The Prince
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no page claims autograph certainty unless source evidence supports it.","GeoCards":[{"Label":"Region","Key":"Region:1"},{"Label":"Terra Avita","Key":"TerraAvita:2"},{"Label":"Terra Avita Region","Key":"TerraAvitaRegion:6"},{"Label":"Modern Country","Key":"Country:ITA:2"}],"OriginalTitle":"Il Principe","Language":"Italian","DisciplineCards":[{"Label":"Primary Discipline","Key":"Discipline:political-philosophy"},{"Label":"Secondary Discipline","Key":"Discipline:ethics"}],"Tradition":"Renaissance political philosophy, Florentine republicanism, early modern political realism, Roman exempla, Italian Wars statecraft, virtu, fortuna, necessity, civic militia, corruption, religion, prudence, and appearances","FullText":{"Title":"Full Text","Copy":"Public-domain full text from Project Gutenberg eBook #1232 .","Url":"","Label":"","Kicker":"","Cards":[]},"CoreThesis":["Machiavelli analyzes princely acquisition, maintenance, force, fraud, arms, fortune, virtue, appearance, and necessity under unstable political conditions."],"Classification":{"AlternateTitles":"De Principatibus","KeyConcepts":"The Prince; Niccolo Machiavelli; Florence; Il Principe; Discourses; virtu; fortuna; necessity; reason of state; republican liberty; civic militia; corruption; religion; prudence; appearances; Roman exempla; Italian Wars","Methodology":"Historical exempla, Roman comparison, chancery observation, political diagnosis, rhetorical compression, comic and satirical presentation, and practical analysis of power under crisis.","Structure":"Registered Machiavelli direct work; the page summarizes title, approximate date, language, tradition, disciplines, source note, and non-full-text status."},"Arguments":["Develops Machiavelli\u0027s account of power, republican liberty, military organization, corruption, prudence, historical cycles, political appearance, necessity, and the hard conditions of founding or preserving states."],"Influence":{"InfluencedBy":"Roman historians, Livy, Tacitus, Polybius, Florentine civic humanism, Italian Wars diplomacy, chancery practice, Medici politics, and classical rhetoric.","InfluenceOn":""},"Significance":["Part of the direct Machiavelli corpus used to reconstruct his political theory, literary voice, Florentine historical method, and afterlife as a founder of modern political thought.","Used in debates about political realism, republican freedom, executive power, institutions, military citizenship, corruption, public religion, leadership, deception, and moral compromise."],"EvidenceNote":["Accepted as a direct Machiavelli work from source-backed bibliography and work-list evidence; 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Niccolo Machiavelli; Florence; Il Principe; Discourses; virtu; fortuna; necessity; reason of state; republican liberty; civic militia; corruption; religion; prudence; appearances; Roman exempla; Italian Wars"},{"Label":"Methodology","Value":"Historical exempla, Roman comparison, chancery observation, political diagnosis, rhetorical compression, comic and satirical presentation, and practical analysis of power under crisis."},{"Label":"Structure","Value":"Registered Machiavelli direct work; the page summarizes title, approximate date, language, tradition, disciplines, source note, and non-full-text status."}]},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Arguments","Paragraphs":["Develops Machiavelli\u0027s account of power, republican liberty, military organization, corruption, prudence, historical cycles, political appearance, necessity, and the hard conditions of founding or preserving states."]},{"Kind":"FieldSection","Title":"Influence","Fields":[{"Label":"Influenced By","Value":"Roman historians, Livy, Tacitus, Polybius, Florentine civic humanism, Italian Wars diplomacy, chancery practice, Medici politics, and classical rhetoric."},{"Label":"Influence On","Value":"Early modern political realism, republican theory, reason of state literature, civic humanism, Enlightenment political theory, modern political science, and debates over ethics and power."}]},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Significance","Paragraphs":["Part of the direct Machiavelli corpus used to reconstruct his political theory, literary voice, Florentine historical method, and afterlife as a founder of modern political thought.","Used in debates about political realism, republican freedom, executive power, institutions, military citizenship, corruption, public religion, leadership, deception, and moral compromise."]},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Evidence Note","Paragraphs":["Accepted as a direct Machiavelli work from source-backed bibliography and work-list evidence; no full-text section is imported or implied."]},{"Kind":"RawSection","Title":"Full Text","BodyHtml":"\u003cp class=\"dz-philo__section-copy dz-philo__full-text-source\"\u003ePublic-domain full text from \u003ca href=\"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/1232\"\u003eProject Gutenberg eBook #1232\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003carticle class=\"dz-philo__full-text-body\"\u003e\r\n\u003ch1\u003eThe Prince\u003c/h1\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2 class=\"no-break\"\u003eby Nicolo Machiavelli\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\r\nTranslated by W. K. Marriott\r\n\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003chr /\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003eContents\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctable summary=\"\" style=\"\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003e \u003ca href=\"#pref01\"\u003eINTRODUCTION\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003e \u003ca href=\"#pref02\"\u003eYOUTH Æt. 1-25—1469-94\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003e \u003ca href=\"#pref03\"\u003eOFFICE Æt. 25-43\u0026mdash;1494-1512\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003e \u003ca href=\"#pref04\"\u003eLITERATURE AND DEATH Æt. 43-58\u0026mdash;1512-27\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003e \u003ca href=\"#pref05\"\u003eTHE MAN AND HIS WORKS\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003e \u003ca href=\"#pref06\"\u003eDEDICATION\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003e \u003ca href=\"#chap00\"\u003e\u003cb\u003eTHE PRINCE\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003e \u003ca href=\"#chap01\"\u003eCHAPTER I. HOW MANY KINDS OF PRINCIPALITIES THERE ARE, AND BY WHAT MEANS THEY ARE ACQUIRED\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003e \u003ca href=\"#chap02\"\u003eCHAPTER II. CONCERNING HEREDITARY PRINCIPALITIES\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003e \u003ca href=\"#chap03\"\u003eCHAPTER III. CONCERNING MIXED PRINCIPALITIES\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003e \u003ca href=\"#chap04\"\u003eCHAPTER IV. WHY THE KINGDOM OF DARIUS, CONQUERED BY ALEXANDER, DID NOT REBEL AGAINST THE SUCCESSORS OF ALEXANDER AT HIS DEATH\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003e \u003ca href=\"#chap05\"\u003eCHAPTER V. CONCERNING THE WAY TO GOVERN CITIES OR PRINCIPALITIES WHICH LIVED UNDER THEIR OWN LAWS BEFORE THEY WERE ANNEXED\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003e \u003ca href=\"#chap06\"\u003eCHAPTER VI. CONCERNING NEW PRINCIPALITIES WHICH ARE ACQUIRED BY ONE\u0026rsquo;S OWN ARMS AND ABILITY\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003e \u003ca href=\"#chap07\"\u003eCHAPTER VII. CONCERNING NEW PRINCIPALITIES WHICH ARE ACQUIRED EITHER BY THE ARMS OF OTHERS OR BY GOOD FORTUNE\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003e \u003ca href=\"#chap08\"\u003eCHAPTER VIII. CONCERNING THOSE WHO HAVE OBTAINED A PRINCIPALITY BY WICKEDNESS\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003e \u003ca href=\"#chap09\"\u003eCHAPTER IX. CONCERNING A CIVIL PRINCIPALITY\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003e \u003ca href=\"#chap10\"\u003eCHAPTER X. CONCERNING THE WAY IN WHICH THE STRENGTH OF ALL PRINCIPALITIES OUGHT TO BE MEASURED\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003e \u003ca href=\"#chap11\"\u003eCHAPTER XI. CONCERNING ECCLESIASTICAL PRINCIPALITIES\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003e \u003ca href=\"#chap12\"\u003eCHAPTER XII. HOW MANY KINDS OF SOLDIERY THERE ARE AND CONCERNING MERCENARIES\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003e \u003ca href=\"#chap13\"\u003eCHAPTER XIII. CONCERNING AUXILIARIES, MIXED SOLDIERY, AND ONE\u0026rsquo;S OWN\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003e \u003ca href=\"#chap14\"\u003eCHAPTER XIV. THAT WHICH CONCERNS A PRINCE ON THE SUBJECT OF WAR\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003e \u003ca href=\"#chap15\"\u003eCHAPTER XV. CONCERNING THINGS FOR WHICH MEN, AND ESPECIALLY PRINCES, ARE PRAISED OR BLAMED\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003e \u003ca href=\"#chap16\"\u003eCHAPTER XVI. CONCERNING LIBERALITY AND MEANNESS\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003e \u003ca href=\"#chap17\"\u003eCHAPTER XVII. CONCERNING CRUELTY AND CLEMENCY, AND WHETHER IT IS BETTER TO BE LOVED THAN FEARED\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003e \u003ca href=\"#chap18\"\u003eCHAPTER XVIII. CONCERNING THE WAY IN WHICH PRINCES SHOULD KEEP FAITH\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003e \u003ca href=\"#chap19\"\u003eCHAPTER XIX. THAT ONE SHOULD AVOID BEING DESPISED AND HATED\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003e \u003ca href=\"#chap20\"\u003eCHAPTER XX. ARE FORTRESSES, AND MANY OTHER THINGS TO WHICH PRINCES OFTEN RESORT, ADVANTAGEOUS OR HURTFUL?\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003e \u003ca href=\"#chap21\"\u003eCHAPTER XXI. HOW A PRINCE SHOULD CONDUCT HIMSELF SO AS TO GAIN RENOWN\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003e \u003ca href=\"#chap22\"\u003eCHAPTER XXII. CONCERNING THE SECRETARIES OF PRINCES\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003e \u003ca href=\"#chap23\"\u003eCHAPTER XXIII. HOW FLATTERERS SHOULD BE AVOIDED\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003e \u003ca href=\"#chap24\"\u003eCHAPTER XXIV. WHY THE PRINCES OF ITALY HAVE LOST THEIR STATES\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003e \u003ca href=\"#chap25\"\u003eCHAPTER XXV. WHAT FORTUNE CAN EFFECT IN HUMAN AFFAIRS AND HOW TO WITHSTAND HER\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003e \u003ca href=\"#chap26\"\u003eCHAPTER XXVI. AN EXHORTATION TO LIBERATE ITALY FROM THE BARBARIANS\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003e \u003ca href=\"#chap27\"\u003e\u003cb\u003eDESCRIPTION OF THE METHODS ADOPTED BY THE DUKE VALENTINO WHEN MURDERING VITELLOZZO VITELLI, OLIVEROTTO DA FERMO, THE SIGNOR PAGOLO, AND THE DUKE DI GRAVINA ORSINI\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ctr\u003e\r\n\u003ctd\u003e \u003ca href=\"#chap28\"\u003e\u003cb\u003eTHE LIFE OF CASTRUCCIO CASTRACANI OF LUCCA\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\r\n\u003c/tr\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/table\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"letter\"\u003e\r\n\u003ci\u003e\r\nNicolo Machiavelli, born at Florence on 3rd May 1469. From 1494 to 1512\r\nheld an official post at Florence which included diplomatic missions to\r\nvarious European courts. Imprisoned in Florence, 1512; later exiled and\r\nreturned to San Casciano. Died at Florence on 22nd June 1527.\r\n\u003c/i\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003c!–end chapter–\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"pref01\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eINTRODUCTION\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nNicolo Machiavelli was born at Florence on 3rd May 1469. He was the second\r\nson of Bernardo di Nicolo Machiavelli, a lawyer of some repute, and of\r\nBartolommea di Stefano Nelli, his wife. Both parents were members of the\r\nold Florentine nobility.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHis life falls naturally into three periods, each of which singularly\r\nenough constitutes a distinct and important era in the history of\r\nFlorence. His youth was concurrent with the greatness of Florence as an\r\nItalian power under the guidance of Lorenzo de\u0026rsquo; Medici, Il Magnifico. The\r\ndownfall of the Medici in Florence occurred in 1494, in which year\r\nMachiavelli entered the public service. During his official career\r\nFlorence was free under the government of a Republic, which lasted until\r\n1512, when the Medici returned to power, and Machiavelli lost his office.\r\nThe Medici again ruled Florence from 1512 until 1527, when they were once\r\nmore driven out. This was the period of Machiavelli\u0026rsquo;s literary activity\r\nand increasing influence; but he died, within a few weeks of the expulsion\r\nof the Medici, on 22nd June 1527, in his fifty-eighth year, without having\r\nregained office.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003c!–end chapter–\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"pref02\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eYOUTH \u0026mdash; Æt. 1-25\u0026mdash;1469-94\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAlthough there is little recorded of the youth of Machiavelli, the\r\nFlorence of those days is so well known that the early environment of this\r\nrepresentative citizen may be easily imagined. Florence has been described\r\nas a city with two opposite currents of life, one directed by the fervent\r\nand austere Savonarola, the other by the splendour-loving Lorenzo.\r\nSavonarola\u0026rsquo;s influence upon the young Machiavelli must have been slight,\r\nfor although at one time he wielded immense power over the fortunes of\r\nFlorence, he only furnished Machiavelli with a subject of a gibe in \u003ci\u003eThe\r\nPrince\u003c/i\u003e, where he is cited as an example of an unarmed prophet who came to\r\na bad end. Whereas the magnificence of the Medicean rule during the life\r\nof Lorenzo appeared to have impressed Machiavelli strongly, for he\r\nfrequently recurs to it in his writings, and it is to Lorenzo\u0026rsquo;s grandson\r\nthat he dedicates \u003ci\u003eThe Prince\u003c/i\u003e.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nMachiavelli, in his \u0026ldquo;History of Florence,\u0026rdquo; gives us a picture of the young\r\nmen among whom his youth was passed. He writes: \u0026ldquo;They were freer than\r\ntheir forefathers in dress and living, and spent more in other kinds of\r\nexcesses, consuming their time and money in idleness, gaming, and women;\r\ntheir chief aim was to appear well dressed and to speak with wit and\r\nacuteness, whilst he who could wound others the most cleverly was thought\r\nthe wisest.\u0026rdquo; In a letter to his son Guido, Machiavelli shows why youth\r\nshould avail itself of its opportunities for study, and leads us to infer\r\nthat his own youth had been so occupied. He writes: \u0026ldquo;I have received your\r\nletter, which has given me the greatest pleasure, especially because you\r\ntell me you are quite restored in health, than which I could have no\r\nbetter news; for if God grant life to you, and to me, I hope to make a\r\ngood man of you if you are willing to do your share.\u0026rdquo; Then, writing of a\r\nnew patron, he continues: \u0026ldquo;This will turn out well for you, but it is\r\nnecessary for you to study; since, then, you have no longer the excuse of\r\nillness, take pains to study letters and music, for you see what honour is\r\ndone to me for the little skill I have. Therefore, my son, if you wish to\r\nplease me, and to bring success and honour to yourself, do right and\r\nstudy, because others will help you if you help yourself.\u0026rdquo;\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003c!–end chapter–\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"pref03\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eOFFICE \u0026mdash; Æt. 25-43\u0026mdash;1494-1512\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe second period of Machiavelli\u0026rsquo;s life was spent in the service of the\r\nfree Republic of Florence, which flourished, as stated above, from the\r\nexpulsion of the Medici in 1494 until their return in 1512. After serving\r\nfour years in one of the public offices he was appointed Chancellor and\r\nSecretary to the Second Chancery, the Ten of Liberty and Peace. Here we\r\nare on firm ground when dealing with the events of Machiavelli\u0026rsquo;s life, for\r\nduring this time he took a leading part in the affairs of the Republic,\r\nand we have its decrees, records, and dispatches to guide us, as well as\r\nhis own writings. A mere recapitulation of a few of his transactions with\r\nthe statesmen and soldiers of his time gives a fair indication of his\r\nactivities, and supplies the sources from which he drew the experiences\r\nand characters which illustrate \u003ci\u003eThe Prince\u003c/i\u003e.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHis first mission was in 1499 to Catherina Sforza, \u0026ldquo;my lady of Forli\u0026rdquo; of\r\n\u003ci\u003eThe Prince\u003c/i\u003e, from whose conduct and fate he drew the moral that it is far\r\nbetter to earn the confidence of the people than to rely on fortresses.\r\nThis is a very noticeable principle in Machiavelli, and is urged by him in\r\nmany ways as a matter of vital importance to princes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIn 1500 he was sent to France to obtain terms from Louis XII for\r\ncontinuing the war against Pisa: this king it was who, in his conduct of\r\naffairs in Italy, committed the five capital errors in statecraft\r\nsummarized in \u003ci\u003eThe Prince\u003c/i\u003e, and was consequently driven out. He, also, it\r\nwas who made the dissolution of his marriage a condition of support to\r\nPope Alexander VI; which leads Machiavelli to refer those who urge that\r\nsuch promises should be kept to what he has written concerning the faith\r\nof princes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nMachiavelli\u0026rsquo;s public life was largely occupied with events arising out of\r\nthe ambitions of Pope Alexander VI and his son, Cesare Borgia, the Duke\r\nValentino, and these characters fill a large space of \u003ci\u003eThe Prince\u003c/i\u003e.\r\nMachiavelli never hesitates to cite the actions of the duke for the\r\nbenefit of usurpers who wish to keep the states they have seized; he can,\r\nindeed, find no precepts to offer so good as the pattern of Cesare\r\nBorgia\u0026rsquo;s conduct, insomuch that Cesare is acclaimed by some critics as the\r\n\u0026ldquo;hero\u0026rdquo; of \u003ci\u003eThe Prince\u003c/i\u003e. Yet in \u003ci\u003eThe Prince\u003c/i\u003e the duke is in point of fact\r\ncited as a type of the man who rises on the fortune of others, and falls\r\nwith them; who takes every course that might be expected from a prudent\r\nman but the course which will save him; who is prepared for all\r\neventualities but the one which happens; and who, when all his abilities\r\nfail to carry him through, exclaims that it was not his fault, but an\r\nextraordinary and unforeseen fatality.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nOn the death of Pius III, in 1503, Machiavelli was sent to Rome to watch\r\nthe election of his successor, and there he saw Cesare Borgia cheated into\r\nallowing the choice of the College to fall on Giuliano delle Rovere\r\n(Julius II), who was one of the cardinals that had most reason to fear the\r\nduke. Machiavelli, when commenting on this election, says that he who\r\nthinks new favours will cause great personages to forget old injuries\r\ndeceives himself. Julius did not rest until he had ruined Cesare.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIt was to Julius II that Machiavelli was sent in 1506, when that pontiff\r\nwas commencing his enterprise against Bologna; which he brought to a\r\nsuccessful issue, as he did many of his other adventures, owing chiefly to\r\nhis impetuous character. It is in reference to Pope Julius that\r\nMachiavelli moralizes on the resemblance between Fortune and women, and\r\nconcludes that it is the bold rather than the cautious man that will win\r\nand hold them both.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIt is impossible to follow here the varying fortunes of the Italian\r\nstates, which in 1507 were controlled by France, Spain, and Germany, with\r\nresults that have lasted to our day; we are concerned with those events,\r\nand with the three great actors in them, so far only as they impinge on\r\nthe personality of Machiavelli. He had several meetings with Louis XII of\r\nFrance, and his estimate of that monarch\u0026rsquo;s character has already been\r\nalluded to. Machiavelli has painted Ferdinand of Aragon as the man who\r\naccomplished great things under the cloak of religion, but who in reality\r\nhad no mercy, faith, humanity, or integrity; and who, had he allowed\r\nhimself to be influenced by such motives, would have been ruined. The\r\nEmperor Maximilian was one of the most interesting men of the age, and his\r\ncharacter has been drawn by many hands; but Machiavelli, who was an envoy\r\nat his court in 1507-8, reveals the secret of his many failures when he\r\ndescribes him as a secretive man, without force of character\u0026mdash;ignoring\r\nthe human agencies necessary to carry his schemes into effect, and never\r\ninsisting on the fulfilment of his wishes.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe remaining years of Machiavelli\u0026rsquo;s official career were filled with\r\nevents arising out of the League of Cambrai, made in 1508 between the\r\nthree great European powers already mentioned and the pope, with the\r\nobject of crushing the Venetian Republic. This result was attained in the\r\nbattle of Vaila, when Venice lost in one day all that she had won in eight\r\nhundred years. Florence had a difficult part to play during these events,\r\ncomplicated as they were by the feud which broke out between the pope and\r\nthe French, because friendship with France had dictated the entire policy\r\nof the Republic. When, in 1511, Julius II finally formed the Holy League\r\nagainst France, and with the assistance of the Swiss drove the French out\r\nof Italy, Florence lay at the mercy of the Pope, and had to submit to his\r\nterms, one of which was that the Medici should be restored. The return of\r\nthe Medici to Florence on 1st September 1512, and the consequent fall of\r\nthe Republic, was the signal for the dismissal of Machiavelli and his\r\nfriends, and thus put an end to his public career, for, as we have seen,\r\nhe died without regaining office.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003c!–end chapter–\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"pref04\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eLITERATURE AND DEATH \u0026mdash; Æt. 43-58\u0026mdash;1512-27\r\n\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nOn the return of the Medici, Machiavelli, who for a few weeks had vainly\r\nhoped to retain his office under the new masters of Florence, was\r\ndismissed by decree dated 7th November 1512. Shortly after this he was\r\naccused of complicity in an abortive conspiracy against the Medici,\r\nimprisoned, and put to the question by torture. The new Medicean pope, Leo\r\nX, procured his release, and he retired to his small property at San\r\nCasciano, near Florence, where he devoted himself to literature. In a\r\nletter to Francesco Vettori, dated 13th December 1513, he has left a very\r\ninteresting description of his life at this period, which elucidates his\r\nmethods and his motives in writing \u003ci\u003eThe Prince\u003c/i\u003e. After describing his\r\ndaily occupations with his family and neighbours, he writes: \u0026ldquo;The evening\r\nbeing come, I return home and go to my study; at the entrance I pull off\r\nmy peasant-clothes, covered with dust and dirt, and put on my noble court\r\ndress, and thus becomingly re-clothed I pass into the ancient courts of\r\nthe men of old, where, being lovingly received by them, I am fed with that\r\nfood which is mine alone; where I do not hesitate to speak with them, and\r\nto ask for the reason of their actions, and they in their benignity answer\r\nme; and for four hours I feel no weariness, I forget every trouble,\r\npoverty does not dismay, death does not terrify me; I am possessed\r\nentirely by those great men. And because Dante says:\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"poem\"\u003e\r\nKnowledge doth come of learning well retained,\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nUnfruitful else,\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"noindent\"\u003e\r\nI have noted down what I have gained from their conversation, and have\r\ncomposed a small work on \u0026lsquo;Principalities,\u0026rsquo; where I pour myself out as\r\nfully as I can in meditation on the subject, discussing what a\r\nprincipality is, what kinds there are, how they can be acquired, how they\r\ncan be kept, why they are lost: and if any of my fancies ever pleased you,\r\nthis ought not to displease you: and to a prince, especially to a new one,\r\nit should be welcome: therefore I dedicate it to his Magnificence\r\nGiuliano. Filippo Casavecchio has seen it; he will be able to tell you\r\nwhat is in it, and of the discourses I have had with him; nevertheless, I\r\nam still enriching and polishing it.\u0026rdquo;\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe \u0026ldquo;little book\u0026rdquo; suffered many vicissitudes before attaining the form in\r\nwhich it has reached us. Various mental influences were at work during its\r\ncomposition; its title and patron were changed; and for some unknown\r\nreason it was finally dedicated to Lorenzo de\u0026rsquo; Medici. Although\r\nMachiavelli discussed with Casavecchio whether it should be sent or\r\npresented in person to the patron, there is no evidence that Lorenzo ever\r\nreceived or even read it: he certainly never gave Machiavelli any\r\nemployment. Although it was plagiarized during Machiavelli\u0026rsquo;s lifetime,\r\n\u003ci\u003eThe Prince\u003c/i\u003e was never published by him, and its text is still disputable.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nMachiavelli concludes his letter to Vettori thus: \u0026ldquo;And as to this little\r\nthing [his book], when it has been read it will be seen that during the\r\nfifteen years I have given to the study of statecraft I have neither slept\r\nnor idled; and men ought ever to desire to be served by one who has reaped\r\nexperience at the expense of others. And of my loyalty none could doubt,\r\nbecause having always kept faith I could not now learn how to break it;\r\nfor he who has been faithful and honest, as I have, cannot change his\r\nnature; and my poverty is a witness to my honesty.\u0026rdquo;\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBefore Machiavelli had got \u003ci\u003eThe Prince\u003c/i\u003e off his hands he commenced his\r\n\u0026ldquo;Discourse on the First Decade of Titus Livius,\u0026rdquo; which should be read\r\nconcurrently with \u003ci\u003eThe Prince\u003c/i\u003e. These and several minor works occupied him\r\nuntil the year 1518, when he accepted a small commission to look after the\r\naffairs of some Florentine merchants at Genoa. In 1519 the Medicean rulers\r\nof Florence granted a few political concessions to her citizens, and\r\nMachiavelli with others was consulted upon a new constitution under which\r\nthe Great Council was to be restored; but on one pretext or another it was\r\nnot promulgated.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIn 1520 the Florentine merchants again had recourse to Machiavelli to\r\nsettle their difficulties with Lucca, but this year was chiefly remarkable\r\nfor his re-entry into Florentine literary society, where he was much\r\nsought after, and also for the production of his \u0026ldquo;Art of War.\u0026rdquo; It was in\r\nthe same year that he received a commission at the instance of Cardinal\r\nde\u0026rsquo; Medici to write the \u0026ldquo;History of Florence,\u0026rdquo; a task which occupied him\r\nuntil 1525. His return to popular favour may have determined the Medici to\r\ngive him this employment, for an old writer observes that \u0026ldquo;an able\r\nstatesman out of work, like a huge whale, will endeavour to overturn the\r\nship unless he has an empty cask to play with.\u0026rdquo;\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWhen the \u0026ldquo;History of Florence\u0026rdquo; was finished, Machiavelli took it to Rome\r\nfor presentation to his patron, Giuliano de\u0026rsquo; Medici, who had in the\r\nmeanwhile become pope under the title of Clement VII. It is somewhat\r\nremarkable that, as, in 1513, Machiavelli had written \u003ci\u003eThe Prince\u003c/i\u003e for the\r\ninstruction of the Medici after they had just regained power in Florence,\r\nso, in 1525, he dedicated the \u0026ldquo;History of Florence\u0026rdquo; to the head of the\r\nfamily when its ruin was now at hand. In that year the battle of Pavia\r\ndestroyed the French rule in Italy, and left Francis I a prisoner in the\r\nhands of his great rival, Charles V. This was followed by the sack of\r\nRome, upon the news of which the popular party at Florence threw off the\r\nyoke of the Medici, who were once more banished.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nMachiavelli was absent from Florence at this time, but hastened his\r\nreturn, hoping to secure his former office of secretary to the \u0026ldquo;Ten of\r\nLiberty and Peace.\u0026rdquo; Unhappily he was taken ill soon after he reached\r\nFlorence, where he died on 22nd June 1527.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003c!–end chapter–\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"pref05\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eTHE MAN AND HIS WORKS\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nNo one can say where the bones of Machiavelli rest, but modern Florence\r\nhas decreed him a stately cenotaph in Santa Croce, by the side of her most\r\nfamous sons; recognizing that, whatever other nations may have found in\r\nhis works, Italy found in them the idea of her unity and the germs of her\r\nrenaissance among the nations of Europe. Whilst it is idle to protest\r\nagainst the world-wide and evil signification of his name, it may be\r\npointed out that the harsh construction of his doctrine which this\r\nsinister reputation implies was unknown to his own day, and that the\r\nresearches of recent times have enabled us to interpret him more\r\nreasonably. It is due to these inquiries that the shape of an \u0026ldquo;unholy\r\nnecromancer,\u0026rdquo; which so long haunted men\u0026rsquo;s vision, has begun to fade.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nMachiavelli was undoubtedly a man of great observation, acuteness, and\r\nindustry; noting with appreciative eye whatever passed before him, and\r\nwith his supreme literary gift turning it to account in his enforced\r\nretirement from affairs. He does not present himself, nor is he depicted\r\nby his contemporaries, as a type of that rare combination, the successful\r\nstatesman and author, for he appears to have been only moderately\r\nprosperous in his several embassies and political employments. He was\r\nmisled by Catherina Sforza, ignored by Louis XII, overawed by Cesare\r\nBorgia; several of his embassies were quite barren of results; his\r\nattempts to fortify Florence failed, and the soldiery that he raised\r\nastonished everybody by their cowardice. In the conduct of his own affairs\r\nhe was timid and time-serving; he dared not appear by the side of\r\nSoderini, to whom he owed so much, for fear of compromising himself; his\r\nconnection with the Medici was open to suspicion, and Giuliano appears to\r\nhave recognized his real forte when he set him to write the \u0026ldquo;History of\r\nFlorence,\u0026rdquo; rather than employ him in the state. And it is on the literary\r\nside of his character, and there alone, that we find no weakness and no\r\nfailure.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAlthough the light of almost four centuries has been focused on \u003ci\u003eThe\r\nPrince\u003c/i\u003e, its problems are still debatable and interesting, because they\r\nare the eternal problems between the ruled and their rulers. Such as they\r\nare, its ethics are those of Machiavelli\u0026rsquo;s contemporaries; yet they cannot\r\nbe said to be out of date so long as the governments of Europe rely on\r\nmaterial rather than on moral forces. Its historical incidents and\r\npersonages become interesting by reason of the uses which Machiavelli\r\nmakes of them to illustrate his theories of government and conduct.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nLeaving out of consideration those maxims of state which still furnish\r\nsome European and eastern statesmen with principles of action, \u003ci\u003eThe\r\nPrince\u003c/i\u003e is bestrewn with truths that can be proved at every turn. Men are\r\nstill the dupes of their simplicity and greed, as they were in the days of\r\nAlexander VI. The cloak of religion still conceals the vices which\r\nMachiavelli laid bare in the character of Ferdinand of Aragon. Men will\r\nnot look at things as they really are, but as they wish them to be\u0026mdash;and\r\nare ruined. In politics there are no perfectly safe courses; prudence\r\nconsists in choosing the least dangerous ones. Then\u0026mdash;to pass to a\r\nhigher plane\u0026mdash;Machiavelli reiterates that, although crimes may win an\r\nempire, they do not win glory. Necessary wars are just wars, and the arms\r\nof a nation are hallowed when it has no other resource but to fight.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIt is the cry of a far later day than Machiavelli\u0026rsquo;s that government should\r\nbe elevated into a living moral force, capable of inspiring the people\r\nwith a just recognition of the fundamental principles of society; to this\r\n\u0026ldquo;high argument\u0026rdquo; \u003ci\u003eThe Prince\u003c/i\u003e contributes but little. Machiavelli always\r\nrefused to write either of men or of governments otherwise than as he\r\nfound them, and he writes with such skill and insight that his work is of\r\nabiding value. But what invests \u003ci\u003eThe Prince\u003c/i\u003e with more than a merely\r\nartistic or historical interest is the incontrovertible truth that it\r\ndeals with the great principles which still guide nations and rulers in\r\ntheir relationship with each other and their neighbours.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIn translating \u003ci\u003eThe Prince\u003c/i\u003e my aim has been to achieve at all costs an\r\nexact literal rendering of the original, rather than a fluent paraphrase\r\nadapted to the modern notions of style and expression. Machiavelli was no\r\nfacile phrasemonger; the conditions under which he wrote obliged him to weigh\r\nevery word; his themes were lofty, his substance grave, his manner nobly plain\r\nand serious. \u003ci\u003eQuis eo fuit unquam in partiundis rebus, in definiendis, in\r\nexplanandis pressior?\u003c/i\u003e In \u003ci\u003eThe Prince\u003c/i\u003e, it may be truly said, there is\r\nreason assignable, not only for every word, but for the position of every word.\r\nTo an Englishman of Shakespeare\u0026rsquo;s time the translation of such a treatise\r\nwas in some ways a comparatively easy task, for in those times the genius of\r\nthe English more nearly resembled that of the Italian language; to the\r\nEnglishman of to-day it is not so simple. To take a single example: the word\r\n\u003ci\u003eintrattenere\u003c/i\u003e, employed by Machiavelli to indicate the policy adopted by\r\nthe Roman Senate towards the weaker states of Greece, would by an Elizabethan\r\nbe correctly rendered \u0026ldquo;entertain,\u0026rdquo; and every contemporary reader\r\nwould understand what was meant by saying that \u0026ldquo;Rome \u003ci\u003eentertained\u003c/i\u003e\r\nthe Ætolians and the Achaeans without augmenting their power.\u0026rdquo; But to-day\r\nsuch a phrase would seem obsolete and ambiguous, if not unmeaning: we are\r\ncompelled to say that \u0026ldquo;\u003ci\u003eRome maintained friendly relations with the\r\nÆtolians\u003c/i\u003e,\u0026rdquo; etc., using four words to do the work of one. I have tried\r\nto preserve the pithy brevity of the Italian so far as was consistent with an\r\nabsolute fidelity to the sense. If the result be an occasional asperity I can\r\nonly hope that the reader, in his eagerness to reach the author\u0026rsquo;s\r\nmeaning, may overlook the roughness of the road that leads him to it.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"p2\"\u003e\r\nThe following is a list of the works of Machiavelli:\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPrincipal works. Discorso sopra le cose di Pisa, 1499; Del modo di\r\ntrattare i popoli della Valdichiana ribellati, 1502; Del modo tenuto dal\r\nduca Valentino nell\u0026rsquo; ammazzare Vitellozzo Vitelli, Oliverotto da Fermo,\r\netc., 1502; Discorso sopra la provisione del danaro, 1502; Decennale primo\r\n(poem in terza rima), 1506; Ritratti delle cose dell\u0026rsquo; Alemagna, 1508-12;\r\nDecennale secondo, 1509; Ritratti delle cose di Francia, 1510; Discorsi\r\nsopra la prima deca di T. Livio, 3 vols., 1512-17; Il Principe, 1513;\r\nAndria, comedy translated from Terence, 1513 (?); Mandragola, prose comedy\r\nin five acts, with prologue in verse, 1513; Della lingua (dialogue), 1514;\r\nClizia, comedy in prose, 1515 (?); Belfagor arcidiavolo (novel), 1515;\r\nAsino d\u0026rsquo;oro (poem in terza rima), 1517; Dell\u0026rsquo; arte della guerra, 1519-20;\r\nDiscorso sopra il riformare lo stato di Firenze, 1520; Sommario delle cose\r\ndella citta di Lucca, 1520; Vita di Castruccio Castracani da Lucca, 1520;\r\nIstorie fiorentine, 8 books, 1521-5; Frammenti storici, 1525.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nOther poems include Sonetti, Canzoni, Ottave, and Canti carnascialeschi.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nEditions. Aldo, Venice, 1546; della Tertina, 1550; Cambiagi, Florence, 6\r\nvols., 1782-5; dei Classici, Milan, 10 1813; Silvestri, 9 vols., 1820-2;\r\nPasserini, Fanfani, Milanesi, 6 vols. only published, 1873-7.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nMinor works. Ed. F. L. Polidori, 1852; Lettere familiari, ed. E. Alvisi,\r\n1883, 2 editions, one with excisions; Credited Writings, ed. G.\r\nCanestrini, 1857; Letters to F. Vettori, see A. Ridolfi, Pensieri intorno\r\nallo scopo di N. Machiavelli nel libro Il Principe, etc.; D. Ferrara, The\r\nPrivate Correspondence of Nicolo Machiavelli, 1929.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003c!–end chapter–\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"pref06\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eDEDICATION\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"center\"\u003e\r\nTo the Magnificent Lorenzo Di Piero De\u0026rsquo; Medici\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThose who strive to obtain the good graces of a prince are accustomed to come\r\nbefore him with such things as they hold most precious, or in which they see\r\nhim take most delight; whence one often sees horses, arms, cloth of gold,\r\nprecious stones, and similar ornaments presented to princes, worthy of their\r\ngreatness.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nDesiring therefore to present myself to your Magnificence with some testimony\r\nof my devotion towards you, I have not found among my possessions anything\r\nwhich I hold more dear than, or value so much as, the knowledge of the actions\r\nof great men, acquired by long experience in contemporary affairs, and a\r\ncontinual study of antiquity; which, having reflected upon it with great and\r\nprolonged diligence, I now send, digested into a little volume, to your\r\nMagnificence.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAnd although I may consider this work unworthy of your countenance,\r\nnevertheless I trust much to your benignity that it may be acceptable, seeing\r\nthat it is not possible for me to make a better gift than to offer you the\r\nopportunity of understanding in the shortest time all that I have learnt in so\r\nmany years, and with so many troubles and dangers; which work I have not\r\nembellished with swelling or magnificent words, nor stuffed with rounded\r\nperiods, nor with any extrinsic allurements or adornments whatever, with which\r\nso many are accustomed to embellish their works; for I have wished either that\r\nno honour should be given it, or else that the truth of the matter and the\r\nweightiness of the theme shall make it acceptable.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nNor do I hold with those who regard it as a presumption if a man of low and\r\nhumble condition dare to discuss and settle the concerns of princes; because,\r\njust as those who draw landscapes place themselves below in the plain to\r\ncontemplate the nature of the mountains and of lofty places, and in order to\r\ncontemplate the plains place themselves upon high mountains, even so to\r\nunderstand the nature of the people it needs to be a prince, and to understand\r\nthat of princes it needs to be of the people.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nTake then, your Magnificence, this little gift in the spirit in which I send\r\nit; wherein, if it be diligently read and considered by you, you will learn my\r\nextreme desire that you should attain that greatness which fortune and your\r\nother attributes promise. And if your Magnificence from the summit of your\r\ngreatness will sometimes turn your eyes to these lower regions, you will see\r\nhow unmeritedly I suffer a great and continued malignity of fortune.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003c!–end chapter–\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"chap00\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eTHE PRINCE\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003c!–end chapter–\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"chap01\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eCHAPTER I.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nHOW MANY KINDS OF PRINCIPALITIES THERE ARE, AND BY WHAT MEANS THEY ARE ACQUIRED\r\n\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAll states, all powers, that have held and hold rule over men have been\r\nand are either republics or principalities.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPrincipalities are either hereditary, in which the family has been long\r\nestablished; or they are new.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe new are either entirely new, as was Milan to Francesco Sforza, or they\r\nare, as it were, members annexed to the hereditary state of the prince who\r\nhas acquired them, as was the kingdom of Naples to that of the King of\r\nSpain.