Republic
{"WorkMasterId":7133,"WpPageId":287668,"ParentWpPageId":189509,"Slug":"republic","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/plato/republic/","RelativeUrl":"theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/plato/republic/","HasFullText":true,"RawHtmlLength":1326208,"CleanHtmlLength":1270098,"Kicker":"Philosophy Work","Title":"Republic","Deck":"Republic presents justice in city and soul, philosopher-rule, education, the divided line, the cave, and the Form of the Good.","BackLink":{"Text":"Back to Plato","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/plato/"},"AuthorCard":{"Label":"Author","Title":"Plato","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/plato/","MediaHref":"","ImageSrc":"https://chrisdeasy.com/wp-content/uploads/plato-01-capitoline-bust-7.jpg","ImageAlt":"Plato bust in the Capitoline Museums","FilterTerra":"Eastern Mediterranean","ClickText":"Plato","ClickHref":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/philosophers/plato/","Copies":["427 BCE – 347 BCE","Athens","Athenian philosopher of Forms, dialectic, recollection, the Good, tripartite soul, philosopher-rule, eros, rhetoric, language, cosmology, theology, the Academy, and the Platonic corpus."]},"ContextCards":[{"Label":"Period","Key":"Period:1","Title":"Ancient History","DateText":"3000 BCE – 499 CE","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/eras-of-thought/philosophers-of-ancient-history/"},{"Label":"Era","Key":"Era:3","Title":"Classical Antiquity","DateText":"500 BCE – 499 CE","Url":"https://chrisdeasy.com/theos/humanities/philosophy/eras-of-thought/philosophers-of-ancient-history/philosophers-of-classical-antiquity/"},{"Label":"Composition","Title":"375 BCE","Url":"","DateText":""}],"DateNote":"Source-backed approximate date.","GeoCards":[{"Label":"Region","Key":"Region:1"},{"Label":"Terra Avita","Key":"TerraAvita:2"},{"Label":"Terra Avita Region","Key":"TerraAvitaRegion:8"},{"Label":"Modern Country","Key":"Country:GRC:2"}],"OriginalTitle":"Politeia","Language":"Ancient Greek","DisciplineCards":[{"Label":"Primary Discipline","Key":"Discipline:political-philosophy"},{"Label":"Secondary Discipline","Key":"Discipline:ethics"}],"Tradition":"Platonism / Ancient Greek philosophy","FullText":{"Title":"Full Text","Copy":"Public-domain full text from Project Gutenberg eBook #1497 .","Url":"","Label":"","Kicker":"","Cards":[]},"CoreThesis":["Republic presents justice in city and soul, philosopher-rule, education, the divided line, the cave, and the Form of the Good."],"Classification":{"AlternateTitles":"Republic; On Justice","KeyConcepts":"Republic; On Justice","Methodology":"Source-backed Direct work entry.","Structure":"Direct Platonic corpus entry"},"Arguments":["Republic presents justice in city and soul, philosopher-rule, education, the divided line, the cave, and the Form of the Good."],"Influence":{"InfluencedBy":"","InfluenceOn":""},"Significance":["Direct Platonic dialogue; date is approximate and no full text is imported.","Republic is registered as a source-backed work in the Platonic corpus. The page records dating and authenticity caveats where needed; no full text is imported."],"EvidenceNote":["Direct Platonic dialogue; date is approximate and no full text is imported."],"MainSections":[{"Kind":"RawSection","Title":"Full Versions","BodyHtml":"\u003cdiv class=\"dz-philo__full-version-grid\"\u003e\n \u003carticle class=\"dz-philo__full-version-card\"\u003e\n \u003cp class=\"dz-philo__full-version-provider\"\u003eProject Gutenberg\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003ch3 class=\"dz-philo__full-version-title\"\u003eProject Gutenberg eBook #1497\u003c/h3\u003e\n \u003cp class=\"dz-philo__full-version-meta\"\u003eHtmlText · Imported\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003ca class=\"dz-philo__full-version-link\" href=\"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/1497\"\u003eOpen full version\u003c/a\u003e\n \u003c/article\u003e\n \u003c/div\u003e"},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Core Thesis","Paragraphs":["Republic presents justice in city and soul, philosopher-rule, education, the divided line, the cave, and the Form of the Good."]},{"Kind":"FieldSection","Title":"Classification","Fields":[{"Label":"Alternate Titles","Value":"Republic; On Justice"},{"Label":"Key Concepts","Value":"Republic; On Justice"},{"Label":"Methodology","Value":"Source-backed Direct work entry."},{"Label":"Structure","Value":"Direct Platonic corpus entry"}]},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Arguments","Paragraphs":["Republic presents justice in city and soul, philosopher-rule, education, the divided line, the cave, and the Form of the Good."]},{"Kind":"FieldSection","Title":"Influence","Fields":[{"Label":"Influenced By","Value":""},{"Label":"Influence On","Value":""}]},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Significance","Paragraphs":["Direct Platonic dialogue; date is approximate and no full text is imported.","Republic is registered as a source-backed work in the Platonic corpus. The page records dating and authenticity caveats where needed; no full text is imported."]},{"Kind":"TextSection","Title":"Evidence Note","Paragraphs":["Direct Platonic dialogue; date is approximate and no full text is imported."]},{"Kind":"RawSection","Title":"Full Text","BodyHtml":"\u003cp class=\"dz-philo__section-copy dz-philo__full-text-source\"\u003ePublic-domain full text from \u003ca href=\"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/1497\"\u003eProject Gutenberg eBook #1497\u003c/a\u003e.\u003c/p\u003e\n \u003carticle class=\"dz-philo__full-text-body\"\u003e\r\n\u003ch1\u003eTHE REPUBLIC\u003c/h1\u003e\n\n\u003ch2 class=\"no-break\"\u003eBy Plato\u003c/h2\u003e\n\n\u003ch3\u003eTranslated by Benjamin Jowett\u003c/h3\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNote: See also \u0026ldquo;The Republic\u0026rdquo; by Plato, Jowett, eBook #150\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003chr \u003e\n\n\u003ch2\u003eContents\u003c/h2\u003e\n\n\u003ctable\u003e\n\n\u003ctr\u003e\n\u003ctd\u003e \u003ca href=\"#link2H_INTR\"\u003eINTRODUCTION AND ANALYSIS.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\n\u003c/tr\u003e\n\n\u003ctr\u003e\n\u003ctd\u003e \u003ca href=\"#link2H_4_0002\"\u003e\u003cb\u003eTHE REPUBLIC.\u003c/b\u003e\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\n\u003c/tr\u003e\n\n\u003ctr\u003e\n\u003ctd\u003e \u003ca href=\"#link2H_4_0003\"\u003ePERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\n\u003c/tr\u003e\n\n\u003ctr\u003e\n\u003ctd\u003e \u003ca href=\"#link2H_4_0004\"\u003eBOOK I.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\n\u003c/tr\u003e\n\n\u003ctr\u003e\n\u003ctd\u003e \u003ca href=\"#link2H_4_0005\"\u003eBOOK II.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\n\u003c/tr\u003e\n\n\u003ctr\u003e\n\u003ctd\u003e \u003ca href=\"#link2H_4_0006\"\u003eBOOK III.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\n\u003c/tr\u003e\n\n\u003ctr\u003e\n\u003ctd\u003e \u003ca href=\"#link2H_4_0007\"\u003eBOOK IV.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\n\u003c/tr\u003e\n\n\u003ctr\u003e\n\u003ctd\u003e \u003ca href=\"#link2H_4_0008\"\u003eBOOK V.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\n\u003c/tr\u003e\n\n\u003ctr\u003e\n\u003ctd\u003e \u003ca href=\"#link2H_4_0009\"\u003eBOOK VI.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\n\u003c/tr\u003e\n\n\u003ctr\u003e\n\u003ctd\u003e \u003ca href=\"#link2H_4_0010\"\u003eBOOK VII.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\n\u003c/tr\u003e\n\n\u003ctr\u003e\n\u003ctd\u003e \u003ca href=\"#link2H_4_0011\"\u003eBOOK VIII.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\n\u003c/tr\u003e\n\n\u003ctr\u003e\n\u003ctd\u003e \u003ca href=\"#link2H_4_0012\"\u003eBOOK IX.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\n\u003c/tr\u003e\n\n\u003ctr\u003e\n\u003ctd\u003e \u003ca href=\"#link2H_4_0013\"\u003eBOOK X.\u003c/a\u003e\u003c/td\u003e\n\u003c/tr\u003e\n\n\u003c/table\u003e\n\n\u003chr \u003e\n\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\n\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca id=\"link2H_INTR\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e INTRODUCTION AND ANALYSIS.\n\u003c/h2\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe Republic of Plato is the longest of his works with the exception of the\nLaws, and is certainly the greatest of them. There are nearer approaches to\nmodern metaphysics in the Philebus and in the Sophist; the Politicus or\nStatesman is more ideal; the form and institutions of the State are more\nclearly drawn out in the Laws; as works of art, the Symposium and the\nProtagoras are of higher excellence. But no other Dialogue of Plato has the\nsame largeness of view and the same perfection of style; no other shows an\nequal knowledge of the world, or contains more of those thoughts which are new\nas well as old, and not of one age only but of all. Nowhere in Plato is there a\ndeeper irony or a greater wealth of humour or imagery, or more dramatic power.\nNor in any other of his writings is the attempt made to interweave life and\nspeculation, or to connect politics with philosophy. The Republic is the centre\naround which the other Dialogues may be grouped; here philosophy reaches the\nhighest point (cp, especially in Books V, VI, VII) to which ancient thinkers\never attained. Plato among the Greeks, like Bacon among the moderns, was the\nfirst who conceived a method of knowledge, although neither of them always\ndistinguished the bare outline or form from the substance of truth; and both of\nthem had to be content with an abstraction of science which was not yet\nrealized. He was the greatest metaphysical genius whom the world has seen; and\nin him, more than in any other ancient thinker, the germs of future knowledge\nare contained. The sciences of logic and psychology, which have supplied so\nmany instruments of thought to after-ages, are based upon the analyses of\nSocrates and Plato. The principles of definition, the law of contradiction, the\nfallacy of arguing in a circle, the distinction between the essence and\naccidents of a thing or notion, between means and ends, between causes and\nconditions; also the division of the mind into the rational, concupiscent, and\nirascible elements, or of pleasures and desires into necessary and\nunnecessary\u0026mdash;these and other great forms of thought are all of them to be\nfound in the Republic, and were probably first invented by Plato. The greatest\nof all logical truths, and the one of which writers on philosophy are most apt\nto lose sight, the difference between words and things, has been most\nstrenuously insisted on by him (cp. Rep.; Polit.; Cratyl. 435, 436 ff),\nalthough he has not always avoided the confusion of them in his own writings\n(e.g. Rep.). But he does not bind up truth in logical formulae,\u0026mdash;logic is\nstill veiled in metaphysics; and the science which he imagines to\n\u0026lsquo;contemplate all truth and all existence\u0026rsquo; is very unlike the\ndoctrine of the syllogism which Aristotle claims to have discovered (Soph.\nElenchi, 33. 18).\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNeither must we forget that the Republic is but the third part of a still\nlarger design which was to have included an ideal history of Athens, as well as\na political and physical philosophy. The fragment of the Critias has given\nbirth to a world-famous fiction, second only in importance to the tale of Troy\nand the legend of Arthur; and is said as a fact to have inspired some of the\nearly navigators of the sixteenth century. This mythical tale, of which the\nsubject was a history of the wars of the Athenians against the Island of\nAtlantis, is supposed to be founded upon an unfinished poem of Solon, to which\nit would have stood in the same relation as the writings of the logographers to\nthe poems of Homer. It would have told of a struggle for Liberty (cp. Tim. 25\nC), intended to represent the conflict of Persia and Hellas. We may judge from\nthe noble commencement of the Timaeus, from the fragment of the Critias itself,\nand from the third book of the Laws, in what manner Plato would have treated\nthis high argument. We can only guess why the great design was abandoned;\nperhaps because Plato became sensible of some incongruity in a fictitious\nhistory, or because he had lost his interest in it, or because advancing years\nforbade the completion of it; and we may please ourselves with the fancy that\nhad this imaginary narrative ever been finished, we should have found Plato\nhimself sympathising with the struggle for Hellenic independence (cp. Laws,\niii. 698 ff.), singing a hymn of triumph over Marathon and Salamis, perhaps\nmaking the reflection of Herodotus (v. 78) where he contemplates the growth of\nthe Athenian empire\u0026mdash;\u0026lsquo;How brave a thing is freedom of speech, which\nhas made the Athenians so far exceed every other state of Hellas in\ngreatness!\u0026rsquo; or, more probably, attributing the victory to the ancient\ngood order of Athens and to the favor of Apollo and Athene (cp. Introd. to\nCritias).\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAgain, Plato may be regarded as the \u0026lsquo;captain\u0026rsquo;\n(\u0026lsquo;arhchegoz\u0026rsquo;) or leader of a goodly band of followers; for in the\nRepublic is to be found the original of Cicero\u0026rsquo;s De Republica, of St.\nAugustine\u0026rsquo;s City of God, of the Utopia of Sir Thomas More, and of the\nnumerous other imaginary States which are framed upon the same model. The\nextent to which Aristotle or the Aristotelian school were indebted to him in\nthe Politics has been little recognised, and the recognition is the more\nnecessary because it is not made by Aristotle himself. The two philosophers had\nmore in common than they were conscious of; and probably some elements of Plato\nremain still undetected in Aristotle. In English philosophy too, many\naffinities may be traced, not only in the works of the Cambridge Platonists,\nbut in great original writers like Berkeley or Coleridge, to Plato and his\nideas. That there is a truth higher than experience, of which the mind bears\nwitness to herself, is a conviction which in our own generation has been\nenthusiastically asserted, and is perhaps gaining ground. Of the Greek authors\nwho at the Renaissance brought a new life into the world Plato has had the\ngreatest influence. The Republic of Plato is also the first treatise upon\neducation, of which the writings of Milton and Locke, Rousseau, Jean Paul, and\nGoethe are the legitimate descendants. Like Dante or Bunyan, he has a\nrevelation of another life; like Bacon, he is profoundly impressed with the\nunity of knowledge; in the early Church he exercised a real influence on\ntheology, and at the Revival of Literature on politics. Even the fragments of\nhis words when \u0026lsquo;repeated at second-hand\u0026rsquo; (Symp. 215 D) have in all\nages ravished the hearts of men, who have seen reflected in them their own\nhigher nature. He is the father of idealism in philosophy, in politics, in\nliterature. And many of the latest conceptions of modern thinkers and\nstatesmen, such as the unity of knowledge, the reign of law, and the equality\nof the sexes, have been anticipated in a dream by him.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe argument of the Republic is the search after Justice, the nature of which\nis first hinted at by Cephalus, the just and blameless old man\u0026mdash;then\ndiscussed on the basis of proverbial morality by Socrates and\nPolemarchus\u0026mdash;then caricatured by Thrasymachus and partially explained by\nSocrates\u0026mdash;reduced to an abstraction by Glaucon and Adeimantus, and having\nbecome invisible in the individual reappears at length in the ideal State which\nis constructed by Socrates. The first care of the rulers is to be education, of\nwhich an outline is drawn after the old Hellenic model, providing only for an\nimproved religion and morality, and more simplicity in music and gymnastic, a\nmanlier strain of poetry, and greater harmony of the individual and the State.\nWe are thus led on to the conception of a higher State, in which \u0026lsquo;no man\ncalls anything his own,\u0026rsquo; and in which there is neither \u0026lsquo;marrying\nnor giving in marriage,\u0026rsquo; and \u0026lsquo;kings are philosophers\u0026rsquo; and\n\u0026lsquo;philosophers are kings;\u0026rsquo; and there is another and higher\neducation, intellectual as well as moral and religious, of science as well as\nof art, and not of youth only but of the whole of life. Such a State is hardly\nto be realized in this world and quickly degenerates. To the perfect ideal\nsucceeds the government of the soldier and the lover of honour, this again\ndeclining into democracy, and democracy into tyranny, in an imaginary but\nregular order having not much resemblance to the actual facts. When \u0026lsquo;the\nwheel has come full circle\u0026rsquo; we do not begin again with a new period of\nhuman life; but we have passed from the best to the worst, and there we end.\nThe subject is then changed and the old quarrel of poetry and philosophy which\nhad been more lightly treated in the earlier books of the Republic is now\nresumed and fought out to a conclusion. Poetry is discovered to be an imitation\nthrice removed from the truth, and Homer, as well as the dramatic poets, having\nbeen condemned as an imitator, is sent into banishment along with them. And the\nidea of the State is supplemented by the revelation of a future life.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe division into books, like all similar divisions (Cp. Sir G.C. Lewis in the\nClassical Museum, vol. ii. p 1.), is probably later than the age of Plato. The\nnatural divisions are five in number;\u0026mdash;(1) Book I and the first half of\nBook II down to the paragraph beginning, \u0026lsquo;I had always admired the genius\nof Glaucon and Adeimantus,\u0026rsquo; which is introductory; the first book\ncontaining a refutation of the popular and sophistical notions of justice, and\nconcluding, like some of the earlier Dialogues, without arriving at any\ndefinite result. To this is appended a restatement of the nature of justice\naccording to common opinion, and an answer is demanded to the\nquestion\u0026mdash;What is justice, stripped of appearances? The second division\n(2) includes the remainder of the second and the whole of the third and fourth\nbooks, which are mainly occupied with the construction of the first State and\nthe first education. The third division (3) consists of the fifth, sixth, and\nseventh books, in which philosophy rather than justice is the subject of\nenquiry, and the second State is constructed on principles of communism and\nruled by philosophers, and the contemplation of the idea of good takes the\nplace of the social and political virtues. In the eighth and ninth books (4)\nthe perversions of States and of the individuals who correspond to them are\nreviewed in succession; and the nature of pleasure and the principle of tyranny\nare further analysed in the individual man. The tenth book (5) is the\nconclusion of the whole, in which the relations of philosophy to poetry are\nfinally determined, and the happiness of the citizens in this life, which has\nnow been assured, is crowned by the vision of another.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nOr a more general division into two parts may be adopted; the first (Books I -\nIV) containing the description of a State framed generally in accordance with\nHellenic notions of religion and morality, while in the second (Books V – X)\nthe Hellenic State is transformed into an ideal kingdom of philosophy, of which\nall other governments are the perversions. These two points of view are really\nopposed, and the opposition is only veiled by the genius of Plato. The\nRepublic, like the Phaedrus (see Introduction to Phaedrus), is an imperfect\nwhole; the higher light of philosophy breaks through the regularity of the\nHellenic temple, which at last fades away into the heavens. Whether this\nimperfection of structure arises from an enlargement of the plan; or from the\nimperfect reconcilement in the writer\u0026rsquo;s own mind of the struggling\nelements of thought which are now first brought together by him; or, perhaps,\nfrom the composition of the work at different times\u0026mdash;are questions, like\nthe similar question about the Iliad and the Odyssey, which are worth asking,\nbut which cannot have a distinct answer. In the age of Plato there was no\nregular mode of publication, and an author would have the less scruple in\naltering or adding to a work which was known only to a few of his friends.\nThere is no absurdity in supposing that he may have laid his labours aside for\na time, or turned from one work to another; and such interruptions would be\nmore likely to occur in the case of a long than of a short writing. In all\nattempts to determine the chronological order of the Platonic writings on\ninternal evidence, this uncertainty about any single Dialogue being composed at\none time is a disturbing element, which must be admitted to affect longer\nworks, such as the Republic and the Laws, more than shorter ones. But, on the\nother hand, the seeming discrepancies of the Republic may only arise out of the\ndiscordant elements which the philosopher has attempted to unite in a single\nwhole, perhaps without being himself able to recognise the inconsistency which\nis obvious to us. For there is a judgment of after ages which few great writers\nhave ever been able to anticipate for themselves. They do not perceive the want\nof connexion in their own writings, or the gaps in their systems which are\nvisible enough to those who come after them. In the beginnings of literature\nand philosophy, amid the first efforts of thought and language, more\ninconsistencies occur than now, when the paths of speculation are well worn and\nthe meaning of words precisely defined. For consistency, too, is the growth of\ntime; and some of the greatest creations of the human mind have been wanting in\nunity. Tried by this test, several of the Platonic Dialogues, according to our\nmodern ideas, appear to be defective, but the deficiency is no proof that they\nwere composed at different times or by different hands. And the supposition\nthat the Republic was written uninterruptedly and by a continuous effort is in\nsome degree confirmed by the numerous references from one part of the work to\nanother.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe second title, \u0026lsquo;Concerning Justice,\u0026rsquo; is not the one by which the\nRepublic is quoted, either by Aristotle or generally in antiquity, and, like\nthe other second titles of the Platonic Dialogues, may therefore be assumed to\nbe of later date. Morgenstern and others have asked whether the definition of\njustice, which is the professed aim, or the construction of the State is the\nprincipal argument of the work. The answer is, that the two blend in one, and\nare two faces of the same truth; for justice is the order of the State, and the\nState is the visible embodiment of justice under the conditions of human\nsociety. The one is the soul and the other is the body, and the Greek ideal of\nthe State, as of the individual, is a fair mind in a fair body. In Hegelian\nphraseology the state is the reality of which justice is the idea. Or,\ndescribed in Christian language, the kingdom of God is within, and yet\ndevelopes into a Church or external kingdom; \u0026lsquo;the house not made with\nhands, eternal in the heavens,\u0026rsquo; is reduced to the proportions of an\nearthly building. Or, to use a Platonic image, justice and the State are the\nwarp and the woof which run through the whole texture. And when the\nconstitution of the State is completed, the conception of justice is not\ndismissed, but reappears under the same or different names throughout the work,\nboth as the inner law of the individual soul, and finally as the principle of\nrewards and punishments in another life. The virtues are based on justice, of\nwhich common honesty in buying and selling is the shadow, and justice is based\non the idea of good, which is the harmony of the world, and is reflected both\nin the institutions of states and in motions of the heavenly bodies (cp. Tim.\n47). The Timaeus, which takes up the political rather than the ethical side of\nthe Republic, and is chiefly occupied with hypotheses concerning the outward\nworld, yet contains many indications that the same law is supposed to reign\nover the State, over nature, and over man.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nToo much, however, has been made of this question both in ancient and modern\ntimes. There is a stage of criticism in which all works, whether of nature or\nof art, are referred to design. Now in ancient writings, and indeed in\nliterature generally, there remains often a large element which was not\ncomprehended in the original design. For the plan grows under the\nauthor\u0026rsquo;s hand; new thoughts occur to him in the act of writing; he has\nnot worked out the argument to the end before he begins. The reader who seeks\nto find some one idea under which the whole may be conceived, must necessarily\nseize on the vaguest and most general. Thus Stallbaum, who is dissatisfied with\nthe ordinary explanations of the argument of the Republic, imagines himself to\nhave found the true argument \u0026lsquo;in the representation of human life in a\nState perfected by justice, and governed according to the idea of good.\u0026rsquo;\nThere may be some use in such general descriptions, but they can hardly be said\nto express the design of the writer. The truth is, that we may as well speak of\nmany designs as of one; nor need anything be excluded from the plan of a great\nwork to which the mind is naturally led by the association of ideas, and which\ndoes not interfere with the general purpose. What kind or degree of unity is to\nbe sought after in a building, in the plastic arts, in poetry, in prose, is a\nproblem which has to be determined relatively to the subject-matter. To Plato\nhimself, the enquiry \u0026lsquo;what was the intention of the writer,\u0026rsquo; or\n\u0026lsquo;what was the principal argument of the Republic\u0026rsquo; would have been\nhardly intelligible, and therefore had better be at once dismissed (cp. the\nIntroduction to the Phaedrus).\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIs not the Republic the vehicle of three or four great truths which, to\nPlato\u0026rsquo;s own mind, are most naturally represented in the form of the\nState? Just as in the Jewish prophets the reign of Messiah, or \u0026lsquo;the day\nof the Lord,\u0026rsquo; or the suffering Servant or people of God, or the\n\u0026lsquo;Sun of righteousness with healing in his wings\u0026rsquo; only convey, to us\nat least, their great spiritual ideals, so through the Greek State Plato\nreveals to us his own thoughts about divine perfection, which is the idea of\ngood\u0026mdash;like the sun in the visible world;\u0026mdash;about human perfection,\nwhich is justice\u0026mdash;about education beginning in youth and continuing in\nlater years\u0026mdash;about poets and sophists and tyrants who are the false\nteachers and evil rulers of mankind\u0026mdash;about \u0026lsquo;the world\u0026rsquo; which\nis the embodiment of them\u0026mdash;about a kingdom which exists nowhere upon earth\nbut is laid up in heaven to be the pattern and rule of human life. No such\ninspired creation is at unity with itself, any more than the clouds of heaven\nwhen the sun pierces through them. Every shade of light and dark, of truth, and\nof fiction which is the veil of truth, is allowable in a work of philosophical\nimagination. It is not all on the same plane; it easily passes from ideas to\nmyths and fancies, from facts to figures of speech. It is not prose but poetry,\nat least a great part of it, and ought not to be judged by the rules of logic\nor the probabilities of history. The writer is not fashioning his ideas into an\nartistic whole; they take possession of him and are too much for him. We have\nno need therefore to discuss whether a State such as Plato has conceived is\npracticable or not, or whether the outward form or the inward life came first\ninto the mind of the writer. For the practicability of his ideas has nothing to\ndo with their truth; and the highest thoughts to which he attains may be truly\nsaid to bear the greatest \u0026lsquo;marks of design\u0026rsquo;\u0026mdash;justice more than\nthe external frame-work of the State, the idea of good more than justice. The\ngreat science of dialectic or the organisation of ideas has no real content;\nbut is only a type of the method or spirit in which the higher knowledge is to\nbe pursued by the spectator of all time and all existence. It is in the fifth,\nsixth, and seventh books that Plato reaches the \u0026lsquo;summit of\nspeculation,\u0026rsquo; and these, although they fail to satisfy the requirements\nof a modern thinker, may therefore be regarded as the most important, as they\nare also the most original, portions of the work.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIt is not necessary to discuss at length a minor question which has been raised\nby Boeckh, respecting the imaginary date at which the conversation was held\n(the year 411 B.C. which is proposed by him will do as well as any other); for\na writer of fiction, and especially a writer who, like Plato, is notoriously\ncareless of chronology (cp. Rep., Symp., 193 A, etc.), only aims at general\nprobability. Whether all the persons mentioned in the Republic could ever have\nmet at any one time is not a difficulty which would have occurred to an\nAthenian reading the work forty years later, or to Plato himself at the time of\nwriting (any more than to Shakespeare respecting one of his own dramas); and\nneed not greatly trouble us now. Yet this may be a question having no answer\n\u0026lsquo;which is still worth asking,\u0026rsquo; because the investigation shows that\nwe cannot argue historically from the dates in Plato; it would be useless\ntherefore to waste time in inventing far-fetched reconcilements of them in\norder to avoid chronological difficulties, such, for example, as the conjecture\nof C.F. Hermann, that Glaucon and Adeimantus are not the brothers but the\nuncles of Plato (cp. Apol. 34 A), or the fancy of Stallbaum that Plato\nintentionally left anachronisms indicating the dates at which some of his\nDialogues were written.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe principal characters in the Republic are Cephalus, Polemarchus,\nThrasymachus, Socrates, Glaucon, and Adeimantus. Cephalus appears in the\nintroduction only, Polemarchus drops at the end of the first argument, and\nThrasymachus is reduced to silence at the close of the first book. The main\ndiscussion is carried on by Socrates, Glaucon, and Adeimantus. Among the\ncompany are Lysias (the orator) and Euthydemus, the sons of Cephalus and\nbrothers of Polemarchus, an unknown Charmantides\u0026mdash;these are mute auditors;\nalso there is Cleitophon, who once interrupts, where, as in the Dialogue which\nbears his name, he appears as the friend and ally of Thrasymachus.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCephalus, the patriarch of the house, has been appropriately engaged in\noffering a sacrifice. He is the pattern of an old man who has almost done with\nlife, and is at peace with himself and with all mankind. He feels that he is\ndrawing nearer to the world below, and seems to linger around the memory of the\npast. He is eager that Socrates should come to visit him, fond of the poetry of\nthe last generation, happy in the consciousness of a well-spent life, glad at\nhaving escaped from the tyranny of youthful lusts. His love of conversation,\nhis affection, his indifference to riches, even his garrulity, are interesting\ntraits of character. He is not one of those who have nothing to say, because\ntheir whole mind has been absorbed in making money. Yet he acknowledges that\nriches have the advantage of placing men above the temptation to dishonesty or\nfalsehood. The respectful attention shown to him by Socrates, whose love of\nconversation, no less than the mission imposed upon him by the Oracle, leads\nhim to ask questions of all men, young and old alike, should also be noted. Who\nbetter suited to raise the question of justice than Cephalus, whose life might\nseem to be the expression of it? The moderation with which old age is pictured\nby Cephalus as a very tolerable portion of existence is characteristic, not\nonly of him, but of Greek feeling generally, and contrasts with the\nexaggeration of Cicero in the De Senectute. The evening of life is described by\nPlato in the most expressive manner, yet with the fewest possible touches. As\nCicero remarks (Ep. ad Attic. iv. 16), the aged Cephalus would have been out of\nplace in the discussion which follows, and which he could neither have\nunderstood nor taken part in without a violation of dramatic propriety (cp.\nLysimachus in the Laches).\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHis \u0026lsquo;son and heir\u0026rsquo; Polemarchus has the frankness and impetuousness\nof youth; he is for detaining Socrates by force in the opening scene, and will\nnot \u0026lsquo;let him off\u0026rsquo; on the subject of women and children. Like\nCephalus, he is limited in his point of view, and represents the proverbial\nstage of morality which has rules of life rather than principles; and he quotes\nSimonides (cp. Aristoph. Clouds) as his father had quoted Pindar. But after\nthis he has no more to say; the answers which he makes are only elicited from\nhim by the dialectic of Socrates. He has not yet experienced the influence of\nthe Sophists like Glaucon and Adeimantus, nor is he sensible of the necessity\nof refuting them; he belongs to the pre-Socratic or pre-dialectical age. He is\nincapable of arguing, and is bewildered by Socrates to such a degree that he\ndoes not know what he is saying. He is made to admit that justice is a thief,\nand that the virtues follow the analogy of the arts. From his brother Lysias\n(contra Eratosth.) we learn that he fell a victim to the Thirty Tyrants, but no\nallusion is here made to his fate, nor to the circumstance that Cephalus and\nhis family were of Syracusan origin, and had migrated from Thurii to Athens.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe \u0026lsquo;Chalcedonian giant,\u0026rsquo; Thrasymachus, of whom we have already\nheard in the Phaedrus, is the personification of the Sophists, according to\nPlato\u0026rsquo;s conception of them, in some of their worst characteristics. He is\nvain and blustering, refusing to discourse unless he is paid, fond of making an\noration, and hoping thereby to escape the inevitable Socrates; but a mere child\nin argument, and unable to foresee that the next \u0026lsquo;move\u0026rsquo; (to use a\nPlatonic expression) will \u0026lsquo;shut him up.\u0026rsquo; He has reached the stage\nof framing general notions, and in this respect is in advance of Cephalus and\nPolemarchus. But he is incapable of defending them in a discussion, and vainly\ntries to cover his confusion with banter and insolence. Whether such doctrines\nas are attributed to him by Plato were really held either by him or by any\nother Sophist is uncertain; in the infancy of philosophy serious errors about\nmorality might easily grow up\u0026mdash;they are certainly put into the mouths of\nspeakers in Thucydides; but we are concerned at present with Plato\u0026rsquo;s\ndescription of him, and not with the historical reality. The inequality of the\ncontest adds greatly to the humour of the scene. The pompous and empty Sophist\nis utterly helpless in the hands of the great master of dialectic, who knows\nhow to touch all the springs of vanity and weakness in him. He is greatly\nirritated by the irony of Socrates, but his noisy and imbecile rage only lays\nhim more and more open to the thrusts of his assailant. His determination to\ncram down their throats, or put \u0026lsquo;bodily into their souls\u0026rsquo; his own\nwords, elicits a cry of horror from Socrates. The state of his temper is quite\nas worthy of remark as the process of the argument. Nothing is more amusing\nthan his complete submission when he has been once thoroughly beaten. At first\nhe seems to continue the discussion with reluctance, but soon with apparent\ngood-will, and he even testifies his interest at a later stage by one or two\noccasional remarks. When attacked by Glaucon he is humorously protected by\nSocrates \u0026lsquo;as one who has never been his enemy and is now his\nfriend.\u0026rsquo; From Cicero and Quintilian and from Aristotle\u0026rsquo;s Rhetoric\nwe learn that the Sophist whom Plato has made so ridiculous was a man of note\nwhose writings were preserved in later ages. The play on his name which was\nmade by his contemporary Herodicus (Aris. Rhet.), \u0026lsquo;thou wast ever bold in\nbattle,\u0026rsquo; seems to show that the description of him is not devoid of\nverisimilitude.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhen Thrasymachus has been silenced, the two principal respondents, Glaucon and\nAdeimantus, appear on the scene: here, as in Greek tragedy (cp. Introd. to\nPhaedo), three actors are introduced. At first sight the two sons of Ariston\nmay seem to wear a family likeness, like the two friends Simmias and Cebes in\nthe Phaedo. But on a nearer examination of them the similarity vanishes, and\nthey are seen to be distinct characters. Glaucon is the impetuous youth who can\n\u0026lsquo;just never have enough of fechting\u0026rsquo; (cp. the character of him in\nXen. Mem. iii. 6); the man of pleasure who is acquainted with the mysteries of\nlove; the \u0026lsquo;juvenis qui gaudet canibus,\u0026rsquo; and who improves the breed\nof animals; the lover of art and music who has all the experiences of youthful\nlife. He is full of quickness and penetration, piercing easily below the clumsy\nplatitudes of Thrasymachus to the real difficulty; he turns out to the light\nthe seamy side of human life, and yet does not lose faith in the just and true.\nIt is Glaucon who seizes what may be termed the ludicrous relation of the\nphilosopher to the world, to whom a state of simplicity is \u0026lsquo;a city of\npigs,\u0026rsquo; who is always prepared with a jest when the argument offers him an\nopportunity, and who is ever ready to second the humour of Socrates and to\nappreciate the ridiculous, whether in the connoisseurs of music, or in the\nlovers of theatricals, or in the fantastic behaviour of the citizens of\ndemocracy. His weaknesses are several times alluded to by Socrates, who,\nhowever, will not allow him to be attacked by his brother Adeimantus. He is a\nsoldier, and, like Adeimantus, has been distinguished at the battle of Megara\n(anno 456?)…The character of Adeimantus is deeper and graver, and the\nprofounder objections are commonly put into his mouth. Glaucon is more\ndemonstrative, and generally opens the game. Adeimantus pursues the argument\nfurther. Glaucon has more of the liveliness and quick sympathy of youth;\nAdeimantus has the maturer judgment of a grown-up man of the world. In the\nsecond book, when Glaucon insists that justice and injustice shall be\nconsidered without regard to their consequences, Adeimantus remarks that they\nare regarded by mankind in general only for the sake of their consequences; and\nin a similar vein of reflection he urges at the beginning of the fourth book\nthat Socrates fails in making his citizens happy, and is answered that\nhappiness is not the first but the second thing, not the direct aim but the\nindirect consequence of the good government of a State. In the discussion about\nreligion and mythology, Adeimantus is the respondent, but Glaucon breaks in\nwith a slight jest, and carries on the conversation in a lighter tone about\nmusic and gymnastic to the end of the book. It is Adeimantus again who\nvolunteers the criticism of common sense on the Socratic method of argument,\nand who refuses to let Socrates pass lightly over the question of women and\nchildren. It is Adeimantus who is the respondent in the more argumentative, as\nGlaucon in the lighter and more imaginative portions of the Dialogue. For\nexample, throughout the greater part of the sixth book, the causes of the\ncorruption of philosophy and the conception of the idea of good are discussed\nwith Adeimantus. Glaucon resumes his place of principal respondent; but he has\na difficulty in apprehending the higher education of Socrates, and makes some\nfalse hits in the course of the discussion. Once more Adeimantus returns with\nthe allusion to his brother Glaucon whom he compares to the contentious State;\nin the next book he is again superseded, and Glaucon continues to the end.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThus in a succession of characters Plato represents the successive stages of\nmorality, beginning with the Athenian gentleman of the olden time, who is\nfollowed by the practical man of that day regulating his life by proverbs and\nsaws; to him succeeds the wild generalization of the Sophists, and lastly come\nthe young disciples of the great teacher, who know the sophistical arguments\nbut will not be convinced by them, and desire to go deeper into the nature of\nthings. These too, like Cephalus, Polemarchus, Thrasymachus, are clearly\ndistinguished from one another. Neither in the Republic, nor in any other\nDialogue of Plato, is a single character repeated.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe delineation of Socrates in the Republic is not wholly consistent. In the\nfirst book we have more of the real Socrates, such as he is depicted in the\nMemorabilia of Xenophon, in the earliest Dialogues of Plato, and in the\nApology. He is ironical, provoking, questioning, the old enemy of the Sophists,\nready to put on the mask of Silenus as well as to argue seriously. But in the\nsixth book his enmity towards the Sophists abates; he acknowledges that they\nare the representatives rather than the corrupters of the world. He also\nbecomes more dogmatic and constructive, passing beyond the range either of the\npolitical or the speculative ideas of the real Socrates. In one passage Plato\nhimself seems to intimate that the time had now come for Socrates, who had\npassed his whole life in philosophy, to give his own opinion and not to be\nalways repeating the notions of other men. There is no evidence that either the\nidea of good or the conception of a perfect state were comprehended in the\nSocratic teaching, though he certainly dwelt on the nature of the universal and\nof final causes (cp. Xen. Mem.; Phaedo); and a deep thinker like him, in his\nthirty or forty years of public teaching, could hardly have failed to touch on\nthe nature of family relations, for which there is also some positive evidence\nin the Memorabilia (Mem.) The Socratic method is nominally retained; and every\ninference is either put into the mouth of the respondent or represented as the\ncommon discovery of him and Socrates. But any one can see that this is a mere\nform, of which the affectation grows wearisome as the work advances. The method\nof enquiry has passed into a method of teaching in which by the help of\ninterlocutors the same thesis is looked at from various points of view. The\nnature of the process is truly characterized by Glaucon, when he describes\nhimself as a companion who is not good for much in an investigation, but can\nsee what he is shown, and may, perhaps, give the answer to a question more\nfluently than another.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNeither can we be absolutely certain that Socrates himself taught the\nimmortality of the soul, which is unknown to his disciple Glaucon in the\nRepublic (cp. Apol.); nor is there any reason to suppose that he used myths or\nrevelations of another world as a vehicle of instruction, or that he would have\nbanished poetry or have denounced the Greek mythology. His favorite oath is\nretained, and a slight mention is made of the daemonium, or internal sign,\nwhich is alluded to by Socrates as a phenomenon peculiar to himself. A real\nelement of Socratic teaching, which is more prominent in the Republic than in\nany of the other Dialogues of Plato, is the use of example and illustration\nτὰ φορτικὰ αὐτῷ προσφέροντες,\n\u0026lsquo;Let us apply the test of common instances.\u0026rsquo; \u0026lsquo;You,\u0026rsquo;\nsays Adeimantus, ironically, in the sixth book, \u0026lsquo;are so unaccustomed to\nspeak in images.\u0026rsquo; And this use of examples or images, though truly\nSocratic in origin, is enlarged by the genius of Plato into the form of an\nallegory or parable, which embodies in the concrete what has been already\ndescribed, or is about to be described, in the abstract. Thus the figure of the\ncave in Book VII is a recapitulation of the divisions of knowledge in Book VI.\nThe composite animal in Book IX is an allegory of the parts of the soul. The\nnoble captain and the ship and the true pilot in Book VI are a figure of the\nrelation of the people to the philosophers in the State which has been\ndescribed. Other figures, such as the dog, or the marriage of the portionless\nmaiden, or the drones and wasps in the eighth and ninth books, also form links\nof connexion in long passages, or are used to recall previous discussions.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nPlato is most true to the character of his master when he describes him as\n\u0026lsquo;not of this world.\u0026rsquo; And with this representation of him the ideal\nstate and the other paradoxes of the Republic are quite in accordance, though\nthey cannot be shown to have been speculations of Socrates. To him, as to other\ngreat teachers both philosophical and religious, when they looked upward, the\nworld seemed to be the embodiment of error and evil. The common sense of\nmankind has revolted against this view, or has only partially admitted it. And\neven in Socrates himself the sterner judgement of the multitude at times passes\ninto a sort of ironical pity or love. Men in general are incapable of\nphilosophy, and are therefore at enmity with the philosopher; but their\nmisunderstanding of him is unavoidable: for they have never seen him as he\ntruly is in his own image; they are only acquainted with artificial systems\npossessing no native force of truth\u0026mdash;words which admit of many\napplications. Their leaders have nothing to measure with, and are therefore\nignorant of their own stature. But they are to be pitied or laughed at, not to\nbe quarrelled with; they mean well with their nostrums, if they could only\nlearn that they are cutting off a Hydra\u0026rsquo;s head. This moderation towards\nthose who are in error is one of the most characteristic features of Socrates\nin the Republic. In all the different representations of Socrates, whether of\nXenophon or Plato, and amid the differences of the earlier or later Dialogues,\nhe always retains the character of the unwearied and disinterested seeker after\ntruth, without which he would have ceased to be Socrates.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nLeaving the characters we may now analyse the contents of the Republic, and\nthen proceed to consider (1) The general aspects of this Hellenic ideal of the\nState, (2) The modern lights in which the thoughts of Plato may be read.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBOOK I. The Republic opens with a truly Greek scene\u0026mdash;a festival in honour\nof the goddess Bendis which is held in the Piraeus; to this is added the\npromise of an equestrian torch-race in the evening. The whole work is supposed\nto be recited by Socrates on the day after the festival to a small party,\nconsisting of Critias, Timaeus, Hermocrates, and another; this we learn from\nthe first words of the Timaeus.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhen the rhetorical advantage of reciting the Dialogue has been gained, the\nattention is not distracted by any reference to the audience; nor is the reader\nfurther reminded of the extraordinary length of the narrative. Of the numerous\ncompany, three only take any serious part in the discussion; nor are we\ninformed whether in the evening they went to the torch-race, or talked, as in\nthe Symposium, through the night. The manner in which the conversation has\narisen is described as follows:\u0026mdash;Socrates and his companion Glaucon are\nabout to leave the festival when they are detained by a message from\nPolemarchus, who speedily appears accompanied by Adeimantus, the brother of\nGlaucon, and with playful violence compels them to remain, promising them not\nonly the torch-race, but the pleasure of conversation with the young, which to\nSocrates is a far greater attraction. They return to the house of Cephalus,\nPolemarchus\u0026rsquo; father, now in extreme old age, who is found sitting upon a\ncushioned seat crowned for a sacrifice. \u0026lsquo;You should come to me oftener,\nSocrates, for I am too old to go to you; and at my time of life, having lost\nother pleasures, I care the more for conversation.\u0026rsquo; Socrates asks him\nwhat he thinks of age, to which the old man replies, that the sorrows and\ndiscontents of age are to be attributed to the tempers of men, and that age is\na time of peace in which the tyranny of the passions is no longer felt. Yes,\nreplies Socrates, but the world will say, Cephalus, that you are happy in old\nage because you are rich. \u0026lsquo;And there is something in what they say,\nSocrates, but not so much as they imagine\u0026mdash;as Themistocles replied to the\nSeriphian, \u0026ldquo;Neither you, if you had been an Athenian, nor I, if I had\nbeen a Seriphian, would ever have been famous,\u0026rdquo; I might in like manner\nreply to you, Neither a good poor man can be happy in age, nor yet a bad rich\nman.\u0026rsquo; Socrates remarks that Cephalus appears not to care about riches, a\nquality which he ascribes to his having inherited, not acquired them, and would\nlike to know what he considers to be the chief advantage of them. Cephalus\nanswers that when you are old the belief in the world below grows upon you, and\nthen to have done justice and never to have been compelled to do injustice\nthrough poverty, and never to have deceived anyone, are felt to be unspeakable\nblessings. Socrates, who is evidently preparing for an argument, next asks,\nWhat is the meaning of the word justice? To tell the truth and pay your debts?\nNo more than this? Or must we admit exceptions? Ought I, for example, to put\nback into the hands of my friend, who has gone mad, the sword which I borrowed\nof him when he was in his right mind? \u0026lsquo;There must be exceptions.\u0026rsquo;\n\u0026lsquo;And yet,\u0026rsquo; says Polemarchus, \u0026lsquo;the definition which has been\ngiven has the authority of Simonides.\u0026rsquo; Here Cephalus retires to look\nafter the sacrifices, and bequeaths, as Socrates facetiously remarks, the\npossession of the argument to his heir, Polemarchus…\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe description of old age is finished, and Plato, as his manner is, has\ntouched the key-note of the whole work in asking for the definition of justice,\nfirst suggesting the question which Glaucon afterwards pursues respecting\nexternal goods, and preparing for the concluding mythus of the world below in\nthe slight allusion of Cephalus. The portrait of the just man is a natural\nfrontispiece or introduction to the long discourse which follows, and may\nperhaps imply that in all our perplexity about the nature of justice, there is\nno difficulty in discerning \u0026lsquo;who is a just man.\u0026rsquo; The first\nexplanation has been supported by a saying of Simonides; and now Socrates has a\nmind to show that the resolution of justice into two unconnected precepts,\nwhich have no common principle, fails to satisfy the demands of dialectic.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n…He proceeds: What did Simonides mean by this saying of his? Did he mean that\nI was to give back arms to a madman? \u0026lsquo;No, not in that case, not if the\nparties are friends, and evil would result. He meant that you were to do what\nwas proper, good to friends and harm to enemies.\u0026rsquo; Every act does\nsomething to somebody; and following this analogy, Socrates asks, What is this\ndue and proper thing which justice does, and to whom? He is answered that\njustice does good to friends and harm to enemies. But in what way good or harm?\n\u0026lsquo;In making alliances with the one, and going to war with the\nother.\u0026rsquo; Then in time of peace what is the good of justice? The answer is\nthat justice is of use in contracts, and contracts are money partnerships. Yes;\nbut how in such partnerships is the just man of more use than any other man?\n\u0026lsquo;When you want to have money safely kept and not used.\u0026rsquo; Then\njustice will be useful when money is useless. And there is another difficulty:\njustice, like the art of war or any other art, must be of opposites, good at\nattack as well as at defence, at stealing as well as at guarding. But then\njustice is a thief, though a hero notwithstanding, like Autolycus, the Homeric\nhero, who was \u0026lsquo;excellent above all men in theft and\nperjury\u0026rsquo;\u0026mdash;to such a pass have you and Homer and Simonides brought\nus; though I do not forget that the thieving must be for the good of friends\nand the harm of enemies. And still there arises another question: Are friends\nto be interpreted as real or seeming; enemies as real or seeming? And are our\nfriends to be only the good, and our enemies to be the evil? The answer is,\nthat we must do good to our seeming and real good friends, and evil to our\nseeming and real evil enemies\u0026mdash;good to the good, evil to the evil. But\nought we to render evil for evil at all, when to do so will only make men more\nevil? Can justice produce injustice any more than the art of horsemanship can\nmake bad horsemen, or heat produce cold? The final conclusion is, that no sage\nor poet ever said that the just return evil for evil; this was a maxim of some\nrich and mighty man, Periander, Perdiccas, or Ismenias the Theban (about B.C.\n398-381)…\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThus the first stage of aphoristic or unconscious morality is shown to be\ninadequate to the wants of the age; the authority of the poets is set aside,\nand through the winding mazes of dialectic we make an approach to the Christian\nprecept of forgiveness of injuries. Similar words are applied by the Persian\nmystic poet to the Divine being when the questioning spirit is stirred within\nhim:\u0026mdash;\u0026lsquo;If because I do evil, Thou punishest me by evil, what is the\ndifference between Thee and me?\u0026rsquo; In this both Plato and Kheyam rise above\nthe level of many Christian (?) theologians. The first definition of justice\neasily passes into the second; for the simple words \u0026lsquo;to speak the truth\nand pay your debts\u0026rsquo; is substituted the more abstract \u0026lsquo;to do good to\nyour friends and harm to your enemies.\u0026rsquo; Either of these explanations\ngives a sufficient rule of life for plain men, but they both fall short of the\nprecision of philosophy. We may note in passing the antiquity of casuistry,\nwhich not only arises out of the conflict of established principles in\nparticular cases, but also out of the effort to attain them, and is prior as\nwell as posterior to our fundamental notions of morality. The\n\u0026lsquo;interrogation\u0026rsquo; of moral ideas; the appeal to the authority of\nHomer; the conclusion that the maxim, \u0026lsquo;Do good to your friends and harm\nto your enemies,\u0026rsquo; being erroneous, could not have been the word of any\ngreat man, are all of them very characteristic of the Platonic Socrates.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n…Here Thrasymachus, who has made several attempts to interrupt, but has\nhitherto been kept in order by the company, takes advantage of a pause and\nrushes into the arena, beginning, like a savage animal, with a roar.\n\u0026lsquo;Socrates,\u0026rsquo; he says, \u0026lsquo;what folly is this?\u0026mdash;Why do you\nagree to be vanquished by one another in a pretended argument?\u0026rsquo; He then\nprohibits all the ordinary definitions of justice; to which Socrates replies\nthat he cannot tell how many twelve is, if he is forbidden to say 2 x 6, or 3 x\n4, or 6 x 2, or 4 x 3. At first Thrasymachus is reluctant to argue; but at\nlength, with a promise of payment on the part of the company and of praise from\nSocrates, he is induced to open the game. \u0026lsquo;Listen,\u0026rsquo; he says,\n\u0026lsquo;my answer is that might is right, justice the interest of the stronger:\nnow praise me.\u0026rsquo; Let me understand you first. Do you mean that because\nPolydamas the wrestler, who is stronger than we are, finds the eating of beef\nfor his interest, the eating of beef is also for our interest, who are not so\nstrong? Thrasymachus is indignant at the illustration, and in pompous words,\napparently intended to restore dignity to the argument, he explains his meaning\nto be that the rulers make laws for their own interests. But suppose, says\nSocrates, that the ruler or stronger makes a mistake\u0026mdash;then the interest of\nthe stronger is not his interest. Thrasymachus is saved from this speedy\ndownfall by his disciple Cleitophon, who introduces the word\n\u0026lsquo;thinks;\u0026rsquo;\u0026mdash;not the actual interest of the ruler, but what he\nthinks or what seems to be his interest, is justice. The contradiction is\nescaped by the unmeaning evasion: for though his real and apparent interests\nmay differ, what the ruler thinks to be his interest will always remain what he\nthinks to be his interest.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nOf course this was not the original assertion, nor is the new interpretation\naccepted by Thrasymachus himself. But Socrates is not disposed to quarrel about\nwords, if, as he significantly insinuates, his adversary has changed his mind.\nIn what follows Thrasymachus does in fact withdraw his admission that the ruler\nmay make a mistake, for he affirms that the ruler as a ruler is infallible.\nSocrates is quite ready to accept the new position, which he equally turns\nagainst Thrasymachus by the help of the analogy of the arts. Every art or\nscience has an interest, but this interest is to be distinguished from the\naccidental interest of the artist, and is only concerned with the good of the\nthings or persons which come under the art. And justice has an interest which\nis the interest not of the ruler or judge, but of those who come under his\nsway.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThrasymachus is on the brink of the inevitable conclusion, when he makes a bold\ndiversion. \u0026lsquo;Tell me, Socrates,\u0026rsquo; he says, \u0026lsquo;have you a\nnurse?\u0026rsquo; What a question! Why do you ask? \u0026lsquo;Because, if you have, she\nneglects you and lets you go about drivelling, and has not even taught you to\nknow the shepherd from the sheep. For you fancy that shepherds and rulers never\nthink of their own interest, but only of their sheep or subjects, whereas the\ntruth is that they fatten them for their use, sheep and subjects alike. And\nexperience proves that in every relation of life the just man is the loser and\nthe unjust the gainer, especially where injustice is on the grand scale, which\nis quite another thing from the petty rogueries of swindlers and burglars and\nrobbers of temples. The language of men proves this\u0026mdash;our\n\u0026lsquo;gracious\u0026rsquo; and \u0026lsquo;blessed\u0026rsquo; tyrant and the like\u0026mdash;all\nwhich tends to show (1) that justice is the interest of the stronger; and (2)\nthat injustice is more profitable and also stronger than justice.\u0026rsquo;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThrasymachus, who is better at a speech than at a close argument, having\ndeluged the company with words, has a mind to escape. But the others will not\nlet him go, and Socrates adds a humble but earnest request that he will not\ndesert them at such a crisis of their fate. \u0026lsquo;And what can I do more for\nyou?\u0026rsquo; he says; \u0026lsquo;would you have me put the words bodily into your\nsouls?\u0026rsquo; God forbid! replies Socrates; but we want you to be consistent in\nthe use of terms, and not to employ \u0026lsquo;physician\u0026rsquo; in an exact sense,\nand then again \u0026lsquo;shepherd\u0026rsquo; or \u0026lsquo;ruler\u0026rsquo; in an\ninexact,\u0026mdash;if the words are strictly taken, the ruler and the shepherd look\nonly to the good of their people or flocks and not to their own: whereas you\ninsist that rulers are solely actuated by love of office. \u0026lsquo;No doubt about\nit,\u0026rsquo; replies Thrasymachus. Then why are they paid? Is not the reason,\nthat their interest is not comprehended in their art, and is therefore the\nconcern of another art, the art of pay, which is common to the arts in general,\nand therefore not identical with any one of them? Nor would any man be a ruler\nunless he were induced by the hope of reward or the fear of\npunishment;\u0026mdash;the reward is money or honour, the punishment is the\nnecessity of being ruled by a man worse than himself. And if a State (or\nChurch) were composed entirely of good men, they would be affected by the last\nmotive only; and there would be as much \u0026lsquo;nolo episcopari\u0026rsquo; as there\nis at present of the opposite…\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe satire on existing governments is heightened by the simple and apparently\nincidental manner in which the last remark is introduced. There is a similar\nirony in the argument that the governors of mankind do not like being in\noffice, and that therefore they demand pay.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n…Enough of this: the other assertion of Thrasymachus is far more\nimportant\u0026mdash;that the unjust life is more gainful than the just. Now, as you\nand I, Glaucon, are not convinced by him, we must reply to him; but if we try\nto compare their respective gains we shall want a judge to decide for us; we\nhad better therefore proceed by making mutual admissions of the truth to one\nanother.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThrasymachus had asserted that perfect injustice was more gainful than perfect\njustice, and after a little hesitation he is induced by Socrates to admit the\nstill greater paradox that injustice is virtue and justice vice. Socrates\npraises his frankness, and assumes the attitude of one whose only wish is to\nunderstand the meaning of his opponents. At the same time he is weaving a net\nin which Thrasymachus is finally enclosed. The admission is elicited from him\nthat the just man seeks to gain an advantage over the unjust only, but not over\nthe just, while the unjust would gain an advantage over either. Socrates, in\norder to test this statement, employs once more the favourite analogy of the\narts. The musician, doctor, skilled artist of any sort, does not seek to gain\nmore than the skilled, but only more than the unskilled (that is to say, he\nworks up to a rule, standard, law, and does not exceed it), whereas the\nunskilled makes random efforts at excess. Thus the skilled falls on the side of\nthe good, and the unskilled on the side of the evil, and the just is the\nskilled, and the unjust is the unskilled.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThere was great difficulty in bringing Thrasymachus to the point; the day was\nhot and he was streaming with perspiration, and for the first time in his life\nhe was seen to blush. But his other thesis that injustice was stronger than\njustice has not yet been refuted, and Socrates now proceeds to the\nconsideration of this, which, with the assistance of Thrasymachus, he hopes to\nclear up; the latter is at first churlish, but in the judicious hands of\nSocrates is soon restored to good-humour: Is there not honour among thieves? Is\nnot the strength of injustice only a remnant of justice? Is not absolute\ninjustice absolute weakness also? A house that is divided against itself cannot\nstand; two men who quarrel detract from one another\u0026rsquo;s strength, and he\nwho is at war with himself is the enemy of himself and the gods. Not wickedness\ntherefore, but semi-wickedness flourishes in states,\u0026mdash;a remnant of good is\nneeded in order to make union in action possible,\u0026mdash;there is no kingdom of\nevil in this world.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnother question has not been answered: Is the just or the unjust the happier?\nTo this we reply, that every art has an end and an excellence or virtue by\nwhich the end is accomplished. And is not the end of the soul happiness, and\njustice the excellence of the soul by which happiness is attained? Justice and\nhappiness being thus shown to be inseparable, the question whether the just or\nthe unjust is the happier has disappeared.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThrasymachus replies: \u0026lsquo;Let this be your entertainment, Socrates, at the\nfestival of Bendis.\u0026rsquo; Yes; and a very good entertainment with which your\nkindness has supplied me, now that you have left off scolding. And yet not a\ngood entertainment\u0026mdash;but that was my own fault, for I tasted of too many\nthings. First of all the nature of justice was the subject of our enquiry, and\nthen whether justice is virtue and wisdom, or evil and folly; and then the\ncomparative advantages of just and unjust: and the sum of all is that I know\nnot what justice is; how then shall I know whether the just is happy or not?…\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThus the sophistical fabric has been demolished, chiefly by appealing to the\nanalogy of the arts. \u0026lsquo;Justice is like the arts (1) in having no external\ninterest, and (2) in not aiming at excess, and (3) justice is to happiness what\nthe implement of the workman is to his work.\u0026rsquo; At this the modern reader\nis apt to stumble, because he forgets that Plato is writing in an age when the\narts and the virtues, like the moral and intellectual faculties, were still\nundistinguished. Among early enquirers into the nature of human action the arts\nhelped to fill up the void of speculation; and at first the comparison of the\narts and the virtues was not perceived by them to be fallacious. They only saw\nthe points of agreement in them and not the points of difference. Virtue, like\nart, must take means to an end; good manners are both an art and a virtue;\ncharacter is naturally described under the image of a statue; and there are\nmany other figures of speech which are readily transferred from art to morals.\nThe next generation cleared up these perplexities; or at least supplied after\nages with a further analysis of them. The contemporaries of Plato were in a\nstate of transition, and had not yet fully realized the common-sense\ndistinction of Aristotle, that \u0026lsquo;virtue is concerned with action, art with\nproduction\u0026rsquo; (Nic. Eth.), or that \u0026lsquo;virtue implies intention and\nconstancy of purpose,\u0026rsquo; whereas \u0026lsquo;art requires knowledge only\u0026rsquo;.\nAnd yet in the absurdities which follow from some uses of the analogy, there\nseems to be an intimation conveyed that virtue is more than art. This is\nimplied in the reductio ad absurdum that \u0026lsquo;justice is a thief,\u0026rsquo; and\nin the dissatisfaction which Socrates expresses at the final result.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe expression \u0026lsquo;an art of pay\u0026rsquo; which is described as \u0026lsquo;common\nto all the arts\u0026rsquo; is not in accordance with the ordinary use of language.\nNor is it employed elsewhere either by Plato or by any other Greek writer. It\nis suggested by the argument, and seems to extend the conception of art to\ndoing as well as making. Another flaw or inaccuracy of language may be noted in\nthe words \u0026lsquo;men who are injured are made more unjust.\u0026rsquo; For those who\nare injured are not necessarily made worse, but only harmed or ill-treated.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe second of the three arguments, \u0026lsquo;that the just does not aim at\nexcess,\u0026rsquo; has a real meaning, though wrapped up in an enigmatical form.\nThat the good is of the nature of the finite is a peculiarly Hellenic\nsentiment, which may be compared with the language of those modern writers who\nspeak of virtue as fitness, and of freedom as obedience to law. The\nmathematical or logical notion of limit easily passes into an ethical one, and\neven finds a mythological expression in the conception of envy (Greek). Ideas\nof measure, equality, order, unity, proportion, still linger in the writings of\nmoralists; and the true spirit of the fine arts is better conveyed by such\nterms than by superlatives.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp class=\"poem\"\u003e\n\u0026lsquo;When workmen strive to do better than well,\u003cbr\u003e\nThey do confound their skill in covetousness.\u0026rsquo; (King John. Act. iv. Sc.\n2.)\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp class=\"noindent\"\u003e\nThe harmony of the soul and body, and of the parts of the soul with one\nanother, a harmony \u0026lsquo;fairer than that of musical notes,\u0026rsquo; is the true\nHellenic mode of conceiving the perfection of human nature.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIn what may be called the epilogue of the discussion with Thrasymachus, Plato\nargues that evil is not a principle of strength, but of discord and\ndissolution, just touching the question which has been often treated in modern\ntimes by theologians and philosophers, of the negative nature of evil. In the\nlast argument we trace the germ of the Aristotelian doctrine of an end and a\nvirtue directed towards the end, which again is suggested by the arts. The\nfinal reconcilement of justice and happiness and the identity of the individual\nand the State are also intimated. Socrates reassumes the character of a\n\u0026lsquo;know-nothing;\u0026rsquo; at the same time he appears to be not wholly\nsatisfied with the manner in which the argument has been conducted. Nothing is\nconcluded; but the tendency of the dialectical process, here as always, is to\nenlarge our conception of ideas, and to widen their application to human life.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBOOK II. Thrasymachus is pacified, but the intrepid Glaucon insists on\ncontinuing the argument. He is not satisfied with the indirect manner in which,\nat the end of the last book, Socrates had disposed of the question\n\u0026lsquo;Whether the just or the unjust is the happier.\u0026rsquo; He begins by\ndividing goods into three classes:\u0026mdash;first, goods desirable in themselves;\nsecondly, goods desirable in themselves and for their results; thirdly, goods\ndesirable for their results only. He then asks Socrates in which of the three\nclasses he would place justice. In the second class, replies Socrates, among\ngoods desirable for themselves and also for their results. \u0026lsquo;Then the\nworld in general are of another mind, for they say that justice belongs to the\ntroublesome class of goods which are desirable for their results only. Socrates\nanswers that this is the doctrine of Thrasymachus which he rejects. Glaucon\nthinks that Thrasymachus was too ready to listen to the voice of the charmer,\nand proposes to consider the nature of justice and injustice in themselves and\napart from the results and rewards of them which the world is always dinning in\nhis ears. He will first of all speak of the nature and origin of justice;\nsecondly, of the manner in which men view justice as a necessity and not a\ngood; and thirdly, he will prove the reasonableness of this view.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n\u0026lsquo;To do injustice is said to be a good; to suffer injustice an evil. As\nthe evil is discovered by experience to be greater than the good, the\nsufferers, who cannot also be doers, make a compact that they will have\nneither, and this compact or mean is called justice, but is really the\nimpossibility of doing injustice. No one would observe such a compact if he\nwere not obliged. Let us suppose that the just and unjust have two rings, like\nthat of Gyges in the well-known story, which make them invisible, and then no\ndifference will appear in them, for every one will do evil if he can. And he\nwho abstains will be regarded by the world as a fool for his pains. Men may\npraise him in public out of fear for themselves, but they will laugh at him in\ntheir hearts (Cp. Gorgias.)\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n\u0026lsquo;And now let us frame an ideal of the just and unjust. Imagine the unjust\nman to be master of his craft, seldom making mistakes and easily correcting\nthem; having gifts of money, speech, strength\u0026mdash;the greatest villain\nbearing the highest character: and at his side let us place the just in his\nnobleness and simplicity\u0026mdash;being, not seeming\u0026mdash;without name or\nreward\u0026mdash;clothed in his justice only\u0026mdash;the best of men who is thought\nto be the worst, and let him die as he has lived. I might add (but I would\nrather put the rest into the mouth of the panegyrists of injustice\u0026mdash;they\nwill tell you) that the just man will be scourged, racked, bound, will have his\neyes put out, and will at last be crucified (literally impaled)\u0026mdash;and all\nthis because he ought to have preferred seeming to being. How different is the\ncase of the unjust who clings to appearance as the true reality! His high\ncharacter makes him a ruler; he can marry where he likes, trade where he likes,\nhelp his friends and hurt his enemies; having got rich by dishonesty he can\nworship the gods better, and will therefore be more loved by them than the\njust.\u0026rsquo;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI was thinking what to answer, when Adeimantus joined in the already unequal\nfray. He considered that the most important point of all had been\nomitted:\u0026mdash;\u0026lsquo;Men are taught to be just for the sake of rewards;\nparents and guardians make reputation the incentive to virtue. And other\nadvantages are promised by them of a more solid kind, such as wealthy marriages\nand high offices. There are the pictures in Homer and Hesiod of fat sheep and\nheavy fleeces, rich corn-fields and trees toppling with fruit, which the gods\nprovide in this life for the just. And the Orphic poets add a similar picture\nof another. The heroes of Musaeus and Eumolpus lie on couches at a festival,\nwith garlands on their heads, enjoying as the meed of virtue a paradise of\nimmortal drunkenness. Some go further, and speak of a fair posterity in the\nthird and fourth generation. But the wicked they bury in a slough and make them\ncarry water in a sieve: and in this life they attribute to them the infamy\nwhich Glaucon was assuming to be the lot of the just who are supposed to be\nunjust.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n\u0026lsquo;Take another kind of argument which is found both in poetry and\nprose:\u0026mdash;\u0026ldquo;Virtue,\u0026rdquo; as Hesiod says, \u0026ldquo;is honourable but\ndifficult, vice is easy and profitable.\u0026rdquo; You may often see the wicked in\ngreat prosperity and the righteous afflicted by the will of heaven. And\nmendicant prophets knock at rich men\u0026rsquo;s doors, promising to atone for the\nsins of themselves or their fathers in an easy fashion with sacrifices and\nfestive games, or with charms and invocations to get rid of an enemy good or\nbad by divine help and at a small charge;\u0026mdash;they appeal to books professing\nto be written by Musaeus and Orpheus, and carry away the minds of whole cities,\nand promise to \u0026ldquo;get souls out of purgatory;\u0026rdquo; and if we refuse to\nlisten to them, no one knows what will happen to us.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n\u0026lsquo;When a lively-minded ingenuous youth hears all this, what will be his\nconclusion? \u0026ldquo;Will he,\u0026rdquo; in the language of Pindar, \u0026ldquo;make\njustice his high tower, or fortify himself with crooked deceit?\u0026rdquo; Justice,\nhe reflects, without the appearance of justice, is misery and ruin; injustice\nhas the promise of a glorious life. Appearance is master of truth and lord of\nhappiness. To appearance then I will turn,\u0026mdash;I will put on the show of\nvirtue and trail behind me the fox of Archilochus. I hear some one saying that\n\u0026ldquo;wickedness is not easily concealed,\u0026rdquo; to which I reply that\n\u0026ldquo;nothing great is easy.\u0026rdquo; Union and force and rhetoric will do much;\nand if men say that they cannot prevail over the gods, still how do we know\nthat there are gods? Only from the poets, who acknowledge that they may be\nappeased by sacrifices. Then why not sin and pay for indulgences out of your\nsin? For if the righteous are only unpunished, still they have no further\nreward, while the wicked may be unpunished and have the pleasure of sinning\ntoo. But what of the world below? Nay, says the argument, there are atoning\npowers who will set that matter right, as the poets, who are the sons of the\ngods, tell us; and this is confirmed by the authority of the State.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n\u0026lsquo;How can we resist such arguments in favour of injustice? Add good\nmanners, and, as the wise tell us, we shall make the best of both worlds. Who\nthat is not a miserable caitiff will refrain from smiling at the praises of\njustice? Even if a man knows the better part he will not be angry with others;\nfor he knows also that more than human virtue is needed to save a man, and that\nhe only praises justice who is incapable of injustice.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n\u0026lsquo;The origin of the evil is that all men from the beginning, heroes,\npoets, instructors of youth, have always asserted \u0026ldquo;the temporal\ndispensation,\u0026rdquo; the honours and profits of justice. Had we been taught in\nearly youth the power of justice and injustice inherent in the soul, and unseen\nby any human or divine eye, we should not have needed others to be our\nguardians, but every one would have been the guardian of himself. This is what\nI want you to show, Socrates;\u0026mdash;other men use arguments which rather tend\nto strengthen the position of Thrasymachus that \u0026ldquo;might is right;\u0026rdquo;\nbut from you I expect better things. And please, as Glaucon said, to exclude\nreputation; let the just be thought unjust and the unjust just, and do you\nstill prove to us the superiority of justice\u0026rsquo;…\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe thesis, which for the sake of argument has been maintained by Glaucon, is\nthe converse of that of Thrasymachus\u0026mdash;not right is the interest of the\nstronger, but right is the necessity of the weaker. Starting from the same\npremises he carries the analysis of society a step further back;\u0026mdash;might is\nstill right, but the might is the weakness of the many combined against the\nstrength of the few.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThere have been theories in modern as well as in ancient times which have a\nfamily likeness to the speculations of Glaucon; e.g. that power is the\nfoundation of right; or that a monarch has a divine right to govern well or\nill; or that virtue is self-love or the love of power; or that war is the\nnatural state of man; or that private vices are public benefits. All such\ntheories have a kind of plausibility from their partial agreement with\nexperience. For human nature oscillates between good and evil, and the motives\nof actions and the origin of institutions may be explained to a certain extent\non either hypothesis according to the character or point of view of a\nparticular thinker. The obligation of maintaining authority under all\ncircumstances and sometimes by rather questionable means is felt strongly and\nhas become a sort of instinct among civilized men. The divine right of kings,\nor more generally of governments, is one of the forms under which this natural\nfeeling is expressed. Nor again is there any evil which has not some\naccompaniment of good or pleasure; nor any good which is free from some alloy\nof evil; nor any noble or generous thought which may not be attended by a\nshadow or the ghost of a shadow of self-interest or of self-love. We know that\nall human actions are imperfect; but we do not therefore attribute them to the\nworse rather than to the better motive or principle. Such a philosophy is both\nfoolish and false, like that opinion of the clever rogue who assumes all other\nmen to be like himself. And theories of this sort do not represent the real\nnature of the State, which is based on a vague sense of right gradually\ncorrected and enlarged by custom and law (although capable also of perversion),\nany more than they describe the origin of society, which is to be sought in the\nfamily and in the social and religious feelings of man. Nor do they represent\nthe average character of individuals, which cannot be explained simply on a\ntheory of evil, but has always a counteracting element of good. And as men\nbecome better such theories appear more and more untruthful to them, because\nthey are more conscious of their own disinterestedness. A little experience may\nmake a man a cynic; a great deal will bring him back to a truer and kindlier\nview of the mixed nature of himself and his fellow men.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe two brothers ask Socrates to prove to them that the just is happy when they\nhave taken from him all that in which happiness is ordinarily supposed to\nconsist. Not that there is (1) any absurdity in the attempt to frame a notion\nof justice apart from circumstances. For the ideal must always be a paradox\nwhen compared with the ordinary conditions of human life. Neither the Stoical\nideal nor the Christian ideal is true as a fact, but they may serve as a basis\nof education, and may exercise an ennobling influence. An ideal is none the\nworse because \u0026lsquo;some one has made the discovery\u0026rsquo; that no such ideal\nwas ever realized. And in a few exceptional individuals who are raised above\nthe ordinary level of humanity, the ideal of happiness may be realized in death\nand misery. This may be the state which the reason deliberately approves, and\nwhich the utilitarian as well as every other moralist may be bound in certain\ncases to prefer.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNor again, (2) must we forget that Plato, though he agrees generally with the\nview implied in the argument of the two brothers, is not expressing his own\nfinal conclusion, but rather seeking to dramatize one of the aspects of ethical\ntruth. He is developing his idea gradually in a series of positions or\nsituations. He is exhibiting Socrates for the first time undergoing the\nSocratic interrogation. Lastly, (3) the word \u0026lsquo;happiness\u0026rsquo; involves\nsome degree of confusion because associated in the language of modern\nphilosophy with conscious pleasure or satisfaction, which was not equally\npresent to his mind.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nGlaucon has been drawing a picture of the misery of the just and the happiness\nof the unjust, to which the misery of the tyrant in Book IX is the answer and\nparallel. And still the unjust must appear just; that is \u0026lsquo;the homage\nwhich vice pays to virtue.\u0026rsquo; But now Adeimantus, taking up the hint which\nhad been already given by Glaucon, proceeds to show that in the opinion of\nmankind justice is regarded only for the sake of rewards and reputation, and\npoints out the advantage which is given to such arguments as those of\nThrasymachus and Glaucon by the conventional morality of mankind. He seems to\nfeel the difficulty of \u0026lsquo;justifying the ways of God to man.\u0026rsquo; Both\nthe brothers touch upon the question, whether the morality of actions is\ndetermined by their consequences; and both of them go beyond the position of\nSocrates, that justice belongs to the class of goods not desirable for\nthemselves only, but desirable for themselves and for their results, to which\nhe recalls them. In their attempt to view justice as an internal principle, and\nin their condemnation of the poets, they anticipate him. The common life of\nGreece is not enough for them; they must penetrate deeper into the nature of\nthings.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIt has been objected that justice is honesty in the sense of Glaucon and\nAdeimantus, but is taken by Socrates to mean all virtue. May we not more truly\nsay that the old-fashioned notion of justice is enlarged by Socrates, and\nbecomes equivalent to universal order or well-being, first in the State, and\nsecondly in the individual? He has found a new answer to his old question\n(Protag.), \u0026lsquo;whether the virtues are one or many,\u0026rsquo; viz. that one is\nthe ordering principle of the three others. In seeking to establish the purely\ninternal nature of justice, he is met by the fact that man is a social being,\nand he tries to harmonise the two opposite theses as well as he can. There is\nno more inconsistency in this than was inevitable in his age and country; there\nis no use in turning upon him the cross lights of modern philosophy, which,\nfrom some other point of view, would appear equally inconsistent. Plato does\nnot give the final solution of philosophical questions for us; nor can he be\njudged of by our standard.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe remainder of the Republic is developed out of the question of the sons of\nAriston. Three points are deserving of remark in what immediately\nfollows:\u0026mdash;First, that the answer of Socrates is altogether indirect. He\ndoes not say that happiness consists in the contemplation of the idea of\njustice, and still less will he be tempted to affirm the Stoical paradox that\nthe just man can be happy on the rack. But first he dwells on the difficulty of\nthe problem and insists on restoring man to his natural condition, before he\nwill answer the question at all. He too will frame an ideal, but his ideal\ncomprehends not only abstract justice, but the whole relations of man. Under\nthe fanciful illustration of the large letters he implies that he will only\nlook for justice in society, and that from the State he will proceed to the\nindividual. His answer in substance amounts to this,\u0026mdash;that under\nfavourable conditions, i.e. in the perfect State, justice and happiness will\ncoincide, and that when justice has been once found, happiness may be left to\ntake care of itself. That he falls into some degree of inconsistency, when in\nthe tenth book he claims to have got rid of the rewards and honours of justice,\nmay be admitted; for he has left those which exist in the perfect State. And\nthe philosopher \u0026lsquo;who retires under the shelter of a wall\u0026rsquo; can\nhardly have been esteemed happy by him, at least not in this world. Still he\nmaintains the true attitude of moral action. Let a man do his duty first,\nwithout asking whether he will be happy or not, and happiness will be the\ninseparable accident which attends him. \u0026lsquo;Seek ye first the kingdom of God\nand his righteousness, and all these things shall be added unto you.\u0026rsquo;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nSecondly, it may be remarked that Plato preserves the genuine character of\nGreek thought in beginning with the State and in going on to the individual.\nFirst ethics, then politics\u0026mdash;this is the order of ideas to us; the reverse\nis the order of history. Only after many struggles of thought does the\nindividual assert his right as a moral being. In early ages he is not ONE, but\none of many, the citizen of a State which is prior to him; and he has no notion\nof good or evil apart from the law of his country or the creed of his church.\nAnd to this type he is constantly tending to revert, whenever the influence of\ncustom, or of party spirit, or the recollection of the past becomes too strong\nfor him.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThirdly, we may observe the confusion or identification of the individual and\nthe State, of ethics and politics, which pervades early Greek speculation, and\neven in modern times retains a certain degree of influence. The subtle\ndifference between the collective and individual action of mankind seems to\nhave escaped early thinkers, and we too are sometimes in danger of forgetting\nthe conditions of united human action, whenever we either elevate politics into\nethics, or lower ethics to the standard of politics. The good man and the good\ncitizen only coincide in the perfect State; and this perfection cannot be\nattained by legislation acting upon them from without, but, if at all, by\neducation fashioning them from within.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n…Socrates praises the sons of Ariston, \u0026lsquo;inspired offspring of the\nrenowned hero,\u0026rsquo; as the elegiac poet terms them; but he does not\nunderstand how they can argue so eloquently on behalf of injustice while their\ncharacter shows that they are uninfluenced by their own arguments. He knows not\nhow to answer them, although he is afraid of deserting justice in the hour of\nneed. He therefore makes a condition, that having weak eyes he shall be allowed\nto read the large letters first and then go on to the smaller, that is, he must\nlook for justice in the State first, and will then proceed to the individual.\nAccordingly he begins to construct the State.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nSociety arises out of the wants of man. His first want is food; his second a\nhouse; his third a coat. The sense of these needs and the possibility of\nsatisfying them by exchange, draw individuals together on the same spot; and\nthis is the beginning of a State, which we take the liberty to invent, although\nnecessity is the real inventor. There must be first a husbandman, secondly a\nbuilder, thirdly a weaver, to which may be added a cobbler. Four or five\ncitizens at least are required to make a city. Now men have different natures,\nand one man will do one thing better than many; and business waits for no man.\nHence there must be a division of labour into different employments; into\nwholesale and retail trade; into workers, and makers of workmen\u0026rsquo;s tools;\ninto shepherds and husbandmen. A city which includes all this will have far\nexceeded the limit of four or five, and yet not be very large. But then again\nimports will be required, and imports necessitate exports, and this implies\nvariety of produce in order to attract the taste of purchasers; also merchants\nand ships. In the city too we must have a market and money and retail trades;\notherwise buyers and sellers will never meet, and the valuable time of the\nproducers will be wasted in vain efforts at exchange. If we add hired servants\nthe State will be complete. And we may guess that somewhere in the intercourse\nof the citizens with one another justice and injustice will appear.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHere follows a rustic picture of their way of life. They spend their days in\nhouses which they have built for themselves; they make their own clothes and\nproduce their own corn and wine. Their principal food is meal and flour, and\nthey drink in moderation. They live on the best of terms with each other, and\ntake care not to have too many children. \u0026lsquo;But,\u0026rsquo; said Glaucon,\ninterposing, \u0026lsquo;are they not to have a relish?\u0026rsquo; Certainly; they will\nhave salt and olives and cheese, vegetables and fruits, and chestnuts to roast\nat the fire. \u0026lsquo;\u0026rsquo;Tis a city of pigs, Socrates.\u0026rsquo; Why, I replied,\nwhat do you want more? \u0026lsquo;Only the comforts of life,\u0026mdash;sofas and\ntables, also sauces and sweets.\u0026rsquo; I see; you want not only a State, but a\nluxurious State; and possibly in the more complex frame we may sooner find\njustice and injustice. Then the fine arts must go to work\u0026mdash;every\nconceivable instrument and ornament of luxury will be wanted. There will be\ndancers, painters, sculptors, musicians, cooks, barbers, tire-women, nurses,\nartists; swineherds and neatherds too for the animals, and physicians to cure\nthe disorders of which luxury is the source. To feed all these superfluous\nmouths we shall need a part of our neighbour\u0026rsquo;s land, and they will want a\npart of ours. And this is the origin of war, which may be traced to the same\ncauses as other political evils. Our city will now require the slight addition\nof a camp, and the citizen will be converted into a soldier. But then again our\nold doctrine of the division of labour must not be forgotten. The art of war\ncannot be learned in a day, and there must be a natural aptitude for military\nduties. There will be some warlike natures who have this aptitude\u0026mdash;dogs\nkeen of scent, swift of foot to pursue, and strong of limb to fight. And as\nspirit is the foundation of courage, such natures, whether of men or animals,\nwill be full of spirit. But these spirited natures are apt to bite and devour\none another; the union of gentleness to friends and fierceness against enemies\nappears to be an impossibility, and the guardian of a State requires both\nqualities. Who then can be a guardian? The image of the dog suggests an answer.\nFor dogs are gentle to friends and fierce to strangers. Your dog is a\nphilosopher who judges by the rule of knowing or not knowing; and philosophy,\nwhether in man or beast, is the parent of gentleness. The human watchdogs must\nbe philosophers or lovers of learning which will make them gentle. And how are\nthey to be learned without education?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut what shall their education be? Is any better than the old-fashioned sort\nwhich is comprehended under the name of music and gymnastic? Music includes\nliterature, and literature is of two kinds, true and false. \u0026lsquo;What do you\nmean?\u0026rsquo; he said. I mean that children hear stories before they learn\ngymnastics, and that the stories are either untrue, or have at most one or two\ngrains of truth in a bushel of falsehood. Now early life is very impressible,\nand children ought not to learn what they will have to unlearn when they grow\nup; we must therefore have a censorship of nursery tales, banishing some and\nkeeping others. Some of them are very improper, as we may see in the great\ninstances of Homer and Hesiod, who not only tell lies but bad lies; stories\nabout Uranus and Saturn, which are immoral as well as false, and which should\nnever be spoken of to young persons, or indeed at all; or, if at all, then in a\nmystery, after the sacrifice, not of an Eleusinian pig, but of some\nunprocurable animal. Shall our youth be encouraged to beat their fathers by the\nexample of Zeus, or our citizens be incited to quarrel by hearing or seeing\nrepresentations of strife among the gods? Shall they listen to the narrative of\nHephaestus binding his mother, and of Zeus sending him flying for helping her\nwhen she was beaten? Such tales may possibly have a mystical interpretation,\nbut the young are incapable of understanding allegory. If any one asks what\ntales are to be allowed, we will answer that we are legislators and not\nbook-makers; we only lay down the principles according to which books are to be\nwritten; to write them is the duty of others.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd our first principle is, that God must be represented as he is; not as the\nauthor of all things, but of good only. We will not suffer the poets to say\nthat he is the steward of good and evil, or that he has two casks full of\ndestinies;\u0026mdash;or that Athene and Zeus incited Pandarus to break the treaty;\nor that God caused the sufferings of Niobe, or of Pelops, or the Trojan war; or\nthat he makes men sin when he wishes to destroy them. Either these were not the\nactions of the gods, or God was just, and men were the better for being\npunished. But that the deed was evil, and God the author, is a wicked, suicidal\nfiction which we will allow no one, old or young, to utter. This is our first\nand great principle\u0026mdash;God is the author of good only.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd the second principle is like unto it:\u0026mdash;With God is no variableness or\nchange of form. Reason teaches us this; for if we suppose a change in God, he\nmust be changed either by another or by himself. By another?\u0026mdash;but the best\nworks of nature and art and the noblest qualities of mind are least liable to\nbe changed by any external force. By himself?\u0026mdash;but he cannot change for\nthe better; he will hardly change for the worse. He remains for ever fairest\nand best in his own image. Therefore we refuse to listen to the poets who tell\nus of Here begging in the likeness of a priestess or of other deities who prowl\nabout at night in strange disguises; all that blasphemous nonsense with which\nmothers fool the manhood out of their children must be suppressed. But some one\nwill say that God, who is himself unchangeable, may take a form in relation to\nus. Why should he? For gods as well as men hate the lie in the soul, or\nprinciple of falsehood; and as for any other form of lying which is used for a\npurpose and is regarded as innocent in certain exceptional cases\u0026mdash;what\nneed have the gods of this? For they are not ignorant of antiquity like the\npoets, nor are they afraid of their enemies, nor is any madman a friend of\ntheirs. God then is true, he is absolutely true; he changes not, he deceives\nnot, by day or night, by word or sign. This is our second great\nprinciple\u0026mdash;God is true. Away with the lying dream of Agamemnon in Homer,\nand the accusation of Thetis against Apollo in Aeschylus…\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIn order to give clearness to his conception of the State, Plato proceeds to\ntrace the first principles of mutual need and of division of labour in an\nimaginary community of four or five citizens. Gradually this community\nincreases; the division of labour extends to countries; imports necessitate\nexports; a medium of exchange is required, and retailers sit in the\nmarket-place to save the time of the producers. These are the steps by which\nPlato constructs the first or primitive State, introducing the elements of\npolitical economy by the way. As he is going to frame a second or civilized\nState, the simple naturally comes before the complex. He indulges, like\nRousseau, in a picture of primitive life\u0026mdash;an idea which has indeed often\nhad a powerful influence on the imagination of mankind, but he does not\nseriously mean to say that one is better than the other (Politicus); nor can\nany inference be drawn from the description of the first state taken apart from\nthe second, such as Aristotle appears to draw in the Politics. We should not\ninterpret a Platonic dialogue any more than a poem or a parable in too literal\nor matter-of-fact a style. On the other hand, when we compare the lively fancy\nof Plato with the dried-up abstractions of modern treatises on philosophy, we\nare compelled to say with Protagoras, that the \u0026lsquo;mythus is more\ninteresting\u0026rsquo; (Protag.)\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nSeveral interesting remarks which in modern times would have a place in a\ntreatise on Political Economy are scattered up and down the writings of Plato:\nespecially Laws, Population; Free Trade; Adulteration; Wills and Bequests;\nBegging; Eryxias, (though not Plato\u0026rsquo;s), Value and Demand; Republic,\nDivision of Labour. The last subject, and also the origin of Retail Trade, is\ntreated with admirable lucidity in the second book of the Republic. But Plato\nnever combined his economic ideas into a system, and never seems to have\nrecognized that Trade is one of the great motive powers of the State and of the\nworld. He would make retail traders only of the inferior sort of citizens\n(Rep., Laws), though he remarks, quaintly enough (Laws), that \u0026lsquo;if only\nthe best men and the best women everywhere were compelled to keep taverns for a\ntime or to carry on retail trade, etc., then we should knew how pleasant and\nagreeable all these things are.\u0026rsquo;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe disappointment of Glaucon at the \u0026lsquo;city of pigs,\u0026rsquo; the ludicrous\ndescription of the ministers of luxury in the more refined State, and the\nafterthought of the necessity of doctors, the illustration of the nature of the\nguardian taken from the dog, the desirableness of offering some almost\nunprocurable victim when impure mysteries are to be celebrated, the behaviour\nof Zeus to his father and of Hephaestus to his mother, are touches of humour\nwhich have also a serious meaning. In speaking of education Plato rather\nstartles us by affirming that a child must be trained in falsehood first and in\ntruth afterwards. Yet this is not very different from saying that children must\nbe taught through the medium of imagination as well as reason; that their minds\ncan only develope gradually, and that there is much which they must learn\nwithout understanding. This is also the substance of Plato\u0026rsquo;s view, though\nhe must be acknowledged to have drawn the line somewhat differently from modern\nethical writers, respecting truth and falsehood. To us, economies or\naccommodations would not be allowable unless they were required by the human\nfaculties or necessary for the communication of knowledge to the simple and\nignorant. We should insist that the word was inseparable from the intention,\nand that we must not be \u0026lsquo;falsely true,\u0026rsquo; i.e. speak or act falsely\nin support of what was right or true. But Plato would limit the use of fictions\nonly by requiring that they should have a good moral effect, and that such a\ndangerous weapon as falsehood should be employed by the rulers alone and for\ngreat objects.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nA Greek in the age of Plato attached no importance to the question whether his\nreligion was an historical fact. He was just beginning to be conscious that the\npast had a history; but he could see nothing beyond Homer and Hesiod. Whether\ntheir narratives were true or false did not seriously affect the political or\nsocial life of Hellas. Men only began to suspect that they were fictions when\nthey recognised them to be immoral. And so in all religions: the consideration\nof their morality comes first, afterwards the truth of the documents in which\nthey are recorded, or of the events natural or supernatural which are told of\nthem. But in modern times, and in Protestant countries perhaps more than in\nCatholic, we have been too much inclined to identify the historical with the\nmoral; and some have refused to believe in religion at all, unless a superhuman\naccuracy was discernible in every part of the record. The facts of an ancient\nor religious history are amongst the most important of all facts; but they are\nfrequently uncertain, and we only learn the true lesson which is to be gathered\nfrom them when we place ourselves above them. These reflections tend to show\nthat the difference between Plato and ourselves, though not unimportant, is not\nso great as might at first sight appear. For we should agree with him in\nplacing the moral before the historical truth of religion; and, generally, in\ndisregarding those errors or misstatements of fact which necessarily occur in\nthe early stages of all religions. We know also that changes in the traditions\nof a country cannot be made in a day; and are therefore tolerant of many things\nwhich science and criticism would condemn.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWe note in passing that the allegorical interpretation of mythology, said to\nhave been first introduced as early as the sixth century before Christ by\nTheagenes of Rhegium, was well established in the age of Plato, and here, as in\nthe Phaedrus, though for a different reason, was rejected by him. That\nanachronisms whether of religion or law, when men have reached another stage of\ncivilization, should be got rid of by fictions is in accordance with universal\nexperience. Great is the art of interpretation; and by a natural process, which\nwhen once discovered was always going on, what could not be altered was\nexplained away. And so without any palpable inconsistency there existed side by\nside two forms of religion, the tradition inherited or invented by the poets\nand the customary worship of the temple; on the other hand, there was the\nreligion of the philosopher, who was dwelling in the heaven of ideas, but did\nnot therefore refuse to offer a cock to Aesculapius, or to be seen saying his\nprayers at the rising of the sun. At length the antagonism between the popular\nand philosophical religion, never so great among the Greeks as in our own age,\ndisappeared, and was only felt like the difference between the religion of the\neducated and uneducated among ourselves. The Zeus of Homer and Hesiod easily\npassed into the \u0026lsquo;royal mind\u0026rsquo; of Plato (Philebus); the giant\nHeracles became the knight-errant and benefactor of mankind. These and still\nmore wonderful transformations were readily effected by the ingenuity of Stoics\nand neo-Platonists in the two or three centuries before and after Christ. The\nGreek and Roman religions were gradually permeated by the spirit of philosophy;\nhaving lost their ancient meaning, they were resolved into poetry and morality;\nand probably were never purer than at the time of their decay, when their\ninfluence over the world was waning.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nA singular conception which occurs towards the end of the book is the lie in\nthe soul; this is connected with the Platonic and Socratic doctrine that\ninvoluntary ignorance is worse than voluntary. The lie in the soul is a true\nlie, the corruption of the highest truth, the deception of the highest part of\nthe soul, from which he who is deceived has no power of delivering himself. For\nexample, to represent God as false or immoral, or, according to Plato, as\ndeluding men with appearances or as the author of evil; or again, to affirm\nwith Protagoras that \u0026lsquo;knowledge is sensation,\u0026rsquo; or that \u0026lsquo;being\nis becoming,\u0026rsquo; or with Thrasymachus \u0026lsquo;that might is right,\u0026rsquo;\nwould have been regarded by Plato as a lie of this hateful sort. The greatest\nunconsciousness of the greatest untruth, e.g. if, in the language of the\nGospels (John), \u0026lsquo;he who was blind\u0026rsquo; were to say \u0026lsquo;I see,\u0026rsquo;\nis another aspect of the state of mind which Plato is describing. The lie in\nthe soul may be further compared with the sin against the Holy Ghost (Luke),\nallowing for the difference between Greek and Christian modes of speaking. To\nthis is opposed the lie in words, which is only such a deception as may occur\nin a play or poem, or allegory or figure of speech, or in any sort of\naccommodation,\u0026mdash;which though useless to the gods may be useful to men in\ncertain cases. Socrates is here answering the question which he had himself\nraised about the propriety of deceiving a madman; and he is also contrasting\nthe nature of God and man. For God is Truth, but mankind can only be true by\nappearing sometimes to be partial, or false. Reserving for another place the\ngreater questions of religion or education, we may note further, (1) the\napproval of the old traditional education of Greece; (2) the preparation which\nPlato is making for the attack on Homer and the poets; (3) the preparation\nwhich he is also making for the use of economies in the State; (4) the\ncontemptuous and at the same time euphemistic manner in which here as below he\nalludes to the \u0026lsquo;Chronique Scandaleuse\u0026rsquo; of the gods.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBOOK III. There is another motive in purifying religion, which is to banish\nfear; for no man can be courageous who is afraid of death, or who believes the\ntales which are repeated by the poets concerning the world below. They must be\ngently requested not to abuse hell; they may be reminded that their stories are\nboth untrue and discouraging. Nor must they be angry if we expunge obnoxious\npassages, such as the depressing words of Achilles\u0026mdash;\u0026lsquo;I would rather\nbe a serving-man than rule over all the dead;\u0026rsquo; and the verses which tell\nof the squalid mansions, the senseless shadows, the flitting soul mourning over\nlost strength and youth, the soul with a gibber going beneath the earth like\nsmoke, or the souls of the suitors which flutter about like bats. The terrors\nand horrors of Cocytus and Styx, ghosts and sapless shades, and the rest of\ntheir Tartarean nomenclature, must vanish. Such tales may have their use; but\nthey are not the proper food for soldiers. As little can we admit the sorrows\nand sympathies of the Homeric heroes:\u0026mdash;Achilles, the son of Thetis, in\ntears, throwing ashes on his head, or pacing up and down the sea-shore in\ndistraction; or Priam, the cousin of the gods, crying aloud, rolling in the\nmire. A good man is not prostrated at the loss of children or fortune. Neither\nis death terrible to him; and therefore lamentations over the dead should not\nbe practised by men of note; they should be the concern of inferior persons\nonly, whether women or men. Still worse is the attribution of such weakness to\nthe gods; as when the goddesses say, \u0026lsquo;Alas! my travail!\u0026rsquo; and worst\nof all, when the king of heaven himself laments his inability to save Hector,\nor sorrows over the impending doom of his dear Sarpedon. Such a character of\nGod, if not ridiculed by our young men, is likely to be imitated by them. Nor\nshould our citizens be given to excess of laughter\u0026mdash;\u0026lsquo;Such violent\ndelights\u0026rsquo; are followed by a violent re-action. The description in the\nIliad of the gods shaking their sides at the clumsiness of Hephaestus will not\nbe admitted by us. \u0026lsquo;Certainly not.\u0026rsquo;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTruth should have a high place among the virtues, for falsehood, as we were\nsaying, is useless to the gods, and only useful to men as a medicine. But this\nemployment of falsehood must remain a privilege of state; the common man must\nnot in return tell a lie to the ruler; any more than the patient would tell a\nlie to his physician, or the sailor to his captain.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIn the next place our youth must be temperate, and temperance consists in\nself-control and obedience to authority. That is a lesson which Homer teaches\nin some places: \u0026lsquo;The Achaeans marched on breathing prowess, in silent awe\nof their leaders;\u0026rsquo;\u0026mdash;but a very different one in other places:\n\u0026lsquo;O heavy with wine, who hast the eyes of a dog, but the heart of a\nstag.\u0026rsquo; Language of the latter kind will not impress self-control on the\nminds of youth. The same may be said about his praises of eating and drinking\nand his dread of starvation; also about the verses in which he tells of the\nrapturous loves of Zeus and Here, or of how Hephaestus once detained Ares and\nAphrodite in a net on a similar occasion. There is a nobler strain heard in the\nwords:\u0026mdash;\u0026lsquo;Endure, my soul, thou hast endured worse.\u0026rsquo; Nor must\nwe allow our citizens to receive bribes, or to say, \u0026lsquo;Gifts persuade the\ngods, gifts reverend kings;\u0026rsquo; or to applaud the ignoble advice of Phoenix\nto Achilles that he should get money out of the Greeks before he assisted them;\nor the meanness of Achilles himself in taking gifts from Agamemnon; or his\nrequiring a ransom for the body of Hector; or his cursing of Apollo; or his\ninsolence to the river-god Scamander; or his dedication to the dead Patroclus\nof his own hair which had been already dedicated to the other river-god\nSpercheius; or his cruelty in dragging the body of Hector round the walls, and\nslaying the captives at the pyre: such a combination of meanness and cruelty in\nCheiron\u0026rsquo;s pupil is inconceivable. The amatory exploits of Peirithous and\nTheseus are equally unworthy. Either these so-called sons of gods were not the\nsons of gods, or they were not such as the poets imagine them, any more than\nthe gods themselves are the authors of evil. The youth who believes that such\nthings are done by those who have the blood of heaven flowing in their veins\nwill be too ready to imitate their example.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nEnough of gods and heroes;\u0026mdash;what shall we say about men? What the poets\nand story-tellers say\u0026mdash;that the wicked prosper and the righteous are\nafflicted, or that justice is another\u0026rsquo;s gain? Such misrepresentations\ncannot be allowed by us. But in this we are anticipating the definition of\njustice, and had therefore better defer the enquiry.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe subjects of poetry have been sufficiently treated; next follows style. Now\nall poetry is a narrative of events past, present, or to come; and narrative is\nof three kinds, the simple, the imitative, and a composition of the two. An\ninstance will make my meaning clear. The first scene in Homer is of the last or\nmixed kind, being partly description and partly dialogue. But if you throw the\ndialogue into the \u0026lsquo;oratio obliqua,\u0026rsquo; the passage will run thus: The\npriest came and prayed Apollo that the Achaeans might take Troy and have a safe\nreturn if Agamemnon would only give him back his daughter; and the other Greeks\nassented, but Agamemnon was wroth, and so on\u0026mdash;The whole then becomes\ndescriptive, and the poet is the only speaker left; or, if you omit the\nnarrative, the whole becomes dialogue. These are the three styles\u0026mdash;which\nof them is to be admitted into our State? \u0026lsquo;Do you ask whether tragedy and\ncomedy are to be admitted?