\nand what we have to seek is, marks whereby we may determine on\r\nwhich side of the barrier an object takes its place. The characters which\r\nwill best do this should be chosen: if they are also important in themselves,\r\nso much the better. When we have selected the characters, we\r\nparcel out the objects according to those characters, and not, I conceive,\r\naccording to resemblance to a type. We do not compose the species Ranunculus\r\nacris, of all plants which bear a satisfactory degree of resemblance\r\nto a model buttercup, but of those which possess certain characters selected\r\nas marks by which we might recognize the possibility of a common\r\nparentage; and the enumeration of those characters is the definition of the\r\nspecies.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe question next arises, whether, as all Kinds must have a place among\r\nthe classes, so all the classes in a natural arrangement must be Kinds?\r\nAnd to this I answer, certainly not. The distinctions of Kinds are not\r\nnumerous enough to make up the whole of a classification. Very few of\r\nthe genera of plants, or even of the families, can be pronounced with certainty\r\nto be Kinds. The great distinctions of Vascular and Cellular, Dicotyledonous\r\nor Exogenous and Monocotyledonous or Endogenous plants,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page504\"\u003e[pg 504]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg504\" id=\"Pg504\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nare perhaps differences of kind; the lines of demarcation which divide\r\nthose classes seem (though even on this I would not pronounce positively)\r\nto go through the whole nature of the plants. But the different species\r\nof a genus, or genera of a family, usually have in common only a limited\r\nnumber of characters. A Rose does not seem to differ from a Rubus, or\r\nthe Umbelliferæ from the Ranunculaceæ, in much else than the characters\r\nbotanically assigned to those genera or those families. Unenumerated differences\r\ncertainly do exist in some cases; there are families of plants\r\nwhich have peculiarities of chemical composition, or yield products having\r\npeculiar effects on the animal economy. The Cruciferæ and Fungi contain\r\nan unusual proportion of nitrogen; the Labiatæ are the chief sources of\r\nessential oils, the Solaneæ are very commonly narcotic, etc. In these and\r\nsimilar cases there are possibly distinctions of Kind; but it is by no means\r\nindispensable that there should be. Genera and Families may be eminently\r\nnatural, though marked out from one another by properties limited in\r\nnumber; provided those properties are important, and the objects contained\r\nin each genus or family resemble each other more than they resemble\r\nany thing which is excluded from the genus or family.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAfter the recognition and definition, then, of the\r\n\u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003einfimæ species\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, the next step is to arrange\r\nthose \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003einfimæ species\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e into larger groups:\r\nmaking these groups correspond to Kinds wherever it is possible, but in most cases without\r\nany such guidance. And in doing this it is true that we are naturally\r\nand properly guided, in most cases at least, by resemblance to a type. We\r\nform our groups round certain selected Kinds, each of which serves as a\r\nsort of exemplar of its group. But though the groups are suggested by\r\ntypes, I can not think that a group when formed is \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003edetermined\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e by the type;\r\nthat in deciding whether a species belongs to the group, a reference is made\r\nto the type, and not to the characters; that the characters \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“can not be expressed\r\nin words.”\u003c/span\u003e This assertion is inconsistent with Dr. Whewell’s own\r\nstatement of the fundamental principle of classification, namely, that \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“general\r\nassertions shall be possible.”\u003c/span\u003e If the class did not possess any characters\r\nin common, what general assertions would be possible respecting it?\r\nExcept that they all resemble each other more than they resemble any thing\r\nelse, nothing whatever could be predicated of the class.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe truth is, on the contrary, that every genus or family is framed with\r\ndistinct reference to certain characters, and is composed, first and principally,\r\nof species which agree in possessing all those characters. To these\r\nare added, as a sort of appendix, such other species, generally in small number,\r\nas possess \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003enearly\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e all the properties selected; wanting some of them\r\none property, some another, and which, while they agree with the rest \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ealmost\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e\r\nas much as these agree with one another, do not resemble in an equal\r\ndegree any other group. Our conception of the class continues to be\r\ngrounded on the characters; and the class might be defined, those things\r\nwhich \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eeither\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e possess that set of characters, \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eor\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e resemble the\r\nthings that do so, more than they resemble any thing else.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAnd this resemblance itself is not, like resemblance between simple sensations,\r\nan ultimate fact, unsusceptible of analysis. Even the inferior degree\r\nof resemblance is created by the possession of common characters.\r\nWhatever resembles the genus Rose more than it resembles any other genus,\r\ndoes so because it possesses a greater number of the characters of that\r\ngenus than of the characters of any other genus. Nor can there be any\r\nreal difficulty in representing, by an enumeration of characters, the nature\r\nand degree of the resemblance which is strictly sufficient to include any object\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page505\"\u003e[pg 505]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg505\" id=\"Pg505\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nin the class. There are always some properties common to all things\r\nwhich are included. Others there often are, to which some things, which\r\nare nevertheless included, are exceptions. But the objects which are exceptions\r\nto one character are not exceptions to another; the resemblance\r\nwhich fails in some particulars must be made up for in others. The class,\r\ntherefore, is constituted by the possession of \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eall\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e the characters which are\r\nuniversal, and \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003emost\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e of those which admit of exceptions. If a plant had the\r\novules erect, the stigmata divided, possessed the albumen, and was without\r\nstipules, it possibly would not be classed among the Rosaceæ. But it may\r\nwant any one, or more than one of these characters, and not be excluded.\r\nThe ends of a scientific classification are better answered by including it.\r\nSince it agrees so nearly, in its known properties, with the sum of the characters\r\nof the class, it is likely to resemble that class more than any other in\r\nthose of its properties which are still undiscovered.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nNot only, therefore, are natural groups, no less than any artificial classes,\r\ndetermined by characters; they are constituted in contemplation of, and by\r\nreason of, characters. But it is in contemplation not of those characters\r\nonly which are rigorously common to all the objects included in the group,\r\nbut of the entire body of characters, all of which are found in most of those\r\nobjects, and most of them in all. And hence our conception of the class,\r\nthe image in our minds which is representative of it, is that of a specimen\r\ncomplete in all the characters; most naturally a specimen which, by possessing\r\nthem all in the greatest degree in which they are ever found, is the\r\nbest fitted to exhibit clearly, and in a marked manner, what they are. It is\r\nby a mental reference to this standard, not instead of, but in illustration of,\r\nthe definition of the class, that we usually and advantageously determine\r\nwhether any individual or species belongs to the class or not. And this, as\r\nit seems to me, is the amount of truth contained in the doctrine of Types.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWe shall see presently that where the classification is made for the express\r\npurpose of a special inductive inquiry, it is not optional, but necessary\r\nfor fulfilling the conditions of a correct Inductive Method, that we should\r\nestablish a type-species or genus, namely, the one which exhibits in the most\r\neminent degree the particular phenomenon under investigation. But of this\r\nhereafter. It remains, for completing the theory of natural groups, that a\r\nfew words should be said on the principles of the nomenclature adapted to\r\nthem.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 5. A Nomenclature in science is, as we have said, a system of the\r\nnames of Kinds. These names, like other class-names, are defined by the\r\nenumeration of the characters distinctive of the class. The only merit\r\nwhich a set of names can have beyond this, is to convey, by the mode of\r\ntheir construction, as much information as possible: so that a person who\r\nknows the thing, may receive all the assistance which the name can give in\r\nremembering what he knows; while he who knows it not, may receive as\r\nmuch knowledge respecting it as the case admits of, by merely being told\r\nits name.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThere are two modes of giving to the name of a Kind this sort of significance.\r\nThe best, but which unfortunately is seldom practicable, is when the\r\nword can be made to indicate, by its formation, the very properties which\r\nit is designed to connote. The name of a Kind does not, of course, connote\r\nall the properties of the Kind, since these are inexhaustible, but such of\r\nthem as are sufficient to distinguish it; such as are sure marks of all the\r\nrest. Now, it is very rarely that one property, or even any two or three\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page506\"\u003e[pg 506]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg506\" id=\"Pg506\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nproperties, can answer this purpose. To distinguish the common daisy\r\nfrom all other species of plants would require the specification of many\r\ncharacters. And a name can not, without being too cumbrous for use, give\r\nindication, by its etymology or mode of construction, of more than a very\r\nsmall number of these. The possibility, therefore, of an ideally perfect\r\nNomenclature, is probably confined to the one case in which we are happily\r\nin possession of something approaching to it—the Nomenclature of\r\nelementary Chemistry. The substances, whether simple or compound, with\r\nwhich chemistry is conversant, are Kinds, and, as such, the properties which\r\ndistinguish each of them from the rest are innumerable; but in the case of\r\ncompound substances (the simple ones are not numerous enough to require\r\na systematic nomenclature), there is one property, the chemical composition,\r\nwhich is of itself sufficient to distinguish the Kind; and is (with certain\r\nreservations not yet thoroughly understood) a sure mark of all the\r\nother properties of the compound. All that was needful, therefore, was to\r\nmake the name of every compound express, on the first hearing, its chemical\r\ncomposition; that is, to form the name of the compound, in some uniform\r\nmanner, from the names of the simple substances which enter into it\r\nas elements. This was done, most skillfully and successfully, by the French\r\nchemists, though their nomenclature has become inadequate to the convenient\r\nexpression of the very complicated compounds now known to chemists.\r\nThe only thing left unexpressed by them was the exact proportion in which\r\nthe elements were combined; and even this, since the establishment of the\r\natomic theory, it has been found possible to express by a simple adaptation\r\nof their phraseology.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nBut where the characters which must be taken into consideration, in\r\norder sufficiently to designate the Kind, are too numerous to be all signified\r\nin the derivation of the name, and where no one of them is of such preponderant\r\nimportance as to justify its being singled out to be so indicated, we\r\nmay avail ourselves of a subsidiary resource. Though we can not indicate\r\nthe distinctive properties of the Kind, we may indicate its nearest natural\r\naffinities, by incorporating into its name the name of the proximate natural\r\ngroup of which it is one of the species. On this principle is founded the\r\nadmirable binary nomenclature of botany and zoology. In this nomenclature\r\nthe name of every species consists of the name of the genus, or\r\nnatural group next above it, with a word added to distinguish the particular\r\nspecies. The last portion of the compound name is sometimes taken\r\nfrom some \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eone\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e of the peculiarities in which that species differs from others\r\nof the genus; as Clematis \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eintegrifolia\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, Potentilla\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ealba\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, Viola \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003epalustris\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\nArtemisia \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003evulgaris\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e; sometimes from a circumstance of an historical\r\nnature, as Narcissus \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003epoeticus\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, Potentilla\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003etormentilla\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e (indicating that the plant\r\nis that which was formerly known by the latter name), Exacum\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eCandollii\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e (from the fact that De Candolle was its first\r\ndiscoverer); and sometimes the word is purely conventional, as Thlaspi\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ebursapastoris\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, Ranunculus\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ethora\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e; it is of little consequence which; since the second, or,\r\nas it is usually called, the specific name, could at most express, independently of\r\nconvention, no more than a very small portion of the connotation of the term.\r\nBut by adding to this the name of the superior genus, we may make the\r\nbest amends we can for the impossibility of so contriving the name as to\r\nexpress all the distinctive characters of the Kind. We make it, at all\r\nevents, express as many of those characters as are common to the proximate\r\nnatural group in which the Kind is included. If even those common\r\ncharacters are so numerous or so little familiar as to require a further extension\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page507\"\u003e[pg 507]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg507\" id=\"Pg507\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nof the same resource, we might, instead of a binary, adopt a ternary\r\nnomenclature, employing not only the name of the genus, but that of the\r\nnext natural group in order of generality above the genus, commonly called\r\nthe Family. This was done in the mineralogical nomenclature proposed\r\nby Professor Mohs. \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“The names framed by him were not composed of\r\ntwo, but of three elements, designating respectively the Species, the Genus,\r\nand the Order; thus he has such species as \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eRhombohedral Lime\r\nHaloide\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eOctohedral Fluor Haloide\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ePrismatic Hal Baryte\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e.”\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca id=\"noteref_226\" name=\"noteref_226\" href=\"#note_226\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e226\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The binary construction,\r\nhowever, has been found sufficient in botany and zoology, the\r\nonly sciences in which this general principle has hitherto been successfully\r\nadopted in the construction of a nomenclature.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nBesides the advantage which this principle of nomenclature possesses, in\r\ngiving to the names of species the greatest quantity of independent significance\r\nwhich the circumstances of the case admit of, it answers the further\r\nend of immensely economizing the use of names, and preventing an otherwise\r\nintolerable burden on the memory. When the names of species become\r\nextremely numerous, some artifice (as Dr.\r\nWhewell\u003ca id=\"noteref_227\" name=\"noteref_227\" href=\"#note_227\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e227\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nobserves) becomes\r\nabsolutely necessary to make it possible to recollect or apply them.\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“The known species of plants, for example, were ten thousand in the time\r\nof Linnæus, and are now probably sixty thousand. It would be useless to\r\nendeavor to frame and employ separate names for each of these species.\r\nThe division of the objects into a subordinated system of classification enables\r\nus to introduce a Nomenclature which does not require this enormous\r\nnumber of names. Each of the genera has its name, and the species\r\nare marked by the addition of some epithet to the name of the genus. In this\r\nmanner about seventeen hundred generic names, with a moderate number\r\nof specific names, were found by Linnæus sufficient to designate with precision\r\nall the species of vegetables known at his time.”\u003c/span\u003e And though the\r\nnumber of generic names has since greatly increased, it has not increased\r\nin any thing like the proportion of the multiplication of known species.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-div\" style=\"margin-bottom: 4.00em; margin-top: 4.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"toc109\" id=\"toc109\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"pdf110\" id=\"pdf110\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: center; margin-bottom: 2.40em; margin-top: 2.40em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 120%\"\u003eChapter VIII.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: left; margin-bottom: 2.88em; margin-top: 2.88em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 144%\"\u003eOf Classification By Series.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 1. Thus far, we have considered the principles of scientific classification\r\nso far only as relates to the formation of natural groups; and at this point\r\nmost of those who have attempted a theory of natural arrangement, including,\r\namong the rest, Dr. Whewell, have stopped. There remains, however,\r\nanother, and a not less important portion of the theory, which has\r\nnot yet, as far as I am aware, been systematically treated of by any writer\r\nexcept M. Comte. This is, the arrangement of the natural groups into a\r\nnatural series.\u003ca id=\"noteref_228\" name=\"noteref_228\" href=\"#note_228\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e228\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page508\"\u003e[pg 508]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg508\" id=\"Pg508\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe end of Classification, as an instrument for the investigation of nature,\r\nis (as before stated) to make us think of those objects together which have\r\nthe greatest number of important common properties; and which, therefore,\r\nwe have oftenest occasion, in the course of our inductions, for taking\r\ninto joint consideration. Our ideas of objects are thus brought into the\r\norder most conducive to the successful prosecution of inductive inquiries\r\ngenerally. But when the purpose is to facilitate some particular inductive\r\ninquiry, more is required. To be instrumental to that purpose, the classification\r\nmust bring those objects together, the simultaneous contemplation\r\nof which is likely to throw most light upon the particular subject. That\r\nsubject being the laws of some phenomenon or some set of connected phenomena;\r\nthe very phenomenon or set of phenomena in question must be\r\nchosen as the groundwork of the classification.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe requisites of a classification intended to facilitate the study of a particular\r\nphenomenon, are, first to bring into one class all Kinds of things\r\nwhich exhibit that phenomenon, in whatever variety of forms or degrees;\r\nand, secondly, to arrange those Kinds in a series according to the degree in\r\nwhich they exhibit it, beginning with those which exhibit most of it, and\r\nterminating with those which exhibit least. The principal example, as yet,\r\nof such a classification, is afforded by comparative anatomy and physiology,\r\nfrom which, therefore, our illustrations shall be taken.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 2. The object being supposed to be, the investigation of the laws of\r\nanimal life; the first step, after forming the most distinct conception of\r\nthe phenomenon itself, possible in the existing state of our knowledge, is to\r\nerect into one great class (that of animals) all the known Kinds of beings\r\nwhere that phenomenon presents itself; in however various combinations\r\nwith other properties, and in however different degrees. As some of these\r\nKinds manifest the general phenomenon of animal life in a very high degree,\r\nand others in an insignificant degree, barely sufficient for recognition;\r\nwe must, in the next place, arrange the various Kinds in a series, following\r\none another according to the degrees in which they severally exhibit the\r\nphenomenon; beginning therefore with man, and ending with the most imperfect\r\nkinds of zoophytes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThis is merely saying that we should put the instances, from which the\r\nlaw is to be inductively collected, into the order which is implied in one of\r\nthe four Methods of Experimental Inquiry discussed in the preceding Book;\r\nthe fourth Method, that of Concomitant Variations. As formerly remarked,\r\nthis is often the only method to which recourse can be had, with assurance\r\nof a true conclusion, in cases in which we have but limited means of effecting,\r\nby artificial experiments, a separation of circumstances usually conjoined.\r\nThe principle of the method is, that facts which increase or diminish together,\r\nand disappear together, are either cause and effect, or effects of a\r\ncommon cause. When it has been ascertained that this relation really subsists\r\nbetween the variations, a connection between the facts themselves may\r\nbe confidently laid down, either as a law of nature or only as an empirical\r\nlaw, according to circumstances.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThat the application of this Method must be preceded by the formation\r\nof such a series as we have described, is too obvious to need being pointed\r\nout; and the mere arrangement of a set of objects in a series, according to\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page509\"\u003e[pg 509]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg509\" id=\"Pg509\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nthe degrees in which they exhibit some fact of which we are seeking the\r\nlaw, is too naturally suggested by the necessities of our inductive operations,\r\nto require any lengthened illustration here. But there are cases in\r\nwhich the arrangement required for the special purpose becomes the determining\r\nprinciple of the classification of the same objects for general\r\npurposes. This will naturally and properly happen, when those laws of the\r\nobjects which are sought in the special inquiry enact so principal a part in\r\nthe general character and history of those objects—exercise so much influence\r\nin determining all the phenomena of which they are either the agents\r\nor the theatre—that all other differences existing among the objects are fittingly\r\nregarded as mere modifications of the one phenomenon sought; effects\r\ndetermined by the co-operation of some incidental circumstance with\r\nthe laws of that phenomenon. Thus in the case of animated beings, the\r\ndifferences between one class of animals and another may reasonably be\r\nconsidered as mere modifications of the general phenomenon, animal life;\r\nmodifications arising either from the different degrees in which that phenomenon\r\nis manifested in different animals, or from the intermixture of the\r\neffects of incidental causes peculiar to the nature of each, with the effects\r\nproduced by the general laws of life; those laws still exercising a predominant\r\ninfluence over the result. Such being the case, no other inductive\r\ninquiry respecting animals can be successfully carried on, except in subordination\r\nto the great inquiry into the universal laws of animal life; and\r\nthe classification of animals best suited to that one purpose, is the most suitable\r\nto all the other purposes of zoological science.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 3. To establish a classification of this sort, or even to apprehend it\r\nwhen established, requires the power of recognizing the essential similarity\r\nof a phenomenon, in its minuter degrees and obscurer forms, with what is\r\ncalled the \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003esame\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e phenomenon in the greatest perfection of its development;\r\nthat is, of identifying with each other all phenomena which differ only in\r\ndegree, and in properties which we suppose to be caused by difference of\r\ndegree. In order to recognize this identity, or, in other words, this exact\r\nsimilarity of quality, the assumption of a type-species is indispensable. We\r\nmust consider as the type of the class, that among the Kinds included in\r\nit, which exhibits the properties constitutive of the class, in the highest\r\ndegree; conceiving the other varieties as instances of degeneracy, as it\r\nwere, from that type; deviations from it by inferior intensity of the characteristic\r\nproperty or properties. For every phenomenon is best studied\r\n(\u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ecæteris paribus\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e) where it exists in the\r\ngreatest intensity. It is there that the effects which either depend on it, or depend on\r\nthe same causes with it, will also exist in the greatest degree. It is there,\r\nconsequently, and only there, that those effects of it, or joint effects with it, can\r\nbecome fully known to us, so that we may learn to recognize their smaller degrees, or\r\neven their mere rudiments, in cases in which the direct study would have\r\nbeen difficult or even impossible. Not to mention that the phenomenon in\r\nits higher degrees may be attended by effects or collateral circumstances\r\nwhich in its smaller degrees do not occur at all, requiring for their production\r\nin any sensible amount a greater degree of intensity of the cause than\r\nis there met with. In man, for example (the species in which both the\r\nphenomenon of animal and that of organic life exist in the highest degree),\r\nmany subordinate phenomena develop themselves in the course of his animated\r\nexistence, which the inferior varieties of animals do not show. The\r\nknowledge of these properties may nevertheless be of great avail toward\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page510\"\u003e[pg 510]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg510\" id=\"Pg510\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nthe discovery of the conditions and laws of the general phenomenon of life,\r\nwhich is common to man with those inferior animals. And they are, even,\r\nrightly considered as properties of animated nature itself; because they\r\nmay evidently be affiliated to the general laws of animated nature; because\r\nwe may fairly presume that some rudiments or feeble degrees of\r\nthose properties would be recognized in all animals by more perfect organs,\r\nor even by more perfect instruments, than ours; and because those\r\nmay be correctly termed properties of a class, which a thing exhibits\r\nexactly in proportion as it belongs to the class, that is, in proportion as it\r\npossesses the main attributes constitutive of the class.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 4. It remains to consider how the internal distribution of the series\r\nmay most properly take place; in what manner it should be divided into\r\nOrders, Families, and Genera.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe main principle of division must of course be natural affinity; the\r\nclasses formed must be natural groups; and the formation of these has already\r\nbeen sufficiently treated of. But the principles of natural grouping\r\nmust be applied in subordination to the principle of a natural series. The\r\ngroups must not be so constituted as to place in the same group things\r\nwhich ought to occupy different points of the general scale. The precaution\r\nnecessary to be observed for this purpose is, that the \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eprimary\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e divisions\r\nmust be grounded not on all distinctions indiscriminately, but on\r\nthose which correspond to variations in the degree of the main phenomenon.\r\nThe series of Animated Nature should be broken into parts at the\r\npoints where the variation in the degree of intensity of the main phenomenon\r\n(as marked by its principal characters, Sensation, Thought, Voluntary\r\nMotion, etc.) begins to be attended by conspicuous changes in the miscellaneous\r\nproperties of the animal. Such well-marked changes take place,\r\nfor example, where the class Mammalia ends; at the points where Fishes\r\nare separated from Insects, Insects from Mollusca, etc. When so formed,\r\nthe primary natural groups will compose the series by mere juxtaposition,\r\nwithout redistribution; each of them corresponding to a definite portion\r\nof the scale. In like manner each family should, if possible, be so subdivided,\r\nthat one portion of it shall stand higher and the other lower, though\r\nof course contiguous, in the general scale; and only when this is impossible\r\nis it allowable to ground the remaining subdivisions on characters having\r\nno determinable connection with the main phenomenon.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWhere the principal phenomenon so far transcends in importance all\r\nother properties on which a classification could be grounded, as it does in\r\nthe case of animated existence, any considerable deviation from the rule\r\nlast laid down is in general sufficiently guarded against by the first principle\r\nof a natural arrangement, that of forming the groups according to the\r\nmost important characters. All attempts at a scientific classification of\r\nanimals, since first their anatomy and physiology were successfully studied,\r\nhave been framed with a certain degree of instinctive reference to a natural\r\nseries, and have accorded in many more points than they have differed,\r\nwith the classification which would most naturally have been grounded on\r\nsuch a series. But the accordance has not always been complete; and it\r\nstill is often a matter of discussion, which of several classifications best accords\r\nwith the true scale of intensity of the main phenomenon. Cuvier,\r\nfor example, has been justly criticised for having formed his natural\r\ngroups, with an undue degree of reference to the mode of alimentation, a\r\ncircumstance directly connected only with organic life, and not leading to\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page511\"\u003e[pg 511]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg511\" id=\"Pg511\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nthe arrangement most appropriate for the purposes of an investigation of\r\nthe laws of animal life, since both carnivorous and herbivorous or frugivorous\r\nanimals are found at almost every degree in the scale of animal perfection.\r\nBlainville’s classification has been considered by high authorities\r\nto be free from this defect; as representing correctly, by the mere order\r\nof the principal groups, the successive degeneracy of animal nature from\r\nits highest to its most imperfect exemplification.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 5. A classification of any large portion of the field of nature in conformity\r\nto the foregoing principles, has hitherto been found practicable\r\nonly in one great instance, that of animals. In the case even of vegetables,\r\nthe natural arrangement has not been carried beyond the formation of natural\r\ngroups. Naturalists have found, and probably will continue to find it\r\nimpossible to form those groups into any series, the terms of which correspond\r\nto real gradations in the phenomenon of vegetative or organic life.\r\nSuch a difference of degree may be traced between the class of Vascular\r\nPlants and that of Cellular, which includes lichens, algæ, and other substances\r\nwhose organization is simpler and more rudimentary than that of\r\nthe higher order of vegetables, and which therefore approach nearer to\r\nmere inorganic nature. But when we rise much above this point, we do\r\nnot find any sufficient difference in the degree in which different plants\r\npossess the properties of organization and life. The dicotyledons are of\r\nmore complex structure, and somewhat more perfect organization, than the\r\nmonocotyledons; and some dicotyledonous families, such as the Compositæ,\r\nare rather more complex in their organization than the rest. But the differences\r\nare not of a marked character, and do not promise to throw any\r\nparticular light upon the conditions and laws of vegetable life and development.\r\nIf they did, the classification of vegetables would have to be made,\r\nlike that of animals, with reference to the scale or series indicated.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAlthough the scientific arrangements of organic nature afford as yet the\r\nonly complete example of the true principles of rational classification,\r\nwhether as to the formation of groups or of series, those principles are applicable\r\nto all cases in which mankind are called upon to bring the various\r\nparts of any extensive subject into mental co-ordination. They are as\r\nmuch to the point when objects are to be classed for purposes of art or\r\nbusiness, as for those of science. The proper arrangement, for example, of\r\na code of laws, depends on the same scientific conditions as the classifications\r\nin natural history; nor could there be a better preparatory discipline\r\nfor that important function, than the study of the principles of a natural\r\narrangement, not only in the abstract, but in their actual application to the\r\nclass of phenomena for which they were first elaborated, and which are still\r\nthe best school for learning their use. Of this the great authority on codification,\r\nBentham, was perfectly aware; and his early \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eFragment on Government\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\nthe admirable introduction to a series of writings unequaled in\r\ntheir department, contains clear and just views (as far as they go) on the\r\nmeaning of a natural arrangement, such as could scarcely have occurred to\r\nany one who lived anterior to the age of Linnæus and Bernard de Jussieu.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page512\"\u003e[pg 512]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg512\" id=\"Pg512\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"page\" /\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-div\" style=\"margin-bottom: 5.00em; margin-top: 5.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"toc111\" id=\"toc111\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"pdf112\" id=\"pdf112\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\u0027chapter\u0027 /\u003e\u003ch2 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: center; margin-bottom: 2.88em; margin-top: 2.88em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 144%\"\u003eBook V.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\u0027chapter\u0027 /\u003e\u003ch2 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: left; margin-bottom: 3.46em; margin-top: 3.46em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 173%\"\u003eOn Fallacies.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"block tei tei-quote\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.80em; margin-left: 3.60em; margin-top: 1.80em; margin-right: 3.60em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 0.90em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e“\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003eErrare non modo affirmando et negando, sed etiam sentiendo, et in tacitâ hominum\r\ncogitatione contingit.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e”\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e—\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%; font-variant: small-caps\"\u003eHobbes\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e,\r\n\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%; font-style: italic\"\u003eComputatio sive Logica\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e, chap. v.\r\n\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 0.90em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e“\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003eIl leur semble qu’il n’y a qu’à douter par fantaisie, et qu’il n’y a qu’à dire en\r\ngénéral que notre nature est infirme; que notre esprit est plein d’aveuglement: qu’il\r\nfaut avoir un grand soin de se défaire de ses préjugés, et autres choses semblables. Ils\r\npensent que cela suffit pour ne plus se laisser séduire à ses sens, et pour ne plus se\r\ntromper du tout. Il ne suffit pas de dire que l’esprit est foible, il faut lui faire\r\nsentir ses foiblesses. Ce n’est pas assez de dire qu’il est sujet à l’erreur, il faut\r\nlui découvrir en quoi consistent ses\r\nerreurs.\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e”\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e—\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%; font-variant: small-caps\"\u003eMalebranche\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e,\r\n\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%; font-style: italic\"\u003eRecherche de la Vérité\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e.\r\n\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-div\" style=\"margin-bottom: 4.00em; margin-top: 4.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"toc113\" id=\"toc113\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"pdf114\" id=\"pdf114\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: center; margin-bottom: 2.40em; margin-top: 2.40em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 120%\"\u003eChapter I.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: left; margin-bottom: 2.88em; margin-top: 2.88em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 144%\"\u003eOf Fallacies In General.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 1. It is a maxim of the school-men, that \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“contrariorum eadem est scientia:”\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwe never really know what a thing is, unless we are also able to\r\ngive a sufficient account of its opposite. Conformably to this maxim, one\r\nconsiderable section, in most treatises on Logic, is devoted to the subject of\r\nFallacies; and the practice is too well worthy of observance, to allow of\r\nour departing from it. The philosophy of reasoning, to be complete, ought\r\nto comprise the theory of bad as well as of good reasoning.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWe have endeavored to ascertain the principles by which the sufficiency\r\nof any proof can be tested, and by which the nature and amount of evidence\r\nneedful to prove any given conclusion can be determined beforehand.\r\nIf these principles were adhered to, then although the number and value\r\nof the truths ascertained would be limited by the opportunities, or by the\r\nindustry, ingenuity, and patience, of the individual inquirer, at least error\r\nwould not be embraced instead of truth. But the general consent of mankind,\r\nfounded on their experience, vouches for their being far indeed from\r\neven this negative kind of perfection in the employment of their reasoning\r\npowers.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIn the conduct of life—in the practical business of mankind—wrong inferences,\r\nincorrect interpretations of experience, unless after much culture of the\r\nthinking faculty, are absolutely inevitable; and with most people, after the\r\nhighest degree of culture they ever attain, such erroneous inferences, producing\r\ncorresponding errors in conduct, are lamentably frequent. Even in the\r\nspeculations to which eminent intellects have systematically devoted themselves,\r\nand in reference to which the collective mind of the scientific world is\r\nalways at hand to aid the efforts and correct the aberrations of individuals,\r\nit is only from the more perfect sciences, from those of which the subject-matter\r\nis the least complicated, that opinions not resting on a correct induction\r\nhave at length, generally speaking, been expelled. In the departments\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page513\"\u003e[pg 513]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg513\" id=\"Pg513\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nof inquiry relating to the more complex phenomena of nature, and\r\nespecially those of which the subject is man, whether as a moral and intellectual,\r\na social, or even as a physical being; the diversity of opinions still\r\nprevalent among instructed persons, and the equal confidence with which\r\nthose of the most contrary ways of thinking cling to their respective tenets,\r\nare proof not only that right modes of philosophizing are not yet generally\r\nadopted on those subjects, but that wrong ones are; that inquirers\r\nhave not only in general missed the truth, but have often embraced error;\r\nthat even the most cultivated portion of our species have not yet learned\r\nto abstain from drawing conclusions which the evidence does not warrant.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe only complete safeguard against reasoning ill, is the habit of reasoning\r\nwell; familiarity with the principles of correct reasoning, and practice\r\nin applying those principles. It is, however, not unimportant to consider\r\nwhat are the most common modes of bad reasoning; by what appearances\r\nthe mind is most likely to be seduced from the observance of true principles\r\nof induction; what, in short, are the most common and most dangerous\r\nvarieties of Apparent Evidence, whereby persons are misled into opinions\r\nfor which there does not exist evidence really conclusive.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nA catalogue of the varieties of apparent evidence which are not real evidence,\r\nis an enumeration of Fallacies. Without such an enumeration, therefore,\r\nthe present work would be wanting in an essential point. And while\r\nwriters who included in their theory of reasoning nothing more than ratiocination,\r\nhave in consistency with this limitation, confined their remarks to\r\nthe fallacies which have their seat in that portion of the process of investigation;\r\nwe, who profess to treat of the whole process, must add to our directions\r\nfor performing it rightly, warnings against performing it wrongly\r\nin any of its parts: whether the ratiocinative or the experimental portion\r\nof it be in fault, or the fault lie in dispensing with ratiocination and induction\r\naltogether.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 2. In considering the sources of unfounded inference, it is unnecessary\r\nto reckon the errors which arise, not from a wrong method, nor even\r\nfrom ignorance of the right one, but from a casual lapse, through hurry or\r\ninattention, in the application of the true principles of induction. Such\r\nerrors, like the accidental mistakes in casting up a sum, do not call for\r\nphilosophical analysis or classification; theoretical considerations can throw\r\nno light upon the means of avoiding them. In the present treatise our attention\r\nis required, not to mere inexpertness in performing the operation\r\nin the right way (the only remedies for which are increased attention and\r\nmore sedulous practice), but to the modes of performing it in a way fundamentally\r\nwrong; the conditions under which the human mind persuades\r\nitself that it has sufficient grounds for a conclusion which it has not arrived\r\nat by any of the legitimate methods of induction—which it has not,\r\neven carelessly or overhastily, endeavored to test by those legitimate\r\nmethods.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 3. There is another branch of what may be called the Philosophy of\r\nError, which must be mentioned here, though only to be excluded from\r\nour subject. The sources of erroneous opinions are twofold, moral and intellectual.\r\nOf these, the moral do not fall within the compass of this work.\r\nThey may be classed under two general heads: Indifference to the attainment\r\nof truth, and Bias; of which last the most common case is that in\r\nwhich we are biased by our wishes; but the liability is almost as great to\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page514\"\u003e[pg 514]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg514\" id=\"Pg514\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nthe undue adoption of a conclusion which is disagreeable to us, as of one\r\nwhich is agreeable, if it be of a nature to bring into action any of the\r\nstronger passions. Persons of timid character are the more predisposed\r\nto believe any statement, the more it is calculated to alarm them. Indeed\r\nit is a psychological law, deducible from the most general laws of the mental\r\nconstitution of man, that any strong passion renders us credulous as to\r\nthe existence of objects suitable to excite it.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nBut the moral causes of opinions, though with most persons the most\r\npowerful of all, are but remote causes; they do not act directly, but by\r\nmeans of the intellectual causes; to which they bear the same relation that\r\nthe circumstances called, in the theory of medicine,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003epredisposing\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e causes, bear to \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eexciting\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\ncauses. Indifference to truth can not, in and by itself,\r\nproduce erroneous belief; it operates by preventing the mind from collecting\r\nthe proper evidences, or from applying to them the test of a legitimate\r\nand rigid induction; by which omission it is exposed unprotected to the\r\ninfluence of any species of apparent evidence which offers itself spontaneously,\r\nor which is elicited by that smaller quantity of trouble which the\r\nmind may be willing to take. As little is Bias a direct source of wrong\r\nconclusions. We can not believe a proposition only by wishing, or only\r\nby dreading, to believe it. The most violent inclination to find a set of\r\npropositions true, will not enable the weakest of mankind to believe them\r\nwithout a vestige of intellectual grounds—without any, even apparent, evidence.\r\nIt acts indirectly, by placing the intellectual grounds of belief in\r\nan incomplete or distorted shape before his eyes. It makes him shrink\r\nfrom the irksome labor of a rigorous induction, when he has a misgiving\r\nthat its result may be disagreeable; and in such examination as he does\r\ninstitute, it makes him exert that which \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eis\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e in a certain measure voluntary,\r\nhis attention, unfairly, giving a larger share of it to the evidence which\r\nseems favorable to the desired conclusion, a smaller to that which seems\r\nunfavorable. It operates, too, by making him look out eagerly for reasons,\r\nor apparent reasons, to support opinions which are conformable, or resist\r\nthose which are repugnant, to his interests or feelings; and when the interests\r\nor feelings are common to great numbers of persons, reasons are\r\naccepted and pass current, which would not for a moment be listened to in\r\nthat character if the conclusion had nothing more powerful than its reasons\r\nto speak in its behalf. The natural or acquired partialities of mankind are\r\ncontinually throwing up philosophical theories, the sole recommendation of\r\nwhich consists in the premises they afford for proving cherished doctrines,\r\nor justifying favorite feelings; and when any one of these theories has\r\nbeen so thoroughly discredited as no longer to serve the purpose, another\r\nis always ready to take its place. This propensity, when exercised in favor\r\nof any widely-spread persuasion or sentiment, is often decorated with\r\ncomplimentary epithets; and the contrary habit of keeping the judgment\r\nin complete subordination to evidence, is stigmatized by various hard names,\r\nas skepticism, immorality, coldness, hard-heartedness, and similar expressions\r\naccording to the nature of the case. But though the opinions of the\r\ngenerality of mankind, when not dependent on mere habit and inculcation,\r\nhave their root much more in the inclinations than in the intellect, it is a\r\nnecessary condition to the triumph of the moral bias that it should first\r\npervert the understanding. Every erroneous inference, though originating\r\nin moral causes, involves the intellectual operation of admitting insufficient\r\nevidence as sufficient; and whoever was on his guard against all kinds of\r\ninconclusive evidence which can be mistaken for conclusive, would be in\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page515\"\u003e[pg 515]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg515\" id=\"Pg515\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nno danger of being led into error even by the strongest bias. There are\r\nminds so strongly fortified on the intellectual side, that they could not\r\nblind themselves to the light of truth, however really desirous of doing so;\r\nthey could not, with all the inclination in the world, pass off upon themselves\r\nbad arguments for good ones. If the sophistry of the intellect could\r\nbe rendered impossible, that of the feelings, having no instrument to work\r\nwith, would be powerless. A comprehensive classification of all those\r\nthings which, not being evidence, are liable to appear such to the understanding,\r\nwill, therefore, of itself include all errors of judgment arising\r\nfrom moral causes, to the exclusion only of errors of practice committed\r\nagainst better knowledge.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nTo examine, then, the various kinds of apparent evidence which are not\r\nevidence at all, and of apparently conclusive evidence which do not really\r\namount to conclusiveness, is the object of that part of our inquiry into\r\nwhich we are about to enter.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe subject is not beyond the compass of classification and comprehensive\r\nsurvey. The things, indeed, which are not evidence of any given conclusion,\r\nare manifestly endless, and this negative property, having no dependence\r\non any positive ones, can not be made the groundwork of a real\r\nclassification. But the things which, not being evidence, are susceptible\r\nof being mistaken for it, are capable of a classification having reference to\r\nthe positive property which they possess of appearing to be evidence. We\r\nmay arrange them, at our choice, on either of two principles; according\r\nto the cause which makes them appear to be evidence, not being so; or\r\naccording to the particular kind of evidence which they simulate. The\r\nClassification of Fallacies which will be attempted in the ensuing chapter,\r\nis founded on these considerations jointly.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-div\" style=\"margin-bottom: 4.00em; margin-top: 4.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"toc115\" id=\"toc115\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"pdf116\" id=\"pdf116\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: center; margin-bottom: 2.40em; margin-top: 2.40em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 120%\"\u003eChapter II.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: left; margin-bottom: 2.88em; margin-top: 2.88em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 144%\"\u003eClassification Of Fallacies.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 1. In attempting to establish certain general distinctions which shall\r\nmark out from one another the various kinds of Fallacious Evidence, we\r\npropose to ourselves an altogether different aim from that of several eminent\r\nthinkers, who have given, under the name of Political or other Fallacies,\r\na mere enumeration of a certain number of erroneous opinions; false\r\ngeneral propositions which happen to be often met with;\r\n\u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eloci communes\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof bad arguments on some particular subject. Logic is not concerned with\r\nthe false opinions which people happen to entertain, but with the manner\r\nin which they come to entertain them. The question is not, what facts\r\nhave at any time been erroneously supposed to be proof of certain other\r\nfacts, but what property in the facts it was which led any one to this mistaken\r\nsupposition.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWhen a fact is supposed, though incorrectly, to be evidentiary of, or\r\na mark of, some other fact, there must be a cause of the error; the supposed\r\nevidentiary fact must be connected in some particular manner with\r\nthe fact of which it is deemed evidentiary—must stand in some particular\r\nrelation to it, without which relation it would not be regarded in that light.\r\nThe relation may either be one resulting from the simple contemplation of\r\nthe two facts side by side with one another, or it may depend on some\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page516\"\u003e[pg 516]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg516\" id=\"Pg516\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nprocess of mind, by which a previous association has been established between\r\nthem. Some peculiarity of relation, however, there must be; the\r\nfact which can, even by the wildest aberration, be supposed to prove another\r\nfact, must stand in some special position with regard to it; and if\r\nwe could ascertain and define that special position, we should perceive the\r\norigin of the error.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWe can not regard one fact as evidentiary of another, unless we believe\r\nthat the two are always, or in the majority of cases, conjoined. If we believe\r\nA to be evidentiary of B, if when we see A we are inclined to infer\r\nB from it, the reason is because we believe that wherever A is, B also either\r\nalways or for the most part exists, either as an antecedent, a consequent,\r\nor a concomitant. If when we see A we are inclined not to expect\r\nB—if we believe A to be evidentiary of the absence of B—it is because we\r\nbelieve that where A is, B either is never, or at least seldom, found. Erroneous\r\nconclusions, in short, no less than correct conclusions, have an invariable\r\nrelation to a general formula, either expressed or tacitly implied.\r\nWhen we infer some fact from some other fact which does not really prove\r\nit, we either have admitted, or, if we maintained consistency, ought to admit,\r\nsome groundless general proposition respecting the conjunction of the\r\ntwo phenomena.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nFor every property, therefore, in facts, or in our mode of considering\r\nfacts, which leads us to believe that they are habitually conjoined when\r\nthey are not, or that they are not when in reality they are, there is a corresponding\r\nkind of Fallacy; and an enumeration of fallacies would consist\r\nin a specification of those properties in facts, and those peculiarities in our\r\nmode of considering them, which give rise to this erroneous opinion.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 2. To begin, then; the supposed connection, or repugnance, between\r\nthe two facts, may either be a conclusion from evidence (that is, from some\r\nother proposition or propositions), or may be admitted without any such\r\nground; admitted, as the phrase is, on its own evidence; embraced as self-evident,\r\nas an axiomatic truth. This gives rise to the first great distinction,\r\nthat between Fallacies of Inference and Fallacies of Simple Inspection.\r\nIn the latter division must be included not only all cases in which\r\na proposition is believed and held for true, literally without any extrinsic\r\nevidence, either of specific experience or general reasoning; but those\r\nmore frequent cases in which simple inspection creates a\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003epresumption\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e in\r\nfavor of a proposition; not sufficient for belief, but sufficient to cause the\r\nstrict principles of a regular induction to be dispensed with, and creating\r\na predisposition to believe it on evidence which would be seen to be insufficient\r\nif no such presumption existed. This class, comprehending the\r\nwhole of what may be termed Natural Prejudices, and which I shall call\r\nindiscriminately Fallacies of Simple Inspection or Fallacies\r\n\u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea priori\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, shall\r\nbe placed at the head of our list.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nFallacies of Inference, or erroneous conclusions from supposed evidence,\r\nmust be subdivided according to the nature of the apparent evidence from\r\nwhich the conclusions are drawn; or (what is the same thing) according\r\nto the particular kind of sound argument which the fallacy in question\r\nsimulates. But there is a distinction to be first drawn, which does not\r\nanswer to any of the divisions of sound arguments, but arises out of the\r\nnature of bad ones. We may know exactly what our evidence is, and yet\r\ndraw a false conclusion from it; we may conceive precisely what our\r\npremises are, what alleged matters of fact, or general principles, are the\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page517\"\u003e[pg 517]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg517\" id=\"Pg517\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nfoundation of our inference; and yet, because the premises are false, or\r\nbecause we have inferred from them what they will not support, our conclusion\r\nmay be erroneous. But a case, perhaps even more frequent, is that\r\nin which the error arises from not conceiving our premises with due clearness,\r\nthat is (as shown in the preceding Book\u003ca id=\"noteref_229\" name=\"noteref_229\" href=\"#note_229\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e229\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e), with due fixity: forming\r\none conception of our evidence when we collect or receive it, and another\r\nwhen we make use of it; or unadvisedly, and in general unconsciously,\r\nsubstituting, as we proceed, different premises in the place of those\r\nwith which we set out, or a different conclusion for that which we undertook\r\nto prove. This gives existence to a class of fallacies which may be\r\njustly termed (in a phrase borrowed from Bentham) Fallacies of Confusion;\r\ncomprehending, among others, all those which have their source in\r\nlanguage, whether arising from the vagueness or ambiguity of our terms,\r\nor from casual associations with them.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWhen the fallacy is not one of Confusion, that is, when the proposition\r\nbelieved, and the evidence on which it is believed, are steadily apprehended\r\nand unambiguously expressed, there remain to be made two cross divisions.\r\nThe Apparent Evidence may be either particular facts, or foregone generalizations;\r\nthat is, the process may simulate either simple Induction or Deduction;\r\nand again, the evidence, whether consisting of supposed facts or\r\nof general propositions, may be false in itself, or, being true, may fail to\r\nbear out the conclusion attempted to be founded on it. This gives us first,\r\nFallacies of Induction and Fallacies of Deduction, and then a subdivision\r\nof each of these, according as the supposed evidence is false, or true but inconclusive.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nFallacies of Induction, where the facts on which the induction proceeds\r\nare erroneous, may be termed Fallacies of Observation. The term is not\r\nstrictly accurate, or, rather, not accurately co-extensive with the class of fallacies\r\nwhich I propose to designate by it. Induction is not always grounded\r\non facts immediately observed, but sometimes on facts inferred; and\r\nwhen these last are erroneous, the error may not be, in the literal sense of\r\nthe term, an instance of bad observation, but of bad inference. It will be\r\nconvenient, however, to make only one class of all the inductions of which\r\nthe error lies in not sufficiently ascertaining the facts on which the theory\r\nis grounded; whether the cause of failure be malobservation, or simple non-observation,\r\nand whether the malobservation be direct, or by means of intermediate\r\nmarks which do not prove what they are supposed to prove.\r\nAnd in the absence of any comprehensive term to denote the ascertainment,\r\nby whatever means, of the facts on which an induction is grounded, I will\r\nventure to retain for this class of fallacies, under the explanation now given,\r\nthe title of Fallacies of Observation.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe other class of inductive fallacies, in which the facts are correct, but\r\nthe conclusion not warranted by them, are properly denominated Fallacies\r\nof Generalization; and these, again, fall into various subordinate classes or\r\nnatural groups, some of which will be enumerated in their proper place.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWhen we now turn to Fallacies of Deduction, namely those modes of incorrect\r\nargumentation in which the premises, or some of them, are general\r\npropositions, and the argument a ratiocination; we may of course subdivide\r\nthese also into two species similar to the two preceding, namely, those\r\nwhich proceed on false premises, and those of which the premises, though\r\ntrue, do not support the conclusion. But of these species, the first must\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page518\"\u003e[pg 518]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg518\" id=\"Pg518\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nnecessarily fall under some one of the heads already enumerated. For the\r\nerror must be either in those premises which are general propositions, or in\r\nthose which assert individual facts. In the former case it is an Inductive\r\nFallacy, of one or the other class; in the latter it is a Fallacy of Observation;\r\nunless, in either case, the erroneous premise has been assumed on\r\nsimple inspection, in which case the fallacy is\r\n\u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea priori\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e. Or, finally, the premises,\r\nof whichever kind they are, may never have been conceived in so distinct\r\na manner as to produce any clear consciousness by what means they\r\nwere arrived at; as in the case of what is called reasoning in a circle; and\r\nthen the fallacy is one of Confusion.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThere remain, therefore, as the only class of fallacies having properly\r\ntheir seat in deduction, those in which the premises of the ratiocination do\r\nnot bear out its conclusion; the various cases, in short, of vicious argumentation,\r\nprovided against by the rules of the syllogism. We shall call\r\nthese, Fallacies of Ratiocination.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 3. We must not, however, expect to find that men’s actual errors always,\r\nor even commonly, fall so unmistakably under some one of these\r\nclasses, as to be incapable of being referred to any other. Erroneous arguments\r\ndo not admit of such a sharply cut division as valid arguments\r\ndo. An argument fully stated, with all its steps distinctly set out, in language\r\nnot susceptible of misunderstanding, must, if it be erroneous, be so\r\nin some one of these five modes unequivocally; or indeed of the first four,\r\nsince the fifth, on such a supposition, would vanish. But it is not in the\r\nnature of bad reasoning to express itself thus unambiguously. When a\r\nsophist, whether he is imposing on himself or attempting to impose on others,\r\ncan be constrained to throw his sophistry into so distinct a form, it\r\nneeds, in a large proportion of cases, no further exposure.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIn all arguments, everywhere but in the schools, some of the links are\r\nsuppressed; \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea fortiori\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e when the arguer either\r\nintends to deceive, or is a\r\nlame and inexpert thinker, little accustomed to bring his reasoning processes\r\nto any test; and it is in those steps of the reasoning which are made\r\nin this tacit and half-conscious, or even wholly unconscious manner, that\r\nthe error oftenest lurks. In order to detect the fallacy, the proposition\r\nthus silently assumed must be supplied; but the reasoner, most likely, has\r\nnever really asked himself what he was assuming; his confuter, unless permitted\r\nto extort it from him by the Socratic mode of interrogation, must\r\nhimself judge what the suppressed premise ought to be in order to support\r\nthe conclusion. And hence, in the words of Archbishop Whately, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“it must\r\nbe often a matter of doubt, or, rather, of arbitrary choice, not only to which\r\ngenus each \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ekind\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e of fallacy should be referred, but even to which kind to\r\nrefer any one \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eindividual\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e fallacy; for since, in any course of argument,\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eone\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e premise is usually suppressed, it frequently happens in the case of a\r\nfallacy, that the hearers are left to the alternative of supplying \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eeither\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e a\r\npremise\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page519\"\u003e[pg 519]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg519\" id=\"Pg519\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nwhich is \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003enot true\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e, or \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eelse\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e, one which \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003edoes not\r\nprove\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e the conclusion; \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ee.g.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, if\r\na man expatiates on the distress of the country, and thence argues that the\r\ngovernment is tyrannical, we must suppose him to assume \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eeither\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e that \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e‘every\r\ndistressed country is under a tyranny,’\u003c/span\u003e which is a manifest falsehood,\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eor\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e merely that \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e‘every country under a tyranny is distressed,’\u003c/span\u003e which,\r\nhowever true, proves nothing, the middle term being undistributed.”\u003c/span\u003e The former\r\nwould be ranked, in our distribution, among fallacies of generalization,\r\nthe latter among those of ratiocination. \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Which are we to suppose the\r\nspeaker meant us to understand? Surely”\u003c/span\u003e (if he understood himself) \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“just\r\nwhichever each of his hearers might happen to prefer: some might assent\r\nto the false premise; others allow the unsound syllogism.”\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAlmost all fallacies, therefore, might in strictness be brought under our\r\nfifth class, Fallacies of Confusion. A fallacy can seldom be absolutely referred\r\nto any of the other classes; we can only say, that if all the links\r\nwere filled up which should be capable of being supplied in a valid argument,\r\nit would either stand thus (forming a fallacy of one class), or thus (a\r\nfallacy of another); or at furthest we may say, that the conclusion is most\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003elikely\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e to have originated in a fallacy of such and such a class. Thus, in\r\nthe illustration just quoted, the error committed may be traced with most\r\nprobability to a fallacy of generalization; that of mistaking an uncertain\r\nmark, or piece of evidence, for a certain one; concluding from an effect to\r\nsome one of its possible causes, when there are others which would have\r\nbeen equally capable of producing it.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nYet, though the five classes run into each other, and a particular error\r\noften seems to be arbitrarily assigned to one of them rather than to any\r\nof the rest, there is considerable use in so distinguishing them. We shall\r\nfind it convenient to set apart, as Fallacies of Confusion, those of which\r\nconfusion is the most obvious characteristic; in which no other cause can\r\nbe assigned for the mistake committed, than neglect or inability to state\r\nthe question properly, and to apprehend the evidence with definiteness and\r\nprecision. In the remaining four classes I shall place not only the cases in\r\nwhich the evidence is clearly seen to be what it is, and yet a wrong conclusion\r\ndrawn from it, but also those in which, although there be confusion,\r\nthe confusion is not the sole cause of the error, but there is some shadow\r\nof a ground for it in the nature of the evidence itself. And in distributing\r\nthese cases of partial confusion among the four classes, I shall, when\r\nthere can be any hesitation as to the precise seat of the fallacy, suppose it\r\nto be in that part of the process in which, from the nature of the case, and\r\nthe tendencies of the human mind, an error would in the particular circumstances\r\nbe the most probable.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAfter these observations we shall proceed, without further preamble, to\r\nconsider the five classes in their order.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page520\"\u003e[pg 520]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg520\" id=\"Pg520\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-div\" style=\"margin-bottom: 4.00em; margin-top: 4.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"toc117\" id=\"toc117\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"pdf118\" id=\"pdf118\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: center; margin-bottom: 2.40em; margin-top: 2.40em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 120%\"\u003eChapter III.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: left; margin-bottom: 2.88em; margin-top: 2.88em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 144%\"\u003eFallacies Of Simple Inspection; Or \u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" style=\"text-align: left\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 144%; font-style: italic\"\u003eA\r\nPriori\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 144%\"\u003e Fallacies.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 1. The tribe of errors of which we are to treat in the first instance,\r\nare those in which no actual inference takes place at all; the proposition\r\n(it can not in such cases be called a conclusion) being embraced, not as\r\nproved, but as requiring no proof; as a self-evident truth; or else as having\r\nsuch intrinsic verisimilitude, that external evidence not in itself amounting\r\nto proof, is sufficient in aid of the antecedent presumption.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAn attempt to treat this subject comprehensively would be a transgression\r\nof the bounds prescribed to this work, since it would necessitate\r\nthe inquiry which, more than any other, is the grand question of what is\r\ncalled metaphysics, viz., What are the propositions which may reasonably\r\nbe received without proof? That there must be some such propositions\r\nall are agreed, since there can not be an infinite series of proof, a chain suspended\r\nfrom nothing. But to determine what these propositions are, is\r\nthe \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eopus magnum\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e of the more recondite mental\r\nphilosophy. Two principal\r\ndivisions of opinion on the subject have divided the schools of philosophy\r\nfrom its first dawn. The one recognizes no ultimate premises but\r\nthe facts of our subjective consciousness; our sensations, emotions, intellectual\r\nstates of mind, and volitions. These, and whatever by strict rules of\r\ninduction can be derived from these, it is possible, according to this theory,\r\nfor us to know; of all else we must remain in ignorance. The opposite\r\nschool hold that there are other existences, suggested indeed to our minds\r\nby these subjective phenomena, but not inferable from them, by any process\r\neither of deduction or of induction; which, however, we must, by the\r\nconstitution of our mental nature, recognize as realities; and realities, too,\r\nof a higher order than the phenomena of our consciousness, being the efficient\r\ncauses and necessary substrata of all Phenomena. Among these\r\nentities they reckon Substances, whether matter or spirit; from the dust\r\nunder our feet to the soul, and from that to Deity. All these, according to\r\nthem, are preternatural or supernatural beings, having no likeness in experience,\r\nthough experience is entirely a manifestation of their agency. Their\r\nexistence, together with more or less of the laws to which they conform in\r\ntheir operations, are, on this theory, apprehended and recognized as real by\r\nthe mind itself intuitively; experience (whether in the form of sensation\r\nor of mental feeling) having no other part in the matter than as affording\r\nfacts which are consistent with these necessary postulates of reason, and\r\nwhich are explained and accounted for by them.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAs it is foreign to the purpose of the present treatise to decide between\r\nthese conflicting theories, we are precluded from inquiring into the existence,\r\nor defining the extent and limits, of knowledge\r\n\u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea priori\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, and from\r\ncharacterizing the kind of correct assumption which the fallacy of incorrect\r\nassumption, now under consideration, simulates. Yet since it is allowed\r\non both sides that such assumptions are often made improperly, we may\r\nfind it practicable, without entering into the ultimate metaphysical grounds\r\nof the discussion, to state some speculative propositions, and suggest some\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page521\"\u003e[pg 521]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg521\" id=\"Pg521\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\npractical cautions, respecting the forms in which such unwarranted assumptions\r\nare most likely to be made.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 2. In the cases in which, according to the thinkers of the ontological\r\nschool, the mind apprehends, by intuition, things, and the laws of things,\r\nnot cognizable by our sensitive faculty; those intuitive, or supposed intuitive,\r\nperceptions are undistinguishable from what the opposite school are\r\naccustomed to call ideas of the mind. When they themselves say that they\r\nperceive the things by an immediate act of a faculty given for that purpose\r\nby their Creator, it would be said of them by their opponents that they\r\nfind an idea or conception in their own minds, and from the idea or conception,\r\ninfer the existence of a corresponding objective reality. Nor would\r\nthis be an unfair statement, but a mere version into other words of the account\r\ngiven by many of themselves; and one to which the more clear-sighted\r\nof them might, and generally do, without hesitation, subscribe.\r\nSince, therefore, in the cases which lay the strongest claims to be examples\r\nof knowledge \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea priori\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\nthe mind proceeds from the idea of a thing to the\r\nreality of the thing itself, we can not be surprised by finding that illicit\r\nassumptions \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea priori\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nconsist in doing the same thing erroneously; in mistaking\r\nsubjective facts for objective, laws of the percipient mind for laws\r\nof the perceived object, properties of the ideas or conceptions for properties\r\nof the things conceived.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAccordingly, a large proportion of the erroneous thinking which exists\r\nin the world proceeds on a tacit assumption, that the same order must obtain\r\namong the objects in nature which obtains among our ideas of them.\r\nThat if we always think of two things together, the two things must always\r\nexist together. That if one thing makes us think of another as preceding\r\nor following it, that other must precede it or follow it in actual\r\nfact. And conversely, that when we can not conceive two things together\r\nthey can not exist together, and that their combination may, without further\r\nevidence, be rejected from the list of possible occurrences.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nFew persons, I am inclined to think, have reflected on the great extent\r\nto which this fallacy has prevailed, and prevails, in the actual beliefs and\r\nactions of mankind. For a first illustration of it we may refer to a large\r\nclass of popular superstitions. If any one will examine in what circumstances\r\nmost of those things agree, which in different ages and by different\r\nportions of the human race have been considered as omens or prognostics\r\nof some interesting event, whether calamitous or fortunate; they will\r\nbe found very generally characterized by this peculiarity, that they cause\r\nthe mind to \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ethink\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e of that, of which they are therefore supposed to forbode\r\nthe actual occurrence. \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Talk of the devil and he will appear,”\u003c/span\u003e has passed\r\ninto a proverb. Talk of the devil, that is, raise the idea, and the reality\r\nwill follow. In times when the appearance of that personage in a visible\r\nform was thought to be no unfrequent occurrence, it has doubtless often\r\nhappened to persons of vivid imagination and susceptible nerves, that talking\r\nof the devil has caused them to fancy they saw him; as even in our\r\nmore incredulous days, listening to ghost stories predisposes us to see\r\nghosts; and thus, as a prop to the \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea priori\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nfallacy, there might come to be\r\nadded an auxiliary fallacy of malobservation, with one of false generalization\r\ngrounded on it. Fallacies of different orders often herd or cluster together\r\nin this fashion, one smoothing the way for another. But the origin\r\nof the superstition is evidently that which we have assigned. In like manner,\r\nit has been universally considered unlucky to speak of misfortune.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page522\"\u003e[pg 522]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg522\" id=\"Pg522\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe day on which any calamity happened has been considered an unfortunate\r\nday, and there has been a feeling everywhere, and in some nations\r\na religious obligation, against transacting any important business on that\r\nday. For on such a day our thoughts are likely to be of misfortune. For\r\na similar reason, any untoward occurrence in commencing an undertaking\r\nhas been considered ominous of failure; and often, doubtless, has really\r\ncontributed to it by putting the persons engaged in the enterprise more or\r\nless out of spirits; but the belief has equally prevailed where the disagreeable\r\ncircumstance was, independently of superstition, too insignificant to\r\ndepress the spirits by any influence of its own. All know the story of\r\nCæsar’s accidentally stumbling in the act of landing on the African coast;\r\nand the presence of mind with which he converted the direful presage into\r\na favorable one by exclaiming, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Africa, I embrace thee.”\u003c/span\u003e Such omens, it\r\nis true, were often conceived as warnings of the future, given by a friendly\r\nor a hostile deity; but this very superstition grew out of a pre-existing\r\ntendency; the god was supposed to send, as an indication of what was to\r\ncome, something which people were already disposed to consider in that\r\nlight. So in the case of lucky or unlucky names. Herodotus tells us how\r\nthe Greeks, on the way to Mycale, were encouraged in their enterprise by\r\nthe arrival of a deputation from Samos, one of the members of which was\r\nnamed Hegesistratus, the leader of armies.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nCases may be pointed out in which something which could have no real\r\neffect but to make persons \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ethink\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e of misfortune, was regarded not merely\r\nas a prognostic, but as something approaching to an actual cause of it.\r\nThe εὐφήμει of the Greeks, and \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003efavete linguis\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\nor \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ebona verba quæso\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, of the\r\nRomans, evince the care with which they endeavored to repress the utterance\r\nof any word expressive or suggestive of ill fortune; not from notions\r\nof delicate politeness, to which their general mode of conduct and feeling\r\nhad very little reference, but from \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ebona fide\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nalarm lest the event so suggested\r\nto the imagination should in fact occur. Some vestige of a similar\r\nsuperstition has been known to exist among uneducated persons even in\r\nour own day: it is thought an unchristian thing to talk of, or suppose, the\r\ndeath of any person while he is alive. It is known how careful the Romans\r\nwere to avoid, by an indirect mode of speech, the utterance of any\r\nword directly expressive of death or other calamity; how instead of\r\n\u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003emortuus est\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e they said\r\n\u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003evixit\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e; and \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“be the event fortunate or\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eotherwise\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e”\u003c/span\u003e instead of \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eadverse\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e. The name Maleventum,\r\nof which Salmasius so sagaciously detected\r\nthe Thessalian origin (Μαλόεις, Μαλοέντος), they changed into the\r\nhighly propitious denomination, Beneventum; Egesta into Segesta; and\r\nEpidamnus, a name so interesting in its associations to the reader of Thucydides,\r\nthey exchanged for Dyrrhachium, to escape the perils of a word\r\nsuggestive of \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-foreign\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003edamnum\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e or detriment.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“If a hare cross the highway,”\u003c/span\u003e says Sir Thomas\r\nBrowne,\u003ca id=\"noteref_230\" name=\"noteref_230\" href=\"#note_230\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e230\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“there are few above threescore that are not perplexed thereat;\r\nwhich notwithstanding is but an augurial terror, according to that received expression,\r\n\u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eInauspicatum dat iter oblatus lepus\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e.\r\nAnd the ground of the conceit was probably\r\nno greater than this, that a fearful animal passing by us portended\r\nunto us something to be feared; as upon the like consideration the meeting\r\nof a fox presaged some future imposture.”\u003c/span\u003e Such superstitions as these\r\nlast must be the result of study; they are too recondite for natural or spontaneous\r\ngrowth. But when the attempt was once made to construct a\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page523\"\u003e[pg 523]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg523\" id=\"Pg523\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nscience of predictions, any association, though ever so faint or remote, by\r\nwhich an object could be connected in however far-fetched a manner with\r\nideas either of prosperity or of danger and misfortune, was enough to determine\r\nits being classed among good or evil omens.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAn example of rather a different kind from any of these, but falling under\r\nthe same principle, is the famous attempt on which so much labor and\r\ningenuity were expended by the alchemists, to make gold potable. The\r\nmotive to this was a conceit that potable gold could be no other than the\r\nuniversal medicine; and why gold? Because it was so precious. It must\r\nhave all marvelous properties as a physical substance, because the mind\r\nwas already accustomed to marvel at it.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nFrom a similar feeling, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“every substance,”\u003c/span\u003e says Dr.\r\nParis,\u003ca id=\"noteref_231\" name=\"noteref_231\" href=\"#note_231\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e231\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“whose origin\r\nis involved in mystery, has at different times been eagerly applied to\r\nthe purposes of medicine. Not long since, one of those showers which are\r\nnow known to consist of the excrements of insects, fell in the north of\r\nItaly; the inhabitants regarded it as manna, or some supernatural panacea,\r\nand they swallowed it with such avidity, that it was only by extreme address\r\nthat a small quantity was obtained for a chemical examination.”\u003c/span\u003e\r\nThe superstition, in this instance, though doubtless partly of a religious\r\ncharacter, probably in part also arose from the prejudice that a wonderful\r\nthing must of course have wonderful properties.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 3. The instances of \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea priori\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nfallacy which we have hitherto cited belong\r\nto the class of vulgar errors, and do not now, nor in any but a rude\r\nage ever could, impose upon minds of any considerable attainments. But\r\nthose to which we are about to proceed, have been, and still are, all but\r\nuniversally prevalent among thinkers. The same disposition to give objectivity\r\nto a law of the mind—to suppose that what is true of our ideas\r\nof things must be true of the things themselves—exhibits itself in many of\r\nthe most accredited modes of philosophical investigation, both on physical\r\nand on metaphysical subjects. In one of its most undisguised manifestations,\r\nit embodies itself in two maxims, which lay claim to axiomatic truth:\r\nThings which we can not think of together, can not co-exist; and Things\r\nwhich we can not help thinking of together, must co-exist. I am not sure\r\nthat the maxims were ever expressed in these precise words, but the history\r\nboth of philosophy and of popular opinions abounds with exemplifications\r\nof both forms of the doctrine.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nTo begin with the latter of them: Things which we can not think of\r\nexcept together, must exist together. This is assumed in the generally\r\nreceived and accredited mode of reasoning which concludes that A must\r\naccompany B in point of fact, because \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“it is involved in the idea.”\u003c/span\u003e Such\r\nthinkers do not reflect that the idea, being a result of abstraction, ought to\r\nconform to the facts, and can not make the facts conform to it. The argument\r\nis at most admissible as an appeal to authority; a surmise, that\r\nwhat is now part of the idea, must, before it became so, have been found\r\nby previous inquirers in the facts. Nevertheless, the philosopher who\r\nmore than all others made professions of rejecting authority, Descartes,\r\nconstructed his system on this very basis. His favorite device for arriving\r\nat truth, even in regard to outward things, was by looking into his own\r\nmind for it. \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Credidi me,”\u003c/span\u003e says his celebrated maxim, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“pro regulâ generali\r\nsumere posse, omne id quod valdè dilucidè et distinctè concipiebam,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page524\"\u003e[pg 524]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg524\" id=\"Pg524\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nverum esse;”\u003c/span\u003e whatever can be very clearly conceived must certainly exist;\r\nthat is, as he afterward explains it, if the idea includes existence. And on\r\nthis ground he infers that geometrical figures really exist, because they\r\ncan be distinctly conceived. Whenever existence is \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“involved in an idea,”\u003c/span\u003e\r\na thing conformable to the idea must really exist; which is as much as to\r\nsay, whatever the idea contains must have its equivalent in the thing; and\r\nwhat we are not able to leave out of the idea can not be absent from the\r\nreality.\u003ca id=\"noteref_232\" name=\"noteref_232\" href=\"#note_232\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e232\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e This assumption pervades the philosophy not only of\r\nDescartes, but of all the thinkers who received their impulse mainly from him, in\r\nparticular the two most remarkable among them, Spinoza and Leibnitz, from\r\nwhom the modern German metaphysical philosophy is essentially an emanation.\r\nI am indeed disposed to think that the fallacy now under consideration\r\nhas been the cause of two-thirds of the bad philosophy, and especially\r\nof the bad metaphysics, which the human mind has never ceased to\r\nproduce. Our general ideas contain nothing but what has been put into\r\nthem, either by our passive experience, or by our active habits of thought;\r\nand the metaphysicians in all ages, who have attempted to construct the\r\nlaws of the universe by reasoning from our supposed necessities of thought,\r\nhave always proceeded, and only could proceed, by laboriously finding in\r\ntheir own minds what they themselves had formerly put there, and evolving\r\nfrom their ideas of things what they had first involved in those ideas.\r\nIn this way all deeply-rooted opinions and feelings are enabled to create\r\napparent demonstrations of their truth and reasonableness, as it were, out\r\nof their own substance.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe other form of the fallacy: Things which we can not think of together\r\ncan not exist together—including as one of its branches, that what\r\nwe can not think of as existing can not exist at all—may thus be briefly\r\nexpressed: Whatever is inconceivable must be false.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAgainst this prevalent doctrine I have sufficiently argued in a former\r\nBook,\u003ca id=\"noteref_233\" name=\"noteref_233\" href=\"#note_233\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e233\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e and nothing is required in this place but examples. It\r\nwas long held that Antipodes were impossible because of the difficulty which was\r\nfound in conceiving persons with their heads in the same direction as our\r\nfeet. And it was one of the received arguments against the Copernican\r\nsystem, that we can not conceive so great a void space as that system supposes\r\nto exist in the celestial regions. When men’s imaginations had always\r\nbeen used to conceive the stars as firmly set in solid spheres, they\r\nnaturally found much difficulty in imagining them in so different, and, as\r\nit doubtless appeared to them, so precarious a situation. But they had no\r\nright to mistake the limitation (whether natural, or, as it in fact proved,\r\nonly artificial) of their own faculties, for an inherent limitation of the possible\r\nmodes of existence in the universe.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt may be said in objection, that the error in these cases was in the\r\nminor premise, not the major; an error of fact, not of principle; that it\r\ndid not consist in supposing that what is inconceivable can not be true, but\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page525\"\u003e[pg 525]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg525\" id=\"Pg525\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nin supposing antipodes to be inconceivable, when present experience proves\r\nthat they can be conceived. Even if this objection were allowed, and the\r\nproposition that what is inconceivable can not be true were suffered to\r\nremain unquestioned as a speculative truth, it would be a truth on which\r\nno practical consequence could ever be founded, since, on this showing,\r\nit is impossible to affirm of any proposition, not being a contradiction in\r\nterms, that it is inconceivable. Antipodes were really, not fictitiously, inconceivable\r\nto our ancestors: they are indeed conceivable to us; and as\r\nthe limits of our power of conception have been so largely extended, by the\r\nextension of our experience and the more varied exercise of our imagination,\r\nso may posterity find many combinations perfectly conceivable to\r\nthem which are inconceivable to us. But, as beings of limited experience,\r\nwe must always and necessarily have limited conceptive powers; while it\r\ndoes not by any means follow that the same limitation obtains in the possibilities\r\nof Nature, nor even in her actual manifestations.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nRather more than a century and a half ago it was a scientific maxim,\r\ndisputed by no one, and which no one deemed to require any proof, that\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“a thing can not act where it is not.”\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca id=\"noteref_234\" name=\"noteref_234\" href=\"#note_234\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e234\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nWith this weapon the Cartesians\r\nwaged a formidable war against the theory of gravitation, which, according\r\nto them, involving so obvious an absurdity, must be rejected \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-foreign\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ein\r\nlimine\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e:\r\nthe sun could not possibly act upon the earth, not being there. It was not\r\nsurprising that the adherents of the old systems of astronomy should urge\r\nthis objection against the new; but the false assumption imposed equally\r\non Newton himself, who, in order to turn the edge of the objection, imagined\r\na subtle ether which filled up the space between the sun and the\r\nearth, and by its intermediate agency was the proximate cause of the phenomena\r\nof gravitation. \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“It is inconceivable,”\u003c/span\u003e said Newton, in one of his\r\nletters to Dr. Bentley,\u003ca id=\"noteref_235\" name=\"noteref_235\" href=\"#note_235\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e235\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“that inanimate brute matter should, without the\r\nmediation of something else, which is not material, operate upon and affect\r\nother matter \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ewithout mutual contact\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e…. That gravity should be innate,\r\ninherent, and essential to matter, so that one body may act on another, at\r\na distance, through a vacuum, without the mediation of any thing else, by\r\nand through which their action and force may be conveyed from one to\r\nanother, is to me so great an absurdity, that I believe no man, who in philosophical\r\nmatters has a competent faculty of thinking, can ever fall into\r\nit.”\u003c/span\u003e This passage should be hung up in the cabinet of every cultivator of\r\nscience who is ever tempted to pronounce a fact impossible because it\r\nappears to him inconceivable. In our own day one would be more tempted,\r\nthough with equal injustice, to reverse the concluding observation, and\r\nconsider the seeing any absurdity at all in a thing so simple and natural,\r\nto be what really marks the absence of \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“a competent faculty of thinking.”\u003c/span\u003e\r\nNo one now feels any difficulty in conceiving gravity to be, as much as\r\nany other property is, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“inherent and essential to matter,”\u003c/span\u003e nor finds the\r\ncomprehension of it facilitated in the smallest degree by the supposition\r\nof an ether (though some recent inquirers do give this as an explanation\r\nof it); nor thinks it at all incredible that the celestial bodies can and do\r\nact where they, in actual bodily presence, are not. To us it is not more\r\nwonderful that bodies should act upon one another \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“without mutual contact,”\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthan that they should do so when in contact; we are familiar with\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page526\"\u003e[pg 526]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg526\" id=\"Pg526\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nboth these facts, and we find them equally inexplicable, but equally easy to\r\nbelieve. To Newton, the one, because his imagination was familiar with it,\r\nappeared natural and a matter of course, while the other, for the contrary\r\nreason, seemed too absurd to be credited.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt is strange that any one, after such a warning, should rely implicitly\r\non the evidence \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea priori\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e of such propositions\r\nas these, that matter can not think; that space, or extension, is infinite; that nothing\r\ncan be made out of nothing (\u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eex nihilo nihil\r\nfit\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e). Whether these propositions are true or\r\nnot this is not the place to determine, nor even whether the questions are\r\nsoluble by the human faculties. But such doctrines are no more self-evident\r\ntruths, than the ancient maxim that a thing can not act where it is\r\nnot, which probably is not now believed by any educated person in\r\nEurope.\u003ca id=\"noteref_236\" name=\"noteref_236\" href=\"#note_236\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e236\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nMatter can not think; why? because we \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ecan not conceive\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e thought\r\nto be annexed to any arrangement of material particles. Space is infinite,\r\nbecause having never known any part of it which had not other parts beyond\r\nit, we \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ecan not conceive\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e an absolute termination.\r\n\u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eEx nihilo nihil fit\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\nbecause having never known any physical product without a pre-existing\r\nphysical material, we \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ecan not\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e, or think we can not, \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eimagine\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e\r\na creation out of nothing. But these things may in themselves be as conceivable as\r\ngravitation without an intervening medium, which Newton thought too\r\ngreat an absurdity for any person of a competent faculty of philosophical\r\nthinking to admit: and even supposing them not conceivable, this, for\r\naught we know, may be merely one of the limitations of our very limited\r\nminds, and not in nature at all.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nNo writer has more directly identified himself with the fallacy now under\r\nconsideration, or has embodied it in more distinct terms, than Leibnitz.\r\nIn his view, unless a thing was not merely conceivable, but even explainable,\r\nit could not exist in nature. All \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003enatural\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e phenomena, according to him,\r\nmust be susceptible of being accounted for \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\r\npriori\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e. The only facts of\r\nwhich no explanation could be given but the will of God, were miracles\r\nproperly so called. \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Je reconnais,”\u003c/span\u003e says\r\nhe,\u003ca id=\"noteref_237\" name=\"noteref_237\" href=\"#note_237\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e237\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“qu’il n’est pas permis de\r\nnier ce qu’on n’entend pas; mais j’ajoute qu’on a droit de nier (au moins\r\ndans l’ordre naturel) ce que absolument n’est point intelligible ni explicable.\r\nJe soutiens aussi … qu’enfin la conception des créatures n’est pas la mesure\r\ndu pouvoir de Dieu, mais que leur conceptivité, ou force de concevoir,\r\nest la mesure du pouvoir de la nature, tout ce qui est conforme à l’ordre\r\nnaturel pouvant être conçu ou entendu par quelque créature.”\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nNot content with assuming that nothing can be true which we are unable\r\nto conceive, scientific inquirers have frequently given a still further extension\r\nto the doctrine, and held that, even of things not altogether inconceivable,\r\nthat which we can conceive with the greatest ease is likeliest to be\r\ntrue. It was long an admitted axiom, and is not yet entirely discredited,\r\nthat \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“nature always acts by the simplest means,”\u003c/span\u003e \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, by\r\nthose which are most easily conceivable.\u003ca id=\"noteref_238\" name=\"noteref_238\" href=\"#note_238\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e238\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nA large proportion of all the errors ever committed\r\nin the investigation of the laws of nature, have arisen from the assumption\r\nthat the most familiar explanation or hypothesis must be the truest.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page527\"\u003e[pg 527]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg527\" id=\"Pg527\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nOne of the most instructive facts in scientific history is the pertinacity with\r\nwhich the human mind clung to the belief that the heavenly bodies must\r\nmove in circles, or be carried round by the revolution of spheres; merely\r\nbecause those were in themselves the simplest suppositions: though, to\r\nmake them accord with the facts which were ever contradicting them more\r\nand more, it became necessary to add sphere to sphere and circle to circle,\r\nuntil the original simplicity was converted into almost inextricable complication.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 4. We pass to another \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea priori\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nfallacy or natural prejudice, allied to\r\nthe former, and originating, as that does, in the tendency to presume an exact\r\ncorrespondence between the laws of the mind and those of things external\r\nto it. The fallacy may be enunciated in this general form—Whatever\r\ncan be thought of apart exists apart: and its most remarkable manifestation\r\nconsists in the personification of abstractions. Mankind in all\r\nages have had a strong propensity to conclude that wherever there is a\r\nname, there must be a distinguishable separate entity corresponding to the\r\nname; and every complex idea which the mind has formed for itself by\r\noperating upon its conceptions of individual things, was considered to have\r\nan outward objective reality answering to it. Fate, Chance, Nature, Time,\r\nSpace, were real beings, nay, even gods. If the analysis of qualities in the\r\nearlier part of this work be correct, names of qualities and names of substances\r\nstand for the very same sets of facts or phenomena; \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ewhiteness\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e and\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea white thing\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e are only different phrases, required by convenience\r\nfor speaking of the same external fact under different relations. Not such, however,\r\nwas the notion which this verbal distinction suggested of old, either\r\nto the vulgar or to the scientific. Whiteness was an entity, inhering or\r\nsticking in the white substance: and so of all other qualities. So far was\r\nthis carried, that even concrete general terms were supposed to be, not\r\nnames of indefinite numbers of individual substances, but names of a peculiar\r\nkind of entities termed Universal Substances. Because we can think\r\nand speak of man in general, that is, of all persons in so far as possessing\r\nthe common attributes of the species, without fastening our thoughts permanently\r\non some one individual person; therefore man in general was\r\nsupposed to be, not an aggregate of individual persons, but an abstract or\r\nuniversal man, distinct from these.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt may be imagined what havoc metaphysicians trained in these habits\r\nmade with philosophy, when they came to the largest generalizations of all.\r\n\u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eSubstantiæ Secundæ\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof any kind were bad enough, but such Substantiæ Secundæ\r\nas τὸ ὄν, for example, and τὸ ἔν, standing for peculiar entities supposed\r\nto be inherent in all things which \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eexist\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\nor in all which are said to be \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eone\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\nwere enough to put an end to all intelligible discussion; especially since,\r\nwith a just perception that the truths which philosophy pursues are \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003egeneral\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e\r\ntruths, it was soon laid down that these general substances were the only\r\nsubjects of science, being immutable, while individual substances cognizable\r\nby the senses, being in a perpetual flux, could not be the subject of real\r\nknowledge. This misapprehension of the import of general language constitutes\r\nMysticism, a word so much oftener written and spoken than understood.\r\nWhether in the Vedas, in the Platonists, or in the Hegelians, mysticism\r\nis neither more nor less than ascribing objective existence to the subjective\r\ncreations of our own faculties, to ideas or feelings of the mind;\r\nand believing that by watching and contemplating these ideas of its own\r\nmaking, it can read in them what takes place in the world without.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page528\"\u003e[pg 528]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg528\" id=\"Pg528\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 5. Proceeding with the enumeration of \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\r\npriori\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e fallacies, and endeavoring\r\nto arrange them with as much reference as possible to their natural\r\naffinities, we come to another, which is also nearly allied to the fallacy preceding\r\nthe last, standing in the same relation to one variety of it as the\r\nfallacy last mentioned does to the other. This, too, represents nature as\r\nunder incapacities corresponding to those of our intellect; but instead of\r\nonly asserting that nature can not do a thing because we can not conceive\r\nit done, goes the still greater length of averring that nature does a particular\r\nthing, on the sole ground that we can see no reason why she should not.\r\nAbsurd as this seems when so plainly stated, it is a received principle\r\namong scientific authorities for demonstrating \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\r\npriori\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e the laws of physical\r\nphenomena. A phenomenon must follow a certain law, because we see no\r\nreason why it should deviate from that law in one way rather than in another.\r\nThis is called the Principle of the Sufficient Reason;\u003ca id=\"noteref_239\" name=\"noteref_239\" href=\"#note_239\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e239\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e and by\r\nmeans of it philosophers often flatter themselves that they are able to establish,\r\nwithout any appeal to experience, the most general truths of experimental\r\nphysics.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nTake, for example, two of the most elementary of all laws, the law of inertia\r\nand the first law of motion. A body at rest can not, it is affirmed,\r\nbegin to move unless acted upon by some external force; because, if it\r\ndid, it must either move up or down, forward or backward, and so forth;\r\nbut if no outward force acts upon it, there can be \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eno reason\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e for its moving\r\nup rather than down, or down rather than up, etc.,\r\n\u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eergo\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, it will not move at all.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThis reasoning I conceive to be entirely fallacious, as indeed Dr. Brown,\r\nin his treatise on Cause and Effect, has shown with great acuteness and\r\njustness of thought. We have before remarked, that almost every fallacy\r\nmay be referred to different genera by different modes of filling up the\r\nsuppressed steps; and this particular one may, at our option, be brought\r\nunder \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003epetitio principii\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e.\r\nIt supposes that nothing can be a \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“sufficient reason”\u003c/span\u003e\r\nfor a body’s moving in one particular direction, except some external\r\nforce. But this is the very thing to be proved. Why not some \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003einternal\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e\r\nforce? Why not the law of the thing’s own nature? Since these philosophers\r\nthink it necessary to prove the law of inertia, they of course do not\r\nsuppose \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eit\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e to be self-evident; they must, therefore, be of opinion that\r\npreviously to all proof, the supposition of a body’s moving by internal impulse\r\nis an admissible hypothesis; but if so, why is not the hypothesis also admissible,\r\nthat the internal impulse acts naturally in some one particular direction,\r\nnot in another? If spontaneous motion might have been the law\r\nof matter, why not spontaneous motion toward the sun, toward the earth,\r\nor toward the zenith? Why not, as the ancients supposed, toward a particular\r\nplace in the universe, appropriated to each particular kind of substance?\r\nSurely it is not allowable to say that spontaneity of motion is\r\ncredible in itself, but not credible if supposed to take place in any determinate\r\ndirection.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIndeed, if any one chose to assert that all bodies when uncontrolled set\r\nout in a direct line toward the North Pole, he might equally prove his point\r\nby the principle of the Sufficient Reason. By what right is it assumed\r\nthat a state of rest is the particular state which can not be deviated from\r\nwithout special cause? Why not a state of motion, and of some particular\r\nsort of motion? Why may we not say that the natural state of a horse\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page529\"\u003e[pg 529]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg529\" id=\"Pg529\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nleft to himself is to amble, because otherwise he must either trot, gallop, or\r\nstand still, and because we know no reason why he should do one of these\r\nrather than another? If this is to be called an unfair use of the \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“sufficient\r\nreason,”\u003c/span\u003e and the other a fair one, there must be a tacit assumption that a\r\nstate of rest is more natural to a horse than a state of ambling. If this\r\nmeans that it is the state which the animal will assume when left to himself,\r\nthat is the very point to be proved; and if it does not mean this, it\r\ncan only mean that a state of rest is the simplest state, and therefore the\r\nmost likely to prevail in nature, which is one of the fallacies or natural\r\nprejudices we have already examined.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nSo again of the First Law of Motion; that a body once moving will, if\r\nleft to itself, continue to move uniformly in a straight line. An attempt\r\nis made to prove this law by saying, that if not, the body must deviate\r\neither to the right or to the left, and that there is no reason why it should\r\ndo one more than the other. But who could know, antecedently to experience,\r\nwhether there was a reason or not? Might it not be the nature of\r\nbodies, or of some particular bodies, to deviate toward the right? or if the\r\nsupposition is preferred, toward the east, or south? It was long thought\r\nthat bodies, terrestrial ones at least, had a natural tendency to deflect downward;\r\nand there is no shadow of any thing objectionable in the supposition,\r\nexcept that it is not true. The pretended proof of the law of motion is even\r\nmore manifestly untenable than that of the law of inertia, for it is flagrantly\r\ninconsistent; it assumes that the continuance of motion in the direction first\r\ntaken is more natural than deviation either to the right or to the left, but\r\ndenies that one of these can possibly be more natural than the other. All\r\nthese fancies of the possibility of knowing what is natural or not natural\r\nby any other means than experience, are, in truth, entirely futile. The real\r\nand only proof of the laws of motion, or of any other law of the universe, is\r\nexperience; it is simply that no other suppositions explain or are consistent\r\nwith the facts of universal nature.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nGeometers have, in all ages, been open to the imputation of endeavoring\r\nto prove the most general facts of the outward world by sophistical reasoning,\r\nin order to avoid appeals to the senses. Archimedes, says Professor\r\nPlayfair,\u003ca id=\"noteref_240\" name=\"noteref_240\" href=\"#note_240\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e240\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nestablished some of the elementary propositions of statics by a\r\nprocess in which he \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“borrows no principle from experiment, but establishes\r\nhis conclusion entirely by reasoning \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea priori\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e.\r\nHe assumes, indeed, that equal bodies, at the ends of the equal arms of a lever, will\r\nbalance one another; and also that a cylinder or parallelopiped of homogeneous matter,\r\nwill be balanced about its centre of magnitude. These, however, are not inferences\r\nfrom experience; they are, properly speaking, conclusions deduced\r\nfrom the principle of the Sufficient Reason.”\u003c/span\u003e And to this day there are\r\nfew geometers who would not think it far more scientific to establish these\r\nor any other premises in this way, than to rest their evidence on that familiar\r\nexperience which in the case in question might have been so safely\r\nappealed to.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 6. Another natural prejudice, of most extensive prevalence, and which\r\nhad a great share in producing the errors fallen into by the ancients in\r\ntheir physical inquiries, was this: That the differences in nature must correspond\r\nto our received distinctions: that effects which we are accustomed,\r\nin popular language, to call by different names, and arrange in different\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page530\"\u003e[pg 530]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg530\" id=\"Pg530\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nclasses, must be of different natures, and have different causes. This prejudice,\r\nso evidently of the same origin with those already treated of, marks\r\nmore especially the earliest stage of science, when it has not yet broken\r\nloose from the trammels of every-day phraseology. The extraordinary\r\nprevalence of the fallacy among the Greek philosophers may be accounted\r\nfor by their generally knowing no other language than their own; from\r\nwhich it was a consequence that their ideas followed the accidental or arbitrary\r\ncombinations of that language, more completely than can happen\r\namong the moderns to any but illiterate persons. They had great difficulty\r\nin distinguishing between things which their language confounded, or in\r\nputting mentally together things which it distinguished; and could hardly\r\ncombine the objects in nature, into any classes but those which were made\r\nfor them by the popular phrases of their own country; or at least could\r\nnot help fancying those classes to be natural and all others arbitrary and\r\nartificial. Accordingly, scientific investigation among the Greek schools\r\nof speculation and their followers in the Middle Ages, was little more than\r\na mere sifting and analyzing of the notions attached to common language.\r\nThey thought that by determining the meaning of words, they could become\r\nacquainted with facts. \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“They took for granted,”\u003c/span\u003e says Dr.\r\nWhewell,\u003ca id=\"noteref_241\" name=\"noteref_241\" href=\"#note_241\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e241\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“that philosophy must result from the relations of those notions which are\r\ninvolved in the common use of language, and they proceeded to seek it by\r\nstudying such notions.”\u003c/span\u003e In his next chapter, Dr. Whewell has so well\r\nillustrated and exemplified this error, that I shall take the liberty of quoting\r\nhim at some length.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“The propensity to seek for principles in the common usages of language\r\nmay be discerned at a very early period. Thus we have an example\r\nof it in a saying which is reported of Thales, the founder of Greek philosophy.\r\nWhen he was asked, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e‘What is the \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003egreatest\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e thing?’\u003c/span\u003e he replied\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e‘\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ePlace\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e; for all other things are \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ein\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e the world, but the world\r\nis \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ein\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e it.’\u003c/span\u003e In Aristotle\r\nwe have the consummation of this mode of speculation. The usual point\r\nfrom which he starts in his inquiries is, that \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ewe say\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e thus or thus in common\r\nlanguage. Thus, when he has to discuss the question whether there be, in\r\nany part of the universe, a void, or space in which there is nothing, he inquires\r\nfirst in how many senses we say that one thing is \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ein\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e another. He\r\nenumerates many of these; we say the part is in the whole, as the finger is\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ein\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e the hand; again we say, the species is in the genus, as man is included\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ein\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e animal; again, the government of Greece is \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ein\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e the king; and\r\nvarious other senses are described and exemplified, but of all these \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ethe most\r\nproper\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e is when we say a thing is \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ein\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e a vessel, and generally\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ein place\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e. He next examines what \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eplace\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e is, and comes to this\r\nconclusion, that \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e‘if about a body\r\nthere be another body including it, it is in place, and if not, not.’\u003c/span\u003e A body\r\nmoves when it changes its place; but he adds, that if water be in a vessel,\r\nthe vessel being at rest, the parts of the water may still move, for they are\r\nincluded by each other; so that while the whole does not change its place,\r\nthe parts may change their place in a circular order. Proceeding then to\r\nthe question of a \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003evoid\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e, he as usual examines the different senses in which\r\nthe term is used, and adopts as the most proper, \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eplace without matter\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e,\r\nwith no useful result.\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Again, in a question concerning mechanical action, he says, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e‘When a\r\nman moves a stone by pushing it with a stick, \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ewe\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e say both that the man\r\nmoves the stone, and that the stick moves the stone, but the latter \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003emore\r\nproperly\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e.’\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page531\"\u003e[pg 531]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg531\" id=\"Pg531\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Again, we find the Greek philosophers applying themselves to extract\r\ntheir dogmas from the most general and abstract notions which they could\r\ndetect; for example, from the conception of the Universe as One or as\r\nMany things. They tried to determine how far we may, or must, combine\r\nwith these conceptions that of a whole, of parts, of number, of limits, of\r\nplace, of beginning or end, of full or void, of rest or motion, of cause and\r\neffect, and the like. The analysis of such conceptions with such a view,\r\noccupies, for instance, almost the whole of Aristotle’s Treatise on the\r\nHeavens.”