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSuch dominions thus acquired are either accustomed to live under a prince,\r\nor to live in freedom; and are acquired either by the arms of the prince\r\nhimself, or of others, or else by fortune or by ability.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003c!–end chapter–\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"chap02\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eCHAPTER II.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nCONCERNING HEREDITARY PRINCIPALITIES\r\n\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nI will leave out all discussion on republics, inasmuch as in another place\r\nI have written of them at length, and will address myself only to\r\nprincipalities. In doing so I will keep to the order indicated above, and\r\ndiscuss how such principalities are to be ruled and preserved.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nI say at once there are fewer difficulties in holding hereditary states,\r\nand those long accustomed to the family of their prince, than new ones;\r\nfor it is sufficient only not to transgress the customs of his ancestors,\r\nand to deal prudently with circumstances as they arise, for a prince of\r\naverage powers to maintain himself in his state, unless he be deprived of\r\nit by some extraordinary and excessive force; and if he should be so\r\ndeprived of it, whenever anything sinister happens to the usurper, he will\r\nregain it.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWe have in Italy, for example, the Duke of Ferrara, who could not have\r\nwithstood the attacks of the Venetians in \u0026rsquo;84, nor those of Pope Julius in\r\n\u0026rsquo;10, unless he had been long established in his dominions. For the\r\nhereditary prince has less cause and less necessity to offend; hence it\r\nhappens that he will be more loved; and unless extraordinary vices cause\r\nhim to be hated, it is reasonable to expect that his subjects will be\r\nnaturally well disposed towards him; and in the antiquity and duration of\r\nhis rule the memories and motives that make for change are lost, for one\r\nchange always leaves the toothing for another.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003c!–end chapter–\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"chap03\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eCHAPTER III.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nCONCERNING MIXED PRINCIPALITIES\r\n\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut the difficulties occur in a new principality. And firstly, if it be\r\nnot entirely new, but is, as it were, a member of a state which, taken\r\ncollectively, may be called composite, the changes arise chiefly from an\r\ninherent difficulty which there is in all new principalities; for men\r\nchange their rulers willingly, hoping to better themselves, and this hope\r\ninduces them to take up arms against him who rules: wherein they are\r\ndeceived, because they afterwards find by experience they have gone from\r\nbad to worse. This follows also on another natural and common necessity,\r\nwhich always causes a new prince to burden those who have submitted to him\r\nwith his soldiery and with infinite other hardships which he must put upon\r\nhis new acquisition.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIn this way you have enemies in all those whom you have injured in seizing\r\nthat principality, and you are not able to keep those friends who put you\r\nthere because of your not being able to satisfy them in the way they\r\nexpected, and you cannot take strong measures against them, feeling bound\r\nto them. For, although one may be very strong in armed forces, yet in\r\nentering a province one has always need of the goodwill of the natives.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nFor these reasons Louis the Twelfth, King of France, quickly occupied\r\nMilan, and as quickly lost it; and to turn him out the first time it only\r\nneeded Lodovico\u0026rsquo;s own forces; because those who had opened the gates to\r\nhim, finding themselves deceived in their hopes of future benefit, would\r\nnot endure the ill-treatment of the new prince. It is very true that,\r\nafter acquiring rebellious provinces a second time, they are not so\r\nlightly lost afterwards, because the prince, with little reluctance, takes\r\nthe opportunity of the rebellion to punish the delinquents, to clear out\r\nthe suspects, and to strengthen himself in the weakest places. Thus to\r\ncause France to lose Milan the first time it was enough for the Duke\r\nLodovico\u003ca href=\"#fn-3.1\" name=\"fnref-3.1\" id=\"fnref-3.1\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[1]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nto raise insurrections on the borders; but to cause him to lose it a second\r\ntime it was necessary to bring the whole world against him, and that his armies\r\nshould be defeated and driven out of Italy; which followed from the causes\r\nabove mentioned.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"fn-3.1\" id=\"fn-3.1\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#fnref-3.1\"\u003e[1]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nDuke Lodovico was Lodovico Moro, a son of Francesco Sforza, who married\r\nBeatrice d\u0026rsquo;Este. He ruled over Milan from 1494 to 1500, and died in 1510.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nNevertheless Milan was taken from France both the first and the second\r\ntime. The general reasons for the first have been discussed; it remains to\r\nname those for the second, and to see what resources he had, and what any\r\none in his situation would have had for maintaining himself more securely\r\nin his acquisition than did the King of France.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nNow I say that those dominions which, when acquired, are added to an\r\nancient state by him who acquires them, are either of the same country and\r\nlanguage, or they are not. When they are, it is easier to hold them,\r\nespecially when they have not been accustomed to self-government; and to\r\nhold them securely it is enough to have destroyed the family of the prince\r\nwho was ruling them; because the two peoples, preserving in other things\r\nthe old conditions, and not being unlike in customs, will live quietly\r\ntogether, as one has seen in Brittany, Burgundy, Gascony, and Normandy,\r\nwhich have been bound to France for so long a time: and, although there\r\nmay be some difference in language, nevertheless the customs are alike,\r\nand the people will easily be able to get on amongst themselves. He who\r\nhas annexed them, if he wishes to hold them, has only to bear in mind two\r\nconsiderations: the one, that the family of their former lord is\r\nextinguished; the other, that neither their laws nor their taxes are\r\naltered, so that in a very short time they will become entirely one body\r\nwith the old principality.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut when states are acquired in a country differing in language, customs,\r\nor laws, there are difficulties, and good fortune and great energy are\r\nneeded to hold them, and one of the greatest and most real helps would be\r\nthat he who has acquired them should go and reside there. This would make\r\nhis position more secure and durable, as it has made that of the Turk in\r\nGreece, who, notwithstanding all the other measures taken by him for\r\nholding that state, if he had not settled there, would not have been able\r\nto keep it. Because, if one is on the spot, disorders are seen as they\r\nspring up, and one can quickly remedy them; but if one is not at hand,\r\nthey are heard of only when they are great, and then one can no longer\r\nremedy them. Besides this, the country is not pillaged by your officials;\r\nthe subjects are satisfied by prompt recourse to the prince; thus, wishing\r\nto be good, they have more cause to love him, and wishing to be otherwise,\r\nto fear him. He who would attack that state from the outside must have the\r\nutmost caution; as long as the prince resides there it can only be wrested\r\nfrom him with the greatest difficulty.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe other and better course is to send colonies to one or two places,\r\nwhich may be as keys to that state, for it is necessary either to do this\r\nor else to keep there a great number of cavalry and infantry. A prince\r\ndoes not spend much on colonies, for with little or no expense he can send\r\nthem out and keep them there, and he offends a minority only of the\r\ncitizens from whom he takes lands and houses to give them to the new\r\ninhabitants; and those whom he offends, remaining poor and scattered, are\r\nnever able to injure him; whilst the rest being uninjured are easily kept\r\nquiet, and at the same time are anxious not to err for fear it should\r\nhappen to them as it has to those who have been despoiled. In conclusion,\r\nI say that these colonies are not costly, they are more faithful, they\r\ninjure less, and the injured, as has been said, being poor and scattered,\r\ncannot hurt. Upon this, one has to remark that men ought either to be well\r\ntreated or crushed, because they can avenge themselves of lighter\r\ninjuries, of more serious ones they cannot; therefore the injury that is\r\nto be done to a man ought to be of such a kind that one does not stand in\r\nfear of revenge.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut in maintaining armed men there in place of colonies one spends much\r\nmore, having to consume on the garrison all the income from the state, so\r\nthat the acquisition turns into a loss, and many more are exasperated,\r\nbecause the whole state is injured; through the shifting of the garrison\r\nup and down all become acquainted with hardship, and all become hostile,\r\nand they are enemies who, whilst beaten on their own ground, are yet able\r\nto do hurt. For every reason, therefore, such guards are as useless as a\r\ncolony is useful.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAgain, the prince who holds a country differing in the above respects\r\nought to make himself the head and defender of his less powerful\r\nneighbours, and to weaken the more powerful amongst them, taking care that\r\nno foreigner as powerful as himself shall, by any accident, get a footing\r\nthere; for it will always happen that such a one will be introduced by\r\nthose who are discontented, either through excess of ambition or through\r\nfear, as one has seen already. The Romans were brought into Greece by the\r\nÆtolians; and in every other country where they obtained a footing they\r\nwere brought in by the inhabitants. And the usual course of affairs is\r\nthat, as soon as a powerful foreigner enters a country, all the subject\r\nstates are drawn to him, moved by the hatred which they feel against the\r\nruling power. So that in respect to those subject states he has not to\r\ntake any trouble to gain them over to himself, for the whole of them\r\nquickly rally to the state which he has acquired there. He has only to\r\ntake care that they do not get hold of too much power and too much\r\nauthority, and then with his own forces, and with their goodwill, he can\r\neasily keep down the more powerful of them, so as to remain entirely\r\nmaster in the country. And he who does not properly manage this business\r\nwill soon lose what he has acquired, and whilst he does hold it he will\r\nhave endless difficulties and troubles.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe Romans, in the countries which they annexed, observed closely these\r\nmeasures; they sent colonies and maintained friendly relations with\u003ca href=\"#fn-3.2\" name=\"fnref-3.2\" id=\"fnref-3.2\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[2]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nthe minor powers, without increasing their strength; they kept down the\r\ngreater, and did not allow any strong foreign powers to gain authority. Greece\r\nappears to me sufficient for an example. The Achaeans and Ætolians were kept\r\nfriendly by them, the kingdom of Macedonia was humbled, Antiochus was driven\r\nout; yet the merits of the Achaeans and Ætolians never secured for them\r\npermission to increase their power, nor did the persuasions of Philip ever\r\ninduce the Romans to be his friends without first humbling him, nor did the\r\ninfluence of Antiochus make them agree that he should retain any lordship over\r\nthe country. Because the Romans did in these instances what all prudent princes\r\nought to do, who have to regard not only present troubles, but also future\r\nones, for which they must prepare with every energy, because, when foreseen, it\r\nis easy to remedy them; but if you wait until they approach, the medicine is no\r\nlonger in time because the malady has become incurable; for it happens in this,\r\nas the physicians say it happens in hectic fever, that in the beginning of the\r\nmalady it is easy to cure but difficult to detect, but in the course of time,\r\nnot having been either detected or treated in the beginning, it becomes easy to\r\ndetect but difficult to cure. Thus it happens in affairs of state, for when the\r\nevils that arise have been foreseen (which it is only given to a wise man to\r\nsee), they can be quickly redressed, but when, through not having been\r\nforeseen, they have been permitted to grow in a way that every one can see\r\nthem, there is no longer a remedy. Therefore, the Romans, foreseeing troubles,\r\ndealt with them at once, and, even to avoid a war, would not let them come to a\r\nhead, for they knew that war is not to be avoided, but is only to be put off to\r\nthe advantage of others; moreover they wished to fight with Philip and\r\nAntiochus in Greece so as not to have to do it in Italy; they could have\r\navoided both, but this they did not wish; nor did that ever please them which\r\nis forever in the mouths of the wise ones of our time:\u0026mdash;Let us enjoy the\r\nbenefits of the time\u0026mdash;but rather the benefits of their own valour and\r\nprudence, for time drives everything before it, and is able to bring with it\r\ngood as well as evil, and evil as well as good.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"fn-3.2\" id=\"fn-3.2\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#fnref-3.2\"\u003e[2]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nSee remark in the introduction on the word \u0026ldquo;intrattenere.\u0026rdquo;\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut let us turn to France and inquire whether she has done any of the\r\nthings mentioned. I will speak of Louis\u003ca href=\"#fn-3.3\" name=\"fnref-3.3\" id=\"fnref-3.3\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[3]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n(and not of Charles)\u003ca href=\"#fn-3.4\" name=\"fnref-3.4\" id=\"fnref-3.4\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[4]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nas the one whose conduct is the better to be observed, he having held\r\npossession of Italy for the longest period; and you will see that he has done\r\nthe opposite to those things which ought to be done to retain a state composed\r\nof divers elements.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"fn-3.3\" id=\"fn-3.3\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#fnref-3.3\"\u003e[3]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nLouis XII, King of France, \u0026ldquo;The Father of the People,\u0026rdquo; born 1462,\r\ndied 1515.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"fn-3.4\" id=\"fn-3.4\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#fnref-3.4\"\u003e[4]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nCharles VIII, King of France, born 1470, died 1498.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nKing Louis was brought into Italy by the ambition of the Venetians, who\r\ndesired to obtain half the state of Lombardy by his intervention. I will\r\nnot blame the course taken by the king, because, wishing to get a foothold\r\nin Italy, and having no friends there\u0026mdash;seeing rather that every door\r\nwas shut to him owing to the conduct of Charles\u0026mdash;he was forced to\r\naccept those friendships which he could get, and he would have succeeded\r\nvery quickly in his design if in other matters he had not made some\r\nmistakes. The king, however, having acquired Lombardy, regained at once\r\nthe authority which Charles had lost: Genoa yielded; the Florentines\r\nbecame his friends; the Marquess of Mantua, the Duke of Ferrara, the\r\nBentivogli, my lady of Forli, the Lords of Faenza, of Pesaro, of Rimini,\r\nof Camerino, of Piombino, the Lucchese, the Pisans, the Sienese\u0026mdash;everybody\r\nmade advances to him to become his friend. Then could the Venetians\r\nrealize the rashness of the course taken by them, which, in order that\r\nthey might secure two towns in Lombardy, had made the king master of\r\ntwo-thirds of Italy.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nLet any one now consider with what little difficulty the king could have\r\nmaintained his position in Italy had he observed the rules above laid\r\ndown, and kept all his friends secure and protected; for although they\r\nwere numerous they were both weak and timid, some afraid of the Church,\r\nsome of the Venetians, and thus they would always have been forced to\r\nstand in with him, and by their means he could easily have made himself\r\nsecure against those who remained powerful. But he was no sooner in Milan\r\nthan he did the contrary by assisting Pope Alexander to occupy the\r\nRomagna. It never occurred to him that by this action he was weakening\r\nhimself, depriving himself of friends and of those who had thrown\r\nthemselves into his lap, whilst he aggrandized the Church by adding much\r\ntemporal power to the spiritual, thus giving it greater authority. And\r\nhaving committed this prime error, he was obliged to follow it up, so much\r\nso that, to put an end to the ambition of Alexander, and to prevent his\r\nbecoming the master of Tuscany, he was himself forced to come into Italy.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAnd as if it were not enough to have aggrandized the Church, and deprived\r\nhimself of friends, he, wishing to have the kingdom of Naples, divided it\r\nwith the King of Spain, and where he was the prime arbiter in Italy he\r\ntakes an associate, so that the ambitious of that country and the\r\nmalcontents of his own should have somewhere to shelter; and whereas he\r\ncould have left in the kingdom his own pensioner as king, he drove him\r\nout, to put one there who was able to drive him, Louis, out in turn.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe wish to acquire is in truth very natural and common, and men always do\r\nso when they can, and for this they will be praised not blamed; but when\r\nthey cannot do so, yet wish to do so by any means, then there is folly and\r\nblame. Therefore, if France could have attacked Naples with her own forces\r\nshe ought to have done so; if she could not, then she ought not to have\r\ndivided it. And if the partition which she made with the Venetians in\r\nLombardy was justified by the excuse that by it she got a foothold in\r\nItaly, this other partition merited blame, for it had not the excuse of\r\nthat necessity.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nTherefore Louis made these five errors: he destroyed the minor powers, he\r\nincreased the strength of one of the greater powers in Italy, he brought\r\nin a foreign power, he did not settle in the country, he did not send\r\ncolonies. Which errors, had he lived, were not enough to injure him had he\r\nnot made a sixth by taking away their dominions from the Venetians;\r\nbecause, had he not aggrandized the Church, nor brought Spain into Italy,\r\nit would have been very reasonable and necessary to humble them; but\r\nhaving first taken these steps, he ought never to have consented to their\r\nruin, for they, being powerful, would always have kept off others from\r\ndesigns on Lombardy, to which the Venetians would never have consented\r\nexcept to become masters themselves there; also because the others would\r\nnot wish to take Lombardy from France in order to give it to the\r\nVenetians, and to run counter to both they would not have had the courage.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAnd if any one should say: \u0026ldquo;King Louis yielded the Romagna to Alexander\r\nand the kingdom to Spain to avoid war,\u0026rdquo; I answer for the reasons given\r\nabove that a blunder ought never to be perpetrated to avoid war, because it is\r\nnot to be avoided, but is only deferred to your disadvantage. And if another\r\nshould allege the pledge which the king had given to the Pope that he would\r\nassist him in the enterprise, in exchange for the dissolution of his\r\nmarriage\u003ca href=\"#fn-3.5\" name=\"fnref-3.5\" id=\"fnref-3.5\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[5]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nand for the cap to Rouen,\u003ca href=\"#fn-3.6\" name=\"fnref-3.6\" id=\"fnref-3.6\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[6]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nto that I reply what I shall write later on concerning the faith of princes,\r\nand how it ought to be kept.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"fn-3.5\" id=\"fn-3.5\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#fnref-3.5\"\u003e[5]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nLouis XII divorced his wife, Jeanne, daughter of Louis XI, and married in 1499\r\nAnne of Brittany, widow of Charles VIII, in order to retain the Duchy of\r\nBrittany for the crown.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"fn-3.6\" id=\"fn-3.6\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#fnref-3.6\"\u003e[6]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nThe Archbishop of Rouen. He was Georges d\u0026rsquo;Amboise, created a cardinal by\r\nAlexander VI. Born 1460, died 1510.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThus King Louis lost Lombardy by not having followed any of the conditions\r\nobserved by those who have taken possession of countries and wished to\r\nretain them. Nor is there any miracle in this, but much that is reasonable\r\nand quite natural. And on these matters I spoke at Nantes with Rouen, when\r\nValentino, as Cesare Borgia, the son of Pope Alexander, was usually\r\ncalled, occupied the Romagna, and on Cardinal Rouen observing to me that\r\nthe Italians did not understand war, I replied to him that the French did\r\nnot understand statecraft, meaning that otherwise they would not have\r\nallowed the Church to reach such greatness. And in fact it has been seen\r\nthat the greatness of the Church and of Spain in Italy has been caused by\r\nFrance, and her ruin may be attributed to them. From this a general rule\r\nis drawn which never or rarely fails: that he who is the cause of another\r\nbecoming powerful is ruined; because that predominancy has been brought\r\nabout either by astuteness or else by force, and both are distrusted by\r\nhim who has been raised to power.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003c!–end chapter–\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"chap04\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eCHAPTER IV.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nWHY THE KINGDOM OF DARIUS, CONQUERED BY ALEXANDER, DID NOT REBEL AGAINST THE\r\nSUCCESSORS OF ALEXANDER AT HIS DEATH\r\n\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nConsidering the difficulties which men have had to hold to a newly\r\nacquired state, some might wonder how, seeing that Alexander the Great\r\nbecame the master of Asia in a few years, and died whilst it was scarcely\r\nsettled (whence it might appear reasonable that the whole empire would\r\nhave rebelled), nevertheless his successors maintained themselves, and had\r\nto meet no other difficulty than that which arose among themselves from\r\ntheir own ambitions.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nI answer that the principalities of which one has record are found to be\r\ngoverned in two different ways; either by a prince, with a body of\r\nservants, who assist him to govern the kingdom as ministers by his favour\r\nand permission; or by a prince and barons, who hold that dignity by\r\nantiquity of blood and not by the grace of the prince. Such barons have\r\nstates and their own subjects, who recognize them as lords and hold them\r\nin natural affection. Those states that are governed by a prince and his\r\nservants hold their prince in more consideration, because in all the\r\ncountry there is no one who is recognized as superior to him, and if they\r\nyield obedience to another they do it as to a minister and official, and\r\nthey do not bear him any particular affection.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe examples of these two governments in our time are the Turk and the\r\nKing of France. The entire monarchy of the Turk is governed by one lord,\r\nthe others are his servants; and, dividing his kingdom into sanjaks, he\r\nsends there different administrators, and shifts and changes them as he\r\nchooses. But the King of France is placed in the midst of an ancient body\r\nof lords, acknowledged by their own subjects, and beloved by them; they\r\nhave their own prerogatives, nor can the king take these away except at\r\nhis peril. Therefore, he who considers both of these states will recognize\r\ngreat difficulties in seizing the state of the Turk, but, once it is\r\nconquered, great ease in holding it. The causes of the difficulties in\r\nseizing the kingdom of the Turk are that the usurper cannot be called in\r\nby the princes of the kingdom, nor can he hope to be assisted in his\r\ndesigns by the revolt of those whom the lord has around him. This arises\r\nfrom the reasons given above; for his ministers, being all slaves and\r\nbondmen, can only be corrupted with great difficulty, and one can expect\r\nlittle advantage from them when they have been corrupted, as they cannot\r\ncarry the people with them, for the reasons assigned. Hence, he who\r\nattacks the Turk must bear in mind that he will find him united, and he\r\nwill have to rely more on his own strength than on the revolt of others;\r\nbut, if once the Turk has been conquered, and routed in the field in such\r\na way that he cannot replace his armies, there is nothing to fear but the\r\nfamily of this prince, and, this being exterminated, there remains no one\r\nto fear, the others having no credit with the people; and as the conqueror\r\ndid not rely on them before his victory, so he ought not to fear them\r\nafter it.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe contrary happens in kingdoms governed like that of France, because one\r\ncan easily enter there by gaining over some baron of the kingdom, for one\r\nalways finds malcontents and such as desire a change. Such men, for the\r\nreasons given, can open the way into the state and render the victory\r\neasy; but if you wish to hold it afterwards, you meet with infinite\r\ndifficulties, both from those who have assisted you and from those you\r\nhave crushed. Nor is it enough for you to have exterminated the family of\r\nthe prince, because the lords that remain make themselves the heads of\r\nfresh movements against you, and as you are unable either to satisfy or\r\nexterminate them, that state is lost whenever time brings the opportunity.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nNow if you will consider what was the nature of the government of Darius,\r\nyou will find it similar to the kingdom of the Turk, and therefore it was\r\nonly necessary for Alexander, first to overthrow him in the field, and\r\nthen to take the country from him. After which victory, Darius being\r\nkilled, the state remained secure to Alexander, for the above reasons. And\r\nif his successors had been united they would have enjoyed it securely and\r\nat their ease, for there were no tumults raised in the kingdom except\r\nthose they provoked themselves.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut it is impossible to hold with such tranquillity states constituted\r\nlike that of France. Hence arose those frequent rebellions against the\r\nRomans in Spain, France, and Greece, owing to the many principalities\r\nthere were in these states, of which, as long as the memory of them\r\nendured, the Romans always held an insecure possession; but with the power\r\nand long continuance of the empire the memory of them passed away, and the\r\nRomans then became secure possessors. And when fighting afterwards amongst\r\nthemselves, each one was able to attach to himself his own parts of the\r\ncountry, according to the authority he had assumed there; and the family\r\nof the former lord being exterminated, none other than the Romans were\r\nacknowledged.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWhen these things are remembered no one will marvel at the ease with which\r\nAlexander held the Empire of Asia, or at the difficulties which others\r\nhave had to keep an acquisition, such as Pyrrhus and many more; this is\r\nnot occasioned by the little or abundance of ability in the conqueror, but\r\nby the want of uniformity in the subject state.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003c!–end chapter–\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"chap05\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eCHAPTER V.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nCONCERNING THE WAY TO GOVERN CITIES OR PRINCIPALITIES WHICH LIVED UNDER THEIR\r\nOWN LAWS BEFORE THEY WERE ANNEXED\r\n\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWhenever those states which have been acquired as stated have been\r\naccustomed to live under their own laws and in freedom, there are three\r\ncourses for those who wish to hold them: the first is to ruin them, the\r\nnext is to reside there in person, the third is to permit them to live\r\nunder their own laws, drawing a tribute, and establishing within it an\r\noligarchy which will keep it friendly to you. Because such a government,\r\nbeing created by the prince, knows that it cannot stand without his\r\nfriendship and interest, and does its utmost to support him; and therefore\r\nhe who would keep a city accustomed to freedom will hold it more easily by\r\nthe means of its own citizens than in any other way.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThere are, for example, the Spartans and the Romans. The Spartans held\r\nAthens and Thebes, establishing there an oligarchy: nevertheless they lost\r\nthem. The Romans, in order to hold Capua, Carthage, and Numantia,\r\ndismantled them, and did not lose them. They wished to hold Greece as the\r\nSpartans held it, making it free and permitting its laws, and did not\r\nsucceed. So to hold it they were compelled to dismantle many cities in the\r\ncountry, for in truth there is no safe way to retain them otherwise than\r\nby ruining them. And he who becomes master of a city accustomed to freedom\r\nand does not destroy it, may expect to be destroyed by it, for in\r\nrebellion it has always the watchword of liberty and its ancient\r\nprivileges as a rallying point, which neither time nor benefits will ever\r\ncause it to forget. And whatever you may do or provide against, they never\r\nforget that name or their privileges unless they are disunited or\r\ndispersed, but at every chance they immediately rally to them, as Pisa\r\nafter the hundred years she had been held in bondage by the Florentines.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut when cities or countries are accustomed to live under a prince, and\r\nhis family is exterminated, they, being on the one hand accustomed to obey\r\nand on the other hand not having the old prince, cannot agree in making\r\none from amongst themselves, and they do not know how to govern\r\nthemselves. For this reason they are very slow to take up arms, and a\r\nprince can gain them to himself and secure them much more easily. But in\r\nrepublics there is more vitality, greater hatred, and more desire for\r\nvengeance, which will never permit them to allow the memory of their\r\nformer liberty to rest; so that the safest way is to destroy them or to\r\nreside there.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003c!–end chapter–\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"chap06\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eCHAPTER VI.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nCONCERNING NEW PRINCIPALITIES WHICH ARE ACQUIRED BY ONE\u0026rsquo;S OWN ARMS AND\r\nABILITY\r\n\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nLet no one be surprised if, in speaking of entirely new principalities as\r\nI shall do, I adduce the highest examples both of prince and of state;\r\nbecause men, walking almost always in paths beaten by others, and\r\nfollowing by imitation their deeds, are yet unable to keep entirely to the\r\nways of others or attain to the power of those they imitate. A wise man\r\nought always to follow the paths beaten by great men, and to imitate those\r\nwho have been supreme, so that if his ability does not equal theirs, at\r\nleast it will savour of it. Let him act like the clever archers who,\r\ndesigning to hit the mark which yet appears too far distant, and knowing\r\nthe limits to which the strength of their bow attains, take aim much\r\nhigher than the mark, not to reach by their strength or arrow to so great\r\na height, but to be able with the aid of so high an aim to hit the mark\r\nthey wish to reach.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nI say, therefore, that in entirely new principalities, where there is a\r\nnew prince, more or less difficulty is found in keeping them, accordingly\r\nas there is more or less ability in him who has acquired the state. Now,\r\nas the fact of becoming a prince from a private station presupposes either\r\nability or fortune, it is clear that one or other of these things will\r\nmitigate in some degree many difficulties. Nevertheless, he who has relied\r\nleast on fortune is established the strongest. Further, it facilitates\r\nmatters when the prince, having no other state, is compelled to reside\r\nthere in person.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut to come to those who, by their own ability and not through fortune,\r\nhave risen to be princes, I say that Moses, Cyrus, Romulus, Theseus, and\r\nsuch like are the most excellent examples. And although one may not\r\ndiscuss Moses, he having been a mere executor of the will of God, yet he\r\nought to be admired, if only for that favour which made him worthy to\r\nspeak with God. But in considering Cyrus and others who have acquired or\r\nfounded kingdoms, all will be found admirable; and if their particular\r\ndeeds and conduct shall be considered, they will not be found inferior to\r\nthose of Moses, although he had so great a preceptor. And in examining\r\ntheir actions and lives one cannot see that they owed anything to fortune\r\nbeyond opportunity, which brought them the material to mould into the form\r\nwhich seemed best to them. Without that opportunity their powers of mind\r\nwould have been extinguished, and without those powers the opportunity\r\nwould have come in vain.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIt was necessary, therefore, to Moses that he should find the people of\r\nIsrael in Egypt enslaved and oppressed by the Egyptians, in order that\r\nthey should be disposed to follow him so as to be delivered out of\r\nbondage. It was necessary that Romulus should not remain in Alba, and that\r\nhe should be abandoned at his birth, in order that he should become King\r\nof Rome and founder of the fatherland. It was necessary that Cyrus should\r\nfind the Persians discontented with the government of the Medes, and the\r\nMedes soft and effeminate through their long peace. Theseus could not have\r\nshown his ability had he not found the Athenians dispersed. These\r\nopportunities, therefore, made those men fortunate, and their high ability\r\nenabled them to recognize the opportunity whereby their country was\r\nennobled and made famous.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThose who by valorous ways become princes, like these men, acquire a\r\nprincipality with difficulty, but they keep it with ease. The difficulties\r\nthey have in acquiring it rise in part from the new rules and methods\r\nwhich they are forced to introduce to establish their government and its\r\nsecurity. And it ought to be remembered that there is nothing more\r\ndifficult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct, or more uncertain in\r\nits success, than to take the lead in the introduction of a new order of\r\nthings, because the innovator has for enemies all those who have done well\r\nunder the old conditions, and lukewarm defenders in those who may do well\r\nunder the new. This coolness arises partly from fear of the opponents, who\r\nhave the laws on their side, and partly from the incredulity of men, who\r\ndo not readily believe in new things until they have had a long experience\r\nof them. Thus it happens that whenever those who are hostile have the\r\nopportunity to attack they do it like partisans, whilst the others defend\r\nlukewarmly, in such wise that the prince is endangered along with them.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIt is necessary, therefore, if we desire to discuss this matter\r\nthoroughly, to inquire whether these innovators can rely on themselves or\r\nhave to depend on others: that is to say, whether, to consummate their\r\nenterprise, have they to use prayers or can they use force? In the first\r\ninstance they always succeed badly, and never compass anything; but when\r\nthey can rely on themselves and use force, then they are rarely\r\nendangered. Hence it is that all armed prophets have conquered, and the\r\nunarmed ones have been destroyed. Besides the reasons mentioned, the\r\nnature of the people is variable, and whilst it is easy to persuade them,\r\nit is difficult to fix them in that persuasion. And thus it is necessary\r\nto take such measures that, when they believe no longer, it may be\r\npossible to make them believe by force.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIf Moses, Cyrus, Theseus, and Romulus had been unarmed they could not have\r\nenforced their constitutions for long\u0026mdash;as happened in our time to Fra\r\nGirolamo Savonarola, who was ruined with his new order of things\r\nimmediately the multitude believed in him no longer, and he had no means\r\nof keeping steadfast those who believed or of making the unbelievers to\r\nbelieve. Therefore such as these have great difficulties in consummating\r\ntheir enterprise, for all their dangers are in the ascent, yet with\r\nability they will overcome them; but when these are overcome, and those\r\nwho envied them their success are exterminated, they will begin to be\r\nrespected, and they will continue afterwards powerful, secure, honoured,\r\nand happy.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nTo these great examples I wish to add a lesser one; still it bears some\r\nresemblance to them, and I wish it to suffice me for all of a like kind: it is\r\nHiero the Syracusan.\u003ca href=\"#fn-6.1\" name=\"fnref-6.1\" id=\"fnref-6.1\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[1]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nThis man rose from a private station to be Prince of Syracuse, nor did he,\r\neither, owe anything to fortune but opportunity; for the Syracusans, being\r\noppressed, chose him for their captain, afterwards he was rewarded by being\r\nmade their prince. He was of so great ability, even as a private citizen, that\r\none who writes of him says he wanted nothing but a kingdom to be a king. This\r\nman abolished the old soldiery, organized the new, gave up old alliances, made\r\nnew ones; and as he had his own soldiers and allies, on such foundations he was\r\nable to build any edifice: thus, whilst he had endured much trouble in\r\nacquiring, he had but little in keeping.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"fn-6.1\" id=\"fn-6.1\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#fnref-6.1\"\u003e[1]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nHiero II, born about 307 B.C., died 216 B.C.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003c!–end chapter–\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"chap07\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eCHAPTER VII.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nCONCERNING NEW PRINCIPALITIES WHICH ARE ACQUIRED EITHER BY THE ARMS OF OTHERS\r\nOR BY GOOD FORTUNE\r\n\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThose who solely by good fortune become princes from being private\r\ncitizens have little trouble in rising, but much in keeping atop; they\r\nhave not any difficulties on the way up, because they fly, but they have\r\nmany when they reach the summit. Such are those to whom some state is\r\ngiven either for money or by the favour of him who bestows it; as happened\r\nto many in Greece, in the cities of Ionia and of the Hellespont, where\r\nprinces were made by Darius, in order that they might hold the cities both\r\nfor his security and his glory; as also were those emperors who, by the\r\ncorruption of the soldiers, from being citizens came to empire. Such stand\r\nsimply elevated upon the goodwill and the fortune of him who has elevated\r\nthem\u0026mdash;two most inconstant and unstable things. Neither have they the\r\nknowledge requisite for the position; because, unless they are men of\r\ngreat worth and ability, it is not reasonable to expect that they should\r\nknow how to command, having always lived in a private condition; besides,\r\nthey cannot hold it because they have not forces which they can keep\r\nfriendly and faithful.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nStates that rise unexpectedly, then, like all other things in nature which are\r\nborn and grow rapidly, cannot leave their foundations and correspondencies\u003ca href=\"#fn-7.1\" name=\"fnref-7.1\" id=\"fnref-7.1\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[1]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nfixed in such a way that the first storm will not overthrow them; unless, as is\r\nsaid, those who unexpectedly become princes are men of so much ability that\r\nthey know they have to be prepared at once to hold that which fortune has\r\nthrown into their laps, and that those foundations, which others have laid\r\n\u003ci\u003ebefore\u003c/i\u003e they became princes, they must lay \u003ci\u003eafterwards\u003c/i\u003e.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"fn-7.1\" id=\"fn-7.1\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#fnref-7.1\"\u003e[1]\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u0026ldquo;Le radici e corrispondenze,\u0026rdquo; their roots (i.e. foundations) and\r\ncorrespondencies or relations with other states\u0026mdash;a common meaning of\r\n\u0026ldquo;correspondence\u0026rdquo; and \u0026ldquo;correspondency\u0026rdquo; in the sixteenth\r\nand seventeenth centuries.