Euthydemus
{"WorkMasterId":7123,"WpPageId":287658,"ParentWpPageId":189509,"Slug":"euthydemus","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/plato/euthydemus/","RelativeUrl":"theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/plato/euthydemus/","HasFullText":true,"RawHtmlLength":209211,"CleanHtmlLength":153101,"Kicker":"Philosophy Work","Title":"Euthydemus","Deck":"Euthydemus contrasts eristic display with philosophical education and exposes fallacious reasoning.","BackLink":{"Text":"Back to Plato","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/plato/"},"AuthorCard":{"Label":"Author","Title":"Plato","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/plato/","MediaHref":"","ImageSrc":"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/plato-01-capitoline-bust-7.jpg","ImageAlt":"Plato bust in the Capitoline Museums","FilterTerra":"Eastern Mediterranean","ClickText":"Plato","ClickHref":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/plato/","Copies":["427 BCE – 347 BCE","Athens","Athenian philosopher of Forms, dialectic, recollection, the Good, tripartite soul, philosopher-rule, eros, rhetoric, language, cosmology, theology, the Academy, and the Platonic corpus."]},"ContextCards":[{"Label":"Period","Key":"Period:1","Title":"Ancient History","DateText":"3000 BCE – 499 CE","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/eras-of-thought/philosophers-of-ancient-history/"},{"Label":"Era","Key":"Era:3","Title":"Classical Antiquity","DateText":"500 BCE – 499 CE","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/eras-of-thought/philosophers-of-ancient-history/philosophers-of-classical-antiquity/"},{"Label":"Composition","Title":"387 BCE","Url":"","DateText":""}],"DateNote":"Source-backed approximate date.","GeoCards":[{"Label":"Region","Key":"Region:1"},{"Label":"Terra Avita","Key":"TerraAvita:2"},{"Label":"Terra Avita Region","Key":"TerraAvitaRegion:8"},{"Label":"Modern Country","Key":"Country:GRC:2"}],"OriginalTitle":"Euthydemos","Language":"Ancient Greek","DisciplineCards":[{"Label":"Primary Discipline","Key":"Discipline:logic"},{"Label":"Secondary Discipline","Key":"Discipline:rhetoric"}],"Tradition":"Platonism / Ancient Greek philosophy","FullText":{"Title":"Full Text","Copy":"Public-domain full text from Project Gutenberg eBook #1598 .","Url":"","Label":"","Kicker":"","Cards":[]},"CoreThesis":["Euthydemus contrasts eristic display with philosophical education and exposes fallacious reasoning."],"Classification":{"AlternateTitles":"Euthydemus","KeyConcepts":"Euthydemus","Methodology":"Source-backed Direct work entry.","Structure":"Direct Platonic corpus entry"},"Arguments":["Euthydemus contrasts eristic display with philosophical education and exposes fallacious reasoning."],"Influence":{"InfluencedBy":"","InfluenceOn":""},"Significance":["Direct Platonic dialogue; date is approximate and no full text is imported.","Euthydemus is registered as a source-backed work in the Platonic corpus. The page records dating and authenticity caveats where needed; no full text is imported."],"EvidenceNote":["Direct Platonic dialogue; date is approximate and no full text is imported."],"MainSections":[{"Kind":"RawSection","Title":"Full Versions","BodyHtml":"\u003cdiv class=\"dz-philo__full-version-grid\"\u003e\n \u003carticle class=\"dz-philo__full-version-card\"\u003e\n \u003cp class=\"dz-philo__full-version-provider\"\u003eProject Gutenberg\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003ch3 class=\"dz-philo__full-version-title\"\u003eProject Gutenberg eBook #1598\u003c/h3\u003e\n \u003cp class=\"dz-philo__full-version-meta\"\u003eHtmlText · Imported\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003ca class=\"dz-philo__full-version-link\" href=\"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/1598\"\u003eOpen full version\u003c/a\u003e\n \u003c/article\u003e\n \u003c/div\u003e"},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Core Thesis","Paragraphs":["Euthydemus contrasts eristic display with philosophical education and exposes fallacious reasoning."]},{"Kind":"FieldSection","Title":"Classification","Fields":[{"Label":"Alternate Titles","Value":"Euthydemus"},{"Label":"Key Concepts","Value":"Euthydemus"},{"Label":"Methodology","Value":"Source-backed Direct work entry."},{"Label":"Structure","Value":"Direct Platonic corpus entry"}]},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Arguments","Paragraphs":["Euthydemus contrasts eristic display with philosophical education and exposes fallacious reasoning."]},{"Kind":"FieldSection","Title":"Influence","Fields":[{"Label":"Influenced By","Value":""},{"Label":"Influence On","Value":""}]},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Significance","Paragraphs":["Direct Platonic dialogue; date is approximate and no full text is imported.","Euthydemus is registered as a source-backed work in the Platonic corpus. The page records dating and authenticity caveats where needed; no full text is imported."]},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Evidence Note","Paragraphs":["Direct Platonic dialogue; date is approximate and no full text is imported."]},{"Kind":"RawSection","Title":"Full Text","BodyHtml":"\u003cp class=\"dz-philo__section-copy dz-philo__full-text-source\"\u003ePublic-domain full text from \u003ca href=\"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/1598\"\u003eProject Gutenberg eBook #1598\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003carticle class=\"dz-philo__full-text-body\"\u003e\r\n\u003ch1\u003e\n EUTHYDEMUS\n \u003c/h1\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n \u003cbr /\u003e\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003ch2\u003e\n by Plato\n \u003c/h2\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n \u003cbr /\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003ch3\u003e\n Translated by Benjamin Jowett\n \u003c/h3\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n \u003cbr /\u003e \u003cbr /\u003e\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003chr /\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n \u003cbr /\u003e \u003cbr /\u003e\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003ch3\u003e\n Contents\n \u003c/h3\u003e\n \u003ctable summary=\"\" style=\"margin-right: auto; margin-left: auto\"\u003e\n \u003ctr\u003e\n \u003ctd\u003e\n \u003cp class=\"toc\"\u003e\n \u003ca href=\"#link2H_INTR\"\u003e INTRODUCTION. \u003c/a\u003e\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp class=\"toc\"\u003e\n \u003ca href=\"#link2H_4_0002\"\u003e EUTHYDEMUS \u003c/a\u003e\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003c/td\u003e\n \u003c/tr\u003e\n \u003c/table\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n \u003cbr /\u003e \u003cbr /\u003e\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003chr /\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n \u003cbr /\u003e \u003cbr /\u003e \u003ca name=\"link2H_INTR\" id=\"link2H_INTR\"\u003e\n \u003c!– H2 anchor –\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003ch2\u003e\n INTRODUCTION.\n \u003c/h2\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n The Euthydemus, though apt to be regarded by us only as an elaborate jest,\n has also a very serious purpose. It may fairly claim to be the oldest\n treatise on logic; for that science originates in the misunderstandings\n which necessarily accompany the first efforts of speculation. Several of\n the fallacies which are satirized in it reappear in the Sophistici Elenchi\n of Aristotle and are retained at the end of our manuals of logic. But if\n the order of history were followed, they should be placed not at the end\n but at the beginning of them; for they belong to the age in which the\n human mind was first making the attempt to distinguish thought from sense,\n and to separate the universal from the particular or individual. How to\n put together words or ideas, how to escape ambiguities in the meaning of\n terms or in the structure of propositions, how to resist the fixed\n impression of an \u0027eternal being\u0027 or \u0027perpetual flux,\u0027 how to distinguish\n between words and things\u0026mdash;these were problems not easy of solution in\n the infancy of philosophy. They presented the same kind of difficulty to\n the half-educated man which spelling or arithmetic do to the mind of a\n child. It was long before the new world of ideas which had been sought\n after with such passionate yearning was set in order and made ready for\n use. To us the fallacies which arise in the pre-Socratic philosophy are\n trivial and obsolete because we are no longer liable to fall into the\n errors which are expressed by them. The intellectual world has become\n better assured to us, and we are less likely to be imposed upon by\n illusions of words.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n The logic of Aristotle is for the most part latent in the dialogues of\n Plato. The nature of definition is explained not by rules but by examples\n in the Charmides, Lysis, Laches, Protagoras, Meno, Euthyphro, Theaetetus,\n Gorgias, Republic; the nature of division is likewise illustrated by\n examples in the Sophist and Statesman; a scheme of categories is found in\n the Philebus; the true doctrine of contradiction is taught, and the\n fallacy of arguing in a circle is exposed in the Republic; the nature of\n synthesis and analysis is graphically described in the Phaedrus; the\n nature of words is analysed in the Cratylus; the form of the syllogism is\n indicated in the genealogical trees of the Sophist and Statesman; a true\n doctrine of predication and an analysis of the sentence are given in the\n Sophist; the different meanings of one and being are worked out in the\n Parmenides. Here we have most of the important elements of logic, not yet\n systematized or reduced to an art or science, but scattered up and down as\n they would naturally occur in ordinary discourse. They are of little or no\n use or significance to us; but because we have grown out of the need of\n them we should not therefore despise them. They are still interesting and\n instructive for the light which they shed on the history of the human\n mind.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n There are indeed many old fallacies which linger among us, and new ones\n are constantly springing up. But they are not of the kind to which ancient\n logic can be usefully applied. The weapons of common sense, not the\n analytics of Aristotle, are needed for their overthrow. Nor is the use of\n the Aristotelian logic any longer natural to us. We no longer put\n arguments into the form of syllogisms like the schoolmen; the simple use\n of language has been, happily, restored to us. Neither do we discuss the\n nature of the proposition, nor extract hidden truths from the copula, nor\n dispute any longer about nominalism and realism. We do not confuse the\n form with the matter of knowledge, or invent laws of thought, or imagine\n that any single science furnishes a principle of reasoning to all the\n rest. Neither do we require categories or heads of argument to be invented\n for our use. Those who have no knowledge of logic, like some of our great\n physical philosophers, seem to be quite as good reasoners as those who\n have. Most of the ancient puzzles have been settled on the basis of usage\n and common sense; there is no need to reopen them. No science should raise\n problems or invent forms of thought which add nothing to knowledge and are\n of no use in assisting the acquisition of it. This seems to be the natural\n limit of logic and metaphysics; if they give us a more comprehensive or a\n more definite view of the different spheres of knowledge they are to be\n studied; if not, not. The better part of ancient logic appears hardly in\n our own day to have a separate existence; it is absorbed in two other\n sciences: (1) rhetoric, if indeed this ancient art be not also fading away\n into literary criticism; (2) the science of language, under which all\n questions relating to words and propositions and the combinations of them\n may properly be included.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n To continue dead or imaginary sciences, which make no signs of progress\n and have no definite sphere, tends to interfere with the prosecution of\n living ones. The study of them is apt to blind the judgment and to render\n men incapable of seeing the value of evidence, and even of appreciating\n the nature of truth. Nor should we allow the living science to become\n confused with the dead by an ambiguity of language. The term logic has two\n different meanings, an ancient and a modern one, and we vainly try to\n bridge the gulf between them. Many perplexities are avoided by keeping\n them apart. There might certainly be a new science of logic; it would not\n however be built up out of the fragments of the old, but would be distinct\n from them\u0026mdash;relative to the state of knowledge which exists at the\n present time, and based chiefly on the methods of Modern Inductive\n philosophy. Such a science might have two legitimate fields: first, the\n refutation and explanation of false philosophies still hovering in the air\n as they appear from the point of view of later experience or are\n comprehended in the history of the human mind, as in a larger horizon:\n secondly, it might furnish new forms of thought more adequate to the\n expression of all the diversities and oppositions of knowledge which have\n grown up in these latter days; it might also suggest new methods of\n enquiry derived from the comparison of the sciences. Few will deny that\n the introduction of the words \u0027subject\u0027 and \u0027object\u0027 and the Hegelian\n reconciliation of opposites have been \u0027most gracious aids\u0027 to psychology,\n or that the methods of Bacon and Mill have shed a light far and wide on\n the realms of knowledge. These two great studies, the one destructive and\n corrective of error, the other conservative and constructive of truth,\n might be a first and second part of logic. Ancient logic would be the\n propaedeutic or gate of approach to logical science,\u0026mdash;nothing more.\n But to pursue such speculations further, though not irrelevant, might lead\n us too far away from the argument of the dialogue.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n The Euthydemus is, of all the Dialogues of Plato, that in which he\n approaches most nearly to the comic poet. The mirth is broader, the irony\n more sustained, the contrast between Socrates and the two Sophists,\n although veiled, penetrates deeper than in any other of his writings. Even\n Thrasymachus, in the Republic, is at last pacified, and becomes a friendly\n and interested auditor of the great discourse. But in the Euthydemus the\n mask is never dropped; the accustomed irony of Socrates continues to the\n end…\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Socrates narrates to Crito a remarkable scene in which he has himself\n taken part, and in which the two brothers, Dionysodorus and Euthydemus,\n are the chief performers. They are natives of Chios, who had settled at\n Thurii, but were driven out, and in former days had been known at Athens\n as professors of rhetoric and of the art of fighting in armour. To this\n they have now added a new accomplishment\u0026mdash;the art of Eristic, or\n fighting with words, which they are likewise willing to teach \u0027for a\n consideration.\u0027 But they can also teach virtue in a very short time and in\n the very best manner. Socrates, who is always on the look-out for teachers\n of virtue, is interested in the youth Cleinias, the grandson of the great\n Alcibiades, and is desirous that he should have the benefit of their\n instructions. He is ready to fall down and worship them; although the\n greatness of their professions does arouse in his mind a temporary\n incredulity.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n A circle gathers round them, in the midst of which are Socrates, the two\n brothers, the youth Cleinias, who is watched by the eager eyes of his\n lover Ctesippus, and others. The performance begins; and such a\n performance as might well seem to require an invocation of Memory and the\n Muses. It is agreed that the brothers shall question Cleinias. \u0027Cleinias,\u0027\n says Euthydemus, \u0027who learn, the wise or the unwise?\u0027 \u0027The wise,\u0027 is the\n reply; given with blushing and hesitation. \u0027And yet when you learned you\n did not know and were not wise.\u0027 Then Dionysodorus takes up the ball: \u0027Who\n are they who learn dictation of the grammar-master; the wise or the\n foolish boys?\u0027 \u0027The wise.\u0027 \u0027Then, after all, the wise learn.\u0027 \u0027And do they\n learn,\u0027 said Euthydemus, \u0027what they know or what they do not know?\u0027 \u0027The\n latter.\u0027 \u0027And dictation is a dictation of letters?\u0027 \u0027Yes.\u0027 \u0027And you know\n letters?\u0027 \u0027Yes.\u0027 \u0027Then you learn what you know.\u0027 \u0027But,\u0027 retorts\n Dionysodorus, \u0027is not learning acquiring knowledge?\u0027 \u0027Yes.\u0027 \u0027And you\n acquire that which you have not got already?\u0027 \u0027Yes.\u0027 \u0027Then you learn that\n which you do not know.\u0027\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Socrates is afraid that the youth Cleinias may be discouraged at these\n repeated overthrows. He therefore explains to him the nature of the\n process to which he is being subjected. The two strangers are not serious;\n there are jests at the mysteries which precede the enthronement, and he is\n being initiated into the mysteries of the sophistical ritual. This is all\n a sort of horse-play, which is now ended. The exhortation to virtue will\n follow, and Socrates himself (if the wise men will not laugh at him) is\n desirous of showing the way in which such an exhortation should be carried\n on, according to his own poor notion. He proceeds to question Cleinias.\n The result of the investigation may be summed up as follows:\u0026mdash;\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n All men desire good; and good means the possession of goods, such as\n wealth, health, beauty, birth, power, honour; not forgetting the virtues\n and wisdom. And yet in this enumeration the greatest good of all is\n omitted. What is that? Good fortune. But what need is there of good\n fortune when we have wisdom already:\u0026mdash;in every art and business are\n not the wise also the fortunate? This is admitted. And again, the\n possession of goods is not enough; there must also be a right use of them\n which can only be given by knowledge: in themselves they are neither good\n nor evil\u0026mdash;knowledge and wisdom are the only good, and ignorance and\n folly the only evil. The conclusion is that we must get \u0027wisdom.\u0027 But can\n wisdom be taught? \u0027Yes,\u0027 says Cleinias. The ingenuousness of the youth\n delights Socrates, who is at once relieved from the necessity of\n discussing one of his great puzzles. \u0027Since wisdom is the only good, he\n must become a philosopher, or lover of wisdom.\u0027 \u0027That I will,\u0027 says\n Cleinias.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n After Socrates has given this specimen of his own mode of instruction, the\n two brothers recommence their exhortation to virtue, which is of quite\n another sort.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n \u0027You want Cleinias to be wise?\u0027 \u0027Yes.\u0027 \u0027And he is not wise yet?\u0027 \u0027No.\u0027\n \u0027Then you want him to be what he is not, and not to be what he is?\u0026mdash;not\n to be\u0026mdash;that is, to perish. Pretty lovers and friends you must all\n be!