\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe following paragraph merits particular attention: \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Another mode\r\nof reasoning, very widely applied in these attempts, was the \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003edoctrine of\r\ncontrarieties\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e, in which it was assumed that adjectives or substances which\r\nare in common language, or in some abstract mode of conception, opposed\r\nto each other, must point at some fundamental antithesis in nature, which\r\nit is important to study. Thus Aristotle says that the Pythagoreans, from\r\nthe contrasts which number suggests, collected ten principles—Limited\r\nand Unlimited, Odd and Even, One and Many, Right and Left, Male and\r\nFemale, Rest and Motion, Straight and Curved, Light and Darkness, Good\r\nand Evil, Square and Oblong…. Aristotle himself deduced the doctrine\r\nof four elements and other dogmas by oppositions of the same kind.”\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nOf the manner in which, from premises obtained in this way, the ancients\r\nattempted to deduce laws of nature, an example is given in the same work\r\na few pages further on. \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Aristotle decides that there is no void on such\r\narguments as this. In a void there could be no difference of up and down;\r\nfor as in nothing there are no differences, so there are none in a privation\r\nor negation; but a void is merely a privation or negation of matter; therefore,\r\nin a void, bodies could not move up and down, which it is in their\r\nnature to do. It is easily seen”\u003c/span\u003e (Dr. Whewell very justly adds) \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“that\r\nsuch a mode of reasoning elevates the familiar forms of language, and\r\nthe intellectual connections of terms, to a supremacy over facts; making\r\ntruth depend upon whether terms are or are not privative, and whether we\r\nsay that bodies fall \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003enaturally\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e.”\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe propensity to assume that the same relations obtain between objects\r\nthemselves, which obtain between our ideas of them, is here seen in\r\nthe extreme stage of its development. For the mode of philosophizing,\r\nexemplified in the foregoing instances, assumes no less than that the proper\r\nway of arriving at knowledge of nature, is to study nature itself subjectively;\r\nto apply our observation and analysis not to the facts, but to\r\nthe common notions entertained of the facts.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nMany other equally striking examples may be given of the tendency to\r\nassume that things which for the convenience of common life are placed in\r\ndifferent classes, must differ in every respect. Of this nature was the universal\r\nand deeply-rooted prejudice of antiquity and the Middle Ages, that\r\ncelestial and terrestrial phenomena must be essentially different, and could\r\nin no manner or degree depend on the same laws. Of the same kind, also,\r\nwas the prejudice against which Bacon contended, that nothing produced\r\nby nature could be successfully imitated by man: \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Calorem solis et ignis\r\ntoto genere differre; ne scilicet homines putent se per opera ignis, aliquid\r\nsimile iis quæ in Natura fiunt, educere et formare posse;”\u003c/span\u003e and again, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Compositionem\r\ntantum opus Hominis, Mistionem vero opus solius Naturæ esse:\r\nne scilicet homines sperent aliquam ex arte Corporum naturalium generationem\r\naut transformationem.”\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca id=\"noteref_242\" name=\"noteref_242\" href=\"#note_242\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e242\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e The grand distinction in the ancient scientific\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page532\"\u003e[pg 532]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg532\" id=\"Pg532\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nspeculations, between natural and violent motions, though not without\r\na plausible foundation in the appearances themselves, was doubtless\r\ngreatly recommended to adoption by its conformity to this prejudice.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 7. From the fundamental error of the scientific inquirers of antiquity,\r\nwe pass, by a natural association, to a scarcely less fundamental one of\r\ntheir great rival and successor, Bacon. It has excited the surprise of philosophers\r\nthat the detailed system of inductive logic, which this extraordinary\r\nman labored to construct, has been turned to so little direct use by\r\nsubsequent inquirers, having neither continued, except in a few of its generalities,\r\nto be recognized as a theory, nor having conducted in practice to\r\nany great scientific results. But this, though not unfrequently remarked,\r\nhas scarcely received any plausible explanation; and some, indeed, have\r\npreferred to assert that all rules of induction are useless, rather than suppose\r\nthat Bacon’s rules are grounded on an insufficient analysis of the inductive\r\nprocess. Such, however, will be seen to be the fact, as soon as it\r\nis considered, that Bacon entirely overlooked Plurality of Causes. All his\r\nrules tacitly imply the assumption, so contrary to all we now know of nature,\r\nthat a phenomenon can not have more than one cause.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWhen he is inquiring into what he terms the forma \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ecalidi\r\naut frigidi, gravis aut levis, sicci aut humidi\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, and the like, he never for an\r\ninstant doubts that there is some one thing, some invariable condition or set of\r\nconditions, which is present in all cases of heat, or cold, or whatever other\r\nphenomenon he is considering; the only difficulty being to find what it is;\r\nwhich accordingly he tries to do by a process of elimination, rejecting or\r\nexcluding, by negative instances, whatever is not the\r\n\u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eforma\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e or cause, in order\r\nto arrive at what is. But, that this \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eforma\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nor cause is \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eone\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e thing, and\r\nthat it is the same in all hot objects, he has no more doubt of, than another\r\nperson has that there is always some cause \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eor other\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e. In the present\r\nstate of knowledge it could not be necessary, even if we had not already\r\ntreated so fully of the question, to point out how widely this supposition\r\nis at variance with the truth. It is particularly unfortunate for Bacon\r\nthat, falling into this error, he should have fixed almost exclusively upon a\r\nclass of inquiries in which it was especially fatal; namely, inquiries into\r\nthe causes of the sensible qualities of objects. For his assumption, groundless\r\nin every case, is false in a peculiar degree with respect to those sensible\r\nqualities. In regard to scarcely any of them has it been found possible\r\nto trace any unity of cause, any set of conditions invariably accompanying\r\nthe quality. The conjunctions of such qualities with one another constitute\r\nthe variety of Kinds, in which, as already remarked, it has not been\r\nfound possible to trace any law. Bacon was seeking for what did not exist.\r\nThe phenomenon of which he sought for the one cause has oftenest no\r\ncause at all, and when it has, depends (as far as hitherto ascertained) on\r\nan unassignable variety of distinct causes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAnd on this rock every one must split, who represents to himself as the\r\nfirst and fundamental problem of science to ascertain what is the cause of\r\na given effect, rather than what are the effects of a given cause. It was\r\nshown, in an early stage of our inquiry into the nature of\r\nInduction,\u003ca id=\"noteref_243\" name=\"noteref_243\" href=\"#note_243\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e243\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e how\r\nmuch more ample are the resources which science commands for the latter\r\nthan for the former inquiry, since it is upon the latter only that we can\r\nthrow any direct light by means of experiment; the power of artificially\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page533\"\u003e[pg 533]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg533\" id=\"Pg533\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nproducing an effect, implying a previous knowledge of at least one of its\r\ncauses. If we discover the causes of effects, it is generally by having previously\r\ndiscovered the effects of causes; the greatest skill in devising crucial\r\ninstances for the former purpose may only end, as Bacon’s physical inquiries\r\ndid, in no result at all. Was it that his eagerness to acquire the\r\npower of producing for man’s benefit effects of practical importance to human\r\nlife, rendering him impatient of pursuing that end by a circuitous\r\nroute, made even him, the champion of experiment, prefer the direct mode,\r\nthough one of mere observation, to the indirect, in which alone experiment\r\nwas possible? Or had even Bacon not entirely cleared his mind from the\r\nnotion of the ancients, that \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“rerum cognoscere\r\n\u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ecausas\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e”\u003c/span\u003e was the sole object\r\nof philosophy, and that to inquire into the \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eeffects\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e of things belonged\r\nto servile and mechanical arts?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt is worth remarking that, while the only efficient mode of cultivating\r\nspeculative science was missed from an undue contempt of manual operations,\r\nthe false speculative views thus engendered gave in their turn a false\r\ndirection to such practical and mechanical aims as were suffered to exist.\r\nThe assumption universal among the ancients and in the Middle Ages, that\r\nthere were \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eprinciples\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e of heat and cold, dryness and moisture, etc., led\r\ndirectly to a belief in alchemy; in a transmutation of substances, a change\r\nfrom one Kind into another. Why should it not be possible to make\r\ngold? Each of the characteristic properties of gold has its\r\n\u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eforma\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, its\r\nessence, its set of conditions, which if we could discover, and learn how to\r\nrealize, we could superinduce that particular property upon any other substance,\r\nupon wood, or iron, or lime, or clay. If, then, we could effect this\r\nwith respect to every one of the essential properties of the precious metal,\r\nwe should have converted the other substance into gold. Nor did this, if\r\nonce the premises were granted, appear to transcend the real powers of\r\nmankind. For daily experience showed that almost every one of the distinctive\r\nsensible properties of any object, its consistence, its color, its taste,\r\nits smell, its shape, admitted of being totally changed by fire, or water, or\r\nsome other chemical agent. The \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eformæ\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nof all those qualities seeming,\r\ntherefore, to be within human power either to produce or to annihilate,\r\nnot only did the transmutation of substances appear abstractedly possible,\r\nbut the employment of the power, at our choice, for practical ends, seemed\r\nby no means hopeless.\u003ca id=\"noteref_244\" name=\"noteref_244\" href=\"#note_244\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e244\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nA prejudice, universal in the ancient world, and from which Bacon was\r\nso far from being free, that it pervaded and vitiated the whole practical\r\npart of his system of logic, may with good reason be ranked high in the\r\norder of Fallacies of which we are now treating.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 8. There remains one \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea priori\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nfallacy or natural prejudice, the most\r\ndeeply-rooted, perhaps, of all which we have enumerated; one which not\r\nonly reigned supreme in the ancient world, but still possesses almost undisputed\r\ndominion over many of the most cultivated minds; and some of the\r\nmost remarkable of the numerous instances by which I shall think it necessary\r\nto exemplify it, will be taken from recent thinkers. This is, that the\r\nconditions of a phenomenon must, or at least probably will, resemble the\r\nphenomenon itself.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page534\"\u003e[pg 534]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg534\" id=\"Pg534\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nConformably to what we have before remarked to be of frequent occurrence,\r\nthis fallacy might without much impropriety have been placed in a\r\ndifferent class, among Fallacies of Generalization; for experience does afford\r\na certain degree of countenance to the assumption. The cause does,\r\nin very many cases, resemble its effect; like produces like. Many phenomena\r\nhave a direct tendency to perpetuate their own existence, or to\r\ngive rise to other phenomena similar to themselves. Not to mention\r\nforms actually moulded on one another, as impressions on wax and the\r\nlike, in which the closest resemblance between the effect and its cause is\r\nthe very law of the phenomenon; all motion tends to continue itself, with\r\nits own velocity, and in its own original direction; and the motion of one\r\nbody tends to set others in motion, which is indeed the most common of\r\nthe modes in which the motions of bodies originate. We need scarcely\r\nrefer to contagion, fermentation, and the like; or to the production of effects\r\nby the growth or expansion of a germ or rudiment resembling on a\r\nsmaller scale the completed phenomenon, as in the growth of a plant or\r\nanimal from an embryo, that embryo itself deriving its origin from another\r\nplant or animal of the same kind. Again, the thoughts or reminiscences,\r\nwhich are effects of our past sensations, resemble those sensations; feelings\r\nproduce similar feelings by way of sympathy; acts produce similar\r\nacts by involuntary or voluntary imitation. With so many appearances in\r\nits favor, no wonder if a presumption naturally grew up, that causes must\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003enecessarily\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e resemble their effects, and that like could\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eonly\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e be produced by like.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThis principle of fallacy has usually presided over the fantastical attempts\r\nto influence the course of nature by conjectural means, the choice\r\nof which was not directed by previous observation and experiment. The\r\nguess almost always fixed upon some means which possessed features of\r\nreal or apparent resemblance to the end in view. If a charm was wanted,\r\nas by Ovid’s Medea, to prolong life, all long-lived animals, or what were\r\nesteemed such, were collected and brewed into a broth:\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"block tei tei-quote\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.80em; margin-left: 3.60em; margin-top: 1.80em; margin-right: 3.60em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-lg\" style=\"margin-bottom: 0.90em; margin-top: 0.90em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-l\" style=\"text-align: left; margin-left: 6.30em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003enec defuit illic\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-l\" style=\"text-align: left\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003eSquamea Cinyphii tenuis membrana chelydri\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-l\" style=\"text-align: left\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003eVivacisque jecur cervi: quibus insuper addit\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-l\" style=\"text-align: left\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003eOra caputque novem cornicis sæcula passæ.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nA similar notion was embodied in the celebrated medical theory called\r\nthe \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Doctrine of Signatures,”\u003c/span\u003e \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“which is no less,”\u003c/span\u003e says Dr.\r\nParis,\u003ca id=\"noteref_245\" name=\"noteref_245\" href=\"#note_245\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e245\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“than\r\na belief that every natural substance which possesses any medicinal virtue\r\nindicates by an obvious and well-marked external character the disease for\r\nwhich it is a remedy, or the object for which it should be employed.”\u003c/span\u003e\r\nThis outward character was generally some feature of resemblance, real or\r\nfantastical, either to the effect it was supposed to produce, or to the phenomenon\r\nover which its power was thought to be exercised. \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Thus the\r\nlungs of a fox must be a specific for asthma, because that animal is remarkable\r\nfor its strong powers of respiration. Turmeric has a brilliant\r\nyellow color, which indicates that it has the power of curing the jaundice;\r\nfor the same reason, poppies must relieve diseases of the head; Agaricus\r\nthose of the bladder; \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eCassia fistula\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe affections of the intestines, and\r\nAristolochia the disorders of the uterus: the polished surface and stony\r\nhardness which so eminently characterize the seeds of the Lithospermum\r\nofficinale (common gromwell) were deemed a certain indication of their\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page535\"\u003e[pg 535]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg535\" id=\"Pg535\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nefficacy in calculous and gravelly disorders; for a similar reason, the roots\r\nof the Saxifraga granulata (white saxifrage) gained reputation in the cure\r\nof the same disease; and the Euphrasia (eye-bright) acquired fame, as an\r\napplication in complaints of the eye, because it exhibits a black spot in its\r\ncorolla resembling the pupil. The blood-stone, the Heliotropium of the\r\nancients, from the occasional small specks or points of a blood-red color\r\nexhibited on its green surface, is even at this very day employed in many\r\nparts of England and Scotland to stop a bleeding from the nose; and nettle\r\ntea continues a popular remedy for the cure of \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eUrticaria\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e. It is\r\nalso asserted that some substances bear the \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003esignatures\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e of the\r\nhumors, as the petals of the red rose that of the blood, and the roots of rhubarb and the\r\nflowers of saffron that of the bile.”\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe early speculations respecting the chemical composition of bodies\r\nwere rendered abortive by no circumstance more than by their invariably\r\ntaking for granted that the properties of the elements must resemble those\r\nof the compounds which were formed from them.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nTo descend to more modern instances; it was long thought, and was\r\nstoutly maintained by the Cartesians and even by Leibnitz against the\r\nNewtonian system (nor did Newton himself, as we have seen, contest the\r\nassumption, but eluded it by an arbitrary hypothesis), that nothing (of a\r\nphysical nature at least) could account for motion, except previous motion;\r\nthe impulse or impact of some other body. It was very long before the\r\nscientific world could prevail upon itself to admit attraction and repulsion\r\n(\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, spontaneous tendencies of particles to approach or recede\r\nfrom one another) as ultimate laws, no more requiring to be accounted for than\r\nimpulse itself, if indeed the latter were not, in truth, resolvable into the\r\nformer. From the same source arose the innumerable hypotheses devised\r\nto explain those classes of motion which appeared more mysterious than\r\nothers because there was no obvious mode of attributing them to impulse,\r\nas for example the voluntary motions of the human body. Such were the\r\ninterminable systems of vibrations propagated along the nerves, or animal\r\nspirits rushing up and down between the muscles and the brain; which, if\r\nthe facts could have been proved, would have been an important addition\r\nto our knowledge of physiological laws; but the mere invention, or arbitrary\r\nsupposition of them, could not unless by the strongest delusion be\r\nsupposed to render the phenomena of animal life more comprehensible, or\r\nless mysterious. Nothing, however, seemed satisfactory, but to make out\r\nthat motion was caused by motion; by something like itself. If it was\r\nnot one kind of motion, it must be another. In like manner it was supposed\r\nthat the physical qualities of objects must arise from some similar\r\nquality, or perhaps only some quality bearing the same name, in the particles\r\nor atoms of which the objects were composed; that a sharp taste, for\r\nexample, must arise from sharp particles. And reversing the inference, the\r\neffects produced by a phenomenon must, it was supposed, resemble in their\r\nphysical attributes the phenomenon itself. The influences of the planets\r\nwere supposed to be analogous to their visible peculiarities: Mars, being of\r\na red color, portended fire and slaughter; and the like.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nPassing from physics to metaphysics, we may notice among the most remarkable\r\nfruits of this \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea priori\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nfallacy two closely analogous theories, employed\r\nin ancient and modern times to bridge over the chasm between the\r\nworld of mind and that of matter; the \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003especies\r\nsensibiles\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e of the Epicureans,\r\nand the modern doctrine of perception by means of ideas. These theories\r\nare indeed, probably, indebted for their existence not solely to the fallacy in\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page536\"\u003e[pg 536]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg536\" id=\"Pg536\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nquestion, but to that fallacy combined with another natural prejudice already\r\nadverted to, that a thing can not act where it is not. In both doctrines\r\nit is assumed that the phenomenon which takes place \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ein us\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e when we see\r\nor touch an object, and which we regard as an effect of that object, or rather\r\nof its presence to our organs, must of necessity resemble very closely the\r\noutward object itself. To fulfill this condition, the Epicureans supposed\r\nthat objects were constantly projecting in all directions impalpable images\r\nof themselves, which entered at the eyes and penetrated to the mind; while\r\nmodern metaphysicians, though they rejected this hypothesis, agreed in\r\ndeeming it necessary to suppose that not the thing itself, but a mental image\r\nor representation of it, was the direct object of perception. Dr. Reid\r\nhad to employ a world of argument and illustration to familiarize people\r\nwith the truth, that the sensations or impressions on our minds need not\r\nnecessarily be copies of, or bear any resemblance to, the causes which produce\r\nthem; in opposition to the natural prejudice which led people to assimilate\r\nthe action of bodies upon our senses, and through them upon our\r\nminds, to the transfer of a given form from one object to another by actual\r\nmoulding. The works of Dr. Reid are even now the most effectual course of\r\nstudy for detaching the mind from the prejudice of which this was an example.\r\nAnd the value of the service which he thus rendered to popular philosophy\r\nis not much diminished, although we may hold, with Brown, that he\r\nwent too far in imputing the \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“ideal theory”\u003c/span\u003e as an actual tenet, to the generality\r\nof the philosophers who preceded him, and especially to Locke and\r\nHume; for if they did not themselves consciously fall into the error, unquestionably\r\nthey often led their readers into it.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe prejudice, that the conditions of a phenomenon must resemble the\r\nphenomenon, is occasionally exaggerated, at least verbally, into a still more\r\npalpable absurdity; the conditions of the thing are spoken of as if they\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ewere\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e the very thing itself. In Bacon’s model inquiry, which occupies so\r\ngreat a space in the \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eNovum Organum\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, the\r\n\u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003einquisitio in formam calidi\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, the\r\nconclusion which he favors is that heat is a kind of motion; meaning of\r\ncourse not the feeling of heat, but the conditions of the feeling; meaning,\r\ntherefore, only that wherever there is heat, there must first be a particular\r\nkind of motion; but he makes no distinction in his language between\r\nthese two ideas, expressing himself as if heat, and the conditions of heat,\r\nwere one and the same thing. So the elder Darwin, in the beginning of\r\nhis \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eZoonomia\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, says, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“The word \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eidea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nhas various meanings in the writers of\r\nmetaphysics; it is here used simply for those notions of external things\r\nwhich our organs of sense bring us acquainted with originally”\u003c/span\u003e (thus far\r\nthe proposition, though vague, is unexceptionable in meaning), \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“and is defined\r\na contraction, a motion, or configuration, of the fibres which constitute\r\nthe immediate organ of sense.”\u003c/span\u003e Our \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003enotions\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e, a configuration of the fibres!\r\nWhat kind of logician must he be who thinks that a phenomenon is \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003edefined\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e\r\nto \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ebe\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e the condition on which he supposes it to depend? Accordingly he\r\nsays soon after, not that our ideas are caused by, or consequent on, certain\r\norganic phenomena, but \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“our ideas \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eare\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e animal motions of the organs of\r\nsense.”\u003c/span\u003e And this confusion runs through the four volumes of the\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eZoonomia\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e;\r\nthe reader never knows whether the writer is speaking of the effect,\r\nor of its supposed cause; of the idea, a state of mental consciousness, or of\r\nthe state of the nerves and brain which he considers it to presuppose.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nI have given a variety of instances in which the natural prejudice, that\r\ncauses and their effects must resemble one another, has operated in practice\r\nso as to give rise to serious errors. I shall now go further, and produce\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page537\"\u003e[pg 537]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg537\" id=\"Pg537\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nfrom writings even of the present or very recent times, instances in which\r\nthis prejudice is laid down as an established principle. M. Victor Cousin,\r\nin the last of his celebrated lectures on Locke, enunciates the maxim in the\r\nfollowing unqualified terms: \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Tout ce qui est vrai de l’effet, est vrai de la\r\ncause.”\u003c/span\u003e A doctrine to which, unless in some peculiar and technical meaning\r\nof the words cause and effect, it is not to be imagined that any person\r\nwould literally adhere; but he who could so write must be far enough from\r\nseeing that the very reverse might be the effect; that there is nothing impossible\r\nin the supposition that no one property which is true of the effect\r\nmight be true of the cause. Without going quite so far in point of expression,\r\nColeridge, in his \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eBiographia Literaria\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\u003ca id=\"noteref_246\" name=\"noteref_246\" href=\"#note_246\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e246\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e affirms as an \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“evident\r\ntruth,”\u003c/span\u003e that \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“the law of causality holds only between homogeneous things,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, things having some common property,”\u003c/span\u003e and therefore\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“can not extend from one world into another, its opposite;”\u003c/span\u003e hence, as mind and matter\r\nhave no common property, mind can not act upon matter, nor matter\r\nupon mind. What is this but the \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea priori\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nfallacy of which we are speaking?\r\nThe doctrine, like many others of Coleridge, is taken from Spinoza,\r\nin the first book of whose \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eEthica\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e (\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eDe Deo\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e)\r\nit stands as the Third Proposition,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Quæ res nihil commune inter se habent, earum una alterius causa\r\nesse non potest,”\u003c/span\u003e and is there proved from two so-called axioms, equally\r\ngratuitous with itself; but Spinoza ever systematically consistent, pursued\r\nthe doctrine to its inevitable consequence, the materiality of God.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe same conception of impossibility led the ingenious and subtle mind\r\nof Leibnitz to his celebrated doctrine of a pre-established harmony. He,\r\ntoo, thought that mind could not act upon matter, nor matter upon mind,\r\nand that the two, therefore, must have been arranged by their Maker like\r\ntwo clocks, which, though unconnected with one another, strike simultaneously,\r\nand always point to the same hour. Malebranche’s equally famous\r\ntheory of Occasional Causes was another form of the same conception; instead\r\nof supposing the clocks originally arranged to strike together, he held\r\nthat when the one strikes, God interposes, and makes the other strike in\r\ncorrespondence with it.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nDescartes, in like manner, whose works are a rich mine of almost every\r\ndescription of \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea priori\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nfallacy, says that the Efficient Cause must at least\r\nhave all the perfections of the effect, and for this singular reason: \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Si enim\r\nponamus aliquid in ideâ reperiri quod non fuerit in ejus causâ, hoc igitur\r\nhabet a nihilo;”\u003c/span\u003e of which it is scarcely a parody to say, that if there be\r\npepper in the soup there must be pepper in the cook who made it, since\r\notherwise the pepper would be without a cause. A similar fallacy is committed\r\nby Cicero, in his second book \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eDe Finibus\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, where, speaking in his\r\nown person against the Epicureans, he charges them with inconsistency in\r\nsaying that the pleasures of the mind had their origin from those of the\r\nbody, and yet that the former were more valuable, as if the effect could surpass\r\nthe cause. \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Animi voluptas oritur propter voluptatem corporis, et\r\nmajor est animi voluptas quam corporis? ita fit ut gratulator, lætior sit\r\nquam is cui gratulatur.”\u003c/span\u003e Even that, surely, is not an impossibility; a person’s\r\ngood fortune has often given more pleasure to others than it gave to\r\nthe person himself.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nDescartes, with no less readiness, applies the same principle the converse\r\nway, and infers the nature of the effects from the assumption that they\r\nmust, in this or that property or in all their properties, resemble their\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page538\"\u003e[pg 538]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg538\" id=\"Pg538\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\ncause. To this class belong his speculations, and those of so many others\r\nafter him, tending to infer the order of the universe, not from observation,\r\nbut by \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea priori\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nreasoning from supposed qualities of the Godhead. This\r\nsort of inference was probably never carried to a greater length than it\r\nwas in one particular instance by Descartes, when, as a proof of one of his\r\nphysical principles, that the quantity of motion in the universe is invariable,\r\nhe had recourse to the immutability of the Divine Nature. Reasoning\r\nof a very similar character is, however, nearly as common now as it\r\nwas in his time, and does duty largely as a means of fencing off disagreeable\r\nconclusions. Writers have not yet ceased to oppose the theory of\r\ndivine benevolence to the evidence of physical facts, to the principle of\r\npopulation for example. And people seem in general to think that they\r\nhave used a very powerful argument, when they have said, that to suppose\r\nsome proposition true, would be a reflection on the goodness or wisdom of\r\nthe Deity. Put into the simplest possible terms, their argument is, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“If it\r\nhad depended on me, I would not have made the proposition true, therefore\r\nit is not true.”\u003c/span\u003e Put into other words, it stands thus: \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“God is perfect,\r\ntherefore (what I think) perfection must obtain in nature.”\u003c/span\u003e But since in\r\nreality every one feels that nature is very far from perfect, the doctrine is\r\nnever applied consistently. It furnishes an argument which (like many\r\nothers of a similar character) people like to appeal to when it makes for\r\ntheir own side. Nobody is convinced by it, but each appears to think\r\nthat it puts religion on his side of the question, and that it is a useful\r\nweapon of offense for wounding an adversary.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAlthough several other varieties of \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea priori\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nfallacy might probably be\r\nadded to those here specified, these are all against which it seems necessary\r\nto give any special caution. Our object is to open, without attempting\r\nor affecting to exhaust, the subject. Having illustrated, therefore, this\r\nfirst class of Fallacies at sufficient length, I shall proceed to the second.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-div\" style=\"margin-bottom: 4.00em; margin-top: 4.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"toc119\" id=\"toc119\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"pdf120\" id=\"pdf120\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: center; margin-bottom: 2.40em; margin-top: 2.40em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 120%\"\u003eChapter IV.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: left; margin-bottom: 2.88em; margin-top: 2.88em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 144%\"\u003eFallacies Of Observation.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 1. From the Fallacies which are properly Prejudices, or presumptions\r\nantecedent to, and superseding, proof, we pass to those which lie in the incorrect\r\nperformance of the proving process. And as Proof, in its widest\r\nextent, embraces one or more, or all, of three processes, Observation, Generalization,\r\nand Deduction, we shall consider in their order the errors capable\r\nof being committed in these three operations. And first, of the first\r\nmentioned.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nA fallacy of misobservation may be either negative or positive; either\r\nNon-observation or Mal-observation. It is non-observation, when all the\r\nerror consists in overlooking, or neglecting, facts or particulars which\r\nought to have been observed. It is mal-observation, when something is\r\nnot simply unseen, but seen wrong; when the fact or phenomenon, instead\r\nof being recognized for what it is in reality, is mistaken for something else.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 2. Non-observation may either take place by overlooking instances, or\r\nby overlooking some of the circumstances of a given instance. If we were\r\nto conclude that a fortune-teller was a true prophet, from not adverting\r\nto the cases in which his predictions had been falsified by the event, this\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page539\"\u003e[pg 539]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg539\" id=\"Pg539\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nwould be non-observation of instances; but if we overlooked or remained\r\nignorant of the fact that in cases where the predictions had been fulfilled,\r\nhe had been in collusion with some one who had given him the information\r\non which they were grounded, this would be non-observation of circumstances.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe former case, in so far as the act of induction from insufficient evidence\r\nis concerned, does not fall under this second class of Fallacies, but\r\nunder the third, Fallacies of Generalization. In every such case, however,\r\nthere are two defects or errors instead of one; there is the error of treating\r\nthe insufficient evidence as if it were sufficient, which is a Fallacy of\r\nthe third class; and there is the insufficiency itself; the not having better\r\nevidence; which, when such evidence, or, in other words, when other instances,\r\nwere to be had, is Non-observation; and the erroneous inference,\r\nso far as it is to be attributed to this cause, is a Fallacy of the second\r\nclass.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt belongs not to our purpose to treat of non-observation as arising from\r\ncasual inattention, from general slovenliness of mental habits, want of due\r\npractice in the use of the observing faculties, or insufficient interest in\r\nthe subject. The question pertinent to logic is—Granting the want of\r\ncomplete competency in the observer, on what point is that insufficiency\r\non his part likely to lead him wrong? or rather, what sorts of instances,\r\nor of circumstances in any given instance, are most likely to escape the\r\nnotice of observers generally; of mankind at large.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 3. First, then, it is evident that when the instances on one side of a\r\nquestion are more likely to be remembered and recorded than those on\r\nthe other; especially if there be any strong motive to preserve the memory\r\nof the first, but not of the latter; these last are likely to be overlooked,\r\nand escape the observation of the mass of mankind. This is the recognized\r\nexplanation of the credit given, in spite of reason and evidence, to\r\nmany classes of impostors; to quack-doctors, and fortune-tellers in all\r\nages; to the \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“cunning man”\u003c/span\u003e of modern times, and the oracles of old.\r\nFew have considered the extent to which this fallacy operates in practice,\r\neven in the teeth of the most palpable negative evidence. A striking example\r\nof it is the faith which the uneducated portion of the agricultural\r\nclasses, in this and other countries, continue to repose in the prophecies as\r\nto weather supplied by almanac-makers; though every season affords to\r\nthem numerous cases of completely erroneous prediction; but as every\r\nseason also furnishes some cases in which the prediction is fulfilled, this is\r\nenough to keep up the credit of the prophet, with people who do not reflect\r\non the number of instances requisite for what we have called, in our\r\ninductive terminology, the Elimination of Chance; since a certain number\r\nof casual coincidences not only may but will happen, between any two unconnected\r\nevents.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nColeridge, in one of the essays in the \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eFriend\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, has illustrated\r\nthe matter we are now considering, in discussing the origin of a proverb, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“which,\r\ndifferently worded, is to be found in all the languages of Europe,”\u003c/span\u003e viz., \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Fortune\r\nfavors fools.”\u003c/span\u003e He ascribes it partly to the \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“tendency to exaggerate\r\nall effects that seem disproportionate to their visible cause, and all circumstances\r\nthat are in any way strongly contrasted with our notions of the\r\npersons under them.”\u003c/span\u003e Omitting some explanations which would refer the\r\nerror to mal-observation, or to the other species of non-observation (that\r\nof circumstances), I take up the quotation further on. \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Unforeseen coincidences\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page540\"\u003e[pg 540]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg540\" id=\"Pg540\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nmay have greatly helped a man, yet if they have done for him only\r\nwhat possibly from his own abilities he might have effected for himself,\r\nhis good luck will excite less attention, and the instances be less remembered.\r\nThat clever men should attain their objects seems natural, and we\r\nneglect the circumstances that perhaps produced that success of themselves\r\nwithout the intervention of skill or foresight; but we dwell on the fact and\r\nremember it, as something strange, when the same happens to a weak or\r\nignorant man. So too, though the latter should fail in his undertakings\r\nfrom concurrences that might have happened to the wisest man, yet his\r\nfailure being no more than might have been expected and accounted for\r\nfrom his folly, it lays no hold on our attention, but fleets away among the\r\nother undistinguished waves in which the stream of ordinary life murmurs\r\nby us, and is forgotten. Had it been as true as it was notoriously false,\r\nthat those all-embracing discoveries, which have shed a dawn of \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003escience\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e\r\non the \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eart\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e of chemistry, and give no obscure promise of some one great\r\nconstitutive law, in the light of which dwell dominion and the power of\r\nprophecy; if these discoveries, instead of having been, as they really were,\r\npreconcerted by meditation, and evolved out of his own intellect, had occurred\r\nby a set of lucky \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eaccidents\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e to the illustrious father and founder of\r\nphilosophic alchemy; if they had presented themselves to Professor Davy\r\nexclusively in consequence of his \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eluck\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e in possessing a particular galvanic\r\nbattery; if this battery, as far as Davy was concerned, had itself been an\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eaccident\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e, and not (as in point of fact it was) desired and obtained by him\r\nfor the purpose of insuring the testimony of experience to his principles,\r\nand in order to bind down material nature under the inquisition of reason,\r\nand force from her, as by torture, unequivocal answers to \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eprepared\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e and\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003epreconceived\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e questions—yet still they would not have been talked of or\r\ndescribed as instances of \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eluck\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e, but as the natural results of his admitted\r\ngenius and known skill. But should an accident have disclosed similar\r\ndiscoveries to a mechanic at Birmingham or Sheffield, and if the man\r\nshould grow rich in consequence, and partly by the envy of his neighbors\r\nand partly with good reason, be considered by them as a man \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ebelow par\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e in\r\nthe general powers of his understanding; then, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e‘Oh, what a lucky fellow!\r\nWell, Fortune \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003edoes\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e favor fools—that’s for certain! It is always\r\nso!’\u003c/span\u003e And forthwith the exclaimer relates half a dozen similar instances. Thus\r\naccumulating the one sort of facts and never collecting the other, we do, as\r\npoets in their diction, and quacks of all denominations do in their reasoning,\r\nput a part for the whole.”\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThis passage very happily sets forth the manner in which, under the\r\nloose mode of induction which proceeds \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eper\r\nenumerationem simplicem\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\nnot seeking for instances of such a kind as to be decisive of the question,\r\nbut generalizing from any which occur, or rather which are remembered,\r\nopinions grow up with the apparent sanction of experience, which have no\r\nfoundation in the laws of nature at all. \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Itaque recte respondit ille”\u003c/span\u003e (we\r\nmay say with Bacon\u003ca id=\"noteref_247\" name=\"noteref_247\" href=\"#note_247\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e247\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e), \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“qui cum suspensa tabula in templo ei monstraretur\r\neorum, qui vota solverant, quod naufragii periculo elapsi sint, atque\r\ninterrogando premeretur, anne tum quidem Deorum numen agnosceret,\r\nquæsivit denuo, \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eAt ubi sunt illi depicti qui post vota nuncupata\r\nperierunt\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e?\r\nEadem ratio est fere omnis superstitionis, ut in Astrologicis, in Somniis,\r\nOminibus, Nemesibus, et hujusmodi; in quibus, homines delectati hujusmodi\r\nvanitatibus, advertunt eventus, ubi implentur; ast ubi fallunt, licet\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page541\"\u003e[pg 541]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg541\" id=\"Pg541\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nmulto frequentius, tamen negligunt, et prætereunt.”\u003c/span\u003e And he proceeds to\r\nsay that, independently of the love of the marvelous, or any other bias in\r\nthe inclinations, there is a natural tendency in the intellect itself to this\r\nkind of fallacy; since the mind is more moved by affirmative instances,\r\nthough negative ones are of most use in philosophy: \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Is tamen humano\r\nintellectui error est proprius et perpetuus, ut magis moveatur et excitetur\r\nAffirmativis quam Negativis; cum rite et ordine æquum se utrique præbere\r\ndebeat; quin contra, in omni Axiomate vero constituendo, major vis\r\nest instantiæ negativæ.”\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nBut the greatest of all causes of non-observation is a preconceived opinion.\r\nThis it is which, in all ages, has made the whole race of mankind,\r\nand every separate section of it, for the most part unobservant of all facts,\r\nhowever abundant, even when passing under their own eyes, which are contradictory\r\nto any first appearance, or any received tenet. It is worth\r\nwhile to recall occasionally to the oblivious memory of mankind some of\r\nthe striking instances in which opinions that the simplest experiment\r\nwould have shown to be erroneous, continued to be entertained because\r\nnobody ever thought of trying that experiment. One of the most remarkable\r\nof these was exhibited in the Copernican controversy. The opponents\r\nof Copernicus argued that the earth did not move, because if it did, a\r\nstone let fall from the top of a high tower would not reach the ground at\r\nthe foot of the tower, but at a little distance from it, in a contrary direction\r\nto the earth’s course; in the same manner (said they) as, if a ball is\r\nlet drop from the mast-head while the ship is in full sail, it does not fall\r\nexactly at the foot of the mast, but nearer to the stern of the vessel. The\r\nCopernicans would have silenced these objectors at once if they had \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003etried\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e\r\ndropping a ball from the mast-head, since they would have found that it\r\ndoes fall exactly at the foot, as the theory requires; but no; they admitted\r\nthe spurious fact, and struggled vainly to make out a difference between\r\nthe two cases. \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“The ball was no \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003epart\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e of the ship—and the motion\r\nforward was not \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003enatural\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e, either to the ship or to the ball. The stone, on the\r\nother hand, let fall from the top of the tower, was a \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003epart\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e of the earth; and\r\ntherefore, the diurnal and annular revolutions which were \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003enatural\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e to the\r\nearth, were also \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003enatural\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e to the stone; the stone would, therefore, retain\r\nthe same motion with the tower, and strike the ground precisely at the\r\nbottom of it.”\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca id=\"noteref_248\" name=\"noteref_248\" href=\"#note_248\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e248\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nOther examples, scarcely less striking, are recorded by Dr.\r\nWhewell,\u003ca id=\"noteref_249\" name=\"noteref_249\" href=\"#note_249\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e249\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nwhere imaginary laws of nature have continued to be received as real,\r\nmerely because no person had steadily looked at facts which almost every\r\none had the opportunity of observing. \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“A vague and loose mode of looking\r\nat facts very easily observable, left men for a long time under the belief\r\nthat a body ten times as heavy as another falls ten times as fast; that\r\nobjects immersed in water are always magnified, without regard to the\r\nform of the surface; that the magnet exerts an irresistible force; that crystal\r\nis always found associated with ice; and the like. These and many\r\nothers are examples how blind and careless man can be even in observation\r\nof the plainest and commonest appearances; and they show us that the\r\nmere faculties of perception, although constantly exercised upon innumerable\r\nobjects, may long fail in leading to any exact knowledge.”\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIf even on physical facts, and these of the most obvious character, the\r\nobserving faculties of mankind can be to this degree the passive slaves of\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page542\"\u003e[pg 542]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg542\" id=\"Pg542\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\ntheir preconceived impressions, we need not be surprised that this should\r\nbe so lamentably true as all experience attests it to be, on things more\r\nnearly connected with their stronger feelings—on moral, social, and religious\r\nsubjects. The information which an ordinary traveler brings back\r\nfrom a foreign country, as the result of the evidence of his senses, is almost\r\nalways such as exactly confirms the opinions with which he set out. He\r\nhas had eyes and ears for such things only as he expected to see. Men read\r\nthe sacred books of their religion, and pass unobserved therein multitudes\r\nof things utterly irreconcilable with even their own notions of moral excellence.\r\nWith the same authorities before them, different historians, alike\r\ninnocent of intentional misrepresentation, see only what is favorable to\r\nProtestants or Catholics, royalists or republicans, Charles I. or Cromwell;\r\nwhile others, having set out with the preconception that extremes must\r\nbe in the wrong, are incapable of seeing truth and justice when these are\r\nwholly on one side.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe influence of a preconceived theory is well exemplified in the superstitions\r\nof barbarians respecting the virtues of medicaments and charms.\r\nThe negroes, among whom coral, as of old among ourselves, is worn as an\r\namulet, affirm, according to Dr.\r\nParis,\u003ca id=\"noteref_250\" name=\"noteref_250\" href=\"#note_250\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e250\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nthat its color \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“is always affected\r\nby the state of health of the wearer, it becoming paler in disease.”\u003c/span\u003e On a\r\nmatter open to universal observation, a general proposition which has not\r\nthe smallest vestige of truth is received as a result of experience; the preconceived\r\nopinion preventing, it would seem, any observation whatever on\r\nthe subject.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 4. For illustration of the first species of non-observation, that of Instances,\r\nwhat has now been stated may suffice. But there may also be\r\nnon-observation of some material circumstances, in instances which have\r\nnot been altogether overlooked—nay, which may be the very instances on\r\nwhich the whole superstructure of a theory has been founded. As, in the\r\ncases hitherto examined, a general proposition was too rashly adopted, on\r\nthe evidence of particulars, true indeed, but insufficient to support it; so\r\nin the cases to which we now turn, the particulars themselves have been\r\nimperfectly observed, and the singular propositions on which the generalization\r\nis grounded, or some at least of those singular propositions, are\r\nfalse.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nSuch, for instance, was one of the mistakes committed in the celebrated\r\nphlogistic theory; a doctrine which accounted for combustion by the extrication\r\nof a substance called phlogiston, supposed to be contained in all\r\ncombustible matter. The hypothesis accorded tolerably well with superficial\r\nappearances; the ascent of flame naturally suggests the escape of a\r\nsubstance; and the visible residuum of ashes, in bulk and weight, generally\r\nfalls extremely short of the combustible material. The error was, non-observation\r\nof an important portion of the actual residue, namely, the gaseous\r\nproducts of combustion. When these were at last noticed and brought\r\ninto account, it appeared to be a universal law, that all substances gain instead\r\nof losing weight by undergoing combustion; and after the usual attempt\r\nto accommodate the old theory to the new fact by means of an arbitrary\r\nhypothesis (that phlogiston had the quality of positive levity instead\r\nof gravity), chemists were conducted to the true explanation, namely,\r\nthat instead of a substance separated, there was, on the contrary, a substance\r\nabsorbed.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page543\"\u003e[pg 543]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg543\" id=\"Pg543\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nMany of the absurd practices which have been deemed to possess medicinal\r\nefficacy, have been indebted for their reputation to non-observance of\r\nsome accompanying circumstance which was the real agent in the cures\r\nascribed to them. Thus, of the sympathetic powder of Sir Kenelm Digby:\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Whenever any wound had been inflicted, this powder was applied to the\r\nweapon that had inflicted it, which was, moreover, covered with ointment,\r\nand dressed two or three times a day. The wound itself, in the mean time,\r\nwas directed to be brought together, and carefully bound up with clean\r\nlinen rags, but, \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eabove all, to be let alone\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e for seven days, at the end of\r\nwhich period the bandages were removed, when the wound was generally found\r\nperfectly united. The triumph of the cure was decreed to the mysterious\r\nagency of the sympathetic powder which had been so assiduously applied\r\nto the weapon, whereas it is hardly necessary to observe that the promptness\r\nof the cure depended on the total exclusion of air from the wound,\r\nand upon the sanative operations of nature not having received any disturbance\r\nfrom the officious interference of art. The result, beyond all\r\ndoubt, furnished the first hint which led surgeons to the improved practice\r\nof healing wounds by what is technically called the \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003efirst\r\nintention\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e.”\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca id=\"noteref_251\" name=\"noteref_251\" href=\"#note_251\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e251\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“In\r\nall records,”\u003c/span\u003e adds Dr. Paris, of \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“extraordinary cures performed by mysterious\r\nagents, there is a great desire to conceal the remedies and other curative\r\nmeans which were simultaneously administered with them; thus Oribasius\r\ncommends in high terms a necklace of Pæony root for the cure of epilepsy;\r\nbut we learn that he always took care to accompany its use with copious\r\nevacuations, although he assigns to them no share of credit in the cure.\r\nIn later times we have a good specimen of this species of deception, presented\r\nto us in a work on scrofula by Mr. Morley, written, as we are informed,\r\nfor the sole purpose of restoring the much-injured character and\r\nuse of the Vervain; in which the author directs the root of this plant to\r\nbe tied with a yard of white satin ribbon around the neck, where it is to\r\nremain until the patient is cured; but mark—during this interval he calls\r\nto his aid the most active medicines in the materia medica.”\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca id=\"noteref_252\" name=\"noteref_252\" href=\"#note_252\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e252\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIn other cases, the cures really produced by rest, regimen, and amusement\r\nhave been ascribed to the medicinal, or occasionally to the supernatural,\r\nmeans which were put in requisition. \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“The celebrated John Wesley,\r\nwhile he commemorates the triumph of sulphur and supplication over his\r\nbodily infirmity, forgets to appreciate the resuscitating influence of four\r\nmonths’ repose from his apostolic labors; and such is the disposition of\r\nthe human mind to place confidence in the operation of mysterious agents,\r\nthat we find him more disposed to attribute his cure to a brown paper\r\nplaster of egg and brimstone, than to Dr. Fothergill’s salutary prescription\r\nof country air, rest, asses’ milk, and horse exercise.”\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca id=\"noteref_253\" name=\"noteref_253\" href=\"#note_253\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e253\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIn the following example, the circumstance overlooked was of a somewhat\r\ndifferent character. \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“When the yellow fever raged in America, the\r\npractitioners trusted exclusively to the copious use of mercury; at first\r\nthis plan was deemed so universally efficacious, that, in the enthusiasm of the\r\nmoment, it was triumphantly proclaimed that death never took place after\r\nthe mercury had evinced its effect upon the system: all this was very true,\r\nbut it furnished no proof of the efficacy of that metal, since the disease in its\r\naggravated form was so rapid in its career, that it swept away its victims\r\nlong before the system could be brought under mercurial influence, while in\r\nits milder shape it passed off equally well without any assistance from\r\nart.”\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca id=\"noteref_254\" name=\"noteref_254\" href=\"#note_254\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e254\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page544\"\u003e[pg 544]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg544\" id=\"Pg544\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIn these examples the circumstance overlooked was cognizable by the\r\nsenses. In other cases, it is one the knowledge of which could only be arrived\r\nat by reasoning; but the fallacy may still be classed under the head\r\nto which, for want of a more appropriate name, we have given the appellation\r\nFallacies of Non-observation. It is not the nature of the faculties\r\nwhich ought to have been employed, but the non-employment of them,\r\nwhich constitutes this Natural Order of Fallacies. Wherever the error is\r\nnegative, not positive; wherever it consists especially in \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eoverlooking\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e, in\r\nbeing ignorant or unmindful of some fact which, if known and attended to,\r\nwould have made a difference in the conclusion arrived at; the error is\r\nproperly placed in the Class which we are considering. In this Class, there\r\nis not, as in all other fallacies there is, a positive misestimate of evidence\r\nactually had. The conclusion would be just, if the portion which is seen\r\nof the case were the whole of it; but there is another portion overlooked,\r\nwhich vitiates the result.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nFor instance, there is a remarkable doctrine which has occasionally found\r\na vent in the public speeches of unwise legislators, but which only in one\r\ninstance that I am aware of has received the sanction of a philosophical\r\nwriter, namely, M. Cousin, who in his preface to the \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eGorgias\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e of\r\nPlato, contending that punishment must have some other and higher justification\r\nthan the prevention of crime, makes use of this argument—that if punishment\r\nwere only for the sake of example, it would be indifferent whether\r\nwe punished the innocent or the guilty, since the punishment, considered as\r\nan example, is equally efficacious in either case. Now we must, in order\r\nto go along with this reasoning, suppose, that the person who feels himself\r\nunder temptation, observing somebody punished, concludes himself to be\r\nin danger of being punished likewise, and is terrified accordingly. But it\r\nis forgotten that if the person punished is supposed to be innocent, or even\r\nif there be any doubt of his guilt, the spectator will reflect that his own\r\ndanger, whatever it may be, is not contingent on his guiltiness, but threatens\r\nhim equally if he remains innocent, and how, therefore, is he deterred\r\nfrom guilt by the apprehension of such punishment? M. Cousin supposes\r\nthat people will be dissuaded from guilt by whatever renders the condition\r\nof the guilty more perilous, forgetting that the condition of the innocent\r\n(also one of the elements in the calculation) is, in the case supposed,\r\nmade perilous in precisely an equal degree. This is a fallacy of overlooking;\r\nor of non-observation, within the intent of our classification.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nFallacies of this description are the great stumbling-block to correct\r\nthinking in political economy. The economical workings of society afford\r\nnumerous cases in which the effects of a cause consist of two sets of phenomena:\r\nthe one immediate, concentrated, obvious to all eyes, and passing,\r\nin common apprehension, for the whole effect; the other widely diffused,\r\nor lying deeper under the surface, and which is exactly contrary to the\r\nformer. Take, for instance, the common notion so plausible at the first\r\nglance, of the encouragement given to industry by lavish expenditure. A,\r\nwho spends his whole income, and even his capital, in expensive living, is\r\nsupposed to give great employment to labor. B, who lives on a small portion,\r\nand invests the remainder in the funds, is thought to give little or\r\nno employment. For every body sees the gains which are made by A’s\r\ntradesmen, servants, and others, while his money is spending. B’s savings,\r\non the contrary, pass into the hands of the person whose stock he\r\npurchased, who with it pays a debt he owed to some banker, who lends it\r\nagain to some merchant or manufacturer; and the capital being laid out\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page545\"\u003e[pg 545]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg545\" id=\"Pg545\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nin hiring spinners and weavers, or carriers and the crews of merchant vessels,\r\nnot only gives immediate employment to at least as much industry as\r\nA employs during the whole of his career, but coming back with increase\r\nby the sale of the goods which have been manufactured or imported, forms\r\na fund for the employment of the same and perhaps a greater quantity of\r\nlabor in perpetuity. But the observer does not see, and therefore does\r\nnot consider, what becomes of B’s money; he does see what is done with\r\nA’s; he observes the amount of industry which A’s profusion feeds; he\r\nobserves not the far greater quantity which it prevents from being fed;\r\nand thence the prejudice, universal to the time of Adam Smith, that prodigality\r\nencourages industry, and parsimony is a discouragement to it.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe common argument against free trade was a fallacy of the same nature.\r\nThe purchaser of British silk encourages British industry; the purchaser\r\nof Lyons silk encourages only French; the former conduct is patriotic,\r\nthe latter ought to be prevented by law. The circumstance is overlooked,\r\nthat the purchaser of any foreign commodity necessarily causes, directly\r\nor indirectly, the export of an equivalent value of some article of\r\nhome production (beyond what would otherwise be exported), either to\r\nthe same foreign country or to some other; which fact, though from the\r\ncomplication of the circumstances it can not always be verified by specific\r\nobservation, no observation can possibly be brought to contradict, while the\r\nevidence of reasoning on which it rests is irrefragable. The fallacy is,\r\ntherefore, the same as in the preceding case, that of seeing a part only of\r\nthe phenomena, and imagining that part to be the whole; and may be\r\nranked among Fallacies of Non-observation.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 5. To complete the examination of the second of our five classes, we\r\nhave now to speak of Mal-observation; in which the error does not lie in\r\nthe fact that something is unseen, but that something seen is seen wrong.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nPerception being infallible evidence of whatever is really perceived, the\r\nerror now under consideration can be committed no otherwise than by\r\nmistaking for conception what is, in fact, inference. We have formerly\r\nshown how intimately the two are blended in almost every thing which is\r\ncalled observation, and still more in every\r\nDescription.\u003ca id=\"noteref_255\" name=\"noteref_255\" href=\"#note_255\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e255\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e What is actually\r\non any occasion perceived by our senses being so minute in amount, and\r\ngenerally so unimportant a portion of the state of facts which we wish to\r\nascertain or to communicate; it would be absurd to say that either in our\r\nobservations, or in conveying their result to others, we ought not to mingle\r\ninference with fact; all that can be said is, that when we do so we ought\r\nto be aware of what we are doing, and to know what part of the assertion\r\nrests on consciousness, and is therefore indisputable, what part on inference,\r\nand is therefore questionable.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nOne of the most celebrated examples of a universal error produced by\r\nmistaking an inference for the direct evidence of the senses, was the resistance\r\nmade, on the ground of common sense, to the Copernican system.\r\nPeople fancied they \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003esaw\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e the sun rise and set, the stars revolve in circles\r\nround the pole. We now know that they saw no such thing; what they\r\nreally saw was a set of appearances, equally reconcilable with the theory\r\nthey held and with a totally different one. It seems strange that such an\r\ninstance as this of the testimony of the senses pleaded with the most entire\r\nconviction in favor of something which was a mere inference of the\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page546\"\u003e[pg 546]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg546\" id=\"Pg546\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\njudgment, and, as it turned out, a false inference, should not have opened\r\nthe eyes of the bigots of common sense, and inspired them with a more\r\nmodest distrust of the competency of mere ignorance to judge the conclusions\r\nof cultivated thought.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIn proportion to any person’s deficiency of knowledge and mental cultivation\r\nis, generally, his inability to discriminate between his inferences and\r\nthe perceptions on which they were grounded. Many a marvelous tale,\r\nmany a scandalous anecdote, owes its origin to this incapacity. The narrator\r\nrelates, not what he saw or heard, but the impression which he derived\r\nfrom what he saw or heard, and of which perhaps the greater part\r\nconsisted of inference, though the whole is related, not as inference but as\r\nmatter of fact. The difficulty of inducing witnesses to restrain within any\r\nmoderate limits the intermixture of their inferences with the narrative of\r\ntheir perceptions, is well known to experienced cross-examiners; and still\r\nmore is this the case when ignorant persons attempt to describe any natural\r\nphenomenon. \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“The simplest narrative,”\u003c/span\u003e says Dugald Stewart,\u003ca id=\"noteref_256\" name=\"noteref_256\" href=\"#note_256\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e256\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“of\r\nthe most illiterate observer involves more or less of hypothesis; nay, in\r\ngeneral, it will be found that, in proportion to his ignorance, the greater is\r\nthe number of conjectural principles involved in his statements. A village\r\napothecary (and, if possible, in a still greater degree, an experienced nurse)\r\nis seldom able to describe the plainest case, without employing a phraseology\r\nof which every word is a theory: whereas a simple and genuine specification\r\nof the phenomena which mark a particular disease; a specification\r\nunsophisticated by fancy, or by preconceived opinions, may be regarded as\r\nunequivocal evidence of a mind trained by long and successful study to the\r\nmost difficult of all arts, that of the faithful \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003einterpretation\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e\r\nof nature.”\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe universality of the confusion between perceptions and the inferences\r\ndrawn from them, and the rarity of the power to discriminate the one from\r\nthe other, ceases to surprise us when we consider that in the far greater\r\nnumber of instances the actual perceptions of our senses are of no importance\r\nor interest to us except as marks from which we infer something beyond\r\nthem. It is not the color and superficial extension perceived by the\r\neye that are important to us, but the object, of which those visible appearances\r\ntestify the presence; and where the sensation itself is indifferent, as\r\nit generally is, we have no motive to attend particularly to it, but acquire a\r\nhabit of passing it over without distinct consciousness, and going on at\r\nonce to the inference. So that to know what the sensation actually was, is\r\na study in itself, to which painters, for example, have to train themselves\r\nby special and long-continued discipline and application. In things farther\r\nremoved from the dominion of the outward senses, no one who has not\r\ngreat experience in psychological analysis is competent to break this intense\r\nassociation; and when such analytic habits do not exist in the requisite\r\ndegree, it is hardly possible to mention any of the habitual judgments\r\nof mankind on subjects of a high degree of abstraction, from the being of\r\na God and the immortality of the soul down to the multiplication table,\r\nwhich are not, or have not been, considered as matter of direct intuition.\r\nSo strong is the tendency to ascribe an intuitive character to judgments\r\nwhich are mere inferences, and often false ones. No one can doubt that\r\nmany a deluded visionary has actually believed that he was directly inspired\r\nfrom Heaven, and that the Almighty had conversed with him face\r\nto face; which yet was only, on his part, a conclusion drawn from appearances\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page547\"\u003e[pg 547]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg547\" id=\"Pg547\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nto his senses, or feelings in his internal consciousness, which afforded\r\nno warrant for any such belief. A caution, therefore, against this class of\r\nerrors, is not only needful but indispensable; though to determine whether,\r\non any of the great questions of metaphysics, such errors are actually\r\ncommitted, belongs not to this place, but, as I have so often said, to a different\r\nscience.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-div\" style=\"margin-bottom: 4.00em; margin-top: 4.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"toc121\" id=\"toc121\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"pdf122\" id=\"pdf122\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: center; margin-bottom: 2.40em; margin-top: 2.40em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 120%\"\u003eChapter V.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: left; margin-bottom: 2.88em; margin-top: 2.88em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 144%\"\u003eFallacies Of Generalization.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 1. The class of Fallacies of which we are now to speak, is the most\r\nextensive of all; embracing a greater number and variety of unfounded\r\ninferences than any of the other classes, and which it is even more difficult\r\nto reduce to sub-classes or species. If the attempt made in the preceding\r\nbooks to define the principles of well-grounded generalization has been\r\nsuccessful, all generalizations not conformable to those principles might,\r\nin a certain sense, be brought under the present class; when, however, the\r\nrules are known and kept in view, but a casual lapse committed in the application\r\nof them, this is a blunder, not a fallacy. To entitle an error of\r\ngeneralization to the latter epithet, it must be committed on principle;\r\nthere must lie in it some erroneous general conception of the inductive\r\nprocess; the legitimate mode of drawing conclusions from observation and\r\nexperiment must be fundamentally misconceived.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWithout attempting any thing so chimerical as an exhaustive classification\r\nof all the misconceptions which can exist on the subject, let us content\r\nourselves with noting, among the cautions which might be suggested,\r\na few of the most useful and needful.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 2. In the first place, there are certain kinds of generalization which,\r\nif the principles already laid down be correct, \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003emust\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e be groundless;\r\nexperience can not afford the necessary conditions for establishing them by a\r\ncorrect induction. Such, for instance, are all inferences from the order of\r\nnature existing on the earth, or in the solar system, to that which may\r\nexist in remote parts of the universe; where the phenomena, for aught we\r\nknow, may be entirely different, or may succeed one another according to\r\ndifferent laws, or even according to no fixed law at all. Such, again, in\r\nmatters dependent on causation, are all universal negatives, all propositions\r\nthat assert impossibility. The non-existence of any given phenomenon,\r\nhowever uniformly experience may as yet have testified to the fact, proves\r\nat most that no cause, adequate to its production, has yet manifested itself;\r\nbut that no such causes exist in nature can only be inferred if we are so\r\nfoolish as to suppose that we know all the forces in nature. The supposition\r\nwould at least be premature while our acquaintance with some even\r\nof those which we do know is so extremely recent. And however much\r\nour knowledge of nature may hereafter be extended, it is not easy to see\r\nhow that knowledge could ever be complete, or how, if it were, we could\r\never be assured of its being so.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe only laws of nature which afford sufficient warrant for attributing\r\nimpossibility (even with reference to the existing order of nature, and to\r\nour own region of the universe) are, first, those of number and extension,\r\nwhich are paramount to the laws of the succession of phenomena, and not\r\nexposed to the agency of counteracting causes; and, secondly, the universal\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page548\"\u003e[pg 548]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg548\" id=\"Pg548\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nlaw of causality itself. That no valuation in any effect or consequent will\r\ntake place while the whole of the antecedents remain the same, may be\r\naffirmed with full assurance. But, that the addition of some new antecedent\r\nmight not entirely alter and subvert the accustomed consequent, or that\r\nantecedents competent to do this do not exist in nature, we are in no case\r\nempowered positively to conclude.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 3. It is next to be remarked that all generalizations which profess,\r\nlike the theories of Thales, Democritus, and others of the early Greek\r\nspeculators, to resolve all things into some one element, or like many modern\r\ntheories, to resolve phenomena radically different into the same, are\r\nnecessarily false. By radically different phenomena I mean impressions\r\non our senses which differ in quality, and not merely in degree. On this\r\nsubject what appeared necessary was said in the chapter on the Limits to\r\nthe Explanation of Laws of Nature; but as the fallacy is even in our own\r\ntimes a common one, I shall touch on it somewhat further in this place.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWhen we say that the force which retains the planets in their orbits is\r\nresolved into gravity, or that the force which makes substances combine\r\nchemically is resolved into electricity, we assert in the one case what is,\r\nand in the other case what might, and probably will ultimately, be a legitimate\r\nresult of induction. In both these cases motion is resolved into motion.\r\nThe assertion is, that a case of motion, which was supposed to be\r\nspecial, and to follow a distinct law of its own, conforms to and is included\r\nin the general law which regulates another class of motions. But, from\r\nthese and similar generalizations, countenance and currency have been\r\ngiven to attempts to resolve, not motion into motion, but heat into motion,\r\nlight into motion, sensation itself into motion; states of consciousness into\r\nstates of the nervous system, as in the ruder forms of the materialist philosophy;\r\nvital phenomena into mechanical or chemical processes, as in\r\nsome schools of physiology.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nNow I am far from pretending that it may not be capable of proof, or\r\nthat it is not an important addition to our knowledge if proved, that certain\r\nmotions in the particles of bodies are the \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003econditions\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e of the production\r\nof heat or light; that certain assignable physical modifications of the nerves\r\nmay be the conditions not only of our sensations or emotions, but even of\r\nour thoughts; that certain mechanical and chemical conditions may, in the\r\norder of nature, be sufficient to determine to action the physiological laws\r\nof life. All I insist upon, in common with every thinker who entertains\r\nany clear idea of the logic of science, is, that it shall not be supposed that\r\nby proving these things one step would be made toward a real explanation\r\nof heat, light, or sensation; or that the generic peculiarity of those phenomena\r\ncan be in the least degree evaded by any such discoveries, however\r\nwell established. Let it be shown, for instance, that the most complex\r\nseries of physical causes and effects succeed one another in the eye\r\nand in the brain to produce a sensation of color; rays falling on the eye,\r\nrefracted, converging, crossing one another, making an inverted image on\r\nthe retina, and after this a motion—let it be a vibration, or a rush of nervous\r\nfluid, or whatever else you are pleased to suppose, along the optic\r\nnerve—a propagation of this motion to the brain itself, and as many more\r\ndifferent motions as you choose; still, at the end of these motions, there is\r\nsomething which is not motion, there is a feeling or sensation of color.\r\nWhatever number of motions we may be able to interpolate, and whether\r\nthey be real or imaginary, we shall still find, at the end of the series, a motion\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page549\"\u003e[pg 549]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg549\" id=\"Pg549\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nantecedent and a color consequent. The mode in which any one of\r\nthe motions produces the next, may possibly be susceptible of explanation\r\nby some general law of motion: but the mode in which the last motion\r\nproduces the sensation of color, can not be explained by any law of motion;\r\nit is the law of color: which is, and must always remain, a peculiar\r\nthing. Where our consciousness recognizes between two phenomena an\r\ninherent distinction; where we are sensible of a difference which is not\r\nmerely of degree, and feel that no adding one of the phenomena to itself\r\nwould produce the other; any theory which attempts to bring either under\r\nthe laws of the other must be false; though a theory which merely\r\ntreats the one as a cause or condition of the other, may possibly be true.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 4. Among the remaining forms of erroneous generalization, several of\r\nthose most worthy of and most requiring notice have fallen under our examination\r\nin former places, where, in investigating the rules of correct induction,\r\nwe have had occasion to advert to the distinction between it and\r\nsome common mode of the incorrect. In this number is what I have formerly\r\ncalled the natural Induction of uninquiring minds, the induction of\r\nthe ancients, which proceeds \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eper enumerationem\r\nsimplicem\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e: \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“This, that,\r\nand the other A are B, I can not think of any A which is not B, therefore\r\nevery A is B.”\u003c/span\u003e As a final condemnation of this rude and slovenly mode\r\nof generalization, I will quote Bacon’s emphatic denunciation of it; the\r\nmost important part, as I have more than once ventured to assert, of the\r\npermanent service rendered by him to philosophy. \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Inductio quæ procedit\r\nper enumerationem simplicem, res puerilis est, et precario concludit”\u003c/span\u003e\r\n(concludes only \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eby your leave\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e, or provisionally), \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“et periculo exponitur ab\r\ninstantiâ contradictoriâ, et plerumque secundum pauciora quam par est, et\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eex his tantummodo quæ præsto sunt pronunciat\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e. At Inductio quæ ad inventionem\r\net demonstrationem Scientiarum et Artium erit utilis, Naturam\r\nseparare debet, per rejectiones et exclusiones debitas; ac deinde post negativas\r\ntot quot sufficiunt, super affirmativas concludere.”\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nI have already said that the mode of Simple Enumeration is still the\r\ncommon and received method of Induction in whatever relates to man and\r\nsociety. Of this a very few instances, more by way of memento than of\r\ninstruction, may suffice. What, for example, is to be thought of all the\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“common-sense”\u003c/span\u003e maxims for which the following may serve as the universal\r\nformula, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Whatsoever has never been, will never be.”\u003c/span\u003e As for example:\r\nnegroes have never been as civilized as whites sometimes are,\r\ntherefore it is impossible they should be so. Women, as a class, are supposed\r\nnot to have hitherto been equal in intellect to men, therefore they\r\nare necessarily inferior. Society can not prosper without this or the other\r\ninstitution; \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ee.g.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, in Aristotle’s time, without slavery; in later\r\ntimes, without an established priesthood, without artificial distinctions of rank, etc.\r\nOne poor person in a thousand, educated, while the nine hundred and ninety-nine\r\nremain uneducated, has usually aimed at raising himself out of his\r\nclass, therefore education makes people dissatisfied with the condition of a\r\nlaborer. Bookish men, taken from speculative pursuits and set to work\r\non something they know nothing about, have generally been found or\r\nthought to do it ill; therefore philosophers are unfit for business, etc.,\r\netc. All these are inductions by simple enumeration. Reasons having\r\nsome reference to the canons of scientific investigation have been attempted\r\nto be given, however unsuccessfully, for some of these propositions;\r\nbut to the multitude of those who parrot them, the\r\n\u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eenumeratio simplex, ex\r\n\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page550\"\u003e[pg 550]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg550\" id=\"Pg550\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003e\r\nhis tantummodo quæ præsto sunt pronuncians\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, is the sole evidence. Their\r\nfallacy consists in this, that they are inductions without elimination: there\r\nhas been no real comparison of instances, nor even ascertainment of the\r\nmaterial facts in any given instance. There is also the further error, of\r\nforgetting that such generalizations, even if well established, could not be\r\nultimate truths, but must be results of laws much more elementary; and\r\ntherefore, until deduced from such, could at most be admitted as empirical\r\nlaws, holding good within the limits of space and time by which the particular\r\nobservations that suggested the generalization were bounded.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThis error, of placing mere empirical laws, and laws in which there is no\r\ndirect evidence of causation, on the same footing of certainty as laws of\r\ncause and effect, an error which is at the root of perhaps the greater number\r\nof bad inductions, is exemplified only in its grossest form in the kind\r\nof generalizations to which we have now referred. These, indeed, do not\r\npossess even the degree of evidence which pertains to a well-ascertained\r\nempirical law; but admit of refutation on the empirical ground itself, without\r\nascending to casual laws. A little reflection, indeed, will show that\r\nmere negations can only form the ground of the lowest and least valuable\r\nkind of empirical law. A phenomenon has never been noticed; this only\r\nproves that the conditions of that phenomenon have not yet occurred in experience,\r\nbut does not prove that they may not occur hereafter. There is\r\na better kind of empirical law than this, namely, when a phenomenon which\r\nis observed presents within the limits of observation a series of gradations,\r\nin which a regularity, or something like a mathematical law, is perceptible;\r\nfrom which, therefore, something may be rationally presumed as to those\r\nterms of the series which are beyond the limits of observation. But in negation\r\nthere are no gradations, and no series; the generalizations, therefore,\r\nwhich deny the possibility of any given condition of man and society merely\r\nbecause it has never yet been witnessed, can not possess this higher degree\r\nof validity even as empirical laws. What is more, the minuter examination\r\nwhich that higher order of empirical laws presupposes, being applied to\r\nthe subject-matter of these, not only does not confirm but actually refutes\r\nthem. For in reality the past history of Man and Society, instead of exhibiting\r\nthem as immovable, unchangeable, incapable of ever presenting\r\nnew phenomena, shows them, on the contrary, to be, in many most important\r\nparticulars, not only changeable, but actually undergoing a progressive\r\nchange. The empirical law, therefore, best expressive, in most cases, of the\r\ngenuine result of observation, would be, not that such and such a phenomenon\r\nwill continue unchanged, but that it will continue to change in some\r\nparticular manner.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAccordingly, while almost all generalizations relating to Man and Society,\r\nantecedent to the last fifty or sixty years, have erred in the gross way which\r\nwe have attempted to characterize, namely, by implicitly assuming that nature\r\nand society will forever revolve in the same orbit, and exhibit essentially\r\nthe same phenomena; which is also the vulgar error of the ostentatiously\r\npractical, the votaries of so-called common sense, in our day, especially in\r\nGreat Britain; the more thinking minds of the present age, having applied\r\na more minute analysis to the past records of our race, have for the most\r\npart adopted a contrary opinion, that the human species is in a state of necessary\r\nprogression, and that from the terms of the series which are past we\r\nmay infer positively those which are yet to come. Of this doctrine, considered\r\nas a philosophical tenet, we shall have occasion to speak more fully in\r\nthe concluding Book. If not, in all its forms, free from error, it is at least\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page551\"\u003e[pg 551]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg551\" id=\"Pg551\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nfree from the gross and error which we previously exemplified. But,\r\nin all except the most eminently philosophical minds, it is infected with precisely\r\nthe same \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ekind\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e of fallacy as that is. For we must remember that even\r\nthis other and better generalization, the progressive change in the condition\r\nof the human species, is, after all, but an empirical law; to which, too, it is\r\nnot difficult to point out exceedingly large exceptions; and even if these\r\ncould be got rid of, either by disputing the facts or by explaining and limiting\r\nthe theory, the general objection remains valid against the supposed\r\nlaw, as applicable to any other than what, in our third book, were termed\r\nAdjacent Cases. For not only is it no ultimate, but not even a causal law.\r\nChanges do indeed take place in human affairs, but every one of those\r\nchanges depends on determinate causes; the \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“progressiveness of the species”\u003c/span\u003e\r\nis not a cause, but a summary expression for the general result of all the\r\ncauses. So soon as, by a quite different sort of induction, it shall be ascertained\r\nwhat causes have produced these successive changes, from the beginning\r\nof history, in so far as they have really taken place, and by what causes\r\nof a contrary tendency they have been occasionally checked or entirely\r\ncounteracted, we may then be prepared to predict the future with reasonable\r\nforesight; we may be in possession of the real \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003elaw\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e of the future; and\r\nmay be able to declare on what circumstances the continuance of the same\r\nonward movement will eventually depend. But this it is the error of many\r\nof the more advanced thinkers, in the present age, to overlook; and to imagine\r\nthat the empirical law collected from a mere comparison of the condition\r\nof our species at different past times, is a real law, is \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ethe\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e law of its\r\nchanges, not only past but also to come. The truth is, that the causes on\r\nwhich the phenomena of the moral world depend, are in every age, and almost\r\nin every country, combined in some different proportion; so that it is\r\nscarcely to be expected that the general result of them all should conform\r\nvery closely, in its details at least, to any uniformly progressive series. And\r\nall generalizations which affirm that mankind have a tendency to grow better\r\nor worse, richer or poorer, more cultivated or more barbarous, that population\r\nincreases faster than subsistence, or subsistence than population,\r\nthat inequality of fortune has a tendency to increase or to break down, and\r\nthe like, propositions of considerable value as empirical laws within certain\r\n(but generally rather narrow) limits, are in reality true or false according\r\nto times and circumstances.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWhat we have said of empirical generalizations from times past to times\r\nstill to come, holds equally true of similar generalizations from present\r\ntimes to times past; when persons whose acquaintance with moral and social\r\nfacts is confined to their own age, take the men and the things of that\r\nage for the type of men and things in general, and apply without scruple\r\nto the interpretation of the events of history, the empirical laws which represent\r\nsufficiently for daily guidance the common phenomena of human\r\nnature at that time and in that particular state of society. If examples\r\nare wanted, almost every historical work, until a very recent period, abounded\r\nin them. The same may be said of those who generalize empirically\r\nfrom the people of their own country to the people of other countries, as\r\nif human beings felt, judged, and acted everywhere in the same manner.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 5. In the foregoing instances, the distinction is confounded between\r\nempirical laws, which express merely the customary order of the succession\r\nof effects, and the laws of causation on which the effects depend. There\r\nmay, however, be incorrect generalization when this mistake is not committed;\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page552\"\u003e[pg 552]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg552\" id=\"Pg552\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nwhen the investigation takes its proper direction, that of causes,\r\nand the result erroneously obtained purports to be a really causal law.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe most vulgar form of this fallacy is that which is commonly called\r\n\u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003epost hoc, ergo propter hoc\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, or,\r\n\u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ecum hoc, ergo propter hoc\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e. As when it was\r\ninferred that England owed her industrial pre-eminence to her restrictions\r\non commerce; as when the old school of financiers, and some speculative\r\nwriters, maintained that the national debt was one of the causes of national\r\nprosperity; as when the excellence of the Church, of the Houses of\r\nLords and Commons, of the procedure of the law courts, etc., were inferred\r\nfrom the mere fact that the country had prospered under them. In\r\nsuch cases as these, if it can be rendered probable by other evidence that\r\nthe supposed causes have some tendency to produce the effect ascribed to\r\nthem, the fact of its having been produced, though only in one instance, is\r\nof some value as a verification by specific experience; but in itself it goes\r\nscarcely any way at all toward establishing such a tendency, since, admitting\r\nthe effect, a hundred other antecedents could show an equally strong\r\ntitle of \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ethat\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e kind to be considered as the cause.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIn these examples we see bad generalization \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\r\nposteriori\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, or empiricism\r\nproperly so called; causation inferred from casual conjunction, without either\r\ndue elimination, or any presumption arising from known properties\r\nof the supposed agent. But bad generalization \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\r\npriori\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e is fully as common;\r\nwhich is properly called false theory; conclusions drawn, by way of deduction,\r\nfrom properties of some one agent which is known or supposed to be\r\npresent, all other co-existing agents being overlooked. As the former is\r\nthe error of sheer ignorance, so the latter is especially that of semi-instructed\r\nminds; and is mainly committed in attempting to explain complicated\r\nphenomena by a simpler theory than their nature admits of. As when one\r\nschool of physicians sought for the universal principle of all disease in\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“lentor and morbid viscidity of the blood,”\u003c/span\u003e and imputing most bodily\r\nderangements to mechanical obstructions, thought to cure them by mechanical\r\nremedies;\u003ca id=\"noteref_257\" name=\"noteref_257\" href=\"#note_257\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e257\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nwhile another, the chemical school, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“acknowledged no\r\nsource of disease but the presence of some hostile acid or alkali, or some\r\nderanged condition in the chemical composition of the fluid or solid parts,”\u003c/span\u003e\r\nand conceived, therefore, that \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“all remedies must act by producing chemical\r\nchanges in the body.”\u003c/span\u003e We find Tournefort busily engaged in testing\r\nevery vegetable juice, in order to discover in it some traces of an acid or\r\nalkaline ingredient, which might confer upon it medicinal activity. The\r\nfatal errors into which such an hypothesis was liable to betray the practitioner,\r\nreceived an awful illustration in the history of the memorable fever\r\nthat raged at Leyden in the year 1699, and which consigned two-thirds of\r\nthe population of that city to an untimely grave; an event which in a great\r\nmeasure depended upon the Professor Sylvius de la Boe, who having just\r\nembraced the chemical doctrines of Van Helmont, assigned the origin of\r\nthe distemper to a prevailing acid, and declared that its cure could alone\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page553\"\u003e[pg 553]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg553\" id=\"Pg553\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n[only] be effected by the copious administration of absorbent and testaceous\r\nmedicines.\u003ca id=\"noteref_258\" name=\"noteref_258\" href=\"#note_258\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e258\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThese aberrations in medical theory have their exact parallels in politics.\r\nAll the doctrines which ascribe absolute goodness to particular forms of\r\ngovernment, particular social arrangements, and even to particular modes of\r\neducation, without reference to the state of civilization and the various distinguishing\r\ncharacters of the society for which they are intended, are open\r\nto the same objection—that of assuming one class of influencing circumstances\r\nto be the paramount rulers of phenomena which depend in an equal\r\nor greater degree on many others. But on these considerations it is the\r\nless necessary that we should now dwell, as they will occupy our attention\r\nmore largely in the concluding Book.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 6. The last of the modes of erroneous generalization to which I shall\r\nadvert, is that to which we may give the name of False Analogies. This\r\nFallacy stands distinguished from those already treated of by the peculiarity\r\nthat it does not even simulate a complete and conclusive induction, but\r\nconsists in the misapplication of an argument which is at best only admissible\r\nas an inconclusive presumption, where real proof is unattainable.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAn argument from analogy, is an inference that what is true in a certain\r\ncase is true in a case known to be somewhat similar, but not known to be\r\nexactly parallel, that is, to be similar in all the material circumstances. An\r\nobject has the property B: another object is not known to have that property,\r\nbut resembles the first in a property A, not known to be connected\r\nwith B; and the conclusion to which the analogy points, is that this object\r\nhas the property B also. As, for example, that the planets are inhabited,\r\nbecause the earth is so. The planets resemble the earth in describing\r\nelliptical orbits round the sun, in being attracted by it and by one another,\r\nin being nearly spherical, revolving on their axes, etc.; and, as we have\r\nnow reason to believe from the revelations of the spectroscope, are composed,\r\nin great part at least, of similar materials; but it is not known that\r\nany of these properties, or all of them together, are the conditions on which\r\nthe possession of inhabitants is dependent, or are marks of those conditions.\r\nNevertheless, so long as we do not know what the conditions are, they\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003emay\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e be connected by some law of nature with those common properties;\r\nand to the extent of that possibility the planets are more likely to be inhabited\r\nthan if they did not resemble the earth at all. This non-assignable\r\nand generally small increase of probability, beyond what would otherwise\r\nexist, is all the evidence which a conclusion can derive from analogy. For\r\nif we have the slightest reason to suppose any real connection between\r\nthe two properties A and B, the argument is no longer one of analogy. If\r\nit had been ascertained (I purposely put an absurd supposition) that there\r\nwas a connection by causation between the fact of revolving on an axis\r\nand the existence of animated beings, or if there were any reasonable\r\nground for even suspecting such a connection, a probability would arise\r\nof the existence of inhabitants in the planets, which might be of any degree\r\nof strength, up to a complete induction; but we should then infer the\r\nfact from the ascertained or presumed law of causation, and not from the\r\nanalogy of the earth.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe name analogy, however, is sometimes employed by extension to\r\ndenote those arguments of an inductive character but not amounting to\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page554\"\u003e[pg 554]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg554\" id=\"Pg554\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\na real induction, which are employed to strengthen the argument drawn\r\nfrom a simple resemblance. Though A, the property common to the two\r\ncases, can not be shown to be the cause or effect of B, the analogical reasoner\r\nwill endeavor to show that there is some less close degree of connection\r\nbetween them; that A is one of a set of conditions from which, when\r\nall united, B would result; or is an occasional effect of some cause which\r\nhas been known also to produce B; and the like. Any of which things,\r\nif shown, would render the existence of B by so much more probable,\r\nthan if there had not been even that amount of known connection between\r\nB and A.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nNow an error or fallacy of analogy may occur in two ways. Sometimes\r\nit consists in employing an argument of either of the above kinds with\r\ncorrectness indeed, but overrating its probative force. This very common\r\naberration is sometimes supposed to be particularly incident to persons\r\ndistinguished for their imagination; but in reality it is the characteristic\r\nintellectual vice of those whose imaginations are barren, either from want\r\nof exercise, natural defect, or the narrowness of their range of ideas. To\r\nsuch minds objects present themselves clothed in but few properties; and\r\nas, therefore, few analogies between one object and another occur to them,\r\nthey almost invariably overrate the degree of importance of those few:\r\nwhile one whose fancy takes a wider range, perceives and remembers so\r\nmany analogies tending to conflicting conclusions, that he is much less\r\nlikely to lay undue stress on any of them. We always find that those\r\nare the greatest slaves to metaphorical language who have but one set\r\nof metaphors.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nBut this is only one of the modes of error in the employment of arguments\r\nof analogy. There is another, more properly deserving the name\r\nof fallacy; namely, when resemblance in one point is inferred from resemblance\r\nin another point, though there is not only no evidence to connect\r\nthe two circumstances by way of causation, but the evidence tends positively\r\nto disconnect them. This is properly the Fallacy of False Analogies.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAs a first instance, we may cite that favorite argument in defense of\r\nabsolute power, drawn from the analogy of paternal government in a family,\r\nwhich government, however much in need of control, is not and can\r\nnot be controlled by the children themselves, while they remain children.\r\nPaternal government, says the argument, works well; therefore, despotic\r\ngovernment in a state will work well. I waive, as not pertinent in this\r\nplace, all that could be said in qualification of the alleged excellence of\r\npaternal government. However this might be, the argument from the\r\nfamily to the state would not the less proceed on a false analogy; implying\r\nthat the beneficial working of parental government depends, in the\r\nfamily, on the only point which it has in common with political despotism,\r\nnamely, irresponsibility. Whereas it depends, when real, not on that but\r\non two other circumstances of the case, the affection of the parent for the\r\nchildren, and the superiority of the parent in wisdom and experience;\r\nneither of which properties can be reckoned on, or are at all likely to exist,\r\nbetween a political despot and his subjects; and when either of these circumstances\r\nfails even in the family, and the influence of the irresponsibility\r\nis allowed to work uncorrected, the result is any thing but good government.\r\nThis, therefore, is a false analogy.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAnother example is the not uncommon \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003edictum\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e that bodies politic have\r\nyouth, maturity, old age, and death, like bodies natural; that after a certain\r\nduration of prosperity, they tend spontaneously to decay. This also\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page555\"\u003e[pg 555]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg555\" id=\"Pg555\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nis a false analogy, because the decay of the vital powers in an animated\r\nbody can be distinctly traced to the natural progress of those very changes\r\nof structure which, in their earlier stages, constitutes its growth to maturity;\r\nwhile in the body politic the progress of those changes can not, generally\r\nspeaking, have any effect but the still further continuance of growth:\r\nit is the stoppage of that progress, and the commencement of retrogression,\r\nthat alone would constitute decay. Bodies politic die, but it is of disease,\r\nor violent death; they have no old age.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe following sentence from Hooker’s \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eEcclesiastical Polity\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e is an\r\ninstance of a false analogy from physical bodies to what are called bodies\r\npolitic. \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“As there could be in natural bodies no motion of any thing unless\r\nthere were some which moveth all things, and continueth immovable;\r\neven so in politic societies there must be some unpunishable, or else no\r\nman shall suffer punishment.”\u003c/span\u003e There is a double fallacy here, for not only\r\nthe analogy, but the premise from which it is drawn, is untenable. The\r\nnotion that there must be something immovable which moves all other\r\nthings, is the old scholastic error of a \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eprimum\r\nmobile\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe following instance I quote from Archbishop Whately’s \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eRhetoric\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e:\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“It would be admitted that a great and permanent diminution in the quantity\r\nof some useful commodity, such as corn, or coal, or iron, throughout\r\nthe world, would be a serious and lasting loss; and again, that if the fields\r\nand coal-mines yielded regularly double quantities, with the same labor,\r\nwe should be so much the richer; hence it might be inferred, that if the\r\nquantity of gold and silver in the world were diminished one-half, or were\r\ndoubled, like results would follow; the utility of these metals, for the purposes\r\nof coin, being very great. Now there are many points of resemblance\r\nand many of difference, between the precious metals on the one\r\nhand, and corn, coal, etc., on the other; but the important circumstance to\r\nthe supposed argument is, that the \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eutility\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e of gold and silver (as coin,\r\nwhich is far the chief) \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003edepends on their value\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e, which is regulated by their\r\nscarcity; or rather, to speak strictly, by the difficulty of obtaining them;\r\nwhereas, if corn and coal were ten times as abundant (\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, more\r\neasily obtained), a bushel of either would still be as useful as now. But if it were\r\ntwice as easy to procure gold as it is, a sovereign would be twice as large;\r\nif only half as easy, it would be of the size of a half-sovereign, and this (besides\r\nthe trifling circumstance of the cheapness or dearness of gold ornaments)\r\nwould be all the difference. The analogy, therefore, fails in the\r\npoint essential to the argument.”\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe same author notices, after Bishop Copleston, the case of False\r\nAnalogy which consists in inferring from the similarity in many respects\r\nbetween the metropolis of a country and the heart of the animal body,\r\nthat the increased size of the metropolis is a disease.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nSome of the false analogies on which systems of physics were confidently\r\ngrounded in the time of the Greek philosophers, are such as we now\r\ncall fanciful, not that the resemblances are not often real, but that it is\r\nlong since any one has been inclined to draw from them the inferences\r\nwhich were then drawn. Such, for instance, are the curious speculations\r\nof the Pythagoreans on the subject of numbers. Finding that the distances\r\nof the planets bore, or seemed to bear, to one another a proportion\r\nnot varying much from that of the divisions of the monochord, they inferred\r\nfrom it the existence of an inaudible music, that of the spheres; as\r\nif the music of a harp had depended solely on the numerical proportions,\r\nand not on the material, nor even on the existence of any material, any\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page556\"\u003e[pg 556]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg556\" id=\"Pg556\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nstrings at all. It has been similarly imagined that certain combinations\r\nof numbers, which were found to prevail in some natural phenomena, must\r\nrun through the whole of nature: as that there must be four elements,\r\nbecause there are four possible combinations of hot and cold, wet and dry;\r\nthat there must be seven planets, because there were seven metals, and\r\neven because there were seven days of the week. Kepler himself thought\r\nthat there could be only six planets, because there were only five regular\r\nsolids. With these we may class the reasonings, so common in the speculations\r\nof the ancients, founded on a supposed \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eperfection\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e in nature; meaning\r\nby nature the customary order of events as they take place of themselves\r\nwithout human interference. This also is a rude guess at an analogy\r\nsupposed to pervade all phenomena, however dissimilar. Since what\r\nwas thought to be perfection appeared to obtain in some phenomena, it\r\nwas inferred (in opposition to the plainest evidence) to obtain in all.\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“We always suppose that which is better to take place in nature, if it be\r\npossible,”\u003c/span\u003e says Aristotle; and the vaguest and most heterogeneous qualities\r\nbeing confounded together under the notion of being \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ebetter\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e, there was\r\nno limit to the wildness of the inferences. Thus, because the heavenly\r\nbodies were \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“perfect,”\u003c/span\u003e they must move in circles and uniformly. For\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“they”\u003c/span\u003e (the Pythagoreans) \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“would not allow,”\u003c/span\u003e says Geminus,\u003ca id=\"noteref_259\" name=\"noteref_259\" href=\"#note_259\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e259\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“of any such disorder among divine and eternal things, as that they should sometimes\r\nmove quicker and sometimes slower, and sometimes stand still; for\r\nno one would tolerate such anomaly in the movements even of a man, who\r\nwas decent and orderly. The occasions of life, however, are often reasons\r\nfor men going quicker or slower; but in the incorruptible nature of the\r\nstars, it is not possible that any cause can be alleged of quickness or slowness.”\u003c/span\u003e\r\nIt is seeking an argument of analogy very far, to suppose that the\r\nstars must observe the rules of decorum in gait and carriage prescribed\r\nfor themselves by the long-bearded philosophers satirized by Lucian.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAs late as the Copernican controversy it was urged as an argument in\r\nfavor of the true theory of the solar system, that it placed the fire, the noblest\r\nelement, in the centre of the universe. This was a remnant of the notion\r\nthat the order of nature must be perfect, and that perfection consisted\r\nin conformity to rules of precedency in dignity, either real or conventional.\r\nAgain, reverting to numbers: certain numbers were \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eperfect\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e, therefore those\r\nnumbers must obtain in the great phenomena of nature. Six was a perfect\r\nnumber, that is, equal to the sum of all its factors; an additional reason\r\nwhy there must be exactly six planets. The Pythagoreans, on the other\r\nhand, attributed perfection to the number ten; but agreed in thinking\r\nthat the perfect number must be somehow realized in the heavens; and\r\nknowing only of nine heavenly bodies, to make up the enumeration, they\r\nasserted \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“that there was an \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-foreign\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eantichthon\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\nor counter-earth, on the other side\r\nof the sun, invisible to us.”\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca id=\"noteref_260\" name=\"noteref_260\" href=\"#note_260\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e260\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e Even Huygens was persuaded that when the\r\nnumber of the heavenly bodies had reached twelve, it could not admit of\r\nany further increase. Creative power could not go beyond that sacred\r\nnumber.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nSome curious instances of false analogy are to be found in the arguments\r\nof the Stoics to prove the equality of all crimes, and the equal wretchedness\r\nof all who had not realized their idea of perfect virtue. Cicero, toward the\r\nend of his Fourth Book, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eDe Finibus\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, states some of these as\r\nfollows: \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Ut, inquit, in fidibus plurimis, si nulla earum ita contenta numeris sit, ut\r\nconcentum\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page557\"\u003e[pg 557]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg557\" id=\"Pg557\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nservare possit, omnes æque incontentæ sunt; sic peccata, quia discrepant,\r\næque discrepant; paria sunt igitur.”\u003c/span\u003e To which Cicero himself aptly\r\nanswers, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“æque contingit omnibus fidibus, ut incontentæ sint; illud non continuo,\r\nut æque incontentæ.”\u003c/span\u003e The Stoic resumes: \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Ut enim, inquit, gubernator\r\næque peccat, si palearum navem evertit, et si auri; item æque peccat\r\nqui parentem, et qui servum, injuriâ verberat;”\u003c/span\u003e assuming, that because the\r\nmagnitude of the interest at stake makes no difference in the mere defect\r\nof skill, it can make none in the moral defect: a false analogy. Again,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Quis ignorat, si plures ex alto emergere velint, propius fore eos quidem\r\nad respirandum, qui ad summam jam aquam appropinquant, sed nihilo\r\nmagis respirare posse, quam eos, qui sunt in profundo? Nihil ergo adjuvat\r\nprocedere, et progredi in virtute, quominus miserrimus sit, antequam\r\nad eam pervenerit, quoniam in aquâ nihil adjuvat: et quoniam catuli, qui\r\njam despecturi sunt, cæci æque, et ii qui modo nati; Platonem quoque necesse\r\nest, quoniam nondum videbat sapientiam, æque cæcum animo, ac\r\nPhalarim fuisse.”\u003c/span\u003e Cicero, in his own person, combats these false analogies\r\nby other analogies tending to an opposite conclusion. \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Ista similia non\r\nsunt, Cato…. Illa sunt similia; hebes acies est cuipiam oculorum: corpore\r\nalius languescit: hi curatione adhibitâ levantur in dies: alter valet\r\nplus quotidie: alter videt. Hi similes sunt omnibus, qui virtuti student;\r\nlevantur vitiis, levantur erroribus.”\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 7. In these and all other arguments drawn from remote analogies, and\r\nfrom metaphors, which are cases of analogy, it is apparent (especially when\r\nwe consider the extreme facility of raising up contrary analogies and conflicting\r\nmetaphors) that, so far from the metaphor or analogy proving any\r\nthing, the applicability of the metaphor is the very thing to be made out.\r\nIt has to be shown that in the two cases asserted to be analogous, the same\r\nlaw is really operating; that between the known resemblance and the inferred\r\none there is some connection by means of causation. Cicero and\r\nCato might have bandied opposite analogies forever; it rested with each\r\nof them to prove by just induction, or at least to render probable, that the\r\ncase resembled the one set of analogous cases and not the other, in the circumstances\r\non which the disputed question really hinged. Metaphors, for\r\nthe most part, therefore, assume the proposition which they are brought to\r\nprove: their use is, to aid the apprehension of it; to make clearly and vividly\r\ncomprehended what it is that the person who employs the metaphor is\r\nproposing to make out; and sometimes also, by what media he proposes to do\r\nso. For an apt metaphor, though it can not prove, often suggests the proof.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nFor instance, when D’Alembert (I believe) remarked that in certain governments\r\nonly two creatures find their way to the highest places, the eagle\r\nand the serpent, the metaphor not only conveys with great vividness the\r\nassertion intended, but contributes toward substantiating it, by suggesting,\r\nin a lively manner, the means by which the two opposite characters thus\r\ntypified effect their rise. When it is said that a certain person misunderstands\r\nanother because the lesser of two objects can not comprehend the\r\ngreater, the application of what is true in the literal sense of the word\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ecomprehend\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, to its metaphorical sense, points to the fact which is\r\nthe ground and justification of the assertion, viz., that one mind can not thoroughly\r\nunderstand another unless it can contain it in itself, that is, unless it possesses\r\nall that is contained in the other. When it is urged as an argument\r\nfor education, that if the soil is left uncultivated, weeds will spring up, the\r\nmetaphor, though no proof, but a statement of the thing to be proved,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page558\"\u003e[pg 558]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg558\" id=\"Pg558\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nstates it in terms which, by suggesting a parallel case, put the mind upon\r\nthe track of the real proof. For, the reason why weeds grow in an uncultivated\r\nsoil, is that the seeds of worthless products exist everywhere, and\r\ncan germinate and grow in almost all circumstances, while the reverse is\r\nthe case with those which are valuable; and this being equally true of\r\nmental products, this mode of conveying an argument, independently of its\r\nrhetorical advantages, has a logical value; since it not only suggests the\r\ngrounds of the conclusion, but points to another case in which those grounds\r\nhave been found, or at least deemed to be, sufficient.