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nConcerning these two methods of rising to be a prince by ability or fortune, I\r\nwish to adduce two examples within our own recollection, and these are\r\nFrancesco Sforza\u003ca href=\"#fn-7.2\" name=\"fnref-7.2\" id=\"fnref-7.2\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[2]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nand Cesare Borgia. Francesco, by proper means and with great ability, from\r\nbeing a private person rose to be Duke of Milan, and that which he had acquired\r\nwith a thousand anxieties he kept with little trouble. On the other hand,\r\nCesare Borgia, called by the people Duke Valentino, acquired his state during\r\nthe ascendancy of his father, and on its decline he lost it, notwithstanding\r\nthat he had taken every measure and done all that ought to be done by a wise\r\nand able man to fix firmly his roots in the states which the arms and fortunes\r\nof others had bestowed on him.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"fn-7.2\" id=\"fn-7.2\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#fnref-7.2\"\u003e[2]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nFrancesco Sforza, born 1401, died 1466. He married Bianca Maria Visconti, a\r\nnatural daughter of Filippo Visconti, the Duke of Milan, on whose death he\r\nprocured his own elevation to the duchy. Machiavelli was the accredited agent\r\nof the Florentine Republic to Cesare Borgia (1478-1507) during the\r\ntransactions which led up to the assassinations of the Orsini and Vitelli at\r\nSinigalia, and along with his letters to his chiefs in Florence he has left an\r\naccount, written ten years before \u003ci\u003eThe Prince\u003c/i\u003e, of the proceedings of the\r\nduke in his \u0026ldquo;Descritione del modo tenuto dal duca Valentino nello\r\nammazzare Vitellozzo Vitelli,\u0026rdquo; etc., a translation of which is appended\r\nto the present work.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBecause, as is stated above, he who has not first laid his foundations may\r\nbe able with great ability to lay them afterwards, but they will be laid\r\nwith trouble to the architect and danger to the building. If, therefore,\r\nall the steps taken by the duke be considered, it will be seen that he\r\nlaid solid foundations for his future power, and I do not consider it\r\nsuperfluous to discuss them, because I do not know what better precepts to\r\ngive a new prince than the example of his actions; and if his dispositions\r\nwere of no avail, that was not his fault, but the extraordinary and\r\nextreme malignity of fortune.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAlexander the Sixth, in wishing to aggrandize the duke, his son, had many\r\nimmediate and prospective difficulties. Firstly, he did not see his way to\r\nmake him master of any state that was not a state of the Church; and if he\r\nwas willing to rob the Church he knew that the Duke of Milan and the\r\nVenetians would not consent, because Faenza and Rimini were already under\r\nthe protection of the Venetians. Besides this, he saw the arms of Italy,\r\nespecially those by which he might have been assisted, in hands that would\r\nfear the aggrandizement of the Pope, namely, the Orsini and the Colonnesi\r\nand their following. It behoved him, therefore, to upset this state of\r\naffairs and embroil the powers, so as to make himself securely master of\r\npart of their states. This was easy for him to do, because he found the\r\nVenetians, moved by other reasons, inclined to bring back the French into\r\nItaly; he would not only not oppose this, but he would render it more easy\r\nby dissolving the former marriage of King Louis. Therefore the king came\r\ninto Italy with the assistance of the Venetians and the consent of\r\nAlexander. He was no sooner in Milan than the Pope had soldiers from him\r\nfor the attempt on the Romagna, which yielded to him on the reputation of\r\nthe king. The duke, therefore, having acquired the Romagna and beaten the\r\nColonnesi, while wishing to hold that and to advance further, was hindered\r\nby two things: the one, his forces did not appear loyal to him, the other,\r\nthe goodwill of France: that is to say, he feared that the forces of the\r\nOrsini, which he was using, would not stand to him, that not only might\r\nthey hinder him from winning more, but might themselves seize what he had\r\nwon, and that the king might also do the same. Of the Orsini he had a\r\nwarning when, after taking Faenza and attacking Bologna, he saw them go\r\nvery unwillingly to that attack. And as to the king, he learned his mind\r\nwhen he himself, after taking the Duchy of Urbino, attacked Tuscany, and\r\nthe king made him desist from that undertaking; hence the duke decided to\r\ndepend no more upon the arms and the luck of others.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nFor the first thing he weakened the Orsini and Colonnesi parties in Rome, by\r\ngaining to himself all their adherents who were gentlemen, making them his\r\ngentlemen, giving them good pay, and, according to their rank, honouring them\r\nwith office and command in such a way that in a few months all attachment to\r\nthe factions was destroyed and turned entirely to the duke. After this he\r\nawaited an opportunity to crush the Orsini, having scattered the adherents of\r\nthe Colonna house. This came to him soon and he used it well; for the Orsini,\r\nperceiving at length that the aggrandizement of the duke and the Church was\r\nruin to them, called a meeting of the Magione in Perugia. From this sprung the\r\nrebellion at Urbino and the tumults in the Romagna, with endless dangers to the\r\nduke, all of which he overcame with the help of the French. Having restored his\r\nauthority, not to leave it at risk by trusting either to the French or other\r\noutside forces, he had recourse to his wiles, and he knew so well how to\r\nconceal his mind that, by the mediation of Signor Pagolo\u0026mdash;whom the duke\r\ndid not fail to secure with all kinds of attention, giving him money, apparel,\r\nand horses\u0026mdash;the Orsini were reconciled, so that their simplicity brought\r\nthem into his power at Sinigalia.\u003ca href=\"#fn-7.3\" name=\"fnref-7.3\" id=\"fnref-7.3\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[3]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nHaving exterminated the leaders, and turned their partisans into his friends,\r\nthe duke laid sufficiently good foundations to his power, having all the\r\nRomagna and the Duchy of Urbino; and the people now beginning to appreciate\r\ntheir prosperity, he gained them all over to himself. And as this point is\r\nworthy of notice, and to be imitated by others, I am not willing to leave it\r\nout.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"fn-7.3\" id=\"fn-7.3\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#fnref-7.3\"\u003e[3]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nSinigalia, 31st December 1502.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWhen the duke occupied the Romagna he found it under the rule of weak masters,\r\nwho rather plundered their subjects than ruled them, and gave them more cause\r\nfor disunion than for union, so that the country was full of robbery, quarrels,\r\nand every kind of violence; and so, wishing to bring back peace and obedience\r\nto authority, he considered it necessary to give it a good governor. Thereupon\r\nhe promoted Messer Ramiro d\u0026rsquo;Orco,\u003ca href=\"#fn-7.4\" name=\"fnref-7.4\" id=\"fnref-7.4\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[4]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\na swift and cruel man, to whom he gave the fullest power. This man in a short\r\ntime restored peace and unity with the greatest success. Afterwards the duke\r\nconsidered that it was not advisable to confer such excessive authority, for he\r\nhad no doubt but that he would become odious, so he set up a court of judgment\r\nin the country, under a most excellent president, wherein all cities had their\r\nadvocates. And because he knew that the past severity had caused some hatred\r\nagainst himself, so, to clear himself in the minds of the people, and gain them\r\nentirely to himself, he desired to show that, if any cruelty had been\r\npractised, it had not originated with him, but in the natural sternness of the\r\nminister. Under this pretence he took Ramiro, and one morning caused him to be\r\nexecuted and left on the piazza at Cesena with the block and a bloody knife at\r\nhis side. The barbarity of this spectacle caused the people to be at once\r\nsatisfied and dismayed.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"fn-7.4\" id=\"fn-7.4\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#fnref-7.4\"\u003e[4]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nRamiro d\u0026rsquo;Orco. Ramiro de Lorqua.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut let us return whence we started. I say that the duke, finding himself\r\nnow sufficiently powerful and partly secured from immediate dangers by\r\nhaving armed himself in his own way, and having in a great measure crushed\r\nthose forces in his vicinity that could injure him if he wished to proceed\r\nwith his conquest, had next to consider France, for he knew that the king,\r\nwho too late was aware of his mistake, would not support him. And from\r\nthis time he began to seek new alliances and to temporize with France in\r\nthe expedition which she was making towards the kingdom of Naples against\r\nthe Spaniards who were besieging Gaeta. It was his intention to secure\r\nhimself against them, and this he would have quickly accomplished had\r\nAlexander lived.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSuch was his line of action as to present affairs. But as to the future he\r\nhad to fear, in the first place, that a new successor to the Church might\r\nnot be friendly to him and might seek to take from him that which\r\nAlexander had given him, so he decided to act in four ways. Firstly, by\r\nexterminating the families of those lords whom he had despoiled, so as to\r\ntake away that pretext from the Pope. Secondly, by winning to himself all\r\nthe gentlemen of Rome, so as to be able to curb the Pope with their aid,\r\nas has been observed. Thirdly, by converting the college more to himself.\r\nFourthly, by acquiring so much power before the Pope should die that he\r\ncould by his own measures resist the first shock. Of these four things, at\r\nthe death of Alexander, he had accomplished three. For he had killed as\r\nmany of the dispossessed lords as he could lay hands on, and few had\r\nescaped; he had won over the Roman gentlemen, and he had the most numerous\r\nparty in the college. And as to any fresh acquisition, he intended to\r\nbecome master of Tuscany, for he already possessed Perugia and Piombino,\r\nand Pisa was under his protection. And as he had no longer to study France\r\n(for the French were already driven out of the kingdom of Naples by the\r\nSpaniards, and in this way both were compelled to buy his goodwill), he\r\npounced down upon Pisa. After this, Lucca and Siena yielded at once,\r\npartly through hatred and partly through fear of the Florentines; and the\r\nFlorentines would have had no remedy had he continued to prosper, as he\r\nwas prospering the year that Alexander died, for he had acquired so much\r\npower and reputation that he would have stood by himself, and no longer\r\nhave depended on the luck and the forces of others, but solely on his own\r\npower and ability.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut Alexander died five years after he had first drawn the sword. He left the\r\nduke with the state of Romagna alone consolidated, with the rest in the air,\r\nbetween two most powerful hostile armies, and sick unto death. Yet there were\r\nin the duke such boldness and ability, and he knew so well how men are to be\r\nwon or lost, and so firm were the foundations which in so short a time he had\r\nlaid, that if he had not had those armies on his back, or if he had been in\r\ngood health, he would have overcome all difficulties. And it is seen that his\r\nfoundations were good, for the Romagna awaited him for more than a month. In\r\nRome, although but half alive, he remained secure; and whilst the Baglioni, the\r\nVitelli, and the Orsini might come to Rome, they could not effect anything\r\nagainst him. If he could not have made Pope him whom he wished, at least the\r\none whom he did not wish would not have been elected. But if he had been in\r\nsound health at the death of Alexander,\u003ca href=\"#fn-7.5\" name=\"fnref-7.5\" id=\"fnref-7.5\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[5]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\neverything would have been different to him. On the day that Julius the\r\nSecond\u003ca href=\"#fn-7.6\" name=\"fnref-7.6\" id=\"fnref-7.6\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[6]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e was\r\nelected, he told me that he had thought of everything that might occur at the\r\ndeath of his father, and had provided a remedy for all, except that he had\r\nnever anticipated that, when the death did happen, he himself would be on the\r\npoint to die.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"fn-7.5\" id=\"fn-7.5\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#fnref-7.5\"\u003e[5]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nAlexander VI died of fever, 18th August 1503.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"fn-7.6\" id=\"fn-7.6\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#fnref-7.6\"\u003e[6]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nJulius II was Giuliano della Rovere, Cardinal of San Pietro ad Vincula, born\r\n1443, died 1513.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWhen all the actions of the duke are recalled, I do not know how to blame\r\nhim, but rather it appears to be, as I have said, that I ought to offer\r\nhim for imitation to all those who, by the fortune or the arms of others,\r\nare raised to government. Because he, having a lofty spirit and\r\nfar-reaching aims, could not have regulated his conduct otherwise, and\r\nonly the shortness of the life of Alexander and his own sickness\r\nfrustrated his designs. Therefore, he who considers it necessary to secure\r\nhimself in his new principality, to win friends, to overcome either by\r\nforce or fraud, to make himself beloved and feared by the people, to be\r\nfollowed and revered by the soldiers, to exterminate those who have power\r\nor reason to hurt him, to change the old order of things for new, to be\r\nsevere and gracious, magnanimous and liberal, to destroy a disloyal\r\nsoldiery and to create new, to maintain friendship with kings and princes\r\nin such a way that they must help him with zeal and offend with caution,\r\ncannot find a more lively example than the actions of this man.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nOnly can he be blamed for the election of Julius the Second, in whom he made a\r\nbad choice, because, as is said, not being able to elect a Pope to his own\r\nmind, he could have hindered any other from being elected Pope; and he ought\r\nnever to have consented to the election of any cardinal whom he had injured or\r\nwho had cause to fear him if they became pontiffs. For men injure either from\r\nfear or hatred. Those whom he had injured, amongst others, were San Pietro ad\r\nVincula, Colonna, San Giorgio, and Ascanio.\u003ca href=\"#fn-7.7\" name=\"fnref-7.7\" id=\"fnref-7.7\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[7]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nThe rest, in becoming Pope, had to fear him, Rouen and the Spaniards excepted;\r\nthe latter from their relationship and obligations, the former from his\r\ninfluence, the kingdom of France having relations with him. Therefore, above\r\neverything, the duke ought to have created a Spaniard Pope, and, failing him,\r\nhe ought to have consented to Rouen and not San Pietro ad Vincula. He who\r\nbelieves that new benefits will cause great personages to forget old injuries\r\nis deceived. Therefore, the duke erred in his choice, and it was the cause of\r\nhis ultimate ruin.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"fn-7.7\" id=\"fn-7.7\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#fnref-7.7\"\u003e[7]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nSan Giorgio is Raffaello Riario. Ascanio is Ascanio Sforza.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003c!–end chapter–\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"chap08\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eCHAPTER VIII.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nCONCERNING THOSE WHO HAVE OBTAINED A PRINCIPALITY BY WICKEDNESS\r\n\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAlthough a prince may rise from a private station in two ways, neither of\r\nwhich can be entirely attributed to fortune or genius, yet it is manifest\r\nto me that I must not be silent on them, although one could be more\r\ncopiously treated when I discuss republics. These methods are when, either\r\nby some wicked or nefarious ways, one ascends to the principality, or when\r\nby the favour of his fellow-citizens a private person becomes the prince\r\nof his country. And speaking of the first method, it will be illustrated\r\nby two examples\u0026mdash;one ancient, the other modern\u0026mdash;and without\r\nentering further into the subject, I consider these two examples will\r\nsuffice those who may be compelled to follow them.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAgathocles, the Sicilian,\u003ca href=\"#fn-8.1\" name=\"fnref-8.1\" id=\"fnref-8.1\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[1]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nbecame King of Syracuse not only from a private but from a low and abject\r\nposition. This man, the son of a potter, through all the changes in his\r\nfortunes always led an infamous life. Nevertheless, he accompanied his infamies\r\nwith so much ability of mind and body that, having devoted himself to the\r\nmilitary profession, he rose through its ranks to be Praetor of Syracuse. Being\r\nestablished in that position, and having deliberately resolved to make himself\r\nprince and to seize by violence, without obligation to others, that which had\r\nbeen conceded to him by assent, he came to an understanding for this purpose\r\nwith Amilcar, the Carthaginian, who, with his army, was fighting in Sicily. One\r\nmorning he assembled the people and the senate of Syracuse, as if he had to\r\ndiscuss with them things relating to the Republic, and at a given signal the\r\nsoldiers killed all the senators and the richest of the people; these dead, he\r\nseized and held the princedom of that city without any civil commotion. And\r\nalthough he was twice routed by the Carthaginians, and ultimately besieged, yet\r\nnot only was he able to defend his city, but leaving part of his men for its\r\ndefence, with the others he attacked Africa, and in a short time raised the\r\nsiege of Syracuse. The Carthaginians, reduced to extreme necessity, were\r\ncompelled to come to terms with Agathocles, and, leaving Sicily to him, had to\r\nbe content with the possession of Africa.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"fn-8.1\" id=\"fn-8.1\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#fnref-8.1\"\u003e[1]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nAgathocles the Sicilian, born 361 B.C., died 289 B.C.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nTherefore, he who considers the actions and the genius of this man will\r\nsee nothing, or little, which can be attributed to fortune, inasmuch as he\r\nattained pre-eminence, as is shown above, not by the favour of any one,\r\nbut step by step in the military profession, which steps were gained with\r\na thousand troubles and perils, and were afterwards boldly held by him\r\nwith many hazardous dangers. Yet it cannot be called talent to slay\r\nfellow-citizens, to deceive friends, to be without faith, without mercy,\r\nwithout religion; such methods may gain empire, but not glory. Still, if\r\nthe courage of Agathocles in entering into and extricating himself from\r\ndangers be considered, together with his greatness of mind in enduring and\r\novercoming hardships, it cannot be seen why he should be esteemed less\r\nthan the most notable captain. Nevertheless, his barbarous cruelty and\r\ninhumanity with infinite wickedness do not permit him to be celebrated\r\namong the most excellent men. What he achieved cannot be attributed either\r\nto fortune or genius.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIn our times, during the rule of Alexander the Sixth, Oliverotto da Fermo,\r\nhaving been left an orphan many years before, was brought up by his\r\nmaternal uncle, Giovanni Fogliani, and in the early days of his youth sent\r\nto fight under Pagolo Vitelli, that, being trained under his discipline,\r\nhe might attain some high position in the military profession. After\r\nPagolo died, he fought under his brother Vitellozzo, and in a very short\r\ntime, being endowed with wit and a vigorous body and mind, he became the\r\nfirst man in his profession. But it appearing a paltry thing to serve\r\nunder others, he resolved, with the aid of some citizens of Fermo, to whom\r\nthe slavery of their country was dearer than its liberty, and with the\r\nhelp of the Vitelleschi, to seize Fermo. So he wrote to Giovanni Fogliani\r\nthat, having been away from home for many years, he wished to visit him\r\nand his city, and in some measure to look upon his patrimony; and although\r\nhe had not laboured to acquire anything except honour, yet, in order that\r\nthe citizens should see he had not spent his time in vain, he desired to\r\ncome honourably, so would be accompanied by one hundred horsemen, his\r\nfriends and retainers; and he entreated Giovanni to arrange that he should\r\nbe received honourably by the Fermians, all of which would be not only to\r\nhis honour, but also to that of Giovanni himself, who had brought him up.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nGiovanni, therefore, did not fail in any attentions due to his nephew, and\r\nhe caused him to be honourably received by the Fermians, and he lodged him\r\nin his own house, where, having passed some days, and having arranged what\r\nwas necessary for his wicked designs, Oliverotto gave a solemn banquet to\r\nwhich he invited Giovanni Fogliani and the chiefs of Fermo. When the\r\nviands and all the other entertainments that are usual in such banquets\r\nwere finished, Oliverotto artfully began certain grave discourses,\r\nspeaking of the greatness of Pope Alexander and his son Cesare, and of\r\ntheir enterprises, to which discourse Giovanni and others answered; but he\r\nrose at once, saying that such matters ought to be discussed in a more\r\nprivate place, and he betook himself to a chamber, whither Giovanni and\r\nthe rest of the citizens went in after him. No sooner were they seated\r\nthan soldiers issued from secret places and slaughtered Giovanni and the\r\nrest. After these murders Oliverotto, mounted on horseback, rode up and\r\ndown the town and besieged the chief magistrate in the palace, so that in\r\nfear the people were forced to obey him, and to form a government, of\r\nwhich he made himself the prince. He killed all the malcontents who were\r\nable to injure him, and strengthened himself with new civil and military\r\nordinances, in such a way that, in the year during which he held the\r\nprincipality, not only was he secure in the city of Fermo, but he had\r\nbecome formidable to all his neighbours. And his destruction would have\r\nbeen as difficult as that of Agathocles if he had not allowed himself to\r\nbe overreached by Cesare Borgia, who took him with the Orsini and Vitelli\r\nat Sinigalia, as was stated above. Thus one year after he had committed\r\nthis parricide, he was strangled, together with Vitellozzo, whom he had\r\nmade his leader in valour and wickedness.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSome may wonder how it can happen that Agathocles, and his like, after infinite\r\ntreacheries and cruelties, should live for long secure in his country, and\r\ndefend himself from external enemies, and never be conspired against by his own\r\ncitizens; seeing that many others, by means of cruelty, have never been able\r\neven in peaceful times to hold the state, still less in the doubtful times of\r\nwar. I believe that this follows from severities\u003ca href=\"#fn-8.2\" name=\"fnref-8.2\" id=\"fnref-8.2\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[2]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nbeing badly or properly used. Those may be called properly used, if of evil it\r\nis possible to speak well, that are applied at one blow and are necessary to\r\none\u0026rsquo;s security, and that are not persisted in afterwards unless they can\r\nbe turned to the advantage of the subjects. The badly employed are those which,\r\nnotwithstanding they may be few in the commencement, multiply with time rather\r\nthan decrease. Those who practise the first system are able, by aid of God or\r\nman, to mitigate in some degree their rule, as Agathocles did. It is impossible\r\nfor those who follow the other to maintain themselves.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"fn-8.2\" id=\"fn-8.2\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#fnref-8.2\"\u003e[2]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nMr Burd suggests that this word probably comes near the modern equivalent of\r\nMachiavelli\u0026rsquo;s thought when he speaks of \u0026ldquo;crudelta\u0026rdquo; than the\r\nmore obvious \u0026ldquo;cruelties.\u0026rdquo;\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHence it is to be remarked that, in seizing a state, the usurper ought to\r\nexamine closely into all those injuries which it is necessary for him to\r\ninflict, and to do them all at one stroke so as not to have to repeat them\r\ndaily; and thus by not unsettling men he will be able to reassure them,\r\nand win them to himself by benefits. He who does otherwise, either from\r\ntimidity or evil advice, is always compelled to keep the knife in his\r\nhand; neither can he rely on his subjects, nor can they attach themselves\r\nto him, owing to their continued and repeated wrongs. For injuries ought\r\nto be done all at one time, so that, being tasted less, they offend less;\r\nbenefits ought to be given little by little, so that the flavour of them\r\nmay last longer.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAnd above all things, a prince ought to live amongst his people in such a\r\nway that no unexpected circumstances, whether of good or evil, shall make\r\nhim change; because if the necessity for this comes in troubled times, you\r\nare too late for harsh measures; and mild ones will not help you, for they\r\nwill be considered as forced from you, and no one will be under any\r\nobligation to you for them.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003c!–end chapter–\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"chap09\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eCHAPTER IX.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nCONCERNING A CIVIL PRINCIPALITY\r\n\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut coming to the other point\u0026mdash;where a leading citizen becomes the\r\nprince of his country, not by wickedness or any intolerable violence, but\r\nby the favour of his fellow citizens\u0026mdash;this may be called a civil\r\nprincipality: nor is genius or fortune altogether necessary to attain to\r\nit, but rather a happy shrewdness. I say then that such a principality is\r\nobtained either by the favour of the people or by the favour of the\r\nnobles. Because in all cities these two distinct parties are found, and\r\nfrom this it arises that the people do not wish to be ruled nor oppressed\r\nby the nobles, and the nobles wish to rule and oppress the people; and\r\nfrom these two opposite desires there arises in cities one of three\r\nresults, either a principality, self-government, or anarchy.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nA principality is created either by the people or by the nobles,\r\naccordingly as one or other of them has the opportunity; for the nobles,\r\nseeing they cannot withstand the people, begin to cry up the reputation of\r\none of themselves, and they make him a prince, so that under his shadow\r\nthey can give vent to their ambitions. The people, finding they cannot\r\nresist the nobles, also cry up the reputation of one of themselves, and\r\nmake him a prince so as to be defended by his authority. He who obtains\r\nsovereignty by the assistance of the nobles maintains himself with more\r\ndifficulty than he who comes to it by the aid of the people, because the\r\nformer finds himself with many around him who consider themselves his\r\nequals, and because of this he can neither rule nor manage them to his\r\nliking. But he who reaches sovereignty by popular favour finds himself\r\nalone, and has none around him, or few, who are not prepared to obey him.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBesides this, one cannot by fair dealing, and without injury to others,\r\nsatisfy the nobles, but you can satisfy the people, for their object is\r\nmore righteous than that of the nobles, the latter wishing to oppress,\r\nwhile the former only desire not to be oppressed. It is to be added also\r\nthat a prince can never secure himself against a hostile people, because\r\nof there being too many, whilst from the nobles he can secure himself, as\r\nthey are few in number. The worst that a prince may expect from a hostile\r\npeople is to be abandoned by them; but from hostile nobles he has not only\r\nto fear abandonment, but also that they will rise against him; for they,\r\nbeing in these affairs more far-seeing and astute, always come forward in\r\ntime to save themselves, and to obtain favours from him whom they expect\r\nto prevail. Further, the prince is compelled to live always with the same\r\npeople, but he can do well without the same nobles, being able to make and\r\nunmake them daily, and to give or take away authority when it pleases him.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nTherefore, to make this point clearer, I say that the nobles ought to be\r\nlooked at mainly in two ways: that is to say, they either shape their\r\ncourse in such a way as binds them entirely to your fortune, or they do\r\nnot. Those who so bind themselves, and are not rapacious, ought to be\r\nhonoured and loved; those who do not bind themselves may be dealt with in\r\ntwo ways; they may fail to do this through pusillanimity and a natural\r\nwant of courage, in which case you ought to make use of them, especially\r\nof those who are of good counsel; and thus, whilst in prosperity you\r\nhonour them, in adversity you do not have to fear them. But when for their\r\nown ambitious ends they shun binding themselves, it is a token that they\r\nare giving more thought to themselves than to you, and a prince ought to\r\nguard against such, and to fear them as if they were open enemies, because\r\nin adversity they always help to ruin him.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nTherefore, one who becomes a prince through the favour of the people ought\r\nto keep them friendly, and this he can easily do seeing they only ask not\r\nto be oppressed by him. But one who, in opposition to the people, becomes\r\na prince by the favour of the nobles, ought, above everything, to seek to\r\nwin the people over to himself, and this he may easily do if he takes them\r\nunder his protection. Because men, when they receive good from him of whom\r\nthey were expecting evil, are bound more closely to their benefactor; thus\r\nthe people quickly become more devoted to him than if he had been raised\r\nto the principality by their favours; and the prince can win their\r\naffections in many ways, but as these vary according to the circumstances\r\none cannot give fixed rules, so I omit them; but, I repeat, it is\r\nnecessary for a prince to have the people friendly, otherwise he has no\r\nsecurity in adversity.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nNabis,\u003ca href=\"#fn-9.1\" name=\"fnref-9.1\" id=\"fnref-9.1\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[1]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nPrince of the Spartans, sustained the attack of all Greece, and of a victorious\r\nRoman army, and against them he defended his country and his government; and\r\nfor the overcoming of this peril it was only necessary for him to make himself\r\nsecure against a few, but this would not have been sufficient had the people\r\nbeen hostile. And do not let any one impugn this statement with the trite\r\nproverb that \u0026ldquo;He who builds on the people, builds on the mud,\u0026rdquo; for\r\nthis is true when a private citizen makes a foundation there, and persuades\r\nhimself that the people will free him when he is oppressed by his enemies or by\r\nthe magistrates; wherein he would find himself very often deceived, as happened\r\nto the Gracchi in Rome and to Messer Giorgio Scali\u003ca href=\"#fn-9.2\" name=\"fnref-9.2\" id=\"fnref-9.2\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[2]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nin Florence. But granted a prince who has established himself as above, who can\r\ncommand, and is a man of courage, undismayed in adversity, who does not fail in\r\nother qualifications, and who, by his resolution and energy, keeps the whole\r\npeople encouraged\u0026mdash;such a one will never find himself deceived in them,\r\nand it will be shown that he has laid his foundations well.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"fn-9.1\" id=\"fn-9.1\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#fnref-9.1\"\u003e[1]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nNabis, tyrant of Sparta, conquered by the Romans under Flamininus in 195 B.C.;\r\nkilled 192 B.C.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"fn-9.2\" id=\"fn-9.2\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#fnref-9.2\"\u003e[2]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nMesser Giorgio Scali. This event is to be found in Machiavelli\u0026rsquo;s\r\n\u0026ldquo;Florentine History,\u0026rdquo; Book III.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThese principalities are liable to danger when they are passing from the\r\ncivil to the absolute order of government, for such princes either rule\r\npersonally or through magistrates. In the latter case their government is\r\nweaker and more insecure, because it rests entirely on the goodwill of\r\nthose citizens who are raised to the magistracy, and who, especially in\r\ntroubled times, can destroy the government with great ease, either by\r\nintrigue or open defiance; and the prince has not the chance amid tumults\r\nto exercise absolute authority, because the citizens and subjects,\r\naccustomed to receive orders from magistrates, are not of a mind to obey\r\nhim amid these confusions, and there will always be in doubtful times a\r\nscarcity of men whom he can trust. For such a prince cannot rely upon what\r\nhe observes in quiet times, when citizens have need of the state, because\r\nthen every one agrees with him; they all promise, and when death is far\r\ndistant they all wish to die for him; but in troubled times, when the\r\nstate has need of its citizens, then he finds but few. And so much the\r\nmore is this experiment dangerous, inasmuch as it can only be tried once.\r\nTherefore a wise prince ought to adopt such a course that his citizens\r\nwill always in every sort and kind of circumstance have need of the state\r\nand of him, and then he will always find them faithful.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003c!–end chapter–\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"chap10\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eCHAPTER X.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nCONCERNING THE WAY IN WHICH THE STRENGTH OF ALL PRINCIPALITIES OUGHT TO BE\r\nMEASURED\r\n\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIt is necessary to consider another point in examining the character of\r\nthese principalities: that is, whether a prince has such power that, in\r\ncase of need, he can support himself with his own resources, or whether he\r\nhas always need of the assistance of others. And to make this quite clear\r\nI say that I consider those who are able to support themselves by their\r\nown resources who can, either by abundance of men or money, raise a\r\nsufficient army to join battle against any one who comes to attack them;\r\nand I consider those always to have need of others who cannot show\r\nthemselves against the enemy in the field, but are forced to defend\r\nthemselves by sheltering behind walls. The first case has been discussed,\r\nbut we will speak of it again should it recur. In the second case one can\r\nsay nothing except to encourage such princes to provision and fortify\r\ntheir towns, and not on any account to defend the country. And whoever\r\nshall fortify his town well, and shall have managed the other concerns of\r\nhis subjects in the way stated above, and to be often repeated, will never\r\nbe attacked without great caution, for men are always adverse to\r\nenterprises where difficulties can be seen, and it will be seen not to be\r\nan easy thing to attack one who has his town well fortified, and is not\r\nhated by his people.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe cities of Germany are absolutely free, they own but little country\r\naround them, and they yield obedience to the emperor when it suits them,\r\nnor do they fear this or any other power they may have near them, because\r\nthey are fortified in such a way that every one thinks the taking of them\r\nby assault would be tedious and difficult, seeing they have proper ditches\r\nand walls, they have sufficient artillery, and they always keep in public\r\ndepots enough for one year\u0026rsquo;s eating, drinking, and firing. And beyond\r\nthis, to keep the people quiet and without loss to the state, they always\r\nhave the means of giving work to the community in those labours that are\r\nthe life and strength of the city, and on the pursuit of which the people\r\nare supported; they also hold military exercises in repute, and moreover\r\nhave many ordinances to uphold them.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nTherefore, a prince who has a strong city, and had not made himself\r\nodious, will not be attacked, or if any one should attack he will only be\r\ndriven off with disgrace; again, because that the affairs of this world\r\nare so changeable, it is almost impossible to keep an army a whole year in\r\nthe field without being interfered with. And whoever should reply: If the\r\npeople have property outside the city, and see it burnt, they will not\r\nremain patient, and the long siege and self-interest will make them forget\r\ntheir prince; to this I answer that a powerful and courageous prince will\r\novercome all such difficulties by giving at one time hope to his subjects\r\nthat the evil will not be for long, at another time fear of the cruelty of\r\nthe enemy, then preserving himself adroitly from those subjects who seem\r\nto him to be too bold.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nFurther, the enemy would naturally on his arrival at once burn and ruin\r\nthe country at the time when the spirits of the people are still hot and\r\nready for the defence; and, therefore, so much the less ought the prince\r\nto hesitate; because after a time, when spirits have cooled, the damage is\r\nalready done, the ills are incurred, and there is no longer any remedy;\r\nand therefore they are so much the more ready to unite with their prince,\r\nhe appearing to be under obligations to them now that their houses have\r\nbeen burnt and their possessions ruined in his defence. For it is the\r\nnature of men to be bound by the benefits they confer as much as by those\r\nthey receive. Therefore, if everything is well considered, it will not be\r\ndifficult for a wise prince to keep the minds of his citizens steadfast\r\nfrom first to last, when he does not fail to support and defend them.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003c!–end chapter–\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"chap11\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eCHAPTER XI.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nCONCERNING ECCLESIASTICAL PRINCIPALITIES\r\n\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIt only remains now to speak of ecclesiastical principalities, touching\r\nwhich all difficulties are prior to getting possession, because they are\r\nacquired either by capacity or good fortune, and they can be held without\r\neither; for they are sustained by the ancient ordinances of religion,\r\nwhich are so all-powerful, and of such a character that the principalities\r\nmay be held no matter how their princes behave and live. These princes\r\nalone have states and do not defend them; and they have subjects and do\r\nnot rule them; and the states, although unguarded, are not taken from\r\nthem, and the subjects, although not ruled, do not care, and they have\r\nneither the desire nor the ability to alienate themselves. Such\r\nprincipalities only are secure and happy. But being upheld by powers, to\r\nwhich the human mind cannot reach, I shall speak no more of them, because,\r\nbeing exalted and maintained by God, it would be the act of a presumptuous\r\nand rash man to discuss them.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nNevertheless, if any one should ask of me how comes it that the Church has\r\nattained such greatness in temporal power, seeing that from Alexander\r\nbackwards the Italian potentates (not only those who have been called\r\npotentates, but every baron and lord, though the smallest) have valued the\r\ntemporal power very slightly\u0026mdash;yet now a king of France trembles\r\nbefore it, and it has been able to drive him from Italy, and to ruin the\r\nVenetians\u0026mdash;although this may be very manifest, it does not appear to\r\nme superfluous to recall it in some measure to memory.