\u0026rsquo; Yes, but also something more\u0026mdash;Is it not\ndoubtful whether our guardians are to be imitators at all? Or rather, has not\nthe question been already answered, for we have decided that one man cannot in\nhis life play many parts, any more than he can act both tragedy and comedy, or\nbe rhapsodist and actor at once? Human nature is coined into very small pieces,\nand as our guardians have their own business already, which is the care of\nfreedom, they will have enough to do without imitating. If they imitate they\nshould imitate, not any meanness or baseness, but the good only; for the mask\nwhich the actor wears is apt to become his face. We cannot allow men to play\nthe parts of women, quarrelling, weeping, scolding, or boasting against the\ngods,\u0026mdash;least of all when making love or in labour. They must not represent\nslaves, or bullies, or cowards, drunkards, or madmen, or blacksmiths, or\nneighing horses, or bellowing bulls, or sounding rivers, or a raging sea. A\ngood or wise man will be willing to perform good and wise actions, but he will\nbe ashamed to play an inferior part which he has never practised; and he will\nprefer to employ the descriptive style with as little imitation as possible.\nThe man who has no self-respect, on the contrary, will imitate anybody and\nanything; sounds of nature and cries of animals alike; his whole performance\nwill be imitation of gesture and voice. Now in the descriptive style there are\nfew changes, but in the dramatic there are a great many. Poets and musicians\nuse either, or a compound of both, and this compound is very attractive to\nyouth and their teachers as well as to the vulgar. But our State in which one\nman plays one part only is not adapted for complexity. And when one of these\npolyphonous pantomimic gentlemen offers to exhibit himself and his poetry we\nwill show him every observance of respect, but at the same time tell him that\nthere is no room for his kind in our State; we prefer the rough, honest poet,\nand will not depart from our original models (Laws).\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNext as to the music. A song or ode has three parts,\u0026mdash;the subject, the\nharmony, and the rhythm; of which the two last are dependent upon the first. As\nwe banished strains of lamentation, so we may now banish the mixed Lydian\nharmonies, which are the harmonies of lamentation; and as our citizens are to\nbe temperate, we may also banish convivial harmonies, such as the Ionian and\npure Lydian. Two remain\u0026mdash;the Dorian and Phrygian, the first for war, the\nsecond for peace; the one expressive of courage, the other of obedience or\ninstruction or religious feeling. And as we reject varieties of harmony, we\nshall also reject the many-stringed, variously-shaped instruments which give\nutterance to them, and in particular the flute, which is more complex than any\nof them. The lyre and the harp may be permitted in the town, and the\nPan\u0026rsquo;s-pipe in the fields. Thus we have made a purgation of music, and\nwill now make a purgation of metres. These should be like the harmonies, simple\nand suitable to the occasion. There are four notes of the tetrachord, and there\nare three ratios of metre, 3/2, 2/2, 2/1, which have all their characteristics,\nand the feet have different characteristics as well as the rhythms. But about\nthis you and I must ask Damon, the great musician, who speaks, if I remember\nrightly, of a martial measure as well as of dactylic, trochaic, and iambic\nrhythms, which he arranges so as to equalize the syllables with one another,\nassigning to each the proper quantity. We only venture to affirm the general\nprinciple that the style is to conform to the subject and the metre to the\nstyle; and that the simplicity and harmony of the soul should be reflected in\nthem all. This principle of simplicity has to be learnt by every one in the\ndays of his youth, and may be gathered anywhere, from the creative and\nconstructive arts, as well as from the forms of plants and animals.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nOther artists as well as poets should be warned against meanness or\nunseemliness. Sculpture and painting equally with music must conform to the law\nof simplicity. He who violates it cannot be allowed to work in our city, and to\ncorrupt the taste of our citizens. For our guardians must grow up, not amid\nimages of deformity which will gradually poison and corrupt their souls, but in\na land of health and beauty where they will drink in from every object sweet\nand harmonious influences. And of all these influences the greatest is the\neducation given by music, which finds a way into the innermost soul and imparts\nto it the sense of beauty and of deformity. At first the effect is unconscious;\nbut when reason arrives, then he who has been thus trained welcomes her as the\nfriend whom he always knew. As in learning to read, first we acquire the\nelements or letters separately, and afterwards their combinations, and cannot\nrecognize reflections of them until we know the letters themselves;\u0026mdash;in\nlike manner we must first attain the elements or essential forms of the\nvirtues, and then trace their combinations in life and experience. There is a\nmusic of the soul which answers to the harmony of the world; and the fairest\nobject of a musical soul is the fair mind in the fair body. Some defect in the\nlatter may be excused, but not in the former. True love is the daughter of\ntemperance, and temperance is utterly opposed to the madness of bodily\npleasure. Enough has been said of music, which makes a fair ending with love.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNext we pass on to gymnastics; about which I would remark, that the soul is\nrelated to the body as a cause to an effect, and therefore if we educate the\nmind we may leave the education of the body in her charge, and need only give a\ngeneral outline of the course to be pursued. In the first place the guardians\nmust abstain from strong drink, for they should be the last persons to lose\ntheir wits. Whether the habits of the palaestra are suitable to them is more\ndoubtful, for the ordinary gymnastic is a sleepy sort of thing, and if left off\nsuddenly is apt to endanger health. But our warrior athletes must be wide-awake\ndogs, and must also be inured to all changes of food and climate. Hence they\nwill require a simpler kind of gymnastic, akin to their simple music; and for\ntheir diet a rule may be found in Homer, who feeds his heroes on roast meat\nonly, and gives them no fish although they are living at the sea-side, nor\nboiled meats which involve an apparatus of pots and pans; and, if I am not\nmistaken, he nowhere mentions sweet sauces. Sicilian cookery and Attic\nconfections and Corinthian courtezans, which are to gymnastic what Lydian and\nIonian melodies are to music, must be forbidden. Where gluttony and\nintemperance prevail the town quickly fills with doctors and pleaders; and law\nand medicine give themselves airs as soon as the freemen of a State take an\ninterest in them. But what can show a more disgraceful state of education than\nto have to go abroad for justice because you have none of your own at home? And\nyet there IS a worse stage of the same disease\u0026mdash;when men have learned to\ntake a pleasure and pride in the twists and turns of the law; not considering\nhow much better it would be for them so to order their lives as to have no need\nof a nodding justice. And there is a like disgrace in employing a physician,\nnot for the cure of wounds or epidemic disorders, but because a man has by\nlaziness and luxury contracted diseases which were unknown in the days of\nAsclepius. How simple is the Homeric practice of medicine. Eurypylus after he\nhas been wounded drinks a posset of Pramnian wine, which is of a heating\nnature; and yet the sons of Asclepius blame neither the damsel who gives him\nthe drink, nor Patroclus who is attending on him. The truth is that this modern\nsystem of nursing diseases was introduced by Herodicus the trainer; who, being\nof a sickly constitution, by a compound of training and medicine tortured first\nhimself and then a good many other people, and lived a great deal longer than\nhe had any right. But Asclepius would not practise this art, because he knew\nthat the citizens of a well-ordered State have no leisure to be ill, and\ntherefore he adopted the \u0026lsquo;kill or cure\u0026rsquo; method, which artisans and\nlabourers employ. \u0026lsquo;They must be at their business,\u0026rsquo; they say,\n\u0026lsquo;and have no time for coddling: if they recover, well; if they\ndon\u0026rsquo;t, there is an end of them.\u0026rsquo; Whereas the rich man is supposed\nto be a gentleman who can afford to be ill. Do you know a maxim of\nPhocylides\u0026mdash;that \u0026lsquo;when a man begins to be rich\u0026rsquo; (or, perhaps,\na little sooner) \u0026lsquo;he should practise virtue\u0026rsquo;? But how can excessive\ncare of health be inconsistent with an ordinary occupation, and yet consistent\nwith that practice of virtue which Phocylides inculcates? When a student\nimagines that philosophy gives him a headache, he never does anything; he is\nalways unwell. This was the reason why Asclepius and his sons practised no such\nart. They were acting in the interest of the public, and did not wish to\npreserve useless lives, or raise up a puny offspring to wretched sires. Honest\ndiseases they honestly cured; and if a man was wounded, they applied the proper\nremedies, and then let him eat and drink what he liked. But they declined to\ntreat intemperate and worthless subjects, even though they might have made\nlarge fortunes out of them. As to the story of Pindar, that Asclepius was slain\nby a thunderbolt for restoring a rich man to life, that is a\nlie\u0026mdash;following our old rule we must say either that he did not take\nbribes, or that he was not the son of a god.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nGlaucon then asks Socrates whether the best physicians and the best judges will\nnot be those who have had severally the greatest experience of diseases and of\ncrimes. Socrates draws a distinction between the two professions. The physician\nshould have had experience of disease in his own body, for he cures with his\nmind and not with his body. But the judge controls mind by mind; and therefore\nhis mind should not be corrupted by crime. Where then is he to gain experience?\nHow is he to be wise and also innocent? When young a good man is apt to be\ndeceived by evil-doers, because he has no pattern of evil in himself; and\ntherefore the judge should be of a certain age; his youth should have been\ninnocent, and he should have acquired insight into evil not by the practice of\nit, but by the observation of it in others. This is the ideal of a judge; the\ncriminal turned detective is wonderfully suspicious, but when in company with\ngood men who have experience, he is at fault, for he foolishly imagines that\nevery one is as bad as himself. Vice may be known of virtue, but cannot know\nvirtue. This is the sort of medicine and this the sort of law which will\nprevail in our State; they will be healing arts to better natures; but the evil\nbody will be left to die by the one, and the evil soul will be put to death by\nthe other. And the need of either will be greatly diminished by good music\nwhich will give harmony to the soul, and good gymnastic which will give health\nto the body. Not that this division of music and gymnastic really corresponds\nto soul and body; for they are both equally concerned with the soul, which is\ntamed by the one and aroused and sustained by the other. The two together\nsupply our guardians with their twofold nature. The passionate disposition when\nit has too much gymnastic is hardened and brutalized, the gentle or philosophic\ntemper which has too much music becomes enervated. While a man is allowing\nmusic to pour like water through the funnel of his ears, the edge of his soul\ngradually wears away, and the passionate or spirited element is melted out of\nhim. Too little spirit is easily exhausted; too much quickly passes into\nnervous irritability. So, again, the athlete by feeding and training has his\ncourage doubled, but he soon grows stupid; he is like a wild beast, ready to do\neverything by blows and nothing by counsel or policy. There are two principles\nin man, reason and passion, and to these, not to the soul and body, the two\narts of music and gymnastic correspond. He who mingles them in harmonious\nconcord is the true musician,\u0026mdash;he shall be the presiding genius of our\nState.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe next question is, Who are to be our rulers? First, the elder must rule the\nyounger; and the best of the elders will be the best guardians. Now they will\nbe the best who love their subjects most, and think that they have a common\ninterest with them in the welfare of the state. These we must select; but they\nmust be watched at every epoch of life to see whether they have retained the\nsame opinions and held out against force and enchantment. For time and\npersuasion and the love of pleasure may enchant a man into a change of purpose,\nand the force of grief and pain may compel him. And therefore our guardians\nmust be men who have been tried by many tests, like gold in the refiner\u0026rsquo;s\nfire, and have been passed first through danger, then through pleasure, and at\nevery age have come out of such trials victorious and without stain, in full\ncommand of themselves and their principles; having all their faculties in\nharmonious exercise for their country\u0026rsquo;s good. These shall receive the\nhighest honours both in life and death. (It would perhaps be better to confine\nthe term \u0026lsquo;guardians\u0026rsquo; to this select class: the younger men may be\ncalled \u0026lsquo;auxiliaries.\u0026rsquo;)\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd now for one magnificent lie, in the belief of which, Oh that we could train\nour rulers!\u0026mdash;at any rate let us make the attempt with the rest of the\nworld. What I am going to tell is only another version of the legend of Cadmus;\nbut our unbelieving generation will be slow to accept such a story. The tale\nmust be imparted, first to the rulers, then to the soldiers, lastly to the\npeople. We will inform them that their youth was a dream, and that during the\ntime when they seemed to be undergoing their education they were really being\nfashioned in the earth, who sent them up when they were ready; and that they\nmust protect and cherish her whose children they are, and regard each other as\nbrothers and sisters. \u0026lsquo;I do not wonder at your being ashamed to propound\nsuch a fiction.\u0026rsquo; There is more behind. These brothers and sisters have\ndifferent natures, and some of them God framed to rule, whom he fashioned of\ngold; others he made of silver, to be auxiliaries; others again to be\nhusbandmen and craftsmen, and these were formed by him of brass and iron. But\nas they are all sprung from a common stock, a golden parent may have a silver\nson, or a silver parent a golden son, and then there must be a change of rank;\nthe son of the rich must descend, and the child of the artisan rise, in the\nsocial scale; for an oracle says \u0026lsquo;that the State will come to an end if\ngoverned by a man of brass or iron.\u0026rsquo; Will our citizens ever believe all\nthis? \u0026lsquo;Not in the present generation, but in the next, perhaps,\nYes.\u0026rsquo;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNow let the earthborn men go forth under the command of their rulers, and look\nabout and pitch their camp in a high place, which will be safe against enemies\nfrom without, and likewise against insurrections from within. There let them\nsacrifice and set up their tents; for soldiers they are to be and not\nshopkeepers, the watchdogs and guardians of the sheep; and luxury and avarice\nwill turn them into wolves and tyrants. Their habits and their dwellings should\ncorrespond to their education. They should have no property; their pay should\nonly meet their expenses; and they should have common meals. Gold and silver we\nwill tell them that they have from God, and this divine gift in their souls\nthey must not alloy with that earthly dross which passes under the name of\ngold. They only of the citizens may not touch it, or be under the same roof\nwith it, or drink from it; it is the accursed thing. Should they ever acquire\nhouses or lands or money of their own, they will become householders and\ntradesmen instead of guardians, enemies and tyrants instead of helpers, and the\nhour of ruin, both to themselves and the rest of the State, will be at hand.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe religious and ethical aspect of Plato\u0026rsquo;s education will hereafter be\nconsidered under a separate head. Some lesser points may be more conveniently\nnoticed in this place.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n1. The constant appeal to the authority of Homer, whom, with grave irony,\nPlato, after the manner of his age, summons as a witness about ethics and\npsychology, as well as about diet and medicine; attempting to distinguish the\nbetter lesson from the worse, sometimes altering the text from design; more\nthan once quoting or alluding to Homer inaccurately, after the manner of the\nearly logographers turning the Iliad into prose, and delighting to draw\nfar-fetched inferences from his words, or to make ludicrous applications of\nthem. He does not, like Heracleitus, get into a rage with Homer and Archilochus\n(Heracl.), but uses their words and expressions as vehicles of a higher truth;\nnot on a system like Theagenes of Rhegium or Metrodorus, or in later times the\nStoics, but as fancy may dictate. And the conclusions drawn from them are\nsound, although the premises are fictitious. These fanciful appeals to Homer\nadd a charm to Plato\u0026rsquo;s style, and at the same time they have the effect\nof a satire on the follies of Homeric interpretation. To us (and probably to\nhimself), although they take the form of arguments, they are really figures of\nspeech. They may be compared with modern citations from Scripture, which have\noften a great rhetorical power even when the original meaning of the words is\nentirely lost sight of. The real, like the Platonic Socrates, as we gather from\nthe Memorabilia of Xenophon, was fond of making similar adaptations. Great in\nall ages and countries, in religion as well as in law and literature, has been\nthe art of interpretation.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n2. \u0026lsquo;The style is to conform to the subject and the metre to the\nstyle.\u0026rsquo; Notwithstanding the fascination which the word\n\u0026lsquo;classical\u0026rsquo; exercises over us, we can hardly maintain that this\nrule is observed in all the Greek poetry which has come down to us. We cannot\ndeny that the thought often exceeds the power of lucid expression in Aeschylus\nand Pindar; or that rhetoric gets the better of the thought in the Sophist-poet\nEuripides. Only perhaps in Sophocles is there a perfect harmony of the two; in\nhim alone do we find a grace of language like the beauty of a Greek statue, in\nwhich there is nothing to add or to take away; at least this is true of single\nplays or of large portions of them. The connection in the Tragic Choruses and\nin the Greek lyric poets is not unfrequently a tangled thread which in an age\nbefore logic the poet was unable to draw out. Many thoughts and feelings\nmingled in his mind, and he had no power of disengaging or arranging them. For\nthere is a subtle influence of logic which requires to be transferred from\nprose to poetry, just as the music and perfection of language are infused by\npoetry into prose. In all ages the poet has been a bad judge of his own meaning\n(Apol.); for he does not see that the word which is full of associations to his\nown mind is difficult and unmeaning to that of another; or that the sequence\nwhich is clear to himself is puzzling to others. There are many passages in\nsome of our greatest modern poets which are far too obscure; in which there is\nno proportion between style and subject, in which any half-expressed figure,\nany harsh construction, any distorted collocation of words, any remote sequence\nof ideas is admitted; and there is no voice \u0026lsquo;coming sweetly from\nnature,\u0026rsquo; or music adding the expression of feeling to thought. As if\nthere could be poetry without beauty, or beauty without ease and clearness. The\nobscurities of early Greek poets arose necessarily out of the state of language\nand logic which existed in their age. They are not examples to be followed by\nus; for the use of language ought in every generation to become clearer and\nclearer. Like Shakespere, they were great in spite, not in consequence, of\ntheir imperfections of expression. But there is no reason for returning to the\nnecessary obscurity which prevailed in the infancy of literature. The English\npoets of the last century were certainly not obscure; and we have no excuse for\nlosing what they had gained, or for going back to the earlier or transitional\nage which preceded them. The thought of our own times has not out-stripped\nlanguage; a want of Plato\u0026rsquo;s \u0026lsquo;art of measuring\u0026rsquo; is the rule\ncause of the disproportion between them.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n3. In the third book of the Republic a nearer approach is made to a theory of\nart than anywhere else in Plato. His views may be summed up as\nfollows:\u0026mdash;True art is not fanciful and imitative, but simple and\nideal,\u0026mdash;the expression of the highest moral energy, whether in action or\nrepose. To live among works of plastic art which are of this noble and simple\ncharacter, or to listen to such strains, is the best of influences,\u0026mdash;the\ntrue Greek atmosphere, in which youth should be brought up. That is the way to\ncreate in them a natural good taste, which will have a feeling of truth and\nbeauty in all things. For though the poets are to be expelled, still art is\nrecognized as another aspect of reason\u0026mdash;like love in the Symposium,\nextending over the same sphere, but confined to the preliminary education, and\nacting through the power of habit; and this conception of art is not limited to\nstrains of music or the forms of plastic art, but pervades all nature and has a\nwide kindred in the world. The Republic of Plato, like the Athens of Pericles,\nhas an artistic as well as a political side.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThere is hardly any mention in Plato of the creative arts; only in two or three\npassages does he even allude to them (Rep.; Soph.). He is not lost in rapture\nat the great works of Phidias, the Parthenon, the Propylea, the statues of Zeus\nor Athene. He would probably have regarded any abstract truth of number or\nfigure as higher than the greatest of them. Yet it is hard to suppose that some\ninfluence, such as he hopes to inspire in youth, did not pass into his own mind\nfrom the works of art which he saw around him. We are living upon the fragments\nof them, and find in a few broken stones the standard of truth and beauty. But\nin Plato this feeling has no expression; he nowhere says that beauty is the\nobject of art; he seems to deny that wisdom can take an external form\n(Phaedrus); he does not distinguish the fine from the mechanical arts. Whether\nor no, like some writers, he felt more than he expressed, it is at any rate\nremarkable that the greatest perfection of the fine arts should coincide with\nan almost entire silence about them. In one very striking passage he tells us\nthat a work of art, like the State, is a whole; and this conception of a whole\nand the love of the newly-born mathematical sciences may be regarded, if not as\nthe inspiring, at any rate as the regulating principles of Greek art (Xen.\nMem.; and Sophist).\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n4. Plato makes the true and subtle remark that the physician had better not be\nin robust health; and should have known what illness is in his own person. But\nthe judge ought to have had no similar experience of evil; he is to be a good\nman who, having passed his youth in innocence, became acquainted late in life\nwith the vices of others. And therefore, according to Plato, a judge should not\nbe young, just as a young man according to Aristotle is not fit to be a hearer\nof moral philosophy. The bad, on the other hand, have a knowledge of vice, but\nno knowledge of virtue. It may be doubted, however, whether this train of\nreflection is well founded. In a remarkable passage of the Laws it is\nacknowledged that the evil may form a correct estimate of the good. The union\nof gentleness and courage in Book ii. at first seemed to be a paradox, yet was\nafterwards ascertained to be a truth. And Plato might also have found that the\nintuition of evil may be consistent with the abhorrence of it. There is a\ndirectness of aim in virtue which gives an insight into vice. And the knowledge\nof character is in some degree a natural sense independent of any special\nexperience of good or evil.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n5. One of the most remarkable conceptions of Plato, because un-Greek and also\nvery different from anything which existed at all in his age of the world, is\nthe transposition of ranks. In the Spartan state there had been enfranchisement\nof Helots and degradation of citizens under special circumstances. And in the\nancient Greek aristocracies, merit was certainly recognized as one of the\nelements on which government was based. The founders of states were supposed to\nbe their benefactors, who were raised by their great actions above the ordinary\nlevel of humanity; at a later period, the services of warriors and legislators\nwere held to entitle them and their descendants to the privileges of\ncitizenship and to the first rank in the state. And although the existence of\nan ideal aristocracy is slenderly proven from the remains of early Greek\nhistory, and we have a difficulty in ascribing such a character, however the\nidea may be defined, to any actual Hellenic state\u0026mdash;or indeed to any state\nwhich has ever existed in the world\u0026mdash;still the rule of the best was\ncertainly the aspiration of philosophers, who probably accommodated a good deal\ntheir views of primitive history to their own notions of good government. Plato\nfurther insists on applying to the guardians of his state a series of tests by\nwhich all those who fell short of a fixed standard were either removed from the\ngoverning body, or not admitted to it; and this \u0026lsquo;academic\u0026rsquo;\ndiscipline did to a certain extent prevail in Greek states, especially in\nSparta. He also indicates that the system of caste, which existed in a great\npart of the ancient, and is by no means extinct in the modern European world,\nshould be set aside from time to time in favour of merit. He is aware how\ndeeply the greater part of mankind resent any interference with the order of\nsociety, and therefore he proposes his novel idea in the form of what he\nhimself calls a \u0026lsquo;monstrous fiction.\u0026rsquo; (Compare the ceremony of\npreparation for the two \u0026lsquo;great waves\u0026rsquo; in Book v.) Two principles\nare indicated by him: first, that there is a distinction of ranks dependent on\ncircumstances prior to the individual: second, that this distinction is and\nought to be broken through by personal qualities. He adapts mythology like the\nHomeric poems to the wants of the state, making \u0026lsquo;the Phoenician\ntale\u0026rsquo; the vehicle of his ideas. Every Greek state had a myth respecting\nits own origin; the Platonic republic may also have a tale of earthborn men.\nThe gravity and verisimilitude with which the tale is told, and the analogy of\nGreek tradition, are a sufficient verification of the \u0026lsquo;monstrous\nfalsehood.\u0026rsquo; Ancient poetry had spoken of a gold and silver and brass and\niron age succeeding one another, but Plato supposes these differences in the\nnatures of men to exist together in a single state. Mythology supplies a figure\nunder which the lesson may be taught (as Protagoras says, \u0026lsquo;the myth is\nmore interesting\u0026rsquo;), and also enables Plato to touch lightly on new\nprinciples without going into details. In this passage he shadows forth a\ngeneral truth, but he does not tell us by what steps the transposition of ranks\nis to be effected. Indeed throughout the Republic he allows the lower ranks to\nfade into the distance. We do not know whether they are to carry arms, and\nwhether in the fifth book they are or are not included in the communistic\nregulations respecting property and marriage. Nor is there any use in arguing\nstrictly either from a few chance words, or from the silence of Plato, or in\ndrawing inferences which were beyond his vision. Aristotle, in his criticism on\nthe position of the lower classes, does not perceive that the poetical creation\nis \u0026lsquo;like the air, invulnerable,\u0026rsquo; and cannot be penetrated by the\nshafts of his logic (Pol.).\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n6. Two paradoxes which strike the modern reader as in the highest degree\nfanciful and ideal, and which suggest to him many reflections, are to be found\nin the third book of the Republic: first, the great power of music, so much\nbeyond any influence which is experienced by us in modern times, when the art\nor science has been far more developed, and has found the secret of harmony, as\nwell as of melody; secondly, the indefinite and almost absolute control which\nthe soul is supposed to exercise over the body.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIn the first we suspect some degree of exaggeration, such as we may also\nobserve among certain masters of the art, not unknown to us, at the present\nday. With this natural enthusiasm, which is felt by a few only, there seems to\nmingle in Plato a sort of Pythagorean reverence for numbers and numerical\nproportion to which Aristotle is a stranger. Intervals of sound and number are\nto him sacred things which have a law of their own, not dependent on the\nvariations of sense. They rise above sense, and become a connecting link with\nthe world of ideas. But it is evident that Plato is describing what to him\nappears to be also a fact. The power of a simple and characteristic melody on\nthe impressible mind of the Greek is more than we can easily appreciate. The\neffect of national airs may bear some comparison with it. And, besides all\nthis, there is a confusion between the harmony of musical notes and the harmony\nof soul and body, which is so potently inspired by them.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe second paradox leads up to some curious and interesting questions\u0026mdash;How\nfar can the mind control the body? Is the relation between them one of mutual\nantagonism or of mutual harmony? Are they two or one, and is either of them the\ncause of the other? May we not at times drop the opposition between them, and\nthe mode of describing them, which is so familiar to us, and yet hardly conveys\nany precise meaning, and try to view this composite creature, man, in a more\nsimple manner? Must we not at any rate admit that there is in human nature a\nhigher and a lower principle, divided by no distinct line, which at times break\nasunder and take up arms against one another? Or again, they are reconciled and\nmove together, either unconsciously in the ordinary work of life, or\nconsciously in the pursuit of some noble aim, to be attained not without an\neffort, and for which every thought and nerve are strained. And then the body\nbecomes the good friend or ally, or servant or instrument of the mind. And the\nmind has often a wonderful and almost superhuman power of banishing disease and\nweakness and calling out a hidden strength. Reason and the desires, the\nintellect and the senses are brought into harmony and obedience so as to form a\nsingle human being. They are ever parting, ever meeting; and the identity or\ndiversity of their tendencies or operations is for the most part unnoticed by\nus. When the mind touches the body through the appetites, we acknowledge the\nresponsibility of the one to the other. There is a tendency in us which says\n\u0026lsquo;Drink.\u0026rsquo; There is another which says, \u0026lsquo;Do not drink; it is\nnot good for you.\u0026rsquo; And we all of us know which is the rightful superior.\nWe are also responsible for our health, although into this sphere there enter\nsome elements of necessity which may be beyond our control. Still even in the\nmanagement of health, care and thought, continued over many years, may make us\nalmost free agents, if we do not exact too much of ourselves, and if we\nacknowledge that all human freedom is limited by the laws of nature and of\nmind.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWe are disappointed to find that Plato, in the general condemnation which he\npasses on the practice of medicine prevailing in his own day, depreciates the\neffects of diet. He would like to have diseases of a definite character and\ncapable of receiving a definite treatment. He is afraid of invalidism\ninterfering with the business of life. He does not recognize that time is the\ngreat healer both of mental and bodily disorders; and that remedies which are\ngradual and proceed little by little are safer than those which produce a\nsudden catastrophe. Neither does he see that there is no way in which the mind\ncan more surely influence the body than by the control of eating and drinking;\nor any other action or occasion of human life on which the higher freedom of\nthe will can be more simple or truly asserted.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n7. Lesser matters of style may be remarked.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n(1) The affected ignorance of music, which is Plato\u0026rsquo;s way of expressing\nthat he is passing lightly over the subject.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n(2) The tentative manner in which here, as in the second book, he proceeds with\nthe construction of the State.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n(3) The description of the State sometimes as a reality, and then again as a\nwork of imagination only; these are the arts by which he sustains the\nreader\u0026rsquo;s interest.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n(4) Connecting links, or the preparation for the entire expulsion of the poets\nin Book X.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n(5) The companion pictures of the lover of litigation and the valetudinarian,\nthe satirical jest about the maxim of Phocylides, the manner in which the image\nof the gold and silver citizens is taken up into the subject, and the argument\nfrom the practice of Asclepius, should not escape notice.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBOOK IV. Adeimantus said: \u0026lsquo;Suppose a person to argue, Socrates, that you\nmake your citizens miserable, and this by their own free-will; they are the\nlords of the city, and yet instead of having, like other men, lands and houses\nand money of their own, they live as mercenaries and are always mounting\nguard.\u0026rsquo; You may add, I replied, that they receive no pay but only their\nfood, and have no money to spend on a journey or a mistress. \u0026lsquo;Well, and\nwhat answer do you give?\u0026rsquo; My answer is, that our guardians may or may not\nbe the happiest of men,\u0026mdash;I should not be surprised to find in the long-run\nthat they were,\u0026mdash;but this is not the aim of our constitution, which was\ndesigned for the good of the whole and not of any one part. If I went to a\nsculptor and blamed him for having painted the eye, which is the noblest\nfeature of the face, not purple but black, he would reply: \u0026lsquo;The eye must\nbe an eye, and you should look at the statue as a whole.\u0026rsquo; \u0026lsquo;Now I\ncan well imagine a fool\u0026rsquo;s paradise, in which everybody is eating and\ndrinking, clothed in purple and fine linen, and potters lie on sofas and have\ntheir wheel at hand, that they may work a little when they please; and cobblers\nand all the other classes of a State lose their distinctive character. And a\nState may get on without cobblers; but when the guardians degenerate into boon\ncompanions, then the ruin is complete. Remember that we are not talking of\npeasants keeping holiday, but of a State in which every man is expected to do\nhis own work. The happiness resides not in this or that class, but in the State\nas a whole. I have another remark to make:\u0026mdash;A middle condition is best for\nartisans; they should have money enough to buy tools, and not enough to be\nindependent of business. And will not the same condition be best for our\ncitizens? If they are poor, they will be mean; if rich, luxurious and lazy; and\nin neither case contented. \u0026lsquo;But then how will our poor city be able to go\nto war against an enemy who has money?\u0026rsquo; There may be a difficulty in\nfighting against one enemy; against two there will be none. In the first place,\nthe contest will be carried on by trained warriors against well-to-do citizens:\nand is not a regular athlete an easy match for two stout opponents at least?\nSuppose also, that before engaging we send ambassadors to one of the two\ncities, saying, \u0026lsquo;Silver and gold we have not; do you help us and take our\nshare of the spoil;\u0026rsquo;\u0026mdash;who would fight against the lean, wiry dogs,\nwhen they might join with them in preying upon the fatted sheep? \u0026lsquo;But if\nmany states join their resources, shall we not be in danger?\u0026rsquo; I am amused\nto hear you use the word \u0026lsquo;state\u0026rsquo; of any but our own State. They are\n\u0026lsquo;states,\u0026rsquo; but not \u0026lsquo;a state\u0026rsquo;\u0026mdash;many in one. For in\nevery state there are two hostile nations, rich and poor, which you may set one\nagainst the other. But our State, while she remains true to her principles,\nwill be in very deed the mightiest of Hellenic states.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTo the size of the state there is no limit but the necessity of unity; it must\nbe neither too large nor too small to be one. This is a matter of secondary\nimportance, like the principle of transposition which was intimated in the\nparable of the earthborn men. The meaning there implied was that every man\nshould do that for which he was fitted, and be at one with himself, and then\nthe whole city would be united. But all these things are secondary, if\neducation, which is the great matter, be duly regarded. When the wheel has once\nbeen set in motion, the speed is always increasing; and each generation\nimproves upon the preceding, both in physical and moral qualities. The care of\nthe governors should be directed to preserve music and gymnastic from\ninnovation; alter the songs of a country, Damon says, and you will soon end by\naltering its laws. The change appears innocent at first, and begins in play;\nbut the evil soon becomes serious, working secretly upon the characters of\nindividuals, then upon social and commercial relations, and lastly upon the\ninstitutions of a state; and there is ruin and confusion everywhere. But if\neducation remains in the established form, there will be no danger. A\nrestorative process will be always going on; the spirit of law and order will\nraise up what has fallen down. Nor will any regulations be needed for the\nlesser matters of life\u0026mdash;rules of deportment or fashions of dress. Like\ninvites like for good or for evil. Education will correct deficiencies and\nsupply the power of self-government. Far be it from us to enter into the\nparticulars of legislation; let the guardians take care of education, and\neducation will take care of all other things.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut without education they may patch and mend as they please; they will make no\nprogress, any more than a patient who thinks to cure himself by some favourite\nremedy and will not give up his luxurious mode of living. If you tell such\npersons that they must first alter their habits, then they grow angry; they are\ncharming people. \u0026lsquo;Charming,\u0026mdash;nay, the very reverse.\u0026rsquo; Evidently\nthese gentlemen are not in your good graces, nor the state which is like them.\nAnd such states there are which first ordain under penalty of death that no one\nshall alter the constitution, and then suffer themselves to be flattered into\nand out of anything; and he who indulges them and fawns upon them, is their\nleader and saviour. \u0026lsquo;Yes, the men are as bad as the states.\u0026rsquo; But do\nyou not admire their cleverness? \u0026lsquo;Nay, some of them are stupid enough to\nbelieve what the people tell them.\u0026rsquo; And when all the world is telling a\nman that he is six feet high, and he has no measure, how can he believe\nanything else? But don\u0026rsquo;t get into a passion: to see our statesmen trying\ntheir nostrums, and fancying that they can cut off at a blow the Hydra-like\nrogueries of mankind, is as good as a play. Minute enactments are superfluous\nin good states, and are useless in bad ones.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd now what remains of the work of legislation? Nothing for us; but to Apollo\nthe god of Delphi we leave the ordering of the greatest of all\nthings\u0026mdash;that is to say, religion. Only our ancestral deity sitting upon\nthe centre and navel of the earth will be trusted by us if we have any sense,\nin an affair of such magnitude. No foreign god shall be supreme in our\nrealms…\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHere, as Socrates would say, let us \u0026lsquo;reflect on\u0026rsquo; (Greek) what has\npreceded: thus far we have spoken not of the happiness of the citizens, but\nonly of the well-being of the State. They may be the happiest of men, but our\nprincipal aim in founding the State was not to make them happy. They were to be\nguardians, not holiday-makers. In this pleasant manner is presented to us the\nfamous question both of ancient and modern philosophy, touching the relation of\nduty to happiness, of right to utility.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nFirst duty, then happiness, is the natural order of our moral ideas. The\nutilitarian principle is valuable as a corrective of error, and shows to us a\nside of ethics which is apt to be neglected. It may be admitted further that\nright and utility are co-extensive, and that he who makes the happiness of\nmankind his object has one of the highest and noblest motives of human action.\nBut utility is not the historical basis of morality; nor the aspect in which\nmoral and religious ideas commonly occur to the mind. The greatest happiness of\nall is, as we believe, the far-off result of the divine government of the\nuniverse. The greatest happiness of the individual is certainly to be found in\na life of virtue and goodness. But we seem to be more assured of a law of right\nthan we can be of a divine purpose, that \u0026lsquo;all mankind should be\nsaved;\u0026rsquo; and we infer the one from the other. And the greatest happiness\nof the individual may be the reverse of the greatest happiness in the ordinary\nsense of the term, and may be realised in a life of pain, or in a voluntary\ndeath. Further, the word \u0026lsquo;happiness\u0026rsquo; has several ambiguities; it\nmay mean either pleasure or an ideal life, happiness subjective or objective,\nin this world or in another, of ourselves only or of our neighbours and of all\nmen everywhere. By the modern founder of Utilitarianism the self-regarding and\ndisinterested motives of action are included under the same term, although they\nare commonly opposed by us as benevolence and self-love. The word happiness has\nnot the definiteness or the sacredness of \u0026lsquo;truth\u0026rsquo; and\n\u0026lsquo;right\u0026rsquo;; it does not equally appeal to our higher nature, and has\nnot sunk into the conscience of mankind. It is associated too much with the\ncomforts and conveniences of life; too little with \u0026lsquo;the goods of the soul\nwhich we desire for their own sake.\u0026rsquo; In a great trial, or danger, or\ntemptation, or in any great and heroic action, it is scarcely thought of. For\nthese reasons \u0026lsquo;the greatest happiness\u0026rsquo; principle is not the true\nfoundation of ethics. But though not the first principle, it is the second,\nwhich is like unto it, and is often of easier application. For the larger part\nof human actions are neither right nor wrong, except in so far as they tend to\nthe happiness of mankind (Introd. to Gorgias and Philebus).\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe same question reappears in politics, where the useful or expedient seems to\nclaim a larger sphere and to have a greater authority. For concerning political\nmeasures, we chiefly ask: How will they affect the happiness of mankind? Yet\nhere too we may observe that what we term expediency is merely the law of right\nlimited by the conditions of human society. Right and truth are the highest\naims of government as well as of individuals; and we ought not to lose sight of\nthem because we cannot directly enforce them. They appeal to the better mind of\nnations; and sometimes they are too much for merely temporal interests to\nresist. They are the watchwords which all men use in matters of public policy,\nas well as in their private dealings; the peace of Europe may be said to depend\nupon them. In the most commercial and utilitarian states of society the power\nof ideas remains. And all the higher class of statesmen have in them something\nof that idealism which Pericles is said to have gathered from the teaching of\nAnaxagoras. They recognise that the true leader of men must be above the\nmotives of ambition, and that national character is of greater value than\nmaterial comfort and prosperity. And this is the order of thought in Plato;\nfirst, he expects his citizens to do their duty, and then under favourable\ncircumstances, that is to say, in a well-ordered State, their happiness is\nassured. That he was far from excluding the modern principle of utility in\npolitics is sufficiently evident from other passages; in which \u0026lsquo;the most\nbeneficial is affirmed to be the most honourable\u0026rsquo;, and also \u0026lsquo;the\nmost sacred\u0026rsquo;.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWe may note\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n(1) The manner in which the objection of Adeimantus here, is designed to draw\nout and deepen the argument of Socrates.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n(2) The conception of a whole as lying at the foundation both of politics and\nof art, in the latter supplying the only principle of criticism, which, under\nthe various names of harmony, symmetry, measure, proportion, unity, the Greek\nseems to have applied to works of art.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n(3) The requirement that the State should be limited in size, after the\ntraditional model of a Greek state; as in the Politics of Aristotle, the fact\nthat the cities of Hellas were small is converted into a principle.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n(4) The humorous pictures of the lean dogs and the fatted sheep, of the light\nactive boxer upsetting two stout gentlemen at least, of the\n\u0026lsquo;charming\u0026rsquo; patients who are always making themselves worse; or\nagain, the playful assumption that there is no State but our own; or the grave\nirony with which the statesman is excused who believes that he is six feet high\nbecause he is told so, and having nothing to measure with is to be pardoned for\nhis ignorance\u0026mdash;he is too amusing for us to be seriously angry with him.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n(5) The light and superficial manner in which religion is passed over when\nprovision has been made for two great principles,\u0026mdash;first, that religion\nshall be based on the highest conception of the gods, secondly, that the true\nnational or Hellenic type shall be maintained…\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nSocrates proceeds: But where amid all this is justice? Son of Ariston, tell me\nwhere. Light a candle and search the city, and get your brother and the rest of\nour friends to help in seeking for her. \u0026lsquo;That won\u0026rsquo;t do,\u0026rsquo;\nreplied Glaucon, \u0026lsquo;you yourself promised to make the search and talked\nabout the impiety of deserting justice.\u0026rsquo; Well, I said, I will lead the\nway, but do you follow. My notion is, that our State being perfect will contain\nall the four virtues\u0026mdash;wisdom, courage, temperance, justice. If we\neliminate the three first, the unknown remainder will be justice.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nFirst then, of wisdom: the State which we have called into being will be wise\nbecause politic. And policy is one among many kinds of skill,\u0026mdash;not the\nskill of the carpenter, or of the worker in metal, or of the husbandman, but\nthe skill of him who advises about the interests of the whole State. Of such a\nkind is the skill of the guardians, who are a small class in number, far\nsmaller than the blacksmiths; but in them is concentrated the wisdom of the\nState. And if this small ruling class have wisdom, then the whole State will be\nwise.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nOur second virtue is courage, which we have no difficulty in finding in another\nclass\u0026mdash;that of soldiers. Courage may be defined as a sort of\nsalvation\u0026mdash;the never-failing salvation of the opinions which law and\neducation have prescribed concerning dangers. You know the way in which dyers\nfirst prepare the white ground and then lay on the dye of purple or of any\nother colour. Colours dyed in this way become fixed, and no soap or lye will\never wash them out. Now the ground is education, and the laws are the colours;\nand if the ground is properly laid, neither the soap of pleasure nor the lye of\npain or fear will ever wash them out. This power which preserves right opinion\nabout danger I would ask you to call \u0026lsquo;courage,\u0026rsquo; adding the epithet\n\u0026lsquo;political\u0026rsquo; or \u0026lsquo;civilized\u0026rsquo; in order to distinguish it\nfrom mere animal courage and from a higher courage which may hereafter be\ndiscussed.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTwo virtues remain; temperance and justice. More than the preceding virtues\ntemperance suggests the idea of harmony. Some light is thrown upon the nature\nof this virtue by the popular description of a man as \u0026lsquo;master of\nhimself\u0026rsquo;\u0026mdash;which has an absurd sound, because the master is also the\nservant. The expression really means that the better principle in a man masters\nthe worse. There are in cities whole classes\u0026mdash;women, slaves and the\nlike\u0026mdash;who correspond to the worse, and a few only to the better; and in\nour State the former class are held under control by the latter. Now to which\nof these classes does temperance belong? \u0026lsquo;To both of them.\u0026rsquo; And our\nState if any will be the abode of temperance; and we were right in describing\nthis virtue as a harmony which is diffused through the whole, making the\ndwellers in the city to be of one mind, and attuning the upper and middle and\nlower classes like the strings of an instrument, whether you suppose them to\ndiffer in wisdom, strength or wealth.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd now we are near the spot; let us draw in and surround the cover and watch\nwith all our eyes, lest justice should slip away and escape. Tell me, if you\nsee the thicket move first. \u0026lsquo;Nay, I would have you lead.\u0026rsquo; Well\nthen, offer up a prayer and follow. The way is dark and difficult; but we must\npush on. I begin to see a track. \u0026lsquo;Good news.\u0026rsquo; Why, Glaucon, our\ndulness of scent is quite ludicrous! While we are straining our eyes into the\ndistance, justice is tumbling out at our feet. We are as bad as people looking\nfor a thing which they have in their hands. Have you forgotten our old\nprinciple of the division of labour, or of every man doing his own business,\nconcerning which we spoke at the foundation of the State\u0026mdash;what but this\nwas justice? Is there any other virtue remaining which can compete with wisdom\nand temperance and courage in the scale of political virtue? For \u0026lsquo;every\none having his own\u0026rsquo; is the great object of government; and the great\nobject of trade is that every man should do his own business. Not that there is\nmuch harm in a carpenter trying to be a cobbler, or a cobbler transforming\nhimself into a carpenter; but great evil may arise from the cobbler leaving his\nlast and turning into a guardian or legislator, or when a single individual is\ntrainer, warrior, legislator, all in one. And this evil is injustice, or every\nman doing another\u0026rsquo;s business. I do not say that as yet we are in a\ncondition to arrive at a final conclusion. For the definition which we believe\nto hold good in states has still to be tested by the individual. Having read\nthe large letters we will now come back to the small. From the two together a\nbrilliant light may be struck out…\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nSocrates proceeds to discover the nature of justice by a method of residues.\nEach of the first three virtues corresponds to one of the three parts of the\nsoul and one of the three classes in the State, although the third, temperance,\nhas more of the nature of a harmony than the first two. If there be a fourth\nvirtue, that can only be sought for in the relation of the three parts in the\nsoul or classes in the State to one another. It is obvious and simple, and for\nthat very reason has not been found out. The modern logician will be inclined\nto object that ideas cannot be separated like chemical substances, but that\nthey run into one another and may be only different aspects or names of the\nsame thing, and such in this instance appears to be the case. For the\ndefinition here given of justice is verbally the same as one of the definitions\nof temperance given by Socrates in the Charmides, which however is only\nprovisional, and is afterwards rejected. And so far from justice remaining over\nwhen the other virtues are eliminated, the justice and temperance of the\nRepublic can with difficulty be distinguished. Temperance appears to be the\nvirtue of a part only, and one of three, whereas justice is a universal virtue\nof the whole soul. Yet on the other hand temperance is also described as a sort\nof harmony, and in this respect is akin to justice. Justice seems to differ\nfrom temperance in degree rather than in kind; whereas temperance is the\nharmony of discordant elements, justice is the perfect order by which all\nnatures and classes do their own business, the right man in the right place,\nthe division and co-operation of all the citizens. Justice, again, is a more\nabstract notion than the other virtues, and therefore, from Plato\u0026rsquo;s point\nof view, the foundation of them, to which they are referred and which in idea\nprecedes them. The proposal to omit temperance is a mere trick of style\nintended to avoid monotony.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThere is a famous question discussed in one of the earlier Dialogues of Plato\n(Protagoras; Arist. Nic. Ethics), \u0026lsquo;Whether the virtues are one or\nmany?\u0026rsquo; This receives an answer which is to the effect that there are four\ncardinal virtues (now for the first time brought together in ethical\nphilosophy), and one supreme over the rest, which is not like Aristotle\u0026rsquo;s\nconception of universal justice, virtue relative to others, but the whole of\nvirtue relative to the parts. To this universal conception of justice or order\nin the first education and in the moral nature of man, the still more universal\nconception of the good in the second education and in the sphere of speculative\nknowledge seems to succeed. Both might be equally described by the terms\n\u0026lsquo;law,\u0026rsquo; \u0026lsquo;order,\u0026rsquo; \u0026lsquo;harmony;\u0026rsquo; but while the\nidea of good embraces \u0026lsquo;all time and all existence,\u0026rsquo; the conception\nof justice is not extended beyond man.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n…Socrates is now going to identify the individual and the State. But first he\nmust prove that there are three parts of the individual soul. His argument is\nas follows:\u0026mdash;Quantity makes no difference in quality. The word\n\u0026lsquo;just,\u0026rsquo; whether applied to the individual or to the State, has the\nsame meaning. And the term \u0026lsquo;justice\u0026rsquo; implied that the same three\nprinciples in the State and in the individual were doing their own business.\nBut are they really three or one? The question is difficult, and one which can\nhardly be solved by the methods which we are now using; but the truer and\nlonger way would take up too much of our time. \u0026lsquo;The shorter will satisfy\nme.\u0026rsquo; Well then, you would admit that the qualities of states mean the\nqualities of the individuals who compose them? The Scythians and Thracians are\npassionate, our own race intellectual, and the Egyptians and Phoenicians\ncovetous, because the individual members of each have such and such a\ncharacter; the difficulty is to determine whether the several principles are\none or three; whether, that is to say, we reason with one part of our nature,\ndesire with another, are angry with another, or whether the whole soul comes\ninto play in each sort of action. This enquiry, however, requires a very exact\ndefinition of terms. The same thing in the same relation cannot be affected in\ntwo opposite ways. But there is no impossibility in a man standing still, yet\nmoving his arms, or in a top which is fixed on one spot going round upon its\naxis. There is no necessity to mention all the possible exceptions; let us\nprovisionally assume that opposites cannot do or be or suffer opposites in the\nsame relation. And to the class of opposites belong assent and dissent, desire\nand avoidance. And one form of desire is thirst and hunger: and here arises a\nnew point\u0026mdash;thirst is thirst of drink, hunger is hunger of food; not of\nwarm drink or of a particular kind of food, with the single exception of course\nthat the very fact of our desiring anything implies that it is good. When\nrelative terms have no attributes, their correlatives have no attributes; when\nthey have attributes, their correlatives also have them. For example, the term\n\u0026lsquo;greater\u0026rsquo; is simply relative to \u0026lsquo;less,\u0026rsquo; and knowledge\nrefers to a subject of knowledge. But on the other hand, a particular knowledge\nis of a particular subject. Again, every science has a distinct character,\nwhich is defined by an object; medicine, for example, is the science of health,\nalthough not to be confounded with health. Having cleared our ideas thus far,\nlet us return to the original instance of thirst, which has a definite\nobject\u0026mdash;drink. Now the thirsty soul may feel two distinct impulses; the\nanimal one saying \u0026lsquo;Drink;\u0026rsquo; the rational one, which says \u0026lsquo;Do\nnot drink.\u0026rsquo; The two impulses are contradictory; and therefore we may\nassume that they spring from distinct principles in the soul. But is passion a\nthird principle, or akin to desire? There is a story of a certain Leontius\nwhich throws some light on this question. He was coming up from the Piraeus\noutside the north wall, and he passed a spot where there were dead bodies lying\nby the executioner. He felt a longing desire to see them and also an abhorrence\nof them; at first he turned away and shut his eyes, then, suddenly tearing them\nopen, he said,\u0026mdash;\u0026lsquo;Take your fill, ye wretches, of the fair\nsight.\u0026rsquo; Now is there not here a third principle which is often found to\ncome to the assistance of reason against desire, but never of desire against\nreason? This is passion or spirit, of the separate existence of which we may\nfurther convince ourselves by putting the following case:\u0026mdash;When a man\nsuffers justly, if he be of a generous nature he is not indignant at the\nhardships which he undergoes: but when he suffers unjustly, his indignation is\nhis great support; hunger and thirst cannot tame him; the spirit within him\nmust do or die, until the voice of the shepherd, that is, of reason, bidding\nhis dog bark no more, is heard within. This shows that passion is the ally of\nreason. Is passion then the same with reason? No, for the former exists in\nchildren and brutes; and Homer affords a proof of the distinction between them\nwhen he says, \u0026lsquo;He smote his breast, and thus rebuked his soul.\u0026rsquo;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd now, at last, we have reached firm ground, and are able to infer that the\nvirtues of the State and of the individual are the same. For wisdom and courage\nand justice in the State are severally the wisdom and courage and justice in\nthe individuals who form the State. Each of the three classes will do the work\nof its own class in the State, and each part in the individual soul; reason,\nthe superior, and passion, the inferior, will be harmonized by the influence of\nmusic and gymnastic. The counsellor and the warrior, the head and the arm, will\nact together in the town of Mansoul, and keep the desires in proper subjection.\nThe courage of the warrior is that quality which preserves a right opinion\nabout dangers in spite of pleasures and pains. The wisdom of the counsellor is\nthat small part of the soul which has authority and reason. The virtue of\ntemperance is the friendship of the ruling and the subject principles, both in\nthe State and in the individual. Of justice we have already spoken; and the\nnotion already given of it may be confirmed by common instances. Will the just\nstate or the just individual steal, lie, commit adultery, or be guilty of\nimpiety to gods and men? \u0026lsquo;No.\u0026rsquo; And is not the reason of this that\nthe several principles, whether in the state or in the individual, do their own\nbusiness? And justice is the quality which makes just men and just states.\nMoreover, our old division of labour, which required that there should be one\nman for one use, was a dream or anticipation of what was to follow; and that\ndream has now been realized in justice, which begins by binding together the\nthree chords of the soul, and then acts harmoniously in every relation of life.\nAnd injustice, which is the insubordination and disobedience of the inferior\nelements in the soul, is the opposite of justice, and is inharmonious and\nunnatural, being to the soul what disease is to the body; for in the soul as\nwell as in the body, good or bad actions produce good or bad habits. And virtue\nis the health and beauty and well-being of the soul, and vice is the disease\nand weakness and deformity of the soul.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAgain the old question returns upon us: Is justice or injustice the more\nprofitable? The question has become ridiculous. For injustice, like mortal\ndisease, makes life not worth having. Come up with me to the hill which\noverhangs the city and look down upon the single form of virtue, and the\ninfinite forms of vice, among which are four special ones, characteristic both\nof states and of individuals. And the state which corresponds to the single\nform of virtue is that which we have been describing, wherein reason rules\nunder one of two names\u0026mdash;monarchy and aristocracy. Thus there are five\nforms in all, both of states and of souls…\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIn attempting to prove that the soul has three separate faculties, Plato takes\noccasion to discuss what makes difference of faculties. And the criterion which\nhe proposes is difference in the working of the faculties. The same faculty\ncannot produce contradictory effects. But the path of early reasoners is beset\nby thorny entanglements, and he will not proceed a step without first clearing\nthe ground. This leads him into a tiresome digression, which is intended to\nexplain the nature of contradiction. First, the contradiction must be at the\nsame time and in the same relation. Secondly, no extraneous word must be\nintroduced into either of the terms in which the contradictory proposition is\nexpressed: for example, thirst is of drink, not of warm drink. He implies, what\nhe does not say, that if, by the advice of reason, or by the impulse of anger,\na man is restrained from drinking, this proves that thirst, or desire under\nwhich thirst is included, is distinct from anger and reason. But suppose that\nwe allow the term \u0026lsquo;thirst\u0026rsquo; or \u0026lsquo;desire\u0026rsquo; to be modified,\nand say an \u0026lsquo;angry thirst,\u0026rsquo; or a \u0026lsquo;revengeful desire,\u0026rsquo;\nthen the two spheres of desire and anger overlap and become confused. This case\ntherefore has to be excluded. And still there remains an exception to the rule\nin the use of the term \u0026lsquo;good,\u0026rsquo; which is always implied in the\nobject of desire. These are the discussions of an age before logic; and any one\nwho is wearied by them should remember that they are necessary to the clearing\nup of ideas in the first development of the human faculties.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe psychology of Plato extends no further than the division of the soul into\nthe rational, irascible, and concupiscent elements, which, as far as we know,\nwas first made by him, and has been retained by Aristotle and succeeding\nethical writers. The chief difficulty in this early analysis of the mind is to\ndefine exactly the place of the irascible faculty (Greek), which may be\nvariously described under the terms righteous indignation, spirit, passion. It\nis the foundation of courage, which includes in Plato moral courage, the\ncourage of enduring pain, and of surmounting intellectual difficulties, as well\nas of meeting dangers in war. Though irrational, it inclines to side with the\nrational: it cannot be aroused by punishment when justly inflicted: it\nsometimes takes the form of an enthusiasm which sustains a man in the\nperformance of great actions. It is the \u0026lsquo;lion heart\u0026rsquo; with which the\nreason makes a treaty. On the other hand it is negative rather than positive;\nit is indignant at wrong or falsehood, but does not, like Love in the Symposium\nand Phaedrus, aspire to the vision of Truth or Good. It is the peremptory\nmilitary spirit which prevails in the government of honour. It differs from\nanger (Greek), this latter term having no accessory notion of righteous\nindignation. Although Aristotle has retained the word, yet we may observe that\n\u0026lsquo;passion\u0026rsquo; (Greek) has with him lost its affinity to the rational\nand has become indistinguishable from \u0026lsquo;anger\u0026rsquo; (Greek). And to this\nvernacular use Plato himself in the Laws seems to revert, though not always. By\nmodern philosophy too, as well as in our ordinary conversation, the words anger\nor passion are employed almost exclusively in a bad sense; there is no\nconnotation of a just or reasonable cause by which they are aroused. The\nfeeling of \u0026lsquo;righteous indignation\u0026rsquo; is too partial and accidental to\nadmit of our regarding it as a separate virtue or habit. We are tempted also to\ndoubt whether Plato is right in supposing that an offender, however justly\ncondemned, could be expected to acknowledge the justice of his sentence; this\nis the spirit of a philosopher or martyr rather than of a criminal.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWe may observe how nearly Plato approaches Aristotle\u0026rsquo;s famous thesis,\nthat \u0026lsquo;good actions produce good habits.\u0026rsquo; The words \u0026lsquo;as\nhealthy practices (Greek) produce health, so do just practices produce\njustice,\u0026rsquo; have a sound very like the Nicomachean Ethics. But we note also\nthat an incidental remark in Plato has become a far-reaching principle in\nAristotle, and an inseparable part of a great Ethical system.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThere is a difficulty in understanding what Plato meant by \u0026lsquo;the longer\nway\u0026rsquo;: he seems to intimate some metaphysic of the future which will not\nbe satisfied with arguing from the principle of contradiction. In the sixth and\nseventh books (compare Sophist and Parmenides) he has given us a sketch of such\na metaphysic; but when Glaucon asks for the final revelation of the idea of\ngood, he is put off with the declaration that he has not yet studied the\npreliminary sciences. How he would have filled up the sketch, or argued about\nsuch questions from a higher point of view, we can only conjecture. Perhaps he\nhoped to find some a priori method of developing the parts out of the whole; or\nhe might have asked which of the ideas contains the other ideas, and possibly\nhave stumbled on the Hegelian identity of the \u0026lsquo;ego\u0026rsquo; and the\n\u0026lsquo;universal.\u0026rsquo; Or he may have imagined that ideas might be\nconstructed in some manner analogous to the construction of figures and numbers\nin the mathematical sciences. The most certain and necessary truth was to Plato\nthe universal; and to this he was always seeking to refer all knowledge or\nopinion, just as in modern times we seek to rest them on the opposite pole of\ninduction and experience. The aspirations of metaphysicians have always tended\nto pass beyond the limits of human thought and language: they seem to have\nreached a height at which they are \u0026lsquo;moving about in worlds\nunrealized,\u0026rsquo; and their conceptions, although profoundly affecting their\nown minds, become invisible or unintelligible to others. We are not therefore\nsurprized to find that Plato himself has nowhere clearly explained his doctrine\nof ideas; or that his school in a later generation, like his contemporaries\nGlaucon and Adeimantus, were unable to follow him in this region of\nspeculation. In the Sophist, where he is refuting the scepticism which\nmaintained either that there was no such thing as predication, or that all\nmight be predicated of all, he arrives at the conclusion that some ideas\ncombine with some, but not all with all. But he makes only one or two steps\nforward on this path; he nowhere attains to any connected system of ideas, or\neven to a knowledge of the most elementary relations of the sciences to one\nanother.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBOOK V. I was going to enumerate the four forms of vice or decline in states,\nwhen Polemarchus\u0026mdash;he was sitting a little farther from me than\nAdeimantus\u0026mdash;taking him by the coat and leaning towards him, said something\nin an undertone, of which I only caught the words, \u0026lsquo;Shall we let him\noff?\u0026rsquo; \u0026lsquo;Certainly not,\u0026rsquo; said Adeimantus, raising his voice.\nWhom, I said, are you not going to let off? \u0026lsquo;You,\u0026rsquo; he said. Why?\n\u0026lsquo;Because we think that you are not dealing fairly with us in omitting\nwomen and children, of whom you have slily disposed under the general formula\nthat friends have all things in common.\u0026rsquo; And was I not right?\n\u0026lsquo;Yes,\u0026rsquo; he replied, \u0026lsquo;but there are many sorts of communism or\ncommunity, and we want to know which of them is right. The company, as you have\njust heard, are resolved to have a further explanation.\u0026rsquo; Thrasymachus\nsaid, \u0026lsquo;Do you think that we have come hither to dig for gold, or to hear\nyou discourse?\u0026rsquo; Yes, I said; but the discourse should be of a reasonable\nlength. Glaucon added, \u0026lsquo;Yes, Socrates, and there is reason in spending\nthe whole of life in such discussions; but pray, without more ado, tell us how\nthis community is to be carried out, and how the interval between birth and\neducation is to be filled up.\u0026rsquo; Well, I said, the subject has several\ndifficulties\u0026mdash;What is possible? is the first question. What is desirable?\nis the second. \u0026lsquo;Fear not,\u0026rsquo; he replied, \u0026lsquo;for you are speaking\namong friends.\u0026rsquo; That, I replied, is a sorry consolation; I shall destroy\nmy friends as well as myself. Not that I mind a little innocent laughter; but\nhe who kills the truth is a murderer. \u0026lsquo;Then,\u0026rsquo; said Glaucon,\nlaughing, \u0026lsquo;in case you should murder us we will acquit you beforehand,\nand you shall be held free from the guilt of deceiving us.\u0026rsquo;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nSocrates proceeds:\u0026mdash;The guardians of our state are to be watch-dogs, as we\nhave already said. Now dogs are not divided into hes and shes\u0026mdash;we do not\ntake the masculine gender out to hunt and leave the females at home to look\nafter their puppies. They have the same employments\u0026mdash;the only difference\nbetween them is that the one sex is stronger and the other weaker. But if women\nare to have the same employments as men, they must have the same\neducation\u0026mdash;they must be taught music and gymnastics, and the art of war. I\nknow that a great joke will be made of their riding on horseback and carrying\nweapons; the sight of the naked old wrinkled women showing their agility in the\npalaestra will certainly not be a vision of beauty, and may be expected to\nbecome a famous jest. But we must not mind the wits; there was a time when they\nmight have laughed at our present gymnastics. All is habit: people have at last\nfound out that the exposure is better than the concealment of the person, and\nnow they laugh no more. Evil only should be the subject of ridicule.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe first question is, whether women are able either wholly or partially to\nshare in the employments of men. And here we may be charged with inconsistency\nin making the proposal at all. For we started originally with the division of\nlabour; and the diversity of employments was based on the difference of\nnatures. But is there no difference between men and women? Nay, are they not\nwholly different? THERE was the difficulty, Glaucon, which made me unwilling to\nspeak of family relations. However, when a man is out of his depth, whether in\na pool or in an ocean, he can only swim for his life; and we must try to find a\nway of escape, if we can.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe argument is, that different natures have different uses, and the natures of\nmen and women are said to differ. But this is only a verbal opposition. We do\nnot consider that the difference may be purely nominal and accidental; for\nexample, a bald man and a hairy man are opposed in a single point of view, but\nyou cannot infer that because a bald man is a cobbler a hairy man ought not to\nbe a cobbler. Now why is such an inference erroneous? Simply because the\nopposition between them is partial only, like the difference between a male\nphysician and a female physician, not running through the whole nature, like\nthe difference between a physician and a carpenter. And if the difference of\nthe sexes is only that the one beget and the other bear children, this does not\nprove that they ought to have distinct educations. Admitting that women differ\nfrom men in capacity, do not men equally differ from one another? Has not\nnature scattered all the qualities which our citizens require indifferently up\nand down among the two sexes? and even in their peculiar pursuits, are not\nwomen often, though in some cases superior to men, ridiculously enough\nsurpassed by them? Women are the same in kind as men, and have the same\naptitude or want of aptitude for medicine or gymnastic or war, but in a less\ndegree. One woman will be a good guardian, another not; and the good must be\nchosen to be the colleagues of our guardians. If however their natures are the\nsame, the inference is that their education must also be the same; there is no\nlonger anything unnatural or impossible in a woman learning music and\ngymnastic. And the education which we give them will be the very best, far\nsuperior to that of cobblers, and will train up the very best women, and\nnothing can be more advantageous to the State than this. Therefore let them\nstrip, clothed in their chastity, and share in the toils of war and in the\ndefence of their country; he who laughs at them is a fool for his pains.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe first wave is past, and the argument is compelled to admit that men and\nwomen have common duties and pursuits. A second and greater wave is rolling\nin\u0026mdash;community of wives and children; is this either expedient or possible?\nThe expediency I do not doubt; I am not so sure of the possibility. \u0026lsquo;Nay,\nI think that a considerable doubt will be entertained on both points.\u0026rsquo; I\nmeant to have escaped the trouble of proving the first, but as you have\ndetected the little stratagem I must even submit. Only allow me to feed my\nfancy like the solitary in his walks, with a dream of what might be, and then I\nwill return to the question of what can be.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIn the first place our rulers will enforce the laws and make new ones where\nthey are wanted, and their allies or ministers will obey. You, as legislator,\nhave already selected the men; and now you shall select the women. After the\nselection has been made, they will dwell in common houses and have their meals\nin common, and will be brought together by a necessity more certain than that\nof mathematics. But they cannot be allowed to live in licentiousness; that is\nan unholy thing, which the rulers are determined to prevent. For the avoidance\nof this, holy marriage festivals will be instituted, and their holiness will be\nin proportion to their usefulness. And here, Glaucon, I should like to ask (as\nI know that you are a breeder of birds and animals), Do you not take the\ngreatest care in the mating? \u0026lsquo;Certainly.\u0026rsquo; And there is no reason to\nsuppose that less care is required in the marriage of human beings. But then\nour rulers must be skilful physicians of the State, for they will often need a\nstrong dose of falsehood in order to bring about desirable unions between their\nsubjects. The good must be paired with the good, and the bad with the bad, and\nthe offspring of the one must be reared, and of the other destroyed; in this\nway the flock will be preserved in prime condition. Hymeneal festivals will be\ncelebrated at times fixed with an eye to population, and the brides and\nbridegrooms will meet at them; and by an ingenious system of lots the rulers\nwill contrive that the brave and the fair come together, and that those of\ninferior breed are paired with inferiors\u0026mdash;the latter will ascribe to\nchance what is really the invention of the rulers. And when children are born,\nthe offspring of the brave and fair will be carried to an enclosure in a\ncertain part of the city, and there attended by suitable nurses; the rest will\nbe hurried away to places unknown. The mothers will be brought to the fold and\nwill suckle the children; care however must be taken that none of them\nrecognise their own offspring; and if necessary other nurses may also be hired.\nThe trouble of watching and getting up at night will be transferred to\nattendants. \u0026lsquo;Then the wives of our guardians will have a fine easy time\nwhen they are having children.\u0026rsquo; And quite right too, I said, that they\nshould.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe parents ought to be in the prime of life, which for a man may be reckoned\nat thirty years\u0026mdash;from twenty-five, when he has \u0026lsquo;passed the point at\nwhich the speed of life is greatest,\u0026rsquo; to fifty-five; and at twenty years\nfor a woman\u0026mdash;from twenty to forty. Any one above or below those ages who\npartakes in the hymeneals shall be guilty of impiety; also every one who forms\na marriage connexion at other times without the consent of the rulers. This\nlatter regulation applies to those who are within the specified ages, after\nwhich they may range at will, provided they avoid the prohibited degrees of\nparents and children, or of brothers and sisters, which last, however, are not\nabsolutely prohibited, if a dispensation be procured. \u0026lsquo;But how shall we\nknow the degrees of affinity, when all things are common?\u0026rsquo; The answer is,\nthat brothers and sisters are all such as are born seven or nine months after\nthe espousals, and their parents those who are then espoused, and every one\nwill have many children and every child many parents.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nSocrates proceeds: I have now to prove that this scheme is advantageous and\nalso consistent with our entire polity. The greatest good of a State is unity;\nthe greatest evil, discord and distraction. And there will be unity where there\nare no private pleasures or pains or interests\u0026mdash;where if one member\nsuffers all the members suffer, if one citizen is touched all are quickly\nsensitive; and the least hurt to the little finger of the State runs through\nthe whole body and vibrates to the soul. For the true State, like an\nindividual, is injured as a whole when any part is affected. Every State has\nsubjects and rulers, who in a democracy are called rulers, and in other States\nmasters: but in our State they are called saviours and allies; and the subjects\nwho in other States are termed slaves, are by us termed nurturers and\npaymasters, and those who are termed comrades and colleagues in other places,\nare by us called fathers and brothers. And whereas in other States members of\nthe same government regard one of their colleagues as a friend and another as\nan enemy, in our State no man is a stranger to another; for every citizen is\nconnected with every other by ties of blood, and these names and this way of\nspeaking will have a corresponding reality\u0026mdash;brother, father, sister,\nmother, repeated from infancy in the ears of children, will not be mere words.\nThen again the citizens will have all things in common, in having common\nproperty they will have common pleasures and pains.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCan there be strife and contention among those who are of one mind; or lawsuits\nabout property when men have nothing but their bodies which they call their\nown; or suits about violence when every one is bound to defend himself? The\npermission to strike when insulted will be an \u0026lsquo;antidote\u0026rsquo; to the\nknife and will prevent disturbances in the State. But no younger man will\nstrike an elder; reverence will prevent him from laying hands on his kindred,\nand he will fear that the rest of the family may retaliate. Moreover, our\ncitizens will be rid of the lesser evils of life; there will be no flattery of\nthe rich, no sordid household cares, no borrowing and not paying. Compared with\nthe citizens of other States, ours will be Olympic victors, and crowned with\nblessings greater still\u0026mdash;they and their children having a better\nmaintenance during life, and after death an honourable burial. Nor has the\nhappiness of the individual been sacrificed to the happiness of the State; our\nOlympic victor has not been turned into a cobbler, but he has a happiness\nbeyond that of any cobbler. At the same time, if any conceited youth begins to\ndream of appropriating the State to himself, he must be reminded that\n\u0026lsquo;half is better than the whole.\u0026rsquo; \u0026lsquo;I should certainly advise\nhim to stay where he is when he has the promise of such a brave life.\u0026rsquo;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut is such a community possible?\u0026mdash;as among the animals, so also among\nmen; and if possible, in what way possible? About war there is no difficulty;\nthe principle of communism is adapted to military service. Parents will take\ntheir children to look on at a battle, just as potters\u0026rsquo; boys are trained\nto the business by looking on at the wheel. And to the parents themselves, as\nto other animals, the sight of their young ones will prove a great incentive to\nbravery. Young warriors must learn, but they must not run into danger, although\na certain degree of risk is worth incurring when the benefit is great. The\nyoung creatures should be placed under the care of experienced veterans, and\nthey should have wings\u0026mdash;that is to say, swift and tractable steeds on\nwhich they may fly away and escape. One of the first things to be done is to\nteach a youth to ride.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCowards and deserters shall be degraded to the class of husbandmen; gentlemen\nwho allow themselves to be taken prisoners, may be presented to the enemy. But\nwhat shall be done to the hero? First of all he shall be crowned by all the\nyouths in the army; secondly, he shall receive the right hand of fellowship;\nand thirdly, do you think that there is any harm in his being kissed? We have\nalready determined that he shall have more wives than others, in order that he\nmay have as many children as possible. And at a feast he shall have more to\neat; we have the authority of Homer for honouring brave men with \u0026lsquo;long\nchines,\u0026rsquo; which is an appropriate compliment, because meat is a very\nstrengthening thing. Fill the bowl then, and give the best seats and meats to\nthe brave\u0026mdash;may they do them good! And he who dies in battle will be at\nonce declared to be of the golden race, and will, as we believe, become one of\nHesiod\u0026rsquo;s guardian angels. He shall be worshipped after death in the\nmanner prescribed by the oracle; and not only he, but all other benefactors of\nthe State who die in any other way, shall be admitted to the same honours.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe next question is, How shall we treat our enemies? Shall Hellenes be\nenslaved? No; for there is too great a risk of the whole race passing under the\nyoke of the barbarians. Or shall the dead be despoiled? Certainly not; for that\nsort of thing is an excuse for skulking, and has been the ruin of many an army.\nThere is meanness and feminine malice in making an enemy of the dead body, when\nthe soul which was the owner has fled\u0026mdash;like a dog who cannot reach his\nassailants, and quarrels with the stones which are thrown at him instead.\nAgain, the arms of Hellenes should not be offered up in the temples of the\nGods; they are a pollution, for they are taken from brethren. And on similar\ngrounds there should be a limit to the devastation of Hellenic\nterritory\u0026mdash;the houses should not be burnt, nor more than the annual\nproduce carried off. For war is of two kinds, civil and foreign; the first of\nwhich is properly termed \u0026lsquo;discord,\u0026rsquo; and only the second\n\u0026lsquo;war;\u0026rsquo; and war between Hellenes is in reality civil war\u0026mdash;a\nquarrel in a family, which is ever to be regarded as unpatriotic and unnatural,\nand ought to be prosecuted with a view to reconciliation in a true\nphil-Hellenic spirit, as of those who would chasten but not utterly enslave.\nThe war is not against a whole nation who are a friendly multitude of men,\nwomen, and children, but only against a few guilty persons; when they are\npunished peace will be restored. That is the way in which Hellenes should war\nagainst one another\u0026mdash;and against barbarians, as they war against one\nanother now.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n\u0026lsquo;But, my dear Socrates, you are forgetting the main question: Is such a\nState possible? I grant all and more than you say about the blessedness of\nbeing one family\u0026mdash;fathers, brothers, mothers, daughters, going out to war\ntogether; but I want to ascertain the possibility of this ideal State.\u0026rsquo;\nYou are too unmerciful. The first wave and the second wave I have hardly\nescaped, and now you will certainly drown me with the third. When you see the\ntowering crest of the wave, I expect you to take pity. \u0026lsquo;Not a\nwhit.\u0026rsquo;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWell, then, we were led to form our ideal polity in the search after justice,\nand the just man answered to the just State. Is this ideal at all the worse for\nbeing impracticable? Would the picture of a perfectly beautiful man be any the\nworse because no such man ever lived? Can any reality come up to the idea?\nNature will not allow words to be fully realized; but if I am to try and\nrealize the ideal of the State in a measure, I think that an approach may be\nmade to the perfection of which I dream by one or two, I do not say slight, but\npossible changes in the present constitution of States. I would reduce them to\na single one\u0026mdash;the great wave, as I call it. Until, then, kings are\nphilosophers, or philosophers are kings, cities will never cease from ill: no,\nnor the human race; nor will our ideal polity ever come into being. I know that\nthis is a hard saying, which few will be able to receive. \u0026lsquo;Socrates, all\nthe world will take off his coat and rush upon you with sticks and stones, and\ntherefore I would advise you to prepare an answer.\u0026rsquo; You got me into the\nscrape, I said. \u0026lsquo;And I was right,\u0026rsquo; he replied; \u0026lsquo;however, I\nwill stand by you as a sort of do-nothing, well-meaning ally.\u0026rsquo; Having the\nhelp of such a champion, I will do my best to maintain my position. And first,\nI must explain of whom I speak and what sort of natures these are who are to be\nphilosophers and rulers. As you are a man of pleasure, you will not have\nforgotten how indiscriminate lovers are in their attachments; they love all,\nand turn blemishes into beauties. The snub-nosed youth is said to have a\nwinning grace; the beak of another has a royal look; the featureless are\nfaultless; the dark are manly, the fair angels; the sickly have a new term of\nendearment invented expressly for them, which is \u0026lsquo;honey-pale.\u0026rsquo;\nLovers of wine and lovers of ambition also desire the objects of their\naffection in every form. Now here comes the point:\u0026mdash;The philosopher too is\na lover of knowledge in every form; he has an insatiable curiosity. \u0026lsquo;But\nwill curiosity make a philosopher? Are the lovers of sights and sounds, who let\nout their ears to every chorus at the Dionysiac festivals, to be called\nphilosophers?\u0026rsquo; They are not true philosophers, but only an imitation.\n\u0026lsquo;Then how are we to describe the true?\u0026rsquo;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYou would acknowledge the existence of abstract ideas, such as justice, beauty,\ngood, evil, which are severally one, yet in their various combinations appear\nto be many. Those who recognize these realities are philosophers; whereas the\nother class hear sounds and see colours, and understand their use in the arts,\nbut cannot attain to the true or waking vision of absolute justice or beauty or\ntruth; they have not the light of knowledge, but of opinion, and what they see\nis a dream only. Perhaps he of whom we say the last will be angry with us; can\nwe pacify him without revealing the disorder of his mind? Suppose we say that,\nif he has knowledge we rejoice to hear it, but knowledge must be of something\nwhich is, as ignorance is of something which is not; and there is a third\nthing, which both is and is not, and is matter of opinion only. Opinion and\nknowledge, then, having distinct objects, must also be distinct faculties. And\nby faculties I mean powers unseen and distinguishable only by the difference in\ntheir objects, as opinion and knowledge differ, since the one is liable to err,\nbut the other is unerring and is the mightiest of all our faculties. If being\nis the object of knowledge, and not-being of ignorance, and these are the\nextremes, opinion must lie between them, and may be called darker than the one\nand brighter than the other. This intermediate or contingent matter is and is\nnot at the same time, and partakes both of existence and of non-existence. Now\nI would ask my good friend, who denies abstract beauty and justice, and affirms\na many beautiful and a many just, whether everything he sees is not in some\npoint of view different\u0026mdash;the beautiful ugly, the pious impious, the just\nunjust? Is not the double also the half, and are not heavy and light relative\nterms which pass into one another? Everything is and is not, as in the old\nriddle\u0026mdash;\u0026lsquo;A man and not a man shot and did not shoot a bird and not a\nbird with a stone and not a stone.\u0026rsquo; The mind cannot be fixed on either\nalternative; and these ambiguous, intermediate, erring, half-lighted objects,\nwhich have a disorderly movement in the region between being and not-being, are\nthe proper matter of opinion, as the immutable objects are the proper matter of\nknowledge. And he who grovels in the world of sense, and has only this\nuncertain perception of things, is not a philosopher, but a lover of opinion\nonly…\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe fifth book is the new beginning of the Republic, in which the community of\nproperty and of family are first maintained, and the transition is made to the\nkingdom of philosophers. For both of these Plato, after his manner, has been\npreparing in some chance words of Book IV, which fall unperceived on the\nreader\u0026rsquo;s mind, as they are supposed at first to have fallen on the ear of\nGlaucon and Adeimantus. The \u0026lsquo;paradoxes,\u0026rsquo; as Morgenstern terms them,\nof this book of the Republic will be reserved for another place; a few remarks\non the style, and some explanations of difficulties, may be briefly added.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nFirst, there is the image of the waves, which serves for a sort of scheme or\nplan of the book. The first wave, the second wave, the third and greatest wave\ncome rolling in, and we hear the roar of them. All that can be said of the\nextravagance of Plato\u0026rsquo;s proposals is anticipated by himself. Nothing is\nmore admirable than the hesitation with which he proposes the solemn text,\n\u0026lsquo;Until kings are philosophers,\u0026rsquo; etc.; or the reaction from the\nsublime to the ridiculous, when Glaucon describes the manner in which the new\ntruth will be received by mankind.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nSome defects and difficulties may be noted in the execution of the communistic\nplan. Nothing is told us of the application of communism to the lower classes;\nnor is the table of prohibited degrees capable of being made out. It is quite\npossible that a child born at one hymeneal festival may marry one of its own\nbrothers or sisters, or even one of its parents, at another. Plato is afraid of\nincestuous unions, but at the same time he does not wish to bring before us the\nfact that the city would be divided into families of those born seven and nine\nmonths after each hymeneal festival. If it were worth while to argue seriously\nabout such fancies, we might remark that while all the old affinities are\nabolished, the newly prohibited affinity rests not on any natural or rational\nprinciple, but only upon the accident of children having been born in the same\nmonth and year. Nor does he explain how the lots could be so manipulated by the\nlegislature as to bring together the fairest and best. The singular expression\nwhich is employed to describe the age of five-and-twenty may perhaps be taken\nfrom some poet.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIn the delineation of the philosopher, the illustrations of the nature of\nphilosophy derived from love are more suited to the apprehension of Glaucon,\nthe Athenian man of pleasure, than to modern tastes or feelings. They are\npartly facetious, but also contain a germ of truth. That science is a whole,\nremains a true principle of inductive as well as of metaphysical philosophy;\nand the love of universal knowledge is still the characteristic of the\nphilosopher in modern as well as in ancient times.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAt the end of the fifth book Plato introduces the figment of contingent matter,\nwhich has exercised so great an influence both on the Ethics and Theology of\nthe modern world, and which occurs here for the first time in the history of\nphilosophy. He did not remark that the degrees of knowledge in the subject have\nnothing corresponding to them in the object. With him a word must answer to an\nidea; and he could not conceive of an opinion which was an opinion about\nnothing. The influence of analogy led him to invent \u0026lsquo;parallels and\nconjugates\u0026rsquo; and to overlook facts. To us some of his difficulties are\npuzzling only from their simplicity: we do not perceive that the answer to them\n\u0026lsquo;is tumbling out at our feet.\u0026rsquo; To the mind of early thinkers, the\nconception of not-being was dark and mysterious; they did not see that this\nterrible apparition which threatened destruction to all knowledge was only a\nlogical determination. The common term under which, through the accidental use\nof language, two entirely different ideas were included was another source of\nconfusion. Thus through the ambiguity of (Greek) Plato, attempting to introduce\norder into the first chaos of human thought, seems to have confused perception\nand opinion, and to have failed to distinguish the contingent from the\nrelative. In the Theaetetus the first of these difficulties begins to clear up;\nin the Sophist the second; and for this, as well as for other reasons, both\nthese dialogues are probably to be regarded as later than the Republic.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBOOK VI. Having determined that the many have no knowledge of true being, and\nhave no clear patterns in their minds of justice, beauty, truth, and that\nphilosophers have such patterns, we have now to ask whether they or the many\nshall be rulers in our State. But who can doubt that philosophers should be\nchosen, if they have the other qualities which are required in a ruler? For\nthey are lovers of the knowledge of the eternal and of all truth; they are\nhaters of falsehood; their meaner desires are absorbed in the interests of\nknowledge; they are spectators of all time and all existence; and in the\nmagnificence of their contemplation the life of man is as nothing to them, nor\nis death fearful. Also they are of a social, gracious disposition, equally free\nfrom cowardice and arrogance. They learn and remember easily; they have\nharmonious, well-regulated minds; truth flows to them sweetly by nature. Can\nthe god of Jealousy himself find any fault with such an assemblage of good\nqualities?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHere Adeimantus interposes:\u0026mdash;\u0026lsquo;No man can answer you, Socrates; but\nevery man feels that this is owing to his own deficiency in argument. He is\ndriven from one position to another, until he has nothing more to say, just as\nan unskilful player at draughts is reduced to his last move by a more skilled\nopponent. And yet all the time he may be right. He may know, in this very\ninstance, that those who make philosophy the business of their lives, generally\nturn out rogues if they are bad men, and fools if they are good. What do you\nsay?\u0026rsquo; I should say that he is quite right. \u0026lsquo;Then how is such an\nadmission reconcileable with the doctrine that philosophers should be\nkings?\u0026rsquo;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI shall answer you in a parable which will also let you see how poor a hand I\nam at the invention of allegories. The relation of good men to their\ngovernments is so peculiar, that in order to defend them I must take an\nillustration from the world of fiction. Conceive the captain of a ship, taller\nby a head and shoulders than any of the crew, yet a little deaf, a little\nblind, and rather ignorant of the seaman\u0026rsquo;s art. The sailors want to\nsteer, although they know nothing of the art; and they have a theory that it\ncannot be learned. If the helm is refused them, they drug the captain\u0026rsquo;s\nposset, bind him hand and foot, and take possession of the ship. He who joins\nin the mutiny is termed a good pilot and what not; they have no conception that\nthe true pilot must observe the winds and the stars, and must be their master,\nwhether they like it or not;\u0026mdash;such an one would be called by them fool,\nprater, star-gazer. This is my parable; which I will beg you to interpret for\nme to those gentlemen who ask why the philosopher has such an evil name, and to\nexplain to them that not he, but those who will not use him, are to blame for\nhis uselessness. The philosopher should not beg of mankind to be put in\nauthority over them. The wise man should not seek the rich, as the proverb\nbids, but every man, whether rich or poor, must knock at the door of the\nphysician when he has need of him. Now the pilot is the philosopher\u0026mdash;he\nwhom in the parable they call star-gazer, and the mutinous sailors are the mob\nof politicians by whom he is rendered useless. Not that these are the worst\nenemies of philosophy, who is far more dishonoured by her own professing sons\nwhen they are corrupted by the world. Need I recall the original image of the\nphilosopher? Did we not say of him just now, that he loved truth and hated\nfalsehood, and that he could not rest in the multiplicity of phenomena, but was\nled by a sympathy in his own nature to the contemplation of the absolute? All\nthe virtues as well as truth, who is the leader of them, took up their abode in\nhis soul. But as you were observing, if we turn aside to view the reality, we\nsee that the persons who were thus described, with the exception of a small and\nuseless class, are utter rogues.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe point which has to be considered, is the origin of this corruption in\nnature. Every one will admit that the philosopher, in our description of him,\nis a rare being. But what numberless causes tend to destroy these rare beings!\nThere is no good thing which may not be a cause of evil\u0026mdash;health, wealth,\nstrength, rank, and the virtues themselves, when placed under unfavourable\ncircumstances. For as in the animal or vegetable world the strongest seeds most\nneed the accompaniment of good air and soil, so the best of human characters\nturn out the worst when they fall upon an unsuitable soil; whereas weak natures\nhardly ever do any considerable good or harm; they are not the stuff out of\nwhich either great criminals or great heroes are made. The philosopher follows\nthe same analogy: he is either the best or the worst of all men. Some persons\nsay that the Sophists are the corrupters of youth; but is not public opinion\nthe real Sophist who is everywhere present\u0026mdash;in those very persons, in the\nassembly, in the courts, in the camp, in the applauses and hisses of the\ntheatre re-echoed by the surrounding hills? Will not a young man\u0026rsquo;s heart\nleap amid these discordant sounds? and will any education save him from being\ncarried away by the torrent? Nor is this all. For if he will not yield to\nopinion, there follows the gentle compulsion of exile or death. What principle\nof rival Sophists or anybody else can overcome in such an unequal contest?\nCharacters there may be more than human, who are exceptions\u0026mdash;God may save\na man, but not his own strength. Further, I would have you consider that the\nhireling Sophist only gives back to the world their own opinions; he is the\nkeeper of the monster, who knows how to flatter or anger him, and observes the\nmeaning of his inarticulate grunts. Good is what pleases him, evil what he\ndislikes; truth and beauty are determined only by the taste of the brute. Such\nis the Sophist\u0026rsquo;s wisdom, and such is the condition of those who make\npublic opinion the test of truth, whether in art or in morals. The curse is\nlaid upon them of being and doing what it approves, and when they attempt first\nprinciples the failure is ludicrous. Think of all this and ask yourself whether\nthe world is more likely to be a believer in the unity of the idea, or in the\nmultiplicity of phenomena. And the world if not a believer in the idea cannot\nbe a philosopher, and must therefore be a persecutor of philosophers. There is\nanother evil:\u0026mdash;the world does not like to lose the gifted nature, and so\nthey flatter the young (Alcibiades) into a magnificent opinion of his own\ncapacity; the tall, proper youth begins to expand, and is dreaming of kingdoms\nand empires. If at this instant a friend whispers to him, \u0026lsquo;Now the gods\nlighten thee; thou art a great fool\u0026rsquo; and must be educated\u0026mdash;do you\nthink that he will listen? Or suppose a better sort of man who is attracted\ntowards philosophy, will they not make Herculean efforts to spoil and corrupt\nhim? Are we not right in saying that the love of knowledge, no less than\nriches, may divert him? Men of this class (Critias) often become\npoliticians\u0026mdash;they are the authors of great mischief in states, and\nsometimes also of great good. And thus philosophy is deserted by her natural\nprotectors, and others enter in and dishonour her. Vulgar little minds see the\nland open and rush from the prisons of the arts into her temple. A clever\nmechanic having a soul coarse as his body, thinks that he will gain caste by\nbecoming her suitor. For philosophy, even in her fallen estate, has a dignity\nof her own\u0026mdash;and he, like a bald little blacksmith\u0026rsquo;s apprentice as he\nis, having made some money and got out of durance, washes and dresses himself\nas a bridegroom and marries his master\u0026rsquo;s daughter. What will be the issue\nof such marriages? Will they not be vile and bastard, devoid of truth and\nnature? \u0026lsquo;They will.\u0026rsquo; Small, then, is the remnant of genuine\nphilosophers; there may be a few who are citizens of small states, in which\npolitics are not worth thinking of, or who have been detained by Theages\u0026rsquo;\nbridle of ill health; for my own case of the oracular sign is almost unique,\nand too rare to be worth mentioning. And these few when they have tasted the\npleasures of philosophy, and have taken a look at that den of thieves and place\nof wild beasts, which is human life, will stand aside from the storm under the\nshelter of a wall, and try to preserve their own innocence and to depart in\npeace. \u0026lsquo;A great work, too, will have been accomplished by them.\u0026rsquo;\nGreat, yes, but not the greatest; for man is a social being, and can only\nattain his highest development in the society which is best suited to him.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nEnough, then, of the causes why philosophy has such an evil name. Another\nquestion is, Which of existing states is suited to her? Not one of them; at\npresent she is like some exotic seed which degenerates in a strange soil; only\nin her proper state will she be shown to be of heavenly growth. \u0026lsquo;And is\nher proper state ours or some other?\u0026rsquo; Ours in all points but one, which\nwas left undetermined. You may remember our saying that some living mind or\nwitness of the legislator was needed in states. But we were afraid to enter\nupon a subject of such difficulty, and now the question recurs and has not\ngrown easier:\u0026mdash;How may philosophy be safely studied? Let us bring her into\nthe light of day, and make an end of the inquiry.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIn the first place, I say boldly that nothing can be worse than the present\nmode of study. Persons usually pick up a little philosophy in early youth, and\nin the intervals of business, but they never master the real difficulty, which\nis dialectic. Later, perhaps, they occasionally go to a lecture on philosophy.\nYears advance, and the sun of philosophy, unlike that of Heracleitus, sets\nnever to rise again. This order of education should be reversed; it should\nbegin with gymnastics in youth, and as the man strengthens, he should increase\nthe gymnastics of his soul. Then, when active life is over, let him finally\nreturn to philosophy. \u0026lsquo;You are in earnest, Socrates, but the world will\nbe equally earnest in withstanding you\u0026mdash;no more than Thrasymachus.\u0026rsquo;\nDo not make a quarrel between Thrasymachus and me, who were never enemies and\nare now good friends enough. And I shall do my best to convince him and all\nmankind of the truth of my words, or at any rate to prepare for the future\nwhen, in another life, we may again take part in similar discussions.\n\u0026lsquo;That will be a long time hence.\u0026rsquo; Not long in comparison with\neternity. The many will probably remain incredulous, for they have never seen\nthe natural unity of ideas, but only artificial juxtapositions; not free and\ngenerous thoughts, but tricks of controversy and quips of law;\u0026mdash;a perfect\nman ruling in a perfect state, even a single one they have not known. And we\nforesaw that there was no chance of perfection either in states or individuals\nuntil a necessity was laid upon philosophers\u0026mdash;not the rogues, but those\nwhom we called the useless class\u0026mdash;of holding office; or until the sons of\nkings were inspired with a true love of philosophy. Whether in the infinity of\npast time there has been, or is in some distant land, or ever will be\nhereafter, an ideal such as we have described, we stoutly maintain that there\nhas been, is, and will be such a state whenever the Muse of philosophy rules.\nWill you say that the world is of another mind? O, my friend, do not revile the\nworld! They will soon change their opinion if they are gently entreated, and\nare taught the true nature of the philosopher. Who can hate a man who loves\nhim? Or be jealous of one who has no jealousy? Consider, again, that the many\nhate not the true but the false philosophers\u0026mdash;the pretenders who force\ntheir way in without invitation, and are always speaking of persons and not of\nprinciples, which is unlike the spirit of philosophy. For the true philosopher\ndespises earthly strife; his eye is fixed on the eternal order in accordance\nwith which he moulds himself into the Divine image (and not himself only, but\nother men), and is the creator of the virtues private as well as public. When\nmankind see that the happiness of states is only to be found in that image,\nwill they be angry with us for attempting to delineate it? \u0026lsquo;Certainly\nnot. But what will be the process of delineation?\u0026rsquo; The artist will do\nnothing until he has made a tabula rasa; on this he will inscribe the\nconstitution of a state, glancing often at the divine truth of nature, and from\nthat deriving the godlike among men, mingling the two elements, rubbing out and\npainting in, until there is a perfect harmony or fusion of the divine and\nhuman. But perhaps the world will doubt the existence of such an artist. What\nwill they doubt? That the philosopher is a lover of truth, having a nature akin\nto the best?\u0026mdash;and if they admit this will they still quarrel with us for\nmaking philosophers our kings? \u0026lsquo;They will be less disposed to\nquarrel.\u0026rsquo; Let us assume then that they are pacified. Still, a person may\nhesitate about the probability of the son of a king being a philosopher. And we\ndo not deny that they are very liable to be corrupted; but yet surely in the\ncourse of ages there might be one exception\u0026mdash;and one is enough. If one son\nof a king were a philosopher, and had obedient citizens, he might bring the\nideal polity into being. Hence we conclude that our laws are not only the best,\nbut that they are also possible, though not free from difficulty.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI gained nothing by evading the troublesome questions which arose concerning\nwomen and children. I will be wiser now and acknowledge that we must go to the\nbottom of another question: What is to be the education of our guardians? It\nwas agreed that they were to be lovers of their country, and were to be tested\nin the refiner\u0026rsquo;s fire of pleasures and pains, and those who came forth\npure and remained fixed in their principles were to have honours and rewards in\nlife and after death. But at this point, the argument put on her veil and\nturned into another path. I hesitated to make the assertion which I now\nhazard,\u0026mdash;that our guardians must be philosophers. You remember all the\ncontradictory elements, which met in the philosopher\u0026mdash;how difficult to\nfind them all in a single person! Intelligence and spirit are not often\ncombined with steadiness; the stolid, fearless, nature is averse to\nintellectual toil. And yet these opposite elements are all necessary, and\ntherefore, as we were saying before, the aspirant must be tested in pleasures\nand dangers; and also, as we must now further add, in the highest branches of\nknowledge. You will remember, that when we spoke of the virtues mention was\nmade of a longer road, which you were satisfied to leave unexplored.\n\u0026lsquo;Enough seemed to have been said.\u0026rsquo; Enough, my friend; but what is\nenough while anything remains wanting? Of all men the guardian must not faint\nin the search after truth; he must be prepared to take the longer road, or he\nwill never reach that higher region which is above the four virtues; and of the\nvirtues too he must not only get an outline, but a clear and distinct vision.\n(Strange that we should be so precise about trifles, so careless about the\nhighest truths!) \u0026lsquo;And what are the highest?\u0026rsquo; You to pretend\nunconsciousness, when you have so often heard me speak of the idea of good,\nabout which we know so little, and without which though a man gain the world he\nhas no profit of it! Some people imagine that the good is wisdom; but this\ninvolves a circle,\u0026mdash;the good, they say, is wisdom, wisdom has to do with\nthe good. According to others the good is pleasure; but then comes the\nabsurdity that good is bad, for there are bad pleasures as well as good. Again,\nthe good must have reality; a man may desire the appearance of virtue, but he\nwill not desire the appearance of good. Ought our guardians then to be ignorant\nof this supreme principle, of which every man has a presentiment, and without\nwhich no man has any real knowledge of anything? \u0026lsquo;But, Socrates, what is\nthis supreme principle, knowledge or pleasure, or what? You may think me\ntroublesome, but I say that you have no business to be always repeating the\ndoctrines of others instead of giving us your own.