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nOn the other hand, when Bacon, who is equally conspicuous in the use\r\nand abuse of figurative illustration, says that the stream of time has brought\r\ndown to us only the least valuable part of the writings of the ancients, as a\r\nriver carries froth and straws floating on its surface, while more weighty\r\nobjects sink to the bottom; this, even if the assertion illustrated by it were\r\ntrue, would be no good illustration, there being no parity of cause. The\r\nlevity by which substances float on a stream, and the levity which is synonymous\r\nwith worthlessness, have nothing in common except the name;\r\nand (to show how little value there is in the metaphor) we need only\r\nchange the word into \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ebuoyancy\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, to turn the semblance of argument\r\ninvolved in Bacon’s illustration against himself.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nA metaphor, then, is not to be considered as an argument, but as an\r\nassertion that an argument exists; that a parity subsists between the case\r\nfrom which the metaphor is drawn and that to which it is applied. This\r\nparity may exist though the two cases be apparently very remote from one\r\nanother; the only resemblance existing between them may be a resemblance\r\nof relations, an analogy in Ferguson’s and Archbishop Whately’s\r\nsense: as in the preceding instance, in which an illustration from agriculture\r\nwas applied to mental cultivation.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 8. To terminate the subject of Fallacies of Generalization, it remains\r\nto be said, that the most fertile source of them is bad classification: bringing\r\ntogether in one group, and under one name, things which have no common\r\nproperties, or none but such as are too unimportant to allow general\r\npropositions of any considerable value to be made respecting the class.\r\nThe misleading effect is greatest, when a word which in common use expresses\r\nsome definite fact, is extended by slight links of connection to\r\ncases in which that fact does not exist, but some other or others, only\r\nslightly resembling it. Thus Bacon,\u003ca id=\"noteref_261\" name=\"noteref_261\" href=\"#note_261\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e261\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e in speaking of the \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eIdola\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e or Fallacies\r\narising from notions \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003etemere\r\net inæqualiter à rebus abstractæ\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, exemplifies\r\nthem by the notion of Humidum or Wet, so familiar in the physics of antiquity\r\nand of the Middle Ages. \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Invenietur verbum istud, Humidum,\r\nnihil aliud quam nota confusa diversarum actionum, quæ nullam constantiam\r\naut reductionem patiuntur. Significat enim, et quod circa aliud corpus\r\nfacile se circumfundit; et quod in se est indeterminabile, nec consistere\r\npotest; et quod facile cedit undique; et quod facile se dividit et dispergit;\r\net quod facile se unit et colligit; et quod facile fluit, et in motu ponitur;\r\net quod alteri corpori facile adhæret, idque madefacit; et quod facile reducitur\r\nin liquidum, sive colliquatur, cum antea consisteret. Itaque quum ad\r\nhujus nominis prædicationem et impositionem ventum sit; si alia accipias,\r\nflamma humida est; si alia accipias, aer humidus non est; si alia, pulvis\r\nminutus humidus est; si alia, vitrum humidum est: ut facile appareat,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page559\"\u003e[pg 559]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg559\" id=\"Pg559\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nistam notionem ex aquâ tantum, et communibus et vulgaribus liquoribus,\r\nabsque ullâ debitâ verificatione, temere abstractam esse.”\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nBacon himself is not exempt from a similar accusation when inquiring\r\ninto the nature of heat: where he occasionally proceeds like one who, seeking\r\nfor the cause of hardness, after examining that quality in iron, flint, and\r\ndiamond, should expect to find that it is something which can be traced\r\nalso in hard water, a hard knot, and a hard heart.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe word κίνησις in the Greek philosophy, and the words Generation and\r\nCorruption, both then and long afterward, denoted such a multitude of\r\nheterogeneous phenomena, that any attempt at philosophizing in which\r\nthose words were used was almost as necessarily abortive as if the word\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ehard\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e had been taken to denote a class including all the things\r\nmentioned above. Κίνησις, for instance, which properly signified motion, was taken to\r\ndenote not only all motion but even all change: ἀλλοίωσις being recognized\r\nas one of the modes of κίνησις. The effect was, to connect with every form\r\nof ἀλλοίωσις or change, ideas drawn from motion in the proper and literal\r\nsense, and which had no real connection with any other kind of κίνησις than\r\nthat. Aristotle and Plato labored under a continual embarrassment from\r\nthis misuse of terms. But if we proceed further in this direction we shall\r\nencroach upon the Fallacy of Ambiguity, which belongs to a different class,\r\nthe last in order of our classification, Fallacies of Confusion.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-div\" style=\"margin-bottom: 4.00em; margin-top: 4.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"toc123\" id=\"toc123\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"pdf124\" id=\"pdf124\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: center; margin-bottom: 2.40em; margin-top: 2.40em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 120%\"\u003eChapter VI.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: left; margin-bottom: 2.88em; margin-top: 2.88em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 144%\"\u003eFallacies Of Ratiocination.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 1. We have now, in our progress through the classes of Fallacies, arrived\r\nat those to which, in the common books of logic, the appellation is\r\nin general exclusively appropriated; those which have their seat in the\r\nratiocinative or deductive part of the investigation of truth. Of these fallacies\r\nit is the less necessary for us to insist at any length, as they have\r\nbeen most satisfactorily treated in a work familiar to almost all, in this\r\ncountry at least, who feel any interest in these speculations, Archbishop\r\nWhately’s \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eLogic\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e. Against the more obvious forms of this class of\r\nfallacies, the rules of the syllogism are a complete protection. Not (as we\r\nhave so often said) that ratiocination can not be good unless it be in the\r\nform of a syllogism; but that, by showing it in that form, we are sure to\r\ndiscover if it be bad, or at least if it contain any fallacy of this class.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 2. Among Fallacies of Ratiocination, we ought perhaps to include the\r\nerrors committed in processes which have the appearance only, not the reality,\r\nof an inference from premises; the fallacies connected with the conversion\r\nand æquipollency of propositions. I believe errors of this description\r\nto be far more frequently committed than is generally supposed, or\r\nthan their extreme obviousness might seem to admit of. For example,\r\nthe simple conversion of a universal affirmative proposition, All A are B,\r\ntherefore all B are A, I take to be a very common form of error: though\r\ncommitted, like many other fallacies, oftener in the silence of thought than\r\nin express words, for it can scarcely be clearly enunciated without being\r\ndetected. And so with another form of fallacy, not substantially different\r\nfrom the preceding: the erroneous conversion of an hypothetical proposition.\r\nThe proper converse of an hypothetical proposition is this: If the\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page560\"\u003e[pg 560]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg560\" id=\"Pg560\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nconsequent be false, the antecedent is false; but this, If the consequent be\r\ntrue, the antecedent is true, by no means holds good, but is an error corresponding\r\nto the simple conversion of a universal affirmative. Yet hardly\r\nany thing is more common than for people, in their private thoughts, to\r\ndraw this inference. As when the conclusion is accepted, which it so often\r\nis, for proof of the premises. That the premises can not be true if\r\nthe conclusion is false, is the unexceptionable foundation of the legitimate\r\nmode of reasoning called \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ereductio ad\r\nabsurdum\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e. But people continually\r\nthink and express themselves, as if they also believed that the premises\r\ncan not be false if the conclusion is true. The truth, or supposed truth, of\r\nthe inferences which follow from a doctrine, often enables it to find acceptance\r\nin spite of gross absurdities in it. How many philosophical systems\r\nwhich had scarcely any intrinsic recommendation, have been received by\r\nthoughtful men because they were supposed to lend additional support to\r\nreligion, morality, some favorite view of politics, or some other cherished\r\npersuasion: not merely because their wishes were thereby enlisted on its\r\nside, but because its leading to what they deemed sound conclusions appeared\r\nto them a strong presumption in favor of its truth: though the\r\npresumption, when viewed in its true light, amounted only to the absence\r\nof that particular evidence of falsehood, which would have resulted from\r\nits leading by correct inference to something already known to be false.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAgain, the very frequent error in conduct, of mistaking reverse of wrong\r\nfor right, is the practical form of a logical error with respect to the Opposition\r\nof Propositions. It is committed for want of the habit of distinguishing\r\nthe \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003econtrary\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e of a proposition from the \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003econtradictory\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e of it, and\r\nof attending to the logical canon, that contrary propositions, though they\r\ncan not both be true, may both be false. If the error were to express itself\r\nin words, it would run distinctly counter to this canon. It generally,\r\nhowever, does not so express itself, and to compel it to do so is the most\r\neffectual method of detecting and exposing it.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 3. Among Fallacies of Ratiocination are to be ranked, in the first\r\nplace, all the cases of vicious syllogism laid down in the books. These\r\ngenerally resolve themselves into having more than three terms to the syllogism,\r\neither avowedly, or in the covert mode of an undistributed middle\r\nterm, or an \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eillicit process\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e of one of the two extremes. It is not, indeed,\r\nvery easy fully to convict an argument of falling under any one of these\r\nvicious cases in particular; for the reason already more than once referred\r\nto, that the premises are seldom formally set out: if they were, the fallacy\r\nwould impose upon nobody; and while they are not, it is almost always to\r\na certain degree optional in what manner the suppressed link shall be filled\r\nup. The rules of the syllogism are rules for compelling a person to be\r\naware of the whole of what he must undertake to defend if he persists in\r\nmaintaining his conclusion. He has it almost always in his power to make\r\nhis syllogism good by introducing a false premise; and hence it is scarcely\r\never possible decidedly to affirm that any argument involves a bad syllogism:\r\nbut this detracts nothing from the value of the syllogistic rules,\r\nsince it is by them that a reasoner is compelled distinctly to make his election\r\nwhat premises he is prepared to maintain. The election made, there\r\nis generally so little difficulty in seeing whether the conclusion follows\r\nfrom the premises set out, that we might without much logical impropriety\r\nhave merged this fourth class of fallacies in the fifth, or Fallacies of\r\nConfusion.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page561\"\u003e[pg 561]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg561\" id=\"Pg561\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 4. Perhaps, however, the commonest, and certainly the most dangerous\r\nfallacies of this class, are those which do not lie in a single syllogism,\r\nbut slip in between one syllogism and another in a chain of argument, and\r\nare committed by \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003echanging the premises\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e. A proposition is proved, or an\r\nacknowledged truth laid down, in the first part of an argumentation, and\r\nin the second a further argument is founded not on the same proposition,\r\nbut on some other, resembling it sufficiently to be mistaken for it. Instances\r\nof this fallacy will be found in almost all the argumentative discourses\r\nof unprecise thinkers; and we need only here advert to one of the\r\nobscurer forms of it, recognized by the school-men as the fallacy\r\n\u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eà dicto\r\nsecundum quid ad dictum simpliciter\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e. This is committed when, in the\r\npremises, a proposition is asserted with a qualification, and the qualification\r\nlost sight of in the conclusion; or oftener, when a limitation or condition,\r\nthough not asserted, is necessary to the truth of the proposition,\r\nbut is forgotten when that proposition comes to be employed as a premise.\r\nMany of the bad arguments in vogue belong to this class of error. The\r\npremise is some admitted truth, some common maxim, the reasons or evidence\r\nfor which have been forgotten, or are not thought of at the time,\r\nbut if they had been thought of would have shown the necessity of so limiting\r\nthe premise that it would no longer have supported the conclusion\r\ndrawn from it.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nOf this nature is the fallacy in what is called, by Adam Smith and others,\r\nthe Mercantile Theory in Political Economy. That theory sets out\r\nfrom the common maxim, that whatever brings in money enriches; or that\r\nevery one is rich in proportion to the quantity of money he obtains.\r\nFrom this it is concluded that the value of any branch of trade, or of the\r\ntrade of the country altogether, consists in the balance of money it brings\r\nin; that any trade which carries more money out of the country than it\r\ndraws into it is a losing trade; that therefore money should be attracted\r\ninto the country and kept there, by prohibitions and bounties; and a train\r\nof similar corollaries. All for want of reflecting that if the riches of an\r\nindividual are in proportion to the quantity of money he can command, it\r\nis because that is the measure of his power of purchasing money’s worth;\r\nand is therefore subject to the proviso that he is not debarred from employing\r\nhis money in such purchases. The premise, therefore, is only true\r\n\u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003esecundum quid\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e;\r\nbut the theory assumes it to be true absolutely, and infers\r\nthat increase of money is increase of riches, even when produced by\r\nmeans subversive of the condition under which alone money can be riches.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nA second instance is, the argument by which it used to be contended,\r\nbefore the commutation of tithe, that tithes fell on the landlord, and were\r\na deduction from rent; because the rent of tithe-free land was always\r\nhigher than that of land of the same quality, and the same advantages of\r\nsituation, subject to tithe. Whether it be true or not that a tithe falls on\r\nrent, a treatise on Logic is not the place to examine; but it is certain that\r\nthis is no proof of it. Whether the proposition be true or false, tithe-free\r\nland must, by the necessity of the case, pay a higher rent. For if tithes\r\ndo not fall on rent, it must be because they fall on the consumer; because\r\nthey raise the price of agricultural produce. But if the produce be raised\r\nin price, the farmer of tithe-free as well as the farmer of tithed land gets\r\nthe benefit. To the latter the rise is but a compensation for the tithe he\r\npays; to the first, who pays none, it is clear gain, and therefore enables\r\nhim, and if there be freedom of competition, forces him, to pay so much\r\nmore rent to his landlord. The question remains, to what class of fallacies\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page562\"\u003e[pg 562]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg562\" id=\"Pg562\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nthis belongs. The premise is, that the owner of tithed land receives less\r\nrent than the owner of tithe-free land; the conclusion is, that therefore he\r\nreceives less than he himself would receive if tithe were abolished. But\r\nthe premise is only true conditionally; the owner of tithed land receives\r\nless than what the owner of tithe-free land is enabled to receive \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ewhen other\r\nlands are tithed\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e; while the conclusion is applied to a state of circumstances\r\nin which that condition fails, and in which, by consequence, the\r\npremise will not be true. The fallacy, therefore, is \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eà\r\ndicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nA third example is the opposition sometimes made to legitimate interferences\r\nof government in the economical affairs of society, grounded on a\r\nmisapplication of the maxim, that an individual is a better judge than the\r\ngovernment of what is for his own pecuniary interest. This objection\r\nwas urged to Mr. Wakefield’s principle of colonization; the concentration\r\nof the settlers, by fixing such a price on unoccupied land as may preserve\r\nthe most desirable proportion between the quantity of land in culture and\r\nthe laboring population. Against this it was argued, that if individuals\r\nfound it for their advantage to occupy extensive tracts of land, they, being\r\nbetter judges of their own interest than the legislature (which can only\r\nproceed on general rules), ought not to be restrained from doing so. But\r\nin this argument it was forgotten that the fact of a person’s taking a large\r\ntract of land is evidence only that it is his interest to take as much as\r\nother people, but not that it might not be for his interest to content himself\r\nwith less, if he could be assured that other people would do so too;\r\nan assurance which nothing but a government regulation can give. If all\r\nother people took much, and he only a little, he would reap none of the\r\nadvantages derived from the concentration of the population and the consequent\r\npossibility of procuring labor for hire, but would have placed himself,\r\nwithout equivalent, in a situation of voluntary inferiority. The proposition,\r\ntherefore, that the quantity of land which people will take when\r\nleft to themselves is that which is most for their interest to take, is true\r\nonly \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003esecundum quid\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e:\r\nit is only their interest while they have no guarantee\r\nfor the conduct of one another. But the arrangement disregards\r\nthe limitation, and takes the proposition for true\r\n\u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003esimpliciter\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nOne of the conditions oftenest dropped, when what would otherwise be\r\na true proposition is employed as a premise for proving others, is the condition\r\nof \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003etime\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e. It is a principle of political economy that prices, profits,\r\nwages, etc., \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“always find their level;”\u003c/span\u003e but this is often interpreted as if it\r\nmeant that they are always, or generally, \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eat\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e their level, while the truth\r\nis, as Coleridge epigrammatically expresses it, that they are always \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003efinding\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e\r\ntheir level, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“which might be taken as a paraphrase or ironical definition of\r\na storm.”\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nUnder the same head of fallacy (\u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eà dicto secundum\r\nquid ad dictum simpliciter\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e)\r\nmight be placed all the errors which are vulgarly called misapplications\r\nof abstract truths; that is, where a principle, true (as the common\r\nexpression is) \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ein the abstract\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e, that is, all modifying causes being supposed\r\nabsent, is reasoned on as if it were true absolutely, and no modifying circumstance\r\ncould ever by possibility exist. This very common form of\r\nerror it is not requisite that we should exemplify here, as it will be particularly\r\ntreated of hereafter in its application to the subjects on which it is\r\nmost frequent and most fatal, those of politics and society.\u003ca id=\"noteref_262\" name=\"noteref_262\" href=\"#note_262\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e262\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page563\"\u003e[pg 563]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg563\" id=\"Pg563\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-div\" style=\"margin-bottom: 4.00em; margin-top: 4.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"toc125\" id=\"toc125\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"pdf126\" id=\"pdf126\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: center; margin-bottom: 2.40em; margin-top: 2.40em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 120%\"\u003eChapter VII.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: left; margin-bottom: 2.88em; margin-top: 2.88em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 144%\"\u003eFallacies Of Confusion.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 1. Under this fifth and last class it is convenient to arrange all those\r\nfallacies in which the source of error is not so much a false estimate of the\r\nprobative force of known evidence, as an indistinct, indefinite, and fluctuating\r\nconception of what the evidence is.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAt the head of these stands that multitudinous body of fallacious reasonings\r\nin which the source of error is the ambiguity of terms: when\r\nsomething which is true if a word be used in a particular sense, is reasoned\r\non as if it were true in another sense. In such a case there is not a mal-estimation\r\nof evidence, because there is not properly any evidence to the\r\npoint at all; there is evidence, but to a different point, which from a confused\r\napprehension of the meaning of the terms used, is supposed to be\r\nthe same. This error will naturally be oftener committed in our ratiocinations\r\nthan in our direct inductions, because in the former we are deciphering\r\nour own or other people’s notes, while in the latter we have the things\r\nthemselves present, either to the senses or to the memory. Except, indeed,\r\nwhen the induction is not from individual cases to a generality, but from\r\ngeneralities to a still higher generalization; in that case the fallacy of ambiguity\r\nmay affect the inductive process as well as the ratiocinative. It\r\noccurs in ratiocination in two ways: when the middle term is ambiguous,\r\nor when one of the terms of the syllogism is taken in one sense in the\r\npremises, and in another sense in the conclusion.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nSome good exemplifications of this fallacy are given by Archbishop\r\nWhately. \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“One case,”\u003c/span\u003e says he, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“which may be regarded as coming under\r\nthe head of Ambiguous Middle, is (what I believe logical writers mean by\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e‘\u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eFallacia Figuræ Dictionis\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e’\u003c/span\u003e) the\r\nfallacy built on the grammatical structure\r\nof language, from men’s usually taking for granted that \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eparonymous\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\n(or \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003econjugate\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e) words, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, those\r\nbelonging to each other, as the substantive,\r\nadjective, verb, etc., of the same root, have a precisely corresponding meaning;\r\nwhich is by no means universally the case. Such a fallacy could not\r\nindeed be even exhibited in strict logical form, which would preclude even\r\nthe attempt at it, since it has two middle terms in sound as well as sense.\r\nBut nothing is more common in practice than to vary continually the terms\r\nemployed, with a view to grammatical convenience; nor is there any thing\r\nunfair in such a practice, as long as the \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003emeaning\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e is preserved unaltered;\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ee.g.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e‘murder should be punished with death; this man is a\r\nmurderer,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page564\"\u003e[pg 564]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg564\" id=\"Pg564\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\ntherefore he deserves to die,’\u003c/span\u003e etc. Here we proceed on the assumption (in\r\nthis case just) that to commit murder, and to be a murderer—to deserve\r\ndeath, and to be one who ought to die, are, respectively, equivalent expressions;\r\nand it would frequently prove a heavy inconvenience to be debarred\r\nthis kind of liberty; but the abuse of it gives rise to the Fallacy in question;\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ee.g.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eprojectors\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e are unfit to be trusted;\r\nthis man has formed a \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eproject\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\ntherefore he is unfit to be trusted: here the sophist proceeds on the hypothesis\r\nthat he who forms a \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eproject\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e must be a\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eprojector\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e: whereas the bad\r\nsense that commonly attaches to the latter word, is not at all implied in the\r\nformer. This fallacy may often be considered as lying not in the Middle,\r\nbut in one of the terms of the Conclusion; so that the conclusion drawn\r\nshall not be, in reality, at all warranted by the premises, though it will appear\r\nto be so, by means of the grammatical affinity of the words; \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ee.g.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\nto be acquainted with the guilty is a \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003epresumption\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e of guilt; this\r\nman is so acquainted, therefore we may \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003epresume\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e that he is guilty:\r\nthis argument proceeds on the supposition of an exact correspondence between\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003epresume\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e and \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003epresumption\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, which, however,\r\ndoes not really exist; for \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e‘presumption’\u003c/span\u003e is commonly used to express a kind of\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eslight suspicion\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e; whereas, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e‘to presume’\u003c/span\u003e\r\namounts to actual belief. There are innumerable instances of a\r\nnon-correspondence in paronymous words, similar to that above instanced;\r\nas between \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eart\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e and \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eartful\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003edesign\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e and \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003edesigning\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003efaith\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e and \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003efaithful\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, etc.;\r\nand the more slight the variation of the meaning, the more likely is the\r\nfallacy to be successful; for when the words have become so widely removed\r\nin sense as \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e‘pity’\u003c/span\u003e and \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e‘pitiful,’\u003c/span\u003e every one would perceive such a\r\nfallacy, nor would it be employed but in jest.\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca id=\"noteref_263\" name=\"noteref_263\" href=\"#note_263\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e263\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“The present Fallacy is nearly allied to, or rather, perhaps, may be regarded\r\nas a branch of, that founded on \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eetymology\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e—viz., when a term\r\nis used, at one time in its customary, and at another in its etymological sense.\r\nPerhaps no example of this can be found that is more extensively and mischievously\r\nemployed than in the case of the word \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003erepresentative\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e: assuming\r\nthat its right meaning must correspond exactly with the strict and original\r\nsense of the verb \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e‘represent,’\u003c/span\u003e the sophist persuades the multitude that a\r\nmember of the House of Commons is bound to be guided in all points by\r\nthe opinion of his constituents; and, in short, to be merely their\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003espokesman\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e;\r\nwhereas law and custom, which in this case may be considered as\r\nfixing the meaning of the term, require no such thing, but enjoin the representative\r\nto act according to the best of his \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eown\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e judgment, and on his\r\nown responsibility.”\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe following are instances of great practical importance, in which arguments\r\nare habitually founded on a verbal ambiguity.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe mercantile public are frequently led into this fallacy by the phrase\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“scarcity of money.”\u003c/span\u003e In the language of commerce, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“money”\u003c/span\u003e has two\r\nmeanings: \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ecurrency\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, or the circulating medium; and\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ecapital seeking investment\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\nespecially investment on loan. In this last sense the word is used\r\nwhen the \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“money market”\u003c/span\u003e is spoken of, and when the \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“value of money”\u003c/span\u003e\r\nis said to be high or low, the rate of interest being meant. The consequence\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page565\"\u003e[pg 565]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg565\" id=\"Pg565\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nof this ambiguity is, that as soon as scarcity of money in the latter\r\nof these senses begins to be felt—as soon as there is difficulty of obtaining\r\nloans, and the rate of interest is high—it is concluded that this must arise\r\nfrom causes acting upon the quantity of money in the other and more popular\r\nsense; that the circulating medium must have diminished in quantity,\r\nor ought to be increased. I am aware that, independently of the double\r\nmeaning of the term, there are in the facts themselves some peculiarities,\r\ngiving an apparent support to this error; but the ambiguity of the language\r\nstands on the very threshold of the subject, and intercepts all attempts\r\nto throw light upon it.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAnother ambiguous expression which continually meets us in the political\r\ncontroversies of the present time, especially in those which relate to\r\norganic changes, is the phrase \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“influence of property”\u003c/span\u003e—which is sometimes\r\nused for the influence of respect for superior intelligence or gratitude for\r\nthe kind offices which persons of large property have it so much in their\r\npower to bestow; at other times for the influence of fear; fear of the\r\nworst sort of power, which large property also gives to its possessor, the\r\npower of doing mischief to dependents. To confound these two, is the\r\nstanding fallacy of ambiguity brought against those who seek to purify\r\nthe electoral system from corruption and intimidation. Persuasive influence,\r\nacting through the conscience of the voter, and carrying his heart\r\nand mind with it, is beneficial—therefore (it is pretended) coercive influence,\r\nwhich compels him to forget that he is a moral agent, or to act in\r\nopposition to his moral convictions, ought not to be placed under restraint.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAnother word which is often turned into an instrument of the fallacy of\r\nambiguity, is Theory. In its most proper acceptation, theory means the\r\ncompleted result of philosophical induction from experience. In that\r\nsense, there are erroneous as well as true theories, for induction may be\r\nincorrectly performed, but theory of some sort is the necessary result of\r\nknowing any thing of a subject, and having put one’s knowledge into the\r\nform of general propositions for the guidance of practice. In this, the\r\nproper sense of the word, Theory is the explanation of practice. In another\r\nand a more vulgar sense, theory means any mere fiction of the imagination,\r\nendeavoring to conceive how a thing may possibly have been\r\nproduced, instead of examining how it was produced. In this sense only\r\nare theory and theorists unsafe guides; but because of this, ridicule or\r\ndiscredit is attempted to be attached to theory in its proper sense, that is,\r\nto legitimate generalization, the end and aim of all philosophy; and a conclusion\r\nis represented as worthless, just because that has been done which,\r\nif done correctly, constitutes the highest worth that a principle for the\r\nguidance of practice can possess, namely, to comprehend in a few words\r\nthe real law on which a phenomenon depends, or some property or relation\r\nwhich is universally true of it.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“The Church”\u003c/span\u003e is sometimes understood to mean the clergy alone, sometimes\r\nthe whole body of believers, or at least of communicants. The declamations\r\nrespecting the inviolability of church property are indebted for\r\nthe greater part of their apparent force to this ambiguity. The clergy,\r\nbeing called the church, are supposed to be the real owners of what is\r\ncalled church property; whereas they are in truth only the managing members\r\nof a much larger body of proprietors, and enjoy on their own part a\r\nmere usufruct, not extending beyond a life interest.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe following is a Stoical argument taken from Cicero, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eDe Finibus\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\nbook the third: \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Quod est bonum, omne laudabile est. Quod autem laudabile\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page566\"\u003e[pg 566]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg566\" id=\"Pg566\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nest, omne honestum est. Bonum igitur quod est, honestum est.”\u003c/span\u003e Here\r\nthe ambiguous word is \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003elaudabile\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, which in the minor premise means\r\nany thing which mankind are accustomed, on good grounds, to admire or\r\nvalue; as beauty, for instance, or good fortune: but in the major, it denotes\r\nexclusively moral qualities. In much the same manner the Stoics\r\nendeavored logically to justify as philosophical truths, their figurative and\r\nrhetorical expressions of ethical sentiment: as that the virtuous man is\r\nalone free, alone beautiful, alone a king, etc. Whoever has virtue has\r\nGood (because it has been previously determined not to call any thing else\r\ngood); but, again, Good necessarily includes freedom, beauty, and even\r\nkingship, all these being good things; therefore whoever has virtue has\r\nall these.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe following is an argument of Descartes to prove, in his\r\n\u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea priori\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nmanner, the being of a God. The conception, says he, of an infinite Being\r\nproves the real existence of such a being. For if there is not really any\r\nsuch being, \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eI\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e must have made the conception; but if I could make it, I can\r\nalso unmake it; which evidently is not true; therefore there must be, externally\r\nto myself, an archetype, from which the conception was derived. In\r\nthis argument (which, it may be observed, would equally prove the real\r\nexistence of ghosts and of witches) the ambiguity is in the pronoun \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eI\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e, by\r\nwhich, in one place, is to be understood my \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ewill\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, in another the\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003elaws of my nature\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e. If the conception, existing as it does in my\r\nmind, had no original without, the conclusion would unquestionably follow that\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eI\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e made it; that is, the laws of my nature must have somehow evolved it: but\r\nthat my \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ewill\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e made it, would not follow. Now when Descartes afterward adds\r\nthat I can not unmake the conception, he means that I can not get rid of\r\nit by an act of my will: which is true, but is not the proposition required.\r\nI can as much unmake this conception as I can any other: no conception\r\nwhich I have once had, can I ever dismiss by mere volition; but what\r\nsome of the laws of my nature have produced, other laws, or those same\r\nlaws in other circumstances, may, and often do, subsequently efface.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAnalogous to this are some of the ambiguities in the free-will controversy;\r\nwhich, as they will come under special consideration in the concluding Book,\r\nI only mention \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ememoriæ causâ\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e. In that\r\ndiscussion, too, the word \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eI\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e is often\r\nshifted from one meaning to another, at one time standing for my volitions,\r\nat another time for the actions which are the consequences of them, or the\r\nmental dispositions from which they proceed. The latter ambiguity is exemplified\r\nin an argument of Coleridge (in his \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eAids to Reflection\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e), in\r\nsupport of the freedom of the will. It is not true, he says, that a man is governed\r\nby motives; \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“the man makes the motive, not the motive the man;”\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe proof being that \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“what is a strong motive to one man is no motive at\r\nall to another.”\u003c/span\u003e The premise is true, but only amounts to this, that different\r\npersons have different degrees of susceptibility to the same motive; as\r\nthey have also to the same intoxicating liquid, which, however, does not\r\nprove that they are free to be drunk or not drunk, whatever quantity of the\r\nfluid they may drink. What is proved is, that certain mental conditions in\r\nthe person himself must co-operate, in the production of the act, with the\r\nexternal inducement; but those mental conditions also are the effect of\r\ncauses; and there is nothing in the argument to prove that they can arise\r\nwithout a cause—that a spontaneous determination of the will, without any\r\ncause at all, ever takes place, as the free-will doctrine supposes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe double use, in the free-will controversy, of the word Necessity, which\r\nsometimes stands only for Certainty, at other times for Compulsion; sometimes\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page567\"\u003e[pg 567]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg567\" id=\"Pg567\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nfor what \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ecan not\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e be prevented, at other times only for what we have\r\nreason to be assured \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ewill\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e not; we shall have occasion hereafter to pursue\r\nto some of its ulterior consequences.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nA most important ambiguity, both in common and in metaphysical language,\r\nis thus pointed out by Archbishop Whately in the Appendix to his\r\nLogic: \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eSame\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e (as well as \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eOne\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eIdentical\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, and other words derived from\r\nthem) is used frequently in a sense very different from its primary one, as\r\napplicable to a \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003esingle\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e object; being employed to denote great\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003esimilarity\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e. When several objects are undistinguishably alike,\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eone single description\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e will apply equally to any of them; and thence they\r\nare said to be all of \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eone and the same\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e nature, appearance, etc. As,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ee.g.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, when we say \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e‘this house is built of the\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003esame\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e stone with such another,’\u003c/span\u003e we only mean that the stones are\r\nundistinguishable in their qualities; not that the one building was pulled\r\ndown, and the other constructed with the materials. Whereas \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003esameness\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e,\r\nin the primary sense, does not even necessarily imply similarity; for if we\r\nsay of any man that he is greatly altered since such a time, we understand,\r\nand indeed imply by the very expression, that he is \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eone person\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e, though\r\ndifferent in several qualities. It is worth observing also, that Same, in\r\nthe secondary sense, admits, according to popular usage, of degrees: we\r\nspeak of two things being \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003enearly\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e the same, but not entirely: personal\r\nidentity does not admit of degrees. Nothing, perhaps, has contributed more to the\r\nerror of Realism than inattention to this ambiguity. When several persons\r\nare said to have \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eone and the same\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e opinion, thought, or idea, many\r\nmen, overlooking the true simple statement of the case, which is, that they are \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eall\r\nthinking alike\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e, look for something more abstruse and mystical, and imagine\r\nthere must be some \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eOne Thing\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e, in the primary sense, though not an\r\nindividual which is present at once in the mind of each of these persons;\r\nand thence readily sprung Plato’s theory of Ideas, each of which was, according\r\nto him, one real, eternal object, existing entire and complete in\r\neach of the individual objects that are known by one name.”\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt is, indeed, not a matter of inference, but of authentic history, that\r\nPlato’s doctrine of Ideas, and the Aristotelian doctrine (in this respect similar\r\nto the Platonic) of substantial forms and second substances, grew up\r\nin the precise way here pointed out; from the supposed necessity of finding,\r\nin things which were said to have the \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003esame\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e nature, or the \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003esame\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e\r\nqualities, something which was the \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003esame\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e in the very sense in which a man is\r\nthe same as himself. All the idle speculations respecting τὸ ὄν, τὸ ἕν, τὸ ὅμοιον,\r\nand similar abstractions, so common in the ancient and in some modern\r\nschools of thought, sprang from the same source. The Aristotelian logicians\r\nsaw, however, one case of the ambiguity, and provided against it with\r\ntheir peculiar felicity in the invention of technical language, when they\r\ndistinguished things which differed both \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-foreign\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003especie\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e and\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-foreign\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003enumero\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, from those which differed\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-foreign\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003enumero tantum\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, that is, which were exactly alike (in\r\nsome particular respect at least) but were distinct individuals. An extension of\r\nthis distinction to the two meanings of the word Same, namely, things which\r\nare the same \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-foreign\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003especie tantum\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, and a thing which is the\r\nsame \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-foreign\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003enumero\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e as well as\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-foreign\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003especie\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, would have prevented the confusion which has\r\nbeen a source of so much darkness and such an abundance of positive error in metaphysical\r\nphilosophy.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nOne of the most singular examples of the length to which a thinker of\r\neminence may be led away by an ambiguity of language, is afforded by this\r\nvery case. I refer to the famous argument by which Bishop Berkeley flattered\r\nhimself that he had forever put an end to \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“skepticism, atheism, and\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page568\"\u003e[pg 568]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg568\" id=\"Pg568\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nirreligion.”\u003c/span\u003e It is briefly as follows: I thought of a thing yesterday; I\r\nceased to think of it; I think of it again to-day. I had, therefore, in my\r\nmind yesterday an \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eidea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e of the object; I have also an idea of it to-day;\r\nthis idea is evidently not another, but the very same idea. Yet an intervening\r\ntime elapsed in which I had it not. Where was the idea during\r\nthis interval? It must have been somewhere; it did not cease to exist;\r\notherwise the idea I had yesterday could not be the \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003esame\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e idea; no more\r\nthan the man I see alive to-day can be the same whom I saw yesterday if\r\nthe man has died in the mean while. Now an idea can not be conceived to\r\nexist anywhere except in a mind; and hence there must exist a Universal\r\nMind, in which all ideas have their permanent residence during the intervals\r\nof their conscious presence in our own minds.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt is evident that Berkeley here confounded sameness\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-foreign\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003enumero\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e with\r\nsameness \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-foreign\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003especie\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, that is, with exact resemblance, and\r\nassumed the former where there was only the latter; not perceiving that when we say we\r\nhave the same thought to-day which we had yesterday, we do not mean the same\r\nindividual thought, but a thought exactly similar: as we say that we have\r\nthe same illness which we had last year, meaning only the same sort of illness.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIn one remarkable instance the scientific world was divided into two\r\nfuriously hostile parties by an ambiguity of language affecting a branch of\r\nscience which, more completely than most others, enjoys the advantage of\r\na precise and well-defined terminology. I refer to the famous dispute respecting\r\nthe vis viva, the history of which is given at large in Professor\r\nPlayfair’s Dissertation. The question was, whether the \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eforce\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e of a moving\r\nbody was proportional (its mass being given) to its velocity simply, or\r\nto the square of its velocity: and the ambiguity was in the word Force.\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“One of the effects,”\u003c/span\u003e says Playfair, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“produced by a moving body is proportional\r\nto the square of the velocity, while another is proportional to the\r\nvelocity simply:”\u003c/span\u003e from whence clearer thinkers were subsequently led to\r\nestablish a double measure of the efficiency of a moving power, one being\r\ncalled \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-foreign\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003evis viva\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, and the other\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003emomentum\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e. About the facts, both parties\r\nwere from the first agreed: the only question was, with which of the two\r\neffects the term \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eforce\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e should be, or could most conveniently be,\r\nassociated. But the disputants were by no means aware that this was all; they\r\nthought that force was one thing, the production of effects another; and\r\nthe question, by which set of effects the force which produced both the\r\none and the other should be measured, was supposed to be a question not\r\nof terminology, but of fact.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe ambiguity of the word Infinite is the real fallacy in the amusing\r\nlogical puzzle of Achilles and the Tortoise, a puzzle which has been too\r\nhard for the ingenuity or patience of many philosophers, and which no less\r\na thinker than Sir William Hamilton considered as insoluble; as a sound\r\nargument, though leading to a palpable falsehood. The fallacy, as Hobbes\r\nhinted, lies in the tacit assumption that whatever is infinitely divisible is\r\ninfinite; but the following solution (to the invention of which I have no\r\nclaim) is more precise and satisfactory.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe argument is, let Achilles run ten times as fast as the tortoise, yet\r\nif the tortoise has the start, Achilles will never overtake him. For suppose\r\nthem to be at first separated by an interval of a thousand feet: when\r\nAchilles has run these thousand feet, the tortoise will have got on a hundred;\r\nwhen Achilles has run those hundred, the tortoise will have run ten,\r\nand so on forever: therefore Achilles may run forever without overtaking\r\nthe tortoise.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page569\"\u003e[pg 569]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg569\" id=\"Pg569\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nNow the \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“forever,”\u003c/span\u003e in the conclusion, means, for any length of time\r\nthat can be supposed; but in the premises, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“ever”\u003c/span\u003e does not mean any\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003elength\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e of time; it means any \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003enumber of subdivisions\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e of time.\r\nIt means that we may divide a thousand feet by ten, and that quotient again by ten,\r\nand so on as often as we please; that there never needs be an end to the\r\nsubdivisions of the distance, nor consequently to those of the time in which\r\nit is performed. But an unlimited number of subdivisions may be made\r\nof that which is itself limited. The argument proves no other infinity of\r\nduration than may be embraced within five minutes. As long as the five\r\nminutes are not expired, what remains of them may be divided by ten,\r\nand again by ten, as often as we like, which is perfectly compatible with\r\ntheir being only five minutes altogether. It proves, in short, that to pass\r\nthrough this finite space requires a time which is infinitely divisible, but\r\nnot an infinite time; the confounding of which distinction Hobbes had\r\nalready seen to be the gist of the fallacy.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe following ambiguities of the word \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eright\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e (in addition to the\r\nobvious and familiar one of \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e right and the \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eadjective\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e right)\r\nare extracted from a forgotten paper of my own, in a periodical:\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Speaking morally, you are said to have a right to do a thing, if all\r\npersons are morally bound not to hinder you from doing it. But, in another\r\nsense, to have a right to do a thing is the opposite of having \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eno\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e\r\nright to do it, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, of being under a moral obligation to\r\nforbear doing it. In this sense, to say that you have a right to do a thing, means that\r\nyou may do it without any breach of duty on your part; that other persons\r\nnot only ought not to hinder you, but have no cause to think worse of you\r\nfor doing it. This is a perfectly distinct proposition from the preceding.\r\nThe right which you have by virtue of a duty incumbent upon other persons,\r\nis obviously quite a different thing from a right consisting in the\r\nabsence of any duty incumbent upon yourself. Yet the two things are\r\nperpetually confounded. Thus, a man will say he has a right to publish\r\nhis opinions; which may be true in this sense, that it would be a breach\r\nof duty in any other person to interfere and prevent the publication: but\r\nhe assumes thereupon that, in publishing his opinions, he himself violates\r\nno duty; which may either be true or false, depending, as it does, on his\r\nhaving taken due pains to satisfy himself, first, that the opinions are true,\r\nand next, that their publication in this manner, and at this particular juncture,\r\nwill probably be beneficial to the interests of truth on the whole.\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“The second ambiguity is that of confounding a right of any kind, with\r\na right to enforce that right by resisting or punishing a violation of it.\r\nPeople will say, for example, that they have a right to good government,\r\nwhich is undeniably true, it being the moral duty of their governors to\r\ngovern them well. But in granting this, you are supposed to have admitted\r\ntheir right or liberty to turn out their governors, and perhaps to punish\r\nthem, for having failed in the performance of this duty; which, far\r\nfrom being the same thing, is by no means universally true, but depends\r\non an immense number of varying circumstances,”\u003c/span\u003e requiring to be conscientiously\r\nweighed before adopting or acting on such a resolution. This\r\nlast example is (like others which have been cited) a case of fallacy within\r\nfallacy; it involves not only the second of the two ambiguities pointed\r\nout, but the first likewise.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nOne not unusual form of the Fallacy of Ambiguous Terms is known\r\ntechnically as the Fallacy of Composition and Division; when the same\r\nterm is collective in the premises, distributive in the conclusion, or\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003evicè\r\n\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page570\"\u003e[pg 570]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg570\" id=\"Pg570\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003e\r\nversa\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e; or when the middle term is collective in one premise, distributive\r\nin the other. As if one were to say (I quote from Archbishop Whately),\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“All the angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles: A B C is\r\nan angle of a triangle; therefore A B C is equal to two right angles….\r\nThere is no fallacy more common, or more likely to deceive, than the one\r\nnow before us. The form in which it is most usually employed is to establish\r\nsome truth, separately, concerning \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eeach single\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e member of a certain\r\nclass, and thence to infer the same of the \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ewhole collectively\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e.”\u003c/span\u003e As in the\r\nargument one sometimes hears, to prove that the world could do without\r\ngreat men. If Columbus (it is said) had never lived, America would still\r\nhave been discovered, at most only a few years later; if Newton had never\r\nlived, some other person would have discovered the law of gravitation;\r\nand so forth. Most true: these things would have been done, but in all\r\nprobability not till some one had again been found with the qualities of\r\nColumbus or Newton. Because any one great man might have had his\r\nplace supplied by other great men, the argument concludes that all great\r\nmen could have been dispensed with. The term \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“great men”\u003c/span\u003e is distributive\r\nin the premises and collective in the conclusion.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Such also is the fallacy which probably operates on most adventurers\r\nin lotteries; \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ee.g.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e‘the gaining of a high prize is no uncommon\r\noccurrence; and what is no uncommon occurrence may reasonably be expected; therefore\r\nthe gaining of a high prize may reasonably be expected;’\u003c/span\u003e the conclusion,\r\nwhen applied to the individual (as in practice it is), must be understood\r\nin the sense of \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e‘reasonably expected \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eby a certain individual\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e;’\u003c/span\u003e therefore\r\nfor the major premise to be true, the middle term must be understood\r\nto mean, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e‘no uncommon occurrence to some one \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eparticular\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e person;’\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwhereas for the minor (which has been placed first) to be true, you must\r\nunderstand it of \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e‘no uncommon occurrence to \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003esome one or other\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e;’\u003c/span\u003e and thus\r\nyou will have the Fallacy of Composition.\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“This is a Fallacy with which men are extremely apt to deceive \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ethemselves\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e;\r\nfor when a multitude of particulars are presented to the mind,\r\nmany are too weak or too indolent to take a comprehensive view of them,\r\nbut confine their attention to each single point, by turns; and then decide,\r\ninfer, and act accordingly; \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ee.g.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, the imprudent spendthrift,\r\nfinding that he is able to afford this, \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eor\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e that, \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eor\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e the other\r\nexpense, forgets that \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eall of them together\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e will ruin him.”\u003c/span\u003e The debauchee\r\ndestroys his health by successive acts of intemperance, because no \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eone\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e of\r\nthose acts would be of itself sufficient to do him any serious harm. A sick person\r\nreasons with himself,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“one, and another, and another, of my symptoms do not prove that I have\r\na fatal disease;”\u003c/span\u003e and practically concludes that all taken together do not\r\nprove it.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 2. We have now sufficiently exemplified one of the principal Genera\r\nin this Order of Fallacies; where, the source of error being the ambiguity\r\nof terms, the premises are verbally what is required to support the conclusion,\r\nbut not really so. In the second great Fallacy of Confusion they are\r\nneither verbally nor really sufficient, though, from their multiplicity and\r\nconfused arrangement, and still oftener from defect of memory, they are\r\nnot seen to be what they are. The fallacy I mean is that of Petitio Principii,\r\nor begging the question; including the more complex and not uncommon\r\nvariety of it, which is termed Reasoning in a Circle.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nPetitio Principii, as defined by Archbishop Whately, is the fallacy \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“in\r\nwhich the premise either appears manifestly to be the same as the conclusion,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page571\"\u003e[pg 571]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg571\" id=\"Pg571\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nor is actually proved from the conclusion, or is such as would naturally\r\nand properly so be proved.”\u003c/span\u003e By the last clause I presume is meant,\r\nthat it is not susceptible of any other proof; for otherwise, there would be\r\nno fallacy. To deduce from a proposition propositions from which it\r\nwould itself more naturally be deduced, is often an allowable deviation\r\nfrom the usual didactic order; or at most, what, by an adaptation of a\r\nphrase familiar to mathematicians, may be called a logical\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003einelegance\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e.\u003ca id=\"noteref_264\" name=\"noteref_264\" href=\"#note_264\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e264\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe employment of a proposition to prove that on which it is itself dependent\r\nfor proof, by no means implies the degree of mental imbecility\r\nwhich might at first be supposed. The difficulty of comprehending how\r\nthis fallacy could possibly be committed, disappears when we reflect that\r\nall persons, even the instructed, hold a great number of opinions without\r\nexactly recollecting how they came by them. Believing that they have at\r\nsome former time verified them by sufficient evidence, but having forgotten\r\nwhat the evidence was, they may easily be betrayed into deducing from\r\nthem the very propositions which are alone capable of serving as premises\r\nfor their establishment. \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“As if,”\u003c/span\u003e says Archbishop Whately, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“one should\r\nattempt to prove the being of a God from the authority of Holy Writ;”\u003c/span\u003e\r\nwhich might easily happen to one with whom both doctrines, as fundamental\r\ntenets of his religious creed, stand on the same ground of familiar\r\nand traditional belief.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nArguing in a circle, however, is a stronger case of the fallacy, and implies\r\nmore than the mere passive reception of a premise by one who does\r\nnot remember how it is to be proved. It implies an actual attempt to\r\nprove two propositions reciprocally from one another; and is seldom resorted\r\nto, at least in express terms, by any person in his own speculations,\r\nbut is committed by those who, being hard pressed by an adversary, are\r\nforced into giving reasons for an opinion of which, when they began to argue,\r\nthey had not sufficiently considered the grounds. As in the following\r\nexample from Archbishop Whately: \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Some mechanicians attempt to prove\r\n(what they ought to lay down as a probable but doubtful hypothesis)\u003ca id=\"noteref_265\" name=\"noteref_265\" href=\"#note_265\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e265\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nthat every particle of matter gravitates equally: \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e‘why?’\u003c/span\u003e \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e‘because those bodies\r\nwhich contain more particles ever gravitate more strongly, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\nare heavier:’\u003c/span\u003e \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e‘but (it may be urged) those which are heaviest are not always more\r\nbulky;’\u003c/span\u003e \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e‘no, but they contain more particles, though more closely condensed:’\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e‘how do you know that?’\u003c/span\u003e \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e‘because they are heavier:’\u003c/span\u003e \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e‘how does\r\nthat prove it?’\u003c/span\u003e \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e‘because all particles of matter gravitating equally, that mass\r\nwhich is specifically the heavier must needs have the more of them in the\r\nsame space.’\u003c/span\u003e ”\u003c/span\u003e It appears to me that the fallacious reasoner, in his private\r\nthoughts, would not be likely to proceed beyond the first step. He would\r\nacquiesce in the sufficiency of the reason first given, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“bodies which contain\r\nmore particles are heavier.”\u003c/span\u003e It is when he finds this questioned, and is\r\ncalled upon to prove it, without knowing how, that he tries to establish his\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page572\"\u003e[pg 572]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg572\" id=\"Pg572\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\npremise by supposing proved what he is attempting to prove by it. The\r\nmost effectual way, in fact, of exposing a petitio principii, when circumstances\r\nallow of it, is by challenging the reasoner to prove his premises;\r\nwhich if he attempts to do, he is necessarily driven into arguing in a circle.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt is not uncommon, however, for thinkers, and those not of the lowest\r\ndescription, to be led even in their own thoughts, not indeed into formally\r\nproving each of two propositions from the other, but into admitting propositions\r\nwhich can only be so proved. In the preceding example the two\r\ntogether form a complete and consistent, though hypothetical, explanation\r\nof the facts concerned. And the tendency to mistake mutual coherency\r\nfor truth—to trust one’s safety to a strong chain though it has no point of\r\nsupport—is at the bottom of much which, when reduced to the strict forms of\r\nargumentation, can exhibit itself no otherwise than as reasoning in a circle.\r\nAll experience bears testimony to the enthralling effect of neat concatenation\r\nin a system of doctrines, and the difficulty with which people admit the\r\npersuasion that any thing which holds so well together can possibly fall.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nSince every case where a conclusion which can only be proved from certain\r\npremises is used for the proof of those premises, is a case of\r\n\u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003epetitio principii\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, that fallacy includes a\r\nvery great proportion of all incorrect reasoning.\r\nIt is necessary, for completing our view of the fallacy, to exemplify\r\nsome of the disguises under which it is accustomed to mask itself, and\r\nto escape exposure.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nA proposition would not be admitted by any person in his senses as a\r\ncorollary from itself, unless it were expressed in language which made it\r\nseem different. One of the commonest modes of so expressing it, is to\r\npresent the proposition itself in abstract terms, as a proof of the same\r\nproposition expressed in concrete language. This is a very frequent mode,\r\nnot only of pretended proof, but of pretended explanation; and is parodied\r\nwhen Molière (\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eLe Malade Imaginaire\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e) makes one of his absurd\r\nphysicians say,\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"block tei tei-quote\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.80em; margin-left: 3.60em; margin-top: 1.80em; margin-right: 3.60em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-lg\" style=\"margin-bottom: 0.90em; margin-top: 0.90em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-l\" style=\"text-align: left; margin-left: 1.80em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003eMihi a docto doctore,\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-l\" style=\"text-align: left; margin-left: 1.80em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003eDemandatur causam et rationem quare\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-l\" style=\"text-align: left\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003eOpium facit dormire.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-l\" style=\"text-align: left; margin-left: 1.80em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003eA quoi respondeo,\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-l\" style=\"text-align: left; margin-left: 1.80em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003eQuia est in eo\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-l\" style=\"text-align: left; margin-left: 1.80em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003eVirtus dormitiva,\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-l\" style=\"text-align: left\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003eCujus est natura\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-l\" style=\"text-align: left; margin-left: 1.80em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003eSensus assoupire.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe words Nature and Essence are grand instruments of this mode of\r\nbegging the question, as in the well-known argument of the scholastic\r\ntheologians, that the mind thinks always, because the \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eessence\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e of the mind\r\nis to think. Locke had to point out, that if by essence is here meant some\r\nproperty which must manifest itself by actual exercise at all times, the\r\npremise is a direct assumption of the conclusion; while if it only means\r\nthat to think is the distinctive property of a mind, there is no connection\r\nbetween the premise and the conclusion, since it is not necessary that a distinctive\r\nproperty should be perpetually in action.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe following is one of the modes in which these abstract terms, Nature\r\nand Essence, are used as instruments of this fallacy. Some particular properties\r\nof a thing are selected, more or less arbitrarily, to be termed its nature\r\nor essence; and when this has been done, these properties are supposed to\r\nbe invested with a kind of indefeasibleness; to have become paramount to\r\nall the other properties of the thing, and incapable of being prevailed over\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page573\"\u003e[pg 573]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg573\" id=\"Pg573\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nor counteracted by them. As when Aristotle, in a passage already cited,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“decides that there is no void on such arguments as this: in a void there\r\ncould be no difference of up and down; for as in nothing there are no differences,\r\nso there are none in a privation or negation; but a void is merely\r\na privation or negation of matter; therefore, in a void, bodies could not\r\nmove up and down, which it is in their \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003enature\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e to\r\ndo.”\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca id=\"noteref_266\" name=\"noteref_266\" href=\"#note_266\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e266\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nIn other words, it is in the \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003enature\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e of bodies to move up and down,\r\n\u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eergo\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e any physical fact\r\nwhich supposes them not so to move, can not be authentic. This mode of\r\nreasoning, by which a bad generalization is made to overrule all facts which\r\ncontradict it, is Petitio Principii in one of its most palpable forms.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nNone of the modes of assuming what should be proved are in more frequent\r\nuse than what are termed by Bentham \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“question-begging appellatives;”\u003c/span\u003e\r\nnames which beg the question under the disguise of stating it.\r\nThe most potent of these are such as have a laudatory or vituperative\r\ncharacter. For instance, in politics, the word Innovation. The dictionary\r\nmeaning of this term being merely \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“a change to something new,”\u003c/span\u003e it is difficult\r\nfor the defenders even of the most salutary improvement to deny\r\nthat it is an innovation; yet the word having acquired in common usage a\r\nvituperative connotation in addition to its dictionary meaning, the admission\r\nis always construed as a large concession to the disadvantage of the\r\nthing proposed.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe following passage from the argument in refutation of the Epicureans,\r\nin the second book of Cicero, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“De Finibus,”\u003c/span\u003e affords a fine example\r\nof this sort of fallacy: \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Et quidem illud ipsum non nimium probo (et\r\ntantum patior) philosophum loqui de cupiditatibus finiendis. An potest\r\ncupiditas finiri? tollenda est, atque extrahenda radicitus. Quis est enim,\r\nin quo sit cupiditas, quin recte cupidus dici possit? Ergo et avarus erit,\r\nsed finite: adulter, verum habebit modum: et luxuriosus eodem modo.\r\nQualis ista philosophia est, quæ non interitum afferat pravitatis, sed sit\r\ncontenta mediocritate vitiorum?”\u003c/span\u003e The question was, whether certain desires,\r\nwhen kept within bounds, are vices or not; and the argument decides\r\nthe point by applying to them a word (\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ecupiditas\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e) which\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eimplies\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e vice.\r\nIt is shown, however, in the remarks which follow, that Cicero did not intend\r\nthis as a serious argument, but as a criticism on what he deemed an\r\ninappropriate expression. \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Rem ipsam prorsus probo: elegantiam desidero.\r\nAppellet hæc \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003edesideria naturæ\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e; cupiditatis nomen servet alio,”\u003c/span\u003e etc.\r\nBut many persons, both ancient and modern, have employed this, or something\r\nequivalent to it, as a real and conclusive argument. We may remark\r\nthat the passage respecting \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ecupiditas\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e and\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ecupidus\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e is also an example\r\nof another fallacy already noticed, that of Paronymous Terms.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nMany more of the arguments of the ancient moralists, and especially of\r\nthe Stoics, fall within the definition of Petitio Principii. In the \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“De Finibus,”\u003c/span\u003e\r\nfor example, which I continue to quote as being probably the best\r\nextant exemplification at once of the doctrines and the methods of the\r\nschools of philosophy existing at that time; of what value as arguments\r\nare such pleas as those of Cato in the third book: That if virtue were not\r\nhappiness, it could not be a thing to \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eboast\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e of: That if death or pain were\r\nevils, it would be impossible not to fear them, and it could not, therefore,\r\nbe laudable to despise them, etc. In one way of viewing these arguments,\r\nthey may be regarded as appeals to the authority of the general sentiment\r\nof mankind which had stamped its approval upon certain actions and characters\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page574\"\u003e[pg 574]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg574\" id=\"Pg574\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nby the phrases referred to; but that such could have been the meaning\r\nintended is very unlikely, considering the contempt of the ancient philosophers\r\nfor vulgar opinion. In any other sense they are clear cases of\r\nPetitio Principii, since the word laudable, and the idea of boasting, imply\r\nprinciples of conduct; and practical maxims can only be proved from\r\nspeculative truths, namely, from the properties of the subject-matter, and\r\ncan not, therefore, be employed to prove those properties. As well might\r\nit be argued that a government is good because we ought to support it, or\r\nthat there is a God because it is our duty to pray to him.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt is assumed by all the disputants in the \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“De Finibus”\u003c/span\u003e as the foundation\r\nof the inquiry into the \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003esummum bonum\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, that\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“sapiens semper beatus est.”\u003c/span\u003e Not simply that wisdom gives the best chance of\r\nhappiness, or that\r\nwisdom consists in knowing what happiness is, and by what things it is\r\npromoted; these propositions would not have been enough for them; but\r\nthat the sage always is, and must of necessity be, happy. The idea that\r\nwisdom could be consistent with unhappiness, was always rejected as inadmissible:\r\nthe reason assigned by one of the interlocutors, near the beginning\r\nof the third book, being, that if the wise could be unhappy, there was\r\nlittle use in pursuing wisdom. But by unhappiness they did not mean\r\npain or suffering; to that it was granted that the wisest person was liable\r\nin common with others: he was happy, because in possessing wisdom he\r\nhad the most valuable of all possessions, the most to be sought and prized\r\nof all things, and to possess the most valuable thing was to be the most\r\nhappy. By laying it down, therefore, at the commencement of the inquiry,\r\nthat the sage must be happy, the disputed question respecting the\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003esummum bonum\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e was in fact begged; with the further assumption,\r\nthat pain and suffering, so far as they can co-exist with wisdom, are not unhappiness,\r\nand are no evil.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe following are additional instances of Petitio Principii, under more\r\nor less of disguise.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nPlato, in the \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eSophistes\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, attempts to prove that things may exist\r\nwhich are incorporeal, by the argument that justice and wisdom are incorporeal,\r\nand justice and wisdom must be something. Here, if by \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003esomething\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e be\r\nmeant, as Plato did in fact mean, a thing capable of existing in and by\r\nitself, and not as a quality of some other thing, he begs the question in\r\nasserting that justice and wisdom must be something; if he means any\r\nthing else, his conclusion is not proved. This fallacy might also be classed\r\nunder ambiguous middleterm; \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003esomething\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e, in the one premise, meaning\r\nsome substance, in the other merely some object of thought, whether substance\r\nor attribute.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt was formerly an argument employed in proof of what is now no longer\r\na popular doctrine, the infinite divisibility of matter, that every portion\r\nof matter however small, must at least have an upper and an under surface.\r\nThose who used this argument did not see that it assumed the very\r\npoint in dispute, the impossibility of arriving at a minimum of thickness;\r\nfor if there be a minimum, its upper and under surface will of course be\r\none; it will be itself a surface, and no more. The argument owes its very\r\nconsiderable plausibility to this, that the premise does actually seem more\r\nobvious than the conclusion, though really identical with it. As expressed\r\nin the premise, the proposition appeals directly and in concrete language\r\nto the incapacity of the human imagination for conceiving a minimum.\r\nViewed in this light, it becomes a case of the \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\r\npriori\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e fallacy or natural\r\nprejudice, that whatever can not be conceived can not exist. Every fallacy\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page575\"\u003e[pg 575]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg575\" id=\"Pg575\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nof Confusion (it is almost unnecessary to repeat) will, if cleared up,\r\nbecome a fallacy of some other sort; and it will be found of deductive or\r\nratiocinative fallacies generally, that when they mislead, there is mostly, as\r\nin this case, a fallacy of some other description lurking under them, by\r\nvirtue of which chiefly it is that the verbal juggle, which is the outside or\r\nbody of this kind of fallacy, passes undetected.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nEuler’s Algebra, a book otherwise of great merit, but full, to overflowing,\r\nof logical errors in respect to the foundation of the science, contains\r\nthe following argument to prove that \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eminus\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e multiplied by\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eminus\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e gives \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eplus\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e, a doctrine the opprobrium of all mere\r\nmathematicians, and which Euler had not a glimpse of the true method of proving. He says\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eminus\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e multiplied by \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eminus\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e can not give \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eminus\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e; for\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eminus\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e multiplied by \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eplus\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e gives \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eminus\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e, and\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eminus\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e multiplied by \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eminus\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e can not give the same product\r\nas \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eminus\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e multiplied by \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eplus\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e. Now one is obliged to ask, why\r\nminus multiplied by minus must give any product at all? and if it does, why its\r\nproduct can not be the same as that of minus multiplied by plus? for this\r\nwould seem, at the first glance, not more absurd than that minus by minus\r\nshould give the same as plus by plus, the proposition which Euler prefers\r\nto it. The premise requires proof, as much as the conclusion; nor can it\r\nbe proved, except by that more comprehensive view of the nature of multiplication,\r\nand of algebraic processes in general, which would also supply\r\na far better proof of the mysterious doctrine which Euler is here endeavoring\r\nto demonstrate.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nA striking instance of reasoning in a circle is that of some ethical writers,\r\nwho first take for their standard of moral truth what, being the general,\r\nthey deem to be the natural or instinctive sentiments and perceptions of\r\nmankind, and then explain away the numerous instances of divergence\r\nfrom their assumed standard, by representing them as cases in which the\r\nperceptions are unhealthy. Some particular mode of conduct or feeling is\r\naffirmed to be \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eunnatural\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e; why? because it is abhorrent to the universal\r\nand natural sentiments of mankind. Finding no such sentiment in yourself,\r\nyou question the fact; and the answer is (if your antagonist is polite),\r\nthat you are an exception, a peculiar case. But neither (say you) do I\r\nfind in the people of some other country, or of some former age, any such\r\nfeeling of abhorrence; \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“ay, but their feelings were sophisticated and unhealthy.”\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nOne of the most notable specimens of reasoning in a circle is the doctrine\r\nof Hobbes, Rousseau, and others, which rests the obligations by\r\nwhich human beings are bound as members of society, on a supposed social\r\ncompact. I waive the consideration of the fictitious nature of the compact\r\nitself; but when Hobbes, through the whole Leviathan, elaborately\r\ndeduces the obligation of obeying the sovereign, not from the necessity or\r\nutility of doing so, but from a promise supposed to have been made by\r\nour ancestors, on renouncing savage life and agreeing to establish political\r\nsociety, it is impossible not to retort by the question, Why are we bound\r\nto keep a promise made for us by others? or why bound to keep a promise\r\nat all? No satisfactory ground can be assigned for the obligation, except\r\nthe mischievous consequences of the absence of faith and mutual confidence\r\namong mankind. We are, therefore, brought round to the interests of society,\r\nas the ultimate ground of the obligation of a promise; and yet those\r\ninterests are not admitted to be a sufficient justification for the existence\r\nof government and law. Without a promise it is thought that we should\r\nnot be bound to that which is implied in all modes of living in society,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page576\"\u003e[pg 576]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg576\" id=\"Pg576\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nnamely, to yield a general obedience to the laws therein established; and\r\nso necessary is the promise deemed, that if none has actually been made,\r\nsome additional safety is supposed to be given to the foundations of society\r\nby feigning one.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 3. Two principal subdivisions of the class of Fallacies of Confusion\r\nhaving been disposed of; there remains a third, in which the confusion is\r\nnot, as in the Fallacy of Ambiguity, in misconceiving the import of the\r\npremises, nor, as in Petitio Principii, in forgetting what the premises are,\r\nbut in mistaking the conclusion which is to be proved. This is the fallacy\r\nof Ignoratio Elenchi, in the widest sense of the phrase; also called by\r\nArchbishop Whately the Fallacy of Irrelevant Conclusion. His examples\r\nand remarks are highly worthy of citation.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Various kinds of propositions are, according to the occasion, substituted\r\nfor the one of which proof is required; sometimes the particular for\r\nthe universal; sometimes a proposition with different terms; and various\r\nare the contrivances employed to effect and to conceal this substitution,\r\nand to make the conclusion which the sophist has drawn, answer practically\r\nthe same purpose as the one he ought to have established. We say,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e‘practically the same purpose,’\u003c/span\u003e because it will very often happen that some\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eemotion\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e will be excited, some sentiment impressed on the mind (by a\r\ndexterous employment of this fallacy), such as shall bring men into the\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003edisposition\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e requisite for your purpose; though they may not have assented\r\nto, or even stated distinctly in their own minds, the \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eproposition\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e which it\r\nwas your business to establish. Thus if a sophist has to defend one who has\r\nbeen guilty of some \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eserious\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e offense, which he wishes to extenuate, though\r\nhe is unable distinctly to prove that it is not such, yet if he can succeed in\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003emaking the audience laugh\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e at some casual matter, he has gained practically\r\nthe same point. So also if any one has pointed out the extenuating circumstances\r\nin some particular case of offense, so as to show that it differs\r\nwidely from the generality of the same class, the sophist, if he finds himself\r\nunable to disprove these circumstances, may do away the force of\r\nthem, by simply \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ereferring the action to that very class\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e, which no one can\r\ndeny that it belongs to, and the very name of which will excite a feeling\r\nof disgust sufficient to counteract the extenuation; \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ee.g.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, let it\r\nbe a case of peculation, and that many \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003emitigating\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e circumstances have been\r\nbrought forward which can not be denied; the sophistical opponent will reply,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e‘Well, but after all, the man is a \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003erogue\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e, and there is an end of it;’\u003c/span\u003e\r\nnow in reality this was (by hypothesis) never the question; and the mere assertion\r\nof what was never denied \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eought\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e not, in fairness, to be regarded as\r\ndecisive; but, practically, the odiousness of the word, arising in great\r\nmeasure from the association of those very circumstances which belong to\r\nmost of the class, but which we have supposed to be \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eabsent\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e in\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ethis particular\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e\r\ninstance, excites precisely that feeling of disgust which, in effect,\r\ndestroys the force of the defense. In like manner we may refer to this\r\nhead all cases of improper appeal to the passions, and every thing else\r\nwhich is mentioned by Aristotle as extraneous to the matter in hand\r\n(ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος).”\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAgain, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“instead of proving that \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e‘this prisoner has committed an atrocious\r\nfraud,’\u003c/span\u003e you prove that the fraud he is accused of is atrocious; instead\r\nof proving (as in the well-known tale of Cyrus and the two coats) that the\r\ntaller boy had a right to force the other boy to exchange coats with him,\r\nyou prove that the exchange would have been advantageous to both; instead\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page577\"\u003e[pg 577]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg577\" id=\"Pg577\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nof proving that the poor ought to be relieved in this way rather than\r\nin that, you prove that the poor ought to be relieved; instead of proving\r\nthat the irrational agent—whether a brute or a madman—can never be deterred\r\nfrom any act by apprehension of punishment (as, for instance, a dog\r\nfrom sheep-biting, by fear of being beaten), you prove that the beating of\r\none dog does not operate as an \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eexample\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e to \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eother\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e dogs, etc.\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“It is evident that Ignoratio Elenchi may be employed as well for the\r\napparent refutation of your opponent’s proposition, as for the apparent establishment\r\nof your own; for it is substantially the same thing, to prove\r\nwhat was not denied or to disprove what was not asserted. The latter\r\npractice is not less common, and it is more offensive, because it frequently\r\namounts to a personal affront, in attributing to a person opinions, etc.,\r\nwhich he perhaps holds in abhorrence. Thus, when in a discussion one\r\nparty vindicates, on the ground of general expediency, a particular instance\r\nof resistance to government in a case of intolerable oppression, the\r\nopponent may gravely maintain, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e‘that we ought not to do evil that good\r\nmay come;’\u003c/span\u003e a proposition which of course had never been denied, the point\r\nin dispute being, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e‘whether resistance in this particular case \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ewere\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e doing\r\nevil or not.’\u003c/span\u003e Or again, by way of disproving the assertion of the right of private\r\njudgment in religion, one may hear a grave argument to prove that \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e‘it\r\nis impossible every one can be \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eright in his judgment\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e.’\u003c/span\u003e ”\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe works of controversial writers are seldom free from this fallacy. The\r\nattempts, for instance, to disprove the population doctrines of Malthus, have\r\nbeen mostly cases of \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eignoratio elenchi\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e.\r\nMalthus has been supposed to be\r\nrefuted if it could be shown that in some countries or ages population has\r\nbeen nearly stationary; as if he had asserted that population always increases\r\nin a given ratio, or had not expressly declared that it increases only\r\nin so far as it is not restrained by prudence, or kept down by poverty and\r\ndisease. Or, perhaps, a collection of facts is produced to prove that in some\r\none country the people are better off with a dense population than they\r\nare in another country with a thin one; or that the people have become\r\nmore numerous and better off at the same time. As if the assertion were\r\nthat a dense population could not possibly be well off; as if it were not\r\npart of the very doctrine, and essential to it, that where there is a more\r\nabundant production there may be a greater population without any increase\r\nof poverty, or even with a diminution of it.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe favorite argument against Berkeley’s theory of the non-existence of\r\nmatter, and the most popularly effective, next to a \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“grin”\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca id=\"noteref_267\" name=\"noteref_267\" href=\"#note_267\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e267\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e—an argument,\r\nmoreover, which is not confined to \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“coxcombs,”\u003c/span\u003e nor to men like Samuel\r\nJohnson, whose greatly overrated ability certainly did not lie in the direction\r\nof metaphysical speculation, but is the stock argument of the Scotch\r\nschool of metaphysicians—is a palpable Ignoratio Elenchi. The argument\r\nis perhaps as frequently expressed by gesture as by words, and one of its\r\ncommonest forms consists in knocking a stick against the ground. This\r\nshort and easy confutation overlooks the fact, that in denying matter, Berkeley\r\ndid not deny any thing to which our senses bear witness, and therefore\r\ncan not be answered by any appeal to them. His skepticism related to the\r\nsupposed substratum, or hidden cause of the appearances perceived by our\r\nsenses; the evidence of which, whatever may be thought of its conclusiveness,\r\nis certainly not the evidence of sense. And it will always remain a\r\nsignal proof of the want of metaphysical profundity of Reid, Stewart, and,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page578\"\u003e[pg 578]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg578\" id=\"Pg578\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nI am sorry to add, of Brown, that they should have persisted in asserting\r\nthat Berkeley, if he believed his own doctrine, was bound to walk into the\r\nkennel, or run his head against a post. As if persons who do not recognize\r\nan occult cause of their sensations could not possibly believe that a fixed\r\norder subsists among the sensations themselves. Such a want of comprehension\r\nof the distinction between a thing and its sensible manifestation,\r\nor, in metaphysical language, between the noumenon and the phenomenon,\r\nwould be impossible to even the dullest disciple of Kant or Coleridge.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt would be easy to add a greater number of examples of this fallacy, as\r\nwell as of the others which I have attempted to characterize. But a more\r\ncopious exemplification does not seem to be necessary; and the intelligent\r\nreader will have little difficulty in adding to the catalogue from his own\r\nreading and experience. We shall, therefore, here close our exposition of\r\nthe general principles of logic, and proceed to the supplementary inquiry\r\nwhich is necessary to complete our design.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page579\"\u003e[pg 579]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg579\" id=\"Pg579\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr class=\"page\" /\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-div\" style=\"margin-bottom: 5.00em; margin-top: 5.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"toc127\" id=\"toc127\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"pdf128\" id=\"pdf128\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\u0027chapter\u0027 /\u003e\u003ch2 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: center; margin-bottom: 2.88em; margin-top: 2.88em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 144%\"\u003eBook VI.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\u003cdiv class=\u0027chapter\u0027 /\u003e\u003ch2 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: left; margin-bottom: 3.46em; margin-top: 3.46em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 173%\"\u003eOn The Logic Of The Moral Sciences.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"block tei tei-quote\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.80em; margin-left: 3.60em; margin-top: 1.80em; margin-right: 3.60em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 0.90em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e“\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003eSi l’homme peut prédire, avec une assurance presque entière, les phénomènes dont il\r\nconnaît les lois; si lors même qu’elles lui sont inconnues, il peut, d’après\r\nl’expérience, prévoir avec une grande probabilité les événements de l’avenir; pourquoi\r\nregarderait-on comme une entreprise chimérique, celle de tracer avec quelque\r\nvraisemblance le tableau des destinées futures de l’espèce humaine, d’après les\r\nrésultats de son histoire? Le seul fondement de croyance dans les sciences naturelles,\r\nest cette idée, que les lois générales, connues ou ignorées, qui règlent les phénomènes\r\nde l’univers, sont nécessaires et constantes; et par quelle raison ce principe serait-il\r\nmoins vrai pour le développement des facultés intellectuelles et morales de\r\nl’homme, que pour les autres opérations de la nature? Enfin, puisque des opinions\r\nformées d’après l’expérience … sont la seule règle de la conduite des hommes les plus\r\nsages, pourquoi interdirait-on au philosophe d’appuyer ses conjectures sur cette même\r\nbase, pourvu qu’il ne leur attribue pas une certitude supérieure à celle qui peut naître\r\ndu nombre, de la constance, de l’exactitude des\r\nobservations?\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e”\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e—\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%; font-variant: small-caps\"\u003eCondorcet\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e, \u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%; font-style: italic\"\u003eEsquisse\r\nd’un Tableau Historique des Progrès de l’Esprit Humain\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 90%\"\u003e.\r\n\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-div\" style=\"margin-bottom: 4.00em; margin-top: 4.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"toc129\" id=\"toc129\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"pdf130\" id=\"pdf130\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: center; margin-bottom: 2.40em; margin-top: 2.40em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 120%\"\u003eChapter I.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: left; margin-bottom: 2.88em; margin-top: 2.88em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 144%\"\u003eIntroductory Remarks.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 1. Principles of Evidence and Theories of Method are not to be constructed\r\n\u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea priori\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e. The laws of our rational faculty,\r\nlike those of every\r\nother natural agency, are only learned by seeing the agent at work. The\r\nearlier achievements of science were made without the conscious observance\r\nof any Scientific Method; and we should never have known by what\r\nprocess truth is to be ascertained, if we had not previously ascertained\r\nmany truths. But it was only the easier problems which could be thus\r\nresolved: natural sagacity, when it tried its strength against the more difficult\r\nones, either failed altogether, or, if it succeeded here and there in obtaining\r\na solution, had no sure means of convincing others that its solution\r\nwas correct. In scientific investigation, as in all other works of human\r\nskill, the way of obtaining the end is seen as it were instinctively by superior\r\nminds in some comparatively simple case, and is then, by judicious\r\ngeneralization, adapted to the variety of complex cases. We learn to do\r\na thing in difficult circumstances, by attending to the manner in which we\r\nhave spontaneously done the same thing in easier ones.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThis truth is exemplified by the history of the various branches of knowledge\r\nwhich have successively, in the ascending order of their complication,\r\nassumed the character of sciences; and will doubtless receive fresh confirmation\r\nfrom those of which the final scientific constitution is yet to\r\ncome, and which are still abandoned to the uncertainties of vague and\r\npopular discussion. Although several other sciences have emerged from\r\nthis state at a comparatively recent date, none now remain in it except\r\nthose which relate to man himself, the most complex and most difficult\r\nsubject of study on which the human mind can be engaged.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page580\"\u003e[pg 580]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg580\" id=\"Pg580\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nConcerning the physical nature of man, as an organized being—though\r\nthere is still much uncertainty and much controversy, which can only be\r\nterminated by the general acknowledgment and employment of stricter\r\nrules of induction than are commonly recognized—there is, however, a\r\nconsiderable body of truths which all who have attended to the subject\r\nconsider to be fully established; nor is there now any radical imperfection\r\nin the method observed in the department of science by its most distinguished\r\nmodern teachers. But the laws of Mind, and, in even a greater\r\ndegree, those of Society, are so far from having attained a similar state\r\nof even partial recognition, that it is still a controversy whether they are\r\ncapable of becoming subjects of science in the strict sense of the term:\r\nand among those who are agreed on this point, there reigns the most irreconcilable\r\ndiversity on almost every other. Here, therefore, if anywhere,\r\nthe principles laid down in the preceding Books may be expected to be\r\nuseful.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIf on matters so much the most important with which human intellect\r\ncan occupy itself a more general agreement is ever to exist among thinkers;\r\nif what has been pronounced \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“the proper study of mankind”\u003c/span\u003e is not\r\ndestined to remain the only subject which Philosophy can not succeed in\r\nrescuing from Empiricism; the same process through which the laws of\r\nmany simpler phenomena have by general acknowledgment been placed\r\nbeyond dispute, must be consciously and deliberately applied to those\r\nmore difficult inquiries. If there are some subjects on which the results\r\nobtained have finally received the unanimous assent of all who have attended\r\nto the proof, and others on which mankind have not yet been equally\r\nsuccessful; on which the most sagacious minds have occupied themselves\r\nfrom the earliest date, and have never succeeded in establishing any considerable\r\nbody of truths, so as to be beyond denial or doubt; it is by generalizing\r\nthe methods successfully followed in the former inquiries, and\r\nadapting them to the latter, that we may hope to remove this blot on the\r\nface of science. The remaining chapters are an endeavor to facilitate this\r\nmost desirable object.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 2. In attempting this, I am not unmindful how little can be done toward\r\nit in a mere treatise on Logic, or how vague and unsatisfactory all\r\nprecepts of Method must necessarily appear when not practically exemplified\r\nin the establishment of a body of doctrine. Doubtless, the most effectual\r\nmode of showing how the sciences of Ethics and Politics may be constructed\r\nwould be to construct them: a task which, it needs scarcely be\r\nsaid, I am not about to undertake. But even if there were no other examples,\r\nthe memorable one of Bacon would be sufficient to demonstrate,\r\nthat it is sometimes both possible and useful to point out the way, though\r\nwithout being one’s self prepared to adventure far into it. And if more\r\nwere to be attempted, this at least is not a proper place for the attempt.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIn substance, whatever can be done in a work like this for the Logic of\r\nthe Moral Sciences, has been or ought to have been accomplished in the\r\nfive preceding Books; to which the present can be only a kind of supplement\r\nor appendix, since the methods of investigation applicable to moral\r\nand social science must have been already described, if I have succeeded\r\nin enumerating and characterizing those of science in general. It remains,\r\nhowever, to examine which of those methods are more especially suited\r\nto the various branches of moral inquiry; under what peculiar facilities\r\nor difficulties they are there employed; how far the unsatisfactory state\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page581\"\u003e[pg 581]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg581\" id=\"Pg581\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nof those inquiries is owing to a wrong choice of methods, how far to want\r\nof skill in the application of right ones; and what degree of ultimate success\r\nmay be attained or hoped for by a better choice or more careful employment\r\nof logical processes appropriate to the case. In other words,\r\nwhether moral sciences exist, or can exist; to what degree of perfection\r\nthey are susceptible of being carried; and by what selection or adaptation\r\nof the methods brought to view in the previous part of this work that degree\r\nof perfection is attainable.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAt the threshold of this inquiry we are met by an objection, which, if\r\nnot removed, would be fatal to the attempt to treat human conduct as a\r\nsubject of science. Are the actions of human beings, like all other natural\r\nevents, subject to invariable laws? Does that constancy of causation, which\r\nis the foundation of every scientific theory of successive phenomena, really\r\nobtain among them? This is often denied; and for the sake of systematic\r\ncompleteness, if not from any very urgent practical necessity, the question\r\nshould receive a deliberate answer in this place. We shall devote to the\r\nsubject a chapter apart.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-div\" style=\"margin-bottom: 4.00em; margin-top: 4.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"toc131\" id=\"toc131\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"pdf132\" id=\"pdf132\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"Book_VI_Chapter_II\" id=\"Book_VI_Chapter_II\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: center; margin-bottom: 2.40em; margin-top: 2.40em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 120%\"\u003eChapter II.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: left; margin-bottom: 2.88em; margin-top: 2.88em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 144%\"\u003eOf Liberty And Necessity.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 1. The question, whether the law of causality applies in the same strict\r\nsense to human actions as to other phenomena, is the celebrated controversy\r\nconcerning the freedom of the will; which, from at least as far back\r\nas the time of Pelagius, has divided both the philosophical and the religious\r\nworld. The affirmative opinion is commonly called the doctrine of\r\nNecessity, as asserting human volitions and actions to be necessary and inevitable.\r\nThe negative maintains that the will is not determined, like other\r\nphenomena, by antecedents, but determines itself; that our volitions are\r\nnot, properly speaking, the effects of causes, or at least have no causes\r\nwhich they uniformly and implicitly obey.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nI have already made it sufficiently apparent that the former of these\r\nopinions is that which I consider the true one; but the misleading terms\r\nin which it is often expressed, and the indistinct manner in which it is usually\r\napprehended, have both obstructed its reception, and perverted its influence\r\nwhen received. The metaphysical theory of free-will, as held by\r\nphilosophers (for the practical feeling of it, common in a greater or less\r\ndegree to all mankind, is in no way inconsistent with the contrary theory),\r\nwas invented because the supposed alternative of admitting human actions\r\nto be \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003enecessary\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e was deemed inconsistent with every one’s instinctive\r\nconsciousness, as well as humiliating to the pride and even degrading to the\r\nmoral nature of man. Nor do I deny that the doctrine, as sometimes held,\r\nis open to these imputations; for the misapprehension in which I shall be\r\nable to show that they originate, unfortunately is not confined to the opponents\r\nof the doctrine, but is participated in by many, perhaps we might\r\nsay by most, of its supporters.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 2. Correctly conceived, the doctrine called Philosophical Necessity is\r\nsimply this: that, given the motives which are present to an individual’s\r\nmind, and given likewise the character and disposition of the individual, the\r\nmanner in which he will act might be unerringly inferred; that if we knew\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page582\"\u003e[pg 582]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg582\" id=\"Pg582\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nthe person thoroughly, and knew all the inducements which are acting upon\r\nhim, we could foretell his conduct with as much certainty as we can predict\r\nany physical event. This proposition I take to be a mere interpretation\r\nof universal experience, a statement in words of what every one is internally\r\nconvinced of. No one who believed that he knew thoroughly the\r\ncircumstances of any case, and the characters of the different persons concerned,\r\nwould hesitate to foretell how all of them would act. Whatever\r\ndegree of doubt he may in fact feel, arises from the uncertainty whether he\r\nreally knows the circumstances, or the character of some one or other of\r\nthe persons, with the degree of accuracy required; but by no means from\r\nthinking that if he did know these things, there could be any uncertainty\r\nwhat the conduct would be. Nor does this full assurance conflict in the\r\nsmallest degree with what is called our feeling of freedom. We do not\r\nfeel ourselves the less free, because those to whom we are intimately known\r\nare well assured how we shall will to act in a particular case. We often,\r\non the contrary, regard the doubt what our conduct will be, as a mark of\r\nignorance of our character, and sometimes even resent it as an imputation.\r\nThe religious metaphysicians who have asserted the freedom of the will,\r\nhave always maintained it to be consistent with divine foreknowledge of\r\nour actions: and if with divine, then with any other foreknowledge. We\r\nmay be free, and yet another may have reason to be perfectly certain what\r\nuse we shall make of our freedom. It is not, therefore, the doctrine that\r\nour volitions and actions are invariable consequents of our antecedent\r\nstates of mind, that is either contradicted by our consciousness, or felt to\r\nbe degrading.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nBut the doctrine of causation, when considered as obtaining between our\r\nvolitions and their antecedents, is almost universally conceived as involving\r\nmore than this. Many do not believe, and very few practically feel, that\r\nthere is nothing in causation but invariable, certain, and unconditional sequence.\r\nThere are few to whom mere constancy of succession appears a\r\nsufficiently stringent bond of union for so peculiar a relation as that of\r\ncause and effect. Even if the reason repudiates, the imagination retains,\r\nthe feeling of some more intimate connection, of some peculiar tie, or mysterious\r\nconstraint exercised by the antecedent over the consequent. Now\r\nthis it is which, considered as applying to the human will, conflicts with\r\nour consciousness, and revolts our feelings. We are certain that, in the\r\ncase of our volitions, there is not this mysterious constraint. We know\r\nthat we are not compelled, as by a magical spell, to obey any particular\r\nmotive. We feel, that if we wished to prove that we have the power of\r\nresisting the motive, we could do so (that wish being, it needs scarcely be\r\nobserved, a \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003enew antecedent\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e); and it would be humiliating to our pride, and\r\n(what is of more importance) paralyzing to our desire of excellence, if we\r\nthought otherwise. But neither is any such mysterious compulsion now\r\nsupposed, by the best philosophical authorities, to be exercised by any other\r\ncause over its effect. Those who think that causes draw their effects after\r\nthem by a mystical tie, are right in believing that the relation between\r\nvolitions and their antecedents is of another nature. But they should go\r\nfarther, and admit that this is also true of all other effects and their antecedents.\r\nIf such a tie is considered to be involved in the word Necessity,\r\nthe doctrine is not true of human actions; but neither is it then true of inanimate\r\nobjects. It would be more correct to say that matter is not bound\r\nby necessity, than that mind is so.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThat the free-will metaphysicians, being mostly of the school which rejects\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page583\"\u003e[pg 583]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg583\" id=\"Pg583\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nHume’s and Brown’s analysis of Cause and Effect, should miss their\r\nway for want of the light which that analysis affords, can not surprise us.\r\nThe wonder is, that the necessitarians, who usually admit that philosophical\r\ntheory, should in practice equally lose sight of it. The very same misconception\r\nof the doctrine called Philosophical Necessity, which prevents\r\nthe opposite party from recognizing its truth, I believe to exist more or\r\nless obscurely in the minds of most necessitarians, however they may in\r\nwords disavow it. I am much mistaken if they habitually feel that the\r\nnecessity which they recognize in actions is but uniformity of order, and\r\ncapability of being predicted. They have a feeling as if there were at bottom\r\na stronger tie between the volitions and their causes; as if, when they\r\nasserted that the will is governed by the balance of motives, they meant\r\nsomething more cogent than if they had only said, that whoever knew the\r\nmotives, and our habitual susceptibilities to them, could predict how we\r\nshould will to act. They commit, in opposition to their own scientific\r\nsystem, the very same mistake which their adversaries commit in obedience\r\nto theirs; and in consequence do really in some instances suffer those depressing\r\nconsequences which their opponents erroneously impute to the\r\ndoctrine itself.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 3. I am inclined to think that this error is almost wholly an effect of\r\nthe associations with a word, and that it would be prevented, by forbearing\r\nto employ, for the expression of the simple fact of causation, so extremely\r\ninappropriate a term as Necessity. That word, in its other acceptations,\r\ninvolves much more than mere uniformity of sequence: it implies\r\nirresistibleness. Applied to the will, it only means that, the given\r\ncause will be followed by the effect, subject to all possibilities of counteraction\r\nby other causes; but in common use it stands for the operation of\r\nthose causes exclusively which are supposed too powerful to be counteracted\r\nat all. When we say that all human actions take place of necessity,\r\nwe only mean that they will certainly happen if nothing prevents; when\r\nwe say that dying of want, to those who can not get food, is a necessity,\r\nwe mean that it will certainly happen whatever may be done to prevent it.\r\nThe application of the same term to the agencies on which human actions\r\ndepend, as is used to express those agencies of nature which are really uncontrollable,\r\ncan not fail, when habitual, to create a feeling of uncontrollableness\r\nin the former also. This, however, is a mere illusion. There are\r\nphysical sequences which we call necessary, as death for want of food or\r\nair; there are others which, though as much cases of causation as the former,\r\nare not said to be necessary, as death from poison, which an antidote,\r\nor the use of the stomach-pump, will sometimes avert. It is apt to be forgotten\r\nby people’s feelings, even if remembered by their understandings,\r\nthat human actions are in this last predicament: they are never (except in\r\nsome cases of mania) ruled by any one motive with such absolute sway\r\nthat there is no room for the influence of any other. The causes, therefore,\r\non which action depends, are never uncontrollable; and any given effect\r\nis only necessary provided that the causes tending to produce it are\r\nnot controlled. That whatever happens, could not have happened otherwise,\r\nunless something had taken place which was capable of preventing it,\r\nno one surely needs hesitate to admit. But to call this by the name Necessity\r\nis to use the term in a sense so different from its primitive and familiar\r\nmeaning, from that which it bears in the common occasions of life, as\r\nto amount almost to a play upon words. The associations derived from\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page584\"\u003e[pg 584]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg584\" id=\"Pg584\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nthe ordinary sense of the term will adhere to it in spite of all we can do;\r\nand though the doctrine of Necessity, as stated by most who hold it, is very\r\nremote from fatalism, it is probable that most necessitarians are fatalists,\r\nmore or less, in their feelings.