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBefore Charles, King of France, passed into Italy,\u003ca href=\"#fn-11.1\" name=\"fnref-11.1\" id=\"fnref-11.1\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[1]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nthis country was under the dominion of the Pope, the Venetians, the King of\r\nNaples, the Duke of Milan, and the Florentines. These potentates had two\r\nprincipal anxieties: the one, that no foreigner should enter Italy under arms;\r\nthe other, that none of themselves should seize more territory. Those about\r\nwhom there was the most anxiety were the Pope and the Venetians. To restrain\r\nthe Venetians the union of all the others was necessary, as it was for the\r\ndefence of Ferrara; and to keep down the Pope they made use of the barons of\r\nRome, who, being divided into two factions, Orsini and Colonnesi, had always a\r\npretext for disorder, and, standing with arms in their hands under the eyes of\r\nthe Pontiff, kept the pontificate weak and powerless. And although there might\r\narise sometimes a courageous pope, such as Sixtus, yet neither fortune nor\r\nwisdom could rid him of these annoyances. And the short life of a pope is also\r\na cause of weakness; for in the ten years, which is the average life of a pope,\r\nhe can with difficulty lower one of the factions; and if, so to speak, one\r\npeople should almost destroy the Colonnesi, another would arise hostile to the\r\nOrsini, who would support their opponents, and yet would not have time to ruin\r\nthe Orsini. This was the reason why the temporal powers of the pope were little\r\nesteemed in Italy.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"fn-11.1\" id=\"fn-11.1\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#fnref-11.1\"\u003e[1]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nCharles VIII invaded Italy in 1494.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAlexander the Sixth arose afterwards, who of all the pontiffs that have\r\never been showed how a pope with both money and arms was able to prevail;\r\nand through the instrumentality of the Duke Valentino, and by reason of\r\nthe entry of the French, he brought about all those things which I have\r\ndiscussed above in the actions of the duke. And although his intention was\r\nnot to aggrandize the Church, but the duke, nevertheless, what he did\r\ncontributed to the greatness of the Church, which, after his death and the\r\nruin of the duke, became the heir to all his labours.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPope Julius came afterwards and found the Church strong, possessing all the\r\nRomagna, the barons of Rome reduced to impotence, and, through the\r\nchastisements of Alexander, the factions wiped out; he also found the way open\r\nto accumulate money in a manner such as had never been practised before\r\nAlexander\u0026rsquo;s time. Such things Julius not only followed, but improved\r\nupon, and he intended to gain Bologna, to ruin the Venetians, and to drive the\r\nFrench out of Italy. All of these enterprises prospered with him, and so much\r\nthe more to his credit, inasmuch as he did everything to strengthen the Church\r\nand not any private person. He kept also the Orsini and Colonnesi factions\r\nwithin the bounds in which he found them; and although there was among them\r\nsome mind to make disturbance, nevertheless he held two things firm: the one,\r\nthe greatness of the Church, with which he terrified them; and the other, not\r\nallowing them to have their own cardinals, who caused the disorders among them.\r\nFor whenever these factions have their cardinals they do not remain quiet for\r\nlong, because cardinals foster the factions in Rome and out of it, and the\r\nbarons are compelled to support them, and thus from the ambitions of prelates\r\narise disorders and tumults among the barons. For these reasons his Holiness\r\nPope Leo\u003ca href=\"#fn-11.2\" name=\"fnref-11.2\" id=\"fnref-11.2\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[2]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nfound the pontificate most powerful, and it is to be hoped that, if others made\r\nit great in arms, he will make it still greater and more venerated by his\r\ngoodness and infinite other virtues.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"fn-11.2\" id=\"fn-11.2\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#fnref-11.2\"\u003e[2]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nPope Leo X was the Cardinal de\u0026rsquo; Medici.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003c!–end chapter–\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"chap12\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eCHAPTER XII.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nHOW MANY KINDS OF SOLDIERY THERE ARE, AND CONCERNING MERCENARIES\r\n\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHaving discoursed particularly on the characteristics of such\r\nprincipalities as in the beginning I proposed to discuss, and having\r\nconsidered in some degree the causes of there being good or bad, and\r\nhaving shown the methods by which many have sought to acquire them and to\r\nhold them, it now remains for me to discuss generally the means of offence\r\nand defence which belong to each of them.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWe have seen above how necessary it is for a prince to have his\r\nfoundations well laid, otherwise it follows of necessity he will go to\r\nruin. The chief foundations of all states, new as well as old or\r\ncomposite, are good laws and good arms; and as there cannot be good laws\r\nwhere the state is not well armed, it follows that where they are well\r\narmed they have good laws. I shall leave the laws out of the discussion\r\nand shall speak of the arms.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nI say, therefore, that the arms with which a prince defends his state are\r\neither his own, or they are mercenaries, auxiliaries, or mixed. Mercenaries and\r\nauxiliaries are useless and dangerous; and if one holds his state based on\r\nthese arms, he will stand neither firm nor safe; for they are disunited,\r\nambitious, and without discipline, unfaithful, valiant before friends, cowardly\r\nbefore enemies; they have neither the fear of God nor fidelity to men, and\r\ndestruction is deferred only so long as the attack is; for in peace one is\r\nrobbed by them, and in war by the enemy. The fact is, they have no other\r\nattraction or reason for keeping the field than a trifle of stipend, which is\r\nnot sufficient to make them willing to die for you. They are ready enough to be\r\nyour soldiers whilst you do not make war, but if war comes they take themselves\r\noff or run from the foe; which I should have little trouble to prove, for the\r\nruin of Italy has been caused by nothing else than by resting all her hopes for\r\nmany years on mercenaries, and although they formerly made some display and\r\nappeared valiant amongst themselves, yet when the foreigners came they showed\r\nwhat they were. Thus it was that Charles, King of France, was allowed to seize\r\nItaly with chalk in hand;\u003ca href=\"#fn-12.1\" name=\"fnref-12.1\" id=\"fnref-12.1\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[1]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nand he who told us that our sins were the cause of it told the truth, but they\r\nwere not the sins he imagined, but those which I have related. And as they were\r\nthe sins of princes, it is the princes who have also suffered the penalty.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"fn-12.1\" id=\"fn-12.1\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#fnref-12.1\"\u003e[1]\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u0026ldquo;With chalk in hand,\u0026rdquo; \u0026ldquo;col gesso.\u0026rdquo; This is one of the\r\n\u003ci\u003ebons mots\u003c/i\u003e of Alexander VI, and refers to the ease with which Charles\r\nVIII seized Italy, implying that it was only necessary for him to send his\r\nquartermasters to chalk up the billets for his soldiers to conquer the country.\r\n\u003ci\u003eCf\u003c/i\u003e. \u0026ldquo;The History of Henry VII,\u0026rdquo; by Lord Bacon: \u0026ldquo;King\r\nCharles had conquered the realm of Naples, and lost it again, in a kind of a\r\nfelicity of a dream. He passed the whole length of Italy without resistance: so\r\nthat it was true what Pope Alexander was wont to say: That the Frenchmen came\r\ninto Italy with chalk in their hands, to mark up their lodgings, rather than\r\nwith swords to fight.\u0026rdquo;\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nI wish to demonstrate further the infelicity of these arms. The mercenary\r\ncaptains are either capable men or they are not; if they are, you cannot\r\ntrust them, because they always aspire to their own greatness, either by\r\noppressing you, who are their master, or others contrary to your\r\nintentions; but if the captain is not skilful, you are ruined in the usual\r\nway.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAnd if it be urged that whoever is armed will act in the same way, whether\r\nmercenary or not, I reply that when arms have to be resorted to, either by\r\na prince or a republic, then the prince ought to go in person and perform\r\nthe duty of a captain; the republic has to send its citizens, and when one\r\nis sent who does not turn out satisfactorily, it ought to recall him, and\r\nwhen one is worthy, to hold him by the laws so that he does not leave the\r\ncommand. And experience has shown princes and republics, single-handed,\r\nmaking the greatest progress, and mercenaries doing nothing except damage;\r\nand it is more difficult to bring a republic, armed with its own arms,\r\nunder the sway of one of its citizens than it is to bring one armed with\r\nforeign arms. Rome and Sparta stood for many ages armed and free. The\r\nSwitzers are completely armed and quite free.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nOf ancient mercenaries, for example, there are the Carthaginians, who were\r\noppressed by their mercenary soldiers after the first war with the Romans,\r\nalthough the Carthaginians had their own citizens for captains. After the\r\ndeath of Epaminondas, Philip of Macedon was made captain of their soldiers\r\nby the Thebans, and after victory he took away their liberty.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nDuke Filippo being dead, the Milanese enlisted Francesco Sforza against the\r\nVenetians, and he, having overcome the enemy at Caravaggio,\u003ca href=\"#fn-12.2\" name=\"fnref-12.2\" id=\"fnref-12.2\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[2]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nallied himself with them to crush the Milanese, his masters. His father,\r\nSforza, having been engaged by Queen Johanna\u003ca href=\"#fn-12.3\" name=\"fnref-12.3\" id=\"fnref-12.3\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[3]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nof Naples, left her unprotected, so that she was forced to throw herself into\r\nthe arms of the King of Aragon, in order to save her kingdom. And if the\r\nVenetians and Florentines formerly extended their dominions by these arms, and\r\nyet their captains did not make themselves princes, but have defended them, I\r\nreply that the Florentines in this case have been favoured by chance, for of\r\nthe able captains, of whom they might have stood in fear, some have not\r\nconquered, some have been opposed, and others have turned their ambitions\r\nelsewhere. One who did not conquer was Giovanni Acuto,\u003ca href=\"#fn-12.4\" name=\"fnref-12.4\" id=\"fnref-12.4\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[4]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nand since he did not conquer his fidelity cannot be proved; but every one will\r\nacknowledge that, had he conquered, the Florentines would have stood at his\r\ndiscretion. Sforza had the Bracceschi always against him, so they watched each\r\nother. Francesco turned his ambition to Lombardy; Braccio against the Church\r\nand the kingdom of Naples. But let us come to that which happened a short while\r\nago. The Florentines appointed as their captain Pagolo Vitelli, a most prudent\r\nman, who from a private position had risen to the greatest renown. If this man\r\nhad taken Pisa, nobody can deny that it would have been proper for the\r\nFlorentines to keep in with him, for if he became the soldier of their enemies\r\nthey had no means of resisting, and if they held to him they must obey him. The\r\nVenetians, if their achievements are considered, will be seen to have acted\r\nsafely and gloriously so long as they sent to war their own men, when with\r\narmed gentlemen and plebians they did valiantly. This was before they turned to\r\nenterprises on land, but when they began to fight on land they forsook this\r\nvirtue and followed the custom of Italy. And in the beginning of their\r\nexpansion on land, through not having much territory, and because of their\r\ngreat reputation, they had not much to fear from their captains; but when they\r\nexpanded, as under Carmignuola,\u003ca href=\"#fn-12.5\" name=\"fnref-12.5\" id=\"fnref-12.5\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[5]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nthey had a taste of this mistake; for, having found him a most valiant man\r\n(they beat the Duke of Milan under his leadership), and, on the other hand,\r\nknowing how lukewarm he was in the war, they feared they would no longer\r\nconquer under him, and for this reason they were not willing, nor were they\r\nable, to let him go; and so, not to lose again that which they had acquired,\r\nthey were compelled, in order to secure themselves, to murder him. They had\r\nafterwards for their captains Bartolomeo da Bergamo, Roberto da San Severino,\r\nthe count of Pitigliano,\u003ca href=\"#fn-12.6\" name=\"fnref-12.6\" id=\"fnref-12.6\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[6]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nand the like, under whom they had to dread loss and not gain, as happened\r\nafterwards at Vaila,\u003ca href=\"#fn-12.7\" name=\"fnref-12.7\" id=\"fnref-12.7\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[7]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nwhere in one battle they lost that which in eight hundred years they had\r\nacquired with so much trouble. Because from such arms conquests come but\r\nslowly, long delayed and inconsiderable, but the losses sudden and portentous.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"fn-12.2\" id=\"fn-12.2\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#fnref-12.2\"\u003e[2]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nBattle of Caravaggio, 15th September 1448.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"fn-12.3\" id=\"fn-12.3\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#fnref-12.3\"\u003e[3]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nJohanna II of Naples, the widow of Ladislao, King of Naples.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"fn-12.4\" id=\"fn-12.4\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#fnref-12.4\"\u003e[4]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nGiovanni Acuto. An English knight whose name was Sir John Hawkwood. He fought\r\nin the English wars in France, and was knighted by Edward III; afterwards he\r\ncollected a body of troops and went into Italy. These became the famous\r\n\u0026ldquo;White Company.\u0026rdquo; He took part in many wars, and died in Florence in\r\n1394. He was born about 1320 at Sible Hedingham, a village in Essex. He married\r\nDomnia, a daughter of Bernabo Visconti.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"fn-12.5\" id=\"fn-12.5\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#fnref-12.5\"\u003e[5]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nCarmignuola. Francesco Bussone, born at Carmagnola about 1390, executed at\r\nVenice, 5th May 1432.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"fn-12.6\" id=\"fn-12.6\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#fnref-12.6\"\u003e[6]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nBartolomeo Colleoni of Bergamo; died 1457. Roberto of San Severino; died\r\nfighting for Venice against Sigismund, Duke of Austria, in 1487. \u0026ldquo;Primo\r\ncapitano in Italia.\u0026rdquo;\u0026mdash;Machiavelli. Count of Pitigliano; Nicolo\r\nOrsini, born 1442, died 1510.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"fn-12.7\" id=\"fn-12.7\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#fnref-12.7\"\u003e[7]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nBattle of Vaila in 1509.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAnd as with these examples I have reached Italy, which has been ruled for\r\nmany years by mercenaries, I wish to discuss them more seriously, in order\r\nthat, having seen their rise and progress, one may be better prepared to\r\ncounteract them. You must understand that the empire has recently come to\r\nbe repudiated in Italy, that the Pope has acquired more temporal power,\r\nand that Italy has been divided up into more states, for the reason that\r\nmany of the great cities took up arms against their nobles, who, formerly\r\nfavoured by the emperor, were oppressing them, whilst the Church was\r\nfavouring them so as to gain authority in temporal power: in many others\r\ntheir citizens became princes. From this it came to pass that Italy fell\r\npartly into the hands of the Church and of republics, and, the Church\r\nconsisting of priests and the republic of citizens unaccustomed to arms,\r\nboth commenced to enlist foreigners.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe first who gave renown to this soldiery was Alberigo da Conio,\u003ca href=\"#fn-12.8\" name=\"fnref-12.8\" id=\"fnref-12.8\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[8]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nthe Romagnian. From the school of this man sprang, among others, Braccio and\r\nSforza, who in their time were the arbiters of Italy. After these came all the\r\nother captains who till now have directed the arms of Italy; and the end of all\r\ntheir valour has been, that she has been overrun by Charles, robbed by Louis,\r\nravaged by Ferdinand, and insulted by the Switzers. The principle that has\r\nguided them has been, first, to lower the credit of infantry so that they might\r\nincrease their own. They did this because, subsisting on their pay and without\r\nterritory, they were unable to support many soldiers, and a few infantry did\r\nnot give them any authority; so they were led to employ cavalry, with a\r\nmoderate force of which they were maintained and honoured; and affairs were\r\nbrought to such a pass that, in an army of twenty thousand soldiers, there were\r\nnot to be found two thousand foot soldiers. They had, besides this, used every\r\nart to lessen fatigue and danger to themselves and their soldiers, not killing\r\nin the fray, but taking prisoners and liberating without ransom. They did not\r\nattack towns at night, nor did the garrisons of the towns attack encampments at\r\nnight; they did not surround the camp either with stockade or ditch, nor did\r\nthey campaign in the winter. All these things were permitted by their military\r\nrules, and devised by them to avoid, as I have said, both fatigue and dangers;\r\nthus they have brought Italy to slavery and contempt.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"fn-12.8\" id=\"fn-12.8\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#fnref-12.8\"\u003e[8]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nAlberigo da Conio. Alberico da Barbiano, Count of Cunio in Romagna. He was the\r\nleader of the famous \u0026ldquo;Company of St George,\u0026rdquo; composed entirely of\r\nItalian soldiers. He died in 1409.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003c!–end chapter–\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"chap13\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eCHAPTER XIII.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nCONCERNING AUXILIARIES, MIXED SOLDIERY, AND ONE\u0026rsquo;S OWN\r\n\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAuxiliaries, which are the other useless arm, are employed when a prince is\r\ncalled in with his forces to aid and defend, as was done by Pope Julius in the\r\nmost recent times; for he, having, in the enterprise against Ferrara, had poor\r\nproof of his mercenaries, turned to auxiliaries, and stipulated with Ferdinand,\r\nKing of Spain,\u003ca href=\"#fn-13.1\" name=\"fnref-13.1\" id=\"fnref-13.1\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[1]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nfor his assistance with men and arms. These arms may be useful and good in\r\nthemselves, but for him who calls them in they are always disadvantageous; for\r\nlosing, one is undone, and winning, one is their captive.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"fn-13.1\" id=\"fn-13.1\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#fnref-13.1\"\u003e[1]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nFerdinand V (F. II of Aragon and Sicily, F. III of Naples), surnamed \u0026ldquo;The\r\nCatholic,\u0026rdquo; born 1452, died 1516.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAnd although ancient histories may be full of examples, I do not wish to\r\nleave this recent one of Pope Julius the Second, the peril of which cannot\r\nfail to be perceived; for he, wishing to get Ferrara, threw himself\r\nentirely into the hands of the foreigner. But his good fortune brought\r\nabout a third event, so that he did not reap the fruit of his rash choice;\r\nbecause, having his auxiliaries routed at Ravenna, and the Switzers having\r\nrisen and driven out the conquerors (against all expectation, both his and\r\nothers), it so came to pass that he did not become prisoner to his\r\nenemies, they having fled, nor to his auxiliaries, he having conquered by\r\nother arms than theirs.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe Florentines, being entirely without arms, sent ten thousand Frenchmen\r\nto take Pisa, whereby they ran more danger than at any other time of their\r\ntroubles.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe Emperor of Constantinople,\u003ca href=\"#fn-13.2\" name=\"fnref-13.2\" id=\"fnref-13.2\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[2]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nto oppose his neighbours, sent ten thousand Turks into Greece, who, on the war\r\nbeing finished, were not willing to quit; this was the beginning of the\r\nservitude of Greece to the infidels.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"fn-13.2\" id=\"fn-13.2\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#fnref-13.2\"\u003e[2]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nJoannes Cantacuzenus, born 1300, died 1383.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nTherefore, let him who has no desire to conquer make use of these arms,\r\nfor they are much more hazardous than mercenaries, because with them the\r\nruin is ready made; they are all united, all yield obedience to others;\r\nbut with mercenaries, when they have conquered, more time and better\r\nopportunities are needed to injure you; they are not all of one community,\r\nthey are found and paid by you, and a third party, which you have made\r\ntheir head, is not able all at once to assume enough authority to injure\r\nyou. In conclusion, in mercenaries dastardy is most dangerous; in\r\nauxiliaries, valour. The wise prince, therefore, has always avoided these\r\narms and turned to his own; and has been willing rather to lose with them\r\nthan to conquer with the others, not deeming that a real victory which is\r\ngained with the arms of others.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nI shall never hesitate to cite Cesare Borgia and his actions. This duke\r\nentered the Romagna with auxiliaries, taking there only French soldiers,\r\nand with them he captured Imola and Forli; but afterwards, such forces not\r\nappearing to him reliable, he turned to mercenaries, discerning less\r\ndanger in them, and enlisted the Orsini and Vitelli; whom presently, on\r\nhandling and finding them doubtful, unfaithful, and dangerous, he\r\ndestroyed and turned to his own men. And the difference between one and\r\nthe other of these forces can easily be seen when one considers the\r\ndifference there was in the reputation of the duke, when he had the\r\nFrench, when he had the Orsini and Vitelli, and when he relied on his own\r\nsoldiers, on whose fidelity he could always count and found it ever\r\nincreasing; he was never esteemed more highly than when every one saw that\r\nhe was complete master of his own forces.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nI was not intending to go beyond Italian and recent examples, but I am\r\nunwilling to leave out Hiero, the Syracusan, he being one of those I have\r\nnamed above. This man, as I have said, made head of the army by the\r\nSyracusans, soon found out that a mercenary soldiery, constituted like our\r\nItalian condottieri, was of no use; and it appearing to him that he could\r\nneither keep them nor let them go, he had them all cut to pieces, and\r\nafterwards made war with his own forces and not with aliens.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nI wish also to recall to memory an instance from the Old Testament\r\napplicable to this subject. David offered himself to Saul to fight with\r\nGoliath, the Philistine champion, and, to give him courage, Saul armed him\r\nwith his own weapons; which David rejected as soon as he had them on his\r\nback, saying he could make no use of them, and that he wished to meet the\r\nenemy with his sling and his knife. In conclusion, the arms of others\r\neither fall from your back, or they weigh you down, or they bind you fast.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCharles the Seventh,\u003ca href=\"#fn-13.3\" name=\"fnref-13.3\" id=\"fnref-13.3\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[3]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nthe father of King Louis the Eleventh,\u003ca href=\"#fn-13.4\" name=\"fnref-13.4\" id=\"fnref-13.4\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[4]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nhaving by good fortune and valour liberated France from the English, recognized\r\nthe necessity of being armed with forces of his own, and he established in his\r\nkingdom ordinances concerning men-at-arms and infantry. Afterwards his son,\r\nKing Louis, abolished the infantry and began to enlist the Switzers, which\r\nmistake, followed by others, is, as is now seen, a source of peril to that\r\nkingdom; because, having raised the reputation of the Switzers, he has entirely\r\ndiminished the value of his own arms, for he has destroyed the infantry\r\naltogether; and his men-at-arms he has subordinated to others, for, being as\r\nthey are so accustomed to fight along with Switzers, it does not appear that\r\nthey can now conquer without them. Hence it arises that the French cannot stand\r\nagainst the Switzers, and without the Switzers they do not come off well\r\nagainst others. The armies of the French have thus become mixed, partly\r\nmercenary and partly national, both of which arms together are much better than\r\nmercenaries alone or auxiliaries alone, but much inferior to one\u0026rsquo;s own\r\nforces. And this example proves it, for the kingdom of France would be\r\nunconquerable if the ordinance of Charles had been enlarged or maintained.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"fn-13.3\" id=\"fn-13.3\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#fnref-13.3\"\u003e[3]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nCharles VII of France, surnamed \u0026ldquo;The Victorious,\u0026rdquo; born 1403, died\r\n1461.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"fn-13.4\" id=\"fn-13.4\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#fnref-13.4\"\u003e[4]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nLouis XI, son of the above, born 1423, died 1483.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut the scanty wisdom of man, on entering into an affair which looks well at\r\nfirst, cannot discern the poison that is hidden in it, as I have said above of\r\nhectic fevers. Therefore, if he who rules a principality cannot recognize evils\r\nuntil they are upon him, he is not truly wise; and this insight is given to\r\nfew. And if the first disaster to the Roman Empire\u003ca href=\"#fn-13.5\" name=\"fnref-13.5\" id=\"fnref-13.5\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[5]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nshould be examined, it will be found to have commenced only with the enlisting\r\nof the Goths; because from that time the vigour of the Roman Empire began to\r\ndecline, and all that valour which had raised it passed away to others.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"fn-13.5\" id=\"fn-13.5\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#fnref-13.5\"\u003e[5]\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u0026ldquo;Many speakers to the House the other night in the debate on the\r\nreduction of armaments seemed to show a most lamentable ignorance of the\r\nconditions under which the British Empire maintains its existence. When Mr\r\nBalfour replied to the allegations that the Roman Empire sank under the weight\r\nof its military obligations, he said that this was \u0026lsquo;wholly\r\nunhistorical.\u0026rsquo; He might well have added that the Roman power was at its\r\nzenith when every citizen acknowledged his liability to fight for the State,\r\nbut that it began to decline as soon as this obligation was no longer\r\nrecognised.\u0026rdquo;\u0026mdash;\u003ci\u003ePall Mall Gazette\u003c/i\u003e, 15th May 1906.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nI conclude, therefore, that no principality is secure without having its\r\nown forces; on the contrary, it is entirely dependent on good fortune, not\r\nhaving the valour which in adversity would defend it. And it has always\r\nbeen the opinion and judgment of wise men that nothing can be so uncertain\r\nor unstable as fame or power not founded on its own strength. And one\u0026rsquo;s\r\nown forces are those which are composed either of subjects, citizens, or\r\ndependents; all others are mercenaries or auxiliaries. And the way to make\r\nready one\u0026rsquo;s own forces will be easily found if the rules suggested by me\r\nshall be reflected upon, and if one will consider how Philip, the father\r\nof Alexander the Great, and many republics and princes have armed and\r\norganized themselves, to which rules I entirely commit myself.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003c!–end chapter–\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"chap14\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eCHAPTER XIV.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nTHAT WHICH CONCERNS A PRINCE ON THE SUBJECT OF THE ART OF WAR\r\n\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nA prince ought to have no other aim or thought, nor select anything else\r\nfor his study, than war and its rules and discipline; for this is the sole\r\nart that belongs to him who rules, and it is of such force that it not\r\nonly upholds those who are born princes, but it often enables men to rise\r\nfrom a private station to that rank. And, on the contrary, it is seen that\r\nwhen princes have thought more of ease than of arms they have lost their\r\nstates. And the first cause of your losing it is to neglect this art; and\r\nwhat enables you to acquire a state is to be master of the art. Francesco\r\nSforza, through being martial, from a private person became Duke of Milan;\r\nand the sons, through avoiding the hardships and troubles of arms, from\r\ndukes became private persons. For among other evils which being unarmed\r\nbrings you, it causes you to be despised, and this is one of those\r\nignominies against which a prince ought to guard himself, as is shown\r\nlater on. Because there is nothing proportionate between the armed and the\r\nunarmed; and it is not reasonable that he who is armed should yield\r\nobedience willingly to him who is unarmed, or that the unarmed man should\r\nbe secure among armed servants. Because, there being in the one disdain\r\nand in the other suspicion, it is not possible for them to work well\r\ntogether. And therefore a prince who does not understand the art of war,\r\nover and above the other misfortunes already mentioned, cannot be\r\nrespected by his soldiers, nor can he rely on them. He ought never,\r\ntherefore, to have out of his thoughts this subject of war, and in peace\r\nhe should addict himself more to its exercise than in war; this he can do\r\nin two ways, the one by action, the other by study.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAs regards action, he ought above all things to keep his men well\r\norganized and drilled, to follow incessantly the chase, by which he\r\naccustoms his body to hardships, and learns something of the nature of\r\nlocalities, and gets to find out how the mountains rise, how the valleys\r\nopen out, how the plains lie, and to understand the nature of rivers and\r\nmarshes, and in all this to take the greatest care. Which knowledge is\r\nuseful in two ways. Firstly, he learns to know his country, and is better\r\nable to undertake its defence; afterwards, by means of the knowledge and\r\nobservation of that locality, he understands with ease any other which it\r\nmay be necessary for him to study hereafter; because the hills, valleys,\r\nand plains, and rivers and marshes that are, for instance, in Tuscany,\r\nhave a certain resemblance to those of other countries, so that with a\r\nknowledge of the aspect of one country one can easily arrive at a\r\nknowledge of others. And the prince that lacks this skill lacks the\r\nessential which it is desirable that a captain should possess, for it\r\nteaches him to surprise his enemy, to select quarters, to lead armies, to\r\narray the battle, to besiege towns to advantage.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPhilopoemen,\u003ca href=\"#fn-14.1\" name=\"fnref-14.1\" id=\"fnref-14.1\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[1]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nPrince of the Achaeans, among other praises which writers have bestowed on him,\r\nis commended because in time of peace he never had anything in his mind but the\r\nrules of war; and when he was in the country with friends, he often stopped and\r\nreasoned with them: \u0026ldquo;If the enemy should be upon that hill, and we should\r\nfind ourselves here with our army, with whom would be the advantage? How should\r\none best advance to meet him, keeping the ranks? If we should wish to retreat,\r\nhow ought we to pursue?\u0026rdquo; And he would set forth to them, as he went, all\r\nthe chances that could befall an army; he would listen to their opinion and\r\nstate his, confirming it with reasons, so that by these continual discussions\r\nthere could never arise, in time of war, any unexpected circumstances that he\r\ncould not deal with.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"fn-14.1\" id=\"fn-14.1\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#fnref-14.1\"\u003e[1]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nPhilopoemen, \u0026ldquo;the last of the Greeks,\u0026rdquo; born 252 B.C., died 183 B.C.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut to exercise the intellect the prince should read histories, and study\r\nthere the actions of illustrious men, to see how they have borne\r\nthemselves in war, to examine the causes of their victories and defeat, so\r\nas to avoid the latter and imitate the former; and above all do as an\r\nillustrious man did, who took as an exemplar one who had been praised and\r\nfamous before him, and whose achievements and deeds he always kept in his\r\nmind, as it is said Alexander the Great imitated Achilles, Caesar\r\nAlexander, Scipio Cyrus. And whoever reads the life of Cyrus, written by\r\nXenophon, will recognize afterwards in the life of Scipio how that\r\nimitation was his glory, and how in chastity, affability, humanity, and\r\nliberality Scipio conformed to those things which have been written of\r\nCyrus by Xenophon. A wise prince ought to observe some such rules, and\r\nnever in peaceful times stand idle, but increase his resources with\r\nindustry in such a way that they may be available to him in adversity, so\r\nthat if fortune chances it may find him prepared to resist her blows.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003c!–end chapter–\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"chap15\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eCHAPTER XV.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nCONCERNING THINGS FOR WHICH MEN, AND ESPECIALLY PRINCES, ARE PRAISED OR BLAMED\r\n\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIt remains now to see what ought to be the rules of conduct for a prince\r\ntowards subject and friends. And as I know that many have written on this\r\npoint, I expect I shall be considered presumptuous in mentioning it again,\r\nespecially as in discussing it I shall depart from the methods of other\r\npeople. But, it being my intention to write a thing which shall be useful\r\nto him who apprehends it, it appears to me more appropriate to follow up\r\nthe real truth of the matter than the imagination of it; for many have\r\npictured republics and principalities which in fact have never been known\r\nor seen, because how one lives is so far distant from how one ought to\r\nlive, that he who neglects what is done for what ought to be done, sooner\r\neffects his ruin than his preservation; for a man who wishes to act\r\nentirely up to his professions of virtue soon meets with what destroys him\r\namong so much that is evil.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHence it is necessary for a prince wishing to hold his own to know how to\r\ndo wrong, and to make use of it or not according to necessity. Therefore,\r\nputting on one side imaginary things concerning a prince, and discussing\r\nthose which are real, I say that all men when they are spoken of, and\r\nchiefly princes for being more highly placed, are remarkable for some of\r\nthose qualities which bring them either blame or praise; and thus it is\r\nthat one is reputed liberal, another miserly, using a Tuscan term (because\r\nan avaricious person in our language is still he who desires to possess by\r\nrobbery, whilst we call one miserly who deprives himself too much of the\r\nuse of his own); one is reputed generous, one rapacious; one cruel, one\r\ncompassionate; one faithless, another faithful; one effeminate and\r\ncowardly, another bold and brave; one affable, another haughty; one\r\nlascivious, another chaste; one sincere, another cunning; one hard,\r\nanother easy; one grave, another frivolous; one religious, another\r\nunbelieving, and the like. And I know that every one will confess that it\r\nwould be most praiseworthy in a prince to exhibit all the above qualities\r\nthat are considered good; but because they can neither be entirely\r\npossessed nor observed, for human conditions do not permit it, it is\r\nnecessary for him to be sufficiently prudent that he may know how to avoid\r\nthe reproach of those vices which would lose him his state; and also to\r\nkeep himself, if it be possible, from those which would not lose him it;\r\nbut this not being possible, he may with less hesitation abandon himself\r\nto them. And again, he need not make himself uneasy at incurring a\r\nreproach for those vices without which the state can only be saved with\r\ndifficulty, for if everything is considered carefully, it will be found\r\nthat something which looks like virtue, if followed, would be his ruin;\r\nwhilst something else, which looks like vice, yet followed brings him\r\nsecurity and prosperity.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003c!–end chapter–\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"chap16\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eCHAPTER XVI.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nCONCERNING LIBERALITY AND MEANNESS\r\n\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCommencing then with the first of the above-named characteristics, I say\r\nthat it would be well to be reputed liberal. Nevertheless, liberality\r\nexercised in a way that does not bring you the reputation for it, injures\r\nyou; for if one exercises it honestly and as it should be exercised, it\r\nmay not become known, and you will not avoid the reproach of its opposite.\r\nTherefore, any one wishing to maintain among men the name of liberal is\r\nobliged to avoid no attribute of magnificence; so that a prince thus\r\ninclined will consume in such acts all his property, and will be compelled\r\nin the end, if he wish to maintain the name of liberal, to unduly weigh\r\ndown his people, and tax them, and do everything he can to get money. This\r\nwill soon make him odious to his subjects, and becoming poor he will be\r\nlittle valued by any one; thus, with his liberality, having offended many\r\nand rewarded few, he is affected by the very first trouble and imperilled\r\nby whatever may be the first danger; recognizing this himself, and wishing\r\nto draw back from it, he runs at once into the reproach of being miserly.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nTherefore, a prince, not being able to exercise this virtue of liberality\r\nin such a way that it is recognized, except to his cost, if he is wise he\r\nought not to fear the reputation of being mean, for in time he will come\r\nto be more considered than if liberal, seeing that with his economy his\r\nrevenues are enough, that he can defend himself against all attacks, and\r\nis able to engage in enterprises without burdening his people; thus it\r\ncomes to pass that he exercises liberality towards all from whom he does\r\nnot take, who are numberless, and meanness towards those to whom he does\r\nnot give, who are few.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWe have not seen great things done in our time except by those who have\r\nbeen considered mean; the rest have failed. Pope Julius the Second was\r\nassisted in reaching the papacy by a reputation for liberality, yet he did\r\nnot strive afterwards to keep it up, when he made war on the King of\r\nFrance; and he made many wars without imposing any extraordinary tax on\r\nhis subjects, for he supplied his additional expenses out of his long\r\nthriftiness. The present King of Spain would not have undertaken or\r\nconquered in so many enterprises if he had been reputed liberal. A prince,\r\ntherefore, provided that he has not to rob his subjects, that he can\r\ndefend himself, that he does not become poor and abject, that he is not\r\nforced to become rapacious, ought to hold of little account a reputation\r\nfor being mean, for it is one of those vices which will enable him to\r\ngovern.