\u0026rsquo; Can I say what I do\nnot know? \u0026lsquo;You may offer an opinion.\u0026rsquo; And will the blindness and\ncrookedness of opinion content you when you might have the light and certainty\nof science? \u0026lsquo;I will only ask you to give such an explanation of the good\nas you have given already of temperance and justice.\u0026rsquo; I wish that I\ncould, but in my present mood I cannot reach to the height of the knowledge of\nthe good. To the parent or principal I cannot introduce you, but to the child\nbegotten in his image, which I may compare with the interest on the principal,\nI will. (Audit the account, and do not let me give you a false statement of the\ndebt.) You remember our old distinction of the many beautiful and the one\nbeautiful, the particular and the universal, the objects of sight and the\nobjects of thought? Did you ever consider that the objects of sight imply a\nfaculty of sight which is the most complex and costly of our senses, requiring\nnot only objects of sense, but also a medium, which is light; without which the\nsight will not distinguish between colours and all will be a blank? For light\nis the noble bond between the perceiving faculty and the thing perceived, and\nthe god who gives us light is the sun, who is the eye of the day, but is not to\nbe confounded with the eye of man. This eye of the day or sun is what I call\nthe child of the good, standing in the same relation to the visible world as\nthe good to the intellectual. When the sun shines the eye sees, and in the\nintellectual world where truth is, there is sight and light. Now that which is\nthe sun of intelligent natures, is the idea of good, the cause of knowledge and\ntruth, yet other and fairer than they are, and standing in the same relation to\nthem in which the sun stands to light. O inconceivable height of beauty, which\nis above knowledge and above truth! (\u0026lsquo;You cannot surely mean\npleasure,\u0026rsquo; he said. Peace, I replied.) And this idea of good, like the\nsun, is also the cause of growth, and the author not of knowledge only, but of\nbeing, yet greater far than either in dignity and power. \u0026lsquo;That is a reach\nof thought more than human; but, pray, go on with the image, for I suspect that\nthere is more behind.\u0026rsquo; There is, I said; and bearing in mind our two suns\nor principles, imagine further their corresponding worlds\u0026mdash;one of the\nvisible, the other of the intelligible; you may assist your fancy by figuring\nthe distinction under the image of a line divided into two unequal parts, and\nmay again subdivide each part into two lesser segments representative of the\nstages of knowledge in either sphere. The lower portion of the lower or visible\nsphere will consist of shadows and reflections, and its upper and smaller\nportion will contain real objects in the world of nature or of art. The sphere\nof the intelligible will also have two divisions,\u0026mdash;one of mathematics, in\nwhich there is no ascent but all is descent; no inquiring into premises, but\nonly drawing of inferences. In this division the mind works with figures and\nnumbers, the images of which are taken not from the shadows, but from the\nobjects, although the truth of them is seen only with the mind\u0026rsquo;s eye; and\nthey are used as hypotheses without being analysed. Whereas in the other\ndivision reason uses the hypotheses as stages or steps in the ascent to the\nidea of good, to which she fastens them, and then again descends, walking\nfirmly in the region of ideas, and of ideas only, in her ascent as well as\ndescent, and finally resting in them. \u0026lsquo;I partly understand,\u0026rsquo; he\nreplied; \u0026lsquo;you mean that the ideas of science are superior to the\nhypothetical, metaphorical conceptions of geometry and the other arts or\nsciences, whichever is to be the name of them; and the latter conceptions you\nrefuse to make subjects of pure intellect, because they have no first\nprinciple, although when resting on a first principle, they pass into the\nhigher sphere.\u0026rsquo; You understand me very well, I said. And now to those\nfour divisions of knowledge you may assign four corresponding\nfaculties\u0026mdash;pure intelligence to the highest sphere; active intelligence to\nthe second; to the third, faith; to the fourth, the perception of\nshadows\u0026mdash;and the clearness of the several faculties will be in the same\nratio as the truth of the objects to which they are related…\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nLike Socrates, we may recapitulate the virtues of the philosopher. In language\nwhich seems to reach beyond the horizon of that age and country, he is\ndescribed as \u0026lsquo;the spectator of all time and all existence.\u0026rsquo; He has\nthe noblest gifts of nature, and makes the highest use of them. All his desires\nare absorbed in the love of wisdom, which is the love of truth. None of the\ngraces of a beautiful soul are wanting in him; neither can he fear death, or\nthink much of human life. The ideal of modern times hardly retains the\nsimplicity of the antique; there is not the same originality either in truth or\nerror which characterized the Greeks. The philosopher is no longer living in\nthe unseen, nor is he sent by an oracle to convince mankind of ignorance; nor\ndoes he regard knowledge as a system of ideas leading upwards by regular stages\nto the idea of good. The eagerness of the pursuit has abated; there is more\ndivision of labour and less of comprehensive reflection upon nature and human\nlife as a whole; more of exact observation and less of anticipation and\ninspiration. Still, in the altered conditions of knowledge, the parallel is not\nwholly lost; and there may be a use in translating the conception of Plato into\nthe language of our own age. The philosopher in modern times is one who fixes\nhis mind on the laws of nature in their sequence and connexion, not on\nfragments or pictures of nature; on history, not on controversy; on the truths\nwhich are acknowledged by the few, not on the opinions of the many. He is aware\nof the importance of \u0026lsquo;classifying according to nature,\u0026rsquo; and will\ntry to \u0026lsquo;separate the limbs of science without breaking them\u0026rsquo;\n(Phaedr.). There is no part of truth, whether great or small, which he will\ndishonour; and in the least things he will discern the greatest (Parmen.). Like\nthe ancient philosopher he sees the world pervaded by analogies, but he can\nalso tell \u0026lsquo;why in some cases a single instance is sufficient for an\ninduction\u0026rsquo; (Mill\u0026rsquo;s Logic), while in other cases a thousand examples\nwould prove nothing. He inquires into a portion of knowledge only, because the\nwhole has grown too vast to be embraced by a single mind or life. He has a\nclearer conception of the divisions of science and of their relation to the\nmind of man than was possible to the ancients. Like Plato, he has a vision of\nthe unity of knowledge, not as the beginning of philosophy to be attained by a\nstudy of elementary mathematics, but as the far-off result of the working of\nmany minds in many ages. He is aware that mathematical studies are preliminary\nto almost every other; at the same time, he will not reduce all varieties of\nknowledge to the type of mathematics. He too must have a nobility of character,\nwithout which genius loses the better half of greatness. Regarding the world as\na point in immensity, and each individual as a link in a never-ending chain of\nexistence, he will not think much of his own life, or be greatly afraid of\ndeath.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAdeimantus objects first of all to the form of the Socratic reasoning, thus\nshowing that Plato is aware of the imperfection of his own method. He brings\nthe accusation against himself which might be brought against him by a modern\nlogician\u0026mdash;that he extracts the answer because he knows how to put the\nquestion. In a long argument words are apt to change their meaning slightly, or\npremises may be assumed or conclusions inferred with rather too much certainty\nor universality; the variation at each step may be unobserved, and yet at last\nthe divergence becomes considerable. Hence the failure of attempts to apply\narithmetical or algebraic formulae to logic. The imperfection, or rather the\nhigher and more elastic nature of language, does not allow words to have the\nprecision of numbers or of symbols. And this quality in language impairs the\nforce of an argument which has many steps.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe objection, though fairly met by Socrates in this particular instance, may\nbe regarded as implying a reflection upon the Socratic mode of reasoning. And\nhere, as elsewhere, Plato seems to intimate that the time had come when the\nnegative and interrogative method of Socrates must be superseded by a positive\nand constructive one, of which examples are given in some of the later\ndialogues. Adeimantus further argues that the ideal is wholly at variance with\nfacts; for experience proves philosophers to be either useless or rogues.\nContrary to all expectation Socrates has no hesitation in admitting the truth\nof this, and explains the anomaly in an allegory, first characteristically\ndepreciating his own inventive powers. In this allegory the people are\ndistinguished from the professional politicians, and, as elsewhere, are spoken\nof in a tone of pity rather than of censure under the image of \u0026lsquo;the noble\ncaptain who is not very quick in his perceptions.\u0026rsquo;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe uselessness of philosophers is explained by the circumstance that mankind\nwill not use them. The world in all ages has been divided between contempt and\nfear of those who employ the power of ideas and know no other weapons.\nConcerning the false philosopher, Socrates argues that the best is most liable\nto corruption; and that the finer nature is more likely to suffer from alien\nconditions. We too observe that there are some kinds of excellence which spring\nfrom a peculiar delicacy of constitution; as is evidently true of the poetical\nand imaginative temperament, which often seems to depend on impressions, and\nhence can only breathe or live in a certain atmosphere. The man of genius has\ngreater pains and greater pleasures, greater powers and greater weaknesses, and\noften a greater play of character than is to be found in ordinary men. He can\nassume the disguise of virtue or disinterestedness without having them, or veil\npersonal enmity in the language of patriotism and philosophy,\u0026mdash;he can say\nthe word which all men are thinking, he has an insight which is terrible into\nthe follies and weaknesses of his fellow-men. An Alcibiades, a Mirabeau, or a\nNapoleon the First, are born either to be the authors of great evils in states,\nor \u0026lsquo;of great good, when they are drawn in that direction.\u0026rsquo;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYet the thesis, \u0026lsquo;corruptio optimi pessima,\u0026rsquo; cannot be maintained\ngenerally or without regard to the kind of excellence which is corrupted. The\nalien conditions which are corrupting to one nature, may be the elements of\nculture to another. In general a man can only receive his highest development\nin a congenial state or family, among friends or fellow-workers. But also he\nmay sometimes be stirred by adverse circumstances to such a degree that he\nrises up against them and reforms them. And while weaker or coarser characters\nwill extract good out of evil, say in a corrupt state of the church or of\nsociety, and live on happily, allowing the evil to remain, the finer or\nstronger natures may be crushed or spoiled by surrounding influences\u0026mdash;may\nbecome misanthrope and philanthrope by turns; or in a few instances, like the\nfounders of the monastic orders, or the Reformers, owing to some peculiarity in\nthemselves or in their age, may break away entirely from the world and from the\nchurch, sometimes into great good, sometimes into great evil, sometimes into\nboth. And the same holds in the lesser sphere of a convent, a school, a family.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nPlato would have us consider how easily the best natures are overpowered by\npublic opinion, and what efforts the rest of mankind will make to get\npossession of them. The world, the church, their own profession, any political\nor party organization, are always carrying them off their legs and teaching\nthem to apply high and holy names to their own prejudices and interests. The\n\u0026lsquo;monster\u0026rsquo; corporation to which they belong judges right and truth\nto be the pleasure of the community. The individual becomes one with his order;\nor, if he resists, the world is too much for him, and will sooner or later be\nrevenged on him. This is, perhaps, a one-sided but not wholly untrue picture of\nthe maxims and practice of mankind when they \u0026lsquo;sit down together at an\nassembly,\u0026rsquo; either in ancient or modern times.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhen the higher natures are corrupted by politics, the lower take possession of\nthe vacant place of philosophy. This is described in one of those continuous\nimages in which the argument, to use a Platonic expression, \u0026lsquo;veils\nherself,\u0026rsquo; and which is dropped and reappears at intervals. The question\nis asked,\u0026mdash;Why are the citizens of states so hostile to philosophy? The\nanswer is, that they do not know her. And yet there is also a better mind of\nthe many; they would believe if they were taught. But hitherto they have only\nknown a conventional imitation of philosophy, words without thoughts, systems\nwhich have no life in them; a (divine) person uttering the words of beauty and\nfreedom, the friend of man holding communion with the Eternal, and seeking to\nframe the state in that image, they have never known. The same double feeling\nrespecting the mass of mankind has always existed among men. The first thought\nis that the people are the enemies of truth and right; the second, that this\nonly arises out of an accidental error and confusion, and that they do not\nreally hate those who love them, if they could be educated to know them.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIn the latter part of the sixth book, three questions have to be considered:\n1st, the nature of the longer and more circuitous way, which is contrasted with\nthe shorter and more imperfect method of Book IV; 2nd, the heavenly pattern or\nidea of the state; 3rd, the relation of the divisions of knowledge to one\nanother and to the corresponding faculties of the soul:\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n1. Of the higher method of knowledge in Plato we have only a glimpse. Neither\nhere nor in the Phaedrus or Symposium, nor yet in the Philebus or Sophist, does\nhe give any clear explanation of his meaning. He would probably have described\nhis method as proceeding by regular steps to a system of universal knowledge,\nwhich inferred the parts from the whole rather than the whole from the parts.\nThis ideal logic is not practised by him in the search after justice, or in the\nanalysis of the parts of the soul; there, like Aristotle in the Nicomachean\nEthics, he argues from experience and the common use of language. But at the\nend of the sixth book he conceives another and more perfect method, in which\nall ideas are only steps or grades or moments of thought, forming a connected\nwhole which is self-supporting, and in which consistency is the test of truth.\nHe does not explain to us in detail the nature of the process. Like many other\nthinkers both in ancient and modern times his mind seems to be filled with a\nvacant form which he is unable to realize. He supposes the sciences to have a\nnatural order and connexion in an age when they can hardly be said to exist. He\nis hastening on to the \u0026lsquo;end of the intellectual world\u0026rsquo; without even\nmaking a beginning of them.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIn modern times we hardly need to be reminded that the process of acquiring\nknowledge is here confused with the contemplation of absolute knowledge. In all\nscience a priori and a posteriori truths mingle in various proportions. The a\npriori part is that which is derived from the most universal experience of men,\nor is universally accepted by them; the a posteriori is that which grows up\naround the more general principles and becomes imperceptibly one with them. But\nPlato erroneously imagines that the synthesis is separable from the analysis,\nand that the method of science can anticipate science. In entertaining such a\nvision of a priori knowledge he is sufficiently justified, or at least his\nmeaning may be sufficiently explained by the similar attempts of Descartes,\nKant, Hegel, and even of Bacon himself, in modern philosophy. Anticipations or\ndivinations, or prophetic glimpses of truths whether concerning man or nature,\nseem to stand in the same relation to ancient philosophy which hypotheses bear\nto modern inductive science. These \u0026lsquo;guesses at truth\u0026rsquo; were not made\nat random; they arose from a superficial impression of uniformities and first\nprinciples in nature which the genius of the Greek, contemplating the expanse\nof heaven and earth, seemed to recognize in the distance. Nor can we deny that\nin ancient times knowledge must have stood still, and the human mind been\ndeprived of the very instruments of thought, if philosophy had been strictly\nconfined to the results of experience.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n2. Plato supposes that when the tablet has been made blank the artist will fill\nin the lineaments of the ideal state. Is this a pattern laid up in heaven, or\nmere vacancy on which he is supposed to gaze with wondering eye? The answer is,\nthat such ideals are framed partly by the omission of particulars, partly by\nimagination perfecting the form which experience supplies (Phaedo). Plato\nrepresents these ideals in a figure as belonging to another world; and in\nmodern times the idea will sometimes seem to precede, at other times to\nco-operate with the hand of the artist. As in science, so also in creative art,\nthere is a synthetical as well as an analytical method. One man will have the\nwhole in his mind before he begins; to another the processes of mind and hand\nwill be simultaneous.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n3. There is no difficulty in seeing that Plato\u0026rsquo;s divisions of knowledge\nare based, first, on the fundamental antithesis of sensible and intellectual\nwhich pervades the whole pre-Socratic philosophy; in which is implied also the\nopposition of the permanent and transient, of the universal and particular. But\nthe age of philosophy in which he lived seemed to require a further\ndistinction;\u0026mdash;numbers and figures were beginning to separate from ideas.\nThe world could no longer regard justice as a cube, and was learning to see,\nthough imperfectly, that the abstractions of sense were distinct from the\nabstractions of mind. Between the Eleatic being or essence and the shadows of\nphenomena, the Pythagorean principle of number found a place, and was, as\nAristotle remarks, a conducting medium from one to the other. Hence Plato is\nled to introduce a third term which had not hitherto entered into the scheme of\nhis philosophy. He had observed the use of mathematics in education; they were\nthe best preparation for higher studies. The subjective relation between them\nfurther suggested an objective one; although the passage from one to the other\nis really imaginary (Metaph.). For metaphysical and moral philosophy has no\nconnexion with mathematics; number and figure are the abstractions of time and\nspace, not the expressions of purely intellectual conceptions. When divested of\nmetaphor, a straight line or a square has no more to do with right and justice\nthan a crooked line with vice. The figurative association was mistaken for a\nreal one; and thus the three latter divisions of the Platonic proportion were\nconstructed.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThere is more difficulty in comprehending how he arrived at the first term of\nthe series, which is nowhere else mentioned, and has no reference to any other\npart of his system. Nor indeed does the relation of shadows to objects\ncorrespond to the relation of numbers to ideas. Probably Plato has been led by\nthe love of analogy (Timaeus) to make four terms instead of three, although the\nobjects perceived in both divisions of the lower sphere are equally objects of\nsense. He is also preparing the way, as his manner is, for the shadows of\nimages at the beginning of the seventh book, and the imitation of an imitation\nin the tenth. The line may be regarded as reaching from unity to infinity, and\nis divided into two unequal parts, and subdivided into two more; each lower\nsphere is the multiplication of the preceding. Of the four faculties, faith in\nthe lower division has an intermediate position (cp. for the use of the word\nfaith or belief, (Greek), Timaeus), contrasting equally with the vagueness of\nthe perception of shadows (Greek) and the higher certainty of understanding\n(Greek) and reason (Greek).\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe difference between understanding and mind or reason (Greek) is analogous to\nthe difference between acquiring knowledge in the parts and the contemplation\nof the whole. True knowledge is a whole, and is at rest; consistency and\nuniversality are the tests of truth. To this self-evidencing knowledge of the\nwhole the faculty of mind is supposed to correspond. But there is a knowledge\nof the understanding which is incomplete and in motion always, because unable\nto rest in the subordinate ideas. Those ideas are called both images and\nhypotheses\u0026mdash;images because they are clothed in sense, hypotheses because\nthey are assumptions only, until they are brought into connexion with the idea\nof good.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe general meaning of the passage, \u0026lsquo;Noble, then, is the bond which links\ntogether sight…And of this kind I spoke as the intelligible…\u0026rsquo; so far\nas the thought contained in it admits of being translated into the terms of\nmodern philosophy, may be described or explained as follows:\u0026mdash;There is a\ntruth, one and self-existent, to which by the help of a ladder let down from\nabove, the human intelligence may ascend. This unity is like the sun in the\nheavens, the light by which all things are seen, the being by which they are\ncreated and sustained. It is the IDEA of good. And the steps of the ladder\nleading up to this highest or universal existence are the mathematical\nsciences, which also contain in themselves an element of the universal. These,\ntoo, we see in a new manner when we connect them with the idea of good. They\nthen cease to be hypotheses or pictures, and become essential parts of a higher\ntruth which is at once their first principle and their final cause.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWe cannot give any more precise meaning to this remarkable passage, but we may\ntrace in it several rudiments or vestiges of thought which are common to us and\nto Plato: such as (1) the unity and correlation of the sciences, or rather of\nscience, for in Plato\u0026rsquo;s time they were not yet parted off or\ndistinguished; (2) the existence of a Divine Power, or life or idea or cause or\nreason, not yet conceived or no longer conceived as in the Timaeus and\nelsewhere under the form of a person; (3) the recognition of the hypothetical\nand conditional character of the mathematical sciences, and in a measure of\nevery science when isolated from the rest; (4) the conviction of a truth which\nis invisible, and of a law, though hardly a law of nature, which permeates the\nintellectual rather than the visible world.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe method of Socrates is hesitating and tentative, awaiting the fuller\nexplanation of the idea of good, and of the nature of dialectic in the seventh\nbook. The imperfect intelligence of Glaucon, and the reluctance of Socrates to\nmake a beginning, mark the difficulty of the subject. The allusion to\nTheages\u0026rsquo; bridle, and to the internal oracle, or demonic sign, of\nSocrates, which here, as always in Plato, is only prohibitory; the remark that\nthe salvation of any remnant of good in the present evil state of the world is\ndue to God only; the reference to a future state of existence, which is unknown\nto Glaucon in the tenth book, and in which the discussions of Socrates and his\ndisciples would be resumed; the surprise in the answers; the fanciful irony of\nSocrates, where he pretends that he can only describe the strange position of\nthe philosopher in a figure of speech; the original observation that the\nSophists, after all, are only the representatives and not the leaders of public\nopinion; the picture of the philosopher standing aside in the shower of sleet\nunder a wall; the figure of \u0026lsquo;the great beast\u0026rsquo; followed by the\nexpression of good-will towards the common people who would not have rejected\nthe philosopher if they had known him; the \u0026lsquo;right noble thought\u0026rsquo;\nthat the highest truths demand the greatest exactness; the hesitation of\nSocrates in returning once more to his well-worn theme of the idea of good; the\nludicrous earnestness of Glaucon; the comparison of philosophy to a deserted\nmaiden who marries beneath her\u0026mdash;are some of the most interesting\ncharacteristics of the sixth book.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYet a few more words may be added, on the old theme, which was so oft discussed\nin the Socratic circle, of which we, like Glaucon and Adeimantus, would fain,\nif possible, have a clearer notion. Like them, we are dissatisfied when we are\ntold that the idea of good can only be revealed to a student of the\nmathematical sciences, and we are inclined to think that neither we nor they\ncould have been led along that path to any satisfactory goal. For we have\nlearned that differences of quantity cannot pass into differences of quality,\nand that the mathematical sciences can never rise above themselves into the\nsphere of our higher thoughts, although they may sometimes furnish symbols and\nexpressions of them, and may train the mind in habits of abstraction and\nself-concentration. The illusion which was natural to an ancient philosopher\nhas ceased to be an illusion to us. But if the process by which we are supposed\nto arrive at the idea of good be really imaginary, may not the idea itself be\nalso a mere abstraction? We remark, first, that in all ages, and especially in\nprimitive philosophy, words such as being, essence, unity, good, have exerted\nan extraordinary influence over the minds of men. The meagreness or\nnegativeness of their content has been in an inverse ratio to their power. They\nhave become the forms under which all things were comprehended. There was a\nneed or instinct in the human soul which they satisfied; they were not ideas,\nbut gods, and to this new mythology the men of a later generation began to\nattach the powers and associations of the elder deities.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe idea of good is one of those sacred words or forms of thought, which were\nbeginning to take the place of the old mythology. It meant unity, in which all\ntime and all existence were gathered up. It was the truth of all things, and\nalso the light in which they shone forth, and became evident to intelligences\nhuman and divine. It was the cause of all things, the power by which they were\nbrought into being. It was the universal reason divested of a human\npersonality. It was the life as well as the light of the world, all knowledge\nand all power were comprehended in it. The way to it was through the\nmathematical sciences, and these too were dependent on it. To ask whether God\nwas the maker of it, or made by it, would be like asking whether God could be\nconceived apart from goodness, or goodness apart from God. The God of the\nTimaeus is not really at variance with the idea of good; they are aspects of\nthe same, differing only as the personal from the impersonal, or the masculine\nfrom the neuter, the one being the expression or language of mythology, the\nother of philosophy.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThis, or something like this, is the meaning of the idea of good as conceived\nby Plato. Ideas of number, order, harmony, development may also be said to\nenter into it. The paraphrase which has just been given of it goes beyond the\nactual words of Plato. We have perhaps arrived at the stage of philosophy which\nenables us to understand what he is aiming at, better than he did himself. We\nare beginning to realize what he saw darkly and at a distance. But if he could\nhave been told that this, or some conception of the same kind, but higher than\nthis, was the truth at which he was aiming, and the need which he sought to\nsupply, he would gladly have recognized that more was contained in his own\nthoughts than he himself knew. As his words are few and his manner reticent and\ntentative, so must the style of his interpreter be. We should not approach his\nmeaning more nearly by attempting to define it further. In translating him into\nthe language of modern thought, we might insensibly lose the spirit of ancient\nphilosophy. It is remarkable that although Plato speaks of the idea of good as\nthe first principle of truth and being, it is nowhere mentioned in his writings\nexcept in this passage. Nor did it retain any hold upon the minds of his\ndisciples in a later generation; it was probably unintelligible to them. Nor\ndoes the mention of it in Aristotle appear to have any reference to this or any\nother passage in his extant writings.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBOOK VII. And now I will describe in a figure the enlightenment or\nunenlightenment of our nature:\u0026mdash;Imagine human beings living in an\nunderground den which is open towards the light; they have been there from\nchildhood, having their necks and legs chained, and can only see into the den.\nAt a distance there is a fire, and between the fire and the prisoners a raised\nway, and a low wall is built along the way, like the screen over which\nmarionette players show their puppets. Behind the wall appear moving figures,\nwho hold in their hands various works of art, and among them images of men and\nanimals, wood and stone, and some of the passers-by are talking and others\nsilent. \u0026lsquo;A strange parable,\u0026rsquo; he said, \u0026lsquo;and strange\ncaptives.\u0026rsquo; They are ourselves, I replied; and they see only the shadows\nof the images which the fire throws on the wall of the den; to these they give\nnames, and if we add an echo which returns from the wall, the voices of the\npassengers will seem to proceed from the shadows. Suppose now that you suddenly\nturn them round and make them look with pain and grief to themselves at the\nreal images; will they believe them to be real? Will not their eyes be dazzled,\nand will they not try to get away from the light to something which they are\nable to behold without blinking? And suppose further, that they are dragged up\na steep and rugged ascent into the presence of the sun himself, will not their\nsight be darkened with the excess of light? Some time will pass before they get\nthe habit of perceiving at all; and at first they will be able to perceive only\nshadows and reflections in the water; then they will recognize the moon and the\nstars, and will at length behold the sun in his own proper place as he is. Last\nof all they will conclude:\u0026mdash;This is he who gives us the year and the\nseasons, and is the author of all that we see. How will they rejoice in passing\nfrom darkness to light! How worthless to them will seem the honours and glories\nof the den! But now imagine further, that they descend into their old\nhabitations;\u0026mdash;in that underground dwelling they will not see as well as\ntheir fellows, and will not be able to compete with them in the measurement of\nthe shadows on the wall; there will be many jokes about the man who went on a\nvisit to the sun and lost his eyes, and if they find anybody trying to set free\nand enlighten one of their number, they will put him to death, if they can\ncatch him. Now the cave or den is the world of sight, the fire is the sun, the\nway upwards is the way to knowledge, and in the world of knowledge the idea of\ngood is last seen and with difficulty, but when seen is inferred to be the\nauthor of good and right\u0026mdash;parent of the lord of light in this world, and\nof truth and understanding in the other. He who attains to the beatific vision\nis always going upwards; he is unwilling to descend into political assemblies\nand courts of law; for his eyes are apt to blink at the images or shadows of\nimages which they behold in them\u0026mdash;he cannot enter into the ideas of those\nwho have never in their lives understood the relation of the shadow to the\nsubstance. But blindness is of two kinds, and may be caused either by passing\nout of darkness into light or out of light into darkness, and a man of sense\nwill distinguish between them, and will not laugh equally at both of them, but\nthe blindness which arises from fulness of light he will deem blessed, and pity\nthe other; or if he laugh at the puzzled soul looking at the sun, he will have\nmore reason to laugh than the inhabitants of the den at those who descend from\nabove. There is a further lesson taught by this parable of ours. Some persons\nfancy that instruction is like giving eyes to the blind, but we say that the\nfaculty of sight was always there, and that the soul only requires to be turned\nround towards the light. And this is conversion; other virtues are almost like\nbodily habits, and may be acquired in the same manner, but intelligence has a\ndiviner life, and is indestructible, turning either to good or evil according\nto the direction given. Did you never observe how the mind of a clever rogue\npeers out of his eyes, and the more clearly he sees, the more evil he does? Now\nif you take such an one, and cut away from him those leaden weights of pleasure\nand desire which bind his soul to earth, his intelligence will be turned round,\nand he will behold the truth as clearly as he now discerns his meaner ends. And\nhave we not decided that our rulers must neither be so uneducated as to have no\nfixed rule of life, nor so over-educated as to be unwilling to leave their\nparadise for the business of the world? We must choose out therefore the\nnatures who are most likely to ascend to the light and knowledge of the good;\nbut we must not allow them to remain in the region of light; they must be\nforced down again among the captives in the den to partake of their labours and\nhonours. \u0026lsquo;Will they not think this a hardship?\u0026rsquo; You should remember\nthat our purpose in framing the State was not that our citizens should do what\nthey like, but that they should serve the State for the common good of all. May\nwe not fairly say to our philosopher,\u0026mdash;Friend, we do you no wrong; for in\nother States philosophy grows wild, and a wild plant owes nothing to the\ngardener, but you have been trained by us to be the rulers and kings of our\nhive, and therefore we must insist on your descending into the den. You must,\neach of you, take your turn, and become able to use your eyes in the dark, and\nwith a little practice you will see far better than those who quarrel about the\nshadows, whose knowledge is a dream only, whilst yours is a waking reality. It\nmay be that the saint or philosopher who is best fitted, may also be the least\ninclined to rule, but necessity is laid upon him, and he must no longer live in\nthe heaven of ideas. And this will be the salvation of the State. For those who\nrule must not be those who are desirous to rule; and, if you can offer to our\ncitizens a better life than that of rulers generally is, there will be a chance\nthat the rich, not only in this world\u0026rsquo;s goods, but in virtue and wisdom,\nmay bear rule. And the only life which is better than the life of political\nambition is that of philosophy, which is also the best preparation for the\ngovernment of a State.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen now comes the question,\u0026mdash;How shall we create our rulers; what way is\nthere from darkness to light? The change is effected by philosophy; it is not\nthe turning over of an oyster-shell, but the conversion of a soul from night to\nday, from becoming to being. And what training will draw the soul upwards? Our\nformer education had two branches, gymnastic, which was occupied with the body,\nand music, the sister art, which infused a natural harmony into mind and\nliterature; but neither of these sciences gave any promise of doing what we\nwant. Nothing remains to us but that universal or primary science of which all\nthe arts and sciences are partakers, I mean number or calculation. \u0026lsquo;Very\ntrue.\u0026rsquo; Including the art of war? \u0026lsquo;Yes, certainly.\u0026rsquo; Then there\nis something ludicrous about Palamedes in the tragedy, coming in and saying\nthat he had invented number, and had counted the ranks and set them in order.\nFor if Agamemnon could not count his feet (and without number how could he?) he\nmust have been a pretty sort of general indeed. No man should be a soldier who\ncannot count, and indeed he is hardly to be called a man. But I am not speaking\nof these practical applications of arithmetic, for number, in my view, is\nrather to be regarded as a conductor to thought and being. I will explain what\nI mean by the last expression:\u0026mdash;Things sensible are of two kinds; the one\nclass invite or stimulate the mind, while in the other the mind acquiesces. Now\nthe stimulating class are the things which suggest contrast and relation. For\nexample, suppose that I hold up to the eyes three fingers\u0026mdash;a fore finger,\na middle finger, a little finger\u0026mdash;the sight equally recognizes all three\nfingers, but without number cannot further distinguish them. Or again, suppose\ntwo objects to be relatively great and small, these ideas of greatness and\nsmallness are supplied not by the sense, but by the mind. And the perception of\ntheir contrast or relation quickens and sets in motion the mind, which is\npuzzled by the confused intimations of sense, and has recourse to number in\norder to find out whether the things indicated are one or more than one. Number\nreplies that they are two and not one, and are to be distinguished from one\nanother. Again, the sight beholds great and small, but only in a confused\nchaos, and not until they are distinguished does the question arise of their\nrespective natures; we are thus led on to the distinction between the visible\nand intelligible. That was what I meant when I spoke of stimulants to the\nintellect; I was thinking of the contradictions which arise in perception. The\nidea of unity, for example, like that of a finger, does not arouse thought\nunless involving some conception of plurality; but when the one is also the\nopposite of one, the contradiction gives rise to reflection; an example of this\nis afforded by any object of sight. All number has also an elevating effect; it\nraises the mind out of the foam and flux of generation to the contemplation of\nbeing, having lesser military and retail uses also. The retail use is not\nrequired by us; but as our guardian is to be a soldier as well as a\nphilosopher, the military one may be retained. And to our higher purpose no\nscience can be better adapted; but it must be pursued in the spirit of a\nphilosopher, not of a shopkeeper. It is concerned, not with visible objects,\nbut with abstract truth; for numbers are pure abstractions\u0026mdash;the true\narithmetician indignantly denies that his unit is capable of division. When you\ndivide, he insists that you are only multiplying; his \u0026lsquo;one\u0026rsquo; is not\nmaterial or resolvable into fractions, but an unvarying and absolute equality;\nand this proves the purely intellectual character of his study. Note also the\ngreat power which arithmetic has of sharpening the wits; no other discipline is\nequally severe, or an equal test of general ability, or equally improving to a\nstupid person.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nLet our second branch of education be geometry. \u0026lsquo;I can easily see,\u0026rsquo;\nreplied Glaucon, \u0026lsquo;that the skill of the general will be doubled by his\nknowledge of geometry.\u0026rsquo; That is a small matter; the use of geometry, to\nwhich I refer, is the assistance given by it in the contemplation of the idea\nof good, and the compelling the mind to look at true being, and not at\ngeneration only. Yet the present mode of pursuing these studies, as any one who\nis the least of a mathematician is aware, is mean and ridiculous; they are made\nto look downwards to the arts, and not upwards to eternal existence. The\ngeometer is always talking of squaring, subtending, apposing, as if he had in\nview action; whereas knowledge is the real object of the study. It should\nelevate the soul, and create the mind of philosophy; it should raise up what\nhas fallen down, not to speak of lesser uses in war and military tactics, and\nin the improvement of the faculties.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nShall we propose, as a third branch of our education, astronomy? \u0026lsquo;Very\ngood,\u0026rsquo; replied Glaucon; \u0026lsquo;the knowledge of the heavens is necessary\nat once for husbandry, navigation, military tactics.\u0026rsquo; I like your way of\ngiving useful reasons for everything in order to make friends of the world. And\nthere is a difficulty in proving to mankind that education is not only useful\ninformation but a purification of the eye of the soul, which is better than the\nbodily eye, for by this alone is truth seen. Now, will you appeal to mankind in\ngeneral or to the philosopher? or would you prefer to look to yourself only?\n\u0026lsquo;Every man is his own best friend.\u0026rsquo; Then take a step backward, for\nwe are out of order, and insert the third dimension which is of solids, after\nthe second which is of planes, and then you may proceed to solids in motion.\nBut solid geometry is not popular and has not the patronage of the State, nor\nis the use of it fully recognized; the difficulty is great, and the votaries of\nthe study are conceited and impatient. Still the charm of the pursuit wins upon\nmen, and, if government would lend a little assistance, there might be great\nprogress made. \u0026lsquo;Very true,\u0026rsquo; replied Glaucon; \u0026lsquo;but do I\nunderstand you now to begin with plane geometry, and to place next geometry of\nsolids, and thirdly, astronomy, or the motion of solids?\u0026rsquo; Yes, I said; my\nhastiness has only hindered us.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n\u0026lsquo;Very good, and now let us proceed to astronomy, about which I am willing\nto speak in your lofty strain. No one can fail to see that the contemplation of\nthe heavens draws the soul upwards.\u0026rsquo; I am an exception, then; astronomy\nas studied at present appears to me to draw the soul not upwards, but\ndownwards. Star-gazing is just looking up at the ceiling\u0026mdash;no better; a man\nmay lie on his back on land or on water\u0026mdash;he may look up or look down, but\nthere is no science in that. The vision of knowledge of which I speak is seen\nnot with the eyes, but with the mind. All the magnificence of the heavens is\nbut the embroidery of a copy which falls far short of the divine Original, and\nteaches nothing about the absolute harmonies or motions of things. Their beauty\nis like the beauty of figures drawn by the hand of Daedalus or any other great\nartist, which may be used for illustration, but no mathematician would seek to\nobtain from them true conceptions of equality or numerical relations. How\nridiculous then to look for these in the map of the heavens, in which the\nimperfection of matter comes in everywhere as a disturbing element, marring the\nsymmetry of day and night, of months and years, of the sun and stars in their\ncourses. Only by problems can we place astronomy on a truly scientific basis.\nLet the heavens alone, and exert the intellect.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nStill, mathematics admit of other applications, as the Pythagoreans say, and we\nagree. There is a sister science of harmonical motion, adapted to the ear as\nastronomy is to the eye, and there may be other applications also. Let us\ninquire of the Pythagoreans about them, not forgetting that we have an aim\nhigher than theirs, which is the relation of these sciences to the idea of\ngood. The error which pervades astronomy also pervades harmonics. The musicians\nput their ears in the place of their minds. \u0026lsquo;Yes,\u0026rsquo; replied Glaucon,\n\u0026lsquo;I like to see them laying their ears alongside of their\nneighbours\u0026rsquo; faces\u0026mdash;some saying, \u0026ldquo;That\u0026rsquo;s a new\nnote,\u0026rdquo; others declaring that the two notes are the same.\u0026rsquo; Yes, I\nsaid; but you mean the empirics who are always twisting and torturing the\nstrings of the lyre, and quarrelling about the tempers of the strings; I am\nreferring rather to the Pythagorean harmonists, who are almost equally in\nerror. For they investigate only the numbers of the consonances which are\nheard, and ascend no higher,\u0026mdash;of the true numerical harmony which is\nunheard, and is only to be found in problems, they have not even a conception.\n\u0026lsquo;That last,\u0026rsquo; he said, \u0026lsquo;must be a marvellous thing.\u0026rsquo; A\nthing, I replied, which is only useful if pursued with a view to the good.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAll these sciences are the prelude of the strain, and are profitable if they\nare regarded in their natural relations to one another. \u0026lsquo;I dare say,\nSocrates,\u0026rsquo; said Glaucon; \u0026lsquo;but such a study will be an endless\nbusiness.\u0026rsquo; What study do you mean\u0026mdash;of the prelude, or what? For all\nthese things are only the prelude, and you surely do not suppose that a mere\nmathematician is also a dialectician? \u0026lsquo;Certainly not. I have hardly ever\nknown a mathematician who could reason.\u0026rsquo; And yet, Glaucon, is not true\nreasoning that hymn of dialectic which is the music of the intellectual world,\nand which was by us compared to the effort of sight, when from beholding the\nshadows on the wall we arrived at last at the images which gave the shadows?\nEven so the dialectical faculty withdrawing from sense arrives by the pure\nintellect at the contemplation of the idea of good, and never rests but at the\nvery end of the intellectual world. And the royal road out of the cave into the\nlight, and the blinking of the eyes at the sun and turning to contemplate the\nshadows of reality, not the shadows of an image only\u0026mdash;this progress and\ngradual acquisition of a new faculty of sight by the help of the mathematical\nsciences, is the elevation of the soul to the contemplation of the highest\nideal of being.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n\u0026lsquo;So far, I agree with you. But now, leaving the prelude, let us proceed\nto the hymn. What, then, is the nature of dialectic, and what are the paths\nwhich lead thither?\u0026rsquo; Dear Glaucon, you cannot follow me here. There can\nbe no revelation of the absolute truth to one who has not been disciplined in\nthe previous sciences. But that there is a science of absolute truth, which is\nattained in some way very different from those now practised, I am confident.\nFor all other arts or sciences are relative to human needs and opinions; and\nthe mathematical sciences are but a dream or hypothesis of true being, and\nnever analyse their own principles. Dialectic alone rises to the principle\nwhich is above hypotheses, converting and gently leading the eye of the soul\nout of the barbarous slough of ignorance into the light of the upper world,\nwith the help of the sciences which we have been describing\u0026mdash;sciences, as\nthey are often termed, although they require some other name, implying greater\nclearness than opinion and less clearness than science, and this in our\nprevious sketch was understanding. And so we get four names\u0026mdash;two for\nintellect, and two for opinion,\u0026mdash;reason or mind, understanding, faith,\nperception of shadows\u0026mdash;which make a proportion\u0026mdash;\nbeing:becoming::intellect:opinion\u0026mdash;and science:belief::understanding:\nperception of shadows. Dialectic may be further described as that science which\ndefines and explains the essence or being of each nature, which distinguishes\nand abstracts the good, and is ready to do battle against all opponents in the\ncause of good. To him who is not a dialectician life is but a sleepy dream; and\nmany a man is in his grave before his is well waked up. And would you have the\nfuture rulers of your ideal State intelligent beings, or stupid as posts?\n\u0026lsquo;Certainly not the latter.\u0026rsquo; Then you must train them in dialectic,\nwhich will teach them to ask and answer questions, and is the coping-stone of\nthe sciences.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI dare say that you have not forgotten how our rulers were chosen; and the\nprocess of selection may be carried a step further:\u0026mdash;As before, they must\nbe constant and valiant, good-looking, and of noble manners, but now they must\nalso have natural ability which education will improve; that is to say, they\nmust be quick at learning, capable of mental toil, retentive, solid, diligent\nnatures, who combine intellectual with moral virtues; not lame and one-sided,\ndiligent in bodily exercise and indolent in mind, or conversely; not a maimed\nsoul, which hates falsehood and yet unintentionally is always wallowing in the\nmire of ignorance; not a bastard or feeble person, but sound in wind and limb,\nand in perfect condition for the great gymnastic trial of the mind. Justice\nherself can find no fault with natures such as these; and they will be the\nsaviours of our State; disciples of another sort would only make philosophy\nmore ridiculous than she is at present. Forgive my enthusiasm; I am becoming\nexcited; but when I see her trampled underfoot, I am angry at the authors of\nher disgrace. \u0026lsquo;I did not notice that you were more excited than you ought\nto have been.\u0026rsquo; But I felt that I was. Now do not let us forget another\npoint in the selection of our disciples\u0026mdash;that they must be young and not\nold. For Solon is mistaken in saying that an old man can be always learning;\nyouth is the time of study, and here we must remember that the mind is free and\ndainty, and, unlike the body, must not be made to work against the grain.\nLearning should be at first a sort of play, in which the natural bent is\ndetected. As in training them for war, the young dogs should at first only\ntaste blood; but when the necessary gymnastics are over which during two or\nthree years divide life between sleep and bodily exercise, then the education\nof the soul will become a more serious matter. At twenty years of age, a\nselection must be made of the more promising disciples, with whom a new epoch\nof education will begin. The sciences which they have hitherto learned in\nfragments will now be brought into relation with each other and with true\nbeing; for the power of combining them is the test of speculative and\ndialectical ability. And afterwards at thirty a further selection shall be made\nof those who are able to withdraw from the world of sense into the abstraction\nof ideas. But at this point, judging from present experience, there is a danger\nthat dialectic may be the source of many evils. The danger may be illustrated\nby a parallel case:\u0026mdash;Imagine a person who has been brought up in wealth\nand luxury amid a crowd of flatterers, and who is suddenly informed that he is\na supposititious son. He has hitherto honoured his reputed parents and\ndisregarded the flatterers, and now he does the reverse. This is just what\nhappens with a man\u0026rsquo;s principles. There are certain doctrines which he\nlearnt at home and which exercised a parental authority over him. Presently he\nfinds that imputations are cast upon them; a troublesome querist comes and\nasks, \u0026lsquo;What is the just and good?\u0026rsquo; or proves that virtue is vice\nand vice virtue, and his mind becomes unsettled, and he ceases to love, honour,\nand obey them as he has hitherto done. He is seduced into the life of pleasure,\nand becomes a lawless person and a rogue. The case of such speculators is very\npitiable, and, in order that our thirty years\u0026rsquo; old pupils may not require\nthis pity, let us take every possible care that young persons do not study\nphilosophy too early. For a young man is a sort of puppy who only plays with an\nargument; and is reasoned into and out of his opinions every day; he soon\nbegins to believe nothing, and brings himself and philosophy into discredit. A\nman of thirty does not run on in this way; he will argue and not merely\ncontradict, and adds new honour to philosophy by the sobriety of his conduct.\nWhat time shall we allow for this second gymnastic training of the\nsoul?\u0026mdash;say, twice the time required for the gymnastics of the body; six,\nor perhaps five years, to commence at thirty, and then for fifteen years let\nthe student go down into the den, and command armies, and gain experience of\nlife. At fifty let him return to the end of all things, and have his eyes\nuplifted to the idea of good, and order his life after that pattern; if\nnecessary, taking his turn at the helm of State, and training up others to be\nhis successors. When his time comes he shall depart in peace to the islands of\nthe blest. He shall be honoured with sacrifices, and receive such worship as\nthe Pythian oracle approves.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n\u0026lsquo;You are a statuary, Socrates, and have made a perfect image of our\ngovernors.\u0026rsquo; Yes, and of our governesses, for the women will share in all\nthings with the men. And you will admit that our State is not a mere\naspiration, but may really come into being when there shall arise\nphilosopher-kings, one or more, who will despise earthly vanities, and will be\nthe servants of justice only. \u0026lsquo;And how will they begin their work?\u0026rsquo;\nTheir first act will be to send away into the country all those who are more\nthan ten years of age, and to proceed with those who are left…\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAt the commencement of the sixth book, Plato anticipated his explanation of the\nrelation of the philosopher to the world in an allegory, in this, as in other\npassages, following the order which he prescribes in education, and proceeding\nfrom the concrete to the abstract. At the commencement of Book VII, under the\nfigure of a cave having an opening towards a fire and a way upwards to the true\nlight, he returns to view the divisions of knowledge, exhibiting familiarly, as\nin a picture, the result which had been hardly won by a great effort of thought\nin the previous discussion; at the same time casting a glance onward at the\ndialectical process, which is represented by the way leading from darkness to\nlight. The shadows, the images, the reflection of the sun and stars in the\nwater, the stars and sun themselves, severally correspond,\u0026mdash;the first, to\nthe realm of fancy and poetry,\u0026mdash;the second, to the world of\nsense,\u0026mdash;the third, to the abstractions or universals of sense, of which\nthe mathematical sciences furnish the type,\u0026mdash;the fourth and last to the\nsame abstractions, when seen in the unity of the idea, from which they derive a\nnew meaning and power. The true dialectical process begins with the\ncontemplation of the real stars, and not mere reflections of them, and ends\nwith the recognition of the sun, or idea of good, as the parent not only of\nlight but of warmth and growth. To the divisions of knowledge the stages of\neducation partly answer:\u0026mdash;first, there is the early education of childhood\nand youth in the fancies of the poets, and in the laws and customs of the\nState;\u0026mdash;then there is the training of the body to be a warrior athlete,\nand a good servant of the mind;\u0026mdash;and thirdly, after an interval follows\nthe education of later life, which begins with mathematics and proceeds to\nphilosophy in general.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThere seem to be two great aims in the philosophy of Plato,\u0026mdash;first, to\nrealize abstractions; secondly, to connect them. According to him, the true\neducation is that which draws men from becoming to being, and to a\ncomprehensive survey of all being. He desires to develop in the human mind the\nfaculty of seeing the universal in all things; until at last the particulars of\nsense drop away and the universal alone remains. He then seeks to combine the\nuniversals which he has disengaged from sense, not perceiving that the\ncorrelation of them has no other basis but the common use of language. He never\nunderstands that abstractions, as Hegel says, are \u0026lsquo;mere\nabstractions\u0026rsquo;\u0026mdash;of use when employed in the arrangement of facts, but\nadding nothing to the sum of knowledge when pursued apart from them, or with\nreference to an imaginary idea of good. Still the exercise of the faculty of\nabstraction apart from facts has enlarged the mind, and played a great part in\nthe education of the human race. Plato appreciated the value of this faculty,\nand saw that it might be quickened by the study of number and relation. All\nthings in which there is opposition or proportion are suggestive of reflection.\nThe mere impression of sense evokes no power of thought or of mind, but when\nsensible objects ask to be compared and distinguished, then philosophy begins.\nThe science of arithmetic first suggests such distinctions. The follow in order\nthe other sciences of plain and solid geometry, and of solids in motion, one\nbranch of which is astronomy or the harmony of the spheres,\u0026mdash;to this is\nappended the sister science of the harmony of sounds. Plato seems also to hint\nat the possibility of other applications of arithmetical or mathematical\nproportions, such as we employ in chemistry and natural philosophy, such as the\nPythagoreans and even Aristotle make use of in Ethics and Politics, e.g. his\ndistinction between arithmetical and geometrical proportion in the Ethics (Book\nV), or between numerical and proportional equality in the Politics.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe modern mathematician will readily sympathise with Plato\u0026rsquo;s delight in\nthe properties of pure mathematics. He will not be disinclined to say with\nhim:\u0026mdash;Let alone the heavens, and study the beauties of number and figure\nin themselves. He too will be apt to depreciate their application to the arts.\nHe will observe that Plato has a conception of geometry, in which figures are\nto be dispensed with; thus in a distant and shadowy way seeming to anticipate\nthe possibility of working geometrical problems by a more general mode of\nanalysis. He will remark with interest on the backward state of solid geometry,\nwhich, alas! was not encouraged by the aid of the State in the age of Plato;\nand he will recognize the grasp of Plato\u0026rsquo;s mind in his ability to\nconceive of one science of solids in motion including the earth as well as the\nheavens,\u0026mdash;not forgetting to notice the intimation to which allusion has\nbeen already made, that besides astronomy and harmonics the science of solids\nin motion may have other applications. Still more will he be struck with the\ncomprehensiveness of view which led Plato, at a time when these sciences hardly\nexisted, to say that they must be studied in relation to one another, and to\nthe idea of good, or common principle of truth and being. But he will also see\n(and perhaps without surprise) that in that stage of physical and mathematical\nknowledge, Plato has fallen into the error of supposing that he can construct\nthe heavens a priori by mathematical problems, and determine the principles of\nharmony irrespective of the adaptation of sounds to the human ear. The illusion\nwas a natural one in that age and country. The simplicity and certainty of\nastronomy and harmonics seemed to contrast with the variation and complexity of\nthe world of sense; hence the circumstance that there was some elementary basis\nof fact, some measurement of distance or time or vibrations on which they must\nultimately rest, was overlooked by him. The modern predecessors of Newton fell\ninto errors equally great; and Plato can hardly be said to have been very far\nwrong, or may even claim a sort of prophetic insight into the subject, when we\nconsider that the greater part of astronomy at the present day consists of\nabstract dynamics, by the help of which most astronomical discoveries have been\nmade.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe metaphysical philosopher from his point of view recognizes mathematics as\nan instrument of education,\u0026mdash;which strengthens the power of attention,\ndevelopes the sense of order and the faculty of construction, and enables the\nmind to grasp under simple formulae the quantitative differences of physical\nphenomena. But while acknowledging their value in education, he sees also that\nthey have no connexion with our higher moral and intellectual ideas. In the\nattempt which Plato makes to connect them, we easily trace the influences of\nancient Pythagorean notions. There is no reason to suppose that he is speaking\nof the ideal numbers; but he is describing numbers which are pure abstractions,\nto which he assigns a real and separate existence, which, as \u0026lsquo;the\nteachers of the art\u0026rsquo; (meaning probably the Pythagoreans) would have\naffirmed, repel all attempts at subdivision, and in which unity and every other\nnumber are conceived of as absolute. The truth and certainty of numbers, when\nthus disengaged from phenomena, gave them a kind of sacredness in the eyes of\nan ancient philosopher. Nor is it easy to say how far ideas of order and\nfixedness may have had a moral and elevating influence on the minds of men,\n\u0026lsquo;who,\u0026rsquo; in the words of the Timaeus, \u0026lsquo;might learn to regulate\ntheir erring lives according to them.\u0026rsquo; It is worthy of remark that the\nold Pythagorean ethical symbols still exist as figures of speech among\nourselves. And those who in modern times see the world pervaded by universal\nlaw, may also see an anticipation of this last word of modern philosophy in the\nPlatonic idea of good, which is the source and measure of all things, and yet\nonly an abstraction (Philebus).\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTwo passages seem to require more particular explanations. First, that which\nrelates to the analysis of vision. The difficulty in this passage may be\nexplained, like many others, from differences in the modes of conception\nprevailing among ancient and modern thinkers. To us, the perceptions of sense\nare inseparable from the act of the mind which accompanies them. The\nconsciousness of form, colour, distance, is indistinguishable from the simple\nsensation, which is the medium of them. Whereas to Plato sense is the\nHeraclitean flux of sense, not the vision of objects in the order in which they\nactually present themselves to the experienced sight, but as they may be\nimagined to appear confused and blurred to the half-awakened eye of the infant.\nThe first action of the mind is aroused by the attempt to set in order this\nchaos, and the reason is required to frame distinct conceptions under which the\nconfused impressions of sense may be arranged. Hence arises the question,\n\u0026lsquo;What is great, what is small?\u0026rsquo; and thus begins the distinction of\nthe visible and the intelligible.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe second difficulty relates to Plato\u0026rsquo;s conception of harmonics. Three\nclasses of harmonists are distinguished by him:\u0026mdash;first, the Pythagoreans,\nwhom he proposes to consult as in the previous discussion on music he was to\nconsult Damon\u0026mdash;they are acknowledged to be masters in the art, but are\naltogether deficient in the knowledge of its higher import and relation to the\ngood; secondly, the mere empirics, whom Glaucon appears to confuse with them,\nand whom both he and Socrates ludicrously describe as experimenting by mere\nauscultation on the intervals of sounds. Both of these fall short in different\ndegrees of the Platonic idea of harmony, which must be studied in a purely\nabstract way, first by the method of problems, and secondly as a part of\nuniversal knowledge in relation to the idea of good.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe allegory has a political as well as a philosophical meaning. The den or\ncave represents the narrow sphere of politics or law (compare the description\nof the philosopher and lawyer in the Theaetetus), and the light of the eternal\nideas is supposed to exercise a disturbing influence on the minds of those who\nreturn to this lower world. In other words, their principles are too wide for\npractical application; they are looking far away into the past and future, when\ntheir business is with the present. The ideal is not easily reduced to the\nconditions of actual life, and may often be at variance with them. And at\nfirst, those who return are unable to compete with the inhabitants of the den\nin the measurement of the shadows, and are derided and persecuted by them; but\nafter a while they see the things below in far truer proportions than those who\nhave never ascended into the upper world. The difference between the politician\nturned into a philosopher and the philosopher turned into a politician, is\nsymbolized by the two kinds of disordered eyesight, the one which is\nexperienced by the captive who is transferred from darkness to day, the other,\nof the heavenly messenger who voluntarily for the good of his fellow-men\ndescends into the den. In what way the brighter light is to dawn on the\ninhabitants of the lower world, or how the idea of good is to become the\nguiding principle of politics, is left unexplained by Plato. Like the nature\nand divisions of dialectic, of which Glaucon impatiently demands to be\ninformed, perhaps he would have said that the explanation could not be given\nexcept to a disciple of the previous sciences. (Symposium.)\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nMany illustrations of this part of the Republic may be found in modern Politics\nand in daily life. For among ourselves, too, there have been two sorts of\nPoliticians or Statesmen, whose eyesight has become disordered in two different\nways. First, there have been great men who, in the language of Burke,\n\u0026lsquo;have been too much given to general maxims,\u0026rsquo; who, like J.S. Mill\nor Burke himself, have been theorists or philosophers before they were\npoliticians, or who, having been students of history, have allowed some great\nhistorical parallel, such as the English Revolution of 1688, or possibly\nAthenian democracy or Roman Imperialism, to be the medium through which they\nviewed contemporary events. Or perhaps the long projecting shadow of some\nexisting institution may have darkened their vision. The Church of the future,\nthe Commonwealth of the future, the Society of the future, have so absorbed\ntheir minds, that they are unable to see in their true proportions the Politics\nof to-day. They have been intoxicated with great ideas, such as liberty, or\nequality, or the greatest happiness of the greatest number, or the brotherhood\nof humanity, and they no longer care to consider how these ideas must be\nlimited in practice or harmonized with the conditions of human life. They are\nfull of light, but the light to them has become only a sort of luminous mist or\nblindness. Almost every one has known some enthusiastic half-educated person,\nwho sees everything at false distances, and in erroneous proportions.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWith this disorder of eyesight may be contrasted another\u0026mdash;of those who see\nnot far into the distance, but what is near only; who have been engaged all\ntheir lives in a trade or a profession; who are limited to a set or sect of\ntheir own. Men of this kind have no universal except their own interests or the\ninterests of their class, no principle but the opinion of persons like\nthemselves, no knowledge of affairs beyond what they pick up in the streets or\nat their club. Suppose them to be sent into a larger world, to undertake some\nhigher calling, from being tradesmen to turn generals or politicians, from\nbeing schoolmasters to become philosophers:\u0026mdash;or imagine them on a sudden\nto receive an inward light which reveals to them for the first time in their\nlives a higher idea of God and the existence of a spiritual world, by this\nsudden conversion or change is not their daily life likely to be upset; and on\nthe other hand will not many of their old prejudices and narrownesses still\nadhere to them long after they have begun to take a more comprehensive view of\nhuman things? From familiar examples like these we may learn what Plato meant\nby the eyesight which is liable to two kinds of disorders.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNor have we any difficulty in drawing a parallel between the young Athenian in\nthe fifth century before Christ who became unsettled by new ideas, and the\nstudent of a modern University who has been the subject of a similar\n\u0026lsquo;aufklärung.\u0026rsquo; We too observe that when young men begin to criticise\ncustomary beliefs, or to analyse the constitution of human nature, they are apt\nto lose hold of solid principle (ἅπαν τὸ βέβαιον αὐτῶν ἐξοίχεται). They are like trees\nwhich have been frequently transplanted. The earth about them is loose, and\nthey have no roots reaching far into the soil. They \u0026lsquo;light upon every\nflower,\u0026rsquo; following their own wayward wills, or because the wind blows\nthem. They catch opinions, as diseases are caught\u0026mdash;when they are in the\nair. Borne hither and thither, \u0026lsquo;they speedily fall into beliefs\u0026rsquo;\nthe opposite of those in which they were brought up. They hardly retain the\ndistinction of right and wrong; they seem to think one thing as good as\nanother. They suppose themselves to be searching after truth when they are\nplaying the game of \u0026lsquo;follow my leader.\u0026rsquo; They fall in love \u0026lsquo;at\nfirst sight\u0026rsquo; with paradoxes respecting morality, some fancy about art,\nsome novelty or eccentricity in religion, and like lovers they are so absorbed\nfor a time in their new notion that they can think of nothing else. The\nresolution of some philosophical or theological question seems to them more\ninteresting and important than any substantial knowledge of literature or\nscience or even than a good life. Like the youth in the Philebus, they are\nready to discourse to any one about a new philosophy. They are generally the\ndisciples of some eminent professor or sophist, whom they rather imitate than\nunderstand. They may be counted happy if in later years they retain some of the\nsimple truths which they acquired in early education, and which they may,\nperhaps, find to be worth all the rest. Such is the picture which Plato draws\nand which we only reproduce, partly in his own words, of the dangers which\nbeset youth in times of transition, when old opinions are fading away and the\nnew are not yet firmly established. Their condition is ingeniously compared by\nhim to that of a supposititious son, who has made the discovery that his\nreputed parents are not his real ones, and, in consequence, they have lost\ntheir authority over him.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe distinction between the mathematician and the dialectician is also\nnoticeable. Plato is very well aware that the faculty of the mathematician is\nquite distinct from the higher philosophical sense which recognizes and\ncombines first principles. The contempt which he expresses for distinctions of\nwords, the danger of involuntary falsehood, the apology which Socrates makes\nfor his earnestness of speech, are highly characteristic of the Platonic style\nand mode of thought. The quaint notion that if Palamedes was the inventor of\nnumber Agamemnon could not have counted his feet; the art by which we are made\nto believe that this State of ours is not a dream only; the gravity with which\nthe first step is taken in the actual creation of the State, namely, the\nsending out of the city all who had arrived at ten years of age, in order to\nexpedite the business of education by a generation, are also truly Platonic.\n(For the last, compare the passage at the end of the third book, in which he\nexpects the lie about the earthborn men to be believed in the second\ngeneration.)\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBOOK VIII. And so we have arrived at the conclusion, that in the perfect State\nwives and children are to be in common; and the education and pursuits of men\nand women, both in war and peace, are to be common, and kings are to be\nphilosophers and warriors, and the soldiers of the State are to live together,\nhaving all things in common; and they are to be warrior athletes, receiving no\npay but only their food, from the other citizens. Now let us return to the\npoint at which we digressed. \u0026lsquo;That is easily done,\u0026rsquo; he replied:\n\u0026lsquo;You were speaking of the State which you had constructed, and of the\nindividual who answered to this, both of whom you affirmed to be good; and you\nsaid that of inferior States there were four forms and four individuals\ncorresponding to them, which although deficient in various degrees, were all of\nthem worth inspecting with a view to determining the relative happiness or\nmisery of the best or worst man. Then Polemarchus and Adeimantus interrupted\nyou, and this led to another argument,\u0026mdash;and so here we are.\u0026rsquo; Suppose\nthat we put ourselves again in the same position, and do you repeat your\nquestion. \u0026lsquo;I should like to know of what constitutions you were\nspeaking?\u0026rsquo; Besides the perfect State there are only four of any note in\nHellas:\u0026mdash;first, the famous Lacedaemonian or Cretan commonwealth; secondly,\noligarchy, a State full of evils; thirdly, democracy, which follows next in\norder; fourthly, tyranny, which is the disease or death of all government. Now,\nStates are not made of \u0026lsquo;oak and rock,\u0026rsquo; but of flesh and blood; and\ntherefore as there are five States there must be five human natures in\nindividuals, which correspond to them. And first, there is the ambitious\nnature, which answers to the Lacedaemonian State; secondly, the oligarchical\nnature; thirdly, the democratical; and fourthly, the tyrannical. This last will\nhave to be compared with the perfectly just, which is the fifth, that we may\nknow which is the happier, and then we shall be able to determine whether the\nargument of Thrasymachus or our own is the more convincing. And as before we\nbegan with the State and went on to the individual, so now, beginning with\ntimocracy, let us go on to the timocratical man, and then proceed to the other\nforms of government, and the individuals who answer to them.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut how did timocracy arise out of the perfect State? Plainly, like all changes\nof government, from division in the rulers. But whence came division?\n\u0026lsquo;Sing, heavenly Muses,\u0026rsquo; as Homer says;\u0026mdash;let them condescend to\nanswer us, as if we were children, to whom they put on a solemn face in jest.\n\u0026lsquo;And what will they say?\u0026rsquo; They will say that human things are fated\nto decay, and even the perfect State will not escape from this law of destiny,\nwhen \u0026lsquo;the wheel comes full circle\u0026rsquo; in a period short or long.\nPlants or animals have times of fertility and sterility, which the intelligence\nof rulers because alloyed by sense will not enable them to ascertain, and\nchildren will be born out of season. For whereas divine creations are in a\nperfect cycle or number, the human creation is in a number which declines from\nperfection, and has four terms and three intervals of numbers, increasing,\nwaning, assimilating, dissimilating, and yet perfectly commensurate with each\nother. The base of the number with a fourth added (or which is 3:4), multiplied\nby five and cubed, gives two harmonies:\u0026mdash;the first a square number, which\nis a hundred times the base (or a hundred times a hundred); the second, an\noblong, being a hundred squares of the rational diameter of a figure the side\nof which is five, subtracting one from each square or two perfect squares from\nall, and adding a hundred cubes of three. This entire number is geometrical and\ncontains the rule or law of generation. When this law is neglected marriages\nwill be unpropitious; the inferior offspring who are then born will in time\nbecome the rulers; the State will decline, and education fall into decay;\ngymnastic will be preferred to music, and the gold and silver and brass and\niron will form a chaotic mass\u0026mdash;thus division will arise. Such is the\nMuses\u0026rsquo; answer to our question. \u0026lsquo;And a true answer, of\ncourse:\u0026mdash;but what more have they to say?\u0026rsquo; They say that the two\nraces, the iron and brass, and the silver and gold, will draw the State\ndifferent ways;\u0026mdash;the one will take to trade and moneymaking, and the\nothers, having the true riches and not caring for money, will resist them: the\ncontest will end in a compromise; they will agree to have private property, and\nwill enslave their fellow-citizens who were once their friends and nurturers.\nBut they will retain their warlike character, and will be chiefly occupied in\nfighting and exercising rule. Thus arises timocracy, which is intermediate\nbetween aristocracy and oligarchy.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe new form of government resembles the ideal in obedience to rulers and\ncontempt for trade, and having common meals, and in devotion to warlike and\ngymnastic exercises. But corruption has crept into philosophy, and simplicity\nof character, which was once her note, is now looked for only in the military\nclass. Arts of war begin to prevail over arts of peace; the ruler is no longer\na philosopher; as in oligarchies, there springs up among them an extravagant\nlove of gain\u0026mdash;get another man\u0026rsquo;s and save your own, is their\nprinciple; and they have dark places in which they hoard their gold and silver,\nfor the use of their women and others; they take their pleasures by stealth,\nlike boys who are running away from their father\u0026mdash;the law; and their\neducation is not inspired by the Muse, but imposed by the strong arm of power.\nThe leading characteristic of this State is party spirit and ambition.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd what manner of man answers to such a State? \u0026lsquo;In love of\ncontention,\u0026rsquo; replied Adeimantus, \u0026lsquo;he will be like our friend\nGlaucon.\u0026rsquo; In that respect, perhaps, but not in others. He is\nself-asserting and ill-educated, yet fond of literature, although not himself a\nspeaker,\u0026mdash;fierce with slaves, but obedient to rulers, a lover of power and\nhonour, which he hopes to gain by deeds of arms,\u0026mdash;fond, too, of gymnastics\nand of hunting. As he advances in years he grows avaricious, for he has lost\nphilosophy, which is the only saviour and guardian of men. His origin is as\nfollows:\u0026mdash;His father is a good man dwelling in an ill-ordered State, who\nhas retired from politics in order that he may lead a quiet life. His mother is\nangry at her loss of precedence among other women; she is disgusted at her\nhusband\u0026rsquo;s selfishness, and she expatiates to her son on the unmanliness\nand indolence of his father. The old family servant takes up the tale, and says\nto the youth:\u0026mdash;\u0026lsquo;When you grow up you must be more of a man than your\nfather.\u0026rsquo; All the world are agreed that he who minds his own business is\nan idiot, while a busybody is highly honoured and esteemed. The young man\ncompares this spirit with his father\u0026rsquo;s words and ways, and as he is\nnaturally well disposed, although he has suffered from evil influences, he\nrests at a middle point and becomes ambitious and a lover of honour.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd now let us set another city over against another man. The next form of\ngovernment is oligarchy, in which the rule is of the rich only; nor is it\ndifficult to see how such a State arises. The decline begins with the\npossession of gold and silver; illegal modes of expenditure are invented; one\ndraws another on, and the multitude are infected; riches outweigh virtue;\nlovers of money take the place of lovers of honour; misers of politicians; and,\nin time, political privileges are confined by law to the rich, who do not\nshrink from violence in order to effect their purposes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThus much of the origin,\u0026mdash;let us next consider the evils of oligarchy.\nWould a man who wanted to be safe on a voyage take a bad pilot because he was\nrich, or refuse a good one because he was poor? And does not the analogy apply\nstill more to the State? And there are yet greater evils: two nations are\nstruggling together in one\u0026mdash;the rich and the poor; and the rich dare not\nput arms into the hands of the poor, and are unwilling to pay for defenders out\nof their own money. And have we not already condemned that State in which the\nsame persons are warriors as well as shopkeepers? The greatest evil of all is\nthat a man may sell his property and have no place in the State; while there is\none class which has enormous wealth, the other is entirely destitute. But\nobserve that these destitutes had not really any more of the governing nature\nin them when they were rich than now that they are poor; they were miserable\nspendthrifts always. They are the drones of the hive; only whereas the actual\ndrone is unprovided by nature with a sting, the two-legged things whom we call\ndrones are some of them without stings and some of them have dreadful stings;\nin other words, there are paupers and there are rogues. These are never far\napart; and in oligarchical cities, where nearly everybody is a pauper who is\nnot a ruler, you will find abundance of both. And this evil state of society\noriginates in bad education and bad government.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nLike State, like man,\u0026mdash;the change in the latter begins with the\nrepresentative of timocracy; he walks at first in the ways of his father, who\nmay have been a statesman, or general, perhaps; and presently he sees him\n\u0026lsquo;fallen from his high estate,\u0026rsquo; the victim of informers, dying in\nprison or exile, or by the hand of the executioner. The lesson which he thus\nreceives, makes him cautious; he leaves politics, represses his pride, and\nsaves pence. Avarice is enthroned as his bosom\u0026rsquo;s lord, and assumes the\nstyle of the Great King; the rational and spirited elements sit humbly on the\nground at either side, the one immersed in calculation, the other absorbed in\nthe admiration of wealth. The love of honour turns to love of money; the\nconversion is instantaneous. The man is mean, saving, toiling, the slave of one\npassion which is the master of the rest: Is he not the very image of the State?\nHe has had no education, or he would never have allowed the blind god of riches\nto lead the dance within him. And being uneducated he will have many slavish\ndesires, some beggarly, some knavish, breeding in his soul. If he is the\ntrustee of an orphan, and has the power to defraud, he will soon prove that he\nis not without the will, and that his passions are only restrained by fear and\nnot by reason. Hence he leads a divided existence; in which the better desires\nmostly prevail. But when he is contending for prizes and other distinctions, he\nis afraid to incur a loss which is to be repaid only by barren honour; in time\nof war he fights with a small part of his resources, and usually keeps his\nmoney and loses the victory.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNext comes democracy and the democratic man, out of oligarchy and the\noligarchical man. Insatiable avarice is the ruling passion of an oligarchy; and\nthey encourage expensive habits in order that they may gain by the ruin of\nextravagant youth. Thus men of family often lose their property or rights of\ncitizenship; but they remain in the city, full of hatred against the new owners\nof their estates and ripe for revolution. The usurer with stooping walk\npretends not to see them; he passes by, and leaves his sting\u0026mdash;that is, his\nmoney\u0026mdash;in some other victim; and many a man has to pay the parent or\nprincipal sum multiplied into a family of children, and is reduced into a state\nof dronage by him. The only way of diminishing the evil is either to limit a\nman in his use of his property, or to insist that he shall lend at his own\nrisk. But the ruling class do not want remedies; they care only for money, and\nare as careless of virtue as the poorest of the citizens. Now there are\noccasions on which the governors and the governed meet together,\u0026mdash;at\nfestivals, on a journey, voyaging or fighting. The sturdy pauper finds that in\nthe hour of danger he is not despised; he sees the rich man puffing and\npanting, and draws the conclusion which he privately imparts to his\ncompanions,\u0026mdash;\u0026lsquo;that our people are not good for much;\u0026rsquo; and as a\nsickly frame is made ill by a mere touch from without, or sometimes without\nexternal impulse is ready to fall to pieces of itself, so from the least cause,\nor with none at all, the city falls ill and fights a battle for life or death.\nAnd democracy comes into power when the poor are the victors, killing some and\nexiling some, and giving equal shares in the government to all the rest.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe manner of life in such a State is that of democrats; there is freedom and\nplainness of speech, and every man does what is right in his own eyes, and has\nhis own way of life. Hence arise the most various developments of character;\nthe State is like a piece of embroidery of which the colours and figures are\nthe manners of men, and there are many who, like women and children, prefer\nthis variety to real beauty and excellence. The State is not one but many, like\na bazaar at which you can buy anything. The great charm is, that you may do as\nyou like; you may govern if you like, let it alone if you like; go to war and\nmake peace if you feel disposed, and all quite irrespective of anybody else.\nWhen you condemn men to death they remain alive all the same; a gentleman is\ndesired to go into exile, and he stalks about the streets like a hero; and\nnobody sees him or cares for him. Observe, too, how grandly Democracy sets her\nfoot upon all our fine theories of education,\u0026mdash;how little she cares for\nthe training of her statesmen! The only qualification which she demands is the\nprofession of patriotism. Such is democracy;\u0026mdash;a pleasing, lawless, various\nsort of government, distributing equality to equals and unequals alike.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nLet us now inspect the individual democrat; and first, as in the case of the\nState, we will trace his antecedents. He is the son of a miserly oligarch, and\nhas been taught by him to restrain the love of unnecessary pleasures. Perhaps I\nought to explain this latter term:\u0026mdash;Necessary pleasures are those which\nare good, and which we cannot do without; unnecessary pleasures are those which\ndo no good, and of which the desire might be eradicated by early training. For\nexample, the pleasures of eating and drinking are necessary and healthy, up to\na certain point; beyond that point they are alike hurtful to body and mind, and\nthe excess may be avoided. When in excess, they may be rightly called expensive\npleasures, in opposition to the useful ones. And the drone, as we called him,\nis the slave of these unnecessary pleasures and desires, whereas the miserly\noligarch is subject only to the necessary.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe oligarch changes into the democrat in the following manner:\u0026mdash;The youth\nwho has had a miserly bringing up, gets a taste of the drone\u0026rsquo;s honey; he\nmeets with wild companions, who introduce him to every new pleasure. As in the\nState, so in the individual, there are allies on both sides, temptations from\nwithout and passions from within; there is reason also and external influences\nof parents and friends in alliance with the oligarchical principle; and the two\nfactions are in violent conflict with one another. Sometimes the party of order\nprevails, but then again new desires and new disorders arise, and the whole mob\nof passions gets possession of the Acropolis, that is to say, the soul, which\nthey find void and unguarded by true words and works. Falsehoods and illusions\nascend to take their place; the prodigal goes back into the country of the\nLotophagi or drones, and openly dwells there. And if any offer of alliance or\nparley of individual elders comes from home, the false spirits shut the gates\nof the castle and permit no one to enter,\u0026mdash;there is a battle, and they\ngain the victory; and straightway making alliance with the desires, they banish\nmodesty, which they call folly, and send temperance over the border. When the\nhouse has been swept and garnished, they dress up the exiled vices, and,\ncrowning them with garlands, bring them back under new names. Insolence they\ncall good breeding, anarchy freedom, waste magnificence, impudence courage.\nSuch is the process by which the youth passes from the necessary pleasures to\nthe unnecessary. After a while he divides his time impartially between them;\nand perhaps, when he gets older and the violence of passion has abated, he\nrestores some of the exiles and lives in a sort of equilibrium, indulging first\none pleasure and then another; and if reason comes and tells him that some\npleasures are good and honourable, and others bad and vile, he shakes his head\nand says that he can make no distinction between them. Thus he lives in the\nfancy of the hour; sometimes he takes to drink, and then he turns abstainer; he\npractises in the gymnasium or he does nothing at all; then again he would be a\nphilosopher or a politician; or again, he would be a warrior or a man of\nbusiness; he is\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp class=\"poem\"\u003e\n\u0026lsquo;Every thing by starts and nothing long.\u0026rsquo;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThere remains still the finest and fairest of all men and all\nStates\u0026mdash;tyranny and the tyrant. Tyranny springs from democracy much as\ndemocracy springs from oligarchy. Both arise from excess; the one from excess\nof wealth, the other from excess of freedom. \u0026lsquo;The great natural good of\nlife,\u0026rsquo; says the democrat, \u0026lsquo;is freedom.\u0026rsquo; And this exclusive\nlove of freedom and regardlessness of everything else, is the cause of the\nchange from democracy to tyranny. The State demands the strong wine of freedom,\nand unless her rulers give her a plentiful draught, punishes and insults them;\nequality and fraternity of governors and governed is the approved principle.\nAnarchy is the law, not of the State only, but of private houses, and extends\neven to the animals. Father and son, citizen and foreigner, teacher and pupil,\nold and young, are all on a level; fathers and teachers fear their sons and\npupils, and the wisdom of the young man is a match for the elder, and the old\nimitate the jaunty manners of the young because they are afraid of being\nthought morose. Slaves are on a level with their masters and mistresses, and\nthere is no difference between men and women. Nay, the very animals in a\ndemocratic State have a freedom which is unknown in other places. The she-dogs\nare as good as their she-mistresses, and horses and asses march along with\ndignity and run their noses against anybody who comes in their way. \u0026lsquo;That\nhas often been my experience.\u0026rsquo; At last the citizens become so sensitive\nthat they cannot endure the yoke of laws, written or unwritten; they would have\nno man call himself their master. Such is the glorious beginning of things out\nof which tyranny springs. \u0026lsquo;Glorious, indeed; but what is to\nfollow?\u0026rsquo; The ruin of oligarchy is the ruin of democracy; for there is a\nlaw of contraries; the excess of freedom passes into the excess of slavery, and\nthe greater the freedom the greater the slavery. You will remember that in the\noligarchy were found two classes\u0026mdash;rogues and paupers, whom we compared to\ndrones with and without stings. These two classes are to the State what phlegm\nand bile are to the human body; and the State-physician, or legislator, must\nget rid of them, just as the bee-master keeps the drones out of the hive. Now\nin a democracy, too, there are drones, but they are more numerous and more\ndangerous than in the oligarchy; there they are inert and unpractised, here\nthey are full of life and animation; and the keener sort speak and act, while\nthe others buzz about the bema and prevent their opponents from being heard.\nAnd there is another class in democratic States, of respectable, thriving\nindividuals, who can be squeezed when the drones have need of their\npossessions; there is moreover a third class, who are the labourers and the\nartisans, and they make up the mass of the people. When the people meet, they\nare omnipotent, but they cannot be brought together unless they are attracted\nby a little honey; and the rich are made to supply the honey, of which the\ndemagogues keep the greater part themselves, giving a taste only to the mob.\nTheir victims attempt to resist; they are driven mad by the stings of the\ndrones, and so become downright oligarchs in self-defence. Then follow\ninformations and convictions for treason. The people have some protector whom\nthey nurse into greatness, and from this root the tree of tyranny springs. The\nnature of the change is indicated in the old fable of the temple of Zeus\nLycaeus, which tells how he who tastes human flesh mixed up with the flesh of\nother victims will turn into a wolf. Even so the protector, who tastes human\nblood, and slays some and exiles others with or without law, who hints at\nabolition of debts and division of lands, must either perish or become a\nwolf\u0026mdash;that is, a tyrant. Perhaps he is driven out, but he soon comes back\nfrom exile; and then if his enemies cannot get rid of him by lawful means, they\nplot his assassination. Thereupon the friend of the people makes his well-known\nrequest to them for a body-guard, which they readily grant, thinking only of\nhis danger and not of their own. Now let the rich man make to himself wings,\nfor he will never run away again if he does not do so then. And the Great\nProtector, having crushed all his rivals, stands proudly erect in the chariot\nof State, a full-blown tyrant: Let us enquire into the nature of his happiness.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIn the early days of his tyranny he smiles and beams upon everybody; he is not\na \u0026lsquo;dominus,\u0026rsquo; no, not he: he has only come to put an end to debt and\nthe monopoly of land. Having got rid of foreign enemies, he makes himself\nnecessary to the State by always going to war. He is thus enabled to depress\nthe poor by heavy taxes, and so keep them at work; and he can get rid of bolder\nspirits by handing them over to the enemy. Then comes unpopularity; some of his\nold associates have the courage to oppose him. The consequence is, that he has\nto make a purgation of the State; but, unlike the physician who purges away the\nbad, he must get rid of the high-spirited, the wise and the wealthy; for he has\nno choice between death and a life of shame and dishonour. And the more hated\nhe is, the more he will require trusty guards; but how will he obtain them?\n\u0026lsquo;They will come flocking like birds\u0026mdash;for pay.\u0026rsquo; Will he not\nrather obtain them on the spot? He will take the slaves from their owners and\nmake them his body-guard; these are his trusted friends, who admire and look up\nto him. Are not the tragic poets wise who magnify and exalt the tyrant, and say\nthat he is wise by association with the wise? And are not their praises of\ntyranny alone a sufficient reason why we should exclude them from our State?\nThey may go to other cities, and gather the mob about them with fine words, and\nchange commonwealths into tyrannies and democracies, receiving honours and\nrewards for their services; but the higher they and their friends ascend\nconstitution hill, the more their honour will fail and become \u0026lsquo;too\nasthmatic to mount.\u0026rsquo; To return to the tyrant\u0026mdash;How will he support\nthat rare army of his? First, by robbing the temples of their treasures, which\nwill enable him to lighten the taxes; then he will take all his father\u0026rsquo;s\nproperty, and spend it on his companions, male or female. Now his father is the\ndemus, and if the demus gets angry, and says that a great hulking son ought not\nto be a burden on his parents, and bids him and his riotous crew begone, then\nwill the parent know what a monster he has been nurturing, and that the son\nwhom he would fain expel is too strong for him. \u0026lsquo;You do not mean to say\nthat he will beat his father?\u0026rsquo; Yes, he will, after having taken away his\narms. \u0026lsquo;Then he is a parricide and a cruel, unnatural son.\u0026rsquo; And the\npeople have jumped from the fear of slavery into slavery, out of the smoke into\nthe fire. Thus liberty, when out of all order and reason, passes into the worst\nform of servitude…\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIn the previous books Plato has described the ideal State; now he returns to\nthe perverted or declining forms, on which he had lightly touched at the end of\nBook IV. These he describes in a succession of parallels between the\nindividuals and the States, tracing the origin of either in the State or\nindividual which has preceded them. He begins by asking the point at which he\ndigressed; and is thus led shortly to recapitulate the substance of the three\nformer books, which also contain a parallel of the philosopher and the State.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nOf the first decline he gives no intelligible account; he would not have liked\nto admit the most probable causes of the fall of his ideal State, which to us\nwould appear to be the impracticability of communism or the natural antagonism\nof the ruling and subject classes. He throws a veil of mystery over the origin\nof the decline, which he attributes to ignorance of the law of population. Of\nthis law the famous geometrical figure or number is the expression. Like the\nancients in general, he had no idea of the gradual perfectibility of man or of\nthe education of the human race. His ideal was not to be attained in the course\nof ages, but was to spring in full armour from the head of the legislator. When\ngood laws had been given, he thought only of the manner in which they were\nlikely to be corrupted, or of how they might be filled up in detail or restored\nin accordance with their original spirit. He appears not to have reflected upon\nthe full meaning of his own words, \u0026lsquo;In the brief space of human life,\nnothing great can be accomplished\u0026rsquo;; or again, as he afterwards says in\nthe Laws, \u0026lsquo;Infinite time is the maker of cities.\u0026rsquo; The order of\nconstitutions which is adopted by him represents an order of thought rather\nthan a succession of time, and may be considered as the first attempt to frame\na philosophy of history.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe first of these declining States is timocracy, or the government of soldiers\nand lovers of honour, which answers to the Spartan State; this is a government\nof force, in which education is not inspired by the Muses, but imposed by the\nlaw, and in which all the finer elements of organization have disappeared. The\nphilosopher himself has lost the love of truth, and the soldier, who is of a\nsimpler and honester nature, rules in his stead. The individual who answers to\ntimocracy has some noticeable qualities. He is described as ill educated, but,\nlike the Spartan, a lover of literature; and although he is a harsh master to\nhis servants he has no natural superiority over them. His character is based\nupon a reaction against the circumstances of his father, who in a troubled city\nhas retired from politics; and his mother, who is dissatisfied at her own\nposition, is always urging him towards the life of political ambition. Such a\ncharacter may have had this origin, and indeed Livy attributes the Licinian\nlaws to a feminine jealousy of a similar kind. But there is obviously no\nconnection between the manner in which the timocratic State springs out of the\nideal, and the mere accident by which the timocratic man is the son of a\nretired statesman.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe two next stages in the decline of constitutions have even less historical\nfoundation. For there is no trace in Greek history of a polity like the Spartan\nor Cretan passing into an oligarchy of wealth, or of the oligarchy of wealth\npassing into a democracy. The order of history appears to be different; first,\nin the Homeric times there is the royal or patriarchal form of government,\nwhich a century or two later was succeeded by an oligarchy of birth rather than\nof wealth, and in which wealth was only the accident of the hereditary\npossession of land and power. Sometimes this oligarchical government gave way\nto a government based upon a qualification of property, which, according to\nAristotle\u0026rsquo;s mode of using words, would have been called a timocracy; and\nthis in some cities, as at Athens, became the conducting medium to democracy.\nBut such was not the necessary order of succession in States; nor, indeed, can\nany order be discerned in the endless fluctuation of Greek history (like the\ntides in the Euripus), except, perhaps, in the almost uniform tendency from\nmonarchy to aristocracy in the earliest times. At first sight there appears to\nbe a similar inversion in the last step of the Platonic succession; for\ntyranny, instead of being the natural end of democracy, in early Greek history\nappears rather as a stage leading to democracy; the reign of Peisistratus and\nhis sons is an episode which comes between the legislation of Solon and the\nconstitution of Cleisthenes; and some secret cause common to them all seems to\nhave led the greater part of Hellas at her first appearance in the dawn of\nhistory, e.g. Athens, Argos, Corinth, Sicyon, and nearly every State with the\nexception of Sparta, through a similar stage of tyranny which ended either in\noligarchy or democracy. But then we must remember that Plato is describing\nrather the contemporary governments of the Sicilian States, which alternated\nbetween democracy and tyranny, than the ancient history of Athens or Corinth.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe portrait of the tyrant himself is just such as the later Greek delighted to\ndraw of Phalaris and Dionysius, in which, as in the lives of mediaeval saints\nor mythic heroes, the conduct and actions of one were attributed to another in\norder to fill up the outline. There was no enormity which the Greek was not\ntoday to believe of them; the tyrant was the negation of government and law;\nhis assassination was glorious; there was no crime, however unnatural, which\nmight not with probability be attributed to him. In this, Plato was only\nfollowing the common thought of his countrymen, which he embellished and\nexaggerated with all the power of his genius. There is no need to suppose that\nhe drew from life; or that his knowledge of tyrants is derived from a personal\nacquaintance with Dionysius. The manner in which he speaks of them would rather\ntend to render doubtful his ever having \u0026lsquo;consorted\u0026rsquo; with them, or\nentertained the schemes, which are attributed to him in the Epistles, of\nregenerating Sicily by their help.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nPlato in a hyperbolical and serio-comic vein exaggerates the follies of\ndemocracy which he also sees reflected in social life. To him democracy is a\nstate of individualism or dissolution; in which every one is doing what is\nright in his own eyes. Of a people animated by a common spirit of liberty,\nrising as one man to repel the Persian host, which is the leading idea of\ndemocracy in Herodotus and Thucydides, he never seems to think. But if he is\nnot a believer in liberty, still less is he a lover of tyranny. His deeper and\nmore serious condemnation is reserved for the tyrant, who is the ideal of\nwickedness and also of weakness, and who in his utter helplessness and\nsuspiciousness is leading an almost impossible existence, without that remnant\nof good which, in Plato\u0026rsquo;s opinion, was required to give power to evil\n(Book I). This ideal of wickedness living in helpless misery, is the reverse of\nthat other portrait of perfect injustice ruling in happiness and splendour,\nwhich first of all Thrasymachus, and afterwards the sons of Ariston had drawn,\nand is also the reverse of the king whose rule of life is the good of his\nsubjects.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nEach of these governments and individuals has a corresponding ethical\ngradation: the ideal State is under the rule of reason, not extinguishing but\nharmonizing the passions, and training them in virtue; in the timocracy and the\ntimocratic man the constitution, whether of the State or of the individual, is\nbased, first, upon courage, and secondly, upon the love of honour; this latter\nvirtue, which is hardly to be esteemed a virtue, has superseded all the rest.\nIn the second stage of decline the virtues have altogether disappeared, and the\nlove of gain has succeeded to them; in the third stage, or democracy, the\nvarious passions are allowed to have free play, and the virtues and vices are\nimpartially cultivated. But this freedom, which leads to many curious\nextravagances of character, is in reality only a state of weakness and\ndissipation. At last, one monster passion takes possession of the whole nature\nof man\u0026mdash;this is tyranny. In all of them excess\u0026mdash;the excess first of\nwealth and then of freedom, is the element of decay.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe eighth book of the Republic abounds in pictures of life and fanciful\nallusions; the use of metaphorical language is carried to a greater extent than\nanywhere else in Plato. We may remark,\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n(1), the description of the two nations in one, which become more and more\ndivided in the Greek Republics, as in feudal times, and perhaps also in our\nown;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n(2), the notion of democracy expressed in a sort of Pythagorean formula as\nequality among unequals;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n(3), the free and easy ways of men and animals, which are characteristic of\nliberty, as foreign mercenaries and universal mistrust are of the tyrant;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n(4), the proposal that mere debts should not be recoverable by law is a\nspeculation which has often been entertained by reformers of the law in modern\ntimes, and is in harmony with the tendencies of modern legislation. Debt and\nland were the two great difficulties of the ancient lawgiver: in modern times\nwe may be said to have almost, if not quite, solved the first of these\ndifficulties, but hardly the second.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nStill more remarkable are the corresponding portraits of individuals: there is\nthe family picture of the father and mother and the old servant of the\ntimocratical man, and the outward respectability and inherent meanness of the\noligarchical; the uncontrolled licence and freedom of the democrat, in which\nthe young Alcibiades seems to be depicted, doing right or wrong as he pleases,\nand who at last, like the prodigal, goes into a far country (note here the play\nof language by which the democratic man is himself represented under the image\nof a State having a citadel and receiving embassies); and there is the\nwild-beast nature, which breaks loose in his successor. The hit about the\ntyrant being a parricide; the representation of the tyrant\u0026rsquo;s life as an\nobscene dream; the rhetorical surprise of a more miserable than the most\nmiserable of men in Book IX; the hint to the poets that if they are the friends\nof tyrants there is no place for them in a constitutional State, and that they\nare too clever not to see the propriety of their own expulsion; the continuous\nimage of the drones who are of two kinds, swelling at last into the monster\ndrone having wings (Book IX),\u0026mdash;are among Plato\u0026rsquo;s happiest touches.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThere remains to be considered the great difficulty of this book of the\nRepublic, the so-called number of the State. This is a puzzle almost as great\nas the Number of the Beast in the Book of Revelation, and though apparently\nknown to Aristotle, is referred to by Cicero as a proverb of obscurity (Ep. ad\nAtt.). And some have imagined that there is no answer to the puzzle, and that\nPlato has been practising upon his readers. But such a deception as this is\ninconsistent with the manner in which Aristotle speaks of the number (Pol.),\nand would have been ridiculous to any reader of the Republic who was acquainted\nwith Greek mathematics. As little reason is there for supposing that Plato\nintentionally used obscure expressions; the obscurity arises from our want of\nfamiliarity with the subject. On the other hand, Plato himself indicates that\nhe is not altogether serious, and in describing his number as a solemn jest of\nthe Muses, he appears to imply some degree of satire on the symbolical use of\nnumber. (Compare Cratylus; Protag.)\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nOur hope of understanding the passage depends principally on an accurate study\nof the words themselves; on which a faint light is thrown by the parallel\npassage in the ninth book. Another help is the allusion in Aristotle, who makes\nthe important remark that the latter part of the passage (Greek) describes a\nsolid figure. (Pol.\u0026mdash;\u0026lsquo;He only says that nothing is abiding, but that\nall things change in a certain cycle; and that the origin of the change is a\nbase of numbers which are in the ratio of 4:3; and this when combined with a\nfigure of five gives two harmonies; he means when the number of this figure\nbecomes solid.\u0026rsquo;) Some further clue may be gathered from the appearance of\nthe Pythagorean triangle, which is denoted by the numbers 3, 4, 5, and in\nwhich, as in every right-angled triangle, the squares of the two lesser sides\nequal the square of the hypotenuse (9 + 16 = 25).\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nPlato begins by speaking of a perfect or cyclical number (Tim.), i.e. a number\nin which the sum of the divisors equals the whole; this is the divine or\nperfect number in which all lesser cycles or revolutions are complete. He also\nspeaks of a human or imperfect number, having four terms and three intervals of\nnumbers which are related to one another in certain proportions; these he\nconverts into figures, and finds in them when they have been raised to the\nthird power certain elements of number, which give two \u0026lsquo;harmonies,\u0026rsquo;\nthe one square, the other oblong; but he does not say that the square number\nanswers to the divine, or the oblong number to the human cycle; nor is any\nintimation given that the first or divine number represents the period of the\nworld, the second the period of the state, or of the human race as Zeller\nsupposes; nor is the divine number afterwards mentioned (Arist.). The second is\nthe number of generations or births, and presides over them in the same\nmysterious manner in which the stars preside over them, or in which, according\nto the Pythagoreans, opportunity, justice, marriage, are represented by some\nnumber or figure. This is probably the number 216.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe explanation given in the text supposes the two harmonies to make up the\nnumber 8000. This explanation derives a certain plausibility from the\ncircumstance that 8000 is the ancient number of the Spartan citizens (Herod.),\nand would be what Plato might have called \u0026lsquo;a number which nearly concerns\nthe population of a city\u0026rsquo;; the mysterious disappearance of the Spartan\npopulation may possibly have suggested to him the first cause of his decline of\nStates. The lesser or square \u0026lsquo;harmony,\u0026rsquo; of 400, might be a symbol\nof the guardians,\u0026mdash;the larger or oblong \u0026lsquo;harmony,\u0026rsquo; of the\npeople, and the numbers 3, 4, 5 might refer respectively to the three orders in\nthe State or parts of the soul, the four virtues, the five forms of government.\nThe harmony of the musical scale, which is elsewhere used as a symbol of the\nharmony of the state, is also indicated. For the numbers 3, 4, 5, which\nrepresent the sides of the Pythagorean triangle, also denote the intervals of\nthe scale.