\u0027\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Here Ctesippus, the lover of Cleinias, interposes in great excitement,\n thinking that he will teach the two Sophists a lesson of good manners. But\n he is quickly entangled in the meshes of their sophistry; and as a storm\n seems to be gathering Socrates pacifies him with a joke, and Ctesippus\n then says that he is not reviling the two Sophists, he is only\n contradicting them. \u0027But,\u0027 says Dionysodorus, \u0027there is no such thing as\n contradiction. When you and I describe the same thing, or you describe one\n thing and I describe another, how can there be a contradiction?\u0027 Ctesippus\n is unable to reply.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Socrates has already heard of the denial of contradiction, and would like\n to be informed by the great master of the art, \u0027What is the meaning of\n this paradox? Is there no such thing as error, ignorance, falsehood? Then\n what are they professing to teach?\u0027 The two Sophists complain that\n Socrates is ready to answer what they said a year ago, but is\n \u0027non-plussed\u0027 at what they are saying now. \u0027What does the word\n \"non-plussed\" mean?\u0027 Socrates is informed, in reply, that words are\n lifeless things, and lifeless things have no sense or meaning. Ctesippus\n again breaks out, and again has to be pacified by Socrates, who renews the\n conversation with Cleinias. The two Sophists are like Proteus in the\n variety of their transformations, and he, like Menelaus in the Odyssey,\n hopes to restore them to their natural form.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n He had arrived at the conclusion that Cleinias must become a philosopher.\n And philosophy is the possession of knowledge; and knowledge must be of a\n kind which is profitable and may be used. What knowledge is there which\n has such a nature? Not the knowledge which is required in any particular\n art; nor again the art of the composer of speeches, who knows how to write\n them, but cannot speak them, although he too must be admitted to be a kind\n of enchanter of wild animals. Neither is the knowledge which we are\n seeking the knowledge of the general. For the general makes over his prey\n to the statesman, as the huntsman does to the cook, or the taker of quails\n to the keeper of quails; he has not the use of that which he acquires. The\n two enquirers, Cleinias and Socrates, are described as wandering about in\n a wilderness, vainly searching after the art of life and happiness. At\n last they fix upon the kingly art, as having the desired sort of\n knowledge. But the kingly art only gives men those goods which are neither\n good nor evil: and if we say further that it makes us wise, in what does\n it make us wise? Not in special arts, such as cobbling or carpentering,\n but only in itself: or say again that it makes us good, there is no answer\n to the question, \u0027good in what?\u0027 At length in despair Cleinias and\n Socrates turn to the \u0027Dioscuri\u0027 and request their aid.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Euthydemus argues that Socrates knows something; and as he cannot know and\n not know, he cannot know some things and not know others, and therefore he\n knows all things: he and Dionysodorus and all other men know all things.\n \u0027Do they know shoemaking, etc?\u0027 \u0027Yes.\u0027 The sceptical Ctesippus would like\n to have some evidence of this extraordinary statement: he will believe if\n Euthydemus will tell him how many teeth Dionysodorus has, and if\n Dionysodorus will give him a like piece of information about Euthydemus.\n Even Socrates is incredulous, and indulges in a little raillery at the\n expense of the brothers. But he restrains himself, remembering that if the\n men who are to be his teachers think him stupid they will take no pains\n with him. Another fallacy is produced which turns on the absoluteness of\n the verb \u0027to know.\u0027 And here Dionysodorus is caught \u0027napping,\u0027 and is\n induced by Socrates to confess that \u0027he does not know the good to be\n unjust.\u0027 Socrates appeals to his brother Euthydemus; at the same time he\n acknowledges that he cannot, like Heracles, fight against a Hydra, and\n even Heracles, on the approach of a second monster, called upon his nephew\n Iolaus to help. Dionysodorus rejoins that Iolaus was no more the nephew of\n Heracles than of Socrates. For a nephew is a nephew, and a brother is a\n brother, and a father is a father, not of one man only, but of all; nor of\n men only, but of dogs and sea-monsters. Ctesippus makes merry with the\n consequences which follow: \u0027Much good has your father got out of the\n wisdom of his puppies.\u0027\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n \u0027But,\u0027 says Euthydemus, unabashed, \u0027nobody wants much good.\u0027 Medicine is a\n good, arms are a good, money is a good, and yet there may be too much of\n them in wrong places. \u0027No,\u0027 says Ctesippus, \u0027there cannot be too much\n gold.\u0027 And would you be happy if you had three talents of gold in your\n belly, a talent in your pate, and a stater in either eye?\u0027 Ctesippus,\n imitating the new wisdom, replies, \u0027And do not the Scythians reckon those\n to be the happiest of men who have their skulls gilded and see the inside\n of them?\u0027 \u0027Do you see,\u0027 retorts Euthydemus, \u0027what has the quality of\n vision or what has not the quality of vision?\u0027 \u0027What has the quality of\n vision.\u0027 \u0027And you see our garments?\u0027 \u0027Yes.\u0027 \u0027Then our garments have the\n quality of vision.\u0027 A similar play of words follows, which is successfully\n retorted by Ctesippus, to the great delight of Cleinias, who is rebuked by\n Socrates for laughing at such solemn and beautiful things.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n \u0027But are there any beautiful things? And if there are such, are they the\n same or not the same as absolute beauty?\u0027 Socrates replies that they are\n not the same, but each of them has some beauty present with it. \u0027And are\n you an ox because you have an ox present with you?\u0027 After a few more\n amphiboliae, in which Socrates, like Ctesippus, in self-defence borrows\n the weapons of the brothers, they both confess that the two heroes are\n invincible; and the scene concludes with a grand chorus of shouting and\n laughing, and a panegyrical oration from Socrates:\u0026mdash;\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n First, he praises the indifference of Dionysodorus and Euthydemus to\n public opinion; for most persons would rather be refuted by such arguments\n than use them in the refutation of others. Secondly, he remarks upon their\n impartiality; for they stop their own mouths, as well as those of other\n people. Thirdly, he notes their liberality, which makes them give away\n their secret to all the world: they should be more reserved, and let no\n one be present at this exhibition who does not pay them a handsome fee; or\n better still they might practise on one another only. He concludes with a\n respectful request that they will receive him and Cleinias among their\n disciples.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Crito tells Socrates that he has heard one of the audience criticise\n severely this wisdom,\u0026mdash;not sparing Socrates himself for countenancing\n such an exhibition. Socrates asks what manner of man was this censorious\n critic. \u0027Not an orator, but a great composer of speeches.\u0027 Socrates\n understands that he is an amphibious animal, half philosopher, half\n politician; one of a class who have the highest opinion of themselves and\n a spite against philosophers, whom they imagine to be their rivals. They\n are a class who are very likely to get mauled by Euthydemus and his\n friends, and have a great notion of their own wisdom; for they imagine\n themselves to have all the advantages and none of the drawbacks both of\n politics and of philosophy. They do not understand the principles of\n combination, and hence are ignorant that the union of two good things\n which have different ends produces a compound inferior to either of them\n taken separately.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Crito is anxious about the education of his children, one of whom is\n growing up. The description of Dionysodorus and Euthydemus suggests to him\n the reflection that the professors of education are strange beings.\n Socrates consoles him with the remark that the good in all professions are\n few, and recommends that \u0027he and his house\u0027 should continue to serve\n philosophy, and not mind about its professors.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n …\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n There is a stage in the history of philosophy in which the old is dying\n out, and the new has not yet come into full life. Great philosophies like\n the Eleatic or Heraclitean, which have enlarged the boundaries of the\n human mind, begin to pass away in words. They subsist only as forms which\n have rooted themselves in language\u0026mdash;as troublesome elements of\n thought which cannot be either used or explained away. The same\n absoluteness which was once attributed to abstractions is now attached to\n the words which are the signs of them. The philosophy which in the first\n and second generation was a great and inspiring effort of reflection, in\n the third becomes sophistical, verbal, eristic.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n It is this stage of philosophy which Plato satirises in the Euthydemus.\n The fallacies which are noted by him appear trifling to us now, but they\n were not trifling in the age before logic, in the decline of the earlier\n Greek philosophies, at a time when language was first beginning to perplex\n human thought. Besides he is caricaturing them; they probably received\n more subtle forms at the hands of those who seriously maintained them.\n They are patent to us in Plato, and we are inclined to wonder how any one\n could ever have been deceived by them; but we must remember also that\n there was a time when the human mind was only with great difficulty\n disentangled from such fallacies.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n To appreciate fully the drift of the Euthydemus, we should imagine a\n mental state in which not individuals only, but whole schools during more\n than one generation, were animated by the desire to exclude the conception\n of rest, and therefore the very word \u0027this\u0027 (Theaet.) from language; in\n which the ideas of space, time, matter, motion, were proved to be\n contradictory and imaginary; in which the nature of qualitative change was\n a puzzle, and even differences of degree, when applied to abstract\n notions, were not understood; in which there was no analysis of grammar,\n and mere puns or plays of words received serious attention; in which\n contradiction itself was denied, and, on the one hand, every predicate was\n affirmed to be true of every subject, and on the other, it was held that\n no predicate was true of any subject, and that nothing was, or was known,\n or could be spoken. Let us imagine disputes carried on with religious\n earnestness and more than scholastic subtlety, in which the catchwords of\n philosophy are completely detached from their context. (Compare Theaet.)\n To such disputes the humour, whether of Plato in the ancient, or of Pope\n and Swift in the modern world, is the natural enemy. Nor must we forget\n that in modern times also there is no fallacy so gross, no trick of\n language so transparent, no abstraction so barren and unmeaning, no form\n of thought so contradictory to experience, which has not been found to\n satisfy the minds of philosophical enquirers at a certain stage, or when\n regarded from a certain point of view only. The peculiarity of the\n fallacies of our own age is that we live within them, and are therefore\n generally unconscious of them.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Aristotle has analysed several of the same fallacies in his book \u0027De\n Sophisticis Elenchis,\u0027 which Plato, with equal command of their true\n nature, has preferred to bring to the test of ridicule. At first we are\n only struck with the broad humour of this \u0027reductio ad absurdum:\u0027\n gradually we perceive that some important questions begin to emerge. Here,\n as everywhere else, Plato is making war against the philosophers who put\n words in the place of things, who tear arguments to tatters, who deny\n predication, and thus make knowledge impossible, to whom ideas and objects\n of sense have no fixedness, but are in a state of perpetual oscillation\n and transition. Two great truths seem to be indirectly taught through\n these fallacies: (1) The uncertainty of language, which allows the same\n words to be used in different meanings, or with different degrees of\n meaning: (2) The necessary limitation or relative nature of all phenomena.\n Plato is aware that his own doctrine of ideas, as well as the Eleatic\n Being and Not-being, alike admit of being regarded as verbal fallacies.\n The sophism advanced in the Meno, \u0027that you cannot enquire either into\n what you know or do not know,\u0027 is lightly touched upon at the commencement\n of the Dialogue; the thesis of Protagoras, that everything is true to him\n to whom it seems to be true, is satirized. In contrast with these\n fallacies is maintained the Socratic doctrine that happiness is gained by\n knowledge. The grammatical puzzles with which the Dialogue concludes\n probably contain allusions to tricks of language which may have been\n practised by the disciples of Prodicus or Antisthenes. They would have had\n more point, if we were acquainted with the writings against which Plato\u0027s\n humour is directed. Most of the jests appear to have a serious meaning;\n but we have lost the clue to some of them, and cannot determine whether,\n as in the Cratylus, Plato has or has not mixed up purely unmeaning fun\n with his satire.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n The two discourses of Socrates may be contrasted in several respects with\n the exhibition of the Sophists: (1) In their perfect relevancy to the\n subject of discussion, whereas the Sophistical discourses are wholly\n irrelevant: (2) In their enquiring sympathetic tone, which encourages the\n youth, instead of \u0027knocking him down,\u0027 after the manner of the two\n Sophists: (3) In the absence of any definite conclusion\u0026mdash;for while\n Socrates and the youth are agreed that philosophy is to be studied, they\n are not able to arrive at any certain result about the art which is to\n teach it. This is a question which will hereafter be answered in the\n Republic; as the conception of the kingly art is more fully developed in\n the Politicus, and the caricature of rhetoric in the Gorgias.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n The characters of the Dialogue are easily intelligible. There is Socrates\n once more in the character of an old man; and his equal in years, Crito,\n the father of Critobulus, like Lysimachus in the Laches, his fellow\n demesman (Apol.), to whom the scene is narrated, and who once or twice\n interrupts with a remark after the manner of the interlocutor in the\n Phaedo, and adds his commentary at the end; Socrates makes a playful\n allusion to his money-getting habits. There is the youth Cleinias, the\n grandson of Alcibiades, who may be compared with Lysis, Charmides,\n Menexenus, and other ingenuous youths out of whose mouths Socrates draws\n his own lessons, and to whom he always seems to stand in a kindly and\n sympathetic relation. Crito will not believe that Socrates has not\n improved or perhaps invented the answers of Cleinias (compare Phaedrus).\n The name of the grandson of Alcibiades, who is described as long dead,\n (Greek), and who died at the age of forty-four, in the year 404 B.C.,\n suggests not only that the intended scene of the Euthydemus could not have\n been earlier than 404, but that as a fact this Dialogue could not have\n been composed before 390 at the soonest. Ctesippus, who is the lover of\n Cleinias, has been already introduced to us in the Lysis, and seems there\n too to deserve the character which is here given him, of a somewhat\n uproarious young man. But the chief study of all is the picture of the two\n brothers, who are unapproachable in their effrontery, equally careless of\n what they say to others and of what is said to them, and never at a loss.\n They are \u0027Arcades ambo et cantare pares et respondere parati.\u0027 Some\n superior degree of wit or subtlety is attributed to Euthydemus, who sees\n the trap in which Socrates catches Dionysodorus.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n The epilogue or conclusion of the Dialogue has been criticised as\n inconsistent with the general scheme. Such a criticism is like similar\n criticisms on Shakespeare, and proceeds upon a narrow notion of the\n variety which the Dialogue, like the drama, seems to admit. Plato in the\n abundance of his dramatic power has chosen to write a play upon a play,\n just as he often gives us an argument within an argument. At the same time\n he takes the opportunity of assailing another class of persons who are as\n alien from the spirit of philosophy as Euthydemus and Dionysodorus. The\n Eclectic, the Syncretist, the Doctrinaire, have been apt to have a bad\n name both in ancient and modern times. The persons whom Plato ridicules in\n the epilogue to the Euthydemus are of this class. They occupy a\n border-ground between philosophy and politics; they keep out of the\n dangers of politics, and at the same time use philosophy as a means of\n serving their own interests. Plato quaintly describes them as making two\n good things, philosophy and politics, a little worse by perverting the\n objects of both. Men like Antiphon or Lysias would be types of the class.\n Out of a regard to the respectabilities of life, they are disposed to\n censure the interest which Socrates takes in the exhibition of the two\n brothers. They do not understand, any more than Crito, that he is pursuing\n his vocation of detecting the follies of mankind, which he finds \u0027not\n unpleasant.\u0027 (Compare Apol.)\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Education is the common subject of all Plato\u0027s earlier Dialogues. The\n concluding remark of Crito, that he has a difficulty in educating his two\n sons, and the advice of Socrates to him that he should not give up\n philosophy because he has no faith in philosophers, seems to be a\n preparation for the more peremptory declaration of the Meno that \u0027Virtue\n cannot be taught because there are no teachers.\u0027\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n The reasons for placing the Euthydemus early in the series are: (1) the\n similarity in plan and style to the Protagoras, Charmides, and Lysis;\u0026mdash;the\n relation of Socrates to the Sophists is still that of humorous antagonism,\n not, as in the later Dialogues of Plato, of embittered hatred; and the\n places and persons have a considerable family likeness; (2) the Euthydemus\n belongs to the Socratic period in which Socrates is represented as willing\n to learn, but unable to teach; and in the spirit of Xenophon\u0027s\n Memorabilia, philosophy is defined as \u0027the knowledge which will make us\n happy;\u0027 (3) we seem to have passed the stage arrived at in the Protagoras,\n for Socrates is no longer discussing whether virtue can be taught\u0026mdash;from\n this question he is relieved by the ingenuous declaration of the youth\n Cleinias; and (4) not yet to have reached the point at which he asserts\n \u0027that there are no teachers.\u0027 Such grounds are precarious, as arguments\n from style and plan are apt to be (Greek). But no arguments equally strong\n can be urged in favour of assigning to the Euthydemus any other position\n in the series.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n \u003ca name=\"link2H_4_0002\" id=\"link2H_4_0002\"\u003e\n \u003c!