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nA fatalist believes, or half believes (for nobody is a consistent fatalist),\r\nnot only that whatever is about to happen will be the infallible result of\r\nthe causes which produce it (which is the true necessitarian doctrine), but\r\nmoreover that there is no use in struggling against it; that it will happen,\r\nhowever we may strive to prevent it. Now, a necessitarian, believing that\r\nour actions follow from our characters, and that our characters follow from\r\nour organization, our education, and our circumstances, is apt to be, with\r\nmore or less of consciousness on his part, a fatalist as to his own actions,\r\nand to believe that his nature is such, or that his education and circumstances\r\nhave so moulded his character, that nothing can now prevent him\r\nfrom feeling and acting in a particular way, or at least that no effort of his\r\nown can hinder it. In the words of the sect which in our own day has\r\nmost perseveringly inculcated and most perversely misunderstood this great\r\ndoctrine, his character is formed \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003efor\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e him, and not \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eby\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e him;\r\ntherefore his wishing that it had been formed differently is of no use; he has no power\r\nto alter it. But this is a grand error. He has, to a certain extent, a power\r\nto alter his character. Its being, in the ultimate resort, formed for him,\r\nis not inconsistent with its being, in part, formed \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eby\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e him as one of the\r\nintermediate agents. His character is formed by his circumstances (including\r\namong these his particular organization); but his own desire to mould\r\nit in a particular way, is one of those circumstances, and by no means one of\r\nthe least influential. We can not, indeed, directly will to be different from\r\nwhat we are. But neither did those who are supposed to have formed our\r\ncharacters directly will that we should be what we are. Their will had no\r\ndirect power except over their own actions. They made us what they did\r\nmake us, by willing, not the end, but the requisite means; and we, when\r\nour habits are not too inveterate, can, by similarly willing the requisite\r\nmeans, make ourselves different. If they could place us under the influence\r\nof certain circumstances, we, in like manner, can place ourselves under the\r\ninfluence of other circumstances. We are exactly as capable of making\r\nour own character, \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eif we will\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e, as others are of making it for us.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nYes (answers the Owenite), but these words, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“if we will,”\u003c/span\u003e surrender the\r\nwhole point: since the will to alter our own character is given us, not by\r\nany efforts of ours, but by circumstances which we can not help, it comes\r\nto us either from external causes, or not at all. Most true: if the Owenite\r\nstops here, he is in a position from which nothing can expel him. Our\r\ncharacter is formed by us as well as for us; but the wish which induces\r\nus to attempt to form it is formed for us; and how? Not, in general, by\r\nour organization, nor wholly by our education, but by our experience; experience\r\nof the painful consequences of the character we previously had;\r\nor by some strong feeling of admiration or aspiration, accidentally aroused.\r\nBut to think that we have no power of altering our character, and to think\r\nthat we shall not use our power unless we desire to use it, are very different\r\nthings, and have a very different effect on the mind. A person who\r\ndoes not wish to alter his character, can not be the person who is supposed\r\nto feel discouraged or paralyzed by thinking himself unable to do it. The\r\ndepressing effect of the fatalist doctrine can only be felt where there \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eis\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e a\r\nwish to do what that doctrine represents as impossible. It is of no consequence\r\nwhat we think forms our character, when we have no desire of our\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page585\"\u003e[pg 585]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg585\" id=\"Pg585\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nown about forming it; but it is of great consequence that we should not\r\nbe prevented from forming such a desire by thinking the attainment impracticable,\r\nand that if we have the desire, we should know that the work\r\nis not so irrevocably done as to be incapable of being altered.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAnd indeed, if we examine closely, we shall find that this feeling, of our\r\nbeing able to modify our own character \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eif we wish\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e, is itself the feeling of\r\nmoral freedom which we are conscious of. A person feels morally free\r\nwho feels that his habits or his temptations are not his masters, but he\r\ntheirs; who, even in yielding to them, knows that he could resist; that\r\nwere he desirous of altogether throwing them off, there would not be\r\nrequired for that purpose a stronger desire than he knows himself to be\r\ncapable of feeling. It is of course necessary, to render our consciousness\r\nof freedom complete, that we should have succeeded in making our character\r\nall we have hitherto attempted to make it; for if we have wished\r\nand not attained, we have, to that extent, not power over our own character;\r\nwe are not free. Or at least, we must feel that our wish, if not strong\r\nenough to alter our character, is strong enough to conquer our character\r\nwhen the two are brought into conflict in any particular case of conduct.\r\nAnd hence it is said with truth, that none but a person of confirmed virtue\r\nis completely free.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe application of so improper a term as Necessity to the doctrine of\r\ncause and effect in the matter of human character, seems to me one of the\r\nmost signal instances in philosophy of the abuse of terms, and its practical\r\nconsequences one of the most striking examples of the power of language\r\nover our associations. The subject will never be generally understood\r\nuntil that objectionable term is dropped. The free-will doctrine, by keeping\r\nin view precisely that portion of the truth which the word Necessity\r\nputs out of sight, namely the power of the mind to co-operate in the formation\r\nof its own character, has given to its adherents a practical feeling\r\nmuch nearer to the truth than has generally (I believe) existed in the\r\nminds of necessitarians. The latter may have had a stronger sense of the\r\nimportance of what human beings can do to shape the characters of one\r\nanother; but the free-will doctrine has, I believe, fostered in its supporters\r\na much stronger spirit of self-culture.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 4. There is still one fact which requires to be noticed (in addition to\r\nthe existence of a power of self-formation) before the doctrine of the causation\r\nof human actions can be freed from the confusion and misapprehensions\r\nwhich surround it in many minds. When the will is said to be determined\r\nby motives, a motive does not mean always, or solely, the anticipation\r\nof a pleasure or of a pain. I shall not here inquire whether it be\r\ntrue that, in the commencement, all our voluntary actions are mere means\r\nconsciously employed to obtain some pleasure or avoid some pain. It is\r\nat least certain that we gradually, through the influence of association,\r\ncome to desire the means without thinking of the end; the action itself\r\nbecomes an object of desire, and is performed without reference to any\r\nmotive beyond itself. Thus far, it may still be objected that, the action\r\nhaving through association become pleasurable, we are, as much as before,\r\nmoved to act by the anticipation of a pleasure, namely, the pleasure\r\nof the action itself. But granting this, the matter does not end here. As\r\nwe proceed in the formation of habits, and become accustomed to will a\r\nparticular act or a particular course of conduct because it is pleasurable,\r\nwe at last continue to will it without any reference to its being pleasurable.\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page586\"\u003e[pg 586]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg586\" id=\"Pg586\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nAlthough, from some change in us or in our circumstances, we have\r\nceased to find any pleasure in the action, or perhaps to anticipate any\r\npleasure as the consequence of it, we still continue to desire the action, and\r\nconsequently to do it. In this manner it is that habits of hurtful excess\r\ncontinue to be practiced although they have ceased to be pleasurable; and\r\nin this manner also it is that the habit of willing to persevere in the course\r\nwhich he has chosen, does not desert the moral hero, even when the reward,\r\nhowever real, which he doubtless receives from the consciousness of\r\nwell-doing, is any thing but an equivalent for the sufferings he undergoes,\r\nor the wishes which he may have to renounce.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nA habit of willing is commonly called a purpose; and among the causes\r\nof our volitions, and of the actions which flow from them, must be reckoned\r\nnot only likings and aversions, but also purposes. It is only when our\r\npurposes have become independent of the feelings of pain or pleasure from\r\nwhich they originally took their rise, that we are said to have a confirmed\r\ncharacter. \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“A character,”\u003c/span\u003e says Novalis, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“is a completely fashioned will:”\u003c/span\u003e\r\nand the will, once so fashioned, may be steady and constant, when the passive\r\nsusceptibilities of pleasure and pain are greatly weakened or materially\r\nchanged.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWith the corrections and explanations now given, the doctrine of the\r\ncausation of our volitions by motives, and of motives by the desirable objects\r\noffered to us, combined with our particular susceptibilities of desire,\r\nmay be considered, I hope, as sufficiently established for the purposes of\r\nthis treatise.\u003ca id=\"noteref_268\" name=\"noteref_268\" href=\"#note_268\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e268\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-div\" style=\"margin-bottom: 4.00em; margin-top: 4.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"toc133\" id=\"toc133\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"pdf134\" id=\"pdf134\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: center; margin-bottom: 2.40em; margin-top: 2.40em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 120%\"\u003eChapter III.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: left; margin-bottom: 2.88em; margin-top: 2.88em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 144%\"\u003eThat There Is, Or May Be, A Science Of Human Nature.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 1. It is a common notion, or at least it is implied in many common\r\nmodes of speech, that the thoughts, feelings, and actions of sentient beings\r\nare not a subject of science, in the same strict sense in which this is true\r\nof the objects of outward nature. This notion seems to involve some confusion\r\nof ideas, which it is necessary to begin by clearing up.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAny facts are fitted, in themselves, to be a subject of science which follow\r\none another according to constant laws, although those laws may not\r\nhave been discovered, nor even be discoverable by our existing resources.\r\nTake, for instance, the most familiar class of meteorological phenomena,\r\nthose of rain and sunshine. Scientific inquiry has not yet succeeded in ascertaining\r\nthe order of antecedence and consequence among these phenomena,\r\nso as to be able, at least in our regions of the earth, to predict them with\r\ncertainty, or even with any high degree of probability. Yet no one doubts\r\nthat the phenomena depend on laws, and that these must be derivative\r\nlaws resulting from known ultimate laws, those of heat, electricity, vaporization,\r\nand elastic fluids. Nor can it be doubted that if we were acquainted\r\nwith all the antecedent circumstances, we could, even from those more\r\ngeneral laws, predict (saving difficulties of calculation) the state of the\r\nweather at any future time. Meteorology, therefore, not only has in itself\r\nevery natural requisite for being, but actually is, a science; though, from\r\nthe difficulty of observing the facts on which the phenomena depend (a difficulty\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page587\"\u003e[pg 587]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg587\" id=\"Pg587\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\ninherent in the peculiar nature of those phenomena), the science is\r\nextremely imperfect; and were it perfect, might probably be of little avail\r\nin practice, since the data requisite for applying its principles to particular\r\ninstances would rarely be procurable.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nA case may be conceived, of an intermediate character, between the perfection\r\nof science and this its extreme imperfection. It may happen that\r\nthe greater causes, those on which the principal part of the phenomena\r\ndepends, are within the reach of observation and measurement; so that if\r\nno other causes intervened, a complete explanation could be given not only\r\nof the phenomena in general, but of all the variations and modifications\r\nwhich it admits of. But inasmuch as other, perhaps many other causes,\r\nseparately insignificant in their effects, co-operate or conflict in many or in\r\nall cases with those greater causes, the effect, accordingly, presents more\r\nor less of aberration from what would be produced by the greater causes\r\nalone. Now if these minor causes are not so constantly accessible, or not\r\naccessible at all, to accurate observation, the principal mass of the effect\r\nmay still, as before, be accounted for, and even predicted; but there will\r\nbe variations and modifications which we shall not be competent to explain\r\nthoroughly, and our predictions will not be fulfilled accurately, but only approximately.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt is thus, for example, with the theory of the tides. No one doubts\r\nthat Tidology (as Dr. Whewell proposes to call it) is really a science. As\r\nmuch of the phenomena as depends on the attraction of the sun and moon\r\nis completely understood, and may, in any, even unknown, part of the\r\nearth’s surface, be foretold with certainty; and the far greater part of the\r\nphenomena depends on those causes. But circumstances of a local or casual\r\nnature, such as the configuration of the bottom of the ocean, the degree\r\nof confinement from shores, the direction of the wind, etc., influence, in\r\nmany or in all places, the height and time of the tide; and a portion of\r\nthese circumstances being either not accurately knowable, not precisely\r\nmeasurable, or not capable of being certainly foreseen, the tide in known\r\nplaces commonly varies from the calculated result of general principles\r\nby some difference that we can not explain, and in unknown ones may\r\nvary from it by a difference that we are not able to foresee or conjecture.\r\nNevertheless, not only is it certain that these variations depend on causes,\r\nand follow their causes by laws of unerring uniformity; not only, therefore,\r\nis tidology a science, like meteorology, but it is, what hitherto at\r\nleast meteorology is not, a science largely available in practice. General\r\nlaws may be laid down respecting the tides, predictions may be founded\r\non those laws, and the result will in the main, though often not with complete\r\naccuracy, correspond to the predictions.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAnd this is what is or ought to be meant by those who speak of sciences\r\nwhich are not \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eexact\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e sciences. Astronomy was once a science, without being\r\nan exact science. It could not become exact until not only the general\r\ncourse of the planetary motions, but the perturbations also, were accounted\r\nfor, and referred to their causes. It has become an exact science, because\r\nits phenomena have been brought under laws comprehending the\r\nwhole of the causes by which the phenomena are influenced, whether in a\r\ngreat or only in a trifling degree, whether in all or only in some cases, and\r\nassigning to each of those causes the share of effect which really belongs\r\nto it. But in the theory of the tides the only laws as yet accurately ascertained\r\nare those of the causes which affect the phenomenon in all cases,\r\nand in a considerable degree; while others which affect it in some cases\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page588\"\u003e[pg 588]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg588\" id=\"Pg588\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nonly, or, if in all, only in a slight degree, have not been sufficiently ascertained\r\nand studied to enable us to lay down their laws; still less to deduce\r\nthe completed law of the phenomenon, by compounding the effects of the\r\ngreater with those of the minor causes. Tidology, therefore, is not yet\r\nan exact science; not from any inherent incapacity of being so, but from\r\nthe difficulty of ascertaining with complete precision the real derivative uniformities.\r\nBy combining, however, the exact laws of the greater causes,\r\nand of such of the minor ones as are sufficiently known, with such empirical\r\nlaws or such approximate generalizations respecting the miscellaneous\r\nvariations as can be obtained by specific observation, we can lay down\r\ngeneral propositions which will be true in the main, and on which, with\r\nallowance for the degree of their probable inaccuracy, we may safely\r\nground our expectations and our conduct.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 2. The science of human nature is of this description. It falls far\r\nshort of the standard of exactness now realized in Astronomy; but there is\r\nno reason that it should not be as much a science as Tidology is, or as Astronomy\r\nwas when its calculations had only mastered the main phenomena,\r\nbut not the perturbations.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe phenomena with which this science is conversant being the thoughts,\r\nfeelings, and actions of human beings, it would have attained the ideal perfection\r\nof a science if it enabled us to foretell how an individual would\r\nthink, feel, or act throughout life, with the same certainty with which astronomy\r\nenables us to predict the places and the occultations of the heavenly\r\nbodies. It needs scarcely be stated that nothing approaching to this can\r\nbe done. The actions of individuals could not be predicted with scientific\r\naccuracy, were it only because we can not foresee the whole of the circumstances\r\nin which those individuals will be placed. But further, even in any\r\ngiven combination of (present) circumstances, no assertion, which is both\r\nprecise and universally true, can be made respecting the manner in which\r\nhuman beings will think, feel, or act. This is not, however, because every\r\nperson’s modes of thinking, feeling, and acting do not depend on causes;\r\nnor can we doubt that if, in the case of any individual, our data could be\r\ncomplete, we even now know enough of the ultimate laws by which mental\r\nphenomena are determined, to enable us in many cases to predict, with tolerable\r\ncertainty, what, in the greater number of supposable combinations of\r\ncircumstances, his conduct or sentiments would be. But the impressions and\r\nactions of human beings are not solely the result of their present circumstances,\r\nbut the joint result of those circumstances and of the characters of\r\nthe individuals; and the agencies which determine human character are\r\nso numerous and diversified (nothing which has happened to the person\r\nthroughout life being without its portion of influence), that in the aggregate\r\nthey are never in any two cases exactly similar. Hence, even if our science\r\nof human nature were theoretically perfect, that is, if we could calculate any\r\ncharacter as we can calculate the orbit of any planet, \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003efrom given data\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e;\r\nstill, as the data are never all given, nor ever precisely alike in different cases,\r\nwe could neither make positive predictions, nor lay down universal propositions.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nInasmuch, however, as many of those effects which it is of most importance\r\nto render amenable to human foresight and control are determined,\r\nlike the tides, in an incomparably greater degree by general causes, than by\r\nall partial causes taken together; depending in the main on those circumstances\r\nand qualities which are common to all mankind, or at least to large\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page589\"\u003e[pg 589]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg589\" id=\"Pg589\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nbodies of them, and only in a small degree on the idiosyncrasies of organization\r\nor the peculiar history of individuals; it is evidently possible with\r\nregard to all such effects, to make predictions which will \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ealmost\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e always\r\nbe verified, and general propositions which are almost always true. And\r\nwhenever it is sufficient to know how the great majority of the human race,\r\nor of some nation or class of persons, will think, feel, and act, these propositions\r\nare equivalent to universal ones. For the purposes of political and\r\nsocial science this \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eis\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e sufficient. As we formerly\r\nremarked,\u003ca id=\"noteref_269\" name=\"noteref_269\" href=\"#note_269\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e269\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e an approximate\r\ngeneralization is, in social inquiries, for most practical purposes equivalent\r\nto an exact one; that which is only probable when asserted of individual\r\nhuman beings indiscriminately selected, being certain when affirmed of the\r\ncharacter and collective conduct of masses.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt is no disparagement, therefore, to the science of Human Nature, that\r\nthose of its general propositions which descend sufficiently into detail to\r\nserve as a foundation for predicting phenomena in the concrete, are for\r\nthe most part only approximately true. But in order to give a genuinely\r\nscientific character to the study, it is indispensable that these approximate\r\ngeneralizations, which in themselves would amount only to the lowest kind\r\nof empirical laws, should be connected deductively with the laws of nature\r\nfrom which they result; should be resolved into the properties of the causes\r\non which the phenomena depend. In other words, the science of Human\r\nNature may be said to exist in proportion as the approximate truths, which\r\ncompose a practical knowledge of mankind, can be exhibited as corollaries\r\nfrom the universal laws of human nature on which they rest; whereby the\r\nproper limits of those approximate truths would be shown, and we should\r\nbe enabled to deduce others for any new state of circumstances, in anticipation\r\nof specific experience.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe proposition now stated is the text on which the two succeeding\r\nchapters will furnish the comment.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-div\" style=\"margin-bottom: 4.00em; margin-top: 4.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"toc135\" id=\"toc135\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"pdf136\" id=\"pdf136\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: center; margin-bottom: 2.40em; margin-top: 2.40em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 120%\"\u003eChapter IV.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: left; margin-bottom: 2.88em; margin-top: 2.88em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 144%\"\u003eOf The Laws Of Mind.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 1. What the Mind is, as well as what Matter is, or any other question\r\nrespecting Things in themselves, as distinguished from their sensible manifestations,\r\nit would be foreign to the purposes of this treatise to consider.\r\nHere, as throughout our inquiry, we shall keep clear of all speculations respecting\r\nthe mind’s own nature, and shall understand by the laws of mind\r\nthose of mental Phenomena; of the various feelings or states of consciousness\r\nof sentient beings. These, according to the classification we have uniformly\r\nfollowed, consist of Thoughts, Emotions, Volitions, and Sensations;\r\nthe last being as truly states of Mind as the three former. It is usual, indeed,\r\nto speak of sensations as states of body, not of mind. But this is\r\nthe common confusion, of giving one and the same name to a phenomenon\r\nand to the approximate cause or conditions of the phenomenon. The immediate\r\nantecedent of a sensation is a state of body, but the sensation itself\r\nis a state of mind. If the word Mind means any thing, it means that\r\nwhich feels. Whatever opinion we hold respecting the fundamental identity\r\nor diversity of matter and mind, in any case the distinction between\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page590\"\u003e[pg 590]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg590\" id=\"Pg590\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nmental and physical facts, between the internal and the external world,\r\nwill always remain, as a matter of classification; and in that classification,\r\nsensations, like all other feelings, must be ranked as mental phenomena.\r\nThe mechanism of their production, both in the body itself and in what is\r\ncalled outward nature, is all that can with any propriety be classed as\r\nphysical.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe phenomena of mind, then, are the various feelings of our nature,\r\nboth those improperly called physical and those peculiarly designated as\r\nmental; and by the laws of mind, I mean the laws according to which\r\nthose feelings generate one another.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 2. All states of mind are immediately caused either by other states of\r\nmind, or by states of body. When a state of mind is produced by a state\r\nof mind, I call the law concerned in the case a law of Mind. When a state\r\nof mind is produced directly by a state of body, the law is a law of Body,\r\nand belongs to physical science.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWith regard to those states of mind which are called sensations, all are\r\nagreed that these have for their immediate antecedents, states of body.\r\nEvery sensation has for its proximate cause some affection of the portion\r\nof our frame called the nervous system, whether this affection originates\r\nin the action of some external object, or in some pathological condition of\r\nthe nervous organization itself. The laws of this portion of our nature—the\r\nvarieties of our sensations, and the physical conditions on which they\r\nproximately depend—manifestly belong to the province of Physiology.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWhether the remainder of our mental states are similarly dependent on\r\nphysical conditions, is one of the \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003evexatæ\r\nquestiones\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e in the science of human\r\nnature. It is still disputed whether our thoughts, emotions, and volitions\r\nare generated through the intervention of material mechanism;\r\nwhether we have organs of thought and of emotion, in the same sense in\r\nwhich we have organs of sensation. Many eminent physiologists hold the\r\naffirmative. These contend that a thought (for example) is as much the\r\nresult of nervous agency, as a sensation; that some particular state of our\r\nnervous system, in particular of that central portion of it called the brain,\r\ninvariably precedes, and is presupposed by, every state of our consciousness.\r\nAccording to this theory, one state of mind is never really produced\r\nby another: all are produced by states of body. When one thought seems\r\nto call up another by association, it is not really a thought which recalls a\r\nthought; the association did not exist between the two thoughts, but between\r\nthe two states of the brain or nerves which preceded the thoughts:\r\none of those states recalls the other, each being attended in its passage by\r\nthe particular state of consciousness which is consequent on it. On this\r\ntheory the uniformities of succession among states of mind would be mere\r\nderivative uniformities, resulting from the laws of succession of the bodily\r\nstates which cause them. There would be no original mental laws, no\r\nLaws of Mind in the sense in which I use the term, at all; and mental\r\nscience would be a mere branch, though the highest and most recondite\r\nbranch, of the science of physiology. M. Comte, accordingly, claims the\r\nscientific cognizance of moral and intellectual phenomena exclusively for\r\nphysiologists; and not only denies to Psychology, or Mental Philosophy\r\nproperly so called, the character of a science, but places it, in the chimerical\r\nnature of its objects and pretensions, almost on a par with astrology.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nBut, after all has been said which can be said, it remains incontestable\r\nthat there exist uniformities of succession among states of mind, and that\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page591\"\u003e[pg 591]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg591\" id=\"Pg591\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nthese can be ascertained by observation and experiment. Further, that\r\nevery mental state has a nervous state for its immediate antecedent and\r\nproximate cause, though extremely probable, can not hitherto be said to\r\nbe proved, in the conclusive manner in which this can be proved of sensations;\r\nand even were it certain, yet every one must admit that we are\r\nwholly ignorant of the characteristics of these nervous states; we know\r\nnot, and at present have no means of knowing, in what respect one of them\r\ndiffers from another; and our only mode of studying their successions or\r\nco-existences must be by observing the successions and co-existences of the\r\nmental states, of which they are supposed to be the generators or causes.\r\nThe successions, therefore, which obtain among mental phenomena, do not\r\nadmit of being deduced from the physiological laws of our nervous organization;\r\nand all real knowledge of them must continue, for a long time at\r\nleast, if not always, to be sought in the direct study, by observation and\r\nexperiment, of the mental successions themselves. Since, therefore, the order\r\nof our mental phenomena must be studied in those phenomena, and\r\nnot inferred from the laws of any phenomena more general, there is a distinct\r\nand separate Science of Mind.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe relations, indeed, of that science to the science of physiology must\r\nnever be overlooked or undervalued. It must by no means be forgotten\r\nthat the laws of mind may be derivative laws resulting from laws of animal\r\nlife, and that their truth, therefore, may ultimately depend on physical\r\nconditions; and the influence of physiological states or physiological\r\nchanges in altering or counteracting the mental successions, is one of the\r\nmost important departments of psychological study. But, on the other\r\nhand, to reject the resource of psychological analysis, and construct the\r\ntheory of the mind solely on such data as physiology at present affords,\r\nseems to me as great an error in principle, and an even more serious one\r\nin practice. Imperfect as is the science of mind, I do not scruple to affirm\r\nthat it is in a considerably more advanced state than the portion of physiology\r\nwhich corresponds to it; and to discard the former for the latter appears,\r\nto me an infringement of the true canons of inductive philosophy,\r\nwhich must produce, and which does produce, erroneous conclusions in\r\nsome very important departments of the science of human nature.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 3. The subject, then, of Psychology is the uniformities of succession,\r\nthe laws, whether ultimate or derivative, according to which one mental\r\nstate succeeds another; is caused by, or at least, is caused to follow, another.\r\nOf these laws some are general, others more special. The following\r\nare examples of the most general laws:\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nFirst. Whenever any state of consciousness has once been excited in us,\r\nno matter by what cause, an inferior degree of the same state of consciousness,\r\na state of consciousness resembling the former, but inferior in intensity,\r\nis capable of being reproduced in us, without the presence of any such\r\ncause as excited it at first. Thus, if we have once seen or touched an object,\r\nwe can afterward think of the object though it be absent from our\r\nsight or from our touch. If we have been joyful or grieved at some event,\r\nwe can think of or remember our past joy or grief, though no new event\r\nof a happy or painful nature has taken place. When a poet has put together\r\na mental picture of an imaginary object, a Castle of Indolence, a\r\nUna, or a Hamlet, he can afterward think of the ideal object he has created,\r\nwithout any fresh act of intellectual combination. This law is expressed by\r\nsaying, in the language of Hume, that every mental \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eimpression\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e has its\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eidea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page592\"\u003e[pg 592]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg592\" id=\"Pg592\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nSecondly. These ideas, or secondary mental states, are excited by our\r\nimpressions, or by other ideas, according to certain laws which are called\r\nLaws of Association. Of these laws the first is, that similar ideas tend to\r\nexcite one another. The second is, that when two impressions have been\r\nfrequently experienced (or even thought of) either simultaneously or in immediate\r\nsuccession, then whenever one of these impressions, or the idea of\r\nit, recurs, it tends to excite the idea of the other. The third law is, that\r\ngreater intensity in either or both of the impressions is equivalent, in rendering\r\nthem excitable by one another, to a greater frequency of conjunction.\r\nThese are the laws of ideas, on which I shall not enlarge in this\r\nplace, but refer the reader to works professedly psychological, in particular\r\nto Mr. James Mill’s \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eAnalysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\nwhere the principal laws of association, along with many of their applications,\r\nare copiously exemplified, and with a masterly hand.\u003ca id=\"noteref_270\" name=\"noteref_270\" href=\"#note_270\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e270\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThese simple or elementary Laws of Mind have been ascertained by the\r\nordinary methods of experimental inquiry; nor could they have been ascertained\r\nin any other manner. But a certain number of elementary laws\r\nhaving thus been obtained, it is a fair subject of scientific inquiry how far\r\nthose laws can be made to go in explaining the actual phenomena. It is\r\nobvious that complex laws of thought and feeling not only may, but must,\r\nbe generated from these simple laws. And it is to be remarked, that the\r\ncase is not always one of Composition of Causes: the effect of concurring\r\ncauses is not always precisely the sum of the effects of those causes when\r\nseparate, nor even always an effect of the same kind with them. Reverting\r\nto the distinction which occupies so prominent a place in the theory of\r\ninduction, the laws of the phenomena of mind are sometimes analogous to\r\nmechanical, but sometimes also to chemical laws. When many impressions\r\nor ideas are operating in the mind together, there sometimes takes place\r\na process of a similar kind to chemical combination. When impressions\r\nhave been so often experienced in conjunction, that each of them calls up\r\nreadily and instantaneously the ideas of the whole group, those ideas sometimes\r\nmelt and coalesce into one another, and appear not several ideas, but\r\none; in the same manner as, when the seven prismatic colors are presented\r\nto the eye in rapid succession, the sensation produced is that of white.\r\nBut as in this last case it is correct to say that the seven colors when they\r\nrapidly follow one another \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003egenerate\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e white, but not that they actually\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eare\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e white; so it appears to me that the Complex Idea, formed by the blending\r\ntogether of several simpler ones, should, when it really appears simple\r\n(that is, when the separate elements are not consciously distinguishable in\r\nit), be said to \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eresult from\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e, or \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ebe generated by\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e, the simple\r\nideas, not to \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003econsist\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e of them. Our idea of an orange really\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003econsists\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e of the simple ideas of\r\na certain color, a certain form, a certain taste and smell, etc., because we can,\r\nby interrogating our consciousness, perceive all these elements in the idea.\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page593\"\u003e[pg 593]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg593\" id=\"Pg593\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nBut we can not perceive, in so apparently simple a feeling as our perception\r\nof the shape of an object by the eye, all that multitude of ideas derived\r\nfrom other senses, without which it is well ascertained that no such\r\nvisual perception would ever have had existence; nor, in our idea of Extension,\r\ncan we discover those elementary ideas of resistance, derived from\r\nour muscular frame, in which it has been conclusively shown that the idea\r\noriginates. These, therefore, are cases of mental chemistry; in which it is\r\nproper to say that the simple ideas generate, rather than that they compose,\r\nthe complex ones.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWith respect to all the other constituents of the mind, its beliefs, its abstruser\r\nconceptions, its sentiments, emotions, and volitions, there are some\r\n(among whom are Hartley and the author of the \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eAnalysis\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e) who think\r\nthat the whole of these are generated from simple ideas of sensation, by a chemistry\r\nsimilar to that which we have just exemplified. These philosophers\r\nhave made out a great part of their case, but I am not satisfied that they\r\nhave established the whole of it. They have shown that there is such a\r\nthing as mental chemistry; that the heterogeneous nature of a feeling A,\r\nconsidered in relation to B and C, is no conclusive argument against its\r\nbeing generated from B and C. Having proved this, they proceed to\r\nshow, that where A is found, B and C were, or may have been present, and\r\nwhy, therefore, they ask, should not A have been generated from B and\r\nC? But even if this evidence were carried to the highest degree of completeness\r\nwhich it admits of; if it were shown (which hitherto it has not,\r\nin all cases, been) that certain groups of associated ideas not only might\r\nhave been, but actually were, present whenever the more recondite mental\r\nfeeling was experienced; this would amount only to the Method of Agreement,\r\nand could not prove causation until confirmed by the more conclusive\r\nevidence of the Method of Difference. If the question be whether\r\nBelief is a mere case of close association of ideas, it would be necessary\r\nto examine experimentally if it be true that any ideas whatever, provided\r\nthey are associated with the required degree of closeness, give rise to belief.\r\nIf the inquiry be into the origin of moral feelings, the feeling for example\r\nof moral reprobation, it is necessary to compare all the varieties of\r\nactions or states of mind which are ever morally disapproved, and see\r\nwhether in all these cases it can be shown, or reasonably surmised, that the\r\naction or state of mind had become connected by association, in the disapproving\r\nmind, with some particular class of hateful or disgusting ideas;\r\nand the method employed is, thus far, that of Agreement. But this is not\r\nenough. Supposing this proved, we must try further by the Method of\r\nDifference, whether this particular kind of hateful or disgusting ideas,\r\nwhen it becomes associated with an action previously indifferent, will render\r\nthat action a subject of moral disapproval. If this question can be\r\nanswered in the affirmative, it is shown to be a law of the human mind,\r\nthat an association of that particular description is the generating cause of\r\nmoral reprobation. That all this is the case has been rendered extremely\r\nprobable, but the experiments have not been tried with the degree of precision\r\nnecessary for a complete and absolutely conclusive induction.\u003ca id=\"noteref_271\" name=\"noteref_271\" href=\"#note_271\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e271\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt is further to be remembered, that even if all which this theory of\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page594\"\u003e[pg 594]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg594\" id=\"Pg594\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nmental phenomena contends for could be proved, we should not be the\r\nmore enabled to resolve the laws of the more complex feelings into those\r\nof the simpler ones. The generation of one class of mental phenomena\r\nfrom another, whenever it can be made out, is a highly interesting fact in\r\npsychological chemistry; but it no more supersedes the necessity of an\r\nexperimental study of the generated phenomenon, than a knowledge of the\r\nproperties of oxygen and sulphur enables us to deduce those of sulphuric\r\nacid without specific observation and experiment. Whatever, therefore,\r\nmay be the final issue of the attempt to account for the origin of our judgments,\r\nour desires, or our volitions, from simpler mental phenomena, it is\r\nnot the less imperative to ascertain the sequences of the complex phenomena\r\nthemselves, by special study in conformity to the canons of Induction.\r\nThus, in respect to Belief, psychologists will always have to inquire what\r\nbeliefs we have by direct consciousness, and according to what laws one\r\nbelief produces another; what are the laws in virtue of which one thing is\r\nrecognized by the mind, either rightly or erroneously, as evidence of another\r\nthing. In regard to Desire, they will have to examine what objects\r\nwe desire naturally, and by what causes we are made to desire things\r\noriginally indifferent, or even disagreeable to us; and so forth. It may be\r\nremarked that the general laws of association prevail among these more\r\nintricate states of mind, in the same manner as among the simpler ones.\r\nA desire, an emotion, an idea of the higher order of abstraction, even our\r\njudgments and volitions, when they have become habitual, are called up by\r\nassociation, according to precisely the same laws as our simple ideas.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 4. In the course of these inquiries, it will be natural and necessary to\r\nexamine how far the production of one state of mind by another is influenced\r\nby any assignable state of body. The commonest observation shows\r\nthat different minds are susceptible in very different degrees to the action\r\nof the same psychological causes. The idea, for example, of a given desirable\r\nobject will excite in different minds very different degrees of intensity\r\nof desire. The same subject of meditation, presented to different minds,\r\nwill excite in them very unequal degrees of intellectual action. These\r\ndifferences of mental susceptibility in different individuals may be, first,\r\noriginal and ultimate facts; or, secondly, they may be consequences of the\r\nprevious mental history of those individuals; or, thirdly and lastly, they\r\nmay depend on varieties of physical organization. That the previous mental\r\nhistory of the individuals must have some share in producing or in\r\nmodifying the whole of their mental character, is an inevitable consequence\r\nof the laws of mind; but that differences of bodily structure also\r\nco-operate, is the opinion of all physiologists, confirmed by common experience.\r\nIt is to be regretted that hitherto this experience, being accepted in\r\nthe gross, without due analysis, has been made the groundwork of empirical\r\ngeneralizations most detrimental to the progress of real knowledge.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt is certain that the natural differences which really exist in the mental\r\npredispositions or susceptibilities of different persons are often not unconnected\r\nwith diversities in their organic constitution. But it does not\r\ntherefore follow that these organic differences must in all cases influence\r\nthe mental phenomena directly and immediately. They often affect them\r\nthrough the medium of their psychological causes. For example, the idea\r\nof some particular pleasure may excite in different persons, even independently\r\nof habit or education, very different strengths of desire, and this may\r\nbe the effect of their different degrees or kinds of nervous susceptibility;\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page595\"\u003e[pg 595]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg595\" id=\"Pg595\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nbut these organic differences, we must remember, will render the pleasurable\r\nsensation itself more intense in one of these persons than in the other;\r\nso that the idea of the pleasure will also be an intenser feeling, and will, by\r\nthe operation of mere mental laws, excite an intenser desire, without its\r\nbeing necessary to suppose that the desire itself is directly influenced by\r\nthe physical peculiarity. As in this, so in many cases, such differences in\r\nthe kind or in the intensity of the physical sensations as must necessarily\r\nresult from differences of bodily organization, will of themselves account\r\nfor many differences not only in the degree, but even in the kind, of the\r\nother mental phenomena. So true is this, that even different \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003equalities\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e of\r\nmind, different types of mental character, will naturally be produced by\r\nmere differences of intensity in the sensations generally; as is well pointed\r\nout in the able essay on Dr. Priestley, by Mr. Martineau, mentioned in a\r\nformer chapter:\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“The sensations which form the elements of all knowledge are received\r\neither simultaneously or successively: when several are received simultaneously,\r\nas the smell, the taste, the color, the form, etc., of a fruit, their association\r\ntogether constitutes our idea of an \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eobject\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e; when received successively,\r\ntheir association makes up the idea of an \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eevent\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e. Any thing, then,\r\nwhich favors the associations of synchronous ideas will tend to produce a\r\nknowledge of objects, a perception of qualities; while any thing which favors\r\nassociation in the successive order, will tend to produce a knowledge\r\nof events, of the order of occurrences, and of the connection of cause and\r\neffect: in other words, in the one case a perceptive mind, with a discriminate\r\nfeeling of the pleasurable and painful properties of things, a sense of\r\nthe grand and the beautiful will be the result: in the other, a mind attentive\r\nto the movements and phenomena, a ratiocinative and philosophic intellect.\r\nNow it is an acknowledged principle, that all sensations experienced\r\nduring the presence of any vivid impression become strongly associated\r\nwith it, and with each other; and does it not follow that the synchronous\r\nfeelings of a sensitive constitution (\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, the one which has\r\nvivid impressions) will be more intimately blended than in a differently formed\r\nmind? If this suggestion has any foundation in truth, it leads to an inference\r\nnot unimportant; that where nature has endowed an individual with\r\ngreat original susceptibility, he will probably be distinguished by fondness\r\nfor natural history, a relish for the beautiful and great, and moral enthusiasm;\r\nwhere there is but a mediocrity of sensibility, a love of science, of abstract\r\ntruth, with a deficiency of taste and of fervor, is likely to be the result.”\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWe see from this example, that when the general laws of mind are more\r\naccurately known, and, above all, more skillfully applied to the detailed explanation\r\nof mental peculiarities, they will account for many more of those\r\npeculiarities than is ordinarily supposed. Unfortunately the reaction of\r\nthe last and present generation against the philosophy of the eighteenth\r\ncentury has produced a very general neglect of this great department of\r\nanalytical inquiry; of which, consequently, the recent progress has been by\r\nno means proportional to its early promise. The majority of those who\r\nspeculate on human nature prefer dogmatically to assume that the mental\r\ndifferences which they perceive, or think they perceive, among human beings,\r\nare ultimate facts, incapable of being either explained or altered, rather\r\nthan take the trouble of fitting themselves, by the requisite processes of\r\nthought, for referring those mental differences to the outward causes by\r\nwhich they are for the most part produced, and on the removal of which\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page596\"\u003e[pg 596]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg596\" id=\"Pg596\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nthey would cease to exist. The German school of metaphysical speculation,\r\nwhich has not yet lost its temporary predominance in European\r\nthought, has had this among many other injurious influences; and at the\r\nopposite extreme of the psychological scale, no writer, either of early or of\r\nrecent date, is chargeable in a higher degree with this aberration from the\r\ntrue scientific spirit, than M. Comte.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt is certain that, in human beings at least, differences in education and in\r\noutward circumstances are capable of affording an adequate explanation of\r\nby far the greatest portion of character; and that the remainder may be in\r\ngreat part accounted for by physical differences in the sensations produced\r\nin different individuals by the same external or internal cause. There are,\r\nhowever, some mental facts which do not seem to admit of these modes of\r\nexplanation. Such, to take the strongest case, are the various instincts of\r\nanimals, and the portion of human nature which corresponds to those instincts.\r\nNo mode has been suggested, even by way of hypothesis, in which\r\nthese can receive any satisfactory, or even plausible, explanation from psychological\r\ncauses alone; and there is great reason to think that they have\r\nas positive, and even as direct and immediate, a connection with physical\r\nconditions of the brain and nerves as any of our mere sensations have. A\r\nsupposition which (it is perhaps not superfluous to add) in no way conflicts\r\nwith the indisputable fact that these instincts may be modified to any extent,\r\nor entirely conquered, in human beings, and to no inconsiderable extent\r\neven in some of the domesticated animals, by other mental influences,\r\nand by education.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWhether organic causes exercise a direct influence over any other classes\r\nof mental phenomena, is hitherto as far from being ascertained as is the\r\nprecise nature of the organic conditions even in the case of instincts. The\r\nphysiology, however, of the brain and nervous system is in a state of such\r\nrapid advance, and is continually bringing forth such new and interesting\r\nresults, that if there be really a connection between mental peculiarities and\r\nany varieties cognizable by our senses in the structure of the cerebral and\r\nnervous apparatus, the nature of that connection is now in a fair way of being\r\nfound out. The latest discoveries in cerebral physiology appear to have\r\nproved that any such connection which may exist is of a radically different\r\ncharacter from that contended for by Gall and his followers, and that, whatever\r\nmay hereafter be found to be the true theory of the subject, phrenology\r\nat least is untenable.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-div\" style=\"margin-bottom: 4.00em; margin-top: 4.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"toc137\" id=\"toc137\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"pdf138\" id=\"pdf138\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: center; margin-bottom: 2.40em; margin-top: 2.40em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 120%\"\u003eChapter V.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: left; margin-bottom: 2.88em; margin-top: 2.88em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 144%\"\u003eOf Ethology, Or The Science Of The Formation Of Character.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 1. The laws of mind as characterized in the preceding chapter, compose\r\nthe universal or abstract portion of the philosophy of human nature;\r\nand all the truths of common experience, constituting a practical knowledge\r\nof mankind, must, to the extent to which they are truths, be results or consequences\r\nof these. Such familiar maxims, when collected \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\r\nposteriori\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nfrom observation of life, occupy among the truths of the science the place\r\nof what, in our analysis of Induction, have so often been spoken of under\r\nthe title of Empirical Laws.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAn Empirical Law (it will be remembered) is a uniformity, whether of\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page597\"\u003e[pg 597]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg597\" id=\"Pg597\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nsuccession or of co-existence, which holds true in all instances within our\r\nlimits of observation, but is not of a nature to afford any assurance that it\r\nwould hold beyond those limits; either because the consequent is not really\r\nthe effect of the antecedent, but forms part along with it of a chain of effects\r\nflowing from prior causes not yet ascertained, or because there is\r\nground to believe that the sequence (though a case of causation) is resolvable\r\ninto simpler sequences, and, depending therefore on a concurrence of\r\nseveral natural agencies, is exposed to an unknown multitude of possibilities\r\nof counteraction. In other words, an empirical law is a generalization, of\r\nwhich, not content with finding it true, we are obliged to ask, why is it\r\ntrue? knowing that its truth is not absolute, but dependent on some more\r\ngeneral conditions, and that it can only be relied on in so far as there is\r\nground of assurance that those conditions are realized.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nNow, the observations concerning human affairs collected from common\r\nexperience are precisely of this nature. Even if they were universally and\r\nexactly true within the bounds of experience, which they never are, still\r\nthey are not the ultimate laws of human action; they are not the principles\r\nof human nature, but results of those principles under the circumstances in\r\nwhich mankind have happened to be placed. When the Psalmist \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“said in\r\nhis haste that all men are liars,”\u003c/span\u003e he enunciated what in some ages and countries\r\nis borne out by ample experience; but it is not a law of man’s nature\r\nto lie; though it is one of the consequences of the laws of human nature,\r\nthat lying is nearly universal when certain external circumstances exist universally,\r\nespecially circumstances productive of habitual distrust and fear.\r\nWhen the character of the old is asserted to be cautious, and of the young\r\nimpetuous, this, again, is but an empirical law; for it is not because of their\r\nyouth that the young are impetuous, nor because of their age that the old\r\nare cautious. It is chiefly, if not wholly, because the old, during their\r\nmany years of life, have generally had much experience of its various evils,\r\nand having suffered or seen others suffer much from incautious exposure\r\nto them, have acquired associations favorable to circumspection; while the\r\nyoung, as well from the absence of similar experience as from the greater\r\nstrength of the inclinations which urge them to enterprise, engage themselves\r\nin it more readily. Here, then, is the \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eexplanation\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e of the empirical\r\nlaw; here are the conditions which ultimately determine whether the law\r\nholds good or not. If an old man has not been oftener than most young\r\nmen in contact with danger and difficulty, he will be equally incautious; if\r\na youth has not stronger inclinations than an old man, he probably will be\r\nas little enterprising. The empirical law derives whatever truth it has\r\nfrom the causal laws of which it is a consequence. If we know those laws,\r\nwe know what are the limits to the derivative law; while, if we have not\r\nyet accounted for the empirical law—if it rests only on observation—there\r\nis no safety in applying it far beyond the limits of time, place, and circumstance\r\nin which the observations were made.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe really scientific truths, then, are not these empirical laws, but the\r\ncausal laws which explain them. The empirical laws of those phenomena\r\nwhich depend on known causes, and of which a general theory can therefore\r\nbe constructed, have, whatever may be their value in practice, no other\r\nfunction in science than that of verifying the conclusions of theory. Still\r\nmore must this be the case when most of the empirical laws amount, even\r\nwithin the limits of observation, only to approximate generalizations.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 2. This, however, is not, so much as is sometimes supposed, a peculiarity\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page598\"\u003e[pg 598]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg598\" id=\"Pg598\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nof the sciences called moral. It is only in the simplest branches of science\r\nthat empirical laws are ever exactly true; and not always in those. Astronomy,\r\nfor example, is the simplest of all the sciences which explain, in\r\nthe concrete, the actual course of natural events. The causes or forces\r\non which astronomical phenomena depend, are fewer in number than those\r\nwhich determine any other of the great phenomena of nature. Accordingly,\r\nas each effect results from the conflict of but few causes, a great degree\r\nof regularity and uniformity might be expected to exist among the effects;\r\nand such is really the case: they have a fixed order, and return in cycles.\r\nBut propositions which should express, with absolute correctness, all the\r\nsuccessive positions of a planet until the cycle is completed, would be of almost\r\nunmanageable complexity, and could be obtained from theory alone.\r\nThe generalizations which can be collected on the subject from direct observation,\r\neven such as Kepler’s law, are mere approximations; the planets,\r\nowing to their perturbations by one another, do not move in exact ellipses.\r\nThus even in astronomy, perfect exactness in the mere empirical laws is\r\nnot to be looked for; much less, then, in more complex subjects of inquiry.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe same example shows how little can be inferred against the universality\r\nor even the simplicity of the ultimate laws, from the impossibility of\r\nestablishing any but approximate empirical laws of the effects. The laws\r\nof causation according to which a class of phenomena are produced may\r\nbe very few and simple, and yet the effects themselves may be so various\r\nand complicated that it shall be impossible to trace any regularity whatever\r\ncompletely through them. For the phenomena in question may be of an\r\neminently modifiable character; insomuch that innumerable circumstances\r\nare capable of influencing the effect, although they may all do it according\r\nto a very small number of laws. Suppose that all which passes in the mind\r\nof man is determined by a few simple laws; still, if those laws be such that\r\nthere is not one of the facts surrounding a human being, or of the events\r\nwhich happen to him, that does not influence in some mode or degree his\r\nsubsequent mental history, and if the circumstances of different human beings\r\nare extremely different, it will be no wonder if very few propositions\r\ncan be made respecting the details of their conduct or feelings, which will\r\nbe true of all mankind.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nNow, without deciding whether the ultimate laws of our mental nature\r\nare few or many, it is at least certain that they are of the above description.\r\nIt is certain that our mental states, and our mental capacities and susceptibilities,\r\nare modified, either for a time or permanently, by every thing which\r\nhappens to us in life. Considering, therefore, how much these modifying\r\ncauses differ in the case of any two individuals, it would be unreasonable\r\nto expect that the empirical laws of the human mind, the generalizations\r\nwhich can be made respecting the feelings or actions of mankind without\r\nreference to the causes that determine them, should be any thing but approximate\r\ngeneralizations. They are the common wisdom of common life,\r\nand as such are invaluable; especially as they are mostly to be applied to\r\ncases not very dissimilar to those from which they were collected. But\r\nwhen maxims of this sort, collected from Englishmen, come to be applied\r\nto Frenchmen, or when those collected from the present day are applied\r\nto past or future generations, they are apt to be very much at fault. Unless\r\nwe have resolved the empirical law into the laws of the causes on which\r\nit depends, and ascertained that those causes extend to the case which we\r\nhave in view, there can be no reliance placed in our inferences. For every\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page599\"\u003e[pg 599]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg599\" id=\"Pg599\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nindividual is surrounded by circumstances different from those of every\r\nother individual; every nation or generation of mankind from every other\r\nnation or generation: and none of these differences are without their influence\r\nin forming a different type of character. There is, indeed, also a certain\r\ngeneral resemblance; but peculiarities of circumstances are continually\r\nconstituting exceptions even to the propositions which are true in the great\r\nmajority of cases.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAlthough, however, there is scarcely any mode of feeling or conduct which\r\nis, in the absolute sense, common to all mankind; and though the generalizations\r\nwhich assert that any given variety of conduct or feeling will be\r\nfound universally (however nearly they may approximate to truth within\r\ngiven limits of observation), will be considered as scientific propositions by\r\nno one who is at all familiar with scientific investigation; yet all modes of\r\nfeeling and conduct met with among mankind have causes which produce\r\nthem; and in the propositions which assign those causes will be found the\r\nexplanation of the empirical laws, and the limiting principle of our reliance\r\non them. Human beings do not all feel and act alike in the same circumstances;\r\nbut it is possible to determine what makes one person, in a given\r\nposition, feel or act in one way, another in another; how any given mode\r\nof feeling and conduct, compatible with the general laws (physical and\r\nmental) of human nature, has been, or may be, formed. In other words,\r\nmankind have not one universal character, but there exist universal laws\r\nof the Formation of Character. And since it is by these laws, combined\r\nwith the facts of each particular case, that the whole of the phenomena of\r\nhuman action and feeling are produced, it is on these that every rational\r\nattempt to construct the science of human nature in the concrete, and for\r\npractical purposes, must proceed.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 3. The laws, then, of the formation of character being the principal object\r\nof scientific inquiry into human nature, it remains to determine the\r\nmethod of investigation best fitted for ascertaining them. And the logical\r\nprinciples according to which this question is to be decided, must be those\r\nwhich preside over every other attempt to investigate the laws of very complex\r\nphenomena. For it is evident that both the character of any human\r\nbeing, and the aggregate of the circumstances by which that character has\r\nbeen formed, are facts of a high order of complexity. Now to such cases\r\nwe have seen that the Deductive Method, setting out from general laws,\r\nand verifying their consequences by specific experience, is alone applicable.\r\nThe grounds of this great logical doctrine have formerly been stated; and\r\nits truth will derive additional support from a brief examination of the\r\nspecialties of the present case.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThere are only two modes in which laws of nature can be ascertained—deductively\r\nand experimentally; including under the denomination of experimental\r\ninquiry, observation as well as artificial experiment. Are the\r\nlaws of the formation of character susceptible of a satisfactory investigation\r\nby the method of experimentation? Evidently not; because, even if we\r\nsuppose unlimited power of varying the experiment (which is abstractedly\r\npossible, though no one but an Oriental despot has that power, or, if he had,\r\nwould probably be disposed to exercise it), a still more essential condition\r\nis wanting—the power of performing any of the experiments with scientific\r\naccuracy.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe instances requisite for the prosecution of a directly experimental inquiry\r\ninto the formation of character, would be a number of human beings\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page600\"\u003e[pg 600]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg600\" id=\"Pg600\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nto bring up and educate, from infancy to mature age. And to perform any\r\none of these experiments with scientific propriety, it would be necessary to\r\nknow and record every sensation or impression received by the young pupil\r\nfrom a period long before it could speak; including its own notions respecting\r\nthe sources of all those sensations and impressions. It is not only\r\nimpossible to do this completely, but even to do so much of it as should\r\nconstitute a tolerable approximation. One apparently trivial circumstance\r\nwhich eluded our vigilance might let in a train of impressions and associations\r\nsufficient to vitiate the experiment as an authentic exhibition of the\r\neffects flowing from given causes. No one who has sufficiently reflected\r\non education is ignorant of this truth; and whoever has not, will find it\r\nmost instructively illustrated in the writings of Rousseau and Helvetius on\r\nthat great subject.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nUnder this impossibility of studying the laws of the formation of character\r\nby experiments purposely contrived to elucidate them, there remains\r\nthe resource of simple observation. But if it be impossible to ascertain\r\nthe influencing circumstances with any approach to completeness even\r\nwhen we have the shaping of them ourselves, much more impossible is it\r\nwhen the cases are further removed from our observation, and altogether\r\nout of our control. Consider the difficulty of the very first step—of ascertaining\r\nwhat actually is the character of the individual, in each particular\r\ncase that we examine. There is hardly any person living concerning some\r\nessential part of whose character there are not differences of opinion even\r\namong his intimate acquaintances; and a single action, or conduct continued\r\nonly for a short time, goes a very little way toward ascertaining it.\r\nWe can only make our observations in a rough way and \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-foreign\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003een\r\nmasse\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e; not attempting\r\nto ascertain completely in any given instance, what character has\r\nbeen formed, and still less by what causes; but only observing in what\r\nstate of previous circumstances it is found that certain marked mental\r\nqualities or deficiencies \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eoftenest\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e exist. These conclusions, besides that\r\nthey are mere approximate generalizations, deserve no reliance, even as such,\r\nunless the instances are sufficiently numerous to eliminate not only chance,\r\nbut every assignable circumstance in which a number of the cases examined\r\nmay happen to have resembled one another. So numerous and\r\nvarious, too, are the circumstances which form individual character, that\r\nthe consequence of any particular combination is hardly ever some definite\r\nand strongly marked character, always found where that combination exists,\r\nand not otherwise. What is obtained, even after the most extensive\r\nand accurate observation, is merely a comparative result; as, for example,\r\nthat in a given number of Frenchmen, taken indiscriminately, there will be\r\nfound more persons of a particular mental tendency, and fewer of the contrary\r\ntendency, than among an equal number of Italians or English, similarly\r\ntaken; or thus: of a hundred Frenchmen and an equal number of\r\nEnglishmen, fairly selected, and arranged according to the degree in which\r\nthey possess a particular mental characteristic, each number, 1, 2, 3, etc.,\r\nof the one series, will be found to possess more of that characteristic than\r\nthe corresponding number of the other. Since, therefore, the comparison\r\nis not one of kinds, but of ratios and degrees; and since, in proportion as\r\nthe differences are slight, it requires a greater number of instances to eliminate\r\nchance, it can not often happen to any one to know a sufficient number\r\nof cases with the accuracy requisite for making the sort of comparison\r\nlast mentioned; less than which, however, would not constitute a real induction.\r\nAccordingly, there is hardly one current opinion respecting the\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page601\"\u003e[pg 601]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg601\" id=\"Pg601\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\ncharacters of nations, classes, or descriptions of persons, which is universally\r\nacknowledged as indisputable.\u003ca id=\"noteref_272\" name=\"noteref_272\" href=\"#note_272\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e272\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAnd finally, if we could even obtain by way of experiment a much more\r\nsatisfactory assurance of these generalizations than is really possible, they\r\nwould still be only empirical laws. They would show, indeed, that there\r\nwas some connection between the type of character formed and the circumstances\r\nexisting in the case; but not what the precise connection was,\r\nnor to which of the peculiarities of those circumstances the effect was really\r\nowing. They could only, therefore, be received as results of causation,\r\nrequiring to be resolved into the general laws of the causes: until the determination\r\nof which, we could not judge within what limits the derivative\r\nlaws might serve as presumptions in cases yet unknown, or even be depended\r\non as permanent in the very cases from which they were collected.\r\nThe French people had, or were supposed to have, a certain national character;\r\nbut they drive out their royal family and aristocracy, alter their institutions,\r\npass through a series of extraordinary events for the greater\r\npart of a century, and at the end of that time their character is found to\r\nhave undergone important changes. A long list of mental and moral differences\r\nare observed, or supposed to exist between men and women; but\r\nat some future and, it may be hoped, not distant period, equal freedom\r\nand an equally independent social position come to be possessed by both,\r\nand their differences of character are either removed or totally altered.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nBut if the differences which we think we observe between French and\r\nEnglish, or between men and women, can be connected with more general\r\nlaws; if they be such as might be expected to be produced by the differences\r\nof government, former customs, and physical peculiarities in the two\r\nnations, and by the diversities of education, occupations, personal independence,\r\nand social privileges, and whatever original differences there\r\nmay be in bodily strength and nervous sensibility between the two sexes;\r\nthen, indeed, the coincidence of the two kinds of evidence justifies us in\r\nbelieving that we have both reasoned rightly and observed rightly. Our\r\nobservation, though not sufficient as proof, is ample as verification. And\r\nhaving ascertained not only the empirical laws, but the causes, of the peculiarities,\r\nwe need be under no difficulty in judging how far they may be\r\nexpected to be permanent, or by what circumstances they would be modified\r\nor destroyed.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 4. Since then it is impossible to obtain really accurate propositions\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page602\"\u003e[pg 602]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg602\" id=\"Pg602\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nrespecting the formation of character from observation and experiment\r\nalone, we are driven perforce to that which, even if it had not been the indispensable,\r\nwould have been the most perfect, mode of investigation, and\r\nwhich it is one of the principal aims of philosophy to extend; namely, that\r\nwhich tries its experiments not on the complex facts, but on the simple\r\nones of which they are compounded; and after ascertaining the laws of the\r\ncauses, the composition of which gives rise to the complex phenomena,\r\nthen considers whether these will not explain and account for the approximate\r\ngeneralizations which have been framed empirically respecting the\r\nsequences of those complex phenomena. The laws of the formation of\r\ncharacter are, in short, derivative laws, resulting from the general laws of\r\nmind, and are to be obtained by deducing them from those general laws\r\nby supposing any given set of circumstances, and then considering what,\r\naccording to the laws of mind, will be the influence of those circumstances\r\non the formation of character.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nA science is thus formed, to which I would propose to give the name of\r\nEthology, or the Science of Character, from ἦθος, a word more nearly corresponding\r\nto the term \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“character”\u003c/span\u003e as I here use it, than any other word in\r\nthe same language. The name is perhaps etymologically applicable to the\r\nentire science of our mental and moral nature; but if, as is usual and convenient,\r\nwe employ the name Psychology for the science of the elementary\r\nlaws of mind, Ethology will serve for the ulterior science which determines\r\nthe kind of character produced in conformity to those general laws by any\r\nset of circumstances, physical and moral. According to this definition,\r\nEthology is the science which corresponds to the art of education in the\r\nwidest sense of the term, including the formation of national or collective\r\ncharacter as well as individual. It would indeed be vain to expect (however\r\ncompletely the laws of the formation of character might be ascertained)\r\nthat we could know so accurately the circumstances of any given case\r\nas to be able positively to predict the character that would be produced in\r\nthat case. But we must remember that a degree of knowledge far short of\r\nthe power of actual prediction is often of much practical value. There\r\nmay be great power of influencing phenomena, with a very imperfect\r\nknowledge of the causes by which they are in any given instance determined.\r\nIt is enough that we know that certain means have a \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003etendency\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e to\r\nproduce a given effect, and that others have a tendency to frustrate it.\r\nWhen the circumstances of an individual or of a nation are in any considerable\r\ndegree under our control, we may, by our knowledge of tendencies,\r\nbe enabled to shape those circumstances in a manner much more favorable\r\nto the ends we desire, than the shape which they would of themselves assume.\r\nThis is the limit of our power; but within this limit the power is\r\na most important one.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThis science of Ethology may be called the Exact Science of Human Nature;\r\nfor its truths are not, like the empirical laws which depend on them,\r\napproximate generalizations, but real laws. It is, however (as in all cases\r\nof complex phenomena), necessary to the exactness of the propositions, that\r\nthey should be hypothetical only, and affirm tendencies, not facts. They\r\nmust not assert that something will always, or certainly, happen; but only\r\nthat such and such will be the effect of a given cause, so far as it operates\r\nuncounteracted. It is a scientific proposition, that bodily strength tends to\r\nmake men courageous; not that it always makes them so: that an interest\r\non one side of a question tends to bias the judgment; not that it invariably\r\ndoes so: that experience tends to give wisdom; not that such is always\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page603\"\u003e[pg 603]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg603\" id=\"Pg603\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nits effect. These propositions, being assertive only of tendencies, are\r\nnot the less universally true because the tendencies may be frustrated.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 5. While, on the one hand, Psychology is altogether, or principally, a\r\nscience of observation and experiment, Ethology, as I have conceived it, is,\r\nas I have already remarked, altogether deductive. The one ascertains the\r\nsimple laws of Mind in general, the other traces their operation in complex\r\ncombinations of circumstances. Ethology stands to Psychology in a relation\r\nvery similar to that in which the various branches of natural philosophy\r\nstand to mechanics. The principles of Ethology are properly the middle\r\nprinciples, the \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eaxiomata media\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e (as Bacon\r\nwould have said) of the science\r\nof mind: as distinguished, on the one hand, from the empirical laws\r\nresulting from simple observation, and, on the other, from the highest generalizations.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAnd this seems a suitable place for a logical remark, which, though of\r\ngeneral application, is of peculiar importance in reference to the present\r\nsubject. Bacon has judiciously observed that the\r\n\u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eaxiomata media\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e of every\r\nscience principally constitute its value. The lowest generalizations, until\r\nexplained by and resolved into the middle principles of which they are\r\nthe consequences, have only the imperfect accuracy of empirical laws;\r\nwhile the most general laws are \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003etoo\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e general, and include too few\r\ncircumstances, to give sufficient indication of what happens in individual cases,\r\nwhere the circumstances are almost always immensely numerous. In the\r\nimportance, therefore, which Bacon assigns, in every science, to the middle\r\nprinciples, it is impossible not to agree with him. But I conceive him to\r\nhave been radically wrong in his doctrine respecting the mode in which\r\nthese \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eaxiomata media\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e should be arrived at;\r\nthough there is no one proposition\r\nlaid down in his works for which he has been more extravagantly\r\neulogized. He enunciates as a universal rule that induction should proceed\r\nfrom the lowest to the middle principles, and from those to the highest,\r\nnever reversing that order, and, consequently, leaving no room for the\r\ndiscovery of new principles by way of deduction at all. It is not to be\r\nconceived that a man of his sagacity could have fallen into this mistake if\r\nthere had existed in his time, among the sciences which treat of successive\r\nphenomena, one single instance of a deductive science, such as mechanics,\r\nastronomy, optics, acoustics, etc., now are. In those sciences it is evident\r\nthat the higher and middle principles are by no means derived from the\r\nlowest, but the reverse. In some of them the very highest generalizations\r\nwere those earliest ascertained with any scientific exactness; as, for example\r\n(in mechanics), the laws of motion. Those general laws had not, indeed,\r\nat first the acknowledged universality which they acquired after having\r\nbeen successfully employed to explain many classes of phenomena to which\r\nthey were not originally seen to be applicable; as when the laws of motion\r\nwere employed, in conjunction with other laws, to explain deductively the\r\ncelestial phenomena. Still, the fact remains, that the propositions which\r\nwere afterward recognized as the most general truths of the science were,\r\nof all its accurate generalizations, those earliest arrived at. Bacon’s greatest\r\nmerit can not therefore consist, as we are so often told that it did, in exploding\r\nthe vicious method pursued by the ancients of flying to the highest\r\ngeneralizations first, and deducing the middle principles from them;\r\nsince this is neither a vicious nor an exploded, but the universally accredited\r\nmethod of modern science, and that to which it owes its greatest triumphs.\r\nThe error of ancient speculation did not consist in making the largest generalizations\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page604\"\u003e[pg 604]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg604\" id=\"Pg604\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nfirst, but in making them without the aid or warrant of rigorous\r\ninductive methods, and applying them deductively without the needful\r\nuse of that important part of the Deductive Method termed Verification.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe order in which truths of the various degrees of generality should\r\nbe ascertained can not, I apprehend, be prescribed by any unbending rule.\r\nI know of no maxim which can be laid down on the subject, but to obtain\r\nthose first in respect to which the conditions of a real induction can be\r\nfirst and most completely realized. Now, wherever our means of investigation\r\ncan reach causes, without stopping at the empirical laws of the effects,\r\nthe simplest cases, being those in which fewest causes are simultaneously\r\nconcerned, will be most amenable to the inductive process; and\r\nthese are the cases which elicit laws of the greatest comprehensiveness.\r\nIn every science, therefore, which has reached the stage at which it becomes\r\na science of causes, it will be usual as well as desirable first to obtain\r\nthe highest generalizations, and then deduce the more special ones\r\nfrom them. Nor can I discover any foundation for the Baconian maxim,\r\nso much extolled by subsequent writers, except this: That before we attempt\r\nto explain deductively from more general laws any new class of phenomena,\r\nit is desirable to have gone as far as is practicable in ascertaining\r\nthe empirical laws of those phenomena; so as to compare the results of\r\ndeduction, not with one individual instance after another, but with general\r\npropositions expressive of the points of agreement which have been found\r\namong many instances. For if Newton had been obliged to verify the\r\ntheory of gravitation, not by deducing from it Kepler’s laws, but by deducing\r\nall the observed planetary positions which had served Kepler to\r\nestablish those laws, the Newtonian theory would probably never have\r\nemerged from the state of an hypothesis.\u003ca id=\"noteref_273\" name=\"noteref_273\" href=\"#note_273\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e273\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe applicability of these remarks to the special case under consideration\r\ncan not admit of question. The science of the formation of character\r\nis a science of causes. The subject is one to which those among the canons\r\nof induction, by which laws of causation are ascertained, can be rigorously\r\napplied. It is, therefore, both natural and advisable to ascertain the\r\nsimplest, which are necessarily the most general, laws of causation first,\r\nand to deduce the middle principles from them. In other words, Ethology,\r\nthe deductive science, is a system of corollaries from Psychology, the\r\nexperimental science.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 6. Of these, the earlier alone has been, as yet, really conceived or studied\r\nas a science; the other, Ethology, is still to be created. But its creation\r\nhas at length become practicable. The empirical laws, destined to\r\nverify its deductions, have been formed in abundance by every successive\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page605\"\u003e[pg 605]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg605\" id=\"Pg605\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nage of humanity; and the premises for the deductions are now sufficiently\r\ncomplete. Excepting the degree of uncertainty which still exists as to\r\nthe extent of the natural differences of individual minds, and the physical\r\ncircumstances on which these may be dependent (considerations which are\r\nof secondary importance when we are considering mankind in the average,\r\nor \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-foreign\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003een masse\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e), I believe most competent judges will\r\nagree that the general laws of the different constituent elements of human nature are\r\neven now sufficiently understood to render it possible for a competent thinker to deduce\r\nfrom those laws, with a considerable approach to certainty, the particular\r\ntype of character which would be formed in mankind generally by\r\nany assumed set of circumstances. A science of Ethology, founded on the\r\nlaws of Psychology, is therefore possible; though little has yet been done,\r\nand that little not at all systematically, toward forming it. The progress\r\nof this important but most imperfect science will depend on a double process:\r\nfirst, that of deducing theoretically the ethological consequences of\r\nparticular circumstances of position, and comparing them with the recognized\r\nresults of common experience; and, secondly, the reverse operation;\r\nincreased study of the various types of human nature that are to be found\r\nin the world; conducted by persons not only capable of analyzing and recording\r\nthe circumstances in which these types severally prevail, but also\r\nsufficiently acquainted with psychological laws to be able to explain and\r\naccount for the characteristics of the type, by the peculiarities of the circumstances:\r\nthe residuum alone, when there proves to be any, being set\r\ndown to the account of congenital predispositions.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nFor the experimental or \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea posteriori\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e part of\r\nthis process, the materials\r\nare continually accumulating by the observation of mankind. So far as\r\nthought is concerned, the great problem of Ethology is to deduce the requisite\r\nmiddle principles from the general laws of Psychology. The subject\r\nto be studied is, the origin and sources of all those qualities in human beings\r\nwhich are interesting to us, either as facts to be produced, to be avoided,\r\nor merely to be understood; and the object is, to determine, from the\r\ngeneral laws of mind, combined with the general position of our species in\r\nthe universe, what actual or possible combinations of circumstances are\r\ncapable of promoting or of preventing the production of those qualities.\r\nA science which possesses middle principles of this kind, arranged in the\r\norder, not of causes, but of the effects which it is desirable to produce or\r\nto prevent, is duly prepared to be the foundation of the corresponding\r\nArt. And when Ethology shall be thus prepared, practical education will\r\nbe the mere transformation of those principles into a parallel system of\r\nprecepts, and the adaptation of these to the sum total of the individual circumstances\r\nwhich exist in each particular case.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt is hardly necessary again to repeat that, as in every other deductive\r\nscience, verification \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea posteriori\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e must\r\nproceed \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003epari passu\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e with deduction\r\n\u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea priori\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e. The inference given by theory as to\r\nthe type of character which\r\nwould be formed by any given circumstances must be tested by specific\r\nexperience of those circumstances whenever obtainable; and the conclusions\r\nof the science as a whole must undergo a perpetual verification and\r\ncorrection from the general remarks afforded by common experience respecting\r\nhuman nature in our own age, and by history respecting times gone\r\nby. The conclusions of theory can not be trusted, unless confirmed by observation;\r\nnor those of observation, unless they can be affiliated to theory,\r\nby deducing them from the laws of human nature, and from a close analysis\r\nof the circumstances of the particular situation. It is the accordance of\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page606\"\u003e[pg 606]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg606\" id=\"Pg606\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nthese two kinds of evidence separately taken—the consilience of\r\n\u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea priori\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nreasoning and specific experience—which forms the only sufficient ground\r\nfor the principles of any science so \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“immersed in matter,”\u003c/span\u003e dealing with\r\nsuch complex and concrete phenomena, as Ethology.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-div\" style=\"margin-bottom: 4.00em; margin-top: 4.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"toc139\" id=\"toc139\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"pdf140\" id=\"pdf140\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: center; margin-bottom: 2.40em; margin-top: 2.40em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 120%\"\u003eChapter VI.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: left; margin-bottom: 2.88em; margin-top: 2.88em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 144%\"\u003eGeneral Considerations On The Social Science.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 1. Next after the science of individual man comes the science of man\r\nin society—of the actions of collective masses of mankind, and the various\r\nphenomena which constitute social life.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIf the formation of individual character is already a complex subject of\r\nstudy, this subject must be, in appearance at least, still more complex; because\r\nthe number of concurrent causes, all exercising more or less influence\r\non the total effect, is greater, in the proportion in which a nation, or the\r\nspecies at large, exposes a larger surface to the operation of agents, psychological\r\nand physical, than any single individual. If it was necessary to\r\nprove, in opposition to an existing prejudice, that the simpler of the two\r\nis capable of being a subject of science, the prejudice is likely to be yet\r\nstronger against the possibility of giving a scientific character to the study\r\nof Politics, and of the phenomena of Society. It is, accordingly, but of\r\nyesterday that the conception of a political or social science has existed\r\nanywhere but in the mind of here and there an insulated thinker, generally\r\nvery ill prepared for its realization: though the subject itself has of all\r\nothers engaged the most general attention, and been a theme of interested\r\nand earnest discussions, almost from the beginning of recorded time.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe condition, indeed, of politics as a branch of knowledge was, until\r\nvery lately, and has scarcely even yet ceased to be, that which Bacon animadverted\r\non, as the natural state of the sciences while their cultivation is\r\nabandoned to practitioners; not being carried on as a branch of speculative\r\ninquiry, but only with a view to the exigencies of daily practice, and the\r\n\u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003efructifera experimenta\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, therefore, being\r\naimed at, almost to the exclusion of the\r\n\u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003elucifera\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e. Such was medical investigation,\r\nbefore physiology and natural history began to be cultivated as branches of general\r\nknowledge. The only questions examined were, what diet is wholesome, or what medicine\r\nwill cure some given disease; without any previous systematic inquiry\r\ninto the laws of nutrition, and of the healthy and morbid action of the\r\ndifferent organs, on which laws the effect of any diet or medicine must\r\nevidently depend. And in politics the questions which engaged general\r\nattention were similar: Is such an enactment, or such a form of government,\r\nbeneficial or the reverse—either universally, or to some particular\r\ncommunity? without any previous inquiry into the general conditions by\r\nwhich the operation of legislative measures, or the effects produced by\r\nforms of government, are determined. Students in politics thus attempted\r\nto study the pathology and therapeutics of the social body, before they had\r\nlaid the necessary foundation in its physiology; to cure disease without\r\nunderstanding the laws of health. And the result was such as it must always\r\nbe when persons, even of ability, attempt to deal with the complex\r\nquestions of a science before its simpler and more elementary truths have\r\nbeen established.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nNo wonder that, when the phenomena of society have so rarely been\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page607\"\u003e[pg 607]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg607\" id=\"Pg607\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\ncontemplated in the point of view characteristic of science, the philosophy\r\nof society should have made little progress; should contain few general\r\npropositions sufficiently precise and certain for common inquirers to recognize\r\nin them a scientific character. The vulgar notion accordingly is, that\r\nall pretension to lay down general truths on politics and society is quackery;\r\nthat no universality and no certainty are attainable in such matters.\r\nWhat partly excuses this common notion is, that it is really not without\r\nfoundation in one particular sense. A large proportion of those who have\r\nlaid claim to the character of philosophic politicians have attempted not\r\nto ascertain universal sequences, but to frame universal precepts. They\r\nhave imagined some one form of government, or system of laws, to fit all\r\ncases—a pretension well meriting the ridicule with which it is treated by\r\npractitioners, and wholly unsupported by the analogy of the art to which,\r\nfrom the nature of its subject, that of politics must be the most nearly\r\nallied. No one now supposes it possible that one remedy can cure all\r\ndiseases, or even the same disease in all constitutions and habits of body.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt is not necessary even to the perfection of a science, that the corresponding\r\nart should possess universal, or even general, rules. The phenomena\r\nof society might not only be completely dependent on known\r\ncauses, but the mode of action of all those causes might be reducible to\r\nlaws of considerable simplicity, and yet no two cases might admit of being\r\ntreated in precisely the same manner. So great might be the variety of\r\ncircumstances on which the results in different cases depend, that the art\r\nmight not have a single general precept to give, except that of watching\r\nthe circumstances of the particular case, and adapting our measures to the\r\neffects which, according to the principles of the science, result from those\r\ncircumstances. But although, in so complicated a class of subjects, it is\r\nimpossible to lay down practical maxims of universal application, it does\r\nnot follow that the phenomena do not conform to universal laws.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 2. All phenomena of society are phenomena of human nature, generated\r\nby the action of outward circumstances upon masses of human beings;\r\nand if, therefore, the phenomena of human thought, feeling, and action\r\nare subject to fixed laws, the phenomena of society can not but conform\r\nto fixed laws, the consequence of the preceding. There is, indeed,\r\nno hope that these laws, though our knowledge of them were as certain\r\nand as complete as it is in astronomy, would enable us to predict the history\r\nof society, like that of the celestial appearances, for thousands of\r\nyears to come. But the difference of certainty is not in the laws themselves,\r\nit is in the data to which these laws are to be applied. In astronomy\r\nthe causes influencing the result are few, and change little, and\r\nthat little according to known laws; we can ascertain what they are now,\r\nand thence determine what they will be at any epoch of a distant future.\r\nThe data, therefore, in astronomy are as certain as the laws themselves.\r\nThe circumstances, on the contrary, which influence the condition and progress\r\nof society are innumerable, and perpetually changing; and though\r\nthey all change in obedience to causes, and therefore to laws, the multitude\r\nof the causes is so great as to defy our limited powers of calculation. Not\r\nto say that the impossibility of applying precise numbers to facts of such\r\na description would set an impassable limit to the possibility of calculating\r\nthem beforehand, even if the powers of the human intellect were otherwise\r\nadequate to the task.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nBut, as before remarked, an amount of knowledge quite insufficient for\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page608\"\u003e[pg 608]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg608\" id=\"Pg608\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nprediction, may be most valuable for guidance. The science of society\r\nwould have attained a very high point of perfection if it enabled us, in\r\nany given condition of social affairs, in the condition, for instance, of Europe\r\nor any European country at the present time, to understand by what\r\ncauses it had, in any and every particular, been made what it was; whether\r\nit was tending to any, and to what, changes; what effects each feature\r\nof its existing state was likely to produce in the future; and by what\r\nmeans any of those effects might be prevented, modified, or accelerated, or\r\na different class of effects superinduced. There is nothing chimerical in\r\nthe hope that general laws, sufficient to enable us to answer these various\r\nquestions for any country or time with the individual circumstances of\r\nwhich we are well acquainted, do really admit of being ascertained; and\r\nthat the other branches of human knowledge, which this undertaking presupposes,\r\nare so far advanced that the time is ripe for its commencement.\r\nSuch is the object of the Social Science.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThat the nature of what I consider the true method of the science may\r\nbe made more palpable, by first showing what that method is not, it will\r\nbe expedient to characterize briefly two radical misconceptions of the\r\nproper mode of philosophizing on society and government, one or other of\r\nwhich is, either explicitly or more often unconsciously, entertained by almost\r\nall who have meditated or argued respecting the logic of politics,\r\nsince the notion of treating it by strict rules, and on Baconian principles,\r\nhas been current among the more advanced thinkers. These erroneous\r\nmethods, if the word method can be applied to erroneous tendencies arising\r\nfrom the absence of any sufficiently distinct conception of method, may\r\nbe termed the Experimental, or Chemical, mode of investigation, and the\r\nAbstract, or Geometrical, mode. We shall begin with the former.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-div\" style=\"margin-bottom: 4.00em; margin-top: 4.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"toc141\" id=\"toc141\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"pdf142\" id=\"pdf142\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: center; margin-bottom: 2.40em; margin-top: 2.40em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 120%\"\u003eChapter VII.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: left; margin-bottom: 2.88em; margin-top: 2.88em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 144%\"\u003eOf The Chemical, Or Experimental, Method In The Social Science.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 1. The laws of the phenomena of society are, and can be, nothing but\r\nthe laws of the actions and passions of human beings united together in\r\nthe social state. Men, however, in a state of society are still men; their\r\nactions and passions are obedient to the laws of individual human nature.\r\nMen are not, when brought together, converted into another kind of substance,\r\nwith different properties; as hydrogen and oxygen are different\r\nfrom water, or as hydrogen, oxygen, carbon, and azote, are different from\r\nnerves, muscles, and tendons. Human beings in society have no properties\r\nbut those which are derived from, and may be resolved into, the laws\r\nof the nature of individual man. In social phenomena the Composition of\r\nCauses is the universal law.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nNow, the method of philosophizing which may be termed chemical overlooks\r\nthis fact, and proceeds as if the nature of man as an individual were\r\nnot concerned at all, or were concerned in a very inferior degree, in the\r\noperations of human beings in society. All reasoning in political or social\r\naffairs, grounded on principles of human nature, is objected to by reasoners\r\nof this sort, under such names as \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“abstract theory.”\u003c/span\u003e For the direction\r\nof their opinions and conduct, they profess to demand, in all cases\r\nwithout exception, specific experience.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page609\"\u003e[pg 609]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg609\" id=\"Pg609\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThis mode of thinking is not only general with practitioners in politics,\r\nand with that very numerous class who (on a subject which no one,\r\nhowever ignorant, thinks himself incompetent to discuss) profess to guide\r\nthemselves by common sense rather than by science; but is often countenanced\r\nby persons with greater pretensions to instruction—persons who,\r\nhaving sufficient acquaintance with books and with the current ideas to\r\nhave heard that Bacon taught mankind to follow experience, and to ground\r\ntheir conclusions on facts instead of metaphysical dogmas, think that, by\r\ntreating political facts in as directly experimental a method as chemical\r\nfacts, they are showing themselves true Baconians, and proving their adversaries\r\nto be mere syllogizers and school-men. As, however, the notion\r\nof the applicability of experimental methods to political philosophy can\r\nnot co-exist with any just conception of these methods themselves, the kind\r\nof arguments from experience which the chemical theory brings forth as\r\nits fruits (and which form the staple, in this country especially, of parliamentary\r\nand hustings oratory), are such as, at no time since Bacon, would\r\nhave been admitted to be valid in chemistry itself, or in any other branch\r\nof experimental science. They are such as these: that the prohibition of\r\nforeign commodities must conduce to national wealth, because England\r\nhas flourished under it, or because countries in general which have adopted\r\nit have flourished; that our laws, or our internal administration, or our\r\nconstitution, are excellent for a similar reason; and the eternal arguments\r\nfrom historical examples, from Athens or Rome, from the fires in Smithfield\r\nor the French Revolution.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nI will not waste time in contending against modes of argumentation\r\nwhich no person with the smallest practice in estimating evidence could\r\npossibly be betrayed into; which draw conclusions of general application\r\nfrom a single unanalyzed instance, or arbitrarily refer an effect to some\r\none among its antecedents, without any process of elimination or comparison\r\nof instances. It is a rule both of justice and of good sense to grapple\r\nnot with the absurdest, but with the most reasonable form of a wrong\r\nopinion. We shall suppose our inquirer acquainted with the true conditions\r\nof experimental investigation, and competent in point of acquirements\r\nfor realizing them, so far as they can be realized. He shall know\r\nas much of the facts of history as mere erudition can teach—as much as\r\ncan be proved by testimony, without the assistance of any theory; and if\r\nthose mere facts, properly collated, can fulfill the conditions of a real induction,\r\nhe shall be qualified for the task.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nBut that no such attempt can have the smallest chance of success, has\r\nbeen abundantly shown in the tenth chapter of the Third\r\nBook.\u003ca id=\"noteref_274\" name=\"noteref_274\" href=\"#note_274\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e274\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e We\r\nthere examined whether effects which depend on a complication of causes\r\ncan be made the subject of a true induction by observation and experiment;\r\nand concluded, on the most convincing grounds, that they can not.\r\nSince, of all effects, none depend on so great a complication of causes as\r\nsocial phenomena, we might leave our case to rest in safety on that previous\r\nshowing. But a logical principle as yet so little familiar to the ordinary\r\nrun of thinkers, requires to be insisted on more than once, in order to\r\nmake the due impression; and the present being the case which of all others\r\nexemplifies it the most strongly, there will be advantage in re-stating\r\nthe grounds of the general maxim, as applied to the specialties of the\r\nclass of inquiries now under consideration.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page610\"\u003e[pg 610]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg610\" id=\"Pg610\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 2. The first difficulty which meets us in the attempt to apply experimental\r\nmethods for ascertaining the laws of social phenomena, is that we\r\nare without the means of making artificial experiments. Even if we could\r\ncontrive experiments at leisure, and try them without limit, we should do\r\nso under immense disadvantage; both from the impossibility of ascertaining\r\nand taking note of all the facts of each case, and because (those facts\r\nbeing in a perpetual state of change), before sufficient time had elapsed to ascertain\r\nthe result of the experiment, some material circumstances would always\r\nhave ceased to be the same. But it is unnecessary to consider the logical\r\nobjections which would exist to the conclusiveness of our experiments,\r\nsince we palpably never have the power of trying any. We can only watch\r\nthose which nature produces, or which are produced for other reasons.\r\nWe can not adapt our logical means to our wants, by varying the circumstances\r\nas the exigencies of elimination may require. If the spontaneous\r\ninstances, formed by contemporary events and by the successions of phenomena\r\nrecorded in history, afford a sufficient variation of circumstances,\r\nan induction from specific experience is attainable; otherwise not. The\r\nquestion to be resolved is, therefore, whether the requisites for induction\r\nrespecting the causes of political effects or the properties of political agents,\r\nare to be met with in history? including under the term, contemporary history.\r\nAnd in order to give fixity to our conceptions, it will be advisable\r\nto suppose this question asked in reference to some special subject of political\r\ninquiry or controversy; such as that frequent topic of debate in the\r\npresent century, the operation of restrictive and prohibitory commercial\r\nlegislation upon national wealth. Let this, then, be the scientific question\r\nto be investigated by specific experience.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 3. In order to apply to the case the most perfect of the methods of experimental\r\ninquiry, the Method of Difference, we require to find two instances\r\nwhich tally in every particular except the one which is the subject\r\nof inquiry. If two nations can be found which are alike in all natural advantages\r\nand disadvantages; whose people resemble each other in every\r\nquality, physical and moral, spontaneous and acquired; whose habits,\r\nusages, opinions, laws, and institutions are the same in all respects, except\r\nthat one of them has a more protective tariff, or in other respects interferes\r\nmore with the freedom of industry; if one of these nations is found to be\r\nrich and the other poor, or one richer than the other, this will be an\r\n\u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eexperimentum crucis\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e:\r\na real proof by experience, which of the two systems is\r\nmost favorable to national riches. But the supposition that two such instances\r\ncan be met with is manifestly absurd. Nor is such a concurrence\r\neven abstractedly possible. Two nations which agreed in every thing except\r\ntheir commercial policy would agree also in that. Differences of legislation\r\nare not inherent and ultimate diversities; are not properties of Kinds.\r\nThey are effects of pre-existing causes. If the two nations differ in this\r\nportion of their institutions, it is from some difference in their position,\r\nand thence in their apparent interests, or in some portion or other of their\r\nopinions, habits, and tendencies; which opens a view of further differences\r\nwithout any assignable limit, capable of operating on their industrial prosperity,\r\nas well as on every other feature of their condition, in more ways\r\nthan can be enumerated or imagined. There is thus a demonstrated impossibility\r\nof obtaining, in the investigations of the social science, the conditions\r\nrequired for the most conclusive form of inquiry by specific experience.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page611\"\u003e[pg 611]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg611\" id=\"Pg611\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIn the absence of the direct, we may next try, as in other cases, the supplementary\r\nresource, called in a former place the Indirect Method of Difference;\r\nwhich, instead of two instances differing in nothing but the presence\r\nor absence of a given circumstance, compares two \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eclasses\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e of instances\r\nrespectively agreeing in nothing but the presence of a circumstance on the\r\none side and its absence on the other. To choose the most advantageous\r\ncase conceivable (a case far too advantageous to be ever obtained), suppose\r\nthat we compare one nation which has a restrictive policy with two or\r\nmore nations agreeing in nothing but in permitting free trade. We need\r\nnot now suppose that either of these nations agrees with the first in all its\r\ncircumstances; one may agree with it in some of its circumstances, and another\r\nin the remainder. And it may be argued, that if these nations remain\r\npoorer than the restrictive nation, it can not be for want either of the\r\nfirst or of the second set of circumstances, but it must be for want of the\r\nprotective system. If (we might say) the restrictive nation had prospered\r\nfrom the one set of causes, the first of the free-trade nations would have\r\nprospered equally; if by reason of the other, the second would; but neither\r\nhas; therefore the prosperity was owing to the restrictions. This\r\nwill be allowed to be a very favorable specimen of an argument from specific\r\nexperience in politics, and if this be inconclusive, it would not be easy\r\nto find another preferable to it.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nYet, that it is inconclusive, scarcely requires to be pointed out. Why\r\nmust the prosperous nation have prospered from one cause exclusively?\r\nNational prosperity is always the collective result of a multitude of favorable\r\ncircumstances; and of these, the restrictive nation may unite a greater\r\nnumber than either of the others, though it may have all of those circumstances\r\nin common with either one or the other of them. Its prosperity\r\nmay be partly owing to circumstances common to it with one of those nations,\r\nand partly with the other, while they, having each of them only half\r\nthe number of favorable circumstances, have remained inferior. So that\r\nthe closest imitation which can be made, in the social science, of a legitimate\r\ninduction from direct experience, gives but a specious semblance of\r\nconclusiveness, without any real value.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 4. The Method of Difference in either of its forms being thus completely\r\nout of the question, there remains the Method of Agreement. But\r\nwe are already aware of how little value this method is, in cases admitting\r\nPlurality of Causes; and social phenomena are those in which the plurality\r\nprevails in the utmost possible extent.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nSuppose that the observer makes the luckiest hit which could be given\r\nby any conceivable combination of chances; that he finds two nations which\r\nagree in no circumstance whatever, except in having a restrictive system,\r\nand in being prosperous; or a number of nations, all prosperous, which\r\nhave no antecedent circumstances common to them all but that of having\r\na restrictive policy. It is unnecessary to go into the consideration of the\r\nimpossibility of ascertaining from history, or even from contemporary observation,\r\nthat such is really the fact; that the nations agree in no other\r\ncircumstance capable of influencing the case. Let us suppose this impossibility\r\nvanquished, and the fact ascertained that they agree only in a restrictive\r\nsystem as an antecedent, and industrial prosperity as a consequent.\r\nWhat degree of presumption does this raise that the restrictive system\r\ncaused the prosperity? One so trifling as to be equivalent to none at all.\r\nThat some one antecedent is the cause of a given effect, because all other\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page612\"\u003e[pg 612]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg612\" id=\"Pg612\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nantecedents have been found capable of being eliminated, is a just inference,\r\nonly if the effect can have but one cause. If it admits of several, nothing\r\nis more natural than that each of these should separately admit of being\r\neliminated. Now, in the case of political phenomena, the supposition of\r\nunity of cause is not only wide of the truth, but at an immeasurable distance\r\nfrom it. The causes of every social phenomenon which we are particularly\r\ninterested about, security, wealth, freedom, good government, public\r\nvirtue, general intelligence, or their opposites, are infinitely numerous,\r\nespecially the external or remote causes, which alone are, for the most part,\r\naccessible to direct observation. No one cause suffices of itself to produce\r\nany of these phenomena; while there are countless causes which have some\r\ninfluence over them, and may co-operate either in their production or in their\r\nprevention. From the mere fact, therefore, of our having been able to eliminate\r\nsome circumstance, we can by no means infer that this circumstance\r\nwas not instrumental to the effect in some of the very instances from which\r\nwe have eliminated it. We can conclude that the effect is sometimes produced\r\nwithout it; but not that, when present, it does not contribute its share.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nSimilar objections will be found to apply to the Method of Concomitant\r\nVariations. If the causes which act upon the state of any society produced\r\neffects differing from one another in kind; if wealth depended on one cause,\r\npeace on another, a third made people virtuous, a fourth intelligent; we\r\nmight, though unable to sever the causes from one another, refer to each of\r\nthem that property of the effect which waxed as it waxed, and which waned\r\nas it waned. But every attribute of the social body is influenced by innumerable\r\ncauses; and such is the mutual action of the co-existing elements\r\nof society, that whatever affects any one of the more important of them,\r\nwill by that alone, if it does not affect the others directly, affect them indirectly.\r\nThe effects, therefore, of different agents not being different in\r\nquality, while the quantity of each is the mixed result of all the agents, the\r\nvariations of the aggregate can not bear a uniform proportion to those of\r\nany one of its component parts.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 5. There remains the Method of Residues; which appears, on the first\r\nview, less foreign to this kind of inquiry than the three other methods, because\r\nit only requires that we should accurately note the circumstances of\r\nsome one country, or state of society. Making allowance, thereupon, for\r\nthe effect of all causes whose tendencies are known, the residue which those\r\ncauses are inadequate to explain may plausibly be imputed to the remainder\r\nof the circumstances which are known to have existed in the case.\r\nSomething similar to this is the method which\r\nColeridge\u003ca id=\"noteref_275\" name=\"noteref_275\" href=\"#note_275\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e275\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e describes himself\r\nas having followed in his political essays in the \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eMorning Post\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e.\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“On every great occurrence I endeavored to discover in past history the event\r\nthat most nearly resembled it. I procured, whenever it was possible, the\r\ncontemporary historians, memorialists, and pamphleteers. Then fairly subtracting\r\nthe points of difference from those of likeness, as the balance favored\r\nthe former or the latter, I conjectured that the result would be the\r\nsame or different. As, for instance, in the series of essays entitled \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e‘A Comparison\r\nof France under Napoleon with Rome under the first Cæsars,’\u003c/span\u003e and\r\nin those which followed, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e‘on the probable final restoration of the Bourbons.’\u003c/span\u003e\r\nThe same plan I pursued at the commencement of the Spanish Revolution,\r\nand with the same success, taking the war of the United Provinces with\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page613\"\u003e[pg 613]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg613\" id=\"Pg613\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nPhilip II. as the groundwork of the comparison.”\u003c/span\u003e In this inquiry he no\r\ndoubt employed the Method of Residues; for, in \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“subtracting the points\r\nof difference from those of likeness,”\u003c/span\u003e he doubtless weighed, and did not\r\ncontent himself with numbering, them: he doubtless took those points of\r\nagreement only which he presumed from their own nature to be capable\r\nof influencing the effect, and, allowing for that influence, concluded that the\r\nremainder of the result would be referable to the points of difference.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWhatever may be the efficacy of this method, it is, as we long ago remarked,\r\nnot a method of pure observation and experiment; it concludes,\r\nnot from a comparison of instances, but from the comparison of an instance\r\nwith the result of a previous deduction. Applied to social phenomena,\r\nit presupposes that the causes from which part of the effect proceeded\r\nare already known; and as we have shown that these can not have been\r\nknown by specific experience, they must have been learned by deduction\r\nfrom principles of human nature; experience being called in only as a supplementary\r\nresource, to determine the causes which produced an unexplained\r\nresidue. But if the principles of human nature may be had recourse\r\nto for the establishment of some political truths, they may for all.\r\nIf it be admissible to say, England must have prospered by reason of\r\nthe prohibitory system, because after allowing for all the other tendencies\r\nwhich have been operating, there is a portion of prosperity still to be accounted\r\nfor; it must be admissible to go to the same source for the effect\r\nof the prohibitory system, and examine what account the laws of human\r\nmotives and actions will enable us to give of \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eits\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e tendencies. Nor, in fact,\r\nwill the experimental argument amount to any thing, except in verification\r\nof a conclusion drawn from those general laws. For we may subtract\r\nthe effect of one, two, three, or four causes, but we shall never succeed in\r\nsubtracting the effect of all causes except one; while it would be a curious\r\ninstance of the dangers of too much caution if, to avoid depending\r\non \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea priori\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e reasoning concerning the effect\r\nof a single cause, we should oblige ourselves to depend on as many separate\r\n\u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea priori\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e reasonings as\r\nthere are causes operating concurrently with that particular cause in some\r\ngiven instance.