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe terms used in the statement of the problem may be explained as follows. A\nperfect number (Greek), as already stated, is one which is equal to the sum of\nits divisors. Thus 6, which is the first perfect or cyclical number, = 1 + 2 +\n3. The words (Greek), \u0026lsquo;terms\u0026rsquo; or \u0026lsquo;notes,\u0026rsquo; and (Greek),\n\u0026lsquo;intervals,\u0026rsquo; are applicable to music as well as to number and\nfigure. (Greek) is the \u0026lsquo;base\u0026rsquo; on which the whole calculation\ndepends, or the \u0026lsquo;lowest term\u0026rsquo; from which it can be worked out. The\nwords (Greek) have been variously translated\u0026mdash;\u0026lsquo;squared and\ncubed\u0026rsquo; (Donaldson), \u0026lsquo;equalling and equalled in power\u0026rsquo;\n(Weber), \u0026lsquo;by involution and evolution,\u0026rsquo; i.e. by raising the power\nand extracting the root (as in the translation). Numbers are called \u0026lsquo;like\nand unlike\u0026rsquo; (Greek) when the factors or the sides of the planes and cubes\nwhich they represent are or are not in the same ratio: e.g. 8 and 27 = 2 cubed\nand 3 cubed; and conversely. \u0026lsquo;Waxing\u0026rsquo; (Greek) numbers, called also\n\u0026lsquo;increasing\u0026rsquo; (Greek), are those which are exceeded by the sum of\ntheir divisors: e.g. 12 and 18 are less than 16 and 21. \u0026lsquo;Waning\u0026rsquo;\n(Greek) numbers, called also \u0026lsquo;decreasing\u0026rsquo; (Greek) are those which\nsucceed the sum of their divisors: e.g. 8 and 27 exceed 7 and 13. The words\ntranslated \u0026lsquo;commensurable and agreeable to one another\u0026rsquo; (Greek)\nseem to be different ways of describing the same relation, with more or less\nprecision. They are equivalent to \u0026lsquo;expressible in terms having the same\nrelation to one another,\u0026rsquo; like the series 8, 12, 18, 27, each of which\nnumbers is in the relation of (1 and 1/2) to the preceding. The\n\u0026lsquo;base,\u0026rsquo; or \u0026lsquo;fundamental number, which has 1/3 added to\nit\u0026rsquo; (1 and 1/3) = 4/3 or a musical fourth. (Greek) is a\n\u0026lsquo;proportion\u0026rsquo; of numbers as of musical notes, applied either to the\nparts or factors of a single number or to the relation of one number to\nanother. The first harmony is a \u0026lsquo;square\u0026rsquo; number (Greek); the second\nharmony is an \u0026lsquo;oblong\u0026rsquo; number (Greek), i.e. a number representing a\nfigure of which the opposite sides only are equal. (Greek) = \u0026lsquo;numbers\nsquared from\u0026rsquo; or \u0026lsquo;upon diameters\u0026rsquo;; (Greek) =\n\u0026lsquo;rational,\u0026rsquo; i.e. omitting fractions, (Greek),\n\u0026lsquo;irrational,\u0026rsquo; i.e. including fractions; e.g. 49 is a square of the\nrational diameter of a figure the side of which = 5: 50, of an irrational\ndiameter of the same. For several of the explanations here given and for a good\ndeal besides I am indebted to an excellent article on the Platonic Number by\nDr. Donaldson (Proc. of the Philol. Society).\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe conclusions which he draws from these data are summed up by him as follows.\nHaving assumed that the number of the perfect or divine cycle is the number of\nthe world, and the number of the imperfect cycle the number of the state, he\nproceeds: \u0026lsquo;The period of the world is defined by the perfect number 6,\nthat of the state by the cube of that number or 216, which is the product of\nthe last pair of terms in the Platonic Tetractys (a series of seven terms, 1,\n2, 3, 4, 9, 8, 27); and if we take this as the basis of our computation, we\nshall have two cube numbers (Greek), viz. 8 and 27; and the mean proportionals\nbetween these, viz. 12 and 18, will furnish three intervals and four terms, and\nthese terms and intervals stand related to one another in the sesqui-altera\nratio, i.e. each term is to the preceding as 3/2. Now if we remember that the\nnumber 216 = 8 x 27 = 3 cubed + 4 cubed + 5 cubed, and 3 squared + 4 squared =\n5 squared, we must admit that this number implies the numbers 3, 4, 5, to which\nmusicians attach so much importance. And if we combine the ratio 4/3 with the\nnumber 5, or multiply the ratios of the sides by the hypotenuse, we shall by\nfirst squaring and then cubing obtain two expressions, which denote the ratio\nof the two last pairs of terms in the Platonic Tetractys, the former multiplied\nby the square, the latter by the cube of the number 10, the sum of the first\nfour digits which constitute the Platonic Tetractys.\u0026rsquo; The two (Greek) he\nelsewhere explains as follows: \u0026lsquo;The first (Greek) is (Greek), in other\nwords (4/3 x 5) all squared = 100 x 2 squared over 3 squared. The second\n(Greek), a cube of the same root, is described as 100 multiplied (alpha) by the\nrational diameter of 5 diminished by unity, i.e., as shown above, 48: (beta) by\ntwo incommensurable diameters, i.e. the two first irrationals, or 2 and 3: and\n(gamma) by the cube of 3, or 27. Thus we have (48 + 5 + 27) 100 = 1000 x 2\ncubed. This second harmony is to be the cube of the number of which the former\nharmony is the square, and therefore must be divided by the cube of 3. In other\nwords, the whole expression will be: (1), for the first harmony, 400/9: (2),\nfor the second harmony, 8000/27.\u0026rsquo;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe reasons which have inclined me to agree with Dr. Donaldson and also with\nSchleiermacher in supposing that 216 is the Platonic number of births are: (1)\nthat it coincides with the description of the number given in the first part of\nthe passage (Greek…): (2) that the number 216 with its permutations would\nhave been familiar to a Greek mathematician, though unfamiliar to us: (3) that\n216 is the cube of 6, and also the sum of 3 cubed, 4 cubed, 5 cubed, the\nnumbers 3, 4, 5 representing the Pythagorean triangle, of which the sides when\nsquared equal the square of the hypotenuse (9 + 16 = 25): (4) that it is also\nthe period of the Pythagorean Metempsychosis: (5) the three ultimate terms or\nbases (3, 4, 5) of which 216 is composed answer to the third, fourth, fifth in\nthe musical scale: (6) that the number 216 is the product of the cubes of 2 and\n3, which are the two last terms in the Platonic Tetractys: (7) that the\nPythagorean triangle is said by Plutarch (de Is. et Osir.), Proclus (super\nprima Eucl.), and Quintilian (de Musica) to be contained in this passage, so\nthat the tradition of the school seems to point in the same direction: (8) that\nthe Pythagorean triangle is called also the figure of marriage (Greek).\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut though agreeing with Dr. Donaldson thus far, I see no reason for supposing,\nas he does, that the first or perfect number is the world, the human or\nimperfect number the state; nor has he given any proof that the second harmony\nis a cube. Nor do I think that (Greek) can mean \u0026lsquo;two\nincommensurables,\u0026rsquo; which he arbitrarily assumes to be 2 and 3, but\nrather, as the preceding clause implies, (Greek), i.e. two square numbers based\nupon irrational diameters of a figure the side of which is 5 = 50 x 2.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe greatest objection to the translation is the sense given to the words\n(Greek), \u0026lsquo;a base of three with a third added to it, multiplied by\n5.\u0026rsquo; In this somewhat forced manner Plato introduces once more the numbers\nof the Pythagorean triangle. But the coincidences in the numbers which follow\nare in favour of the explanation. The first harmony of 400, as has been already\nremarked, probably represents the rulers; the second and oblong harmony of\n7600, the people.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd here we take leave of the difficulty. The discovery of the riddle would be\nuseless, and would throw no light on ancient mathematics. The point of interest\nis that Plato should have used such a symbol, and that so much of the\nPythagorean spirit should have prevailed in him. His general meaning is that\ndivine creation is perfect, and is represented or presided over by a perfect or\ncyclical number; human generation is imperfect, and represented or presided\nover by an imperfect number or series of numbers. The number 5040, which is the\nnumber of the citizens in the Laws, is expressly based by him on utilitarian\ngrounds, namely, the convenience of the number for division; it is also made up\nof the first seven digits multiplied by one another. The contrast of the\nperfect and imperfect number may have been easily suggested by the corrections\nof the cycle, which were made first by Meton and secondly by Callippus; (the\nlatter is said to have been a pupil of Plato). Of the degree of importance or\nof exactness to be attributed to the problem, the number of the tyrant in Book\nIX (729 = 365 x 2), and the slight correction of the error in the number\n5040/12 (Laws), may furnish a criterion. There is nothing surprising in the\ncircumstance that those who were seeking for order in nature and had found\norder in number, should have imagined one to give law to the other. Plato\nbelieves in a power of number far beyond what he could see realized in the\nworld around him, and he knows the great influence which \u0026lsquo;the little\nmatter of 1, 2, 3\u0026rsquo; exercises upon education. He may even be thought to\nhave a prophetic anticipation of the discoveries of Quetelet and others, that\nnumbers depend upon numbers; e.g.\u0026mdash;in population, the numbers of births\nand the respective numbers of children born of either sex, on the respective\nages of parents, i.e. on other numbers.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBOOK IX. Last of all comes the tyrannical man, about whom we have to enquire,\nWhence is he, and how does he live\u0026mdash;in happiness or in misery? There is,\nhowever, a previous question of the nature and number of the appetites, which I\nshould like to consider first. Some of them are unlawful, and yet admit of\nbeing chastened and weakened in various degrees by the power of reason and law.\n\u0026lsquo;What appetites do you mean?\u0026rsquo; I mean those which are awake when the\nreasoning powers are asleep, which get up and walk about naked without any\nself-respect or shame; and there is no conceivable folly or crime, however\ncruel or unnatural, of which, in imagination, they may not be guilty.\n\u0026lsquo;True,\u0026rsquo; he said; \u0026lsquo;very true.\u0026rsquo; But when a man\u0026rsquo;s\npulse beats temperately; and he has supped on a feast of reason and come to a\nknowledge of himself before going to rest, and has satisfied his desires just\nenough to prevent their perturbing his reason, which remains clear and\nluminous, and when he is free from quarrel and heat,\u0026mdash;the visions which he\nhas on his bed are least irregular and abnormal. Even in good men there is such\nan irregular wild-beast nature, which peers out in sleep.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTo return:\u0026mdash;You remember what was said of the democrat; that he was the\nson of a miserly father, who encouraged the saving desires and repressed the\nornamental and expensive ones; presently the youth got into fine company, and\nbegan to entertain a dislike to his father\u0026rsquo;s narrow ways; and being a\nbetter man than the corrupters of his youth, he came to a mean, and led a life,\nnot of lawless or slavish passion, but of regular and successive indulgence.\nNow imagine that the youth has become a father, and has a son who is exposed to\nthe same temptations, and has companions who lead him into every sort of\niniquity, and parents and friends who try to keep him right. The counsellors of\nevil find that their only chance of retaining him is to implant in his soul a\nmonster drone, or love; while other desires buzz around him and mystify him\nwith sweet sounds and scents, this monster love takes possession of him, and\nputs an end to every true or modest thought or wish. Love, like drunkenness and\nmadness, is a tyranny; and the tyrannical man, whether made by nature or habit,\nis just a drinking, lusting, furious sort of animal.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd how does such an one live? \u0026lsquo;Nay, that you must tell me.\u0026rsquo; Well\nthen, I fancy that he will live amid revelries and harlotries, and love will be\nthe lord and master of the house. Many desires require much money, and so he\nspends all that he has and borrows more; and when he has nothing the young\nravens are still in the nest in which they were hatched, crying for food. Love\nurges them on; and they must be gratified by force or fraud, or if not, they\nbecome painful and troublesome; and as the new pleasures succeed the old ones,\nso will the son take possession of the goods of his parents; if they show signs\nof refusing, he will defraud and deceive them; and if they openly resist, what\nthen? \u0026lsquo;I can only say, that I should not much like to be in their\nplace.\u0026rsquo; But, O heavens, Adeimantus, to think that for some new-fangled\nand unnecessary love he will give up his old father and mother, best and\ndearest of friends, or enslave them to the fancies of the hour! Truly a\ntyrannical son is a blessing to his father and mother! When there is no more to\nbe got out of them, he turns burglar or pickpocket, or robs a temple. Love\novermasters the thoughts of his youth, and he becomes in sober reality the\nmonster that he was sometimes in sleep. He waxes strong in all violence and\nlawlessness; and is ready for any deed of daring that will supply the wants of\nhis rabble-rout. In a well-ordered State there are only a few such, and these\nin time of war go out and become the mercenaries of a tyrant. But in time of\npeace they stay at home and do mischief; they are the thieves, footpads,\ncut-purses, man-stealers of the community; or if they are able to speak, they\nturn false-witnesses and informers. \u0026lsquo;No small catalogue of crimes truly,\neven if the perpetrators are few.\u0026rsquo; Yes, I said; but small and great are\nrelative terms, and no crimes which are committed by them approach those of the\ntyrant, whom this class, growing strong and numerous, create out of themselves.\nIf the people yield, well and good, but, if they resist, then, as before he\nbeat his father and mother, so now he beats his fatherland and motherland, and\nplaces his mercenaries over them. Such men in their early days live with\nflatterers, and they themselves flatter others, in order to gain their ends;\nbut they soon discard their followers when they have no longer any need of\nthem; they are always either masters or servants,\u0026mdash;the joys of friendship\nare unknown to them. And they are utterly treacherous and unjust, if the nature\nof justice be at all understood by us. They realize our dream; and he who is\nthe most of a tyrant by nature, and leads the life of a tyrant for the longest\ntime, will be the worst of them, and being the worst of them, will also be the\nmost miserable.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nLike man, like State,\u0026mdash;the tyrannical man will answer to tyranny, which is\nthe extreme opposite of the royal State; for one is the best and the other the\nworst. But which is the happier? Great and terrible as the tyrant may appear\nenthroned amid his satellites, let us not be afraid to go in and ask; and the\nanswer is, that the monarchical is the happiest, and the tyrannical the most\nmiserable of States. And may we not ask the same question about the men\nthemselves, requesting some one to look into them who is able to penetrate the\ninner nature of man, and will not be panic-struck by the vain pomp of tyranny?\nI will suppose that he is one who has lived with him, and has seen him in\nfamily life, or perhaps in the hour of trouble and danger.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAssuming that we ourselves are the impartial judge for whom we seek, let us\nbegin by comparing the individual and State, and ask first of all, whether the\nState is likely to be free or enslaved\u0026mdash;Will there not be a little freedom\nand a great deal of slavery? And the freedom is of the bad, and the slavery of\nthe good; and this applies to the man as well as to the State; for his soul is\nfull of meanness and slavery, and the better part is enslaved to the worse. He\ncannot do what he would, and his mind is full of confusion; he is the very\nreverse of a freeman. The State will be poor and full of misery and sorrow; and\nthe man\u0026rsquo;s soul will also be poor and full of sorrows, and he will be the\nmost miserable of men. No, not the most miserable, for there is yet a more\nmiserable. \u0026lsquo;Who is that?\u0026rsquo; The tyrannical man who has the misfortune\nalso to become a public tyrant. \u0026lsquo;There I suspect that you are\nright.\u0026rsquo; Say rather, \u0026lsquo;I am sure;\u0026rsquo; conjecture is out of place\nin an enquiry of this nature. He is like a wealthy owner of slaves, only he has\nmore of them than any private individual. You will say, \u0026lsquo;The owners of\nslaves are not generally in any fear of them.\u0026rsquo; But why? Because the whole\ncity is in a league which protects the individual. Suppose however that one of\nthese owners and his household is carried off by a god into a wilderness, where\nthere are no freemen to help him\u0026mdash;will he not be in an agony of\nterror?\u0026mdash;will he not be compelled to flatter his slaves and to promise\nthem many things sore against his will? And suppose the same god who carried\nhim off were to surround him with neighbours who declare that no man ought to\nhave slaves, and that the owners of them should be punished with death.\n\u0026lsquo;Still worse and worse! He will be in the midst of his enemies.\u0026rsquo;\nAnd is not our tyrant such a captive soul, who is tormented by a swarm of\npassions which he cannot indulge; living indoors always like a woman, and\njealous of those who can go out and see the world?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHaving so many evils, will not the most miserable of men be still more\nmiserable in a public station? Master of others when he is not master of\nhimself; like a sick man who is compelled to be an athlete; the meanest of\nslaves and the most abject of flatterers; wanting all things, and never able to\nsatisfy his desires; always in fear and distraction, like the State of which he\nis the representative. His jealous, hateful, faithless temper grows worse with\ncommand; he is more and more faithless, envious, unrighteous,\u0026mdash;the most\nwretched of men, a misery to himself and to others. And so let us have a final\ntrial and proclamation; need we hire a herald, or shall I proclaim the result?\n\u0026lsquo;Made the proclamation yourself.\u0026rsquo; The son of Ariston (the best) is\nof opinion that the best and justest of men is also the happiest, and that this\nis he who is the most royal master of himself; and that the unjust man is he\nwho is the greatest tyrant of himself and of his State. And I add\nfurther\u0026mdash;\u0026lsquo;seen or unseen by gods or men.\u0026rsquo;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThis is our first proof. The second is derived from the three kinds of\npleasure, which answer to the three elements of the soul\u0026mdash;reason, passion,\ndesire; under which last is comprehended avarice as well as sensual appetite,\nwhile passion includes ambition, party-feeling, love of reputation. Reason,\nagain, is solely directed to the attainment of truth, and careless of money and\nreputation. In accordance with the difference of men\u0026rsquo;s natures, one of\nthese three principles is in the ascendant, and they have their several\npleasures corresponding to them. Interrogate now the three natures, and each\none will be found praising his own pleasures and depreciating those of others.\nThe money-maker will contrast the vanity of knowledge with the solid advantages\nof wealth. The ambitious man will despise knowledge which brings no honour;\nwhereas the philosopher will regard only the fruition of truth, and will call\nother pleasures necessary rather than good. Now, how shall we decide between\nthem? Is there any better criterion than experience and knowledge? And which of\nthe three has the truest knowledge and the widest experience? The experience of\nyouth makes the philosopher acquainted with the two kinds of desire, but the\navaricious and the ambitious man never taste the pleasures of truth and wisdom.\nHonour he has equally with them; they are \u0026lsquo;judged of him,\u0026rsquo; but he\nis \u0026lsquo;not judged of them,\u0026rsquo; for they never attain to the knowledge of\ntrue being. And his instrument is reason, whereas their standard is only wealth\nand honour; and if by reason we are to judge, his good will be the truest. And\nso we arrive at the result that the pleasure of the rational part of the soul,\nand a life passed in such pleasure is the pleasantest. He who has a right to\njudge judges thus. Next comes the life of ambition, and, in the third place,\nthat of money-making.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTwice has the just man overthrown the unjust\u0026mdash;once more, as in an Olympian\ncontest, first offering up a prayer to the saviour Zeus, let him try a fall. A\nwise man whispers to me that the pleasures of the wise are true and pure; all\nothers are a shadow only. Let us examine this: Is not pleasure opposed to pain,\nand is there not a mean state which is neither? When a man is sick, nothing is\nmore pleasant to him than health. But this he never found out while he was\nwell. In pain he desires only to cease from pain; on the other hand, when he is\nin an ecstasy of pleasure, rest is painful to him. Thus rest or cessation is\nboth pleasure and pain. But can that which is neither become both? Again,\npleasure and pain are motions, and the absence of them is rest; but if so, how\ncan the absence of either of them be the other? Thus we are led to infer that\nthe contradiction is an appearance only, and witchery of the senses. And these\nare not the only pleasures, for there are others which have no preceding pains.\nPure pleasure then is not the absence of pain, nor pure pain the absence of\npleasure; although most of the pleasures which reach the mind through the body\nare reliefs of pain, and have not only their reactions when they depart, but\ntheir anticipations before they come. They can be best described in a simile.\nThere is in nature an upper, lower, and middle region, and he who passes from\nthe lower to the middle imagines that he is going up and is already in the\nupper world; and if he were taken back again would think, and truly think, that\nhe was descending. All this arises out of his ignorance of the true upper,\nmiddle, and lower regions. And a like confusion happens with pleasure and pain,\nand with many other things. The man who compares grey with black, calls grey\nwhite; and the man who compares absence of pain with pain, calls the absence of\npain pleasure. Again, hunger and thirst are inanitions of the body, ignorance\nand folly of the soul; and food is the satisfaction of the one, knowledge of\nthe other. Now which is the purer satisfaction\u0026mdash;that of eating and\ndrinking, or that of knowledge? Consider the matter thus: The satisfaction of\nthat which has more existence is truer than of that which has less. The\ninvariable and immortal has a more real existence than the variable and mortal,\nand has a corresponding measure of knowledge and truth. The soul, again, has\nmore existence and truth and knowledge than the body, and is therefore more\nreally satisfied and has a more natural pleasure. Those who feast only on\nearthly food, are always going at random up to the middle and down again; but\nthey never pass into the true upper world, or have a taste of true pleasure.\nThey are like fatted beasts, full of gluttony and sensuality, and ready to kill\none another by reason of their insatiable lust; for they are not filled with\ntrue being, and their vessel is leaky (Gorgias). Their pleasures are mere\nshadows of pleasure, mixed with pain, coloured and intensified by contrast, and\ntherefore intensely desired; and men go fighting about them, as Stesichorus\nsays that the Greeks fought about the shadow of Helen at Troy, because they\nknow not the truth.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe same may be said of the passionate element:\u0026mdash;the desires of the\nambitious soul, as well as of the covetous, have an inferior satisfaction. Only\nwhen under the guidance of reason do either of the other principles do their\nown business or attain the pleasure which is natural to them. When not\nattaining, they compel the other parts of the soul to pursue a shadow of\npleasure which is not theirs. And the more distant they are from philosophy and\nreason, the more distant they will be from law and order, and the more illusive\nwill be their pleasures. The desires of love and tyranny are the farthest from\nlaw, and those of the king are nearest to it. There is one genuine pleasure,\nand two spurious ones: the tyrant goes beyond even the latter; he has run away\naltogether from law and reason. Nor can the measure of his inferiority be told,\nexcept in a figure. The tyrant is the third removed from the oligarch, and has\ntherefore, not a shadow of his pleasure, but the shadow of a shadow only. The\noligarch, again, is thrice removed from the king, and thus we get the formula 3\nx 3, which is the number of a surface, representing the shadow which is the\ntyrant\u0026rsquo;s pleasure, and if you like to cube this \u0026lsquo;number of the\nbeast,\u0026rsquo; you will find that the measure of the difference amounts to 729;\nthe king is 729 times more happy than the tyrant. And this extraordinary number\nis NEARLY equal to the number of days and nights in a year (365 x 2 = 730); and\nis therefore concerned with human life. This is the interval between a good and\nbad man in happiness only: what must be the difference between them in\ncomeliness of life and virtue!\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nPerhaps you may remember some one saying at the beginning of our discussion\nthat the unjust man was profited if he had the reputation of justice. Now that\nwe know the nature of justice and injustice, let us make an image of the soul,\nwhich will personify his words. First of all, fashion a multitudinous beast,\nhaving a ring of heads of all manner of animals, tame and wild, and able to\nproduce and change them at pleasure. Suppose now another form of a lion, and\nanother of a man; the second smaller than the first, the third than the second;\njoin them together and cover them with a human skin, in which they are\ncompletely concealed. When this has been done, let us tell the supporter of\ninjustice that he is feeding up the beasts and starving the man. The maintainer\nof justice, on the other hand, is trying to strengthen the man; he is\nnourishing the gentle principle within him, and making an alliance with the\nlion heart, in order that he may be able to keep down the many-headed hydra,\nand bring all into unity with each other and with themselves. Thus in every\npoint of view, whether in relation to pleasure, honour, or advantage, the just\nman is right, and the unjust wrong.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut now, let us reason with the unjust, who is not intentionally in error. Is\nnot the noble that which subjects the beast to the man, or rather to the God in\nman; the ignoble, that which subjects the man to the beast? And if so, who\nwould receive gold on condition that he was to degrade the noblest part of\nhimself under the worst?\u0026mdash;who would sell his son or daughter into the\nhands of brutal and evil men, for any amount of money? And will he sell his own\nfairer and diviner part without any compunction to the most godless and foul?\nWould he not be worse than Eriphyle, who sold her husband\u0026rsquo;s life for a\nnecklace? And intemperance is the letting loose of the multiform monster, and\npride and sullenness are the growth and increase of the lion and serpent\nelement, while luxury and effeminacy are caused by a too great relaxation of\nspirit. Flattery and meanness again arise when the spirited element is\nsubjected to avarice, and the lion is habituated to become a monkey. The real\ndisgrace of handicraft arts is, that those who are engaged in them have to\nflatter, instead of mastering their desires; therefore we say that they should\nbe placed under the control of the better principle in another because they\nhave none in themselves; not, as Thrasymachus imagined, to the injury of the\nsubjects, but for their good. And our intention in educating the young, is to\ngive them self-control; the law desires to nurse up in them a higher principle,\nand when they have acquired this, they may go their ways.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n\u0026lsquo;What, then, shall a man profit, if he gain the whole world\u0026rsquo; and\nbecome more and more wicked? Or what shall he profit by escaping discovery, if\nthe concealment of evil prevents the cure? If he had been punished, the brute\nwithin him would have been silenced, and the gentler element liberated; and he\nwould have united temperance, justice, and wisdom in his soul\u0026mdash;a union\nbetter far than any combination of bodily gifts. The man of understanding will\nhonour knowledge above all; in the next place he will keep under his body, not\nonly for the sake of health and strength, but in order to attain the most\nperfect harmony of body and soul. In the acquisition of riches, too, he will\naim at order and harmony; he will not desire to heap up wealth without measure,\nbut he will fear that the increase of wealth will disturb the constitution of\nhis own soul. For the same reason he will only accept such honours as will make\nhim a better man; any others he will decline. \u0026lsquo;In that case,\u0026rsquo; said\nhe, \u0026lsquo;he will never be a politician.\u0026rsquo; Yes, but he will, in his own\ncity; though probably not in his native country, unless by some divine\naccident. \u0026lsquo;You mean that he will be a citizen of the ideal city, which\nhas no place upon earth.\u0026rsquo; But in heaven, I replied, there is a pattern of\nsuch a city, and he who wishes may order his life after that image. Whether\nsuch a state is or ever will be matters not; he will act according to that\npattern and no other…\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe most noticeable points in the 9th Book of the Republic are:\u0026mdash;(1) the\naccount of pleasure; (2) the number of the interval which divides the king from\nthe tyrant; (3) the pattern which is in heaven.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n1. Plato\u0026rsquo;s account of pleasure is remarkable for moderation, and in this\nrespect contrasts with the later Platonists and the views which are attributed\nto them by Aristotle. He is not, like the Cynics, opposed to all pleasure, but\nrather desires that the several parts of the soul shall have their natural\nsatisfaction; he even agrees with the Epicureans in describing pleasure as\nsomething more than the absence of pain. This is proved by the circumstance\nthat there are pleasures which have no antecedent pains (as he also remarks in\nthe Philebus), such as the pleasures of smell, and also the pleasures of hope\nand anticipation. In the previous book he had made the distinction between\nnecessary and unnecessary pleasure, which is repeated by Aristotle, and he now\nobserves that there are a further class of \u0026lsquo;wild beast\u0026rsquo; pleasures,\ncorresponding to Aristotle\u0026rsquo;s (Greek). He dwells upon the relative and\nunreal character of sensual pleasures and the illusion which arises out of the\ncontrast of pleasure and pain, pointing out the superiority of the pleasures of\nreason, which are at rest, over the fleeting pleasures of sense and emotion.\nThe pre-eminence of royal pleasure is shown by the fact that reason is able to\nform a judgment of the lower pleasures, while the two lower parts of the soul\nare incapable of judging the pleasures of reason. Thus, in his treatment of\npleasure, as in many other subjects, the philosophy of Plato is \u0026lsquo;sawn up\ninto quantities\u0026rsquo; by Aristotle; the analysis which was originally made by\nhim became in the next generation the foundation of further technical\ndistinctions. Both in Plato and Aristotle we note the illusion under which the\nancients fell of regarding the transience of pleasure as a proof of its\nunreality, and of confounding the permanence of the intellectual pleasures with\nthe unchangeableness of the knowledge from which they are derived. Neither do\nwe like to admit that the pleasures of knowledge, though more elevating, are\nnot more lasting than other pleasures, and are almost equally dependent on the\naccidents of our bodily state (Introduction to Philebus).\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n2. The number of the interval which separates the king from the tyrant, and\nroyal from tyrannical pleasures, is 729, the cube of 9. Which Plato\ncharacteristically designates as a number concerned with human life, because\nNEARLY equivalent to the number of days and nights in the year. He is desirous\nof proclaiming that the interval between them is immeasurable, and invents a\nformula to give expression to his idea. Those who spoke of justice as a cube,\nof virtue as an art of measuring (Prot.), saw no inappropriateness in\nconceiving the soul under the figure of a line, or the pleasure of the tyrant\nas separated from the pleasure of the king by the numerical interval of 729.\nAnd in modern times we sometimes use metaphorically what Plato employed as a\nphilosophical formula. \u0026lsquo;It is not easy to estimate the loss of the\ntyrant, except perhaps in this way,\u0026rsquo; says Plato. So we might say, that\nalthough the life of a good man is not to be compared to that of a bad man, yet\nyou may measure the difference between them by valuing one minute of the one at\nan hour of the other (\u0026lsquo;One day in thy courts is better than a\nthousand\u0026rsquo;), or you might say that \u0026lsquo;there is an infinite\ndifference.\u0026rsquo; But this is not so much as saying, in homely phrase,\n\u0026lsquo;They are a thousand miles asunder.\u0026rsquo; And accordingly Plato finds\nthe natural vehicle of his thoughts in a progression of numbers; this\narithmetical formula he draws out with the utmost seriousness, and both here\nand in the number of generation seems to find an additional proof of the truth\nof his speculation in forming the number into a geometrical figure; just as\npersons in our own day are apt to fancy that a statement is verified when it\nhas been only thrown into an abstract form. In speaking of the number 729 as\nproper to human life, he probably intended to intimate that one year of the\ntyrannical = 12 hours of the royal life.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe simple observation that the comparison of two similar solids is effected by\nthe comparison of the cubes of their sides, is the mathematical groundwork of\nthis fanciful expression. There is some difficulty in explaining the steps by\nwhich the number 729 is obtained; the oligarch is removed in the third degree\nfrom the royal and aristocratical, and the tyrant in the third degree from the\noligarchical; but we have to arrange the terms as the sides of a square and to\ncount the oligarch twice over, thus reckoning them not as = 5 but as = 9. The\nsquare of 9 is passed lightly over as only a step towards the cube.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n3. Towards the close of the Republic, Plato seems to be more and more convinced\nof the ideal character of his own speculations. At the end of the 9th Book the\npattern which is in heaven takes the place of the city of philosophers on\nearth. The vision which has received form and substance at his hands, is now\ndiscovered to be at a distance. And yet this distant kingdom is also the rule\nof man\u0026rsquo;s life. (\u0026lsquo;Say not lo! here, or lo! there, for the kingdom of\nGod is within you.\u0026rsquo;) Thus a note is struck which prepares for the\nrevelation of a future life in the following Book. But the future life is\npresent still; the ideal of politics is to be realized in the individual.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBOOK X. Many things pleased me in the order of our State, but there was nothing\nwhich I liked better than the regulation about poetry. The division of the soul\nthrows a new light on our exclusion of imitation. I do not mind telling you in\nconfidence that all poetry is an outrage on the understanding, unless the\nhearers have that balm of knowledge which heals error. I have loved Homer ever\nsince I was a boy, and even now he appears to me to be the great master of\ntragic poetry. But much as I love the man, I love truth more, and therefore I\nmust speak out: and first of all, will you explain what is imitation, for\nreally I do not understand? \u0026lsquo;How likely then that I should\nunderstand!\u0026rsquo; That might very well be, for the duller often sees better\nthan the keener eye. \u0026lsquo;True, but in your presence I can hardly venture to\nsay what I think.\u0026rsquo; Then suppose that we begin in our old fashion, with\nthe doctrine of universals. Let us assume the existence of beds and tables.\nThere is one idea of a bed, or of a table, which the maker of each had in his\nmind when making them; he did not make the ideas of beds and tables, but he\nmade beds and tables according to the ideas. And is there not a maker of the\nworks of all workmen, who makes not only vessels but plants and animals,\nhimself, the earth and heaven, and things in heaven and under the earth? He\nmakes the Gods also. \u0026lsquo;He must be a wizard indeed!\u0026rsquo; But do you not\nsee that there is a sense in which you could do the same? You have only to take\na mirror, and catch the reflection of the sun, and the earth, or anything\nelse\u0026mdash;there now you have made them. \u0026lsquo;Yes, but only in\nappearance.\u0026rsquo; Exactly so; and the painter is such a creator as you are\nwith the mirror, and he is even more unreal than the carpenter; although\nneither the carpenter nor any other artist can be supposed to make the absolute\nbed. \u0026lsquo;Not if philosophers may be believed.\u0026rsquo; Nor need we wonder that\nhis bed has but an imperfect relation to the truth. Reflect:\u0026mdash;Here are\nthree beds; one in nature, which is made by God; another, which is made by the\ncarpenter; and the third, by the painter. God only made one, nor could he have\nmade more than one; for if there had been two, there would always have been a\nthird\u0026mdash;more absolute and abstract than either, under which they would have\nbeen included. We may therefore conceive God to be the natural maker of the\nbed, and in a lower sense the carpenter is also the maker; but the painter is\nrather the imitator of what the other two make; he has to do with a creation\nwhich is thrice removed from reality. And the tragic poet is an imitator, and,\nlike every other imitator, is thrice removed from the king and from the truth.\nThe painter imitates not the original bed, but the bed made by the carpenter.\nAnd this, without being really different, appears to be different, and has many\npoints of view, of which only one is caught by the painter, who represents\neverything because he represents a piece of everything, and that piece an\nimage. And he can paint any other artist, although he knows nothing of their\narts; and this with sufficient skill to deceive children or simple people.\nSuppose now that somebody came to us and told us, how he had met a man who knew\nall that everybody knows, and better than anybody:\u0026mdash;should we not infer\nhim to be a simpleton who, having no discernment of truth and falsehood, had\nmet with a wizard or enchanter, whom he fancied to be all-wise? And when we\nhear persons saying that Homer and the tragedians know all the arts and all the\nvirtues, must we not infer that they are under a similar delusion? they do not\nsee that the poets are imitators, and that their creations are only imitations.\n\u0026lsquo;Very true.\u0026rsquo; But if a person could create as well as imitate, he\nwould rather leave some permanent work and not an imitation only; he would\nrather be the receiver than the giver of praise? \u0026lsquo;Yes, for then he would\nhave more honour and advantage.\u0026rsquo;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nLet us now interrogate Homer and the poets. Friend Homer, say I to him, I am\nnot going to ask you about medicine, or any art to which your poems\nincidentally refer, but about their main subjects\u0026mdash;war, military tactics,\npolitics. If you are only twice and not thrice removed from the truth\u0026mdash;not\nan imitator or an image-maker, please to inform us what good you have ever done\nto mankind? Is there any city which professes to have received laws from you,\nas Sicily and Italy have from Charondas, Sparta from Lycurgus, Athens from\nSolon? Or was any war ever carried on by your counsels? or is any invention\nattributed to you, as there is to Thales and Anacharsis? Or is there any\nHomeric way of life, such as the Pythagorean was, in which you instructed men,\nand which is called after you? \u0026lsquo;No, indeed; and Creophylus (Flesh-child)\nwas even more unfortunate in his breeding than he was in his name, if, as\ntradition says, Homer in his lifetime was allowed by him and his other friends\nto starve.\u0026rsquo; Yes, but could this ever have happened if Homer had really\nbeen the educator of Hellas? Would he not have had many devoted followers? If\nProtagoras and Prodicus can persuade their contemporaries that no one can\nmanage house or State without them, is it likely that Homer and Hesiod would\nhave been allowed to go about as beggars\u0026mdash;I mean if they had really been\nable to do the world any good?\u0026mdash;would not men have compelled them to stay\nwhere they were, or have followed them about in order to get education? But\nthey did not; and therefore we may infer that Homer and all the poets are only\nimitators, who do but imitate the appearances of things. For as a painter by a\nknowledge of figure and colour can paint a cobbler without any practice in\ncobbling, so the poet can delineate any art in the colours of language, and\ngive harmony and rhythm to the cobbler and also to the general; and you know\nhow mere narration, when deprived of the ornaments of metre, is like a face\nwhich has lost the beauty of youth and never had any other. Once more, the\nimitator has no knowledge of reality, but only of appearance. The painter\npaints, and the artificer makes a bridle and reins, but neither understands the\nuse of them\u0026mdash;the knowledge of this is confined to the horseman; and so of\nother things. Thus we have three arts: one of use, another of invention, a\nthird of imitation; and the user furnishes the rule to the two others. The\nflute-player will know the good and bad flute, and the maker will put faith in\nhim; but the imitator will neither know nor have faith\u0026mdash;neither science\nnor true opinion can be ascribed to him. Imitation, then, is devoid of\nknowledge, being only a kind of play or sport, and the tragic and epic poets\nare imitators in the highest degree.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd now let us enquire, what is the faculty in man which answers to imitation.\nAllow me to explain my meaning: Objects are differently seen when in the water\nand when out of the water, when near and when at a distance; and the painter or\njuggler makes use of this variation to impose upon us. And the art of measuring\nand weighing and calculating comes in to save our bewildered minds from the\npower of appearance; for, as we were saying, two contrary opinions of the same\nabout the same and at the same time, cannot both of them be true. But which of\nthem is true is determined by the art of calculation; and this is allied to the\nbetter faculty in the soul, as the arts of imitation are to the worse. And the\nsame holds of the ear as well as of the eye, of poetry as well as painting. The\nimitation is of actions voluntary or involuntary, in which there is an\nexpectation of a good or bad result, and present experience of pleasure and\npain. But is a man in harmony with himself when he is the subject of these\nconflicting influences? Is there not rather a contradiction in him? Let me\nfurther ask, whether he is more likely to control sorrow when he is alone or\nwhen he is in company. \u0026lsquo;In the latter case.\u0026rsquo; Feeling would lead him\nto indulge his sorrow, but reason and law control him and enjoin patience;\nsince he cannot know whether his affliction is good or evil, and no human thing\nis of any great consequence, while sorrow is certainly a hindrance to good\ncounsel. For when we stumble, we should not, like children, make an uproar; we\nshould take the measures which reason prescribes, not raising a lament, but\nfinding a cure. And the better part of us is ready to follow reason, while the\nirrational principle is full of sorrow and distraction at the recollection of\nour troubles. Unfortunately, however, this latter furnishes the chief materials\nof the imitative arts. Whereas reason is ever in repose and cannot easily be\ndisplayed, especially to a mixed multitude who have no experience of her. Thus\nthe poet is like the painter in two ways: first he paints an inferior degree of\ntruth, and secondly, he is concerned with an inferior part of the soul. He\nindulges the feelings, while he enfeebles the reason; and we refuse to allow\nhim to have authority over the mind of man; for he has no measure of greater\nand less, and is a maker of images and very far gone from truth.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut we have not yet mentioned the heaviest count in the indictment\u0026mdash;the\npower which poetry has of injuriously exciting the feelings. When we hear some\npassage in which a hero laments his sufferings at tedious length, you know that\nwe sympathize with him and praise the poet; and yet in our own sorrows such an\nexhibition of feeling is regarded as effeminate and unmanly (Ion). Now, ought a\nman to feel pleasure in seeing another do what he hates and abominates in\nhimself? Is he not giving way to a sentiment which in his own case he would\ncontrol?\u0026mdash;he is off his guard because the sorrow is another\u0026rsquo;s; and\nhe thinks that he may indulge his feelings without disgrace, and will be the\ngainer by the pleasure. But the inevitable consequence is that he who begins by\nweeping at the sorrows of others, will end by weeping at his own. The same is\ntrue of comedy,\u0026mdash;you may often laugh at buffoonery which you would be\nashamed to utter, and the love of coarse merriment on the stage will at last\nturn you into a buffoon at home. Poetry feeds and waters the passions and\ndesires; she lets them rule instead of ruling them. And therefore, when we hear\nthe encomiasts of Homer affirming that he is the educator of Hellas, and that\nall life should be regulated by his precepts, we may allow the excellence of\ntheir intentions, and agree with them in thinking Homer a great poet and\ntragedian. But we shall continue to prohibit all poetry which goes beyond hymns\nto the Gods and praises of famous men. Not pleasure and pain, but law and\nreason shall rule in our State.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThese are our grounds for expelling poetry; but lest she should charge us with\ndiscourtesy, let us also make an apology to her. We will remind her that there\nis an ancient quarrel between poetry and philosophy, of which there are many\ntraces in the writings of the poets, such as the saying of \u0026lsquo;the she-dog,\nyelping at her mistress,\u0026rsquo; and \u0026lsquo;the philosophers who are ready to\ncircumvent Zeus,\u0026rsquo; and \u0026lsquo;the philosophers who are paupers.\u0026rsquo;\nNevertheless we bear her no ill-will, and will gladly allow her to return upon\ncondition that she makes a defence of herself in verse; and her supporters who\nare not poets may speak in prose. We confess her charms; but if she cannot show\nthat she is useful as well as delightful, like rational lovers, we must\nrenounce our love, though endeared to us by early associations. Having come to\nyears of discretion, we know that poetry is not truth, and that a man should be\ncareful how he introduces her to that state or constitution which he himself\nis; for there is a mighty issue at stake\u0026mdash;no less than the good or evil of\na human soul. And it is not worth while to forsake justice and virtue for the\nattractions of poetry, any more than for the sake of honour or wealth. \u0026lsquo;I\nagree with you.\u0026rsquo;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd yet the rewards of virtue are greater far than I have described. \u0026lsquo;And\ncan we conceive things greater still?\u0026rsquo; Not, perhaps, in this brief span\nof life: but should an immortal being care about anything short of eternity?\n\u0026lsquo;I do not understand what you mean?\u0026rsquo; Do you not know that the soul\nis immortal? \u0026lsquo;Surely you are not prepared to prove that?\u0026rsquo; Indeed I\nam. \u0026lsquo;Then let me hear this argument, of which you make so light.\u0026rsquo;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYou would admit that everything has an element of good and of evil. In all\nthings there is an inherent corruption; and if this cannot destroy them,\nnothing else will. The soul too has her own corrupting principles, which are\ninjustice, intemperance, cowardice, and the like. But none of these destroy the\nsoul in the same sense that disease destroys the body. The soul may be full of\nall iniquities, but is not, by reason of them, brought any nearer to death.\nNothing which was not destroyed from within ever perished by external affection\nof evil. The body, which is one thing, cannot be destroyed by food, which is\nanother, unless the badness of the food is communicated to the body. Neither\ncan the soul, which is one thing, be corrupted by the body, which is another,\nunless she herself is infected. And as no bodily evil can infect the soul,\nneither can any bodily evil, whether disease or violence, or any other destroy\nthe soul, unless it can be shown to render her unholy and unjust. But no one\nwill ever prove that the souls of men become more unjust when they die. If a\nperson has the audacity to say the contrary, the answer is\u0026mdash;Then why do\ncriminals require the hand of the executioner, and not die of themselves?\n\u0026lsquo;Truly,\u0026rsquo; he said, \u0026lsquo;injustice would not be very terrible if it\nbrought a cessation of evil; but I rather believe that the injustice which\nmurders others may tend to quicken and stimulate the life of the unjust.\u0026rsquo;\nYou are quite right. If sin which is her own natural and inherent evil cannot\ndestroy the soul, hardly will anything else destroy her. But the soul which\ncannot be destroyed either by internal or external evil must be immortal and\neverlasting. And if this be true, souls will always exist in the same number.\nThey cannot diminish, because they cannot be destroyed; nor yet increase, for\nthe increase of the immortal must come from something mortal, and so all would\nend in immortality. Neither is the soul variable and diverse; for that which is\nimmortal must be of the fairest and simplest composition. If we would conceive\nher truly, and so behold justice and injustice in their own nature, she must be\nviewed by the light of reason pure as at birth, or as she is reflected in\nphilosophy when holding converse with the divine and immortal and eternal. In\nher present condition we see her only like the sea-god Glaucus, bruised and\nmaimed in the sea which is the world, and covered with shells and stones which\nare incrusted upon her from the entertainments of earth.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThus far, as the argument required, we have said nothing of the rewards and\nhonours which the poets attribute to justice; we have contented ourselves with\nshowing that justice in herself is best for the soul in herself, even if a man\nshould put on a Gyges\u0026rsquo; ring and have the helmet of Hades too. And now you\nshall repay me what you borrowed; and I will enumerate the rewards of justice\nin life and after death. I granted, for the sake of argument, as you will\nremember, that evil might perhaps escape the knowledge of Gods and men,\nalthough this was really impossible. And since I have shown that justice has\nreality, you must grant me also that she has the palm of appearance. In the\nfirst place, the just man is known to the Gods, and he is therefore the friend\nof the Gods, and he will receive at their hands every good, always excepting\nsuch evil as is the necessary consequence of former sins. All things end in\ngood to him, either in life or after death, even what appears to be evil; for\nthe Gods have a care of him who desires to be in their likeness. And what shall\nwe say of men? Is not honesty the best policy? The clever rogue makes a great\nstart at first, but breaks down before he reaches the goal, and slinks away in\ndishonour; whereas the true runner perseveres to the end, and receives the\nprize. And you must allow me to repeat all the blessings which you attributed\nto the fortunate unjust\u0026mdash;they bear rule in the city, they marry and give\nin marriage to whom they will; and the evils which you attributed to the\nunfortunate just, do really fall in the end on the unjust, although, as you\nimplied, their sufferings are better veiled in silence.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut all the blessings of this present life are as nothing when compared with\nthose which await good men after death. \u0026lsquo;I should like to hear about\nthem.\u0026rsquo; Come, then, and I will tell you the story of Er, the son of\nArmenius, a valiant man. He was supposed to have died in battle, but ten days\nafterwards his body was found untouched by corruption and sent home for burial.\nOn the twelfth day he was placed on the funeral pyre and there he came to life\nagain, and told what he had seen in the world below. He said that his soul went\nwith a great company to a place, in which there were two chasms near together\nin the earth beneath, and two corresponding chasms in the heaven above. And\nthere were judges sitting in the intermediate space, bidding the just ascend by\nthe heavenly way on the right hand, having the seal of their judgment set upon\nthem before, while the unjust, having the seal behind, were bidden to descend\nby the way on the left hand. Him they told to look and listen, as he was to be\ntheir messenger to men from the world below. And he beheld and saw the souls\ndeparting after judgment at either chasm; some who came from earth, were worn\nand travel-stained; others, who came from heaven, were clean and bright. They\nseemed glad to meet and rest awhile in the meadow; here they discoursed with\none another of what they had seen in the other world. Those who came from earth\nwept at the remembrance of their sorrows, but the spirits from above spoke of\nglorious sights and heavenly bliss. He said that for every evil deed they were\npunished tenfold\u0026mdash;now the journey was of a thousand years\u0026rsquo; duration,\nbecause the life of man was reckoned as a hundred years\u0026mdash;and the rewards\nof virtue were in the same proportion. He added something hardly worth\nrepeating about infants dying almost as soon as they were born. Of parricides\nand other murderers he had tortures still more terrible to narrate. He was\npresent when one of the spirits asked\u0026mdash;Where is Ardiaeus the Great? (This\nArdiaeus was a cruel tyrant, who had murdered his father, and his elder\nbrother, a thousand years before.) Another spirit answered, \u0026lsquo;He comes not\nhither, and will never come. And I myself,\u0026rsquo; he added, \u0026lsquo;actually saw\nthis terrible sight. At the entrance of the chasm, as we were about to\nreascend, Ardiaeus appeared, and some other sinners\u0026mdash;most of whom had been\ntyrants, but not all\u0026mdash;and just as they fancied that they were returning to\nlife, the chasm gave a roar, and then wild, fiery-looking men who knew the\nmeaning of the sound, seized him and several others, and bound them hand and\nfoot and threw them down, and dragged them along at the side of the road,\nlacerating them and carding them like wool, and explaining to the passers-by,\nthat they were going to be cast into hell.\u0026rsquo; The greatest terror of the\npilgrims ascending was lest they should hear the voice, and when there was\nsilence one by one they passed up with joy. To these sufferings there were\ncorresponding delights.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nOn the eighth day the souls of the pilgrims resumed their journey, and in four\ndays came to a spot whence they looked down upon a line of light, in colour\nlike a rainbow, only brighter and clearer. One day more brought them to the\nplace, and they saw that this was the column of light which binds together the\nwhole universe. The ends of the column were fastened to heaven, and from them\nhung the distaff of Necessity, on which all the heavenly bodies\nturned\u0026mdash;the hook and spindle were of adamant, and the whorl of a mixed\nsubstance. The whorl was in form like a number of boxes fitting into one\nanother with their edges turned upwards, making together a single whorl which\nwas pierced by the spindle. The outermost had the rim broadest, and the inner\nwhorls were smaller and smaller, and had their rims narrower. The largest (the\nfixed stars) was spangled\u0026mdash;the seventh (the sun) was brightest\u0026mdash;the\neighth (the moon) shone by the light of the seventh\u0026mdash;the second and fifth\n(Saturn and Mercury) were most like one another and yellower than the\neighth\u0026mdash;the third (Jupiter) had the whitest light\u0026mdash;the fourth (Mars)\nwas red\u0026mdash;the sixth (Venus) was in whiteness second. The whole had one\nmotion, but while this was revolving in one direction the seven inner circles\nwere moving in the opposite, with various degrees of swiftness and slowness.\nThe spindle turned on the knees of Necessity, and a Siren stood hymning upon\neach circle, while Lachesis, Clotho, and Atropos, the daughters of Necessity,\nsat on thrones at equal intervals, singing of past, present, and future,\nresponsive to the music of the Sirens; Clotho from time to time guiding the\nouter circle with a touch of her right hand; Atropos with her left hand\ntouching and guiding the inner circles; Lachesis in turn putting forth her hand\nfrom time to time to guide both of them. On their arrival the pilgrims went to\nLachesis, and there was an interpreter who arranged them, and taking from her\nknees lots, and samples of lives, got up into a pulpit and said: \u0026lsquo;Mortal\nsouls, hear the words of Lachesis, the daughter of Necessity. A new period of\nmortal life has begun, and you may choose what divinity you please; the\nresponsibility of choosing is with you\u0026mdash;God is blameless.\u0026rsquo; After\nspeaking thus, he cast the lots among them and each one took up the lot which\nfell near him. He then placed on the ground before them the samples of lives,\nmany more than the souls present; and there were all sorts of lives, of men and\nof animals. There were tyrannies ending in misery and exile, and lives of men\nand women famous for their different qualities; and also mixed lives, made up\nof wealth and poverty, sickness and health. Here, Glaucon, is the great risk of\nhuman life, and therefore the whole of education should be directed to the\nacquisition of such a knowledge as will teach a man to refuse the evil and\nchoose the good. He should know all the combinations which occur in\nlife\u0026mdash;of beauty with poverty or with wealth,\u0026mdash;of knowledge with\nexternal goods,\u0026mdash;and at last choose with reference to the nature of the\nsoul, regarding that only as the better life which makes men better, and\nleaving the rest. And a man must take with him an iron sense of truth and right\ninto the world below, that there too he may remain undazzled by wealth or the\nallurements of evil, and be determined to avoid the extremes and choose the\nmean. For this, as the messenger reported the interpreter to have said, is the\ntrue happiness of man; and any one, as he proclaimed, may, if he choose with\nunderstanding, have a good lot, even though he come last. \u0026lsquo;Let not the\nfirst be careless in his choice, nor the last despair.\u0026rsquo; He spoke; and\nwhen he had spoken, he who had drawn the first lot chose a tyranny: he did not\nsee that he was fated to devour his own children\u0026mdash;and when he discovered\nhis mistake, he wept and beat his breast, blaming chance and the Gods and\nanybody rather than himself. He was one of those who had come from heaven, and\nin his previous life had been a citizen of a well-ordered State, but he had\nonly habit and no philosophy. Like many another, he made a bad choice, because\nhe had no experience of life; whereas those who came from earth and had seen\ntrouble were not in such a hurry to choose. But if a man had followed\nphilosophy while upon earth, and had been moderately fortunate in his lot, he\nmight not only be happy here, but his pilgrimage both from and to this world\nwould be smooth and heavenly. Nothing was more curious than the spectacle of\nthe choice, at once sad and laughable and wonderful; most of the souls only\nseeking to avoid their own condition in a previous life. He saw the soul of\nOrpheus changing into a swan because he would not be born of a woman; there was\nThamyras becoming a nightingale; musical birds, like the swan, choosing to be\nmen; the twentieth soul, which was that of Ajax, preferring the life of a lion\nto that of a man, in remembrance of the injustice which was done to him in the\njudgment of the arms; and Agamemnon, from a like enmity to human nature,\npassing into an eagle. About the middle was the soul of Atalanta choosing the\nhonours of an athlete, and next to her Epeus taking the nature of a workwoman;\namong the last was Thersites, who was changing himself into a monkey. Thither,\nthe last of all, came Odysseus, and sought the lot of a private man, which lay\nneglected and despised, and when he found it he went away rejoicing, and said\nthat if he had been first instead of last, his choice would have been the same.\nMen, too, were seen passing into animals, and wild and tame animals changing\ninto one another.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhen all the souls had chosen they went to Lachesis, who sent with each of them\ntheir genius or attendant to fulfil their lot. He first of all brought them\nunder the hand of Clotho, and drew them within the revolution of the spindle\nimpelled by her hand; from her they were carried to Atropos, who made the\nthreads irreversible; whence, without turning round, they passed beneath the\nthrone of Necessity; and when they had all passed, they moved on in scorching\nheat to the plain of Forgetfulness and rested at evening by the river\nUnmindful, whose water could not be retained in any vessel; of this they had\nall to drink a certain quantity\u0026mdash;some of them drank more than was\nrequired, and he who drank forgot all things. Er himself was prevented from\ndrinking. When they had gone to rest, about the middle of the night there were\nthunderstorms and earthquakes, and suddenly they were all driven divers ways,\nshooting like stars to their birth. Concerning his return to the body, he only\nknew that awaking suddenly in the morning he found himself lying on the pyre.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThus, Glaucon, the tale has been saved, and will be our salvation, if we\nbelieve that the soul is immortal, and hold fast to the heavenly way of Justice\nand Knowledge. So shall we pass undefiled over the river of Forgetfulness, and\nbe dear to ourselves and to the Gods, and have a crown of reward and happiness\nboth in this world and also in the millennial pilgrimage of the other.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe Tenth Book of the Republic of Plato falls into two divisions: first,\nresuming an old thread which has been interrupted, Socrates assails the poets,\nwho, now that the nature of the soul has been analyzed, are seen to be very far\ngone from the truth; and secondly, having shown the reality of the happiness of\nthe just, he demands that appearance shall be restored to him, and then\nproceeds to prove the immortality of the soul. The argument, as in the Phaedo\nand Gorgias, is supplemented by the vision of a future life.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhy Plato, who was himself a poet, and whose dialogues are poems and dramas,\nshould have been hostile to the poets as a class, and especially to the\ndramatic poets; why he should not have seen that truth may be embodied in verse\nas well as in prose, and that there are some indefinable lights and shadows of\nhuman life which can only be expressed in poetry\u0026mdash;some elements of\nimagination which always entwine with reason; why he should have supposed epic\nverse to be inseparably associated with the impurities of the old Hellenic\nmythology; why he should try Homer and Hesiod by the unfair and prosaic test of\nutility,\u0026mdash;are questions which have always been debated amongst students of\nPlato. Though unable to give a complete answer to them, we may\nshow\u0026mdash;first, that his views arose naturally out of the circumstances of\nhis age; and secondly, we may elicit the truth as well as the error which is\ncontained in them.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHe is the enemy of the poets because poetry was declining in his own lifetime,\nand a theatrocracy, as he says in the Laws, had taken the place of an\nintellectual aristocracy. Euripides exhibited the last phase of the tragic\ndrama, and in him Plato saw the friend and apologist of tyrants, and the\nSophist of tragedy. The old comedy was almost extinct; the new had not yet\narisen. Dramatic and lyric poetry, like every other branch of Greek literature,\nwas falling under the power of rhetoric. There was no \u0026lsquo;second or\nthird\u0026rsquo; to Aeschylus and Sophocles in the generation which followed them.\nAristophanes, in one of his later comedies (Frogs), speaks of \u0026lsquo;thousands\nof tragedy-making prattlers,\u0026rsquo; whose attempts at poetry he compares to the\nchirping of swallows; \u0026lsquo;their garrulity went far beyond\nEuripides,\u0026rsquo;\u0026mdash;\u0026lsquo;they appeared once upon the stage, and there was\nan end of them.\u0026rsquo; To a man of genius who had a real appreciation of the\ngodlike Aeschylus and the noble and gentle Sophocles, though disagreeing with\nsome parts of their \u0026lsquo;theology\u0026rsquo; (Rep.), these \u0026lsquo;minor\npoets\u0026rsquo; must have been contemptible and intolerable. There is no feeling\nstronger in the dialogues of Plato than a sense of the decline and decay both\nin literature and in politics which marked his own age. Nor can he have been\nexpected to look with favour on the licence of Aristophanes, now at the end of\nhis career, who had begun by satirizing Socrates in the Clouds, and in a\nsimilar spirit forty years afterwards had satirized the founders of ideal\ncommonwealths in his Eccleziazusae, or Female Parliament (Laws).\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThere were other reasons for the antagonism of Plato to poetry. The profession\nof an actor was regarded by him as a degradation of human nature, for\n\u0026lsquo;one man in his life\u0026rsquo; cannot \u0026lsquo;play many parts;\u0026rsquo; the\ncharacters which the actor performs seem to destroy his own character, and to\nleave nothing which can be truly called himself. Neither can any man live his\nlife and act it. The actor is the slave of his art, not the master of it.\nTaking this view Plato is more decided in his expulsion of the dramatic than of\nthe epic poets, though he must have known that the Greek tragedians afforded\nnoble lessons and examples of virtue and patriotism, to which nothing in Homer\ncan be compared. But great dramatic or even great rhetorical power is hardly\nconsistent with firmness or strength of mind, and dramatic talent is often\nincidentally associated with a weak or dissolute character.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIn the Tenth Book Plato introduces a new series of objections. First, he says\nthat the poet or painter is an imitator, and in the third degree removed from\nthe truth. His creations are not tested by rule and measure; they are only\nappearances. In modern times we should say that art is not merely imitation,\nbut rather the expression of the ideal in forms of sense. Even adopting the\nhumble image of Plato, from which his argument derives a colour, we should\nmaintain that the artist may ennoble the bed which he paints by the folds of\nthe drapery, or by the feeling of home which he introduces; and there have been\nmodern painters who have imparted such an ideal interest to a\nblacksmith\u0026rsquo;s or a carpenter\u0026rsquo;s shop. The eye or mind which feels as\nwell as sees can give dignity and pathos to a ruined mill, or a straw-built\nshed (Rembrandt), to the hull of a vessel \u0026lsquo;going to its last home\u0026rsquo;\n(Turner). Still more would this apply to the greatest works of art, which seem\nto be the visible embodiment of the divine. Had Plato been asked whether the\nZeus or Athene of Pheidias was the imitation of an imitation only, would he not\nhave been compelled to admit that something more was to be found in them than\nin the form of any mortal; and that the rule of proportion to which they\nconformed was \u0026lsquo;higher far than any geometry or arithmetic could\nexpress?\u0026rsquo; (Statesman.)\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAgain, Plato objects to the imitative arts that they express the emotional\nrather than the rational part of human nature. He does not admit\nAristotle\u0026rsquo;s theory, that tragedy or other serious imitations are a\npurgation of the passions by pity and fear; to him they appear only to afford\nthe opportunity of indulging them. Yet we must acknowledge that we may\nsometimes cure disordered emotions by giving expression to them; and that they\noften gain strength when pent up within our own breast. It is not every\nindulgence of the feelings which is to be condemned. For there may be a\ngratification of the higher as well as of the lower\u0026mdash;thoughts which are\ntoo deep or too sad to be expressed by ourselves, may find an utterance in the\nwords of poets. Every one would acknowledge that there have been times when\nthey were consoled and elevated by beautiful music or by the sublimity of\narchitecture or by the peacefulness of nature. Plato has himself admitted, in\nthe earlier part of the Republic, that the arts might have the effect of\nharmonizing as well as of enervating the mind; but in the Tenth Book he regards\nthem through a Stoic or Puritan medium. He asks only \u0026lsquo;What good have they\ndone?\u0026rsquo; and is not satisfied with the reply, that \u0026lsquo;They have given\ninnocent pleasure to mankind.\u0026rsquo;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHe tells us that he rejoices in the banishment of the poets, since he has found\nby the analysis of the soul that they are concerned with the inferior\nfaculties. He means to say that the higher faculties have to do with\nuniversals, the lower with particulars of sense. The poets are on a level with\ntheir own age, but not on a level with Socrates and Plato; and he was well\naware that Homer and Hesiod could not be made a rule of life by any process of\nlegitimate interpretation; his ironical use of them is in fact a denial of\ntheir authority; he saw, too, that the poets were not critics\u0026mdash;as he says\nin the Apology, \u0026lsquo;Any one was a better interpreter of their writings than\nthey were themselves. He himself ceased to be a poet when he became a disciple\nof Socrates; though, as he tells us of Solon, \u0026lsquo;he might have been one of\nthe greatest of them, if he had not been deterred by other pursuits\u0026rsquo;\n(Tim.) Thus from many points of view there is an antagonism between Plato and\nthe poets, which was foreshadowed to him in the old quarrel between philosophy\nand poetry. The poets, as he says in the Protagoras, were the Sophists of their\nday; and his dislike of the one class is reflected on the other. He regards\nthem both as the enemies of reasoning and abstraction, though in the case of\nEuripides more with reference to his immoral sentiments about tyrants and the\nlike. For Plato is the prophet who \u0026lsquo;came into the world to convince\nmen\u0026rsquo;\u0026mdash;first of the fallibility of sense and opinion, and secondly of\nthe reality of abstract ideas. Whatever strangeness there may be in modern\ntimes in opposing philosophy to poetry, which to us seem to have so many\nelements in common, the strangeness will disappear if we conceive of poetry as\nallied to sense, and of philosophy as equivalent to thought and abstraction.\nUnfortunately the very word \u0026lsquo;idea,\u0026rsquo; which to Plato is expressive of\nthe most real of all things, is associated in our minds with an element of\nsubjectiveness and unreality. We may note also how he differs from Aristotle\nwho declares poetry to be truer than history, for the opposite reason, because\nit is concerned with universals, not like history, with particulars (Poet).\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe things which are seen are opposed in Scripture to the things which are\nunseen\u0026mdash;they are equally opposed in Plato to universals and ideas. To him\nall particulars appear to be floating about in a world of sense; they have a\ntaint of error or even of evil. There is no difficulty in seeing that this is\nan illusion; for there is no more error or variation in an individual man,\nhorse, bed, etc., than in the class man, horse, bed, etc.; nor is the truth\nwhich is displayed in individual instances less certain than that which is\nconveyed through the medium of ideas. But Plato, who is deeply impressed with\nthe real importance of universals as instruments of thought, attributes to them\nan essential truth which is imaginary and unreal; for universals may be often\nfalse and particulars true. Had he attained to any clear conception of the\nindividual, which is the synthesis of the universal and the particular; or had\nhe been able to distinguish between opinion and sensation, which the ambiguity\nof the words (Greek) and the like, tended to confuse, he would not have denied\ntruth to the particulars of sense.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut the poets are also the representatives of falsehood and feigning in all\ndepartments of life and knowledge, like the sophists and rhetoricians of the\nGorgias and Phaedrus; they are the false priests, false prophets, lying\nspirits, enchanters of the world. There is another count put into the\nindictment against them by Plato, that they are the friends of the tyrant, and\nbask in the sunshine of his patronage. Despotism in all ages has had an\napparatus of false ideas and false teachers at its service\u0026mdash;in the history\nof Modern Europe as well as of Greece and Rome. For no government of men\ndepends solely upon force; without some corruption of literature and\nmorals\u0026mdash;some appeal to the imagination of the masses\u0026mdash;some pretence\nto the favour of heaven\u0026mdash;some element of good giving power to evil,\ntyranny, even for a short time, cannot be maintained. The Greek tyrants were\nnot insensible to the importance of awakening in their cause a Pseudo-Hellenic\nfeeling; they were proud of successes at the Olympic games; they were not\ndevoid of the love of literature and art. Plato is thinking in the first\ninstance of Greek poets who had graced the courts of Dionysius or Archelaus:\nand the old spirit of freedom is roused within him at their prostitution of the\nTragic Muse in the praises of tyranny. But his prophetic eye extends beyond\nthem to the false teachers of other ages who are the creatures of the\ngovernment under which they live. He compares the corruption of his\ncontemporaries with the idea of a perfect society, and gathers up into one mass\nof evil the evils and errors of mankind; to him they are personified in the\nrhetoricians, sophists, poets, rulers who deceive and govern the world.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nA further objection which Plato makes to poetry and the imitative arts is that\nthey excite the emotions. Here the modern reader will be disposed to introduce\na distinction which appears to have escaped him. For the emotions are neither\nbad nor good in themselves, and are not most likely to be controlled by the\nattempt to eradicate them, but by the moderate indulgence of them. And the\nvocation of art is to present thought in the form of feeling, to enlist the\nfeelings on the side of reason, to inspire even for a moment courage or\nresignation; perhaps to suggest a sense of infinity and eternity in a way which\nmere language is incapable of attaining. True, the same power which in the\npurer age of art embodies gods and heroes only, may be made to express the\nvoluptuous image of a Corinthian courtezan. But this only shows that art, like\nother outward things, may be turned to good and also to evil, and is not more\nclosely connected with the higher than with the lower part of the soul. All\nimitative art is subject to certain limitations, and therefore necessarily\npartakes of the nature of a compromise. Something of ideal truth is sacrificed\nfor the sake of the representation, and something in the exactness of the\nrepresentation is sacrificed to the ideal. Still, works of art have a permanent\nelement; they idealize and detain the passing thought, and are the\nintermediates between sense and ideas.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIn the present stage of the human mind, poetry and other forms of fiction may\ncertainly be regarded as a good. But we can also imagine the existence of an\nage in which a severer conception of truth has either banished or transformed\nthem. At any rate we must admit that they hold a different place at different\nperiods of the world\u0026rsquo;s history. In the infancy of mankind, poetry, with\nthe exception of proverbs, is the whole of literature, and the only instrument\nof intellectual culture; in modern times she is the shadow or echo of her\nformer self, and appears to have a precarious existence. Milton in his day\ndoubted whether an epic poem was any longer possible. At the same time we must\nremember, that what Plato would have called the charms of poetry have been\npartly transferred to prose; he himself (Statesman) admits rhetoric to be the\nhandmaiden of Politics, and proposes to find in the strain of law (Laws) a\nsubstitute for the old poets. Among ourselves the creative power seems often to\nbe growing weaker, and scientific fact to be more engrossing and overpowering\nto the mind than formerly. The illusion of the feelings commonly called love,\nhas hitherto been the inspiring influence of modern poetry and romance, and has\nexercised a humanizing if not a strengthening influence on the world. But may\nnot the stimulus which love has given to fancy be some day exhausted? The\nmodern English novel which is the most popular of all forms of reading is not\nmore than a century or two old: will the tale of love a hundred years hence,\nafter so many thousand variations of the same theme, be still received with\nunabated interest?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nArt cannot claim to be on a level with philosophy or religion, and may often\ncorrupt them. It is possible to conceive a mental state in which all artistic\nrepresentations are regarded as a false and imperfect expression, either of the\nreligious ideal or of the philosophical ideal. The fairest forms may be\nrevolting in certain moods of mind, as is proved by the fact that the\nMahometans, and many sects of Christians, have renounced the use of pictures\nand images. The beginning of a great religion, whether Christian or Gentile,\nhas not been \u0026lsquo;wood or stone,\u0026rsquo; but a spirit moving in the hearts of\nmen. The disciples have met in a large upper room or in \u0026lsquo;holes and caves\nof the earth\u0026rsquo;; in the second or third generation, they have had mosques,\ntemples, churches, monasteries. And the revival or reform of religions, like\nthe first revelation of them, has come from within and has generally\ndisregarded external ceremonies and accompaniments.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut poetry and art may also be the expression of the highest truth and the\npurest sentiment. Plato himself seems to waver between two opposite\nviews\u0026mdash;when, as in the third Book, he insists that youth should be brought\nup amid wholesome imagery; and again in Book X, when he banishes the poets from\nhis Republic. Admitting that the arts, which some of us almost deify, have\nfallen short of their higher aim, we must admit on the other hand that to\nbanish imagination wholly would be suicidal as well as impossible. For nature\ntoo is a form of art; and a breath of the fresh air or a single glance at the\nvarying landscape would in an instant revive and reillumine the extinguished\nspark of poetry in the human breast. In the lower stages of civilization\nimagination more than reason distinguishes man from the animals; and to banish\nart would be to banish thought, to banish language, to banish the expression of\nall truth. No religion is wholly devoid of external forms; even the Mahometan\nwho renounces the use of pictures and images has a temple in which he worships\nthe Most High, as solemn and beautiful as any Greek or Christian building.\nFeeling too and thought are not really opposed; for he who thinks must feel\nbefore he can execute. And the highest thoughts, when they become familiarized\nto us, are always tending to pass into the form of feeling.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nPlato does not seriously intend to expel poets from life and society. But he\nfeels strongly the unreality of their writings; he is protesting against the\ndegeneracy of poetry in his own day as we might protest against the want of\nserious purpose in modern fiction, against the unseemliness or extravagance of\nsome of our poets or novelists, against the time-serving of preachers or public\nwriters, against the regardlessness of truth which to the eye of the\nphilosopher seems to characterize the greater part of the world. For we too\nhave reason to complain that our poets and novelists \u0026lsquo;paint inferior\ntruth\u0026rsquo; and \u0026lsquo;are concerned with the inferior part of the\nsoul\u0026rsquo;; that the readers of them become what they read and are injuriously\naffected by them. And we look in vain for that healthy atmosphere of which\nPlato speaks,\u0026mdash;\u0026lsquo;the beauty which meets the sense like a breeze and\nimperceptibly draws the soul, even in childhood, into harmony with the beauty\nof reason.\u0026rsquo;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nFor there might be a poetry which would be the hymn of divine perfection, the\nharmony of goodness and truth among men: a strain which should renew the youth\nof the world, and bring back the ages in which the poet was man\u0026rsquo;s only\nteacher and best friend,\u0026mdash;which would find materials in the living present\nas well as in the romance of the past, and might subdue to the fairest forms of\nspeech and verse the intractable materials of modern civilisation,\u0026mdash;which\nmight elicit the simple principles, or, as Plato would have called them, the\nessential forms, of truth and justice out of the variety of opinion and the\ncomplexity of modern society,\u0026mdash;which would preserve all the good of each\ngeneration and leave the bad unsung,\u0026mdash;which should be based not on vain\nlongings or faint imaginings, but on a clear insight into the nature of man.\nThen the tale of love might begin again in poetry or prose, two in one, united\nin the pursuit of knowledge, or the service of God and man; and feelings of\nlove might still be the incentive to great thoughts and heroic deeds as in the\ndays of Dante or Petrarch; and many types of manly and womanly beauty might\nappear among us, rising above the ordinary level of humanity, and many lives\nwhich were like poems (Laws), be not only written, but lived by us. A few such\nstrains have been heard among men in the tragedies of Aeschylus and Sophocles,\nwhom Plato quotes, not, as Homer is quoted by him, in irony, but with deep and\nserious approval,\u0026mdash;in the poetry of Milton and Wordsworth, and in passages\nof other English poets,\u0026mdash;first and above all in the Hebrew prophets and\npsalmists. Shakespeare has taught us how great men should speak and act; he has\ndrawn characters of a wonderful purity and depth; he has ennobled the human\nmind, but, like Homer (Rep.), he \u0026lsquo;has left no way of life.\u0026rsquo; The\nnext greatest poet of modern times, Goethe, is concerned with \u0026lsquo;a lower\ndegree of truth\u0026rsquo;; he paints the world as a stage on which \u0026lsquo;all the\nmen and women are merely players\u0026rsquo;; he cultivates life as an art, but he\nfurnishes no ideals of truth and action. The poet may rebel against any attempt\nto set limits to his fancy; and he may argue truly that moralizing in verse is\nnot poetry. Possibly, like Mephistopheles in Faust, he may retaliate on his\nadversaries. But the philosopher will still be justified in asking, \u0026lsquo;How\nmay the heavenly gift of poesy be devoted to the good of mankind?\u0026rsquo;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nReturning to Plato, we may observe that a similar mixture of truth and error\nappears in other parts of the argument. He is aware of the absurdity of mankind\nframing their whole lives according to Homer; just as in the Phaedrus he\nintimates the absurdity of interpreting mythology upon rational principles;\nboth these were the modern tendencies of his own age, which he deservedly\nridicules. On the other hand, his argument that Homer, if he had been able to\nteach mankind anything worth knowing, would not have been allowed by them to go\nabout begging as a rhapsodist, is both false and contrary to the spirit of\nPlato (Rep.). It may be compared with those other paradoxes of the Gorgias,\nthat \u0026lsquo;No statesman was ever unjustly put to death by the city of which he\nwas the head\u0026rsquo;; and that \u0026lsquo;No Sophist was ever defrauded by his\npupils\u0026rsquo; (Gorg.)…\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe argument for immortality seems to rest on the absolute dualism of soul and\nbody. Admitting the existence of the soul, we know of no force which is able to\nput an end to her. Vice is her own proper evil; and if she cannot be destroyed\nby that, she cannot be destroyed by any other. Yet Plato has acknowledged that\nthe soul may be so overgrown by the incrustations of earth as to lose her\noriginal form; and in the Timaeus he recognizes more strongly than in the\nRepublic the influence which the body has over the mind, denying even the\nvoluntariness of human actions, on the ground that they proceed from physical\nstates (Tim.). In the Republic, as elsewhere, he wavers between the original\nsoul which has to be restored, and the character which is developed by training\nand education…\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe vision of another world is ascribed to Er, the son of Armenius, who is said\nby Clement of Alexandria to have been Zoroaster. The tale has certainly an\noriental character, and may be compared with the pilgrimages of the soul in the\nZend Avesta (Haug, Avesta). But no trace of acquaintance with Zoroaster is\nfound elsewhere in Plato\u0026rsquo;s writings, and there is no reason for giving\nhim the name of Er the Pamphylian. The philosophy of Heracleitus cannot be\nshown to be borrowed from Zoroaster, and still less the myths of Plato.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe local arrangement of the vision is less distinct than that of the Phaedrus\nand Phaedo. Astronomy is mingled with symbolism and mythology; the great sphere\nof heaven is represented under the symbol of a cylinder or box, containing the\nseven orbits of the planets and the fixed stars; this is suspended from an axis\nor spindle which turns on the knees of Necessity; the revolutions of the seven\norbits contained in the cylinder are guided by the fates, and their harmonious\nmotion produces the music of the spheres. Through the innermost or eighth of\nthese, which is the moon, is passed the spindle; but it is doubtful whether\nthis is the continuation of the column of light, from which the pilgrims\ncontemplate the heavens; the words of Plato imply that they are connected, but\nnot the same. The column itself is clearly not of adamant. The spindle (which\nis of adamant) is fastened to the ends of the chains which extend to the middle\nof the column of light\u0026mdash;this column is said to hold together the heaven;\nbut whether it hangs from the spindle, or is at right angles to it, is not\nexplained. The cylinder containing the orbits of the stars is almost as much a\nsymbol as the figure of Necessity turning the spindle;\u0026mdash;for the outermost\nrim is the sphere of the fixed stars, and nothing is said about the intervals\nof space which divide the paths of the stars in the heavens. The description is\nboth a picture and an orrery, and therefore is necessarily inconsistent with\nitself. The column of light is not the Milky Way\u0026mdash;which is neither\nstraight, nor like a rainbow\u0026mdash;but the imaginary axis of the earth. This is\ncompared to the rainbow in respect not of form but of colour, and not to the\nundergirders of a trireme, but to the straight rope running from prow to stern\nin which the undergirders meet.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe orrery or picture of the heavens given in the Republic differs in its mode\nof representation from the circles of the same and of the other in the Timaeus.\nIn both the fixed stars are distinguished from the planets, and they move in\norbits without them, although in an opposite direction: in the Republic as in\nthe Timaeus they are all moving round the axis of the world. But we are not\ncertain that in the former they are moving round the earth. No distinct mention\nis made in the Republic of the circles of the same and other; although both in\nthe Timaeus and in the Republic the motion of the fixed stars is supposed to\ncoincide with the motion of the whole. The relative thickness of the rims is\nperhaps designed to express the relative distances of the planets. Plato\nprobably intended to represent the earth, from which Er and his companions are\nviewing the heavens, as stationary in place; but whether or not herself\nrevolving, unless this is implied in the revolution of the axis, is uncertain\n(Timaeus). The spectator may be supposed to look at the heavenly bodies, either\nfrom above or below. The earth is a sort of earth and heaven in one, like the\nheaven of the Phaedrus, on the back of which the spectator goes out to take a\npeep at the stars and is borne round in the revolution. There is no distinction\nbetween the equator and the ecliptic. But Plato is no doubt led to imagine that\nthe planets have an opposite motion to that of the fixed stars, in order to\naccount for their appearances in the heavens. In the description of the meadow,\nand the retribution of the good and evil after death, there are traces of\nHomer.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe description of the axis as a spindle, and of the heavenly bodies as forming\na whole, partly arises out of the attempt to connect the motions of the\nheavenly bodies with the mythological image of the web, or weaving of the\nFates. The giving of the lots, the weaving of them, and the making of them\nirreversible, which are ascribed to the three Fates\u0026mdash;Lachesis, Clotho,\nAtropos, are obviously derived from their names. The element of chance in human\nlife is indicated by the order of the lots. But chance, however adverse, may be\novercome by the wisdom of man, if he knows how to choose aright; there is a\nworse enemy to man than chance; this enemy is himself. He who was moderately\nfortunate in the number of the lot\u0026mdash;even the very last comer\u0026mdash;might\nhave a good life if he chose with wisdom. And as Plato does not like to make an\nassertion which is unproven, he more than confirms this statement a few\nsentences afterwards by the example of Odysseus, who chose last. But the virtue\nwhich is founded on habit is not sufficient to enable a man to choose; he must\nadd to virtue knowledge, if he is to act rightly when placed in new\ncircumstances. The routine of good actions and good habits is an inferior sort\nof goodness; and, as Coleridge says, \u0026lsquo;Common sense is intolerable which\nis not based on metaphysics,\u0026rsquo; so Plato would have said, \u0026lsquo;Habit is\nworthless which is not based upon philosophy.\u0026rsquo;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe freedom of the will to refuse the evil and to choose the good is distinctly\nasserted. \u0026lsquo;Virtue is free, and as a man honours or dishonours her he will\nhave more or less of her.\u0026rsquo; The life of man is \u0026lsquo;rounded\u0026rsquo; by\nnecessity; there are circumstances prior to birth which affect him (Pol.). But\nwithin the walls of necessity there is an open space in which he is his own\nmaster, and can study for himself the effects which the variously compounded\ngifts of nature or fortune have upon the soul, and act accordingly. All men\ncannot have the first choice in everything. But the lot of all men is good\nenough, if they choose wisely and will live diligently.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe verisimilitude which is given to the pilgrimage of a thousand years, by the\nintimation that Ardiaeus had lived a thousand years before; the coincidence of\nEr coming to life on the twelfth day after he was supposed to have been dead\nwith the seven days which the pilgrims passed in the meadow, and the four days\nduring which they journeyed to the column of light; the precision with which\nthe soul is mentioned who chose the twentieth lot; the passing remarks that\nthere was no definite character among the souls, and that the souls which had\nchosen ill blamed any one rather than themselves; or that some of the souls\ndrank more than was necessary of the waters of Forgetfulness, while Er himself\nwas hindered from drinking; the desire of Odysseus to rest at last, unlike the\nconception of him in Dante and Tennyson; the feigned ignorance of how Er\nreturned to the body, when the other souls went shooting like stars to their\nbirth,\u0026mdash;add greatly to the probability of the narrative. They are such\ntouches of nature as the art of Defoe might have introduced when he wished to\nwin credibility for marvels and apparitions.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003chr \u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThere still remain to be considered some points which have been intentionally\nreserved to the end: (1) the Janus-like character of the Republic, which\npresents two faces\u0026mdash;one an Hellenic state, the other a kingdom of\nphilosophers. Connected with the latter of the two aspects are (2) the\nparadoxes of the Republic, as they have been termed by Morgenstern: (a) the\ncommunity of property; (b) of families; (c) the rule of philosophers; (d) the\nanalogy of the individual and the State, which, like some other analogies in\nthe Republic, is carried too far. We may then proceed to consider (3) the\nsubject of education as conceived by Plato, bringing together in a general view\nthe education of youth and the education of after-life; (4) we may note further\nsome essential differences between ancient and modern politics which are\nsuggested by the Republic; (5) we may compare the Politicus and the Laws; (6)\nwe may observe the influence exercised by Plato on his imitators; and (7) take\noccasion to consider the nature and value of political, and (8) of religious\nideals.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n1. Plato expressly says that he is intending to found an Hellenic State (Book\nV). Many of his regulations are characteristically Spartan; such as the\nprohibition of gold and silver, the common meals of the men, the military\ntraining of the youth, the gymnastic exercises of the women. The life of Sparta\nwas the life of a camp (Laws), enforced even more rigidly in time of peace than\nin war; the citizens of Sparta, like Plato\u0026rsquo;s, were forbidden to\ntrade\u0026mdash;they were to be soldiers and not shopkeepers. Nowhere else in\nGreece was the individual so completely subjected to the State; the time when\nhe was to marry, the education of his children, the clothes which he was to\nwear, the food which he was to eat, were all prescribed by law. Some of the\nbest enactments in the Republic, such as the reverence to be paid to parents\nand elders, and some of the worst, such as the exposure of deformed children,\nare borrowed from the practice of Sparta. The encouragement of friendships\nbetween men and youths, or of men with one another, as affording incentives to\nbravery, is also Spartan; in Sparta too a nearer approach was made than in any\nother Greek State to equality of the sexes, and to community of property; and\nwhile there was probably less of licentiousness in the sense of immorality, the\ntie of marriage was regarded more lightly than in the rest of Greece. The\n\u0026lsquo;suprema lex\u0026rsquo; was the preservation of the family, and the interest\nof the State. The coarse strength of a military government was not favourable\nto purity and refinement; and the excessive strictness of some regulations\nseems to have produced a reaction. Of all Hellenes the Spartans were most\naccessible to bribery; several of the greatest of them might be described in\nthe words of Plato as having a \u0026lsquo;fierce secret longing after gold and\nsilver.\u0026rsquo; Though not in the strict sense communists, the principle of\ncommunism was maintained among them in their division of lands, in their common\nmeals, in their slaves, and in the free use of one another\u0026rsquo;s goods.\nMarriage was a public institution: and the women were educated by the State,\nand sang and danced in public with the men.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nMany traditions were preserved at Sparta of the severity with which the\nmagistrates had maintained the primitive rule of music and poetry; as in the\nRepublic of Plato, the new-fangled poet was to be expelled. Hymns to the Gods,\nwhich are the only kind of music admitted into the ideal State, were the only\nkind which was permitted at Sparta. The Spartans, though an unpoetical race,\nwere nevertheless lovers of poetry; they had been stirred by the Elegiac\nstrains of Tyrtaeus, they had crowded around Hippias to hear his recitals of\nHomer; but in this they resembled the citizens of the timocratic rather than of\nthe ideal State. The council of elder men also corresponds to the Spartan\ngerousia; and the freedom with which they are permitted to judge about matters\nof detail agrees with what we are told of that institution. Once more, the\nmilitary rule of not spoiling the dead or offering arms at the temples; the\nmoderation in the pursuit of enemies; the importance attached to the physical\nwell-being of the citizens; the use of warfare for the sake of defence rather\nthan of aggression\u0026mdash;are features probably suggested by the spirit and\npractice of Sparta.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTo the Spartan type the ideal State reverts in the first decline; and the\ncharacter of the individual timocrat is borrowed from the Spartan citizen. The\nlove of Lacedaemon not only affected Plato and Xenophon, but was shared by many\nundistinguished Athenians; there they seemed to find a principle which was\nwanting in their own democracy. The (Greek) of the Spartans attracted them,\nthat is to say, not the goodness of their laws, but the spirit of order and\nloyalty which prevailed. Fascinated by the idea, citizens of Athens would\nimitate the Lacedaemonians in their dress and manners; they were known to the\ncontemporaries of Plato as \u0026lsquo;the persons who had their ears\nbruised,\u0026rsquo; like the Roundheads of the Commonwealth. The love of another\nchurch or country when seen at a distance only, the longing for an imaginary\nsimplicity in civilized times, the fond desire of a past which never has been,\nor of a future which never will be,\u0026mdash;these are aspirations of the human\nmind which are often felt among ourselves. Such feelings meet with a response\nin the Republic of Plato.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut there are other features of the Platonic Republic, as, for example, the\nliterary and philosophical education, and the grace and beauty of life, which\nare the reverse of Spartan. Plato wishes to give his citizens a taste of\nAthenian freedom as well as of Lacedaemonian discipline. His individual genius\nis purely Athenian, although in theory he is a lover of Sparta; and he is\nsomething more than either\u0026mdash;he has also a true Hellenic feeling. He is\ndesirous of humanizing the wars of Hellenes against one another; he\nacknowledges that the Delphian God is the grand hereditary interpreter of all\nHellas. The spirit of harmony and the Dorian mode are to prevail, and the whole\nState is to have an external beauty which is the reflex of the harmony within.\nBut he has not yet found out the truth which he afterwards enunciated in the\nLaws\u0026mdash;that he was a better legislator who made men to be of one mind, than\nhe who trained them for war. The citizens, as in other Hellenic States,\ndemocratic as well as aristocratic, are really an upper class; for, although no\nmention is made of slaves, the lower classes are allowed to fade away into the\ndistance, and are represented in the individual by the passions. Plato has no\nidea either of a social State in which all classes are harmonized, or of a\nfederation of Hellas or the world in which different nations or States have a\nplace. His city is equipped for war rather than for peace, and this would seem\nto be justified by the ordinary condition of Hellenic States. The myth of the\nearth-born men is an embodiment of the orthodox tradition of Hellas, and the\nallusion to the four ages of the world is also sanctioned by the authority of\nHesiod and the poets. Thus we see that the Republic is partly founded on the\nideal of the old Greek polis, partly on the actual circumstances of Hellas in\nthat age. Plato, like the old painters, retains the traditional form, and like\nthem he has also a vision of a city in the clouds.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThere is yet another thread which is interwoven in the texture of the work; for\nthe Republic is not only a Dorian State, but a Pythagorean league. The\n\u0026lsquo;way of life\u0026rsquo; which was connected with the name of Pythagoras, like\nthe Catholic monastic orders, showed the power which the mind of an individual\nmight exercise over his contemporaries, and may have naturally suggested to\nPlato the possibility of reviving such \u0026lsquo;mediaeval institutions.\u0026rsquo;\nThe Pythagoreans, like Plato, enforced a rule of life and a moral and\nintellectual training. The influence ascribed to music, which to us seems\nexaggerated, is also a Pythagorean feature; it is not to be regarded as\nrepresenting the real influence of music in the Greek world. More nearly than\nany other government of Hellas, the Pythagorean league of three hundred was an\naristocracy of virtue. For once in the history of mankind the philosophy of\norder or (Greek), expressing and consequently enlisting on its side the\ncombined endeavours of the better part of the people, obtained the management\nof public affairs and held possession of it for a considerable time (until\nabout B.C. 500). Probably only in States prepared by Dorian institutions would\nsuch a league have been possible. The rulers, like Plato\u0026rsquo;s (Greek), were\nrequired to submit to a severe training in order to prepare the way for the\neducation of the other members of the community. Long after the dissolution of\nthe Order, eminent Pythagoreans, such as Archytas of Tarentum, retained their\npolitical influence over the cities of Magna Graecia. There was much here that\nwas suggestive to the kindred spirit of Plato, who had doubtless meditated\ndeeply on the \u0026lsquo;way of life of Pythagoras\u0026rsquo; (Rep.) and his followers.\nSlight traces of Pythagoreanism are to be found in the mystical number of the\nState, in the number which expresses the interval between the king and the\ntyrant, in the doctrine of transmigration, in the music of the spheres, as well\nas in the great though secondary importance ascribed to mathematics in\neducation.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut as in his philosophy, so also in the form of his State, he goes far beyond\nthe old Pythagoreans. He attempts a task really impossible, which is to unite\nthe past of Greek history with the future of philosophy, analogous to that\nother impossibility, which has often been the dream of Christendom, the attempt\nto unite the past history of Europe with the kingdom of Christ. Nothing\nactually existing in the world at all resembles Plato\u0026rsquo;s ideal State; nor\ndoes he himself imagine that such a State is possible. This he repeats again\nand again; e.g. in the Republic, or in the Laws where, casting a glance back on\nthe Republic, he admits that the perfect state of communism and philosophy was\nimpossible in his own age, though still to be retained as a pattern. The same\ndoubt is implied in the earnestness with which he argues in the Republic that\nideals are none the worse because they cannot be realized in fact, and in the\nchorus of laughter, which like a breaking wave will, as he anticipates, greet\nthe mention of his proposals; though like other writers of fiction, he uses all\nhis art to give reality to his inventions. When asked how the ideal polity can\ncome into being, he answers ironically, \u0026lsquo;When one son of a king becomes a\nphilosopher\u0026rsquo;; he designates the fiction of the earth-born men as \u0026lsquo;a\nnoble lie\u0026rsquo;; and when the structure is finally complete, he fairly tells\nyou that his Republic is a vision only, which in some sense may have reality,\nbut not in the vulgar one of a reign of philosophers upon earth. It has been\nsaid that Plato flies as well as walks, but this falls short of the truth; for\nhe flies and walks at the same time, and is in the air and on firm ground in\nsuccessive instants.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNiebuhr has asked a trifling question, which may be briefly noticed in this\nplace\u0026mdash;Was Plato a good citizen? If by this is meant, Was he loyal to\nAthenian institutions?\u0026mdash;he can hardly be said to be the friend of\ndemocracy: but neither is he the friend of any other existing form of\ngovernment; all of them he regarded as \u0026lsquo;states of faction\u0026rsquo; (Laws);\nnone attained to his ideal of a voluntary rule over voluntary subjects, which\nseems indeed more nearly to describe democracy than any other; and the worst of\nthem is tyranny. The truth is, that the question has hardly any meaning when\napplied to a great philosopher whose writings are not meant for a particular\nage and country, but for all time and all mankind. The decline of Athenian\npolitics was probably the motive which led Plato to frame an ideal State, and\nthe Republic may be regarded as reflecting the departing glory of Hellas. As\nwell might we complain of St. Augustine, whose great work \u0026lsquo;The City of\nGod\u0026rsquo; originated in a similar motive, for not being loyal to the Roman\nEmpire. Even a nearer parallel might be afforded by the first Christians, who\ncannot fairly be charged with being bad citizens because, though \u0026lsquo;subject\nto the higher powers,\u0026rsquo; they were looking forward to a city which is in\nheaven.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n2. The idea of the perfect State is full of paradox when judged of according to\nthe ordinary notions of mankind. The paradoxes of one age have been said to\nbecome the commonplaces of the next; but the paradoxes of Plato are at least as\nparadoxical to us as they were to his contemporaries. The modern world has\neither sneered at them as absurd, or denounced them as unnatural and immoral;\nmen have been pleased to find in Aristotle\u0026rsquo;s criticisms of them the\nanticipation of their own good sense. The wealthy and cultivated classes have\ndisliked and also dreaded them; they have pointed with satisfaction to the\nfailure of efforts to realize them in practice. Yet since they are the thoughts\nof one of the greatest of human intelligences, and of one who had done most to\nelevate morality and religion, they seem to deserve a better treatment at our\nhands. We may have to address the public, as Plato does poetry, and assure them\nthat we mean no harm to existing institutions. There are serious errors which\nhave a side of truth and which therefore may fairly demand a careful\nconsideration: there are truths mixed with error of which we may indeed say,\n\u0026lsquo;The half is better than the whole.\u0026rsquo; Yet \u0026lsquo;the half\u0026rsquo; may\nbe an important contribution to the study of human nature.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n(a) The first paradox is the community of goods, which is mentioned slightly at\nthe end of the third Book, and seemingly, as Aristotle observes, is confined to\nthe guardians; at least no mention is made of the other classes. But the\nomission is not of any real significance, and probably arises out of the plan\nof the work, which prevents the writer from entering into details.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAristotle censures the community of property much in the spirit of modern\npolitical economy, as tending to repress industry, and as doing away with the\nspirit of benevolence. Modern writers almost refuse to consider the subject,\nwhich is supposed to have been long ago settled by the common opinion of\nmankind. But it must be remembered that the sacredness of property is a notion\nfar more fixed in modern than in ancient times. The world has grown older, and\nis therefore more conservative. Primitive society offered many examples of land\nheld in common, either by a tribe or by a township, and such may probably have\nbeen the original form of landed tenure. Ancient legislators had invented\nvarious modes of dividing and preserving the divisions of land among the\ncitizens; according to Aristotle there were nations who held the land in common\nand divided the produce, and there were others who divided the land and stored\nthe produce in common. The evils of debt and the inequality of property were\nfar greater in ancient than in modern times, and the accidents to which\nproperty was subject from war, or revolution, or taxation, or other legislative\ninterference, were also greater. All these circumstances gave property a less\nfixed and sacred character. The early Christians are believed to have held\ntheir property in common, and the principle is sanctioned by the words of\nChrist himself, and has been maintained as a counsel of perfection in almost\nall ages of the Church. Nor have there been wanting instances of modern\nenthusiasts who have made a religion of communism; in every age of religious\nexcitement notions like Wycliffe\u0026rsquo;s \u0026lsquo;inheritance of grace\u0026rsquo;\nhave tended to prevail. A like spirit, but fiercer and more violent, has\nappeared in politics. \u0026lsquo;The preparation of the Gospel of peace\u0026rsquo; soon\nbecomes the red flag of Republicanism.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWe can hardly judge what effect Plato\u0026rsquo;s views would have upon his own\ncontemporaries; they would perhaps have seemed to them only an exaggeration of\nthe Spartan commonwealth. Even modern writers would acknowledge that the right\nof private property is based on expediency, and may be interfered with in a\nvariety of ways for the public good. Any other mode of vesting property which\nwas found to be more advantageous, would in time acquire the same basis of\nright; \u0026lsquo;the most useful,\u0026rsquo; in Plato\u0026rsquo;s words, \u0026lsquo;would be\nthe most sacred.\u0026rsquo; The lawyers and ecclesiastics of former ages would have\nspoken of property as a sacred institution. But they only meant by such\nlanguage to oppose the greatest amount of resistance to any invasion of the\nrights of individuals and of the Church.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhen we consider the question, without any fear of immediate application to\npractice, in the spirit of Plato\u0026rsquo;s Republic, are we quite sure that the\nreceived notions of property are the best? Is the distribution of wealth which\nis customary in civilized countries the most favourable that can be conceived\nfor the education and development of the mass of mankind? Can \u0026lsquo;the\nspectator of all time and all existence\u0026rsquo; be quite convinced that one or\ntwo thousand years hence, great changes will not have taken place in the rights\nof property, or even that the very notion of property, beyond what is necessary\nfor personal maintenance, may not have disappeared? This was a distinction\nfamiliar to Aristotle, though likely to be laughed at among ourselves. Such a\nchange would not be greater than some other changes through which the world has\npassed in the transition from ancient to modern society, for example, the\nemancipation of the serfs in Russia, or the abolition of slavery in America and\nthe West Indies; and not so great as the difference which separates the Eastern\nvillage community from the Western world. To accomplish such a revolution in\nthe course of a few centuries, would imply a rate of progress not more rapid\nthan has actually taken place during the last fifty or sixty years. The kingdom\nof Japan underwent more change in five or six years than Europe in five or six\nhundred. Many opinions and beliefs which have been cherished among ourselves\nquite as strongly as the sacredness of property have passed away; and the most\nuntenable propositions respecting the right of bequests or entail have been\nmaintained with as much fervour as the most moderate. Some one will be heard to\nask whether a state of society can be final in which the interests of thousands\nare perilled on the life or character of a single person. And many will indulge\nthe hope that our present condition may, after all, be only transitional, and\nmay conduct to a higher, in which property, besides ministering to the\nenjoyment of the few, may also furnish the means of the highest culture to all,\nand will be a greater benefit to the public generally, and also more under the\ncontrol of public authority. There may come a time when the saying, \u0026lsquo;Have\nI not a right to do what I will with my own?