– H2 anchor –\u003e \u003c/a\u003e\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cdiv style=\"height: 4em;\"\u003e\n \u003cbr /\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\n \u003c/div\u003e\n \u003ch2\u003e\n EUTHYDEMUS\n \u003c/h2\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: Socrates, who is the narrator of the Dialogue.\n Crito, Cleinias, Euthydemus, Dionysodorus, Ctesippus.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n SCENE: The Lyceum.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n CRITO: Who was the person, Socrates, with whom you were talking yesterday\n at the Lyceum? There was such a crowd around you that I could not get\n within hearing, but I caught a sight of him over their heads, and I made\n out, as I thought, that he was a stranger with whom you were talking: who\n was he?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n SOCRATES: There were two, Crito; which of them do you mean?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n CRITO: The one whom I mean was seated second from you on the right-hand\n side. In the middle was Cleinias the young son of Axiochus, who has\n wonderfully grown; he is only about the age of my own Critobulus, but he\n is much forwarder and very good-looking: the other is thin and looks\n younger than he is.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n SOCRATES: He whom you mean, Crito, is Euthydemus; and on my left hand\n there was his brother Dionysodorus, who also took part in the\n conversation.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n CRITO: Neither of them are known to me, Socrates; they are a new\n importation of Sophists, as I should imagine. Of what country are they,\n and what is their line of wisdom?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n SOCRATES: As to their origin, I believe that they are natives of this part\n of the world, and have migrated from Chios to Thurii; they were driven out\n of Thurii, and have been living for many years past in these regions. As\n to their wisdom, about which you ask, Crito, they are wonderful\u0026mdash;consummate!\n I never knew what the true pancratiast was before; they are simply made up\n of fighting, not like the two Acarnanian brothers who fight with their\n bodies only, but this pair of heroes, besides being perfect in the use of\n their bodies, are invincible in every sort of warfare; for they are\n capital at fighting in armour, and will teach the art to any one who pays\n them; and also they are most skilful in legal warfare; they will plead\n themselves and teach others to speak and to compose speeches which will\n have an effect upon the courts. And this was only the beginning of their\n wisdom, but they have at last carried out the pancratiastic art to the\n very end, and have mastered the only mode of fighting which had been\n hitherto neglected by them; and now no one dares even to stand up against\n them: such is their skill in the war of words, that they can refute any\n proposition whether true or false. Now I am thinking, Crito, of placing\n myself in their hands; for they say that in a short time they can impart\n their skill to any one.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n CRITO: But, Socrates, are you not too old? there may be reason to fear\n that.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n SOCRATES: Certainly not, Crito; as I will prove to you, for I have the\n consolation of knowing that they began this art of disputation which I\n covet, quite, as I may say, in old age; last year, or the year before,\n they had none of their new wisdom. I am only apprehensive that I may bring\n the two strangers into disrepute, as I have done Connus the son of\n Metrobius, the harp-player, who is still my music-master; for when the\n boys who go to him see me going with them, they laugh at me and call him\n grandpapa\u0027s master. Now I should not like the strangers to experience\n similar treatment; the fear of ridicule may make them unwilling to receive\n me; and therefore, Crito, I shall try and persuade some old men to\n accompany me to them, as I persuaded them to go with me to Connus, and I\n hope that you will make one: and perhaps we had better take your sons as a\n bait; they will want to have them as pupils, and for the sake of them\n willing to receive us.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n CRITO: I see no objection, Socrates, if you like; but first I wish that\n you would give me a description of their wisdom, that I may know\n beforehand what we are going to learn.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n SOCRATES: In less than no time you shall hear; for I cannot say that I did\n not attend\u0026mdash;I paid great attention to them, and I remember and will\n endeavour to repeat the whole story. Providentially I was sitting alone in\n the dressing-room of the Lyceum where you saw me, and was about to depart;\n when I was getting up I recognized the familiar divine sign: so I sat down\n again, and in a little while the two brothers Euthydemus and Dionysodorus\n came in, and several others with them, whom I believe to be their\n disciples, and they walked about in the covered court; they had not taken\n more than two or three turns when Cleinias entered, who, as you truly say,\n is very much improved: he was followed by a host of lovers, one of whom\n was Ctesippus the Paeanian, a well-bred youth, but also having the\n wildness of youth. Cleinias saw me from the entrance as I was sitting\n alone, and at once came and sat down on the right hand of me, as you\n describe; and Dionysodorus and Euthydemus, when they saw him, at first\n stopped and talked with one another, now and then glancing at us, for I\n particularly watched them; and then Euthydemus came and sat down by the\n youth, and the other by me on the left hand; the rest anywhere. I saluted\n the brothers, whom I had not seen for a long time; and then I said to\n Cleinias: Here are two wise men, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, Cleinias,\n wise not in a small but in a large way of wisdom, for they know all about\n war,\u0026mdash;all that a good general ought to know about the array and\n command of an army, and the whole art of fighting in armour: and they know\n about law too, and can teach a man how to use the weapons of the courts\n when he is injured.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n They heard me say this, but only despised me. I observed that they looked\n at one another, and both of them laughed; and then Euthydemus said: Those,\n Socrates, are matters which we no longer pursue seriously; to us they are\n secondary occupations.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Indeed, I said, if such occupations are regarded by you as secondary, what\n must the principal one be; tell me, I beseech you, what that noble study\n is?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n The teaching of virtue, Socrates, he replied, is our principal occupation;\n and we believe that we can impart it better and quicker than any man.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n My God! I said, and where did you learn that? I always thought, as I was\n saying just now, that your chief accomplishment was the art of fighting in\n armour; and I used to say as much of you, for I remember that you\n professed this when you were here before. But now if you really have the\n other knowledge, O forgive me: I address you as I would superior beings,\n and ask you to pardon the impiety of my former expressions. But are you\n quite sure about this, Dionysodorus and Euthydemus? the promise is so\n vast, that a feeling of incredulity steals over me.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n You may take our word, Socrates, for the fact.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Then I think you happier in having such a treasure than the great king is\n in the possession of his kingdom. And please to tell me whether you intend\n to exhibit your wisdom; or what will you do?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n That is why we have come hither, Socrates; and our purpose is not only to\n exhibit, but also to teach any one who likes to learn.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n But I can promise you, I said, that every unvirtuous person will want to\n learn. I shall be the first; and there is the youth Cleinias, and\n Ctesippus: and here are several others, I said, pointing to the lovers of\n Cleinias, who were beginning to gather round us. Now Ctesippus was sitting\n at some distance from Cleinias; and when Euthydemus leaned forward in\n talking with me, he was prevented from seeing Cleinias, who was between\n us; and so, partly because he wanted to look at his love, and also because\n he was interested, he jumped up and stood opposite to us: and all the\n other admirers of Cleinias, as well as the disciples of Euthydemus and\n Dionysodorus, followed his example. And these were the persons whom I\n showed to Euthydemus, telling him that they were all eager to learn: to\n which Ctesippus and all of them with one voice vehemently assented, and\n bid him exhibit the power of his wisdom. Then I said: O Euthydemus and\n Dionysodorus, I earnestly request you to do myself and the company the\n favour to exhibit. There may be some trouble in giving the whole\n exhibition; but tell me one thing,\u0026mdash;can you make a good man of him\n only who is already convinced that he ought to learn of you, or of him\n also who is not convinced, either because he imagines that virtue is a\n thing which cannot be taught at all, or that you are not the teachers of\n it? Has your art power to persuade him, who is of the latter temper of\n mind, that virtue can be taught; and that you are the men from whom he\n will best learn it?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Certainly, Socrates, said Dionysodorus; our art will do both.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n And you and your brother, Dionysodorus, I said, of all men who are now\n living are the most likely to stimulate him to philosophy and to the study\n of virtue?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Yes, Socrates, I rather think that we are.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Then I wish that you would be so good as to defer the other part of the\n exhibition, and only try to persuade the youth whom you see here that he\n ought to be a philosopher and study virtue. Exhibit that, and you will\n confer a great favour on me and on every one present; for the fact is I\n and all of us are extremely anxious that he should become truly good. His\n name is Cleinias, and he is the son of Axiochus, and grandson of the old\n Alcibiades, cousin of the Alcibiades that now is. He is quite young, and\n we are naturally afraid that some one may get the start of us, and turn\n his mind in a wrong direction, and he may be ruined. Your visit,\n therefore, is most happily timed; and I hope that you will make a trial of\n the young man, and converse with him in our presence, if you have no\n objection.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n These were pretty nearly the expressions which I used; and Euthydemus, in\n a manly and at the same time encouraging tone, replied: There can be no\n objection, Socrates, if the young man is only willing to answer questions.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n He is quite accustomed to do so, I replied; for his friends often come and\n ask him questions and argue with him; and therefore he is quite at home in\n answering.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n What followed, Crito, how can I rightly narrate? For not slight is the\n task of rehearsing infinite wisdom, and therefore, like the poets, I ought\n to commence my relation with an invocation to Memory and the Muses. Now\n Euthydemus, if I remember rightly, began nearly as follows: O Cleinias,\n are those who learn the wise or the ignorant?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n The youth, overpowered by the question blushed, and in his perplexity\n looked at me for help; and I, knowing that he was disconcerted, said: Take\n courage, Cleinias, and answer like a man whichever you think; for my\n belief is that you will derive the greatest benefit from their questions.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Whichever he answers, said Dionysodorus, leaning forward so as to catch my\n ear, his face beaming with laughter, I prophesy that he will be refuted,\n Socrates.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n While he was speaking to me, Cleinias gave his answer: and therefore I had\n no time to warn him of the predicament in which he was placed, and he\n answered that those who learned were the wise.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Euthydemus proceeded: There are some whom you would call teachers, are\n there not?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n The boy assented.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n And they are the teachers of those who learn\u0026mdash;the grammar-master and\n the lyre-master used to teach you and other boys; and you were the\n learners?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Yes.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n And when you were learners you did not as yet know the things which you\n were learning?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n No, he said.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n And were you wise then?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n No, indeed, he said.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n But if you were not wise you were unlearned?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Certainly.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n You then, learning what you did not know, were unlearned when you were\n learning?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n The youth nodded assent.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Then the unlearned learn, and not the wise, Cleinias, as you imagine.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n At these words the followers of Euthydemus, of whom I spoke, like a chorus\n at the bidding of their director, laughed and cheered. Then, before the\n youth had time to recover his breath, Dionysodorus cleverly took him in\n hand, and said: Yes, Cleinias; and when the grammar-master dictated\n anything to you, were they the wise boys or the unlearned who learned the\n dictation?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n The wise, replied Cleinias.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Then after all the wise are the learners and not the unlearned; and your\n last answer to Euthydemus was wrong.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Then once more the admirers of the two heroes, in an ecstasy at their\n wisdom, gave vent to another peal of laughter, while the rest of us were\n silent and amazed. Euthydemus, observing this, determined to persevere\n with the youth; and in order to heighten the effect went on asking another\n similar question, which might be compared to the double turn of an expert\n dancer. Do those, said he, who learn, learn what they know, or what they\n do not know?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Again Dionysodorus whispered to me: That, Socrates, is just another of the\n same sort.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Good heavens, I said; and your last question was so good!\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Like all our other questions, Socrates, he replied\u0026mdash;inevitable.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n I see the reason, I said, why you are in such reputation among your\n disciples.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Meanwhile Cleinias had answered Euthydemus that those who learned learn\n what they do not know; and he put him through a series of questions the\n same as before.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Do you not know letters?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n He assented.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n All letters?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Yes.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n But when the teacher dictates to you, does he not dictate letters?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n To this also he assented.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Then if you know all letters, he dictates that which you know?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n This again was admitted by him.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Then, said the other, you do not learn that which he dictates; but he only\n who does not know letters learns?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Nay, said Cleinias; but I do learn.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Then, said he, you learn what you know, if you know all the letters?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n He admitted that.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Then, he said, you were wrong in your answer.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n The word was hardly out of his mouth when Dionysodorus took up the\n argument, like a ball which he caught, and had another throw at the youth.\n Cleinias, he said, Euthydemus is deceiving you. For tell me now, is not\n learning acquiring knowledge of that which one learns?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Cleinias assented.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n And knowing is having knowledge at the time?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n He agreed.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n And not knowing is not having knowledge at the time?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n He admitted that.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n And are those who acquire those who have or have not a thing?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Those who have not.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n And have you not admitted that those who do not know are of the number of\n those who have not?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n He nodded assent.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Then those who learn are of the class of those who acquire, and not of\n those who have?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n He agreed.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Then, Cleinias, he said, those who do not know learn, and not those who\n know.