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAnd if any one should say: Caesar obtained empire by liberality, and many\r\nothers have reached the highest positions by having been liberal, and by\r\nbeing considered so, I answer: Either you are a prince in fact, or in a\r\nway to become one. In the first case this liberality is dangerous, in the\r\nsecond it is very necessary to be considered liberal; and Caesar was one\r\nof those who wished to become pre-eminent in Rome; but if he had survived\r\nafter becoming so, and had not moderated his expenses, he would have\r\ndestroyed his government. And if any one should reply: Many have been\r\nprinces, and have done great things with armies, who have been considered\r\nvery liberal, I reply: Either a prince spends that which is his own or his\r\nsubjects\u0026rsquo; or else that of others. In the first case he ought to be\r\nsparing, in the second he ought not to neglect any opportunity for\r\nliberality. And to the prince who goes forth with his army, supporting it\r\nby pillage, sack, and extortion, handling that which belongs to others,\r\nthis liberality is necessary, otherwise he would not be followed by\r\nsoldiers. And of that which is neither yours nor your subjects\u0026rsquo; you can be\r\na ready giver, as were Cyrus, Caesar, and Alexander; because it does not\r\ntake away your reputation if you squander that of others, but adds to it;\r\nit is only squandering your own that injures you.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAnd there is nothing wastes so rapidly as liberality, for even whilst you\r\nexercise it you lose the power to do so, and so become either poor or\r\ndespised, or else, in avoiding poverty, rapacious and hated. And a prince\r\nshould guard himself, above all things, against being despised and hated;\r\nand liberality leads you to both. Therefore it is wiser to have a\r\nreputation for meanness which brings reproach without hatred, than to be\r\ncompelled through seeking a reputation for liberality to incur a name for\r\nrapacity which begets reproach with hatred.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003c!–end chapter–\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"chap17\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eCHAPTER XVII.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nCONCERNING CRUELTY AND CLEMENCY, AND WHETHER IT IS BETTER TO BE LOVED THAN\r\nFEARED\r\n\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nComing now to the other qualities mentioned above, I say that every prince\r\nought to desire to be considered clement and not cruel. Nevertheless he ought\r\nto take care not to misuse this clemency. Cesare Borgia was considered cruel;\r\nnotwithstanding, his cruelty reconciled the Romagna, unified it, and restored\r\nit to peace and loyalty. And if this be rightly considered, he will be seen to\r\nhave been much more merciful than the Florentine people, who, to avoid a\r\nreputation for cruelty, permitted Pistoia to be destroyed.\u003ca href=\"#fn-17.1\" name=\"fnref-17.1\" id=\"fnref-17.1\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[1]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nTherefore a prince, so long as he keeps his subjects united and loyal, ought\r\nnot to mind the reproach of cruelty; because with a few examples he will be\r\nmore merciful than those who, through too much mercy, allow disorders to arise,\r\nfrom which follow murders or robberies; for these are wont to injure the whole\r\npeople, whilst those executions which originate with a prince offend the\r\nindividual only.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"fn-17.1\" id=\"fn-17.1\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#fnref-17.1\"\u003e[1]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nDuring the rioting between the Cancellieri and Panciatichi factions in 1502 and\r\n1503.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAnd of all princes, it is impossible for the new prince to avoid the\r\nimputation of cruelty, owing to new states being full of dangers. Hence\r\nVirgil, through the mouth of Dido, excuses the inhumanity of her reign\r\nowing to its being new, saying:\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"poem\"\u003e\r\n\u0026ldquo;Res dura, et regni novitas me talia cogunt\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nMoliri, et late fines custode tueri.\u0026rdquo;\u003ca href=\"#fn-17.2\" name=\"fnref-17.2\" id=\"fnref-17.2\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[2]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"noindent\"\u003e\r\nNevertheless he ought to be slow to believe and to act, nor should he\r\nhimself show fear, but proceed in a temperate manner with prudence and\r\nhumanity, so that too much confidence may not make him incautious and too\r\nmuch distrust render him intolerable.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"fn-17.2\" id=\"fn-17.2\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#fnref-17.2\"\u003e[2]\u003c/a\u003e\r\n. . . against my will, my fate\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nA throne unsettled, and an infant state,\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nBid me defend my realms with all my pow\u0026rsquo;rs,\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nAnd guard with these severities my shores.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nChristopher Pitt.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nUpon this a question arises: whether it be better to be loved than feared\r\nor feared than loved? It may be answered that one should wish to be both,\r\nbut, because it is difficult to unite them in one person, it is much safer\r\nto be feared than loved, when, of the two, either must be dispensed with.\r\nBecause this is to be asserted in general of men, that they are\r\nungrateful, fickle, false, cowardly, covetous, and as long as you succeed\r\nthey are yours entirely; they will offer you their blood, property, life,\r\nand children, as is said above, when the need is far distant; but when it\r\napproaches they turn against you. And that prince who, relying entirely on\r\ntheir promises, has neglected other precautions, is ruined; because\r\nfriendships that are obtained by payments, and not by greatness or\r\nnobility of mind, may indeed be earned, but they are not secured, and in\r\ntime of need cannot be relied upon; and men have less scruple in offending\r\none who is beloved than one who is feared, for love is preserved by the\r\nlink of obligation which, owing to the baseness of men, is broken at every\r\nopportunity for their advantage; but fear preserves you by a dread of\r\npunishment which never fails.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nNevertheless a prince ought to inspire fear in such a way that, if he does\r\nnot win love, he avoids hatred; because he can endure very well being\r\nfeared whilst he is not hated, which will always be as long as he abstains\r\nfrom the property of his citizens and subjects and from their women. But\r\nwhen it is necessary for him to proceed against the life of someone, he\r\nmust do it on proper justification and for manifest cause, but above all\r\nthings he must keep his hands off the property of others, because men more\r\nquickly forget the death of their father than the loss of their patrimony.\r\nBesides, pretexts for taking away the property are never wanting; for he\r\nwho has once begun to live by robbery will always find pretexts for\r\nseizing what belongs to others; but reasons for taking life, on the\r\ncontrary, are more difficult to find and sooner lapse. But when a prince\r\nis with his army, and has under control a multitude of soldiers, then it\r\nis quite necessary for him to disregard the reputation of cruelty, for\r\nwithout it he would never hold his army united or disposed to its duties.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAmong the wonderful deeds of Hannibal this one is enumerated: that having\r\nled an enormous army, composed of many various races of men, to fight in\r\nforeign lands, no dissensions arose either among them or against the\r\nprince, whether in his bad or in his good fortune. This arose from nothing\r\nelse than his inhuman cruelty, which, with his boundless valour, made him\r\nrevered and terrible in the sight of his soldiers, but without that\r\ncruelty, his other virtues were not sufficient to produce this effect. And\r\nshort-sighted writers admire his deeds from one point of view and from\r\nanother condemn the principal cause of them. That it is true his other\r\nvirtues would not have been sufficient for him may be proved by the case\r\nof Scipio, that most excellent man, not only of his own times but within\r\nthe memory of man, against whom, nevertheless, his army rebelled in Spain;\r\nthis arose from nothing but his too great forbearance, which gave his\r\nsoldiers more license than is consistent with military discipline. For\r\nthis he was upbraided in the Senate by Fabius Maximus, and called the\r\ncorrupter of the Roman soldiery. The Locrians were laid waste by a legate\r\nof Scipio, yet they were not avenged by him, nor was the insolence of the\r\nlegate punished, owing entirely to his easy nature. Insomuch that someone\r\nin the Senate, wishing to excuse him, said there were many men who knew\r\nmuch better how not to err than to correct the errors of others. This\r\ndisposition, if he had been continued in the command, would have destroyed\r\nin time the fame and glory of Scipio; but, he being under the control of\r\nthe Senate, this injurious characteristic not only concealed itself, but\r\ncontributed to his glory.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nReturning to the question of being feared or loved, I come to the\r\nconclusion that, men loving according to their own will and fearing\r\naccording to that of the prince, a wise prince should establish himself on\r\nthat which is in his own control and not in that of others; he must\r\nendeavour only to avoid hatred, as is noted.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003c!–end chapter–\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"chap18\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eCHAPTER XVIII.\u003ca href=\"#fn-18.1\" name=\"fnref-18.1\" id=\"fnref-18.1\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[1]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nCONCERNING THE WAY IN WHICH PRINCES SHOULD KEEP FAITH\r\n\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"fn-18.1\" id=\"fn-18.1\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#fnref-18.1\"\u003e[1]\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u0026ldquo;The present chapter has given greater offence than any other portion of\r\nMachiavelli\u0026rsquo;s writings.\u0026rdquo; Burd, \u0026ldquo;Il Principe,\u0026rdquo; p. 297.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nEvery one admits how praiseworthy it is in a prince to keep faith, and to live\r\nwith integrity and not with craft. Nevertheless our experience has been that\r\nthose princes who have done great things have held good faith of little\r\naccount, and have known how to circumvent the intellect of men by craft, and in\r\nthe end have overcome those who have relied on their word. You must know there\r\nare two ways of contesting,\u003ca href=\"#fn-18.2\" name=\"fnref-18.2\" id=\"fnref-18.2\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[2]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nthe one by the law, the other by force; the first method is proper to men, the\r\nsecond to beasts; but because the first is frequently not sufficient, it is\r\nnecessary to have recourse to the second. Therefore it is necessary for a\r\nprince to understand how to avail himself of the beast and the man. This has\r\nbeen figuratively taught to princes by ancient writers, who describe how\r\nAchilles and many other princes of old were given to the Centaur Chiron to\r\nnurse, who brought them up in his discipline; which means solely that, as they\r\nhad for a teacher one who was half beast and half man, so it is necessary for a\r\nprince to know how to make use of both natures, and that one without the other\r\nis not durable. A prince, therefore, being compelled knowingly to adopt the\r\nbeast, ought to choose the fox and the lion; because the lion cannot defend\r\nhimself against snares and the fox cannot defend himself against wolves.\r\nTherefore, it is necessary to be a fox to discover the snares and a lion to\r\nterrify the wolves. Those who rely simply on the lion do not understand what\r\nthey are about. Therefore a wise lord cannot, nor ought he to, keep faith when\r\nsuch observance may be turned against him, and when the reasons that caused him\r\nto pledge it exist no longer. If men were entirely good this precept would not\r\nhold, but because they are bad, and will not keep faith with you, you too are\r\nnot bound to observe it with them. Nor will there ever be wanting to a prince\r\nlegitimate reasons to excuse this non-observance. Of this endless modern\r\nexamples could be given, showing how many treaties and engagements have been\r\nmade void and of no effect through the faithlessness of princes; and he who has\r\nknown best how to employ the fox has succeeded best.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"fn-18.2\" id=\"fn-18.2\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#fnref-18.2\"\u003e[2]\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u0026ldquo;Contesting,\u0026rdquo; \u003ci\u003ei.e\u003c/i\u003e. \u0026ldquo;striving for mastery.\u0026rdquo; Mr\r\nBurd points out that this passage is imitated directly from Cicero\u0026rsquo;s\r\n\u0026ldquo;De Officiis\u0026rdquo;: \u0026ldquo;Nam cum sint duo genera decertandi, unum per\r\ndisceptationem, alterum per vim; cumque illud proprium sit hominis, hoc\r\nbeluarum; confugiendum est ad posterius, si uti non licet superiore.\u0026rdquo;\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut it is necessary to know well how to disguise this characteristic, and to be\r\na great pretender and dissembler; and men are so simple, and so subject to\r\npresent necessities, that he who seeks to deceive will always find someone who\r\nwill allow himself to be deceived. One recent example I cannot pass over in\r\nsilence. Alexander the Sixth did nothing else but deceive men, nor ever thought\r\nof doing otherwise, and he always found victims; for there never was a man who\r\nhad greater power in asserting, or who with greater oaths would affirm a thing,\r\nyet would observe it less; nevertheless his deceits always succeeded according\r\nto his wishes,\u003ca href=\"#fn-18.3\" name=\"fnref-18.3\" id=\"fnref-18.3\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[3]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e because he well understood this side of mankind.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"fn-18.3\" id=\"fn-18.3\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#fnref-18.3\"\u003e[3]\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u0026ldquo;Nondimanco sempre gli succederono gli inganni (ad votum).\u0026rdquo; The\r\nwords \u0026ldquo;ad votum\u0026rdquo; are omitted in the Testina addition, 1550.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nAlexander never did what he said,\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nCesare never said what he did.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nItalian Proverb.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nTherefore it is unnecessary for a prince to have all the good qualities I\r\nhave enumerated, but it is very necessary to appear to have them. And I\r\nshall dare to say this also, that to have them and always to observe them\r\nis injurious, and that to appear to have them is useful; to appear\r\nmerciful, faithful, humane, religious, upright, and to be so, but with a\r\nmind so framed that should you require not to be so, you may be able and\r\nknow how to change to the opposite.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAnd you have to understand this, that a prince, especially a new one, cannot\r\nobserve all those things for which men are esteemed, being often forced, in\r\norder to maintain the state, to act contrary to fidelity,\u003ca href=\"#fn-18.4\" name=\"fnref-18.4\" id=\"fnref-18.4\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[4]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nfriendship, humanity, and religion. Therefore it is necessary for him to have a\r\nmind ready to turn itself accordingly as the winds and variations of fortune\r\nforce it, yet, as I have said above, not to diverge from the good if he can\r\navoid doing so, but, if compelled, then to know how to set about it.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"fn-18.4\" id=\"fn-18.4\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#fnref-18.4\"\u003e[4]\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u0026ldquo;Contrary to fidelity\u0026rdquo; or \u0026ldquo;faith,\u0026rdquo; \u0026ldquo;contro alla\r\nfede,\u0026rdquo; and \u0026ldquo;tutto fede,\u0026rdquo; \u0026ldquo;altogether faithful,\u0026rdquo;\r\nin the next paragraph. It is noteworthy that these two phrases, \u0026ldquo;contro\r\nalla fede\u0026rdquo; and \u0026ldquo;tutto fede,\u0026rdquo; were omitted in the Testina\r\nedition, which was published with the sanction of the papal authorities. It may\r\nbe that the meaning attached to the word \u0026ldquo;fede\u0026rdquo; was \u0026ldquo;the\r\nfaith,\u0026rdquo; \u003ci\u003ei.e\u003c/i\u003e. the Catholic creed, and not as rendered here\r\n\u0026ldquo;fidelity\u0026rdquo; and \u0026ldquo;faithful.\u0026rdquo; Observe that the word\r\n\u0026ldquo;religione\u0026rdquo; was suffered to stand in the text of the Testina, being\r\nused to signify indifferently every shade of belief, as witness \u0026ldquo;the\r\nreligion,\u0026rdquo; a phrase inevitably employed to designate the Huguenot heresy.\r\nSouth in his Sermon IX, p. 69, ed. 1843, comments on this passage as follows:\r\n\u0026ldquo;That great patron and Coryphaeus of this tribe, Nicolo Machiavel, laid\r\ndown this for a master rule in his political scheme: \u0026lsquo;That the show of\r\nreligion was helpful to the politician, but the reality of it hurtful and\r\npernicious.\u0026rsquo;\u0026rdquo;\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nFor this reason a prince ought to take care that he never lets anything\r\nslip from his lips that is not replete with the above-named five\r\nqualities, that he may appear to him who sees and hears him altogether\r\nmerciful, faithful, humane, upright, and religious. There is nothing more\r\nnecessary to appear to have than this last quality, inasmuch as men judge\r\ngenerally more by the eye than by the hand, because it belongs to\r\neverybody to see you, to few to come in touch with you. Every one sees\r\nwhat you appear to be, few really know what you are, and those few dare\r\nnot oppose themselves to the opinion of the many, who have the majesty of\r\nthe state to defend them; and in the actions of all men, and especially of\r\nprinces, which it is not prudent to challenge, one judges by the result.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nFor that reason, let a prince have the credit of conquering and holding\r\nhis state, the means will always be considered honest, and he will be\r\npraised by everybody; because the vulgar are always taken by what a thing\r\nseems to be and by what comes of it; and in the world there are only the\r\nvulgar, for the few find a place there only when the many have no ground\r\nto rest on.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nOne prince\u003ca href=\"#fn-18.5\" name=\"fnref-18.5\" id=\"fnref-18.5\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[5]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nof the present time, whom it is not well to name, never preaches anything else\r\nbut peace and good faith, and to both he is most hostile, and either, if he had\r\nkept it, would have deprived him of reputation and kingdom many a time.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"fn-18.5\" id=\"fn-18.5\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#fnref-18.5\"\u003e[5]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nFerdinand of Aragon. \u0026ldquo;When Machiavelli was writing \u003ci\u003eThe Prince\u003c/i\u003e it\r\nwould have been clearly impossible to mention Ferdinand\u0026rsquo;s name here\r\nwithout giving offence.\u0026rdquo; Burd\u0026rsquo;s \u0026ldquo;Il Principe,\u0026rdquo; p. 308.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003c!–end chapter–\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"chap19\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eCHAPTER XIX.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nTHAT ONE SHOULD AVOID BEING DESPISED AND HATED\r\n\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nNow, concerning the characteristics of which mention is made above, I have\r\nspoken of the more important ones, the others I wish to discuss briefly\r\nunder this generality, that the prince must consider, as has been in part\r\nsaid before, how to avoid those things which will make him hated or\r\ncontemptible; and as often as he shall have succeeded he will have\r\nfulfilled his part, and he need not fear any danger in other reproaches.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIt makes him hated above all things, as I have said, to be rapacious, and\r\nto be a violator of the property and women of his subjects, from both of\r\nwhich he must abstain. And when neither their property nor their honor is\r\ntouched, the majority of men live content, and he has only to contend with\r\nthe ambition of a few, whom he can curb with ease in many ways.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIt makes him contemptible to be considered fickle, frivolous, effeminate,\r\nmean-spirited, irresolute, from all of which a prince should guard himself\r\nas from a rock; and he should endeavour to show in his actions greatness,\r\ncourage, gravity, and fortitude; and in his private dealings with his\r\nsubjects let him show that his judgments are irrevocable, and maintain\r\nhimself in such reputation that no one can hope either to deceive him or\r\nto get round him.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThat prince is highly esteemed who conveys this impression of himself, and\r\nhe who is highly esteemed is not easily conspired against; for, provided\r\nit is well known that he is an excellent man and revered by his people, he\r\ncan only be attacked with difficulty. For this reason a prince ought to\r\nhave two fears, one from within, on account of his subjects, the other\r\nfrom without, on account of external powers. From the latter he is\r\ndefended by being well armed and having good allies, and if he is well\r\narmed he will have good friends, and affairs will always remain quiet\r\nwithin when they are quiet without, unless they should have been already\r\ndisturbed by conspiracy; and even should affairs outside be disturbed, if\r\nhe has carried out his preparations and has lived as I have said, as long\r\nas he does not despair, he will resist every attack, as I said Nabis the\r\nSpartan did.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut concerning his subjects, when affairs outside are disturbed he has\r\nonly to fear that they will conspire secretly, from which a prince can\r\neasily secure himself by avoiding being hated and despised, and by keeping\r\nthe people satisfied with him, which it is most necessary for him to\r\naccomplish, as I said above at length. And one of the most efficacious\r\nremedies that a prince can have against conspiracies is not to be hated\r\nand despised by the people, for he who conspires against a prince always\r\nexpects to please them by his removal; but when the conspirator can only\r\nlook forward to offending them, he will not have the courage to take such\r\na course, for the difficulties that confront a conspirator are infinite.\r\nAnd as experience shows, many have been the conspiracies, but few have\r\nbeen successful; because he who conspires cannot act alone, nor can he\r\ntake a companion except from those whom he believes to be malcontents, and\r\nas soon as you have opened your mind to a malcontent you have given him\r\nthe material with which to content himself, for by denouncing you he can\r\nlook for every advantage; so that, seeing the gain from this course to be\r\nassured, and seeing the other to be doubtful and full of dangers, he must\r\nbe a very rare friend, or a thoroughly obstinate enemy of the prince, to\r\nkeep faith with you.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAnd, to reduce the matter into a small compass, I say that, on the side of\r\nthe conspirator, there is nothing but fear, jealousy, prospect of\r\npunishment to terrify him; but on the side of the prince there is the\r\nmajesty of the principality, the laws, the protection of friends and the\r\nstate to defend him; so that, adding to all these things the popular\r\ngoodwill, it is impossible that any one should be so rash as to conspire.\r\nFor whereas in general the conspirator has to fear before the execution of\r\nhis plot, in this case he has also to fear the sequel to the crime;\r\nbecause on account of it he has the people for an enemy, and thus cannot\r\nhope for any escape.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nEndless examples could be given on this subject, but I will be content with\r\none, brought to pass within the memory of our fathers. Messer Annibale\r\nBentivogli, who was prince in Bologna (grandfather of the present Annibale),\r\nhaving been murdered by the Canneschi, who had conspired against him, not one\r\nof his family survived but Messer Giovanni,\u003ca href=\"#fn-19.1\" name=\"fnref-19.1\" id=\"fnref-19.1\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[1]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nwho was in childhood: immediately after his assassination the people rose and\r\nmurdered all the Canneschi. This sprung from the popular goodwill which the\r\nhouse of Bentivogli enjoyed in those days in Bologna; which was so great that,\r\nalthough none remained there after the death of Annibale who was able to rule\r\nthe state, the Bolognese, having information that there was one of the\r\nBentivogli family in Florence, who up to that time had been considered the son\r\nof a blacksmith, sent to Florence for him and gave him the government of their\r\ncity, and it was ruled by him until Messer Giovanni came in due course to the\r\ngovernment.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"fn-19.1\" id=\"fn-19.1\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#fnref-19.1\"\u003e[1]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nGiovanni Bentivogli, born in Bologna 1438, died at Milan 1508. He ruled Bologna\r\nfrom 1462 to 1506. Machiavelli\u0026rsquo;s strong condemnation of conspiracies may\r\nget its edge from his own very recent experience (February 1513), when he had\r\nbeen arrested and tortured for his alleged complicity in the Boscoli\r\nconspiracy.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nFor this reason I consider that a prince ought to reckon conspiracies of\r\nlittle account when his people hold him in esteem; but when it is hostile\r\nto him, and bears hatred towards him, he ought to fear everything and\r\neverybody. And well-ordered states and wise princes have taken every care\r\nnot to drive the nobles to desperation, and to keep the people satisfied\r\nand contented, for this is one of the most important objects a prince can\r\nhave.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAmong the best ordered and governed kingdoms of our times is France, and\r\nin it are found many good institutions on which depend the liberty and\r\nsecurity of the king; of these the first is the parliament and its\r\nauthority, because he who founded the kingdom, knowing the ambition of the\r\nnobility and their boldness, considered that a bit to their mouths would\r\nbe necessary to hold them in; and, on the other side, knowing the hatred\r\nof the people, founded in fear, against the nobles, he wished to protect\r\nthem, yet he was not anxious for this to be the particular care of the\r\nking; therefore, to take away the reproach which he would be liable to\r\nfrom the nobles for favouring the people, and from the people for\r\nfavouring the nobles, he set up an arbiter, who should be one who could\r\nbeat down the great and favour the lesser without reproach to the king.\r\nNeither could you have a better or a more prudent arrangement, or a\r\ngreater source of security to the king and kingdom. From this one can draw\r\nanother important conclusion, that princes ought to leave affairs of\r\nreproach to the management of others, and keep those of grace in their own\r\nhands. And further, I consider that a prince ought to cherish the nobles,\r\nbut not so as to make himself hated by the people.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIt may appear, perhaps, to some who have examined the lives and deaths of\r\nthe Roman emperors that many of them would be an example contrary to my\r\nopinion, seeing that some of them lived nobly and showed great qualities\r\nof soul, nevertheless they have lost their empire or have been killed by\r\nsubjects who have conspired against them. Wishing, therefore, to answer\r\nthese objections, I will recall the characters of some of the emperors,\r\nand will show that the causes of their ruin were not different to those\r\nalleged by me; at the same time I will only submit for consideration those\r\nthings that are noteworthy to him who studies the affairs of those times.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIt seems to me sufficient to take all those emperors who succeeded to the\r\nempire from Marcus the philosopher down to Maximinus; they were Marcus and\r\nhis son Commodus, Pertinax, Julian, Severus and his son Antoninus\r\nCaracalla, Macrinus, Heliogabalus, Alexander, and Maximinus.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThere is first to note that, whereas in other principalities the ambition\r\nof the nobles and the insolence of the people only have to be contended\r\nwith, the Roman emperors had a third difficulty in having to put up with\r\nthe cruelty and avarice of their soldiers, a matter so beset with\r\ndifficulties that it was the ruin of many; for it was a hard thing to give\r\nsatisfaction both to soldiers and people; because the people loved peace,\r\nand for this reason they loved the unaspiring prince, whilst the soldiers\r\nloved the warlike prince who was bold, cruel, and rapacious, which\r\nqualities they were quite willing he should exercise upon the people, so\r\nthat they could get double pay and give vent to their own greed and\r\ncruelty. Hence it arose that those emperors were always overthrown who,\r\neither by birth or training, had no great authority, and most of them,\r\nespecially those who came new to the principality, recognizing the\r\ndifficulty of these two opposing humours, were inclined to give\r\nsatisfaction to the soldiers, caring little about injuring the people.\r\nWhich course was necessary, because, as princes cannot help being hated by\r\nsomeone, they ought, in the first place, to avoid being hated by every\r\none, and when they cannot compass this, they ought to endeavour with the\r\nutmost diligence to avoid the hatred of the most powerful. Therefore,\r\nthose emperors who through inexperience had need of special favour adhered\r\nmore readily to the soldiers than to the people; a course which turned out\r\nadvantageous to them or not, accordingly as the prince knew how to\r\nmaintain authority over them.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nFrom these causes it arose that Marcus, Pertinax, and Alexander, being all\r\nmen of modest life, lovers of justice, enemies to cruelty, humane, and\r\nbenignant, came to a sad end except Marcus; he alone lived and died\r\nhonoured, because he had succeeded to the throne by hereditary title, and\r\nowed nothing either to the soldiers or the people; and afterwards, being\r\npossessed of many virtues which made him respected, he always kept both\r\norders in their places whilst he lived, and was neither hated nor\r\ndespised.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut Pertinax was created emperor against the wishes of the soldiers, who,\r\nbeing accustomed to live licentiously under Commodus, could not endure the\r\nhonest life to which Pertinax wished to reduce them; thus, having given\r\ncause for hatred, to which hatred there was added contempt for his old\r\nage, he was overthrown at the very beginning of his administration. And\r\nhere it should be noted that hatred is acquired as much by good works as\r\nby bad ones, therefore, as I said before, a prince wishing to keep his\r\nstate is very often forced to do evil; for when that body is corrupt whom\r\nyou think you have need of to maintain yourself\u0026mdash;it may be either the\r\npeople or the soldiers or the nobles\u0026mdash;you have to submit to its\r\nhumours and to gratify them, and then good works will do you harm.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut let us come to Alexander, who was a man of such great goodness, that\r\namong the other praises which are accorded him is this, that in the\r\nfourteen years he held the empire no one was ever put to death by him\r\nunjudged; nevertheless, being considered effeminate and a man who allowed\r\nhimself to be governed by his mother, he became despised, the army\r\nconspired against him, and murdered him.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nTurning now to the opposite characters of Commodus, Severus, Antoninus\r\nCaracalla, and Maximinus, you will find them all cruel and rapacious-men\r\nwho, to satisfy their soldiers, did not hesitate to commit every kind of\r\niniquity against the people; and all, except Severus, came to a bad end;\r\nbut in Severus there was so much valour that, keeping the soldiers\r\nfriendly, although the people were oppressed by him, he reigned\r\nsuccessfully; for his valour made him so much admired in the sight of the\r\nsoldiers and people that the latter were kept in a way astonished and awed\r\nand the former respectful and satisfied. And because the actions of this\r\nman, as a new prince, were great, I wish to show briefly that he knew well\r\nhow to counterfeit the fox and the lion, which natures, as I said above,\r\nit is necessary for a prince to imitate.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nKnowing the sloth of the Emperor Julian, he persuaded the army in\r\nSclavonia, of which he was captain, that it would be right to go to Rome\r\nand avenge the death of Pertinax, who had been killed by the praetorian\r\nsoldiers; and under this pretext, without appearing to aspire to the\r\nthrone, he moved the army on Rome, and reached Italy before it was known\r\nthat he had started. On his arrival at Rome, the Senate, through fear,\r\nelected him emperor and killed Julian. After this there remained for\r\nSeverus, who wished to make himself master of the whole empire, two\r\ndifficulties; one in Asia, where Niger, head of the Asiatic army, had\r\ncaused himself to be proclaimed emperor; the other in the west where\r\nAlbinus was, who also aspired to the throne. And as he considered it\r\ndangerous to declare himself hostile to both, he decided to attack Niger\r\nand to deceive Albinus. To the latter he wrote that, being elected emperor\r\nby the Senate, he was willing to share that dignity with him and sent him\r\nthe title of Caesar; and, moreover, that the Senate had made Albinus his\r\ncolleague; which things were accepted by Albinus as true. But after\r\nSeverus had conquered and killed Niger, and settled oriental affairs, he\r\nreturned to Rome and complained to the Senate that Albinus, little\r\nrecognizing the benefits that he had received from him, had by treachery\r\nsought to murder him, and for this ingratitude he was compelled to punish\r\nhim. Afterwards he sought him out in France, and took from him his\r\ngovernment and life. He who will, therefore, carefully examine the actions\r\nof this man will find him a most valiant lion and a most cunning fox; he\r\nwill find him feared and respected by every one, and not hated by the\r\narmy; and it need not be wondered at that he, a new man, was able to hold\r\nthe empire so well, because his supreme renown always protected him from\r\nthat hatred which the people might have conceived against him for his\r\nviolence.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut his son Antoninus was a most eminent man, and had very excellent\r\nqualities, which made him admirable in the sight of the people and\r\nacceptable to the soldiers, for he was a warlike man, most enduring of\r\nfatigue, a despiser of all delicate food and other luxuries, which caused\r\nhim to be beloved by the armies. Nevertheless, his ferocity and cruelties\r\nwere so great and so unheard of that, after endless single murders, he\r\nkilled a large number of the people of Rome and all those of Alexandria.\r\nHe became hated by the whole world, and also feared by those he had around\r\nhim, to such an extent that he was murdered in the midst of his army by a\r\ncenturion. And here it must be noted that such-like deaths, which are\r\ndeliberately inflicted with a resolved and desperate courage, cannot be\r\navoided by princes, because any one who does not fear to die can inflict\r\nthem; but a prince may fear them the less because they are very rare; he\r\nhas only to be careful not to do any grave injury to those whom he employs\r\nor has around him in the service of the state. Antoninus had not taken\r\nthis care, but had contumeliously killed a brother of that centurion, whom\r\nalso he daily threatened, yet retained in his bodyguard; which, as it\r\nturned out, was a rash thing to do, and proved the emperor\u0026rsquo;s ruin.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut let us come to Commodus, to whom it should have been very easy to hold\r\nthe empire, for, being the son of Marcus, he had inherited it, and he had\r\nonly to follow in the footsteps of his father to please his people and\r\nsoldiers; but, being by nature cruel and brutal, he gave himself up to\r\namusing the soldiers and corrupting them, so that he might indulge his\r\nrapacity upon the people; on the other hand, not maintaining his dignity,\r\noften descending to the theatre to compete with gladiators, and doing\r\nother vile things, little worthy of the imperial majesty, he fell into\r\ncontempt with the soldiers, and being hated by one party and despised by\r\nthe other, he was conspired against and was killed.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIt remains to discuss the character of Maximinus. He was a very warlike\r\nman, and the armies, being disgusted with the effeminacy of Alexander, of\r\nwhom I have already spoken, killed him and elected Maximinus to the\r\nthrone. This he did not possess for long, for two things made him hated\r\nand despised; the one, his having kept sheep in Thrace, which brought him\r\ninto contempt (it being well known to all, and considered a great\r\nindignity by every one), and the other, his having at the accession to his\r\ndominions deferred going to Rome and taking possession of the imperial\r\nseat; he had also gained a reputation for the utmost ferocity by having,\r\nthrough his prefects in Rome and elsewhere in the empire, practised many\r\ncruelties, so that the whole world was moved to anger at the meanness of\r\nhis birth and to fear at his barbarity. First Africa rebelled, then the\r\nSenate with all the people of Rome, and all Italy conspired against him,\r\nto which may be added his own army; this latter, besieging Aquileia and\r\nmeeting with difficulties in taking it, were disgusted with his cruelties,\r\nand fearing him less when they found so many against him, murdered him.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nI do not wish to discuss Heliogabalus, Macrinus, or Julian, who, being\r\nthoroughly contemptible, were quickly wiped out; but I will bring this\r\ndiscourse to a conclusion by saying that princes in our times have this\r\ndifficulty of giving inordinate satisfaction to their soldiers in a far\r\nless degree, because, notwithstanding one has to give them some\r\nindulgence, that is soon done; none of these princes have armies that are\r\nveterans in the governance and administration of provinces, as were the\r\narmies of the Roman Empire; and whereas it was then more necessary to give\r\nsatisfaction to the soldiers than to the people, it is now more necessary\r\nto all princes, except the Turk and the Soldan, to satisfy the people\r\nrather the soldiers, because the people are the more powerful.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nFrom the above I have excepted the Turk, who always keeps round him twelve\r\nthousand infantry and fifteen thousand cavalry on which depend the\r\nsecurity and strength of the kingdom, and it is necessary that, putting\r\naside every consideration for the people, he should keep them his friends.\r\nThe kingdom of the Soldan is similar; being entirely in the hands of\r\nsoldiers, it follows again that, without regard to the people, he must\r\nkeep them his friends. But you must note that the state of the Soldan is\r\nunlike all other principalities, for the reason that it is like the\r\nChristian pontificate, which cannot be called either an hereditary or a\r\nnewly formed principality; because the sons of the old prince are not the\r\nheirs, but he who is elected to that position by those who have authority,\r\nand the sons remain only noblemen. And this being an ancient custom, it\r\ncannot be called a new principality, because there are none of those\r\ndifficulties in it that are met with in new ones; for although the prince\r\nis new, the constitution of the state is old, and it is framed so as to\r\nreceive him as if he were its hereditary lord.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut returning to the subject of our discourse, I say that whoever will\r\nconsider it will acknowledge that either hatred or contempt has been fatal\r\nto the above-named emperors, and it will be recognized also how it\r\nhappened that, a number of them acting in one way and a number in another,\r\nonly one in each way came to a happy end and the rest to unhappy ones.\r\nBecause it would have been useless and dangerous for Pertinax and\r\nAlexander, being new princes, to imitate Marcus, who was heir to the\r\nprincipality; and likewise it would have been utterly destructive to\r\nCaracalla, Commodus, and Maximinus to have imitated Severus, they not\r\nhaving sufficient valour to enable them to tread in his footsteps.\r\nTherefore a prince, new to the principality, cannot imitate the actions of\r\nMarcus, nor, again, is it necessary to follow those of Severus, but he\r\nought to take from Severus those parts which are necessary to found his\r\nstate, and from Marcus those which are proper and glorious to keep a state\r\nthat may already be stable and firm.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003c!