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWe have now sufficiently characterized the gross misconception of the\r\nmode of investigation proper to political phenomena, which I have termed\r\nthe Chemical Method. So lengthened a discussion would not have been\r\nnecessary, if the claim to decide authoritatively on political doctrines were\r\nconfined to persons who had competently studied any one of the higher\r\ndepartments of physical science. But since the generality of those who\r\nreason on political subjects, satisfactorily to themselves and to a more or\r\nless numerous body of admirers, know nothing whatever of the methods of\r\nphysical investigation beyond a few precepts which they continue to parrot\r\nafter Bacon, being entirely unaware that Bacon’s conception of scientific\r\ninquiry has done its work, and that science has now advanced into a\r\nhigher stage, there are probably many to whom such remarks as the foregoing\r\nmay still be useful. In an age in which chemistry itself, when attempting\r\nto deal with the more complex chemical sequences—those of the\r\nanimal or even the vegetable organism—has found it necessary to become,\r\nand has succeeded in becoming, a Deductive Science, it is not to be apprehended\r\nthat any person of scientific habits, who has kept pace with the\r\ngeneral progress of the knowledge of nature, can be in danger of applying\r\nthe methods of elementary chemistry to explore the sequences of the most\r\ncomplex order of phenomena in existence.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page614\"\u003e[pg 614]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg614\" id=\"Pg614\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-div\" style=\"margin-bottom: 4.00em; margin-top: 4.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"toc143\" id=\"toc143\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"pdf144\" id=\"pdf144\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: center; margin-bottom: 2.40em; margin-top: 2.40em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 120%\"\u003eChapter VIII.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: left; margin-bottom: 2.88em; margin-top: 2.88em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 144%\"\u003eOf The Geometrical, Or Abstract, Method.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 1. The misconception discussed in the preceding chapter is, as we\r\nsaid, chiefly committed by persons not much accustomed to scientific investigation:\r\npractitioners in politics, who rather employ the commonplaces\r\nof philosophy to justify their practice than seek to guide their practice by\r\nphilosophic principles; or imperfectly educated persons, who, in ignorance\r\nof the careful selection and elaborate comparison of instances required for\r\nthe formation of a sound theory, attempt to found one upon a few coincidences\r\nwhich they have casually noticed.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe erroneous method of which we are now to treat is, on the contrary,\r\npeculiar to thinking and studious minds. It never could have suggested\r\nitself but to persons of some familiarity with the nature of scientific research;\r\nwho, being aware of the impossibility of establishing, by casual\r\nobservation or direct experimentation, a true theory of sequences so complex\r\nas are those of the social phenomena, have recourse to the simpler\r\nlaws which are immediately operative in those phenomena, and which are\r\nno other than the laws of the nature of the human beings therein concerned,\r\nThese thinkers perceive (what the partisans of the chemical or experimental\r\ntheory do not) that the science of society must necessarily be deductive.\r\nBut, from an insufficient consideration of the specific nature of\r\nthe subject-matter—and often because (their own scientific education having\r\nstopped short in too early a stage) geometry stands in their minds as\r\nthe type of all deductive science—it is to geometry, rather than to astronomy\r\nand natural philosophy, that they unconsciously assimilate the\r\ndeductive science of society.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAmong the differences between geometry (a science of co-existent facts,\r\naltogether independent of the laws of the succession of phenomena), and\r\nthose physical Sciences of Causation which have been rendered deductive,\r\nthe following is one of the most conspicuous: That geometry affords no\r\nroom for what so constantly occurs in mechanics and its applications, the\r\ncase of conflicting forces; of causes which counteract or modify one another.\r\nIn mechanics we continually find two or more moving forces producing,\r\nnot motion, but rest; or motion in a different direction from that\r\nwhich would have been produced by either of the generating forces. It\r\nis true that the effect of the joint forces is the same when they act simultaneously,\r\nas if they had acted one after another, or by turns; and it is\r\nin this that the difference between mechanical and chemical laws consists.\r\nBut still the effects, whether produced by successive or by simultaneous\r\naction, do, wholly or in part, cancel one another: what the one force does,\r\nthe other, partly, or altogether undoes. There is no similar state of things\r\nin geometry. The result which follows from one geometrical principle has\r\nnothing that conflicts with the result which follows from another. What\r\nis proved true from one geometrical theorem, what would be true if no\r\nother geometrical principles existed, can not be altered and made no longer\r\ntrue by reason of some other geometrical principle. What is once proved\r\ntrue is true in all cases, whatever supposition may be made in regard to\r\nany other matter.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page615\"\u003e[pg 615]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg615\" id=\"Pg615\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nNow a conception similar to this last would appear to have been formed\r\nof the social science, in the minds of the earlier of those who have attempted\r\nto cultivate it by a deductive method. Mechanics would be a\r\nscience very similar to geometry, if every motion resulted from one force\r\nalone, and not from a conflict of forces. In the geometrical theory of society,\r\nit seems to be supposed that this is really the case with the social\r\nphenomena; that each of them results always from only one force, one\r\nsingle property of human nature.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAt the point which we have now reached, it can not be necessary to say\r\nany thing either in proof or in illustration of the assertion that such is not\r\nthe true character of the social phenomena. There is not, among these\r\nmost complex and (for that reason) most modifiable of all phenomena, any\r\none over which innumerable forces do not exercise influence; which does\r\nnot depend on a conjunction of very many causes. We have not, therefore,\r\nto prove the notion in question to be an error, but to prove that the\r\nerror has been committed; that so mistaken a conception of the mode in\r\nwhich the phenomena of society are produced has actually been ascertained.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 2. One numerous division of the reasoners who have treated social\r\nfacts according to geometrical methods, not admitting any modification of\r\none law by another, must for the present be left out of consideration, because\r\nin them this error is complicated with, and is the effect of, another\r\nfundamental misconception, of which we have already taken some notice,\r\nand which will be further treated of before we conclude. I speak of those\r\nwho deduce political conclusions not from laws of nature, not from sequences\r\nof phenomena, real or imaginary, but from unbending practical\r\nmaxims. Such, for example, are all who found their theory of politics on\r\nwhat is called abstract right, that is to say, on universal precepts; a pretension\r\nof which we have already noticed the chimerical nature. Such, in\r\nlike manner, are those who make the assumption of a social contract, or\r\nany other kind of original obligation, and apply it to particular cases by\r\nmere interpretation. But in this the fundamental error is the attempt to\r\ntreat an art like a science, and to have a deductive art; the irrationality\r\nof which will be shown in a future chapter. It will be proper to take our\r\nexemplification of the geometrical theory from those thinkers who have\r\navoided this additional error, and who entertain, so far, a juster idea of\r\nthe nature of political inquiry.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWe may cite, in the first instance, those who assume as the principle of\r\ntheir political philosophy that government is founded on fear; that the\r\ndread of each other is the one motive by which human beings were originally\r\nbrought into a state of society, and are still held in it. Some of the\r\nearlier scientific inquirers into politics, in particular Hobbes, assumed this\r\nproposition, not by implication, but avowedly, as the foundation of their\r\ndoctrine, and attempted to build a complete philosophy of politics thereupon.\r\nIt is true that Hobbes did not find this one maxim sufficient to\r\ncarry him through the whole of his subject, but was obliged to eke it out\r\nby the double sophism of an original contract. I call this a double sophism;\r\nfirst, as passing off a fiction for a fact, and, secondly, assuming a\r\npractical principle, or precept, as the basis of a theory; which is a\r\n\u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003epetitio principii\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\nsince (as we noticed in treating of that Fallacy) every rule of\r\nconduct, even though it be so binding a one as the observance of a promise,\r\nmust rest its own foundations on the theory of the subject; and the\r\ntheory, therefore, can not rest upon it.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page616\"\u003e[pg 616]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg616\" id=\"Pg616\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 3. Passing over less important instances, I shall come at once to the\r\nmost remarkable example afforded by our own times of the geometrical\r\nmethod in politics; emanating from persons who are well aware of the\r\ndistinction between science and art; who knew that rules of conduct must\r\nfollow, not precede, the ascertainment of laws of nature, and that the latter,\r\nnot the former, is the legitimate field for the application of the deductive\r\nmethod. I allude to the interest-philosophy of the Bentham school.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe profound and original thinkers who are commonly known under\r\nthis description, founded their general theory of government on one comprehensive\r\npremise, namely, that men’s actions are always determined by\r\ntheir interests. There is an ambiguity in this last expression; for, as the\r\nsame philosophers, especially Bentham, gave the name of an interest to\r\nany thing which a person likes, the proposition may be understood to mean\r\nonly this, that men’s actions are always determined by their wishes. In\r\nthis sense, however, it would not bear out any of the consequences which\r\nthese writers drew from it; and the word, therefore, in their political\r\nreasonings, must be understood to mean (which is also the explanation they\r\nthemselves, on such occasions gave of it) what is commonly termed private,\r\nor worldly, interest.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nTaking the doctrine, then, in this sense, an objection presents itself\r\n\u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ein limine\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e which might be deemed a fatal one,\r\nnamely, that so sweeping a proposition is far from being universally true. Human beings\r\nare not governed in all their actions by their worldly interests. This, however, is\r\nby no means so conclusive an objection as it at first appears; because in\r\npolitics we are for the most part concerned with the conduct, not of individual\r\npersons, but either of a series of persons (as a succession of kings),\r\nor a body or mass of persons, as a nation, an aristocracy, or a representative\r\nassembly. And whatever is true of a large majority of mankind, may\r\nwithout much error be taken for true of any succession of persons, considered\r\nas a whole, or of any collection of persons in which the act of the\r\nmajority becomes the act of the whole body. Although, therefore, the\r\nmaxim is sometimes expressed in a manner unnecessarily paradoxical, the\r\nconsequences drawn from it will hold equally good if the assertion be limited\r\nas follows: Any succession of persons, or the majority of any body\r\nof persons, will be governed in the bulk of their conduct by their personal\r\ninterests. We are bound to allow to this school of thinkers the benefit of\r\nthis more rational statement of their fundamental maxim, which is also in\r\nstrict conformity to the explanations which, when considered to be called\r\nfor, have been given by themselves.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe theory goes on to infer, quite correctly, that if the actions of mankind\r\nare determined in the main by their selfish interests, the only rulers\r\nwho will govern according to the interest of the governed, are those whose\r\nselfish interests are in accordance with it. And to this is added a third\r\nproposition, namely, that no rulers have their selfish interest identical with\r\nthat of the governed, unless it be rendered so by accountability, that is,\r\nby dependence on the will of the governed. In other words (and as the\r\nresult of the whole), that the desire of retaining or the fear of losing their\r\npower, and whatever is thereon consequent, is the sole motive which can\r\nbe relied on for producing on the part of rulers a course of conduct in accordance\r\nwith the general interest.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWe have thus a fundamental theorem of political science, consisting of\r\nthree syllogisms, and depending chiefly on two general premises, in each of\r\nwhich a certain effect is considered as determined only by one cause, not\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page617\"\u003e[pg 617]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg617\" id=\"Pg617\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nby a concurrence of causes. In the one, it is assumed that the actions of\r\naverage rulers are determined solely by self-interest; in the other, that the\r\nsense of identity of interest with the governed, is produced and producible\r\nby no other cause than responsibility.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nNeither of these propositions is by any means true; the last is extremely\r\nwide of the truth.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt is not true that the actions even of average rulers are wholly, or any\r\nthing approaching to wholly, determined by their personal interest, or even\r\nby their own opinion of their personal interest. I do not speak of the influence\r\nof a sense of duty, or feelings of philanthropy, motives never to be\r\nmainly relied on, though (except in countries or during periods of great\r\nmoral debasement) they influence almost all rulers in some degree, and\r\nsome rulers in a very great degree. But I insist only on what is true of all\r\nrulers, viz., that the character and course of their actions is largely influenced\r\n(independently of personal calculation) by the habitual sentiments\r\nand feelings, the general modes of thinking and acting, which prevail\r\nthroughout the community of which they are members; as well as by the\r\nfeelings, habits, and modes of thought which characterize the particular class\r\nin that community to which they themselves belong. And no one will understand\r\nor be able to decipher their system of conduct, who does not take\r\nall these things into account. They are also much influenced by the maxims\r\nand traditions which have descended to them from other rulers, their\r\npredecessors; which maxims and traditions have been known to retain an\r\nascendancy during long periods, even in opposition to the private interests\r\nof the rulers for the time being. I put aside the influence of other less general\r\ncauses. Although, therefore, the private interest of the rulers or of\r\nthe ruling class is a very powerful force, constantly in action, and exercising\r\nthe most important influence upon their conduct, there is also, in\r\nwhat they do, a large portion which that private interest by no means affords\r\na sufficient explanation of; and even the particulars which constitute\r\nthe goodness or badness of their government, are in some, and no small\r\ndegree, influenced by those among the circumstances acting upon them,\r\nwhich can not, with any propriety, be included in the term self-interest.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nTurning now to the other proposition, that responsibility to the governed\r\nis the only cause capable of producing in the rulers a sense of identity\r\nof interest with the community, this is still less admissible as a universal\r\ntruth, than even the former. I am not speaking of perfect identity of interest,\r\nwhich is an impracticable chimera; which, most assuredly, responsibility\r\nto the people does not give. I speak of identity in essentials; and\r\nthe essentials are different at different places and times. There are a large\r\nnumber of cases in which those things which it is most for the general interest\r\nthat the rulers should do, are also those which they are prompted to do\r\nby their strongest personal interest, the consolidation of their power. The\r\nsuppression, for instance, of anarchy and resistance to law—the complete\r\nestablishment of the authority of the central government, in a state of society\r\nlike that of Europe in the Middle Ages—is one of the strongest interests\r\nof the people, and also of the rulers simply because they are the rulers;\r\nand responsibility on their part could not strengthen, though in many\r\nconceivable ways it might weaken, the motives prompting them to pursue\r\nthis object. During the greater part, of the reign of Queen Elizabeth, and\r\nof many other monarchs who might be named, the sense of identity of interest\r\nbetween the sovereign and the majority of the people was probably\r\nstronger than it usually is in responsible governments; every thing that\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page618\"\u003e[pg 618]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg618\" id=\"Pg618\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nthe people had most at heart, the monarch had at heart too. Had Peter\r\nthe Great, or the rugged savages whom he began to civilize, the truest\r\ninclination toward the things which were for the real interest of those\r\nsavages?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nI am not here attempting to establish a theory of government, and am\r\nnot called upon to determine the proportional weight which ought to be\r\ngiven to the circumstances which this school of geometrical politicians left\r\nout of their system, and those which they took into it. I am only concerned\r\nto show that their method was unscientific; not to measure the\r\namount of error which may have affected their practical conclusions.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt is but justice to them, however, to remark, that their mistake was not\r\nso much one of substance as of form, and consisted in presenting in a\r\nsystematic shape, and as the scientific treatment of a great philosophical\r\nquestion, what should have passed for that which it really was, the mere\r\npolemics of the day. Although the actions of rulers are by no means\r\nwholly determined by their selfish interests, it is chiefly as a security\r\nagainst those selfish interests that constitutional checks are required; and\r\nfor that purpose such checks, in England, and the other nations of modern\r\nEurope, can in no manner be dispensed with. It is likewise true, that in\r\nthese same nations, and in the present age, responsibility to the governed\r\nis the only means practically available to create a feeling of identity of\r\ninterest, in the cases, and on the points, where that feeling does not sufficiently\r\nexist. To all this, and to the arguments which may be founded on\r\nit in favor of measures for the correction of our representative system, I\r\nhave nothing to object; but I confess my regret, that the small though\r\nhighly important portion of the philosophy of government, which was\r\nwanted for the immediate purpose of serving the cause of parliamentary\r\nreform, should have been held forth by thinkers of such eminence as a\r\ncomplete theory.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt is not to be imagined possible, nor is it true in point of fact, that\r\nthese philosophers regarded the few premises of their theory as including\r\nall that is required for explaining social phenomena, or for determining\r\nthe choice of forms of government and measures of legislation and administration.\r\nThey were too highly instructed, of too comprehensive intellect,\r\nand some of them of too sober and practical a character, for such an error.\r\nThey would have applied, and did apply, their principles with innumerable\r\nallowances. But it is not allowances that are wanted. There is little\r\nchance of making due amends in the superstructure of a theory for the\r\nwant of sufficient breadth in its foundations. It is unphilosophical to construct\r\na science out of a few of the agencies by which the phenomena are\r\ndetermined, and leave the rest to the routine of practice or the sagacity of\r\nconjecture. We either ought not to pretend to scientific forms, or we\r\nought to study all the determining agencies equally, and endeavor, so far\r\nas it can be done, to include all of them within the pale of the science;\r\nelse we shall infallibly bestow a disproportionate attention upon those\r\nwhich our theory takes into account, while we misestimate the rest, and\r\nprobably underrate their importance. That the deductions should be\r\nfrom the whole and not from a part only of the laws of nature that are\r\nconcerned, would be desirable even if those omitted were so insignificant\r\nin comparison with the others, that they might, for most purposes and on\r\nmost occasions, be left out of the account. But this is far indeed from being\r\ntrue in the social science. The phenomena of society do not depend,\r\nin essentials, on some one agency or law of human nature, with only inconsiderable\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page619\"\u003e[pg 619]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg619\" id=\"Pg619\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nmodifications from others. The whole of the qualities of human\r\nnature influence those phenomena, and there is not one which influences\r\nthem in a small degree. There is not one, the removal or any great alteration\r\nof which would not materially affect the whole aspect of society,\r\nand change more or less the sequences of social phenomena generally.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe theory which has been the subject of these remarks is, in this country\r\nat least, the principal contemporary example of what I have styled the\r\ngeometrical method of philosophizing in the social science; and our examination\r\nof it has, for this reason, been more detailed than would otherwise\r\nhave been suitable to a work like the present. Having now sufficiently\r\nillustrated the two erroneous methods, we shall pass without further\r\npreliminary to the true method; that which proceeds (conformably\r\nto the practice of the more complex physical sciences) deductively indeed,\r\nbut by deduction from many, not from one or a very few, original premises;\r\nconsidering each effect as (what it really is) an aggregate result of\r\nmany causes, operating sometimes through the same, sometimes through\r\ndifferent mental agencies, or laws of human nature.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-div\" style=\"margin-bottom: 4.00em; margin-top: 4.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"toc145\" id=\"toc145\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"pdf146\" id=\"pdf146\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: center; margin-bottom: 2.40em; margin-top: 2.40em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 120%\"\u003eChapter IX.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: left; margin-bottom: 2.88em; margin-top: 2.88em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 144%\"\u003eOf The Physical, Or Concrete Deductive, Method.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 1. After what has been said to illustrate the nature of the inquiry\r\ninto social phenomena, the general character of the method proper to that\r\ninquiry is sufficiently evident, and needs only to be recapitulated, not\r\nproved. However complex the phenomena, all their sequences and co-existences\r\nresult from the laws of the separate elements. The effect produced,\r\nin social phenomena, by any complex set of circumstances, amounts\r\nprecisely to the sum of the effects of the circumstances taken singly; and\r\nthe complexity does not arise from the number of the laws themselves,\r\nwhich is not remarkably great, but from the extraordinary number and\r\nvariety of the data or elements—of the agents which, in obedience to that\r\nsmall number of laws, co-operate toward the effect. The Social Science,\r\ntherefore (which, by a convenient barbarism, has been termed Sociology),\r\nis a deductive science; not, indeed, after the model of geometry, but after\r\nthat of the more complex physical sciences. It infers the law of each effect\r\nfrom the laws of causation on which that effect depends; not, however,\r\nfrom the law merely of one cause, as in the geometrical method, but\r\nby considering all the causes which conjunctly influence the effect, and\r\ncompounding their laws with one another. Its method, in short, is the\r\nConcrete Deductive Method: that of which astronomy furnishes the most\r\nperfect, natural philosophy a somewhat less perfect, example, and the employment\r\nof which, with the adaptations and precautions required by the\r\nsubject, is beginning to regenerate physiology.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nNor does it admit of doubt, that similar adaptations and precautions are\r\nindispensable in sociology. In applying to that most complex of all studies\r\nwhat is demonstrably the sole method capable of throwing the light\r\nof science even upon phenomena of a far inferior degree of complication,\r\nwe ought to be aware that the same superior complexity which renders the\r\ninstrument of Deduction more necessary, renders it also more precarious;\r\nand we must be prepared to meet, by appropriate contrivances, this increase\r\nof difficulty.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page620\"\u003e[pg 620]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg620\" id=\"Pg620\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe actions and feelings of human beings in the social state, are, no\r\ndoubt, entirely governed by psychological and ethological laws: whatever\r\ninfluence any cause exercises upon the social phenomena, it exercises\r\nthrough those laws. Supposing therefore the laws of human actions and\r\nfeelings to be sufficiently known, there is no extraordinary difficulty in determining\r\nfrom those laws, the nature of the social effects which any given\r\ncause tends to produce. But when the question is that of compounding\r\nseveral tendencies together, and computing the aggregate result of many\r\nco-existent causes; and especially when, by attempting to predict what will\r\nactually occur in a given case, we incur the obligation of estimating and\r\ncompounding the influences of all the causes which happen to exist in that\r\ncase, we attempt a task to proceed far in which, surpasses the compass of\r\nthe human faculties.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIf all the resources of science are not sufficient to enable us to calculate,\r\n\u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea priori\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, with complete precision, the mutual\r\naction of three bodies gravitating\r\ntoward one another, it may be judged with what prospect of success\r\nwe should endeavor to calculate the result of the conflicting tendencies\r\nwhich are acting in a thousand different directions and promoting a thousand\r\ndifferent changes at a given instant in a given society; although we\r\nmight and ought to be able, from the laws of human nature, to distinguish\r\ncorrectly enough the tendencies themselves, so far as they depend on causes\r\naccessible to our observation; and to determine the direction which each\r\nof them, if acting alone, would impress upon society, as well as, in a general\r\nway at least, to pronounce that some of these tendencies are more powerful\r\nthan others.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nBut, without dissembling the necessary imperfections of the\r\n\u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea priori\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nmethod when applied to such a subject, neither ought we, on the other\r\nhand; to exaggerate them. The same objections which apply to the Method\r\nof Deduction in this its most difficult employment, apply to it, as we\r\nformerly showed,\u003ca id=\"noteref_276\" name=\"noteref_276\" href=\"#note_276\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e276\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e in its easiest; and would even there have been insuperable,\r\nif there had not existed, as was then fully explained, an appropriate\r\nremedy. This remedy consists in the process which, under the name of\r\nVerification, we have characterized as the third essential constituent part\r\nof the Deductive Method; that of collating the conclusions of the ratiocination\r\neither with the concrete phenomena themselves, or, when such are\r\nobtainable, with their empirical laws. The ground of confidence in any\r\nconcrete deductive science is not the \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\r\npriori\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e reasoning itself, but the accordance\r\nbetween its results and those of observation \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\r\nposteriori\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e. Either\r\nof these processes, apart from the other, diminishes in value as the subject\r\nincreases in complication, and this is in so rapid a ratio as soon to become\r\nentirely worthless; but the reliance to be placed in the concurrence of the\r\ntwo sorts of evidence, not only does not diminish in any thing like the\r\nsame proportion, but is not necessarily much diminished at all. Nothing\r\nmore results than a disturbance in the order of precedency of the two\r\nprocesses, sometimes amounting to its actual inversion: insomuch that instead\r\nof deducing our conclusions by reasoning, and verifying them by observation,\r\nwe in some cases begin by obtaining them provisionally from\r\nspecific experience, and afterward connect them with the principles of human\r\nnature by \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea priori\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e reasonings, which\r\nreasonings are thus a real Verification.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe only thinker who, with a competent knowledge of scientific methods\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page621\"\u003e[pg 621]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg621\" id=\"Pg621\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nin general, has attempted to characterize the Method of Sociology, M.\r\nComte, considers this inverse order as inseparably inherent in the nature of\r\nsociological speculation. He looks upon the social science as essentially\r\nconsisting of generalizations from history, verified, not originally suggested,\r\nby deduction from the laws of human nature. Though there is a truth\r\ncontained in this opinion, of which I shall presently endeavor to show the\r\nimportance, I can not but think that this truth is enunciated in too unlimited\r\na manner, and that there is considerable scope in sociological inquiry\r\nfor the direct, as well as for the inverse, Deductive Method.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt will, in fact, be shown in the next chapter, that there is a kind of sociological\r\ninquiries to which, from their prodigious complication, the method\r\nof direct deduction is altogether inapplicable, while by a happy compensation\r\nit is precisely in these cases that we are able to obtain the best empirical\r\nlaws: to these inquiries, therefore, the Inverse Method is exclusively\r\nadapted. But there are also, as will presently appear, other cases in which\r\nit is impossible to obtain from direct observation any thing worthy the\r\nname of an empirical law; and it fortunately happens that these are the\r\nvery cases in which the Direct Method is least affected by the objection\r\nwhich undoubtedly must always affect it in a certain degree.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWe shall begin, then, by looking at the Social Science as a science of direct\r\nDeduction, and considering what can be accomplished in it, and under\r\nwhat limitations, by that mode of investigation. We shall, then, in a separate\r\nchapter, examine and endeavor to characterize the inverse process.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 2. It is evident, in the first place, that Sociology, considered as a system\r\nof deductions \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea priori\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, can not be a science\r\nof positive predictions, but only of tendencies. We may be able to conclude, from the\r\nlaws of human nature applied to the circumstances of a given state of society, that a\r\nparticular cause will operate in a certain manner unless counteracted; but\r\nwe can never be assured to what extent or amount it will so operate, or\r\naffirm with certainty that it will not be counteracted; because we can seldom\r\nknow, even approximately, all the agencies which may co-exist with it,\r\nand still less calculate the \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“collective result”\u003c/span\u003e of so many combined elements.\r\nThe remark, however, must here be once more repeated, that knowledge\r\ninsufficient for prediction may be most valuable for guidance. It is not\r\nnecessary for the wise conduct of the affairs of society, no more than of\r\nany one’s private concerns, that we should be able to foresee infallibly the\r\nresults of what we do. We must seek our objects by means which may\r\nperhaps be defeated, and take precautions against dangers which possibly\r\nmay never be realized. The aim of practical politics is to surround any\r\ngiven society with the greatest possible number of circumstances of which\r\nthe tendencies are beneficial, and to remove or counteract, as far as practicable,\r\nthose of which the tendencies are injurious. A knowledge of the\r\ntendencies only, though without the power of accurately predicting their\r\nconjunct result, gives us to a considerable extent this power.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt would, however, be an error to suppose that even with respect to tendencies\r\nwe could arrive in this manner at any great number of propositions\r\nwhich will be true in all societies without exception. Such a supposition\r\nwould be inconsistent with the eminently modifiable nature of the\r\nsocial phenomena, and the multitude and variety of the circumstances by\r\nwhich they are modified—circumstances never the same, or even nearly the\r\nsame, in two different societies, or in two different periods of the same\r\nsociety. This would not be so serious an obstacle if, though the causes\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page622\"\u003e[pg 622]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg622\" id=\"Pg622\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nacting upon society in general are numerous, those which influence any one\r\nfeature of society were limited in number; for we might then insulate any\r\nparticular social phenomenon, and investigate its laws without disturbance\r\nfrom the rest. But the truth is the very opposite of this. Whatever affects,\r\nin an appreciable degree, any one element of the social state, affects\r\nthrough it all the other elements. The mode of production of all social\r\nphenomena is one great case of Intermixture of Laws. We can never either\r\nunderstand in theory or command in practice the condition of a society\r\nin any one respect, without taking into consideration its condition in\r\nall other respects. There is no social phenomenon which is not more or\r\nless influenced by every other part of the condition of the same society,\r\nand therefore by every cause which is influencing any other of the contemporaneous\r\nsocial phenomena. There is, in short, what physiologists term\r\na \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003econsensus\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, similar to that existing among the various organs\r\nand functions of the physical frame of man and the more perfect animals; and constituting\r\none of the many analogies which have rendered universal such\r\nexpressions as the \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“body politic”\u003c/span\u003e and \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“body natural.”\u003c/span\u003e It follows from\r\nthis \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003econsensus\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, that unless two societies could be alike in all\r\nthe circumstances which surround and influence them (which would imply their being\r\nalike in their previous history), no portion whatever of the phenomena\r\nwill, unless by accident, precisely correspond; no one cause will produce\r\nexactly the same effects in both. Every cause, as its effect spreads through\r\nsociety, comes somewhere in contact with different sets of agencies, and\r\nthus has its effects on some of the social phenomena differently modified;\r\nand these differences, by their reaction, produce a difference even in those\r\nof the effects which would otherwise have been the same. We can never,\r\ntherefore, affirm with certainty that a cause which has a particular tendency\r\nin one people or in one age will have exactly the same tendency in\r\nanother, without referring back to our premises, and performing over again\r\nfor the second age or nation, that analysis of the whole of its influencing\r\ncircumstances which we had already performed for the first. The deductive\r\nscience of society will not lay down a theorem, asserting in a universal\r\nmanner the effect of any cause; but will rather teach us how to frame\r\nthe proper theorem for the circumstances of any given case. It will not\r\ngive the laws of society in general, but the means of determining the phenomena\r\nof any given society from the particular elements or data of that\r\nsociety.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAll the general propositions which can be framed by the deductive science,\r\nare therefore, in the strictest sense of the word, hypothetical. They\r\nare grounded on some suppositious set of circumstances, and declare how\r\nsome given cause would operate in those circumstances, supposing that no\r\nothers were combined with them. If the set of circumstances supposed\r\nhave been copied from those of any existing society, the conclusions will\r\nbe true of that society, provided, and in as far as, the effect of those circumstances\r\nshall not be modified by others which have not been taken into\r\nthe account. If we desire a nearer approach to concrete truth, we can only\r\naim at it by taking, or endeavoring to take, a greater number of individualizing\r\ncircumstances into the computation.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nConsidering, however, in how accelerating a ratio the uncertainty of our\r\nconclusions increases as we attempt to take the effect of a greater number\r\nof concurrent causes into our calculations, the hypothetical combinations\r\nof circumstances on which we construct the general theorems of the science,\r\ncan not be made very complex, without so rapidly accumulating a\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page623\"\u003e[pg 623]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg623\" id=\"Pg623\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nliability to error as must soon deprive our conclusions of all value. This\r\nmode of inquiry, considered as a means of obtaining general propositions,\r\nmust, therefore, on pain of frivolity, be limited to those classes of social\r\nfacts which, though influenced like the rest by all sociological agents, are\r\nunder the \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eimmediate\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e influence, principally at least, of a few only.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 3. Notwithstanding the universal \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003econsensus\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e of the social\r\nphenomena, whereby nothing which takes place in any part of the operations of society\r\nis without its share of influence on every other part; and notwithstanding\r\nthe paramount ascendancy which the general state of civilization and social\r\nprogress in any given society must hence exercise over all the partial and\r\nsubordinate phenomena; it is not the less true that different species of social\r\nfacts are in the main dependent, immediately and in the first resort,\r\non different kinds of causes; and therefore not only may with advantage,\r\nbut must, be studied apart: just as in the natural body we study separately\r\nthe physiology and pathology of each of the principal organs and tissues,\r\nthough every one is acted upon by the state of all the others; and\r\nthough the peculiar constitution and general state of health of the organism\r\nco-operates with, and often preponderates over, the local causes, in determining\r\nthe state of any particular organ.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nOn these considerations is grounded the existence of distinct and separate,\r\nthough not independent, branches or departments of sociological\r\nspeculation.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThere is, for example, one large class of social phenomena in which the\r\nimmediately determining causes are principally those which act through\r\nthe desire of wealth, and in which the psychological law mainly concerned\r\nis the familiar one, that a greater gain is preferred to a smaller. I mean,\r\nof course, that portion of the phenomena of society which emanate from\r\nthe industrial, or productive, operations of mankind; and from those of\r\ntheir acts through which the distribution of the products of those industrial\r\noperations takes place, in so far as not effected by force, or modified\r\nby voluntary gift. By reasoning from that one law of human nature, and\r\nfrom the principal outward circumstances (whether universal or confined\r\nto particular states of society) which operate upon the human mind through\r\nthat law, we may be enabled to explain and predict this portion of the phenomena\r\nof society, so far as they depend on that class of circumstances\r\nonly; overlooking the influence of any other of the circumstances of society;\r\nand therefore neither tracing back the circumstances which we do take\r\ninto account, to their possible origin in some other facts in the social state,\r\nnor making allowance for the manner in which any of those other circumstances\r\nmay interfere with, and counteract or modify, the effect of the\r\nformer. A department of science may thus be constructed, which has received\r\nthe name of Political Economy.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe motive which suggests the separation of this portion of the social\r\nphenomena from the rest, and the creation of a distinct branch of science\r\nrelating to them is—that they do \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003emainly\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e depend, at least in the first\r\nresort, on one class of circumstances only; and that even when other circumstances\r\ninterfere, the ascertainment of the effect due to the one class of\r\ncircumstances alone, is a sufficiently intricate and difficult business to make\r\nit expedient to perform it once for all, and then allow for the effect of the\r\nmodifying circumstances; especially as certain fixed combinations of the\r\nformer are apt to recur often, in conjunction with ever-varying circumstances\r\nof the latter class.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page624\"\u003e[pg 624]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg624\" id=\"Pg624\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nPolitical Economy, as I have said on another occasion, concerns itself\r\nonly with \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“such of the phenomena of the social state as take place in consequence\r\nof the pursuit of wealth. It makes entire abstraction of every\r\nother human passion or motive; except those which may be regarded as\r\nperpetually antagonizing principles to the desire of wealth, namely, aversion\r\nto labor, and desire of the present enjoyment of costly indulgences. These\r\nit takes, to a certain extent, into its calculations, because these do not\r\nmerely, like our other desires, occasionally conflict with the pursuit of\r\nwealth, but accompany it always as a drag or impediment, and are therefore\r\ninseparably mixed up in the consideration of it. Political Economy\r\nconsiders mankind as occupied solely in acquiring and consuming wealth;\r\nand aims at showing what is the course of action into which mankind,\r\nliving in a state of society, would be impelled, if that motive, except in the\r\ndegree in which it is checked by the two perpetual counter-motives above\r\nadverted to, were absolute ruler of all their actions. Under the influence\r\nof this desire, it shows mankind accumulating wealth, and employing\r\nthat wealth in the production of other wealth; sanctioning by mutual\r\nagreement the institution of property; establishing laws to prevent individuals\r\nfrom encroaching upon the property of others by force or fraud;\r\nadopting various contrivances for increasing the productiveness of their\r\nlabor; settling the division of the produce by agreement, under the influence\r\nof competition (competition itself being governed by certain laws,\r\nwhich laws are therefore the ultimate regulators of the division of the\r\nproduce); and employing certain expedients (as money, credit, etc.) to\r\nfacilitate the distribution. All these operations, though many of them are\r\nreally the result of a plurality of motives, are considered by political economy\r\nas flowing solely from the desire of wealth. The science then proceeds\r\nto investigate the laws which govern these several operations, under\r\nthe supposition that man is a being who is determined, by the necessity\r\nof his nature, to prefer a greater portion of wealth to a smaller, in all cases,\r\nwithout any other exception than that constituted by the two counter-motives\r\nalready specified. Not that any political economist was ever so\r\nabsurd as to suppose that mankind are really thus constituted, but because\r\nthis is the mode in which science must necessarily proceed. When an\r\neffect depends on a concurrence of causes, these causes must be studied\r\none at a time, and their laws separately investigated, if we wish, through\r\nthe causes, to obtain the power of either predicting or controlling the\r\neffect; since the law of the effect is compounded of the laws of all the\r\ncauses which determine it. The law of the centripetal and that of the\r\nprojectile force must have been known, before the motions of the earth\r\nand planets could be explained, or many of them predicted. The same is\r\nthe case with the conduct of man in society. In order to judge how he\r\nwill act under the variety of desires and aversions which are concurrently\r\noperating upon him, we must know how he would act under the exclusive\r\ninfluence of each one in particular. There is, perhaps, no action of a man’s\r\nlife in which he is neither under the immediate nor under the remote influence\r\nof any impulse but the mere desire of wealth. With respect to\r\nthose parts of human conduct of which wealth is not even the principal\r\nobject, to these political economy does not pretend that its conclusions are\r\napplicable. But there are also certain departments of human affairs, in\r\nwhich the acquisition of wealth is the main and acknowledged end. It is\r\nonly of these that political economy takes notice. The manner in which it\r\nnecessarily proceeds is that of treating the main and acknowledged end as\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page625\"\u003e[pg 625]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg625\" id=\"Pg625\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nif it were the sole end; which, of all hypotheses equally simple, is the nearest\r\nto the truth. The political economist inquires, what are the actions\r\nwhich would be produced by this desire, if within the departments in\r\nquestion it were unimpeded by any other. In this way a nearer approximation\r\nis obtained than would otherwise be practicable to the real order\r\nof human affairs in those departments. This approximation has then to\r\nbe corrected by making proper allowance for the effects of any impulses\r\nof a different description, which can be shown to interfere with the result\r\nin any particular case. Only in a few of the most striking cases (such as\r\nthe important one of the principle of population) are these corrections interpolated\r\ninto the expositions of political economy itself; the strictness\r\nof purely scientific arrangement being thereby somewhat departed from,\r\nfor the sake of practical utility. So far as it is known, or may be presumed,\r\nthat the conduct of mankind in the pursuit of wealth is under the\r\ncollateral influence of any other of the properties of our nature than the\r\ndesire of obtaining the greatest quantity of wealth with the least labor\r\nand self-denial, the conclusions of political economy will so far fail of being\r\napplicable to the explanation or prediction of real events, until they are\r\nmodified by a correct allowance for the degree of influence exercised by\r\nthe other cause.”\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca id=\"noteref_277\" name=\"noteref_277\" href=\"#note_277\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e277\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nExtensive and important practical guidance may be derived, in any given\r\nstate of society, from general propositions such as those above indicated;\r\neven though the modifying influence of the miscellaneous causes which the\r\ntheory does not take into account, as well as the effect of the general social\r\nchanges in progress, be provisionally overlooked. And though it has been\r\na very common error of political economists to draw conclusions from the\r\nelements of one state of society, and apply them to other states in which\r\nmany of the elements are not the same, it is even then not difficult, by\r\ntracing back the demonstrations, and introducing the new premises in\r\ntheir proper places, to make the same general course of argument which\r\nserved for the one case, serve for the others too.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nFor example, it has been greatly the custom of English political economists\r\nto discuss the laws of the distribution of the produce of industry,\r\non a supposition which is scarcely realized anywhere out of England and\r\nScotland, namely, that the produce is \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“shared among three classes, altogether\r\ndistinct from one another, laborers, capitalists, and landlords; and that\r\nall these are free agents, permitted in law and in fact to set upon their labor,\r\ntheir capital, and their land, whatever price they are able to get for it.\r\nThe conclusions of the science, being all adapted to a society thus constituted,\r\nrequire to be revised whenever they are applied to any other. They\r\nare inapplicable where the only capitalists are the landlords, and the laborers\r\nare their property, as in slave countries. They are inapplicable where\r\nthe almost universal landlord is the state, as in India. They are inapplicable\r\nwhere the agricultural laborer is generally the owner both of the land\r\nitself and of the capital, as frequently in France, or of the capital only, as\r\nin Ireland.”\u003c/span\u003e But though it may often be very justly objected to the existing\r\nrace of political economists \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“that they attempt to construct a permanent\r\nfabric out of transitory materials; that they take for granted the\r\nimmutability of arrangements of society, many of which are in their nature\r\nfluctuating or progressive, and enunciate with as little qualification as if\r\nthey were universal and absolute truths, propositions which are perhaps\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page626\"\u003e[pg 626]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg626\" id=\"Pg626\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\napplicable to no state of society except the particular one in which the\r\nwriter happened to live;”\u003c/span\u003e this does not take away the value of the propositions,\r\nconsidered with reference to the state of society from which they\r\nwere drawn. And even as applicable to other states of society, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“it must\r\nnot be supposed that the science is so incomplete and unsatisfactory as this\r\nmight seem to prove. Though many of its conclusions are only locally\r\ntrue, its method of investigation is applicable universally; and as whoever\r\nhas solved a certain number of algebraic equations, can without difficulty\r\nsolve all others of the same kind, so whoever knows the political economy\r\nof England, or even of Yorkshire, knows that of all nations, actual or possible,\r\nprovided he have good sense enough not to expect the same conclusion\r\nto issue from varying premises.”\u003c/span\u003e Whoever has mastered with the\r\ndegree of precision which is attainable the laws which, under free competition,\r\ndetermine the rent, profits, and wages, received by landlords, capitalists,\r\nand laborers, in a state of society in which the three classes are completely\r\nseparate, will have no difficulty in determining the very different\r\nlaws which regulate the distribution of the produce among the classes interested\r\nin it in any of the states of cultivation and landed property set\r\nforth in the foregoing extract.\u003ca id=\"noteref_278\" name=\"noteref_278\" href=\"#note_278\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e278\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 4. I would not here undertake to decide what other hypothetical or\r\nabstract sciences similar to Political Economy, may admit of being carved\r\nout of the general body of the social science; what other portions of the\r\nsocial phenomena are in a sufficiently close and complete dependence, in the\r\nfirst resort, on a peculiar class of causes, to make it convenient to create a\r\npreliminary science of those causes; postponing the consideration of the\r\ncauses which act through them, or in concurrence with them, to a later\r\nperiod of the inquiry. There is, however, among these separate departments\r\none which can not be passed over in silence, being of a more comprehensive\r\nand commanding character than any of the other branches into\r\nwhich the social science may admit of being divided. Like them, it is directly\r\nconversant with the causes of only one class of social facts, but a class\r\nwhich exercises, immediately or remotely, a paramount influence over the\r\ntest. I allude to what may be termed Political Ethology, or the theory of\r\nthe causes which determine the type of character belonging to a people or\r\nto an age. Of all the subordinate branches of the social science, this is\r\nthe most completely in its infancy. The causes of national character are\r\nscarcely at all understood, and the effect of institutions or social arrangements\r\nupon the character of the people is generally that portion of their\r\neffects which is least attended to, and least comprehended. Nor is this\r\nwonderful, when we consider the infant state of the science of Ethology\r\nitself, from whence the laws must be drawn, of which the truths of political\r\nethology can be but results and exemplifications.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nYet, to whoever well considers the matter, it must appear that the laws\r\nof national (or collective) character are by far the most important class of\r\nsociological laws. In the first place, the character which is formed by any\r\nstate of social circumstances is in itself the most interesting phenomenon\r\nwhich that state of society can possibly present. Secondly, it is also a fact\r\nwhich enters largely into the production of all the other phenomena. And\r\nabove all, the character, that is, the opinions, feelings, and habits, of the\r\npeople, though greatly the results of the state of society which precedes\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page627\"\u003e[pg 627]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg627\" id=\"Pg627\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nthem, are also greatly the causes of the state of society which follows them;\r\nand are the power by which all those of the circumstances of society which\r\nare artificial, laws and customs for instance, are altogether moulded: customs\r\nevidently, laws no less really, either by the direct influence of public\r\nsentiment upon the ruling powers, or by the effect which the state of national\r\nopinion and feeling has in determining the form of government and\r\nshaping the character of the governors.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAs might be expected, the most imperfect part of those branches of social\r\ninquiry which have been cultivated as separate sciences, is the theory of the\r\nmanner in which their conclusions are affected by ethological considerations.\r\nThe omission is no defect in them as abstract or hypothetical sciences, but\r\nit vitiates them in their practical application as branches of a comprehensive\r\nsocial science. In political economy, for instance, empirical laws of human\r\nnature are tacitly assumed by English thinkers, which are calculated\r\nonly for Great Britain and the United States. Among other things, an intensity\r\nof competition is constantly supposed, which, as a general mercantile\r\nfact, exists in no country in the world except those two. An English\r\npolitical economist, like his countrymen in general, has seldom learned that\r\nit is possible that men, in conducting the business of selling their goods\r\nover a counter, should care more about their ease or their vanity than about\r\ntheir pecuniary gain. Yet those who know the habits of the continent of\r\nEurope are aware how apparently small a motive often outweighs the desire\r\nof money getting, even in the operations which have money getting for their\r\ndirect object. The more highly the science of ethology is cultivated, and\r\nthe better the diversities of individual and national character are understood,\r\nthe smaller, probably, will the number of propositions become, which\r\nit will be considered safe to build on as universal principles of human nature.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThese considerations show that the process of dividing off the social\r\nscience into compartments, in order that each may be studied separately,\r\nand its conclusions afterward corrected for practice by the modifications\r\nsupplied by the others, must be subject to at least one important limitation.\r\nThose portions alone of the social phenomena can with advantage be made\r\nthe subjects, even provisionally, of distinct branches of science, into which\r\nthe diversities of character between different nations or different times enter\r\nas influencing causes only in a secondary degree. Those phenomena,\r\non the contrary, with which the influences of the ethological state of the\r\npeople are mixed up at every step (so that the connection of effects and\r\ncauses can not be even rudely marked out without taking those influences\r\ninto consideration) could not with any advantage, nor without great disadvantage,\r\nbe treated independently of political ethology, nor, therefore, of all\r\nthe circumstances by which the qualities of a people are influenced. For\r\nthis reason (as well as for others which will hereafter appear) there can be\r\nno separate Science of Government; that being the fact which, of all others,\r\nis most mixed up, both as cause and effect, with the qualities of the particular\r\npeople or of the particular age. All questions respecting the tendencies\r\nof forms of government must stand part of the general science of\r\nsociety, not of any separate branch of it.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThis general Science of Society, as distinguished from the separate departments\r\nof the science (each of which asserts its conclusions only conditionally,\r\nsubject to the paramount control of the laws of the general science)\r\nnow remains to be characterized. And as will be shown presently,\r\nnothing of a really scientific character is here possible, except by the inverse\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page628\"\u003e[pg 628]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg628\" id=\"Pg628\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\ndeductive method. But before we quit the subject of those sociological\r\nspeculations which proceed by way of direct deduction, we must examine\r\nin what relation they stand to that indispensable element in all deductive\r\nsciences, Verification by Specific Experience—comparison between the conclusions\r\nof reasoning and the results of observation.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 5. We have seen that, in most deductive sciences, and among the rest\r\nin Ethology itself, which is the immediate foundation of the Social Science,\r\na preliminary work of preparation is performed on the observed facts, to\r\nfit them for being rapidly and accurately collated (sometimes even for\r\nbeing collated at all) with the conclusions of theory. This preparatory\r\ntreatment consists in finding general propositions which express concisely\r\nwhat is common to large classes of observed facts; and these are called the\r\nempirical laws of the phenomena. We have, therefore, to inquire, whether\r\nany similar preparatory process can be performed on the facts of the social\r\nscience; whether there are any empirical laws in history or statistics.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIn statistics, it is evident that empirical laws may sometimes be traced;\r\nand the tracing them forms an important part of that system of indirect\r\nobservation on which we must often rely for the data of the Deductive\r\nScience. The process of the science consists in inferring effects from their\r\ncauses; but we have often no means of observing the causes, except through\r\nthe medium of their effects. In such cases the deductive science is unable\r\nto predict the effects, for want of the necessary data; it can determine\r\nwhat causes are capable of producing any given effect, but not with what\r\nfrequency and in what quantities those causes exist. An instance in point\r\nis afforded by a newspaper now lying before me. A statement was furnished\r\nby one of the official assignees in bankruptcy showing among the\r\nvarious bankruptcies which it had been his duty to investigate, in how\r\nmany cases the losses had been caused by misconduct of different kinds,\r\nand in how many by unavoidable misfortunes. The result was, that the\r\nnumber of failures caused by misconduct greatly preponderated over those\r\narising from all other causes whatever. Nothing but specific experience\r\ncould have given sufficient ground for a conclusion to this purport. To\r\ncollect, therefore, such empirical laws (which are never more than approximate\r\ngeneralizations) from direct observation, is an important part of the\r\nprocess of sociological inquiry.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe experimental process is not here to be regarded as a distinct road to\r\nthe truth, but as a means (happening accidentally to be the only, or the best,\r\navailable) for obtaining the necessary data for the deductive science. When\r\nthe immediate causes of social facts are not open to direct observation, the\r\nempirical law of the effects gives us the empirical law (which in that case\r\nis all that we can obtain) of the causes likewise. But those immediate\r\ncauses depend on remote causes; and the empirical law, obtained by this\r\nindirect mode of observation, can only be relied on as applicable to unobserved\r\ncases, so long as there is reason to think that no change has taken\r\nplace in any of the remote causes on which the immediate causes depend.\r\nIn making use, therefore, of even the best statistical generalizations for the\r\npurpose of inferring (though it be only conjecturally) that the same empirical\r\nlaws will hold in any new case, it is necessary that we be well acquainted\r\nwith the remoter causes, in order that we may avoid applying the\r\nempirical law to cases which differ in any of the circumstances on which\r\nthe truth of the law ultimately depends. And thus, even where conclusions\r\nderived from specific observation are available for practical inferences\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page629\"\u003e[pg 629]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg629\" id=\"Pg629\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nin new cases, it is necessary that the deductive science should stand\r\nsentinel over the whole process; that it should be constantly referred to,\r\nand its sanction obtained to every inference.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe same thing holds true of all generalizations which can be grounded\r\non history. Not only there are such generalizations, but it will presently\r\nbe shown that the general science of society, which inquires into the laws\r\nof succession and co-existence of the great facts constituting the state of\r\nsociety and civilization at any time, can proceed in no other manner than\r\nby making such generalizations—afterward to be confirmed by connecting\r\nthem with the psychological and ethological laws on which they must\r\nreally depend.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 6. But (reserving this question for its proper place) in those more special\r\ninquiries which form the subject of the separate branches of the social science,\r\nthis twofold logical process and reciprocal verification is not possible;\r\nspecific experience affords nothing amounting to empirical laws. This is\r\nparticularly the case where the object is to determine the effect of any one\r\nsocial cause among a great number acting simultaneously; the effect, for\r\nexample, of corn laws, or of a prohibitive commercial system generally.\r\nThough it may be perfectly certain, from theory, what \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ekind\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e of effects corn\r\nlaws must produce, and in what general direction their influence must tell\r\nupon industrial prosperity, their effect is yet of necessity so much disguised\r\nby the similar or contrary effects of other influencing agents, that\r\nspecific experience can at most only show that on the average of some\r\ngreat number of instances, the cases where there were corn laws exhibited\r\nthe effect in a greater degree than those where there were not. Now the\r\nnumber of instances necessary to exhaust the whole round of combinations\r\nof the various influential circumstances, and thus afford a fair average, never\r\ncan be obtained. Not only we can never learn with sufficient authenticity\r\nthe facts of so many instances, but the world itself does not afford\r\nthem in sufficient numbers, within the limits of the given state of society\r\nand civilization which such inquiries always presuppose. Having thus no\r\nprevious empirical generalizations with which to collate the conclusions of\r\ntheory, the only mode of direct verification which remains is to compare\r\nthose conclusions with the result of an individual experiment or instance.\r\nBut here the difficulty is equally great. For in order to verify a theory by\r\nan experiment, the circumstances of the experiment must be exactly the\r\nsame with those contemplated in the theory. But in social phenomena the\r\ncircumstances of no two cases are exactly alike. A trial of corn laws in another\r\ncountry, or in a former generation, would go a very little way toward\r\nverifying a conclusion drawn respecting their effect in this generation and\r\nin this country. It thus happens, in most cases, that the only individual\r\ninstance really fitted to verify the predictions of theory is the very instance\r\nfor which the predictions were made; and the verification comes too late\r\nto be of any avail for practical guidance.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAlthough, however, direct verification is impossible, there is an indirect\r\nverification, which is scarcely of less value, and which is always practicable.\r\nThe conclusion drawn as to the individual case can only be directly\r\nverified in that case; but it is verified indirectly, by the verification of other\r\nconclusions, drawn in other individual cases from the same laws. The experience\r\nwhich comes too late to verify the particular proposition to which\r\nit refers, is not too late to help toward verifying the general sufficiency\r\nof the theory. The test of the degree in which the science affords safe\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page630\"\u003e[pg 630]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg630\" id=\"Pg630\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nground for predicting (and consequently for practically dealing with) what\r\nhas not yet happened, is the degree in which it would have enabled us to\r\npredict what has actually occurred. Before our theory of the influence of\r\na particular cause, in a given state of circumstances, can be entirely trusted,\r\nwe must be able to explain and account for the existing state of all\r\nthat portion of the social phenomena which that cause has a tendency to\r\ninfluence. If, for instance, we would apply our speculations in political\r\neconomy to the prediction or guidance of the phenomena of any country,\r\nwe must be able to explain all the mercantile or industrial facts of a general\r\ncharacter, appertaining to the present state of that country; to point\r\nout causes sufficient to account for all of them, and prove, or show good\r\nground for supposing, that these causes have really existed. If we can\r\nnot do this, it is a proof either that the facts which ought to be taken into\r\naccount are not yet completely known to us, or that although we know the\r\nfacts, we are not masters of a sufficiently perfect theory to enable us to\r\nassign their consequences. In either case we are not, in the present state\r\nof our knowledge, fully competent to draw conclusions, speculative or\r\npractical, for that country. In like manner, if we would attempt to judge\r\nof the effect which any political institution would have, supposing that it\r\ncould be introduced into any given country, we must be able to show that\r\nthe existing state of the practical government of that country, and of\r\nwhatever else depends thereon, together with the particular character and\r\ntendencies of the people, and their state in respect to the various elements\r\nof social well-being, are such as the institutions they have lived under, in\r\nconjunction with the other circumstances of their nature or of their position,\r\nwere calculated to produce.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nTo prove, in short, that our science, and our knowledge of the particular\r\ncase, render us competent to predict the future, we must show that\r\nthey would have enabled us to predict the present and the past. If there\r\nbe any thing which we could not have predicted, this constitutes a residual\r\nphenomenon, requiring further study for the purpose of explanation;\r\nand we must either search among the circumstances of the particular case\r\nuntil we find one which, on the principles of our existing theory, accounts\r\nfor the unexplained phenomenon, or we must turn back, and seek the explanation\r\nby an extension and improvement of the theory itself.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-div\" style=\"margin-bottom: 4.00em; margin-top: 4.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"toc147\" id=\"toc147\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"pdf148\" id=\"pdf148\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: center; margin-bottom: 2.40em; margin-top: 2.40em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 120%\"\u003eChapter X.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: left; margin-bottom: 2.88em; margin-top: 2.88em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 144%\"\u003eOf The Inverse Deductive, Or Historical, Method.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 1. There are two kinds of sociological inquiry. In the first kind, the\r\nquestion proposed is, what effect will follow from a given cause, a certain\r\ngeneral condition of social circumstances being presupposed. As, for example,\r\nwhat would be the effect of imposing or of repealing corn laws, of\r\nabolishing monarchy or introducing universal suffrage, in the present condition\r\nof society and civilization in any European country, or under any\r\nother given supposition with regard to the circumstances of society in general,\r\nwithout reference to the changes which might take place, or which\r\nmay already be in progress, in those circumstances. But there is also a\r\nsecond inquiry, namely, what are the laws which determine those general\r\ncircumstances themselves. In this last the question is, not what will be\r\nthe effect of a given cause in a certain state of society, but what are the\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page631\"\u003e[pg 631]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg631\" id=\"Pg631\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\ncauses which produce, and the phenomena which characterize, states of\r\nsociety generally. In the solution of this question consists the general\r\nScience of Society; by which the conclusions of the other and more special\r\nkind of inquiry must be limited and controlled.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 2. In order to conceive correctly the scope of this general science, and\r\ndistinguish it from the subordinate departments of sociological speculation,\r\nit is necessary to fix the ideas attached to the phrase, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“A State of Society.”\u003c/span\u003e\r\nWhat is called a state of society, is the simultaneous state of all\r\nthe greater social facts or phenomena. Such are: the degree of knowledge,\r\nand of intellectual and moral culture, existing in the community, and\r\nin every class of it; the state of industry, of wealth and its distribution;\r\nthe habitual occupations of the community; their division into classes, and\r\nthe relations of those classes to one another; the common beliefs which\r\nthey entertain on all the subjects most important to mankind, and the degree\r\nof assurance with which those beliefs are held; their tastes, and the\r\ncharacter and degree of their æsthetic development; their form of government,\r\nand the more important of their laws and customs. The condition of\r\nall these things, and of many more which will readily suggest themselves,\r\nconstitute the state of society, or the state of civilization, at any given time.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWhen states of society, and the causes which produce them, are spoken\r\nof as a subject of science, it is implied that there exists a natural correlation\r\namong these different elements; that not every variety of combination\r\nof these general social facts is possible, but only certain combinations;\r\nthat, in short, there exist Uniformities of Co-existence between the states\r\nof the various social phenomena. And such is the truth; as is indeed a\r\nnecessary consequence of the influence exercised by every one of those\r\nphenomena over every other. It is a fact implied in the \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003econsensus\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e of the\r\nvarious parts of the social body.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nStates of society are like different constitutions or different ages in the\r\nphysical frame; they are conditions not of one or a few organs or functions,\r\nbut of the whole organism. Accordingly, the information which we\r\npossess respecting past ages, and respecting the various states of society\r\nnow existing in different regions of the earth, does, when duly analyzed,\r\nexhibit uniformities. It is found that when one of the features of society\r\nis in a particular state, a state of many other features, more or less precisely\r\ndeterminate, always or usually co-exists with it.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nBut the uniformities of co-existence obtaining among phenomena which\r\nare effects of causes, must (as we have so often observed) be corollaries\r\nfrom the laws of causation by which these phenomena are really determined.\r\nThe mutual correlation between the different elements of each\r\nstate of society, is, therefore, a derivative law, resulting from the laws\r\nwhich regulate the succession between one state of society and another;\r\nfor the proximate cause of every state of society is the state of society\r\nimmediately preceding it. The fundamental problem, therefore, of the\r\nsocial science, is to find the laws according to which any state of society\r\nproduces the state which succeeds it and takes its place. This opens the\r\ngreat and vexed question of the progressiveness of man and society; an\r\nidea involved in every just conception of social phenomena as the subject\r\nof a science.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 3. It is one of the characters, not absolutely peculiar to the sciences\r\nof human nature and society, but belonging to them in a peculiar degree,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page632\"\u003e[pg 632]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg632\" id=\"Pg632\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nto be conversant with a subject-matter whose properties are changeable.\r\nI do not mean changeable from day to day, but from age to age; so that\r\nnot only the qualities of individuals vary, but those of the majority are\r\nnot the same in one age as in another.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe principal cause of this peculiarity is the extensive and constant reaction\r\nof the effects upon their causes. The circumstances in which mankind\r\nare placed, operating according to their own laws and to the laws\r\nof human nature, form the characters of the human beings; but the human\r\nbeings, in their turn, mould and shape the circumstances for themselves\r\nand for those who come after them. From this reciprocal action there\r\nmust necessarily result either a cycle or a progress. In astronomy also,\r\nevery fact is at once effect and cause; the successive positions of the various\r\nheavenly bodies produce changes both in the direction and in the intensity\r\nof the forces by which those positions are determined. But in the\r\ncase of the solar system, these mutual actions bring around again, after a\r\ncertain number of changes, the former state of circumstances; which, of\r\ncourse, leads to the perpetual recurrence of the same series in an unvarying\r\norder. Those bodies, in short, revolve in orbits: but there are (or, conformably\r\nto the laws of astronomy, there might be) others which, instead of\r\nan orbit, describe a trajectory—a course not returning into itself. One or\r\nother of these must be the type to which human affairs must conform.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nOne of the thinkers who earliest conceived the succession of historical\r\nevents as subject to fixed laws, and endeavored to discover these laws by\r\nan analytical survey of history, Vico, the celebrated author of the\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eScienza Nuova\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, adopted the former of these opinions. He conceived\r\nthe phenomena of human society as revolving in an orbit; as going through periodically\r\nthe same series of changes. Though there were not wanting circumstances\r\ntending to give some plausibility to this view, it would not bear\r\na close scrutiny: and those who have succeeded Vico in this kind of speculations\r\nhave universally adopted the idea of a trajectory or progress, in\r\nlieu of an orbit or cycle.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe words Progress and Progressiveness are not here to be understood\r\nas synonymous with improvement and tendency to improvement. It is\r\nconceivable that the laws of human nature might determine, and even necessitate,\r\na certain series of changes in man and society, which might not\r\nin every case, or which might not on the whole, be improvements. It is\r\nmy belief, indeed, that the general tendency is, and will continue to be,\r\nsaving occasional and temporary exceptions, one of improvement; a tendency\r\ntoward a better and happier state. This, however, is not a question\r\nof the method of the social science, but a theorem of the science itself.\r\nFor our purpose it is sufficient that there is a progressive change both in\r\nthe character of the human race and in their outward circumstances, so far\r\nas moulded by themselves; that in each successive age the principal phenomena\r\nof society are different from what they were in the age preceding,\r\nand still more different from any previous age: the periods which most\r\ndistinctly mark these successive changes being intervals of one generation,\r\nduring which a new set of human beings have been educated, have grown\r\nup from childhood, and taken possession of society.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe progressiveness of the human race is the foundation on which a\r\nmethod of philosophizing in the social science has been of late years erected,\r\nfar superior to either of the two modes which had previously been\r\nprevalent, the chemical or experimental, and the geometrical modes. This\r\nmethod, which is now generally adopted by the most advanced thinkers\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page633\"\u003e[pg 633]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg633\" id=\"Pg633\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\non the Continent, consists in attempting, by a study and analysis of the\r\ngeneral facts of history, to discover (what these philosophers term) the law\r\nof progress: which law, once ascertained, must according to them enable\r\nus to predict future events, just as after a few terms of an infinite series\r\nin algebra we are able to detect the principle, of regularity in their formation,\r\nand to predict the rest of the series to any number of terms we please.\r\nThe principal aim of historical speculation in France, of late years, has\r\nbeen to ascertain this law. But while I gladly acknowledge the great services\r\nwhich have been rendered to historical knowledge by this school, I\r\ncan not but deem them to be mostly chargeable with a fundamental misconception\r\nof the true method of social philosophy. The misconception\r\nconsists in supposing that the order of succession which we may be able\r\nto trace among the different states of society and civilization which history\r\npresents to us, even if that order were more rigidly uniform than it has\r\nyet been proved to be, could ever amount to a law of nature. It can only\r\nbe an empirical law. The succession of states of the human mind and of\r\nhuman society can not have an independent law of its own; it must depend\r\non the psychological and ethological laws which govern the action of\r\ncircumstances on men and of men on circumstances. It is conceivable\r\nthat those laws might be such, and the general circumstances of the human\r\nrace such, as to determine the successive transformations of man and society\r\nto one given and unvarying order. But even if the case were so, it can not\r\nbe the ultimate aim of science to discover an empirical law. Until that\r\nlaw could be connected with the psychological and ethological laws on\r\nwhich it must depend, and, by the consilience of deduction\r\n\u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea priori\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e with\r\nhistorical evidence, could be converted from an empirical law into a scientific\r\none, it could not be relied on for the prediction of future events, beyond,\r\nat most, strictly adjacent cases. M. Comte alone, among the new\r\nhistorical school, has seen the necessity of thus connecting all our generalizations\r\nfrom history with the laws of human nature.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 4. But, while it is an imperative rule never to introduce any generalization\r\nfrom history into the social science unless sufficient grounds can\r\nbe pointed out for it in human nature, I do not think any one will contend\r\nthat it would have been possible, setting out from the principles of human\r\nnature and from the general circumstances of the position of our species, to\r\ndetermine \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea priori\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e the order in which human\r\ndevelopment must take place,\r\nand to predict, consequently, the general facts of history up to the present\r\ntime. After the first few terms of the series, the influence exercised,\r\nover each generation by the generations which preceded it, becomes, (as is\r\nwell observed by the writer last referred to) more and more preponderant\r\nover all other influences; until at length what we now are and do, is in\r\na very small degree the result of the universal circumstances of the human\r\nrace, or even of our own circumstances acting through the original qualities\r\nof our species, but mainly of the qualities produced in us by the whole\r\nprevious history of humanity. So long a series of actions and reactions\r\nbetween Circumstances and Man, each successive term being composed of\r\nan ever greater number and variety of parts, could not possibly be computed\r\nby human faculties from the elementary laws which produce it. The\r\nmere length of the series would be a sufficient obstacle, since a slight error\r\nin any one of the terms would augment in rapid progression at every subsequent\r\nstep.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIf, therefore, the series of the effects themselves did not, when examined\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page634\"\u003e[pg 634]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg634\" id=\"Pg634\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nas a whole, manifest any regularity, we should in vain attempt to construct\r\na general science of society. We must in that case have contented ourselves\r\nwith that subordinate order of sociological speculation formerly noticed,\r\nnamely, with endeavoring to ascertain what would be the effect of\r\nthe introduction of any new cause, in a state of society supposed to be fixed—a\r\nknowledge sufficient for the more common exigencies of daily political\r\npractice, but liable to fail in all cases in which the progressive movement\r\nof society is one of the influencing elements; and therefore more\r\nprecarious in proportion as the case is more important. But since both the\r\nnatural varieties of mankind, and the original diversities of local circumstances,\r\nare much less considerable than the points of agreement, there will\r\nnaturally be a certain degree of uniformity in the progressive development\r\nof the species and of its works. And this uniformity tends to become\r\ngreater, not less, as society advances; since the evolution of each people,\r\nwhich is at first determined exclusively by the nature and circumstances\r\nof that people, is gradually brought under the influence (which becomes\r\nstronger as civilization advances) of the other nations of the earth, and of\r\nthe circumstances by which they have been influenced. History accordingly\r\ndoes, when judiciously examined, afford Empirical Laws of Society.\r\nAnd the problem of general sociology is to ascertain these, and connect\r\nthem with the laws of human nature, by deductions showing that such\r\nwere the derivative laws naturally to be expected as the consequences of\r\nthose ultimate ones.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt is, indeed, hardly ever possible, even after history has suggested the\r\nderivative law, to demonstrate \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea priori\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e that\r\nsuch was the only order of succession or of co-existence in which the effects could,\r\nconsistently with the laws of human nature, have been produced. We can at most make out\r\nthat there were strong \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea priori\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e reasons for\r\nexpecting it, and that no other order of succession or co-existence would have been so\r\nlikely to result from the nature of man and the general circumstances of his position.\r\nOften we can not do even this; we can not even show that what did take place\r\nwas probable \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea priori\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, but only that it was\r\npossible. This, however—which,\r\nin the Inverse Deductive Method that we are now characterizing, is\r\na real process of verification—is as indispensable, as verification by specific\r\nexperience has been shown to be, where the conclusion is originally obtained\r\nby the direct way of deduction. The empirical laws must be the result\r\nof but a few instances, since few nations have ever attained at all, and still\r\nfewer by their own independent development, a high stage of social progress.\r\nIf, therefore, even one or two of these few instances be insufficiently\r\nknown, or imperfectly analyzed into their elements, and therefore not adequately\r\ncompared with other instances, nothing is more probable than that\r\na wrong empirical law will emerge instead of the right one. Accordingly,\r\nthe most erroneous generalizations are continually made from the course of\r\nhistory; not only in this country, where history can not yet be said to be\r\nat all cultivated as a science, but in other countries where it is so cultivated,\r\nand by persons well versed in it. The only check or corrective is,\r\nconstant verification by psychological and ethological laws. We may add\r\nto this, that no one but a person competently skilled in those laws is\r\ncapable of preparing the materials for historical generalization, by analyzing\r\nthe facts of history, or even by observing the social phenomena of his\r\nown time. No other will be aware of the comparative importance of different\r\nfacts, nor consequently know what facts to look for, or to observe;\r\nstill less will he be capable of estimating the evidence of facts which, as is\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page635\"\u003e[pg 635]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg635\" id=\"Pg635\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nthe case with most, can not be ascertained by direct observation or learned\r\nfrom testimony, but must be inferred from marks.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 5. The Empirical Laws of Society are of two kinds; some are uniformities\r\nof co-existence, some of succession. According as the science is\r\noccupied in ascertaining and verifying the former sort of uniformities or\r\nthe latter, M. Comte gives it the title of Social Statics, or of Social Dynamics;\r\nconformably to the distinction in mechanics between the conditions\r\nof equilibrium and those of movement; or in biology, between the\r\nlaws of organization and those of life. The first branch of the science ascertains\r\nthe conditions of stability in the social union; the second, the laws\r\nof progress. Social Dynamics is the theory of Society considered in a\r\nstate of progressive movement; while Social Statics is the theory of the\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003econsensus\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e already spoken of as existing among the different parts\r\nof the social organism; in other words, the theory of the mutual actions and reactions\r\nof contemporaneous social phenomena; making\u003ca id=\"noteref_279\" name=\"noteref_279\" href=\"#note_279\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e279\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e provisionally, as\r\nfar as possible, abstraction, for scientific purposes, of the fundamental movement\r\nwhich is at all times gradually modifying the whole of them.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“In this first point of view, the provisions of sociology will enable us to\r\ninfer one from another (subject to ulterior verification by direct observation)\r\nthe various characteristic marks of each distinct mode of social existence,\r\nin a manner essentially analogous to what is now habitually practiced\r\nin the anatomy of the physical body. This preliminary aspect, therefore,\r\nof political science, of necessity supposes that (contrary to the existing\r\nhabits of philosophers) each of the numerous elements of the social\r\nstate, ceasing to be looked at independently and absolutely, shall be always\r\nand exclusively considered relatively to all the other elements, with\r\nthe whole of which it is united by mutual interdependence. It would be\r\nsuperfluous to insist here upon the great and constant utility of this branch\r\nof sociological speculation. It is, in the first place, the indispensable basis\r\nof the theory of social progress. It may, moreover, be employed, immediately,\r\nand of itself, to supply the place, provisionally at least, of direct observation,\r\nwhich in many cases is not always practicable for some of the\r\nelements of society, the real condition of which may, however, be sufficiently\r\njudged of by means of the relations which connect them with others\r\npreviously known. The history of the sciences may give us some notion\r\nof the habitual importance of this auxiliary resource, by reminding us, for\r\nexample, how the vulgar errors of mere erudition concerning the pretended\r\nacquirements of the ancient Egyptians in the higher astronomy were\r\nirrevocably dissipated (even before sentence had been passed on them by\r\na sounder erudition) from the single consideration of the inevitable connection\r\nbetween the general state of astronomy and that of abstract geometry,\r\nthen evidently in its infancy. It would be easy to cite a multitude\r\nof analogous cases, the character of which could admit of no dispute.\r\nIn order to avoid exaggeration, however, it should be remarked, that these\r\nnecessary relations among the different aspects of society can not, from\r\ntheir very nature, be so simple and precise that the results observed could\r\nonly have arisen from some one mode of mutual co-ordination. Such a\r\nnotion, already too narrow in the science of life, would be completely at\r\nvariance with the still more complex nature of sociological speculations.\r\nBut the exact estimation of these limits of variation, both in the healthy\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page636\"\u003e[pg 636]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg636\" id=\"Pg636\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nand in the morbid state, constitutes, at least as much as in the anatomy of\r\nthe natural body, an indispensable complement to every theory of Sociological\r\nStatics; without which the indirect exploration above spoken of\r\nwould often lead into error.\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“This is not the place for methodically demonstrating the existence of\r\na necessary relation among all the possible aspects of the same social organism;\r\na point on which, in principle at least, there is now little difference\r\nof opinion among sound thinkers. From whichever of the social elements\r\nwe choose to set out, we may easily recognize that it has always a connection,\r\nmore or less immediate, with all the other elements, even with those\r\nwhich at first sight appear the most independent of it. The dynamical\r\nconsideration of the progressive development of civilized humanity, affords,\r\nno doubt, a still more efficacious means of effecting this interesting\r\nverification of the \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003econsensus\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e of the social phenomena, by displaying the\r\nmanner in which every change in any one part, operates immediately, or\r\nvery speedily, upon all the rest. But this indication may be preceded, or\r\nat all events followed, by a confirmation of a purely statical kind; for, in\r\npolitics as in mechanics, the communication of motion from one object to\r\nanother proves a connection between them. Without descending to the\r\nminute interdependence of the different branches of any one science or\r\nart, is it not evident that among the different sciences, as well as among\r\nmost of the arts, there exists such a connection, that if the state of any one\r\nwell-marked division of them is sufficiently known to us, we can with real\r\nscientific assurance infer, from their necessary correlation, the contemporaneous\r\nstate of every one of the others? By a further extension of this\r\nconsideration, we may conceive the necessary relation which exists between\r\nthe condition of the sciences in general and that of the arts in general,\r\nexcept that the mutual dependence is less intense in proportion as it\r\nis more indirect. The same is the case, when, instead of considering the\r\naggregate of the social phenomena in some one people, we examine it simultaneously\r\nin different contemporaneous nations; between which the\r\nperpetual reciprocity of influence, especially in modern times, can not be\r\ncontested, though the \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003econsensus\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e must in this case be ordinarily of a less\r\ndecided character, and must decrease gradually with the affinity of the\r\ncases and the multiplicity of the points of contact, so as at last, in some\r\ncases, to disappear almost entirely; as for, example, between Western Europe\r\nand Eastern Asia, of which the various general states of society appear\r\nto have been hitherto almost independent of one another.\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThese remarks are followed by illustrations of one of the most important,\r\nand until lately, most neglected, of the general principles which, in\r\nthis division of the social science, may be considered as established; namely, the\r\nnecessary correlation between the form of government existing in\r\nany society and the contemporaneous state of civilization: a natural law\r\nwhich stamps the endless discussions and innumerable theories respecting\r\nforms of government in the abstract, as fruitless and worthless, for any\r\nother purpose than as a preparatory treatment of materials to be afterward\r\nused for the construction of a better philosophy.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAs already remarked, one of the main results of the science of social\r\nstatics would be to ascertain the requisites of stable political union. There\r\nare some circumstances which, being found in all societies without exception,\r\nand in the greatest degree where the social union is most complete,\r\nmay be considered (when psychological and ethological laws confirm the\r\nindication) as conditions of the existence of the complex phenomena called\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page637\"\u003e[pg 637]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg637\" id=\"Pg637\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\na State. For example, no numerous society has ever been held together\r\nwithout laws, or usages equivalent to them; without tribunals, and an organized\r\nforce of some sort to execute their decisions. There have always\r\nbeen public authorities whom, with more or less strictness and in cases\r\nmore or less accurately defined, the rest of the community obeyed, or according\r\nto general opinion were bound to obey. By following out this\r\ncourse of inquiry we shall find a number of requisites, which have been\r\npresent in every society that has maintained a collective existence, and on\r\nthe cessation of which it has either merged in some other society, or reconstructed\r\nitself on some new basis, in which the conditions were conformed\r\nto. Although these results, obtained by comparing different forms\r\nand states of society, amount in themselves only to empirical laws; some\r\nof them, when once suggested, are found to follow with so much probability\r\nfrom general laws of human nature, that the consilience of the two\r\nprocesses raises the evidence to proof, and the generalizations to the rank\r\nof scientific truths.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThis seems to be affirmable (for instance) of the conclusions arrived at\r\nin the following passage, extracted, with some alterations, from a criticism\r\non the negative philosophy of the eighteenth century,\u003ca id=\"noteref_280\" name=\"noteref_280\" href=\"#note_280\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e280\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e and which I quote,\r\nthough (as in some former instances) from myself, because I have no better\r\nway of illustrating the conception I have formed of the kind of theorems\r\nof which sociological statics would consist.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“The very first element of the social union, obedience to a government\r\nof some sort, has not been found so easy a thing to establish in the world.\r\nAmong a timid and spiritless race like the inhabitants of the vast plains of\r\ntropical countries, passive obedience may be of natural growth; though\r\neven there we doubt whether it has ever been found among any people with\r\nwhom fatalism, or in other words, submission to the pressure of circumstances\r\nas a divine decree, did not prevail as a religious doctrine. But the\r\ndifficulty of inducing a brave and warlike race to submit their individual\r\n\u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003earbitrium\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e to any common umpire, has always\r\nbeen felt to be so great, that\r\nnothing short of supernatural power has been deemed adequate to overcome\r\nit; and such tribes have always assigned to the first institution of\r\ncivil society a divine origin. So differently did those judge who knew\r\nsavage men by actual experience, from those who had no acquaintance\r\nwith them except in the civilized state. In modern Europe itself, after the\r\nfall of the Roman empire, to subdue the feudal anarchy and bring the\r\nwhole people of any European nation into subjection to government\r\n(though Christianity in the most concentrated form of its influence was\r\nco-operating in the work) required thrice as many centuries as have elapsed\r\nsince that time.\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Now if these philosophers had known human nature under any other\r\ntype than that of their own age, and of the particular classes of society\r\namong whom they lived, it would have occurred to them, that wherever\r\nthis habitual submission to law and government has been firmly and durably\r\nestablished, and yet the vigor and manliness of character which resisted\r\nits establishment have been in any degree preserved, certain requisites\r\nhave existed, certain conditions have been fulfilled, of which the following\r\nmay be regarded as the principal.\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“First: there has existed, for all who were accounted citizens—for\r\nall who were not slaves, kept down by brute force—a system of\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eeducation\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page638\"\u003e[pg 638]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg638\" id=\"Pg638\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nbeginning with infancy and continued through life, of which whatever else\r\nit might include, one main and incessant ingredient was \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003erestraining\r\ndiscipline\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e.\r\nTo train the human being in the habit, and thence the power, of\r\nsubordinating his personal impulses and aims to what were considered the\r\nends of society; of adhering, against all temptation, to the course of conduct\r\nwhich those ends prescribed; of controlling in himself all feelings\r\nwhich were liable to militate against those ends, and encouraging all such\r\nas tended toward them; this was the purpose, to which every outward\r\nmotive that the authority directing the system could command, and every\r\ninward power or principle which its knowledge of human nature enabled\r\nit to evoke, were endeavored to be rendered instrumental. The entire civil\r\nand military policy of the ancient commonwealths was such a system\r\nof training; in modern nations its place has been attempted to be supplied,\r\nprincipally, by religious teaching. And whenever and in proportion as the\r\nstrictness of the restraining discipline was relaxed, the natural tendency\r\nof mankind to anarchy re-asserted itself; the state became disorganized\r\nfrom within; mutual conflict for selfish ends, neutralized the energies\r\nwhich were required to keep up the contest against natural causes of evil;\r\nand the nation, after a longer or briefer interval of progressive decline, became\r\neither the slave of a despotism, or the prey of a foreign invader.\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“The second condition of permanent political society has been found to\r\nbe, the existence, in some form or other, of the feeling of allegiance or loyalty.\r\nThis feeling may vary in its objects, and is not confined to any particular\r\nform of government; but whether in a democracy or in a monarchy,\r\nits essence is always the same; viz., that there be in the constitution\r\nof the state \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003esomething\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e which is settled, something permanent, and not to\r\nbe called in question; something which, by general agreement, has a right\r\nto be where it is, and to be secure against disturbance, whatever else may\r\nchange. This feeling may attach itself, as among the Jews (and in most\r\nof the commonwealths of antiquity), to a common God or gods, the protectors\r\nand guardians of their state. Or it may attach itself to certain persons,\r\nwho are deemed to be, whether by divine appointment, by long prescription,\r\nor by the general recognition of their superior capacity and\r\nworthiness, the rightful guides and guardians of the rest. Or it may connect\r\nitself with laws; with ancient liberties or ordinances. Or, finally,\r\n(and this is the only shape in which the feeling is likely to exist hereafter),\r\nit may attach itself to the principles of individual freedom and political and\r\nsocial equality, as realized in institutions which as yet exist nowhere, or exist\r\nonly in a rudimentary state. But in all political societies which have\r\nhad a durable existence, there has been some fixed point: something which\r\npeople agreed in holding sacred; which, wherever freedom of discussion\r\nwas a recognized principle, it was of course lawful to contest in theory, but\r\nwhich no one could either fear or hope to see shaken in practice; which, in\r\nshort (except perhaps during some temporary crisis), was in the common\r\nestimation placed beyond discussion. And the necessity of this may easily\r\nbe made evident. A state never is, nor until mankind are vastly improved,\r\ncan hope to be, for any long time exempt from internal dissension; for\r\nthere neither is nor has ever been any state of society in which collisions\r\ndid not occur between the immediate interests and passions of powerful\r\nsections of the people. What, then, enables nations to weather these\r\nstorms, and pass through turbulent times without any permanent weakening\r\nof the securities for peaceable existence? Precisely this—that however\r\nimportant the interests about which men fell out, the conflict did not\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page639\"\u003e[pg 639]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg639\" id=\"Pg639\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\naffect the fundamental principle of the system of social union which happened\r\nto exist; nor threaten large portions of the community with the\r\nsubversion of that on which they had built their calculations, and with\r\nwhich their hopes and aims had become identified. But when the questioning\r\nof these fundamental principles is (not the occasional disease, or\r\nsalutary medicine, but) the habitual condition of the body politic, and when\r\nall the violent animosities are called forth, which spring naturally from such\r\na situation, the state is virtually in a position of civil war; and can never\r\nlong remain free from it in act and fact.\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“The third essential condition of stability in political society, is a strong\r\nand active principle of cohesion among the members of the same community\r\nor state. We need scarcely say that we do not mean nationality, in\r\nthe vulgar sense of the term; a senseless antipathy to foreigners; indifference\r\nto the general welfare of the human race, or an unjust preference of\r\nthe supposed interests of our own country; a cherishing of bad peculiarities\r\nbecause they are national, or a refusal to adopt what has been found\r\ngood by other countries. We mean a principle of sympathy, not of hostility;\r\nof union, not of separation. We mean a feeling of common interest\r\namong those who live under the same government, and are contained within\r\nthe same natural or historical boundaries. We mean, that one part of\r\nthe community do not consider themselves as foreigners with regard to another\r\npart; that they set a value on their connection—feel that they are\r\none people, that their lot is cast together, that evil to any of their fellow-countrymen\r\nis evil to themselves, and do not desire selfishly to free themselves\r\nfrom their share of any common inconvenience by severing the connection.\r\nHow strong this feeling was in those ancient commonwealths\r\nwhich attained any durable greatness, every one knows. How happily\r\nRome, in spite of all her tyranny, succeeded in establishing the feeling of a\r\ncommon country among the provinces of her vast and divided empire, will\r\nappear when any one who has given due attention to the subject shall take\r\nthe trouble to point it out. In modern times the countries which have had\r\nthat feeling in the strongest degree have been the most powerful countries:\r\nEngland, France, and, in proportion to their territory and resources, Holland\r\nand Switzerland; while England in her connection with Ireland is one\r\nof the most signal examples of the consequences of its absence. Every\r\nItalian knows why Italy is under a foreign yoke; every German knows\r\nwhat maintains despotism in the Austrian empire;\u003ca id=\"noteref_281\" name=\"noteref_281\" href=\"#note_281\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e281\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e the evils of Spain flow\r\nas much from the absence of nationality among the Spaniards themselves,\r\nas from the presence of it in their relations with foreigners: while the completest\r\nillustration of all is afforded by the republics of South America,\r\nwhere the parts of one and the same state adhere so slightly together, that\r\nno sooner does any province think itself aggrieved by the general government\r\nthan it proclaims itself a separate nation.”\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 6. While the derivative laws of social statics are ascertained by analyzing\r\ndifferent states of society, and comparing them with one another,\r\nwithout regard to the order of their succession, the consideration of the\r\nsuccessive order is, on the contrary, predominant in the study of social\r\ndynamics, of which the aim is to observe and explain the sequences of social\r\nconditions. This branch of the social science would be as complete as\r\nit can be made, if every one of the leading general circumstances of each\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page640\"\u003e[pg 640]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg640\" id=\"Pg640\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\ngeneration were traced to its causes in the generation immediately preceding.\r\nBut the \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003econsensus\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e is so complete (especially in modern history), that\r\nin the filiation of one generation and another, it is the whole which produces\r\nthe whole, rather than any part a part. Little progress, therefore,\r\ncan be made in establishing the filiation, directly from laws of human nature,\r\nwithout having first ascertained the immediate or derivative laws according\r\nto which social states generate one another as society advances;\r\nthe \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eaxiomata media\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e of General Sociology.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe empirical laws which are most readily obtained by generalization\r\nfrom history do not amount to this. They are not the “middle principles”\r\nthemselves, but only evidence toward the establishment of such principles.\r\nThey consist of certain general tendencies which may be perceived\r\nin society; a progressive increase of some social elements, and diminution\r\nof others, or a gradual change in the general character of certain elements.\r\nIt is easily seen, for instance, that as society advances, mental tend more\r\nand more to prevail over bodily qualities, and masses over individuals;\r\nthat the occupation of all that portion of mankind who are not under external\r\nrestraint is at first chiefly military, but society becomes progressively\r\nmore and more engrossed with productive pursuits, and the military\r\nspirit gradually gives way to the industrial; to which many similar truths\r\nmight be added. And with generalizations of this description, ordinary\r\ninquirers, even of the historical school now predominant on the Continent,\r\nare satisfied. But these and all such results are still at too great a distance\r\nfrom the elementary laws of human nature on which they depend—too\r\nmany links intervene, and the concurrence of causes at each link is far\r\ntoo complicated—to enable these propositions to be presented as direct\r\ncorollaries from those elementary principles. They have, therefore, in the\r\nminds of most inquirers, remained in the state of empirical laws, applicable\r\nonly within the bounds of actual observation; without any means of\r\ndetermining their real limits, and of judging whether the changes which\r\nhave hitherto been in progress are destined to continue indefinitely, or to\r\nterminate, or even to be reversed.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 7. In order to obtain better empirical laws, we must not rest satisfied\r\nwith noting the progressive changes which manifest themselves in the separate\r\nelements of society, and in which nothing is indicated but the relation\r\nof fragments of the effect to corresponding fragments of the cause.\r\nIt is necessary to combine the statical view of social phenomena with\r\nthe dynamical, considering not only the progressive changes of the different\r\nelements, but the contemporaneous condition of each; and thus obtain\r\nempirically the law of correspondence not only between the simultaneous\r\nstates, but between the simultaneous changes, of those elements. This\r\nlaw of correspondence it is, which, duly verified \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\r\npriori\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, would become\r\nthe real scientific derivative law of the development of humanity and human\r\naffairs.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIn the difficult process of observation and comparison which is here required,\r\nit would evidently be a great assistance if it should happen to be\r\nthe fact, that some one element in the complex existence of social man is\r\npre-eminent over all others as the prime agent of the social movement.\r\nFor we could then take the progress of that one element as the central\r\nchain, to each successive link of which, the corresponding links of all the\r\nother progressions being appended, the succession of the facts would by\r\nthis alone be presented in a kind of spontaneous order, far more nearly approaching\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page641\"\u003e[pg 641]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg641\" id=\"Pg641\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nto the real order of their filiation than could be obtained by any\r\nother merely empirical process.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nNow, the evidence of history and that of human nature combine, by a\r\nstriking instance of consilience, to show that there really is one social element\r\nwhich is thus predominant, and almost paramount, among the agents\r\nof the social progression. This is, the state of the speculative faculties of\r\nmankind; including the nature of the beliefs which by any means they\r\nhave arrived at, concerning themselves and the world by which they are\r\nsurrounded.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt would be a great error, and one very little likely to be committed, to\r\nassert that speculation, intellectual activity, the pursuit of truth, is among\r\nthe more powerful propensities of human nature, or holds a predominating\r\nplace in the lives of any, save decidedly exceptional, individuals. But, notwithstanding\r\nthe relative weakness of this principle among other sociological\r\nagents, its influence is the main determining cause of the social progress;\r\nall the other dispositions of our nature which contribute to that\r\nprogress being dependent on it for the means of accomplishing their share\r\nof the work. Thus (to take the most obvious case first), the impelling\r\nforce to most of the improvements effected in the arts of life, is the desire\r\nof increased material comfort; but as we can only act upon external objects\r\nin proportion to our knowledge of them, the state of knowledge at\r\nany time is the limit of the industrial improvements possible at that time;\r\nand the progress of industry must follow, and depend on, the progress of\r\nknowledge. The same thing may be shown to be true, though it is not\r\nquite so obvious, of the progress of the fine arts. Further, as the strongest\r\npropensities of uncultivated or half-cultivated human nature (being the\r\npurely selfish ones, and those of a sympathetic character which partake\r\nmost of the nature of selfishness) evidently tend in themselves to disunite\r\nmankind, not to unite them—to make them rivals, not confederates, social\r\nexistence is only possible by a disciplining of those more powerful\r\npropensities, which consists in subordinating them to a common system of\r\nopinions. The degree of this subordination is the measure of the completeness\r\nof the social union, and the nature of the common opinions determines\r\nits kind. But in order that mankind should conform their actions\r\nto any set of opinions, these opinions must exist, must be believed\r\nby them. And thus, the state of the speculative faculties, the character of\r\nthe propositions assented to by the intellect, essentially determines the\r\nmoral and political state of the community, as we have already seen that\r\nit determines the physical.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThese conclusions, deduced from the laws of human nature, are in entire\r\naccordance with the general facts of history. Every considerable change\r\nhistorically known to us in the condition of any portion of mankind, when\r\nnot brought about by external force, has been preceded by a change, of\r\nproportional extent, in the state of their knowledge, or in their prevalent\r\nbeliefs. As between any given state of speculation, and the correlative\r\nstate of every thing else, it was almost always the former which first showed\r\nitself; though the effects, no doubt, reacted potently upon the cause.\r\nEvery considerable advance in material civilization has been preceded by\r\nan advance in knowledge: and when any great social change has come to\r\npass, either in the way of gradual development or of sudden conflict, it has\r\nhad for its precursor a great change in the opinions and modes of thinking\r\nof society. Polytheism, Judaism, Christianity, Protestantism, the critical\r\nphilosophy of modern Europe, and its positive science—each of these has\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page642\"\u003e[pg 642]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg642\" id=\"Pg642\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nbeen a primary agent in making society what it was at each successive period,\r\nwhile society was but secondarily instrumental in making \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ethem\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e, each\r\nof them (so far as causes can be assigned for its existence) being mainly\r\nan emanation not from the practical life of the period, but from the previous\r\nstate of belief and thought. The weakness of the speculative propensity\r\nin mankind generally has not, therefore, prevented the progress of\r\nspeculation from governing that of society at large; it has only, and too\r\noften, prevented progress altogether, where the intellectual progression has\r\ncome to an early stand for want of sufficiently favorable circumstances.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nFrom this accumulated evidence, we are justified in concluding, that the\r\norder of human progression in all respects will mainly depend on the order\r\nof progression in the intellectual convictions of mankind, that is, on the\r\nlaw of the successive transformations of human opinions. The question\r\nremains, whether this law can be determined; at first from history as an\r\nempirical law, then converted into a scientific theorem by deducing it\r\n\u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea priori\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e from the principles of human nature.\r\nAs the progress of knowledge\r\nand the changes in the opinions of mankind are very slow, and manifest\r\nthemselves in a well-defined manner only at long intervals, it can not\r\nbe expected that the general order of sequence should be discoverable from\r\nthe examination of less than a very considerable part of the duration of the\r\nsocial progress. It is necessary to take into consideration the whole of\r\npast time, from the first recorded condition of the human race, to the memorable\r\nphenomena of the last and present generations.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 8. The investigation which I have thus endeavored to characterize,\r\nhas been systematically attempted, up to the present time, by M. Comte\r\nalone. His work is hitherto the only known example of the study of social\r\nphenomena according to this conception of the Historical Method. Without\r\ndiscussing here the worth of his conclusions, and especially of his predictions\r\nand recommendations with respect to the Future of society, which\r\nappear to me greatly inferior in value to his appreciation of the Past, I\r\nshall confine myself to mentioning one important generalization, which\r\nM. Comte regards as the fundamental law of the progress of human knowledge.\r\nSpeculation he conceives to have, on every subject of human inquiry,\r\nthree successive stages; in the first of which it tends to explain the\r\nphenomena by supernatural agencies, in the second by metaphysical abstractions,\r\nand in the third or final state confines itself to ascertaining their\r\nlaws of succession and similitude. This generalization appears to me to\r\nhave that high degree of scientific evidence which is derived from the concurrence\r\nof the indications of history with the probabilities derived from\r\nthe constitution of the human mind. Nor could it be easily conceived,\r\nfrom the mere enunciation of such a proposition, what a flood of light it\r\nlets in upon the whole course of history, when its consequences are traced,\r\nby connecting with each of the three states of human intellect which it distinguishes,\r\nand with each successive modification of those three states, the\r\ncorrelative condition of other social phenomena.\u003ca id=\"noteref_282\" name=\"noteref_282\" href=\"#note_282\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e282\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page643\"\u003e[pg 643]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg643\" id=\"Pg643\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nBut whatever decision competent judges may pronounce on the results\r\narrived at by any individual inquirer, the method now characterized is that\r\nby which the derivative laws of social order and of social progress must\r\nbe sought. By its aid we may hereafter succeed not only in looking far\r\nforward into the future history of the human race, but in determining what\r\nartificial means may be used, and to what extent, to accelerate the natural\r\nprogress in so far as it is beneficial; to compensate for whatever may be\r\nits inherent inconveniences or disadvantages; and to guard against the\r\ndangers or accidents to which our species is exposed from the necessary\r\nincidents of its progression. Such practical instructions, founded on the\r\nhighest branch of speculative sociology, will form the noblest and most\r\nbeneficial portion of the Political Art.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThat of this science and art even the foundations are but beginning to\r\nbe laid, is sufficiently evident. But the superior minds are fairly turning\r\nthemselves toward that object. It has become the aim of really scientific\r\nthinkers to connect by theories the facts of universal history: it is acknowledged\r\nto be one of the requisites of a general system of social doctrine,\r\nthat it should explain, so far as the data exist, the main facts of history;\r\nand a Philosophy of History is generally admitted to be at once the verification,\r\nand the initial form, of the Philosophy of the Progress of Society.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIf the endeavors now making in all the more cultivated nations, and beginning\r\nto be made even in England (usually the last to enter into the general\r\nmovement of the European mind) for the construction of a Philosophy\r\nof History, shall be directed and controlled by those views of the nature of\r\nsociological evidence which I have (very briefly and imperfectly) attempted\r\nto characterize; they can not fail to give birth to a sociological system\r\nwidely removed from the vague and conjectural character of all former attempts,\r\nand worthy to take its place, at last, among the sciences. When\r\nthis time shall come, no important branch of human affairs will be any\r\nlonger abandoned to empiricism and unscientific surmise: the circle of human\r\nknowledge will be complete, and it can only thereafter receive further\r\nenlargement by perpetual expansion from within.