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Euthydemus was proceeding to give the youth a third fall; but I knew that\n he was in deep water, and therefore, as I wanted to give him a respite\n lest he should be disheartened, I said to him consolingly: You must not be\n surprised, Cleinias, at the singularity of their mode of speech: this I\n say because you may not understand what the two strangers are doing with\n you; they are only initiating you after the manner of the Corybantes in\n the mysteries; and this answers to the enthronement, which, if you have\n ever been initiated, is, as you will know, accompanied by dancing and\n sport; and now they are just prancing and dancing about you, and will next\n proceed to initiate you; imagine then that you have gone through the first\n part of the sophistical ritual, which, as Prodicus says, begins with\n initiation into the correct use of terms. The two foreign gentlemen,\n perceiving that you did not know, wanted to explain to you that the word\n \u0027to learn\u0027 has two meanings, and is used, first, in the sense of acquiring\n knowledge of some matter of which you previously have no knowledge, and\n also, when you have the knowledge, in the sense of reviewing this matter,\n whether something done or spoken by the light of this newly-acquired\n knowledge; the latter is generally called \u0027knowing\u0027 rather than\n \u0027learning,\u0027 but the word \u0027learning\u0027 is also used; and you did not see, as\n they explained to you, that the term is employed of two opposite sorts of\n men, of those who know, and of those who do not know. There was a similar\n trick in the second question, when they asked you whether men learn what\n they know or what they do not know. These parts of learning are not\n serious, and therefore I say that the gentlemen are not serious, but are\n only playing with you. For if a man had all that sort of knowledge that\n ever was, he would not be at all the wiser; he would only be able to play\n with men, tripping them up and oversetting them with distinctions of\n words. He would be like a person who pulls away a stool from some one when\n he is about to sit down, and then laughs and makes merry at the sight of\n his friend overturned and laid on his back. And you must regard all that\n has hitherto passed between you and them as merely play. But in what is to\n follow I am certain that they will exhibit to you their serious purpose,\n and keep their promise (I will show them how); for they promised to give\n me a sample of the hortatory philosophy, but I suppose that they wanted to\n have a game with you first. And now, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, I think\n that we have had enough of this. Will you let me see you explaining to the\n young man how he is to apply himself to the study of virtue and wisdom?\n And I will first show you what I conceive to be the nature of the task,\n and what sort of a discourse I desire to hear; and if I do this in a very\n inartistic and ridiculous manner, do not laugh at me, for I only venture\n to improvise before you because I am eager to hear your wisdom: and I must\n therefore ask you and your disciples to refrain from laughing. And now, O\n son of Axiochus, let me put a question to you: Do not all men desire\n happiness? And yet, perhaps, this is one of those ridiculous questions\n which I am afraid to ask, and which ought not to be asked by a sensible\n man: for what human being is there who does not desire happiness?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n There is no one, said Cleinias, who does not.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Well, then, I said, since we all of us desire happiness, how can we be\n happy?\u0026mdash;that is the next question. Shall we not be happy if we have\n many good things? And this, perhaps, is even a more simple question than\n the first, for there can be no doubt of the answer.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n He assented.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n And what things do we esteem good? No solemn sage is required to tell us\n this, which may be easily answered; for every one will say that wealth is\n a good.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Certainly, he said.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n And are not health and beauty goods, and other personal gifts?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n He agreed.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Can there be any doubt that good birth, and power, and honours in one\u0027s\n own land, are goods?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n He assented.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n And what other goods are there? I said. What do you say of temperance,\n justice, courage: do you not verily and indeed think, Cleinias, that we\n shall be more right in ranking them as goods than in not ranking them as\n goods? For a dispute might possibly arise about this. What then do you\n say?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n They are goods, said Cleinias.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Very well, I said; and where in the company shall we find a place for\n wisdom\u0026mdash;among the goods or not?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Among the goods.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n And now, I said, think whether we have left out any considerable goods.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n I do not think that we have, said Cleinias.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Upon recollection, I said, indeed I am afraid that we have left out the\n greatest of them all.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n What is that? he asked.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Fortune, Cleinias, I replied; which all, even the most foolish, admit to\n be the greatest of goods.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n True, he said.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n On second thoughts, I added, how narrowly, O son of Axiochus, have you and\n I escaped making a laughing-stock of ourselves to the strangers.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Why do you say so?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Why, because we have already spoken of good-fortune, and are but repeating\n ourselves.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n What do you mean?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n I mean that there is something ridiculous in again putting forward\n good-fortune, which has a place in the list already, and saying the same\n thing twice over.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n He asked what was the meaning of this, and I replied: Surely wisdom is\n good-fortune; even a child may know that.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n The simple-minded youth was amazed; and, observing his surprise, I said to\n him: Do you not know, Cleinias, that flute-players are most fortunate and\n successful in performing on the flute?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n He assented.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n And are not the scribes most fortunate in writing and reading letters?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Certainly.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Amid the dangers of the sea, again, are any more fortunate on the whole\n than wise pilots?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n None, certainly.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n And if you were engaged in war, in whose company would you rather take the\n risk\u0026mdash;in company with a wise general, or with a foolish one?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n With a wise one.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n And if you were ill, whom would you rather have as a companion in a\n dangerous illness\u0026mdash;a wise physician, or an ignorant one?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n A wise one.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n You think, I said, that to act with a wise man is more fortunate than to\n act with an ignorant one?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n He assented.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Then wisdom always makes men fortunate: for by wisdom no man would ever\n err, and therefore he must act rightly and succeed, or his wisdom would be\n wisdom no longer.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n We contrived at last, somehow or other, to agree in a general conclusion,\n that he who had wisdom had no need of fortune. I then recalled to his mind\n the previous state of the question. You remember, I said, our making the\n admission that we should be happy and fortunate if many good things were\n present with us?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n He assented.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n And should we be happy by reason of the presence of good things, if they\n profited us not, or if they profited us?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n If they profited us, he said.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n And would they profit us, if we only had them and did not use them? For\n example, if we had a great deal of food and did not eat, or a great deal\n of drink and did not drink, should we be profited?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Certainly not, he said.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Or would an artisan, who had all the implements necessary for his work,\n and did not use them, be any the better for the possession of them? For\n example, would a carpenter be any the better for having all his tools and\n plenty of wood, if he never worked?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Certainly not, he said.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n And if a person had wealth and all the goods of which we were just now\n speaking, and did not use them, would he be happy because he possessed\n them?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n No indeed, Socrates.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Then, I said, a man who would be happy must not only have the good things,\n but he must also use them; there is no advantage in merely having them?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n True.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Well, Cleinias, but if you have the use as well as the possession of good\n things, is that sufficient to confer happiness?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Yes, in my opinion.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n And may a person use them either rightly or wrongly?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n He must use them rightly.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n That is quite true, I said. And the wrong use of a thing is far worse than\n the non-use; for the one is an evil, and the other is neither a good nor\n an evil. You admit that?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n He assented.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Now in the working and use of wood, is not that which gives the right use\n simply the knowledge of the carpenter?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Nothing else, he said.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n And surely, in the manufacture of vessels, knowledge is that which gives\n the right way of making them?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n He agreed.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n And in the use of the goods of which we spoke at first\u0026mdash;wealth and\n health and beauty, is not knowledge that which directs us to the right use\n of them, and regulates our practice about them?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n He assented.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Then in every possession and every use of a thing, knowledge is that which\n gives a man not only good-fortune but success?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n He again assented.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n And tell me, I said, O tell me, what do possessions profit a man, if he\n have neither good sense nor wisdom? Would a man be better off, having and\n doing many things without wisdom, or a few things with wisdom? Look at the\n matter thus: If he did fewer things would he not make fewer mistakes? if\n he made fewer mistakes would he not have fewer misfortunes? and if he had\n fewer misfortunes would he not be less miserable?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Certainly, he said.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n And who would do least\u0026mdash;a poor man or a rich man?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n A poor man.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n A weak man or a strong man?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n A weak man.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n A noble man or a mean man?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n A mean man.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n And a coward would do less than a courageous and temperate man?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Yes.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n And an indolent man less than an active man?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n He assented.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n And a slow man less than a quick; and one who had dull perceptions of\n seeing and hearing less than one who had keen ones?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n All this was mutually allowed by us.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Then, I said, Cleinias, the sum of the matter appears to be that the goods\n of which we spoke before are not to be regarded as goods in themselves,\n but the degree of good and evil in them depends on whether they are or are\n not under the guidance of knowledge: under the guidance of ignorance, they\n are greater evils than their opposites, inasmuch as they are more able to\n minister to the evil principle which rules them; and when under the\n guidance of wisdom and prudence, they are greater goods: but in themselves\n they are nothing?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n That, he replied, is obvious.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n What then is the result of what has been said? Is not this the result\u0026mdash;that\n other things are indifferent, and that wisdom is the only good, and\n ignorance the only evil?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n He assented.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Let us consider a further point, I said: Seeing that all men desire\n happiness, and happiness, as has been shown, is gained by a use, and a\n right use, of the things of life, and the right use of them, and\n good-fortune in the use of them, is given by knowledge,\u0026mdash;the\n inference is that everybody ought by all means to try and make himself as\n wise as he can?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Yes, he said.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n And when a man thinks that he ought to obtain this treasure, far more than\n money, from a father or a guardian or a friend or a suitor, whether\n citizen or stranger\u0026mdash;the eager desire and prayer to them that they\n would impart wisdom to you, is not at all dishonourable, Cleinias; nor is\n any one to be blamed for doing any honourable service or ministration to\n any man, whether a lover or not, if his aim is to get wisdom. Do you\n agree? I said.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Yes, he said, I quite agree, and think that you are right.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Yes, I said, Cleinias, if only wisdom can be taught, and does not come to\n man spontaneously; for this is a point which has still to be considered,\n and is not yet agreed upon by you and me\u0026mdash;\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n But I think, Socrates, that wisdom can be taught, he said.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Best of men, I said, I am delighted to hear you say so; and I am also\n grateful to you for having saved me from a long and tiresome investigation\n as to whether wisdom can be taught or not. But now, as you think that\n wisdom can be taught, and that wisdom only can make a man happy and\n fortunate, will you not acknowledge that all of us ought to love wisdom,\n and you individually will try to love her?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Certainly, Socrates, he said; I will do my best.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n I was pleased at hearing this; and I turned to Dionysodorus and Euthydemus\n and said: That is an example, clumsy and tedious I admit, of the sort of\n exhortations which I would have you give; and I hope that one of you will\n set forth what I have been saying in a more artistic style: or at least\n take up the enquiry where I left off, and proceed to show the youth\n whether he should have all knowledge; or whether there is one sort of\n knowledge only which will make him good and happy, and what that is. For,\n as I was saying at first, the improvement of this young man in virtue and\n wisdom is a matter which we have very much at heart.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Thus I spoke, Crito, and was all attention to what was coming. I wanted to\n see how they would approach the question, and where they would start in\n their exhortation to the young man that he should practise wisdom and\n virtue. Dionysodorus, who was the elder, spoke first. Everybody\u0027s eyes\n were directed towards him, perceiving that something wonderful might\n shortly be expected. And certainly they were not far wrong; for the man,\n Crito, began a remarkable discourse well worth hearing, and wonderfully\n persuasive regarded as an exhortation to virtue.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Tell me, he said, Socrates and the rest of you who say that you want this\n young man to become wise, are you in jest or in real earnest?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n I was led by this to imagine that they fancied us to have been jesting\n when we asked them to converse with the youth, and that this made them\n jest and play, and being under this impression, I was the more decided in\n saying that we were in profound earnest. Dionysodorus said:\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Reflect, Socrates; you may have to deny your words.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n I have reflected, I said; and I shall never deny my words.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Well, said he, and so you say that you wish Cleinias to become wise?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Undoubtedly.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n And he is not wise as yet?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n At least his modesty will not allow him to say that he is.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n You wish him, he said, to become wise and not, to be ignorant?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n That we do.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n You wish him to be what he is not, and no longer to be what he is?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n I was thrown into consternation at this.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Taking advantage of my consternation he added: You wish him no longer to\n be what he is, which can only mean that you wish him to perish. Pretty\n lovers and friends they must be who want their favourite not to be, or to\n perish!\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n When Ctesippus heard this he got very angry (as a lover well might) and\n said: Stranger of Thurii\u0026mdash;if politeness would allow me I should say,\n A plague upon you! What can make you tell such a lie about me and the\n others, which I hardly like to repeat, as that I wish Cleinias to perish?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Euthydemus replied: And do you think, Ctesippus, that it is possible to\n tell a lie?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Yes, said Ctesippus; I should be mad to say anything else.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n And in telling a lie, do you tell the thing of which you speak or not?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n You tell the thing of which you speak.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n And he who tells, tells that thing which he tells, and no other?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Yes, said Ctesippus.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n And that is a distinct thing apart from other things?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Certainly.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n And he who says that thing says that which is?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Yes.