–end chapter–\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"chap20\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eCHAPTER XX.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nARE FORTRESSES, AND MANY OTHER THINGS TO WHICH PRINCES OFTEN RESORT,\r\nADVANTAGEOUS OR HURTFUL?\r\n\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n1. Some princes, so as to hold securely the state, have disarmed their\r\nsubjects; others have kept their subject towns distracted by factions;\r\nothers have fostered enmities against themselves; others have laid\r\nthemselves out to gain over those whom they distrusted in the beginning of\r\ntheir governments; some have built fortresses; some have overthrown and\r\ndestroyed them. And although one cannot give a final judgment on all of\r\nthese things unless one possesses the particulars of those states in which\r\na decision has to be made, nevertheless I will speak as comprehensively as\r\nthe matter of itself will admit.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n2. There never was a new prince who has disarmed his subjects; rather when\r\nhe has found them disarmed he has always armed them, because, by arming\r\nthem, those arms become yours, those men who were distrusted become\r\nfaithful, and those who were faithful are kept so, and your subjects\r\nbecome your adherents. And whereas all subjects cannot be armed, yet when\r\nthose whom you do arm are benefited, the others can be handled more\r\nfreely, and this difference in their treatment, which they quite\r\nunderstand, makes the former your dependents, and the latter, considering\r\nit to be necessary that those who have the most danger and service should\r\nhave the most reward, excuse you. But when you disarm them, you at once\r\noffend them by showing that you distrust them, either for cowardice or for\r\nwant of loyalty, and either of these opinions breeds hatred against you.\r\nAnd because you cannot remain unarmed, it follows that you turn to\r\nmercenaries, which are of the character already shown; even if they should\r\nbe good they would not be sufficient to defend you against powerful\r\nenemies and distrusted subjects. Therefore, as I have said, a new prince\r\nin a new principality has always distributed arms. Histories are full of\r\nexamples. But when a prince acquires a new state, which he adds as a\r\nprovince to his old one, then it is necessary to disarm the men of that\r\nstate, except those who have been his adherents in acquiring it; and these\r\nagain, with time and opportunity, should be rendered soft and effeminate;\r\nand matters should be managed in such a way that all the armed men in the\r\nstate shall be your own soldiers who in your old state were living near\r\nyou.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n3. Our forefathers, and those who were reckoned wise, were accustomed to\r\nsay that it was necessary to hold Pistoia by factions and Pisa by\r\nfortresses; and with this idea they fostered quarrels in some of their\r\ntributary towns so as to keep possession of them the more easily. This may\r\nhave been well enough in those times when Italy was in a way balanced, but\r\nI do not believe that it can be accepted as a precept for to-day, because\r\nI do not believe that factions can ever be of use; rather it is certain\r\nthat when the enemy comes upon you in divided cities you are quickly lost,\r\nbecause the weakest party will always assist the outside forces and the\r\nother will not be able to resist. The Venetians, moved, as I believe, by\r\nthe above reasons, fostered the Guelph and Ghibelline factions in their\r\ntributary cities; and although they never allowed them to come to\r\nbloodshed, yet they nursed these disputes amongst them, so that the\r\ncitizens, distracted by their differences, should not unite against them.\r\nWhich, as we saw, did not afterwards turn out as expected, because, after\r\nthe rout at Vaila, one party at once took courage and seized the state.\r\nSuch methods argue, therefore, weakness in the prince, because these\r\nfactions will never be permitted in a vigorous principality; such methods\r\nfor enabling one the more easily to manage subjects are only useful in\r\ntimes of peace, but if war comes this policy proves fallacious.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n4. Without doubt princes become great when they overcome the difficulties\r\nand obstacles by which they are confronted, and therefore fortune,\r\nespecially when she desires to make a new prince great, who has a greater\r\nnecessity to earn renown than an hereditary one, causes enemies to arise\r\nand form designs against him, in order that he may have the opportunity of\r\novercoming them, and by them to mount higher, as by a ladder which his\r\nenemies have raised. For this reason many consider that a wise prince,\r\nwhen he has the opportunity, ought with craft to foster some animosity\r\nagainst himself, so that, having crushed it, his renown may rise higher.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n5. Princes, especially new ones, have found more fidelity and assistance\r\nin those men who in the beginning of their rule were distrusted than among\r\nthose who in the beginning were trusted. Pandolfo Petrucci, Prince of\r\nSiena, ruled his state more by those who had been distrusted than by\r\nothers. But on this question one cannot speak generally, for it varies so\r\nmuch with the individual; I will only say this, that those men who at the\r\ncommencement of a princedom have been hostile, if they are of a\r\ndescription to need assistance to support themselves, can always be gained\r\nover with the greatest ease, and they will be tightly held to serve the\r\nprince with fidelity, inasmuch as they know it to be very necessary for\r\nthem to cancel by deeds the bad impression which he had formed of them;\r\nand thus the prince always extracts more profit from them than from those\r\nwho, serving him in too much security, may neglect his affairs. And since\r\nthe matter demands it, I must not fail to warn a prince, who by means of\r\nsecret favours has acquired a new state, that he must well consider the\r\nreasons which induced those to favour him who did so; and if it be not a\r\nnatural affection towards him, but only discontent with their government,\r\nthen he will only keep them friendly with great trouble and difficulty,\r\nfor it will be impossible to satisfy them. And weighing well the reasons\r\nfor this in those examples which can be taken from ancient and modern\r\naffairs, we shall find that it is easier for the prince to make friends of\r\nthose men who were contented under the former government, and are\r\ntherefore his enemies, than of those who, being discontented with it, were\r\nfavourable to him and encouraged him to seize it.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n6. It has been a custom with princes, in order to hold their states more\r\nsecurely, to build fortresses that may serve as a bridle and bit to those who\r\nmight design to work against them, and as a place of refuge from a first\r\nattack. I praise this system because it has been made use of formerly.\r\nNotwithstanding that, Messer Nicolo Vitelli in our times has been seen to\r\ndemolish two fortresses in Citta di Castello so that he might keep that state;\r\nGuido Ubaldo, Duke of Urbino, on returning to his dominion, whence he had been\r\ndriven by Cesare Borgia, razed to the foundations all the fortresses in that\r\nprovince, and considered that without them it would be more difficult to lose\r\nit; the Bentivogli returning to Bologna came to a similar decision. Fortresses,\r\ntherefore, are useful or not according to circumstances; if they do you good in\r\none way they injure you in another. And this question can be reasoned thus: the\r\nprince who has more to fear from the people than from foreigners ought to build\r\nfortresses, but he who has more to fear from foreigners than from the people\r\nought to leave them alone. The castle of Milan, built by Francesco Sforza, has\r\nmade, and will make, more trouble for the house of Sforza than any other\r\ndisorder in the state. For this reason the best possible fortress is\u0026mdash;not\r\nto be hated by the people, because, although you may hold the fortresses, yet\r\nthey will not save you if the people hate you, for there will never be wanting\r\nforeigners to assist a people who have taken arms against you. It has not been\r\nseen in our times that such fortresses have been of use to any prince, unless\r\nto the Countess of Forli,\u003ca href=\"#fn-20.1\" name=\"fnref-20.1\" id=\"fnref-20.1\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[1]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nwhen the Count Girolamo, her consort, was killed; for by that means she was\r\nable to withstand the popular attack and wait for assistance from Milan, and\r\nthus recover her state; and the posture of affairs was such at that time that\r\nthe foreigners could not assist the people. But fortresses were of little value\r\nto her afterwards when Cesare Borgia attacked her, and when the people, her\r\nenemy, were allied with foreigners. Therefore, it would have been safer for\r\nher, both then and before, not to have been hated by the people than to have\r\nhad the fortresses. All these things considered then, I shall praise him who\r\nbuilds fortresses as well as him who does not, and I shall blame whoever,\r\ntrusting in them, cares little about being hated by the people.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"fn-20.1\" id=\"fn-20.1\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#fnref-20.1\"\u003e[1]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nCatherine Sforza, a daughter of Galeazzo Sforza and Lucrezia Landriani, born\r\n1463, died 1509. It was to the Countess of Forli that Machiavelli was sent as\r\nenvoy on 1499. A letter from Fortunati to the countess announces the\r\nappointment: \u0026ldquo;I have been with the signori,\u0026rdquo; wrote Fortunati,\r\n\u0026ldquo;to learn whom they would send and when. They tell me that Nicolo\r\nMachiavelli, a learned young Florentine noble, secretary to my Lords of the\r\nTen, is to leave with me at once.\u0026rdquo; \u003ci\u003eCf\u003c/i\u003e. \u0026ldquo;Catherine\r\nSforza,\u0026rdquo; by Count Pasolini, translated by P. Sylvester, 1898.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003c!–end chapter–\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"chap21\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eCHAPTER XXI.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nHOW A PRINCE SHOULD CONDUCT HIMSELF SO AS TO GAIN RENOWN\r\n\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nNothing makes a prince so much esteemed as great enterprises and setting a\r\nfine example. We have in our time Ferdinand of Aragon, the present King of\r\nSpain. He can almost be called a new prince, because he has risen, by fame\r\nand glory, from being an insignificant king to be the foremost king in\r\nChristendom; and if you will consider his deeds you will find them all\r\ngreat and some of them extraordinary. In the beginning of his reign he\r\nattacked Granada, and this enterprise was the foundation of his dominions.\r\nHe did this quietly at first and without any fear of hindrance, for he\r\nheld the minds of the barons of Castile occupied in thinking of the war\r\nand not anticipating any innovations; thus they did not perceive that by\r\nthese means he was acquiring power and authority over them. He was able\r\nwith the money of the Church and of the people to sustain his armies, and\r\nby that long war to lay the foundation for the military skill which has\r\nsince distinguished him. Further, always using religion as a plea, so as\r\nto undertake greater schemes, he devoted himself with pious cruelty to\r\ndriving out and clearing his kingdom of the Moors; nor could there be a\r\nmore admirable example, nor one more rare. Under this same cloak he\r\nassailed Africa, he came down on Italy, he has finally attacked France;\r\nand thus his achievements and designs have always been great, and have\r\nkept the minds of his people in suspense and admiration and occupied with\r\nthe issue of them. And his actions have arisen in such a way, one out of\r\nthe other, that men have never been given time to work steadily against\r\nhim.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAgain, it much assists a prince to set unusual examples in internal\r\naffairs, similar to those which are related of Messer Bernabo da Milano,\r\nwho, when he had the opportunity, by any one in civil life doing some\r\nextraordinary thing, either good or bad, would take some method of\r\nrewarding or punishing him, which would be much spoken about. And a prince\r\nought, above all things, always endeavour in every action to gain for\r\nhimself the reputation of being a great and remarkable man.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nA prince is also respected when he is either a true friend or a downright\r\nenemy, that is to say, when, without any reservation, he declares himself\r\nin favour of one party against the other; which course will always be more\r\nadvantageous than standing neutral; because if two of your powerful\r\nneighbours come to blows, they are of such a character that, if one of\r\nthem conquers, you have either to fear him or not. In either case it will\r\nalways be more advantageous for you to declare yourself and to make war\r\nstrenuously; because, in the first case, if you do not declare yourself,\r\nyou will invariably fall a prey to the conqueror, to the pleasure and\r\nsatisfaction of him who has been conquered, and you will have no reasons\r\nto offer, nor anything to protect or to shelter you. Because he who\r\nconquers does not want doubtful friends who will not aid him in the time\r\nof trial; and he who loses will not harbour you because you did not\r\nwillingly, sword in hand, court his fate.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAntiochus went into Greece, being sent for by the Ætolians to drive out\r\nthe Romans. He sent envoys to the Achaeans, who were friends of the\r\nRomans, exhorting them to remain neutral; and on the other hand the Romans\r\nurged them to take up arms. This question came to be discussed in the\r\ncouncil of the Achaeans, where the legate of Antiochus urged them to stand\r\nneutral. To this the Roman legate answered: \u0026ldquo;As for that which has been\r\nsaid, that it is better and more advantageous for your state not to\r\ninterfere in our war, nothing can be more erroneous; because by not\r\ninterfering you will be left, without favour or consideration, the guerdon\r\nof the conqueror.\u0026rdquo; Thus it will always happen that he who is not your\r\nfriend will demand your neutrality, whilst he who is your friend will\r\nentreat you to declare yourself with arms. And irresolute princes, to\r\navoid present dangers, generally follow the neutral path, and are\r\ngenerally ruined. But when a prince declares himself gallantly in favour\r\nof one side, if the party with whom he allies himself conquers, although\r\nthe victor may be powerful and may have him at his mercy, yet he is\r\nindebted to him, and there is established a bond of amity; and men are\r\nnever so shameless as to become a monument of ingratitude by oppressing\r\nyou. Victories after all are never so complete that the victor must not\r\nshow some regard, especially to justice. But if he with whom you ally\r\nyourself loses, you may be sheltered by him, and whilst he is able he may\r\naid you, and you become companions on a fortune that may rise again.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIn the second case, when those who fight are of such a character that you\r\nhave no anxiety as to who may conquer, so much the more is it greater\r\nprudence to be allied, because you assist at the destruction of one by the\r\naid of another who, if he had been wise, would have saved him; and\r\nconquering, as it is impossible that he should not do with your\r\nassistance, he remains at your discretion. And here it is to be noted that\r\na prince ought to take care never to make an alliance with one more\r\npowerful than himself for the purposes of attacking others, unless\r\nnecessity compels him, as is said above; because if he conquers you are at\r\nhis discretion, and princes ought to avoid as much as possible being at\r\nthe discretion of any one. The Venetians joined with France against the\r\nDuke of Milan, and this alliance, which caused their ruin, could have been\r\navoided. But when it cannot be avoided, as happened to the Florentines\r\nwhen the Pope and Spain sent armies to attack Lombardy, then in such a\r\ncase, for the above reasons, the prince ought to favour one of the\r\nparties.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nNever let any Government imagine that it can choose perfectly safe\r\ncourses; rather let it expect to have to take very doubtful ones, because\r\nit is found in ordinary affairs that one never seeks to avoid one trouble\r\nwithout running into another; but prudence consists in knowing how to\r\ndistinguish the character of troubles, and for choice to take the lesser\r\nevil.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nA prince ought also to show himself a patron of ability, and to honour the\r\nproficient in every art. At the same time he should encourage his citizens\r\nto practise their callings peaceably, both in commerce and agriculture,\r\nand in every other following, so that the one should not be deterred from\r\nimproving his possessions for fear lest they be taken away from him or\r\nanother from opening up trade for fear of taxes; but the prince ought to\r\noffer rewards to whoever wishes to do these things and designs in any way\r\nto honour his city or state.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nFurther, he ought to entertain the people with festivals and spectacles at\r\nconvenient seasons of the year; and as every city is divided into guilds or\r\ninto societies,\u003ca href=\"#fn-21.1\" name=\"fnref-21.1\" id=\"fnref-21.1\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[1]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nhe ought to hold such bodies in esteem, and associate with them sometimes, and\r\nshow himself an example of courtesy and liberality; nevertheless, always\r\nmaintaining the majesty of his rank, for this he must never consent to abate in\r\nanything.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"fn-21.1\" id=\"fn-21.1\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#fnref-21.1\"\u003e[1]\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u0026ldquo;Guilds or societies,\u0026rdquo; \u0026ldquo;in arti o in tribu.\u0026rdquo;\r\n\u0026ldquo;Arti\u0026rdquo; were craft or trade guilds, \u003ci\u003ecf\u003c/i\u003e. Florio:\r\n\u0026ldquo;Arte . . . a whole company of any trade in any city or corporation\r\ntown.\u0026rdquo; The guilds of Florence are most admirably described by Mr Edgcumbe\r\nStaley in his work on the subject (Methuen, 1906). Institutions of a somewhat\r\nsimilar character, called \u0026ldquo;artel,\u0026rdquo; exist in Russia to-day,\r\n\u003ci\u003ecf\u003c/i\u003e. Sir Mackenzie Wallace\u0026rsquo;s \u0026ldquo;Russia,\u0026rdquo; ed. 1905:\r\n\u0026ldquo;The sons . . . were always during the working season members of an\r\nartel. In some of the larger towns there are artels of a much more complex\r\nkind\u0026mdash; permanent associations, possessing large capital, and pecuniarily\r\nresponsible for the acts of the individual members.\u0026rdquo; The word\r\n\u0026ldquo;artel,\u0026rdquo; despite its apparent similarity, has, Mr Aylmer Maude\r\nassures me, no connection with \u0026ldquo;ars\u0026rdquo; or \u0026ldquo;arte.\u0026rdquo; Its\r\nroot is that of the verb \u0026ldquo;rotisya,\u0026rdquo; to bind oneself by an oath; and\r\nit is generally admitted to be only another form of \u0026ldquo;rota,\u0026rdquo; which\r\nnow signifies a \u0026ldquo;regimental company.\u0026rdquo; In both words the underlying\r\nidea is that of a body of men united by an oath. \u0026ldquo;Tribu\u0026rdquo; were\r\npossibly gentile groups, united by common descent, and included individuals\r\nconnected by marriage. Perhaps our words \u0026ldquo;sects\u0026rdquo; or\r\n\u0026ldquo;clans\u0026rdquo; would be most appropriate.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003c!–end chapter–\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"chap22\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eCHAPTER XXII.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nCONCERNING THE SECRETARIES OF PRINCES\r\n\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe choice of servants is of no little importance to a prince, and they\r\nare good or not according to the discrimination of the prince. And the\r\nfirst opinion which one forms of a prince, and of his understanding, is by\r\nobserving the men he has around him; and when they are capable and\r\nfaithful he may always be considered wise, because he has known how to\r\nrecognize the capable and to keep them faithful. But when they are\r\notherwise one cannot form a good opinion of him, for the prime error which\r\nhe made was in choosing them.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThere were none who knew Messer Antonio da Venafro as the servant of\r\nPandolfo Petrucci, Prince of Siena, who would not consider Pandolfo to be\r\na very clever man in having Venafro for his servant. Because there are\r\nthree classes of intellects: one which comprehends by itself; another\r\nwhich appreciates what others comprehended; and a third which neither\r\ncomprehends by itself nor by the showing of others; the first is the most\r\nexcellent, the second is good, the third is useless. Therefore, it follows\r\nnecessarily that, if Pandolfo was not in the first rank, he was in the\r\nsecond, for whenever one has judgment to know good and bad when it is said\r\nand done, although he himself may not have the initiative, yet he can\r\nrecognize the good and the bad in his servant, and the one he can praise\r\nand the other correct; thus the servant cannot hope to deceive him, and is\r\nkept honest.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut to enable a prince to form an opinion of his servant there is one test\r\nwhich never fails; when you see the servant thinking more of his own\r\ninterests than of yours, and seeking inwardly his own profit in\r\neverything, such a man will never make a good servant, nor will you ever\r\nbe able to trust him; because he who has the state of another in his hands\r\nought never to think of himself, but always of his prince, and never pay\r\nany attention to matters in which the prince is not concerned.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nOn the other hand, to keep his servant honest the prince ought to study\r\nhim, honouring him, enriching him, doing him kindnesses, sharing with him\r\nthe honours and cares; and at the same time let him see that he cannot\r\nstand alone, so that many honours may not make him desire more, many\r\nriches make him wish for more, and that many cares may make him dread\r\nchances. When, therefore, servants, and princes towards servants, are thus\r\ndisposed, they can trust each other, but when it is otherwise, the end\r\nwill always be disastrous for either one or the other.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003c!–end chapter–\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"chap23\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eCHAPTER XXIII.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nHOW FLATTERERS SHOULD BE AVOIDED\r\n\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nI do not wish to leave out an important branch of this subject, for it is\r\na danger from which princes are with difficulty preserved, unless they are\r\nvery careful and discriminating. It is that of flatterers, of whom courts\r\nare full, because men are so self-complacent in their own affairs, and in\r\na way so deceived in them, that they are preserved with difficulty from\r\nthis pest, and if they wish to defend themselves they run the danger of\r\nfalling into contempt. Because there is no other way of guarding oneself\r\nfrom flatterers except letting men understand that to tell you the truth\r\ndoes not offend you; but when every one may tell you the truth, respect\r\nfor you abates.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nTherefore a wise prince ought to hold a third course by choosing the wise\r\nmen in his state, and giving to them only the liberty of speaking the\r\ntruth to him, and then only of those things of which he inquires, and of\r\nnone others; but he ought to question them upon everything, and listen to\r\ntheir opinions, and afterwards form his own conclusions. With these\r\ncouncillors, separately and collectively, he ought to carry himself in\r\nsuch a way that each of them should know that, the more freely he shall\r\nspeak, the more he shall be preferred; outside of these, he should listen\r\nto no one, pursue the thing resolved on, and be steadfast in his\r\nresolutions. He who does otherwise is either overthrown by flatterers, or\r\nis so often changed by varying opinions that he falls into contempt.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nI wish on this subject to adduce a modern example. Fra Luca, the man of affairs\r\nto Maximilian,\u003ca href=\"#fn-23.1\" name=\"fnref-23.1\" id=\"fnref-23.1\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[1]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nthe present emperor, speaking of his majesty, said: He consulted with no one,\r\nyet never got his own way in anything. This arose because of his following a\r\npractice the opposite to the above; for the emperor is a secretive man\u0026mdash;he\r\ndoes not communicate his designs to any one, nor does he receive opinions on\r\nthem. But as in carrying them into effect they become revealed and known, they\r\nare at once obstructed by those men whom he has around him, and he, being\r\npliant, is diverted from them. Hence it follows that those things he does one\r\nday he undoes the next, and no one ever understands what he wishes or intends\r\nto do, and no one can rely on his resolutions.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"fn-23.1\" id=\"fn-23.1\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#fnref-23.1\"\u003e[1]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nMaximilian I, born in 1459, died 1519, Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire. He\r\nmarried, first, Mary, daughter of Charles the Bold; after her death, Bianca\r\nSforza; and thus became involved in Italian politics.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nA prince, therefore, ought always to take counsel, but only when he wishes\r\nand not when others wish; he ought rather to discourage every one from\r\noffering advice unless he asks it; but, however, he ought to be a constant\r\ninquirer, and afterwards a patient listener concerning the things of which\r\nhe inquired; also, on learning that any one, on any consideration, has not\r\ntold him the truth, he should let his anger be felt.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAnd if there are some who think that a prince who conveys an impression of\r\nhis wisdom is not so through his own ability, but through the good\r\nadvisers that he has around him, beyond doubt they are deceived, because\r\nthis is an axiom which never fails: that a prince who is not wise himself\r\nwill never take good advice, unless by chance he has yielded his affairs\r\nentirely to one person who happens to be a very prudent man. In this case\r\nindeed he may be well governed, but it would not be for long, because such\r\na governor would in a short time take away his state from him.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut if a prince who is not inexperienced should take counsel from more\r\nthan one he will never get united counsels, nor will he know how to unite\r\nthem. Each of the counsellors will think of his own interests, and the\r\nprince will not know how to control them or to see through them. And they\r\nare not to be found otherwise, because men will always prove untrue to you\r\nunless they are kept honest by constraint. Therefore it must be inferred\r\nthat good counsels, whencesoever they come, are born of the wisdom of the\r\nprince, and not the wisdom of the prince from good counsels.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003c!–end chapter–\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"chap24\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eCHAPTER XXIV.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nWHY THE PRINCES OF ITALY HAVE LOST THEIR STATES\r\n\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe previous suggestions, carefully observed, will enable a new prince to\r\nappear well established, and render him at once more secure and fixed in\r\nthe state than if he had been long seated there. For the actions of a new\r\nprince are more narrowly observed than those of an hereditary one, and\r\nwhen they are seen to be able they gain more men and bind far tighter than\r\nancient blood; because men are attracted more by the present than by the\r\npast, and when they find the present good they enjoy it and seek no\r\nfurther; they will also make the utmost defence of a prince if he fails\r\nthem not in other things. Thus it will be a double glory for him to have\r\nestablished a new principality, and adorned and strengthened it with good\r\nlaws, good arms, good allies, and with a good example; so will it be a\r\ndouble disgrace to him who, born a prince, shall lose his state by want of\r\nwisdom.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAnd if those seigniors are considered who have lost their states in Italy\r\nin our times, such as the King of Naples, the Duke of Milan, and others,\r\nthere will be found in them, firstly, one common defect in regard to arms\r\nfrom the causes which have been discussed at length; in the next place,\r\nsome one of them will be seen, either to have had the people hostile, or\r\nif he has had the people friendly, he has not known how to secure the\r\nnobles. In the absence of these defects states that have power enough to\r\nkeep an army in the field cannot be lost.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPhilip of Macedon, not the father of Alexander the Great, but he who was\r\nconquered by Titus Quintius, had not much territory compared to the\r\ngreatness of the Romans and of Greece who attacked him, yet being a\r\nwarlike man who knew how to attract the people and secure the nobles, he\r\nsustained the war against his enemies for many years, and if in the end he\r\nlost the dominion of some cities, nevertheless he retained the kingdom.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nTherefore, do not let our princes accuse fortune for the loss of their\r\nprincipalities after so many years\u0026rsquo; possession, but rather their own\r\nsloth, because in quiet times they never thought there could be a change\r\n(it is a common defect in man not to make any provision in the calm\r\nagainst the tempest), and when afterwards the bad times came they thought\r\nof flight and not of defending themselves, and they hoped that the people,\r\ndisgusted with the insolence of the conquerors, would recall them. This\r\ncourse, when others fail, may be good, but it is very bad to have\r\nneglected all other expedients for that, since you would never wish to\r\nfall because you trusted to be able to find someone later on to restore\r\nyou. This again either does not happen, or, if it does, it will not be for\r\nyour security, because that deliverance is of no avail which does not\r\ndepend upon yourself; those only are reliable, certain, and durable that\r\ndepend on yourself and your valour.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003c!–end chapter–\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"chap25\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eCHAPTER XXV.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nWHAT FORTUNE CAN EFFECT IN HUMAN AFFAIRS AND HOW TO WITHSTAND HER\r\n\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIt is not unknown to me how many men have had, and still have, the opinion that\r\nthe affairs of the world are in such wise governed by fortune and by God that\r\nmen with their wisdom cannot direct them and that no one can even help them;\r\nand because of this they would have us believe that it is not necessary to\r\nlabour much in affairs, but to let chance govern them. This opinion has been\r\nmore credited in our times because of the great changes in affairs which have\r\nbeen seen, and may still be seen, every day, beyond all human conjecture.\r\nSometimes pondering over this, I am in some degree inclined to their opinion.\r\nNevertheless, not to extinguish our free will, I hold it to be true that\r\nFortune is the arbiter of one-half of our actions,\u003ca href=\"#fn-25.1\" name=\"fnref-25.1\" id=\"fnref-25.1\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[1]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nbut that she still leaves us to direct the other half, or perhaps a little\r\nless.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"fn-25.1\" id=\"fn-25.1\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#fnref-25.1\"\u003e[1]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nFrederick the Great was accustomed to say: \u0026ldquo;The older one gets the more\r\nconvinced one becomes that his Majesty King Chance does three-quarters of the\r\nbusiness of this miserable universe.\u0026rdquo; Sorel\u0026rsquo;s \u0026ldquo;Eastern\r\nQuestion.\u0026rdquo;\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nI compare her to one of those raging rivers, which when in flood overflows\r\nthe plains, sweeping away trees and buildings, bearing away the soil from\r\nplace to place; everything flies before it, all yield to its violence,\r\nwithout being able in any way to withstand it; and yet, though its nature\r\nbe such, it does not follow therefore that men, when the weather becomes\r\nfair, shall not make provision, both with defences and barriers, in such a\r\nmanner that, rising again, the waters may pass away by canal, and their\r\nforce be neither so unrestrained nor so dangerous. So it happens with\r\nfortune, who shows her power where valour has not prepared to resist her,\r\nand thither she turns her forces where she knows that barriers and\r\ndefences have not been raised to constrain her.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAnd if you will consider Italy, which is the seat of these changes, and\r\nwhich has given to them their impulse, you will see it to be an open\r\ncountry without barriers and without any defence. For if it had been\r\ndefended by proper valour, as are Germany, Spain, and France, either this\r\ninvasion would not have made the great changes it has made or it would not\r\nhave come at all. And this I consider enough to say concerning resistance\r\nto fortune in general.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut confining myself more to the particular, I say that a prince may be\r\nseen happy to-day and ruined to-morrow without having shown any change of\r\ndisposition or character. This, I believe, arises firstly from causes that\r\nhave already been discussed at length, namely, that the prince who relies\r\nentirely on fortune is lost when it changes. I believe also that he will\r\nbe successful who directs his actions according to the spirit of the\r\ntimes, and that he whose actions do not accord with the times will not be\r\nsuccessful. Because men are seen, in affairs that lead to the end which\r\nevery man has before him, namely, glory and riches, to get there by\r\nvarious methods; one with caution, another with haste; one by force,\r\nanother by skill; one by patience, another by its opposite; and each one\r\nsucceeds in reaching the goal by a different method. One can also see of\r\ntwo cautious men the one attain his end, the other fail; and similarly,\r\ntwo men by different observances are equally successful, the one being\r\ncautious, the other impetuous; all this arises from nothing else than\r\nwhether or not they conform in their methods to the spirit of the times.\r\nThis follows from what I have said, that two men working differently bring\r\nabout the same effect, and of two working similarly, one attains his\r\nobject and the other does not.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nChanges in estate also issue from this, for if, to one who governs himself\r\nwith caution and patience, times and affairs converge in such a way that\r\nhis administration is successful, his fortune is made; but if times and\r\naffairs change, he is ruined if he does not change his course of action.\r\nBut a man is not often found sufficiently circumspect to know how to\r\naccommodate himself to the change, both because he cannot deviate from\r\nwhat nature inclines him to do, and also because, having always prospered\r\nby acting in one way, he cannot be persuaded that it is well to leave it;\r\nand, therefore, the cautious man, when it is time to turn adventurous,\r\ndoes not know how to do it, hence he is ruined; but had he changed his\r\nconduct with the times fortune would not have changed.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nPope Julius the Second went to work impetuously in all his affairs, and\r\nfound the times and circumstances conform so well to that line of action\r\nthat he always met with success. Consider his first enterprise against\r\nBologna, Messer Giovanni Bentivogli being still alive. The Venetians were\r\nnot agreeable to it, nor was the King of Spain, and he had the enterprise\r\nstill under discussion with the King of France; nevertheless he personally\r\nentered upon the expedition with his accustomed boldness and energy, a\r\nmove which made Spain and the Venetians stand irresolute and passive, the\r\nlatter from fear, the former from desire to recover the kingdom of Naples;\r\non the other hand, he drew after him the King of France, because that\r\nking, having observed the movement, and desiring to make the Pope his\r\nfriend so as to humble the Venetians, found it impossible to refuse him.\r\nTherefore Julius with his impetuous action accomplished what no other\r\npontiff with simple human wisdom could have done; for if he had waited in\r\nRome until he could get away, with his plans arranged and everything\r\nfixed, as any other pontiff would have done, he would never have\r\nsucceeded. Because the King of France would have made a thousand excuses,\r\nand the others would have raised a thousand fears.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nI will leave his other actions alone, as they were all alike, and they all\r\nsucceeded, for the shortness of his life did not let him experience the\r\ncontrary; but if circumstances had arisen which required him to go\r\ncautiously, his ruin would have followed, because he would never have\r\ndeviated from those ways to which nature inclined him.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nI conclude, therefore that, fortune being changeful and mankind steadfast\r\nin their ways, so long as the two are in agreement men are successful, but\r\nunsuccessful when they fall out. For my part I consider that it is better\r\nto be adventurous than cautious, because fortune is a woman, and if you\r\nwish to keep her under it is necessary to beat and ill-use her; and it is\r\nseen that she allows herself to be mastered by the adventurous rather than\r\nby those who go to work more coldly. She is, therefore, always,\r\nwoman-like, a lover of young men, because they are less cautious, more\r\nviolent, and with more audacity command her.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003c!–end chapter–\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"chap26\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eCHAPTER XXVI.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nAN EXHORTATION TO LIBERATE ITALY FROM THE BARBARIANS\r\n\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHaving carefully considered the subject of the above discourses, and\r\nwondering within myself whether the present times were propitious to a new\r\nprince, and whether there were elements that would give an opportunity to\r\na wise and virtuous one to introduce a new order of things which would do\r\nhonour to him and good to the people of this country, it appears to me\r\nthat so many things concur to favour a new prince that I never knew a time\r\nmore fit than the present.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAnd if, as I said, it was necessary that the people of Israel should be\r\ncaptive so as to make manifest the ability of Moses; that the Persians\r\nshould be oppressed by the Medes so as to discover the greatness of the\r\nsoul of Cyrus; and that the Athenians should be dispersed to illustrate\r\nthe capabilities of Theseus: then at the present time, in order to\r\ndiscover the virtue of an Italian spirit, it was necessary that Italy\r\nshould be reduced to the extremity that she is now in, that she should be\r\nmore enslaved than the Hebrews, more oppressed than the Persians, more\r\nscattered than the Athenians; without head, without order, beaten,\r\ndespoiled, torn, overrun; and to have endured every kind of desolation.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAlthough lately some spark may have been shown by one, which made us think\r\nhe was ordained by God for our redemption, nevertheless it was afterwards\r\nseen, in the height of his career, that fortune rejected him; so that\r\nItaly, left as without life, waits for him who shall yet heal her wounds\r\nand put an end to the ravaging and plundering of Lombardy, to the\r\nswindling and taxing of the kingdom and of Tuscany, and cleanse those\r\nsores that for long have festered. It is seen how she entreats God to send\r\nsomeone who shall deliver her from these wrongs and barbarous insolencies.\r\nIt is seen also that she is ready and willing to follow a banner if only\r\nsomeone will raise it.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nNor is there to be seen at present one in whom she can place more hope than in\r\nyour illustrious house,\u003ca href=\"#fn-26.1\" name=\"fnref-26.1\" id=\"fnref-26.1\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[1]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\nwith its valour and fortune, favoured by God and by the Church of which it is\r\nnow the chief, and which could be made the head of this redemption. This will\r\nnot be difficult if you will recall to yourself the actions and lives of the\r\nmen I have named. And although they were great and wonderful men, yet they were\r\nmen, and each one of them had no more opportunity than the present offers, for\r\ntheir enterprises were neither more just nor easier than this, nor was God more\r\ntheir friend than He is yours.