\u0026rsquo; will appear to be a\nbarbarous relic of individualism;\u0026mdash;when the possession of a part may be a\ngreater blessing to each and all than the possession of the whole is now to any\none.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nSuch reflections appear visionary to the eye of the practical statesman, but\nthey are within the range of possibility to the philosopher. He can imagine\nthat in some distant age or clime, and through the influence of some\nindividual, the notion of common property may or might have sunk as deep into\nthe heart of a race, and have become as fixed to them, as private property is\nto ourselves. He knows that this latter institution is not more than four or\nfive thousand years old: may not the end revert to the beginning? In our own\nage even Utopias affect the spirit of legislation, and an abstract idea may\nexercise a great influence on practical politics.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe objections that would be generally urged against Plato\u0026rsquo;s community of\nproperty, are the old ones of Aristotle, that motives for exertion would be\ntaken away, and that disputes would arise when each was dependent upon all.\nEvery man would produce as little and consume as much as he liked. The\nexperience of civilized nations has hitherto been adverse to Socialism. The\neffort is too great for human nature; men try to live in common, but the\npersonal feeling is always breaking in. On the other hand it may be doubted\nwhether our present notions of property are not conventional, for they differ\nin different countries and in different states of society. We boast of an\nindividualism which is not freedom, but rather an artificial result of the\nindustrial state of modern Europe. The individual is nominally free, but he is\nalso powerless in a world bound hand and foot in the chains of economic\nnecessity. Even if we cannot expect the mass of mankind to become\ndisinterested, at any rate we observe in them a power of organization which\nfifty years ago would never have been suspected. The same forces which have\nrevolutionized the political system of Europe, may effect a similar change in\nthe social and industrial relations of mankind. And if we suppose the influence\nof some good as well as neutral motives working in the community, there will be\nno absurdity in expecting that the mass of mankind having power, and becoming\nenlightened about the higher possibilities of human life, when they learn how\nmuch more is attainable for all than is at present the possession of a favoured\nfew, may pursue the common interest with an intelligence and persistency which\nmankind have hitherto never seen.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNow that the world has once been set in motion, and is no longer held fast\nunder the tyranny of custom and ignorance; now that criticism has pierced the\nveil of tradition and the past no longer overpowers the present,\u0026mdash;the\nprogress of civilization may be expected to be far greater and swifter than\nheretofore. Even at our present rate of speed the point at which we may arrive\nin two or three generations is beyond the power of imagination to foresee.\nThere are forces in the world which work, not in an arithmetical, but in a\ngeometrical ratio of increase. Education, to use the expression of Plato, moves\nlike a wheel with an ever-multiplying rapidity. Nor can we say how great may be\nits influence, when it becomes universal,\u0026mdash;when it has been inherited by\nmany generations,\u0026mdash;when it is freed from the trammels of superstition and\nrightly adapted to the wants and capacities of different classes of men and\nwomen. Neither do we know how much more the co-operation of minds or of hands\nmay be capable of accomplishing, whether in labour or in study. The resources\nof the natural sciences are not half-developed as yet; the soil of the earth,\ninstead of growing more barren, may become many times more fertile than\nhitherto; the uses of machinery far greater, and also more minute than at\npresent. New secrets of physiology may be revealed, deeply affecting human\nnature in its innermost recesses. The standard of health may be raised and the\nlives of men prolonged by sanitary and medical knowledge. There may be peace,\nthere may be leisure, there may be innocent refreshments of many kinds. The\never-increasing power of locomotion may join the extremes of earth. There may\nbe mysterious workings of the human mind, such as occur only at great crises of\nhistory. The East and the West may meet together, and all nations may\ncontribute their thoughts and their experience to the common stock of humanity.\nMany other elements enter into a speculation of this kind. But it is better to\nmake an end of them. For such reflections appear to the majority far-fetched,\nand to men of science, commonplace.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n(b) Neither to the mind of Plato nor of Aristotle did the doctrine of community\nof property present at all the same difficulty, or appear to be the same\nviolation of the common Hellenic sentiment, as the community of wives and\nchildren. This paradox he prefaces by another proposal, that the occupations of\nmen and women shall be the same, and that to this end they shall have a common\ntraining and education. Male and female animals have the same\npursuits\u0026mdash;why not also the two sexes of man?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut have we not here fallen into a contradiction? for we were saying that\ndifferent natures should have different pursuits. How then can men and women\nhave the same? And is not the proposal inconsistent with our notion of the\ndivision of labour?\u0026mdash;These objections are no sooner raised than answered;\nfor, according to Plato, there is no organic difference between men and women,\nbut only the accidental one that men beget and women bear children. Following\nthe analogy of the other animals, he contends that all natural gifts are\nscattered about indifferently among both sexes, though there may be a\nsuperiority of degree on the part of the men. The objection on the score of\ndecency to their taking part in the same gymnastic exercises, is met by\nPlato\u0026rsquo;s assertion that the existing feeling is a matter of habit.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat Plato should have emancipated himself from the ideas of his own country\nand from the example of the East, shows a wonderful independence of mind. He is\nconscious that women are half the human race, in some respects the more\nimportant half (Laws); and for the sake both of men and women he desires to\nraise the woman to a higher level of existence. He brings, not sentiment, but\nphilosophy to bear upon a question which both in ancient and modern times has\nbeen chiefly regarded in the light of custom or feeling. The Greeks had noble\nconceptions of womanhood in the goddesses Athene and Artemis, and in the\nheroines Antigone and Andromache. But these ideals had no counterpart in actual\nlife. The Athenian woman was in no way the equal of her husband; she was not\nthe entertainer of his guests or the mistress of his house, but only his\nhousekeeper and the mother of his children. She took no part in military or\npolitical matters; nor is there any instance in the later ages of Greece of a\nwoman becoming famous in literature. \u0026lsquo;Hers is the greatest glory who has\nthe least renown among men,\u0026rsquo; is the historian\u0026rsquo;s conception of\nfeminine excellence. A very different ideal of womanhood is held up by Plato to\nthe world; she is to be the companion of the man, and to share with him in the\ntoils of war and in the cares of government. She is to be similarly trained\nboth in bodily and mental exercises. She is to lose as far as possible the\nincidents of maternity and the characteristics of the female sex.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe modern antagonist of the equality of the sexes would argue that the\ndifferences between men and women are not confined to the single point urged by\nPlato; that sensibility, gentleness, grace, are the qualities of women, while\nenergy, strength, higher intelligence, are to be looked for in men. And the\ncriticism is just: the differences affect the whole nature, and are not, as\nPlato supposes, confined to a single point. But neither can we say how far\nthese differences are due to education and the opinions of mankind, or\nphysically inherited from the habits and opinions of former generations. Women\nhave been always taught, not exactly that they are slaves, but that they are in\nan inferior position, which is also supposed to have compensating advantages;\nand to this position they have conformed. It is also true that the physical\nform may easily change in the course of generations through the mode of life;\nand the weakness or delicacy, which was once a matter of opinion, may become a\nphysical fact. The characteristics of sex vary greatly in different countries\nand ranks of society, and at different ages in the same individuals. Plato may\nhave been right in denying that there was any ultimate difference in the sexes\nof man other than that which exists in animals, because all other differences\nmay be conceived to disappear in other states of society, or under different\ncircumstances of life and training.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe first wave having been passed, we proceed to the second\u0026mdash;community of\nwives and children. \u0026lsquo;Is it possible? Is it desirable?\u0026rsquo; For as\nGlaucon intimates, and as we far more strongly insist, \u0026lsquo;Great doubts may\nbe entertained about both these points.\u0026rsquo; Any free discussion of the\nquestion is impossible, and mankind are perhaps right in not allowing the\nultimate bases of social life to be examined. Few of us can safely enquire into\nthe things which nature hides, any more than we can dissect our own bodies.\nStill, the manner in which Plato arrived at his conclusions should be\nconsidered. For here, as Mr. Grote has remarked, is a wonderful thing, that one\nof the wisest and best of men should have entertained ideas of morality which\nare wholly at variance with our own. And if we would do Plato justice, we must\nexamine carefully the character of his proposals. First, we may observe that\nthe relations of the sexes supposed by him are the reverse of licentious: he\nseems rather to aim at an impossible strictness. Secondly, he conceives the\nfamily to be the natural enemy of the state; and he entertains the serious hope\nthat an universal brotherhood may take the place of private interests\u0026mdash;an\naspiration which, although not justified by experience, has possessed many\nnoble minds. On the other hand, there is no sentiment or imagination in the\nconnections which men and women are supposed by him to form; human beings\nreturn to the level of the animals, neither exalting to heaven, nor yet abusing\nthe natural instincts. All that world of poetry and fancy which the passion of\nlove has called forth in modern literature and romance would have been banished\nby Plato. The arrangements of marriage in the Republic are directed to one\nobject\u0026mdash;the improvement of the race. In successive generations a great\ndevelopment both of bodily and mental qualities might be possible. The analogy\nof animals tends to show that mankind can within certain limits receive a\nchange of nature. And as in animals we should commonly choose the best for\nbreeding, and destroy the others, so there must be a selection made of the\nhuman beings whose lives are worthy to be preserved.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWe start back horrified from this Platonic ideal, in the belief, first, that\nthe higher feelings of humanity are far too strong to be crushed out; secondly,\nthat if the plan could be carried into execution we should be poorly\nrecompensed by improvements in the breed for the loss of the best things in\nlife. The greatest regard for the weakest and meanest of human beings\u0026mdash;the\ninfant, the criminal, the insane, the idiot, truly seems to us one of the\nnoblest results of Christianity. We have learned, though as yet imperfectly,\nthat the individual man has an endless value in the sight of God, and that we\nhonour Him when we honour the darkened and disfigured image of Him (Laws). This\nis the lesson which Christ taught in a parable when He said, \u0026lsquo;Their\nangels do always behold the face of My Father which is in heaven.\u0026rsquo; Such\nlessons are only partially realized in any age; they were foreign to the age of\nPlato, as they have very different degrees of strength in different countries\nor ages of the Christian world. To the Greek the family was a religious and\ncustomary institution binding the members together by a tie inferior in\nstrength to that of friendship, and having a less solemn and sacred sound than\nthat of country. The relationship which existed on the lower level of custom,\nPlato imagined that he was raising to the higher level of nature and reason;\nwhile from the modern and Christian point of view we regard him as sanctioning\nmurder and destroying the first principles of morality.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe great error in these and similar speculations is that the difference\nbetween man and the animals is forgotten in them. The human being is regarded\nwith the eye of a dog- or bird-fancier, or at best of a slave-owner; the higher\nor human qualities are left out. The breeder of animals aims chiefly at size or\nspeed or strength; in a few cases at courage or temper; most often the fitness\nof the animal for food is the great desideratum. But mankind are not bred to be\neaten, nor yet for their superiority in fighting or in running or in drawing\ncarts. Neither does the improvement of the human race consist merely in the\nincrease of the bones and flesh, but in the growth and enlightenment of the\nmind. Hence there must be \u0026lsquo;a marriage of true minds\u0026rsquo; as well as of\nbodies, of imagination and reason as well as of lusts and instincts. Men and\nwomen without feeling or imagination are justly called brutes; yet Plato takes\naway these qualities and puts nothing in their place, not even the desire of a\nnoble offspring, since parents are not to know their own children. The most\nimportant transaction of social life, he who is the idealist philosopher\nconverts into the most brutal. For the pair are to have no relation to one\nanother, except at the hymeneal festival; their children are not theirs, but\nthe state\u0026rsquo;s; nor is any tie of affection to unite them. Yet here the\nanalogy of the animals might have saved Plato from a gigantic error, if he had\n\u0026lsquo;not lost sight of his own illustration.\u0026rsquo; For the \u0026lsquo;nobler\nsort of birds and beasts\u0026rsquo; nourish and protect their offspring and are\nfaithful to one another.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAn eminent physiologist thinks it worth while \u0026lsquo;to try and place life on a\nphysical basis.\u0026rsquo; But should not life rest on the moral rather than upon\nthe physical? The higher comes first, then the lower, first the human and\nrational, afterwards the animal. Yet they are not absolutely divided; and in\ntimes of sickness or moments of self-indulgence they seem to be only different\naspects of a common human nature which includes them both. Neither is the moral\nthe limit of the physical, but the expansion and enlargement of it,\u0026mdash;the\nhighest form which the physical is capable of receiving. As Plato would say,\nthe body does not take care of the body, and still less of the mind, but the\nmind takes care of both. In all human action not that which is common to man\nand the animals is the characteristic element, but that which distinguishes him\nfrom them. Even if we admit the physical basis, and resolve all virtue into\nhealth of body \u0026lsquo;la facon que notre sang circule,\u0026rsquo; still on merely\nphysical grounds we must come back to ideas. Mind and reason and duty and\nconscience, under these or other names, are always reappearing. There cannot be\nhealth of body without health of mind; nor health of mind without the sense of\nduty and the love of truth (Charm).\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat the greatest of ancient philosophers should in his regulations about\nmarriage have fallen into the error of separating body and mind, does indeed\nappear surprising. Yet the wonder is not so much that Plato should have\nentertained ideas of morality which to our own age are revolting, but that he\nshould have contradicted himself to an extent which is hardly credible, falling\nin an instant from the heaven of idealism into the crudest animalism. Rejoicing\nin the newly found gift of reflection, he appears to have thought out a subject\nabout which he had better have followed the enlightened feeling of his own age.\nThe general sentiment of Hellas was opposed to his monstrous fancy. The old\npoets, and in later time the tragedians, showed no want of respect for the\nfamily, on which much of their religion was based. But the example of Sparta,\nand perhaps in some degree the tendency to defy public opinion, seems to have\nmisled him. He will make one family out of all the families of the state. He\nwill select the finest specimens of men and women and breed from these only.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYet because the illusion is always returning (for the animal part of human\nnature will from time to time assert itself in the disguise of philosophy as\nwell as of poetry), and also because any departure from established morality,\neven where this is not intended, is apt to be unsettling, it may be worth while\nto draw out a little more at length the objections to the Platonic marriage. In\nthe first place, history shows that wherever polygamy has been largely allowed\nthe race has deteriorated. One man to one woman is the law of God and nature.\nNearly all the civilized peoples of the world at some period before the age of\nwritten records, have become monogamists; and the step when once taken has\nnever been retraced. The exceptions occurring among Brahmins or Mahometans or\nthe ancient Persians, are of that sort which may be said to prove the rule. The\nconnexions formed between superior and inferior races hardly ever produce a\nnoble offspring, because they are licentious; and because the children in such\ncases usually despise the mother and are neglected by the father who is ashamed\nof them. Barbarous nations when they are introduced by Europeans to vice die\nout; polygamist peoples either import and adopt children from other countries,\nor dwindle in numbers, or both. Dynasties and aristocracies which have\ndisregarded the laws of nature have decreased in numbers and degenerated in\nstature; \u0026lsquo;mariages de convenance\u0026rsquo; leave their enfeebling stamp on\nthe offspring of them (King Lear). The marriage of near relations, or the\nmarrying in and in of the same family tends constantly to weakness or idiocy in\nthe children, sometimes assuming the form as they grow older of passionate\nlicentiousness. The common prostitute rarely has any offspring. By such\nunmistakable evidence is the authority of morality asserted in the relations of\nthe sexes: and so many more elements enter into this \u0026lsquo;mystery\u0026rsquo; than\nare dreamed of by Plato and some other philosophers.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nRecent enquirers have indeed arrived at the conclusion that among primitive\ntribes there existed a community of wives as of property, and that the captive\ntaken by the spear was the only wife or slave whom any man was permitted to\ncall his own. The partial existence of such customs among some of the lower\nraces of man, and the survival of peculiar ceremonies in the marriages of some\ncivilized nations, are thought to furnish a proof of similar institutions\nhaving been once universal. There can be no question that the study of\nanthropology has considerably changed our views respecting the first appearance\nof man upon the earth. We know more about the aborigines of the world than\nformerly, but our increasing knowledge shows above all things how little we\nknow. With all the helps which written monuments afford, we do but faintly\nrealize the condition of man two thousand or three thousand years ago. Of what\nhis condition was when removed to a distance 200,000 or 300,000 years, when the\nmajority of mankind were lower and nearer the animals than any tribe now\nexisting upon the earth, we cannot even entertain conjecture. Plato (Laws) and\nAristotle (Metaph.) may have been more right than we imagine in supposing that\nsome forms of civilisation were discovered and lost several times over. If we\ncannot argue that all barbarism is a degraded civilization, neither can we set\nany limits to the depth of degradation to which the human race may sink through\nwar, disease, or isolation. And if we are to draw inferences about the origin\nof marriage from the practice of barbarous nations, we should also consider the\nremoter analogy of the animals. Many birds and animals, especially the\ncarnivorous, have only one mate, and the love and care of offspring which seems\nto be natural is inconsistent with the primitive theory of marriage. If we go\nback to an imaginary state in which men were almost animals and the companions\nof them, we have as much right to argue from what is animal to what is human as\nfrom the barbarous to the civilized man. The record of animal life on the globe\nis fragmentary,\u0026mdash;the connecting links are wanting and cannot be supplied;\nthe record of social life is still more fragmentary and precarious. Even if we\nadmit that our first ancestors had no such institution as marriage, still the\nstages by which men passed from outer barbarism to the comparative civilization\nof China, Assyria, and Greece, or even of the ancient Germans, are wholly\nunknown to us.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nSuch speculations are apt to be unsettling, because they seem to show that an\ninstitution which was thought to be a revelation from heaven, is only the\ngrowth of history and experience. We ask what is the origin of marriage, and we\nare told that like the right of property, after many wars and contests, it has\ngradually arisen out of the selfishness of barbarians. We stand face to face\nwith human nature in its primitive nakedness. We are compelled to accept, not\nthe highest, but the lowest account of the origin of human society. But on the\nother hand we may truly say that every step in human progress has been in the\nsame direction, and that in the course of ages the idea of marriage and of the\nfamily has been more and more defined and consecrated. The civilized East is\nimmeasurably in advance of any savage tribes; the Greeks and Romans have\nimproved upon the East; the Christian nations have been stricter in their views\nof the marriage relation than any of the ancients. In this as in so many other\nthings, instead of looking back with regret to the past, we should look forward\nwith hope to the future. We must consecrate that which we believe to be the\nmost holy, and that \u0026lsquo;which is the most holy will be the most\nuseful.\u0026rsquo; There is more reason for maintaining the sacredness of the\nmarriage tie, when we see the benefit of it, than when we only felt a vague\nreligious horror about the violation of it. But in all times of transition,\nwhen established beliefs are being undermined, there is a danger that in the\npassage from the old to the new we may insensibly let go the moral principle,\nfinding an excuse for listening to the voice of passion in the uncertainty of\nknowledge, or the fluctuations of opinion. And there are many persons in our\nown day who, enlightened by the study of anthropology, and fascinated by what\nis new and strange, some using the language of fear, others of hope, are\ninclined to believe that a time will come when through the self-assertion of\nwomen, or the rebellious spirit of children, by the analysis of human\nrelations, or by the force of outward circumstances, the ties of family life\nmay be broken or greatly relaxed. They point to societies in America and\nelsewhere which tend to show that the destruction of the family need not\nnecessarily involve the overthrow of all morality. Wherever we may think of\nsuch speculations, we can hardly deny that they have been more rife in this\ngeneration than in any other; and whither they are tending, who can predict?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTo the doubts and queries raised by these \u0026lsquo;social reformers\u0026rsquo;\nrespecting the relation of the sexes and the moral nature of man, there is a\nsufficient answer, if any is needed. The difference about them and us is really\none of fact. They are speaking of man as they wish or fancy him to be, but we\nare speaking of him as he is. They isolate the animal part of his nature; we\nregard him as a creature having many sides, or aspects, moving between good and\nevil, striving to rise above himself and to become \u0026lsquo;a little lower than\nthe angels.\u0026rsquo; We also, to use a Platonic formula, are not ignorant of the\ndissatisfactions and incompatibilities of family life, of the meannesses of\ntrade, of the flatteries of one class of society by another, of the impediments\nwhich the family throws in the way of lofty aims and aspirations. But we are\nconscious that there are evils and dangers in the background greater still,\nwhich are not appreciated, because they are either concealed or suppressed.\nWhat a condition of man would that be, in which human passions were controlled\nby no authority, divine or human, in which there was no shame or decency, no\nhigher affection overcoming or sanctifying the natural instincts, but simply a\nrule of health! Is it for this that we are asked to throw away the civilization\nwhich is the growth of ages?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nFor strength and health are not the only qualities to be desired; there are the\nmore important considerations of mind and character and soul. We know how human\nnature may be degraded; we do not know how by artificial means any improvement\nin the breed can be effected. The problem is a complex one, for if we go back\nonly four steps (and these at least enter into the composition of a child),\nthere are commonly thirty progenitors to be taken into account. Many curious\nfacts, rarely admitting of proof, are told us respecting the inheritance of\ndisease or character from a remote ancestor. We can trace the physical\nresemblances of parents and children in the same family\u0026mdash;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n\u0026lsquo;Sic oculos, sic ille manus, sic ora ferebat\u0026rsquo;;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nbut scarcely less often the differences which distinguish children both from\ntheir parents and from one another. We are told of similar mental peculiarities\nrunning in families, and again of a tendency, as in the animals, to revert to a\ncommon or original stock. But we have a difficulty in distinguishing what is a\ntrue inheritance of genius or other qualities, and what is mere imitation or\nthe result of similar circumstances. Great men and great women have rarely had\ngreat fathers and mothers. Nothing that we know of in the circumstances of\ntheir birth or lineage will explain their appearance. Of the English poets of\nthe last and two preceding centuries scarcely a descendant remains,\u0026mdash;none\nhave ever been distinguished. So deeply has nature hidden her secret, and so\nridiculous is the fancy which has been entertained by some that we might in\ntime by suitable marriage arrangements or, as Plato would have said, \u0026lsquo;by\nan ingenious system of lots,\u0026rsquo; produce a Shakespeare or a Milton. Even\nsupposing that we could breed men having the tenacity of bulldogs, or, like the\nSpartans, \u0026lsquo;lacking the wit to run away in battle,\u0026rsquo; would the world\nbe any the better? Many of the noblest specimens of the human race have been\namong the weakest physically. Tyrtaeus or Aesop, or our own Newton, would have\nbeen exposed at Sparta; and some of the fairest and strongest men and women\nhave been among the wickedest and worst. Not by the Platonic device of uniting\nthe strong and fair with the strong and fair, regardless of sentiment and\nmorality, nor yet by his other device of combining dissimilar natures\n(Statesman), have mankind gradually passed from the brutality and\nlicentiousness of primitive marriage to marriage Christian and civilized.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nFew persons would deny that we bring into the world an inheritance of mental\nand physical qualities derived first from our parents, or through them from\nsome remoter ancestor, secondly from our race, thirdly from the general\ncondition of mankind into which we are born. Nothing is commoner than the\nremark, that \u0026lsquo;So and so is like his father or his uncle\u0026rsquo;; and an\naged person may not unfrequently note a resemblance in a youth to a\nlong-forgotten ancestor, observing that \u0026lsquo;Nature sometimes skips a\ngeneration.\u0026rsquo; It may be true also, that if we knew more about our\nancestors, these similarities would be even more striking to us. Admitting the\nfacts which are thus described in a popular way, we may however remark that\nthere is no method of difference by which they can be defined or estimated, and\nthat they constitute only a small part of each individual. The doctrine of\nheredity may seem to take out of our hands the conduct of our own lives, but it\nis the idea, not the fact, which is really terrible to us. For what we have\nreceived from our ancestors is only a fraction of what we are, or may become.\nThe knowledge that drunkenness or insanity has been prevalent in a family may\nbe the best safeguard against their recurrence in a future generation. The\nparent will be most awake to the vices or diseases in his child of which he is\nmost sensible within himself. The whole of life may be directed to their\nprevention or cure. The traces of consumption may become fainter, or be wholly\neffaced: the inherent tendency to vice or crime may be eradicated. And so\nheredity, from being a curse, may become a blessing. We acknowledge that in the\nmatter of our birth, as in our nature generally, there are previous\ncircumstances which affect us. But upon this platform of circumstances or\nwithin this wall of necessity, we have still the power of creating a life for\nourselves by the informing energy of the human will.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThere is another aspect of the marriage question to which Plato is a stranger.\nAll the children born in his state are foundlings. It never occurred to him\nthat the greater part of them, according to universal experience, would have\nperished. For children can only be brought up in families. There is a subtle\nsympathy between the mother and the child which cannot be supplied by other\nmothers, or by \u0026lsquo;strong nurses one or more\u0026rsquo; (Laws). If Plato\u0026rsquo;s\n\u0026lsquo;pen\u0026rsquo; was as fatal as the Creches of Paris, or the foundling\nhospital of Dublin, more than nine-tenths of his children would have perished.\nThere would have been no need to expose or put out of the way the weaklier\nchildren, for they would have died of themselves. So emphatically does nature\nprotest against the destruction of the family.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat Plato had heard or seen of Sparta was applied by him in a mistaken way to\nhis ideal commonwealth. He probably observed that both the Spartan men and\nwomen were superior in form and strength to the other Greeks; and this\nsuperiority he was disposed to attribute to the laws and customs relating to\nmarriage. He did not consider that the desire of a noble offspring was a\npassion among the Spartans, or that their physical superiority was to be\nattributed chiefly, not to their marriage customs, but to their temperance and\ntraining. He did not reflect that Sparta was great, not in consequence of the\nrelaxation of morality, but in spite of it, by virtue of a political principle\nstronger far than existed in any other Grecian state. Least of all did he\nobserve that Sparta did not really produce the finest specimens of the Greek\nrace. The genius, the political inspiration of Athens, the love of\nliberty\u0026mdash;all that has made Greece famous with posterity, were wanting\namong the Spartans. They had no Themistocles, or Pericles, or Aeschylus, or\nSophocles, or Socrates, or Plato. The individual was not allowed to appear\nabove the state; the laws were fixed, and he had no business to alter or reform\nthem. Yet whence has the progress of cities and nations arisen, if not from\nremarkable individuals, coming into the world we know not how, and from causes\nover which we have no control? Something too much may have been said in modern\ntimes of the value of individuality. But we can hardly condemn too strongly a\nsystem which, instead of fostering the scattered seeds or sparks of genius and\ncharacter, tends to smother and extinguish them.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nStill, while condemning Plato, we must acknowledge that neither Christianity,\nnor any other form of religion and society, has hitherto been able to cope with\nthis most difficult of social problems, and that the side from which Plato\nregarded it is that from which we turn away. Population is the most untameable\nforce in the political and social world. Do we not find, especially in large\ncities, that the greatest hindrance to the amelioration of the poor is their\nimprovidence in marriage?\u0026mdash;a small fault truly, if not involving endless\nconsequences. There are whole countries too, such as India, or, nearer home,\nIreland, in which a right solution of the marriage question seems to lie at the\nfoundation of the happiness of the community. There are too many people on a\ngiven space, or they marry too early and bring into the world a sickly and\nhalf-developed offspring; or owing to the very conditions of their existence,\nthey become emaciated and hand on a similar life to their descendants. But who\ncan oppose the voice of prudence to the \u0026lsquo;mightiest passions of\nmankind\u0026rsquo; (Laws), especially when they have been licensed by custom and\nreligion? In addition to the influences of education, we seem to require some\nnew principles of right and wrong in these matters, some force of opinion,\nwhich may indeed be already heard whispering in private, but has never affected\nthe moral sentiments of mankind in general. We unavoidably lose sight of the\nprinciple of utility, just in that action of our lives in which we have the\nmost need of it. The influences which we can bring to bear upon this question\nare chiefly indirect. In a generation or two, education, emigration,\nimprovements in agriculture and manufactures, may have provided the solution.\nThe state physician hardly likes to probe the wound: it is beyond his art; a\nmatter which he cannot safely let alone, but which he dare not touch:\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n\u0026lsquo;We do but skin and film the ulcerous place.\u0026rsquo;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhen again in private life we see a whole family one by one dropping into the\ngrave under the Ate of some inherited malady, and the parents perhaps surviving\nthem, do our minds ever go back silently to that day twenty-five or thirty\nyears before on which under the fairest auspices, amid the rejoicings of\nfriends and acquaintances, a bride and bridegroom joined hands with one\nanother? In making such a reflection we are not opposing physical\nconsiderations to moral, but moral to physical; we are seeking to make the\nvoice of reason heard, which drives us back from the extravagance of\nsentimentalism on common sense. The late Dr. Combe is said by his biographer to\nhave resisted the temptation to marriage, because he knew that he was subject\nto hereditary consumption. One who deserved to be called a man of genius, a\nfriend of my youth, was in the habit of wearing a black ribbon on his wrist, in\norder to remind him that, being liable to outbreaks of insanity, he must not\ngive way to the natural impulses of affection: he died unmarried in a lunatic\nasylum. These two little facts suggest the reflection that a very few persons\nhave done from a sense of duty what the rest of mankind ought to have done\nunder like circumstances, if they had allowed themselves to think of all the\nmisery which they were about to bring into the world. If we could prevent such\nmarriages without any violation of feeling or propriety, we clearly ought; and\nthe prohibition in the course of time would be protected by a \u0026lsquo;horror\nnaturalis\u0026rsquo; similar to that which, in all civilized ages and countries,\nhas prevented the marriage of near relations by blood. Mankind would have been\nthe happier, if some things which are now allowed had from the beginning been\ndenied to them; if the sanction of religion could have prohibited practices\ninimical to health; if sanitary principles could in early ages have been\ninvested with a superstitious awe. But, living as we do far on in the\nworld\u0026rsquo;s history, we are no longer able to stamp at once with the impress\nof religion a new prohibition. A free agent cannot have his fancies regulated\nby law; and the execution of the law would be rendered impossible, owing to the\nuncertainty of the cases in which marriage was to be forbidden. Who can weigh\nvirtue, or even fortune against health, or moral and mental qualities against\nbodily? Who can measure probabilities against certainties? There has been some\ngood as well as evil in the discipline of suffering; and there are diseases,\nsuch as consumption, which have exercised a refining and softening influence on\nthe character. Youth is too inexperienced to balance such nice considerations;\nparents do not often think of them, or think of them too late. They are at a\ndistance and may probably be averted; change of place, a new state of life, the\ninterests of a home may be the cure of them. So persons vainly reason when\ntheir minds are already made up and their fortunes irrevocably linked together.\nNor is there any ground for supposing that marriages are to any great extent\ninfluenced by reflections of this sort, which seem unable to make any head\nagainst the irresistible impulse of individual attachment.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nLastly, no one can have observed the first rising flood of the passions in\nyouth, the difficulty of regulating them, and the effects on the whole mind and\nnature which follow from them, the stimulus which is given to them by the\nimagination, without feeling that there is something unsatisfactory in our\nmethod of treating them. That the most important influence on human life should\nbe wholly left to chance or shrouded in mystery, and instead of being\ndisciplined or understood, should be required to conform only to an external\nstandard of propriety\u0026mdash;cannot be regarded by the philosopher as a safe or\nsatisfactory condition of human things. And still those who have the charge of\nyouth may find a way by watchfulness, by affection, by the manliness and\ninnocence of their own lives, by occasional hints, by general admonitions which\nevery one can apply for himself, to mitigate this terrible evil which eats out\nthe heart of individuals and corrupts the moral sentiments of nations. In no\nduty towards others is there more need of reticence and self-restraint. So\ngreat is the danger lest he who would be the counsellor of another should\nreveal the secret prematurely, lest he should get another too much into his\npower; or fix the passing impression of evil by demanding the confession of it.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNor is Plato wrong in asserting that family attachments may interfere with\nhigher aims. If there have been some who \u0026lsquo;to party gave up what was meant\nfor mankind,\u0026rsquo; there have certainly been others who to family gave up what\nwas meant for mankind or for their country. The cares of children, the\nnecessity of procuring money for their support, the flatteries of the rich by\nthe poor, the exclusiveness of caste, the pride of birth or wealth, the\ntendency of family life to divert men from the pursuit of the ideal or the\nheroic, are as lowering in our own age as in that of Plato. And if we prefer to\nlook at the gentle influences of home, the development of the affections, the\namenities of society, the devotion of one member of a family for the good of\nthe others, which form one side of the picture, we must not quarrel with him,\nor perhaps ought rather to be grateful to him, for having presented to us the\nreverse. Without attempting to defend Plato on grounds of morality, we may\nallow that there is an aspect of the world which has not unnaturally led him\ninto error.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWe hardly appreciate the power which the idea of the State, like all other\nabstract ideas, exercised over the mind of Plato. To us the State seems to be\nbuilt up out of the family, or sometimes to be the framework in which family\nand social life is contained. But to Plato in his present mood of mind the\nfamily is only a disturbing influence which, instead of filling up, tends to\ndisarrange the higher unity of the State. No organization is needed except a\npolitical, which, regarded from another point of view, is a military one. The\nState is all-sufficing for the wants of man, and, like the idea of the Church\nin later ages, absorbs all other desires and affections. In time of war the\nthousand citizens are to stand like a rampart impregnable against the world or\nthe Persian host; in time of peace the preparation for war and their duties to\nthe State, which are also their duties to one another, take up their whole life\nand time. The only other interest which is allowed to them besides that of war,\nis the interest of philosophy. When they are too old to be soldiers they are to\nretire from active life and to have a second novitiate of study and\ncontemplation. There is an element of monasticism even in Plato\u0026rsquo;s\ncommunism. If he could have done without children, he might have converted his\nRepublic into a religious order. Neither in the Laws, when the daylight of\ncommon sense breaks in upon him, does he retract his error. In the state of\nwhich he would be the founder, there is no marrying or giving in marriage: but\nbecause of the infirmity of mankind, he condescends to allow the law of nature\nto prevail.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n(c) But Plato has an equal, or, in his own estimation, even greater paradox in\nreserve, which is summed up in the famous text, \u0026lsquo;Until kings are\nphilosophers or philosophers are kings, cities will never cease from\nill.\u0026rsquo; And by philosophers he explains himself to mean those who are\ncapable of apprehending ideas, especially the idea of good. To the attainment\nof this higher knowledge the second education is directed. Through a process of\ntraining which has already made them good citizens they are now to be made good\nlegislators. We find with some surprise (not unlike the feeling which Aristotle\nin a well-known passage describes the hearers of Plato\u0026rsquo;s lectures as\nexperiencing, when they went to a discourse on the idea of good, expecting to\nbe instructed in moral truths, and received instead of them arithmetical and\nmathematical formulae) that Plato does not propose for his future legislators\nany study of finance or law or military tactics, but only of abstract\nmathematics, as a preparation for the still more abstract conception of good.\nWe ask, with Aristotle, What is the use of a man knowing the idea of good, if\nhe does not know what is good for this individual, this state, this condition\nof society? We cannot understand how Plato\u0026rsquo;s legislators or guardians are\nto be fitted for their work of statesmen by the study of the five mathematical\nsciences. We vainly search in Plato\u0026rsquo;s own writings for any explanation of\nthis seeming absurdity.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe discovery of a great metaphysical conception seems to ravish the mind with\na prophetic consciousness which takes away the power of estimating its value.\nNo metaphysical enquirer has ever fairly criticised his own speculations; in\nhis own judgment they have been above criticism; nor has he understood that\nwhat to him seemed to be absolute truth may reappear in the next generation as\na form of logic or an instrument of thought. And posterity have also sometimes\nequally misapprehended the real value of his speculations. They appear to them\nto have contributed nothing to the stock of human knowledge. The IDEA of good\nis apt to be regarded by the modern thinker as an unmeaning abstraction; but he\nforgets that this abstraction is waiting ready for use, and will hereafter be\nfilled up by the divisions of knowledge. When mankind do not as yet know that\nthe world is subject to law, the introduction of the mere conception of law or\ndesign or final cause, and the far-off anticipation of the harmony of\nknowledge, are great steps onward. Even the crude generalization of the unity\nof all things leads men to view the world with different eyes, and may easily\naffect their conception of human life and of politics, and also their own\nconduct and character (Tim). We can imagine how a great mind like that of\nPericles might derive elevation from his intercourse with Anaxagoras (Phaedr.).\nTo be struggling towards a higher but unattainable conception is a more\nfavourable intellectual condition than to rest satisfied in a narrow portion of\nascertained fact. And the earlier, which have sometimes been the greater ideas\nof science, are often lost sight of at a later period. How rarely can we say of\nany modern enquirer in the magnificent language of Plato, that \u0026lsquo;He is the\nspectator of all time and of all existence!\u0026rsquo;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNor is there anything unnatural in the hasty application of these vast\nmetaphysical conceptions to practical and political life. In the first\nenthusiasm of ideas men are apt to see them everywhere, and to apply them in\nthe most remote sphere. They do not understand that the experience of ages is\nrequired to enable them to fill up \u0026lsquo;the intermediate axioms.\u0026rsquo; Plato\nhimself seems to have imagined that the truths of psychology, like those of\nastronomy and harmonics, would be arrived at by a process of deduction, and\nthat the method which he has pursued in the Fourth Book, of inferring them from\nexperience and the use of language, was imperfect and only provisional. But\nwhen, after having arrived at the idea of good, which is the end of the science\nof dialectic, he is asked, What is the nature, and what are the divisions of\nthe science? He refuses to answer, as if intending by the refusal to intimate\nthat the state of knowledge which then existed was not such as would allow the\nphilosopher to enter into his final rest. The previous sciences must first be\nstudied, and will, we may add, continue to be studied till the end of time,\nalthough in a sense different from any which Plato could have conceived. But we\nmay observe, that while he is aware of the vacancy of his own ideal, he is full\nof enthusiasm in the contemplation of it. Looking into the orb of light, he\nsees nothing, but he is warmed and elevated. The Hebrew prophet believed that\nfaith in God would enable him to govern the world; the Greek philosopher\nimagined that contemplation of the good would make a legislator. There is as\nmuch to be filled up in the one case as in the other, and the one mode of\nconception is to the Israelite what the other is to the Greek. Both find a\nrepose in a divine perfection, which, whether in a more personal or impersonal\nform, exists without them and independently of them, as well as within them.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThere is no mention of the idea of good in the Timaeus, nor of the divine\nCreator of the world in the Republic; and we are naturally led to ask in what\nrelation they stand to one another. Is God above or below the idea of good? Or\nis the Idea of Good another mode of conceiving God? The latter appears to be\nthe truer answer. To the Greek philosopher the perfection and unity of God was\na far higher conception than his personality, which he hardly found a word to\nexpress, and which to him would have seemed to be borrowed from mythology. To\nthe Christian, on the other hand, or to the modern thinker in general, it is\ndifficult, if not impossible, to attach reality to what he terms mere\nabstraction; while to Plato this very abstraction is the truest and most real\nof all things. Hence, from a difference in forms of thought, Plato appears to\nbe resting on a creation of his own mind only. But if we may be allowed to\nparaphrase the idea of good by the words \u0026lsquo;intelligent principle of law\nand order in the universe, embracing equally man and nature,\u0026rsquo; we begin to\nfind a meeting-point between him and ourselves.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe question whether the ruler or statesman should be a philosopher is one that\nhas not lost interest in modern times. In most countries of Europe and Asia\nthere has been some one in the course of ages who has truly united the power of\ncommand with the power of thought and reflection, as there have been also many\nfalse combinations of these qualities. Some kind of speculative power is\nnecessary both in practical and political life; like the rhetorician in the\nPhaedrus, men require to have a conception of the varieties of human character,\nand to be raised on great occasions above the commonplaces of ordinary life.\nYet the idea of the philosopher-statesman has never been popular with the mass\nof mankind; partly because he cannot take the world into his confidence or make\nthem understand the motives from which he acts; and also because they are\njealous of a power which they do not understand. The revolution which human\nnature desires to effect step by step in many ages is likely to be precipitated\nby him in a single year or life. They are afraid that in the pursuit of his\ngreater aims he may disregard the common feelings of humanity, he is too apt to\nbe looking into the distant future or back into the remote past, and unable to\nsee actions or events which, to use an expression of Plato\u0026rsquo;s \u0026lsquo;are\ntumbling out at his feet.\u0026rsquo; Besides, as Plato would say, there are other\ncorruptions of these philosophical statesmen. Either \u0026lsquo;the native hue of\nresolution is sicklied o\u0026rsquo;er with the pale cast of thought,\u0026rsquo; and at\nthe moment when action above all things is required he is undecided, or general\nprinciples are enunciated by him in order to cover some change of policy; or\nhis ignorance of the world has made him more easily fall a prey to the arts of\nothers; or in some cases he has been converted into a courtier, who enjoys the\nluxury of holding liberal opinions, but was never known to perform a liberal\naction. No wonder that mankind have been in the habit of calling statesmen of\nthis class pedants, sophisters, doctrinaires, visionaries. For, as we may be\nallowed to say, a little parodying the words of Plato, \u0026lsquo;they have seen\nbad imitations of the philosopher-statesman.\u0026rsquo; But a man in whom the power\nof thought and action are perfectly balanced, equal to the present, reaching\nforward to the future, \u0026lsquo;such a one,\u0026rsquo; ruling in a constitutional\nstate, \u0026lsquo;they have never seen.\u0026rsquo;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut as the philosopher is apt to fail in the routine of political life, so the\nordinary statesman is also apt to fail in extraordinary crises. When the face\nof the world is beginning to alter, and thunder is heard in the distance, he is\nstill guided by his old maxims, and is the slave of his inveterate party\nprejudices; he cannot perceive the signs of the times; instead of looking\nforward he looks back; he learns nothing and forgets nothing; with \u0026lsquo;wise\nsaws and modern instances\u0026rsquo; he would stem the rising tide of revolution.\nHe lives more and more within the circle of his own party, as the world without\nhim becomes stronger. This seems to be the reason why the old order of things\nmakes so poor a figure when confronted with the new, why churches can never\nreform, why most political changes are made blindly and convulsively. The great\ncrises in the history of nations have often been met by an ecclesiastical\npositiveness, and a more obstinate reassertion of principles which have lost\ntheir hold upon a nation. The fixed ideas of a reactionary statesman may be\ncompared to madness; they grow upon him, and he becomes possessed by them; no\njudgement of others is ever admitted by him to be weighed in the balance\nagainst his own.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n(d) Plato, labouring under what, to modern readers, appears to have been a\nconfusion of ideas, assimilates the state to the individual, and fails to\ndistinguish Ethics from Politics. He thinks that to be most of a state which is\nmost like one man, and in which the citizens have the greatest uniformity of\ncharacter. He does not see that the analogy is partly fallacious, and that the\nwill or character of a state or nation is really the balance or rather the\nsurplus of individual wills, which are limited by the condition of having to\nact in common. The movement of a body of men can never have the pliancy or\nfacility of a single man; the freedom of the individual, which is always\nlimited, becomes still more straitened when transferred to a nation. The powers\nof action and feeling are necessarily weaker and more balanced when they are\ndiffused through a community; whence arises the often discussed question,\n\u0026lsquo;Can a nation, like an individual, have a conscience?\u0026rsquo; We hesitate\nto say that the characters of nations are nothing more than the sum of the\ncharacters of the individuals who compose them; because there may be tendencies\nin individuals which react upon one another. A whole nation may be wiser than\nany one man in it; or may be animated by some common opinion or feeling which\ncould not equally have affected the mind of a single person, or may have been\ninspired by a leader of genius to perform acts more than human. Plato does not\nappear to have analysed the complications which arise out of the collective\naction of mankind. Neither is he capable of seeing that analogies, though\nspecious as arguments, may often have no foundation in fact, or of\ndistinguishing between what is intelligible or vividly present to the mind, and\nwhat is true. In this respect he is far below Aristotle, who is comparatively\nseldom imposed upon by false analogies. He cannot disentangle the arts from the\nvirtues\u0026mdash;at least he is always arguing from one to the other. His notion\nof music is transferred from harmony of sounds to harmony of life: in this he\nis assisted by the ambiguities of language as well as by the prevalence of\nPythagorean notions. And having once assimilated the state to the individual,\nhe imagines that he will find the succession of states paralleled in the lives\nof individuals.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nStill, through this fallacious medium, a real enlargement of ideas is attained.\nWhen the virtues as yet presented no distinct conception to the mind, a great\nadvance was made by the comparison of them with the arts; for virtue is partly\nart, and has an outward form as well as an inward principle. The harmony of\nmusic affords a lively image of the harmonies of the world and of human life,\nand may be regarded as a splendid illustration which was naturally mistaken for\na real analogy. In the same way the identification of ethics with politics has\na tendency to give definiteness to ethics, and also to elevate and ennoble\nmen\u0026rsquo;s notions of the aims of government and of the duties of citizens;\nfor ethics from one point of view may be conceived as an idealized law and\npolitics; and politics, as ethics reduced to the conditions of human society.\nThere have been evils which have arisen out of the attempt to identify them,\nand this has led to the separation or antagonism of them, which has been\nintroduced by modern political writers. But we may likewise feel that something\nhas been lost in their separation, and that the ancient philosophers who\nestimated the moral and intellectual wellbeing of mankind first, and the wealth\nof nations and individuals second, may have a salutary influence on the\nspeculations of modern times. Many political maxims originate in a reaction\nagainst an opposite error; and when the errors against which they were directed\nhave passed away, they in turn become errors.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n3. Plato\u0026rsquo;s views of education are in several respects remarkable; like\nthe rest of the Republic they are partly Greek and partly ideal, beginning with\nthe ordinary curriculum of the Greek youth, and extending to after-life. Plato\nis the first writer who distinctly says that education is to comprehend the\nwhole of life, and to be a preparation for another in which education begins\nagain. This is the continuous thread which runs through the Republic, and which\nmore than any other of his ideas admits of an application to modern life.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHe has long given up the notion that virtue cannot be taught; and he is\ndisposed to modify the thesis of the Protagoras, that the virtues are one and\nnot many. He is not unwilling to admit the sensible world into his scheme of\ntruth. Nor does he assert in the Republic the involuntariness of vice, which is\nmaintained by him in the Timaeus, Sophist, and Laws (Protag., Apol., Gorg.).\nNor do the so-called Platonic ideas recovered from a former state of existence\naffect his theory of mental improvement. Still we observe in him the remains of\nthe old Socratic doctrine, that true knowledge must be elicited from within,\nand is to be sought for in ideas, not in particulars of sense. Education, as he\nsays, will implant a principle of intelligence which is better than ten\nthousand eyes. The paradox that the virtues are one, and the kindred notion\nthat all virtue is knowledge, are not entirely renounced; the first is seen in\nthe supremacy given to justice over the rest; the second in the tendency to\nabsorb the moral virtues in the intellectual, and to centre all goodness in the\ncontemplation of the idea of good. The world of sense is still depreciated and\nidentified with opinion, though admitted to be a shadow of the true. In the\nRepublic he is evidently impressed with the conviction that vice arises chiefly\nfrom ignorance and may be cured by education; the multitude are hardly to be\ndeemed responsible for what they do. A faint allusion to the doctrine of\nreminiscence occurs in the Tenth Book; but Plato\u0026rsquo;s views of education\nhave no more real connection with a previous state of existence than our own;\nhe only proposes to elicit from the mind that which is there already. Education\nis represented by him, not as the filling of a vessel, but as the turning the\neye of the soul towards the light.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHe treats first of music or literature, which he divides into true and false,\nand then goes on to gymnastics; of infancy in the Republic he takes no notice,\nthough in the Laws he gives sage counsels about the nursing of children and the\nmanagement of the mothers, and would have an education which is even prior to\nbirth. But in the Republic he begins with the age at which the child is capable\nof receiving ideas, and boldly asserts, in language which sounds paradoxical to\nmodern ears, that he must be taught the false before he can learn the true. The\nmodern and ancient philosophical world are not agreed about truth and\nfalsehood; the one identifies truth almost exclusively with fact, the other\nwith ideas. This is the difference between ourselves and Plato, which is,\nhowever, partly a difference of words. For we too should admit that a child\nmust receive many lessons which he imperfectly understands; he must be taught\nsome things in a figure only, some too which he can hardly be expected to\nbelieve when he grows older; but we should limit the use of fiction by the\nnecessity of the case. Plato would draw the line differently; according to him\nthe aim of early education is not truth as a matter of fact, but truth as a\nmatter of principle; the child is to be taught first simple religious truths,\nand then simple moral truths, and insensibly to learn the lesson of good\nmanners and good taste. He would make an entire reformation of the old\nmythology; like Xenophanes and Heracleitus he is sensible of the deep chasm\nwhich separates his own age from Homer and Hesiod, whom he quotes and invests\nwith an imaginary authority, but only for his own purposes. The lusts and\ntreacheries of the gods are to be banished; the terrors of the world below are\nto be dispelled; the misbehaviour of the Homeric heroes is not to be a model\nfor youth. But there is another strain heard in Homer which may teach our youth\nendurance; and something may be learnt in medicine from the simple practice of\nthe Homeric age. The principles on which religion is to be based are two only:\nfirst, that God is true; secondly, that he is good. Modern and Christian\nwriters have often fallen short of these; they can hardly be said to have gone\nbeyond them.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe young are to be brought up in happy surroundings, out of the way of sights\nor sounds which may hurt the character or vitiate the taste. They are to live\nin an atmosphere of health; the breeze is always to be wafting to them the\nimpressions of truth and goodness. Could such an education be realized, or if\nour modern religious education could be bound up with truth and virtue and good\nmanners and good taste, that would be the best hope of human improvement.\nPlato, like ourselves, is looking forward to changes in the moral and religious\nworld, and is preparing for them. He recognizes the danger of unsettling young\nmen\u0026rsquo;s minds by sudden changes of laws and principles, by destroying the\nsacredness of one set of ideas when there is nothing else to take their place.\nHe is afraid too of the influence of the drama, on the ground that it\nencourages false sentiment, and therefore he would not have his children taken\nto the theatre; he thinks that the effect on the spectators is bad, and on the\nactors still worse. His idea of education is that of harmonious growth, in\nwhich are insensibly learnt the lessons of temperance and endurance, and the\nbody and mind develope in equal proportions. The first principle which runs\nthrough all art and nature is simplicity; this also is to be the rule of human\nlife.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe second stage of education is gymnastic, which answers to the period of\nmuscular growth and development. The simplicity which is enforced in music is\nextended to gymnastic; Plato is aware that the training of the body may be\ninconsistent with the training of the mind, and that bodily exercise may be\neasily overdone. Excessive training of the body is apt to give men a headache\nor to render them sleepy at a lecture on philosophy, and this they attribute\nnot to the true cause, but to the nature of the subject. Two points are\nnoticeable in Plato\u0026rsquo;s treatment of gymnastic:\u0026mdash;First, that the time\nof training is entirely separated from the time of literary education. He seems\nto have thought that two things of an opposite and different nature could not\nbe learnt at the same time. Here we can hardly agree with him; and, if we may\njudge by experience, the effect of spending three years between the ages of\nfourteen and seventeen in mere bodily exercise would be far from improving to\nthe intellect. Secondly, he affirms that music and gymnastic are not, as common\nopinion is apt to imagine, intended, the one for the cultivation of the mind\nand the other of the body, but that they are both equally designed for the\nimprovement of the mind. The body, in his view, is the servant of the mind; the\nsubjection of the lower to the higher is for the advantage of both. And\ndoubtless the mind may exercise a very great and paramount influence over the\nbody, if exerted not at particular moments and by fits and starts, but\ncontinuously, in making preparation for the whole of life. Other Greek writers\nsaw the mischievous tendency of Spartan discipline (Arist. Pol; Thuc.). But\nonly Plato recognized the fundamental error on which the practice was based.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe subject of gymnastic leads Plato to the sister subject of medicine, which\nhe further illustrates by the parallel of law. The modern disbelief in medicine\nhas led in this, as in some other departments of knowledge, to a demand for\ngreater simplicity; physicians are becoming aware that they often make diseases\n\u0026lsquo;greater and more complicated\u0026rsquo; by their treatment of them (Rep.).\nIn two thousand years their art has made but slender progress; what they have\ngained in the analysis of the parts is in a great degree lost by their feebler\nconception of the human frame as a whole. They have attended more to the cure\nof diseases than to the conditions of health; and the improvements in medicine\nhave been more than counterbalanced by the disuse of regular training. Until\nlately they have hardly thought of air and water, the importance of which was\nwell understood by the ancients; as Aristotle remarks, \u0026lsquo;Air and water,\nbeing the elements which we most use, have the greatest effect upon\nhealth\u0026rsquo; (Polit.). For ages physicians have been under the dominion of\nprejudices which have only recently given way; and now there are as many\nopinions in medicine as in theology, and an equal degree of scepticism and some\nwant of toleration about both. Plato has several good notions about medicine;\naccording to him, \u0026lsquo;the eye cannot be cured without the rest of the body,\nnor the body without the mind\u0026rsquo; (Charm.). No man of sense, he says in the\nTimaeus, would take physic; and we heartily sympathize with him in the Laws\nwhen he declares that \u0026lsquo;the limbs of the rustic worn with toil will derive\nmore benefit from warm baths than from the prescriptions of a not over wise\ndoctor.\u0026rsquo; But we can hardly praise him when, in obedience to the authority\nof Homer, he depreciates diet, or approve of the inhuman spirit in which he\nwould get rid of invalid and useless lives by leaving them to die. He does not\nseem to have considered that the \u0026lsquo;bridle of Theages\u0026rsquo; might be\naccompanied by qualities which were of far more value to the State than the\nhealth or strength of the citizens; or that the duty of taking care of the\nhelpless might be an important element of education in a State. The physician\nhimself (this is a delicate and subtle observation) should not be a man in\nrobust health; he should have, in modern phraseology, a nervous temperament; he\nshould have experience of disease in his own person, in order that his powers\nof observation may be quickened in the case of others.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe perplexity of medicine is paralleled by the perplexity of law; in which,\nagain, Plato would have men follow the golden rule of simplicity. Greater\nmatters are to be determined by the legislator or by the oracle of Delphi,\nlesser matters are to be left to the temporary regulation of the citizens\nthemselves. Plato is aware that laissez faire is an important element of\ngovernment. The diseases of a State are like the heads of a hydra; they\nmultiply when they are cut off. The true remedy for them is not extirpation but\nprevention. And the way to prevent them is to take care of education, and\neducation will take care of all the rest. So in modern times men have often\nfelt that the only political measure worth having\u0026mdash;the only one which\nwould produce any certain or lasting effect, was a measure of national\neducation. And in our own more than in any previous age the necessity has been\nrecognized of restoring the ever-increasing confusion of law to simplicity and\ncommon sense.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhen the training in music and gymnastic is completed, there follows the first\nstage of active and public life. But soon education is to begin again from a\nnew point of view. In the interval between the Fourth and Seventh Books we have\ndiscussed the nature of knowledge, and have thence been led to form a higher\nconception of what was required of us. For true knowledge, according to Plato,\nis of abstractions, and has to do, not with particulars or individuals, but\nwith universals only; not with the beauties of poetry, but with the ideas of\nphilosophy. And the great aim of education is the cultivation of the habit of\nabstraction. This is to be acquired through the study of the mathematical\nsciences. They alone are capable of giving ideas of relation, and of arousing\nthe dormant energies of thought.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nMathematics in the age of Plato comprehended a very small part of that which is\nnow included in them; but they bore a much larger proportion to the sum of\nhuman knowledge. They were the only organon of thought which the human mind at\nthat time possessed, and the only measure by which the chaos of particulars\ncould be reduced to rule and order. The faculty which they trained was\nnaturally at war with the poetical or imaginative; and hence to Plato, who is\neverywhere seeking for abstractions and trying to get rid of the illusions of\nsense, nearly the whole of education is contained in them. They seemed to have\nan inexhaustible application, partly because their true limits were not yet\nunderstood. These Plato himself is beginning to investigate; though not aware\nthat number and figure are mere abstractions of sense, he recognizes that the\nforms used by geometry are borrowed from the sensible world. He seeks to find\nthe ultimate ground of mathematical ideas in the idea of good, though he does\nnot satisfactorily explain the connexion between them; and in his conception of\nthe relation of ideas to numbers, he falls very far short of the definiteness\nattributed to him by Aristotle (Met.). But if he fails to recognize the true\nlimits of mathematics, he also reaches a point beyond them; in his view, ideas\nof number become secondary to a higher conception of knowledge. The\ndialectician is as much above the mathematician as the mathematician is above\nthe ordinary man. The one, the self-proving, the good which is the higher\nsphere of dialectic, is the perfect truth to which all things ascend, and in\nwhich they finally repose.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThis self-proving unity or idea of good is a mere vision of which no distinct\nexplanation can be given, relative only to a particular stage in Greek\nphilosophy. It is an abstraction under which no individuals are comprehended, a\nwhole which has no parts (Arist., Nic. Eth.). The vacancy of such a form was\nperceived by Aristotle, but not by Plato. Nor did he recognize that in the\ndialectical process are included two or more methods of investigation which are\nat variance with each other. He did not see that whether he took the longer or\nthe shorter road, no advance could be made in this way. And yet such visions\noften have an immense effect; for although the method of science cannot\nanticipate science, the idea of science, not as it is, but as it will be in the\nfuture, is a great and inspiring principle. In the pursuit of knowledge we are\nalways pressing forward to something beyond us; and as a false conception of\nknowledge, for example the scholastic philosophy, may lead men astray during\nmany ages, so the true ideal, though vacant, may draw all their thoughts in a\nright direction. It makes a great difference whether the general expectation of\nknowledge, as this indefinite feeling may be termed, is based upon a sound\njudgment. For mankind may often entertain a true conception of what knowledge\nought to be when they have but a slender experience of facts. The correlation\nof the sciences, the consciousness of the unity of nature, the idea of\nclassification, the sense of proportion, the unwillingness to stop short of\ncertainty or to confound probability with truth, are important principles of\nthe higher education. Although Plato could tell us nothing, and perhaps knew\nthat he could tell us nothing, of the absolute truth, he has exercised an\ninfluence on the human mind which even at the present day is not exhausted; and\npolitical and social questions may yet arise in which the thoughts of Plato may\nbe read anew and receive a fresh meaning.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe Idea of good is so called only in the Republic, but there are traces of it\nin other dialogues of Plato. It is a cause as well as an idea, and from this\npoint of view may be compared with the creator of the Timaeus, who out of his\ngoodness created all things. It corresponds to a certain extent with the modern\nconception of a law of nature, or of a final cause, or of both in one, and in\nthis regard may be connected with the measure and symmetry of the Philebus. It\nis represented in the Symposium under the aspect of beauty, and is supposed to\nbe attained there by stages of initiation, as here by regular gradations of\nknowledge. Viewed subjectively, it is the process or science of dialectic. This\nis the science which, according to the Phaedrus, is the true basis of rhetoric,\nwhich alone is able to distinguish the natures and classes of men and things;\nwhich divides a whole into the natural parts, and reunites the scattered parts\ninto a natural or organized whole; which defines the abstract essences or\nuniversal ideas of all things, and connects them; which pierces the veil of\nhypotheses and reaches the final cause or first principle of all; which regards\nthe sciences in relation to the idea of good. This ideal science is the highest\nprocess of thought, and may be described as the soul conversing with herself or\nholding communion with eternal truth and beauty, and in another form is the\neverlasting question and answer\u0026mdash;the ceaseless interrogative of Socrates.\nThe dialogues of Plato are themselves examples of the nature and method of\ndialectic. Viewed objectively, the idea of good is a power or cause which makes\nthe world without us correspond with the world within. Yet this world without\nus is still a world of ideas. With Plato the investigation of nature is another\ndepartment of knowledge, and in this he seeks to attain only probable\nconclusions (Timaeus).\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIf we ask whether this science of dialectic which Plato only half explains to\nus is more akin to logic or to metaphysics, the answer is that in his mind the\ntwo sciences are not as yet distinguished, any more than the subjective and\nobjective aspects of the world and of man, which German philosophy has revealed\nto us. Nor has he determined whether his science of dialectic is at rest or in\nmotion, concerned with the contemplation of absolute being, or with a process\nof development and evolution. Modern metaphysics may be described as the\nscience of abstractions, or as the science of the evolution of thought; modern\nlogic, when passing beyond the bounds of mere Aristotelian forms, may be\ndefined as the science of method. The germ of both of them is contained in the\nPlatonic dialectic; all metaphysicians have something in common with the ideas\nof Plato; all logicians have derived something from the method of Plato. The\nnearest approach in modern philosophy to the universal science of Plato, is to\nbe found in the Hegelian \u0026lsquo;succession of moments in the unity of the\nidea.\u0026rsquo; Plato and Hegel alike seem to have conceived the world as the\ncorrelation of abstractions; and not impossibly they would have understood one\nanother better than any of their commentators understand them (Swift\u0026rsquo;s\nVoyage to Laputa. \u0026lsquo;Having a desire to see those ancients who were most\nrenowned for wit and learning, I set apart one day on purpose. I proposed that\nHomer and Aristotle might appear at the head of all their commentators; but\nthese were so numerous that some hundreds were forced to attend in the court\nand outward rooms of the palace. I knew, and could distinguish these two\nheroes, at first sight, not only from the crowd, but from each other. Homer was\nthe taller and comelier person of the two, walked very erect for one of his\nage, and his eyes were the most quick and piercing I ever beheld. Aristotle\nstooped much, and made use of a staff. His visage was meagre, his hair lank and\nthin, and his voice hollow. I soon discovered that both of them were perfect\nstrangers to the rest of the company, and had never seen or heard of them\nbefore. And I had a whisper from a ghost, who shall be nameless, \u0026ldquo;That\nthese commentators always kept in the most distant quarters from their\nprincipals, in the lower world, through a consciousness of shame and guilt,\nbecause they had so horribly misrepresented the meaning of these authors to\nposterity.\u0026rdquo; I introduced Didymus and Eustathius to Homer, and prevailed\non him to treat them better than perhaps they deserved, for he soon found they\nwanted a genius to enter into the spirit of a poet. But Aristotle was out of\nall patience with the account I gave him of Scotus and Ramus, as I presented\nthem to him; and he asked them \u0026ldquo;whether the rest of the tribe were as\ngreat dunces as themselves?\u0026rdquo;\u0026rsquo;). There is, however, a difference\nbetween them: for whereas Hegel is thinking of all the minds of men as one\nmind, which developes the stages of the idea in different countries or at\ndifferent times in the same country, with Plato these gradations are regarded\nonly as an order of thought or ideas; the history of the human mind had not yet\ndawned upon him.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nMany criticisms may be made on Plato\u0026rsquo;s theory of education. While in some\nrespects he unavoidably falls short of modern thinkers, in others he is in\nadvance of them. He is opposed to the modes of education which prevailed in his\nown time; but he can hardly be said to have discovered new ones. He does not\nsee that education is relative to the characters of individuals; he only\ndesires to impress the same form of the state on the minds of all. He has no\nsufficient idea of the effect of literature on the formation of the mind, and\ngreatly exaggerates that of mathematics. His aim is above all things to train\nthe reasoning faculties; to implant in the mind the spirit and power of\nabstraction; to explain and define general notions, and, if possible, to\nconnect them. No wonder that in the vacancy of actual knowledge his followers,\nand at times even he himself, should have fallen away from the doctrine of\nideas, and have returned to that branch of knowledge in which alone the\nrelation of the one and many can be truly seen\u0026mdash;the science of number. In\nhis views both of teaching and training he might be styled, in modern language,\na doctrinaire; after the Spartan fashion he would have his citizens cast in one\nmould; he does not seem to consider that some degree of freedom, \u0026lsquo;a\nlittle wholesome neglect,\u0026rsquo; is necessary to strengthen and develope the\ncharacter and to give play to the individual nature. His citizens would not\nhave acquired that knowledge which in the vision of Er is supposed to be gained\nby the pilgrims from their experience of evil.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nOn the other hand, Plato is far in advance of modern philosophers and\ntheologians when he teaches that education is to be continued through life and\nwill begin again in another. He would never allow education of some kind to\ncease; although he was aware that the proverbial saying of Solon, \u0026lsquo;I grow\nold learning many things,\u0026rsquo; cannot be applied literally. Himself ravished\nwith the contemplation of the idea of good, and delighting in solid geometry\n(Rep.), he has no difficulty in imagining that a lifetime might be passed\nhappily in such pursuits. We who know how many more men of business there are\nin the world than real students or thinkers, are not equally sanguine. The\neducation which he proposes for his citizens is really the ideal life of the\nphilosopher or man of genius, interrupted, but only for a time, by practical\nduties,\u0026mdash;a life not for the many, but for the few.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYet the thought of Plato may not be wholly incapable of application to our own\ntimes. Even if regarded as an ideal which can never be realized, it may have a\ngreat effect in elevating the characters of mankind, and raising them above the\nroutine of their ordinary occupation or profession. It is the best form under\nwhich we can conceive the whole of life. Nevertheless the idea of Plato is not\neasily put into practice. For the education of after life is necessarily the\neducation which each one gives himself. Men and women cannot be brought\ntogether in schools or colleges at forty or fifty years of age; and if they\ncould the result would be disappointing. The destination of most men is what\nPlato would call \u0026lsquo;the Den\u0026rsquo; for the whole of life, and with that\nthey are content. Neither have they teachers or advisers with whom they can\ntake counsel in riper years. There is no \u0026lsquo;schoolmaster abroad\u0026rsquo; who\nwill tell them of their faults, or inspire them with the higher sense of duty,\nor with the ambition of a true success in life; no Socrates who will convict\nthem of ignorance; no Christ, or follower of Christ, who will reprove them of\nsin. Hence they have a difficulty in receiving the first element of\nimprovement, which is self-knowledge. The hopes of youth no longer stir them;\nthey rather wish to rest than to pursue high objects. A few only who have come\nacross great men and women, or eminent teachers of religion and morality, have\nreceived a second life from them, and have lighted a candle from the fire of\ntheir genius.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe want of energy is one of the main reasons why so few persons continue to\nimprove in later years. They have not the will, and do not know the way. They\n\u0026lsquo;never try an experiment,\u0026rsquo; or look up a point of interest for\nthemselves; they make no sacrifices for the sake of knowledge; their minds,\nlike their bodies, at a certain age become fixed. Genius has been defined as\n\u0026lsquo;the power of taking pains\u0026rsquo;; but hardly any one keeps up his\ninterest in knowledge throughout a whole life. The troubles of a family, the\nbusiness of making money, the demands of a profession destroy the elasticity of\nthe mind. The waxen tablet of the memory which was once capable of receiving\n\u0026lsquo;true thoughts and clear impressions\u0026rsquo; becomes hard and crowded;\nthere is not room for the accumulations of a long life (Theaet.). The student,\nas years advance, rather makes an exchange of knowledge than adds to his\nstores. There is no pressing necessity to learn; the stock of Classics or\nHistory or Natural Science which was enough for a man at twenty-five is enough\nfor him at fifty. Neither is it easy to give a definite answer to any one who\nasks how he is to improve. For self-education consists in a thousand things,\ncommonplace in themselves,\u0026mdash;in adding to what we are by nature something\nof what we are not; in learning to see ourselves as others see us; in judging,\nnot by opinion, but by the evidence of facts; in seeking out the society of\nsuperior minds; in a study of lives and writings of great men; in observation\nof the world and character; in receiving kindly the natural influence of\ndifferent times of life; in any act or thought which is raised above the\npractice or opinions of mankind; in the pursuit of some new or original\nenquiry; in any effort of mind which calls forth some latent power.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIf any one is desirous of carrying out in detail the Platonic education of\nafter-life, some such counsels as the following may be offered to\nhim:\u0026mdash;That he shall choose the branch of knowledge to which his own mind\nmost distinctly inclines, and in which he takes the greatest delight, either\none which seems to connect with his own daily employment, or, perhaps,\nfurnishes the greatest contrast to it. He may study from the speculative side\nthe profession or business in which he is practically engaged. He may make\nHomer, Dante, Shakespeare, Plato, Bacon the friends and companions of his life.\nHe may find opportunities of hearing the living voice of a great teacher. He\nmay select for enquiry some point of history or some unexplained phenomenon of\nnature. An hour a day passed in such scientific or literary pursuits will\nfurnish as many facts as the memory can retain, and will give him \u0026lsquo;a\npleasure not to be repented of\u0026rsquo; (Timaeus). Only let him beware of being\nthe slave of crotchets, or of running after a Will o\u0026rsquo; the Wisp in his\nignorance, or in his vanity of attributing to himself the gifts of a poet or\nassuming the air of a philosopher. He should know the limits of his own powers.\nBetter to build up the mind by slow additions, to creep on quietly from one\nthing to another, to gain insensibly new powers and new interests in knowledge,\nthan to form vast schemes which are never destined to be realized. But perhaps,\nas Plato would say, \u0026lsquo;This is part of another subject\u0026rsquo; (Tim.);\nthough we may also defend our digression by his example (Theaet.).\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n4. We remark with surprise that the progress of nations or the natural growth\nof institutions which fill modern treatises on political philosophy seem hardly\never to have attracted the attention of Plato and Aristotle. The ancients were\nfamiliar with the mutability of human affairs; they could moralize over the\nruins of cities and the fall of empires (Plato, Statesman, and Sulpicius\u0026rsquo;\nLetter to Cicero); by them fate and chance were deemed to be real powers,\nalmost persons, and to have had a great share in political events. The wiser of\nthem like Thucydides believed that \u0026lsquo;what had been would be again,\u0026rsquo;\nand that a tolerable idea of the future could be gathered from the past. Also\nthey had dreams of a Golden Age which existed once upon a time and might still\nexist in some unknown land, or might return again in the remote future. But the\nregular growth of a state enlightened by experience, progressing in knowledge,\nimproving in the arts, of which the citizens were educated by the fulfilment of\npolitical duties, appears never to have come within the range of their hopes\nand aspirations. Such a state had never been seen, and therefore could not be\nconceived by them. Their experience (Aristot. Metaph.; Plato, Laws) led them to\nconclude that there had been cycles of civilization in which the arts had been\ndiscovered and lost many times over, and cities had been overthrown and rebuilt\nagain and again, and deluges and volcanoes and other natural convulsions had\naltered the face of the earth. Tradition told them of many destructions of\nmankind and of the preservation of a remnant. The world began again after a\ndeluge and was reconstructed out of the fragments of itself. Also they were\nacquainted with empires of unknown antiquity, like the Egyptian or Assyrian;\nbut they had never seen them grow, and could not imagine, any more than we can,\nthe state of man which preceded them. They were puzzled and awestricken by the\nEgyptian monuments, of which the forms, as Plato says, not in a figure, but\nliterally, were ten thousand years old (Laws), and they contrasted the\nantiquity of Egypt with their own short memories.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe early legends of Hellas have no real connection with the later history:\nthey are at a distance, and the intermediate region is concealed from view;\nthere is no road or path which leads from one to the other. At the beginning of\nGreek history, in the vestibule of the temple, is seen standing first of all\nthe figure of the legislator, himself the interpreter and servant of the God.\nThe fundamental laws which he gives are not supposed to change with time and\ncircumstances. The salvation of the state is held rather to depend on the\ninviolable maintenance of them. They were sanctioned by the authority of\nheaven, and it was deemed impiety to alter them. The desire to maintain them\nunaltered seems to be the origin of what at first sight is very surprising to\nus\u0026mdash;the intolerant zeal of Plato against innovators in religion or\npolitics (Laws); although with a happy inconsistency he is also willing that\nthe laws of other countries should be studied and improvements in legislation\nprivately communicated to the Nocturnal Council (Laws). The additions which\nwere made to them in later ages in order to meet the increasing complexity of\naffairs were still ascribed by a fiction to the original legislator; and the\nwords of such enactments at Athens were disputed over as if they had been the\nwords of Solon himself. Plato hopes to preserve in a later generation the mind\nof the legislator; he would have his citizens remain within the lines which he\nhas laid down for them. He would not harass them with minute regulations, he\nwould have allowed some changes in the laws: but not changes which would affect\nthe fundamental institutions of the state, such for example as would convert an\naristocracy into a timocracy, or a timocracy into a popular form of government.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nPassing from speculations to facts, we observe that progress has been the\nexception rather than the law of human history. And therefore we are not\nsurprised to find that the idea of progress is of modern rather than of ancient\ndate; and, like the idea of a philosophy of history, is not more than a century\nor two old. It seems to have arisen out of the impression left on the human\nmind by the growth of the Roman Empire and of the Christian Church, and to be\ndue to the political and social improvements which they introduced into the\nworld; and still more in our own century to the idealism of the first French\nRevolution and the triumph of American Independence; and in a yet greater\ndegree to the vast material prosperity and growth of population in England and\nher colonies and in America. It is also to be ascribed in a measure to the\ngreater study of the philosophy of history. The optimist temperament of some\ngreat writers has assisted the creation of it, while the opposite character has\nled a few to regard the future of the world as dark. The \u0026lsquo;spectator of\nall time and of all existence\u0026rsquo; sees more of \u0026lsquo;the increasing purpose\nwhich through the ages ran\u0026rsquo; than formerly: but to the inhabitant of a\nsmall state of Hellas the vision was necessarily limited like the valley in\nwhich he dwelt. There was no remote past on which his eye could rest, nor any\nfuture from which the veil was partly lifted up by the analogy of history. The\nnarrowness of view, which to ourselves appears so singular, was to him natural,\nif not unavoidable.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n5. For the relation of the Republic to the Statesman and the Laws, and the two\nother works of Plato which directly treat of politics, see the Introductions to\nthe two latter; a few general points of comparison may be touched upon in this\nplace.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd first of the Laws.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n(1) The Republic, though probably written at intervals, yet speaking generally\nand judging by the indications of thought and style, may be reasonably ascribed\nto the middle period of Plato\u0026rsquo;s life: the Laws are certainly the work of\nhis declining years, and some portions of them at any rate seem to have been\nwritten in extreme old age.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n(2) The Republic is full of hope and aspiration: the Laws bear the stamp of\nfailure and disappointment. The one is a finished work which received the last\ntouches of the author: the other is imperfectly executed, and apparently\nunfinished. The one has the grace and beauty of youth: the other has lost the\npoetical form, but has more of the severity and knowledge of life which is\ncharacteristic of old age.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n(3) The most conspicuous defect of the Laws is the failure of dramatic power,\nwhereas the Republic is full of striking contrasts of ideas and oppositions of\ncharacter.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n(4) The Laws may be said to have more the nature of a sermon, the Republic of a\npoem; the one is more religious, the other more intellectual.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n(5) Many theories of Plato, such as the doctrine of ideas, the government of\nthe world by philosophers, are not found in the Laws; the immortality of the\nsoul is first mentioned in xii; the person of Socrates has altogether\ndisappeared. The community of women and children is renounced; the institution\nof common or public meals for women (Laws) is for the first time introduced\n(Ar. Pol.).\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n(6) There remains in the Laws the old enmity to the poets, who are ironically\nsaluted in high-flown terms, and, at the same time, are peremptorily ordered\nout of the city, if they are not willing to submit their poems to the\ncensorship of the magistrates (Rep.).\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n(7) Though the work is in most respects inferior, there are a few passages in\nthe Laws, such as the honour due to the soul, the evils of licentious or\nunnatural love, the whole of Book x. (religion), the dishonesty of retail\ntrade, and bequests, which come more home to us, and contain more of what may\nbe termed the modern element in Plato than almost anything in the Republic.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe relation of the two works to one another is very well given:\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n(1) by Aristotle in the Politics from the side of the Laws:\u0026mdash;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n\u0026lsquo;The same, or nearly the same, objections apply to Plato\u0026rsquo;s later\nwork, the Laws, and therefore we had better examine briefly the constitution\nwhich is therein described. In the Republic, Socrates has definitely settled in\nall a few questions only; such as the community of women and children, the\ncommunity of property, and the constitution of the state. The population is\ndivided into two classes\u0026mdash;one of husbandmen, and the other of warriors;\nfrom this latter is taken a third class of counsellors and rulers of the state.\nBut Socrates has not determined whether the husbandmen and artists are to have\na share in the government, and whether they too are to carry arms and share in\nmilitary service or not. He certainly thinks that the women ought to share in\nthe education of the guardians, and to fight by their side. The remainder of\nthe work is filled up with digressions foreign to the main subject, and with\ndiscussions about the education of the guardians. In the Laws there is hardly\nanything but laws; not much is said about the constitution. This, which he had\nintended to make more of the ordinary type, he gradually brings round to the\nother or ideal form. For with the exception of the community of women and\nproperty, he supposes everything to be the same in both states; there is to be\nthe same education; the citizens of both are to live free from servile\noccupations, and there are to be common meals in both. The only difference is\nthat in the Laws the common meals are extended to women, and the warriors\nnumber about 5000, but in the Republic only 1000.\u0026rsquo;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n(2) by Plato in the Laws (Book v.), from the side of the Republic:\u0026mdash;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n\u0026lsquo;The first and highest form of the state and of the government and of the\nlaw is that in which there prevails most widely the ancient saying that\n\u0026ldquo;Friends have all things in common.\u0026rdquo; Whether there is now, or ever\nwill be, this communion of women and children and of property, in which the\nprivate and individual is altogether banished from life, and things which are\nby nature private, such as eyes and ears and hands, have become common, and all\nmen express praise and blame, and feel joy and sorrow, on the same occasions,\nand the laws unite the city to the utmost,\u0026mdash;whether all this is possible\nor not, I say that no man, acting upon any other principle, will ever\nconstitute a state more exalted in virtue, or truer or better than this. Such a\nstate, whether inhabited by Gods or sons of Gods, will make them blessed who\ndwell therein; and therefore to this we are to look for the pattern of the\nstate, and to cling to this, and, as far as possible, to seek for one which is\nlike this. The state which we have now in hand, when created, will be nearest\nto immortality and unity in the next degree; and after that, by the grace of\nGod, we will complete the third one. And we will begin by speaking of the\nnature and origin of the second.\u0026rsquo;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe comparatively short work called the Statesman or Politicus in its style and\nmanner is more akin to the Laws, while in its idealism it rather resembles the\nRepublic. As far as we can judge by various indications of language and\nthought, it must be later than the one and of course earlier than the other. In\nboth the Republic and Statesman a close connection is maintained between\nPolitics and Dialectic. In the Statesman, enquiries into the principles of\nMethod are interspersed with discussions about Politics. The comparative\nadvantages of the rule of law and of a person are considered, and the decision\ngiven in favour of a person (Arist. Pol.). But much may be said on the other\nside, nor is the opposition necessary; for a person may rule by law, and law\nmay be so applied as to be the living voice of the legislator. As in the\nRepublic, there is a myth, describing, however, not a future, but a former\nexistence of mankind. The question is asked, \u0026lsquo;Whether the state of\ninnocence which is described in the myth, or a state like our own which\npossesses art and science and distinguishes good from evil, is the preferable\ncondition of man.\u0026rsquo; To this question of the comparative happiness of\ncivilized and primitive life, which was so often discussed in the last century\nand in our own, no answer is given. The Statesman, though less perfect in style\nthan the Republic and of far less range, may justly be regarded as one of the\ngreatest of Plato\u0026rsquo;s dialogues.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n6. Others as well as Plato have chosen an ideal Republic to be the vehicle of\nthoughts which they could not definitely express, or which went beyond their\nown age. The classical writing which approaches most nearly to the Republic of\nPlato is the \u0026lsquo;De Republica\u0026rsquo; of Cicero; but neither in this nor in\nany other of his dialogues does he rival the art of Plato. The manners are\nclumsy and inferior; the hand of the rhetorician is apparent at every turn. Yet\nnoble sentiments are constantly recurring: the true note of Roman\npatriotism\u0026mdash;\u0026lsquo;We Romans are a great people\u0026rsquo;\u0026mdash;resounds\nthrough the whole work. Like Socrates, Cicero turns away from the phenomena of\nthe heavens to civil and political life. He would rather not discuss the\n\u0026lsquo;two Suns\u0026rsquo; of which all Rome was talking, when he can converse\nabout \u0026lsquo;the two nations in one\u0026rsquo; which had divided Rome ever since\nthe days of the Gracchi. Like Socrates again, speaking in the person of Scipio,\nhe is afraid lest he should assume too much the character of a teacher, rather\nthan of an equal who is discussing among friends the two sides of a question.\nHe would confine the terms King or State to the rule of reason and justice, and\nhe will not concede that title either to a democracy or to a monarchy. But\nunder the rule of reason and justice he is willing to include the natural\nsuperior ruling over the natural inferior, which he compares to the soul ruling\nover the body. He prefers a mixture of forms of government to any single one.\nThe two portraits of the just and the unjust, which occur in the second book of\nthe Republic, are transferred to the state\u0026mdash;Philus, one of the\ninterlocutors, maintaining against his will the necessity of injustice as a\nprinciple of government, while the other, Laelius, supports the opposite\nthesis. His views of language and number are derived from Plato; like him he\ndenounces the drama. He also declares that if his life were to be twice as long\nhe would have no time to read the lyric poets. The picture of democracy is\ntranslated by him word for word, though he had hardly shown himself able to\n\u0026lsquo;carry the jest\u0026rsquo; of Plato. He converts into a stately sentence the\nhumorous fancy about the animals, who \u0026lsquo;are so imbued with the spirit of\ndemocracy that they make the passers-by get out of their way.\u0026rsquo; His\ndescription of the tyrant is imitated from Plato, but is far inferior. The\nsecond book is historical, and claims for the Roman constitution (which is to\nhim the ideal) a foundation of fact such as Plato probably intended to have\ngiven to the Republic in the Critias. His most remarkable imitation of Plato is\nthe adaptation of the vision of Er, which is converted by Cicero into the\n\u0026lsquo;Somnium Scipionis\u0026rsquo;; he has \u0026lsquo;romanized\u0026rsquo; the myth of the\nRepublic, adding an argument for the immortality of the soul taken from the\nPhaedrus, and some other touches derived from the Phaedo and the Timaeus.\nThough a beautiful tale and containing splendid passages, the \u0026lsquo;Somnium\nScipionis; is very inferior to the vision of Er; it is only a dream, and hardly\nallows the reader to suppose that the writer believes in his own creation.\nWhether his dialogues were framed on the model of the lost dialogues of\nAristotle, as he himself tells us, or of Plato, to which they bear many\nsuperficial resemblances, he is still the Roman orator; he is not conversing,\nbut making speeches, and is never able to mould the intractable Latin to the\ngrace and ease of the Greek Platonic dialogue. But if he is defective in form,\nmuch more is he inferior to the Greek in matter; he nowhere in his\nphilosophical writings leaves upon our minds the impression of an original\nthinker.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nPlato\u0026rsquo;s Republic has been said to be a church and not a state; and such\nan ideal of a city in the heavens has always hovered over the Christian world,\nand is embodied in St. Augustine\u0026rsquo;s \u0026lsquo;De Civitate Dei,\u0026rsquo; which\nis suggested by the decay and fall of the Roman Empire, much in the same manner\nin which we may imagine the Republic of Plato to have been influenced by the\ndecline of Greek politics in the writer\u0026rsquo;s own age. The difference is that\nin the time of Plato the degeneracy, though certain, was gradual and\ninsensible: whereas the taking of Rome by the Goths stirred like an earthquake\nthe age of St. Augustine. Men were inclined to believe that the overthrow of\nthe city was to be ascribed to the anger felt by the old Roman deities at the\nneglect of their worship. St. Augustine maintains the opposite thesis; he\nargues that the destruction of the Roman Empire is due, not to the rise of\nChristianity, but to the vices of Paganism. He wanders over Roman history, and\nover Greek philosophy and mythology, and finds everywhere crime, impiety and\nfalsehood. He compares the worst parts of the Gentile religions with the best\nelements of the faith of Christ. He shows nothing of the spirit which led\nothers of the early Christian Fathers to recognize in the writings of the Greek\nphilosophers the power of the divine truth. He traces the parallel of the\nkingdom of God, that is, the history of the Jews, contained in their\nscriptures, and of the kingdoms of the world, which are found in gentile\nwriters, and pursues them both into an ideal future. It need hardly be remarked\nthat his use both of Greek and of Roman historians and of the sacred writings\nof the Jews is wholly uncritical. The heathen mythology, the Sybilline oracles,\nthe myths of Plato, the dreams of Neo-Platonists are equally regarded by him as\nmatter of fact. He must be acknowledged to be a strictly polemical or\ncontroversial writer who makes the best of everything on one side and the worst\nof everything on the other. He has no sympathy with the old Roman life as Plato\nhas with Greek life, nor has he any idea of the ecclesiastical kingdom which\nwas to arise out of the ruins of the Roman empire. He is not blind to the\ndefects of the Christian Church, and looks forward to a time when Christian and\nPagan shall be alike brought before the judgment-seat, and the true City of God\nshall appear…The work of St. Augustine is a curious repertory of antiquarian\nlearning and quotations, deeply penetrated with Christian ethics, but showing\nlittle power of reasoning, and a slender knowledge of the Greek literature and\nlanguage. He was a great genius, and a noble character, yet hardly capable of\nfeeling or understanding anything external to his own theology. Of all the\nancient philosophers he is most attracted by Plato, though he is very slightly\nacquainted with his writings. He is inclined to believe that the idea of\ncreation in the Timaeus is derived from the narrative in Genesis; and he is\nstrangely taken with the coincidence (?) of Plato\u0026rsquo;s saying that\n\u0026lsquo;the philosopher is the lover of God,\u0026rsquo; and the words of the Book of\nExodus in which God reveals himself to Moses (Exod.) He dwells at length on\nmiracles performed in his own day, of which the evidence is regarded by him as\nirresistible. He speaks in a very interesting manner of the beauty and utility\nof nature and of the human frame, which he conceives to afford a foretaste of\nthe heavenly state and of the resurrection of the body. The book is not really\nwhat to most persons the title of it would imply, and belongs to an age which\nhas passed away. But it contains many fine passages and thoughts which are for\nall time.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe short treatise de Monarchia of Dante is by far the most remarkable of\nmediaeval ideals, and bears the impress of the great genius in whom Italy and\nthe Middle Ages are so vividly reflected. It is the vision of an Universal\nEmpire, which is supposed to be the natural and necessary government of the\nworld, having a divine authority distinct from the Papacy, yet coextensive with\nit. It is not \u0026lsquo;the ghost of the dead Roman Empire sitting crowned upon\nthe grave thereof,\u0026rsquo; but the legitimate heir and successor of it,\njustified by the ancient virtues of the Romans and the beneficence of their\nrule. Their right to be the governors of the world is also confirmed by the\ntestimony of miracles, and acknowledged by St. Paul when he appealed to Caesar,\nand even more emphatically by Christ Himself, Who could not have made atonement\nfor the sins of men if He had not been condemned by a divinely authorized\ntribunal. The necessity for the establishment of an Universal Empire is proved\npartly by a priori arguments such as the unity of God and the unity of the\nfamily or nation; partly by perversions of Scripture and history, by false\nanalogies of nature, by misapplied quotations from the classics, and by odd\nscraps and commonplaces of logic, showing a familiar but by no means exact\nknowledge of Aristotle (of Plato there is none). But a more convincing argument\nstill is the miserable state of the world, which he touchingly describes. He\nsees no hope of happiness or peace for mankind until all nations of the earth\nare comprehended in a single empire. The whole treatise shows how deeply the\nidea of the Roman Empire was fixed in the minds of his contemporaries. Not much\nargument was needed to maintain the truth of a theory which to his own\ncontemporaries seemed so natural and congenial. He speaks, or rather preaches,\nfrom the point of view, not of the ecclesiastic, but of the layman, although,\nas a good Catholic, he is willing to acknowledge that in certain respects the\nEmpire must submit to the Church. The beginning and end of all his noble\nreflections and of his arguments, good and bad, is the aspiration \u0026lsquo;that\nin this little plot of earth belonging to mortal man life may pass in freedom\nand peace.\u0026rsquo; So inextricably is his vision of the future bound up with the\nbeliefs and circumstances of his own age.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe \u0026lsquo;Utopia\u0026rsquo; of Sir Thomas More is a surprising monument of his\ngenius, and shows a reach of thought far beyond his contemporaries. The book\nwas written by him at the age of about 34 or 35, and is full of the generous\nsentiments of youth. He brings the light of Plato to bear upon the miserable\nstate of his own country. Living not long after the Wars of the Roses, and in\nthe dregs of the Catholic Church in England, he is indignant at the corruption\nof the clergy, at the luxury of the nobility and gentry, at the sufferings of\nthe poor, at the calamities caused by war. To the eye of More the whole world\nwas in dissolution and decay; and side by side with the misery and oppression\nwhich he has described in the First Book of the Utopia, he places in the Second\nBook the ideal state which by the help of Plato he had constructed. The times\nwere full of stir and intellectual interest. The distant murmur of the\nReformation was beginning to be heard. To minds like More\u0026rsquo;s, Greek\nliterature was a revelation: there had arisen an art of interpretation, and the\nNew Testament was beginning to be understood as it had never been before, and\nhas not often been since, in its natural sense. The life there depicted\nappeared to him wholly unlike that of Christian commonwealths, in which\n\u0026lsquo;he saw nothing but a certain conspiracy of rich men procuring their own\ncommodities under the name and title of the Commonwealth.\u0026rsquo; He thought\nthat Christ, like Plato, \u0026lsquo;instituted all things common,\u0026rsquo; for which\nreason, he tells us, the citizens of Utopia were the more willing to receive\nhis doctrines (\u0026lsquo;Howbeit, I think this was no small help and furtherance\nin the matter, that they heard us say that Christ instituted among his, all\nthings common, and that the same community doth yet remain in the rightest\nChristian communities\u0026rsquo; (Utopia).). The community of property is a fixed\nidea with him, though he is aware of the arguments which may be urged on the\nother side (\u0026lsquo;These things (I say), when I consider with myself, I hold\nwell with Plato, and do nothing marvel that he would make no laws for them that\nrefused those laws, whereby all men should have and enjoy equal portions of\nriches and commodities. For the wise men did easily foresee this to be the one\nand only way to the wealth of a community, if equality of all things should be\nbrought in and established\u0026rsquo; (Utopia).). We wonder how in the reign of\nHenry VIII, though veiled in another language and published in a foreign\ncountry, such speculations could have been endured.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHe is gifted with far greater dramatic invention than any one who succeeded\nhim, with the exception of Swift. In the art of feigning he is a worthy\ndisciple of Plato. Like him, starting from a small portion of fact, he founds\nhis tale with admirable skill on a few lines in the Latin narrative of the\nvoyages of Amerigo Vespucci. He is very precise about dates and facts, and has\nthe power of making us believe that the narrator of the tale must have been an\neyewitness. We are fairly puzzled by his manner of mixing up real and imaginary\npersons; his boy John Clement and Peter Giles, citizen of Antwerp, with whom he\ndisputes about the precise words which are supposed to have been used by the\n(imaginary) Portuguese traveller, Raphael Hythloday. \u0026lsquo;I have the more\ncause,\u0026rsquo; says Hythloday, \u0026lsquo;to fear that my words shall not be\nbelieved, for that I know how difficultly and hardly I myself would have\nbelieved another man telling the same, if I had not myself seen it with mine\nown eyes.