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n And he who says that which is, says the truth. And therefore Dionysodorus,\n if he says that which is, says the truth of you and no lie.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Yes, Euthydemus, said Ctesippus; but in saying this, he says what is not.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Euthydemus answered: And that which is not is not?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n True.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n And that which is not is nowhere?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Nowhere.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n And can any one do anything about that which has no existence, or do to\n Cleinias that which is not and is nowhere?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n I think not, said Ctesippus.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Well, but do rhetoricians, when they speak in the assembly, do nothing?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Nay, he said, they do something.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n And doing is making?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Yes.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n And speaking is doing and making?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n He agreed.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Then no one says that which is not, for in saying what is not he would be\n doing something; and you have already acknowledged that no one can do what\n is not. And therefore, upon your own showing, no one says what is false;\n but if Dionysodorus says anything, he says what is true and what is.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Yes, Euthydemus, said Ctesippus; but he speaks of things in a certain way\n and manner, and not as they really are.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Why, Ctesippus, said Dionysodorus, do you mean to say that any one speaks\n of things as they are?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Yes, he said\u0026mdash;all gentlemen and truth-speaking persons.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n And are not good things good, and evil things evil?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n He assented.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n And you say that gentlemen speak of things as they are?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Yes.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Then the good speak evil of evil things, if they speak of them as they\n are?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Yes, indeed, he said; and they speak evil of evil men. And if I may give\n you a piece of advice, you had better take care that they do not speak\n evil of you, since I can tell you that the good speak evil of the evil.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n And do they speak great things of the great, rejoined Euthydemus, and warm\n things of the warm?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n To be sure they do, said Ctesippus; and they speak coldly of the insipid\n and cold dialectician.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n You are abusive, Ctesippus, said Dionysodorus, you are abusive!\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Indeed, I am not, Dionysodorus, he replied; for I love you and am giving\n you friendly advice, and, if I could, would persuade you not like a boor\n to say in my presence that I desire my beloved, whom I value above all\n men, to perish.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n I saw that they were getting exasperated with one another, so I made a\n joke with him and said: O Ctesippus, I think that we must allow the\n strangers to use language in their own way, and not quarrel with them\n about words, but be thankful for what they give us. If they know how to\n destroy men in such a way as to make good and sensible men out of bad and\n foolish ones\u0026mdash;whether this is a discovery of their own, or whether\n they have learned from some one else this new sort of death and\n destruction which enables them to get rid of a bad man and turn him into a\n good one\u0026mdash;if they know this (and they do know this\u0026mdash;at any rate\n they said just now that this was the secret of their newly-discovered art)\u0026mdash;let\n them, in their phraseology, destroy the youth and make him wise, and all\n of us with him. But if you young men do not like to trust yourselves with\n them, then fiat experimentum in corpore senis; I will be the Carian on\n whom they shall operate. And here I offer my old person to Dionysodorus;\n he may put me into the pot, like Medea the Colchian, kill me, boil me, if\n he will only make me good.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Ctesippus said: And I, Socrates, am ready to commit myself to the\n strangers; they may skin me alive, if they please (and I am pretty well\n skinned by them already), if only my skin is made at last, not like that\n of Marsyas, into a leathern bottle, but into a piece of virtue. And here\n is Dionysodorus fancying that I am angry with him, when really I am not\n angry at all; I do but contradict him when I think that he is speaking\n improperly to me: and you must not confound abuse and contradiction, O\n illustrious Dionysodorus; for they are quite different things.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Contradiction! said Dionysodorus; why, there never was such a thing.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Certainly there is, he replied; there can be no question of that. Do you,\n Dionysodorus, maintain that there is not?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n You will never prove to me, he said, that you have heard any one\n contradicting any one else.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Indeed, said Ctesippus; then now you may hear me contradicting\n Dionysodorus.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Are you prepared to make that good?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Certainly, he said.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Well, have not all things words expressive of them?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Yes.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Of their existence or of their non-existence?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Of their existence.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Yes, Ctesippus, and we just now proved, as you may remember, that no man\n could affirm a negative; for no one could affirm that which is not.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n And what does that signify? said Ctesippus; you and I may contradict all\n the same for that.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n But can we contradict one another, said Dionysodorus, when both of us are\n describing the same thing? Then we must surely be speaking the same thing?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n He assented.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Or when neither of us is speaking of the same thing? For then neither of\n us says a word about the thing at all?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n He granted that proposition also.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n But when I describe something and you describe another thing, or I say\n something and you say nothing\u0026mdash;is there any contradiction? How can he\n who speaks contradict him who speaks not?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Here Ctesippus was silent; and I in my astonishment said: What do you\n mean, Dionysodorus? I have often heard, and have been amazed to hear, this\n thesis of yours, which is maintained and employed by the disciples of\n Protagoras, and others before them, and which to me appears to be quite\n wonderful, and suicidal as well as destructive, and I think that I am most\n likely to hear the truth about it from you. The dictum is that there is no\n such thing as falsehood; a man must either say what is true or say\n nothing. Is not that your position?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n He assented.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n But if he cannot speak falsely, may he not think falsely?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n No, he cannot, he said.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Then there is no such thing as false opinion?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n No, he said.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Then there is no such thing as ignorance, or men who are ignorant; for is\n not ignorance, if there be such a thing, a mistake of fact?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Certainly, he said.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n And that is impossible?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Impossible, he replied.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Are you saying this as a paradox, Dionysodorus; or do you seriously\n maintain no man to be ignorant?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Refute me, he said.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n But how can I refute you, if, as you say, to tell a falsehood is\n impossible?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Very true, said Euthydemus.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Neither did I tell you just now to refute me, said Dionysodorus; for how\n can I tell you to do that which is not?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n O Euthydemus, I said, I have but a dull conception of these subtleties and\n excellent devices of wisdom; I am afraid that I hardly understand them,\n and you must forgive me therefore if I ask a very stupid question: if\n there be no falsehood or false opinion or ignorance, there can be no such\n thing as erroneous action, for a man cannot fail of acting as he is acting\u0026mdash;that\n is what you mean?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Yes, he replied.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n And now, I said, I will ask my stupid question: If there is no such thing\n as error in deed, word, or thought, then what, in the name of goodness, do\n you come hither to teach? And were you not just now saying that you could\n teach virtue best of all men, to any one who was willing to learn?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n And are you such an old fool, Socrates, rejoined Dionysodorus, that you\n bring up now what I said at first\u0026mdash;and if I had said anything last\n year, I suppose that you would bring that up too\u0026mdash;but are non-plussed\n at the words which I have just uttered?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Why, I said, they are not easy to answer; for they are the words of wise\n men: and indeed I know not what to make of this word \u0027nonplussed,\u0027 which\n you used last: what do you mean by it, Dionysodorus? You must mean that I\n cannot refute your argument. Tell me if the words have any other sense.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n No, he replied, they mean what you say. And now answer.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n What, before you, Dionysodorus? I said.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Answer, said he.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n And is that fair?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Yes, quite fair, he said.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Upon what principle? I said. I can only suppose that you are a very wise\n man who comes to us in the character of a great logician, and who knows\n when to answer and when not to answer\u0026mdash;and now you will not open your\n mouth at all, because you know that you ought not.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n You prate, he said, instead of answering. But if, my good sir, you admit\n that I am wise, answer as I tell you.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n I suppose that I must obey, for you are master. Put the question.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Are the things which have sense alive or lifeless?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n They are alive.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n And do you know of any word which is alive?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n I cannot say that I do.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Then why did you ask me what sense my words had?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Why, because I was stupid and made a mistake. And yet, perhaps, I was\n right after all in saying that words have a sense;\u0026mdash;what do you say,\n wise man? If I was not in error, even you will not refute me, and all your\n wisdom will be non-plussed; but if I did fall into error, then again you\n are wrong in saying that there is no error,\u0026mdash;and this remark was made\n by you not quite a year ago. I am inclined to think, however, Dionysodorus\n and Euthydemus, that this argument lies where it was and is not very\n likely to advance: even your skill in the subtleties of logic, which is\n really amazing, has not found out the way of throwing another and not\n falling yourself, now any more than of old.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Ctesippus said: Men of Chios, Thurii, or however and whatever you call\n yourselves, I wonder at you, for you seem to have no objection to talking\n nonsense.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Fearing that there would be high words, I again endeavoured to soothe\n Ctesippus, and said to him: To you, Ctesippus, I must repeat what I said\n before to Cleinias\u0026mdash;that you do not understand the ways of these\n philosophers from abroad. They are not serious, but, like the Egyptian\n wizard, Proteus, they take different forms and deceive us by their\n enchantments: and let us, like Menelaus, refuse to let them go until they\n show themselves to us in earnest. When they begin to be in earnest their\n full beauty will appear: let us then beg and entreat and beseech them to\n shine forth. And I think that I had better once more exhibit the form in\n which I pray to behold them; it might be a guide to them. I will go on\n therefore where I left off, as well as I can, in the hope that I may touch\n their hearts and move them to pity, and that when they see me deeply\n serious and interested, they also may be serious. You, Cleinias, I said,\n shall remind me at what point we left off. Did we not agree that\n philosophy should be studied? and was not that our conclusion?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Yes, he replied.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n And philosophy is the acquisition of knowledge?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Yes, he said.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n And what knowledge ought we to acquire? May we not answer with absolute\n truth\u0026mdash;A knowledge which will do us good?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Certainly, he said.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n And should we be any the better if we went about having a knowledge of the\n places where most gold was hidden in the earth?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Perhaps we should, he said.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n But have we not already proved, I said, that we should be none the better\n off, even if without trouble and digging all the gold which there is in\n the earth were ours? And if we knew how to convert stones into gold, the\n knowledge would be of no value to us, unless we also knew how to use the\n gold? Do you not remember? I said.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n I quite remember, he said.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Nor would any other knowledge, whether of money-making, or of medicine, or\n of any other art which knows only how to make a thing, and not to use it\n when made, be of any good to us. Am I not right?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n He agreed.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n And if there were a knowledge which was able to make men immortal, without\n giving them the knowledge of the way to use the immortality, neither would\n there be any use in that, if we may argue from the analogy of the previous\n instances?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n To all this he agreed.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Then, my dear boy, I said, the knowledge which we want is one that uses as\n well as makes?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n True, he said.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n And our desire is not to be skilful lyre-makers, or artists of that sort\u0026mdash;far\n otherwise; for with them the art which makes is one, and the art which\n uses is another. Although they have to do with the same, they are divided:\n for the art which makes and the art which plays on the lyre differ widely\n from one another. Am I not right?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n He agreed.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n And clearly we do not want the art of the flute-maker; this is only\n another of the same sort?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n He assented.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n But suppose, I said, that we were to learn the art of making speeches\u0026mdash;would\n that be the art which would make us happy?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n I should say, no, rejoined Cleinias.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n And why should you say so? I asked.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n I see, he replied, that there are some composers of speeches who do not\n know how to use the speeches which they make, just as the makers of lyres\n do not know how to use the lyres; and also some who are of themselves\n unable to compose speeches, but are able to use the speeches which the\n others make for them; and this proves that the art of making speeches is\n not the same as the art of using them.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Yes, I said; and I take your words to be a sufficient proof that the art\n of making speeches is not one which will make a man happy. And yet I did\n think that the art which we have so long been seeking might be discovered\n in that direction; for the composers of speeches, whenever I meet them,\n always appear to me to be very extraordinary men, Cleinias, and their art\n is lofty and divine, and no wonder. For their art is a part of the great\n art of enchantment, and hardly, if at all, inferior to it: and whereas the\n art of the enchanter is a mode of charming snakes and spiders and\n scorpions, and other monsters and pests, this art of their\u0027s acts upon\n dicasts and ecclesiasts and bodies of men, for the charming and pacifying\n of them. Do you agree with me?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Yes, he said, I think that you are quite right.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Whither then shall we go, I said, and to what art shall we have recourse?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n I do not see my way, he said.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n But I think that I do, I replied.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n And what is your notion? asked Cleinias.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n I think that the art of the general is above all others the one of which\n the possession is most likely to make a man happy.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n I do not think so, he said.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Why not? I said.