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"fn-26.1\" id=\"fn-26.1\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#fnref-26.1\"\u003e[1]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nGiuliano de Medici. He had just been created a cardinal by Leo X. In 1523\r\nGiuliano was elected Pope, and took the title of Clement VII.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWith us there is great justice, because that war is just which is\r\nnecessary, and arms are hallowed when there is no other hope but in them.\r\nHere there is the greatest willingness, and where the willingness is great\r\nthe difficulties cannot be great if you will only follow those men to whom\r\nI have directed your attention. Further than this, how extraordinarily the\r\nways of God have been manifested beyond example: the sea is divided, a\r\ncloud has led the way, the rock has poured forth water, it has rained\r\nmanna, everything has contributed to your greatness; you ought to do the\r\nrest. God is not willing to do everything, and thus take away our free\r\nwill and that share of glory which belongs to us.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAnd it is not to be wondered at if none of the above-named Italians have\r\nbeen able to accomplish all that is expected from your illustrious house;\r\nand if in so many revolutions in Italy, and in so many campaigns, it has\r\nalways appeared as if military virtue were exhausted, this has happened\r\nbecause the old order of things was not good, and none of us have known\r\nhow to find a new one. And nothing honours a man more than to establish\r\nnew laws and new ordinances when he himself was newly risen. Such things\r\nwhen they are well founded and dignified will make him revered and\r\nadmired, and in Italy there are not wanting opportunities to bring such\r\ninto use in every form.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nHere there is great valour in the limbs whilst it fails in the head. Look\r\nattentively at the duels and the hand-to-hand combats, how superior the\r\nItalians are in strength, dexterity, and subtlety. But when it comes to armies\r\nthey do not bear comparison, and this springs entirely from the insufficiency\r\nof the leaders, since those who are capable are not obedient, and each one\r\nseems to himself to know, there having never been any one so distinguished\r\nabove the rest, either by valour or fortune, that others would yield to him.\r\nHence it is that for so long a time, and during so much fighting in the past\r\ntwenty years, whenever there has been an army wholly Italian, it has always\r\ngiven a poor account of itself; the first witness to this is Il Taro,\r\nafterwards Allesandria, Capua, Genoa, Vaila, Bologna, Mestri.\u003ca href=\"#fn-26.2\" name=\"fnref-26.2\" id=\"fnref-26.2\"\u003e\u003csup\u003e[2]\u003c/sup\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"footnote\"\u003e\r\n\u003ca name=\"fn-26.2\" id=\"fn-26.2\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e \u003ca href=\"#fnref-26.2\"\u003e[2]\u003c/a\u003e\r\nThe battles of Il Taro, 1495; Alessandria, 1499; Capua, 1501; Genoa, 1507;\r\nVaila, 1509; Bologna, 1511; Mestri, 1513.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIf, therefore, your illustrious house wishes to follow these remarkable\r\nmen who have redeemed their country, it is necessary before all things, as\r\na true foundation for every enterprise, to be provided with your own\r\nforces, because there can be no more faithful, truer, or better soldiers.\r\nAnd although singly they are good, altogether they will be much better\r\nwhen they find themselves commanded by their prince, honoured by him, and\r\nmaintained at his expense. Therefore it is necessary to be prepared with\r\nsuch arms, so that you can be defended against foreigners by Italian\r\nvalour.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAnd although Swiss and Spanish infantry may be considered very formidable,\r\nnevertheless there is a defect in both, by reason of which a third order\r\nwould not only be able to oppose them, but might be relied upon to\r\noverthrow them. For the Spaniards cannot resist cavalry, and the Switzers\r\nare afraid of infantry whenever they encounter them in close combat. Owing\r\nto this, as has been and may again be seen, the Spaniards are unable to\r\nresist French cavalry, and the Switzers are overthrown by Spanish\r\ninfantry. And although a complete proof of this latter cannot be shown,\r\nnevertheless there was some evidence of it at the battle of Ravenna, when\r\nthe Spanish infantry were confronted by German battalions, who follow the\r\nsame tactics as the Swiss; when the Spaniards, by agility of body and with\r\nthe aid of their shields, got in under the pikes of the Germans and stood\r\nout of danger, able to attack, while the Germans stood helpless, and, if\r\nthe cavalry had not dashed up, all would have been over with them. It is\r\npossible, therefore, knowing the defects of both these infantries, to\r\ninvent a new one, which will resist cavalry and not be afraid of infantry;\r\nthis need not create a new order of arms, but a variation upon the old.\r\nAnd these are the kind of improvements which confer reputation and power\r\nupon a new prince.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThis opportunity, therefore, ought not to be allowed to pass for letting\r\nItaly at last see her liberator appear. Nor can one express the love with\r\nwhich he would be received in all those provinces which have suffered so\r\nmuch from these foreign scourings, with what thirst for revenge, with what\r\nstubborn faith, with what devotion, with what tears. What door would be\r\nclosed to him? Who would refuse obedience to him? What envy would hinder\r\nhim? What Italian would refuse him homage? To all of us this barbarous\r\ndominion stinks. Let, therefore, your illustrious house take up this\r\ncharge with that courage and hope with which all just enterprises are\r\nundertaken, so that under its standard our native country may be ennobled,\r\nand under its auspices may be verified that saying of Petrarch:\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"poem\"\u003e\r\nVirtu contro al Furore\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n Prendera l\u0026rsquo;arme, e fia il combatter corto:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nChe l\u0026rsquo;antico valore\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n Negli italici cuor non e ancor morto.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nVirtue against fury shall advance the fight,\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n And it i\u0026rsquo; th\u0026rsquo; combat soon shall put to flight:\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nFor the old Roman valour is not dead,\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n Nor in th\u0026rsquo; Italians\u0026rsquo; brests extinguished.\u003cbr /\u003e\r\n\u003cbr /\u003e\r\nEdward Dacre, 1640.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003c!–end chapter–\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"chap27\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eDESCRIPTION OF THE METHODS ADOPTED BY THE DUKE\r\nVALENTINO WHEN MURDERING VITELLOZZO VITELLI, OLIVEROTTO DA FERMO, THE SIGNOR\r\nPAGOLO, AND THE DUKE DI GRAVINA ORSINI\r\n\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"center\"\u003e\r\nBY NICOLO MACHIAVELLI\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe Duke Valentino had returned from Lombardy, where he had been to clear\r\nhimself with the King of France from the calumnies which had been raised\r\nagainst him by the Florentines concerning the rebellion of Arezzo and\r\nother towns in the Val di Chiana, and had arrived at Imola, whence he\r\nintended with his army to enter upon the campaign against Giovanni\r\nBentivogli, the tyrant of Bologna: for he intended to bring that city\r\nunder his domination, and to make it the head of his Romagnian duchy.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThese matters coming to the knowledge of the Vitelli and Orsini and their\r\nfollowing, it appeared to them that the duke would become too powerful,\r\nand it was feared that, having seized Bologna, he would seek to destroy\r\nthem in order that he might become supreme in Italy. Upon this a meeting\r\nwas called at Magione in the district of Perugia, to which came the\r\ncardinal, Pagolo, and the Duke di Gravina Orsini, Vitellozzo Vitelli,\r\nOliverotto da Fermo, Gianpagolo Baglioni, the tyrant of Perugia, and\r\nMesser Antonio da Venafro, sent by Pandolfo Petrucci, the Prince of Siena.\r\nHere were discussed the power and courage of the duke and the necessity of\r\ncurbing his ambitions, which might otherwise bring danger to the rest of\r\nbeing ruined. And they decided not to abandon the Bentivogli, but to\r\nstrive to win over the Florentines; and they sent their men to one place\r\nand another, promising to one party assistance and to another\r\nencouragement to unite with them against the common enemy. This meeting\r\nwas at once reported throughout all Italy, and those who were discontented\r\nunder the duke, among whom were the people of Urbino, took hope of\r\neffecting a revolution.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThus it arose that, men\u0026rsquo;s minds being thus unsettled, it was decided by\r\ncertain men of Urbino to seize the fortress of San Leo, which was held for\r\nthe duke, and which they captured by the following means. The castellan\r\nwas fortifying the rock and causing timber to be taken there; so the\r\nconspirators watched, and when certain beams which were being carried to\r\nthe rock were upon the bridge, so that it was prevented from being drawn\r\nup by those inside, they took the opportunity of leaping upon the bridge\r\nand thence into the fortress. Upon this capture being effected, the whole\r\nstate rebelled and recalled the old duke, being encouraged in this, not so\r\nmuch by the capture of the fort, as by the Diet at Magione, from whom they\r\nexpected to get assistance.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThose who heard of the rebellion at Urbino thought they would not lose the\r\nopportunity, and at once assembled their men so as to take any town,\r\nshould any remain in the hands of the duke in that state; and they sent\r\nagain to Florence to beg that republic to join with them in destroying the\r\ncommon firebrand, showing that the risk was lessened and that they ought\r\nnot to wait for another opportunity.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut the Florentines, from hatred, for sundry reasons, of the Vitelli and\r\nOrsini, not only would not ally themselves, but sent Nicolo Machiavelli,\r\ntheir secretary, to offer shelter and assistance to the duke against his\r\nenemies. The duke was found full of fear at Imola, because, against\r\neverybody\u0026rsquo;s expectation, his soldiers had at once gone over to the enemy\r\nand he found himself disarmed and war at his door. But recovering courage\r\nfrom the offers of the Florentines, he decided to temporize before\r\nfighting with the few soldiers that remained to him, and to negotiate for\r\na reconciliation, and also to get assistance. This latter he obtained in\r\ntwo ways, by sending to the King of France for men and by enlisting\r\nmen-at-arms and others whom he turned into cavalry of a sort: to all he\r\ngave money.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nNotwithstanding this, his enemies drew near to him, and approached\r\nFossombrone, where they encountered some men of the duke and, with the aid\r\nof the Orsini and Vitelli, routed them. When this happened, the duke\r\nresolved at once to see if he could not close the trouble with offers of\r\nreconciliation, and being a most perfect dissembler he did not fail in any\r\npractices to make the insurgents understand that he wished every man who\r\nhad acquired anything to keep it, as it was enough for him to have the\r\ntitle of prince, whilst others might have the principality.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAnd the duke succeeded so well in this that they sent Signor Pagolo to him\r\nto negotiate for a reconciliation, and they brought their army to a\r\nstandstill. But the duke did not stop his preparations, and took every\r\ncare to provide himself with cavalry and infantry, and that such\r\npreparations might not be apparent to the others, he sent his troops in\r\nseparate parties to every part of the Romagna. In the meanwhile there came\r\nalso to him five hundred French lancers, and although he found himself\r\nsufficiently strong to take vengeance on his enemies in open war, he\r\nconsidered that it would be safer and more advantageous to outwit them,\r\nand for this reason he did not stop the work of reconciliation.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAnd that this might be effected the duke concluded a peace with them in\r\nwhich he confirmed their former covenants; he gave them four thousand\r\nducats at once; he promised not to injure the Bentivogli; and he formed an\r\nalliance with Giovanni; and moreover he would not force them to come\r\npersonally into his presence unless it pleased them to do so. On the other\r\nhand, they promised to restore to him the duchy of Urbino and other places\r\nseized by them, to serve him in all his expeditions, and not to make war\r\nagainst or ally themselves with any one without his permission.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThis reconciliation being completed, Guido Ubaldo, the Duke of Urbino,\r\nagain fled to Venice, having first destroyed all the fortresses in his\r\nstate; because, trusting in the people, he did not wish that the\r\nfortresses, which he did not think he could defend, should be held by the\r\nenemy, since by these means a check would be kept upon his friends. But\r\nthe Duke Valentino, having completed this convention, and dispersed his\r\nmen throughout the Romagna, set out for Imola at the end of November\r\ntogether with his French men-at-arms: thence he went to Cesena, where he\r\nstayed some time to negotiate with the envoys of the Vitelli and Orsini,\r\nwho had assembled with their men in the duchy of Urbino, as to the\r\nenterprise in which they should now take part; but nothing being\r\nconcluded, Oliverotto da Fermo was sent to propose that if the duke wished\r\nto undertake an expedition against Tuscany they were ready; if he did not\r\nwish it, then they would besiege Sinigalia. To this the duke replied that\r\nhe did not wish to enter into war with Tuscany, and thus become hostile to\r\nthe Florentines, but that he was very willing to proceed against\r\nSinigalia.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIt happened that not long afterwards the town surrendered, but the\r\nfortress would not yield to them because the castellan would not give it\r\nup to any one but the duke in person; therefore they exhorted him to come\r\nthere. This appeared a good opportunity to the duke, as, being invited by\r\nthem, and not going of his own will, he would awaken no suspicions. And\r\nthe more to reassure them, he allowed all the French men-at-arms who were\r\nwith him in Lombardy to depart, except the hundred lancers under Mons. di\r\nCandales, his brother-in-law. He left Cesena about the middle of December,\r\nand went to Fano, and with the utmost cunning and cleverness he persuaded\r\nthe Vitelli and Orsini to wait for him at Sinigalia, pointing out to them\r\nthat any lack of compliance would cast a doubt upon the sincerity and\r\npermanency of the reconciliation, and that he was a man who wished to make\r\nuse of the arms and councils of his friends. But Vitellozzo remained very\r\nstubborn, for the death of his brother warned him that he should not\r\noffend a prince and afterwards trust him; nevertheless, persuaded by\r\nPagolo Orsini, whom the duke had corrupted with gifts and promises, he\r\nagreed to wait.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nUpon this the duke, before his departure from Fano, which was to be on\r\n30th December 1502, communicated his designs to eight of his most trusted\r\nfollowers, among whom were Don Michele and the Monsignor d\u0026rsquo;Euna, who was\r\nafterwards cardinal; and he ordered that, as soon as Vitellozzo, Pagolo\r\nOrsini, the Duke di Gravina, and Oliverotto should arrive, his followers\r\nin pairs should take them one by one, entrusting certain men to certain\r\npairs, who should entertain them until they reached Sinigalia; nor should\r\nthey be permitted to leave until they came to the duke\u0026rsquo;s quarters, where\r\nthey should be seized.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe duke afterwards ordered all his horsemen and infantry, of which there\r\nwere more than two thousand cavalry and ten thousand footmen, to assemble\r\nby daybreak at the Metauro, a river five miles distant from Fano, and\r\nawait him there. He found himself, therefore, on the last day of December\r\nat the Metauro with his men, and having sent a cavalcade of about two\r\nhundred horsemen before him, he then moved forward the infantry, whom he\r\naccompanied with the rest of the men-at-arms.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nFano and Sinigalia are two cities of La Marca situated on the shore of the\r\nAdriatic Sea, fifteen miles distant from each other, so that he who goes\r\ntowards Sinigalia has the mountains on his right hand, the bases of which\r\nare touched by the sea in some places. The city of Sinigalia is distant\r\nfrom the foot of the mountains a little more than a bow-shot and from the\r\nshore about a mile. On the side opposite to the city runs a little river\r\nwhich bathes that part of the walls looking towards Fano, facing the high\r\nroad. Thus he who draws near to Sinigalia comes for a good space by road\r\nalong the mountains, and reaches the river which passes by Sinigalia. If\r\nhe turns to his left hand along the bank of it, and goes for the distance\r\nof a bow-shot, he arrives at a bridge which crosses the river; he is then\r\nalmost abreast of the gate that leads into Sinigalia, not by a straight\r\nline, but transversely. Before this gate there stands a collection of\r\nhouses with a square to which the bank of the river forms one side.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe Vitelli and Orsini having received orders to wait for the duke, and to\r\nhonour him in person, sent away their men to several castles distant from\r\nSinigalia about six miles, so that room could be made for the men of the\r\nduke; and they left in Sinigalia only Oliverotto and his band, which\r\nconsisted of one thousand infantry and one hundred and fifty horsemen, who\r\nwere quartered in the suburb mentioned above. Matters having been thus\r\narranged, the Duke Valentino left for Sinigalia, and when the leaders of\r\nthe cavalry reached the bridge they did not pass over, but having opened\r\nit, one portion wheeled towards the river and the other towards the\r\ncountry, and a way was left in the middle through which the infantry\r\npassed, without stopping, into the town.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nVitellozzo, Pagolo, and the Duke di Gravina on mules, accompanied by a few\r\nhorsemen, went towards the duke; Vitellozo, unarmed and wearing a cape\r\nlined with green, appeared very dejected, as if conscious of his\r\napproaching death\u0026mdash;a circumstance which, in view of the ability of\r\nthe man and his former fortune, caused some amazement. And it is said that\r\nwhen he parted from his men before setting out for Sinigalia to meet the\r\nduke he acted as if it were his last parting from them. He recommended his\r\nhouse and its fortunes to his captains, and advised his nephews that it\r\nwas not the fortune of their house, but the virtues of their fathers that\r\nshould be kept in mind. These three, therefore, came before the duke and\r\nsaluted him respectfully, and were received by him with goodwill; they\r\nwere at once placed between those who were commissioned to look after\r\nthem.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut the duke noticing that Oliverotto, who had remained with his band in\r\nSinigalia, was missing\u0026mdash;for Oliverotto was waiting in the square\r\nbefore his quarters near the river, keeping his men in order and drilling\r\nthem\u0026mdash;signalled with his eye to Don Michelle, to whom the care of\r\nOliverotto had been committed, that he should take measures that\r\nOliverotto should not escape. Therefore Don Michele rode off and joined\r\nOliverotto, telling him that it was not right to keep his men out of their\r\nquarters, because these might be taken up by the men of the duke; and he\r\nadvised him to send them at once to their quarters and to come himself to\r\nmeet the duke. And Oliverotto, having taken this advice, came before the\r\nduke, who, when he saw him, called to him; and Oliverotto, having made his\r\nobeisance, joined the others.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nSo the whole party entered Sinigalia, dismounted at the duke\u0026rsquo;s quarters,\r\nand went with him into a secret chamber, where the duke made them\r\nprisoners; he then mounted on horseback, and issued orders that the men of\r\nOliverotto and the Orsini should be stripped of their arms. Those of\r\nOliverotto, being at hand, were quickly settled, but those of the Orsini\r\nand Vitelli, being at a distance, and having a presentiment of the\r\ndestruction of their masters, had time to prepare themselves, and bearing\r\nin mind the valour and discipline of the Orsinian and Vitellian houses,\r\nthey stood together against the hostile forces of the country and saved\r\nthemselves.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut the duke\u0026rsquo;s soldiers, not being content with having pillaged the men of\r\nOliverotto, began to sack Sinigalia, and if the duke had not repressed\r\nthis outrage by killing some of them they would have completely sacked it.\r\nNight having come and the tumult being silenced, the duke prepared to kill\r\nVitellozzo and Oliverotto; he led them into a room and caused them to be\r\nstrangled. Neither of them used words in keeping with their past lives:\r\nVitellozzo prayed that he might ask of the pope full pardon for his sins;\r\nOliverotto cringed and laid the blame for all injuries against the duke on\r\nVitellozzo. Pagolo and the Duke di Gravina Orsini were kept alive until\r\nthe duke heard from Rome that the pope had taken the Cardinal Orsino, the\r\nArchbishop of Florence, and Messer Jacopo da Santa Croce. After which\r\nnews, on 18th January 1502, in the castle of Pieve, they also were\r\nstrangled in the same way.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003c!–end chapter–\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca name=\"chap28\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003eTHE LIFE OF CASTRUCCIO CASTRACANI OF LUCCA\r\n\u003c/h2\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"center\"\u003e\r\nWRITTEN BY NICOLO MACHIAVELLI\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp class=\"center\"\u003e\r\nAnd sent to his friends ZANOBI BUONDELMONTI And LUIGI ALAMANNI\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003ch3\u003e\r\nCASTRUCCIO CASTRACANI 1284-1328\r\n\u003c/h3\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIt appears, dearest Zanobi and Luigi, a wonderful thing to those who have\r\nconsidered the matter, that all men, or the larger number of them, who\r\nhave performed great deeds in the world, and excelled all others in their\r\nday, have had their birth and beginning in baseness and obscurity; or have\r\nbeen aggrieved by Fortune in some outrageous way. They have either been\r\nexposed to the mercy of wild beasts, or they have had so mean a parentage\r\nthat in shame they have given themselves out to be sons of Jove or of some\r\nother deity. It would be wearisome to relate who these persons may have\r\nbeen because they are well known to everybody, and, as such tales would\r\nnot be particularly edifying to those who read them, they are omitted. I\r\nbelieve that these lowly beginnings of great men occur because Fortune is\r\ndesirous of showing to the world that such men owe much to her and little\r\nto wisdom, because she begins to show her hand when wisdom can really take\r\nno part in their career: thus all success must be attributed to her.\r\nCastruccio Castracani of Lucca was one of those men who did great deeds,\r\nif he is measured by the times in which he lived and the city in which he\r\nwas born; but, like many others, he was neither fortunate nor\r\ndistinguished in his birth, as the course of this history will show. It\r\nappeared to be desirable to recall his memory, because I have discerned in\r\nhim such indications of valour and fortune as should make him a great\r\nexemplar to men. I think also that I ought to call your attention to his\r\nactions, because you of all men I know delight most in noble deeds.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe family of Castracani was formerly numbered among the noble families of\r\nLucca, but in the days of which I speak it had somewhat fallen in estate,\r\nas so often happens in this world. To this family was born a son Antonio,\r\nwho became a priest of the order of San Michele of Lucca, and for this\r\nreason was honoured with the title of Messer Antonio. He had an only\r\nsister, who had been married to Buonaccorso Cenami, but Buonaccorso dying\r\nshe became a widow, and not wishing to marry again went to live with her\r\nbrother. Messer Antonio had a vineyard behind the house where he resided,\r\nand as it was bounded on all sides by gardens, any person could have\r\naccess to it without difficulty. One morning, shortly after sunrise,\r\nMadonna Dianora, as the sister of Messer Antonio was called, had occasion\r\nto go into the vineyard as usual to gather herbs for seasoning the dinner,\r\nand hearing a slight rustling among the leaves of a vine she turned her\r\neyes in that direction, and heard something resembling the cry of an\r\ninfant. Whereupon she went towards it, and saw the hands and face of a\r\nbaby who was lying enveloped in the leaves and who seemed to be crying for\r\nits mother. Partly wondering and partly fearing, yet full of compassion,\r\nshe lifted it up and carried it to the house, where she washed it and\r\nclothed it with clean linen as is customary, and showed it to Messer\r\nAntonio when he returned home. When he heard what had happened and saw the\r\nchild he was not less surprised or compassionate than his sister. They\r\ndiscussed between themselves what should be done, and seeing that he was\r\npriest and that she had no children, they finally determined to bring it\r\nup. They had a nurse for it, and it was reared and loved as if it were\r\ntheir own child. They baptized it, and gave it the name of Castruccio\r\nafter their father. As the years passed Castruccio grew very handsome, and\r\ngave evidence of wit and discretion, and learnt with a quickness beyond\r\nhis years those lessons which Messer Antonio imparted to him. Messer\r\nAntonio intended to make a priest of him, and in time would have inducted\r\nhim into his canonry and other benefices, and all his instruction was\r\ngiven with this object; but Antonio discovered that the character of\r\nCastruccio was quite unfitted for the priesthood. As soon as Castruccio\r\nreached the age of fourteen he began to take less notice of the chiding of\r\nMesser Antonio and Madonna Dianora and no longer to fear them; he left off\r\nreading ecclesiastical books, and turned to playing with arms, delighting\r\nin nothing so much as in learning their uses, and in running, leaping, and\r\nwrestling with other boys. In all exercises he far excelled his companions\r\nin courage and bodily strength, and if at any time he did turn to books,\r\nonly those pleased him which told of wars and the mighty deeds of men.\r\nMesser Antonio beheld all this with vexation and sorrow.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThere lived in the city of Lucca a gentleman of the Guinigi family, named\r\nMesser Francesco, whose profession was arms and who in riches, bodily\r\nstrength, and valour excelled all other men in Lucca. He had often fought\r\nunder the command of the Visconti of Milan, and as a Ghibelline was the\r\nvalued leader of that party in Lucca. This gentleman resided in Lucca and\r\nwas accustomed to assemble with others most mornings and evenings under\r\nthe balcony of the Podesta, which is at the top of the square of San\r\nMichele, the finest square in Lucca, and he had often seen Castruccio\r\ntaking part with other children of the street in those games of which I\r\nhave spoken. Noticing that Castruccio far excelled the other boys, and\r\nthat he appeared to exercise a royal authority over them, and that they\r\nloved and obeyed him, Messer Francesco became greatly desirous of learning\r\nwho he was. Being informed of the circumstances of the bringing up of\r\nCastruccio he felt a greater desire to have him near to him. Therefore he\r\ncalled him one day and asked him whether he would more willingly live in\r\nthe house of a gentleman, where he would learn to ride horses and use\r\narms, or in the house of a priest, where he would learn nothing but masses\r\nand the services of the Church. Messer Francesco could see that it pleased\r\nCastruccio greatly to hear horses and arms spoken of, even though he stood\r\nsilent, blushing modestly; but being encouraged by Messer Francesco to\r\nspeak, he answered that, if his master were agreeable, nothing would\r\nplease him more than to give up his priestly studies and take up those of\r\na soldier. This reply delighted Messer Francesco, and in a very short time\r\nhe obtained the consent of Messer Antonio, who was driven to yield by his\r\nknowledge of the nature of the lad, and the fear that he would not be able\r\nto hold him much longer.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThus Castruccio passed from the house of Messer Antonio the priest to the\r\nhouse of Messer Francesco Guinigi the soldier, and it was astonishing to\r\nfind that in a very short time he manifested all that virtue and bearing\r\nwhich we are accustomed to associate with a true gentleman. In the first\r\nplace he became an accomplished horseman, and could manage with ease the\r\nmost fiery charger, and in all jousts and tournaments, although still a\r\nyouth, he was observed beyond all others, and he excelled in all exercises\r\nof strength and dexterity. But what enhanced so much the charm of these\r\naccomplishments, was the delightful modesty which enabled him to avoid\r\noffence in either act or word to others, for he was deferential to the\r\ngreat men, modest with his equals, and courteous to his inferiors. These\r\ngifts made him beloved, not only by all the Guinigi family, but by all\r\nLucca. When Castruccio had reached his eighteenth year, the Ghibellines\r\nwere driven from Pavia by the Guelphs, and Messer Francesco was sent by\r\nthe Visconti to assist the Ghibellines, and with him went Castruccio, in\r\ncharge of his forces. Castruccio gave ample proof of his prudence and\r\ncourage in this expedition, acquiring greater reputation than any other\r\ncaptain, and his name and fame were known, not only in Pavia, but\r\nthroughout all Lombardy.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCastruccio, having returned to Lucca in far higher estimation than he left\r\nit, did not omit to use all the means in his power to gain as many friends\r\nas he could, neglecting none of those arts which are necessary for that\r\npurpose. About this time Messer Francesco died, leaving a son thirteen\r\nyears of age named Pagolo, and having appointed Castruccio to be his son\u0026rsquo;s\r\ntutor and administrator of his estate. Before he died Francesco called\r\nCastruccio to him, and prayed him to show Pagolo that goodwill which he\r\n(Francesco) had always shown to HIM, and to render to the son the\r\ngratitude which he had not been able to repay to the father. Upon the\r\ndeath of Francesco, Castruccio became the governor and tutor of Pagolo,\r\nwhich increased enormously his power and position, and created a certain\r\namount of envy against him in Lucca in place of the former universal\r\ngoodwill, for many men suspected him of harbouring tyrannical intentions.\r\nAmong these the leading man was Giorgio degli Opizi, the head of the\r\nGuelph party. This man hoped after the death of Messer Francesco to become\r\nthe chief man in Lucca, but it seemed to him that Castruccio, with the\r\ngreat abilities which he already showed, and holding the position of\r\ngovernor, deprived him of his opportunity; therefore he began to sow those\r\nseeds which should rob Castruccio of his eminence. Castruccio at first\r\ntreated this with scorn, but afterwards he grew alarmed, thinking that\r\nMesser Giorgio might be able to bring him into disgrace with the deputy of\r\nKing Ruberto of Naples and have him driven out of Lucca.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe Lord of Pisa at that time was Uguccione of the Faggiuola of Arezzo,\r\nwho being in the first place elected their captain afterwards became their\r\nlord. There resided in Paris some exiled Ghibellines from Lucca, with whom\r\nCastruccio held communications with the object of effecting their\r\nrestoration by the help of Uguccione. Castruccio also brought into his\r\nplans friends from Lucca who would not endure the authority of the Opizi.\r\nHaving fixed upon a plan to be followed, Castruccio cautiously fortified\r\nthe tower of the Onesti, filling it with supplies and munitions of war, in\r\norder that it might stand a siege for a few days in case of need. When the\r\nnight came which had been agreed upon with Uguccione, who had occupied the\r\nplain between the mountains and Pisa with many men, the signal was given,\r\nand without being observed Uguccione approached the gate of San Piero and\r\nset fire to the portcullis. Castruccio raised a great uproar within the\r\ncity, calling the people to arms and forcing open the gate from his side.\r\nUguccione entered with his men, poured through the town, and killed Messer\r\nGiorgio with all his family and many of his friends and supporters. The\r\ngovernor was driven out, and the government reformed according to the\r\nwishes of Uguccione, to the detriment of the city, because it was found\r\nthat more than one hundred families were exiled at that time. Of those who\r\nfled, part went to Florence and part to Pistoia, which city was the\r\nheadquarters of the Guelph party, and for this reason it became most\r\nhostile to Uguccione and the Lucchese.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAs it now appeared to the Florentines and others of the Guelph party that\r\nthe Ghibellines absorbed too much power in Tuscany, they determined to\r\nrestore the exiled Guelphs to Lucca. They assembled a large army in the\r\nVal di Nievole, and seized Montecatini; from thence they marched to\r\nMontecarlo, in order to secure the free passage into Lucca. Upon this\r\nUguccione assembled his Pisan and Lucchese forces, and with a number of\r\nGerman cavalry which he drew out of Lombardy, he moved against the\r\nquarters of the Florentines, who upon the appearance of the enemy withdrew\r\nfrom Montecarlo, and posted themselves between Montecatini and Pescia.\r\nUguccione now took up a position near to Montecarlo, and within about two\r\nmiles of the enemy, and slight skirmishes between the horse of both\r\nparties were of daily occurrence. Owing to the illness of Uguccione, the\r\nPisans and Lucchese delayed coming to battle with the enemy. Uguccione,\r\nfinding himself growing worse, went to Montecarlo to be cured, and left\r\nthe command of the army in the hands of Castruccio. This change brought\r\nabout the ruin of the Guelphs, who, thinking that the hostile army having\r\nlost its captain had lost its head, grew over-confident. Castruccio\r\nobserved this, and allowed some days to pass in order to encourage this\r\nbelief; he also showed signs of fear, and did not allow any of the\r\nmunitions of the camp to be used. On the other side, the Guelphs grew more\r\ninsolent the more they saw these evidences of fear, and every day they\r\ndrew out in the order of battle in front of the army of Castruccio.\r\nPresently, deeming that the enemy was sufficiently emboldened, and having\r\nmastered their tactics, he decided to join battle with them. First he\r\nspoke a few words of encouragement to his soldiers, and pointed out to\r\nthem the certainty of victory if they would but obey his commands.\r\nCastruccio had noticed how the enemy had placed all his best troops in the\r\ncentre of the line of battle, and his less reliable men on the wings of\r\nthe army; whereupon he did exactly the opposite, putting his most valiant\r\nmen on the flanks, while those on whom he could not so strongly rely he\r\nmoved to the centre. Observing this order of battle, he drew out of his\r\nlines and quickly came in sight of the hostile army, who, as usual, had\r\ncome in their insolence to defy him. He then commanded his centre\r\nsquadrons to march slowly, whilst he moved rapidly forward those on the\r\nwings. Thus, when they came into contact with the enemy, only the wings of\r\nthe two armies became engaged, whilst the center battalions remained out\r\nof action, for these two portions of the line of battle were separated\r\nfrom each other by a long interval and thus unable to reach each other. By\r\nthis expedient the more valiant part of Castruccio\u0026rsquo;s men were opposed to\r\nthe weaker part of the enemy\u0026rsquo;s troops, and the most efficient men of the\r\nenemy were disengaged; and thus the Florentines were unable to fight with\r\nthose who were arrayed opposite to them, or to give any assistance to\r\ntheir own flanks. So, without much difficulty, Castruccio put the enemy to\r\nflight on both flanks, and the centre battalions took to flight when they\r\nfound themselves exposed to attack, without having a chance of displaying\r\ntheir valour. The defeat was complete, and the loss in men very heavy,\r\nthere being more than ten thousand men killed with many officers and\r\nknights of the Guelph party in Tuscany, and also many princes who had come\r\nto help them, among whom were Piero, the brother of King Ruberto, and\r\nCarlo, his nephew, and Filippo, the lord of Taranto. On the part of\r\nCastruccio the loss did not amount to more than three hundred men, among\r\nwhom was Francesco, the son of Uguccione, who, being young and rash, was\r\nkilled in the first onset.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThis victory so greatly increased the reputation of Castruccio that\r\nUguccione conceived some jealousy and suspicion of him, because it\r\nappeared to Uguccione that this victory had given him no increase of\r\npower, but rather than diminished it. Being of this mind, he only waited\r\nfor an opportunity to give effect to it. This occurred on the death of\r\nPier Agnolo Micheli, a man of great repute and abilities in Lucca, the\r\nmurderer of whom fled to the house of Castruccio for refuge. On the\r\nsergeants of the captain going to arrest the murderer, they were driven\r\noff by Castruccio, and the murderer escaped. This affair coming to the\r\nknowledge of Uguccione, who was then at Pisa, it appeared to him a proper\r\nopportunity to punish Castruccio. He therefore sent for his son Neri, who\r\nwas the governor of Lucca, and commissioned him to take Castruccio\r\nprisoner at a banquet and put him to death. Castruccio, fearing no evil,\r\nwent to the governor in a friendly way, was entertained at supper, and\r\nthen thrown into prison. But Neri, fearing to put him to death lest the\r\npeople should be incensed, kept him alive, in order to hear further from\r\nhis father concerning his intentions. Ugucionne cursed the hesitation and\r\ncowardice of his son, and at once set out from Pisa to Lucca with four\r\nhundred horsemen to finish the business in his own way; but he had not yet\r\nreached the baths when the Pisans rebelled and put his deputy to death and\r\ncreated Count Gaddo della Gherardesca their lord. Before Uguccione reached\r\nLucca he heard of the occurrences at Pisa, but it did not appear wise to\r\nhim to turn back, lest the Lucchese with the example of Pisa before them\r\nshould close their gates against him. But the Lucchese, having heard of\r\nwhat had happened at Pisa, availed themselves of this opportunity to\r\ndemand the liberation of Castruccio, notwithstanding that Uguccione had\r\narrived in their city. They first began to speak of it in private circles,\r\nafterwards openly in the squares and streets; then they raised a tumult,\r\nand with arms in their hands went to Uguccione and demanded that\r\nCastruccio should be set at liberty. Uguccione, fearing that worse might\r\nhappen, released him from prison. Whereupon Castruccio gathered his\r\nfriends around him, and with the help of the people attacked Uguccione;\r\nwho, finding he had no resource but in flight, rode away with his friends\r\nto Lombardy, to the lords of Scale, where he died in poverty.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut Castruccio from being a prisoner became almost a prince in Lucca, and\r\nhe carried himself so discreetly with his friends and the people that they\r\nappointed him captain of their army for one year. Having obtained this,\r\nand wishing to gain renown in war, he planned the recovery of the many\r\ntowns which had rebelled after the departure of Uguccione, and with the\r\nhelp of the Pisans, with whom he had concluded a treaty, he marched to\r\nSerezzana. To capture this place he constructed a fort against it, which\r\nis called to-day Zerezzanello; in the course of two months Castruccio\r\ncaptured the town. With the reputation gained at that siege, he rapidly\r\nseized Massa, Carrara, and Lavenza, and in a short time had overrun the\r\nwhole of Lunigiana. In order to close the pass which leads from Lombardy\r\nto Lunigiana, he besieged Pontremoli and wrested it from the hands of\r\nMesser Anastagio Palavicini, who was the lord of it. After this victory he\r\nreturned to Lucca, and was welcomed by the whole people. And now\r\nCastruccio, deeming it imprudent any longer to defer making himself a\r\nprince, got himself created the lord of Lucca by the help of Pazzino del\r\nPoggio, Puccinello dal Portico, Francesco Boccansacchi, and Cecco Guinigi,\r\nall of whom he had corrupted; and he was afterwards solemnly and\r\ndeliberately elected prince by the people. At this time Frederick of\r\nBavaria, the King of the Romans, came into Italy to assume the Imperial\r\ncrown, and Castruccio, in order that he might make friends with him, met\r\nhim at the head of five hundred horsemen. Castruccio had left as his\r\ndeputy in Lucca, Pagolo Guinigi, who was held in high estimation, because\r\nof the people\u0026rsquo;s love for the memory of his father. Castruccio was received\r\nin great honour by Frederick, and many privileges were conferred upon him,\r\nand he was appointed the emperor\u0026rsquo;s lieutenant in Tuscany. At this time the\r\nPisans were in great fear of Gaddo della Gherardesca, whom they had driven\r\nout of Pisa, and they had recourse for assistance to Frederick. Frederick\r\ncreated Castruccio the lord of Pisa, and the Pisans, in dread of the\r\nGuelph party, and particularly of the Florentines, were constrained to\r\naccept him as their lord.