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page644\"\u003e[pg 644]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg644\" id=\"Pg644\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-div\" style=\"margin-bottom: 4.00em; margin-top: 4.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"toc149\" id=\"toc149\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"pdf150\" id=\"pdf150\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: center; margin-bottom: 2.40em; margin-top: 2.40em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 120%\"\u003eChapter XI.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: left; margin-bottom: 2.88em; margin-top: 2.88em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 144%\"\u003eAdditional Elucidations Of The Science Of History.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 1. The doctrine which the preceding chapters were intended to enforce\r\nand elucidate—that the collective series of social phenomena, in other words\r\nthe course of history, is subject to general laws, which philosophy may possibly\r\ndetect—has been familiar for generations to the scientific thinkers\r\nof the Continent, and has for the last quarter of a century passed out of\r\ntheir peculiar domain, into that of newspapers and ordinary political discussion.\r\nIn our own country, however, at the time of the first publication\r\nof this Treatise, it was almost a novelty, and the prevailing habits of thought\r\non historical subjects were the very reverse of a preparation for it. Since\r\nthen a great change has taken place, and has been eminently promoted by\r\nthe important work of Mr. Buckle; who, with characteristic energy, flung\r\ndown this great principle, together with many striking exemplifications of\r\nit, into the arena of popular discussion, to be fought over by a sort of combatants,\r\nin the presence of a sort of spectators, who would never even have\r\nbeen aware that there existed such a principle if they had been left to learn\r\nits existence from the speculations of pure science. And hence has arisen\r\na considerable amount of controversy, tending not only to make the principle\r\nrapidly familiar to the majority of cultivated minds, but also to clear\r\nit from the confusions and misunderstandings by which it was but natural\r\nthat it should for a time be clouded, and which impair the worth of the\r\ndoctrine to those who accept it, and are the stumbling-block of many who\r\ndo not.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAmong the impediments to the general acknowledgment, by thoughtful\r\nminds, of the subjection of historical facts to scientific laws, the most fundamental\r\ncontinues to be that which is grounded on the doctrine of Free\r\nWill, or, in other words, on the denial that the law of invariable Causation\r\nholds true of human volitions; for if it does not, the course of history, being\r\nthe result of human volitions, can not be a subject of scientific laws, since\r\nthe volitions on which it depends can neither be foreseen, nor reduced to\r\nany canon of regularity even after they have occurred. I have discussed\r\nthis question, as far as seemed suitable to the occasion, in a former chapter;\r\nand I only think it necessary to repeat, that the doctrine of the Causation\r\nof human actions, improperly called the doctrine of Necessity, affirms no\r\nmysterious \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003enexus\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e, or overruling fatality: it asserts only that men’s actions\r\nare the joint result of the general laws and circumstances of human nature,\r\nand of their own particular characters; those characters again being\r\nthe consequence of the natural and artificial circumstances that constituted\r\ntheir education, among which circumstances must be reckoned their own\r\nconscious efforts. Any one who is willing to take (if the expression may\r\nbe permitted) the trouble of thinking himself into the doctrine as thus\r\nstated, will find it, I believe, not only a faithful interpretation of the universal\r\nexperience of human conduct, but a correct representation of the\r\nmode in which he himself, in every particular case, spontaneously interprets\r\nhis own experience of that conduct.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nBut if this principle is true of individual man, it must be true of collective\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page645\"\u003e[pg 645]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg645\" id=\"Pg645\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nman. If it is the law of human life, the law must be realized in history.\r\nThe experience of human affairs when looked at \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-foreign\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003een\r\nmasse\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, must be in accordance with it if true, or repugnant to it if false.\r\nThe support which this \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea posteriori\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nverification affords to the law, is the part of the case which\r\nhas been most clearly and triumphantly brought out by Mr. Buckle.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe facts of statistics, since they have been made a subject of careful recordation\r\nand study, have yielded conclusions, some of which have been very\r\nstartling to persons not accustomed to regard moral actions as subject to uniform\r\nlaws. The very events which in their own nature appear most capricious\r\nand uncertain, and which in any individual case no attainable degree\r\nof knowledge would enable us to foresee, occur, when considerable numbers\r\nare taken into the account, with a degree of regularity approaching to mathematical.\r\nWhat act is there which all would consider as more completely\r\ndependent on individual character, and on the exercise of individual free\r\nwill, than that of slaying a fellow-creature? Yet in any large country, the\r\nnumber of murders, in proportion to the population, varies (it has been\r\nfound) very little from one year to another, and in its variations never deviates\r\nwidely from a certain average. What is still more remarkable, there\r\nis a similar approach to constancy in the proportion of these murders annually\r\ncommitted with every particular kind of instrument. There is a\r\nlike approximation to identity, as between one year and another, in the comparative\r\nnumber of legitimate and of illegitimate births. The same thing\r\nis found true of suicides, accidents, and all other social phenomena of which\r\nthe registration is sufficiently perfect; one of the most curiously illustrative\r\nexamples being the fact, ascertained by the registers of the London and\r\nParis post-offices, that the number of letters posted which the writers have\r\nforgotten to direct, is nearly the same, in proportion to the whole number\r\nof letters posted, in one year as in another. \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Year after year,”\u003c/span\u003e says Mr.\r\nBuckle, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“the same proportion of letter-writers forget this simple act; so\r\nthat for each successive period we can actually foretell the number of persons\r\nwhose memory will fail them in regard to this trifling, and as it might\r\nappear, accidental occurrence.”\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca id=\"noteref_283\" name=\"noteref_283\" href=\"#note_283\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e283\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThis singular degree of regularity \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-foreign\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003een masse\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, combined\r\nwith the extreme of irregularity in the cases composing the mass, is a felicitous\r\nverification \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea posteriori\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e of the law of\r\ncausation in its application to human conduct.\r\nAssuming the truth of that law, every human action, every murder, for instance,\r\nis the concurrent result of two sets of causes. On the one part, the\r\ngeneral circumstances of the country and its inhabitants; the moral, educational,\r\neconomical, and other influences operating on the whole people, and\r\nconstituting what we term the state of civilization. On the other part, the\r\ngreat variety of influences special to the individual: his temperament, and\r\nother peculiarities of organization, his parentage, habitual associates, temptations,\r\nand so forth. If we now take the whole of the instances which occur\r\nwithin a sufficiently large field to exhaust all the combinations of these\r\nspecial influences, or, in other words, to eliminate chance; and if all these\r\ninstances have occurred within such narrow limits of time, that no material\r\nchange can have taken place in the general influences constituting the state\r\nof civilization of the country; we may be certain, that if human actions are\r\ngoverned by invariable laws, the aggregate result will be something like a\r\nconstant quantity. The number of murders committed within that space\r\nand time, being the effect partly of general causes which have not varied,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page646\"\u003e[pg 646]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg646\" id=\"Pg646\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nand partly of partial causes the whole round of whose variations has been\r\nincluded, will be, practically speaking, invariable.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nLiterally and mathematically invariable it is not, and could not be expected\r\nto be: because the period of a year is too short to include \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eall\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e the possible\r\ncombinations of partial causes, while it is, at the same time, sufficiently\r\nlong to make it probable that in some years at least, of every series, there\r\nwill have been introduced new influences of a more or less general character;\r\nsuch as a more vigorous or a more relaxed police; some temporary\r\nexcitement from political or religious causes; or some incident generally\r\nnotorious, of a nature to act morbidly on the imagination. That in spite of\r\nthese unavoidable imperfections in the data, there should be so very trifling\r\na margin of variation in the annual results, is a brilliant continuation of the\r\ngeneral theory.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 2. The same considerations which thus strikingly corroborate the evidence\r\nof the doctrine, that historical facts are the invariable effects of\r\ncauses, tend equally to clear that doctrine from various misapprehensions,\r\nthe existence of which has been put in evidence by the recent discussions.\r\nSome persons, for instance, seemingly imagine the doctrine to imply, not\r\nmerely that the total number of murders committed in a given space and\r\ntime is entirely the effect of the general circumstances of society, but that\r\nevery particular murder is so too—that the individual murderer is, so to\r\nspeak, a mere instrument in the hands of general causes that he himself\r\nhas no option, or, if he has, and chose to exercise it, some one else would\r\nbe necessitated to take his place; that if any one of the actual murderers\r\nhad abstained from the crime, some person who would otherwise have remained\r\ninnocent, would have committed an extra murder to make up the\r\naverage. Such a corollary would certainly convict any theory which necessarily\r\nled to it of absurdity. It is obvious, however, that each particular\r\nmurder depends, not on the general state of society only, but on that combined\r\nwith causes special to the case, which are generally much more powerful;\r\nand if these special causes, which have greater influence than the\r\ngeneral ones in causing every particular murder, have no influence on the\r\nnumber of murders in a given period, it is because the field of observation\r\nis so extensive as to include all possible combinations of the special causes—all\r\nvarieties of individual character and individual temptation compatible\r\nwith the general state of society. The collective experiment, as it may be\r\ntermed, exactly separates the effect of the general from that of the special\r\ncauses, and shows the net result of the former; but it declares nothing at\r\nall respecting the amount of influence of the special causes, be it greater or\r\nsmaller, since the scale of the experiment extends to the number of cases\r\nwithin which the effects of the special causes balance one another, and disappear\r\nin that of the general causes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nI will not pretend that all the defenders of the theory have always kept\r\ntheir language free from this same confusion, and have shown no tendency\r\nto exalt the influence of general causes at the expense of special. I am of\r\nopinion, on the contrary, that they have done so in a very great degree,\r\nand by so doing have encumbered their theory with difficulties, and laid it\r\nopen to objections, which do not necessarily affect it. Some, for example\r\n(among whom is Mr. Buckle himself), have inferred, or allowed it to be\r\nsupposed that they inferred, from the regularity in the recurrence of events\r\nwhich depend on moral qualities, that the moral qualities of mankind are\r\nlittle capable of being improved, or are of little importance in the general\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page647\"\u003e[pg 647]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg647\" id=\"Pg647\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nprogress of society, compared with intellectual or economic causes. But\r\nto draw this inference is to forget that the statistical tables, from which\r\nthe invariable averages are deduced, were compiled from facts occurring\r\nwithin narrow geographical limits and in a small number of successive\r\nyears; that is, from a field the whole of which was under the operation of\r\nthe same general causes, and during too short a time to allow of much\r\nchange therein. All moral causes but those common to the country generally,\r\nhave been eliminated by the great number of instances taken; and\r\nthose which are common to the whole country have not varied considerably,\r\nin the short space of time comprised in the observations. If we admit\r\nthe supposition that they have varied; if we compare one age with another,\r\nor one country with another, or even one part of a country with another,\r\ndiffering in position and character as to the moral elements, the\r\ncrimes committed within a year give no longer the same, but a widely\r\ndifferent numerical aggregate. And this can not but be the case: for,\r\ninasmuch as every single crime committed by an individual mainly depends\r\non his moral qualities, the crimes committed by the entire population of\r\nthe country must depend in an equal degree on their collective moral qualities.\r\nTo render this element inoperative upon the large scale, it would\r\nbe necessary to suppose that the general moral average of mankind does\r\nnot vary from country to country or from age to age; which is not true,\r\nand, even if it were true, could not possibly be proved by any existing\r\nstatistics. I do not on this account the less agree in the opinion of Mr.\r\nBuckle, that the intellectual element in mankind, including in that expression\r\nthe nature of their beliefs, the amount of their knowledge, and the\r\ndevelopment of their intelligence, is the predominant circumstance in determining\r\ntheir progress. But I am of this opinion, not because I regard\r\ntheir moral or economical condition either as less powerful or less variable\r\nagencies, but because these are in a great degree the consequences of the\r\nintellectual condition, and are, in all cases, limited by it; as was observed\r\nin the preceding chapter. The intellectual changes are the most conspicuous\r\nagents in history, not from their superior force, considered in themselves,\r\nbut because practically they work with the united power belonging\r\nto all three.\u003ca id=\"noteref_284\" name=\"noteref_284\" href=\"#note_284\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e284\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 3. There is another distinction often neglected in the discussion of this\r\nsubject, which it is extremely important to observe. The theory of the\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page648\"\u003e[pg 648]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg648\" id=\"Pg648\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nsubjection of social progress to invariable laws, is often held in conjunction\r\nwith the doctrine, that social progress can not be materially influenced\r\nby the exertions of individual persons, or by the acts of governments.\r\nBut though these opinions are often held by the same persons, they are\r\ntwo very different opinions, and the confusion between them is the eternally\r\nrecurring error of confounding Causation with Fatalism. Because\r\nwhatever happens will be the effect of causes, human volitions among the\r\nrest, it does not follow that volitions, even those of peculiar individuals,\r\nare not of great efficacy as causes. If any one in a storm at sea, because\r\nabout the same number of persons in every year perish by shipwreck,\r\nshould conclude that it was useless for him to attempt to save his own life,\r\nwe should call him a Fatalist; and should remind him that the efforts of\r\nshipwrecked persons to save their lives are so far from being immaterial,\r\nthat the average amount of those efforts is one of the causes on which the\r\nascertained annual number of deaths by shipwreck depend. However universal\r\nthe laws of social development may be, they can not be more universal\r\nor more rigorous than those of the physical agencies of nature; yet\r\nhuman will can convert these into instruments of its designs, and the extent\r\nto which it does so makes the chief difference between savages and\r\nthe most highly civilized people. Human and social facts, from their more\r\ncomplicated nature, are not less, but more, modifiable than mechanical and\r\nchemical facts; human agency, therefore, has still greater power over them.\r\nAnd accordingly, those who maintain that the evolution of society depends\r\nexclusively, or almost exclusively, on general causes, always include among\r\nthese the collective knowledge and intellectual development of the race.\r\nBut if of the race, why not also of some powerful monarch or thinker, or\r\nof the ruling portion of some political society, acting through its government?\r\nThough the varieties of character among ordinary individuals neutralize\r\none another on any large scale, exceptional individuals in important\r\npositions do not in any given age neutralize one another; there was not\r\nanother Themistocles, or Luther, or Julius Cæsar, of equal powers and\r\ncontrary dispositions, who exactly balanced the given Themistocles, Luther,\r\nand Cæsar, and prevented them from having any permanent effect. Moreover,\r\nfor aught that appears, the volitions of exceptional persons, or the\r\nopinions and purposes of the individuals who at some particular time compose\r\na government, may be indispensable links in the chain of causation by\r\nwhich even the general causes produce their effects; and I believe this to\r\nbe the only tenable form of the theory.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nLord Macaulay, in a celebrated passage of one of his early essays (let\r\nme add that it was one which he did not himself choose to reprint), gives\r\nexpression to the doctrine of the absolute inoperativeness of great men,\r\nmore unqualified, I should think, than has been given to it by any writer\r\nof equal abilities. He compares them to persons who merely stand on a\r\nloftier height, and thence receive the sun’s rays a little earlier, than the\r\nrest of the human race. \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“The sun illuminates the hills while it is still below\r\nthe horizon, and truth is discovered by the highest minds a little before\r\nit becomes manifest to the multitude. This is the extent of their superiority.\r\nThey are the first to catch and reflect a light which, without\r\ntheir assistance, must in a short time be visible to those who lie far beneath\r\nthem.”\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca id=\"noteref_285\" name=\"noteref_285\" href=\"#note_285\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e285\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e If this metaphor is to be carried out, it follows that if\r\nthere had been no Newton, the world would not only have had the Newtonian\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page649\"\u003e[pg 649]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg649\" id=\"Pg649\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nsystem, but would have had it equally soon; as the sun would have\r\nrisen just as early to spectators in the plain if there had been no mountain\r\nat hand to catch still earlier rays. And so it would be, if truths, like the\r\nsun, rose by their own proper motion, without human effort; but not otherwise.\r\nI believe that if Newton had not lived, the world must have waited\r\nfor the Newtonian philosophy until there had been another Newton,\r\nor his equivalent. No ordinary man, and no succession of ordinary men,\r\ncould have achieved it. I will not go the length of saying that what Newton\r\ndid in a single life, might not have been done in successive steps by\r\nsome of those who followed him, each singly inferior to him in genius.\r\nBut even the least of those steps required a man of great intellectual superiority.\r\nEminent men do not merely see the coming light from the hill-top,\r\nthey mount on the hill-top and evoke it; and if no one had ever ascended\r\nthither, the light, in many cases, might never have risen upon the\r\nplain at all. Philosophy and religion are abundantly amenable to general\r\ncauses; yet few will doubt that, had there been no Socrates, no Plato, and\r\nno Aristotle, there would have been no philosophy for the next two thousand\r\nyears, nor in all probability then; and that if there had been no\r\nChrist, and no St. Paul, there would have been no Christianity.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe point in which, above all, the influence of remarkable individuals is\r\ndecisive, is in determining the celerity of the movement. In most states\r\nof society it is the existence of great men which decides even whether there\r\nshall be any progress. It is conceivable that Greece, or that Christian\r\nEurope, might have been progressive in certain periods of their history\r\nthrough general causes only: but if there had been no Mohammed, would\r\nArabia have produced Avicenna or Averroes, or Caliphs of Bagdad or of\r\nCordova? In determining, however, in what manner and order the progress\r\nof mankind shall take place if it take place at all, much less depends\r\non the character of individuals. There is a sort of necessity established in\r\nthis respect by the general laws of human nature—by the constitution of\r\nthe human mind. Certain truths can not be discovered, nor inventions\r\nmade, unless certain others have been made first; certain social improvements,\r\nfrom the nature of the case, can only follow, and not precede, others.\r\nThe order of human progress, therefore, may to a certain extent have definite\r\nlaws assigned to it: while as to its celerity, or even as to its taking\r\nplace at all, no generalization, extending to the human species generally, can\r\npossibly be made; but only some very precarious approximate generalizations,\r\nconfined to the small portion of mankind in whom there has been\r\nany thing like consecutive progress within the historical period, and deduced\r\nfrom their special position, or collected from their particular history.\r\nEven looking to the \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003emanner\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e of progress, the order of succession of social\r\nstates, there is need of great flexibility in our generalizations. The limits\r\nof variation in the possible development of social, as of animal life, are a\r\nsubject of which little is yet understood, and are one of the great problems\r\nin social science. It is, at all events, a fact, that different portions of mankind,\r\nunder the influence of different circumstances, have developed themselves\r\nin a more or less different manner and into different forms; and\r\namong these determining circumstances, the individual character of their\r\ngreat speculative thinkers or practical organizers may well have been one.\r\nWho can tell how profoundly the whole subsequent history of China may\r\nhave been influenced by the individuality of Confucius? and of Sparta (and\r\nhence of Greece and the world) by that of Lycurgus?\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nConcerning the nature and extent of what a great man under favorable\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page650\"\u003e[pg 650]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg650\" id=\"Pg650\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\ncircumstances can do for mankind, as well as of what a government can do\r\nfor a nation, many different opinions are possible; and every shade of opinion\r\non these points is consistent with the fullest recognition that there are\r\ninvariable laws of historical phenomena. Of course the degree of influence\r\nwhich has to be assigned to these more special agencies, makes a great difference\r\nin the precision which can be given to the general laws, and in the\r\nconfidence with which predictions can be grounded on them. Whatever\r\ndepends on the peculiarities of individuals, combined with the accident of\r\nthe positions they hold, is necessarily incapable of being foreseen. Undoubtedly\r\nthese casual combinations might be eliminated like any others,\r\nby taking a sufficiently large cycle: the peculiarities of a great historical\r\ncharacter make their influence felt in history sometimes for several thousand\r\nyears, but it is highly probable that they will make no difference at\r\nall at the end of fifty millions. Since, however, we can not obtain an average\r\nof the vast length of time necessary to exhaust all the possible combinations\r\nof great men and circumstances, as much of the law of evolution of\r\nhuman affairs as depends upon this average, is and remains inaccessible to\r\nus; and within the next thousand years, which are of considerably more\r\nimportance to us than the whole remainder of the fifty millions, the favorable\r\nand unfavorable combinations which will occur will be to us purely\r\naccidental. We can not foresee the advent of great men. Those who introduce\r\nnew speculative thoughts or great practical conceptions into the\r\nworld, can not have their epoch fixed beforehand. What science can do,\r\nis this. It can trace through past history the general causes which had\r\nbrought mankind into that preliminary state which, when the right sort of\r\ngreat man appeared, rendered them accessible to his influence. If this\r\nstate continues, experience renders it tolerably certain that in a longer or\r\nshorter period the great man will be produced; provided that the general\r\ncircumstances of the country and people are (which very often they are\r\nnot) compatible with his existence; of which point also, science can in\r\nsome measure judge. It is in this manner that the results of progress, except\r\nas to the celerity of their production, can be, to a certain extent, reduced\r\nto regularity and law. And the belief that they can be so, is equally\r\nconsistent with assigning very great, or very little efficacy, to the influence\r\nof exceptional men, or of the acts of governments. And the same\r\nmay be said of all other accidents and disturbing causes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 4. It would nevertheless be a great error to assign only a trifling importance\r\nto the agency of eminent individuals, or of governments. It must\r\nnot be concluded that the influence of either is small, because they can not\r\nbestow what the general circumstances of society, and the course of its\r\nprevious history, have not prepared it to receive. Neither thinkers nor\r\ngovernments effect all that they intend, but in compensation they often\r\nproduce important results which they did not in the least foresee. Great\r\nmen, and great actions, are seldom wasted; they send forth a thousand unseen\r\ninfluences, more effective than those which are seen; and though nine\r\nout of every ten things done, with a good purpose, by those who are in\r\nadvance of their age, produce no material effect, the tenth thing produces\r\neffects twenty times as great as any one would have dreamed of predicting\r\nfrom it. Even the men who for want of sufficiently favorable circumstances\r\nleft no impress at all upon their own age, have often been of the\r\ngreatest value to posterity. Who could appear to have lived more entirely\r\nin vain than some of the early heretics? They were burned or massacred,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page651\"\u003e[pg 651]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg651\" id=\"Pg651\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\ntheir writings extirpated, their memory anathematized, and their\r\nvery names and existence left for seven or eight centuries in the obscurity\r\nof musty manuscripts—their history to be gathered, perhaps, only from\r\nthe sentences by which they were condemned. Yet the memory of these\r\nmen—men who resisted certain pretensions or certain dogmas of the\r\nChurch in the very age in which the unanimous assent of Christendom\r\nwas afterward claimed as having been given to them, and asserted as the\r\nground of their authority—broke the chain of tradition, established a series\r\nof precedents for resistance, inspired later Reformers with the courage,\r\nand armed them with the weapons, which they needed when mankind\r\nwere better prepared to follow their impulse. To this example from men,\r\nlet us add another from governments. The comparatively enlightened\r\nrule of which Spain had the benefit during a considerable part of the\r\neighteenth century, did not correct the fundamental defects of the Spanish\r\npeople; and in consequence, though it did great temporary good, so much\r\nof that good perished with it, that it may plausibly be affirmed to have\r\nhad no permanent effect. The case has been cited as a proof how little\r\ngovernments can do in opposition to the causes which have determined\r\nthe general character of the nation. It does show how much there is\r\nwhich they can not do; but not that they can do nothing. Compare what\r\nSpain was at the beginning of that half-century of liberal government,\r\nwith what she had become at its close. That period fairly let in the light\r\nof European thought upon the more educated classes; and it never afterward\r\nceased to go on spreading. Previous to that time the change was\r\nin an inverse direction; culture, light, intellectual and even material activity,\r\nwere becoming extinguished. Was it nothing to arrest this downward\r\nand convert it into an upward course? How much that Charles the\r\nThird and Aranda could not do, has been the ultimate consequence of\r\nwhat they did! To that half-century Spain owes that she has got rid of\r\nthe Inquisition, that she has got rid of the monks, that she now has parliaments\r\nand (save in exceptional intervals) a free press, and the feelings of\r\nfreedom and citizenship, and is acquiring railroads and all the other constituents\r\nof material and economical progress. In the Spain which preceded\r\nthat era, there was not a single element at work which could have\r\nled to these results in any length of time, if the country had continued to\r\nbe governed as it was by the last princes of the Austrian dynasty, or if\r\nthe Bourbon rulers had been from the first what, both in Spain and in Naples,\r\nthey afterward became.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAnd if a government can do much, even when it seems to have done\r\nlittle, in causing positive improvement, still greater are the issues dependent\r\non it in the way of warding off evils, both internal and external, which\r\nelse would stop improvement altogether. A good or a bad counselor, in a\r\nsingle city at a particular crisis, has affected the whole subsequent fate of\r\nthe world. It is as certain as any contingent judgment respecting historical\r\nevents can be, that if there had been no Themistocles there would\r\nhave been no victory of Salamis; and had there not, where would have\r\nbeen all our civilization? How different, again, would have been the issue\r\nif Epaminondas, or Timoleon, or even Iphicrates, instead of Chares and Lysicles,\r\nhad commanded at Chæroneia. As is well said in the second of two\r\nEssays on the Study of History,\u003ca id=\"noteref_286\" name=\"noteref_286\" href=\"#note_286\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e286\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e in my judgment the soundest and most\r\nphilosophical productions which the recent controversies on this subject\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page652\"\u003e[pg 652]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg652\" id=\"Pg652\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nhave called forth, historical science authorizes not absolute, but only conditional\r\npredictions. General causes count for much, but individuals also\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“produce great changes in history, and color its whole complexion long\r\nafter their death…. No one can doubt that the Roman republic would\r\nhave subsided into a military despotism if Julius Cæsar had never lived”\u003c/span\u003e\r\n(thus much was rendered practically certain by general causes); \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“but is\r\nit at all clear that in that case Gaul would ever have formed a province of\r\nthe empire? Might not Varus have lost his three legions on the banks of\r\nthe Rhone? and might not that river have become the frontier instead of\r\nthe Rhine? This might well have happened if Cæsar and Crassus had\r\nchanged provinces; and it is surely impossible to say that in such an\r\nevent the venue (as lawyers say) of European civilization might not have\r\nbeen changed. The Norman Conquest in the same way was as much the\r\nact of a single man, as the writing of a newspaper article; and knowing\r\nas we do the history of that man and his family, we can retrospectively\r\npredict with all but infallible certainty, that no other person”\u003c/span\u003e (no other in\r\nthat age, I presume, is meant) \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“could have accomplished the enterprise.\r\nIf it had not been accomplished, is there any ground to suppose that either\r\nour history or our national character would have been what they are?”\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAs is most truly remarked by the same writer, the whole stream of Grecian\r\nhistory, as cleared up by Mr. Grote, is one series of examples how often\r\nevents on which the whole destiny of subsequent civilization turned,\r\nwere dependent on the personal character for good or evil of some one individual.\r\nIt must be said, however, that Greece furnishes the most extreme\r\nexample of this nature to be found in history, and is a very exaggerated\r\nspecimen of the general tendency. It has happened only that once, and\r\nwill probably never happen again, that the fortunes of mankind depended\r\nupon keeping a certain order of things in existence in a single town, or a\r\ncountry scarcely larger than Yorkshire; capable of being ruined or saved\r\nby a hundred causes, of very slight magnitude in comparison with the general\r\ntendencies of human affairs. Neither ordinary accidents, nor the characters\r\nof individuals, can ever again be so vitally important as they then\r\nwere. The longer our species lasts, and the more civilized it becomes, the\r\nmore, as Comte remarks, does the influence of past generations over the\r\npresent, and of mankind \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-foreign\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003een masse\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e over every individual\r\nin it, predominate\r\nover other forces; and though the course of affairs never ceases to be susceptible\r\nof alteration both by accidents and by personal qualities, the increasing\r\npreponderance of the collective agency of the species over all\r\nminor causes, is constantly bringing the general evolution of the race into\r\nsomething which deviates less from a certain and preappointed track. Historical\r\nscience, therefore, is always becoming more possible; not solely because\r\nit is better studied, but because, in every generation, it becomes better\r\nadapted for study.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-div\" style=\"margin-bottom: 4.00em; margin-top: 4.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"toc151\" id=\"toc151\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"pdf152\" id=\"pdf152\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: center; margin-bottom: 2.40em; margin-top: 2.40em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 120%\"\u003eChapter XII.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\u003ch3 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: left; margin-bottom: 2.88em; margin-top: 2.88em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 144%\"\u003eOf The Logic Of Practice, Or Art; Including Morality And Policy.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 1. In the preceding chapters we have endeavored to characterize the\r\npresent state of those among the branches of knowledge called Moral, which\r\nare sciences in the only proper sense of the term, that is, inquiries into the\r\ncourse of nature. It is customary, however, to include under the term\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page653\"\u003e[pg 653]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg653\" id=\"Pg653\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nmoral knowledge, and even (though improperly) under that of moral science,\r\nan inquiry the results of which do not express themselves in the indicative,\r\nbut in the imperative mood, or in periphrases equivalent to it; what\r\nis called the knowledge of duties; practical ethics, or morality.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nNow, the imperative mood is the characteristic of art, as distinguished\r\nfrom science. Whatever speaks in rules, or precepts, not in assertions respecting\r\nmatters of fact, is art; and ethics, or morality, is properly a portion\r\nof the art corresponding to the sciences of human nature and\r\nsociety.\u003ca id=\"noteref_287\" name=\"noteref_287\" href=\"#note_287\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e287\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe Method, therefore, of Ethics, can be no other than that of Art, or\r\nPractice, in general; and the portion yet uncompleted of the task which\r\nwe proposed to ourselves in the concluding Book, is to characterize the general\r\nMethod of Art, as distinguished from Science.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 2. In all branches of practical business there are cases in which individuals\r\nare bound to conform their practice to a pre-established rule, while\r\nthere are others in which it is part of their task to find or construct the\r\nrule by which they are to govern their conduct. The first, for example, is\r\nthe case of a judge, under a definite written code. The judge is not called\r\nupon to determine what course would be intrinsically the most advisable\r\nin the particular case in hand, but only within what rule of law it falls;\r\nwhat the legislature has ordained to be done in the kind of case, and must\r\ntherefore be presumed to have intended in the individual case. The method\r\nmust here be wholly and exclusively one of ratiocination, or syllogism;\r\nand the process is obviously, what in our analysis of the syllogism we\r\nshowed that all ratiocination is, namely the interpretation of a formula.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIn order that our illustration of the opposite case may be taken from the\r\nsame class of subjects as the former, we will suppose, in contrast with the\r\nsituation of the judge, the position of the legislator. As the judge has laws\r\nfor his guidance, so the legislator has rules, and maxims of policy; but it\r\nwould be a manifest error to suppose that the legislator is bound by these\r\nmaxims in the same manner as the judge is bound by the laws, and that all\r\nhe has to do is to argue down from them to the particular case, as the judge\r\ndoes from the laws. The legislator is bound to take into consideration the\r\nreasons or grounds of the maxim; the judge has nothing to do with those\r\nof the law, except so far as a consideration of them may throw light upon\r\nthe intention of the law-maker, where his words have left it doubtful. To\r\nthe judge, the rule, once positively ascertained, is final; but the legislator,\r\nor other practitioner, who goes by rules rather than by their reasons, like\r\nthe old-fashioned German tacticians who were vanquished by Napoleon,\r\nor the physician who preferred that his patients should die by rule rather\r\nthan recover contrary to it, is rightly judged to be a mere pedant, and the\r\nslave of his formulas.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nNow, the reasons of a maxim of policy, or of any other rule of art, can\r\nbe no other than the theorems of the corresponding science.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe relation in which rules of art stand to doctrines of science may be\r\nthus characterized. The art proposes to itself an end to be attained, defines\r\nthe end, and hands it over to the science. The science receives it, considers\r\nit as a phenomenon or effect to be studied, and having investigated\r\nits causes and conditions, sends it back to art with a theorem of the combination\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page654\"\u003e[pg 654]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg654\" id=\"Pg654\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nof circumstances by which it could be produced. Art then examines\r\nthese combinations of circumstances, and according as any of them are\r\nor are not in human power, pronounces the end attainable or not. The only\r\none of the premises, therefore, which Art supplies, is the original major\r\npremise, which asserts that the attainment of the given end is desirable.\r\nScience then lends to Art the proposition (obtained by a series of inductions\r\nor of deductions) that the performance of certain actions will attain\r\nthe end. From these premises Art concludes that the performance of these\r\nactions is desirable, and finding it also practicable, converts the theorem\r\ninto a rule or precept.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 3. It deserves particular notice, that the theorem or speculative truth\r\nis not ripe for being turned into a precept, until the whole, and not a part\r\nmerely, of the operation which belongs to science, has been performed.\r\nSuppose that we have completed the scientific process only up to a certain\r\npoint; have discovered that a particular cause will produce the desired effect,\r\nbut have not ascertained all the negative conditions which are necessary,\r\nthat is, all the circumstances which, if present, would prevent its production.\r\nIf, in this imperfect state of the scientific theory, we attempt to\r\nframe a rule of art, we perform that operation prematurely. Whenever any\r\ncounteracting cause, overlooked by the theorem, takes place, the rule will be\r\nat fault; we shall employ the means and the end will not follow. No arguing\r\nfrom or about the rule itself will then help us through the difficulty;\r\nthere is nothing for it but to turn back and finish the scientific process\r\nwhich should have preceded the formation of the rule. We must re-open\r\nthe investigation to inquire into the remainder of the conditions on which\r\nthe effect depends; and only after we have ascertained the whole of these\r\nare we prepared to transform the completed law of the effect into a precept,\r\nin which those circumstances or combinations of circumstances which\r\nthe science exhibits as conditions are prescribed as means.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt is true that, for the sake of convenience, rules must be formed from\r\nsomething less than this ideally perfect theory: in the first place, because\r\nthe theory can seldom be made ideally perfect; and next, because, if all the\r\ncounteracting contingencies, whether of frequent or of rare occurrence,\r\nwere included, the rules would be too cumbrous to be apprehended and remembered\r\nby ordinary capacities, on the common occasions of life. The\r\nrules of art do not attempt to comprise more conditions than require to be\r\nattended to in ordinary cases; and are therefore always imperfect. In the\r\nmanual arts, where the requisite conditions are not numerous, and where\r\nthose which the rules do not specify are generally either plain to common\r\nobservation or speedily learned from practice, rules may often be safely acted\r\non by persons who know nothing more than the rule. But in the complicated\r\naffairs of life, and still more in those of states and societies, rules\r\ncan not be relied on, without constantly referring back to the scientific laws\r\non which they are founded. To know what are the practical contingencies\r\nwhich require a modification of the rule, or which are altogether exceptions\r\nto it, is to know what combinations of circumstances would interfere\r\nwith, or entirely counteract, the consequences of those laws; and\r\nthis can only be learned by a reference to the theoretic grounds of the rule.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nBy a wise practitioner, therefore, rules of conduct will only be considered\r\nas provisional. Being made for the most numerous cases, or for those\r\nof most ordinary occurrence, they point out the manner in which it will be\r\nleast perilous to act, where time or means do not exist for analyzing the\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page655\"\u003e[pg 655]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg655\" id=\"Pg655\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nactual circumstances of the case, or where we can not trust our judgment\r\nin estimating them. But they do not at all supersede the propriety of going\r\nthrough, when circumstances permit, the scientific process requisite\r\nfor framing a rule from the data of the particular case before us. At the\r\nsame time, the common rule may very properly serve as an admonition that\r\na certain mode of action has been found by ourselves and others to be well\r\nadapted to the cases of most common occurrence; so that if it be unsuitable\r\nto the case in hand, the reason of its being so will be likely to arise\r\nfrom some unusual circumstance.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 4. The error is therefore apparent of those who would deduce the line\r\nof conduct proper to particular cases from supposed universal practical\r\nmaxims, overlooking the necessity of constantly referring back to the principles\r\nof the speculative science, in order to be sure of attaining even the\r\nspecific end which the rules have in view. How much greater still, then,\r\nmust the error be, of setting up such unbending principles, not merely as\r\nuniversal rules for attaining a given end, but as rules of conduct generally,\r\nwithout regard to the possibility, not only that some modifying cause may\r\nprevent the attainment of the given end by the means which the rule prescribes,\r\nbut that success itself may conflict with some other end, which may\r\npossibly chance to be more desirable.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThis is the habitual error of many of the political speculators whom I\r\nhave characterized as the geometrical school; especially in France, where\r\nratiocination from rules of practice forms the staple commodity of journalism\r\nand political oratory—a misapprehension of the functions of Deduction\r\nwhich has brought much discredit, in the estimation of other countries,\r\nupon the spirit of generalization so honorably characteristic of the French\r\nmind. The commonplaces of politics in France are large and sweeping\r\npractical maxims, from which, as ultimate premises, men reason downward\r\nto particular applications; and this they call being logical and consistent.\r\nFor instance, they are perpetually arguing that such and such a measure\r\nought to be adopted, because it is a consequence of the principle on which\r\nthe form of government is founded; of the principle of legitimacy, or the\r\nprinciple of the sovereignty of the people. To which it may be answered,\r\nthat if these be really practical principles, they must rest on speculative\r\ngrounds; the sovereignty of the people, for example, must be a right foundation\r\nfor government, because a government thus constituted tends to produce\r\ncertain beneficial effects. Inasmuch, however, as no government produces\r\nall possible beneficial effects, but all are attended with more or fewer\r\ninconveniences, and since these can not usually be combated by means\r\ndrawn from the very causes which produce them, it would be often a much\r\nstronger recommendation of some practical arrangement, that it does not\r\nfollow from what is called the general principle of the government, than\r\nthat it does. Under a government of legitimacy, the presumption is far\r\nrather in favor of institutions of popular origin; and in a democracy, in\r\nfavor of arrangements tending to check the impetus of popular will. The\r\nline of augmentation so commonly mistaken in France for political philosophy,\r\ntends to the practical conclusion that we should exert our utmost efforts\r\nto aggravate, instead of alleviating, whatever are the characteristic\r\nimperfections of the system of institutions which we prefer, or under which\r\nwe happen to live.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 5. The grounds, then, of every rule of art, are to be found in the theorems\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page656\"\u003e[pg 656]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg656\" id=\"Pg656\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nof science. An art, or a body of art, consists of the rules, together\r\nwith as much of the speculative propositions as comprises the justification\r\nof those rules. The complete art of any matter includes a selection of\r\nsuch a portion from the science as is necessary to show on what conditions\r\nthe effects, which the art aims at producing, depend. And Art in\r\ngeneral, consists of the truths of Science, arranged in the most convenient\r\norder for practice, instead of the order which is the most convenient for\r\nthought. Science groups and arranges its truths, so as to enable us to\r\ntake in at one view as much as possible of the general order of the universe.\r\nArt, though it must assume the same general laws, follows them\r\nonly into such of their detailed consequences as have led to the formation\r\nof rules of conduct; and brings together from parts of the field of science\r\nmost remote from one another, the truths relating to the production of the\r\ndifferent and heterogeneous conditions necessary to each effect which the\r\nexigencies of practical life require to be produced.\u003ca id=\"noteref_288\" name=\"noteref_288\" href=\"#note_288\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e288\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nScience, therefore, following one cause to its various effects, while art\r\ntraces one effect to its multiplied and diversified causes and conditions,\r\nthere is need of a set of intermediate scientific truths, derived from the\r\nhigher generalities of science, and destined to serve as the generalia or\r\nfirst principles of the various arts. The scientific operation of framing\r\nthese intermediate principles, M. Comte characterizes as one of those results\r\nof philosophy which are reserved for futurity. The only complete\r\nexample which he points out as actually realized, and which can be held\r\nup as a type to be imitated in more important matters, is the general theory\r\nof the art of Descriptive Geometry, as conceived by M. Monge. It is\r\nnot, however, difficult to understand what the nature of these intermediate\r\nprinciples must generally be. After framing the most comprehensive possible\r\nconception of the end to be aimed at, that is, of the effect to be produced,\r\nand determining in the same comprehensive manner the set of conditions\r\non which that effect depends, there remains to be taken, a general\r\nsurvey of the resources which can be commanded for realizing this set of\r\nconditions; and when the result of this survey has been embodied in the\r\nfewest and most extensive propositions possible, those propositions will\r\nexpress the general relation between the available means and the end, and\r\nwill constitute the general scientific theory of the art, from which its\r\npractical methods will follow as corollaries.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 6. But though the reasonings which connect the end or purpose of every\r\nart with its means belong to the domain of Science, the definition of\r\nthe end itself belongs exclusively to Art, and forms its peculiar province.\r\nEvery art has one first principle, or general major premise, not borrowed\r\nfrom science; that which enunciates the object aimed at, and affirms it to\r\nbe a desirable object. The builder’s art assumes that it is desirable to\r\nhave buildings; architecture, as one of the fine arts, that it is desirable\r\nto have them beautiful or imposing. The hygienic and medical arts assume,\r\nthe one that the preservation of health, the other that the cure of\r\ndisease, are fitting and desirable ends. These are not propositions of science.\r\nPropositions of science assert a matter of fact: an existence, a co-existence,\r\na succession, or a resemblance. The propositions now spoken\r\nof do not assert that any thing is, but enjoin or recommend that something\r\nshould be. They are a class by themselves. A proposition of which the\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page657\"\u003e[pg 657]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg657\" id=\"Pg657\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\npredicate is expressed by the words \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eought\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e or \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eshould be\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e, is\r\ngenerically different from one which is expressed by \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eis\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e, or \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ewill\r\nbe\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e. It is true, that in the\r\nlargest sense of the words, even these propositions assert something as a\r\nmatter of fact. The fact affirmed in them is, that the conduct recommended\r\nexcites in the speaker’s mind the feeling of approbation. This, however,\r\ndoes not go to the bottom of the matter; for the speaker’s approbation\r\nis no sufficient reason why other people should approve; nor ought it\r\nto be a conclusive reason even with himself. For the purposes of practice,\r\nevery one must be required to justify his approbation; and for this there\r\nis need of general premises, determining what are the proper objects of approbation,\r\nand what the proper order of precedence among those objects.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThese general premises, together with the principal conclusions which may\r\nbe deduced from them, form (or rather might form) a body of doctrine,\r\nwhich is properly the Art of Life, in its three departments, Morality, Prudence\r\nor Policy, and Æsthetics; the Right, the Expedient, and the Beautiful\r\nor Noble, in human conduct and works. To this art (which, in the\r\nmain, is unfortunately still to be created), all other arts are subordinate;\r\nsince its principles are those which must determine whether the special aim\r\nof any particular art is worthy and desirable, and what is its place in the\r\nscale of desirable things. Every art is thus a joint result of laws of nature\r\ndisclosed by science, and of the general principles of what has been called\r\nTeleology, or the Doctrine of Ends;\u003ca id=\"noteref_289\" name=\"noteref_289\" href=\"#note_289\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e289\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nwhich, borrowing the language of the\r\nGerman metaphysicians, may also be termed, not improperly, the principles\r\nof Practical Reason.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nA scientific observer or reasoner, merely as such, is not an adviser for\r\npractice. His part is only to show that certain consequences follow from\r\ncertain causes, and that to obtain certain ends, certain means are the most effectual.\r\nWhether the ends themselves are such as ought to be pursued, and\r\nif so, in what cases and to how great a length, it is no part of his business\r\nas a cultivator of science to decide, and science alone will never qualify him\r\nfor the decision. In purely physical science, there is not much temptation\r\nto assume this ulterior office; but those who treat of human nature and society\r\ninvariably claim it: they always undertake to say, not merely what\r\nis, but what ought to be. To entitle them to do this, a complete doctrine\r\nof Teleology is indispensable. A scientific theory, however perfect, of the\r\nsubject-matter, considered merely as part of the order of nature, can in no\r\ndegree serve as a substitute. In this respect the various subordinate arts\r\nafford a misleading analogy. In them there is seldom any visible necessity\r\nfor justifying the end, since in general its desirableness is denied by nobody,\r\nand it is only when the question of precedence is to be decided between\r\nthat end and some other, that the general principles of Teleology have to\r\nbe called in; but a writer on Morals and Politics requires those principles\r\nat every step. The most elaborate and well-digested exposition of the\r\nlaws of succession and co-existence among mental or social phenomena, and\r\nof their relation to one another as causes and effects, will be of no avail\r\ntoward the art of Life or of Society, if the ends to be aimed at by that art\r\nare left to the vague suggestions of the \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eintellectus\r\nsibi permissus\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, or are\r\ntaken for granted without analysis or questioning.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 7. There is, then, a \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ephilosophia prima\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\npeculiar to Art, as there is one\r\nwhich belongs to Science. There are not only first principles of Knowledge,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page658\"\u003e[pg 658]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg658\" id=\"Pg658\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nbut first principles of Conduct. There must be some standard by\r\nwhich to determine the goodness or badness, absolute and comparative, of\r\nends, or objects of desire. And whatever that standard is, there can be but\r\none; for if there were several ultimate principles of conduct, the same conduct\r\nmight be approved by one of those principles and condemned by another;\r\nand there would be needed some more general principle, as umpire\r\nbetween them.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAccordingly, writers on Moral Philosophy have mostly felt the necessity\r\nnot only of referring all rules of conduct, and all judgments of praise and\r\nblame, to principles, but of referring them to some one principle; some\r\nrule, or standard, with which all other rules of conduct were required to be\r\nconsistent, and from which by ultimate consequence they could all be deduced.\r\nThose who have dispensed with the assumption of such a universal\r\nstandard, have only been enabled to do so by supposing that a moral sense,\r\nor instinct, inherent in our constitution, informs us, both what principles of\r\nconduct we are bound to observe, and also in what order these should be\r\nsubordinated to one another.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe theory of the foundations of morality is a subject which it would be\r\nout of place, in a work like this, to discuss at large, and which could not to\r\nany useful purpose be treated incidentally. I shall content myself, therefore,\r\nwith saying, that the doctrine of intuitive moral principles, even if true,\r\nwould provide only for that portion of the field of conduct which is properly\r\ncalled moral. For the remainder of the practice of life some general\r\nprinciple, or standard, must still be sought; and if that principle be rightly\r\nchosen, it will be found, I apprehend, to serve quite as well for the ultimate\r\nprinciple of Morality, as for that of Prudence, Policy, or Taste.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWithout attempting in this place to justify my opinion, or even to define\r\nthe kind of justification which it admits of, I merely declare my conviction,\r\nthat the general principle to which all rules of practice ought to conform,\r\nand the test by which they should be tried, is that of conduciveness to the\r\nhappiness of mankind, or rather, of all sentient beings; in other words, that\r\nthe promotion of happiness is the ultimate principle of Teleology.\u003ca id=\"noteref_290\" name=\"noteref_290\" href=\"#note_290\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-noteref\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 60%; vertical-align: super\"\u003e290\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nI do not mean to assert that the promotion of happiness should be itself\r\nthe end of all actions, or even of all rules of action. It is the justification,\r\nand ought to be the controller, of all ends, but it is not itself the sole end.\r\nThere are many virtuous actions, and even virtuous modes of action (though\r\nthe cases are, I think, less frequent than is often supposed), by which happiness\r\nin the particular instance is sacrificed, more pain being produced\r\nthan pleasure. But conduct of which this can be truly asserted, admits of\r\njustification only because it can be shown that, on the whole, more happiness\r\nwill exist in the world, if feelings are cultivated which will make people, in\r\ncertain cases, regardless of happiness. I fully admit that this is true; that\r\nthe cultivation of an ideal nobleness of will and conduct should be to individual\r\nhuman beings an end, to which the specific pursuit either of their\r\nown happiness or of that of others (except so far as included in that idea)\r\nshould, in any case of conflict, give way. But I hold that the very question,\r\nwhat constitutes this elevation of character, is itself to be decided by\r\na reference to happiness as the standard. The character itself should be,\r\nto the individual, a paramount end, simply because the existence of this\r\nideal nobleness of character, or of a near approach to it, in any abundance,\r\nwould go farther than all things else toward making human life happy,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-pb\" id=\"page659\"\u003e[pg 659]\u003c/span\u003e\u003ca name=\"Pg659\" id=\"Pg659\" class=\"tei tei-anchor\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nboth in the comparatively humble sense of pleasure and freedom from\r\npain, and in the higher meaning, of rendering life, not what it now is almost\r\nuniversally, puerile and insignificant, but such as human beings with highly\r\ndeveloped faculties can care to have.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n§ 8. With these remarks we must close this summary view of the application\r\nof the general logic of scientific inquiry to the moral and social departments\r\nof science. Notwithstanding the extreme generality of the\r\nprinciples of method which I have laid down (a generality which, I trust,\r\nis not, in this instance, synonymous with vagueness), I have indulged the\r\nhope that to some of those on whom the task will devolve of bringing those\r\nmost important of all sciences into a more satisfactory state, these observations\r\nmay be useful, both in removing erroneous, and in clearing up the\r\ntrue, conceptions of the means by which, on subjects of so high a degree of\r\ncomplication, truth can be attained. Should this hope be realized, what is\r\nprobably destined to be the great intellectual achievement of the next two\r\nor three generations of European thinkers will have been in some degree\r\nforwarded.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nTHE END.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003chr class=\"doublepage\" /\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"tei tei-back\" style=\"margin-bottom: 2.00em; margin-top: 6.00em\"\u003e\r\n \u003cdiv id=\"footnotes\" class=\"tei tei-div\" style=\"margin-bottom: 5.00em; margin-top: 5.00em\"\u003e\r\n \u003ca name=\"toc153\" id=\"toc153\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n \u003ca name=\"pdf154\" id=\"pdf154\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n \u003cdiv class=\u0027chapter\u0027 /\u003e\u003ch2 class=\"tei tei-head\" style=\"text-align: left; margin-bottom: 3.46em; margin-top: 3.46em\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-size: 173%\"\u003eFootnotes\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n \u003cdl class=\"tei tei-list-footnotes\"\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_1\" name=\"note_1\" href=\"#noteref_1\"\u003e1.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eIn the later editions of Archbishop Whately’s \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Logic,”\u003c/span\u003e\r\nhe states his meaning to be, not that \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“rules”\u003c/span\u003e for the ascertainment of truths by\r\ninductive investigation can not be laid down, or that they may not be \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“of eminent\r\nservice,”\u003c/span\u003e but that they \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“must always be comparatively vague and general, and\r\nincapable of being built up into a regular demonstrative theory like that of the\r\nSyllogism.”\u003c/span\u003e (Book iv., ch. iv., § 3.) And he observes, that to devise a system\r\nfor this purpose, capable of being \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“brought into a scientific form,”\u003c/span\u003e would be an\r\nachievement which \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“he must be more sanguine than scientific who expects.”\u003c/span\u003e (Book iv.,\r\nch. ii., § 4.) To effect this, however, being the express object of the portion of the\r\npresent work which treats of Induction, the words in the text are no overstatement of the\r\ndifference of opinion between Archbishop Whately and me on the subject.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_2\" name=\"note_2\" href=\"#noteref_2\"\u003e2.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eNow forming a chapter in his volume on\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“The Philosophy of Discovery.”\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_3\" name=\"note_3\" href=\"#noteref_3\"\u003e3.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eArchbishop Whately.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_4\" name=\"note_4\" href=\"#noteref_4\"\u003e4.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eI use these terms\r\nindiscriminately, because, for the purpose in view, there is no need for\r\nmaking any distinction between them. But metaphysicians usually restrict the name\r\nIntuition to the direct knowledge we are supposed to have of things external to our\r\nminds, and Consciousness to our knowledge of our own mental phenomena.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_5\" name=\"note_5\" href=\"#noteref_5\"\u003e5.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eThis important theory has of late\r\nbeen called in question by a writer of deserved reputation, Mr. Samuel Bailey; but I do\r\nnot conceive that the grounds on which it has been admitted as an established doctrine\r\nfor a century past, have been at all shaken by that gentleman’s objections. I have\r\nelsewhere said what appeared to me necessary in reply to his arguments.\r\n(\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eWestminster Review\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e for October, 1842; reprinted in\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Dissertations and Discussions,”\u003c/span\u003e vol. ii.)\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_6\" name=\"note_6\" href=\"#noteref_6\"\u003e6.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eThe view taken in the text, of the definition\r\nand purpose of Logic, stands in marked opposition to that of the school of philosophy\r\nwhich, in this country, is represented by the writings of Sir William Hamilton and of\r\nhis numerous pupils. Logic, as this school conceives it, is \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“the Science of the Formal\r\nLaws of Thought;”\u003c/span\u003e a definition framed for the express purpose of excluding, as\r\nirrelevant to Logic, whatever relates to Belief and Disbelief, or to the pursuit of\r\ntruth as such, and restricting the science to that very limited portion of its total\r\nprovince, which has reference to the conditions, not of Truth, but of Consistency. What\r\nI have thought it useful to say in opposition to this limitation of the field of Logic,\r\nhas been said at some length in a separate work, first published in 1865, and entitled\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“An Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy, and of the Principal\r\nPhilosophical Questions discussed in his Writings.”\u003c/span\u003e For the purposes of the present\r\nTreatise, I am content that the justification of the larger extension which I give to the\r\ndomain of the science, should rest on the sequel of the Treatise itself. Some remarks on\r\nthe relation which the Logic of Consistency bears to the Logic of Truth, and on the\r\nplace which that particular part occupies in the whole to which it belongs, will be\r\nfound in the present volume\r\n(\u003ca href=\"#Book_II_Chapter_III_Section_9\" class=\"tei tei-ref\"\u003eBook II., chap. iii., § 9\u003c/a\u003e).\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_7\" name=\"note_7\" href=\"#noteref_7\"\u003e7.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eComputation or\r\nLogic\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, chap. ii.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_8\" name=\"note_8\" href=\"#noteref_8\"\u003e8.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eIn the original \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“had, \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eor had\r\nnot\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e.”\u003c/span\u003e These last words, as involving a subtlety foreign to\r\nour present purpose, I have forborne to quote.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_9\" name=\"note_9\" href=\"#noteref_9\"\u003e9.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eVide infra, note at the\r\nend of \u003ca href=\"#Book_II_Chapter_II_Section_3\" class=\"tei tei-ref\"\u003e§ 3, book ii., chap. ii\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_10\" name=\"note_10\" href=\"#noteref_10\"\u003e10.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eNotare\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, to mark; \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003econ\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003enotare, to mark \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ealong with\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e; to mark one thing\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ewith\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e or \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ein addition to\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e another.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_11\" name=\"note_11\" href=\"#noteref_11\"\u003e11.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eArchbishop Whately, who, in the later editions\r\nof his \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eElements of Logic\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, aided in reviving\r\nthe important distinction treated of in the text, proposes the term \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Attributive”\u003c/span\u003e\r\nas a substitute for \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Connotative”\u003c/span\u003e (p. 22, 9th edit.). The expression is, in\r\nitself, appropriate; but as it has not the advantage of being connected with\r\nany verb, of so markedly distinctive a character as \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“to connote,”\u003c/span\u003e it is not,\r\nI think, fitted to supply the place of the word Connotative in\r\nscientific use.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_12\" name=\"note_12\" href=\"#noteref_12\"\u003e12.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eA writer who entitles his\r\nbook \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ePhilosophy; or, the Science of Truth\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, charges me in his\r\nvery first page (referring at the foot of it to this passage) with asserting that\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003egeneral\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e names have properly no signification. And he repeats this\r\nstatement many times in the course of his volume, with comments, not at all flattering,\r\nthereon. It is well to be now and then reminded to how great a length perverse\r\nmisquotation (for, strange as it appears, I do not believe that the writer is\r\ndishonest) can sometimes go. It is a warning to readers when they see an author\r\naccused, with volume and page referred to, and the apparent guarantee of inverted\r\ncommas, of maintaining something more than commonly absurd, not to give implicit credence\r\nto the assertion without verifying the reference.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_13\" name=\"note_13\" href=\"#noteref_13\"\u003e13.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Take\r\nthe familiar term Stone. It is applied to mineral and rocky materials, to the\r\nkernels of fruit, to the accumulations in the gall-bladder and in the kidney; while\r\nit is refused to polished minerals (called gems), to rocks that have the cleavage\r\nsuited for roofing (slates), and to baked clay (bricks). It occurs in the designation\r\nof the magnetic oxide of iron (loadstone), and not in speaking of other metallic\r\nores. Such a term is wholly unfit for accurate reasoning, unless hedged round on\r\nevery occasion by other phrases; as building stone, precious stone, gall-stone,\r\netc. Moreover, the methods of definition are baffled for want of sufficient\r\ncommunity to ground upon. There is no quality uniformly present in the cases\r\nwhere it is applied, and uniformly absent where it is not applied; hence the definer\r\nwould have to employ largely the license of striking off existing applications, and\r\ntaking in new ones.”\u003c/span\u003e—\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-variant: small-caps\"\u003eBain\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eLogic\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, ii., 172.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_14\" name=\"note_14\" href=\"#noteref_14\"\u003e14.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003eBefore\r\nquitting the subject of connotative names, it is proper to observe, that the first\r\nwriter who, in our times, has adopted from the schoolmen the word \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eto\r\nconnote\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, Mr. James Mill, in his \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eAnalysis of the Phenomena\r\nof the Human Mind\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, employs it in a signification different from that in which\r\nit is here used. He uses the word in a sense co-extensive with its etymology,\r\napplying it to every case in which a name, while pointing directly to one thing\r\n(which is consequently termed its signification), includes also a tacit reference to\r\nsome other thing. In the case considered in the text, that of concrete general\r\nnames, his language and mine are the converse of one another. Considering (very\r\njustly) the signification of the name to lie in the attribute, he speaks of the\r\nword as \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003enoting\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e the attribute, and\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003econnoting\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e the things possessing the attribute. And he describes\r\nabstract names as being properly concrete names with their connotation dropped;\r\nwhereas, in my view, it is the \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ede\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003enotation which would be\r\nsaid to be dropped, what was previously connoted becoming the whole signification.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIn adopting a phraseology at variance with that which so high an authority, and one which\r\nI am less likely than any other person to undervalue, has deliberately sanctioned, I\r\nhave been influenced by the urgent necessity for a term exclusively appropriated to\r\nexpress the manner in which a concrete general name serves to mark the attributes which\r\nare involved in its signification. This necessity can scarcely be felt in its full\r\nforce by any one who has not found by experience how vain is the attempt to\r\ncommunicate clear ideas on the philosophy of language without such a word. It is\r\nhardly an exaggeration to say, that some of the most prevalent of the errors with\r\nwhich logic has been infected, and a large part of the cloudiness and confusion\r\nof ideas which have enveloped it, would, in all probability, have been avoided, if a\r\nterm had been in common use to express exactly what I have signified by the term\r\nto connote. And the schoolmen, to whom we are indebted for the greater part of our\r\nlogical language, gave us this also, and in this very sense. For though some of\r\ntheir general expressions countenance the use of the word in the more extensive\r\nand vague acceptation in which it is taken by Mr. Mill, yet when they had to define\r\nit specifically as a technical term, and to fix its meaning as such, with that\r\nadmirable precision which always characterizes their definitions, they clearly\r\nexplained that nothing was said to be connoted except \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eforms\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\nwhich word may generally, in their writings, be understood as synonymous with\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eattributes\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nNow, if the word \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eto connote\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, so well suited to the purpose\r\nto which they applied it, be diverted from that purpose by being taken to fulfill\r\nanother, for which it does not seem to me to be at all required; I am unable to find\r\nany expression to replace it, but such as are commonly employed in a sense so\r\nmuch more general, that it would be useless attempting to associate them peculiarly\r\nwith this precise idea. Such are the words, to involve, to imply, etc. By\r\nemploying these, I should fail of attaining the object for which alone the name is\r\nneeded, namely, to distinguish this particular kind of involving and implying from\r\nall other kinds, and to assure to it the degree of habitual attention which its\r\nimportance demands.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_15\" name=\"note_15\" href=\"#noteref_15\"\u003e15.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eProfessor Bain (\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eLogic\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\ni., 56) thinks that negative names are not names of all things whatever except\r\nthose denoted by the correlative positive name, but only for all things of some\r\nparticular class: \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003enot-white\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, for instance, he deems not to\r\nbe a name for every thing in nature except white things, but only for every\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ecolored\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e thing other than white. In this case, however, as in all\r\nothers, the test of what a name denotes is what it can be predicated of: and we can\r\ncertainly predicate of a sound, or a smell, that it is not white. The affirmation\r\nand the negation of the same attribute can not but divide the whole field of\r\npredication between them.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_16\" name=\"note_16\" href=\"#noteref_16\"\u003e16.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003eOr\r\nrather, all objects except itself and the percipient mind; for, as we shall see hereafter,\r\nto ascribe any attribute to an object, necessarily implies a mind to perceive it.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe simple and clear explanation given in the text, of relation and relative names, a\r\nsubject so long the opprobrium of metaphysics, was given (as far as I know) for the\r\nfirst time, by Mr. James Mill, in his Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human\r\nMind.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_17\" name=\"note_17\" href=\"#noteref_17\"\u003e17.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003eOn the\r\npreceding passage Professor Bain remarks (Logic, i., 265): \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“The Categories do not\r\nseem to have been intended as a classification of Namable Things, in the sense of\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e‘an enumeration of all kinds of Things which are capable of being made predicates,\r\nor of having any thing predicated of them.’\u003c/span\u003e They seem to have been rather intended\r\nas a generalization of predicates; an analysis of the final import of predication.\r\nViewed in this light, they are not open to the objections offered by Mr. Mill. The\r\nproper question to ask is not—In what Category are we to place sensations or\r\nother feelings or states of mind? but, Under what Categories can we predicate regarding\r\nstates of mind? Take, for example, Hope. When we say that it is a state of mind, we\r\npredicate Substance: we may also describe how great it is (Quantity), what is the\r\nquality of it, pleasurable or painful (Quality), what it has reference to (Relation).\r\nAristotle seems to have framed the Categories on the plan—Here is\r\nan individual; what is the final analysis of all that we can predicate about him?”\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThis is doubtless a true statement of the leading idea in the classification. The\r\nCategory Οὐσία was certainly understood by Aristotle to be a general name for all\r\npossible answers to the question Quid sit? when asked respecting a concrete\r\nindividual; as the other Categories are names comprehending all possible answers to\r\nthe questions Quantum sit? Quale sit? etc. In Aristotle’s conception, therefore, the\r\nCategories may not have been a classification of Things; but they were soon converted\r\ninto one by his Scholastic followers, who certainly regarded and treated them as a\r\nclassification of Things, and carried them out as such, dividing down the Category\r\nSubstance as a naturalist might do, into the different classes of physical or\r\nmetaphysical objects as distinguished from attributes, and the other Categories into the\r\nprincipal varieties of quantity, quality, relation, etc. It is, therefore, a just\r\nsubject of complaint against them, that they had no Category of Feeling. Feeling is\r\nassuredly predicable as a summum genus, of every particular kind of feeling, for\r\ninstance, as in Mr. Bain’s example, of Hope: but it can not be brought within any of\r\nthe Categories as interpreted either by Aristotle\r\nor by his followers.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_18\" name=\"note_18\" href=\"#noteref_18\"\u003e18.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ePhilosophy of the\r\nInductive Sciences\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, vol. i., p. 40.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_19\" name=\"note_19\" href=\"#noteref_19\"\u003e19.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eDiscussions on Philosophy\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\netc. Appendix I., pp. 643, 644.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_20\" name=\"note_20\" href=\"#noteref_20\"\u003e20.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eIt is to be\r\nregretted that Sir William Hamilton, though he often strenuously insists on\r\nthis doctrine, and though, in the passage quoted, he states it with a comprehensiveness\r\nand force which leave nothing to be desired, did not consistently adhere to his own\r\ndoctrine, but maintained along with it opinions with which it is utterly\r\nirreconcilable. See the third and other chapters of \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eAn Examination\r\nof Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_21\" name=\"note_21\" href=\"#noteref_21\"\u003e21.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Nous\r\nsavons qu’il existe quelque chose hors de nous, parceque nous ne pouvons expliquer\r\nnos perceptions sans les rattacher à des causes distinctes de nous mêmes; nous savons\r\nde plus que ces causes, dont nous ne connaissons pas d’ailleurs l’essence, produisent\r\nles effets les plus variables, les plus divers, et même les plus contraires, selon\r\nqu’elles rencontrent telle nature ou telle disposition du sujet. Mais savons-nous\r\nquelque chose de plus? et même, vu le caractère indéterminé des causes que nous\r\nconcevons dans les corps, y a-t-il quelque chose de plus à savoir? Y a-t-il lieu de\r\nnous enquérir si nous percevons les choses telles qu’elles sont? Non évidemment…. Je\r\nne dis pas que le problème est insoluble, \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eje dis qu’il est absurde et enferme\r\nune contradiction\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e. Nous \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ene savons pas ce que ces causes sont en\r\nelles-mêmes\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e, et la raison nous défend de chercher à le connaître: mais il est\r\nbien évident \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eà priori\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\nqu’\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eelles ne sont pas en elles-mêmes ce qu’elles sont par rapport à nous\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e,\r\npuisque la présence du sujet modifie nécessairement leur action. Supprimez tout sujet\r\nsentant, il est certain que ces causes agiraient encore puisqu’elles continueraient\r\nd’exister; mais elles agiraient autrement; elles seraient encore des qualités et des\r\npropriétés, mais qui ne ressembleraient à rien de ce que nous connaissons. Le feu ne\r\nmanifesterait plus aucune des propriétés que nous lui connaissons: que serait-il?\r\nC’est ce que nous ne saurons jamais. \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eC’est d’ailleurs peut-être un problème qui\r\nne répugne pas seulement à la nature de notre esprit, mais à l’essence même des\r\nchoses.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e Quand même en effet on supprimerait par le pensée tous les sujets\r\nsentants, il faudrait encore admettre que nul corps ne manifesterait ses propriétés\r\nautrement qu’en relation avec un sujet quelconque, et dans ce cas \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eses propriétés\r\nne seraient encore que relatives\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e: en sorte qu’il me paraît fort raisonnable\r\nd’admettre que les propriétés déterminées des corps n’existent pas indépendamment d’un\r\nsujet quelconque, et que quand on demande si les propriétés de la matiere sont telles\r\nque nous les percevons, il faudrait voir auparavant si elles sont en tant que\r\ndéterminées, et dans quel sens il est vrai de dire qu’elles\r\nsont.”\u003c/span\u003e—\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eCours d’Histoire de la Philosophie Morale au\r\n18me siècle\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, 8me leçon.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_22\" name=\"note_22\" href=\"#noteref_22\"\u003e22.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003eAn attempt, indeed,\r\nhas been made by Reid and others, to establish that although some of the properties\r\nwe ascribe to objects exist only in our sensations, others exist in the things\r\nthemselves, being such as can not possibly be copies of any impression upon the senses;\r\nand they ask, from what sensations our notions of extension and figure have been\r\nderived? The gauntlet thrown down by Reid was taken up by Brown, who, applying greater\r\npowers of analysis than had previously been applied to the notions of extension and\r\nfigure, pointed out that the sensations from which those notions are derived, are\r\nsensations of touch, combined with sensations of a class previously too little adverted\r\nto by metaphysicians, those which have their seat in our muscular frame. His analysis,\r\nwhich was adopted and followed up by James Mill, has been further and greatly improved\r\nupon in Professor Bain’s profound work, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eThe Senses and the\r\nIntellect\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, and in the chapters on \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Perception”\u003c/span\u003e of a work of eminent analytic\r\npower, Mr. Herbert Spencer’s \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ePrinciples of Psychology\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nOn this point M. Cousin may again be cited in favor of the better doctrine. M. Cousin\r\nrecognizes, in opposition to Reid, the essential subjectivity of our conceptions of\r\nwhat are called the primary qualities of matter, as extension, solidity, etc., equally\r\nwith those of color, heat, and the remainder of the so-called secondary\r\nqualities.—\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eCours\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, ut supra, 9me leçon.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_23\" name=\"note_23\" href=\"#noteref_23\"\u003e23.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003eThis doctrine, which is the most\r\ncomplete form of the philosophical theory known as the Relativity of Human Knowledge,\r\nhas, since the recent revival in this country of an active interest in metaphysical\r\nspeculation, been the subject of a greatly increased amount of discussion and\r\ncontroversy; and dissentients have manifested themselves in considerably greater number\r\nthan I had any knowledge of when the passage in the text was written. The doctrine has\r\nbeen attacked from two sides. Some thinkers, among whom are the late Professor Ferrier,\r\nin his \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eInstitutes of Metaphysic\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, and Professor John Grote, in\r\nhis \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eExploratio Philosophica\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, appear to deny altogether the\r\nreality of Noumena, or Things in themselves—of an unknowable substratum or\r\nsupport for the sensations which we experience, and which, according to the theory,\r\nconstitute all our knowledge of an external world. It seems to me, however, that in\r\nProfessor Grote’s case at least, the denial of Noumena is only apparent, and that he\r\ndoes not essentially differ from the other class of objectors, including Mr. Bailey in\r\nhis valuable \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eLetters on the Philosophy of the Human Mind\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, and\r\n(in spite of the striking passage quoted in the text) also Sir William Hamilton, who\r\ncontend for a direct knowledge by the human mind of more than the sensations—of\r\ncertain attributes or properties as they exist not in us, but in the Things themselves.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWith the first of these opinions, that which denies Noumena, I have, as a metaphysician,\r\nno quarrel; but, whether it be true or false, it is irrelevant to Logic. And since all\r\nthe forms of language are in contradiction to it, nothing but confusion could result\r\nfrom its unnecessary introduction into a treatise, every essential doctrine of which\r\ncould stand equally well with the opposite and accredited opinion. The other and rival\r\ndoctrine, that of a direct perception or intuitive knowledge of the outward object as it\r\nis in itself, considered as distinct from the sensations we receive from it, is of far\r\ngreater practical moment. But even this question, depending on the nature and laws of\r\nIntuitive Knowledge, is not within the province of Logic. For the grounds of my own\r\nopinion concerning it, I must content myself with referring to a work already\r\nmentioned—\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eAn Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s\r\nPhilosophy\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e; several chapters of which are devoted to a full discussion of the\r\nquestions and theories relating to the supposed direct perception of external\r\nobjects.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_24\" name=\"note_24\" href=\"#noteref_24\"\u003e24.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eProfessor Bain\r\n(\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eLogic\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, i., 49) defines attributes as \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“points of community\r\namong classes.”\u003c/span\u003e This definition expresses well one point of view, but is liable\r\nto the objection that it applies only to the attributes of classes; though an object,\r\nunique in its kind, may be said to have attributes. Moreover, the definition is not\r\nultimate, since the points of community themselves admit of, and require, further\r\nanalysis; and Mr. Bain does analyze them into resemblances in the sensations, or\r\nother states of consciousness excited by the object.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_25\" name=\"note_25\" href=\"#noteref_25\"\u003e25.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eAnalysis\r\nof the Human Mind\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, i., 126 et seq.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_26\" name=\"note_26\" href=\"#noteref_26\"\u003e26.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eLogic\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, i.,\r\n85.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_27\" name=\"note_27\" href=\"#noteref_27\"\u003e27.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eInstead of Universal and Particular as applied to\r\npropositions, Professor Bain proposes (\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eLogic\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, i., 81) the terms\r\nTotal and Partial; reserving the former pair of terms for their inductive\r\nmeaning, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“the contrast between a general proposition and the particulars or individuals\r\nthat we derive it from.”\u003c/span\u003e This change in nomenclature would be attended with the further\r\nadvantage, that Singular propositions, which in the Syllogism follow the same rules\r\nas Universal, would be included along with them in the same class, that of Total\r\npredications. It is not the Subject’s denoting many things or only one, that is of\r\nimportance in reasoning, it is that the assertion is made of the whole or a part only\r\nof what the Subject denotes. The words Universal and Particular, however, are so\r\nfamiliar and so well understood in both the senses mentioned by Mr. Bain, that the\r\ndouble meaning does not produce any material inconvenience.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_28\" name=\"note_28\" href=\"#noteref_28\"\u003e28.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eIt may, however, be considered as\r\nequivalent to a universal proposition with a different predicate, viz.: \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“All\r\nwine is good \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003equâ\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e wine,”\u003c/span\u003e or \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“is\r\ngood in respect of the qualities which constitute it wine.”\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_29\" name=\"note_29\" href=\"#noteref_29\"\u003e29.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eLogic\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, i., 82.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_30\" name=\"note_30\" href=\"#noteref_30\"\u003e30.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eDr. Whewell\r\n(\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ePhilosophy of Discovery\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, p. 242) questions this statement, and\r\nasks, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Are we to say that a mole can not dig the ground, except he has an idea of the\r\nground, and of the snout and paws with which he digs it?”\u003c/span\u003e I do not know what passes\r\nin a mole’s mind, nor what amount of mental apprehension may or may not accompany his\r\ninstinctive actions. But a human being does not use a spade by instinct; and he\r\ncertainly could not use it unless he had knowledge of a spade, and of the earth which he\r\nuses it upon.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_31\" name=\"note_31\" href=\"#noteref_31\"\u003e31.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003eProfessor Bain\r\nremarks, in qualification of the statement in the text (\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eLogic\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\ni., 50), that the word Class has two meanings; \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“the class definite, and the class\r\nindefinite. The class definite is an enumeration of actual individuals, as the Peers\r\nof the Realm, the oceans of the globe, the known planets…. The class indefinite is\r\nunenumerated. Such classes are stars, planets, gold-bearing rocks, men, poets,\r\nvirtuous…. In this last acceptation of the word, class name and general name are\r\nidentical. The class name denotes an indefinite number of individuals, and connotes\r\nthe points of community or likeness.”\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe theory controverted in the text, tacitly supposes all classes to be\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003edefinite\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e. I have assumed them to be indefinite; because, for the purposes\r\nof Logic, definite classes, as such, are almost useless; though often serviceable as\r\nmeans of abridged expression. (Vide infra,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Book_III_Chapter_II\" class=\"tei tei-ref\"\u003ebook iii., chap. ii\u003c/a\u003e.)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_32\" name=\"note_32\" href=\"#noteref_32\"\u003e32.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“From hence also this may be deduced, that the first truths\r\nwere arbitrarily made by those that first of all imposed names upon things, or received\r\nthem from the imposition of others. For it is true (for example) that\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eman is a living creature\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, but it is for this reason, that it\r\npleased men to impose both these names on the same\r\nthing.”\u003c/span\u003e—\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eComputation or Logic\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, chap.\r\niii., sect. 8.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_33\" name=\"note_33\" href=\"#noteref_33\"\u003e33.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Men\r\nare subject to err not only in affirming and denying, but also in perception, and in\r\nsilent cogitation…. Tacit errors, or the errors of sense and cogitation, are made by\r\npassing from one imagination to the imagination of another different thing; or by\r\nfeigning that to be past, or future, which never was, nor ever shall be; as when by\r\nseeing the image of the sun in water, we imagine the sun itself to be there; or by\r\nseeing swords, that there has been, or shall be, fighting, because it used to be so for\r\nthe most part; or when from promises we feign the mind of the promiser to be such and\r\nsuch; or, lastly, when from any sign we vainly imagine something to be signified\r\nwhich is not. And errors of this sort are common to all things that have\r\nsense.”\u003c/span\u003e—\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eComputation or Logic\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, chap. v., sect. 1.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_34\" name=\"note_34\" href=\"#noteref_34\"\u003e34.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eChap.\r\niii., sect 3.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_35\" name=\"note_35\" href=\"#noteref_35\"\u003e35.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003eTo the preceding\r\nstatement it has been objected, that \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“we naturally construe the subject of a\r\nproposition in its extension, and the predicate (which therefore may be an adjective) in\r\nits intension (connotation): and that consequently co-existence of attributes does not,\r\nany more than the opposite theory of equation of groups, correspond with the living\r\nprocesses of thought and language.”\u003c/span\u003e I acknowledge the distinction here drawn, which,\r\nindeed, I had myself laid down and exemplified a few pages back\r\n(\u003ca href=\"#Pg077\" class=\"tei tei-ref\"\u003ep. 77\u003c/a\u003e). But though it is true that we naturally\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“construe the subject of a proposition in its extension,”\u003c/span\u003e this extension, or in\r\nother words, the extent of the class denoted by the name, is not apprehended or\r\nindicated directly. It is both apprehended and indicated solely through the\r\nattributes. In the \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“living processes of thought and language”\u003c/span\u003e the extension,\r\nthough in this case really thought of (which in the case of the predicate it is not),\r\nis thought of only through the medium of what my acute and courteous critic terms the\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“intension.”\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nFor further illustrations of this subject, see \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eExamination of Sir\r\nWilliam Hamilton’s Philosophy\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, chap. xxii.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_36\" name=\"note_36\" href=\"#noteref_36\"\u003e36.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003eProfessor Bain, in his\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eLogic\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e (i., 256), excludes Existence from the list, considering it\r\nas a mere name. All propositions, he says, which predicate mere existence \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“are more\r\nor less abbreviated, or elliptical: when fully expressed they fall under either\r\nco-existence or succession. When we say there \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eexists\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e a\r\nconspiracy for a particular purpose, we mean that at the present time a body of men\r\nhave formed themselves into a society for a particular object; which is a\r\ncomplex affirmation, resolvable into propositions of co-existence and succession (as\r\ncausation). The assertion that the dodo does not exist, points to the fact that this\r\nanimal, once known in a certain place, has disappeared or become extinct; is no longer\r\nassociated with the locality: all which may be better stated without the use of the\r\nverb \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e‘exist.’\u003c/span\u003e There is a debated question—Does an ether exist? but the\r\nconcrete form would be this—\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e‘Are heat and light and other radiant influences\r\npropagated by an ethereal medium diffused in space;’\u003c/span\u003e which is a proposition\r\nof causation. In like manner the question of the Existence of a Deity can not be\r\ndiscussed in that form. It is properly a question as to the First \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eCause\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e\r\nof the Universe, and as to the continued exertion of that Cause in providential\r\nsuperintendence.”\u003c/span\u003e (i., 407.)\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nMr. Bain thinks it \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“fictitious and unmeaning language”\u003c/span\u003e to carry up the\r\nclassification of Nature to one \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003esummum genus\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\nBeing, or that which Exists; since nothing can be perceived or\r\napprehended but by way of contrast with something else (of which important truth, under\r\nthe name of Law of Relativity, he has been in our time the principal expounder and\r\nchampion), and we have no other class to oppose to Being, or fact to contrast with\r\nExistence.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nI accept fully Mr. Bain’s Law of Relativity, but I do not understand by it that to\r\nenable us to apprehend or be conscious of any fact, it is necessary that we should\r\ncontrast it with some other positive fact. The antithesis necessary to consciousness\r\nneed not, I conceive, be an antithesis between two positives; it may be between one\r\npositive and its negative. Hobbes was undoubtedly right when he said that a single\r\nsensation indefinitely prolonged would cease to be felt at all; but simple\r\nintermission, without other change, would restore it to consciousness. In order to\r\nbe conscious of heat, it is not necessary that we should pass to it from cold; it\r\nsuffices that we should pass to it from a state of no sensation, or from a sensation of\r\nsome other kind. The relative opposite of Being, considered as a summum genus, is\r\nNonentity, or Nothing; and we have, now and then, occasion to consider and discuss\r\nthings merely in contrast with Nonentity.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nI grant that the \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003edecision\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e of questions of Existence usually if not always\r\ndepends on a previous question of either Causation or Co-existence. But Existence is\r\nnevertheless a different thing from Causation or Co-existence, and can be predicated\r\napart from them. The meaning of the abstract name Existence, and the connotation of\r\nthe concrete name Being, consist, like the meaning of all other names, in sensations or\r\nstates of consciousness: their peculiarity is that to exist, is to excite, or be\r\ncapable of exciting, \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eany\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e sensations or states of consciousness:\r\nno matter what, but it is indispensable that there should be some. It was from\r\noverlooking this that Hegel, finding that Being is an abstraction reached by thinking\r\naway all particular attributes, arrived at the self-contradictory proposition on which\r\nhe founded all his philosophy, that Being is the same as Nothing. It is really the\r\nname of Something, taken in the most comprehensive sense of the word.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_37\" name=\"note_37\" href=\"#noteref_37\"\u003e37.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Book_IV_Chapter_VII\" class=\"tei tei-ref\"\u003eBook iv., chap. vii\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_38\" name=\"note_38\" href=\"#noteref_38\"\u003e38.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eLogic\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, i.,\r\n103-105.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_39\" name=\"note_39\" href=\"#noteref_39\"\u003e39.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eThe doctrines which prevented the real meaning of Essences from\r\nbeing understood, had not assumed so settled a shape in the time of Aristotle and his\r\nimmediate followers, as was afterward given to them by the Realists of the Middle Ages.\r\nAristotle himself (in his Treatise on the Categories) expressly denies that the\r\nδεύτεραι οὔσιαι, or Substantiæ Secundæ, inhere in a subject. They are only, he says,\r\npredicated of it.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_40\" name=\"note_40\" href=\"#noteref_40\"\u003e40.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eThe always acute and often profound author of\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eAn Outline of Sematology\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e (Mr. B. H. Smart) justly says, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Locke\r\nwill be much more intelligible, if, in the majority of places, we substitute\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e‘the knowledge of’\u003c/span\u003e for what he calls \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e‘the Idea of’\u003c/span\u003e ”\u003c/span\u003e (p. 10). Among the many\r\ncriticisms on Locke’s use of the word Idea, this is the one which, as it appears to me,\r\nmost nearly hits the mark; and I quote it for the additional reason that it precisely\r\nexpresses the point of difference respecting the import of Propositions, between my view\r\nand what I have spoken of as the Conceptualist view of them. Where a Conceptualist says\r\nthat a name or a proposition expresses our Idea of a thing, I should generally say\r\n(instead of our Idea) our Knowledge, or Belief, concerning the thing itself.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_41\" name=\"note_41\" href=\"#noteref_41\"\u003e41.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eThis\r\ndistinction corresponds to that which is drawn by Kant and other metaphysicians\r\nbetween what they term \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eanalytic\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e and\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003esynthetic\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, judgments; the former being those which can\r\nbe evolved from the meaning of the terms used.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_42\" name=\"note_42\" href=\"#noteref_42\"\u003e42.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eIf we allow a differentia\r\nto what is not really a species. For the distinction of Kinds,\r\nin the sense explained by us, not being in any way applicable to\r\nattributes, it of course follows that although attributes may be\r\nput into classes, those classes can be admitted to be genera\r\nor species only by courtesy.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_43\" name=\"note_43\" href=\"#noteref_43\"\u003e43.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003eProfessor Bain, in his Logic,\r\ntakes a peculiar view of Definition. He holds (i., 71) with\r\nthe present work, that \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“the definition in its full import, is the sum of all the\r\nproperties connoted by the name; it exhausts the meaning of a word.”\u003c/span\u003e But he\r\nregards the meaning of a general name as including, not indeed all the common\r\nproperties of the class named, but all of them that are ultimate properties, not\r\nresolvable into one another. \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“The enumeration of the attributes of oxygen, of\r\ngold, of man, should be an enumeration of the final (so far as can be made out),\r\nthe underivable, powers or functions of each,”\u003c/span\u003e and nothing less than this is a\r\ncomplete Definition (i., 75). An independent property, not derivable from other\r\nproperties, even if previously unknown, yet as soon as discovered becomes, according to\r\nhim, part of the meaning of the term, and should be included in the definition.\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“When we are told that diamond, which we know to be a transparent, glittering,\r\nhard, and high-priced substance, is composed of carbon, and is combustible, we must put\r\nthese additional properties on the same level as the rest; to us they are henceforth\r\nconnoted by the name”\u003c/span\u003e (i., 73). Consequently the propositions that diamond is\r\ncomposed of carbon, and that it is combustible, are regarded by Mr. Bain as merely\r\nverbal propositions. He carries this doctrine so far as to say that unless\r\nmortality can be shown to be a consequence of the ultimate laws of animal organization,\r\nmortality is connoted by man, and \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Man is Mortal”\u003c/span\u003e is a merely verbal proposition.\r\nAnd one of the peculiarities (I think a disadvantageous peculiarity) of his able\r\nand valuable treatise, is the large number of propositions requiring proof, and\r\nlearned by experience, which, in conformity\r\nwith this doctrine, he considers as not real, but verbal, propositions.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe objection I have to this language is that it confounds, or at least confuses, a much\r\nmore important distinction than that which it draws. The only reason for dividing\r\nPropositions into real and verbal, is in order to discriminate propositions which convey\r\ninformation about facts, from those which do not. A proposition which affirms that an\r\nobject has a given attribute, while designating the object by a name which already\r\nsignifies the attribute, adds no information to that which was already possessed by\r\nall who understood the name. But when this is said, it is implied that, by the\r\nsignification of a name, is meant the signification attached to it in the common\r\nusage of life. I can not think we ought to say that the meaning of a word includes\r\nmatters of fact which are unknown to every person who uses the word unless\r\nhe has learned them by special study of a particular department of Nature; or that because\r\na few persons are aware of these matters of fact, the affirmation of them is a\r\nproposition conveying no information. I hold that (special scientific connotation\r\napart) a name means, or connotes, only the properties which it is a mark of in the\r\ngeneral mind; and that in the case of any additional properties, however uniformly found\r\nto accompany these, it remains possible that a thing which did not possess the\r\nproperties might still be thought entitled to the name.\r\nRuminant, according to Mr. Bain’s use of language, connotes cloven-hoofed, since the two\r\nproperties are always found together, and no connection has ever been discovered between\r\nthem: but ruminant does not mean cloven-hoofed; and were an animal to be discovered\r\nwhich chews the cud, but has its feet undivided, I venture to say that it would still be\r\ncalled ruminant.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_44\" name=\"note_44\" href=\"#noteref_44\"\u003e44.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003eIn the\r\nfuller discussion which Archbishop Whately has given to this subject in his later\r\neditions, he almost ceases to regard the definitions of names and those of things as, in\r\nany important sense, distinct. He seems (9th ed., p. 145) to limit the notion of a Real\r\nDefinition to one which \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“explains any thing \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003emore\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e of the nature of\r\nthe thing than is implied in the name;”\u003c/span\u003e (including under the word \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“implied,”\u003c/span\u003e\r\nnot only what the name connotes, but every thing which can be deduced by reasoning\r\nfrom the attributes connoted). Even this, as he adds, is usually called not a\r\nDefinition, but a Description; and (as it seems to me) rightly so called. A Description,\r\nI conceive, can only be ranked among Definitions, when taken (as in the case of the\r\nzoological definition of man) to fulfill the true office of a Definition, by declaring\r\nthe connotation given to a word in some special use, as a term of science or art:\r\nwhich special connotation of course would not be expressed by the proper definition\r\nof the word in its ordinary employment.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nMr. De Morgan, exactly reversing the doctrine of Archbishop Whately, understands by a\r\nReal Definition one which contains \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eless\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e than the Nominal Definition,\r\nprovided only that what it contains is sufficient for distinction. \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“By\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ereal\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e definition I mean such an explanation of the word, be it the whole\r\nof the meaning or only part, as will be sufficient to separate the things contained under\r\nthat word from all others. Thus the following, I believe, is a complete definition of an\r\nelephant: An animal which naturally drinks by drawing the water into its nose, and then\r\nspurting it into its mouth.”\u003c/span\u003e—\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eFormal Logic\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, p. 36. Mr.\r\nDe Morgan’s general proposition and his example are at variance; for the peculiar mode\r\nof drinking of the elephant certainly forms no part of the meaning of the word\r\nelephant. It could not be said, because a person happened to be ignorant of this\r\nproperty, that he did not know what an elephant means.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_45\" name=\"note_45\" href=\"#noteref_45\"\u003e45.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003eIn the only attempt which, so far as I know, has been made\r\nto refute the preceding argumentation,\r\nit is maintained that in the first form of the syllogism,\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nA dragon is a thing which breathes flame,\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nA dragon is a serpent,\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nTherefore some serpent or serpents breathe flame,\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“there is just as much truth in the conclusion as there is in the premises, or rather,\r\nno more in the latter than in the former. If the general name serpent includes both real\r\nand imaginary serpents, there is no falsity in the conclusion; if not, there is\r\nfalsity in the minor premise.”\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nLet us, then, try to set out the syllogism on the hypothesis that the name serpent\r\nincludes imaginary serpents. We shall find that it is now necessary to alter the\r\npredicates; for it can not be asserted that an imaginary creature breathes flame; in\r\npredicating of it such a fact, we assert by the most positive implication that it is\r\nreal, and not imaginary. The conclusion must run thus, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Some serpent or serpents\r\neither do or are \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eimagined\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e to breathe flame.”\u003c/span\u003e And to prove this\r\nconclusion by the instance of dragons, the premises must be, A dragon is\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eimagined\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e as breathing flame. A dragon is a (real or imaginary) serpent:\r\nfrom which it undoubtedly follows, that there are serpents which are imagined to\r\nbreathe flame; but the major premise is not a definition, nor part of a definition;\r\nwhich is all that I am concerned to prove.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nLet us now examine the other assertion—that if the word serpent stands for none\r\nbut real serpents, the minor premise (a dragon is a serpent) is false. This is exactly\r\nwhat I have myself said of the premise, considered as a statement of fact: but it is\r\nnot false as part of the definition of a dragon; and since the premises, or one of\r\nthem, must be false (the conclusion being so), the real premise can not be the\r\ndefinition, which is true, but the statement of fact, which is false.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_46\" name=\"note_46\" href=\"#noteref_46\"\u003e46.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Few people”\u003c/span\u003e (I have\r\nsaid in another place) \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“have reflected how great a knowledge\r\nof Things is required to enable a man to affirm that any given argument turns wholly upon\r\nwords. There is, perhaps, not one of the leading terms of philosophy which is not used in\r\nalmost innumerable shades of meaning, to express ideas more or less widely different from\r\none another. Between two of these ideas a sagacious and penetrating mind will discern, as\r\nit were intuitively, an unobvious link of connection, upon which, though perhaps unable to\r\ngive a logical account of it, he will found a perfectly valid argument, which his critic,\r\nnot having so keen an insight into the Things, will mistake for a fallacy turning on the\r\ndouble meaning of a term. And the greater the genius of him who thus safely leaps over\r\nthe chasm, the greater will probably be the crowing and vainglory of the mere logician,\r\nwho, hobbling after him, evinces his own superior wisdom by pausing on its brink, and\r\ngiving up as desperate his proper business of bridging it over.”\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_47\" name=\"note_47\" href=\"#noteref_47\"\u003e47.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eThe different cases of Equipollency, or \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Equivalent\r\nPropositional Forms,”\u003c/span\u003e are set forth with some fullness in Professor Bain’s\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eLogic\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e. One of the commonest of these changes of\r\nexpression, that from affirming a proposition to denying its negative, or\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003evicè versa\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, Mr. Bain\r\ndesignates, very happily, by the name Obversion.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_48\" name=\"note_48\" href=\"#noteref_48\"\u003e48.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eAs Sir William Hamilton has pointed out, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Some A is\r\nnot B”\u003c/span\u003e may also be converted in the following form: \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“No B is \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003esome\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e\r\nA.”\u003c/span\u003e Some men are not negroes; therefore, No negroes are \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003esome\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e\r\nmen (\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ee.g.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, Europeans).\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_49\" name=\"note_49\" href=\"#noteref_49\"\u003e49.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003eContraries:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nAll A is B\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nNo A is B\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003eSubtraries:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nSome A is B\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nSome A is not B\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nContradictories:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nAll A is B\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nSome A is not B\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAlso contradictories:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nNo A is B\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nSome A is B\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nRespectively subalternate:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nAll A is B and No A is B\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nSome A is B and Some A is not B\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_50\" name=\"note_50\" href=\"#noteref_50\"\u003e50.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003eProfessor Bain denies the claim\r\nof Singular Propositions to be classed, for the purposes\r\nof ratiocination, with Universal; though they come within the designation which he himself\r\nproposes as an equivalent for Universal, that of Total. He would even, to use his own\r\nexpression, banish them entirely from the syllogism. He takes as an example,\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nSocrates is wise,\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nSocrates is poor, therefore\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nSome poor men are wise,\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nor more properly (as he observes) \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“one poor man is wise.”\u003c/span\u003e \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Now,\r\nif wise, poor, and a\r\nman, are attributes belonging to the meaning of the word Socrates, there is then no\r\nmarch of reasoning at all. We have given in Socrates, \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003einter alia\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, the facts wise, poor, and a man, and\r\nwe merely repeat the concurrence which is selected from the whole aggregate of properties\r\nmaking up the whole, Socrates. The case is one under the head\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e‘Greater and Less Connotation’\u003c/span\u003e\r\nin Equivalent Propositional Forms, or Immediate Inference.