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n The art of the general is surely an art of hunting mankind.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n What of that? I said.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Why, he said, no art of hunting extends beyond hunting and capturing; and\n when the prey is taken the huntsman or fisherman cannot use it; but they\n hand it over to the cook, and the geometricians and astronomers and\n calculators (who all belong to the hunting class, for they do not make\n their diagrams, but only find out that which was previously contained in\n them)\u0026mdash;they, I say, not being able to use but only to catch their\n prey, hand over their inventions to the dialectician to be applied by him,\n if they have any sense in them.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Good, I said, fairest and wisest Cleinias. And is this true?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Certainly, he said; just as a general when he takes a city or a camp hands\n over his new acquisition to the statesman, for he does not know how to use\n them himself; or as the quail-taker transfers the quails to the keeper of\n them. If we are looking for the art which is to make us blessed, and which\n is able to use that which it makes or takes, the art of the general is not\n the one, and some other must be found.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n CRITO: And do you mean, Socrates, that the youngster said all this?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n SOCRATES: Are you incredulous, Crito?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n CRITO: Indeed, I am; for if he did say so, then in my opinion he needs\n neither Euthydemus nor any one else to be his instructor.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n SOCRATES: Perhaps I may have forgotten, and Ctesippus was the real\n answerer.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n CRITO: Ctesippus! nonsense.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n SOCRATES: All I know is that I heard these words, and that they were not\n spoken either by Euthydemus or Dionysodorus. I dare say, my good Crito,\n that they may have been spoken by some superior person: that I heard them\n I am certain.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n CRITO: Yes, indeed, Socrates, by some one a good deal superior, as I\n should be disposed to think. But did you carry the search any further, and\n did you find the art which you were seeking?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n SOCRATES: Find! my dear sir, no indeed. And we cut a poor figure; we were\n like children after larks, always on the point of catching the art, which\n was always getting away from us. But why should I repeat the whole story?\n At last we came to the kingly art, and enquired whether that gave and\n caused happiness, and then we got into a labyrinth, and when we thought we\n were at the end, came out again at the beginning, having still to seek as\n much as ever.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n CRITO: How did that happen, Socrates?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n SOCRATES: I will tell you; the kingly art was identified by us with the\n political.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n CRITO: Well, and what came of that?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n SOCRATES: To this royal or political art all the arts, including the art\n of the general, seemed to render up the supremacy, that being the only one\n which knew how to use what they produce. Here obviously was the very art\n which we were seeking\u0026mdash;the art which is the source of good\n government, and which may be described, in the language of Aeschylus, as\n alone sitting at the helm of the vessel of state, piloting and governing\n all things, and utilizing them.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n CRITO: And were you not right, Socrates?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n SOCRATES: You shall judge, Crito, if you are willing to hear what\n followed; for we resumed the enquiry, and a question of this sort was\n asked: Does the kingly art, having this supreme authority, do anything for\n us? To be sure, was the answer. And would not you, Crito, say the same?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n CRITO: Yes, I should.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n SOCRATES: And what would you say that the kingly art does? If medicine\n were supposed to have supreme authority over the subordinate arts, and I\n were to ask you a similar question about that, you would say\u0026mdash;it\n produces health?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n CRITO: I should.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n SOCRATES: And what of your own art of husbandry, supposing that to have\n supreme authority over the subject arts\u0026mdash;what does that do? Does it\n not supply us with the fruits of the earth?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n CRITO: Yes.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n SOCRATES: And what does the kingly art do when invested with supreme\n power? Perhaps you may not be ready with an answer?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n CRITO: Indeed I am not, Socrates.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n SOCRATES: No more were we, Crito. But at any rate you know that if this is\n the art which we were seeking, it ought to be useful.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n CRITO: Certainly.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n SOCRATES: And surely it ought to do us some good?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n CRITO: Certainly, Socrates.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n SOCRATES: And Cleinias and I had arrived at the conclusion that knowledge\n of some kind is the only good.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n CRITO: Yes, that was what you were saying.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n SOCRATES: All the other results of politics, and they are many, as for\n example, wealth, freedom, tranquillity, were neither good nor evil in\n themselves; but the political science ought to make us wise, and impart\n knowledge to us, if that is the science which is likely to do us good, and\n make us happy.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n CRITO: Yes; that was the conclusion at which you had arrived, according to\n your report of the conversation.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n SOCRATES: And does the kingly art make men wise and good?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n CRITO: Why not, Socrates?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n SOCRATES: What, all men, and in every respect? and teach them all the\n arts,\u0026mdash;carpentering, and cobbling, and the rest of them?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n CRITO: I think not, Socrates.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n SOCRATES: But then what is this knowledge, and what are we to do with it?\n For it is not the source of any works which are neither good nor evil, and\n gives no knowledge, but the knowledge of itself; what then can it be, and\n what are we to do with it? Shall we say, Crito, that it is the knowledge\n by which we are to make other men good?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n CRITO: By all means.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n SOCRATES: And in what will they be good and useful? Shall we repeat that\n they will make others good, and that these others will make others again,\n without ever determining in what they are to be good; for we have put\n aside the results of politics, as they are called. This is the old, old\n song over again; and we are just as far as ever, if not farther, from the\n knowledge of the art or science of happiness.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n CRITO: Indeed, Socrates, you do appear to have got into a great\n perplexity.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n SOCRATES: Thereupon, Crito, seeing that I was on the point of shipwreck, I\n lifted up my voice, and earnestly entreated and called upon the strangers\n to save me and the youth from the whirlpool of the argument; they were our\n Castor and Pollux, I said, and they should be serious, and show us in\n sober earnest what that knowledge was which would enable us to pass the\n rest of our lives in happiness.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n CRITO: And did Euthydemus show you this knowledge?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n SOCRATES: Yes, indeed; he proceeded in a lofty strain to the following\n effect: Would you rather, Socrates, said he, that I should show you this\n knowledge about which you have been doubting, or shall I prove that you\n already have it?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n What, I said, are you blessed with such a power as this?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Indeed I am.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Then I would much rather that you should prove me to have such a\n knowledge; at my time of life that will be more agreeable than having to\n learn.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Then tell me, he said, do you know anything?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Yes, I said, I know many things, but not anything of much importance.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n That will do, he said: And would you admit that anything is what it is,\n and at the same time is not what it is?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Certainly not.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n And did you not say that you knew something?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n I did.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n If you know, you are knowing.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Certainly, of the knowledge which I have.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n That makes no difference;\u0026mdash;and must you not, if you are knowing, know\n all things?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Certainly not, I said, for there are many other things which I do not\n know.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n And if you do not know, you are not knowing.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Yes, friend, of that which I do not know.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Still you are not knowing, and you said just now that you were knowing;\n and therefore you are and are not at the same time, and in reference to\n the same things.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n A pretty clatter, as men say, Euthydemus, this of yours! and will you\n explain how I possess that knowledge for which we were seeking? Do you\n mean to say that the same thing cannot be and also not be; and therefore,\n since I know one thing, that I know all, for I cannot be knowing and not\n knowing at the same time, and if I know all things, then I must have the\n knowledge for which we are seeking\u0026mdash;May I assume this to be your\n ingenious notion?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Out of your own mouth, Socrates, you are convicted, he said.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Well, but, Euthydemus, I said, has that never happened to you? for if I am\n only in the same case with you and our beloved Dionysodorus, I cannot\n complain. Tell me, then, you two, do you not know some things, and not\n know others?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Certainly not, Socrates, said Dionysodorus.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n What do you mean, I said; do you know nothing?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Nay, he replied, we do know something.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Then, I said, you know all things, if you know anything?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Yes, all things, he said; and that is as true of you as of us.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n O, indeed, I said, what a wonderful thing, and what a great blessing! And\n do all other men know all things or nothing?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Certainly, he replied; they cannot know some things, and not know others,\n and be at the same time knowing and not knowing.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Then what is the inference? I said.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n They all know all things, he replied, if they know one thing.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n O heavens, Dionysodorus, I said, I see now that you are in earnest; hardly\n have I got you to that point. And do you really and truly know all things,\n including carpentering and leather-cutting?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Certainly, he said.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n And do you know stitching?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Yes, by the gods, we do, and cobbling, too.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n And do you know things such as the numbers of the stars and of the sand?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Certainly; did you think we should say No to that?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n By Zeus, said Ctesippus, interrupting, I only wish that you would give me\n some proof which would enable me to know whether you speak truly.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n What proof shall I give you? he said.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Will you tell me how many teeth Euthydemus has? and Euthydemus shall tell\n how many teeth you have.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Will you not take our word that we know all things?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Certainly not, said Ctesippus: you must further tell us this one thing,\n and then we shall know that you are speak the truth; if you tell us the\n number, and we count them, and you are found to be right, we will believe\n the rest. They fancied that Ctesippus was making game of them, and they\n refused, and they would only say in answer to each of his questions, that\n they knew all things. For at last Ctesippus began to throw off all\n restraint; no question in fact was too bad for him; he would ask them if\n they knew the foulest things, and they, like wild boars, came rushing on\n his blows, and fearlessly replied that they did. At last, Crito, I too was\n carried away by my incredulity, and asked Euthydemus whether Dionysodorus\n could dance.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Certainly, he replied.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n And can he vault among swords, and turn upon a wheel, at his age? has he\n got to such a height of skill as that?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n He can do anything, he said.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n And did you always know this?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Always, he said.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n When you were children, and at your birth?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n They both said that they did.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n This we could not believe. And Euthydemus said: You are incredulous,\n Socrates.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Yes, I said, and I might well be incredulous, if I did not know you to be\n wise men.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n But if you will answer, he said, I will make you confess to similar\n marvels.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Well, I said, there is nothing that I should like better than to be\n self-convicted of this, for if I am really a wise man, which I never knew\n before, and you will prove to me that I know and have always known all\n things, nothing in life would be a greater gain to me.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Answer then, he said.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Ask, I said, and I will answer.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Do you know something, Socrates, or nothing?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Something, I said.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n And do you know with what you know, or with something else?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n With what I know; and I suppose that you mean with my soul?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Are you not ashamed, Socrates, of asking a question when you are asked\n one?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Well, I said; but then what am I to do? for I will do whatever you bid;\n when I do not know what you are asking, you tell me to answer\n nevertheless, and not to ask again.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Why, you surely have some notion of my meaning, he said.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Yes, I replied.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Well, then, answer according to your notion of my meaning.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Yes, I said; but if the question which you ask in one sense is understood\n and answered by me in another, will that please you\u0026mdash;if I answer what\n is not to the point?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n That will please me very well; but will not please you equally well, as I\n imagine.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n I certainly will not answer unless I understand you, I said.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n You will not answer, he said, according to your view of the meaning,\n because you will be prating, and are an ancient.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Now I saw that he was getting angry with me for drawing distinctions, when\n he wanted to catch me in his springes of words. And I remembered that\n Connus was always angry with me when I opposed him, and then he neglected\n me, because he thought that I was stupid; and as I was intending to go to\n Euthydemus as a pupil, I reflected that I had better let him have his way,\n as he might think me a blockhead, and refuse to take me. So I said: You\n are a far better dialectician than myself, Euthydemus, for I have never\n made a profession of the art, and therefore do as you say; ask your\n questions once more, and I will answer.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Answer then, he said, again, whether you know what you know with\n something, or with nothing.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Yes, I said; I know with my soul.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n The man will answer more than the question; for I did not ask you, he\n said, with what you know, but whether you know with something.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Again I replied, Through ignorance I have answered too much, but I hope\n that you will forgive me. And now I will answer simply that I always know\n what I know with something.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n And is that something, he rejoined, always the same, or sometimes one\n thing, and sometimes another thing?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Always, I replied, when I know, I know with this.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Will you not cease adding to your answers?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n My fear is that this word \u0027always\u0027 may get us into trouble.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n You, perhaps, but certainly not us. And now answer: Do you always know\n with this?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Always; since I am required to withdraw the words \u0027when I know.