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nFrederick, having appointed a governor in Rome to watch his Italian\r\naffairs, returned to Germany. All the Tuscan and Lombardian Ghibellines,\r\nwho followed the imperial lead, had recourse to Castruccio for help and\r\ncounsel, and all promised him the governorship of his country, if enabled\r\nto recover it with his assistance. Among these exiles were Matteo Guidi,\r\nNardo Scolari, Lapo Uberti, Gerozzo Nardi, and Piero Buonaccorsi, all\r\nexiled Florentines and Ghibellines. Castruccio had the secret intention of\r\nbecoming the master of all Tuscany by the aid of these men and of his own\r\nforces; and in order to gain greater weight in affairs, he entered into a\r\nleague with Messer Matteo Visconti, the Prince of Milan, and organized for\r\nhim the forces of his city and the country districts. As Lucca had five\r\ngates, he divided his own country districts into five parts, which he\r\nsupplied with arms, and enrolled the men under captains and ensigns, so\r\nthat he could quickly bring into the field twenty thousand soldiers,\r\nwithout those whom he could summon to his assistance from Pisa. While he\r\nsurrounded himself with these forces and allies, it happened at Messer\r\nMatteo Visconti was attacked by the Guelphs of Piacenza, who had driven\r\nout the Ghibellines with the assistance of a Florentine army and the King\r\nRuberto. Messer Matteo called upon Castruccio to invade the Florentines in\r\ntheir own territories, so that, being attacked at home, they should be\r\ncompelled to draw their army out of Lombardy in order to defend\r\nthemselves. Castruccio invaded the Valdarno, and seized Fucecchio and San\r\nMiniato, inflicting immense damage upon the country. Whereupon the\r\nFlorentines recalled their army, which had scarcely reached Tuscany, when\r\nCastruccio was forced by other necessities to return to Lucca.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThere resided in the city of Lucca the Poggio family, who were so powerful\r\nthat they could not only elevate Castruccio, but even advance him to the\r\ndignity of prince; and it appearing to them they had not received such\r\nrewards for their services as they deserved, they incited other families\r\nto rebel and to drive Castruccio out of Lucca. They found their\r\nopportunity one morning, and arming themselves, they set upon the\r\nlieutenant whom Castruccio had left to maintain order and killed him. They\r\nendeavoured to raise the people in revolt, but Stefano di Poggio, a\r\npeaceable old man who had taken no hand in the rebellion, intervened and\r\ncompelled them by his authority to lay down their arms; and he offered to\r\nbe their mediator with Castruccio to obtain from him what they desired.\r\nTherefore they laid down their arms with no greater intelligence than they\r\nhad taken them up. Castruccio, having heard the news of what had happened\r\nat Lucca, at once put Pagolo Guinigi in command of the army, and with a\r\ntroop of cavalry set out for home. Contrary to his expectations, he found\r\nthe rebellion at an end, yet he posted his men in the most advantageous\r\nplaces throughout the city. As it appeared to Stefano that Castruccio\r\nought to be very much obliged to him, he sought him out, and without\r\nsaying anything on his own behalf, for he did not recognize any need for\r\ndoing so, he begged Castruccio to pardon the other members of his family\r\nby reason of their youth, their former friendships, and the obligations\r\nwhich Castruccio was under to their house. To this Castruccio graciously\r\nresponded, and begged Stefano to reassure himself, declaring that it gave\r\nhim more pleasure to find the tumult at an end than it had ever caused him\r\nanxiety to hear of its inception. He encouraged Stefano to bring his\r\nfamily to him, saying that he thanked God for having given him the\r\nopportunity of showing his clemency and liberality. Upon the word of\r\nStefano and Castruccio they surrendered, and with Stefano were immediately\r\nthrown into prison and put to death. Meanwhile the Florentines had\r\nrecovered San Miniato, whereupon it seemed advisable to Castruccio to make\r\npeace, as it did not appear to him that he was sufficiently secure at\r\nLucca to leave him. He approached the Florentines with the proposal of a\r\ntruce, which they readily entertained, for they were weary of the war, and\r\ndesirous of getting rid of the expenses of it. A treaty was concluded with\r\nthem for two years, by which both parties agreed to keep the conquests\r\nthey had made. Castruccio thus released from this trouble, turned his\r\nattention to affairs in Lucca, and in order that he should not again be\r\nsubject to the perils from which he had just escaped, he, under various\r\npretences and reasons, first wiped out all those who by their ambition\r\nmight aspire to the principality; not sparing one of them, but depriving\r\nthem of country and property, and those whom he had in his hands of life\r\nalso, stating that he had found by experience that none of them were to be\r\ntrusted. Then for his further security he raised a fortress in Lucca with\r\nthe stones of the towers of those whom he had killed or hunted out of the\r\nstate.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nWhilst Castruccio made peace with the Florentines, and strengthened his\r\nposition in Lucca, he neglected no opportunity, short of open war, of\r\nincreasing his importance elsewhere. It appeared to him that if he could\r\nget possession of Pistoia, he would have one foot in Florence, which was\r\nhis great desire. He, therefore, in various ways made friends with the\r\nmountaineers, and worked matters so in Pistoia that both parties confided\r\ntheir secrets to him. Pistoia was divided, as it always had been, into the\r\nBianchi and Neri parties; the head of the Bianchi was Bastiano di\r\nPossente, and of the Neri, Jacopo da Gia. Each of these men held secret\r\ncommunications with Castruccio, and each desired to drive the other out of\r\nthe city; and, after many threatenings, they came to blows. Jacopo\r\nfortified himself at the Florentine gate, Bastiano at that of the Lucchese\r\nside of the city; both trusted more in Castruccio than in the Florentines,\r\nbecause they believed that Castruccio was far more ready and willing to\r\nfight than the Florentines, and they both sent to him for assistance. He\r\ngave promises to both, saying to Bastiano that he would come in person,\r\nand to Jacopo that he would send his pupil, Pagolo Guinigi. At the\r\nappointed time he sent forward Pagolo by way of Pisa, and went himself\r\ndirect to Pistoia; at midnight both of them met outside the city, and both\r\nwere admitted as friends. Thus the two leaders entered, and at a signal\r\ngiven by Castruccio, one killed Jacopo da Gia, and the other Bastiano di\r\nPossente, and both took prisoners or killed the partisans of either\r\nfaction. Without further opposition Pistoia passed into the hands of\r\nCastruccio, who, having forced the Signoria to leave the palace, compelled\r\nthe people to yield obedience to him, making them many promises and\r\nremitting their old debts. The countryside flocked to the city to see the\r\nnew prince, and all were filled with hope and quickly settled down,\r\ninfluenced in a great measure by his great valour.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAbout this time great disturbances arose in Rome, owing to the dearness of\r\nliving which was caused by the absence of the pontiff at Avignon. The\r\nGerman governor, Enrico, was much blamed for what happened\u0026mdash;murders\r\nand tumults following each other daily, without his being able to put an\r\nend to them. This caused Enrico much anxiety lest the Romans should call\r\nin Ruberto, the King of Naples, who would drive the Germans out of the\r\ncity, and bring back the Pope. Having no nearer friend to whom he could\r\napply for help than Castruccio, he sent to him, begging him not only to\r\ngive him assistance, but also to come in person to Rome. Castruccio\r\nconsidered that he ought not to hesitate to render the emperor this\r\nservice, because he believed that he himself would not be safe if at any\r\ntime the emperor ceased to hold Rome. Leaving Pagolo Guinigi in command at\r\nLucca, Castruccio set out for Rome with six hundred horsemen, where he was\r\nreceived by Enrico with the greatest distinction. In a short time the\r\npresence of Castruccio obtained such respect for the emperor that, without\r\nbloodshed or violence, good order was restored, chiefly by reason of\r\nCastruccio having sent by sea from the country round Pisa large quantities\r\nof corn, and thus removed the source of the trouble. When he had chastised\r\nsome of the Roman leaders, and admonished others, voluntary obedience was\r\nrendered to Enrico. Castruccio received many honours, and was made a Roman\r\nsenator. This dignity was assumed with the greatest pomp, Castruccio being\r\nclothed in a brocaded toga, which had the following words embroidered on\r\nits front: \u0026ldquo;I am what God wills.\u0026rdquo; Whilst on the back was: \u0026ldquo;What God\r\ndesires shall be.\u0026rdquo;\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nDuring this time the Florentines, who were much enraged that Castruccio\r\nshould have seized Pistoia during the truce, considered how they could\r\ntempt the city to rebel, to do which they thought would not be difficult\r\nin his absence. Among the exiled Pistoians in Florence were Baldo Cecchi\r\nand Jacopo Baldini, both men of leading and ready to face danger. These\r\nmen kept up communications with their friends in Pistoia, and with the aid\r\nof the Florentines entered the city by night, and after driving out some\r\nof Castruccio\u0026rsquo;s officials and partisans, and killing others, they restored\r\nthe city to its freedom. The news of this greatly angered Castruccio, and\r\ntaking leave of Enrico, he pressed on in great haste to Pistoia. When the\r\nFlorentines heard of his return, knowing that he would lose no time, they\r\ndecided to intercept him with their forces in the Val di Nievole, under\r\nthe belief that by doing so they would cut off his road to Pistoia.\r\nAssembling a great army of the supporters of the Guelph cause, the\r\nFlorentines entered the Pistoian territories. On the other hand,\r\nCastruccio reached Montecarlo with his army; and having heard where the\r\nFlorentines\u0026rsquo; lay, he decided not to encounter it in the plains of Pistoia,\r\nnor to await it in the plains of Pescia, but, as far as he possibly could,\r\nto attack it boldly in the Pass of Serravalle. He believed that if he\r\nsucceeded in this design, victory was assured, although he was informed\r\nthat the Florentines had thirty thousand men, whilst he had only twelve\r\nthousand. Although he had every confidence in his own abilities and the\r\nvalour of his troops, yet he hesitated to attack his enemy in the open\r\nlest he should be overwhelmed by numbers. Serravalle is a castle between\r\nPescia and Pistoia, situated on a hill which blocks the Val di Nievole,\r\nnot in the exact pass, but about a bowshot beyond; the pass itself is in\r\nplaces narrow and steep, whilst in general it ascends gently, but is still\r\nnarrow, especially at the summit where the waters divide, so that twenty\r\nmen side by side could hold it. The lord of Serravalle was Manfred, a\r\nGerman, who, before Castruccio became lord of Pistoia, had been allowed to\r\nremain in possession of the castle, it being common to the Lucchese and\r\nthe Pistoians, and unclaimed by either\u0026mdash;neither of them wishing to\r\ndisplace Manfred as long as he kept his promise of neutrality, and came\r\nunder obligations to no one. For these reasons, and also because the\r\ncastle was well fortified, he had always been able to maintain his\r\nposition. It was here that Castruccio had determined to fall upon his\r\nenemy, for here his few men would have the advantage, and there was no\r\nfear lest, seeing the large masses of the hostile force before they became\r\nengaged, they should not stand. As soon as this trouble with Florence\r\narose, Castruccio saw the immense advantage which possession of this\r\ncastle would give him, and having an intimate friendship with a resident\r\nin the castle, he managed matters so with him that four hundred of his men\r\nwere to be admitted into the castle the night before the attack on the\r\nFlorentines, and the castellan put to death.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nCastruccio, having prepared everything, had now to encourage the\r\nFlorentines to persist in their desire to carry the seat of war away from\r\nPistoia into the Val di Nievole, therefore he did not move his army from\r\nMontecarlo. Thus the Florentines hurried on until they reached their\r\nencampment under Serravalle, intending to cross the hill on the following\r\nmorning. In the meantime, Castruccio had seized the castle at night, had\r\nalso moved his army from Montecarlo, and marching from thence at midnight\r\nin dead silence, had reached the foot of Serravalle: thus he and the\r\nFlorentines commenced the ascent of the hill at the same time in the\r\nmorning. Castruccio sent forward his infantry by the main road, and a\r\ntroop of four hundred horsemen by a path on the left towards the castle.\r\nThe Florentines sent forward four hundred cavalry ahead of their army\r\nwhich was following, never expecting to find Castruccio in possession of\r\nthe hill, nor were they aware of his having seized the castle. Thus it\r\nhappened that the Florentine horsemen mounting the hill were completely\r\ntaken by surprise when they discovered the infantry of Castruccio, and so\r\nclose were they upon it they had scarcely time to pull down their visors.\r\nIt was a case of unready soldiers being attacked by ready, and they were\r\nassailed with such vigour that with difficulty they could hold their own,\r\nalthough some few of them got through. When the noise of the fighting\r\nreached the Florentine camp below, it was filled with confusion. The\r\ncavalry and infantry became inextricably mixed: the captains were unable\r\nto get their men either backward or forward, owing to the narrowness of\r\nthe pass, and amid all this tumult no one knew what ought to be done or\r\nwhat could be done. In a short time the cavalry who were engaged with the\r\nenemy\u0026rsquo;s infantry were scattered or killed without having made any\r\neffective defence because of their unfortunate position, although in sheer\r\ndesperation they had offered a stout resistance. Retreat had been\r\nimpossible, with the mountains on both flanks, whilst in front were their\r\nenemies, and in the rear their friends. When Castruccio saw that his men\r\nwere unable to strike a decisive blow at the enemy and put them to flight,\r\nhe sent one thousand infantrymen round by the castle, with orders to join\r\nthe four hundred horsemen he had previously dispatched there, and\r\ncommanded the whole force to fall upon the flank of the enemy. These\r\norders they carried out with such fury that the Florentines could not\r\nsustain the attack, but gave way, and were soon in full retreat\u0026mdash;conquered\r\nmore by their unfortunate position than by the valour of their enemy.\r\nThose in the rear turned towards Pistoia, and spread through the plains,\r\neach man seeking only his own safety. The defeat was complete and very\r\nsanguinary. Many captains were taken prisoners, among whom were Bandini\r\ndei Rossi, Francesco Brunelleschi, and Giovanni della Tosa, all Florentine\r\nnoblemen, with many Tuscans and Neapolitans who fought on the Florentine\r\nside, having been sent by King Ruberto to assist the Guelphs. Immediately\r\nthe Pistoians heard of this defeat they drove out the friends of the\r\nGuelphs, and surrendered to Castruccio. He was not content with occupying\r\nPrato and all the castles on the plains on both sides of the Arno, but\r\nmarched his army into the plain of Peretola, about two miles from\r\nFlorence. Here he remained many days, dividing the spoils, and celebrating\r\nhis victory with feasts and games, holding horse races, and foot races for\r\nmen and women. He also struck medals in commemoration of the defeat of the\r\nFlorentines. He endeavoured to corrupt some of the citizens of Florence,\r\nwho were to open the city gates at night; but the conspiracy was\r\ndiscovered, and the participators in it taken and beheaded, among whom\r\nwere Tommaso Lupacci and Lambertuccio Frescobaldi. This defeat caused the\r\nFlorentines great anxiety, and despairing of preserving their liberty,\r\nthey sent envoys to King Ruberto of Naples, offering him the dominion of\r\ntheir city; and he, knowing of what immense importance the maintenance of\r\nthe Guelph cause was to him, accepted it. He agreed with the Florentines\r\nto receive from them a yearly tribute of two hundred thousand florins, and\r\nhe sent his son Carlo to Florence with four thousand horsemen.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nShortly after this the Florentines were relieved in some degree of the\r\npressure of Castruccio\u0026rsquo;s army, owing to his being compelled to leave his\r\npositions before Florence and march on Pisa, in order to suppress a\r\nconspiracy that had been raised against him by Benedetto Lanfranchi, one\r\nof the first men in Pisa, who could not endure that his fatherland should\r\nbe under the dominion of the Lucchese. He had formed this conspiracy,\r\nintending to seize the citadel, kill the partisans of Castruccio, and\r\ndrive out the garrison. As, however, in a conspiracy paucity of numbers is\r\nessential to secrecy, so for its execution a few are not sufficient, and\r\nin seeking more adherents to his conspiracy Lanfranchi encountered a\r\nperson who revealed the design to Castruccio. This betrayal cannot be\r\npassed by without severe reproach to Bonifacio Cerchi and Giovanni Guidi,\r\ntwo Florentine exiles who were suffering their banishment in Pisa.\r\nThereupon Castruccio seized Benedetto and put him to death, and beheaded\r\nmany other noble citizens, and drove their families into exile. It now\r\nappeared to Castruccio that both Pisa and Pistoia were thoroughly\r\ndisaffected; he employed much thought and energy upon securing his\r\nposition there, and this gave the Florentines their opportunity to\r\nreorganize their army, and to await the coming of Carlo, the son of the\r\nKing of Naples. When Carlo arrived they decided to lose no more time, and\r\nassembled a great army of more than thirty thousand infantry and ten\r\nthousand cavalry\u0026mdash;having called to their aid every Guelph there was\r\nin Italy. They consulted whether they should attack Pistoia or Pisa first,\r\nand decided that it would be better to march on the latter\u0026mdash;a course,\r\nowing to the recent conspiracy, more likely to succeed, and of more\r\nadvantage to them, because they believed that the surrender of Pistoia\r\nwould follow the acquisition of Pisa.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nIn the early part of May 1328, the Florentines put in motion this army and\r\nquickly occupied Lastra, Signa, Montelupo, and Empoli, passing from thence\r\non to San Miniato. When Castruccio heard of the enormous army which the\r\nFlorentines were sending against him, he was in no degree alarmed,\r\nbelieving that the time had now arrived when Fortune would deliver the\r\nempire of Tuscany into his hands, for he had no reason to think that his\r\nenemy would make a better fight, or had better prospects of success, than\r\nat Pisa or Serravalle. He assembled twenty thousand foot soldiers and four\r\nthousand horsemen, and with this army went to Fucecchio, whilst he sent\r\nPagolo Guinigi to Pisa with five thousand infantry. Fucecchio has a\r\nstronger position than any other town in the Pisan district, owing to its\r\nsituation between the rivers Arno and Gusciana and its slight elevation\r\nabove the surrounding plain. Moreover, the enemy could not hinder its\r\nbeing victualled unless they divided their forces, nor could they approach\r\nit either from the direction of Lucca or Pisa, nor could they get through\r\nto Pisa, or attack Castruccio\u0026rsquo;s forces except at a disadvantage. In one\r\ncase they would find themselves placed between his two armies, the one\r\nunder his own command and the other under Pagolo, and in the other case\r\nthey would have to cross the Arno to get to close quarters with the enemy,\r\nan undertaking of great hazard. In order to tempt the Florentines to take\r\nthis latter course, Castruccio withdrew his men from the banks of the\r\nriver and placed them under the walls of Fucecchio, leaving a wide expanse\r\nof land between them and the river.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nThe Florentines, having occupied San Miniato, held a council of war to\r\ndecide whether they should attack Pisa or the army of Castruccio, and,\r\nhaving weighed the difficulties of both courses, they decided upon the\r\nlatter. The river Arno was at that time low enough to be fordable, yet the\r\nwater reached to the shoulders of the infantrymen and to the saddles of\r\nthe horsemen. On the morning of 10 June 1328, the Florentines commenced\r\nthe battle by ordering forward a number of cavalry and ten thousand\r\ninfantry. Castruccio, whose plan of action was fixed, and who well knew\r\nwhat to do, at once attacked the Florentines with five thousand infantry\r\nand three thousand horsemen, not allowing them to issue from the river\r\nbefore he charged them; he also sent one thousand light infantry up the\r\nriver bank, and the same number down the Arno. The infantry of the\r\nFlorentines were so much impeded by their arms and the water that they\r\nwere not able to mount the banks of the river, whilst the cavalry had made\r\nthe passage of the river more difficult for the others, by reason of the\r\nfew who had crossed having broken up the bed of the river, and this being\r\ndeep with mud, many of the horses rolled over with their riders and many\r\nof them had stuck so fast that they could not move. When the Florentine\r\ncaptains saw the difficulties their men were meeting, they withdrew them\r\nand moved higher up the river, hoping to find the river bed less\r\ntreacherous and the banks more adapted for landing. These men were met at\r\nthe bank by the forces which Castruccio had already sent forward, who,\r\nbeing light armed with bucklers and javelins in their hands, let fly with\r\ntremendous shouts into the faces and bodies of the cavalry. The horses,\r\nalarmed by the noise and the wounds, would not move forward, and trampled\r\neach other in great confusion. The fight between the men of Castruccio and\r\nthose of the enemy who succeeded in crossing was sharp and terrible; both\r\nsides fought with the utmost desperation and neither would yield. The\r\nsoldiers of Castruccio fought to drive the others back into the river,\r\nwhilst the Florentines strove to get a footing on land in order to make\r\nroom for the others pressing forward, who if they could but get out of the\r\nwater would be able to fight, and in this obstinate conflict they were\r\nurged on by their captains. Castruccio shouted to his men that these were\r\nthe same enemies whom they had before conquered at Serravalle, whilst the\r\nFlorentines reproached each other that the many should be overcome by the\r\nfew. At length Castruccio, seeing how long the battle had lasted, and that\r\nboth his men and the enemy were utterly exhausted, and that both sides had\r\nmany killed and wounded, pushed forward another body of infantry to take\r\nup a position at the rear of those who were fighting; he then commanded\r\nthese latter to open their ranks as if they intended to retreat, and one\r\npart of them to turn to the right and another to the left. This cleared a\r\nspace of which the Florentines at once took advantage, and thus gained\r\npossession of a portion of the battlefield. But when these tired soldiers\r\nfound themselves at close quarters with Castruccio\u0026rsquo;s reserves they could\r\nnot stand against them and at once fell back into the river. The cavalry\r\nof either side had not as yet gained any decisive advantage over the\r\nother, because Castruccio, knowing his inferiority in this arm, had\r\ncommanded his leaders only to stand on the defensive against the attacks\r\nof their adversaries, as he hoped that when he had overcome the infantry\r\nhe would be able to make short work of the cavalry. This fell out as he\r\nhad hoped, for when he saw the Florentine army driven back across the\r\nriver he ordered the remainder of his infantry to attack the cavalry of\r\nthe enemy. This they did with lance and javelin, and, joined by their own\r\ncavalry, fell upon the enemy with the greatest fury and soon put him to\r\nflight. The Florentine captains, having seen the difficulty their cavalry\r\nhad met with in crossing the river, had attempted to make their infantry\r\ncross lower down the river, in order to attack the flanks of Castruccio\u0026rsquo;s\r\narmy. But here, also, the banks were steep and already lined by the men of\r\nCastruccio, and this movement was quite useless. Thus the Florentines were\r\nso completely defeated at all points that scarcely a third of them\r\nescaped, and Castruccio was again covered with glory. Many captains were\r\ntaken prisoners, and Carlo, the son of King Ruberto, with Michelagnolo\r\nFalconi and Taddeo degli Albizzi, the Florentine commissioners, fled to\r\nEmpoli. If the spoils were great, the slaughter was infinitely greater, as\r\nmight be expected in such a battle. Of the Florentines there fell twenty\r\nthousand two hundred and thirty-one men, whilst Castruccio lost one\r\nthousand five hundred and seventy men.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nBut Fortune growing envious of the glory of Castruccio took away his life\r\njust at the time when she should have preserved it, and thus ruined all\r\nthose plans which for so long a time he had worked to carry into effect,\r\nand in the successful prosecution of which nothing but death could have\r\nstopped him. Castruccio was in the thick of the battle the whole of the\r\nday; and when the end of it came, although fatigued and overheated, he\r\nstood at the gate of Fucecchio to welcome his men on their return from\r\nvictory and personally thank them. He was also on the watch for any\r\nattempt of the enemy to retrieve the fortunes of the day; he being of the\r\nopinion that it was the duty of a good general to be the first man in the\r\nsaddle and the last out of it. Here Castruccio stood exposed to a wind\r\nwhich often rises at midday on the banks of the Arno, and which is often\r\nvery unhealthy; from this he took a chill, of which he thought nothing, as\r\nhe was accustomed to such troubles; but it was the cause of his death. On\r\nthe following night he was attacked with high fever, which increased so\r\nrapidly that the doctors saw it must prove fatal. Castruccio, therefore,\r\ncalled Pagolo Guinigi to him, and addressed him as follows:\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\n\u0026ldquo;If I could have believed that Fortune would have cut me off in the midst\r\nof the career which was leading to that glory which all my successes\r\npromised, I should have laboured less, and I should have left thee, if a\r\nsmaller state, at least with fewer enemies and perils, because I should\r\nhave been content with the governorships of Lucca and Pisa. I should\r\nneither have subjugated the Pistoians, nor outraged the Florentines with\r\nso many injuries. But I would have made both these peoples my friends, and\r\nI should have lived, if no longer, at least more peacefully, and have left\r\nyou a state without a doubt smaller, but one more secure and established\r\non a surer foundation. But Fortune, who insists upon having the\r\narbitrament of human affairs, did not endow me with sufficient judgment to\r\nrecognize this from the first, nor the time to surmount it. Thou hast\r\nheard, for many have told thee, and I have never concealed it, how I\r\nentered the house of thy father whilst yet a boy\u0026mdash;a stranger to all\r\nthose ambitions which every generous soul should feel\u0026mdash;and how I was\r\nbrought up by him, and loved as though I had been born of his blood; how\r\nunder his governance I learned to be valiant and capable of availing\r\nmyself of all that fortune, of which thou hast been witness. When thy good\r\nfather came to die, he committed thee and all his possessions to my care,\r\nand I have brought thee up with that love, and increased thy estate with\r\nthat care, which I was bound to show. And in order that thou shouldst not\r\nonly possess the estate which thy father left, but also that which my\r\nfortune and abilities have gained, I have never married, so that the love\r\nof children should never deflect my mind from that gratitude which I owed\r\nto the children of thy father. Thus I leave thee a vast estate, of which I\r\nam well content, but I am deeply concerned, inasmuch as I leave it thee\r\nunsettled and insecure. Thou hast the city of Lucca on thy hands, which\r\nwill never rest contented under thy government. Thou hast also Pisa,\r\nwhere the men are of nature changeable and unreliable, who, although they\r\nmay be sometimes held in subjection, yet they will ever disdain to serve\r\nunder a Lucchese. Pistoia is also disloyal to thee, she being eaten up\r\nwith factions and deeply incensed against thy family by reason of the\r\nwrongs recently inflicted upon them. Thou hast for neighbours the offended\r\nFlorentines, injured by us in a thousand ways, but not utterly destroyed,\r\nwho will hail the news of my death with more delight than they would the\r\nacquisition of all Tuscany. In the Emperor and in the princes of Milan\r\nthou canst place no reliance, for they are far distant, slow, and their\r\nhelp is very long in coming. Therefore, thou hast no hope in anything but\r\nin thine own abilities, and in the memory of my valour, and in the\r\nprestige which this latest victory has brought thee; which, as thou\r\nknowest how to use it with prudence, will assist thee to come to terms\r\nwith the Florentines, who, as they are suffering under this great defeat,\r\nshould be inclined to listen to thee. And whereas I have sought to make\r\nthem my enemies, because I believed that war with them would conduce to my\r\npower and glory, thou hast every inducement to make friends of them,\r\nbecause their alliance will bring thee advantages and security. It is of\r\nthe greatest important in this world that a man should know himself, and\r\nthe measure of his own strength and means; and he who knows that he has\r\nnot a genius for fighting must learn how to govern by the arts of peace.\r\nAnd it will be well for thee to rule thy conduct by my counsel, and to\r\nlearn in this way to enjoy what my life-work and dangers have gained; and\r\nin this thou wilt easily succeed when thou hast learnt to believe that\r\nwhat I have told thee is true. And thou wilt be doubly indebted to me, in\r\nthat I have left thee this realm and have taught thee how to keep it.\u0026rdquo;\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nAfter this there came to Castruccio those citizens of Pisa, Pistoia, and\r\nLucca, who had been fighting at his side, and whilst recommending Pagolo\r\nto them, and making them swear obedience to him as his successor, he died.\r\nHe left a happy memory to those who had known him, and no prince of those\r\ntimes was ever loved with such devotion as he was. His obsequies were\r\ncelebrated with every sign of mourning, and he was buried in San Francesco\r\nat Lucca. Fortune was not so friendly to Pagolo Guinigi as she had been to\r\nCastruccio, for he had not the abilities. Not long after the death of\r\nCastruccio, Pagolo lost Pisa, and then Pistoia, and only with difficulty\r\nheld on to Lucca. This latter city continued in the family of Guinigi\r\nuntil the time of the great-grandson of Pagolo.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nFrom what has been related here it will be seen that Castruccio was a man\r\nof exceptional abilities, not only measured by men of his own time, but\r\nalso by those of an earlier date. In stature he was above the ordinary\r\nheight, and perfectly proportioned. He was of a gracious presence, and he\r\nwelcomed men with such urbanity that those who spoke with him rarely left\r\nhim displeased. His hair was inclined to be red, and he wore it cut short\r\nabove the ears, and, whether it rained or snowed, he always went without a\r\nhat. He was delightful among friends, but terrible to his enemies; just to\r\nhis subjects; ready to play false with the unfaithful, and willing to\r\novercome by fraud those whom he desired to subdue, because he was wont to\r\nsay that it was the victory that brought the glory, not the methods of\r\nachieving it. No one was bolder in facing danger, none more prudent in\r\nextricating himself. He was accustomed to say that men ought to attempt\r\neverything and fear nothing; that God is a lover of strong men, because\r\none always sees that the weak are chastised by the strong. He was also\r\nwonderfully sharp or biting though courteous in his answers; and as he did\r\nnot look for any indulgence in this way of speaking from others, so he was\r\nnot angered with others did not show it to him. It has often happened that\r\nhe has listened quietly when others have spoken sharply to him, as on the\r\nfollowing occasions. He had caused a ducat to be given for a partridge,\r\nand was taken to task for doing so by a friend, to whom Castruccio had\r\nsaid: \u0026ldquo;You would not have given more than a penny.\u0026rdquo; \u0026ldquo;That is true,\u0026rdquo;\r\nanswered the friend. Then said Castruccio to him: \u0026ldquo;A ducat is much less to\r\nme.\u0026rdquo; Having about him a flatterer on whom he had spat to show that he\r\nscorned him, the flatterer said to him: \u0026ldquo;Fisherman are willing to let the\r\nwaters of the sea saturate them in order that they may take a few little\r\nfishes, and I allow myself to be wetted by spittle that I may catch a\r\nwhale\u0026rdquo;; and this was not only heard by Castruccio with patience but\r\nrewarded. When told by a priest that it was wicked for him to live so\r\nsumptuously, Castruccio said: \u0026ldquo;If that be a vice then you should not fare\r\nso splendidly at the feasts of our saints.\u0026rdquo; Passing through a street he\r\nsaw a young man as he came out of a house of ill fame blush at being seen\r\nby Castruccio, and said to him: \u0026ldquo;Thou shouldst not be ashamed when thou\r\ncomest out, but when thou goest into such places.\u0026rdquo; A friend gave him a\r\nvery curiously tied knot to undo and was told: \u0026ldquo;Fool, do you think that I\r\nwish to untie a thing which gave so much trouble to fasten.\u0026rdquo; Castruccio\r\nsaid to one who professed to be a philosopher: \u0026ldquo;You are like the dogs who\r\nalways run after those who will give them the best to eat,\u0026rdquo; and was\r\nanswered: \u0026ldquo;We are rather like the doctors who go to the houses of those\r\nwho have the greatest need of them.\u0026rdquo; Going by water from Pisa to Leghorn,\r\nCastruccio was much disturbed by a dangerous storm that sprang up, and was\r\nreproached for cowardice by one of those with him, who said that he did\r\nnot fear anything. Castruccio answered that he did not wonder at that,\r\nsince every man valued his soul for what is was worth. Being asked by one\r\nwhat he ought to do to gain estimation, he said: \u0026ldquo;When thou goest to a\r\nbanquet take care that thou dost not seat one piece of wood upon another.\u0026rdquo;\r\nTo a person who was boasting that he had read many things, Castruccio\r\nsaid: \u0026ldquo;He knows better than to boast of remembering many things.\u0026rdquo; Someone\r\nbragged that he could drink much without becoming intoxicated. Castruccio\r\nreplied: \u0026ldquo;An ox does the same.\u0026rdquo; Castruccio was acquainted with a girl with\r\nwhom he had intimate relations, and being blamed by a friend who told him\r\nthat it was undignified for him to be taken in by a woman, he said: \u0026ldquo;She\r\nhas not taken me in, I have taken her.\u0026rdquo; Being also blamed for eating very\r\ndainty foods, he answered: \u0026ldquo;Thou dost not spend as much as I do?\u0026rdquo; and\r\nbeing told that it was true, he continued: \u0026ldquo;Then thou art more avaricious\r\nthan I am gluttonous.\u0026rdquo; Being invited by Taddeo Bernardi, a very rich and\r\nsplendid citizen of Luca, to supper, he went to the house and was shown by\r\nTaddeo into a chamber hung with silk and paved with fine stones\r\nrepresenting flowers and foliage of the most beautiful colouring.\r\nCastruccio gathered some saliva in his mouth and spat it out upon Taddeo,\r\nand seeing him much disturbed by this, said to him: \u0026ldquo;I knew not where to\r\nspit in order to offend thee less.\u0026rdquo; Being asked how Caesar died he said:\r\n\u0026ldquo;God willing I will die as he did.\u0026rdquo; Being one night in the house of one of\r\nhis gentlemen where many ladies were assembled, he was reproved by one of\r\nhis friends for dancing and amusing himself with them more than was usual\r\nin one of his station, so he said: \u0026ldquo;He who is considered wise by day will\r\nnot be considered a fool at night.\u0026rdquo; A person came to demand a favour of\r\nCastruccio, and thinking he was not listening to his plea threw himself on\r\nhis knees to the ground, and being sharply reproved by Castruccio, said:\r\n\u0026ldquo;Thou art the reason of my acting thus for thou hast thy ears in thy\r\nfeet,\u0026rdquo; whereupon he obtained double the favour he had asked. Castruccio\r\nused to say that the way to hell was an easy one, seeing that it was in a\r\ndownward direction and you travelled blindfolded. Being asked a favour by\r\none who used many superfluous words, he said to him: \u0026ldquo;When you have\r\nanother request to make, send someone else to make it.\u0026rdquo; Having been\r\nwearied by a similar man with a long oration who wound up by saying:\r\n\u0026ldquo;Perhaps I have fatigued you by speaking so long,\u0026rdquo; Castruccio said: \u0026ldquo;You\r\nhave not, because I have not listened to a word you said.\u0026rdquo; He used to say\r\nof one who had been a beautiful child and who afterwards became a fine\r\nman, that he was dangerous, because he first took the husbands from the\r\nwives and now he took the wives from their husbands. To an envious man who\r\nlaughed, he said: \u0026ldquo;Do you laugh because you are successful or because\r\nanother is unfortunate?\u0026rdquo; Whilst he was still in the charge of Messer\r\nFrancesco Guinigi, one of his companions said to him: \u0026ldquo;What shall I give\r\nyou if you will let me give you a blow on the nose?\u0026rdquo; Castruccio answered:\r\n\u0026ldquo;A helmet.\u0026rdquo; Having put to death a citizen of Lucca who had been\r\ninstrumental in raising him to power, and being told that he had done\r\nwrong to kill one of his old friends, he answered that people deceived\r\nthemselves; he had only killed a new enemy. Castruccio praised greatly\r\nthose men who intended to take a wife and then did not do so, saying that\r\nthey were like men who said they would go to sea, and then refused when\r\nthe time came. He said that it always struck him with surprise that whilst\r\nmen in buying an earthen or glass vase would sound it first to learn if it\r\nwere good, yet in choosing a wife they were content with only looking at\r\nher. He was once asked in what manner he would wish to be buried when he\r\ndied, and answered: \u0026ldquo;With the face turned downwards, for I know when I am\r\ngone this country will be turned upside down.\u0026rdquo; On being asked if it had\r\never occurred to him to become a friar in order to save his soul, he\r\nanswered that it had not, because it appeared strange to him that Fra\r\nLazerone should go to Paradise and Uguccione della Faggiuola to the\r\nInferno. He was once asked when should a man eat to preserve his health,\r\nand replied: \u0026ldquo;If the man be rich let him eat when he is hungry; if he be\r\npoor, then when he can.\u0026rdquo; Seeing one of his gentlemen make a member of his\r\nfamily lace him up, he said to him: \u0026ldquo;I pray God that you will let him feed\r\nyou also.\u0026rdquo; Seeing that someone had written upon his house in Latin the\r\nwords: \u0026ldquo;May God preserve this house from the wicked,\u0026rdquo; he said, \u0026ldquo;The owner\r\nmust never go in.\u0026rdquo; Passing through one of the streets he saw a small house\r\nwith a very large door, and remarked: \u0026ldquo;That house will fly through the\r\ndoor.\u0026rdquo; He was having a discussion with the ambassador of the King of\r\nNaples concerning the property of some banished nobles, when a dispute\r\narose between them, and the ambassador asked him if he had no fear of the\r\nking. \u0026ldquo;Is this king of yours a bad man or a good one?\u0026rdquo; asked Castruccio,\r\nand was told that he was a good one, whereupon he said, \u0026ldquo;Why should you\r\nsuggest that I should be afraid of a good man?\u0026rdquo;\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003cp\u003e\r\nI could recount many other stories of his sayings both witty and weighty,\r\nbut I think that the above will be sufficient testimony to his high\r\nqualities. He lived forty-four years, and was in every way a prince. And\r\nas he was surrounded by many evidences of his good fortune, so he also\r\ndesired to have near him some memorials of his bad fortune; therefore the\r\nmanacles with which he was chained in prison are to be seen to this day\r\nfixed up in the tower of his residence, where they were placed by him to\r\ntestify forever to his days of adversity. As in his life he was inferior\r\nneither to Philip of Macedon, the father of Alexander, nor to Scipio of\r\nRome, so he died in the same year of his age as they did, and he would\r\ndoubtless have excelled both of them had Fortune decreed that he should be\r\nborn, not in Lucca, but in Macedonia or Rome.\r\n\u003c/p\u003e\r\n\r\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003c!–end chapter–\u003e\r\n\u003c/article\u003e"}],"SectionSequence":["Back Link","Work Title","Deck","Author","Period","Era","Composition","Date Note","Region","Terra Avita","Terra Avita Region","Modern Country","Original Title","Language","Primary Discipline","Secondary Discipline","Tradition","Full Versions","Core Thesis","Classification","Arguments","Influence","Significance","Evidence Note","Full Text"],"Counts":{"ContextCards":3,"GeoCards":4,"DisciplineCards":2,"Links":11,"Sections":25,"Styles":3,"Scripts":1}}