\u0026rsquo; Or again: \u0026lsquo;If you had been with me in Utopia, and had\npresently seen their fashions and laws as I did which lived there five years\nand more, and would never have come thence, but only to make the new land known\nhere,\u0026rsquo; etc. More greatly regrets that he forgot to ask Hythloday in what\npart of the world Utopia is situated; he \u0026lsquo;would have spent no small sum\nof money rather than it should have escaped him,\u0026rsquo; and he begs Peter Giles\nto see Hythloday or write to him and obtain an answer to the question. After\nthis we are not surprised to hear that a Professor of Divinity (perhaps\n\u0026lsquo;a late famous vicar of Croydon in Surrey,\u0026rsquo; as the translator\nthinks) is desirous of being sent thither as a missionary by the High Bishop,\n\u0026lsquo;yea, and that he may himself be made Bishop of Utopia, nothing doubting\nthat he must obtain this Bishopric with suit; and he counteth that a godly suit\nwhich proceedeth not of the desire of honour or lucre, but only of a godly\nzeal.\u0026rsquo; The design may have failed through the disappearance of Hythloday,\nconcerning whom we have \u0026lsquo;very uncertain news\u0026rsquo; after his departure.\nThere is no doubt, however, that he had told More and Giles the exact situation\nof the island, but unfortunately at the same moment More\u0026rsquo;s attention, as\nhe is reminded in a letter from Giles, was drawn off by a servant, and one of\nthe company from a cold caught on shipboard coughed so loud as to prevent Giles\nfrom hearing. And \u0026lsquo;the secret has perished\u0026rsquo; with him; to this day\nthe place of Utopia remains unknown.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe words of Phaedrus, \u0026lsquo;O Socrates, you can easily invent Egyptians or\nanything,\u0026rsquo; are recalled to our mind as we read this lifelike fiction. Yet\nthe greater merit of the work is not the admirable art, but the originality of\nthought. More is as free as Plato from the prejudices of his age, and far more\ntolerant. The Utopians do not allow him who believes not in the immortality of\nthe soul to share in the administration of the state (Laws), \u0026lsquo;howbeit\nthey put him to no punishment, because they be persuaded that it is in no\nman\u0026rsquo;s power to believe what he list\u0026rsquo;; and \u0026lsquo;no man is to be\nblamed for reasoning in support of his own religion (\u0026lsquo;One of our company\nin my presence was sharply punished. He, as soon as he was baptised, began,\nagainst our wills, with more earnest affection than wisdom, to reason of\nChrist\u0026rsquo;s religion, and began to wax so hot in his matter, that he did not\nonly prefer our religion before all other, but also did despise and condemn all\nother, calling them profane, and the followers of them wicked and devilish, and\nthe children of everlasting damnation. When he had thus long reasoned the\nmatter, they laid hold on him, accused him, and condemned him into exile, not\nas a despiser of religion, but as a seditious person and a raiser up of\ndissension among the people\u0026rsquo;).\u0026rsquo; In the public services \u0026lsquo;no\nprayers be used, but such as every man may boldly pronounce without giving\noffence to any sect.\u0026rsquo; He says significantly, \u0026lsquo;There be that give\nworship to a man that was once of excellent virtue or of famous glory, not only\nas God, but also the chiefest and highest God. But the most and the wisest\npart, rejecting all these, believe that there is a certain godly power unknown,\nfar above the capacity and reach of man\u0026rsquo;s wit, dispersed throughout all\nthe world, not in bigness, but in virtue and power. Him they call the Father of\nall. To Him alone they attribute the beginnings, the increasings, the\nproceedings, the changes, and the ends of all things. Neither give they any\ndivine honours to any other than him.\u0026rsquo; So far was More from sharing the\npopular beliefs of his time. Yet at the end he reminds us that he does not in\nall respects agree with the customs and opinions of the Utopians which he\ndescribes. And we should let him have the benefit of this saving clause, and\nnot rudely withdraw the veil behind which he has been pleased to conceal\nhimself.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNor is he less in advance of popular opinion in his political and moral\nspeculations. He would like to bring military glory into contempt; he would set\nall sorts of idle people to profitable occupation, including in the same class,\npriests, women, noblemen, gentlemen, and \u0026lsquo;sturdy and valiant\nbeggars,\u0026rsquo; that the labour of all may be reduced to six hours a day. His\ndislike of capital punishment, and plans for the reformation of offenders; his\ndetestation of priests and lawyers (Compare his satirical observation:\n\u0026lsquo;They (the Utopians) have priests of exceeding holiness, and therefore\nvery few.); his remark that \u0026lsquo;although every one may hear of ravenous dogs\nand wolves and cruel man-eaters, it is not easy to find states that are well\nand wisely governed,\u0026rsquo; are curiously at variance with the notions of his\nage and indeed with his own life. There are many points in which he shows a\nmodern feeling and a prophetic insight like Plato. He is a sanitary reformer;\nhe maintains that civilized states have a right to the soil of waste countries;\nhe is inclined to the opinion which places happiness in virtuous pleasures, but\nherein, as he thinks, not disagreeing from those other philosophers who define\nvirtue to be a life according to nature. He extends the idea of happiness so as\nto include the happiness of others; and he argues ingeniously, \u0026lsquo;All men\nagree that we ought to make others happy; but if others, how much more\nourselves!\u0026rsquo; And still he thinks that there may be a more excellent way,\nbut to this no man\u0026rsquo;s reason can attain unless heaven should inspire him\nwith a higher truth. His ceremonies before marriage; his humane proposal that\nwar should be carried on by assassinating the leaders of the enemy, may be\ncompared to some of the paradoxes of Plato. He has a charming fancy, like the\naffinities of Greeks and barbarians in the Timaeus, that the Utopians learnt\nthe language of the Greeks with the more readiness because they were originally\nof the same race with them. He is penetrated with the spirit of Plato, and\nquotes or adapts many thoughts both from the Republic and from the Timaeus. He\nprefers public duties to private, and is somewhat impatient of the importunity\nof relations. His citizens have no silver or gold of their own, but are ready\nenough to pay them to their mercenaries. There is nothing of which he is more\ncontemptuous than the love of money. Gold is used for fetters of criminals, and\ndiamonds and pearls for children\u0026rsquo;s necklaces (When the ambassadors came\narrayed in gold and peacocks\u0026rsquo; feathers \u0026lsquo;to the eyes of all the\nUtopians except very few, which had been in other countries for some reasonable\ncause, all that gorgeousness of apparel seemed shameful and reproachful. In so\nmuch that they most reverently saluted the vilest and most abject of them for\nlords\u0026mdash;passing over the ambassadors themselves without any honour, judging\nthem by their wearing of golden chains to be bondmen. You should have seen\nchildren also, that had cast away their pearls and precious stones, when they\nsaw the like sticking upon the ambassadors\u0026rsquo; caps, dig and push their\nmothers under the sides, saying thus to them\u0026mdash;\u0026ldquo;Look, though he were\na little child still.\u0026rdquo; But the mother; yea and that also in good earnest:\n\u0026ldquo;Peace, son,\u0026rdquo; saith she, \u0026ldquo;I think he be some of the\nambassadors\u0026rsquo; fools.\u0026rdquo;\u0026rsquo;)\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nLike Plato he is full of satirical reflections on governments and princes; on\nthe state of the world and of knowledge. The hero of his discourse (Hythloday)\nis very unwilling to become a minister of state, considering that he would lose\nhis independence and his advice would never be heeded (Compare an exquisite\npassage, of which the conclusion is as follows: \u0026lsquo;And verily it is\nnaturally given…suppressed and ended.\u0026rsquo;) He ridicules the new logic of\nhis time; the Utopians could never be made to understand the doctrine of Second\nIntentions (\u0026lsquo;For they have not devised one of all those rules of\nrestrictions, amplifications, and suppositions, very wittily invented in the\nsmall Logicals, which here our children in every place do learn. Furthermore,\nthey were never yet able to find out the second intentions; insomuch that none\nof them all could ever see man himself in common, as they call him, though he\nbe (as you know) bigger than was ever any giant, yea, and pointed to of us even\nwith our finger.\u0026rsquo;) He is very severe on the sports of the gentry; the\nUtopians count \u0026lsquo;hunting the lowest, the vilest, and the most abject part\nof butchery.\u0026rsquo; He quotes the words of the Republic in which the\nphilosopher is described \u0026lsquo;standing out of the way under a wall until the\ndriving storm of sleet and rain be overpast,\u0026rsquo; which admit of a singular\napplication to More\u0026rsquo;s own fate; although, writing twenty years before\n(about the year 1514), he can hardly be supposed to have foreseen this. There\nis no touch of satire which strikes deeper than his quiet remark that the\ngreater part of the precepts of Christ are more at variance with the lives of\nordinary Christians than the discourse of Utopia (\u0026lsquo;And yet the most part\nof them is more dissident from the manners of the world now a days, than my\ncommunication was. But preachers, sly and wily men, following your counsel (as\nI suppose) because they saw men evil-willing to frame their manners to\nChrist\u0026rsquo;s rule, they have wrested and wried his doctrine, and, like a rule\nof lead, have applied it to men\u0026rsquo;s manners, that by some means at the\nleast way, they might agree together.\u0026rsquo;)\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe \u0026lsquo;New Atlantis\u0026rsquo; is only a fragment, and far inferior in merit to\nthe \u0026lsquo;Utopia.\u0026rsquo; The work is full of ingenuity, but wanting in\ncreative fancy, and by no means impresses the reader with a sense of\ncredibility. In some places Lord Bacon is characteristically different from Sir\nThomas More, as, for example, in the external state which he attributes to the\ngovernor of Solomon\u0026rsquo;s House, whose dress he minutely describes, while to\nSir Thomas More such trappings appear simple ridiculous. Yet, after this\nprogramme of dress, Bacon adds the beautiful trait, \u0026lsquo;that he had a look\nas though he pitied men.\u0026rsquo; Several things are borrowed by him from the\nTimaeus; but he has injured the unity of style by adding thoughts and passages\nwhich are taken from the Hebrew Scriptures.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe \u0026lsquo;City of the Sun\u0026rsquo; written by Campanella (1568-1639), a\nDominican friar, several years after the \u0026lsquo;New Atlantis\u0026rsquo; of Bacon,\nhas many resemblances to the Republic of Plato. The citizens have wives and\nchildren in common; their marriages are of the same temporary sort, and are\narranged by the magistrates from time to time. They do not, however, adopt his\nsystem of lots, but bring together the best natures, male and female,\n\u0026lsquo;according to philosophical rules.\u0026rsquo; The infants until two years of\nage are brought up by their mothers in public temples; and since individuals\nfor the most part educate their children badly, at the beginning of their third\nyear they are committed to the care of the State, and are taught at first, not\nout of books, but from paintings of all kinds, which are emblazoned on the\nwalls of the city. The city has six interior circuits of walls, and an outer\nwall which is the seventh. On this outer wall are painted the figures of\nlegislators and philosophers, and on each of the interior walls the symbols or\nforms of some one of the sciences are delineated. The women are, for the most\npart, trained, like the men, in warlike and other exercises; but they have two\nspecial occupations of their own. After a battle, they and the boys soothe and\nrelieve the wounded warriors; also they encourage them with embraces and\npleasant words. Some elements of the Christian or Catholic religion are\npreserved among them. The life of the Apostles is greatly admired by this\npeople because they had all things in common; and the short prayer which Jesus\nChrist taught men is used in their worship. It is a duty of the chief\nmagistrates to pardon sins, and therefore the whole people make secret\nconfession of them to the magistrates, and they to their chief, who is a sort\nof Rector Metaphysicus; and by this means he is well informed of all that is\ngoing on in the minds of men. After confession, absolution is granted to the\ncitizens collectively, but no one is mentioned by name. There also exists among\nthem a practice of perpetual prayer, performed by a succession of priests, who\nchange every hour. Their religion is a worship of God in Trinity, that is of\nWisdom, Love and Power, but without any distinction of persons. They behold in\nthe sun the reflection of His glory; mere graven images they reject, refusing\nto fall under the \u0026lsquo;tyranny\u0026rsquo; of idolatry.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nMany details are given about their customs of eating and drinking, about their\nmode of dressing, their employments, their wars. Campanella looks forward to a\nnew mode of education, which is to be a study of nature, and not of Aristotle.\nHe would not have his citizens waste their time in the consideration of what he\ncalls \u0026lsquo;the dead signs of things.\u0026rsquo; He remarks that he who knows one\nscience only, does not really know that one any more than the rest, and insists\nstrongly on the necessity of a variety of knowledge. More scholars are turned\nout in the City of the Sun in one year than by contemporary methods in ten or\nfifteen. He evidently believes, like Bacon, that henceforward natural science\nwill play a great part in education, a hope which seems hardly to have been\nrealized, either in our own or in any former age; at any rate the fulfilment of\nit has been long deferred.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThere is a good deal of ingenuity and even originality in this work, and a most\nenlightened spirit pervades it. But it has little or no charm of style, and\nfalls very far short of the \u0026lsquo;New Atlantis\u0026rsquo; of Bacon, and still more\nof the \u0026lsquo;Utopia\u0026rsquo; of Sir Thomas More. It is full of inconsistencies,\nand though borrowed from Plato, shows but a superficial acquaintance with his\nwritings. It is a work such as one might expect to have been written by a\nphilosopher and man of genius who was also a friar, and who had spent\ntwenty-seven years of his life in a prison of the Inquisition. The most\ninteresting feature of the book, common to Plato and Sir Thomas More, is the\ndeep feeling which is shown by the writer, of the misery and ignorance\nprevailing among the lower classes in his own time. Campanella takes note of\nAristotle\u0026rsquo;s answer to Plato\u0026rsquo;s community of property, that in a\nsociety where all things are common, no individual would have any motive to\nwork (Arist. Pol.): he replies, that his citizens being happy and contented in\nthemselves (they are required to work only four hours a day), will have greater\nregard for their fellows than exists among men at present. He thinks, like\nPlato, that if he abolishes private feelings and interests, a great public\nfeeling will take their place.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nOther writings on ideal states, such as the \u0026lsquo;Oceana\u0026rsquo; of Harrington,\nin which the Lord Archon, meaning Cromwell, is described, not as he was, but as\nhe ought to have been; or the \u0026lsquo;Argenis\u0026rsquo; of Barclay, which is an\nhistorical allegory of his own time, are too unlike Plato to be worth\nmentioning. More interesting than either of these, and far more Platonic in\nstyle and thought, is Sir John Eliot\u0026rsquo;s \u0026lsquo;Monarchy of Man,\u0026rsquo; in\nwhich the prisoner of the Tower, no longer able \u0026lsquo;to be a politician in\nthe land of his birth,\u0026rsquo; turns away from politics to view \u0026lsquo;that\nother city which is within him,\u0026rsquo; and finds on the very threshold of the\ngrave that the secret of human happiness is the mastery of self. The change of\ngovernment in the time of the English Commonwealth set men thinking about first\nprinciples, and gave rise to many works of this class…The great original\ngenius of Swift owes nothing to Plato; nor is there any trace in the\nconversation or in the works of Dr. Johnson of any acquaintance with his\nwritings. He probably would have refuted Plato without reading him, in the same\nfashion in which he supposed himself to have refuted Bishop Berkeley\u0026rsquo;s\ntheory of the non-existence of matter. If we except the so-called English\nPlatonists, or rather Neo-Platonists, who never understood their master, and\nthe writings of Coleridge, who was to some extent a kindred spirit, Plato has\nleft no permanent impression on English literature.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n7. Human life and conduct are affected by ideals in the same way that they are\naffected by the examples of eminent men. Neither the one nor the other are\nimmediately applicable to practice, but there is a virtue flowing from them\nwhich tends to raise individuals above the common routine of society or trade,\nand to elevate States above the mere interests of commerce or the necessities\nof self-defence. Like the ideals of art they are partly framed by the omission\nof particulars; they require to be viewed at a certain distance, and are apt to\nfade away if we attempt to approach them. They gain an imaginary distinctness\nwhen embodied in a State or in a system of philosophy, but they still remain\nthe visions of \u0026lsquo;a world unrealized.\u0026rsquo; More striking and obvious to\nthe ordinary mind are the examples of great men, who have served their own\ngeneration and are remembered in another. Even in our own family circle there\nmay have been some one, a woman, or even a child, in whose face has shone forth\na goodness more than human. The ideal then approaches nearer to us, and we\nfondly cling to it. The ideal of the past, whether of our own past lives or of\nformer states of society, has a singular fascination for the minds of many. Too\nlate we learn that such ideals cannot be recalled, though the recollection of\nthem may have a humanizing influence on other times. But the abstractions of\nphilosophy are to most persons cold and vacant; they give light without warmth;\nthey are like the full moon in the heavens when there are no stars appearing.\nMen cannot live by thought alone; the world of sense is always breaking in upon\nthem. They are for the most part confined to a corner of earth, and see but a\nlittle way beyond their own home or place of abode; they \u0026lsquo;do not lift up\ntheir eyes to the hills\u0026rsquo;; they are not awake when the dawn appears. But\nin Plato we have reached a height from which a man may look into the distance\nand behold the future of the world and of philosophy. The ideal of the State\nand of the life of the philosopher; the ideal of an education continuing\nthrough life and extending equally to both sexes; the ideal of the unity and\ncorrelation of knowledge; the faith in good and immortality\u0026mdash;are the\nvacant forms of light on which Plato is seeking to fix the eye of mankind.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n8. Two other ideals, which never appeared above the horizon in Greek\nPhilosophy, float before the minds of men in our own day: one seen more clearly\nthan formerly, as though each year and each generation brought us nearer to\nsome great change; the other almost in the same degree retiring from view\nbehind the laws of nature, as if oppressed by them, but still remaining a\nsilent hope of we know not what hidden in the heart of man. The first ideal is\nthe future of the human race in this world; the second the future of the\nindividual in another. The first is the more perfect realization of our own\npresent life; the second, the abnegation of it: the one, limited by experience,\nthe other, transcending it. Both of them have been and are powerful motives of\naction; there are a few in whom they have taken the place of all earthly\ninterests. The hope of a future for the human race at first sight seems to be\nthe more disinterested, the hope of individual existence the more egotistical,\nof the two motives. But when men have learned to resolve their hope of a future\neither for themselves or for the world into the will of God\u0026mdash;\u0026lsquo;not my\nwill but Thine,\u0026rsquo; the difference between them falls away; and they may be\nallowed to make either of them the basis of their lives, according to their own\nindividual character or temperament. There is as much faith in the willingness\nto work for an unseen future in this world as in another. Neither is it\ninconceivable that some rare nature may feel his duty to another generation, or\nto another century, almost as strongly as to his own, or that living always in\nthe presence of God, he may realize another world as vividly as he does this.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe greatest of all ideals may, or rather must be conceived by us under\nsimilitudes derived from human qualities; although sometimes, like the Jewish\nprophets, we may dash away these figures of speech and describe the nature of\nGod only in negatives. These again by degrees acquire a positive meaning. It\nwould be well, if when meditating on the higher truths either of philosophy or\nreligion, we sometimes substituted one form of expression for another, lest\nthrough the necessities of language we should become the slaves of mere words.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThere is a third ideal, not the same, but akin to these, which has a place in\nthe home and heart of every believer in the religion of Christ, and in which\nmen seem to find a nearer and more familiar truth, the Divine man, the Son of\nMan, the Saviour of mankind, Who is the first-born and head of the whole family\nin heaven and earth, in Whom the Divine and human, that which is without and\nthat which is within the range of our earthly faculties, are indissolubly\nunited. Neither is this divine form of goodness wholly separable from the ideal\nof the Christian Church, which is said in the New Testament to be \u0026lsquo;His\nbody,\u0026rsquo; or at variance with those other images of good which Plato sets\nbefore us. We see Him in a figure only, and of figures of speech we select but\na few, and those the simplest, to be the expression of Him. We behold Him in a\npicture, but He is not there. We gather up the fragments of His discourses, but\nneither do they represent Him as He truly was. His dwelling is neither in\nheaven nor earth, but in the heart of man. This is that image which Plato saw\ndimly in the distance, which, when existing among men, he called, in the\nlanguage of Homer, \u0026lsquo;the likeness of God,\u0026rsquo; the likeness of a nature\nwhich in all ages men have felt to be greater and better than themselves, and\nwhich in endless forms, whether derived from Scripture or nature, from the\nwitness of history or from the human heart, regarded as a person or not as a\nperson, with or without parts or passions, existing in space or not in space,\nis and will always continue to be to mankind the Idea of Good.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003c!–end chapter–\u003e\n\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\n\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca id=\"link2H_4_0002\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e THE REPUBLIC.\u003c/h2\u003e\n\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003c!–end chapter–\u003e\n\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\n\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca id=\"link2H_4_0003\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE.\n\u003c/h2\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nSocrates, who is the narrator.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nGlaucon.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAdeimantus.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nPolemarchus.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCephalus.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThrasymachus.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCleitophon.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd others who are mute auditors.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe scene is laid in the house of Cephalus at the Piraeus; and the whole\ndialogue is narrated by Socrates the day after it actually took place to\nTimaeus, Hermocrates, Critias, and a nameless person, who are introduced in the\nTimaeus.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003c!–end chapter–\u003e\n\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\n\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca id=\"link2H_4_0004\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e BOOK I.\u003c/h2\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI went down yesterday to the Piraeus with Glaucon the son of Ariston, that I\nmight offer up my prayers to the goddess (Bendis, the Thracian Artemis.); and\nalso because I wanted to see in what manner they would celebrate the festival,\nwhich was a new thing. I was delighted with the procession of the inhabitants;\nbut that of the Thracians was equally, if not more, beautiful. When we had\nfinished our prayers and viewed the spectacle, we turned in the direction of\nthe city; and at that instant Polemarchus the son of Cephalus chanced to catch\nsight of us from a distance as we were starting on our way home, and told his\nservant to run and bid us wait for him. The servant took hold of me by the\ncloak behind, and said: Polemarchus desires you to wait.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI turned round, and asked him where his master was.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThere he is, said the youth, coming after you, if you will only wait.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly we will, said Glaucon; and in a few minutes Polemarchus appeared, and\nwith him Adeimantus, Glaucon\u0026rsquo;s brother, Niceratus the son of Nicias, and\nseveral others who had been at the procession.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nPolemarchus said to me: I perceive, Socrates, that you and your companion are\nalready on your way to the city.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYou are not far wrong, I said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut do you see, he rejoined, how many we are?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nOf course.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd are you stronger than all these? for if not, you will have to remain where\nyou are.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nMay there not be the alternative, I said, that we may persuade you to let us\ngo?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut can you persuade us, if we refuse to listen to you? he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly not, replied Glaucon.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen we are not going to listen; of that you may be assured.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAdeimantus added: Has no one told you of the torch-race on horseback in honour\nof the goddess which will take place in the evening?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWith horses! I replied: That is a novelty. Will horsemen carry torches and pass\nthem one to another during the race?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, said Polemarchus, and not only so, but a festival will be celebrated at\nnight, which you certainly ought to see. Let us rise soon after supper and see\nthis festival; there will be a gathering of young men, and we will have a good\ntalk. Stay then, and do not be perverse.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nGlaucon said: I suppose, since you insist, that we must.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery good, I replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAccordingly we went with Polemarchus to his house; and there we found his\nbrothers Lysias and Euthydemus, and with them Thrasymachus the Chalcedonian,\nCharmantides the Paeanian, and Cleitophon the son of Aristonymus. There too was\nCephalus the father of Polemarchus, whom I had not seen for a long time, and I\nthought him very much aged. He was seated on a cushioned chair, and had a\ngarland on his head, for he had been sacrificing in the court; and there were\nsome other chairs in the room arranged in a semicircle, upon which we sat down\nby him. He saluted me eagerly, and then he said:\u0026mdash;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYou don\u0026rsquo;t come to see me, Socrates, as often as you ought: If I were\nstill able to go and see you I would not ask you to come to me. But at my age I\ncan hardly get to the city, and therefore you should come oftener to the\nPiraeus. For let me tell you, that the more the pleasures of the body fade\naway, the greater to me is the pleasure and charm of conversation. Do not then\ndeny my request, but make our house your resort and keep company with these\nyoung men; we are old friends, and you will be quite at home with us.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI replied: There is nothing which for my part I like better, Cephalus, than\nconversing with aged men; for I regard them as travellers who have gone a\njourney which I too may have to go, and of whom I ought to enquire, whether the\nway is smooth and easy, or rugged and difficult. And this is a question which I\nshould like to ask of you who have arrived at that time which the poets call\nthe \u0026lsquo;threshold of old age\u0026rsquo;\u0026mdash;Is life harder towards the end, or\nwhat report do you give of it?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI will tell you, Socrates, he said, what my own feeling is. Men of my age flock\ntogether; we are birds of a feather, as the old proverb says; and at our\nmeetings the tale of my acquaintance commonly is\u0026mdash;I cannot eat, I cannot\ndrink; the pleasures of youth and love are fled away: there was a good time\nonce, but now that is gone, and life is no longer life. Some complain of the\nslights which are put upon them by relations, and they will tell you sadly of\nhow many evils their old age is the cause. But to me, Socrates, these\ncomplainers seem to blame that which is not really in fault. For if old age\nwere the cause, I too being old, and every other old man, would have felt as\nthey do. But this is not my own experience, nor that of others whom I have\nknown. How well I remember the aged poet Sophocles, when in answer to the\nquestion, How does love suit with age, Sophocles,\u0026mdash;are you still the man\nyou were? Peace, he replied; most gladly have I escaped the thing of which you\nspeak; I feel as if I had escaped from a mad and furious master. His words have\noften occurred to my mind since, and they seem as good to me now as at the time\nwhen he uttered them. For certainly old age has a great sense of calm and\nfreedom; when the passions relax their hold, then, as Sophocles says, we are\nfreed from the grasp not of one mad master only, but of many. The truth is,\nSocrates, that these regrets, and also the complaints about relations, are to\nbe attributed to the same cause, which is not old age, but men\u0026rsquo;s\ncharacters and tempers; for he who is of a calm and happy nature will hardly\nfeel the pressure of age, but to him who is of an opposite disposition youth\nand age are equally a burden.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI listened in admiration, and wanting to draw him out, that he might go\non\u0026mdash;Yes, Cephalus, I said: but I rather suspect that people in general are\nnot convinced by you when you speak thus; they think that old age sits lightly\nupon you, not because of your happy disposition, but because you are rich, and\nwealth is well known to be a great comforter.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYou are right, he replied; they are not convinced: and there is something in\nwhat they say; not, however, so much as they imagine. I might answer them as\nThemistocles answered the Seriphian who was abusing him and saying that he was\nfamous, not for his own merits but because he was an Athenian: \u0026lsquo;If you\nhad been a native of my country or I of yours, neither of us would have been\nfamous.\u0026rsquo; And to those who are not rich and are impatient of old age, the\nsame reply may be made; for to the good poor man old age cannot be a light\nburden, nor can a bad rich man ever have peace with himself.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nMay I ask, Cephalus, whether your fortune was for the most part inherited or\nacquired by you?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAcquired! Socrates; do you want to know how much I acquired? In the art of\nmaking money I have been midway between my father and grandfather: for my\ngrandfather, whose name I bear, doubled and trebled the value of his patrimony,\nthat which he inherited being much what I possess now; but my father Lysanias\nreduced the property below what it is at present: and I shall be satisfied if I\nleave to these my sons not less but a little more than I received.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat was why I asked you the question, I replied, because I see that you are\nindifferent about money, which is a characteristic rather of those who have\ninherited their fortunes than of those who have acquired them; the makers of\nfortunes have a second love of money as a creation of their own, resembling the\naffection of authors for their own poems, or of parents for their children,\nbesides that natural love of it for the sake of use and profit which is common\nto them and all men. And hence they are very bad company, for they can talk\nabout nothing but the praises of wealth.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat is true, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, that is very true, but may I ask another question?\u0026mdash;What do you\nconsider to be the greatest blessing which you have reaped from your wealth?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nOne, he said, of which I could not expect easily to convince others. For let me\ntell you, Socrates, that when a man thinks himself to be near death, fears and\ncares enter into his mind which he never had before; the tales of a world below\nand the punishment which is exacted there of deeds done here were once a\nlaughing matter to him, but now he is tormented with the thought that they may\nbe true: either from the weakness of age, or because he is now drawing nearer\nto that other place, he has a clearer view of these things; suspicions and\nalarms crowd thickly upon him, and he begins to reflect and consider what\nwrongs he has done to others. And when he finds that the sum of his\ntransgressions is great he will many a time like a child start up in his sleep\nfor fear, and he is filled with dark forebodings. But to him who is conscious\nof no sin, sweet hope, as Pindar charmingly says, is the kind nurse of his age:\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n\u0026lsquo;Hope,\u0026rsquo; he says, \u0026lsquo;cherishes the soul of him who lives in\njustice and holiness, and is the nurse of his age and the companion of his\njourney;\u0026mdash;hope which is mightiest to sway the restless soul of man.\u0026rsquo;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHow admirable are his words! And the great blessing of riches, I do not say to\nevery man, but to a good man, is, that he has had no occasion to deceive or to\ndefraud others, either intentionally or unintentionally; and when he departs to\nthe world below he is not in any apprehension about offerings due to the gods\nor debts which he owes to men. Now to this peace of mind the possession of\nwealth greatly contributes; and therefore I say, that, setting one thing\nagainst another, of the many advantages which wealth has to give, to a man of\nsense this is in my opinion the greatest.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWell said, Cephalus, I replied; but as concerning justice, what is it?\u0026mdash;to\nspeak the truth and to pay your debts\u0026mdash;no more than this? And even to this\nare there not exceptions? Suppose that a friend when in his right mind has\ndeposited arms with me and he asks for them when he is not in his right mind,\nought I to give them back to him? No one would say that I ought or that I\nshould be right in doing so, any more than they would say that I ought always\nto speak the truth to one who is in his condition.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYou are quite right, he replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut then, I said, speaking the truth and paying your debts is not a correct\ndefinition of justice.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nQuite correct, Socrates, if Simonides is to be believed, said Polemarchus\ninterposing.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI fear, said Cephalus, that I must go now, for I have to look after the\nsacrifices, and I hand over the argument to Polemarchus and the company.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIs not Polemarchus your heir? I said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTo be sure, he answered, and went away laughing to the sacrifices.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTell me then, O thou heir of the argument, what did Simonides say, and\naccording to you truly say, about justice?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHe said that the repayment of a debt is just, and in saying so he appears to me\nto be right.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI should be sorry to doubt the word of such a wise and inspired man, but his\nmeaning, though probably clear to you, is the reverse of clear to me. For he\ncertainly does not mean, as we were just now saying, that I ought to return a\ndeposit of arms or of anything else to one who asks for it when he is not in\nhis right senses; and yet a deposit cannot be denied to be a debt.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen when the person who asks me is not in his right mind I am by no means to\nmake the return?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly not.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhen Simonides said that the repayment of a debt was justice, he did not mean\nto include that case?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly not; for he thinks that a friend ought always to do good to a friend\nand never evil.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYou mean that the return of a deposit of gold which is to the injury of the\nreceiver, if the two parties are friends, is not the repayment of a\ndebt,\u0026mdash;that is what you would imagine him to say?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd are enemies also to receive what we owe to them?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTo be sure, he said, they are to receive what we owe them, and an enemy, as I\ntake it, owes to an enemy that which is due or proper to him\u0026mdash;that is to\nsay, evil.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nSimonides, then, after the manner of poets, would seem to have spoken darkly of\nthe nature of justice; for he really meant to say that justice is the giving to\neach man what is proper to him, and this he termed a debt.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat must have been his meaning, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBy heaven! I replied; and if we asked him what due or proper thing is given by\nmedicine, and to whom, what answer do you think that he would make to us?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHe would surely reply that medicine gives drugs and meat and drink to human\nbodies.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd what due or proper thing is given by cookery, and to what?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nSeasoning to food.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd what is that which justice gives, and to whom?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIf, Socrates, we are to be guided at all by the analogy of the preceding\ninstances, then justice is the art which gives good to friends and evil to\nenemies.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat is his meaning then?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI think so.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd who is best able to do good to his friends and evil to his enemies in time\nof sickness?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe physician.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nOr when they are on a voyage, amid the perils of the sea?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe pilot.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd in what sort of actions or with a view to what result is the just man most\nable to do harm to his enemy and good to his friend?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIn going to war against the one and in making alliances with the other.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut when a man is well, my dear Polemarchus, there is no need of a physician?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNo.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd he who is not on a voyage has no need of a pilot?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNo.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen in time of peace justice will be of no use?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI am very far from thinking so.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYou think that justice may be of use in peace as well as in war?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nLike husbandry for the acquisition of corn?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nOr like shoemaking for the acquisition of shoes,\u0026mdash;that is what you mean?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd what similar use or power of acquisition has justice in time of peace?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIn contracts, Socrates, justice is of use.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd by contracts you mean partnerships?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nExactly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut is the just man or the skilful player a more useful and better partner at a\ngame of draughts?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe skilful player.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd in the laying of bricks and stones is the just man a more useful or better\npartner than the builder?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nQuite the reverse.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen in what sort of partnership is the just man a better partner than the\nharp-player, as in playing the harp the harp-player is certainly a better\npartner than the just man?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIn a money partnership.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, Polemarchus, but surely not in the use of money; for you do not want a\njust man to be your counsellor in the purchase or sale of a horse; a man who is\nknowing about horses would be better for that, would he not?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd when you want to buy a ship, the shipwright or the pilot would be better?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen what is that joint use of silver or gold in which the just man is to be\npreferred?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhen you want a deposit to be kept safely.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYou mean when money is not wanted, but allowed to lie?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nPrecisely.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat is to say, justice is useful when money is useless?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat is the inference.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd when you want to keep a pruning-hook safe, then justice is useful to the\nindividual and to the state; but when you want to use it, then the art of the\nvine-dresser?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nClearly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd when you want to keep a shield or a lyre, and not to use them, you would\nsay that justice is useful; but when you want to use them, then the art of the\nsoldier or of the musician?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd so of all other things;\u0026mdash;justice is useful when they are useless, and\nuseless when they are useful?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat is the inference.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen justice is not good for much. But let us consider this further point: Is\nnot he who can best strike a blow in a boxing match or in any kind of fighting\nbest able to ward off a blow?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd he who is most skilful in preventing or escaping from a disease is best\nable to create one?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd he is the best guard of a camp who is best able to steal a march upon the\nenemy?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen he who is a good keeper of anything is also a good thief?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat, I suppose, is to be inferred.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen if the just man is good at keeping money, he is good at stealing it.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat is implied in the argument.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen after all the just man has turned out to be a thief. And this is a lesson\nwhich I suspect you must have learnt out of Homer; for he, speaking of\nAutolycus, the maternal grandfather of Odysseus, who is a favourite of his,\naffirms that\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n\u0026lsquo;He was excellent above all men in theft and perjury.\u0026rsquo;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd so, you and Homer and Simonides are agreed that justice is an art of theft;\nto be practised however \u0026lsquo;for the good of friends and for the harm of\nenemies,\u0026rsquo;\u0026mdash;that was what you were saying?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNo, certainly not that, though I do not now know what I did say; but I still\nstand by the latter words.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWell, there is another question: By friends and enemies do we mean those who\nare so really, or only in seeming?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nSurely, he said, a man may be expected to love those whom he thinks good, and\nto hate those whom he thinks evil.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, but do not persons often err about good and evil: many who are not good\nseem to be so, and conversely?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat is true.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen to them the good will be enemies and the evil will be their friends? True.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd in that case they will be right in doing good to the evil and evil to the\ngood?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nClearly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut the good are just and would not do an injustice?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen according to your argument it is just to injure those who do no wrong?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNay, Socrates; the doctrine is immoral.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen I suppose that we ought to do good to the just and harm to the unjust?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI like that better.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut see the consequence:\u0026mdash;Many a man who is ignorant of human nature has\nfriends who are bad friends, and in that case he ought to do harm to them; and\nhe has good enemies whom he ought to benefit; but, if so, we shall be saying\nthe very opposite of that which we affirmed to be the meaning of Simonides.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery true, he said: and I think that we had better correct an error into which\nwe seem to have fallen in the use of the words \u0026lsquo;friend\u0026rsquo; and\n\u0026lsquo;enemy.\u0026rsquo;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat was the error, Polemarchus? I asked.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWe assumed that he is a friend who seems to be or who is thought good.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd how is the error to be corrected?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWe should rather say that he is a friend who is, as well as seems, good; and\nthat he who seems only, and is not good, only seems to be and is not a friend;\nand of an enemy the same may be said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYou would argue that the good are our friends and the bad our enemies?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd instead of saying simply as we did at first, that it is just to do good to\nour friends and harm to our enemies, we should further say: It is just to do\ngood to our friends when they are good and harm to our enemies when they are\nevil?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, that appears to me to be the truth.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut ought the just to injure any one at all?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nUndoubtedly he ought to injure those who are both wicked and his enemies.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhen horses are injured, are they improved or deteriorated?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe latter.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nDeteriorated, that is to say, in the good qualities of horses, not of dogs?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, of horses.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd dogs are deteriorated in the good qualities of dogs, and not of horses?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nOf course.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd will not men who are injured be deteriorated in that which is the proper\nvirtue of man?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd that human virtue is justice?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTo be sure.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen men who are injured are of necessity made unjust?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat is the result.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut can the musician by his art make men unmusical?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly not.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nOr the horseman by his art make them bad horsemen?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nImpossible.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd can the just by justice make men unjust, or speaking generally, can the\ngood by virtue make them bad?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAssuredly not.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAny more than heat can produce cold?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIt cannot.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nOr drought moisture?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nClearly not.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNor can the good harm any one?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nImpossible.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd the just is the good?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen to injure a friend or any one else is not the act of a just man, but of\nthe opposite, who is the unjust?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI think that what you say is quite true, Socrates.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen if a man says that justice consists in the repayment of debts, and that\ngood is the debt which a just man owes to his friends, and evil the debt which\nhe owes to his enemies,\u0026mdash;to say this is not wise; for it is not true, if,\nas has been clearly shown, the injuring of another can be in no case just.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI agree with you, said Polemarchus.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen you and I are prepared to take up arms against any one who attributes such\na saying to Simonides or Bias or Pittacus, or any other wise man or seer?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI am quite ready to do battle at your side, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nShall I tell you whose I believe the saying to be?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhose?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI believe that Periander or Perdiccas or Xerxes or Ismenias the Theban, or some\nother rich and mighty man, who had a great opinion of his own power, was the\nfirst to say that justice is \u0026lsquo;doing good to your friends and harm to your\nenemies.\u0026rsquo;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nMost true, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, I said; but if this definition of justice also breaks down, what other can\nbe offered?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nSeveral times in the course of the discussion Thrasymachus had made an attempt\nto get the argument into his own hands, and had been put down by the rest of\nthe company, who wanted to hear the end. But when Polemarchus and I had done\nspeaking and there was a pause, he could no longer hold his peace; and,\ngathering himself up, he came at us like a wild beast, seeking to devour us. We\nwere quite panic-stricken at the sight of him.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHe roared out to the whole company: What folly, Socrates, has taken possession\nof you all? And why, sillybillies, do you knock under to one another? I say\nthat if you want really to know what justice is, you should not only ask but\nanswer, and you should not seek honour to yourself from the refutation of an\nopponent, but have your own answer; for there is many a one who can ask and\ncannot answer. And now I will not have you say that justice is duty or\nadvantage or profit or gain or interest, for this sort of nonsense will not do\nfor me; I must have clearness and accuracy.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI was panic-stricken at his words, and could not look at him without trembling.\nIndeed I believe that if I had not fixed my eye upon him, I should have been\nstruck dumb: but when I saw his fury rising, I looked at him first, and was\ntherefore able to reply to him.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThrasymachus, I said, with a quiver, don\u0026rsquo;t be hard upon us. Polemarchus\nand I may have been guilty of a little mistake in the argument, but I can\nassure you that the error was not intentional. If we were seeking for a piece\nof gold, you would not imagine that we were \u0026lsquo;knocking under to one\nanother,\u0026rsquo; and so losing our chance of finding it. And why, when we are\nseeking for justice, a thing more precious than many pieces of gold, do you say\nthat we are weakly yielding to one another and not doing our utmost to get at\nthe truth? Nay, my good friend, we are most willing and anxious to do so, but\nthe fact is that we cannot. And if so, you people who know all things should\npity us and not be angry with us.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHow characteristic of Socrates! he replied, with a bitter\nlaugh;\u0026mdash;that\u0026rsquo;s your ironical style! Did I not foresee\u0026mdash;have I\nnot already told you, that whatever he was asked he would refuse to answer, and\ntry irony or any other shuffle, in order that he might avoid answering?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYou are a philosopher, Thrasymachus, I replied, and well know that if you ask a\nperson what numbers make up twelve, taking care to prohibit him whom you ask\nfrom answering twice six, or three times four, or six times two, or four times\nthree, \u0026lsquo;for this sort of nonsense will not do for me,\u0026rsquo;\u0026mdash;then\nobviously, if that is your way of putting the question, no one can answer you.\nBut suppose that he were to retort, \u0026lsquo;Thrasymachus, what do you mean? If\none of these numbers which you interdict be the true answer to the question, am\nI falsely to say some other number which is not the right one?\u0026mdash;is that\nyour meaning?\u0026rsquo;\u0026mdash;How would you answer him?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nJust as if the two cases were at all alike! he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhy should they not be? I replied; and even if they are not, but only appear to\nbe so to the person who is asked, ought he not to say what he thinks, whether\nyou and I forbid him or not?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI presume then that you are going to make one of the interdicted answers?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI dare say that I may, notwithstanding the danger, if upon reflection I approve\nof any of them.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut what if I give you an answer about justice other and better, he said, than\nany of these? What do you deserve to have done to you?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nDone to me!\u0026mdash;as becomes the ignorant, I must learn from the\nwise\u0026mdash;that is what I deserve to have done to me.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat, and no payment! a pleasant notion!\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI will pay when I have the money, I replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut you have, Socrates, said Glaucon: and you, Thrasymachus, need be under no\nanxiety about money, for we will all make a contribution for Socrates.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he replied, and then Socrates will do as he always does\u0026mdash;refuse to\nanswer himself, but take and pull to pieces the answer of some one else.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhy, my good friend, I said, how can any one answer who knows, and says that he\nknows, just nothing; and who, even if he has some faint notions of his own, is\ntold by a man of authority not to utter them? The natural thing is, that the\nspeaker should be some one like yourself who professes to know and can tell\nwhat he knows. Will you then kindly answer, for the edification of the company\nand of myself?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nGlaucon and the rest of the company joined in my request, and Thrasymachus, as\nany one might see, was in reality eager to speak; for he thought that he had an\nexcellent answer, and would distinguish himself. But at first he affected to\ninsist on my answering; at length he consented to begin. Behold, he said, the\nwisdom of Socrates; he refuses to teach himself, and goes about learning of\nothers, to whom he never even says Thank you.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat I learn of others, I replied, is quite true; but that I am ungrateful I\nwholly deny. Money I have none, and therefore I pay in praise, which is all I\nhave; and how ready I am to praise any one who appears to me to speak well you\nwill very soon find out when you answer; for I expect that you will answer\nwell.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nListen, then, he said; I proclaim that justice is nothing else than the\ninterest of the stronger. And now why do you not praise me? But of course you\nwon\u0026rsquo;t.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nLet me first understand you, I replied. Justice, as you say, is the interest of\nthe stronger. What, Thrasymachus, is the meaning of this? You cannot mean to\nsay that because Polydamas, the pancratiast, is stronger than we are, and finds\nthe eating of beef conducive to his bodily strength, that to eat beef is\ntherefore equally for our good who are weaker than he is, and right and just\nfor us?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat\u0026rsquo;s abominable of you, Socrates; you take the words in the sense which\nis most damaging to the argument.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNot at all, my good sir, I said; I am trying to understand them; and I wish\nthat you would be a little clearer.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWell, he said, have you never heard that forms of government differ; there are\ntyrannies, and there are democracies, and there are aristocracies?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, I know.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd the government is the ruling power in each state?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd the different forms of government make laws democratical, aristocratical,\ntyrannical, with a view to their several interests; and these laws, which are\nmade by them for their own interests, are the justice which they deliver to\ntheir subjects, and him who transgresses them they punish as a breaker of the\nlaw, and unjust. And that is what I mean when I say that in all states there is\nthe same principle of justice, which is the interest of the government; and as\nthe government must be supposed to have power, the only reasonable conclusion\nis, that everywhere there is one principle of justice, which is the interest of\nthe stronger.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNow I understand you, I said; and whether you are right or not I will try to\ndiscover. But let me remark, that in defining justice you have yourself used\nthe word \u0026lsquo;interest\u0026rsquo; which you forbade me to use. It is true,\nhowever, that in your definition the words \u0026lsquo;of the stronger\u0026rsquo; are\nadded.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nA small addition, you must allow, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nGreat or small, never mind about that: we must first enquire whether what you\nare saying is the truth. Now we are both agreed that justice is interest of\nsome sort, but you go on to say \u0026lsquo;of the stronger\u0026rsquo;; about this\naddition I am not so sure, and must therefore consider further.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nProceed.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI will; and first tell me, Do you admit that it is just for subjects to obey\ntheir rulers?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI do.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut are the rulers of states absolutely infallible, or are they sometimes\nliable to err?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTo be sure, he replied, they are liable to err.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen in making their laws they may sometimes make them rightly, and sometimes\nnot?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhen they make them rightly, they make them agreeably to their interest; when\nthey are mistaken, contrary to their interest; you admit that?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd the laws which they make must be obeyed by their subjects,\u0026mdash;and that\nis what you call justice?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nDoubtless.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen justice, according to your argument, is not only obedience to the interest\nof the stronger but the reverse?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat is that you are saying? he asked.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI am only repeating what you are saying, I believe. But let us consider: Have\nwe not admitted that the rulers may be mistaken about their own interest in\nwhat they command, and also that to obey them is justice? Has not that been\nadmitted?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen you must also have acknowledged justice not to be for the interest of the\nstronger, when the rulers unintentionally command things to be done which are\nto their own injury. For if, as you say, justice is the obedience which the\nsubject renders to their commands, in that case, O wisest of men, is there any\nescape from the conclusion that the weaker are commanded to do, not what is for\nthe interest, but what is for the injury of the stronger?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNothing can be clearer, Socrates, said Polemarchus.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, said Cleitophon, interposing, if you are allowed to be his witness.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut there is no need of any witness, said Polemarchus, for Thrasymachus himself\nacknowledges that rulers may sometimes command what is not for their own\ninterest, and that for subjects to obey them is justice.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, Polemarchus,\u0026mdash;Thrasymachus said that for subjects to do what was\ncommanded by their rulers is just.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, Cleitophon, but he also said that justice is the interest of the stronger,\nand, while admitting both these propositions, he further acknowledged that the\nstronger may command the weaker who are his subjects to do what is not for his\nown interest; whence follows that justice is the injury quite as much as the\ninterest of the stronger.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut, said Cleitophon, he meant by the interest of the stronger what the\nstronger thought to be his interest,\u0026mdash;this was what the weaker had to do;\nand this was affirmed by him to be justice.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThose were not his words, rejoined Polemarchus.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNever mind, I replied, if he now says that they are, let us accept his\nstatement. Tell me, Thrasymachus, I said, did you mean by justice what the\nstronger thought to be his interest, whether really so or not?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly not, he said. Do you suppose that I call him who is mistaken the\nstronger at the time when he is mistaken?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, I said, my impression was that you did so, when you admitted that the\nruler was not infallible but might be sometimes mistaken.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYou argue like an informer, Socrates. Do you mean, for example, that he who is\nmistaken about the sick is a physician in that he is mistaken? or that he who\nerrs in arithmetic or grammar is an arithmetician or grammarian at the time\nwhen he is making the mistake, in respect of the mistake? True, we say that the\nphysician or arithmetician or grammarian has made a mistake, but this is only a\nway of speaking; for the fact is that neither the grammarian nor any other\nperson of skill ever makes a mistake in so far as he is what his name implies;\nthey none of them err unless their skill fails them, and then they cease to be\nskilled artists. No artist or sage or ruler errs at the time when he is what\nhis name implies; though he is commonly said to err, and I adopted the common\nmode of speaking. But to be perfectly accurate, since you are such a lover of\naccuracy, we should say that the ruler, in so far as he is a ruler, is\nunerring, and, being unerring, always commands that which is for his own\ninterest; and the subject is required to execute his commands; and therefore,\nas I said at first and now repeat, justice is the interest of the stronger.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIndeed, Thrasymachus, and do I really appear to you to argue like an informer?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly, he replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd do you suppose that I ask these questions with any design of injuring you\nin the argument?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNay, he replied, \u0026lsquo;suppose\u0026rsquo; is not the word\u0026mdash;I know it; but you\nwill be found out, and by sheer force of argument you will never prevail.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI shall not make the attempt, my dear man; but to avoid any misunderstanding\noccurring between us in future, let me ask, in what sense do you speak of a\nruler or stronger whose interest, as you were saying, he being the superior, it\nis just that the inferior should execute\u0026mdash;is he a ruler in the popular or\nin the strict sense of the term?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIn the strictest of all senses, he said. And now cheat and play the informer if\nyou can; I ask no quarter at your hands. But you never will be able, never.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd do you imagine, I said, that I am such a madman as to try and cheat,\nThrasymachus? I might as well shave a lion.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhy, he said, you made the attempt a minute ago, and you failed.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nEnough, I said, of these civilities. It will be better that I should ask you a\nquestion: Is the physician, taken in that strict sense of which you are\nspeaking, a healer of the sick or a maker of money? And remember that I am now\nspeaking of the true physician.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nA healer of the sick, he replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd the pilot\u0026mdash;that is to say, the true pilot\u0026mdash;is he a captain of\nsailors or a mere sailor?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nA captain of sailors.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe circumstance that he sails in the ship is not to be taken into account;\nneither is he to be called a sailor; the name pilot by which he is\ndistinguished has nothing to do with sailing, but is significant of his skill\nand of his authority over the sailors.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery true, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNow, I said, every art has an interest?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nFor which the art has to consider and provide?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, that is the aim of art.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd the interest of any art is the perfection of it\u0026mdash;this and nothing\nelse?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat do you mean?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI mean what I may illustrate negatively by the example of the body. Suppose you\nwere to ask me whether the body is self-sufficing or has wants, I should reply:\nCertainly the body has wants; for the body may be ill and require to be cured,\nand has therefore interests to which the art of medicine ministers; and this is\nthe origin and intention of medicine, as you will acknowledge. Am I not right?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nQuite right, he replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut is the art of medicine or any other art faulty or deficient in any quality\nin the same way that the eye may be deficient in sight or the ear fail of\nhearing, and therefore requires another art to provide for the interests of\nseeing and hearing\u0026mdash;has art in itself, I say, any similar liability to\nfault or defect, and does every art require another supplementary art to\nprovide for its interests, and that another and another without end? Or have\nthe arts to look only after their own interests? Or have they no need either of\nthemselves or of another?\u0026mdash;having no faults or defects, they have no need\nto correct them, either by the exercise of their own art or of any other; they\nhave only to consider the interest of their subject-matter. For every art\nremains pure and faultless while remaining true\u0026mdash;that is to say, while\nperfect and unimpaired. Take the words in your precise sense, and tell me\nwhether I am not right.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, clearly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen medicine does not consider the interest of medicine, but the interest of\nthe body?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNor does the art of horsemanship consider the interests of the art of\nhorsemanship, but the interests of the horse; neither do any other arts care\nfor themselves, for they have no needs; they care only for that which is the\nsubject of their art?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut surely, Thrasymachus, the arts are the superiors and rulers of their own\nsubjects?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTo this he assented with a good deal of reluctance.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen, I said, no science or art considers or enjoins the interest of the\nstronger or superior, but only the interest of the subject and weaker?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHe made an attempt to contest this proposition also, but finally acquiesced.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen, I continued, no physician, in so far as he is a physician, considers his\nown good in what he prescribes, but the good of his patient; for the true\nphysician is also a ruler having the human body as a subject, and is not a mere\nmoney-maker; that has been admitted?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd the pilot likewise, in the strict sense of the term, is a ruler of sailors\nand not a mere sailor?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat has been admitted.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd such a pilot and ruler will provide and prescribe for the interest of the\nsailor who is under him, and not for his own or the ruler\u0026rsquo;s interest?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHe gave a reluctant \u0026lsquo;Yes.\u0026rsquo;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen, I said, Thrasymachus, there is no one in any rule who, in so far as he is\na ruler, considers or enjoins what is for his own interest, but always what is\nfor the interest of his subject or suitable to his art; to that he looks, and\nthat alone he considers in everything which he says and does.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhen we had got to this point in the argument, and every one saw that the\ndefinition of justice had been completely upset, Thrasymachus, instead of\nreplying to me, said: Tell me, Socrates, have you got a nurse?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhy do you ask such a question, I said, when you ought rather to be answering?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBecause she leaves you to snivel, and never wipes your nose: she has not even\ntaught you to know the shepherd from the sheep.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat makes you say that? I replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBecause you fancy that the shepherd or neatherd fattens or tends the sheep or\noxen with a view to their own good and not to the good of himself or his\nmaster; and you further imagine that the rulers of states, if they are true\nrulers, never think of their subjects as sheep, and that they are not studying\ntheir own advantage day and night. Oh, no; and so entirely astray are you in\nyour ideas about the just and unjust as not even to know that justice and the\njust are in reality another\u0026rsquo;s good; that is to say, the interest of the\nruler and stronger, and the loss of the subject and servant; and injustice the\nopposite; for the unjust is lord over the truly simple and just: he is the\nstronger, and his subjects do what is for his interest, and minister to his\nhappiness, which is very far from being their own. Consider further, most\nfoolish Socrates, that the just is always a loser in comparison with the\nunjust. First of all, in private contracts: wherever the unjust is the partner\nof the just you will find that, when the partnership is dissolved, the unjust\nman has always more and the just less. Secondly, in their dealings with the\nState: when there is an income-tax, the just man will pay more and the unjust\nless on the same amount of income; and when there is anything to be received\nthe one gains nothing and the other much. Observe also what happens when they\ntake an office; there is the just man neglecting his affairs and perhaps\nsuffering other losses, and getting nothing out of the public, because he is\njust; moreover he is hated by his friends and acquaintance for refusing to\nserve them in unlawful ways. But all this is reversed in the case of the unjust\nman. I am speaking, as before, of injustice on a large scale in which the\nadvantage of the unjust is most apparent; and my meaning will be most clearly\nseen if we turn to that highest form of injustice in which the criminal is the\nhappiest of men, and the sufferers or those who refuse to do injustice are the\nmost miserable\u0026mdash;that is to say tyranny, which by fraud and force takes\naway the property of others, not little by little but wholesale; comprehending\nin one, things sacred as well as profane, private and public; for which acts of\nwrong, if he were detected perpetrating any one of them singly, he would be\npunished and incur great disgrace\u0026mdash;they who do such wrong in particular\ncases are called robbers of temples, and man-stealers and burglars and\nswindlers and thieves. But when a man besides taking away the money of the\ncitizens has made slaves of them, then, instead of these names of reproach, he\nis termed happy and blessed, not only by the citizens but by all who hear of\nhis having achieved the consummation of injustice. For mankind censure\ninjustice, fearing that they may be the victims of it and not because they\nshrink from committing it. And thus, as I have shown, Socrates, injustice, when\non a sufficient scale, has more strength and freedom and mastery than justice;\nand, as I said at first, justice is the interest of the stronger, whereas\ninjustice is a man\u0026rsquo;s own profit and interest.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThrasymachus, when he had thus spoken, having, like a bath-man, deluged our\nears with his words, had a mind to go away. But the company would not let him;\nthey insisted that he should remain and defend his position; and I myself added\nmy own humble request that he would not leave us. Thrasymachus, I said to him,\nexcellent man, how suggestive are your remarks! And are you going to run away\nbefore you have fairly taught or learned whether they are true or not? Is the\nattempt to determine the way of man\u0026rsquo;s life so small a matter in your\neyes\u0026mdash;to determine how life may be passed by each one of us to the\ngreatest advantage?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd do I differ from you, he said, as to the importance of the enquiry?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYou appear rather, I replied, to have no care or thought about us,\nThrasymachus\u0026mdash;whether we live better or worse from not knowing what you\nsay you know, is to you a matter of indifference. Prithee, friend, do not keep\nyour knowledge to yourself; we are a large party; and any benefit which you\nconfer upon us will be amply rewarded. For my own part I openly declare that I\nam not convinced, and that I do not believe injustice to be more gainful than\njustice, even if uncontrolled and allowed to have free play. For, granting that\nthere may be an unjust man who is able to commit injustice either by fraud or\nforce, still this does not convince me of the superior advantage of injustice,\nand there may be others who are in the same predicament with myself. Perhaps we\nmay be wrong; if so, you in your wisdom should convince us that we are mistaken\nin preferring justice to injustice.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd how am I to convince you, he said, if you are not already convinced by what\nI have just said; what more can I do for you? Would you have me put the proof\nbodily into your souls?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHeaven forbid! I said; I would only ask you to be consistent; or, if you\nchange, change openly and let there be no deception. For I must remark,\nThrasymachus, if you will recall what was previously said, that although you\nbegan by defining the true physician in an exact sense, you did not observe a\nlike exactness when speaking of the shepherd; you thought that the shepherd as\na shepherd tends the sheep not with a view to their own good, but like a mere\ndiner or banquetter with a view to the pleasures of the table; or, again, as a\ntrader for sale in the market, and not as a shepherd. Yet surely the art of the\nshepherd is concerned only with the good of his subjects; he has only to\nprovide the best for them, since the perfection of the art is already ensured\nwhenever all the requirements of it are satisfied. And that was what I was\nsaying just now about the ruler. I conceived that the art of the ruler,\nconsidered as ruler, whether in a state or in private life, could only regard\nthe good of his flock or subjects; whereas you seem to think that the rulers in\nstates, that is to say, the true rulers, like being in authority.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThink! Nay, I am sure of it.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen why in the case of lesser offices do men never take them willingly without\npayment, unless under the idea that they govern for the advantage not of\nthemselves but of others? Let me ask you a question: Are not the several arts\ndifferent, by reason of their each having a separate function? And, my dear\nillustrious friend, do say what you think, that we may make a little progress.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, that is the difference, he replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd each art gives us a particular good and not merely a general\none\u0026mdash;medicine, for example, gives us health; navigation, safety at sea,\nand so on?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd the art of payment has the special function of giving pay: but we do not\nconfuse this with other arts, any more than the art of the pilot is to be\nconfused with the art of medicine, because the health of the pilot may be\nimproved by a sea voyage. You would not be inclined to say, would you, that\nnavigation is the art of medicine, at least if we are to adopt your exact use\nof language?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly not.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nOr because a man is in good health when he receives pay you would not say that\nthe art of payment is medicine?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI should not.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNor would you say that medicine is the art of receiving pay because a man takes\nfees when he is engaged in healing?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly not.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd we have admitted, I said, that the good of each art is specially confined\nto the art?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen, if there be any good which all artists have in common, that is to be\nattributed to something of which they all have the common use?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue, he replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd when the artist is benefited by receiving pay the advantage is gained by an\nadditional use of the art of pay, which is not the art professed by him?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHe gave a reluctant assent to this.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen the pay is not derived by the several artists from their respective arts.\nBut the truth is, that while the art of medicine gives health, and the art of\nthe builder builds a house, another art attends them which is the art of pay.\nThe various arts may be doing their own business and benefiting that over which\nthey preside, but would the artist receive any benefit from his art unless he\nwere paid as well?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI suppose not.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut does he therefore confer no benefit when he works for nothing?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly, he confers a benefit.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen now, Thrasymachus, there is no longer any doubt that neither arts nor\ngovernments provide for their own interests; but, as we were before saying,\nthey rule and provide for the interests of their subjects who are the weaker\nand not the stronger\u0026mdash;to their good they attend and not to the good of the\nsuperior. And this is the reason, my dear Thrasymachus, why, as I was just now\nsaying, no one is willing to govern; because no one likes to take in hand the\nreformation of evils which are not his concern without remuneration. For, in\nthe execution of his work, and in giving his orders to another, the true artist\ndoes not regard his own interest, but always that of his subjects; and\ntherefore in order that rulers may be willing to rule, they must be paid in one\nof three modes of payment, money, or honour, or a penalty for refusing.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat do you mean, Socrates? said Glaucon. The first two modes of payment are\nintelligible enough, but what the penalty is I do not understand, or how a\npenalty can be a payment.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYou mean that you do not understand the nature of this payment which to the\nbest men is the great inducement to rule? Of course you know that ambition and\navarice are held to be, as indeed they are, a disgrace?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery true.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd for this reason, I said, money and honour have no attraction for them; good\nmen do not wish to be openly demanding payment for governing and so to get the\nname of hirelings, nor by secretly helping themselves out of the public\nrevenues to get the name of thieves. And not being ambitious they do not care\nabout honour. Wherefore necessity must be laid upon them, and they must be\ninduced to serve from the fear of punishment. And this, as I imagine, is the\nreason why the forwardness to take office, instead of waiting to be compelled,\nhas been deemed dishonourable. Now the worst part of the punishment is that he\nwho refuses to rule is liable to be ruled by one who is worse than himself. And\nthe fear of this, as I conceive, induces the good to take office, not because\nthey would, but because they cannot help\u0026mdash;not under the idea that they are\ngoing to have any benefit or enjoyment themselves, but as a necessity, and\nbecause they are not able to commit the task of ruling to any one who is better\nthan themselves, or indeed as good. For there is reason to think that if a city\nwere composed entirely of good men, then to avoid office would be as much an\nobject of contention as to obtain office is at present; then we should have\nplain proof that the true ruler is not meant by nature to regard his own\ninterest, but that of his subjects; and every one who knew this would choose\nrather to receive a benefit from another than to have the trouble of conferring\none. So far am I from agreeing with Thrasymachus that justice is the interest\nof the stronger. This latter question need not be further discussed at present;\nbut when Thrasymachus says that the life of the unjust is more advantageous\nthan that of the just, his new statement appears to me to be of a far more\nserious character. Which of us has spoken truly? And which sort of life,\nGlaucon, do you prefer?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI for my part deem the life of the just to be the more advantageous, he\nanswered.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nDid you hear all the advantages of the unjust which Thrasymachus was\nrehearsing?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, I heard him, he replied, but he has not convinced me.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen shall we try to find some way of convincing him, if we can, that he is\nsaying what is not true?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nMost certainly, he replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIf, I said, he makes a set speech and we make another recounting all the\nadvantages of being just, and he answers and we rejoin, there must be a\nnumbering and measuring of the goods which are claimed on either side, and in\nthe end we shall want judges to decide; but if we proceed in our enquiry as we\nlately did, by making admissions to one another, we shall unite the offices of\njudge and advocate in our own persons.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery good, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd which method do I understand you to prefer? I said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat which you propose.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWell, then, Thrasymachus, I said, suppose you begin at the beginning and answer\nme. You say that perfect injustice is more gainful than perfect justice?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, that is what I say, and I have given you my reasons.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd what is your view about them? Would you call one of them virtue and the\nother vice?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI suppose that you would call justice virtue and injustice vice?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat a charming notion! So likely too, seeing that I affirm injustice to be\nprofitable and justice not.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat else then would you say?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe opposite, he replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd would you call justice vice?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNo, I would rather say sublime simplicity.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen would you call injustice malignity?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNo; I would rather say discretion.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd do the unjust appear to you to be wise and good?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said; at any rate those of them who are able to be perfectly unjust,\nand who have the power of subduing states and nations; but perhaps you imagine\nme to be talking of cutpurses. Even this profession if undetected has\nadvantages, though they are not to be compared with those of which I was just\nnow speaking.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI do not think that I misapprehend your meaning, Thrasymachus, I replied; but\nstill I cannot hear without amazement that you class injustice with wisdom and\nvirtue, and justice with the opposite.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly I do so class them.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNow, I said, you are on more substantial and almost unanswerable ground; for if\nthe injustice which you were maintaining to be profitable had been admitted by\nyou as by others to be vice and deformity, an answer might have been given to\nyou on received principles; but now I perceive that you will call injustice\nhonourable and strong, and to the unjust you will attribute all the qualities\nwhich were attributed by us before to the just, seeing that you do not hesitate\nto rank injustice with wisdom and virtue.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYou have guessed most infallibly, he replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen I certainly ought not to shrink from going through with the argument so\nlong as I have reason to think that you, Thrasymachus, are speaking your real\nmind; for I do believe that you are now in earnest and are not amusing yourself\nat our expense.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI may be in earnest or not, but what is that to you?\u0026mdash;to refute the\nargument is your business.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery true, I said; that is what I have to do: But will you be so good as answer\nyet one more question? Does the just man try to gain any advantage over the\njust?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nFar otherwise; if he did he would not be the simple amusing creature which he\nis.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd would he try to go beyond just action?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHe would not.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd how would he regard the attempt to gain an advantage over the unjust; would\nthat be considered by him as just or unjust?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHe would think it just, and would try to gain the advantage; but he would not\nbe able.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhether he would or would not be able, I said, is not to the point. My question\nis only whether the just man, while refusing to have more than another just\nman, would wish and claim to have more than the unjust?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he would.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd what of the unjust\u0026mdash;does he claim to have more than the just man and\nto do more than is just?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nOf course, he said, for he claims to have more than all men.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd the unjust man will strive and struggle to obtain more than the unjust man\nor action, in order that he may have more than all?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWe may put the matter thus, I said\u0026mdash;the just does not desire more than his\nlike but more than his unlike, whereas the unjust desires more than both his\nlike and his unlike?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNothing, he said, can be better than that statement.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd the unjust is good and wise, and the just is neither?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nGood again, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd is not the unjust like the wise and good and the just unlike them?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nOf course, he said, he who is of a certain nature, is like those who are of a\ncertain nature; he who is not, not.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nEach of them, I said, is such as his like is?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly, he replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery good, Thrasymachus, I said; and now to take the case of the arts: you\nwould admit that one man is a musician and another not a musician?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd which is wise and which is foolish?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nClearly the musician is wise, and he who is not a musician is foolish.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd he is good in as far as he is wise, and bad in as far as he is foolish?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd you would say the same sort of thing of the physician?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd do you think, my excellent friend, that a musician when he adjusts the lyre\nwould desire or claim to exceed or go beyond a musician in the tightening and\nloosening the strings?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI do not think that he would.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut he would claim to exceed the non-musician?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nOf course.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd what would you say of the physician? In prescribing meats and drinks would\nhe wish to go beyond another physician or beyond the practice of medicine?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHe would not.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut he would wish to go beyond the non-physician?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd about knowledge and ignorance in general; see whether you think that any\nman who has knowledge ever would wish to have the choice of saying or doing\nmore than another man who has knowledge. Would he not rather say or do the same\nas his like in the same case?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat, I suppose, can hardly be denied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd what of the ignorant? would he not desire to have more than either the\nknowing or the ignorant?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI dare say.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd the knowing is wise?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd the wise is good?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen the wise and good will not desire to gain more than his like, but more\nthan his unlike and opposite?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI suppose so.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhereas the bad and ignorant will desire to gain more than both?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut did we not say, Thrasymachus, that the unjust goes beyond both his like and\nunlike? Were not these your words?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThey were.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd you also said that the just will not go beyond his like but his unlike?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen the just is like the wise and good, and the unjust like the evil and\nignorant?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat is the inference.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd each of them is such as his like is?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat was admitted.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen the just has turned out to be wise and good and the unjust evil and\nignorant.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThrasymachus made all these admissions, not fluently, as I repeat them, but\nwith extreme reluctance; it was a hot summer\u0026rsquo;s day, and the perspiration\npoured from him in torrents; and then I saw what I had never seen before,\nThrasymachus blushing. As we were now agreed that justice was virtue and\nwisdom, and injustice vice and ignorance, I proceeded to another point:\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWell, I said, Thrasymachus, that matter is now settled; but were we not also\nsaying that injustice had strength; do you remember?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, I remember, he said, but do not suppose that I approve of what you are\nsaying or have no answer; if however I were to answer, you would be quite\ncertain to accuse me of haranguing; therefore either permit me to have my say\nout, or if you would rather ask, do so, and I will answer \u0026lsquo;Very\ngood,\u0026rsquo; as they say to story-telling old women, and will nod\n\u0026lsquo;Yes\u0026rsquo; and \u0026lsquo;No.\u0026rsquo;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly not, I said, if contrary to your real opinion.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said, I will, to please you, since you will not let me speak. What else\nwould you have?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNothing in the world, I said; and if you are so disposed I will ask and you\nshall answer.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nProceed.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen I will repeat the question which I asked before, in order that our\nexamination of the relative nature of justice and injustice may be carried on\nregularly. A statement was made that injustice is stronger and more powerful\nthan justice, but now justice, having been identified with wisdom and virtue,\nis easily shown to be stronger than injustice, if injustice is ignorance; this\ncan no longer be questioned by any one. But I want to view the matter,\nThrasymachus, in a different way: You would not deny that a state may be unjust\nand may be unjustly attempting to enslave other states, or may have already\nenslaved them, and may be holding many of them in subjection?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue, he replied; and I will add that the best and most perfectly unjust state\nwill be most likely to do so.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI know, I said, that such was your position; but what I would further consider\nis, whether this power which is possessed by the superior state can exist or be\nexercised without justice or only with justice.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIf you are right in your view, and justice is wisdom, then only with justice;\nbut if I am right, then without justice.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI am delighted, Thrasymachus, to see you not only nodding assent and dissent,\nbut making answers which are quite excellent.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat is out of civility to you, he replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYou are very kind, I said; and would you have the goodness also to inform me,\nwhether you think that a state, or an army, or a band of robbers and thieves,\nor any other gang of evil-doers could act at all if they injured one another?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNo indeed, he said, they could not.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut if they abstained from injuring one another, then they might act together\nbetter?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd this is because injustice creates divisions and hatreds and fighting, and\njustice imparts harmony and friendship; is not that true, Thrasymachus?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI agree, he said, because I do not wish to quarrel with you.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHow good of you, I said; but I should like to know also whether injustice,\nhaving this tendency to arouse hatred, wherever existing, among slaves or among\nfreemen, will not make them hate one another and set them at variance and\nrender them incapable of common action?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd even if injustice be found in two only, will they not quarrel and fight,\nand become enemies to one another and to the just?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThey will.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd suppose injustice abiding in a single person, would your wisdom say that\nshe loses or that she retains her natural power?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nLet us assume that she retains her power.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYet is not the power which injustice exercises of such a nature that wherever\nshe takes up her abode, whether in a city, in an army, in a family, or in any\nother body, that body is, to begin with, rendered incapable of united action by\nreason of sedition and distraction; and does it not become its own enemy and at\nvariance with all that opposes it, and with the just? Is not this the case?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, certainly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd is not injustice equally fatal when existing in a single person; in the\nfirst place rendering him incapable of action because he is not at unity with\nhimself, and in the second place making him an enemy to himself and the just?\nIs not that true, Thrasymachus?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd O my friend, I said, surely the gods are just?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nGranted that they are.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut if so, the unjust will be the enemy of the gods, and the just will be their\nfriend?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nFeast away in triumph, and take your fill of the argument; I will not oppose\nyou, lest I should displease the company.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWell then, proceed with your answers, and let me have the remainder of my\nrepast. For we have already shown that the just are clearly wiser and better\nand abler than the unjust, and that the unjust are incapable of common action;\nnay more, that to speak as we did of men who are evil acting at any time\nvigorously together, is not strictly true, for if they had been perfectly evil,\nthey would have laid hands upon one another; but it is evident that there must\nhave been some remnant of justice in them, which enabled them to combine; if\nthere had not been they would have injured one another as well as their\nvictims; they were but half-villains in their enterprises; for had they been\nwhole villains, and utterly unjust, they would have been utterly incapable of\naction. That, as I believe, is the truth of the matter, and not what you said\nat first. But whether the just have a better and happier life than the unjust\nis a further question which we also proposed to consider. I think that they\nhave, and for the reasons which I have given; but still I should like to\nexamine further, for no light matter is at stake, nothing less than the rule of\nhuman life.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nProceed.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI will proceed by asking a question: Would you not say that a horse has some\nend?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI should.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd the end or use of a horse or of anything would be that which could not be\naccomplished, or not so well accomplished, by any other thing?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI do not understand, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nLet me explain: Can you see, except with the eye?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly not.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nOr hear, except with the ear?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNo.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThese then may be truly said to be the ends of these organs?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThey may.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut you can cut off a vine-branch with a dagger or with a chisel, and in many\nother ways?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nOf course.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd yet not so well as with a pruning-hook made for the purpose?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nMay we not say that this is the end of a pruning-hook?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWe may.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen now I think you will have no difficulty in understanding my meaning when I\nasked the question whether the end of anything would be that which could not be\naccomplished, or not so well accomplished, by any other thing?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI understand your meaning, he said, and assent.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd that to which an end is appointed has also an excellence? Need I ask again\nwhether the eye has an end?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIt has.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd has not the eye an excellence?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd the ear has an end and an excellence also?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd the same is true of all other things; they have each of them an end and a\nspecial excellence?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat is so.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWell, and can the eyes fulfil their end if they are wanting in their own proper\nexcellence and have a defect instead?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHow can they, he said, if they are blind and cannot see?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYou mean to say, if they have lost their proper excellence, which is sight; but\nI have not arrived at that point yet. I would rather ask the question more\ngenerally, and only enquire whether the things which fulfil their ends fulfil\nthem by their own proper excellence, and fail of fulfilling them by their own\ndefect?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly, he replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI might say the same of the ears; when deprived of their own proper excellence\nthey cannot fulfil their end?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd the same observation will apply to all other things?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI agree.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWell; and has not the soul an end which nothing else can fulfil? for example,\nto superintend and command and deliberate and the like. Are not these functions\nproper to the soul, and can they rightly be assigned to any other?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTo no other.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd is not life to be reckoned among the ends of the soul?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAssuredly, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd has not the soul an excellence also?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd can she or can she not fulfil her own ends when deprived of that\nexcellence?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nShe cannot.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen an evil soul must necessarily be an evil ruler and superintendent, and the\ngood soul a good ruler?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, necessarily.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd we have admitted that justice is the excellence of the soul, and injustice\nthe defect of the soul?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat has been admitted.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen the just soul and the just man will live well, and the unjust man will\nlive ill?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat is what your argument proves.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd he who lives well is blessed and happy, and he who lives ill the reverse of\nhappy?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen the just is happy, and the unjust miserable?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nSo be it.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut happiness and not misery is profitable.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nOf course.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen, my blessed Thrasymachus, injustice can never be more profitable than\njustice.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nLet this, Socrates, he said, be your entertainment at the Bendidea.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nFor which I am indebted to you, I said, now that you have grown gentle towards\nme and have left off scolding. Nevertheless, I have not been well entertained;\nbut that was my own fault and not yours. As an epicure snatches a taste of\nevery dish which is successively brought to table, he not having allowed\nhimself time to enjoy the one before, so have I gone from one subject to\nanother without having discovered what I sought at first, the nature of\njustice. I left that enquiry and turned away to consider whether justice is\nvirtue and wisdom or evil and folly; and when there arose a further question\nabout the comparative advantages of justice and injustice, I could not refrain\nfrom passing on to that. And the result of the whole discussion has been that I\nknow nothing at all. For I know not what justice is, and therefore I am not\nlikely to know whether it is or is not a virtue, nor can I say whether the just\nman is happy or unhappy.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003c!–end chapter–\u003e\n\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\n\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca id=\"link2H_4_0005\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e BOOK II.\u003c/h2\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWith these words I was thinking that I had made an end of the discussion; but\nthe end, in truth, proved to be only a beginning. For Glaucon, who is always\nthe most pugnacious of men, was dissatisfied at Thrasymachus\u0026rsquo; retirement;\nhe wanted to have the battle out. So he said to me: Socrates, do you wish\nreally to persuade us, or only to seem to have persuaded us, that to be just is\nalways better than to be unjust?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI should wish really to persuade you, I replied, if I could.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen you certainly have not succeeded. Let me ask you now:\u0026mdash;How would you\narrange goods\u0026mdash;are there not some which we welcome for their own sakes,\nand independently of their consequences, as, for example, harmless pleasures\nand enjoyments, which delight us at the time, although nothing follows from\nthem?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI agree in thinking that there is such a class, I replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIs there not also a second class of goods, such as knowledge, sight, health,\nwhich are desirable not only in themselves, but also for their results?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly, I said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd would you not recognize a third class, such as gymnastic, and the care of\nthe sick, and the physician\u0026rsquo;s art; also the various ways of\nmoney-making\u0026mdash;these do us good but we regard them as disagreeable; and no\none would choose them for their own sakes, but only for the sake of some reward\nor result which flows from them?