\u0027\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n You always know with this, or, always knowing, do you know some things\n with this, and some things with something else, or do you know all things\n with this?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n All that I know, I replied, I know with this.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n There again, Socrates, he said, the addition is superfluous.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Well, then, I said, I will take away the words \u0027that I know.\u0027\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Nay, take nothing away; I desire no favours of you; but let me ask: Would\n you be able to know all things, if you did not know all things?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Quite impossible.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n And now, he said, you may add on whatever you like, for you confess that\n you know all things.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n I suppose that is true, I said, if my qualification implied in the words\n \u0027that I know\u0027 is not allowed to stand; and so I do know all things.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n And have you not admitted that you always know all things with that which\n you know, whether you make the addition of \u0027when you know them\u0027 or not?\n for you have acknowledged that you have always and at once known all\n things, that is to say, when you were a child, and at your birth, and when\n you were growing up, and before you were born, and before the heaven and\n earth existed, you knew all things, if you always know them; and I swear\n that you shall always continue to know all things, if I am of the mind to\n make you.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n But I hope that you will be of that mind, reverend Euthydemus, I said, if\n you are really speaking the truth, and yet I a little doubt your power to\n make good your words unless you have the help of your brother\n Dionysodorus; then you may do it. Tell me now, both of you, for although\n in the main I cannot doubt that I really do know all things, when I am\n told so by men of your prodigious wisdom\u0026mdash;how can I say that I know\n such things, Euthydemus, as that the good are unjust; come, do I know that\n or not?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Certainly, you know that.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n What do I know?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n That the good are not unjust.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Quite true, I said; and that I have always known; but the question is,\n where did I learn that the good are unjust?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Nowhere, said Dionysodorus.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Then, I said, I do not know this.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n You are ruining the argument, said Euthydemus to Dionysodorus; he will be\n proved not to know, and then after all he will be knowing and not knowing\n at the same time.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Dionysodorus blushed.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n I turned to the other, and said, What do you think, Euthydemus? Does not\n your omniscient brother appear to you to have made a mistake?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n What, replied Dionysodorus in a moment; am I the brother of Euthydemus?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Thereupon I said, Please not to interrupt, my good friend, or prevent\n Euthydemus from proving to me that I know the good to be unjust; such a\n lesson you might at least allow me to learn.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n You are running away, Socrates, said Dionysodorus, and refusing to answer.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n No wonder, I said, for I am not a match for one of you, and a fortiori I\n must run away from two. I am no Heracles; and even Heracles could not\n fight against the Hydra, who was a she-Sophist, and had the wit to shoot\n up many new heads when one of them was cut off; especially when he saw a\n second monster of a sea-crab, who was also a Sophist, and appeared to have\n newly arrived from a sea-voyage, bearing down upon him from the left,\n opening his mouth and biting. When the monster was growing troublesome he\n called Iolaus, his nephew, to his help, who ably succoured him; but if my\n Iolaus, who is my brother Patrocles (the statuary), were to come, he would\n only make a bad business worse.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n And now that you have delivered yourself of this strain, said\n Dionysodorus, will you inform me whether Iolaus was the nephew of Heracles\n any more than he is yours?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n I suppose that I had best answer you, Dionysodorus, I said, for you will\n insist on asking\u0026mdash;that I pretty well know\u0026mdash;out of envy, in order\n to prevent me from learning the wisdom of Euthydemus.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Then answer me, he said.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Well then, I said, I can only reply that Iolaus was not my nephew at all,\n but the nephew of Heracles; and his father was not my brother Patrocles,\n but Iphicles, who has a name rather like his, and was the brother of\n Heracles.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n And is Patrocles, he said, your brother?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Yes, I said, he is my half-brother, the son of my mother, but not of my\n father.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Then he is and is not your brother.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Not by the same father, my good man, I said, for Chaeredemus was his\n father, and mine was Sophroniscus.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n And was Sophroniscus a father, and Chaeredemus also?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Yes, I said; the former was my father, and the latter his.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Then, he said, Chaeredemus is not a father.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n He is not my father, I said.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n But can a father be other than a father? or are you the same as a stone?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n I certainly do not think that I am a stone, I said, though I am afraid\n that you may prove me to be one.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Are you not other than a stone?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n I am.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n And being other than a stone, you are not a stone; and being other than\n gold, you are not gold?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Very true.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n And so Chaeredemus, he said, being other than a father, is not a father?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n I suppose that he is not a father, I replied.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n For if, said Euthydemus, taking up the argument, Chaeredemus is a father,\n then Sophroniscus, being other than a father, is not a father; and you,\n Socrates, are without a father.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Ctesippus, here taking up the argument, said: And is not your father in\n the same case, for he is other than my father?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Assuredly not, said Euthydemus.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Then he is the same?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n He is the same.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n I cannot say that I like the connection; but is he only my father,\n Euthydemus, or is he the father of all other men?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Of all other men, he replied. Do you suppose the same person to be a\n father and not a father?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Certainly, I did so imagine, said Ctesippus.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n And do you suppose that gold is not gold, or that a man is not a man?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n They are not \u0027in pari materia,\u0027 Euthydemus, said Ctesippus, and you had\n better take care, for it is monstrous to suppose that your father is the\n father of all.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n But he is, he replied.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n What, of men only, said Ctesippus, or of horses and of all other animals?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Of all, he said.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n And your mother, too, is the mother of all?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Yes, our mother too.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Yes; and your mother has a progeny of sea-urchins then?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Yes; and yours, he said.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n And gudgeons and puppies and pigs are your brothers?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n And yours too.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n And your papa is a dog?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n And so is yours, he said.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n If you will answer my questions, said Dionysodorus, I will soon extract\n the same admissions from you, Ctesippus. You say that you have a dog.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Yes, a villain of a one, said Ctesippus.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n And he has puppies?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Yes, and they are very like himself.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n And the dog is the father of them?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Yes, he said, I certainly saw him and the mother of the puppies come\n together.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n And is he not yours?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n To be sure he is.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Then he is a father, and he is yours; ergo, he is your father, and the\n puppies are your brothers.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Let me ask you one little question more, said Dionysodorus, quickly\n interposing, in order that Ctesippus might not get in his word: You beat\n this dog?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Ctesippus said, laughing, Indeed I do; and I only wish that I could beat\n you instead of him.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Then you beat your father, he said.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n I should have far more reason to beat yours, said Ctesippus; what could he\n have been thinking of when he begat such wise sons? much good has this\n father of you and your brethren the puppies got out of this wisdom of\n yours.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n But neither he nor you, Ctesippus, have any need of much good.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n And have you no need, Euthydemus? he said.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Neither I nor any other man; for tell me now, Ctesippus, if you think it\n good or evil for a man who is sick to drink medicine when he wants it; or\n to go to war armed rather than unarmed.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Good, I say. And yet I know that I am going to be caught in one of your\n charming puzzles.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n That, he replied, you will discover, if you answer; since you admit\n medicine to be good for a man to drink, when wanted, must it not be good\n for him to drink as much as possible; when he takes his medicine, a\n cartload of hellebore will not be too much for him?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Ctesippus said: Quite so, Euthydemus, that is to say, if he who drinks is\n as big as the statue of Delphi.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n And seeing that in war to have arms is a good thing, he ought to have as\n many spears and shields as possible?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Very true, said Ctesippus; and do you think, Euthydemus, that he ought to\n have one shield only, and one spear?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n I do.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n And would you arm Geryon and Briareus in that way? Considering that you\n and your companion fight in armour, I thought that you would have known\n better…Here Euthydemus held his peace, but Dionysodorus returned to the\n previous answer of Ctesippus and said:\u0026mdash;\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Do you not think that the possession of gold is a good thing?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Yes, said Ctesippus, and the more the better.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n And to have money everywhere and always is a good?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Certainly, a great good, he said.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n And you admit gold to be a good?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Certainly, he replied.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n And ought not a man then to have gold everywhere and always, and as much\n as possible in himself, and may he not be deemed the happiest of men who\n has three talents of gold in his belly, and a talent in his pate, and a\n stater of gold in either eye?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Yes, Euthydemus, said Ctesippus; and the Scythians reckon those who have\n gold in their own skulls to be the happiest and bravest of men (that is\n only another instance of your manner of speaking about the dog and\n father), and what is still more extraordinary, they drink out of their own\n skulls gilt, and see the inside of them, and hold their own head in their\n hands.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n And do the Scythians and others see that which has the quality of vision,\n or that which has not? said Euthydemus.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n That which has the quality of vision clearly.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n And you also see that which has the quality of vision? he said. [Note: the\n ambiguity of (Greek), \u0027things visible and able to see,\u0027 (Greek), \u0027the\n speaking of the silent,\u0027 the silent denoting either the speaker or the\n subject of the speech, cannot be perfectly rendered in English.] Compare\n Aristot. Soph. Elenchi (Poste\u0027s translation):\u0026mdash;\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n \u0027Of ambiguous propositions the following are instances:\u0026mdash;\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n \u0027I hope that you the enemy may slay.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n \u0027Whom one knows, he knows. Either the person knowing or the person known\n is here affirmed to know.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n \u0027What one sees, that one sees: one sees a pillar: ergo, that one pillar\n sees.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n \u0027What you ARE holding, that you are: you are holding a stone: ergo, a\n stone you are.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n \u0027Is a speaking of the silent possible? \"The silent\" denotes either the\n speaker are the subject of speech.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n \u0027There are three kinds of ambiguity of term or proposition. The first is\n when there is an equal linguistic propriety in several interpretations;\n the second when one is improper but customary; the third when the\n ambiguity arises in the combination of elements that are in themselves\n unambiguous, as in \"knowing letters.\" \"Knowing\" and \"letters\" are perhaps\n separately unambiguous, but in combination may imply either that the\n letters are known, or that they themselves have knowledge. Such are the\n modes in which propositions and terms may be ambiguous.\u0027\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Yes, I do.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Then do you see our garments?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Yes.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Then our garments have the quality of vision.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n They can see to any extent, said Ctesippus.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n What can they see?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Nothing; but you, my sweet man, may perhaps imagine that they do not see;\n and certainly, Euthydemus, you do seem to me to have been caught napping\n when you were not asleep, and that if it be possible to speak and say\n nothing\u0026mdash;you are doing so.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n And may there not be a silence of the speaker? said Dionysodorus.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Impossible, said Ctesippus.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Or a speaking of the silent?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n That is still more impossible, he said.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n But when you speak of stones, wood, iron bars, do you not speak of the\n silent?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Not when I pass a smithy; for then the iron bars make a tremendous noise\n and outcry if they are touched: so that here your wisdom is strangely\n mistaken; please, however, to tell me how you can be silent when speaking\n (I thought that Ctesippus was put upon his mettle because Cleinias was\n present).\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n When you are silent, said Euthydemus, is there not a silence of all\n things?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Yes, he said.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n But if speaking things are included in all things, then the speaking are\n silent.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n What, said Ctesippus; then all things are not silent?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Certainly not, said Euthydemus.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Then, my good friend, do they all speak?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Yes; those which speak.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Nay, said Ctesippus, but the question which I ask is whether all things\n are silent or speak?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Neither and both, said Dionysodorus, quickly interposing; I am sure that\n you will be \u0027non-plussed\u0027 at that answer.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Here Ctesippus, as his manner was, burst into a roar of laughter; he said,\n That brother of yours, Euthydemus, has got into a dilemma; all is over\n with him. This delighted Cleinias, whose laughter made Ctesippus ten times\n as uproarious; but I cannot help thinking that the rogue must have picked\n up this answer from them; for there has been no wisdom like theirs in our\n time. Why do you laugh, Cleinias, I said, at such solemn and beautiful\n things?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Why, Socrates, said Dionysodorus, did you ever see a beautiful thing?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Yes, Dionysodorus, I replied, I have seen many.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Were they other than the beautiful, or the same as the beautiful?