\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“But the example in this form does not do justice to the syllogism of\r\nsingulars. We must suppose both propositions to be real, the predicates being in\r\nno way involved in the subject. Thus\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nSocrates was the master of Plato,\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nSocrates fought at Delium,\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nThe master of Plato fought at Delium.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“It may fairly be doubted whether the transitions, in this instance, are any thing more\r\nthan equivalent forms. For the proposition \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e‘Socrates was the master of Plato and\r\nfought at Delium,’\u003c/span\u003e compounded out of the two premises, is obviously nothing more\r\nthan a grammatical abbreviation. No one can say that there is here any change of\r\nmeaning, or any thing beyond a verbal modification of the original form. The next step\r\nis, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e‘The master of Plato fought at Delium,’\u003c/span\u003e which is the previous statement cut\r\ndown by the omission of Socrates. It contents itself with reproducing a part of the\r\nmeaning, or saying less than had been previously said. The full equivalent of the\r\naffirmation is, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e‘The master of Plato fought at Delium, and the master of Plato was\r\nSocrates:’\u003c/span\u003e the new form omits the last piece of information, and gives only the\r\nfirst. Now, we never consider that we have made a real inference, a step in advance,\r\nwhen we repeat \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eless\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e than we are entitled to say, or drop from a complex\r\nstatement some portion not desired at the moment. Such an operation keeps strictly\r\nwithin the domain of equivalence, or Immediate Inference. In no way, therefore, can a\r\nsyllogism with two singular premises be viewed as a genuine syllogistic or deductive\r\ninference.”\u003c/span\u003e (\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eLogic\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, i., 159.)\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe first argument, as will have been seen, rests upon the supposition that the name\r\nSocrates has a meaning; that man, wise, and poor, are parts of this meaning; and that\r\nby predicating them of Socrates we convey no information; a view of the signification\r\nof names which, for reasons already given (Note to § 4 of the chapter on Definition,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003esupra\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, pp. \u003ca href=\"#Pg110\" class=\"tei tei-ref\"\u003e110\u003c/a\u003e,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Pg111\" class=\"tei tei-ref\"\u003e111.\u003c/a\u003e), I can not admit, and which, as applied to the class of\r\nnames which Socrates belongs to, is at war with Mr. Bain’s own definition of a\r\nProper Name (i., 148), \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“a single \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003emeaningless\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e mark or designation\r\nappropriated to the thing.”\u003c/span\u003e Such names, Mr. Bain proceeded to say, do not\r\nnecessarily indicate even human beings: much less then does the name Socrates include\r\nthe meaning of wise or poor. Otherwise it would follow that if Socrates had grown\r\nrich, or had lost his mental faculties by illness, he would no longer have\r\nbeen called Socrates.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe second part of Mr. Bain’s argument, in which he contends that even when the premises\r\nconvey real information, the conclusion is merely the premises with a part left out, is\r\napplicable, if at all, as much to universal propositions as to singular. In every\r\nsyllogism the conclusion contains less than is asserted in the two premises taken\r\ntogether. Suppose the syllogism to be\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAll bees are intelligent,\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nAll bees are insects, therefore\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nSome insects are intelligent:\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\none might use the same liberty taken by Mr. Bain, of joining together the two premises\r\nas if they were one—\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“All bees are insects and intelligent”\u003c/span\u003e—and might\r\nsay that in omitting the middle term \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ebees\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e we make no real\r\ninference, but merely reproduce part of what had been previously\r\nsaid. Mr. Bain’s is really an objection to the syllogism itself, or at all events to the\r\nthird figure: it has no special applicability to singular propositions.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_51\" name=\"note_51\" href=\"#noteref_51\"\u003e51.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eHis conclusions are, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“The\r\nfirst figure is suited to the discovery or proof of the properties\r\nof a thing; the second to the discovery or proof of the distinctions between things; the\r\nthird to the discovery or proof of instances and exceptions; the fourth to the\r\ndiscovery, or exclusion, of the different species of a genus.”\u003c/span\u003e The reference of\r\nsyllogisms in the last three figures to the \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003edictum\r\nde omni et nullo\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e is, in Lambert’s opinion, strained and unnatural: to each of\r\nthe three belongs, according to him, a separate axiom, co-ordinate and of equal\r\nauthority with that \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003edictum\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, and to which he\r\ngives the names of \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003edictum de diverso\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e for the\r\nsecond figure, \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003edictum de exemplo\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e for the\r\nthird, and \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003edictum de reciproco\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e for the\r\nfourth. See part i., or \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eDianoiologie\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, chap, iv., § 229\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eet seqq.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e Mr. Bailey (\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eTheory of Reasoning\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\n2d ed., pp. 70-74) takes a similar view of the subject.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_52\" name=\"note_52\" href=\"#noteref_52\"\u003e52.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003eSince this chapter was\r\nwritten, two treatises have appeared (or rather a treatise and a\r\nfragment of a treatise), which aim at a further improvement in the theory of the forms of\r\nratiocination: Mr. De Morgan’s \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Formal Logic; or, the Calculus of Inference, Necessary\r\nand Probable;”\u003c/span\u003e and the \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“New Analytic of Logical Forms,”\u003c/span\u003e attached as an Appendix\r\nto Sir William Hamilton’s \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eDiscussions on Philosophy\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, and at\r\ngreater length, to his posthumous \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eLectures on Logic\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIn Mr. De Morgan’s volume—abounding, in its more popular parts, with valuable\r\nobservations felicitously expressed—the principal feature of originality is an\r\nattempt to bring within strict technical rules the cases in which a conclusion can be\r\ndrawn from premises of a form usually classed as particular. Mr. De Morgan observes,\r\nvery justly, that from the premises most Bs are Cs, most Bs are As, it may be concluded\r\nwith certainty that some As are Cs, since two portions of the class B, each of them\r\ncomprising more than half, must necessarily in part consist of the same individuals.\r\nFollowing out this line of thought, it is equally evident that if we knew exactly what\r\nproportion the \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“most”\u003c/span\u003e in each of the premises bear to the entire class B, we\r\ncould increase in a corresponding degree the definiteness of the conclusion.\r\nThus if 60 per cent. of B are included in C, and 70 per cent. in A, 30 per cent. at\r\nleast must be common to both; in other words, the number of As which are Cs, and of Cs\r\nwhich are As, must be at least equal to 30 per cent. of the class B. Proceeding on this\r\nconception of \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“numerically definite propositions,”\u003c/span\u003e and extending it to such forms\r\nas these:—\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“45 Xs (or more) are each of them one of 70 Ys,”\u003c/span\u003e or \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“45 Xs (or\r\nmore) are no one of them to be found among 70 Ys,”\u003c/span\u003e and examining what inferences\r\nadmit of being drawn from the various combinations which may be made of premises of this\r\ndescription, Mr. De Morgan establishes universal formulæ for such inferences; creating\r\nfor that purpose not only a new technical language, but a formidable array of\r\nsymbols analogous to those of algebra.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nSince it is undeniable that inferences, in the cases examined by Mr. De Morgan, can\r\nlegitimately be drawn, and that the ordinary theory takes no account of them, I will not\r\nsay that it was not worth while to show in detail how these also could be reduced to\r\nformulæ as rigorous as those of Aristotle. What Mr. De Morgan has done was worth doing\r\nonce (perhaps more than once, as a school exercise); but I question if its results are\r\nworth studying and mastering for any practical purpose. The practical use of technical\r\nforms of reasoning is to bar out fallacies: but the fallacies which require to be guarded\r\nagainst in ratiocination properly so called, arise from the incautious use of the common\r\nforms of language; and the logician must track the fallacy into that territory, instead\r\nof waiting for it on a territory of his own. While he remains among propositions which\r\nhave acquired the numerical precision of the Calculus of Probabilities, the enemy is\r\nleft in possession of the only ground on which he can be formidable. And since the\r\npropositions (short of universal) on which a thinker has to depend, either for purposes\r\nof speculation or of practice, do not, except in a few peculiar cases,\r\nadmit of any numerical precision; common reasoning can not be translated into Mr. De\r\nMorgan’s forms, which therefore can not serve any purpose as a test of it.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nSir William Hamilton’s theory of the \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“quantification of the predicate”\u003c/span\u003e may be\r\ndescribed as follows:\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Logically”\u003c/span\u003e (I quote his words) \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“we ought to take into account the quantity,\r\nalways understood in thought, but usually, for manifest reasons, elided in its\r\nexpression, not only of the subject, but also of the predicate of a judgment.”\u003c/span\u003e\r\nAll A is B, is equivalent to all A is \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003esome\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e B. No A is B, to No A is\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eany\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e B. Some A is B, is tantamount to some A is \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003esome\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e B.\r\nSome A is not B, to Some A is \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003enot any\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e B. As in these forms of assertion\r\nthe predicate is exactly co-extensive with the subject, they all admit of simple\r\nconversion; and by this we obtain two additional forms—Some B is\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eall\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e A, and No B is \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003esome\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e A. We may also make the assertion\r\nAll A is all B, which will be true if the classes A and B are exactly co-extensive.\r\nThe last three forms, though conveying real assertions, have no place in the ordinary\r\nclassification of Propositions. All propositions, then, being supposed to be translated\r\ninto this language, and written each in that one of the preceding forms which answers to\r\nits signification, there emerges a new set of syllogistic rules, materially different\r\nfrom the common ones. A general view of the points of difference may be given in the\r\nwords of Sir W. Hamilton (\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eDiscussions\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, 2d ed., p. 651):\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“The revocation of the two terms of a Proposition to their true relation; a\r\nproposition being always an \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eequation\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e of its subject and its\r\npredicate.\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“The consequent reduction of the Conversion of Propositions from three\r\nspecies to one—that of Simple Conversion.\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“The reduction of all the \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eGeneral Laws\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e of\r\nCategorical Syllogisms to a single Canon.\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“The evolution from that one canon of all the Species and varieties of\r\nSyllogisms.\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“The abrogation of all the \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eSpecial Laws\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e of\r\nSyllogism.\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“A demonstration of the exclusive possibility of Three Syllogistic Figures;\r\nand (on new grounds) the scientific and final abolition of the Fourth.\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“A manifestation that Figure is an unessential variation in syllogistic\r\nform; and the consequent absurdity of Reducing the syllogisms of the other figures to\r\nthe first.\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“An enouncement of \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eone Organic Principle\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e for each\r\nFigure.\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“A determination of the true number of the Legitimate Moods; with\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Their amplification in number (thirty-six);\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Their numerical equality under all the figures; and\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Their relative equivalence, or virtual identity, throughout every\r\nschematic difference.\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“That, in the second and third figures, the extremes holding both the same\r\nrelation to the middle term, there is not, as in the first, an opposition and\r\nsubordination between a term major and a term minor, mutually containing and\r\ncontained, in the counter wholes of Extension and Comprehension.\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Consequently, in the second and third figures, there is no determinate major and minor\r\npremises, and there are two indifferent conclusions: whereas in the first the premises\r\nare determinate, and there is a single proximate conclusion.”\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThis doctrine, like that of Mr. De Morgan previously noticed, is a real addition to the\r\nsyllogistic theory; and has moreover this advantage over Mr. De Morgan’s \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“numerically\r\ndefinite Syllogism,”\u003c/span\u003e that the forms it supplies are really available as a test of the\r\ncorrectness of ratiocination; since propositions in the common form may always have their\r\npredicates quantified, and so be made amenable to Sir W. Hamilton’s rules. Considered,\r\nhowever, as a contribution to the \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eScience\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e of Logic, that is, to\r\nthe analysis of the mental processes concerned in reasoning, the new doctrine appears to\r\nme, I confess, not merely superfluous, but erroneous; since the form in which it\r\nclothes propositions does not, like the ordinary form, express what is in the mind of\r\nthe speaker when he enunciates the proposition. I can not think Sir William Hamilton\r\nright in maintaining that the quantity of the predicate is \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“always understood in\r\nthought.”\u003c/span\u003e It is implied, but is not present to the mind of the person who asserts the\r\nproposition. The quantification of the predicate, instead of being a means of bringing\r\nout more clearly the meaning of the proposition, actually leads the mind out of the\r\nproposition, into another order of ideas. For when we say, All men are mortal, we\r\nsimply mean to affirm the attribute mortality of all men; without thinking at all of\r\nthe \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eclass\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e mortal in the concrete, or troubling ourselves about whether it\r\ncontains any other beings or not. It is only for some artificial purpose\r\nthat we ever look at the proposition in the aspect in which the predicate also is thought\r\nof as a class-name, either including the subject only, or the subject and something\r\nmore. (See above, p. \u003ca href=\"#Pg077\" class=\"tei tei-ref\"\u003e77\u003c/a\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg078\" class=\"tei tei-ref\"\u003e78\u003c/a\u003e.)\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nFor a fuller discussion of this subject, see the twenty-second chapter of a work already\r\nreferred to, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“An Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy.”\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_53\" name=\"note_53\" href=\"#noteref_53\"\u003e53.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003eMr. Herbert Spencer\r\n(\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ePrinciples of Psychology\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, pp. 125-7), though his theory of the\r\nsyllogism coincides with all that is essential of mine, thinks it a logical fallacy to\r\npresent the two axioms in the text, as the regulating principles of syllogism. He charges\r\nme with falling into the error pointed out by Archbishop Whately and myself, of\r\nconfounding exact likeness with literal identity; and maintains, that we ought not to\r\nsay that Socrates possesses \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ethe same\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e attributes which are connoted by the\r\nword Man, but only that he possesses attributes \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eexactly like\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e them: according\r\nto which phraseology, Socrates, and the attribute mortality, are not two things\r\nco-existing with the same thing, as the axiom asserts, but two things coexisting\r\nwith two different things.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe question between Mr. Spencer and me is merely one of language; for neither of us (if\r\nI understand Mr. Spencer’s opinions rightly) believes an attribute to be a real thing,\r\npossessed of objective existence; we believe it to be a particular mode of naming our\r\nsensations, or our expectations of sensation, when looked at in their relation to an\r\nexternal object which excites them. The question raised by Mr. Spencer does not,\r\ntherefore, concern the properties of any really existing thing, but the comparative\r\nappropriateness, for philosophical purposes, of two different modes of using a name.\r\nConsidered in this point of view, the phraseology I have employed, which is that\r\ncommonly used by philosophers, seems to me to be the best. Mr. Spencer is of opinion\r\nthat because Socrates and Alcibiades are not the same man, the attribute which\r\nconstitutes them men should not be called the same attribute; that because the\r\nhumanity of one man and that of another express themselves to our senses not by the same\r\nindividual sensations but by sensations exactly alike, humanity ought to be regarded as\r\na different attribute in every different man. But on this showing, the humanity even of\r\nany one man should be considered as different attributes now and half an hour hence; for\r\nthe sensations by which it will then manifest itself to my organs will not be a\r\ncontinuation of my present sensations, but a repetition of them; fresh sensations, not\r\nidentical with, but only exactly like the present. If every general conception, instead\r\nof being \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“the One in the Many,”\u003c/span\u003e were considered to be as many different conceptions\r\nas there are things to which it is applicable, there would be no such thing as general\r\nlanguage. A name would have no general meaning if \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eman\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e connoted\r\none thing when predicated of John, and another, though closely resembling,\r\nthing when predicated of William. Accordingly a recent pamphlet asserts the impossibility\r\nof general knowledge on this precise ground.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe meaning of any general name is some outward or inward phenomenon, consisting, in\r\nthe last resort, of feelings; and these feelings, if their continuity is for an instant\r\nbroken, are no longer the same feelings, in the sense of individual identity. What, then,\r\nis the common something which gives a meaning to the general name? Mr. Spencer can only\r\nsay, it is the similarity of the feelings; and I rejoin, the attribute is precisely that\r\nsimilarity. The names of attributes are in their ultimate analysis names for the\r\nresemblances of our sensations (or other feelings). Every general name, whether abstract\r\nor concrete, denotes or connotes one or more of those resemblances. It will not,\r\nprobably, be denied, that if a hundred sensations are undistinguishably alike, their\r\nresemblance ought to be spoken of as one resemblance, and not a hundred resemblances\r\nwhich merely \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eresemble\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e one another. The things compared are many, but the\r\nsomething common to all of them must be conceived as one, just as the name is conceived\r\nas one, though corresponding to numerically different sensations of sound each\r\ntime it is pronounced. The general term \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eman\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e does not connote the\r\nsensations derived once from one man, which, once gone, can no more occur again than the\r\nsame flash of lightning. It connotes the general type of the sensations derived always\r\nfrom all men, and the power (always thought of as one) of producing sensations of that\r\ntype. And the axiom might be thus worded: Two \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003etypes of sensation\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e each of\r\nwhich co-exists with a third type, co-exist with another; or Two \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003epowers\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e\r\neach of which co-exists with a third power co-exist\r\nwith one another.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nMr. Spencer has misunderstood me in another particular. He supposes that the co-existence\r\nspoken of in the axiom, of two things with the same third thing, means simultaneousness\r\nin time. The co-existence meant is that of being jointly attributes of the same subject.\r\nThe attribute of being born without teeth, and the attribute of having thirty-two teeth\r\nin mature age, are in this sense co-existent, both being attributes of man, though\r\n\u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eex vi termini\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e never of\r\nthe same man at the same time.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_54\" name=\"note_54\" href=\"#noteref_54\"\u003e54.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eSupra, \u003ca href=\"#Pg093\" class=\"tei tei-ref\"\u003ep. 93\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_55\" name=\"note_55\" href=\"#noteref_55\"\u003e55.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003eProfessor Bain\r\n(\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eLogic\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, i., 157) considers the axiom (or rather axioms) here\r\nproposed as a substitute for the \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003edictum de\r\nomni\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, to possess certain advantages, but to be \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“unworkable as a basis of\r\nthe syllogism. The fatal defect consists in this, that it is ill-adapted to bring out\r\nthe difference between total and partial coincidence of terms, the observation of which\r\nis the essential precaution in syllogizing correctly. If all the terms were co-extensive,\r\nthe axiom would flow on admirably; A carries B, all B and none but B; B carries C in the\r\nsame manner; at once A carries C, without limitation or reserve. But in point of fact,\r\nwe know that while A carries B, other things carry B also; whence a process of limitation\r\nis required, in transferring A to C through B. A (in common with other things) carries\r\nB; B (in common with other things) carries C; whence A (in common with other things)\r\ncarries C. The axiom provides no means of making this limitation; if we were to follow A\r\nliterally, we should be led to suppose A and C co-extensive: for such is the only\r\nobvious meaning of \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e‘the attribute A coincides with the attribute C.’\u003c/span\u003e ”\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt is certainly possible that a careless learner here and there may suppose that if A\r\ncarries B, it follows that B carries A. But if any one is so incautious as to commit\r\nthis mistake, the very earliest lesson in the logic of inference, the Conversion of\r\npropositions, will correct it. The first of the two forms in which I have stated the\r\naxiom, is in some degree open to Mr. Bain’s criticism: when B is said to co-exist with A\r\n(it must be by a \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003elapsus calami\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e that Mr.\r\nBain uses the word \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ecoincide\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e), it is possible, in the absence of\r\nwarning, to suppose the meaning to be that the two things are only found together. But\r\nthis misinterpretation is excluded by the other, or practical, form of the maxim;\r\n\u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eNota notœ est nota rei ipsius.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e No one would be\r\nin any danger of inferring that because \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e is a mark of\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eb, b\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e can never exist without \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e; that\r\nbecause being in a confirmed consumption is a mark of being about to die, no one dies\r\nwho is not in a consumption; that because being coal is a mark of having come out of the\r\nearth, nothing can come out of the earth except coal. Ordinary knowledge of English seems\r\na sufficient protection against these mistakes, since in speaking of a mark of any thing\r\nwe are never understood as implying reciprocity.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nA more fundamental objection is stated by Mr. Bain in a subsequent passage (p. 158).\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“The axiom does not accommodate itself to the type of Deductive Reasoning as contrasted\r\nwith Induction—the application of a general principle to a special case. Any thing\r\nthat fails to make prominent this circumstance is not adapted as a foundation for the\r\nsyllogism.”\u003c/span\u003e But though it may be proper to limit the term Deduction to the application\r\nof a general principle to a special case, it has never been held that Ratiocination or\r\nSyllogism is subject to the same limitation; and the adoption of it would exclude a\r\ngreat amount of valid and conclusive syllogistic reasoning. Moreover, if the\r\n\u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003edictum de omni\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e makes prominent the fact of\r\nthe application of a general principle to a particular case, the axiom I propose makes\r\nprominent the condition which alone makes that application a real inference.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nI conclude, therefore, that both forms have their value, and their place in Logic. The\r\n\u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003edictum de omni\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e should be retained as the\r\nfundamental axiom of the logic of mere consistency, often called Formal Logic; nor have\r\nI ever quarreled with the use of it in that character, nor proposed to banish it\r\nfrom treatises on Formal Logic. But the other is the proper axiom for the logic of the\r\npursuit of truth by way of Deduction; and the recognition of it can alone\r\nshow how it is possible that deductive reasoning can be a road to truth.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_56\" name=\"note_56\" href=\"#noteref_56\"\u003e56.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eLogic\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\np. 239 (9th ed.).\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_57\" name=\"note_57\" href=\"#noteref_57\"\u003e57.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eIt is hardly necessary to say, that I am not\r\ncontending for any such absurdity as that we \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eactually\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“ought to have\r\nknown”\u003c/span\u003e and considered the case of every individual man, past, present, and future,\r\nbefore affirming that all men are mortal: although this interpretation has been,\r\nstrangely enough, put upon the preceding observations. There is no difference between me\r\nand Archbishop Whately, or any other defender of the syllogism, on the practical part of\r\nthe matter; I am only pointing out an inconsistency in the logical theory of it, as\r\nconceived by almost all writers. I do not say that a person who affirmed, before the\r\nDuke of Wellington was born, that all men are mortal, \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eknew\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e that the Duke\r\nof Wellington was mortal; but I do say that he \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003easserted\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e it; and I ask for\r\nan explanation of the apparent logical fallacy, of adducing\r\nin proof of the Duke of Wellington’s mortality, a general statement which presupposes\r\nit. Finding no sufficient resolution of this difficulty in any of the writers on Logic,\r\nI have attempted to supply one.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_58\" name=\"note_58\" href=\"#noteref_58\"\u003e58.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eThe language\r\nof ratiocination would, I think, be brought into closer agreement with the\r\nreal nature of the process, if the general propositions employed in reasoning, instead\r\nof being in the form All men are mortal, or Every man is mortal, were expressed in the\r\nform Any man is mortal. This mode of expression, exhibiting as the type of all reasoning\r\nfrom experience \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“The men A, B, C, etc., are so and so, therefore \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eany\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e\r\nman is so and so,”\u003c/span\u003e would much better manifest the true idea—that inductive\r\nreasoning is always, at bottom, inference from particulars to particulars, and that\r\nthe whole function of general propositions in reasoning, is\r\nto vouch for the legitimacy of such inferences.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_59\" name=\"note_59\" href=\"#noteref_59\"\u003e59.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eReview of Quetelet on Probabilities,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eEssays\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, p. 367.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_60\" name=\"note_60\" href=\"#noteref_60\"\u003e60.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ePhilosophy of Discovery\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, p.\r\n289.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_61\" name=\"note_61\" href=\"#noteref_61\"\u003e61.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eTheory of\r\nReasoning\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, chap. iv., to which I may refer for an able statement and enforcement\r\nof the grounds of the doctrine.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_62\" name=\"note_62\" href=\"#noteref_62\"\u003e62.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eOn a recent careful reperusal of Berkeley’s\r\nwhole works, I have been unable to find this doctrine in them. Sir John Herschel\r\nprobably meant that it is implied in Berkeley’s argument against abstract ideas.\r\nBut I can not find that Berkeley saw the implication, or had ever asked himself what\r\nbearing his argument had on the theory of the syllogism. Still less can I admit that the\r\ndoctrine is (as has been affirmed by one of my ablest and most candid critics)\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“among the standing marks of what is called the empirical philosophy.”\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_63\" name=\"note_63\" href=\"#noteref_63\"\u003e63.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eLogic\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, book iv., chap. i., sect.\r\n1.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_64\" name=\"note_64\" href=\"#noteref_64\"\u003e64.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eSee the\r\nimportant chapter on Belief, in Professor Bain’s great treatise, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eThe\r\nEmotions and the Will\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, pp. 581-4.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_65\" name=\"note_65\" href=\"#noteref_65\"\u003e65.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003eA writer in the \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“British Quarterly Review”\u003c/span\u003e (August,\r\n1846), in a review of this treatise, endeavors to show that there is no\r\n\u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003epetitio principii\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e in the syllogism, by\r\ndenying that the proposition, All men are mortal, asserts or assumes that Socrates is\r\nmortal. In support of this denial, he argues that we may, and in fact do, admit the\r\ngeneral proposition that all men are mortal, without having particularly examined the\r\ncase of Socrates, and even without knowing whether the individual so named is a man or\r\nsomething else. But this of course was never denied. That we can and do draw conclusions\r\nconcerning cases specifically unknown to us, is the datum from which all who discuss\r\nthis subject must set out. The question is, in what terms the evidence, or ground, on\r\nwhich we draw these conclusions, may best be designated—whether it is most correct\r\nto say, that the unknown case is proved by known cases, or that it is proved by a\r\ngeneral proposition including both sets of cases, the unknown and the known? I contend\r\nfor the former mode of expression. I hold it an abuse of language to say, that the\r\nproof that Socrates is mortal, is that all men are mortal. Turn it in what way we will,\r\nthis seems to me to be asserting that a thing is the proof of itself. Whoever\r\npronounces the words, All men are mortal, has affirmed that Socrates is mortal, though\r\nhe may never have heard of Socrates; for since Socrates, whether known to be so or not,\r\nreally is a man, he is included in the words, All men, and in every assertion of which\r\nthey are the subject. If the reviewer does not see that there is a difficulty here, I\r\ncan only advise him to reconsider the subject until he does: after which he will be a\r\nbetter judge of the success or failure of an attempt to remove the difficulty. That he\r\nhad reflected very little on the point when he wrote his remarks, is shown by his\r\noversight respecting the \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003edictum de omni et\r\nnullo\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e. He acknowledges that this maxim as commonly expressed—\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Whatever\r\nis true of a class, is true of every thing included in the class,”\u003c/span\u003e is a mere\r\nidentical proposition, since the class \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eis\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e nothing but the things included\r\nin it. But he thinks this defect would be cured by wording the maxim\r\nthus—\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Whatever is true of a class, is true of every thing which \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ecan be\r\nshown\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e to be a member of the class:”\u003c/span\u003e as if a thing could \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“be shown”\u003c/span\u003e to be\r\na member of the class without being one. If a class means the sum of all the things\r\nincluded in the class, the things which can \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“be shown”\u003c/span\u003e to be included in it are\r\npart of the sum, and the \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003edictum\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e is as much\r\nan identical proposition with respect to them as to the rest. One would almost imagine\r\nthat, in the reviewer’s opinion, things are not members of a class until they are called\r\nup publicly to take their place in it—that so long, in fact, as Socrates is not\r\nknown to be a man, he \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eis not\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e a man, and any assertion which can be made\r\nconcerning men does not at all regard him, nor is affected as to its truth or falsity\r\nby any thing in which he is concerned.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe difference between the reviewer’s theory and mine may be thus stated. Both admit\r\nthat when we say, All men are mortal, we make an assertion reaching beyond the sphere of\r\nour knowledge of individual cases; and that when a new individual, Socrates, is brought\r\nwithin the field of our knowledge by means of the minor premise, we learn that we have\r\nalready made an assertion respecting Socrates without knowing it: our own general\r\nformula being, to that extent, for the first time \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003einterpreted\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e to us. But\r\naccording to the reviewer’s theory, the smaller assertion is proved by the larger: while\r\nI contend, that both assertions are proved together, by the same evidence, namely, the\r\ngrounds of experience on which the general assertion\r\nwas made, and by which it must be justified.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe reviewer says, that if the major premise included the conclusion, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“we should be\r\nable to affirm the conclusion without the intervention of the minor premise; but every\r\none sees that that is impossible.”\u003c/span\u003e A similar argument is urged by Mr. De Morgan\r\n(\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eFormal Logic\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, p. 259): \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“The whole objection tacitly assumes\r\nthe superfluity of the minor; that is, tacitly assumes we know Socrates (Mr. De Morgan\r\nsays \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e‘Plato,’\u003c/span\u003e but to prevent confusion I have kept to my own \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eexemplum\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e.) to be a man as soon as we know him to be\r\nSocrates.”\u003c/span\u003e The objection would be well grounded if the assertion that the major\r\npremise includes the conclusion, meant that it individually specifies all it includes.\r\nAs, however, the only indication it gives is a description by marks, we have still to\r\ncompare any new individual with the marks; and to show that this comparison has been\r\nmade, is the office of the minor. But since, by supposition, the new individual has the\r\nmarks, whether we have ascertained him to have them or not; if we have affirmed the\r\nmajor premise, we have asserted him to be mortal. Now my position is that this assertion\r\ncan not be a necessary part of the argument. It can not be a necessary condition of\r\nreasoning that we should begin by making an assertion, which is afterward to be employed\r\nin proving a part of itself. I can conceive only one way out of this difficulty,\r\nviz., that what really forms the proof is \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ethe other\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e part of the assertion:\r\nthe portion of it, the truth of which has been ascertained previously: and that the\r\nunproved part is bound up in one formula with the proved part in mere anticipation, and\r\nas a memorandum of the nature of the conclusions which we are prepared to prove.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWith respect to the minor premise in its formal shape, the minor as it stands in the\r\nsyllogism, predicating of Socrates a definite class name, I readily admit that it is no\r\nmore a necessary part of reasoning than the major. When there is a major, doing its work\r\nby means of a class name, minors are needed to interpret it: but reasoning can be\r\ncarried on without either the one or the other. They are not the conditions of\r\nreasoning, but a precaution against erroneous reasoning. The only minor premise\r\nnecessary to reasoning in the example under consideration, is, Socrates is\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003elike\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e A, B, C, and the other individuals who are known to have\r\ndied. And this is the only universal type of that step in the reasoning process which is\r\nrepresented by the minor. Experience, however, of the uncertainty of this loose mode of\r\ninference, teaches the expediency of determining beforehand what \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ekind\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e of\r\nlikeness to the cases observed, is necessary to bring an unobserved case within the same\r\npredicate; and the answer to this question is the major. The minor then identifies the\r\nprecise kind of likeness possessed by Socrates, as being the kind required by the\r\nformula. Thus the syllogistic major and the syllogistic minor start into existence\r\ntogether, and are called forth by the same exigency. When we conclude from personal\r\nexperience without referring to any record—to any general theorems, either\r\nwritten, or traditional, or mentally registered by ourselves as conclusions of\r\nour own drawing—we do not use, in our thoughts, either a major or a minor, such as\r\nthe syllogism puts into words. When, however, we revise this rough inference from\r\nparticulars to particulars, and substitute a careful one, the revision consists in\r\nselecting two syllogistic premises. But this neither alters nor adds to the evidence\r\nwe had before; it only puts us in a better position for judging whether our inference\r\nfrom particulars to particulars is well grounded.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_66\" name=\"note_66\" href=\"#noteref_66\"\u003e66.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eInfra, \u003ca href=\"#Book_III_Chapter_II\" class=\"tei tei-ref\"\u003ebook iii.,\r\nchap. ii\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_67\" name=\"note_67\" href=\"#noteref_67\"\u003e67.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eInfra,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Book_III_Chapter_IV_Section_3\" class=\"tei tei-ref\"\u003ebook iii., ch. iv., § 3\u003c/a\u003e,\r\nand elsewhere.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_68\" name=\"note_68\" href=\"#noteref_68\"\u003e68.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eIt\r\nis justly remarked by Professor Bain (\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eLogic\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, ii., 134) that the\r\nword Hypothesis is here used in a somewhat peculiar sense. An hypothesis, in science,\r\nusually means a supposition not proved to be true, but surmised to be so, because if\r\ntrue it would account for certain known facts; and the final result of the speculation\r\nmay be to prove its truth. The hypotheses spoken of in the text are of a different\r\ncharacter; they are known not to be literally true, while as much of them as is true is\r\nnot hypothetical, but certain. The two cases, however, resemble in the circumstance that\r\nin both we reason, not from a truth, but from an assumption, and the truth therefore of\r\nthe conclusions is conditional, not categorical. This suffices to justify, in point of\r\nlogical propriety, Stewart’s use of the term. It is of course needful to bear in mind\r\nthat the hypothetical element in the definitions of geometry is the assumption that what\r\nis very nearly true is exactly so. This unreal exactitude might be called a fiction,\r\nas properly as an hypothesis; but that appellation, still more than the other, would\r\nfail to point out the close relation which exists between the fictitious point or line\r\nand the points and lines of which we have experience.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_69\" name=\"note_69\" href=\"#noteref_69\"\u003e69.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eMechanical Euclid\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, pp. 149\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eet seqq.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_70\" name=\"note_70\" href=\"#noteref_70\"\u003e70.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eWe might, it is true, insert this property into the\r\ndefinition of parallel lines, framing the definition so as to require, both that when\r\nproduced indefinitely they shall never meet, and also that any straight line which\r\nintersects one of them shall, if prolonged, meet the other. But by doing this we by no\r\nmeans get rid of the assumption; we are still obliged to take for granted the\r\ngeometrical truth, that all straight lines in the same plane, which have the former\r\nof these properties, have also the latter. For if it were possible that they should not,\r\nthat is, if any straight lines in the same plane, other than those which are parallel\r\naccording to the definition, had the property of never meeting although indefinitely\r\nproduced, the demonstrations of the subsequent portions of the theory of parallels could\r\nnot be maintained.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_71\" name=\"note_71\" href=\"#noteref_71\"\u003e71.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003eSome persons find themselves\r\nprevented from believing that the axiom, Two straight lines can not inclose a space,\r\ncould ever become known to us through experience, by a difficulty which may be stated\r\nas follows: If the straight lines spoken of are those contemplated in the\r\ndefinition—lines absolutely without breadth and absolutely straight—that\r\nsuch are incapable of inclosing a space is not proved by experience, for lines such as\r\nthese do not present themselves in our experience. If, on the other hand, the lines\r\nmeant are such straight lines as we do meet with in experience, lines straight enough\r\nfor practical purposes, but in reality slightly zigzag, and with some, however trifling,\r\nbreadth; as applied to these lines the axiom is not true, for two of them may, and\r\nsometimes do, inclose a small portion of space. In neither case, therefore, does\r\nexperience prove the axiom.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThose who employ this argument to show that geometrical axioms can not be proved by\r\ninduction, show themselves unfamiliar with a common and perfectly valid mode of\r\ninductive proof; proof by approximation. Though experience furnishes us with no lines so\r\nunimpeachably straight that two of them are incapable of inclosing the smallest space,\r\nit presents us with gradations of lines possessing less and less either of breadth or\r\nof flexure, of which series the straight line of the definition is the ideal limit. And\r\nobservation shows that just as much, and as nearly, as the straight lines of experience\r\napproximate to having no breadth or flexure, so much and so nearly does the\r\nspace-inclosing power of any two of them approach to zero. The inference that if they\r\nhad no breadth or flexure at all, they would inclose no space at all, is a correct\r\ninductive inference from these facts, conformable to one of the four\r\nInductive Methods hereinafter characterized, the Method of Concomitant Variations; of\r\nwhich the mathematical Doctrine of Limits presents the extreme case.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_72\" name=\"note_72\" href=\"#noteref_72\"\u003e72.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eWhewell’s \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eHistory of Scientific\r\nIdeas\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, i., 140.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_73\" name=\"note_73\" href=\"#noteref_73\"\u003e73.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003eDr.\r\nWhewell (\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ePhilosophy of Discovery\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, p. 289) thinks it unreasonable\r\nto contend that we know by experience, that our idea of a line exactly resembles a real\r\nline. \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“It does not appear,”\u003c/span\u003e he says, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“how we can compare our ideas with the\r\nrealities, since we know the realities only by our ideas.”\u003c/span\u003e We know the realities by\r\nour sensations. Dr. Whewell surely does not hold the \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“doctrine of perception by means\r\nof ideas,”\u003c/span\u003e which Reid gave himself so much trouble to refute.\r\nIf Dr. Whewell doubts whether we compare our ideas with the corresponding sensations,\r\nand assume that they resemble, let me ask on what evidence do we judge that a portrait\r\nof a person not present is like the original. Surely because it is like our idea, or\r\nmental image of the person, and because our idea is like the man himself.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nDr. Whewell also says, that it does not appear why this resemblance of ideas to the\r\nsensations of which they are copies, should be spoken of as if it were a peculiarity of\r\none class of ideas, those of space. My reply is, that I do not so speak of it. The\r\npeculiarity I contend for is only one of degree. All our ideas of sensation of course\r\nresemble the corresponding sensations, but they do so with very different degrees of\r\nexactness and of reliability. No one, I presume, can recall in imagination a color or\r\nan odor with the same distinctness and accuracy with which almost every one can mentally\r\nreproduce an image of a straight line or a triangle. To the extent, however, of their\r\ncapabilities of accuracy, our recollections of colors or of odors may serve as subjects\r\nof experimentation, as well as those of lines and spaces, and may yield conclusions\r\nwhich will be true of their external prototypes. A person in whom, either from natural\r\ngift or from cultivation, the impressions of color were peculiarly vivid and distinct,\r\nif asked which of two blue flowers was of the darkest tinge, though he might never\r\nhave compared the two, or even looked at them together, might be able to give a confident\r\nanswer on the faith of his distinct recollection of the colors; that is, he might\r\nexamine his mental pictures, and find there a property of the outward objects. But in\r\nhardly any case except that of simple geometrical forms, could this be done by mankind\r\ngenerally, with a degree of assurance equal to that which is given by a contemplation\r\nof the objects themselves. Persons differ most widely in the precision of their\r\nrecollection, even of forms: one person, when he has looked any one in the face for half\r\na minute, can draw an accurate likeness of him from memory; another may have seen him\r\nevery day for six months, and hardly know whether his nose is long or short. But every\r\nbody has a perfectly distinct mental image of a straight line, a circle, or a rectangle.\r\nAnd every one concludes confidently from these mental images to the corresponding\r\noutward things. The truth is, that we may, and continually do, study nature in our\r\nrecollections, when the objects themselves are absent; and in the case of geometrical\r\nforms we can perfectly, but in most other cases only imperfectly, trust our\r\nrecollections.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_74\" name=\"note_74\" href=\"#noteref_74\"\u003e74.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eLogic\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, i., 222.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_75\" name=\"note_75\" href=\"#noteref_75\"\u003e75.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eIbid., 226.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_76\" name=\"note_76\" href=\"#noteref_76\"\u003e76.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eHistory of Scientific Ideas\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, i.,\r\n65-67.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_77\" name=\"note_77\" href=\"#noteref_77\"\u003e77.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eIbid., i., 60.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_78\" name=\"note_78\" href=\"#noteref_78\"\u003e78.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eIbid., 58, 59.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_79\" name=\"note_79\" href=\"#noteref_79\"\u003e79.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“If all\r\nmankind had spoken one language, we can not doubt that there would have been\r\na powerful, perhaps a universal, school of philosophers, who would have believed in the\r\ninherent connection between names and things, who would have taken the sound\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eman\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e to be the mode of agitating the air which is essentially\r\ncommunicative of the ideas of reason, cookery, bipedality, etc.”\u003c/span\u003e—De Morgan,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eFormal Logic\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, p. 246.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_80\" name=\"note_80\" href=\"#noteref_80\"\u003e80.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eIt\r\nwould be difficult to name a man more remarkable at once for the greatness and the\r\nwide range of his mental accomplishments, than Leibnitz. Yet this eminent man gave as a\r\nreason for rejecting Newton’s scheme of the solar system, that God \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ecould\r\nnot\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e make a body revolve round a distant centre, unless either by some impelling\r\nmechanism, or by miracle: \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Tout ce qui n’est pas explicable,”\u003c/span\u003e says he in a letter\r\nto the Abbé Conti, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“par la nature des créatures, est miraculeux. Il ne suffit pas de\r\ndire: Dieu a fait une telle loi de nature; donc la chose est naturelle. Il faut que la\r\nloi soit exécutable par les natures des créatures. Si Dien donnait cette loi, par\r\nexemple, à un corps libre, de tourner à l’entour d’un certain centre, \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eil faudrait\r\nou qu’il y joignît d’autres corps qui par leur impulsion l’obligeassent de rester\r\ntoujours dans son orbite circulaire, ou qu’il mît un ange à ses trousses, ou enfin il\r\nfaudrait qu’il y concourût extraordinairement\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e; car naturellement il s’écartera\r\npar la tangente.”\u003c/span\u003e—\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eWorks of Leibnitz\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, ed. Dutens, iii.,\r\n446.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_81\" name=\"note_81\" href=\"#noteref_81\"\u003e81.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eNovum Organum\r\nRenovatum\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, pp. 32, 33.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_82\" name=\"note_82\" href=\"#noteref_82\"\u003e82.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eHistory of Scientific Ideas\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\ni., 264.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_83\" name=\"note_83\" href=\"#noteref_83\"\u003e83.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eIbid., i., 263.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_84\" name=\"note_84\" href=\"#noteref_84\"\u003e84.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eIbid., 240.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_85\" name=\"note_85\" href=\"#noteref_85\"\u003e85.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eHist. Scientific Ideas\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, ii., 25,\r\n26.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_86\" name=\"note_86\" href=\"#noteref_86\"\u003e86.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ePhil. of Disc.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, p.\r\n339.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_87\" name=\"note_87\" href=\"#noteref_87\"\u003e87.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ePhil.\r\nof Disc.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, p. 338.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_88\" name=\"note_88\" href=\"#noteref_88\"\u003e88.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eIbid., p.\r\n463.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_89\" name=\"note_89\" href=\"#noteref_89\"\u003e89.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ePhil. of Disc.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, pp.\r\n472, 473.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_90\" name=\"note_90\" href=\"#noteref_90\"\u003e90.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003eThe \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eQuarterly Review\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e for June, 1841,\r\ncontained an article of great ability on Dr. Whewell’s two great works (since\r\nacknowledged and reprinted in Sir John Herschel’s Essays) which maintains, on the\r\nsubject of axioms, the doctrine advanced in the text, that they are generalizations from\r\nexperience, and supports that opinion by a line of argument strikingly coinciding with\r\nmine. When I state that the whole of the present chapter (except the last four pages,\r\nadded in the fifth edition) was written before I had seen the article (the greater\r\npart, indeed, before it was published), it is not my object to occupy the reader’s\r\nattention with a matter so unimportant as the degree of originality which may or may not\r\nbelong to any portion of my own speculations, but to obtain for an opinion which is\r\nopposed to reigning doctrines, the recommendation derived from a striking concurrence\r\nof sentiment between two inquirers entirely independent of one another. I embrace the\r\nopportunity of citing from a writer of the extensive acquirements in physical and\r\nmetaphysical knowledge and the capacity of systematic thought which the article evinces,\r\npassages so remarkably in unison with my own views as the following:\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“The truths of geometry are summed up and embodied in its definitions and axioms….\r\nLet us turn to the axioms, and what do we find? A string of propositions concerning\r\nmagnitude in the abstract, which are equally true of space, time, force, number, and\r\nevery other magnitude susceptible of aggregation and subdivision. Such propositions,\r\nwhere they are not mere definitions, as some of them are, carry their inductive origin\r\non the face of their enunciation…. Those which declare that two straight lines can not\r\ninclose a space, and that two straight lines which cut one another can not both be\r\nparallel to a third, are in reality the only ones which express characteristic\r\nproperties of space, and these it will be worth while to consider more nearly. Now the\r\nonly clear notion we can form of straightness is uniformity of direction, for space in\r\nits ultimate analysis is nothing but an assemblage of distances and directions. And (not\r\nto dwell on the notion of continued contemplation, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, mental\r\nexperience, as included in the very idea of uniformity; nor on that of transfer of the\r\ncontemplating being from point to point, and of experience, during such transfer, of the\r\nhomogeneity of the interval passed over) we can not even propose the proposition in an\r\nintelligible form to any one whose experience ever since he was born has not assured him\r\nof the fact. The unity of direction, or that we can not march from a given point by more\r\nthan one path direct to the same object, is matter of practical experience long before\r\nit can by possibility become matter of abstract thought. \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eWe can not attempt\r\nmentally to exemplify the conditions of the assertion in an imaginary case opposed to\r\nit, without violating our habitual recollection of this experience, and defacing our\r\nmental picture of space as grounded on it.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e What but experience, we may ask, can\r\npossibly assure us of the homogeneity of the parts of distance, time, force, and\r\nmeasurable aggregates in general, on which the truth of the other axioms depends? As\r\nregards the latter axiom, after what has been said it must be clear that the very same\r\ncourse of remarks equally applies to its case, and that its truth is quite as much\r\nforced on the mind as that of the former by daily and hourly experience, …\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eincluding always, be it observed, in our notion of experience, that which is\r\ngained by contemplation of the inward picture which the mind forms to itself in any\r\nproposed case, or which it arbitrarily selects as an example—such picture, in\r\nvirtue of the extreme simplicity of these primary relations, being called up by the\r\nimagination with as much vividness and clearness as could be done by any external\r\nimpression, which is the only meaning we can attach to the word intuition, as applied\r\nto such relations\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e.”\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAnd again, of the axioms of mechanics: \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“As we admit no such propositions, other than\r\nas truths inductively collected from observation, even in geometry itself, it can hardly\r\nbe expected that, in a science of obviously contingent relations, we should acquiesce in\r\na contrary view. Let us take one of these axioms and examine its evidence: for instance,\r\nthat equal forces perpendicularly applied at the opposite ends of equal arms of a\r\nstraight lever will balance each other. What but experience, we may ask, in the first\r\nplace, can possibly inform us that a force so applied will have any tendency to turn\r\nthe lever on its centre at all? or that force can be so transmitted along a rigid line\r\nperpendicular to its direction, as to act elsewhere in space than along its own line of\r\naction? Surely this is so far from being self-evident that it has even a paradoxical\r\nappearance, which is only to be removed by giving our lever thickness, material\r\ncomposition, and molecular powers. Again, we conclude, that the two forces, being equal\r\nand applied under precisely similar circumstances, must, if they exert any effort\r\nat all to turn the lever, exert equal and opposite efforts: but what \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea priori\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e reasoning can possibly assure us that they\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003edo\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e act under precisely similar circumstances? that points which differ\r\nin place \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eare\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e similarly circumstanced as regards the exertion of force? that\r\nuniversal space may not have relations to universal force—or, at all events, that\r\nthe organization of the material universe may not be such as to place that portion of\r\nspace occupied by it in such relations to the forces exerted in it, as may invalidate\r\nthe absolute similarity of circumstances assumed? Or we may argue, what have we to do\r\nwith the notion of angular movement in the lever at all? The case is one of rest, and of\r\nquiescent destruction of force by force. Now how is this destruction effected? Assuredly\r\nby the counter-pressure which supports the fulcrum. But would not this destruction\r\nequally arise, and by the same amount of counteracting force, if each force simply\r\npressed its own half of the lever against the fulcrum? And what can assure us that it is\r\nnot so, except removal of one or other force, and consequent tilting of the lever? The\r\nother fundamental axiom of statics, that the pressure on the point of support is the sum\r\nof the weights … is merely a scientific transformation and more refined mode of\r\nstating a coarse and obvious result of universal experience, viz., that the weight of a\r\nrigid body is the same, handle it or suspend it in what position or by what point we\r\nwill, and that whatever sustains it sustains its total weight. Assuredly, as Mr.\r\nWhewell justly remarks, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e‘No one probably ever made a trial for the purpose of showing\r\nthat the pressure on the support is equal to the sum of the weights.’\u003c/span\u003e … But it is\r\nprecisely because in every action of his life from earliest infancy he has been\r\ncontinually making the trial, and seeing it made by every other living being about him,\r\nthat he never dreams of staking its result on one additional attempt made with\r\nscientific accuracy. This would be as if a man should resolve to decide by experiment\r\nwhether his eyes were useful for the purpose of seeing, by hermetically\r\nsealing himself up for half an hour in a metal case.”\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nOn the \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“paradox of universal propositions obtained by experience,”\u003c/span\u003e the same writer\r\nsays: \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“If there be necessary and universal truths expressible in propositions of\r\naxiomatic simplicity and obviousness, and having for their subject-matter the elements\r\nof all our experience and all our knowledge, surely these are the truths which, if\r\nexperience suggest to us any truths at all, it ought to suggest most readily, clearly,\r\nand unceasingly. If it were a truth, universal and necessary, that a net is spread over\r\nthe whole surface of every planetary globe, we should not travel far on our own without\r\ngetting entangled in its meshes, and making the necessity of some means of extrication\r\nan axiom of locomotion…. There is, therefore, nothing paradoxical, but the reverse, in\r\nour being led by observation to a recognition of such truths, as \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003egeneral\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e\r\npropositions, co-extensive at least with all human experience. That they pervade all\r\nthe objects of experience, must insure their continual suggestion \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eby\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e\r\nexperience; that they are true, must insure that consistency of suggestion, that\r\niteration of uncontradicted assertion, which commands implicit assent, and removes all\r\noccasion of exception; that they are simple, and admit of no misunderstanding, must\r\nsecure their admission by every mind.”\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“A truth, necessary and universal, relative to any object of our knowledge, must\r\nverify itself in every instance where that object is before our contemplation, and if at\r\nthe same time it be simple and intelligible, its verification must be obvious.\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eThe sentiment of such a truth can not, therefore, but be present to our minds\r\nwhenever that object is contemplated, and must therefore make a part of the mental\r\npicture or idea of that object which we may on any occasion summon before our\r\nimagination…. All propositions, therefore, become not only untrue but\r\ninconceivable\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e, if … axioms be violated in their enunciation.”\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAnother eminent mathematician had previously sanctioned by his authority the doctrine of\r\nthe origin of geometrical axioms in experience. \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Geometry is thus founded likewise on\r\nobservation; but of a kind so familiar and obvious, that the primary notions which it\r\nfurnishes might seem intuitive.”\u003c/span\u003e—\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eSir John Leslie\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\nquoted by Sir William Hamilton, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eDiscourses\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\netc., p. 272.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_91\" name=\"note_91\" href=\"#noteref_91\"\u003e91.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003ePrinciples\r\nof Psychology.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_92\" name=\"note_92\" href=\"#noteref_92\"\u003e92.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eMr. Spencer is mistaken in supposing me to claim any\r\npeculiar \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“necessity”\u003c/span\u003e for this axiom as compared with others. I have corrected the\r\nexpressions which led him into that misapprehension\r\nof my meaning.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_93\" name=\"note_93\" href=\"#noteref_93\"\u003e93.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003eMr.\r\nSpencer, in recently returning to the subject (Principles of Psychology, new edition,\r\nchap. xii.: \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“The Test of Relative Validity”\u003c/span\u003e), makes two answers to the preceding\r\nremarks. One is:\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Were an argument formed by repeating the same proposition over and over again, it\r\nwould be true that any intrinsic fallibility of the postulate would not make the\r\nconclusion more untrustworthy than the first step. But an argument consists of unlike\r\npropositions. Now, since Mr. Mill’s criticism on the Universal Postulate is that in some\r\ncases, which he names, it has proved to be an untrustworthy test; it follows that in any\r\nargument consisting of heterogeneous propositions, there is a risk, increasing as the\r\nnumber of propositions increases, that some one of them belongs to this class of cases,\r\nand is wrongly accepted because of the inconceivableness of its negation.”\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nNo doubt: but this supposes new \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003epremises\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e to be taken in. The point we are\r\ndiscussing is the fallibility not of the premises, but of the reasoning, as\r\ndistinguished from the premises. Now the validity of the reasoning depends always upon\r\nthe same axiom, repeated (in thought) \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“over and over again,”\u003c/span\u003e viz., that whatever\r\nhas a mark, has what it is a mark of. Even, therefore, on the assumption that this axiom\r\nrests ultimately on the Universal Postulate, and that, the Postulate not being wholly\r\ntrustworthy, the axiom may be one of the cases of its failure; all the risk there is of\r\nthis is incurred at the very first step of the reasoning, and is not added to, however\r\nlong may be the series of subsequent steps.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nI am here arguing, of course, from Mr. Spencer’s point of view. From my own the case is\r\nstill clearer; for, in my view, the truth that whatever has a mark has what it is a mark\r\nof, is wholly trustworthy, and derives none of its evidence from so very untrustworthy a\r\ntest as the inconceivability of the negative.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nMr. Spencer’s second answer is valid up to a certain point; it is, that every\r\nprolongation of the process involves additional chances of casual error, from\r\ncarelessness in the reasoning operation. This is an important consideration in the\r\nprivate speculations of an individual reasoner; and even with respect to mankind at\r\nlarge, it must be admitted that, though mere oversights in the syllogistic process,\r\nlike errors of addition in an account, are special to the individual, and seldom escape\r\ndetection, confusion of thought produced (for example) by ambiguous terms has led whole\r\nnations or ages to accept fallacious reasoning as valid. But this very fact points to\r\ncauses of error so much more dangerous than the mere length of the process, as quite to\r\nvitiate the doctrine that the \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“test of the relative validities of conflicting\r\nconclusions”\u003c/span\u003e is the number of times the fundamental postulate is involved. On the\r\ncontrary, the subjects on which the trains of reasoning are longest, and the assumption,\r\ntherefore, oftenest repeated, are in general those which are best fortified against the\r\nreally formidable causes of\r\nfallacy; as in the example already given of mathematics.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_94\" name=\"note_94\" href=\"#noteref_94\"\u003e94.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eMr.\r\nSpencer makes a distinction between conceiving myself looking into darkness, and\r\nconceiving \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ethat I am\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e then and there looking into darkness. To me it seems\r\nthat this change of the expression to the form \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eI am\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, just marks\r\nthe transition from conception to belief, and that the phrase \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“to conceive that\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eI am\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e,”\u003c/span\u003e or \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“that any thing \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eis\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e,”\u003c/span\u003e is not consistent with\r\nusing the word conceive in its rigorous sense.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_95\" name=\"note_95\" href=\"#noteref_95\"\u003e95.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eI have myself accepted the contest, and fought it\r\nout on this battle-ground, in the eleventh chapter of\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eAn Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_96\" name=\"note_96\" href=\"#noteref_96\"\u003e96.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eChap. xi.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_97\" name=\"note_97\" href=\"#noteref_97\"\u003e97.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003eIn one of the three cases, Mr. Spencer, to my no\r\nsmall surprise, thinks that the belief of mankind \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“can not be rightly said to\r\nhave undergone”\u003c/span\u003e the change I allege. Mr. Spencer himself still thinks we are unable\r\nto conceive gravitation acting through empty space. \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“If an astronomer avowed that\r\nhe could conceive gravitative force as exercised through space absolutely\r\nvoid, my private opinion would be that he mistook the nature of conception. Conception\r\nimplies representation. Here the elements of the representation are the two bodies\r\nand an agency by which either affects the other. To conceive this agency is to represent\r\nit in some terms derived from our experiences—that is, from our sensations. As\r\nthis agency gives us no sensations, we are obliged (if we try to conceive it) to use\r\nsymbols idealized from our sensations—imponderable units forming a medium.”\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIf Mr. Spencer means that the action of gravitation gives us no sensations, the\r\nassertion is one than which I have not seen, in the writings of philosophers, many more\r\nstartling. What other sensation do we need than the sensation of one body moving toward\r\nanother? \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“The elements of the representation”\u003c/span\u003e are not two bodies and an\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“agency,”\u003c/span\u003e but two bodies and an effect; viz., the fact of their approaching one\r\nanother. If we are able to conceive a vacuum, is there any difficulty\r\nin conceiving a body falling to the earth through it?\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_98\" name=\"note_98\" href=\"#noteref_98\"\u003e98.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eDiscussions\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, etc., 2d ed.,\r\np. 624.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_99\" name=\"note_99\" href=\"#noteref_99\"\u003e99.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eProfessor Bain (\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eLogic\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, i.,\r\n16) identifies the Principle of Contradiction with his Law of\r\nRelativity, viz., that \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“every thing that can be thought of, every affirmation\r\nthat can be made, has an opposite or counter notion or affirmation;”\u003c/span\u003e\r\na proposition which is one of the general results of the whole body of human\r\nexperience. For further considerations respecting the axioms of Contradiction and\r\nExcluded Middle, see the twenty-first chapter of \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eAn Examination\r\nof Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_100\" name=\"note_100\" href=\"#noteref_100\"\u003e100.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003eDr. Whewell thinks it\r\nimproper to apply the term Induction to any operation not terminating\r\nin the establishment of a general truth. Induction, he says\r\n(\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ePhilosophy of Discovery\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, p. 245), \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“is not the\r\nsame thing as experience and observation. Induction is experience or\r\nobservation \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003econsciously\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e looked at in a \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003egeneral\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e form.\r\nThis consciousness and generality are necessary parts of that knowledge\r\nwhich is science.”\u003c/span\u003e And he objects (p. 241) to the mode in which the word\r\nInduction is employed in this work, as an undue extension of that term \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“not\r\nonly to the cases in which the general induction is consciously applied to a\r\nparticular instance, but to the cases in which the particular instance is dealt\r\nwith by means of experience in that rude sense in which experience can be\r\nasserted of brutes, and in which of course we can in no way imagine that the\r\nlaw is possessed or understood as a general proposition.”\u003c/span\u003e This use of the\r\nterm he deems a \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“confusion of knowledge with practical tendencies.”\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nI disclaim, as strongly as Dr. Whewell can do, the application of such terms as induction,\r\ninference, or reasoning, to operations performed by mere instinct, that is, from an\r\nanimal impulse, without the exertion of any intelligence. But I perceive no ground\r\nfor confining the use of those terms to cases in which the inference is drawn in\r\nthe forms and with the precautions required by scientific propriety. To the idea of\r\nScience, an express recognition and distinct apprehension of general laws as such,\r\nis essential: but nine-tenths of the conclusions drawn from experience in the\r\ncourse of practical life, are drawn without any such recognition: they are\r\ndirect inferences from known cases, to a case supposed to be similar. I have endeavored\r\nto show that this is not only as legitimate an operation, but substantially the same\r\noperation, as that of ascending from known cases to a general proposition; except that\r\nthe latter process has one great security for correctness which the former does not\r\npossess. In science, the inference must necessarily pass through the intermediate\r\nstage of a general proposition, because Science wants its conclusions for record,\r\nand not for instantaneous use. But the inferences drawn for the guidance of\r\npractical affairs, by persons who would often be quite incapable of expressing\r\nin unexceptionable terms the corresponding generalizations, may and frequently do\r\nexhibit intellectual powers quite equal to any which have ever been displayed\r\nin science; and if these inferences are not inductive, what are they? The limitation\r\nimposed on the term by Dr. Whewell seems perfectly arbitrary; neither justified by\r\nany fundamental distinction between what he includes and what he desires to exclude,\r\nnor sanctioned by usage, at least from the time of Reid and Stewart, the principal\r\nlegislators (as far as the English language is concerned) of modern metaphysical\r\nterminology.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_101\" name=\"note_101\" href=\"#noteref_101\"\u003e101.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eSupra,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Pg145\" class=\"tei tei-ref\"\u003ep. 145\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_102\" name=\"note_102\" href=\"#noteref_102\"\u003e102.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eNovum Organum Renovatum\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\npp. 72, 73.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_103\" name=\"note_103\" href=\"#noteref_103\"\u003e103.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eNovum Organum\r\nRenovatum\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, p. 32.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_104\" name=\"note_104\" href=\"#noteref_104\"\u003e104.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eCours\r\nde Philosophie Positive\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, vol. ii., p. 202.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_105\" name=\"note_105\" href=\"#noteref_105\"\u003e105.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003eDr. Whewell, in\r\nhis reply, contests the distinction here drawn, and maintains, that not\r\nonly different descriptions, but different explanations of a phenomenon, may all be\r\ntrue. Of the three theories respecting the motions of the heavenly bodies, he says\r\n(\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ePhilosophy of Discovery\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, p. 231): \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Undoubtedly all these\r\nexplanations may be true and consistent with each other, and would be so if each\r\nhad been followed out so as to show in what manner it could be made consistent with\r\nthe facts. And this was, in reality, in a great measure done. The doctrine that the\r\nheavenly bodies were moved by vortices was successfully modified, so that\r\nit came to coincide in its results with the doctrine of an inverse-quadratic\r\ncentripetal force…. When this point was reached, the vortex was merely a machinery,\r\nwell or ill devised, for producing such a centripetal force, and therefore did not\r\ncontradict the doctrine of a centripetal force. Newton himself does not appear to have\r\nbeen averse to explaining gravity by impulse. So little is it true that if one theory\r\nbe true the other must be false. The attempt to explain gravity by the impulse of\r\nstreams of particles flowing through the universe in all directions, which I have\r\nmentioned in the \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ePhilosophy\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, is so far from being inconsistent with\r\nthe Newtonian theory, that it is founded entirely upon it. And even with regard to the\r\ndoctrine, that the heavenly bodies move by an inherent virtue; if this doctrine had been\r\nmaintained in any such way that it was brought to agree with the facts, the inherent\r\nvirtue must have had its laws determined; and then it would have been found that the\r\nvirtue had a reference to the central body; and so, the \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e‘inherent virtue’\u003c/span\u003e must\r\nhave coincided in its effect with the Newtonian force; and then, the two explanations\r\nwould agree, except so far as the word \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e‘inherent’\u003c/span\u003e was concerned. And if such a\r\npart of an earlier theory as this word \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003einherent\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e indicates,\r\nis found to be untenable, it is of course rejected in the transition to later and more\r\nexact theories, in Inductions of this kind, as well as in what Mr. Mill calls\r\nDescriptions. There is, therefore, still no validity discoverable in the distinction\r\nwhich Mr. Mill attempts to draw between descriptions like Kepler’s law of elliptical\r\norbits, and other examples of induction.”\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIf the doctrine of vortices had meant, not that vortices existed, but only that the\r\nplanets moved \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ein the same manner\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e as if they had been whirled by vortices;\r\nif the hypothesis had been merely a mode of representing the facts, not an attempt\r\nto account for them; if, in short, it had been only a Description; it would, no\r\ndoubt, have been reconcilable with the Newtonian theory. The vortices, however, were not\r\na mere aid to conceiving the motions of the planets, but a supposed physical agent,\r\nactively impelling them; a material fact, which might be true or not true, but could\r\nnot be both true and not true. According to Descartes’s theory it was true, according to\r\nNewton’s it was not true. Dr. Whewell probably means that since the phrases, centripetal\r\nand projectile force, do not declare the nature but only the direction of the forces,\r\nthe Newtonian theory does not absolutely contradict any hypothesis which may be\r\nframed respecting the mode of their production. The Newtonian theory, regarded as a mere\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003edescription\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e of the planetary motions, does not; but the Newtonian theory\r\nas an \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eexplanation\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e of them does. For in what does the explanation consist?\r\nIn ascribing those motions to a general law which obtains between all particles of\r\nmatter, and in identifying this with the law by which bodies fall to the ground. If the\r\nplanets are kept in their orbits by a force which draws the particles composing them\r\ntoward every other particle of matter in the solar system, they are not kept in those\r\norbits by the impulsive force of certain streams of matter which whirl them round.\r\nThe one explanation absolutely excludes the other. Either the planets\r\nare not moved by vortices, or they do not move by a law common to all matter. It is\r\nimpossible that both opinions can be true. As well might it be said that there is no\r\ncontradiction between the assertions, that a man died because somebody killed him, and\r\nthat he died a natural death.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nSo, again, the theory that the planets move by a virtue inherent in their celestial\r\nnature, is incompatible with either of the two others: either that of their being moved\r\nby vortices, or that which regards them as moving by a property which they have in\r\ncommon with the earth and all terrestrial bodies. Dr. Whewell says that the theory of\r\nan inherent virtue agrees with Newton’s when the word inherent is left out, which of\r\ncourse it would be (he says) if \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“found to be untenable.”\u003c/span\u003e But leave that out, and\r\nwhere is the theory? The word inherent \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eis\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e the theory. When that is\r\nomitted, there remains nothing except that the heavenly bodies move \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“by a virtue,”\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, by a power of some sort; or by virtue of their celestial\r\nnature, which directly contradicts the doctrine that terrestrial bodies fall by the same\r\nlaw.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIf Dr. Whewell is not yet satisfied, any other subject will serve equally well to test\r\nhis doctrine. He will hardly say that there is no contradiction between the emission\r\ntheory and the undulatory theory of light; or that there can be both one and two\r\nelectricities; or that the hypothesis of the production of the higher organic forms by\r\ndevelopment from the lower, and the supposition of separate and successive acts of\r\ncreation, are quite reconcilable; or that the theory that volcanoes are fed from a\r\ncentral fire, and the doctrines which ascribe them to chemical action at a comparatively\r\nsmall depth below the earth’s surface, are consistent with\r\none another, and all true as far as they go.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIf different explanations of the same fact can not both be true, still less, surely, can\r\ndifferent predictions. Dr. Whewell quarrels (on what ground it is not necessary here to\r\nconsider) with the example I had chosen on this point, and thinks an objection to an\r\nillustration a sufficient answer to a theory. Examples not liable to his objection are\r\neasily found, if the proposition that conflicting predictions can not both be true, can\r\nbe made clearer by many examples.\r\nSuppose the phenomenon to be a newly-discovered comet, and that one astronomer predicts\r\nits return once in every 300 years—another once in every 400: can they both be\r\nright? When Columbus predicted that by sailing constantly westward he should in time\r\nreturn to the point from which he set out, while others asserted that he could never do\r\nso except by turning back, were both he and his opponents true prophets? Were the\r\npredictions which foretold the wonders of railways and steamships, and those which\r\naverred that the Atlantic could never be crossed by steam navigation, nor a railway\r\ntrain propelled ten miles an hour, both (in Dr. Whewell’s words) \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“true, and\r\nconsistent with one another?”\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nDr. Whewell sees no distinction between holding contradictory opinions on a question of\r\nfact, and merely employing different analogies to facilitate the conception of the same\r\nfact. The case of different Inductions belongs to the former class, that of different\r\nDescriptions to the latter.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_106\" name=\"note_106\" href=\"#noteref_106\"\u003e106.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ePhil. of Discov.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, p. 256.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_107\" name=\"note_107\" href=\"#noteref_107\"\u003e107.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eEssays on\r\nthe Pursuit of Truth.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_108\" name=\"note_108\" href=\"#noteref_108\"\u003e108.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003eIn the first edition a note was appended\r\nat this place, containing some criticism on Archbishop\r\nWhately’s mode of conceiving the relation between Syllogism and Induction. In a\r\nsubsequent issue of his \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eLogic\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, the Archbishop made a reply to the\r\ncriticism, which induced me to cancel part of the note, incorporating the remainder\r\nin the text. In a still later edition, the Archbishop observes in a tone of something\r\nlike disapprobation, that the objections, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“doubtless from their being fully answered\r\nand found untenable, were silently suppressed,”\u003c/span\u003e and that hence he might appear to\r\nsome of his readers to be combating a shadow. On this latter point, the Archbishop need\r\ngive himself no uneasiness. His readers, I make bold to say, will fully credit his mere\r\naffirmation that the objections have actually been made.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nBut as he seems to think that what he terms the suppression of the objections ought not to\r\nhave been made \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“silently,”\u003c/span\u003e I now break that silence, and state exactly what it is\r\nthat I suppressed, and why. I suppressed that alone which might be regarded as personal\r\ncriticism on the Archbishop. I had imputed to him the having omitted to ask himself a\r\nparticular question. I found that he had asked himself the question, and could give it\r\nan answer consistent with his own theory. I had also, within the compass of a\r\nparenthesis, hazarded some remarks on certain general characteristics of Archbishop\r\nWhately as a philosopher. These remarks, though their tone, I hope, was neither\r\ndisrespectful nor arrogant, I felt, on reconsideration, that I was hardly entitled to\r\nmake; least of all, when the instance which I had regarded as an illustration of them,\r\nfailed, as I now saw, to bear them out. The real matter at the bottom of the whole\r\ndispute, the different view we take of the function of the major premise,\r\nremains exactly where it was; and so far was I from thinking that my opinion had\r\nbeen fully \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“answered”\u003c/span\u003e and was \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“untenable,”\u003c/span\u003e that in the same edition in which I\r\ncanceled the note, I not only enforced the opinion by further arguments, but answered\r\n(though without naming him) those of the Archbishop.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nFor not having made this statement before, I do not think it needful to apologize. It\r\nwould be attaching very great importance to one’s smallest sayings, to think a formal\r\nretractation requisite every time that one falls into an error. Nor is Archbishop\r\nWhately’s well-earned fame of so tender a quality as to require that in withdrawing a\r\nslight criticism on him I should have been bound to offer a public\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eamende\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e for having made it.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_109\" name=\"note_109\" href=\"#noteref_109\"\u003e109.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003eBut\r\nthough it is a condition of the validity of every induction that there be uniformity in\r\nthe course of nature, it is not a necessary condition that the uniformity should pervade\r\nall nature. It is enough that it pervades the particular class of phenomena to which the\r\ninduction relates. An induction concerning the motions of the planets, or the properties\r\nof the magnet, would not be vitiated though we were to suppose that wind and weather are\r\nthe sport of chance, provided it be assumed that astronomical and magnetic phenomena are\r\nunder the dominion of general laws. Otherwise the early experience of mankind would have\r\nrested on a very weak foundation; for in the infancy of science it could not be known\r\nthat \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eall\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e phenomena are regular in their course.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nNeither would it be correct to say that every induction by which we infer any truth,\r\nimplies the general fact of uniformity \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eas foreknown\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e, even in reference to\r\nthe kind of phenomena concerned. It implies, \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eeither\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e that this general fact\r\nis already known, \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eor\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e that we may now know it: as the conclusion, the Duke\r\nof Wellington is mortal, drawn from the instances A, B, and C, implies either that we\r\nhave already concluded all men to be mortal, or that we are now entitled\r\nto do so from the same evidence. A vast amount of confusion and paralogism respecting\r\nthe grounds of Induction would be dispelled by keeping in view these simple\r\nconsiderations.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_110\" name=\"note_110\" href=\"#noteref_110\"\u003e110.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eInfra,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Book_III_Chapter_XXI\" class=\"tei tei-ref\"\u003echap. xxi\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_111\" name=\"note_111\" href=\"#noteref_111\"\u003e111.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eInfra, chap. \u003ca href=\"#Book_III_Chapter_XXI\" class=\"tei tei-ref\"\u003exxi\u003c/a\u003e.,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Book_III_Chapter_XXII\" class=\"tei tei-ref\"\u003exxii\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_112\" name=\"note_112\" href=\"#noteref_112\"\u003e112.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eIn strictness, wherever the present\r\nconstitution of space exists; which we have ample reason to believe that it does\r\nin the region of the fixed stars.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_113\" name=\"note_113\" href=\"#noteref_113\"\u003e113.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003eDr.\r\nWhewell (\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ePhil. of Discov.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, p. 246) will not allow these and\r\nsimilar erroneous judgments to be called inductions; inasmuch as such superstitious\r\nfancies \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“were not collected from the facts by seeking a law of their occurrence, but\r\nwere suggested by an imagination of the anger of superior powers, shown by such\r\ndeviations from the ordinary course of nature.”\u003c/span\u003e I conceive the question to be, not\r\nin what manner these notions were at first suggested, but by what evidence they have,\r\nfrom time to time, been supposed to be substantiated. If the believers\r\nin these erroneous opinions had been put on their defense, they would have referred\r\nto experience: to the comet which preceded the assassination of Julius Cæsar, or to\r\noracles and other prophecies known to have been fulfilled. It is by such appeals to\r\nfacts that all analogous superstitions, even in our day, attempt to justify themselves;\r\nthe supposed evidence of experience is necessary to their hold on the mind. I quite\r\nadmit that the influence of such coincidences would not be what it is, if strength were\r\nnot lent to it by an antecedent presumption; but this is not peculiar to such cases;\r\npreconceived notions of probability form part of the explanation of many other cases of\r\nbelief on insufficient evidence. The \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea priori\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\nprejudice does not prevent the erroneous opinion from being sincerely regarded as a\r\nlegitimate conclusion from experience; though it improperly predisposes the mind to\r\nthat interpretation of experience.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThus much in defense of the sort of examples objected to. But it would be easy to produce\r\ninstances, equally adapted to the purpose, and in which no antecedent prejudice is at all\r\nconcerned. \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“For many ages,”\u003c/span\u003e says Archbishop Whately, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“all farmers and gardeners\r\nwere firmly convinced—and convinced of their knowing it by experience—that\r\nthe crops would never turn out good unless the seed were sown during the increase of the\r\nmoon.”\u003c/span\u003e This was induction, but bad induction; just as a vicious syllogism is\r\nreasoning, but bad reasoning.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_114\" name=\"note_114\" href=\"#noteref_114\"\u003e114.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003eThe\r\nassertion, that any and every one of the conditions of a phenomenon may be and is, on\r\nsome occasions and for some purposes, spoken of as the cause, has been disputed by an\r\nintelligent reviewer of this work in the \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eProspective Review\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\r\n(the predecessor of the justly esteemed \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eNational Review\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e), who\r\nmaintains that \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“we always apply the word cause rather to that element in the\r\nantecedents which exercises \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eforce\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e, and which would \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003etend\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e at\r\nall times to produce the same or a similar effect to that which, under certain\r\nconditions, it would actually produce.”\u003c/span\u003e And he says, that \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“every one would feel”\u003c/span\u003e\r\nthe expression, that the cause of a surprise was the sentinel’s being off his post, to\r\nbe incorrect; but that the \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“allurement or force which \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003edrew\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e him off his\r\npost, might be so called, because in doing so it removed a resisting power which would\r\nhave prevented the surprise.”\u003c/span\u003e I can not think that it would be wrong to say,\r\nthat the event took place because the sentinel was absent, and yet right to say that it\r\ntook place because he was bribed to be absent. Since the only direct effect of the bribe\r\nwas his absence, the bribe could be called the remote cause of the surprise, only on the\r\nsupposition that the absence was the proximate cause; nor does it seem to me that any\r\none (who had not a theory to support) would use the one expression and reject the other.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe reviewer observes, that when a person dies of poison, his possession of bodily organs\r\nis a necessary condition, but that no one would ever speak of it as the cause. I admit\r\nthe fact; but I believe the reason to be, that the occasion could never arise for so\r\nspeaking of it; for when in the inaccuracy of common discourse we are led to speak of\r\nsome one condition of a phenomenon as its cause, the condition so spoken of is always\r\none which it is at least possible that the hearer may require to be informed of. The\r\npossession of bodily organs is a known condition, and to give that as the answer, when\r\nasked the cause of a person’s death, would not supply the\r\ninformation sought. Once conceive that a doubt could exist as to his\r\nhaving bodily organs, or that he were to be compared with some being who had them not,\r\nand cases may be imagined in which it might be said that his possession of them was the\r\ncause of his death. If Faust and Mephistopheles together took poison, it might be said\r\nthat Faust died because he was a human being, and had a body, while Mephistopheles\r\nsurvived because he was a spirit.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt is for the same reason that no one (as the reviewer remarks) \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“calls the cause of\r\na leap, the muscles or sinews of the body, though they are necessary conditions;\r\nnor the cause of a self-sacrifice, the knowledge which was necessary\r\nfor it; nor the cause of writing a book, that a man has time for it,\r\nwhich is a necessary condition.”\u003c/span\u003e These conditions (besides that they\r\nare antecedent \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003estates\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e, and not proximate antecedent\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eevents\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e, and are therefore never the conditions\r\nin closest apparent proximity to the effect) are all of\r\nthem so obviously implied, that it is hardly possible there should\r\nexist that necessity for insisting on them, which alone gives\r\noccasion for speaking of a single condition as if it were the cause. Wherever\r\nthis necessity exists in regard to some one condition, and does not exist\r\nin regard to any other, I conceive that it is consistent with usage,\r\nwhen scientific accuracy is not aimed at, to apply the name\r\ncause to that one condition. If the only condition which\r\ncan be supposed to be unknown is a negative condition, the negative condition\r\nmay be spoken of as the cause. It might be said that a person\r\ndied for want of medical advice: though this would not be likely to be said, unless\r\nthe person was already understood to be ill, and in order to indicate that this negative\r\ncircumstance was what made the illness fatal, and not the weakness of his\r\nconstitution, or the original virulence of the disease. It might be said\r\nthat a person was drowned because he could not swim; the positive condition, namely,\r\nthat he fell into the water, being already implied in the word drowned. And here\r\nlet me remark, that his falling into the water is in this case the only positive\r\ncondition: all the conditions not expressly or virtually included in this\r\n(as that he could not swim, that nobody helped him, and so forth) are negative. Yet, if\r\nit were simply said that the cause of a man’s death was falling into the water, there\r\nwould be quite as great a sense of impropriety in the expression, as there\r\nwould be if it were said that the cause was his inability to swim; because,\r\nthough the one condition is positive and the other negative, it would be felt\r\nthat neither of them was sufficient, without the other, to produce death.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWith regard to the assertion that nothing is termed the cause, except the element which\r\nexerts active force; I waive the question as to the meaning of active force, and\r\naccepting the phrase in its popular sense, I revert to a former example, and\r\nI ask, would it be more agreeable to custom to say that a man fell because\r\nhis foot slipped in climbing a ladder, or that he fell because of his weight?\r\nfor his weight, and not the motion of his foot, was the active force\r\nwhich determined his fall. If a person walking out in a frosty day, stumbled and fell, it\r\nmight be said that he stumbled because the ground was slippery, or because he was not\r\nsufficiently careful: but few people, I suppose, would say, that he stumbled because\r\nhe walked. Yet the only active force concerned was that which he exerted in walking: the\r\nothers were mere negative conditions; but they happened to be the only ones which there\r\ncould be any necessity to state; for he walked, most likely, in exactly his usual\r\nmanner, and the negative conditions made all the difference. Again, if a person\r\nwere asked why the army of Xerxes defeated that of Leonidas, he would probably\r\nsay, because they were a thousand times the number; but I do not think he\r\nwould say, it was because they fought, though that was the element of active\r\nforce. To borrow another example, used by Mr. Grove and by Mr.\r\nBaden Powell, the opening of flood-gates is said to be the cause of the flow of water;\r\nyet the active force is exerted by the water itself, and opening the flood-gates merely\r\nsupplies a negative condition. The reviewer adds, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“There are some conditions\r\nabsolutely passive, and yet absolutely necessary to physical\r\nphenomena, viz., the relations of space and time; and to\r\nthese no one ever applies the word cause without being immediately arrested by those who\r\nhear him.”\u003c/span\u003e Even from this statement I am compelled to dissent. Few persons would feel\r\nit incongruous to say (for example) that a secret became known because it was spoken of\r\nwhen A. B. was within hearing; which is a condition of space: or that the cause why one\r\nof two particular trees is taller than the other, is that it has been longer planted;\r\nwhich is a condition of time.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_115\" name=\"note_115\" href=\"#noteref_115\"\u003e115.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eThere\r\nare a few exceptions; for there are some properties of objects which seem to be\r\npurely preventive; as the property of opaque bodies, by which they intercept the passage\r\nof light. This, as far as we are able to understand it, appears an instance not of one\r\ncause counteracting another by the same law whereby it produces its own effects, but of\r\nan agency which manifests itself in no other way than in defeating the effects of another\r\nagency. If we knew on what other relations to light, or on what peculiarities of\r\nstructure, opacity depends, we might find that this is only an apparent, not a real,\r\nexception to the general proposition in the text. In any case it needs not affect the\r\npractical application. The formula which includes all the negative conditions of an\r\neffect in the single one of the absence of counteracting causes, is not violated by such\r\ncases as this; though, if all counteracting agencies were of this description, there\r\nwould be no purpose served by employing the formula.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_116\" name=\"note_116\" href=\"#noteref_116\"\u003e116.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eI mean by this expression, the ultimate laws of nature\r\n(whatever they may be) as distinguished from the derivative laws\r\nand from the collocations. The diurnal revolution of the earth (for example) is\r\nnot a part of the constitution of things, because nothing can be so\r\ncalled which might possibly be terminated or altered by natural causes.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_117\" name=\"note_117\" href=\"#noteref_117\"\u003e117.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eI use the words \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“straight line”\u003c/span\u003e\r\nfor brevity and simplicity. In reality the line in question is not exactly straight,\r\nfor, from the effect of refraction, we actually see the sun for a short interval\r\nduring which the opaque mass of the earth is interposed in a direct line between the\r\nsun and our eyes; thus realizing, though but to a limited extent, the coveted\r\ndesideratum of seeing round a corner.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_118\" name=\"note_118\" href=\"#noteref_118\"\u003e118.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eSecond Burnett Prize Essay\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\nby Principal Tulloch, p. 25.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_119\" name=\"note_119\" href=\"#noteref_119\"\u003e119.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eLetters on\r\nthe Philosophy of the Human Mind\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, First Series, p. 219.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_120\" name=\"note_120\" href=\"#noteref_120\"\u003e120.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eEssays\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, pp. 206-208.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_121\" name=\"note_121\" href=\"#noteref_121\"\u003e121.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eTo the universality which mankind are agreed\r\nin ascribing to the Law of Causation, there is one claim\r\nof exception, one disputed case, that of the Human Will; the determinations of\r\nwhich, a large class of metaphysicians are not willing\r\nto regard as following the causes called\r\nmotives, according to as strict laws as those\r\nwhich they suppose to exist in the world of mere\r\nmatter. This controverted point will undergo a special\r\nexamination when we come to treat\r\nparticularly of the Logic of the Moral Sciences\r\n(\u003ca href=\"#Book_VI_Chapter_II\" class=\"tei tei-ref\"\u003eBook vi., chap. 2\u003c/a\u003e). In the mean time, I may\r\nremark that these metaphysicians, who, it must be observed,\r\nground the main part of their objection on the supposed repugnance of the doctrine\r\nin question to our consciousness, seem to\r\nme to mistake the fact which consciousness testifies\r\nagainst. What is really in contradiction\r\nto consciousness, they would, I think, on strict\r\nself-examination, find to be, the application to\r\nhuman actions and volitions of the ideas involved\r\nin the common use of the term Necessity;\r\nwhich I agree with them in objecting to. But\r\nif they would consider that by saying that a\r\nperson’s actions \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003enecessarily\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e follow\r\nfrom his character, all that is really meant (for no more is\r\nmeant in any case whatever of causation) is\r\nthat he invariably \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003edoes\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e act in conformity to his\r\ncharacter, and that any one who thoroughly knew\r\nhis character could certainly predict how he\r\nwould act in any supposable case; they probably\r\nwould not find this doctrine either contrary\r\nto their experience or revolting to their feelings.\r\nAnd no more than this is contended for by\r\nany one but an Asiatic fatalist.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_122\" name=\"note_122\" href=\"#noteref_122\"\u003e122.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eI believe, however,\r\nthe accredited authorities do suppose that molecular motion, equivalent\r\nin amount to that which will be manifested in the combustion of\r\nthe coal, is actually taking place during the whole of the long interval,\r\nif not in the coal, yet in the oxygen which will then combine with it.\r\nBut how purely hypothetical this supposition is, need hardly be remarked; I venture\r\nto say, unnecessarily and extravagantly hypothetical.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_123\" name=\"note_123\" href=\"#noteref_123\"\u003e123.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eLectures on Metaphysics\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, vol.\r\nii., Lect. xxxix., pp. 391-2.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nI regret that I can not invoke the authority of Sir William Hamilton in favor of my own\r\nopinions on Causation, as I can against the particular theory which I am now combating.\r\nBut that acute thinker has a theory of Causation peculiar to himself, which has never\r\nyet, as far as I know, been analytically examined, but which, I venture to think, admits\r\nof as complete refutation as any one of the false or insufficient psychological theories\r\nwhich strew the ground in such numbers under his potent metaphysical scythe. (Since\r\nexamined and controverted in the sixteenth chapter of \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eAn Examination\r\nof Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e.)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_124\" name=\"note_124\" href=\"#noteref_124\"\u003e124.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003eUnless\r\nwe are to consider as such the following statement, by one of the writers quoted\r\nin the text: \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“In the case of mental exertion, the result to be accomplished is\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003epreconsidered\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e or meditated, and is therefore known\r\n\u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea priori\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, or before\r\nexperience.”\u003c/span\u003e—(Bowen’s \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eLowell Lectures\r\non the Application of Metaphysical and Ethical Science to the Evidence of Religion\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e.\r\nBoston, 1849.) This is merely saying that when we will a thing we have an idea of it. But\r\nto have an idea of what we wish to happen, does not imply a prophetic knowledge that it\r\nwill happen. Perhaps it will be said that the \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003efirst time\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e\r\nwe exerted our will, when we had of course no experience of any\r\nof the powers residing in us, we nevertheless must already have\r\nknown that we possessed them, since we can not will that which we do not believe to be in\r\nour power. But the impossibility is perhaps in the words only, and not in the facts; for\r\nwe may \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003edesire\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e what we do not know to be in our power; and finding by\r\nexperience that our bodies move according to our \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003edesire\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e,\r\nwe may then, and only then, pass into the more complicated\r\nmental state which is termed will.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAfter all, even if we had an instinctive knowledge that our actions would follow our will,\r\nthis, as Brown remarks, would prove nothing as to the nature of Causation. Our knowing,\r\nprevious to experience, that an antecedent will be followed by a certain consequent, would\r\nnot prove the relation between them to be any thing more than antecedence and\r\nconsequence.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_125\" name=\"note_125\" href=\"#noteref_125\"\u003e125.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eReid’s\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eEssays on the Active Powers\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, Essay iv., chap. 3.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_126\" name=\"note_126\" href=\"#noteref_126\"\u003e126.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eProspective\r\nReview\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e for February, 1850.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_127\" name=\"note_127\" href=\"#noteref_127\"\u003e127.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eVide supra, \u003ca href=\"#Pg178\" class=\"tei tei-ref\"\u003ep.\r\n178\u003c/a\u003e, note.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_128\" name=\"note_128\" href=\"#noteref_128\"\u003e128.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eWestminster Review\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e for October,\r\n1855.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_129\" name=\"note_129\" href=\"#noteref_129\"\u003e129.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eSee the whole\r\ndoctrine in Aristotle \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ede Ánimâ\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, where the θρεπτικὴ ψυχὴ is\r\ntreated as exactly equivalent to θρεπτικὴ δύναμις.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_130\" name=\"note_130\" href=\"#noteref_130\"\u003e130.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eIt deserves notice that the parts of\r\nnature which Aristotle regards as representing evidence of design, are the Uniformities:\r\nthe phenomena in so far as reducible to law. Τύχη and τὸ αὐτομάτον satisfy him as\r\nexplanations of the variable element in phenomena, but their occurring according to a\r\nfixed rule can only, to his conceptions, be accounted for by an Intelligent Will. The\r\ncommon, or what may be called the instinctive, religious interpretation\r\nof nature, is the reverse of this. The events in which men spontaneously see the hand of\r\na supernatural being, are those which can not, as they think, be reduced to a physical\r\nlaw. What they can distinctly connect with physical causes, and especially what they can\r\npredict, though of course ascribed to an Author of Nature, if they already recognize\r\nsuch an author, might be conceived, they think, to arise from a blind fatality, and in\r\nany case do not appear to them to bear so obviously the mark of a divine will. And this\r\ndistinction has been countenanced by eminent writers on Natural Theology, in particular\r\nby Dr. Chalmers, who thinks that though design is present everywhere, the irresistible\r\nevidence of it is to be found not in the \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003elaws\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e of nature but in the\r\ncollocations, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, in the part of nature in which it is\r\nimpossible to trace any law. A few properties of dead matter might, he thinks,\r\nconceivably account for the regular and invariable succession of effects and causes; but\r\nthat the different kinds of matter have been so placed as to promote beneficent ends, is\r\nwhat he regards as the proof of a Divine Providence. Mr. Baden Powell, in his Essay\r\nentitled \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Philosophy of Creation,”\u003c/span\u003e has returned to the point of view of Aristotle\r\nand the ancients, and vigorously re-asserts the doctrine that the indication of design\r\nin the universe is not special adaptations, but Uniformity and Law, these being the\r\nevidences of mind, and not what appears to us to be a provision for our uses. While I\r\ndecline to express any opinion here on this \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003evexata\r\nquæstio\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, I ought not to mention Mr. Powell’s volume without the acknowledgment\r\ndue to the philosophic spirit which pervades generally the three Essays composing it,\r\nforming in the case of one of them (the \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Unity of Worlds”\u003c/span\u003e) an honorable contrast\r\nwith the other dissertations, so far as they have come under my notice, which have\r\nappeared on either side of that controversy.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_131\" name=\"note_131\" href=\"#noteref_131\"\u003e131.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eIn the words of Fontenelle, another celebrated\r\nCartesian, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“les philosophes aussi bien que le peuple avaient cru que l’âme et le corps\r\nagissaient réellement et physiquement l’un sur l’autre. Descartes vint, qui prouva que\r\nleur nature ne permettait point cette sorte de communication véritable, et qu’ils n’en\r\npouvaient avoir qu’une apparente, dont Dieu était le\r\nMédiateur.”\u003c/span\u003e—(\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eŒuvres de Fontenelle\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, ed. 1767, tom. v.,\r\np. 534.)\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_132\" name=\"note_132\" href=\"#noteref_132\"\u003e132.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eI omit, for\r\nsimplicity, to take into account the effect, in this latter case, of the diminution\r\nof pressure, in diminishing the flow of water through the drain; which evidently in no\r\nway affects the truth or applicability of the principle, since when the two causes act\r\nsimultaneously the conditions of that diminution of pressure do not arise.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_133\" name=\"note_133\" href=\"#noteref_133\"\u003e133.