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThere is, I said, this third class also. But why do you ask?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBecause I want to know in which of the three classes you would place justice?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIn the highest class, I replied,\u0026mdash;among those goods which he who would be\nhappy desires both for their own sake and for the sake of their results.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen the many are of another mind; they think that justice is to be reckoned in\nthe troublesome class, among goods which are to be pursued for the sake of\nrewards and of reputation, but in themselves are disagreeable and rather to be\navoided.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI know, I said, that this is their manner of thinking, and that this was the\nthesis which Thrasymachus was maintaining just now, when he censured justice\nand praised injustice. But I am too stupid to be convinced by him.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI wish, he said, that you would hear me as well as him, and then I shall see\nwhether you and I agree. For Thrasymachus seems to me, like a snake, to have\nbeen charmed by your voice sooner than he ought to have been; but to my mind\nthe nature of justice and injustice have not yet been made clear. Setting aside\ntheir rewards and results, I want to know what they are in themselves, and how\nthey inwardly work in the soul. If you, please, then, I will revive the\nargument of Thrasymachus. And first I will speak of the nature and origin of\njustice according to the common view of them. Secondly, I will show that all\nmen who practise justice do so against their will, of necessity, but not as a\ngood. And thirdly, I will argue that there is reason in this view, for the life\nof the unjust is after all better far than the life of the just\u0026mdash;if what\nthey say is true, Socrates, since I myself am not of their opinion. But still I\nacknowledge that I am perplexed when I hear the voices of Thrasymachus and\nmyriads of others dinning in my ears; and, on the other hand, I have never yet\nheard the superiority of justice to injustice maintained by any one in a\nsatisfactory way. I want to hear justice praised in respect of itself; then I\nshall be satisfied, and you are the person from whom I think that I am most\nlikely to hear this; and therefore I will praise the unjust life to the utmost\nof my power, and my manner of speaking will indicate the manner in which I\ndesire to hear you too praising justice and censuring injustice. Will you say\nwhether you approve of my proposal?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIndeed I do; nor can I imagine any theme about which a man of sense would\noftener wish to converse.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI am delighted, he replied, to hear you say so, and shall begin by speaking, as\nI proposed, of the nature and origin of justice.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThey say that to do injustice is, by nature, good; to suffer injustice, evil;\nbut that the evil is greater than the good. And so when men have both done and\nsuffered injustice and have had experience of both, not being able to avoid the\none and obtain the other, they think that they had better agree among\nthemselves to have neither; hence there arise laws and mutual covenants; and\nthat which is ordained by law is termed by them lawful and just. This they\naffirm to be the origin and nature of justice;\u0026mdash;it is a mean or\ncompromise, between the best of all, which is to do injustice and not be\npunished, and the worst of all, which is to suffer injustice without the power\nof retaliation; and justice, being at a middle point between the two, is\ntolerated not as a good, but as the lesser evil, and honoured by reason of the\ninability of men to do injustice. For no man who is worthy to be called a man\nwould ever submit to such an agreement if he were able to resist; he would be\nmad if he did. Such is the received account, Socrates, of the nature and origin\nof justice.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNow that those who practise justice do so involuntarily and because they have\nnot the power to be unjust will best appear if we imagine something of this\nkind: having given both to the just and the unjust power to do what they will,\nlet us watch and see whither desire will lead them; then we shall discover in\nthe very act the just and unjust man to be proceeding along the same road,\nfollowing their interest, which all natures deem to be their good, and are only\ndiverted into the path of justice by the force of law. The liberty which we are\nsupposing may be most completely given to them in the form of such a power as\nis said to have been possessed by Gyges, the ancestor of Croesus the Lydian.\nAccording to the tradition, Gyges was a shepherd in the service of the king of\nLydia; there was a great storm, and an earthquake made an opening in the earth\nat the place where he was feeding his flock. Amazed at the sight, he descended\ninto the opening, where, among other marvels, he beheld a hollow brazen horse,\nhaving doors, at which he stooping and looking in saw a dead body of stature,\nas appeared to him, more than human, and having nothing on but a gold ring;\nthis he took from the finger of the dead and reascended. Now the shepherds met\ntogether, according to custom, that they might send their monthly report about\nthe flocks to the king; into their assembly he came having the ring on his\nfinger, and as he was sitting among them he chanced to turn the collet of the\nring inside his hand, when instantly he became invisible to the rest of the\ncompany and they began to speak of him as if he were no longer present. He was\nastonished at this, and again touching the ring he turned the collet outwards\nand reappeared; he made several trials of the ring, and always with the same\nresult\u0026mdash;when he turned the collet inwards he became invisible, when\noutwards he reappeared. Whereupon he contrived to be chosen one of the\nmessengers who were sent to the court; whereas soon as he arrived he seduced\nthe queen, and with her help conspired against the king and slew him, and took\nthe kingdom. Suppose now that there were two such magic rings, and the just put\non one of them and the unjust the other; no man can be imagined to be of such\nan iron nature that he would stand fast in justice. No man would keep his hands\noff what was not his own when he could safely take what he liked out of the\nmarket, or go into houses and lie with any one at his pleasure, or kill or\nrelease from prison whom he would, and in all respects be like a God among men.\nThen the actions of the just would be as the actions of the unjust; they would\nboth come at last to the same point. And this we may truly affirm to be a great\nproof that a man is just, not willingly or because he thinks that justice is\nany good to him individually, but of necessity, for wherever any one thinks\nthat he can safely be unjust, there he is unjust. For all men believe in their\nhearts that injustice is far more profitable to the individual than justice,\nand he who argues as I have been supposing, will say that they are right. If\nyou could imagine any one obtaining this power of becoming invisible, and never\ndoing any wrong or touching what was another\u0026rsquo;s, he would be thought by\nthe lookers-on to be a most wretched idiot, although they would praise him to\none another\u0026rsquo;s faces, and keep up appearances with one another from a fear\nthat they too might suffer injustice. Enough of this.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNow, if we are to form a real judgment of the life of the just and unjust, we\nmust isolate them; there is no other way; and how is the isolation to be\neffected? I answer: Let the unjust man be entirely unjust, and the just man\nentirely just; nothing is to be taken away from either of them, and both are to\nbe perfectly furnished for the work of their respective lives. First, let the\nunjust be like other distinguished masters of craft; like the skilful pilot or\nphysician, who knows intuitively his own powers and keeps within their limits,\nand who, if he fails at any point, is able to recover himself. So let the\nunjust make his unjust attempts in the right way, and lie hidden if he means to\nbe great in his injustice: (he who is found out is nobody:) for the highest\nreach of injustice is, to be deemed just when you are not. Therefore I say that\nin the perfectly unjust man we must assume the most perfect injustice; there is\nto be no deduction, but we must allow him, while doing the most unjust acts, to\nhave acquired the greatest reputation for justice. If he have taken a false\nstep he must be able to recover himself; he must be one who can speak with\neffect, if any of his deeds come to light, and who can force his way where\nforce is required by his courage and strength, and command of money and\nfriends. And at his side let us place the just man in his nobleness and\nsimplicity, wishing, as Aeschylus says, to be and not to seem good. There must\nbe no seeming, for if he seem to be just he will be honoured and rewarded, and\nthen we shall not know whether he is just for the sake of justice or for the\nsake of honours and rewards; therefore, let him be clothed in justice only, and\nhave no other covering; and he must be imagined in a state of life the opposite\nof the former. Let him be the best of men, and let him be thought the worst;\nthen he will have been put to the proof; and we shall see whether he will be\naffected by the fear of infamy and its consequences. And let him continue thus\nto the hour of death; being just and seeming to be unjust. When both have\nreached the uttermost extreme, the one of justice and the other of injustice,\nlet judgment be given which of them is the happier of the two.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHeavens! my dear Glaucon, I said, how energetically you polish them up for the\ndecision, first one and then the other, as if they were two statues.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI do my best, he said. And now that we know what they are like there is no\ndifficulty in tracing out the sort of life which awaits either of them. This I\nwill proceed to describe; but as you may think the description a little too\ncoarse, I ask you to suppose, Socrates, that the words which follow are not\nmine.\u0026mdash;Let me put them into the mouths of the eulogists of injustice: They\nwill tell you that the just man who is thought unjust will be scourged, racked,\nbound\u0026mdash;will have his eyes burnt out; and, at last, after suffering every\nkind of evil, he will be impaled: Then he will understand that he ought to seem\nonly, and not to be, just; the words of Aeschylus may be more truly spoken of\nthe unjust than of the just. For the unjust is pursuing a reality; he does not\nlive with a view to appearances\u0026mdash;he wants to be really unjust and not to\nseem only:\u0026mdash;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n\u0026lsquo;His mind has a soil deep and fertile, Out of which spring his prudent\ncounsels.\u0026rsquo;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIn the first place, he is thought just, and therefore bears rule in the city;\nhe can marry whom he will, and give in marriage to whom he will; also he can\ntrade and deal where he likes, and always to his own advantage, because he has\nno misgivings about injustice; and at every contest, whether in public or\nprivate, he gets the better of his antagonists, and gains at their expense, and\nis rich, and out of his gains he can benefit his friends, and harm his enemies;\nmoreover, he can offer sacrifices, and dedicate gifts to the gods abundantly\nand magnificently, and can honour the gods or any man whom he wants to honour\nin a far better style than the just, and therefore he is likely to be dearer\nthan they are to the gods. And thus, Socrates, gods and men are said to unite\nin making the life of the unjust better than the life of the just.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI was going to say something in answer to Glaucon, when Adeimantus, his\nbrother, interposed: Socrates, he said, you do not suppose that there is\nnothing more to be urged?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhy, what else is there? I answered.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe strongest point of all has not been even mentioned, he replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWell, then, according to the proverb, \u0026lsquo;Let brother help\nbrother\u0026rsquo;\u0026mdash;if he fails in any part do you assist him; although I must\nconfess that Glaucon has already said quite enough to lay me in the dust, and\ntake from me the power of helping justice.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNonsense, he replied. But let me add something more: There is another side to\nGlaucon\u0026rsquo;s argument about the praise and censure of justice and injustice,\nwhich is equally required in order to bring out what I believe to be his\nmeaning. Parents and tutors are always telling their sons and their wards that\nthey are to be just; but why? not for the sake of justice, but for the sake of\ncharacter and reputation; in the hope of obtaining for him who is reputed just\nsome of those offices, marriages, and the like which Glaucon has enumerated\namong the advantages accruing to the unjust from the reputation of justice.\nMore, however, is made of appearances by this class of persons than by the\nothers; for they throw in the good opinion of the gods, and will tell you of a\nshower of benefits which the heavens, as they say, rain upon the pious; and\nthis accords with the testimony of the noble Hesiod and Homer, the first of\nwhom says, that the gods make the oaks of the just\u0026mdash;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp class=\"poem\"\u003e \u0026lsquo;To bear acorns at their summit, and bees in the\nmiddle;\u003cbr\u003e\nAnd the sheep are bowed down with the weight of their fleeces,\u0026rsquo;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nand many other blessings of a like kind are provided for them. And Homer has a\nvery similar strain; for he speaks of one whose fame is\u0026mdash;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n\u0026lsquo;As the fame of some blameless king who, like a god, Maintains justice;\nto whom the black earth brings forth Wheat and barley, whose trees are bowed\nwith fruit, And his sheep never fail to bear, and the sea gives him\nfish.\u0026rsquo;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nStill grander are the gifts of heaven which Musaeus and his son vouchsafe to\nthe just; they take them down into the world below, where they have the saints\nlying on couches at a feast, everlastingly drunk, crowned with garlands; their\nidea seems to be that an immortality of drunkenness is the highest meed of\nvirtue. Some extend their rewards yet further; the posterity, as they say, of\nthe faithful and just shall survive to the third and fourth generation. This is\nthe style in which they praise justice. But about the wicked there is another\nstrain; they bury them in a slough in Hades, and make them carry water in a\nsieve; also while they are yet living they bring them to infamy, and inflict\nupon them the punishments which Glaucon described as the portion of the just\nwho are reputed to be unjust; nothing else does their invention supply. Such is\ntheir manner of praising the one and censuring the other.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nOnce more, Socrates, I will ask you to consider another way of speaking about\njustice and injustice, which is not confined to the poets, but is found in\nprose writers. The universal voice of mankind is always declaring that justice\nand virtue are honourable, but grievous and toilsome; and that the pleasures of\nvice and injustice are easy of attainment, and are only censured by law and\nopinion. They say also that honesty is for the most part less profitable than\ndishonesty; and they are quite ready to call wicked men happy, and to honour\nthem both in public and private when they are rich or in any other way\ninfluential, while they despise and overlook those who may be weak and poor,\neven though acknowledging them to be better than the others. But most\nextraordinary of all is their mode of speaking about virtue and the gods: they\nsay that the gods apportion calamity and misery to many good men, and good and\nhappiness to the wicked. And mendicant prophets go to rich men\u0026rsquo;s doors\nand persuade them that they have a power committed to them by the gods of\nmaking an atonement for a man\u0026rsquo;s own or his ancestor\u0026rsquo;s sins by\nsacrifices or charms, with rejoicings and feasts; and they promise to harm an\nenemy, whether just or unjust, at a small cost; with magic arts and\nincantations binding heaven, as they say, to execute their will. And the poets\nare the authorities to whom they appeal, now smoothing the path of vice with\nthe words of Hesiod;\u0026mdash;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n\u0026lsquo;Vice may be had in abundance without trouble; the way is smooth and her\ndwelling-place is near. But before virtue the gods have set toil,\u0026rsquo;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nand a tedious and uphill road: then citing Homer as a witness that the gods may\nbe influenced by men; for he also says:\u0026mdash;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n\u0026lsquo;The gods, too, may be turned from their purpose; and men pray to them\nand avert their wrath by sacrifices and soothing entreaties, and by libations\nand the odour of fat, when they have sinned and transgressed.\u0026rsquo;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd they produce a host of books written by Musaeus and Orpheus, who were\nchildren of the Moon and the Muses\u0026mdash;that is what they say\u0026mdash;according\nto which they perform their ritual, and persuade not only individuals, but\nwhole cities, that expiations and atonements for sin may be made by sacrifices\nand amusements which fill a vacant hour, and are equally at the service of the\nliving and the dead; the latter sort they call mysteries, and they redeem us\nfrom the pains of hell, but if we neglect them no one knows what awaits us.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHe proceeded: And now when the young hear all this said about virtue and vice,\nand the way in which gods and men regard them, how are their minds likely to be\naffected, my dear Socrates,\u0026mdash;those of them, I mean, who are quickwitted,\nand, like bees on the wing, light on every flower, and from all that they hear\nare prone to draw conclusions as to what manner of persons they should be and\nin what way they should walk if they would make the best of life? Probably the\nyouth will say to himself in the words of Pindar\u0026mdash;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n\u0026lsquo;Can I by justice or by crooked ways of deceit ascend a loftier tower\nwhich may be a fortress to me all my days?\u0026rsquo;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nFor what men say is that, if I am really just and am not also thought just\nprofit there is none, but the pain and loss on the other hand are\nunmistakeable. But if, though unjust, I acquire the reputation of justice, a\nheavenly life is promised to me. Since then, as philosophers prove, appearance\ntyrannizes over truth and is lord of happiness, to appearance I must devote\nmyself. I will describe around me a picture and shadow of virtue to be the\nvestibule and exterior of my house; behind I will trail the subtle and crafty\nfox, as Archilochus, greatest of sages, recommends. But I hear some one\nexclaiming that the concealment of wickedness is often difficult; to which I\nanswer, Nothing great is easy. Nevertheless, the argument indicates this, if we\nwould be happy, to be the path along which we should proceed. With a view to\nconcealment we will establish secret brotherhoods and political clubs. And\nthere are professors of rhetoric who teach the art of persuading courts and\nassemblies; and so, partly by persuasion and partly by force, I shall make\nunlawful gains and not be punished. Still I hear a voice saying that the gods\ncannot be deceived, neither can they be compelled. But what if there are no\ngods? or, suppose them to have no care of human things\u0026mdash;why in either case\nshould we mind about concealment? And even if there are gods, and they do care\nabout us, yet we know of them only from tradition and the genealogies of the\npoets; and these are the very persons who say that they may be influenced and\nturned by \u0026lsquo;sacrifices and soothing entreaties and by offerings.\u0026rsquo;\nLet us be consistent then, and believe both or neither. If the poets speak\ntruly, why then we had better be unjust, and offer of the fruits of injustice;\nfor if we are just, although we may escape the vengeance of heaven, we shall\nlose the gains of injustice; but, if we are unjust, we shall keep the gains,\nand by our sinning and praying, and praying and sinning, the gods will be\npropitiated, and we shall not be punished. \u0026lsquo;But there is a world below in\nwhich either we or our posterity will suffer for our unjust deeds.\u0026rsquo; Yes,\nmy friend, will be the reflection, but there are mysteries and atoning deities,\nand these have great power. That is what mighty cities declare; and the\nchildren of the gods, who were their poets and prophets, bear a like testimony.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nOn what principle, then, shall we any longer choose justice rather than the\nworst injustice? when, if we only unite the latter with a deceitful regard to\nappearances, we shall fare to our mind both with gods and men, in life and\nafter death, as the most numerous and the highest authorities tell us. Knowing\nall this, Socrates, how can a man who has any superiority of mind or person or\nrank or wealth, be willing to honour justice; or indeed to refrain from\nlaughing when he hears justice praised? And even if there should be some one\nwho is able to disprove the truth of my words, and who is satisfied that\njustice is best, still he is not angry with the unjust, but is very ready to\nforgive them, because he also knows that men are not just of their own free\nwill; unless, peradventure, there be some one whom the divinity within him may\nhave inspired with a hatred of injustice, or who has attained knowledge of the\ntruth\u0026mdash;but no other man. He only blames injustice who, owing to cowardice\nor age or some weakness, has not the power of being unjust. And this is proved\nby the fact that when he obtains the power, he immediately becomes unjust as\nfar as he can be.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe cause of all this, Socrates, was indicated by us at the beginning of the\nargument, when my brother and I told you how astonished we were to find that of\nall the professing panegyrists of justice\u0026mdash;beginning with the ancient\nheroes of whom any memorial has been preserved to us, and ending with the men\nof our own time\u0026mdash;no one has ever blamed injustice or praised justice\nexcept with a view to the glories, honours, and benefits which flow from them.\nNo one has ever adequately described either in verse or prose the true\nessential nature of either of them abiding in the soul, and invisible to any\nhuman or divine eye; or shown that of all the things of a man\u0026rsquo;s soul\nwhich he has within him, justice is the greatest good, and injustice the\ngreatest evil. Had this been the universal strain, had you sought to persuade\nus of this from our youth upwards, we should not have been on the watch to keep\none another from doing wrong, but every one would have been his own watchman,\nbecause afraid, if he did wrong, of harbouring in himself the greatest of\nevils. I dare say that Thrasymachus and others would seriously hold the\nlanguage which I have been merely repeating, and words even stronger than these\nabout justice and injustice, grossly, as I conceive, perverting their true\nnature. But I speak in this vehement manner, as I must frankly confess to you,\nbecause I want to hear from you the opposite side; and I would ask you to show\nnot only the superiority which justice has over injustice, but what effect they\nhave on the possessor of them which makes the one to be a good and the other an\nevil to him. And please, as Glaucon requested of you, to exclude reputations;\nfor unless you take away from each of them his true reputation and add on the\nfalse, we shall say that you do not praise justice, but the appearance of it;\nwe shall think that you are only exhorting us to keep injustice dark, and that\nyou really agree with Thrasymachus in thinking that justice is another\u0026rsquo;s\ngood and the interest of the stronger, and that injustice is a man\u0026rsquo;s own\nprofit and interest, though injurious to the weaker. Now as you have admitted\nthat justice is one of that highest class of goods which are desired indeed for\ntheir results, but in a far greater degree for their own sakes\u0026mdash;like sight\nor hearing or knowledge or health, or any other real and natural and not merely\nconventional good\u0026mdash;I would ask you in your praise of justice to regard one\npoint only: I mean the essential good and evil which justice and injustice work\nin the possessors of them. Let others praise justice and censure injustice,\nmagnifying the rewards and honours of the one and abusing the other; that is a\nmanner of arguing which, coming from them, I am ready to tolerate, but from you\nwho have spent your whole life in the consideration of this question, unless I\nhear the contrary from your own lips, I expect something better. And therefore,\nI say, not only prove to us that justice is better than injustice, but show\nwhat they either of them do to the possessor of them, which makes the one to be\na good and the other an evil, whether seen or unseen by gods and men.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI had always admired the genius of Glaucon and Adeimantus, but on hearing these\nwords I was quite delighted, and said: Sons of an illustrious father, that was\nnot a bad beginning of the Elegiac verses which the admirer of Glaucon made in\nhonour of you after you had distinguished yourselves at the battle of\nMegara:\u0026mdash;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n\u0026lsquo;Sons of Ariston,\u0026rsquo; he sang, \u0026lsquo;divine offspring of an\nillustrious hero.\u0026rsquo;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe epithet is very appropriate, for there is something truly divine in being\nable to argue as you have done for the superiority of injustice, and remaining\nunconvinced by your own arguments. And I do believe that you are not\nconvinced\u0026mdash;this I infer from your general character, for had I judged only\nfrom your speeches I should have mistrusted you. But now, the greater my\nconfidence in you, the greater is my difficulty in knowing what to say. For I\nam in a strait between two; on the one hand I feel that I am unequal to the\ntask; and my inability is brought home to me by the fact that you were not\nsatisfied with the answer which I made to Thrasymachus, proving, as I thought,\nthe superiority which justice has over injustice. And yet I cannot refuse to\nhelp, while breath and speech remain to me; I am afraid that there would be an\nimpiety in being present when justice is evil spoken of and not lifting up a\nhand in her defence. And therefore I had best give such help as I can.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nGlaucon and the rest entreated me by all means not to let the question drop,\nbut to proceed in the investigation. They wanted to arrive at the truth, first,\nabout the nature of justice and injustice, and secondly, about their relative\nadvantages. I told them, what I really thought, that the enquiry would be of a\nserious nature, and would require very good eyes. Seeing then, I said, that we\nare no great wits, I think that we had better adopt a method which I may\nillustrate thus; suppose that a short-sighted person had been asked by some one\nto read small letters from a distance; and it occurred to some one else that\nthey might be found in another place which was larger and in which the letters\nwere larger\u0026mdash;if they were the same and he could read the larger letters\nfirst, and then proceed to the lesser\u0026mdash;this would have been thought a rare\npiece of good fortune.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery true, said Adeimantus; but how does the illustration apply to our enquiry?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI will tell you, I replied; justice, which is the subject of our enquiry, is,\nas you know, sometimes spoken of as the virtue of an individual, and sometimes\nas the virtue of a State.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue, he replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd is not a State larger than an individual?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIt is.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen in the larger the quantity of justice is likely to be larger and more\neasily discernible. I propose therefore that we enquire into the nature of\njustice and injustice, first as they appear in the State, and secondly in the\nindividual, proceeding from the greater to the lesser and comparing them.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat, he said, is an excellent proposal.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd if we imagine the State in process of creation, we shall see the justice\nand injustice of the State in process of creation also.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI dare say.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhen the State is completed there may be a hope that the object of our search\nwill be more easily discovered.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, far more easily.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut ought we to attempt to construct one? I said; for to do so, as I am\ninclined to think, will be a very serious task. Reflect therefore.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI have reflected, said Adeimantus, and am anxious that you should proceed.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nA State, I said, arises, as I conceive, out of the needs of mankind; no one is\nself-sufficing, but all of us have many wants. Can any other origin of a State\nbe imagined?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThere can be no other.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen, as we have many wants, and many persons are needed to supply them, one\ntakes a helper for one purpose and another for another; and when these partners\nand helpers are gathered together in one habitation the body of inhabitants is\ntermed a State.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd they exchange with one another, and one gives, and another receives, under\nthe idea that the exchange will be for their good.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery true.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen, I said, let us begin and create in idea a State; and yet the true creator\nis necessity, who is the mother of our invention.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nOf course, he replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNow the first and greatest of necessities is food, which is the condition of\nlife and existence.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe second is a dwelling, and the third clothing and the like.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd now let us see how our city will be able to supply this great demand: We\nmay suppose that one man is a husbandman, another a builder, some one else a\nweaver\u0026mdash;shall we add to them a shoemaker, or perhaps some other purveyor\nto our bodily wants?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nQuite right.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe barest notion of a State must include four or five men.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nClearly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd how will they proceed? Will each bring the result of his labours into a\ncommon stock?\u0026mdash;the individual husbandman, for example, producing for four,\nand labouring four times as long and as much as he need in the provision of\nfood with which he supplies others as well as himself; or will he have nothing\nto do with others and not be at the trouble of producing for them, but provide\nfor himself alone a fourth of the food in a fourth of the time, and in the\nremaining three fourths of his time be employed in making a house or a coat or\na pair of shoes, having no partnership with others, but supplying himself all\nhis own wants?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAdeimantus thought that he should aim at producing food only and not at\nproducing everything.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nProbably, I replied, that would be the better way; and when I hear you say\nthis, I am myself reminded that we are not all alike; there are diversities of\nnatures among us which are adapted to different occupations.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery true.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd will you have a work better done when the workman has many occupations, or\nwhen he has only one?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhen he has only one.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nFurther, there can be no doubt that a work is spoilt when not done at the right\ntime?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNo doubt.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nFor business is not disposed to wait until the doer of the business is at\nleisure; but the doer must follow up what he is doing, and make the business\nhis first object.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHe must.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd if so, we must infer that all things are produced more plentifully and\neasily and of a better quality when one man does one thing which is natural to\nhim and does it at the right time, and leaves other things.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nUndoubtedly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen more than four citizens will be required; for the husbandman will not make\nhis own plough or mattock, or other implements of agriculture, if they are to\nbe good for anything. Neither will the builder make his tools\u0026mdash;and he too\nneeds many; and in like manner the weaver and shoemaker.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen carpenters, and smiths, and many other artisans, will be sharers in our\nlittle State, which is already beginning to grow?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYet even if we add neatherds, shepherds, and other herdsmen, in order that our\nhusbandmen may have oxen to plough with, and builders as well as husbandmen may\nhave draught cattle, and curriers and weavers fleeces and hides,\u0026mdash;still\nour State will not be very large.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat is true; yet neither will it be a very small State which contains all\nthese.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen, again, there is the situation of the city\u0026mdash;to find a place where\nnothing need be imported is wellnigh impossible.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nImpossible.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen there must be another class of citizens who will bring the required supply\nfrom another city?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThere must.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut if the trader goes empty-handed, having nothing which they require who\nwould supply his need, he will come back empty-handed.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat is certain.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd therefore what they produce at home must be not only enough for themselves,\nbut such both in quantity and quality as to accommodate those from whom their\nwants are supplied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery true.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen more husbandmen and more artisans will be required?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThey will.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNot to mention the importers and exporters, who are called merchants?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen we shall want merchants?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWe shall.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd if merchandise is to be carried over the sea, skilful sailors will also be\nneeded, and in considerable numbers?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, in considerable numbers.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen, again, within the city, how will they exchange their productions? To\nsecure such an exchange was, as you will remember, one of our principal objects\nwhen we formed them into a society and constituted a State.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nClearly they will buy and sell.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen they will need a market-place, and a money-token for purposes of exchange.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nSuppose now that a husbandman, or an artisan, brings some production to market,\nand he comes at a time when there is no one to exchange with him,\u0026mdash;is he\nto leave his calling and sit idle in the market-place?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNot at all; he will find people there who, seeing the want, undertake the\noffice of salesmen. In well-ordered states they are commonly those who are the\nweakest in bodily strength, and therefore of little use for any other purpose;\ntheir duty is to be in the market, and to give money in exchange for goods to\nthose who desire to sell and to take money from those who desire to buy.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThis want, then, creates a class of retail-traders in our State. Is not\n\u0026lsquo;retailer\u0026rsquo; the term which is applied to those who sit in the\nmarket-place engaged in buying and selling, while those who wander from one\ncity to another are called merchants?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd there is another class of servants, who are intellectually hardly on the\nlevel of companionship; still they have plenty of bodily strength for labour,\nwhich accordingly they sell, and are called, if I do not mistake, hirelings,\nhire being the name which is given to the price of their labour.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen hirelings will help to make up our population?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd now, Adeimantus, is our State matured and perfected?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI think so.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhere, then, is justice, and where is injustice, and in what part of the State\ndid they spring up?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nProbably in the dealings of these citizens with one another. I cannot imagine\nthat they are more likely to be found any where else.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI dare say that you are right in your suggestion, I said; we had better think\nthe matter out, and not shrink from the enquiry.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nLet us then consider, first of all, what will be their way of life, now that we\nhave thus established them. Will they not produce corn, and wine, and clothes,\nand shoes, and build houses for themselves? And when they are housed, they will\nwork, in summer, commonly, stripped and barefoot, but in winter substantially\nclothed and shod. They will feed on barley-meal and flour of wheat, baking and\nkneading them, making noble cakes and loaves; these they will serve up on a mat\nof reeds or on clean leaves, themselves reclining the while upon beds strewn\nwith yew or myrtle. And they and their children will feast, drinking of the\nwine which they have made, wearing garlands on their heads, and hymning the\npraises of the gods, in happy converse with one another. And they will take\ncare that their families do not exceed their means; having an eye to poverty or\nwar.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut, said Glaucon, interposing, you have not given them a relish to their meal.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue, I replied, I had forgotten; of course they must have a relish\u0026mdash;salt,\nand olives, and cheese, and they will boil roots and herbs such as country\npeople prepare; for a dessert we shall give them figs, and peas, and beans; and\nthey will roast myrtle-berries and acorns at the fire, drinking in moderation.\nAnd with such a diet they may be expected to live in peace and health to a good\nold age, and bequeath a similar life to their children after them.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, Socrates, he said, and if you were providing for a city of pigs, how else\nwould you feed the beasts?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut what would you have, Glaucon? I replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhy, he said, you should give them the ordinary conveniences of life. People\nwho are to be comfortable are accustomed to lie on sofas, and dine off tables,\nand they should have sauces and sweets in the modern style.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, I said, now I understand: the question which you would have me consider\nis, not only how a State, but how a luxurious State is created; and possibly\nthere is no harm in this, for in such a State we shall be more likely to see\nhow justice and injustice originate. In my opinion the true and healthy\nconstitution of the State is the one which I have described. But if you wish\nalso to see a State at fever-heat, I have no objection. For I suspect that many\nwill not be satisfied with the simpler way of life. They will be for adding\nsofas, and tables, and other furniture; also dainties, and perfumes, and\nincense, and courtesans, and cakes, all these not of one sort only, but in\nevery variety; we must go beyond the necessaries of which I was at first\nspeaking, such as houses, and clothes, and shoes: the arts of the painter and\nthe embroiderer will have to be set in motion, and gold and ivory and all sorts\nof materials must be procured.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen we must enlarge our borders; for the original healthy State is no longer\nsufficient. Now will the city have to fill and swell with a multitude of\ncallings which are not required by any natural want; such as the whole tribe of\nhunters and actors, of whom one large class have to do with forms and colours;\nanother will be the votaries of music\u0026mdash;poets and their attendant train of\nrhapsodists, players, dancers, contractors; also makers of divers kinds of\narticles, including women\u0026rsquo;s dresses. And we shall want more servants.\nWill not tutors be also in request, and nurses wet and dry, tirewomen and\nbarbers, as well as confectioners and cooks; and swineherds, too, who were not\nneeded and therefore had no place in the former edition of our State, but are\nneeded now? They must not be forgotten: and there will be animals of many other\nkinds, if people eat them.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd living in this way we shall have much greater need of physicians than\nbefore?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nMuch greater.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd the country which was enough to support the original inhabitants will be\ntoo small now, and not enough?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nQuite true.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen a slice of our neighbours\u0026rsquo; land will be wanted by us for pasture and\ntillage, and they will want a slice of ours, if, like ourselves, they exceed\nthe limit of necessity, and give themselves up to the unlimited accumulation of\nwealth?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat, Socrates, will be inevitable.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd so we shall go to war, Glaucon. Shall we not?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nMost certainly, he replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen without determining as yet whether war does good or harm, thus much we may\naffirm, that now we have discovered war to be derived from causes which are\nalso the causes of almost all the evils in States, private as well as public.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nUndoubtedly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd our State must once more enlarge; and this time the enlargement will be\nnothing short of a whole army, which will have to go out and fight with the\ninvaders for all that we have, as well as for the things and persons whom we\nwere describing above.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhy? he said; are they not capable of defending themselves?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNo, I said; not if we were right in the principle which was acknowledged by all\nof us when we were framing the State: the principle, as you will remember, was\nthat one man cannot practise many arts with success.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery true, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut is not war an art?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd an art requiring as much attention as shoemaking?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nQuite true.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd the shoemaker was not allowed by us to be a husbandman, or a weaver, or a\nbuilder\u0026mdash;in order that we might have our shoes well made; but to him and\nto every other worker was assigned one work for which he was by nature fitted,\nand at that he was to continue working all his life long and at no other; he\nwas not to let opportunities slip, and then he would become a good workman. Now\nnothing can be more important than that the work of a soldier should be well\ndone. But is war an art so easily acquired that a man may be a warrior who is\nalso a husbandman, or shoemaker, or other artisan; although no one in the world\nwould be a good dice or draught player who merely took up the game as a\nrecreation, and had not from his earliest years devoted himself to this and\nnothing else? No tools will make a man a skilled workman, or master of defence,\nnor be of any use to him who has not learned how to handle them, and has never\nbestowed any attention upon them. How then will he who takes up a shield or\nother implement of war become a good fighter all in a day, whether with\nheavy-armed or any other kind of troops?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said, the tools which would teach men their own use would be beyond\nprice.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd the higher the duties of the guardian, I said, the more time, and skill,\nand art, and application will be needed by him?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNo doubt, he replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWill he not also require natural aptitude for his calling?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen it will be our duty to select, if we can, natures which are fitted for the\ntask of guarding the city?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIt will.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd the selection will be no easy matter, I said; but we must be brave and do\nour best.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWe must.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIs not the noble youth very like a well-bred dog in respect of guarding and\nwatching?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat do you mean?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI mean that both of them ought to be quick to see, and swift to overtake the\nenemy when they see him; and strong too if, when they have caught him, they\nhave to fight with him.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAll these qualities, he replied, will certainly be required by them.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWell, and your guardian must be brave if he is to fight well?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd is he likely to be brave who has no spirit, whether horse or dog or any\nother animal? Have you never observed how invincible and unconquerable is\nspirit and how the presence of it makes the soul of any creature to be\nabsolutely fearless and indomitable?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI have.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen now we have a clear notion of the bodily qualities which are required in\nthe guardian.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd also of the mental ones; his soul is to be full of spirit?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut are not these spirited natures apt to be savage with one another, and with\neverybody else?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nA difficulty by no means easy to overcome, he replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhereas, I said, they ought to be dangerous to their enemies, and gentle to\ntheir friends; if not, they will destroy themselves without waiting for their\nenemies to destroy them.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat is to be done then? I said; how shall we find a gentle nature which has\nalso a great spirit, for the one is the contradiction of the other?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHe will not be a good guardian who is wanting in either of these two qualities;\nand yet the combination of them appears to be impossible; and hence we must\ninfer that to be a good guardian is impossible.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI am afraid that what you say is true, he replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHere feeling perplexed I began to think over what had preceded.\u0026mdash;My\nfriend, I said, no wonder that we are in a perplexity; for we have lost sight\nof the image which we had before us.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat do you mean? he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI mean to say that there do exist natures gifted with those opposite qualities.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd where do you find them?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nMany animals, I replied, furnish examples of them; our friend the dog is a very\ngood one: you know that well-bred dogs are perfectly gentle to their familiars\nand acquaintances, and the reverse to strangers.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, I know.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen there is nothing impossible or out of the order of nature in our finding a\nguardian who has a similar combination of qualities?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly not.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWould not he who is fitted to be a guardian, besides the spirited nature, need\nto have the qualities of a philosopher?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI do not apprehend your meaning.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe trait of which I am speaking, I replied, may be also seen in the dog, and\nis remarkable in the animal.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat trait?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhy, a dog, whenever he sees a stranger, is angry; when an acquaintance, he\nwelcomes him, although the one has never done him any harm, nor the other any\ngood. Did this never strike you as curious?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe matter never struck me before; but I quite recognise the truth of your\nremark.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd surely this instinct of the dog is very charming;\u0026mdash;your dog is a true\nphilosopher.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhy?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhy, because he distinguishes the face of a friend and of an enemy only by the\ncriterion of knowing and not knowing. And must not an animal be a lover of\nlearning who determines what he likes and dislikes by the test of knowledge and\nignorance?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nMost assuredly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd is not the love of learning the love of wisdom, which is philosophy?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThey are the same, he replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd may we not say confidently of man also, that he who is likely to be gentle\nto his friends and acquaintances, must by nature be a lover of wisdom and\nknowledge?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat we may safely affirm.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen he who is to be a really good and noble guardian of the State will require\nto unite in himself philosophy and spirit and swiftness and strength?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nUndoubtedly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen we have found the desired natures; and now that we have found them, how\nare they to be reared and educated? Is not this an enquiry which may be\nexpected to throw light on the greater enquiry which is our final end\u0026mdash;How\ndo justice and injustice grow up in States? for we do not want either to omit\nwhat is to the point or to draw out the argument to an inconvenient length.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAdeimantus thought that the enquiry would be of great service to us.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen, I said, my dear friend, the task must not be given up, even if somewhat\nlong.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly not.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCome then, and let us pass a leisure hour in story-telling, and our story shall\nbe the education of our heroes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBy all means.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd what shall be their education? Can we find a better than the traditional\nsort?\u0026mdash;and this has two divisions, gymnastic for the body, and music for\nthe soul.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nShall we begin education with music, and go on to gymnastic afterwards?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBy all means.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd when you speak of music, do you include literature or not?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI do.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd literature may be either true or false?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd the young should be trained in both kinds, and we begin with the false?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI do not understand your meaning, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYou know, I said, that we begin by telling children stories which, though not\nwholly destitute of truth, are in the main fictitious; and these stories are\ntold them when they are not of an age to learn gymnastics.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery true.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat was my meaning when I said that we must teach music before gymnastics.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nQuite right, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYou know also that the beginning is the most important part of any work,\nespecially in the case of a young and tender thing; for that is the time at\nwhich the character is being formed and the desired impression is more readily\ntaken.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nQuite true.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd shall we just carelessly allow children to hear any casual tales which may\nbe devised by casual persons, and to receive into their minds ideas for the\nmost part the very opposite of those which we should wish them to have when\nthey are grown up?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWe cannot.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen the first thing will be to establish a censorship of the writers of\nfiction, and let the censors receive any tale of fiction which is good, and\nreject the bad; and we will desire mothers and nurses to tell their children\nthe authorised ones only. Let them fashion the mind with such tales, even more\nfondly than they mould the body with their hands; but most of those which are\nnow in use must be discarded.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nOf what tales are you speaking? he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYou may find a model of the lesser in the greater, I said; for they are\nnecessarily of the same type, and there is the same spirit in both of them.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery likely, he replied; but I do not as yet know what you would term the\ngreater.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThose, I said, which are narrated by Homer and Hesiod, and the rest of the\npoets, who have ever been the great story-tellers of mankind.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut which stories do you mean, he said; and what fault do you find with them?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nA fault which is most serious, I said; the fault of telling a lie, and, what is\nmore, a bad lie.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut when is this fault committed?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhenever an erroneous representation is made of the nature of gods and\nheroes,\u0026mdash;as when a painter paints a portrait not having the shadow of a\nlikeness to the original.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said, that sort of thing is certainly very blameable; but what are the\nstories which you mean?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nFirst of all, I said, there was that greatest of all lies in high places, which\nthe poet told about Uranus, and which was a bad lie too,\u0026mdash;I mean what\nHesiod says that Uranus did, and how Cronus retaliated on him. The doings of\nCronus, and the sufferings which in turn his son inflicted upon him, even if\nthey were true, ought certainly not to be lightly told to young and thoughtless\npersons; if possible, they had better be buried in silence. But if there is an\nabsolute necessity for their mention, a chosen few might hear them in a\nmystery, and they should sacrifice not a common (Eleusinian) pig, but some huge\nand unprocurable victim; and then the number of the hearers will be very few\nindeed.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhy, yes, said he, those stories are extremely objectionable.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, Adeimantus, they are stories not to be repeated in our State; the young\nman should not be told that in committing the worst of crimes he is far from\ndoing anything outrageous; and that even if he chastises his father when he\ndoes wrong, in whatever manner, he will only be following the example of the\nfirst and greatest among the gods.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI entirely agree with you, he said; in my opinion those stories are quite unfit\nto be repeated.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNeither, if we mean our future guardians to regard the habit of quarrelling\namong themselves as of all things the basest, should any word be said to them\nof the wars in heaven, and of the plots and fightings of the gods against one\nanother, for they are not true. No, we shall never mention the battles of the\ngiants, or let them be embroidered on garments; and we shall be silent about\nthe innumerable other quarrels of gods and heroes with their friends and\nrelatives. If they would only believe us we would tell them that quarrelling is\nunholy, and that never up to this time has there been any quarrel between\ncitizens; this is what old men and old women should begin by telling children;\nand when they grow up, the poets also should be told to compose for them in a\nsimilar spirit. But the narrative of Hephaestus binding Here his mother, or how\non another occasion Zeus sent him flying for taking her part when she was being\nbeaten, and all the battles of the gods in Homer\u0026mdash;these tales must not be\nadmitted into our State, whether they are supposed to have an allegorical\nmeaning or not. For a young person cannot judge what is allegorical and what is\nliteral; anything that he receives into his mind at that age is likely to\nbecome indelible and unalterable; and therefore it is most important that the\ntales which the young first hear should be models of virtuous thoughts.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThere you are right, he replied; but if any one asks where are such models to\nbe found and of what tales are you speaking\u0026mdash;how shall we answer him?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI said to him, You and I, Adeimantus, at this moment are not poets, but\nfounders of a State: now the founders of a State ought to know the general\nforms in which poets should cast their tales, and the limits which must be\nobserved by them, but to make the tales is not their business.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery true, he said; but what are these forms of theology which you mean?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nSomething of this kind, I replied:\u0026mdash;God is always to be represented as he\ntruly is, whatever be the sort of poetry, epic, lyric or tragic, in which the\nrepresentation is given.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nRight.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd is he not truly good? and must he not be represented as such?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd no good thing is hurtful?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNo, indeed.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd that which is not hurtful hurts not?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly not.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd that which hurts not does no evil?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNo.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd can that which does no evil be a cause of evil?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nImpossible.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd the good is advantageous?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd therefore the cause of well-being?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIt follows therefore that the good is not the cause of all things, but of the\ngood only?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAssuredly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen God, if he be good, is not the author of all things, as the many assert,\nbut he is the cause of a few things only, and not of most things that occur to\nmen. For few are the goods of human life, and many are the evils, and the good\nis to be attributed to God alone; of the evils the causes are to be sought\nelsewhere, and not in him.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat appears to me to be most true, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen we must not listen to Homer or to any other poet who is guilty of the\nfolly of saying that two casks\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n\u0026lsquo;Lie at the threshold of Zeus, full of lots, one of good, the other of\nevil lots,\u0026rsquo;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nand that he to whom Zeus gives a mixture of the two\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n\u0026lsquo;Sometimes meets with evil fortune, at other times with good;\u0026rsquo;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nbut that he to whom is given the cup of unmingled ill,\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n\u0026lsquo;Him wild hunger drives o\u0026rsquo;er the beauteous earth.\u0026rsquo;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd again\u0026mdash;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n\u0026lsquo;Zeus, who is the dispenser of good and evil to us.\u0026rsquo;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd if any one asserts that the violation of oaths and treaties, which was\nreally the work of Pandarus, was brought about by Athene and Zeus, or that the\nstrife and contention of the gods was instigated by Themis and Zeus, he shall\nnot have our approval; neither will we allow our young men to hear the words of\nAeschylus, that\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n\u0026lsquo;God plants guilt among men when he desires utterly to destroy a\nhouse.\u0026rsquo;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd if a poet writes of the sufferings of Niobe\u0026mdash;the subject of the\ntragedy in which these iambic verses occur\u0026mdash;or of the house of Pelops, or\nof the Trojan war or on any similar theme, either we must not permit him to say\nthat these are the works of God, or if they are of God, he must devise some\nexplanation of them such as we are seeking; he must say that God did what was\njust and right, and they were the better for being punished; but that those who\nare punished are miserable, and that God is the author of their\nmisery\u0026mdash;the poet is not to be permitted to say; though he may say that the\nwicked are miserable because they require to be punished, and are benefited by\nreceiving punishment from God; but that God being good is the author of evil to\nany one is to be strenuously denied, and not to be said or sung or heard in\nverse or prose by any one whether old or young in any well-ordered\ncommonwealth. Such a fiction is suicidal, ruinous, impious.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI agree with you, he replied, and am ready to give my assent to the law.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nLet this then be one of our rules and principles concerning the gods, to which\nour poets and reciters will be expected to conform,\u0026mdash;that God is not the\nauthor of all things, but of good only.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat will do, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd what do you think of a second principle? Shall I ask you whether God is a\nmagician, and of a nature to appear insidiously now in one shape, and now in\nanother\u0026mdash;sometimes himself changing and passing into many forms, sometimes\ndeceiving us with the semblance of such transformations; or is he one and the\nsame immutably fixed in his own proper image?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI cannot answer you, he said, without more thought.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWell, I said; but if we suppose a change in anything, that change must be\neffected either by the thing itself, or by some other thing?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nMost certainly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd things which are at their best are also least liable to be altered or\ndiscomposed; for example, when healthiest and strongest, the human frame is\nleast liable to be affected by meats and drinks, and the plant which is in the\nfullest vigour also suffers least from winds or the heat of the sun or any\nsimilar causes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nOf course.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd will not the bravest and wisest soul be least confused or deranged by any\nexternal influence?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd the same principle, as I should suppose, applies to all composite\nthings\u0026mdash;furniture, houses, garments: when good and well made, they are\nleast altered by time and circumstances.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery true.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen everything which is good, whether made by art or nature, or both, is least\nliable to suffer change from without?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut surely God and the things of God are in every way perfect?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nOf course they are.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen he can hardly be compelled by external influence to take many shapes?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHe cannot.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut may he not change and transform himself?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nClearly, he said, that must be the case if he is changed at all.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd will he then change himself for the better and fairer, or for the worse and\nmore unsightly?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIf he change at all he can only change for the worse, for we cannot suppose him\nto be deficient either in virtue or beauty.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery true, Adeimantus; but then, would any one, whether God or man, desire to\nmake himself worse?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nImpossible.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen it is impossible that God should ever be willing to change; being, as is\nsupposed, the fairest and best that is conceivable, every God remains\nabsolutely and for ever in his own form.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat necessarily follows, he said, in my judgment.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen, I said, my dear friend, let none of the poets tell us that\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n\u0026lsquo;The gods, taking the disguise of strangers from other lands, walk up and\ndown cities in all sorts of forms;\u0026rsquo;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nand let no one slander Proteus and Thetis, neither let any one, either in\ntragedy or in any other kind of poetry, introduce Here disguised in the\nlikeness of a priestess asking an alms\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n\u0026lsquo;For the life-giving daughters of Inachus the river of Argos;\u0026rsquo;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n\u0026mdash;let us have no more lies of that sort. Neither must we have mothers\nunder the influence of the poets scaring their children with a bad version of\nthese myths\u0026mdash;telling how certain gods, as they say, \u0026lsquo;Go about by\nnight in the likeness of so many strangers and in divers forms;\u0026rsquo; but let\nthem take heed lest they make cowards of their children, and at the same time\nspeak blasphemy against the gods.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHeaven forbid, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut although the gods are themselves unchangeable, still by witchcraft and\ndeception they may make us think that they appear in various forms?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nPerhaps, he replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWell, but can you imagine that God will be willing to lie, whether in word or\ndeed, or to put forth a phantom of himself?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI cannot say, he replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nDo you not know, I said, that the true lie, if such an expression may be\nallowed, is hated of gods and men?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat do you mean? he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI mean that no one is willingly deceived in that which is the truest and\nhighest part of himself, or about the truest and highest matters; there, above\nall, he is most afraid of a lie having possession of him.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nStill, he said, I do not comprehend you.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe reason is, I replied, that you attribute some profound meaning to my words;\nbut I am only saying that deception, or being deceived or uninformed about the\nhighest realities in the highest part of themselves, which is the soul, and in\nthat part of them to have and to hold the lie, is what mankind least\nlike;\u0026mdash;that, I say, is what they utterly detest.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThere is nothing more hateful to them.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd, as I was just now remarking, this ignorance in the soul of him who is\ndeceived may be called the true lie; for the lie in words is only a kind of\nimitation and shadowy image of a previous affection of the soul, not pure\nunadulterated falsehood. Am I not right?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nPerfectly right.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe true lie is hated not only by the gods, but also by men?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhereas the lie in words is in certain cases useful and not hateful; in dealing\nwith enemies\u0026mdash;that would be an instance; or again, when those whom we call\nour friends in a fit of madness or illusion are going to do some harm, then it\nis useful and is a sort of medicine or preventive; also in the tales of\nmythology, of which we were just now speaking\u0026mdash;because we do not know the\ntruth about ancient times, we make falsehood as much like truth as we can, and\nso turn it to account.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery true, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut can any of these reasons apply to God? Can we suppose that he is ignorant\nof antiquity, and therefore has recourse to invention?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat would be ridiculous, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen the lying poet has no place in our idea of God?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI should say not.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nOr perhaps he may tell a lie because he is afraid of enemies?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat is inconceivable.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut he may have friends who are senseless or mad?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut no mad or senseless person can be a friend of God.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen no motive can be imagined why God should lie?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNone whatever.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen the superhuman and divine is absolutely incapable of falsehood?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen is God perfectly simple and true both in word and deed; he changes not; he\ndeceives not, either by sign or word, by dream or waking vision.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYour thoughts, he said, are the reflection of my own.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYou agree with me then, I said, that this is the second type or form in which\nwe should write and speak about divine things. The gods are not magicians who\ntransform themselves, neither do they deceive mankind in any way.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI grant that.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen, although we are admirers of Homer, we do not admire the lying dream which\nZeus sends to Agamemnon; neither will we praise the verses of Aeschylus in\nwhich Thetis says that Apollo at her nuptials\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n\u0026lsquo;Was celebrating in song her fair progeny whose days were to be long, and\nto know no sickness. And when he had spoken of my lot as in all things blessed\nof heaven he raised a note of triumph and cheered my soul. And I thought that\nthe word of Phoebus, being divine and full of prophecy, would not fail. And now\nhe himself who uttered the strain, he who was present at the banquet, and who\nsaid this\u0026mdash;he it is who has slain my son.\u0026rsquo;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThese are the kind of sentiments about the gods which will arouse our anger;\nand he who utters them shall be refused a chorus; neither shall we allow\nteachers to make use of them in the instruction of the young, meaning, as we\ndo, that our guardians, as far as men can be, should be true worshippers of the\ngods and like them.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI entirely agree, he said, in these principles, and promise to make them my\nlaws.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003c!–end chapter–\u003e\n\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\n\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca id=\"link2H_4_0006\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e BOOK III.\u003c/h2\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nSuch then, I said, are our principles of theology\u0026mdash;some tales are to be\ntold, and others are not to be told to our disciples from their youth upwards,\nif we mean them to honour the gods and their parents, and to value friendship\nwith one another.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes; and I think that our principles are right, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut if they are to be courageous, must they not learn other lessons besides\nthese, and lessons of such a kind as will take away the fear of death? Can any\nman be courageous who has the fear of death in him?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly not, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd can he be fearless of death, or will he choose death in battle rather than\ndefeat and slavery, who believes the world below to be real and terrible?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nImpossible.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen we must assume a control over the narrators of this class of tales as well\nas over the others, and beg them not simply to revile but rather to commend the\nworld below, intimating to them that their descriptions are untrue, and will do\nharm to our future warriors.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat will be our duty, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen, I said, we shall have to obliterate many obnoxious passages, beginning\nwith the verses,\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n\u0026lsquo;I would rather be a serf on the land of a poor and portionless man than\nrule over all the dead who have come to nought.\u0026rsquo;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWe must also expunge the verse, which tells us how Pluto feared,\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n\u0026lsquo;Lest the mansions grim and squalid which the gods abhor should be seen\nboth of mortals and immortals.\u0026rsquo;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd again:\u0026mdash;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n\u0026lsquo;O heavens! verily in the house of Hades there is soul and ghostly form\nbut no mind at all!\u0026rsquo;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAgain of Tiresias:\u0026mdash;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n\u0026lsquo;(To him even after death did Persephone grant mind,) that he alone\nshould be wise; but the other souls are flitting shades.\u0026rsquo;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAgain:\u0026mdash;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n\u0026lsquo;The soul flying from the limbs had gone to Hades, lamenting her fate,\nleaving manhood and youth.\u0026rsquo;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAgain:\u0026mdash;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n\u0026lsquo;And the soul, with shrilling cry, passed like smoke beneath the\nearth.\u0026rsquo;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd,\u0026mdash;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n\u0026lsquo;As bats in hollow of mystic cavern, whenever any of them has dropped out\nof the string and falls from the rock, fly shrilling and cling to one another,\nso did they with shrilling cry hold together as they moved.\u0026rsquo;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd we must beg Homer and the other poets not to be angry if we strike out\nthese and similar passages, not because they are unpoetical, or unattractive to\nthe popular ear, but because the greater the poetical charm of them, the less\nare they meet for the ears of boys and men who are meant to be free, and who\nshould fear slavery more than death.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nUndoubtedly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAlso we shall have to reject all the terrible and appalling names which\ndescribe the world below\u0026mdash;Cocytus and Styx, ghosts under the earth, and\nsapless shades, and any similar words of which the very mention causes a\nshudder to pass through the inmost soul of him who hears them. I do not say\nthat these horrible stories may not have a use of some kind; but there is a\ndanger that the nerves of our guardians may be rendered too excitable and\neffeminate by them.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThere is a real danger, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen we must have no more of them.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnother and a nobler strain must be composed and sung by us.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nClearly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd shall we proceed to get rid of the weepings and wailings of famous men?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThey will go with the rest.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut shall we be right in getting rid of them? Reflect: our principle is that\nthe good man will not consider death terrible to any other good man who is his\ncomrade.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes; that is our principle.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd therefore he will not sorrow for his departed friend as though he had\nsuffered anything terrible?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHe will not.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nSuch an one, as we further maintain, is sufficient for himself and his own\nhappiness, and therefore is least in need of other men.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd for this reason the loss of a son or brother, or the deprivation of\nfortune, is to him of all men least terrible.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAssuredly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd therefore he will be least likely to lament, and will bear with the\ngreatest equanimity any misfortune of this sort which may befall him.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he will feel such a misfortune far less than another.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen we shall be right in getting rid of the lamentations of famous men, and\nmaking them over to women (and not even to women who are good for anything), or\nto men of a baser sort, that those who are being educated by us to be the\ndefenders of their country may scorn to do the like.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat will be very right.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen we will once more entreat Homer and the other poets not to depict\nAchilles, who is the son of a goddess, first lying on his side, then on his\nback, and then on his face; then starting up and sailing in a frenzy along the\nshores of the barren sea; now taking the sooty ashes in both his hands and\npouring them over his head, or weeping and wailing in the various modes which\nHomer has delineated. Nor should he describe Priam the kinsman of the gods as\npraying and beseeching,\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n\u0026lsquo;Rolling in the dirt, calling each man loudly by his name.\u0026rsquo;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nStill more earnestly will we beg of him at all events not to introduce the gods\nlamenting and saying,\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n\u0026lsquo;Alas! my misery! Alas! that I bore the bravest to my sorrow.\u0026rsquo;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut if he must introduce the gods, at any rate let him not dare so completely\nto misrepresent the greatest of the gods, as to make him say\u0026mdash;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n\u0026lsquo;O heavens! with my eyes verily I behold a dear friend of mine chased\nround and round the city, and my heart is sorrowful.\u0026rsquo;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nOr again:\u0026mdash;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWoe is me that I am fated to have Sarpedon, dearest of men to me, subdued at\nthe hands of Patroclus the son of Menoetius.\u0026rsquo;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nFor if, my sweet Adeimantus, our youth seriously listen to such unworthy\nrepresentations of the gods, instead of laughing at them as they ought, hardly\nwill any of them deem that he himself, being but a man, can be dishonoured by\nsimilar actions; neither will he rebuke any inclination which may arise in his\nmind to say and do the like. And instead of having any shame or self-control,\nhe will be always whining and lamenting on slight occasions.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said, that is most true.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, I replied; but that surely is what ought not to be, as the argument has\njust proved to us; and by that proof we must abide until it is disproved by a\nbetter.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIt ought not to be.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNeither ought our guardians to be given to laughter. For a fit of laughter\nwhich has been indulged to excess almost always produces a violent reaction.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nSo I believe.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen persons of worth, even if only mortal men, must not be represented as\novercome by laughter, and still less must such a representation of the gods be\nallowed.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nStill less of the gods, as you say, he replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen we shall not suffer such an expression to be used about the gods as that\nof Homer when he describes how\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n\u0026lsquo;Inextinguishable laughter arose among the blessed gods, when they saw\nHephaestus bustling about the mansion.\u0026rsquo;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nOn your views, we must not admit them.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nOn my views, if you like to father them on me; that we must not admit them is\ncertain.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAgain, truth should be highly valued; if, as we were saying, a lie is useless\nto the gods, and useful only as a medicine to men, then the use of such\nmedicines should be restricted to physicians; private individuals have no\nbusiness with them.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nClearly not, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen if any one at all is to have the privilege of lying, the rulers of the\nState should be the persons; and they, in their dealings either with enemies or\nwith their own citizens, may be allowed to lie for the public good. But nobody\nelse should meddle with anything of the kind; and although the rulers have this\nprivilege, for a private man to lie to them in return is to be deemed a more\nheinous fault than for the patient or the pupil of a gymnasium not to speak the\ntruth about his own bodily illnesses to the physician or to the trainer, or for\na sailor not to tell the captain what is happening about the ship and the rest\nof the crew, and how things are going with himself or his fellow sailors.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nMost true, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIf, then, the ruler catches anybody beside himself lying in the State,\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n\u0026lsquo;Any of the craftsmen, whether he be priest or physician or\ncarpenter,\u0026rsquo;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nhe will punish him for introducing a practice which is equally subversive and\ndestructive of ship or State.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nMost certainly, he said, if our idea of the State is ever carried out.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIn the next place our youth must be temperate?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAre not the chief elements of temperance, speaking generally, obedience to\ncommanders and self-control in sensual pleasures?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen we shall approve such language as that of Diomede in Homer,\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n\u0026lsquo;Friend, sit still and obey my word,\u0026rsquo;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nand the verses which follow,\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n\u0026lsquo;The Greeks marched breathing prowess, …in silent awe of their\nleaders,\u0026rsquo;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nand other sentiments of the same kind.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWe shall.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat of this line,\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n\u0026lsquo;O heavy with wine, who hast the eyes of a dog and the heart of a\nstag,\u0026rsquo;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nand of the words which follow? Would you say that these, or any similar\nimpertinences which private individuals are supposed to address to their\nrulers, whether in verse or prose, are well or ill spoken?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThey are ill spoken.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThey may very possibly afford some amusement, but they do not conduce to\ntemperance. And therefore they are likely to do harm to our young men\u0026mdash;you\nwould agree with me there?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd then, again, to make the wisest of men say that nothing in his opinion is\nmore glorious than\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n\u0026lsquo;When the tables are full of bread and meat, and the cup-bearer carries\nround wine which he draws from the bowl and pours into the cups,\u0026rsquo;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nis it fit or conducive to temperance for a young man to hear such words? Or the\nverse\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n\u0026lsquo;The saddest of fates is to die and meet destiny from hunger?\u0026rsquo;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat would you say again to the tale of Zeus, who, while other gods and men\nwere asleep and he the only person awake, lay devising plans, but forgot them\nall in a moment through his lust, and was so completely overcome at the sight\nof Here that he would not even go into the hut, but wanted to lie with her on\nthe ground, declaring that he had never been in such a state of rapture before,\neven when they first met one another\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n\u0026lsquo;Without the knowledge of their parents;\u0026rsquo;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nor that other tale of how Hephaestus, because of similar goings on, cast a\nchain around Ares and Aphrodite?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIndeed, he said, I am strongly of opinion that they ought not to hear that sort\nof thing.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut any deeds of endurance which are done or told by famous men, these they\nought to see and hear; as, for example, what is said in the verses,\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n\u0026lsquo;He smote his breast, and thus reproached his heart, Endure, my heart;\nfar worse hast thou endured!\u0026rsquo;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIn the next place, we must not let them be receivers of gifts or lovers of\nmoney.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly not.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNeither must we sing to them of\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n\u0026lsquo;Gifts persuading gods, and persuading reverend kings.\u0026rsquo;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNeither is Phoenix, the tutor of Achilles, to be approved or deemed to have\ngiven his pupil good counsel when he told him that he should take the gifts of\nthe Greeks and assist them; but that without a gift he should not lay aside his\nanger. Neither will we believe or acknowledge Achilles himself to have been\nsuch a lover of money that he took Agamemnon\u0026rsquo;s gifts, or that when he had\nreceived payment he restored the dead body of Hector, but that without payment\nhe was unwilling to do so.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nUndoubtedly, he said, these are not sentiments which can be approved.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nLoving Homer as I do, I hardly like to say that in attributing these feelings\nto Achilles, or in believing that they are truly attributed to him, he is\nguilty of downright impiety. As little can I believe the narrative of his\ninsolence to Apollo, where he says,\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n\u0026lsquo;Thou hast wronged me, O far-darter, most abominable of deities. Verily I\nwould be even with thee, if I had only the power;\u0026rsquo;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nor his insubordination to the river-god, on whose divinity he is ready to lay\nhands; or his offering to the dead Patroclus of his own hair, which had been\npreviously dedicated to the other river-god Spercheius, and that he actually\nperformed this vow; or that he dragged Hector round the tomb of Patroclus, and\nslaughtered the captives at the pyre; of all this I cannot believe that he was\nguilty, any more than I can allow our citizens to believe that he, the wise\nCheiron\u0026rsquo;s pupil, the son of a goddess and of Peleus who was the gentlest\nof men and third in descent from Zeus, was so disordered in his wits as to be\nat one time the slave of two seemingly inconsistent passions, meanness, not\nuntainted by avarice, combined with overweening contempt of gods and men.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYou are quite right, he replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd let us equally refuse to believe, or allow to be repeated, the tale of\nTheseus son of Poseidon, or of Peirithous son of Zeus, going forth as they did\nto perpetrate a horrid rape; or of any other hero or son of a god daring to do\nsuch impious and dreadful things as they falsely ascribe to them in our day:\nand let us further compel the poets to declare either that these acts were not\ndone by them, or that they were not the sons of gods;\u0026mdash;both in the same\nbreath they shall not be permitted to affirm. We will not have them trying to\npersuade our youth that the gods are the authors of evil, and that heroes are\nno better than men\u0026mdash;sentiments which, as we were saying, are neither pious\nnor true, for we have already proved that evil cannot come from the gods.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAssuredly not.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd further they are likely to have a bad effect on those who hear them; for\neverybody will begin to excuse his own vices when he is convinced that similar\nwickednesses are always being perpetrated by\u0026mdash;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n\u0026lsquo;The kindred of the gods, the relatives of Zeus, whose ancestral altar,\nthe altar of Zeus, is aloft in air on the peak of Ida,\u0026rsquo;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nand who have\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n\u0026lsquo;the blood of deities yet flowing in their veins.\u0026rsquo;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd therefore let us put an end to such tales, lest they engender laxity of\nmorals among the young.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBy all means, he replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut now that we are determining what classes of subjects are or are not to be\nspoken of, let us see whether any have been omitted by us. The manner in which\ngods and demigods and heroes and the world below should be treated has been\nalready laid down.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery true.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd what shall we say about men? That is clearly the remaining portion of our\nsubject.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nClearly so.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut we are not in a condition to answer this question at present, my friend.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhy not?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBecause, if I am not mistaken, we shall have to say that about men poets and\nstory-tellers are guilty of making the gravest misstatements when they tell us\nthat wicked men are often happy, and the good miserable; and that injustice is\nprofitable when undetected, but that justice is a man\u0026rsquo;s own loss and\nanother\u0026rsquo;s gain\u0026mdash;these things we shall forbid them to utter, and\ncommand them to sing and say the opposite.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTo be sure we shall, he replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut if you admit that I am right in this, then I shall maintain that you have\nimplied the principle for which we have been all along contending.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI grant the truth of your inference.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat such things are or are not to be said about men is a question which we\ncannot determine until we have discovered what justice is, and how naturally\nadvantageous to the possessor, whether he seem to be just or not.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nMost true, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nEnough of the subjects of poetry: let us now speak of the style; and when this\nhas been considered, both matter and manner will have been completely treated.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI do not understand what you mean, said Adeimantus.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen I must make you understand; and perhaps I may be more intelligible if I\nput the matter in this way. You are aware, I suppose, that all mythology and\npoetry is a narration of events, either past, present, or to come?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly, he replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd narration may be either simple narration, or imitation, or a union of the\ntwo?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat again, he said, I do not quite understand.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI fear that I must be a ridiculous teacher when I have so much difficulty in\nmaking myself apprehended. Like a bad speaker, therefore, I will not take the\nwhole of the subject, but will break a piece off in illustration of my meaning.\nYou know the first lines of the Iliad, in which the poet says that Chryses\nprayed Agamemnon to release his daughter, and that Agamemnon flew into a\npassion with him; whereupon Chryses, failing of his object, invoked the anger\nof the God against the Achaeans. Now as far as these lines,\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n\u0026lsquo;And he prayed all the Greeks, but especially the two sons of Atreus, the\nchiefs of the people,\u0026rsquo;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nthe poet is speaking in his own person; he never leads us to suppose that he is\nany one else. But in what follows he takes the person of Chryses, and then he\ndoes all that he can to make us believe that the speaker is not Homer, but the\naged priest himself. And in this double form he has cast the entire narrative\nof the events which occurred at Troy and in Ithaca and throughout the Odyssey.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd a narrative it remains both in the speeches which the poet recites from\ntime to time and in the intermediate passages?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nQuite true.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut when the poet speaks in the person of another, may we not say that he\nassimilates his style to that of the person who, as he informs you, is going to\nspeak?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd this assimilation of himself to another, either by the use of voice or\ngesture, is the imitation of the person whose character he assumes?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nOf course.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen in this case the narrative of the poet may be said to proceed by way of\nimitation?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery true.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nOr, if the poet everywhere appears and never conceals himself, then again the\nimitation is dropped, and his poetry becomes simple narration. However, in\norder that I may make my meaning quite clear, and that you may no more say,\n\u0026lsquo;I don\u0026rsquo;t understand,\u0026rsquo; I will show how the change might be\neffected. If Homer had said, \u0026lsquo;The priest came, having his\ndaughter\u0026rsquo;s ransom in his hands, supplicating the Achaeans, and above all\nthe kings;\u0026rsquo; and then if, instead of speaking in the person of Chryses, he\nhad continued in his own person, the words would have been, not imitation, but\nsimple narration. The passage would have run as follows (I am no poet, and\ntherefore I drop the metre), \u0026lsquo;The priest came and prayed the gods on\nbehalf of the Greeks that they might capture Troy and return safely home, but\nbegged that they would give him back his daughter, and take the ransom which he\nbrought, and respect the God. Thus he spoke, and the other Greeks revered the\npriest and assented. But Agamemnon was wroth, and bade him depart and not come\nagain, lest the staff and chaplets of the God should be of no avail to\nhim\u0026mdash;the daughter of Chryses should not be released, he said\u0026mdash;she\nshould grow old with him in Argos. And then he told him to go away and not to\nprovoke him, if he intended to get home unscathed. And the old man went away in\nfear and silence, and, when he had left the camp, he called upon Apollo by his\nmany names, reminding him of everything which he had done pleasing to him,\nwhether in building his temples, or in offering sacrifice, and praying that his\ngood deeds might be returned to him, and that the Achaeans might expiate his\ntears by the arrows of the god,\u0026rsquo;\u0026mdash;and so on. In this way the whole\nbecomes simple narrative.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI understand, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nOr you may suppose the opposite case\u0026mdash;that the intermediate passages are\nomitted, and the dialogue only left.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat also, he said, I understand; you mean, for example, as in tragedy.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYou have conceived my meaning perfectly; and if I mistake not, what you failed\nto apprehend before is now made clear to you, that poetry and mythology are, in\nsome cases, wholly imitative\u0026mdash;instances of this are supplied by tragedy\nand comedy; there is likewise the opposite style, in which the poet is the only\nspeaker\u0026mdash;of this the dithyramb affords the best example; and the\ncombination of both is found in epic, and in several other styles of poetry. Do\nI take you with me?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said; I see now what you meant.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI will ask you to remember also what I began by saying, that we had done with\nthe subject and might proceed to the style.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, I remember.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIn saying this, I intended to imply that we must come to an understanding about\nthe mimetic art,\u0026mdash;whether the poets, in narrating their stories, are to be\nallowed by us to imitate, and if so, whether in whole or in part, and if the\nlatter, in what parts; or should all imitation be prohibited?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYou mean, I suspect, to ask whether tragedy and comedy shall be admitted into\nour State?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, I said; but there may be more than this in question: I really do not know\nas yet, but whither the argument may blow, thither we go.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd go we will, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen, Adeimantus, let me ask you whether our guardians ought to be imitators;\nor rather, has not this question been decided by the rule already laid down\nthat one man can only do one thing well, and not many; and that if he attempt\nmany, he will altogether fail of gaining much reputation in any?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd this is equally true of imitation; no one man can imitate many things as\nwell as he would imitate a single one?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHe cannot.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen the same person will hardly be able to play a serious part in life, and at\nthe same time to be an imitator and imitate many other parts as well; for even\nwhen two species of imitation are nearly allied, the same persons cannot\nsucceed in both, as, for example, the writers of tragedy and comedy\u0026mdash;did\nyou not just now call them imitations?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, I did; and you are right in thinking that the same persons cannot succeed\nin both.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAny more than they can be rhapsodists and actors at once?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNeither are comic and tragic actors the same; yet all these things are but\nimitations.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThey are so.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd human nature, Adeimantus, appears to have been coined into yet smaller\npieces, and to be as incapable of imitating many things well, as of performing\nwell the actions of which the imitations are copies.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nQuite true, he replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIf then we adhere to our original notion and bear in mind that our guardians,\nsetting aside every other business, are to dedicate themselves wholly to the\nmaintenance of freedom in the State, making this their craft, and engaging in\nno work which does not bear on this end, they ought not to practise or imitate\nanything else; if they imitate at all, they should imitate from youth upward\nonly those characters which are suitable to their profession\u0026mdash;the\ncourageous, temperate, holy, free, and the like; but they should not depict or\nbe skilful at imitating any kind of illiberality or baseness, lest from\nimitation they should come to be what they imitate. Did you never observe how\nimitations, beginning in early youth and continuing far into life, at length\ngrow into habits and become a second nature, affecting body, voice, and mind?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, certainly, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen, I said, we will not allow those for whom we profess a care and of whom we\nsay that they ought to be good men, to imitate a woman, whether young or old,\nquarrelling with her husband, or striving and vaunting against the gods in\nconceit of her happiness, or when she is in affliction, or sorrow, or weeping;\nand certainly not one who is in sickness, love, or labour.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery right, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNeither must they represent slaves, male or female, performing the offices of\nslaves?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThey must not.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd surely not bad men, whether cowards or any others, who do the reverse of\nwhat we have just been prescribing, who scold or mock or revile one another in\ndrink or out of drink, or who in any other manner sin against themselves and\ntheir neighbours in word or deed, as the manner of such is. Neither should they\nbe trained to imitate the action or speech of men or women who are mad or bad;\nfor madness, like vice, is to be known but not to be practised or imitated.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery true, he replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNeither may they imitate smiths or other artificers, or oarsmen, or boatswains,\nor the like?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHow can they, he said, when they are not allowed to apply their minds to the\ncallings of any of these?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNor may they imitate the neighing of horses, the bellowing of bulls, the murmur\nof rivers and roll of the ocean, thunder, and all that sort of thing?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNay, he said, if madness be forbidden, neither may they copy the behaviour of\nmadmen.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYou mean, I said, if I understand you aright, that there is one sort of\nnarrative style which may be employed by a truly good man when he has anything\nto say, and that another sort will be used by a man of an opposite character\nand education.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd which are these two sorts? he asked.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nSuppose, I answered, that a just and good man in the course of a narration\ncomes on some saying or action of another good man,\u0026mdash;I should imagine that\nhe will like to personate him, and will not be ashamed of this sort of\nimitation: he will be most ready to play the part of the good man when he is\nacting firmly and wisely; in a less degree when he is overtaken by illness or\nlove or drink, or has met with any other disaster. But when he comes to a\ncharacter which is unworthy of him, he will not make a study of that; he will\ndisdain such a person, and will assume his likeness, if at all, for a moment\nonly when he is performing some good action; at other times he will be ashamed\nto play a part which he has never practised, nor will he like to fashion and\nframe himself after the baser models; he feels the employment of such an art,\nunless in jest, to be beneath him, and his mind revolts at it.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nSo I should expect, he replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen he will adopt a mode of narration such as we have illustrated out of\nHomer, that is to say, his style will be both imitative and narrative; but\nthere will be very little of the former, and a great deal of the latter. Do you\nagree?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly, he said; that is the model which such a speaker must necessarily\ntake.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut there is another sort of character who will narrate anything, and, the\nworse he is, the more unscrupulous he will be; nothing will be too bad for him:\nand he will be ready to imitate anything, not as a joke, but in right good\nearnest, and before a large company. As I was just now saying, he will attempt\nto represent the roll of thunder, the noise of wind and hail, or the creaking\nof wheels, and pulleys, and the various sounds of flutes, pipes, trumpets, and\nall sorts of instruments: he will bark like a dog, bleat like a sheep, or crow\nlike a cock; his entire art will consist in imitation of voice and gesture, and\nthere will be very little narration.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat, he said, will be his mode of speaking.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThese, then, are the two kinds of style?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd you would agree with me in saying that one of them is simple and has but\nslight changes; and if the harmony and rhythm are also chosen for their\nsimplicity, the result is that the speaker, if he speaks correctly, is always\npretty much the same in style, and he will keep within the limits of a single\nharmony (for the changes are not great), and in like manner he will make use of\nnearly the same rhythm?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat is quite true, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhereas the other requires all sorts of harmonies and all sorts of rhythms, if\nthe music and the style are to correspond, because the style has all sorts of\nchanges.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat is also perfectly true, he replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd do not the two styles, or the mixture of the two, comprehend all poetry,\nand every form of expression in words? No one can say anything except in one or\nother of them or in both together.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThey include all, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd shall we receive into our State all the three styles, or one only of the\ntwo unmixed styles? or would you include the mixed?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI should prefer only to admit the pure imitator of virtue.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, I said, Adeimantus, but the mixed style is also very charming: and indeed\nthe pantomimic, which is the opposite of the one chosen by you, is the most\npopular style with children and their attendants, and with the world in\ngeneral.