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Now I was in a great quandary at having to answer this question, and I\n thought that I was rightly served for having opened my mouth at all: I\n said however, They are not the same as absolute beauty, but they have\n beauty present with each of them.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n And are you an ox because an ox is present with you, or are you\n Dionysodorus, because Dionysodorus is present with you?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n God forbid, I replied.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n But how, he said, by reason of one thing being present with another, will\n one thing be another?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Is that your difficulty? I said. For I was beginning to imitate their\n skill, on which my heart was set.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Of course, he replied, I and all the world are in a difficulty about the\n non-existent.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n What do you mean, Dionysodorus? I said. Is not the honourable honourable\n and the base base?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n That, he said, is as I please.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n And do you please?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Yes, he said.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n And you will admit that the same is the same, and the other other; for\n surely the other is not the same; I should imagine that even a child will\n hardly deny the other to be other. But I think, Dionysodorus, that you\n must have intentionally missed the last question; for in general you and\n your brother seem to me to be good workmen in your own department, and to\n do the dialectician\u0027s business excellently well.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n What, said he, is the business of a good workman? tell me, in the first\n place, whose business is hammering?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n The smith\u0027s.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n And whose the making of pots?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n The potter\u0027s.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n And who has to kill and skin and mince and boil and roast?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n The cook, I said.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n And if a man does his business he does rightly?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Certainly.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n And the business of the cook is to cut up and skin; you have admitted\n that?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Yes, I have admitted that, but you must not be too hard upon me.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Then if some one were to kill, mince, boil, roast the cook, he would do\n his business, and if he were to hammer the smith, and make a pot of the\n potter, he would do their business.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Poseidon, I said, this is the crown of wisdom; can I ever hope to have\n such wisdom of my own?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n And would you be able, Socrates, to recognize this wisdom when it has\n become your own?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Certainly, I said, if you will allow me.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n What, he said, do you think that you know what is your own?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Yes, I do, subject to your correction; for you are the bottom, and\n Euthydemus is the top, of all my wisdom.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Is not that which you would deem your own, he said, that which you have in\n your own power, and which you are able to use as you would desire, for\n example, an ox or a sheep\u0026mdash;would you not think that which you could\n sell and give and sacrifice to any god whom you pleased, to be your own,\n and that which you could not give or sell or sacrifice you would think not\n to be in your own power?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Yes, I said (for I was certain that something good would come out of the\n questions, which I was impatient to hear); yes, such things, and such\n things only are mine.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Yes, he said, and you would mean by animals living beings?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Yes, I said.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n You agree then, that those animals only are yours with which you have the\n power to do all these things which I was just naming?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n I agree.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Then, after a pause, in which he seemed to be lost in the contemplation of\n something great, he said: Tell me, Socrates, have you an ancestral Zeus?\n Here, anticipating the final move, like a person caught in a net, who\n gives a desperate twist that he may get away, I said: No, Dionysodorus, I\n have not.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n What a miserable man you must be then, he said; you are not an Athenian at\n all if you have no ancestral gods or temples, or any other mark of\n gentility.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Nay, Dionysodorus, I said, do not be rough; good words, if you please; in\n the way of religion I have altars and temples, domestic and ancestral, and\n all that other Athenians have.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n And have not other Athenians, he said, an ancestral Zeus?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n That name, I said, is not to be found among the Ionians, whether colonists\n or citizens of Athens; an ancestral Apollo there is, who is the father of\n Ion, and a family Zeus, and a Zeus guardian of the phratry, and an Athene\n guardian of the phratry. But the name of ancestral Zeus is unknown to us.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n No matter, said Dionysodorus, for you admit that you have Apollo, Zeus,\n and Athene.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Certainly, I said.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n And they are your gods, he said.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Yes, I said, my lords and ancestors.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n At any rate they are yours, he said, did you not admit that?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n I did, I said; what is going to happen to me?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n And are not these gods animals? for you admit that all things which have\n life are animals; and have not these gods life?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n They have life, I said.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Then are they not animals?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n They are animals, I said.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n And you admitted that of animals those are yours which you could give away\n or sell or offer in sacrifice, as you pleased?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n I did admit that, Euthydemus, and I have no way of escape.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Well then, said he, if you admit that Zeus and the other gods are yours,\n can you sell them or give them away or do what you will with them, as you\n would with other animals?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n At this I was quite struck dumb, Crito, and lay prostrate. Ctesippus came\n to the rescue.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Bravo, Heracles, brave words, said he.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Bravo Heracles, or is Heracles a Bravo? said Dionysodorus.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Poseidon, said Ctesippus, what awful distinctions. I will have no more of\n them; the pair are invincible.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Then, my dear Crito, there was universal applause of the speakers and\n their words, and what with laughing and clapping of hands and rejoicings\n the two men were quite overpowered; for hitherto their partisans only had\n cheered at each successive hit, but now the whole company shouted with\n delight until the columns of the Lyceum returned the sound, seeming to\n sympathize in their joy. To such a pitch was I affected myself, that I\n made a speech, in which I acknowledged that I had never seen the like of\n their wisdom; I was their devoted servant, and fell to praising and\n admiring of them. What marvellous dexterity of wit, I said, enabled you to\n acquire this great perfection in such a short time? There is much, indeed,\n to admire in your words, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, but there is nothing\n that I admire more than your magnanimous disregard of any opinion\u0026mdash;whether\n of the many, or of the grave and reverend seigniors\u0026mdash;you regard only\n those who are like yourselves. And I do verily believe that there are few\n who are like you, and who would approve of such arguments; the majority of\n mankind are so ignorant of their value, that they would be more ashamed of\n employing them in the refutation of others than of being refuted by them.\n I must further express my approval of your kind and public-spirited denial\n of all differences, whether of good and evil, white or black, or any\n other; the result of which is that, as you say, every mouth is sewn up,\n not excepting your own, which graciously follows the example of others;\n and thus all ground of offence is taken away. But what appears to me to be\n more than all is, that this art and invention of yours has been so\n admirably contrived by you, that in a very short time it can be imparted\n to any one. I observed that Ctesippus learned to imitate you in no time.\n Now this quickness of attainment is an excellent thing; but at the same\n time I would advise you not to have any more public entertainments; there\n is a danger that men may undervalue an art which they have so easy an\n opportunity of acquiring; the exhibition would be best of all, if the\n discussion were confined to your two selves; but if there must be an\n audience, let him only be present who is willing to pay a handsome fee;\u0026mdash;you\n should be careful of this;\u0026mdash;and if you are wise, you will also bid\n your disciples discourse with no man but you and themselves. For only what\n is rare is valuable; and \u0027water,\u0027 which, as Pindar says, is the \u0027best of\n all things,\u0027 is also the cheapest. And now I have only to request that you\n will receive Cleinias and me among your pupils.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n Such was the discussion, Crito; and after a few more words had passed\n between us we went away. I hope that you will come to them with me, since\n they say that they are able to teach any one who will give them money; no\n age or want of capacity is an impediment. And I must repeat one thing\n which they said, for your especial benefit,\u0026mdash;that the learning of\n their art did not at all interfere with the business of money-making.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n CRITO: Truly, Socrates, though I am curious and ready to learn, yet I fear\n that I am not like-minded with Euthydemus, but one of the other sort, who,\n as you were saying, would rather be refuted by such arguments than use\n them in refutation of others. And though I may appear ridiculous in\n venturing to advise you, I think that you may as well hear what was said\n to me by a man of very considerable pretensions\u0026mdash;he was a professor\n of legal oratory\u0026mdash;who came away from you while I was walking up and\n down. \u0027Crito,\u0027 said he to me, \u0027are you giving no attention to these wise\n men?\u0027 \u0027No, indeed,\u0027 I said to him; \u0027I could not get within hearing of them\u0026mdash;there\n was such a crowd.\u0027 \u0027You would have heard something worth hearing if you\n had.\u0027 \u0027What was that?\u0027 I said. \u0027You would have heard the greatest masters\n of the art of rhetoric discoursing.\u0027 \u0027And what did you think of them?\u0027 I\n said. \u0027What did I think of them?\u0027 he said:\u0026mdash;\u0027theirs was the sort of\n discourse which anybody might hear from men who were playing the fool, and\n making much ado about nothing.\u0027 That was the expression which he used.\n \u0027Surely,\u0027 I said, \u0027philosophy is a charming thing.\u0027 \u0027Charming!\u0027 he said;\n \u0027what simplicity! philosophy is nought; and I think that if you had been\n present you would have been ashamed of your friend\u0026mdash;his conduct was\n so very strange in placing himself at the mercy of men who care not what\n they say, and fasten upon every word. And these, as I was telling you, are\n supposed to be the most eminent professors of their time. But the truth\n is, Crito, that the study itself and the men themselves are utterly mean\n and ridiculous.\u0027 Now censure of the pursuit, Socrates, whether coming from\n him or from others, appears to me to be undeserved; but as to the\n impropriety of holding a public discussion with such men, there, I confess\n that, in my opinion, he was in the right.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n SOCRATES: O Crito, they are marvellous men; but what was I going to say?\n First of all let me know;\u0026mdash;What manner of man was he who came up to\n you and censured philosophy; was he an orator who himself practises in the\n courts, or an instructor of orators, who makes the speeches with which\n they do battle?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n CRITO: He was certainly not an orator, and I doubt whether he had ever\n been into court; but they say that he knows the business, and is a clever\n man, and composes wonderful speeches.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n SOCRATES: Now I understand, Crito; he is one of an amphibious class, whom\n I was on the point of mentioning\u0026mdash;one of those whom Prodicus\n describes as on the border-ground between philosophers and statesmen\u0026mdash;they\n think that they are the wisest of all men, and that they are generally\n esteemed the wisest; nothing but the rivalry of the philosophers stands in\n their way; and they are of the opinion that if they can prove the\n philosophers to be good for nothing, no one will dispute their title to\n the palm of wisdom, for that they are themselves really the wisest,\n although they are apt to be mauled by Euthydemus and his friends, when\n they get hold of them in conversation. This opinion which they entertain\n of their own wisdom is very natural; for they have a certain amount of\n philosophy, and a certain amount of political wisdom; there is reason in\n what they say, for they argue that they have just enough of both, and so\n they keep out of the way of all risks and conflicts and reap the fruits of\n their wisdom.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n CRITO: What do you say of them, Socrates? There is certainly something\n specious in that notion of theirs.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n SOCRATES: Yes, Crito, there is more speciousness than truth; they cannot\n be made to understand the nature of intermediates. For all persons or\n things, which are intermediate between two other things, and participate\n in both of them\u0026mdash;if one of these two things is good and the other\n evil, are better than the one and worse than the other; but if they are in\n a mean between two good things which do not tend to the same end, they\n fall short of either of their component elements in the attainment of\n their ends. Only in the case when the two component elements which do not\n tend to the same end are evil is the participant better than either. Now,\n if philosophy and political action are both good, but tend to different\n ends, and they participate in both, and are in a mean between them, then\n they are talking nonsense, for they are worse than either; or, if the one\n be good and the other evil, they are better than the one and worse than\n the other; only on the supposition that they are both evil could there be\n any truth in what they say. I do not think that they will admit that their\n two pursuits are either wholly or partly evil; but the truth is, that\n these philosopher-politicians who aim at both fall short of both in the\n attainment of their respective ends, and are really third, although they\n would like to stand first. There is no need, however, to be angry at this\n ambition of theirs\u0026mdash;which may be forgiven; for every man ought to be\n loved who says and manfully pursues and works out anything which is at all\n like wisdom: at the same time we shall do well to see them as they really\n are.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n CRITO: I have often told you, Socrates, that I am in a constant difficulty\n about my two sons. What am I to do with them? There is no hurry about the\n younger one, who is only a child; but the other, Critobulus, is getting\n on, and needs some one who will improve him. I cannot help thinking, when\n I hear you talk, that there is a sort of madness in many of our anxieties\n about our children:\u0026mdash;in the first place, about marrying a wife of\n good family to be the mother of them, and then about heaping up money for\n them\u0026mdash;and yet taking no care about their education. But then again,\n when I contemplate any of those who pretend to educate others, I am\n amazed. To me, if I am to confess the truth, they all seem to be such\n outrageous beings: so that I do not know how I can advise the youth to\n study philosophy.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n SOCRATES: Dear Crito, do you not know that in every profession the\n inferior sort are numerous and good for nothing, and the good are few and\n beyond all price: for example, are not gymnastic and rhetoric and\n money-making and the art of the general, noble arts?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n CRITO: Certainly they are, in my judgment.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n SOCRATES: Well, and do you not see that in each of these arts the many are\n ridiculous performers?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n CRITO: Yes, indeed, that is very true.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n SOCRATES: And will you on this account shun all these pursuits yourself\n and refuse to allow them to your son?\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n CRITO: That would not be reasonable, Socrates.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n SOCRATES: Do you then be reasonable, Crito, and do not mind whether the\n teachers of philosophy are good or bad, but think only of philosophy\n herself. Try and examine her well and truly, and if she be evil seek to\n turn away all men from her, and not your sons only; but if she be what I\n believe that she is, then follow her and serve her, you and your house, as\n the saying is, and be of good cheer.\n \u003c/p\u003e\n \u003cp\u003e\n \u003cbr /\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\u003cbr /\u003e\n \u003c/p\u003e\r\n\u003c/article\u003e"}],"SectionSequence":["Back Link","Work Title","Deck","Author","Period","Era","Composition","Date Note","Region","Terra Avita","Terra Avita Region","Modern Country","Original Title","Language","Primary Discipline","Secondary Discipline","Tradition","Full Versions","Core Thesis","Classification","Arguments","Influence","Significance","Evidence Note","Full Text"],"Counts":{"ContextCards":3,"GeoCards":4,"DisciplineCards":2,"Links":11,"Sections":25,"Styles":3,"Scripts":1}}