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eProfessor Bain adds\r\nseveral other well-established chemical generalizations: \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“The laws that simple\r\nsubstances exhibit the strongest affinities; that compounds are more fusible than\r\ntheir elements; that combination tends to a lower state of matter from gas down to\r\nsolid;”\u003c/span\u003e and some general propositions concerning the circumstances which facilitate\r\nor resist chemical combination. (Logic, ii., 254.)\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_134\" name=\"note_134\" href=\"#noteref_134\"\u003e134.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003eProfessor Bain\r\n(Logic, ii., 39) points out a class of cases, other than that spoken of in\r\nthe text, which he thinks must be regarded as an exception to the Composition of Causes.\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Causes that merely make good the collocation for bringing a prime mover into action,\r\nor that release a potential force, do not follow any such rule. One man may direct a gun\r\nupon a fort as well as three: two sparks are not more effectual than one in exploding a\r\nbarrel of gunpowder. In medicine there is a certain dose that answers the end; and\r\nadding to it does no more good.”\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nI am not sure that these cases are really exceptions. The law of Composition of Causes, I\r\nthink, is really fulfilled, and the appearance to the contrary is produced by attending\r\nto the remote instead of the immediate effect of the causes. In the cases mentioned, the\r\nimmediate effect of the causes in action is a collocation, and the duplication of the\r\ncause does double the quantity of collocation. Two men could raise the gun to the\r\nrequired angle twice as quickly as one, though one is enough. Two sparks put two sets of\r\nparticles of the gunpowder into the state of intestine motion which makes them explode,\r\nthough one is sufficient. It is the collocation itself that does not, by being doubled,\r\nalways double the effect; because in many cases a certain collocation, once obtained, is\r\nall that is required for the production of the whole amount of effect which can be\r\nproduced at all at the given time and place. Doubling the collocation with difference of\r\ntime and place, as by pointing two guns, or exploding a second barrel after the first,\r\ndoes double the effect. This remark applies still more to Mr. Bain’s third example, that\r\nof a double dose of medicine; for a double dose of an aperient does purge more violently,\r\nand a double dose of laudanum does produce longer and sounder sleep. But a double\r\npurging, or a double amount of narcotism, may have remote effects different in kind from\r\nthe effect of the smaller amount, reducing the case to that of heteropathic\r\nlaws, discussed in the text.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_135\" name=\"note_135\" href=\"#noteref_135\"\u003e135.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eUnless, indeed, the consequent was\r\ngenerated, not by the antecedent, but by the means employed to produce the antecedent.\r\nAs, however, these means are under our power, there is so far a probability that they\r\nare also sufficiently within our knowledge to enable us to judge whether that could be\r\nthe case or not.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_136\" name=\"note_136\" href=\"#noteref_136\"\u003e136.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eDiscourse on the Study of Natural\r\nPhilosophy\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, p. 179.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_137\" name=\"note_137\" href=\"#noteref_137\"\u003e137.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eFor this speculation, as for many other of my\r\nscientific illustrations, I am indebted to Professor Bain, whose subsequent treatise on\r\nLogic abounds with apt illustrations of all the inductive methods.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_138\" name=\"note_138\" href=\"#noteref_138\"\u003e138.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eThis view of the\r\nnecessary co-existence of opposite excitements involves a great extension\r\nof the original doctrine of two electricities. The early theorists assumed that, when\r\namber was rubbed, the amber was made positive and the rubber negative to the same\r\ndegree; but it never occurred to them to suppose that the existence of the amber charge\r\nwas dependent on an opposite charge in the bodies with which the amber was contiguous,\r\nwhile the existence of the negative charge on the rubber was equally dependent on a\r\ncontrary state of the surfaces that might accidentally be confronted with it; that, in\r\nfact, in a case of electrical excitement by friction, four charges were the minimum that\r\ncould exist. But this double electrical action is essentially implied in the explanation\r\nnow universally adopted in regard to the phenomena of the common electric machine.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_139\" name=\"note_139\" href=\"#noteref_139\"\u003e139.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003ePp. 110, 111.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_140\" name=\"note_140\" href=\"#noteref_140\"\u003e140.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eInfra,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Book_IV_Chapter_II\" class=\"tei tei-ref\"\u003ebook iv., chap. ii., On Abstraction\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_141\" name=\"note_141\" href=\"#noteref_141\"\u003e141.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eI must, however, remark,\r\nthat this example, which seems to militate against the assertion\r\nwe made of the comparative inapplicability of the Method of Difference to cases of pure\r\nobservation, is really one of those exceptions which, according to a proverbial\r\nexpression, prove the general rule. For in this case, in which Nature, in her\r\nexperiment, seems to have imitated the type of the experiments made by man, she has only\r\nsucceeded in producing the likeness of man’s most imperfect experiments; namely, those\r\nin which, though he succeeds in producing the phenomenon, he does so by employing\r\ncomplex means, which he is unable perfectly to analyze, and can form, therefore, no\r\nsufficient judgment what portion of the effects may be due, not to the supposed cause,\r\nbut to some unknown agency of the means by which that cause was produced. In the natural\r\nexperiment which we are speaking of, the means used was the clearing off a canopy of\r\nclouds; and we certainly do not know sufficiently in what this process consists, or on\r\nwhat it depends, to be certain \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea priori\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e that\r\nit might not operate upon the deposition of dew independently of any thermometric effect\r\nat the earth’s surface. Even, therefore, in a case so favorable as this to Nature’s\r\nexperimental talents, her experiment is of little value except in corroboration of a\r\nconclusion already attained through other means.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_142\" name=\"note_142\" href=\"#noteref_142\"\u003e142.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eIn his subsequent work, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eOutlines of\r\nAstronomy\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e (§ 570), Sir John Herschel suggests another\r\npossible explanation of the acceleration of the revolution of a comet.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_143\" name=\"note_143\" href=\"#noteref_143\"\u003e143.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eDiscourse, pp. 156-8, and 171.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_144\" name=\"note_144\" href=\"#noteref_144\"\u003e144.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eOutlines of Astronomy, § 856.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_145\" name=\"note_145\" href=\"#noteref_145\"\u003e145.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ePhilosophy of Discovery\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, pp. 263,\r\n264.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_146\" name=\"note_146\" href=\"#noteref_146\"\u003e146.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eSee, on this point,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Book_III_Chapter_II\" class=\"tei tei-ref\"\u003ethe second chapter of the present book\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_147\" name=\"note_147\" href=\"#noteref_147\"\u003e147.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eAnte, \u003ca href=\"#Book_III_Chapter_VII_Section_1\" class=\"tei tei-ref\"\u003echap.\r\nvii., § 1\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_148\" name=\"note_148\" href=\"#noteref_148\"\u003e148.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eIt seems\r\nhardly necessary to say that the word \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eimpinge\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, as a general term\r\nto express collision of forces, is here used by a figure of speech, and not as\r\nexpressive of any theory respecting the nature of force.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_149\" name=\"note_149\" href=\"#noteref_149\"\u003e149.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eEssays on some Unsettled Questions of\r\nPolitical Economy\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, Essay V.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_150\" name=\"note_150\" href=\"#noteref_150\"\u003e150.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003eIt\r\nis justly remarked by Professor Bain, that though the Methods of Agreement and\r\nDifference are not applicable to these cases, they are not wholly inaccessible to the\r\nMethod of Concomitant Variations. \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“If a cause happens to vary alone, the effect will\r\nalso vary alone: a cause and effect may be thus singled out under the greatest\r\ncomplications. Thus, when the appetite for food increases with the cold, we have a\r\nstrong evidence of connection between these two facts, although other circumstances may\r\noperate in the same direction. The assigning of the respective parts of the sun and moon\r\nin the action of the tides may be effected, to a certain degree of exactness, by the\r\nvariations of the amount according to the positions of the two attractive bodies. By a\r\nseries of experiments of Concomitant Variations, directed to ascertain the elimination\r\nof nitrogen from the human body under varieties of muscular exercise, Dr. Parkes\r\nobtained the remarkable conclusion, that a muscle grows during exercise,\r\nand loses bulk during the subsequent rest.”\u003c/span\u003e (\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eLogic\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, ii., 83.)\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIt is, no doubt, often possible to single out the influencing causes from among a great\r\nnumber of mere concomitants, by noting what are the antecedents, a variation in which is\r\nfollowed by a variation in the effect. But when there are many influencing causes, no\r\none of them greatly predominating over the rest, and especially when some of these are\r\ncontinually changing, it is scarcely ever possible to trace such a relation between the\r\nvariations of the effect and those of any one cause as would enable us to assign to that\r\ncause its real share in the production of the effect.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_151\" name=\"note_151\" href=\"#noteref_151\"\u003e151.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eBain’s\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eLogic\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, ii., 360.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_152\" name=\"note_152\" href=\"#noteref_152\"\u003e152.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eWhat is said in the text on the\r\napplicability of the experimental methods to resolve particular\r\nquestions of medical treatment, does not detract from their efficacy in ascertaining the\r\ngeneral laws of the animal or human system. The functions, for example, of the different\r\nclasses of nerves have been discovered, and probably could only have been discovered, by\r\nexperiments on living animals. Observation and experiment are the ultimate basis of all\r\nknowledge: from them we obtain the elementary laws of life, as we obtain all other\r\nelementary truths. It is in dealing with the complex combinations that the experimental\r\nmethods are for the most part illusory, and the deductive mode of investigation must be\r\ninvoked to disentangle the complexity.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_153\" name=\"note_153\" href=\"#noteref_153\"\u003e153.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eProfessor Bain, though concurring generally in the\r\nviews expressed in this chapter, seems to estimate more highly than I do the scope for\r\nspecific experimental evidence in politics. (\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eLogic\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, ii., 333-337.)\r\nThere are, it is true, as he remarks (p. 336), some cases \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“when an\r\nagent suddenly introduced is almost instantaneously followed by some other changes, as\r\nwhen the announcement of a diplomatic rupture between two nations is followed the same\r\nday by a derangement of the money-market.”\u003c/span\u003e But this experiment would be quite\r\ninconclusive merely as an experiment. It can only serve, as any experiment may, to\r\nverify the conclusion of a deduction. Unless we already knew by our knowledge of the\r\nmotives which act on business men, that the prospect of war \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003etends\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e to\r\nderange the money-market, we should never have been able to prove a connection between\r\nthe two facts, unless after having ascertained historically that the one followed the\r\nother in too great a number of instances to be consistent with their\r\nhaving been recorded with due precautions. Whoever has carefully examined any of the\r\nattempts continually made to prove economic doctrines by such a recital of instances,\r\nknows well how futile they are. It always turns out that the circumstances of scarcely\r\nany of the cases have been fully stated; and that cases, in equal or greater numbers,\r\nhave been omitted which would have tended to an opposite conclusion.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_154\" name=\"note_154\" href=\"#noteref_154\"\u003e154.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eVide Memoir by Thomas\r\nGraham, F.R.S., Master of the Mint, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“On Liquid Diffusion applied to Analysis,”\u003c/span\u003e\r\nin the \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ePhilosophical Transactions\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e for 1862, reprinted in the\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eJournal of the Chemical Society\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, and also separately as a\r\npamphlet.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_155\" name=\"note_155\" href=\"#noteref_155\"\u003e155.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eIt was an old generalization in surgery, that tight\r\nbandaging had a tendency to prevent or dissipate local inflammation. This sequence,\r\nbeing, in the progress of physiological knowledge, resolved into more general laws, led\r\nto the important surgical invention made by Dr. Arnott, the treatment of local\r\ninflammation and tumors by means of an equable pressure, produced by a bladder partially\r\nfilled with air. The pressure, by keeping back the blood from the part, prevents the\r\ninflammation, or the tumor, from being nourished: in the case of inflammation, it\r\nremoves the stimulus, which the organ is unfit to receive; in the case of tumors,\r\nby keeping back the nutritive fluid, it causes the absorption of matter to exceed the\r\nsupply, and the diseased mass is gradually absorbed and disappears.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_156\" name=\"note_156\" href=\"#noteref_156\"\u003e156.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eSince acknowledged and reprinted in Mr. Martineau’s\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eMiscellanies\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_157\" name=\"note_157\" href=\"#noteref_157\"\u003e157.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eDissertations and Discussions\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\nvol. i., fourth paper.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_158\" name=\"note_158\" href=\"#noteref_158\"\u003e158.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eWritten before the rise\r\nof the new views respecting the relation of heat to mechanical\r\nforce; but confirmed rather than contradicted by them.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_159\" name=\"note_159\" href=\"#noteref_159\"\u003e159.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003eAs is well remarked\r\nby Professor Bain, in the very valuable chapter of his Logic which\r\ntreats of this subject (ii., 121), \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“scientific explanation and inductive generalization\r\nbeing the same thing, the limits of Explanation are the limits of Induction,”\u003c/span\u003e and\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“the limits to inductive generalization are the limits to the agreement or community\r\nof facts. Induction supposes similarity among phenomena; and when such similarity is\r\ndiscovered, it reduces the phenomena under a common statement. The similarity of\r\nterrestrial gravity to celestial attraction enables the two to be expressed as one\r\nphenomenon. The similarity between capillary attraction, solution, the operation of\r\ncements, etc., leads to their being regarded not as a plurality, but as a unity, a\r\nsingle causative link, the operation of a single agency…. If it be asked whether we can\r\nmerge gravity itself in some still higher law, the answer must depend upon the facts.\r\nAre there any other forces, at present held distinct from gravity, that we may hope to\r\nmake fraternize with it, so as to join in constituting a higher unity? Gravity\r\nis an attractive force; and another great attractive force is cohesion, or the force\r\nthat binds together the atoms of solid matter. Might we, then, join these two in a still\r\nhigher unity, expressed under a more comprehensive law? Certainly we might, but not to\r\nany advantage. The two kinds of force agree in the one point, attraction, but they agree\r\nin no other; indeed, in the manner of the attraction, they differ widely; so widely that\r\nwe should have to state totally distinct laws for each. Gravity is common to all matter,\r\nand equal in amount in equal masses of matter, whatever be the kind; it follows the law\r\nof the diffusion of space from a point (the inverse square of the distance); it extends\r\nto distances unlimited; it is indestructible and invariable. Cohesion is special for\r\neach separate substance; it decreases according to distance much more rapidly than the\r\ninverse square, vanishing entirely at very small distances. Two such forces have not\r\nsufficient kindred to be generalized into one force; the generalization is only\r\nillusory; the statement of the difference would still make two forces; while the\r\nconsideration of one would not in any way simplify the phenomena of the other, as\r\nhappened in the generalization of gravity itself.”\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nTo the impassable limit of the explanation of laws of nature, set forth in the text, must\r\ntherefore be added a further limitation. Although, when the phenomena to be explained are\r\nnot, in their own nature, generically distinct, the attempt to refer them to the same\r\ncause is scientifically legitimate; yet to the success of the attempt it is\r\nindispensable that the cause should be shown to be capable of producing them according\r\nto the same law. Otherwise the unity of cause is a mere guess, and the generalization\r\nonly a nominal one, which, even if admitted, would not diminish the number of ultimate\r\nlaws of nature.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_160\" name=\"note_160\" href=\"#noteref_160\"\u003e160.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eCours de Philosophie Positive\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\nii., 656.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_161\" name=\"note_161\" href=\"#noteref_161\"\u003e161.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eVide\r\nsupra, \u003ca href=\"#Book_III_Chapter_XI\" class=\"tei tei-ref\"\u003ebook iii., chap. xi\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_162\" name=\"note_162\" href=\"#noteref_162\"\u003e162.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ePhilosophy of Discovery\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\np. 185 et seq.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_163\" name=\"note_163\" href=\"#noteref_163\"\u003e163.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eComte, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ePhilosophie\r\nPositive\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, ii., 434-437.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_164\" name=\"note_164\" href=\"#noteref_164\"\u003e164.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003eAs an example of legitimate\r\nhypothesis according to the test here laid down, has been justly cited that of\r\nBroussais, who, proceeding on the very rational principle that every disease\r\nmust originate in some definite part or other of the organism, boldly assumed that certain\r\nfevers, which not being known to be local were called constitutional, had their origin in\r\nthe mucous membrane of the alimentary canal. The supposition was, indeed, as is now\r\ngenerally admitted, erroneous; but he was justified in making it, since by deducing the\r\nconsequences of the supposition, and comparing them with the facts of those maladies, he\r\nmight be certain of disproving his hypothesis if it was ill founded, and might expect\r\nthat the comparison would materially aid him in framing another more conformable to the\r\nphenomena.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe doctrine now universally received that the earth is a natural magnet, was originally\r\nan hypothesis of the celebrated Gilbert.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAnother hypothesis, to the legitimacy of which no objection can lie, and which is well\r\ncalculated to light the path of scientific inquiry, is that suggested by several recent\r\nwriters, that the brain is a voltaic pile, and that each of its pulsations is a\r\ndischarge of electricity through the system. It has been remarked that the sensation\r\nfelt by the hand from the beating of a brain, bears a strong resemblance to a voltaic\r\nshock. And the hypothesis, if followed to its consequences, might afford a plausible\r\nexplanation of many physiological facts, while there is nothing to discourage the hope\r\nthat we may in time sufficiently understand the conditions of voltaic phenomena to\r\nrender the truth of the hypothesis amenable to observation and experiment.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe attempt to localize, in different regions of the brain, the physical organs of our\r\ndifferent mental faculties and propensities, was, on the part of its original author, a\r\nlegitimate example of a scientific hypothesis; and we ought not, therefore, to blame him\r\nfor the extremely slight grounds on which he often proceeded, in an operation which could\r\nonly be tentative, though we may regret that materials barely sufficient for a first rude\r\nhypothesis should have been hastily worked up into the vain semblance of a science. If\r\nthere be really a connection between the scale of mental endowments and the various\r\ndegrees of complication in the cerebral system, the nature of that connection was in no\r\nother way so likely to be brought to light as by framing, in the first instance, an\r\nhypothesis similar to that of Gall. But the verification of any such hypothesis is\r\nattended, from the peculiar nature of the phenomena, with difficulties which\r\nphrenologists have not shown themselves even competent to appreciate, much less to\r\novercome.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nMr. Darwin’s remarkable speculation on the Origin of Species is another unimpeachable\r\nexample of a legitimate hypothesis. What he terms \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“natural selection”\u003c/span\u003e is not only a\r\n\u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003evera causa\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, but one proved to be capable of\r\nproducing effects of the same kind with those which the hypothesis ascribes to it; the\r\nquestion of possibility is entirely one of degree. It is unreasonable\r\nto accuse Mr. Darwin (as has been done) of violating the rules of Induction. The\r\nrules of Induction are concerned with the conditions of Proof. Mr. Darwin has never\r\npretended that his doctrine was proved. He was not bound by the rules of Induction, but by\r\nthose of Hypothesis. And these last have seldom been more completely fulfilled. He has\r\nopened a path of inquiry full of promise, the results of which none can foresee. And is it\r\nnot a wonderful feat of scientific knowledge and ingenuity to have rendered so bold a\r\nsuggestion, which the first impulse of every one was to reject at once, admissible and\r\ndiscussible, even as a conjecture?\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_165\" name=\"note_165\" href=\"#noteref_165\"\u003e165.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eWhewell’s \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ePhil. of\r\nDiscovery\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, pp. 275, 276.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_166\" name=\"note_166\" href=\"#noteref_166\"\u003e166.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eWhat has most contributed to accredit the hypothesis of a\r\nphysical medium for the conveyance of light, is the certain fact that light\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003etravels\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e (which can not be proved of gravitation); that its communication is\r\nnot instantaneous, but requires time; and that it is intercepted (which gravitation is\r\nnot) by intervening objects. These are analogies between its phenomena and those of the\r\nmechanical motion of a solid or fluid substance. But we are not entitled to assume that\r\nmechanical motion is the only power in nature capable of exhibiting those\r\nattributes.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_167\" name=\"note_167\" href=\"#noteref_167\"\u003e167.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ePhil. of Discovery\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\np. 274.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_168\" name=\"note_168\" href=\"#noteref_168\"\u003e168.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eP. 271.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_169\" name=\"note_169\" href=\"#noteref_169\"\u003e169.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eP. 251 and the whole of\r\nAppendix G.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_170\" name=\"note_170\" href=\"#noteref_170\"\u003e170.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eIn Dr. Whewell’s latest version of his theory\r\n(\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ePhilosophy of Discovery\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, p. 331) he makes a concession respecting\r\nthe medium of the transmission of light, which, taken in conjunction with the rest of\r\nhis doctrine on the subject, is not, I confess, very intelligible to me, but which\r\ngoes far toward removing, if it does not actually remove, the whole of the difference\r\nbetween us. He is contending, against Sir William Hamilton, that all matter has weight.\r\nSir William, in proof of the contrary, cited the luminiferous ether, and the calorific\r\nand electric fluids, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“which,”\u003c/span\u003e he said, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“we can neither denude of their character\r\nof substance, nor clothe with the attribute of weight.”\u003c/span\u003e \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“To which,”\u003c/span\u003e continues\r\nDr. Whewell, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“my reply is, that precisely because I can not clothe these agents with\r\nthe attribute of Weight, I \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003edo\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e denude them of the character of Substance.\r\nThey are not substances, but agencies. These Imponderable Agents are not properly called\r\nImponderable Fluids. This I conceive that I have proved.”\u003c/span\u003e Nothing can be more\r\nphilosophical. But if the luminiferous ether is not matter, and fluid matter, too, what\r\nis the meaning of its undulations? Can an agency undulate? Can there be alternate motion\r\nforward and backward of the particles of an agency? And does not the whole mathematical\r\ntheory of the undulations imply them to be material? Is it not a series of deductions\r\nfrom the known properties of elastic fluids? \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eThis\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e opinion of Dr. Whewell\r\nreduces the undulations to a figure of speech, and the undulatory theory to the\r\nproposition which all must admit, that the transmission of light takes place according to\r\nlaws which present a very striking and remarkable agreement with those of undulations.\r\nIf Dr. Whewell is prepared to stand by this doctrine, I have no difference with him on\r\nthe subject.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_171\" name=\"note_171\" href=\"#noteref_171\"\u003e171.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eThus water, of which eight-ninths in weight\r\nare oxygen, dissolves most bodies which contain a high proportion of oxygen, such as all\r\nthe nitrates (which have more oxygen than any others of the common salts), most of the\r\nsulphates, many of the carbonates, etc. Again, bodies largely composed of combustible\r\nelements, like hydrogen and carbon, are soluble in bodies of similar composition; resin,\r\nfor instance, will dissolve in alcohol, tar in oil of turpentine. This empirical\r\ngeneralization is far from being universally true; no doubt because it is a remote, and\r\ntherefore easily defeated, result of general laws too deep for us at present to\r\npenetrate; but it will probably in time suggest processes of inquiry, leading to the\r\ndiscovery of those laws.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_172\" name=\"note_172\" href=\"#noteref_172\"\u003e172.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eOr, according to\r\nLaplace’s theory, the sun and the sun’s rotation.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_173\" name=\"note_173\" href=\"#noteref_173\"\u003e173.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eSupra,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Book_III_Chapter_V_Section_7\" class=\"tei tei-ref\"\u003ebook iii., chap. v., § 7\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_174\" name=\"note_174\" href=\"#noteref_174\"\u003e174.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eSupra,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Book_III_Chapter_X_Section_2\" class=\"tei tei-ref\"\u003ebook iii., chap. x., § 2\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_175\" name=\"note_175\" href=\"#noteref_175\"\u003e175.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eIn the preceding discussion,\r\nthe \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003emean\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e is spoken of as if it were exactly the same thing with the\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eaverage\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e. But the mean, for purposes of inductive inquiry, is not the\r\naverage, or arithmetical mean, though in a familiar illustration of the theory the\r\ndifference may be disregarded. If the deviations on one side of the average are much more\r\nnumerous than those on the other (these last being fewer but greater), the effect due to\r\nthe invariable cause, as distinct from the variable ones, will not coincide with the\r\naverage, but will be either below or above the average, the deviation being toward the\r\nside on which the greatest number of the instances are found. This follows from a truth,\r\nascertained both inductively and deductively, that small deviations from the true central\r\npoint are greatly more frequent than large ones. The mathematical law is, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“that the\r\nmost probable determination of one or more invariable elements from observation is that\r\nin which the \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003esum of the squares\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e of the individual aberrations,”\u003c/span\u003e\r\nor deviations, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eshall be the least possible\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e.”\u003c/span\u003e See this principle\r\nstated, and its grounds popularly explained, by Sir John Herschel, in his review of\r\nQuetelet on Probabilities, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eEssays\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, p. 395 \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eet\r\nseq.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_176\" name=\"note_176\" href=\"#noteref_176\"\u003e176.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eEssai\r\nPhilosophique sur les Probabilités\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, fifth Paris edition, p. 7.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_177\" name=\"note_177\" href=\"#noteref_177\"\u003e177.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eIt even appears to me\r\nthat the calculation of chances, where there are no data grounded\r\neither on special experience or on special inference, must, in an immense majority of\r\ncases, break down, from sheer impossibility of assigning any principle by which to be\r\nguided in setting out the list of possibilities. In the case of the colored balls we\r\nhave no difficulty in making the enumeration, because we ourselves determine what the\r\npossibilities shall be. But suppose a case more analogous to those which occur in\r\nnature: instead of three colors, let there be in the box all possible colors, we being\r\nsupposed ignorant of the comparative frequency with which different colors occur in\r\nnature, or in the productions of art. How is the list of cases to be made out? Is every\r\ndistinct shade to count as a color? If so, is the test to be a common eye, or an\r\neducated eye—a painter’s, for instance? On the answer to these questions would\r\ndepend whether the chances against some particular color would be estimated\r\nat ten, twenty, or perhaps five hundred to one. While if we knew from experience\r\nthat the particular color occurs on an average a certain number of times in every\r\nhundred or thousand, we should not require to know any thing either of the frequency or\r\nof the number of the other possibilities.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_178\" name=\"note_178\" href=\"#noteref_178\"\u003e178.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eProspective Review\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e for\r\nFebruary, 1850.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_179\" name=\"note_179\" href=\"#noteref_179\"\u003e179.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“If this be not so, why do we feel so much more\r\nprobability added by the first instance than by any single subsequent instance? Why,\r\nexcept that the first instance gives us its possibility (a cause \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eadequate\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e\r\nto it), while every other only gives us the frequency of its conditions?\r\nIf no reference to a cause be supposed, possibility would have no meaning; yet it is\r\nclear that, antecedent to its happening, we might have supposed the event impossible,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ei.e.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, have believed that there was no physical energy really\r\nexisting in the world equal to producing it…. After the first time of happening,\r\nwhich is, then, more important to the whole probability than any other single instance\r\n(because proving the possibility), the \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003enumber\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e of times becomes important\r\nas an index to the intensity or extent of the cause, and its independence of any\r\nparticular time. If we took the case of a tremendous leap, for instance, and wished to\r\nform an estimate of the probability of its succeeding a certain number of times; the\r\nfirst instance, by showing its possibility (before doubtful) is of the most importance;\r\nbut every succeeding leap shows the power to be more perfectly under control, greater\r\nand more invariable, and so increases the probability; and no one would think of\r\nreasoning in this case straight from one instance to the next, without referring to the\r\nphysical energy which each leap indicated. Is it not, then, clear that we do not ever”\u003c/span\u003e\r\n(let us rather say, that we do not in an advanced state of our knowledge) \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“conclude\r\ndirectly from the happening of an event to the probability of its happening again; but\r\nthat we refer to the cause, regarding the past cases as an index to the cause, and the\r\ncause as our guide to the future?”\u003c/span\u003e—\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eIbid.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_180\" name=\"note_180\" href=\"#noteref_180\"\u003e180.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eThe writer last quoted says that the valuation\r\nof chances by comparing the number of cases in which the event occurs with the number in\r\nwhich it does not occur, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“would generally be wholly erroneous,”\u003c/span\u003e and \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“is not the\r\ntrue theory of probability.”\u003c/span\u003e It is at least that which forms the foundation of\r\ninsurance, and of all those calculations of chances in the business of life which\r\nexperience so abundantly verifies. The reason which the reviewer gives for rejecting the\r\ntheory is, that it \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“would regard an event as certain which had hitherto never\r\nfailed; which is exceedingly far from the truth, even for a very large number of\r\nconstant successes.”\u003c/span\u003e This is not a defect in a particular theory, but in any theory\r\nof chances. No principle of evaluation can provide for such a case as that which the\r\nreviewer supposes. If an event has never once failed, in a number of trials sufficient to\r\neliminate chance, it really has all the certainty which can be given by an empirical\r\nlaw; it \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eis\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e certain during the continuance of the same collocation of causes\r\nwhich existed during the observations. If it ever fails, it is in consequence of some\r\nchange in that collocation. Now, no theory of chances will enable us to infer the future\r\nprobability of an event from the past, if the causes in operation, capable of\r\ninfluencing the event, have intermediately undergone a change.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_181\" name=\"note_181\" href=\"#noteref_181\"\u003e181.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003ePp. 18, 19. The theorem is not stated by Laplace\r\nin the exact terms in which I have stated it; but the identity of import of the two\r\nmodes of expression is easily demonstrable.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_182\" name=\"note_182\" href=\"#noteref_182\"\u003e182.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eFor a fuller treatment of the many\r\ninteresting questions raised by the theory of probabilities, I may now refer to a recent\r\nwork by Mr. Venn, Fellow of Caius College, Cambridge, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“The Logic of Chance;”\u003c/span\u003e one\r\nof the most thoughtful and philosophical treatises on any subject\r\nconnected with Logic and Evidence which have been produced, to my knowledge, for\r\nmany years. Some criticisms contained in it have been very useful to me in revising the\r\ncorresponding chapters of the present work. In several of Mr. Venn’s opinions, however,\r\nI do not agree. What these are will be obvious to any reader of Mr. Venn’s work who is\r\nalso a reader of this.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_183\" name=\"note_183\" href=\"#noteref_183\"\u003e183.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eHartley’s \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eObservations on\r\nMan\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, vol. i., p. 16. The passage is not in Priestley’s curtailed\r\nedition.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_184\" name=\"note_184\" href=\"#noteref_184\"\u003e184.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003eI am happy to be\r\nable to quote the following excellent passage from Mr. Baden Powell’s\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eEssay on the Inductive Philosophy\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, in confirmation, both in\r\nregard to history and to doctrine, of the statement made in the text. Speaking of the\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“conviction of the universal and permanent uniformity of nature,”\u003c/span\u003e Mr. Powell says\r\n(pp. 98-100):\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“We may remark that this idea, in its proper extent, is by no means one of\r\npopular acceptance or natural growth. Just so far as the daily experience of every one\r\ngoes, so far indeed he comes to embrace a certain persuasion of this kind, but merely to\r\nthis limited extent, that what is going on around him at present, in his own narrow\r\nsphere of observation, will go on in like manner in future. The peasant believes that the\r\nsun which rose to-day will rise again to-morrow; that the seed put into the ground will\r\nbe followed in due time by the harvest this year as it was last year, and the like; but\r\nhas no notion of such inferences in subjects beyond his immediate observation. And it\r\nshould be observed that each class of persons, in admitting this belief within the\r\nlimited range of his own experience, though he doubt or deny it in every thing beyond,\r\nis, in fact, bearing unconscious testimony to its universal truth. Nor, again, is it\r\nonly among the \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003emost\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e ignorant that this limitation is put upon the truth.\r\nThere is a very general propensity to believe that every thing beyond common experience,\r\nor especially ascertained laws of nature, is left to the dominion of chance or fate or\r\narbitrary intervention; and even to object to any attempted explanation by physical\r\ncauses, if conjecturally thrown out for an apparently unaccountable phenomenon.\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“The precise doctrine of the \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003egeneralization\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e of this idea of the\r\nuniformity of nature, so far from being obvious, natural, or intuitive, is utterly\r\nbeyond the attainment of the many. In all the extent of its universality it is\r\ncharacteristic of the philosopher. It is clearly the result of philosophic cultivation\r\nand training, and by no means the spontaneous offspring of any primary principle\r\nnaturally inherent in the mind, as some seem to believe. It is no mere vague persuasion\r\ntaken up without examination, as a common prepossession to which we are always\r\naccustomed; on the contrary, all common prejudices and associations are against it. It\r\nis pre-eminently \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ean acquired idea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e. It is not attained without deep study\r\nand reflection. The best informed philosopher is the man who most firmly believes it,\r\neven in opposition to received notions; its acceptance depends on the extent and\r\nprofoundness of his inductive studies.”\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_185\" name=\"note_185\" href=\"#noteref_185\"\u003e185.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eSupra,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Book_III_Chapter_III_Section_1\" class=\"tei tei-ref\"\u003ebook iii., chap. iii., § 1\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_186\" name=\"note_186\" href=\"#noteref_186\"\u003e186.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eIt deserves remark, that these early\r\ngeneralizations did not, like scientific inductions, presuppose causation. What they did\r\npresuppose, was \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003euniformity\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e in physical facts. But the observers were as\r\nready to presume uniformity in the co-existence of facts as in the sequences.\r\nOn the other hand, they never thought of assuming that this uniformity was a principle\r\npervading all nature: their generalizations did not imply that there was uniformity in\r\nevery thing, but only that as much uniformity as existed within their observation,\r\nexisted also beyond it. The induction, fire burns, does not require for its validity\r\nthat all nature should observe uniform laws, but only that there should be uniformity in\r\none particular class of natural phenomena; the effects of fire on the senses and on\r\ncombustible substances. And uniformity to this extent was not assumed, anterior to the\r\nexperience, but proved by the experience. The same observed instances which proved the\r\nnarrower truth, proved as much of the wider one as corresponded to it. It is from\r\nlosing sight of this fact, and considering the law of causation in its full extent as\r\nnecessarily presupposed in the very earliest generalizations, that persons have been led\r\ninto the belief that the law of causation is known \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\r\npriori\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, and is not itself a conclusion from experience.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_187\" name=\"note_187\" href=\"#noteref_187\"\u003e187.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Book_II_Chapter_III\" class=\"tei tei-ref\"\u003eBook ii., chap.\r\niii\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_188\" name=\"note_188\" href=\"#noteref_188\"\u003e188.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003eOne of the\r\nmost rising thinkers of the new generation in France, M. Taine (who has given, in the\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eRevue des Deux Mondes\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, the most masterly analysis, at least in\r\none point of view, ever made of the present work), though he rejects, on this and similar\r\npoints of psychology, the intuition theory in its ordinary form, nevertheless assigns to\r\nthe law of causation, and to some other of the most universal laws, that certainty\r\nbeyond the bounds of human experience, which I have not been able to accord to them. He\r\ndoes this on the faith of our faculty of abstraction, in which he seems to recognize an\r\nindependent source of evidence, not indeed disclosing truths not contained in our\r\nexperience, but affording an assurance which experience can not give, of the universality\r\nof those which it does contain. By abstraction M. Taine seems to think that we are able,\r\nnot merely to analyze that part of nature which we see, and exhibit apart the elements\r\nwhich pervade it, but to distinguish such of them as are elements of the system of nature\r\nconsidered as a whole, not incidents belonging to our limited terrestrial experience. I\r\nam not sure that I fully enter into M. Taine’s meaning; but I confess I do not see how\r\nany mere abstract conception, elicited by our minds from our experience, can be evidence\r\nof an objective fact in universal Nature, beyond what the experience itself bears witness\r\nof; or how, in the process of interpreting in general language the testimony\r\nof experience, the limitations of the testimony itself can be cast off.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nDr. Ward, in an able article in the \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eDublin Review\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e for October,\r\n1871, contends that the uniformity of nature can not be proved from experience, but from\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“transcendental considerations”\u003c/span\u003e only, and that, consequently, all physical science\r\nwould be deprived of its basis, if such transcendental proof were impossible.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nWhen physical science is said to depend on the assumption that the course of nature is\r\ninvariable, all that is meant is that the conclusions of physical science are not known\r\nas \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eabsolute\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e truths: the truth of them is \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003econditional\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e on the\r\nuniformity of the course of nature; and all that the most conclusive observations and\r\nexperiments can prove, is that the result arrived at will be true if, and as long as,\r\nthe present laws of nature are valid. But this is all the assurance we require for the\r\nguidance of our conduct. Dr. Ward himself does not think that his transcendental proofs\r\nmake it practically greater; for he believes, as a Catholic, that the course of nature\r\nnot only has been, but frequently and even daily is, suspended by supernatural\r\nintervention.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nBut though this conditional conclusiveness of the evidence of experience, which is\r\nsufficient for the purposes of life, is all that I was necessarily concerned to prove, I\r\nhave given reasons for thinking that the uniformity, as itself a part of experience, is\r\nsufficiently proved to justify undoubting reliance on it. This Dr. Ward contests, for the\r\nfollowing reasons:\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nFirst (p. 315), supposing it true that there has hitherto been no well authenticated\r\ncase of a breach in the uniformity of nature; \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“the number of natural agents constantly\r\nat work is incalculably large; and the observed cases of uniformity in their action must\r\nbe immeasurably fewer than one thousandth of the whole. Scientific men, we assume for the\r\nmoment, have discovered that in a certain proportion of instances—immeasurably\r\nfewer than one thousandth of the whole—a certain fact has prevailed; the fact of\r\nuniformity; and they have not found a single instance in which that fact does\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003enot\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e prevail. Are they justified, we ask, in inferring from these premises\r\nthat the fact is universal? Surely the question answers itself.\r\nLet us make a very grotesque supposition, in which, however, the conclusion would\r\nreally be tried according to the arguments adduced. In some desert of Africa there is an\r\nenormous connected edifice, surrounding some vast space, in which dwell certain reasonable\r\nbeings, who are unable to leave the inclosure. In this edifice are more than a thousand\r\nchambers, which some years ago were entirely locked up, and the keys no one knew where.\r\nBy constant diligence twenty-five keys have been found, out of the whole number; and the\r\ncorresponding chambers, situated promiscuously throughout the edifice, have been opened.\r\nEach chamber, when examined, is found to be in the precise shape of a dodecahedron. Are\r\nthe inhabitants justified on that account in holding with certitude that the remaining 975\r\nchambers are built on the same plan?”\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nNot with perfect certitude, but (if the chambers to which the keys have been found are\r\nreally \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“situated promiscuously”\u003c/span\u003e) with so high a degree of probability that they\r\nwould be justified in acting upon the presumption until an exception appeared.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nDr. Ward’s argument, however, does not touch mine as it stands in the text. My argument\r\nis grounded on the fact that the uniformity of the course of nature as a whole, is\r\nconstituted by the uniform sequences of special effects from special natural agencies;\r\nthat the number of these natural agencies in the part of the universe known to us is not\r\nincalculable, nor even extremely great; that we have now reason to think that at least\r\nthe far greater number of them, if not separately, at least in some of the combinations\r\ninto which they enter, have been made sufficiently amenable to observation, to have\r\nenabled us actually to ascertain some of their fixed laws; and that this amount of\r\nexperience justifies the same degree of assurance that the course of nature is uniform\r\nthroughout, which we previously had of the uniformity of sequence among the phenomena\r\nbest known to us. This view of the\r\nsubject, if correct, destroys the force of Dr. Ward’s first argument.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nHis second argument is, that many or most persons, both scientific and unscientific,\r\nbelieve that there \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eare\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e well authenticated cases of breach in the uniformity\r\nof nature, namely, miracles. Neither does this consideration touch what I have said in\r\nthe text. I admit no other uniformity in the events of nature than the law of Causation;\r\nand (as I have explained in the chapter of this volume which treats of the Grounds of\r\nDisbelief) a miracle is no exception to that law. In every case of alleged miracle, a\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003enew antecedent\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e is affirmed to exist; a \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ecounteracting cause\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e,\r\nnamely, the volition of a supernatural being. To all, therefore, to whom beings with\r\nsuperhuman power over nature are a \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003evera causa\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\na miracle is a \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ecase\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e of the Law of Universal Causation, not a deviation from\r\nit.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nDr. Ward’s last, and as he says, strongest argument, is the familiar one of Reid,\r\nStewart, and their followers—that whatever knowledge experience gives us of the\r\npast and present, it gives us none of the future. I confess that I see no force whatever\r\nin this argument. Wherein does a future fact differ from a present or a past fact,\r\nexcept in their merely momentary relation to the human beings at present in existence?\r\nThe answer made by Priestley, in his \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eExamination of Reid\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, seems\r\nto me sufficient, viz., that though we have had no experience of what\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eis\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e future, we have had abundant experience of what \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ewas\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e future.\r\nThe \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“leap in the dark”\u003c/span\u003e (as Professor Bain calls it) from the past to the future, is\r\nexactly as much in the dark and no more, as the leap from a past which we have\r\npersonally observed, to a past which we have not. I agree with Mr. Bain in the opinion\r\nthat the resemblance of what we have not experienced to what we have, is, by a law of\r\nour nature, presumed through the mere energy of the idea, before experience has proved\r\nit. This \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003epsychological\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e truth, however, is not, as Dr. Ward when criticising\r\nMr. Bain appears to think, inconsistent with the \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003elogical\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e truth that\r\nexperience does prove it. The proof comes after the presumption, and consists in its\r\ninvariable \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003everification\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e by experience when the experience arrives. The fact\r\nwhich while it was future could not be observed, having as yet no existence, is always,\r\nwhen it becomes present and \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ecan\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e be observed, found conformable to the past.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nDr. M’Cosh maintains (\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eExamination of Mr. J. S. Mill’s Philosophy\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\np. 257) that the uniformity of the course of nature is a different thing from the law of\r\ncausation; and while he allows that the former is only proved by a long continuance of\r\nexperience, and that it is not inconceivable nor necessarily incredible that there may be\r\nworlds in which it does not prevail, he considers the law of causation to be known\r\nintuitively. There is, however, no other uniformity in the events of nature than that\r\nwhich arises from the law of causation: so long therefore as there remained any doubt\r\nthat the course of nature was uniform throughout, at least when not modified by the\r\nintervention of a new (supernatural) cause, a doubt was necessarily implied, not indeed\r\nof the reality of causation, but of its universality. If the uniformity\r\nof the course of nature has any exceptions—if any events succeed one another without\r\nfixed laws—to that extent the law of causation fails; there are events which do\r\nnot depend on causes.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_189\" name=\"note_189\" href=\"#noteref_189\"\u003e189.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003ca href=\"#Book_I_Chapter_VII\" class=\"tei tei-ref\"\u003eBook i., chap.\r\nvii\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_190\" name=\"note_190\" href=\"#noteref_190\"\u003e190.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eIn some cases, a\r\nKind is sufficiently identified by some one remarkable property: but most commonly\r\nseveral are required; each property considered singly, being a joint property\r\nof that and of other Kinds. The color and brightness of the diamond are common to it\r\nwith the paste from which false diamonds are made; its octohedral form is common to it\r\nwith alum, and magnetic iron ore; but the color and brightness and the form together,\r\nidentify its Kind: that is, are a mark to us that it is combustible; that when burned it\r\nproduces carbonic acid; that it can not be cut with any known substance; together with\r\nmany other ascertained properties, and the fact that there exist an indefinite number\r\nstill unascertained.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_191\" name=\"note_191\" href=\"#noteref_191\"\u003e191.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eThis doctrine of course assumes that the allotropic\r\nforms of what is chemically the same substance are so many different Kinds; and such,\r\nin the sense in which the word Kind is used in this treatise, they really are.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_192\" name=\"note_192\" href=\"#noteref_192\"\u003e192.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003eProfessor\r\nBain (Logic, ii., 13) mentions two empirical laws, which he considers to be, with\r\nthe exception of the law connecting Gravity with Resistance to motion, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“the two most\r\nwidely operating laws as yet discovered whereby two distinct properties are conjoined\r\nthroughout substances generally.”\u003c/span\u003e The first is, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“a law connecting Atomic Weight and\r\nSpecific Heat by an inverse proportion. For equal weights of the simple bodies, the\r\natomic weight multiplied by a number expressing the specific heat, gives a nearly\r\nuniform product. The products, for all the elements, are near the constant number 6.”\u003c/span\u003e\r\nThe other is a law which obtains \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“between the specific gravity of substances in the\r\ngaseous state, and the atomic weights. The relationship of the two numbers is in some\r\ninstances equality; in other instances the one is a multiple of the other.”\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nNeither of these generalizations has the smallest appearance of being an ultimate law.\r\nThey point unmistakably to higher laws. Since the heat necessary to raise to a given\r\ntemperature the same weight of different substances (called their specific heat) is\r\ninversely as their atomic weight, that is, directly as the number of atoms in a given\r\nweight of the substance, it follows that a single atom of every substance requires the\r\nsame amount of heat to raise it to a given temperature; a most interesting and important\r\nlaw, but a law of causation. The other law mentioned by Mr. Bain points to the\r\nconclusion, that in the gaseous state all substances contain, in the same space, the\r\nsame number of atoms; which, as the gaseous state suspends all cohesive force, might\r\nnaturally be expected, though it could not have been positively assumed. This law may\r\nalso be a result of the mode of action of causes, namely, of molecular motions. The\r\ncases in which one of the numbers is not identical with the other, but a multiple of it,\r\nmay be explained on the nowise unlikely supposition, that in our present\r\nestimate of the atomic weights of some substances, we mistake two, or three, atoms for\r\none, or one for several.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_193\" name=\"note_193\" href=\"#noteref_193\"\u003e193.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003eDr. M’Cosh (p. 324 of his\r\nbook) considers the laws of the chemical composition of bodies as not coming under the\r\nprinciple of Causation; and thinks it an omission in this work not to have provided\r\nspecial canons for their investigation and proof. But every case of chemical\r\ncomposition is, as I have explained, a case of causation. When it is said that water is\r\ncomposed of hydrogen and oxygen, the affirmation is that hydrogen and oxygen, by the\r\naction on one another which they exert under certain conditions, \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003egenerate\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e\r\nthe properties of water. The Canons of Induction, therefore, as laid down in this\r\ntreatise, are applicable to the case. Such special adaptations as the Inductive methods\r\nmay require in their application to chemistry, or any other science, are a proper\r\nsubject for any one who treats of the logic of the special sciences, as Professor Bain\r\nhas done in the latter part of his work; but they do not appertain to General Logic.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nDr. M’Cosh also complains (p. 325) that I have given no canons for those sciences in\r\nwhich \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“the end sought is not the discovery of Causes or of Composition, but of Classes;\r\nthat is, Natural Classes.”\u003c/span\u003e Such canons could be no other than the principles and\r\nrules of Natural Classification, which I certainly thought that I had expounded at\r\nconsiderable length. But this is far from the only instance in which Dr. M’Cosh does not\r\nappear to be aware of the contents of the books he is criticising.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_194\" name=\"note_194\" href=\"#noteref_194\"\u003e194.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eMr. De\r\nMorgan, in his \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eFormal Logic\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, makes the just remark, that from two\r\nsuch premises as Most A are B, and Most A are C, we may infer with certainty that some B\r\nare C. But this is the utmost limit of the conclusions which can be drawn from two\r\napproximate generalizations, when the precise degree of their approximation to\r\nuniversality is unknown or undefined.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_195\" name=\"note_195\" href=\"#noteref_195\"\u003e195.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eRationale of Judicial Evidence\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, vol.\r\niii., p. 224.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_196\" name=\"note_196\" href=\"#noteref_196\"\u003e196.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003eThe evaluation of the chances in this statement has been\r\nobjected to by a mathematical friend. The correct mode, in his opinion, of setting out\r\nthe possibilities is as follows. If the thing (let us call it T) which is both an A and\r\na C, is a B, something is true which is only true twice in every thrice, and something\r\nelse which is only true thrice in every four times. The first fact being true eight\r\ntimes in twelve, and the second being true six times in every eight, and consequently\r\nsix times in those eight; both facts will be true only six times in twelve. On the other\r\nhand, if T, although it is both an A and a C, is not a B, something is true which is\r\nonly true once in every thrice, and something else which is only true once in every four\r\ntimes. The former being true four times out of twelve, and the latter once in\r\nevery four, and therefore once in those four; both are only true in one case out of\r\ntwelve. So that T is a B six times in twelve, and T is not a B, only once: making the\r\ncomparative probabilities, not eleven to one, as I had previously made them, but six to\r\none.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nIn the last edition I accepted this reasoning as conclusive. More attentive consideration,\r\nhowever, has convinced me that it contains a fallacy.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe objector argues, that the fact of A’s being a B is true eight times in twelve, and\r\nthe fact of C’s being a B six times in eight, and consequently six times in those eight;\r\nboth facts, therefore, are true only six times in every twelve. That is, he concludes\r\nthat because among As taken indiscriminately only eight out of twelve are Bs and the\r\nremaining four are not, it must equally hold that four out of twelve are not Bs when the\r\ntwelve are taken from the select portion of As which are also Cs. And by this assumption\r\nhe arrives at the strange result, that there are fewer Bs among things which are both As\r\nand Cs than there are among either As or Cs taken indiscriminately; so that a thing which\r\nhas both chances of being a B, is less likely to be so than if it had only the one\r\nchance or only the other.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe objector (as has been acutely remarked by another correspondent) applies to the\r\nproblem under consideration, a mode of calculation only suited to the reverse problem.\r\nHad the question been—If two of every three Bs are As and three out of every four\r\nBs are Cs, how many Bs will be both As and Cs, his reasoning would have been correct.\r\nFor the Bs that are both As and Cs must be fewer than either the Bs that are As or the\r\nBs that are Cs, and to find their number we must abate either of these numbers in the\r\nratio due to the other. But when the problem is to find, not how many Bs are both As and\r\nCs, but how many things that are both As and Cs are Bs, it is evident that among these\r\nthe proportion of Bs must be not less, but greater, than among things which are only A,\r\nor among things which are only B.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe true theory of the chances is best found by going back to the scientific grounds on\r\nwhich the proportions rest. The degree of frequency of a coincidence depends on, and is a\r\nmeasure of, the frequency, combined with the efficacy, of the causes in operation that\r\nare favorable to it. If out of every twelve As taken indiscriminately eight are Bs and\r\nfour are not, it is implied that there are causes operating on A which tend to make it a\r\nB, and that these causes are sufficiently constant and sufficiently powerful to succeed\r\nin eight out of twelve cases, but fail in the remaining four. So if of twelve Cs, nine\r\nare Bs and three are not, there must be causes of the same tendency operating on C,\r\nwhich succeed in nine cases and fail in three. Now suppose twelve cases which are both\r\nAs and Cs. The whole twelve are now under the operation of both sets of causes. One set\r\nis sufficient to prevail in eight of the twelve cases, the other in nine. The analysis\r\nof the cases shows that six of the twelve will be Bs through the operation of both sets\r\nof causes; two more in virtue of the causes operating on A; and three more through those\r\noperating on C, and that there will be only one case in which all the causes will be\r\ninoperative. The total number, therefore, which are Bs will be eleven in twelve, and the\r\nevaluation in the text is correct.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_197\" name=\"note_197\" href=\"#noteref_197\"\u003e197.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eSupra, \u003ca href=\"#Book_I_Chapter_V\" class=\"tei tei-ref\"\u003ebook i., chap.\r\nv\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_198\" name=\"note_198\" href=\"#noteref_198\"\u003e198.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eSupra, \u003ca href=\"#Book_I_Chapter_V_Section_1\" class=\"tei tei-ref\"\u003ebook i.,\r\nchap. v., § 1\u003c/a\u003e, and \u003ca href=\"#Book_II_Chapter_V_Section_5\" class=\"tei tei-ref\"\u003ebook ii., chap, v.,\r\n§ 5\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_199\" name=\"note_199\" href=\"#noteref_199\"\u003e199.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003eThe axiom, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Equals subtracted from equals leave equal\r\ndifferences,”\u003c/span\u003e may be demonstrated from the two axioms in the text. If A =\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e and B = \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eb\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, A-B =\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea-b\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e. For if not, let A-B = \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea-b+c\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e. Then\r\nsince B = \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eb\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, adding equals to equals, A =\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea+c\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e. But A = \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e. Therefore\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea = a+c\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, which is impossible.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThis proposition having been demonstrated, we may, by means of it, demonstrate the\r\nfollowing: \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“If equals be added to unequals, the sums are unequal.”\u003c/span\u003e If A =\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e and B not = \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eb\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\nA+B is not = \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea+b\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e. For suppose it to be so. Then, since A =\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e and A+B = \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea+b\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, subtracting\r\nequals from equals, B = \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eb\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e; which is contrary to the hypothesis.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nSo again, it may be proved that two things, one of which is equal and the other unequal\r\nto a third thing, are unequal to one another. If A = \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e and A not\r\n= B, neither is \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e = B. For suppose it to be equal. Then since A =\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e and \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e = B, and since things equal to the\r\nsame thing are equal to one another A = B; which is contrary to the\r\nhypothesis.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_200\" name=\"note_200\" href=\"#noteref_200\"\u003e200.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eGeometers have usually preferred to define parallel lines by\r\nthe property of being in the same plane and never meeting. This, however, has rendered\r\nit necessary for them to assume, as an additional axiom, some other property of parallel\r\nlines; and the unsatisfactory manner in which properties for that purpose have been\r\nselected by Euclid and others has always been deemed the opprobrium of elementary\r\ngeometry. Even as a verbal definition, equidistance is a fitter property to characterize\r\nparallels by, since it is the attribute really involved in the signification\r\nof the name. If to be in the same plane and never to meet were all that is meant\r\nby being parallel, we should feel no incongruity in speaking of a curve as parallel to\r\nits asymptote. The meaning of parallel lines is, lines which pursue exactly the same\r\ndirection, and which, therefore, neither draw nearer nor go farther from one another; a\r\nconception suggested at once by the contemplation of nature. That the lines will never\r\nmeet is of course included in the more comprehensive proposition that they are\r\neverywhere equally distant. And that any straight lines which are in the same plane and\r\nnot equidistant will certainly meet, may be demonstrated in the most rigorous manner\r\nfrom the fundamental property of straight lines assumed in the text, viz., that if they\r\nset out from the same point, they diverge more and more without limit.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_201\" name=\"note_201\" href=\"#noteref_201\"\u003e201.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ePhilosophie Positive\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, iii.,\r\n414-416.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_202\" name=\"note_202\" href=\"#noteref_202\"\u003e202.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eSee the two remarkable notes (A) and (F), appended to his\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eInquiry into the Relation of Cause and Effect\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_203\" name=\"note_203\" href=\"#noteref_203\"\u003e203.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eSupra, \u003ca href=\"#Pg413\" class=\"tei tei-ref\"\u003ep.\r\n413\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_204\" name=\"note_204\" href=\"#noteref_204\"\u003e204.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003eA writer to whom I have\r\nseveral times referred, gives as the definition of an impossibility,\r\nthat which there exists in the world no cause adequate to produce. This definition does\r\nnot take in such impossibilities as these—that two and two should make five; that\r\ntwo straight lines should inclose a space; or that any thing should begin to exist\r\nwithout a cause. I can think of no definition of impossibility comprehensive enough to\r\ninclude all its varieties, except the one which I have given: viz., An impossibility is\r\nthat, the truth of which would conflict with a complete induction, that is, with the\r\nmost conclusive evidence which we possess of universal truth.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAs to the reputed impossibilities which rest on no other grounds than our ignorance of\r\nany cause capable of producing the supposed effects; very few of them are certainly\r\nimpossible, or permanently incredible. The facts of traveling seventy miles an hour,\r\npainless surgical operations, and conversing by instantaneous signals between London and\r\nNew York, held a high place, not many years ago, among such impossibilities.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_205\" name=\"note_205\" href=\"#noteref_205\"\u003e205.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eNot, however, as might at\r\nfirst sight appear, 999 times as much. A complete analysis of the cases shows that\r\n(always assuming the veracity of the witness to be ⁹⁄₁₀) in 10,000 drawings,\r\nthe drawing of No. 79 will occur nine times, and be announced incorrectly once; the\r\ncredibility, therefore, of the announcement of No. 79 is ⁹⁄₁₀; while the drawing of a\r\nwhite ball will occur nine times, and be announced incorrectly 999 times. The\r\ncredibility, therefore, of the announcement of white is ⁹⁄₁₀₀₈, and the ratio of the two\r\n1008:10; the one announcement being thus only about a hundred times more credible than\r\nthe other, instead of 999 times.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_206\" name=\"note_206\" href=\"#noteref_206\"\u003e206.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eSupra, \u003ca href=\"#Book_III_Chapter_II\" class=\"tei tei-ref\"\u003ebook iii., chap.\r\nii\u003c/a\u003e., § \u003ca href=\"#Book_III_Chapter_II_Section_3\" class=\"tei tei-ref\"\u003e3\u003c/a\u003e,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Book_III_Chapter_II_Section_4\" class=\"tei tei-ref\"\u003e4\u003c/a\u003e,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Book_III_Chapter_II_Section_5\" class=\"tei tei-ref\"\u003e5\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_207\" name=\"note_207\" href=\"#noteref_207\"\u003e207.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eMr. Bailey has given the best statement of this\r\ntheory. \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“The general name,”\u003c/span\u003e he says, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“raises up the image sometimes of one\r\nindividual of the class formerly seen, sometimes of another, not unfrequently of many\r\nindividuals in succession; and it sometimes suggests an image made up of elements from\r\nseveral different objects, by a latent process of which I am not conscious.”\u003c/span\u003e (Letters\r\non the Philosophy of the Human Mind, 1st series, letter 22.) But Mr. Bailey must allow\r\nthat we carry on inductions and ratiocinations respecting the class, by\r\nmeans of this idea or conception of some one individual in it. This is all I require. The\r\nname of a class calls up some idea, through which we can, to all intents and purposes,\r\nthink of the class as such, and not solely of an individual member of it.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_208\" name=\"note_208\" href=\"#noteref_208\"\u003e208.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eI have entered rather fully into this question in chap.\r\nxvii. of \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eAn Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\nheaded \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“The Doctrine of Concepts or General Notions,”\u003c/span\u003e which contains my last views\r\non the subject.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_209\" name=\"note_209\" href=\"#noteref_209\"\u003e209.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eOther examples of inappropriate conceptions are\r\ngiven by Dr. Whewell (\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ePhil. Ind. Sc.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e ii., 185) as follows:\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Aristotle and his followers endeavored in vain to account for the mechanical\r\nrelation of forces in the lever, by applying the \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003einappropriate\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e geometrical\r\nconceptions of the properties of the circle: they failed in explaining the\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eform\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e of the luminous spot made by the sun shining through a hole, because\r\nthey applied the \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003einappropriate\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e conception of a circular \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003equality\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e\r\nin the sun’s light: they speculated to no purpose about the elementary composition of\r\nbodies, because they assumed the \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003einappropriate\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e conception of\r\n\u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003elikeness\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e between the elements and the compound, instead of the genuine\r\nnotion of elements merely \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003edetermining\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e the qualities of the compound.”\u003c/span\u003e\r\nBut in these cases there is more than an inappropriate conception;\r\nthere is a false conception; one which has no prototype in nature, nothing corresponding\r\nto it in facts. This is evident in the last two examples, and is equally true in the\r\nfirst; the \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“properties of the circle”\u003c/span\u003e which were referred to, being purely\r\nfantastical. There is, therefore, an error beyond the wrong choice of a principle of\r\ngeneralization; there is a false assumption of matters of fact. The attempt is made to\r\nresolve certain laws of nature into a more general law, that law not being one which,\r\nthough real, is inappropriate, but one wholly imaginary.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_210\" name=\"note_210\" href=\"#noteref_210\"\u003e210.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eProfessor\r\nBain.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_211\" name=\"note_211\" href=\"#noteref_211\"\u003e211.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eThis sentence having been erroneously\r\nunderstood as if I had meant to assert that belief is nothing but an irresistible\r\nassociation, I think it necessary to observe that I express no theory\r\nrespecting the ultimate analysis either of reasoning or of belief, two of the most\r\nobscure points in analytical psychology. I am speaking not of the powers themselves, but\r\nof the previous conditions necessary to enable those powers to exert themselves: of which\r\nconditions I am contending that language is not one, senses and association being\r\nsufficient without it. The irresistible association theory of belief, and the\r\ndifficulties connected with the subject, have been discussed at length in the notes to\r\nthe new edition of Mr. James Mill’s \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eAnalysis of the\r\nPhenomena of the Human Mind\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_212\" name=\"note_212\" href=\"#noteref_212\"\u003e212.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eMr. Bailey agrees with me in thinking that whenever \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“from\r\nsomething actually present to my senses, conjoined with past experience, I feel\r\nsatisfied that something has happened, or will happen, or is happening, beyond the\r\nsphere of my personal observation,”\u003c/span\u003e I may with strict propriety be said to reason: and\r\nof course to reason inductively, for demonstrative reasoning is excluded by the\r\ncircumstances of the case. (\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eThe Theory of\r\nReasoning\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, 2d ed., p. 27.)\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_213\" name=\"note_213\" href=\"#noteref_213\"\u003e213.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eNovum Organum Renovatum\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, pp.\r\n35-37.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_214\" name=\"note_214\" href=\"#noteref_214\"\u003e214.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eNovum Organum Renovatum\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\npp. 39, 40.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_215\" name=\"note_215\" href=\"#noteref_215\"\u003e215.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eP. 217, 4to edition.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_216\" name=\"note_216\" href=\"#noteref_216\"\u003e216.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“E, ex, extra, extraneus,\r\nétranger, stranger.”\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nAnother etymological example sometimes cited is the derivation of the English\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003euncle\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e from the Latin\r\n\u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eavus\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e. It is scarcely possible for two words\r\nto bear fewer outward marks of relationship, yet there is but one step between them,\r\n\u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eavus\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eavunculus\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003euncle\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e. So \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003epilgrim\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, from\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eager\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e: \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eper agrum\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eperagrinus\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eperegrinus\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003epellegrino\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003epilgrim\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e.\r\nProfessor Bain gives some apt examples of these transitions of meaning. \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“The word\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e‘damp’\u003c/span\u003e primarily signified moist, humid, wet. But the property is often accompanied\r\nwith the feeling of cold or chilliness, and hence the idea of cold is strongly suggested\r\nby the word. This is not all. Proceeding upon the superadded meaning, we speak of\r\ndamping a man’s ardor, a metaphor where the cooling is the only circumstance concerned;\r\nwe go on still further to designate the iron slide that shuts off the draft of a stove,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e‘the damper,’\u003c/span\u003e the primary meaning being now entirely dropped. \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e‘Dry,’\u003c/span\u003e in like\r\nmanner, through signifying the absence of moisture, water, or liquidity, is applied to\r\nsulphuric acid containing water, although not thereby ceasing to be a moist, wet, or\r\nliquid substance.”\u003c/span\u003e So in the phrases, dry sherry, or Champagne.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“ \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e‘Street,’\u003c/span\u003e originally a paved way, with or without houses, has been extended to\r\nroads lined with houses, whether paved or unpaved. \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e‘Impertinent’\u003c/span\u003e signified at first\r\nirrelevant, alien to the purpose in hand: through which it has come to mean, meddling,\r\nintrusive, unmannerly, insolent.”\u003c/span\u003e (\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eLogic\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, ii., 173,\r\n174.)\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_217\" name=\"note_217\" href=\"#noteref_217\"\u003e217.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003ePp. 226, 227.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_218\" name=\"note_218\" href=\"#noteref_218\"\u003e218.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eEssays\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, p. 214.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_219\" name=\"note_219\" href=\"#noteref_219\"\u003e219.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eEssays\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, p. 215.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_220\" name=\"note_220\" href=\"#noteref_220\"\u003e220.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eThough no such evil consequences as take place\r\nin these instances are likely to arise from the modern freak of writing\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003esanatory\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e instead of sanitary, it deserves notice as a charming\r\nspecimen of pedantry ingrafted upon ignorance. Those who thus undertake to correct the\r\nspelling of the classical English writers, are not aware that the meaning of\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003esanatory\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, if there were such a word in the language, would have\r\nreference not to the preservation of health, but to the cure of disease.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_221\" name=\"note_221\" href=\"#noteref_221\"\u003e221.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eHistorical\r\nIntroduction\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, vol. i., pp. 66-68.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_222\" name=\"note_222\" href=\"#noteref_222\"\u003e222.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eHistory of Scientific Ideas\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, ii., 110,\r\n111.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_223\" name=\"note_223\" href=\"#noteref_223\"\u003e223.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eHistory of Scientific\r\nIdeas\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, ii., 111-113.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_224\" name=\"note_224\" href=\"#noteref_224\"\u003e224.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eNov. Org. Renov.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, pp. 286,\r\n287.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_225\" name=\"note_225\" href=\"#noteref_225\"\u003e225.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eHistory of Scientific Ideas\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, ii.,\r\n120-122.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_226\" name=\"note_226\" href=\"#noteref_226\"\u003e226.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eNov.\r\nOrg. Renov.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, p. 274.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_227\" name=\"note_227\" href=\"#noteref_227\"\u003e227.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eHist. Sc. Id.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, i. 133.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_228\" name=\"note_228\" href=\"#noteref_228\"\u003e228.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eDr. Whewell, in his reply\r\n(\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ePhilosophy of Discovery\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, p. 270) says that he \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“stopped short\r\nof, or rather passed by, the doctrine of a series of organized beings,”\u003c/span\u003e because he\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“thought it bad and narrow philosophy.”\u003c/span\u003e If he did, it was evidently without\r\nunderstanding this form of the doctrine; for he proceeds to quote a passage from his\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“History,”\u003c/span\u003e in which the doctrine he condemns is designated as that of \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“a mere\r\nlinear progression in nature, which would place each genus in contact only with the\r\npreceding and succeeding ones.”\u003c/span\u003e Now the series treated of in the text agrees with\r\nthis linear progression in nothing whatever but in being a progression.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_229\" name=\"note_229\" href=\"#noteref_229\"\u003e229.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eSupra,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Pg137\" class=\"tei tei-ref\"\u003ep. 137\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_230\" name=\"note_230\" href=\"#noteref_230\"\u003e230.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eVulgar Errors\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, book v., chap.\r\n21.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_231\" name=\"note_231\" href=\"#noteref_231\"\u003e231.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ePharmacologia\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, Historical Introduction,\r\np. 16.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_232\" name=\"note_232\" href=\"#noteref_232\"\u003e232.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eThe author of one of the Bridgewater Treatises has fallen, as\r\nit seems to me, into a similar fallacy when, after arguing in rather a\r\ncurious way to prove that matter may exist without any of the known\r\nproperties of matter, and may therefore be changeable, he concludes\r\nthat it can not be eternal, because \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“eternal (passive) existence necessarily\r\ninvolves incapability of change.”\u003c/span\u003e I believe it would be difficult to\r\npoint out any other connection between the facts of eternity and\r\nunchangeableness, than a strong association between the two ideas. Most of the\r\n\u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea priori\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e arguments, both\r\nreligious and anti-religious, on the origin of things, are fallacies drawn\r\nfrom the same source.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_233\" name=\"note_233\" href=\"#noteref_233\"\u003e233.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eSupra, \u003ca href=\"#Book_II_Chapter_V_Section_6\" class=\"tei tei-ref\"\u003ebook ii.,\r\nchap. v., § 6\u003c/a\u003e, and \u003ca href=\"#Book_II_Chapter_VII\" class=\"tei tei-ref\"\u003echap. vii.\u003c/a\u003e, §\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Book_II_Chapter_VII_Section_1\" class=\"tei tei-ref\"\u003e1\u003c/a\u003e,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Book_II_Chapter_VII_Section_2\" class=\"tei tei-ref\"\u003e2\u003c/a\u003e,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Book_II_Chapter_VII_Section_3\" class=\"tei tei-ref\"\u003e3\u003c/a\u003e,\r\n\u003ca href=\"#Book_II_Chapter_VII_Section_4\" class=\"tei tei-ref\"\u003e4\u003c/a\u003e.\r\nSee also \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eExamination of Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\nchap. vi. and elsewhere.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_234\" name=\"note_234\" href=\"#noteref_234\"\u003e234.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eIt seems that this\r\ndoctrine was, before the time I have mentioned, disputed by some\r\nthinkers. Dr. Ward mentions Scotus, Vasquez, Biel, Francis Lugo, and Valentia.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_235\" name=\"note_235\" href=\"#noteref_235\"\u003e235.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eI quote this passage from Playfair’s\r\ncelebrated \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eDissertation on the Progress of Mathematical\r\nand Physical Science\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_236\" name=\"note_236\" href=\"#noteref_236\"\u003e236.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eThis statement I must now correct, as too unqualified. The\r\nmaxim in question was maintained with full conviction by no less an authority than Sir\r\nWilliam Hamilton. See my \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eExamination\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, chap. xxiv.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_237\" name=\"note_237\" href=\"#noteref_237\"\u003e237.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eNouveaux Essais sur l’Entendement\r\nHumain—Avant-propos.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e (Œuvres, Paris ed., 1842,\r\nvol. i., p. 19.)\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_238\" name=\"note_238\" href=\"#noteref_238\"\u003e238.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eThis doctrine also was\r\naccepted as true, and conclusions were grounded on it, by Sir\r\nWilliam Hamilton. See \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eExamination\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, chap. xxiv.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_239\" name=\"note_239\" href=\"#noteref_239\"\u003e239.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eNot that of\r\nLeibnitz, but the principle commonly appealed to under that name by\r\nmathematicians.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_240\" name=\"note_240\" href=\"#noteref_240\"\u003e240.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eDissertation\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, p. 27.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_241\" name=\"note_241\" href=\"#noteref_241\"\u003e241.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eHist. Ind. Sc.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, Book i., chap. i.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_242\" name=\"note_242\" href=\"#noteref_242\"\u003e242.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eNovum Organum\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\nAph. 75.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_243\" name=\"note_243\" href=\"#noteref_243\"\u003e243.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eSupra, \u003ca href=\"#Book_III_Chapter_VII_Section_4\" class=\"tei tei-ref\"\u003ebook\r\niii., chap. vii., § 4\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_244\" name=\"note_244\" href=\"#noteref_244\"\u003e244.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eIt is hardly needful to remark that nothing\r\nis here intended to be said against the possibility at some future period\r\nof making gold—by first discovering it to be a compound, and\r\nputting together its different elements or ingredients. But this is a totally different\r\nidea from that of the seekers of the grand arcanum.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_245\" name=\"note_245\" href=\"#noteref_245\"\u003e245.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ePharmacologia\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, pp. 43-45.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_246\" name=\"note_246\" href=\"#noteref_246\"\u003e246.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eVol.\r\ni., chap. 8.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_247\" name=\"note_247\" href=\"#noteref_247\"\u003e247.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eNov. Org.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, Aph.\r\n46.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_248\" name=\"note_248\" href=\"#noteref_248\"\u003e248.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003ePlayfair’s \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eDissertation\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\nsect. 4.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_249\" name=\"note_249\" href=\"#noteref_249\"\u003e249.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eNov. Org. Renov.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, p. 61.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_250\" name=\"note_250\" href=\"#noteref_250\"\u003e250.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ePharmacologia\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, p. 21.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_251\" name=\"note_251\" href=\"#noteref_251\"\u003e251.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ePharmacologia\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, pp. 23,\r\n24.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_252\" name=\"note_252\" href=\"#noteref_252\"\u003e252.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eIbid.,\r\np. 28.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_253\" name=\"note_253\" href=\"#noteref_253\"\u003e253.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eIbid.,\r\np. 62.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_254\" name=\"note_254\" href=\"#noteref_254\"\u003e254.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eIbid., pp. 61, 62.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_255\" name=\"note_255\" href=\"#noteref_255\"\u003e255.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eSupra\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg450\" class=\"tei tei-ref\"\u003ep.\r\n450\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_256\" name=\"note_256\" href=\"#noteref_256\"\u003e256.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eElements of the Philosophy of the Mind\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, vol. ii., chap. 4, sect.\r\n5.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_257\" name=\"note_257\" href=\"#noteref_257\"\u003e257.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Thus Fourcroy,”\u003c/span\u003e says Dr. Paris, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“explained the\r\noperation of mercury by its specific gravity, and the advocates of this doctrine favored\r\nthe general introduction of the preparations of iron, especially in scirrhus of the\r\nspleen or liver, upon the same hypothetical principle; for, say they, whatever is most\r\nforcible in removing the obstruction must be the most proper instrument of\r\ncure: such is steel, which, besides the attenuating power with which it is furnished,\r\nhas still a greater force in this case from the gravity of its particles, which, being\r\nseven times specifically heavier than any vegetable, acts in proportion with a stronger\r\nimpulse, and therefore is a more powerful deobstruent. This may be taken as a specimen of\r\nthe style in which these mechanical physicians reasoned and\r\npracticed.”\u003c/span\u003e—\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ePharmacologia\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, pp. 38, 39.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_258\" name=\"note_258\" href=\"#noteref_258\"\u003e258.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ePharmacologia\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, pp. 39, 40.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_259\" name=\"note_259\" href=\"#noteref_259\"\u003e259.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eI\r\nquote from Dr. Whewell’s \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eHist. Ind. Sc.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, 3d ed., i., 129.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_260\" name=\"note_260\" href=\"#noteref_260\"\u003e260.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eHist. Ind.\r\nSc.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, i., 52.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_261\" name=\"note_261\" href=\"#noteref_261\"\u003e261.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eNov.\r\nOrg.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, Aph. 60.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_262\" name=\"note_262\" href=\"#noteref_262\"\u003e262.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“An\r\nadvocate,”\u003c/span\u003e says Mr. De Morgan (\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eFormal Logic\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, p. 270), \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“is\r\nsometimes guilty of the argument \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eà dicto secundum quid\r\nad dictum simpliciter\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e: it is his business to do for his client all that his\r\nclient might \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ehonestly\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e do for himself. Is not the word in italics frequently\r\nomitted? \u003cem class=\"tei tei-emph\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eMight\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/em\u003e any man honestly try to do for himself all that counsel\r\nfrequently try to do for him? We are often reminded of the two men who stole the leg of\r\nmutton; one could swear he had not got it, the other that he had not taken it. The\r\ncounsel is doing his duty by his client, the client has left the matter to his counsel.\r\nBetween the unexecuted intention of the client, and the unintended execution of the\r\ncounsel, there may be a wrong done, and, if we are to believe the usual maxims, no\r\nwrong-doer.”\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe same writer justly remarks (p. 251) that there is a converse fallacy,\r\n\u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eà dicto simpliciter ad dictum secundum quid\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e,\r\ncalled by the scholastic logicians \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003efallacia\r\naccidentis\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e; and another which may be called \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eà\r\ndicto secundum quid ad dictum secundum alterum quid\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e (p. 265). For\r\napt instances of both, I must refer the reader to Mr. De Morgan’s able chapter on\r\nFallacies.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_263\" name=\"note_263\" href=\"#noteref_263\"\u003e263.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eAn example of this\r\nfallacy is the popular error that \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003estrong\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e drink must be a cause\r\nof \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003estrength\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e. There is here fallacy within fallacy; for granting\r\nthat the words \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“strong”\u003c/span\u003e and \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“strength”\u003c/span\u003e were not (as they are) applied in a\r\ntotally different sense to fermented liquors and\r\nto the human body, there would still be involved the error of supposing that an effect\r\nmust be like its cause; that the conditions of a phenomenon are likely to resemble the\r\nphenomenon itself; which we have already treated of as an\r\n\u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ea priori\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e fallacy of the first rank. As well\r\nmight it be supposed that a strong poison will make the person who takes it\r\nstrong.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_264\" name=\"note_264\" href=\"#noteref_264\"\u003e264.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eIn his later editions, Archbishop\r\nWhately confines the name of Petitio Principii \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“to those cases in which one of the\r\npremises either is manifestly the same in sense with the conclusion,\r\nor is actually proved from it, or is such as the persons you are addressing are not\r\nlikely to know, or to admit, except as an inference from the conclusion; as,\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ee.g.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, if any one should infer the authenticity of a certain\r\nhistory, from its recording such and such facts, the reality of which rests on the\r\nevidence of that history.”\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_265\" name=\"note_265\" href=\"#noteref_265\"\u003e265.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eNo\r\nlonger even a probable hypothesis, since the establishment of the atomic theory; it\r\nbeing now certain that the integral particles of different substances gravitate\r\nunequally. It is true that these particles, though real \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eminima\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e for\r\nthe purposes of chemical combination, may not be the ultimate particles of the substance;\r\nand this doubt alone renders the hypothesis admissible, even as an hypothesis.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_266\" name=\"note_266\" href=\"#noteref_266\"\u003e266.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eHist. Ind. Sc.\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, i., 34.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_267\" name=\"note_267\" href=\"#noteref_267\"\u003e267.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“And\r\ncoxcombs vanquish Berkeley with a grin.”\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_268\" name=\"note_268\" href=\"#noteref_268\"\u003e268.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eSome arguments and explanations, supplementary to those\r\nin the text, will be found in \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eAn Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s\r\nPhilosophy\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, chap. xxvi.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_269\" name=\"note_269\" href=\"#noteref_269\"\u003e269.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eSupra\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg424\" class=\"tei tei-ref\"\u003ep.\r\n424\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_270\" name=\"note_270\" href=\"#noteref_270\"\u003e270.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003eWhen this\r\nchapter was written, Professor Bain had not yet published even the first part\r\n(\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“The Senses and the Intellect”\u003c/span\u003e) of his profound Treatise on the Mind. In this the\r\nlaws of association have been more comprehensively stated and more largely exemplified\r\nthan by any previous writer; and the work, having been completed by the publication of\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“The Emotions and the Will,”\u003c/span\u003e may now be referred to as incomparably the most\r\ncomplete analytical exposition of the mental phenomena, on the basis of a legitimate\r\nInduction, which has yet been produced. More recently still, Mr. Bain has joined with\r\nme in appending to a new edition of the \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Analysis,”\u003c/span\u003e notes intended to bring up the\r\nanalytic science of Mind to its latest improvements.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nMany striking applications of the laws of association to the explanation of complex\r\nmental phenomena are also to be found in Mr. Herbert Spencer’s \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Principles of\r\nPsychology.”\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_271\" name=\"note_271\" href=\"#noteref_271\"\u003e271.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eIn the\r\ncase of the moral sentiments the place of direct experiment is to a considerable\r\nextent supplied by historical experience, and we are able to trace with a tolerable\r\napproach to certainty the particular associations by which those sentiments are\r\nengendered. This has been attempted, so far as respects the sentiment of justice, in a\r\nlittle work by the present author, entitled \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eUtilitarianism\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_272\" name=\"note_272\" href=\"#noteref_272\"\u003e272.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eThe most favorable cases for making such\r\napproximate generalizations are what may be termed collective instances; where we are\r\nfortunately enabled to see the whole class respecting which we are inquiring in action\r\nat once, and, from the qualities displayed by the collective body, are able to judge what\r\nmust be the qualities of the majority of the individuals composing it. Thus the character\r\nof a nation is shown in its acts as a nation; not so much in the acts of its government,\r\nfor those are much influenced by other causes; but in the current popular maxims, and\r\nother marks of the general direction of public opinion; in the character of the persons\r\nor writings that are held in permanent esteem or admiration; in laws and institutions,\r\nso far as they are the work of the nation itself, or are acknowledged and supported\r\nby it; and so forth. But even here there is a large margin of doubt and uncertainty.\r\nThese things are liable to be influenced by many circumstances; they are partially\r\ndetermined by the distinctive qualities of that nation or body of persons, but partly\r\nalso by external causes which would influence any other body of persons in the same\r\nmanner. In order, therefore, to make the experiment really complete, we ought to be able\r\nto try it without variation upon other nations: to try how Englishmen would act or feel\r\nif placed in the same circumstances in which we have supposed Frenchmen to be placed; to\r\napply, in short, the Method of Differences as well as that of Agreement. Now these\r\nexperiments we can not try, nor even approximate to.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_273\" name=\"note_273\" href=\"#noteref_273\"\u003e273.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“To which,”\u003c/span\u003e says Dr.\r\nWhewell, \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“we may add, that it is certain, from the history of the\r\nsubject, that in that case the hypothesis would never have been framed at all.”\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nDr. Whewell (\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ePhilosophy of Discovery\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, pp. 277-282) defends Bacon’s\r\nrule against the preceding strictures. But his defense consists only in asserting and\r\nexemplifying a proposition which I had myself stated, viz., that though the largest\r\ngeneralizations may be the earliest made, they are not at first seen in their entire\r\ngenerality, but acquire it by degrees, as they are found to explain one class after\r\nanother of phenomena. The laws of motion, for example, were not known to extend to the\r\ncelestial regions, until the motions of the celestial bodies had been deduced from them.\r\nThis, however, does not in any way affect the fact, that the middle principles of\r\nastronomy, the central force, for example, and the law of the inverse square, could not\r\nhave been discovered, if the laws of motion, which are so much more universal,\r\nhad not been known first. On Bacon’s system of step-by-step generalization, it would\r\nbe impossible in any science to ascend higher than the empirical laws; a remark which Dr.\r\nWhewell’s own Inductive Tables, referred to by him in support of his argument, amply\r\nbear out.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_274\" name=\"note_274\" href=\"#noteref_274\"\u003e274.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eSupra\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg317\" class=\"tei tei-ref\"\u003epage 317\u003c/a\u003e\r\nto the end of the chapter.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_275\" name=\"note_275\" href=\"#noteref_275\"\u003e275.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eBiographia Literaria\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, i.,\r\n214.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_276\" name=\"note_276\" href=\"#noteref_276\"\u003e276.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eSupra\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, \u003ca href=\"#Pg321\" class=\"tei tei-ref\"\u003ep.\r\n321\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_277\" name=\"note_277\" href=\"#noteref_277\"\u003e277.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eEssays on some Unsettled\r\nQuestions of Political Economy\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, pp. 137-140.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_278\" name=\"note_278\" href=\"#noteref_278\"\u003e278.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eThe quotations in this paragraph are\r\nfrom a paper written by the author, and published in a periodical in 1834.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_279\" name=\"note_279\" href=\"#noteref_279\"\u003e279.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eCours de\r\nPhilosophie Positive\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, iv., 325-29.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_280\" name=\"note_280\" href=\"#noteref_280\"\u003e280.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eSince reprinted\r\nentire in \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eDissertations and Discussions\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, as the concluding paper\r\nof the first volume.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_281\" name=\"note_281\" href=\"#noteref_281\"\u003e281.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eWritten and first\r\npublished in 1840.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_282\" name=\"note_282\" href=\"#noteref_282\"\u003e282.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003eThis great\r\ngeneralization is often unfavorably criticised (as by Dr. Whewell, for instance)\r\nunder a misapprehension of its real import. The doctrine, that the theological\r\nexplanation of phenomena belongs only to the infancy of our knowledge of them, ought not\r\nto be construed as if it was equivalent to the assertion, that mankind, as their\r\nknowledge advances, will necessarily cease to believe in any kind of theology. This was\r\nM. Comte’s opinion; but it is by no means implied in his fundamental theorem. All that\r\nis implied is, that in an advanced state of human knowledge, no other Ruler of the World\r\nwill be acknowledged than one who rules by universal laws, and does not at all, or does\r\nnot unless in very peculiar cases, produce events by special interpositions. Originally\r\nall natural events were ascribed to such interpositions. At present every educated person\r\nrejects this explanation in regard to all classes of phenomena of which the laws have\r\nbeen fully ascertained; though some have not yet reached the point of referring all\r\nphenomena to the idea of Law, but believe that rain and sunshine, famine and pestilence,\r\nvictory and defeat, death and life, are issues which the Creator does not leave to the\r\noperation of his general laws, but reserves to be decided by express acts of volition.\r\nM. Comte’s theory is the negation of this doctrine.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nDr. Whewell equally misunderstands M. Comte’s doctrine respecting the second or\r\nmetaphysical stage of speculation. M. Comte did not mean that \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“discussions concerning\r\nideas”\u003c/span\u003e are limited to an early stage of inquiry, and cease when science enters into\r\nthe positive stage. (\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003ePhilosophy of Discovery\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, pp. 226 et seq.) In\r\nall M. Comte’s speculations as much stress is laid on the process of clearing up our\r\nconceptions as on the ascertainment of facts. When M. Comte speaks of the metaphysical\r\nstage of speculation, he means the stage in which men speak of \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Nature”\u003c/span\u003e and other\r\nabstractions as if they were active forces, producing effects; when Nature is said to do\r\nthis, or forbid that; when Nature’s horror of a vacuum, Nature’s non-admission of a\r\nbreak, Nature’s \u003cspan lang=\"la\" class=\"tei tei-foreign\" xml:lang=\"la\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003evis medicatrix\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, were offered\r\nas explanations of phenomena; when the qualities of things were mistaken for real\r\nentities dwelling in the things; when the phenomena of living bodies were thought to be\r\naccounted for by being referred to a \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“vital force;”\u003c/span\u003e when, in short, the abstract\r\nnames of phenomena were mistaken for the causes of their existence. In this sense of the\r\nword it can not be reasonably denied that the metaphysical explanation of phenomena,\r\nequally with the theological, gives way before the advance of real science.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThat the final, or positive stage, as conceived by M. Comte, has been equally\r\nmisunderstood, and that, notwithstanding some expressions open to just criticism, M.\r\nComte never dreamed of denying the legitimacy of inquiry into all causes which are\r\naccessible to human investigation, I have pointed out in a former place.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_283\" name=\"note_283\" href=\"#noteref_283\"\u003e283.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eBuckle’s \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eHistory\r\nof Civilization\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e, i., 30.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_284\" name=\"note_284\" href=\"#noteref_284\"\u003e284.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003e\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003eI have been assured by an intimate friend of Mr.\r\nBuckle that he would not have withheld his assent from these remarks, and that he never\r\nintended to affirm or imply that mankind are not progressive in their moral as well as\r\nin their intellectual qualities. \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“In dealing with his problem, he availed himself of\r\nthe artifice resorted to by the Political Economist, who leaves out of consideration the\r\ngenerous and benevolent sentiments, and founds his science on the proposition that\r\nmankind are actuated by acquisitive propensities alone,”\u003c/span\u003e not because such is the\r\nfact, but because it is necessary to begin by treating the principal influence\r\nas if it was the sole one, and make the due corrections afterward. \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“He desired to make\r\nabstraction of the intellect as the determining and dynamical element of the progression,\r\neliminating the more dependent set of conditions, and treating the more active one as if\r\nit were an entirely independent variable.”\u003c/span\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003cp class=\"tei tei-p\" style=\"margin-bottom: 1.00em\"\u003e\r\nThe same friend of Mr. Buckle states that when he used expressions which seemed to\r\nexaggerate the influence of general at the expense of special causes, and especially at\r\nthe expense of the influence of individual minds, Mr. Buckle really intended no more\r\nthan to affirm emphatically that the greatest men can not effect great changes in human\r\naffairs unless the general mind has been in some considerable degree prepared for them\r\nby the general circumstances of the age; a truth which, of course, no one thinks of\r\ndenying. And there certainly are passages in Mr. Buckle’s writings which speak of the\r\ninfluence exercised by great individual intellects in as strong terms as could be\r\ndesired.\u003c/p\u003e\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_285\" name=\"note_285\" href=\"#noteref_285\"\u003e285.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eEssay on Dryden, in Miscellaneous Writings, i.,\r\n186.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_286\" name=\"note_286\" href=\"#noteref_286\"\u003e286.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eIn the \u003cspan class=\"tei tei-hi\"\u003e\u003cspan style=\"font-style: italic\"\u003eCornhill\r\nMagazine\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/span\u003e for June and July, 1861.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_287\" name=\"note_287\" href=\"#noteref_287\"\u003e287.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eIt is almost superfluous to observe, that there is another\r\nmeaning of the word Art, in which it may be said to denote the poetical department or\r\naspect of things in general, in contradistinction to the scientific. In the text, the\r\nword is used in its older, and I hope, not yet obsolete sense.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_288\" name=\"note_288\" href=\"#noteref_288\"\u003e288.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eProfessor Bain\r\nand others call the selection from the truths of science made for the purposes\r\nof an art, a Practical Science, and confine the name Art to the actual rules.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_289\" name=\"note_289\" href=\"#noteref_289\"\u003e289.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eThe word Teleology is also, but\r\ninconveniently and improperly, employed by some writers as a name for the attempt to\r\nexplain the phenomena of the universe from final causes.\u003c/dd\u003e\u003cdt class=\"tei tei-notelabel\"\u003e\u003ca id=\"note_290\" name=\"note_290\" href=\"#noteref_290\"\u003e290.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/dt\u003e\u003cdd class=\"tei tei-notetext\"\u003eFor\r\nan express discussion and vindication of this principle, see the little volume entitled\r\n\u003cspan class=\"tei tei-q\"\u003e“Utilitarianism.”\u003c/span\u003e\u003c/dd\u003e\u003c/dl\u003e\r\n \u003c/div\u003e\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\r\n \u003chr class=\"doublepage\" /\u003e\r\n\u003c/article\u003e"}],"SectionSequence":["Back Link","Work Title","Deck","Author","Period","Era","Composition","Date Note","Region","Terra Avita","Terra Avita Region","Modern Country","Original Title","Language","Primary Discipline","Secondary Discipline","Tradition","Full Versions","Core Thesis","Classification","Arguments","Influence","Significance","Evidence Note","Full Text"],"Counts":{"ContextCards":3,"GeoCards":4,"DisciplineCards":2,"Links":11,"Sections":25,"Styles":3,"Scripts":1}}