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI do not deny it.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut I suppose you would argue that such a style is unsuitable to our State, in\nwhich human nature is not twofold or manifold, for one man plays one part only?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes; quite unsuitable.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd this is the reason why in our State, and in our State only, we shall find a\nshoemaker to be a shoemaker and not a pilot also, and a husbandman to be a\nhusbandman and not a dicast also, and a soldier a soldier and not a trader\nalso, and the same throughout?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd therefore when any one of these pantomimic gentlemen, who are so clever\nthat they can imitate anything, comes to us, and makes a proposal to exhibit\nhimself and his poetry, we will fall down and worship him as a sweet and holy\nand wonderful being; but we must also inform him that in our State such as he\nare not permitted to exist; the law will not allow them. And so when we have\nanointed him with myrrh, and set a garland of wool upon his head, we shall send\nhim away to another city. For we mean to employ for our souls\u0026rsquo; health the\nrougher and severer poet or story-teller, who will imitate the style of the\nvirtuous only, and will follow those models which we prescribed at first when\nwe began the education of our soldiers.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWe certainly will, he said, if we have the power.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen now, my friend, I said, that part of music or literary education which\nrelates to the story or myth may be considered to be finished; for the matter\nand manner have both been discussed.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI think so too, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNext in order will follow melody and song.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat is obvious.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nEvery one can see already what we ought to say about them, if we are to be\nconsistent with ourselves.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI fear, said Glaucon, laughing, that the word \u0026lsquo;every one\u0026rsquo; hardly\nincludes me, for I cannot at the moment say what they should be; though I may\nguess.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAt any rate you can tell that a song or ode has three parts\u0026mdash;the words,\nthe melody, and the rhythm; that degree of knowledge I may presuppose?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said; so much as that you may.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd as for the words, there will surely be no difference between words which\nare and which are not set to music; both will conform to the same laws, and\nthese have been already determined by us?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd the melody and rhythm will depend upon the words?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWe were saying, when we spoke of the subject-matter, that we had no need of\nlamentation and strains of sorrow?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd which are the harmonies expressive of sorrow? You are musical, and can tell\nme.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe harmonies which you mean are the mixed or tenor Lydian, and the full-toned\nor bass Lydian, and such like.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThese then, I said, must be banished; even to women who have a character to\nmaintain they are of no use, and much less to men.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIn the next place, drunkenness and softness and indolence are utterly\nunbecoming the character of our guardians.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nUtterly unbecoming.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd which are the soft or drinking harmonies?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe Ionian, he replied, and the Lydian; they are termed \u0026lsquo;relaxed.\u0026rsquo;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWell, and are these of any military use?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nQuite the reverse, he replied; and if so the Dorian and the Phrygian are the\nonly ones which you have left.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI answered: Of the harmonies I know nothing, but I want to have one warlike, to\nsound the note or accent which a brave man utters in the hour of danger and\nstern resolve, or when his cause is failing, and he is going to wounds or death\nor is overtaken by some other evil, and at every such crisis meets the blows of\nfortune with firm step and a determination to endure; and another to be used by\nhim in times of peace and freedom of action, when there is no pressure of\nnecessity, and he is seeking to persuade God by prayer, or man by instruction\nand admonition, or on the other hand, when he is expressing his willingness to\nyield to persuasion or entreaty or admonition, and which represents him when by\nprudent conduct he has attained his end, not carried away by his success, but\nacting moderately and wisely under the circumstances, and acquiescing in the\nevent. These two harmonies I ask you to leave; the strain of necessity and the\nstrain of freedom, the strain of the unfortunate and the strain of the\nfortunate, the strain of courage, and the strain of temperance; these, I say,\nleave.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd these, he replied, are the Dorian and Phrygian harmonies of which I was\njust now speaking.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen, I said, if these and these only are to be used in our songs and melodies,\nwe shall not want multiplicity of notes or a panharmonic scale?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI suppose not.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen we shall not maintain the artificers of lyres with three corners and\ncomplex scales, or the makers of any other many-stringed curiously-harmonised\ninstruments?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly not.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut what do you say to flute-makers and flute-players? Would you admit them\ninto our State when you reflect that in this composite use of harmony the flute\nis worse than all the stringed instruments put together; even the panharmonic\nmusic is only an imitation of the flute?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nClearly not.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThere remain then only the lyre and the harp for use in the city, and the\nshepherds may have a pipe in the country.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat is surely the conclusion to be drawn from the argument.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe preferring of Apollo and his instruments to Marsyas and his instruments is\nnot at all strange, I said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNot at all, he replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd so, by the dog of Egypt, we have been unconsciously purging the State,\nwhich not long ago we termed luxurious.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd we have done wisely, he replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen let us now finish the purgation, I said. Next in order to harmonies,\nrhythms will naturally follow, and they should be subject to the same rules,\nfor we ought not to seek out complex systems of metre, or metres of every kind,\nbut rather to discover what rhythms are the expressions of a courageous and\nharmonious life; and when we have found them, we shall adapt the foot and the\nmelody to words having a like spirit, not the words to the foot and melody. To\nsay what these rhythms are will be your duty\u0026mdash;you must teach me them, as\nyou have already taught me the harmonies.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut, indeed, he replied, I cannot tell you. I only know that there are some\nthree principles of rhythm out of which metrical systems are framed, just as in\nsounds there are four notes (i.e. the four notes of the tetrachord.) out of\nwhich all the harmonies are composed; that is an observation which I have made.\nBut of what sort of lives they are severally the imitations I am unable to say.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen, I said, we must take Damon into our counsels; and he will tell us what\nrhythms are expressive of meanness, or insolence, or fury, or other\nunworthiness, and what are to be reserved for the expression of opposite\nfeelings. And I think that I have an indistinct recollection of his mentioning\na complex Cretic rhythm; also a dactylic or heroic, and he arranged them in\nsome manner which I do not quite understand, making the rhythms equal in the\nrise and fall of the foot, long and short alternating; and, unless I am\nmistaken, he spoke of an iambic as well as of a trochaic rhythm, and assigned\nto them short and long quantities. Also in some cases he appeared to praise or\ncensure the movement of the foot quite as much as the rhythm; or perhaps a\ncombination of the two; for I am not certain what he meant. These matters,\nhowever, as I was saying, had better be referred to Damon himself, for the\nanalysis of the subject would be difficult, you know? (Socrates expresses\nhimself carelessly in accordance with his assumed ignorance of the details of\nthe subject. In the first part of the sentence he appears to be speaking of\npaeonic rhythms which are in the ratio of 3/2; in the second part, of dactylic\nand anapaestic rhythms, which are in the ratio of 1/1; in the last clause, of\niambic and trochaic rhythms, which are in the ratio of 1/2 or 2/1.)\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nRather so, I should say.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut there is no difficulty in seeing that grace or the absence of grace is an\neffect of good or bad rhythm.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNone at all.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd also that good and bad rhythm naturally assimilate to a good and bad style;\nand that harmony and discord in like manner follow style; for our principle is\nthat rhythm and harmony are regulated by the words, and not the words by them.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nJust so, he said, they should follow the words.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd will not the words and the character of the style depend on the temper of\nthe soul?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd everything else on the style?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen beauty of style and harmony and grace and good rhythm depend on\nsimplicity,\u0026mdash;I mean the true simplicity of a rightly and nobly ordered\nmind and character, not that other simplicity which is only an euphemism for\nfolly?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery true, he replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd if our youth are to do their work in life, must they not make these graces\nand harmonies their perpetual aim?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThey must.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd surely the art of the painter and every other creative and constructive art\nare full of them,\u0026mdash;weaving, embroidery, architecture, and every kind of\nmanufacture; also nature, animal and vegetable,\u0026mdash;in all of them there is\ngrace or the absence of grace. And ugliness and discord and inharmonious motion\nare nearly allied to ill words and ill nature, as grace and harmony are the\ntwin sisters of goodness and virtue and bear their likeness.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat is quite true, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut shall our superintendence go no further, and are the poets only to be\nrequired by us to express the image of the good in their works, on pain, if\nthey do anything else, of expulsion from our State? Or is the same control to\nbe extended to other artists, and are they also to be prohibited from\nexhibiting the opposite forms of vice and intemperance and meanness and\nindecency in sculpture and building and the other creative arts; and is he who\ncannot conform to this rule of ours to be prevented from practising his art in\nour State, lest the taste of our citizens be corrupted by him? We would not\nhave our guardians grow up amid images of moral deformity, as in some noxious\npasture, and there browse and feed upon many a baneful herb and flower day by\nday, little by little, until they silently gather a festering mass of\ncorruption in their own soul. Let our artists rather be those who are gifted to\ndiscern the true nature of the beautiful and graceful; then will our youth\ndwell in a land of health, amid fair sights and sounds, and receive the good in\neverything; and beauty, the effluence of fair works, shall flow into the eye\nand ear, like a health-giving breeze from a purer region, and insensibly draw\nthe soul from earliest years into likeness and sympathy with the beauty of\nreason.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThere can be no nobler training than that, he replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd therefore, I said, Glaucon, musical training is a more potent instrument\nthan any other, because rhythm and harmony find their way into the inward\nplaces of the soul, on which they mightily fasten, imparting grace, and making\nthe soul of him who is rightly educated graceful, or of him who is ill-educated\nungraceful; and also because he who has received this true education of the\ninner being will most shrewdly perceive omissions or faults in art and nature,\nand with a true taste, while he praises and rejoices over and receives into his\nsoul the good, and becomes noble and good, he will justly blame and hate the\nbad, now in the days of his youth, even before he is able to know the reason\nwhy; and when reason comes he will recognise and salute the friend with whom\nhis education has made him long familiar.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said, I quite agree with you in thinking that our youth should be\ntrained in music and on the grounds which you mention.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nJust as in learning to read, I said, we were satisfied when we knew the letters\nof the alphabet, which are very few, in all their recurring sizes and\ncombinations; not slighting them as unimportant whether they occupy a space\nlarge or small, but everywhere eager to make them out; and not thinking\nourselves perfect in the art of reading until we recognise them wherever they\nare found:\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue\u0026mdash;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nOr, as we recognise the reflection of letters in the water, or in a mirror,\nonly when we know the letters themselves; the same art and study giving us the\nknowledge of both:\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nExactly\u0026mdash;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nEven so, as I maintain, neither we nor our guardians, whom we have to educate,\ncan ever become musical until we and they know the essential forms of\ntemperance, courage, liberality, magnificence, and their kindred, as well as\nthe contrary forms, in all their combinations, and can recognise them and their\nimages wherever they are found, not slighting them either in small things or\ngreat, but believing them all to be within the sphere of one art and study.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nMost assuredly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd when a beautiful soul harmonizes with a beautiful form, and the two are\ncast in one mould, that will be the fairest of sights to him who has an eye to\nsee it?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe fairest indeed.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd the fairest is also the loveliest?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat may be assumed.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd the man who has the spirit of harmony will be most in love with the\nloveliest; but he will not love him who is of an inharmonious soul?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat is true, he replied, if the deficiency be in his soul; but if there be any\nmerely bodily defect in another he will be patient of it, and will love all the\nsame.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI perceive, I said, that you have or have had experiences of this sort, and I\nagree. But let me ask you another question: Has excess of pleasure any affinity\nto temperance?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHow can that be? he replied; pleasure deprives a man of the use of his\nfaculties quite as much as pain.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nOr any affinity to virtue in general?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNone whatever.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAny affinity to wantonness and intemperance?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, the greatest.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd is there any greater or keener pleasure than that of sensual love?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNo, nor a madder.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhereas true love is a love of beauty and order\u0026mdash;temperate and harmonious?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nQuite true, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen no intemperance or madness should be allowed to approach true love?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly not.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen mad or intemperate pleasure must never be allowed to come near the lover\nand his beloved; neither of them can have any part in it if their love is of\nthe right sort?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNo, indeed, Socrates, it must never come near them.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen I suppose that in the city which we are founding you would make a law to\nthe effect that a friend should use no other familiarity to his love than a\nfather would use to his son, and then only for a noble purpose, and he must\nfirst have the other\u0026rsquo;s consent; and this rule is to limit him in all his\nintercourse, and he is never to be seen going further, or, if he exceeds, he is\nto be deemed guilty of coarseness and bad taste.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI quite agree, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThus much of music, which makes a fair ending; for what should be the end of\nmusic if not the love of beauty?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI agree, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAfter music comes gymnastic, in which our youth are next to be trained.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nGymnastic as well as music should begin in early years; the training in it\nshould be careful and should continue through life. Now my belief is,\u0026mdash;and\nthis is a matter upon which I should like to have your opinion in confirmation\nof my own, but my own belief is,\u0026mdash;not that the good body by any bodily\nexcellence improves the soul, but, on the contrary, that the good soul, by her\nown excellence, improves the body as far as this may be possible. What do you\nsay?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, I agree.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen, to the mind when adequately trained, we shall be right in handing over\nthe more particular care of the body; and in order to avoid prolixity we will\nnow only give the general outlines of the subject.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery good.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat they must abstain from intoxication has been already remarked by us; for\nof all persons a guardian should be the last to get drunk and not know where in\nthe world he is.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said; that a guardian should require another guardian to take care of\nhim is ridiculous indeed.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut next, what shall we say of their food; for the men are in training for the\ngreat contest of all\u0026mdash;are they not?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd will the habit of body of our ordinary athletes be suited to them?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhy not?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI am afraid, I said, that a habit of body such as they have is but a sleepy\nsort of thing, and rather perilous to health. Do you not observe that these\nathletes sleep away their lives, and are liable to most dangerous illnesses if\nthey depart, in ever so slight a degree, from their customary regimen?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, I do.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen, I said, a finer sort of training will be required for our warrior\nathletes, who are to be like wakeful dogs, and to see and hear with the utmost\nkeenness; amid the many changes of water and also of food, of summer heat and\nwinter cold, which they will have to endure when on a campaign, they must not\nbe liable to break down in health.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat is my view.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe really excellent gymnastic is twin sister of that simple music which we\nwere just now describing.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHow so?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhy, I conceive that there is a gymnastic which, like our music, is simple and\ngood; and especially the military gymnastic.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat do you mean?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nMy meaning may be learned from Homer; he, you know, feeds his heroes at their\nfeasts, when they are campaigning, on soldiers\u0026rsquo; fare; they have no fish,\nalthough they are on the shores of the Hellespont, and they are not allowed\nboiled meats but only roast, which is the food most convenient for soldiers,\nrequiring only that they should light a fire, and not involving the trouble of\ncarrying about pots and pans.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd I can hardly be mistaken in saying that sweet sauces are nowhere mentioned\nin Homer. In proscribing them, however, he is not singular; all professional\nathletes are well aware that a man who is to be in good condition should take\nnothing of the kind.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said; and knowing this, they are quite right in not taking them.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen you would not approve of Syracusan dinners, and the refinements of\nSicilian cookery?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI think not.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNor, if a man is to be in condition, would you allow him to have a Corinthian\ngirl as his fair friend?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly not.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNeither would you approve of the delicacies, as they are thought, of Athenian\nconfectionary?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly not.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAll such feeding and living may be rightly compared by us to melody and song\ncomposed in the panharmonic style, and in all the rhythms.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nExactly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThere complexity engendered licence, and here disease; whereas simplicity in\nmusic was the parent of temperance in the soul; and simplicity in gymnastic of\nhealth in the body.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nMost true, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut when intemperance and diseases multiply in a State, halls of justice and\nmedicine are always being opened; and the arts of the doctor and the lawyer\ngive themselves airs, finding how keen is the interest which not only the\nslaves but the freemen of a city take about them.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nOf course.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd yet what greater proof can there be of a bad and disgraceful state of\neducation than this, that not only artisans and the meaner sort of people need\nthe skill of first-rate physicians and judges, but also those who would profess\nto have had a liberal education? Is it not disgraceful, and a great sign of\nwant of good-breeding, that a man should have to go abroad for his law and\nphysic because he has none of his own at home, and must therefore surrender\nhimself into the hands of other men whom he makes lords and judges over him?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nOf all things, he said, the most disgraceful.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWould you say \u0026lsquo;most,\u0026rsquo; I replied, when you consider that there is a\nfurther stage of the evil in which a man is not only a life-long litigant,\npassing all his days in the courts, either as plaintiff or defendant, but is\nactually led by his bad taste to pride himself on his litigiousness; he\nimagines that he is a master in dishonesty; able to take every crooked turn,\nand wriggle into and out of every hole, bending like a withy and getting out of\nthe way of justice: and all for what?\u0026mdash;in order to gain small points not\nworth mentioning, he not knowing that so to order his life as to be able to do\nwithout a napping judge is a far higher and nobler sort of thing. Is not that\nstill more disgraceful?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said, that is still more disgraceful.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWell, I said, and to require the help of medicine, not when a wound has to be\ncured, or on occasion of an epidemic, but just because, by indolence and a\nhabit of life such as we have been describing, men fill themselves with waters\nand winds, as if their bodies were a marsh, compelling the ingenious sons of\nAsclepius to find more names for diseases, such as flatulence and catarrh; is\nnot this, too, a disgrace?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said, they do certainly give very strange and newfangled names to\ndiseases.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, I said, and I do not believe that there were any such diseases in the days\nof Asclepius; and this I infer from the circumstance that the hero Eurypylus,\nafter he has been wounded in Homer, drinks a posset of Pramnian wine well\nbesprinkled with barley-meal and grated cheese, which are certainly\ninflammatory, and yet the sons of Asclepius who were at the Trojan war do not\nblame the damsel who gives him the drink, or rebuke Patroclus, who is treating\nhis case.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWell, he said, that was surely an extraordinary drink to be given to a person\nin his condition.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNot so extraordinary, I replied, if you bear in mind that in former days, as is\ncommonly said, before the time of Herodicus, the guild of Asclepius did not\npractise our present system of medicine, which may be said to educate diseases.\nBut Herodicus, being a trainer, and himself of a sickly constitution, by a\ncombination of training and doctoring found out a way of torturing first and\nchiefly himself, and secondly the rest of the world.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHow was that? he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBy the invention of lingering death; for he had a mortal disease which he\nperpetually tended, and as recovery was out of the question, he passed his\nentire life as a valetudinarian; he could do nothing but attend upon himself,\nand he was in constant torment whenever he departed in anything from his usual\nregimen, and so dying hard, by the help of science he struggled on to old age.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nA rare reward of his skill!\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, I said; a reward which a man might fairly expect who never understood\nthat, if Asclepius did not instruct his descendants in valetudinarian arts, the\nomission arose, not from ignorance or inexperience of such a branch of\nmedicine, but because he knew that in all well-ordered states every individual\nhas an occupation to which he must attend, and has therefore no leisure to\nspend in continually being ill. This we remark in the case of the artisan, but,\nludicrously enough, do not apply the same rule to people of the richer sort.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHow do you mean? he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI mean this: When a carpenter is ill he asks the physician for a rough and\nready cure; an emetic or a purge or a cautery or the knife,\u0026mdash;these are his\nremedies. And if some one prescribes for him a course of dietetics, and tells\nhim that he must swathe and swaddle his head, and all that sort of thing, he\nreplies at once that he has no time to be ill, and that he sees no good in a\nlife which is spent in nursing his disease to the neglect of his customary\nemployment; and therefore bidding good-bye to this sort of physician, he\nresumes his ordinary habits, and either gets well and lives and does his\nbusiness, or, if his constitution fails, he dies and has no more trouble.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said, and a man in his condition of life ought to use the art of\nmedicine thus far only.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHas he not, I said, an occupation; and what profit would there be in his life\nif he were deprived of his occupation?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nQuite true, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut with the rich man this is otherwise; of him we do not say that he has any\nspecially appointed work which he must perform, if he would live.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHe is generally supposed to have nothing to do.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen you never heard of the saying of Phocylides, that as soon as a man has a\nlivelihood he should practise virtue?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNay, he said, I think that he had better begin somewhat sooner.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nLet us not have a dispute with him about this, I said; but rather ask\nourselves: Is the practice of virtue obligatory on the rich man, or can he live\nwithout it? And if obligatory on him, then let us raise a further question,\nwhether this dieting of disorders, which is an impediment to the application of\nthe mind in carpentering and the mechanical arts, does not equally stand in the\nway of the sentiment of Phocylides?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nOf that, he replied, there can be no doubt; such excessive care of the body,\nwhen carried beyond the rules of gymnastic, is most inimical to the practice of\nvirtue.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, indeed, I replied, and equally incompatible with the management of a\nhouse, an army, or an office of state; and, what is most important of all,\nirreconcileable with any kind of study or thought or\nself-reflection\u0026mdash;there is a constant suspicion that headache and giddiness\nare to be ascribed to philosophy, and hence all practising or making trial of\nvirtue in the higher sense is absolutely stopped; for a man is always fancying\nthat he is being made ill, and is in constant anxiety about the state of his\nbody.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, likely enough.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd therefore our politic Asclepius may be supposed to have exhibited the power\nof his art only to persons who, being generally of healthy constitution and\nhabits of life, had a definite ailment; such as these he cured by purges and\noperations, and bade them live as usual, herein consulting the interests of the\nState; but bodies which disease had penetrated through and through he would not\nhave attempted to cure by gradual processes of evacuation and infusion: he did\nnot want to lengthen out good-for-nothing lives, or to have weak fathers\nbegetting weaker sons;\u0026mdash;if a man was not able to live in the ordinary way\nhe had no business to cure him; for such a cure would have been of no use\neither to himself, or to the State.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen, he said, you regard Asclepius as a statesman.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nClearly; and his character is further illustrated by his sons. Note that they\nwere heroes in the days of old and practised the medicines of which I am\nspeaking at the siege of Troy: You will remember how, when Pandarus wounded\nMenelaus, they\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n\u0026lsquo;Sucked the blood out of the wound, and sprinkled soothing\nremedies,\u0026rsquo;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nbut they never prescribed what the patient was afterwards to eat or drink in\nthe case of Menelaus, any more than in the case of Eurypylus; the remedies, as\nthey conceived, were enough to heal any man who before he was wounded was\nhealthy and regular in his habits; and even though he did happen to drink a\nposset of Pramnian wine, he might get well all the same. But they would have\nnothing to do with unhealthy and intemperate subjects, whose lives were of no\nuse either to themselves or others; the art of medicine was not designed for\ntheir good, and though they were as rich as Midas, the sons of Asclepius would\nhave declined to attend them.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThey were very acute persons, those sons of Asclepius.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNaturally so, I replied. Nevertheless, the tragedians and Pindar disobeying our\nbehests, although they acknowledge that Asclepius was the son of Apollo, say\nalso that he was bribed into healing a rich man who was at the point of death,\nand for this reason he was struck by lightning. But we, in accordance with the\nprinciple already affirmed by us, will not believe them when they tell us\nboth;\u0026mdash;if he was the son of a god, we maintain that he was not avaricious;\nor, if he was avaricious, he was not the son of a god.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAll that, Socrates, is excellent; but I should like to put a question to you:\nOught there not to be good physicians in a State, and are not the best those\nwho have treated the greatest number of constitutions good and bad? and are not\nthe best judges in like manner those who are acquainted with all sorts of moral\nnatures?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, I said, I too would have good judges and good physicians. But do you know\nwhom I think good?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWill you tell me?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI will, if I can. Let me however note that in the same question you join two\nthings which are not the same.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHow so? he asked.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhy, I said, you join physicians and judges. Now the most skilful physicians\nare those who, from their youth upwards, have combined with the knowledge of\ntheir art the greatest experience of disease; they had better not be robust in\nhealth, and should have had all manner of diseases in their own persons. For\nthe body, as I conceive, is not the instrument with which they cure the body;\nin that case we could not allow them ever to be or to have been sickly; but\nthey cure the body with the mind, and the mind which has become and is sick can\ncure nothing.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat is very true, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut with the judge it is otherwise; since he governs mind by mind; he ought not\ntherefore to have been trained among vicious minds, and to have associated with\nthem from youth upwards, and to have gone through the whole calendar of crime,\nonly in order that he may quickly infer the crimes of others as he might their\nbodily diseases from his own self-consciousness; the honourable mind which is\nto form a healthy judgment should have had no experience or contamination of\nevil habits when young. And this is the reason why in youth good men often\nappear to be simple, and are easily practised upon by the dishonest, because\nthey have no examples of what evil is in their own souls.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said, they are far too apt to be deceived.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTherefore, I said, the judge should not be young; he should have learned to\nknow evil, not from his own soul, but from late and long observation of the\nnature of evil in others: knowledge should be his guide, not personal\nexperience.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said, that is the ideal of a judge.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, I replied, and he will be a good man (which is my answer to your\nquestion); for he is good who has a good soul. But the cunning and suspicious\nnature of which we spoke,\u0026mdash;he who has committed many crimes, and fancies\nhimself to be a master in wickedness, when he is amongst his fellows, is\nwonderful in the precautions which he takes, because he judges of them by\nhimself: but when he gets into the company of men of virtue, who have the\nexperience of age, he appears to be a fool again, owing to his unseasonable\nsuspicions; he cannot recognise an honest man, because he has no pattern of\nhonesty in himself; at the same time, as the bad are more numerous than the\ngood, and he meets with them oftener, he thinks himself, and is by others\nthought to be, rather wise than foolish.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nMost true, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen the good and wise judge whom we are seeking is not this man, but the\nother; for vice cannot know virtue too, but a virtuous nature, educated by\ntime, will acquire a knowledge both of virtue and vice: the virtuous, and not\nthe vicious, man has wisdom\u0026mdash;in my opinion.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd in mine also.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThis is the sort of medicine, and this is the sort of law, which you will\nsanction in your state. They will minister to better natures, giving health\nboth of soul and of body; but those who are diseased in their bodies they will\nleave to die, and the corrupt and incurable souls they will put an end to\nthemselves.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat is clearly the best thing both for the patients and for the State.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd thus our youth, having been educated only in that simple music which, as we\nsaid, inspires temperance, will be reluctant to go to law.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nClearly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd the musician, who, keeping to the same track, is content to practise the\nsimple gymnastic, will have nothing to do with medicine unless in some extreme\ncase.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat I quite believe.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe very exercises and tolls which he undergoes are intended to stimulate the\nspirited element of his nature, and not to increase his strength; he will not,\nlike common athletes, use exercise and regimen to develope his muscles.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery right, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNeither are the two arts of music and gymnastic really designed, as is often\nsupposed, the one for the training of the soul, the other for the training of\nthe body.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat then is the real object of them?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI believe, I said, that the teachers of both have in view chiefly the\nimprovement of the soul.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHow can that be? he asked.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nDid you never observe, I said, the effect on the mind itself of exclusive\ndevotion to gymnastic, or the opposite effect of an exclusive devotion to\nmusic?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIn what way shown? he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe one producing a temper of hardness and ferocity, the other of softness and\neffeminacy, I replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said, I am quite aware that the mere athlete becomes too much of a\nsavage, and that the mere musician is melted and softened beyond what is good\nfor him.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYet surely, I said, this ferocity only comes from spirit, which, if rightly\neducated, would give courage, but, if too much intensified, is liable to become\nhard and brutal.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat I quite think.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nOn the other hand the philosopher will have the quality of gentleness. And this\nalso, when too much indulged, will turn to softness, but, if educated rightly,\nwill be gentle and moderate.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd in our opinion the guardians ought to have both these qualities?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAssuredly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd both should be in harmony?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBeyond question.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd the harmonious soul is both temperate and courageous?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd the inharmonious is cowardly and boorish?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery true.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd, when a man allows music to play upon him and to pour into his soul through\nthe funnel of his ears those sweet and soft and melancholy airs of which we\nwere just now speaking, and his whole life is passed in warbling and the\ndelights of song; in the first stage of the process the passion or spirit which\nis in him is tempered like iron, and made useful, instead of brittle and\nuseless. But, if he carries on the softening and soothing process, in the next\nstage he begins to melt and waste, until he has wasted away his spirit and cut\nout the sinews of his soul; and he becomes a feeble warrior.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery true.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIf the element of spirit is naturally weak in him the change is speedily\naccomplished, but if he have a good deal, then the power of music weakening the\nspirit renders him excitable;\u0026mdash;on the least provocation he flames up at\nonce, and is speedily extinguished; instead of having spirit he grows irritable\nand passionate and is quite impracticable.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nExactly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd so in gymnastics, if a man takes violent exercise and is a great feeder,\nand the reverse of a great student of music and philosophy, at first the high\ncondition of his body fills him with pride and spirit, and he becomes twice the\nman that he was.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd what happens? if he do nothing else, and holds no converse with the Muses,\ndoes not even that intelligence which there may be in him, having no taste of\nany sort of learning or enquiry or thought or culture, grow feeble and dull and\nblind, his mind never waking up or receiving nourishment, and his senses not\nbeing purged of their mists?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd he ends by becoming a hater of philosophy, uncivilized, never using the\nweapon of persuasion,\u0026mdash;he is like a wild beast, all violence and\nfierceness, and knows no other way of dealing; and he lives in all ignorance\nand evil conditions, and has no sense of propriety and grace.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat is quite true, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd as there are two principles of human nature, one the spirited and the other\nthe philosophical, some God, as I should say, has given mankind two arts\nanswering to them (and only indirectly to the soul and body), in order that\nthese two principles (like the strings of an instrument) may be relaxed or\ndrawn tighter until they are duly harmonized.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat appears to be the intention.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd he who mingles music with gymnastic in the fairest proportions, and best\nattempers them to the soul, may be rightly called the true musician and\nharmonist in a far higher sense than the tuner of the strings.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYou are quite right, Socrates.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd such a presiding genius will be always required in our State if the\ngovernment is to last.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he will be absolutely necessary.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nSuch, then, are our principles of nurture and education: Where would be the use\nof going into further details about the dances of our citizens, or about their\nhunting and coursing, their gymnastic and equestrian contests? For these all\nfollow the general principle, and having found that, we shall have no\ndifficulty in discovering them.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI dare say that there will be no difficulty.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery good, I said; then what is the next question? Must we not ask who are to\nbe rulers and who subjects?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThere can be no doubt that the elder must rule the younger.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nClearly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd that the best of these must rule.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat is also clear.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNow, are not the best husbandmen those who are most devoted to husbandry?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd as we are to have the best of guardians for our city, must they not be\nthose who have most the character of guardians?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd to this end they ought to be wise and efficient, and to have a special care\nof the State?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd a man will be most likely to care about that which he loves?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTo be sure.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd he will be most likely to love that which he regards as having the same\ninterests with himself, and that of which the good or evil fortune is supposed\nby him at any time most to affect his own?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery true, he replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen there must be a selection. Let us note among the guardians those who in\ntheir whole life show the greatest eagerness to do what is for the good of\ntheir country, and the greatest repugnance to do what is against her interests.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThose are the right men.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd they will have to be watched at every age, in order that we may see whether\nthey preserve their resolution, and never, under the influence either of force\nor enchantment, forget or cast off their sense of duty to the State.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHow cast off? he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI will explain to you, I replied. A resolution may go out of a man\u0026rsquo;s mind\neither with his will or against his will; with his will when he gets rid of a\nfalsehood and learns better, against his will whenever he is deprived of a\ntruth.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI understand, he said, the willing loss of a resolution; the meaning of the\nunwilling I have yet to learn.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhy, I said, do you not see that men are unwillingly deprived of good, and\nwillingly of evil? Is not to have lost the truth an evil, and to possess the\ntruth a good? and you would agree that to conceive things as they are is to\npossess the truth?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he replied; I agree with you in thinking that mankind are deprived of\ntruth against their will.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd is not this involuntary deprivation caused either by theft, or force, or\nenchantment?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nStill, he replied, I do not understand you.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI fear that I must have been talking darkly, like the tragedians. I only mean\nthat some men are changed by persuasion and that others forget; argument steals\naway the hearts of one class, and time of the other; and this I call theft. Now\nyou understand me?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThose again who are forced, are those whom the violence of some pain or grief\ncompels to change their opinion.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI understand, he said, and you are quite right.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd you would also acknowledge that the enchanted are those who change their\nminds either under the softer influence of pleasure, or the sterner influence\nof fear?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said; everything that deceives may be said to enchant.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTherefore, as I was just now saying, we must enquire who are the best guardians\nof their own conviction that what they think the interest of the State is to be\nthe rule of their lives. We must watch them from their youth upwards, and make\nthem perform actions in which they are most likely to forget or to be deceived,\nand he who remembers and is not deceived is to be selected, and he who fails in\nthe trial is to be rejected. That will be the way?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd there should also be toils and pains and conflicts prescribed for them, in\nwhich they will be made to give further proof of the same qualities.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery right, he replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd then, I said, we must try them with enchantments\u0026mdash;that is the third\nsort of test\u0026mdash;and see what will be their behaviour: like those who take\ncolts amid noise and tumult to see if they are of a timid nature, so must we\ntake our youth amid terrors of some kind, and again pass them into pleasures,\nand prove them more thoroughly than gold is proved in the furnace, that we may\ndiscover whether they are armed against all enchantments, and of a noble\nbearing always, good guardians of themselves and of the music which they have\nlearned, and retaining under all circumstances a rhythmical and harmonious\nnature, such as will be most serviceable to the individual and to the State.\nAnd he who at every age, as boy and youth and in mature life, has come out of\nthe trial victorious and pure, shall be appointed a ruler and guardian of the\nState; he shall be honoured in life and death, and shall receive sepulture and\nother memorials of honour, the greatest that we have to give. But him who\nfails, we must reject. I am inclined to think that this is the sort of way in\nwhich our rulers and guardians should be chosen and appointed. I speak\ngenerally, and not with any pretension to exactness.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd, speaking generally, I agree with you, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd perhaps the word \u0026lsquo;guardian\u0026rsquo; in the fullest sense ought to be\napplied to this higher class only who preserve us against foreign enemies and\nmaintain peace among our citizens at home, that the one may not have the will,\nor the others the power, to harm us. The young men whom we before called\nguardians may be more properly designated auxiliaries and supporters of the\nprinciples of the rulers.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI agree with you, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHow then may we devise one of those needful falsehoods of which we lately\nspoke\u0026mdash;just one royal lie which may deceive the rulers, if that be\npossible, and at any rate the rest of the city?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat sort of lie? he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNothing new, I replied; only an old Phoenician tale (Laws) of what has often\noccurred before now in other places, (as the poets say, and have made the world\nbelieve,) though not in our time, and I do not know whether such an event could\never happen again, or could now even be made probable, if it did.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHow your words seem to hesitate on your lips!\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYou will not wonder, I replied, at my hesitation when you have heard.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nSpeak, he said, and fear not.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWell then, I will speak, although I really know not how to look you in the\nface, or in what words to utter the audacious fiction, which I propose to\ncommunicate gradually, first to the rulers, then to the soldiers, and lastly to\nthe people. They are to be told that their youth was a dream, and the education\nand training which they received from us, an appearance only; in reality during\nall that time they were being formed and fed in the womb of the earth, where\nthey themselves and their arms and appurtenances were manufactured; when they\nwere completed, the earth, their mother, sent them up; and so, their country\nbeing their mother and also their nurse, they are bound to advise for her good,\nand to defend her against attacks, and her citizens they are to regard as\nchildren of the earth and their own brothers.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYou had good reason, he said, to be ashamed of the lie which you were going to\ntell.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue, I replied, but there is more coming; I have only told you half. Citizens,\nwe shall say to them in our tale, you are brothers, yet God has framed you\ndifferently. Some of you have the power of command, and in the composition of\nthese he has mingled gold, wherefore also they have the greatest honour; others\nhe has made of silver, to be auxiliaries; others again who are to be husbandmen\nand craftsmen he has composed of brass and iron; and the species will generally\nbe preserved in the children. But as all are of the same original stock, a\ngolden parent will sometimes have a silver son, or a silver parent a golden\nson. And God proclaims as a first principle to the rulers, and above all else,\nthat there is nothing which they should so anxiously guard, or of which they\nare to be such good guardians, as of the purity of the race. They should\nobserve what elements mingle in their offspring; for if the son of a golden or\nsilver parent has an admixture of brass and iron, then nature orders a\ntransposition of ranks, and the eye of the ruler must not be pitiful towards\nthe child because he has to descend in the scale and become a husbandman or\nartisan, just as there may be sons of artisans who having an admixture of gold\nor silver in them are raised to honour, and become guardians or auxiliaries.\nFor an oracle says that when a man of brass or iron guards the State, it will\nbe destroyed. Such is the tale; is there any possibility of making our citizens\nbelieve in it?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNot in the present generation, he replied; there is no way of accomplishing\nthis; but their sons may be made to believe in the tale, and their sons\u0026rsquo;\nsons, and posterity after them.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI see the difficulty, I replied; yet the fostering of such a belief will make\nthem care more for the city and for one another. Enough, however, of the\nfiction, which may now fly abroad upon the wings of rumour, while we arm our\nearth-born heroes, and lead them forth under the command of their rulers. Let\nthem look round and select a spot whence they can best suppress insurrection,\nif any prove refractory within, and also defend themselves against enemies, who\nlike wolves may come down on the fold from without; there let them encamp, and\nwhen they have encamped, let them sacrifice to the proper Gods and prepare\ntheir dwellings.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nJust so, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd their dwellings must be such as will shield them against the cold of winter\nand the heat of summer.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI suppose that you mean houses, he replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, I said; but they must be the houses of soldiers, and not of shop-keepers.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat is the difference? he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat I will endeavour to explain, I replied. To keep watch-dogs, who, from want\nof discipline or hunger, or some evil habit or other, would turn upon the sheep\nand worry them, and behave not like dogs but wolves, would be a foul and\nmonstrous thing in a shepherd?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTruly monstrous, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd therefore every care must be taken that our auxiliaries, being stronger\nthan our citizens, may not grow to be too much for them and become savage\ntyrants instead of friends and allies?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, great care should be taken.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd would not a really good education furnish the best safeguard?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut they are well-educated already, he replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI cannot be so confident, my dear Glaucon, I said; I am much more certain that\nthey ought to be, and that true education, whatever that may be, will have the\ngreatest tendency to civilize and humanize them in their relations to one\nanother, and to those who are under their protection.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery true, he replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd not only their education, but their habitations, and all that belongs to\nthem, should be such as will neither impair their virtue as guardians, nor\ntempt them to prey upon the other citizens. Any man of sense must acknowledge\nthat.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHe must.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen now let us consider what will be their way of life, if they are to realize\nour idea of them. In the first place, none of them should have any property of\nhis own beyond what is absolutely necessary; neither should they have a private\nhouse or store closed against any one who has a mind to enter; their provisions\nshould be only such as are required by trained warriors, who are men of\ntemperance and courage; they should agree to receive from the citizens a fixed\nrate of pay, enough to meet the expenses of the year and no more; and they will\ngo to mess and live together like soldiers in a camp. Gold and silver we will\ntell them that they have from God; the diviner metal is within them, and they\nhave therefore no need of the dross which is current among men, and ought not\nto pollute the divine by any such earthly admixture; for that commoner metal\nhas been the source of many unholy deeds, but their own is undefiled. And they\nalone of all the citizens may not touch or handle silver or gold, or be under\nthe same roof with them, or wear them, or drink from them. And this will be\ntheir salvation, and they will be the saviours of the State. But should they\never acquire homes or lands or moneys of their own, they will become\nhousekeepers and husbandmen instead of guardians, enemies and tyrants instead\nof allies of the other citizens; hating and being hated, plotting and being\nplotted against, they will pass their whole life in much greater terror of\ninternal than of external enemies, and the hour of ruin, both to themselves and\nto the rest of the State, will be at hand. For all which reasons may we not say\nthat thus shall our State be ordered, and that these shall be the regulations\nappointed by us for guardians concerning their houses and all other matters?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, said Glaucon.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003c!–end chapter–\u003e\n\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\n\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca id=\"link2H_4_0007\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e BOOK IV.\u003c/h2\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHere Adeimantus interposed a question: How would you answer, Socrates, said he,\nif a person were to say that you are making these people miserable, and that\nthey are the cause of their own unhappiness; the city in fact belongs to them,\nbut they are none the better for it; whereas other men acquire lands, and build\nlarge and handsome houses, and have everything handsome about them, offering\nsacrifices to the gods on their own account, and practising hospitality;\nmoreover, as you were saying just now, they have gold and silver, and all that\nis usual among the favourites of fortune; but our poor citizens are no better\nthan mercenaries who are quartered in the city and are always mounting guard?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, I said; and you may add that they are only fed, and not paid in addition\nto their food, like other men; and therefore they cannot, if they would, take a\njourney of pleasure; they have no money to spend on a mistress or any other\nluxurious fancy, which, as the world goes, is thought to be happiness; and many\nother accusations of the same nature might be added.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut, said he, let us suppose all this to be included in the charge.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYou mean to ask, I said, what will be our answer?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIf we proceed along the old path, my belief, I said, is that we shall find the\nanswer. And our answer will be that, even as they are, our guardians may very\nlikely be the happiest of men; but that our aim in founding the State was not\nthe disproportionate happiness of any one class, but the greatest happiness of\nthe whole; we thought that in a State which is ordered with a view to the good\nof the whole we should be most likely to find justice, and in the ill-ordered\nState injustice: and, having found them, we might then decide which of the two\nis the happier. At present, I take it, we are fashioning the happy State, not\npiecemeal, or with a view of making a few happy citizens, but as a whole; and\nby-and-by we will proceed to view the opposite kind of State. Suppose that we\nwere painting a statue, and some one came up to us and said, Why do you not put\nthe most beautiful colours on the most beautiful parts of the body\u0026mdash;the\neyes ought to be purple, but you have made them black\u0026mdash;to him we might\nfairly answer, Sir, you would not surely have us beautify the eyes to such a\ndegree that they are no longer eyes; consider rather whether, by giving this\nand the other features their due proportion, we make the whole beautiful. And\nso I say to you, do not compel us to assign to the guardians a sort of\nhappiness which will make them anything but guardians; for we too can clothe\nour husbandmen in royal apparel, and set crowns of gold on their heads, and bid\nthem till the ground as much as they like, and no more. Our potters also might\nbe allowed to repose on couches, and feast by the fireside, passing round the\nwinecup, while their wheel is conveniently at hand, and working at pottery only\nas much as they like; in this way we might make every class happy\u0026mdash;and\nthen, as you imagine, the whole State would be happy. But do not put this idea\ninto our heads; for, if we listen to you, the husbandman will be no longer a\nhusbandman, the potter will cease to be a potter, and no one will have the\ncharacter of any distinct class in the State. Now this is not of much\nconsequence where the corruption of society, and pretension to be what you are\nnot, is confined to cobblers; but when the guardians of the laws and of the\ngovernment are only seeming and not real guardians, then see how they turn the\nState upside down; and on the other hand they alone have the power of giving\norder and happiness to the State. We mean our guardians to be true saviours and\nnot the destroyers of the State, whereas our opponent is thinking of peasants\nat a festival, who are enjoying a life of revelry, not of citizens who are\ndoing their duty to the State. But, if so, we mean different things, and he is\nspeaking of something which is not a State. And therefore we must consider\nwhether in appointing our guardians we would look to their greatest happiness\nindividually, or whether this principle of happiness does not rather reside in\nthe State as a whole. But if the latter be the truth, then the guardians and\nauxiliaries, and all others equally with them, must be compelled or induced to\ndo their own work in the best way. And thus the whole State will grow up in a\nnoble order, and the several classes will receive the proportion of happiness\nwhich nature assigns to them.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI think that you are quite right.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI wonder whether you will agree with another remark which occurs to me.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat may that be?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThere seem to be two causes of the deterioration of the arts.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat are they?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWealth, I said, and poverty.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHow do they act?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe process is as follows: When a potter becomes rich, will he, think you, any\nlonger take the same pains with his art?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly not.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHe will grow more and more indolent and careless?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery true.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd the result will be that he becomes a worse potter?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes; he greatly deteriorates.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut, on the other hand, if he has no money, and cannot provide himself with\ntools or instruments, he will not work equally well himself, nor will he teach\nhis sons or apprentices to work equally well.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly not.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen, under the influence either of poverty or of wealth, workmen and their\nwork are equally liable to degenerate?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat is evident.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHere, then, is a discovery of new evils, I said, against which the guardians\nwill have to watch, or they will creep into the city unobserved.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat evils?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWealth, I said, and poverty; the one is the parent of luxury and indolence, and\nthe other of meanness and viciousness, and both of discontent.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat is very true, he replied; but still I should like to know, Socrates, how\nour city will be able to go to war, especially against an enemy who is rich and\npowerful, if deprived of the sinews of war.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThere would certainly be a difficulty, I replied, in going to war with one such\nenemy; but there is no difficulty where there are two of them.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHow so? he asked.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIn the first place, I said, if we have to fight, our side will be trained\nwarriors fighting against an army of rich men.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat is true, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd do you not suppose, Adeimantus, that a single boxer who was perfect in his\nart would easily be a match for two stout and well-to-do gentlemen who were not\nboxers?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHardly, if they came upon him at once.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat, now, I said, if he were able to run away and then turn and strike at the\none who first came up? And supposing he were to do this several times under the\nheat of a scorching sun, might he not, being an expert, overturn more than one\nstout personage?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly, he said, there would be nothing wonderful in that.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd yet rich men probably have a greater superiority in the science and\npractise of boxing than they have in military qualities.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nLikely enough.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen we may assume that our athletes will be able to fight with two or three\ntimes their own number?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI agree with you, for I think you right.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd suppose that, before engaging, our citizens send an embassy to one of the\ntwo cities, telling them what is the truth: Silver and gold we neither have nor\nare permitted to have, but you may; do you therefore come and help us in war,\nand take the spoils of the other city: Who, on hearing these words, would\nchoose to fight against lean wiry dogs, rather than, with the dogs on their\nside, against fat and tender sheep?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat is not likely; and yet there might be a danger to the poor State if the\nwealth of many States were to be gathered into one.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut how simple of you to use the term State at all of any but our own!\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhy so?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYou ought to speak of other States in the plural number; not one of them is a\ncity, but many cities, as they say in the game. For indeed any city, however\nsmall, is in fact divided into two, one the city of the poor, the other of the\nrich; these are at war with one another; and in either there are many smaller\ndivisions, and you would be altogether beside the mark if you treated them all\nas a single State. But if you deal with them as many, and give the wealth or\npower or persons of the one to the others, you will always have a great many\nfriends and not many enemies. And your State, while the wise order which has\nnow been prescribed continues to prevail in her, will be the greatest of\nStates, I do not mean to say in reputation or appearance, but in deed and\ntruth, though she number not more than a thousand defenders. A single State\nwhich is her equal you will hardly find, either among Hellenes or barbarians,\nthough many that appear to be as great and many times greater.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat is most true, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd what, I said, will be the best limit for our rulers to fix when they are\nconsidering the size of the State and the amount of territory which they are to\ninclude, and beyond which they will not go?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat limit would you propose?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI would allow the State to increase so far as is consistent with unity; that, I\nthink, is the proper limit.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery good, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHere then, I said, is another order which will have to be conveyed to our\nguardians: Let our city be accounted neither large nor small, but one and\nself-sufficing.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd surely, said he, this is not a very severe order which we impose upon them.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd the other, said I, of which we were speaking before is lighter\nstill,\u0026mdash;I mean the duty of degrading the offspring of the guardians when\ninferior, and of elevating into the rank of guardians the offspring of the\nlower classes, when naturally superior. The intention was, that, in the case of\nthe citizens generally, each individual should be put to the use for which\nnature intended him, one to one work, and then every man would do his own\nbusiness, and be one and not many; and so the whole city would be one and not\nmany.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said; that is not so difficult.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe regulations which we are prescribing, my good Adeimantus, are not, as might\nbe supposed, a number of great principles, but trifles all, if care be taken,\nas the saying is, of the one great thing,\u0026mdash;a thing, however, which I would\nrather call, not great, but sufficient for our purpose.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat may that be? he asked.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nEducation, I said, and nurture: If our citizens are well educated, and grow\ninto sensible men, they will easily see their way through all these, as well as\nother matters which I omit; such, for example, as marriage, the possession of\nwomen and the procreation of children, which will all follow the general\nprinciple that friends have all things in common, as the proverb says.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat will be the best way of settling them.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAlso, I said, the State, if once started well, moves with accumulating force\nlike a wheel. For good nurture and education implant good constitutions, and\nthese good constitutions taking root in a good education improve more and more,\nand this improvement affects the breed in man as in other animals.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery possibly, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen to sum up: This is the point to which, above all, the attention of our\nrulers should be directed,\u0026mdash;that music and gymnastic be preserved in their\noriginal form, and no innovation made. They must do their utmost to maintain\nthem intact. And when any one says that mankind most regard\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n\u0026lsquo;The newest song which the singers have,\u0026rsquo;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nthey will be afraid that he may be praising, not new songs, but a new kind of\nsong; and this ought not to be praised, or conceived to be the meaning of the\npoet; for any musical innovation is full of danger to the whole State, and\nought to be prohibited. So Damon tells me, and I can quite believe\nhim;\u0026mdash;he says that when modes of music change, the fundamental laws of the\nState always change with them.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, said Adeimantus; and you may add my suffrage to Damon\u0026rsquo;s and your\nown.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen, I said, our guardians must lay the foundations of their fortress in\nmusic?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said; the lawlessness of which you speak too easily steals in.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, I replied, in the form of amusement; and at first sight it appears\nharmless.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhy, yes, he said, and there is no harm; were it not that little by little this\nspirit of licence, finding a home, imperceptibly penetrates into manners and\ncustoms; whence, issuing with greater force, it invades contracts between man\nand man, and from contracts goes on to laws and constitutions, in utter\nrecklessness, ending at last, Socrates, by an overthrow of all rights, private\nas well as public.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIs that true? I said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat is my belief, he replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen, as I was saying, our youth should be trained from the first in a stricter\nsystem, for if amusements become lawless, and the youths themselves become\nlawless, they can never grow up into well-conducted and virtuous citizens.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery true, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd when they have made a good beginning in play, and by the help of music have\ngained the habit of good order, then this habit of order, in a manner how\nunlike the lawless play of the others! will accompany them in all their actions\nand be a principle of growth to them, and if there be any fallen places in the\nState will raise them up again.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery true, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThus educated, they will invent for themselves any lesser rules which their\npredecessors have altogether neglected.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat do you mean?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI mean such things as these:\u0026mdash;when the young are to be silent before their\nelders; how they are to show respect to them by standing and making them sit;\nwhat honour is due to parents; what garments or shoes are to be worn; the mode\nof dressing the hair; deportment and manners in general. You would agree with\nme?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut there is, I think, small wisdom in legislating about such matters,\u0026mdash;I\ndoubt if it is ever done; nor are any precise written enactments about them\nlikely to be lasting.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nImpossible.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIt would seem, Adeimantus, that the direction in which education starts a man,\nwill determine his future life. Does not like always attract like?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTo be sure.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nUntil some one rare and grand result is reached which may be good, and may be\nthe reverse of good?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat is not to be denied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd for this reason, I said, I shall not attempt to legislate further about\nthem.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNaturally enough, he replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWell, and about the business of the agora, and the ordinary dealings between\nman and man, or again about agreements with artisans; about insult and injury,\nor the commencement of actions, and the appointment of juries, what would you\nsay? there may also arise questions about any impositions and exactions of\nmarket and harbour dues which may be required, and in general about the\nregulations of markets, police, harbours, and the like. But, oh heavens! shall\nwe condescend to legislate on any of these particulars?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI think, he said, that there is no need to impose laws about them on good men;\nwhat regulations are necessary they will find out soon enough for themselves.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, I said, my friend, if God will only preserve to them the laws which we\nhave given them.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd without divine help, said Adeimantus, they will go on for ever making and\nmending their laws and their lives in the hope of attaining perfection.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYou would compare them, I said, to those invalids who, having no\nself-restraint, will not leave off their habits of intemperance?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nExactly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, I said; and what a delightful life they lead! they are always doctoring\nand increasing and complicating their disorders, and always fancying that they\nwill be cured by any nostrum which anybody advises them to try.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nSuch cases are very common, he said, with invalids of this sort.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, I replied; and the charming thing is that they deem him their worst enemy\nwho tells them the truth, which is simply that, unless they give up eating and\ndrinking and wenching and idling, neither drug nor cautery nor spell nor amulet\nnor any other remedy will avail.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCharming! he replied. I see nothing charming in going into a passion with a man\nwho tells you what is right.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThese gentlemen, I said, do not seem to be in your good graces.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAssuredly not.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNor would you praise the behaviour of States which act like the men whom I was\njust now describing. For are there not ill-ordered States in which the citizens\nare forbidden under pain of death to alter the constitution; and yet he who\nmost sweetly courts those who live under this regime and indulges them and\nfawns upon them and is skilful in anticipating and gratifying their humours is\nheld to be a great and good statesman\u0026mdash;do not these States resemble the\npersons whom I was describing?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said; the States are as bad as the men; and I am very far from praising\nthem.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut do you not admire, I said, the coolness and dexterity of these ready\nministers of political corruption?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said, I do; but not of all of them, for there are some whom the\napplause of the multitude has deluded into the belief that they are really\nstatesmen, and these are not much to be admired.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat do you mean? I said; you should have more feeling for them. When a man\ncannot measure, and a great many others who cannot measure declare that he is\nfour cubits high, can he help believing what they say?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNay, he said, certainly not in that case.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWell, then, do not be angry with them; for are they not as good as a play,\ntrying their hand at paltry reforms such as I was describing; they are always\nfancying that by legislation they will make an end of frauds in contracts, and\nthe other rascalities which I was mentioning, not knowing that they are in\nreality cutting off the heads of a hydra?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said; that is just what they are doing.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI conceive, I said, that the true legislator will not trouble himself with this\nclass of enactments whether concerning laws or the constitution either in an\nill-ordered or in a well-ordered State; for in the former they are quite\nuseless, and in the latter there will be no difficulty in devising them; and\nmany of them will naturally flow out of our previous regulations.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat, then, he said, is still remaining to us of the work of legislation?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNothing to us, I replied; but to Apollo, the God of Delphi, there remains the\nordering of the greatest and noblest and chiefest things of all.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhich are they? he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe institution of temples and sacrifices, and the entire service of gods,\ndemigods, and heroes; also the ordering of the repositories of the dead, and\nthe rites which have to be observed by him who would propitiate the inhabitants\nof the world below. These are matters of which we are ignorant ourselves, and\nas founders of a city we should be unwise in trusting them to any interpreter\nbut our ancestral deity. He is the god who sits in the centre, on the navel of\nthe earth, and he is the interpreter of religion to all mankind.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYou are right, and we will do as you propose.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut where, amid all this, is justice? son of Ariston, tell me where. Now that\nour city has been made habitable, light a candle and search, and get your\nbrother and Polemarchus and the rest of our friends to help, and let us see\nwhere in it we can discover justice and where injustice, and in what they\ndiffer from one another, and which of them the man who would be happy should\nhave for his portion, whether seen or unseen by gods and men.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNonsense, said Glaucon: did you not promise to search yourself, saying that for\nyou not to help justice in her need would be an impiety?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI do not deny that I said so, and as you remind me, I will be as good as my\nword; but you must join.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWe will, he replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWell, then, I hope to make the discovery in this way: I mean to begin with the\nassumption that our State, if rightly ordered, is perfect.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat is most certain.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd being perfect, is therefore wise and valiant and temperate and just.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat is likewise clear.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd whichever of these qualities we find in the State, the one which is not\nfound will be the residue?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery good.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIf there were four things, and we were searching for one of them, wherever it\nmight be, the one sought for might be known to us from the first, and there\nwould be no further trouble; or we might know the other three first, and then\nthe fourth would clearly be the one left.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery true, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd is not a similar method to be pursued about the virtues, which are also\nfour in number?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nClearly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nFirst among the virtues found in the State, wisdom comes into view, and in this\nI detect a certain peculiarity.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat is that?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe State which we have been describing is said to be wise as being good in\ncounsel?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery true.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd good counsel is clearly a kind of knowledge, for not by ignorance, but by\nknowledge, do men counsel well?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nClearly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd the kinds of knowledge in a State are many and diverse?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nOf course.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThere is the knowledge of the carpenter; but is that the sort of knowledge\nwhich gives a city the title of wise and good in counsel?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly not; that would only give a city the reputation of skill in\ncarpentering.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen a city is not to be called wise because possessing a knowledge which\ncounsels for the best about wooden implements?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly not.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNor by reason of a knowledge which advises about brazen pots, I said, nor as\npossessing any other similar knowledge?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNot by reason of any of them, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNor yet by reason of a knowledge which cultivates the earth; that would give\nthe city the name of agricultural?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWell, I said, and is there any knowledge in our recently-founded State among\nany of the citizens which advises, not about any particular thing in the State,\nbut about the whole, and considers how a State can best deal with itself and\nwith other States?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThere certainly is.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd what is this knowledge, and among whom is it found? I asked.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIt is the knowledge of the guardians, he replied, and is found among those whom\nwe were just now describing as perfect guardians.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd what is the name which the city derives from the possession of this sort of\nknowledge?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe name of good in counsel and truly wise.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd will there be in our city more of these true guardians or more smiths?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe smiths, he replied, will be far more numerous.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWill not the guardians be the smallest of all the classes who receive a name\nfrom the profession of some kind of knowledge?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nMuch the smallest.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd so by reason of the smallest part or class, and of the knowledge which\nresides in this presiding and ruling part of itself, the whole State, being\nthus constituted according to nature, will be wise; and this, which has the\nonly knowledge worthy to be called wisdom, has been ordained by nature to be of\nall classes the least.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nMost true.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThus, then, I said, the nature and place in the State of one of the four\nvirtues has somehow or other been discovered.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd, in my humble opinion, very satisfactorily discovered, he replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAgain, I said, there is no difficulty in seeing the nature of courage, and in\nwhat part that quality resides which gives the name of courageous to the State.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHow do you mean?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhy, I said, every one who calls any State courageous or cowardly, will be\nthinking of the part which fights and goes out to war on the State\u0026rsquo;s\nbehalf.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNo one, he replied, would ever think of any other.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe rest of the citizens may be courageous or may be cowardly, but their\ncourage or cowardice will not, as I conceive, have the effect of making the\ncity either the one or the other.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly not.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe city will be courageous in virtue of a portion of herself which preserves\nunder all circumstances that opinion about the nature of things to be feared\nand not to be feared in which our legislator educated them; and this is what\nyou term courage.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI should like to hear what you are saying once more, for I do not think that I\nperfectly understand you.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI mean that courage is a kind of salvation.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nSalvation of what?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nOf the opinion respecting things to be feared, what they are and of what\nnature, which the law implants through education; and I mean by the words\n\u0026lsquo;under all circumstances\u0026rsquo; to intimate that in pleasure or in pain,\nor under the influence of desire or fear, a man preserves, and does not lose\nthis opinion. Shall I give you an illustration?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIf you please.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYou know, I said, that dyers, when they want to dye wool for making the true\nsea-purple, begin by selecting their white colour first; this they prepare and\ndress with much care and pains, in order that the white ground may take the\npurple hue in full perfection. The dyeing then proceeds; and whatever is dyed\nin this manner becomes a fast colour, and no washing either with lyes or\nwithout them can take away the bloom. But, when the ground has not been duly\nprepared, you will have noticed how poor is the look either of purple or of any\nother colour.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said; I know that they have a washed-out and ridiculous appearance.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen now, I said, you will understand what our object was in selecting our\nsoldiers, and educating them in music and gymnastic; we were contriving\ninfluences which would prepare them to take the dye of the laws in perfection,\nand the colour of their opinion about dangers and of every other opinion was to\nbe indelibly fixed by their nurture and training, not to be washed away by such\npotent lyes as pleasure\u0026mdash;mightier agent far in washing the soul than any\nsoda or lye; or by sorrow, fear, and desire, the mightiest of all other\nsolvents. And this sort of universal saving power of true opinion in conformity\nwith law about real and false dangers I call and maintain to be courage, unless\nyou disagree.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut I agree, he replied; for I suppose that you mean to exclude mere\nuninstructed courage, such as that of a wild beast or of a slave\u0026mdash;this, in\nyour opinion, is not the courage which the law ordains, and ought to have\nanother name.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nMost certainly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen I may infer courage to be such as you describe?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhy, yes, said I, you may, and if you add the words \u0026lsquo;of a citizen,\u0026rsquo;\nyou will not be far wrong;\u0026mdash;hereafter, if you like, we will carry the\nexamination further, but at present we are seeking not for courage but justice;\nand for the purpose of our enquiry we have said enough.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYou are right, he replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTwo virtues remain to be discovered in the State\u0026mdash;first, temperance, and\nthen justice which is the end of our search.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery true.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNow, can we find justice without troubling ourselves about temperance?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI do not know how that can be accomplished, he said, nor do I desire that\njustice should be brought to light and temperance lost sight of; and therefore\nI wish that you would do me the favour of considering temperance first.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly, I replied, I should not be justified in refusing your request.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen consider, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, I replied; I will; and as far as I can at present see, the virtue of\ntemperance has more of the nature of harmony and symphony than the preceding.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHow so? he asked.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTemperance, I replied, is the ordering or controlling of certain pleasures and\ndesires; this is curiously enough implied in the saying of \u0026lsquo;a man being\nhis own master;\u0026rsquo; and other traces of the same notion may be found in\nlanguage.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNo doubt, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThere is something ridiculous in the expression \u0026lsquo;master of\nhimself;\u0026rsquo; for the master is also the servant and the servant the master;\nand in all these modes of speaking the same person is denoted.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe meaning is, I believe, that in the human soul there is a better and also a\nworse principle; and when the better has the worse under control, then a man is\nsaid to be master of himself; and this is a term of praise: but when, owing to\nevil education or association, the better principle, which is also the smaller,\nis overwhelmed by the greater mass of the worse\u0026mdash;in this case he is blamed\nand is called the slave of self and unprincipled.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, there is reason in that.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd now, I said, look at our newly-created State, and there you will find one\nof these two conditions realized; for the State, as you will acknowledge, may\nbe justly called master of itself, if the words \u0026lsquo;temperance\u0026rsquo; and\n\u0026lsquo;self-mastery\u0026rsquo; truly express the rule of the better part over the\nworse.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said, I see that what you say is true.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nLet me further note that the manifold and complex pleasures and desires and\npains are generally found in children and women and servants, and in the\nfreemen so called who are of the lowest and more numerous class.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhereas the simple and moderate desires which follow reason, and are under the\nguidance of mind and true opinion, are to be found only in a few, and those the\nbest born and best educated.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery true.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThese two, as you may perceive, have a place in our State; and the meaner\ndesires of the many are held down by the virtuous desires and wisdom of the\nfew.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat I perceive, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen if there be any city which may be described as master of its own pleasures\nand desires, and master of itself, ours may claim such a designation?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly, he replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIt may also be called temperate, and for the same reasons?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd if there be any State in which rulers and subjects will be agreed as to the\nquestion who are to rule, that again will be our State?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nUndoubtedly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd the citizens being thus agreed among themselves, in which class will\ntemperance be found\u0026mdash;in the rulers or in the subjects?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIn both, as I should imagine, he replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nDo you observe that we were not far wrong in our guess that temperance was a\nsort of harmony?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhy so?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhy, because temperance is unlike courage and wisdom, each of which resides in\na part only, the one making the State wise and the other valiant; not so\ntemperance, which extends to the whole, and runs through all the notes of the\nscale, and produces a harmony of the weaker and the stronger and the middle\nclass, whether you suppose them to be stronger or weaker in wisdom or power or\nnumbers or wealth, or anything else. Most truly then may we deem temperance to\nbe the agreement of the naturally superior and inferior, as to the right to\nrule of either, both in states and individuals.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI entirely agree with you.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd so, I said, we may consider three out of the four virtues to have been\ndiscovered in our State. The last of those qualities which make a state\nvirtuous must be justice, if we only knew what that was.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe inference is obvious.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe time then has arrived, Glaucon, when, like huntsmen, we should surround the\ncover, and look sharp that justice does not steal away, and pass out of sight\nand escape us; for beyond a doubt she is somewhere in this country: watch\ntherefore and strive to catch a sight of her, and if you see her first, let me\nknow.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWould that I could! but you should regard me rather as a follower who has just\neyes enough to see what you show him\u0026mdash;that is about as much as I am good\nfor.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nOffer up a prayer with me and follow.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI will, but you must show me the way.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHere is no path, I said, and the wood is dark and perplexing; still we must\npush on.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nLet us push on.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHere I saw something: Halloo! I said, I begin to perceive a track, and I\nbelieve that the quarry will not escape.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nGood news, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTruly, I said, we are stupid fellows.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhy so?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhy, my good sir, at the beginning of our enquiry, ages ago, there was justice\ntumbling out at our feet, and we never saw her; nothing could be more\nridiculous. Like people who go about looking for what they have in their\nhands\u0026mdash;that was the way with us\u0026mdash;we looked not at what we were\nseeking, but at what was far off in the distance; and therefore, I suppose, we\nmissed her.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat do you mean?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI mean to say that in reality for a long time past we have been talking of\njustice, and have failed to recognise her.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI grow impatient at the length of your exordium.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWell then, tell me, I said, whether I am right or not: You remember the\noriginal principle which we were always laying down at the foundation of the\nState, that one man should practise one thing only, the thing to which his\nnature was best adapted;\u0026mdash;now justice is this principle or a part of it.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, we often said that one man should do one thing only.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nFurther, we affirmed that justice was doing one\u0026rsquo;s own business, and not\nbeing a busybody; we said so again and again, and many others have said the\nsame to us.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, we said so.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen to do one\u0026rsquo;s own business in a certain way may be assumed to be\njustice. Can you tell me whence I derive this inference?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI cannot, but I should like to be told.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBecause I think that this is the only virtue which remains in the State when\nthe other virtues of temperance and courage and wisdom are abstracted; and,\nthat this is the ultimate cause and condition of the existence of all of them,\nand while remaining in them is also their preservative; and we were saying that\nif the three were discovered by us, justice would be the fourth or remaining\none.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat follows of necessity.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIf we are asked to determine which of these four qualities by its presence\ncontributes most to the excellence of the State, whether the agreement of\nrulers and subjects, or the preservation in the soldiers of the opinion which\nthe law ordains about the true nature of dangers, or wisdom and watchfulness in\nthe rulers, or whether this other which I am mentioning, and which is found in\nchildren and women, slave and freeman, artisan, ruler, subject,\u0026mdash;the\nquality, I mean, of every one doing his own work, and not being a busybody,\nwould claim the palm\u0026mdash;the question is not so easily answered.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly, he replied, there would be a difficulty in saying which.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen the power of each individual in the State to do his own work appears to\ncompete with the other political virtues, wisdom, temperance, courage.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd the virtue which enters into this competition is justice?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nExactly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nLet us look at the question from another point of view: Are not the rulers in a\nState those to whom you would entrust the office of determining suits at law?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd are suits decided on any other ground but that a man may neither take what\nis another\u0026rsquo;s, nor be deprived of what is his own?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes; that is their principle.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhich is a just principle?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen on this view also justice will be admitted to be the having and doing what\nis a man\u0026rsquo;s own, and belongs to him?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery true.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThink, now, and say whether you agree with me or not. Suppose a carpenter to be\ndoing the business of a cobbler, or a cobbler of a carpenter; and suppose them\nto exchange their implements or their duties, or the same person to be doing\nthe work of both, or whatever be the change; do you think that any great harm\nwould result to the State?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNot much.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut when the cobbler or any other man whom nature designed to be a trader,\nhaving his heart lifted up by wealth or strength or the number of his\nfollowers, or any like advantage, attempts to force his way into the class of\nwarriors, or a warrior into that of legislators and guardians, for which he is\nunfitted, and either to take the implements or the duties of the other; or when\none man is trader, legislator, and warrior all in one, then I think you will\nagree with me in saying that this interchange and this meddling of one with\nanother is the ruin of the State.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nMost true.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nSeeing then, I said, that there are three distinct classes, any meddling of one\nwith another, or the change of one into another, is the greatest harm to the\nState, and may be most justly termed evil-doing?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nPrecisely.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd the greatest degree of evil-doing to one\u0026rsquo;s own city would be termed\nby you injustice?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThis then is injustice; and on the other hand when the trader, the auxiliary,\nand the guardian each do their own business, that is justice, and will make the\ncity just.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI agree with you.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWe will not, I said, be over-positive as yet; but if, on trial, this conception\nof justice be verified in the individual as well as in the State, there will be\nno longer any room for doubt; if it be not verified, we must have a fresh\nenquiry. First let us complete the old investigation, which we began, as you\nremember, under the impression that, if we could previously examine justice on\nthe larger scale, there would be less difficulty in discerning her in the\nindividual. That larger example appeared to be the State, and accordingly we\nconstructed as good a one as we could, knowing well that in the good State\njustice would be found. Let the discovery which we made be now applied to the\nindividual\u0026mdash;if they agree, we shall be satisfied; or, if there be a\ndifference in the individual, we will come back to the State and have another\ntrial of the theory. The friction of the two when rubbed together may possibly\nstrike a light in which justice will shine forth, and the vision which is then\nrevealed we will fix in our souls.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat will be in regular course; let us do as you say.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI proceeded to ask: When two things, a greater and less, are called by the same\nname, are they like or unlike in so far as they are called the same?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nLike, he replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe just man then, if we regard the idea of justice only, will be like the just\nState?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHe will.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd a State was thought by us to be just when the three classes in the State\nseverally did their own business; and also thought to be temperate and valiant\nand wise by reason of certain other affections and qualities of these same\nclasses?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd so of the individual; we may assume that he has the same three principles\nin his own soul which are found in the State; and he may be rightly described\nin the same terms, because he is affected in the same manner?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nOnce more then, O my friend, we have alighted upon an easy\nquestion\u0026mdash;whether the soul has these three principles or not?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAn easy question! Nay, rather, Socrates, the proverb holds that hard is the\ngood.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery true, I said; and I do not think that the method which we are employing is\nat all adequate to the accurate solution of this question; the true method is\nanother and a longer one. Still we may arrive at a solution not below the level\nof the previous enquiry.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nMay we not be satisfied with that? he said;\u0026mdash;under the circumstances, I am\nquite content.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI too, I replied, shall be extremely well satisfied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen faint not in pursuing the speculation, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nMust we not acknowledge, I said, that in each of us there are the same\nprinciples and habits which there are in the State; and that from the\nindividual they pass into the State?\u0026mdash;how else can they come there? Take\nthe quality of passion or spirit;\u0026mdash;it would be ridiculous to imagine that\nthis quality, when found in States, is not derived from the individuals who are\nsupposed to possess it, e.g. the Thracians, Scythians, and in general the\nnorthern nations; and the same may be said of the love of knowledge, which is\nthe special characteristic of our part of the world, or of the love of money,\nwhich may, with equal truth, be attributed to the Phoenicians and Egyptians.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nExactly so, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThere is no difficulty in understanding this.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNone whatever.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut the question is not quite so easy when we proceed to ask whether these\nprinciples are three or one; whether, that is to say, we learn with one part of\nour nature, are angry with another, and with a third part desire the\nsatisfaction of our natural appetites; or whether the whole soul comes into\nplay in each sort of action\u0026mdash;to determine that is the difficulty.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said; there lies the difficulty.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen let us now try and determine whether they are the same or different.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHow can we? he asked.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI replied as follows: The same thing clearly cannot act or be acted upon in the\nsame part or in relation to the same thing at the same time, in contrary ways;\nand therefore whenever this contradiction occurs in things apparently the same,\nwe know that they are really not the same, but different.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nGood.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nFor example, I said, can the same thing be at rest and in motion at the same\ntime in the same part?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nImpossible.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nStill, I said, let us have a more precise statement of terms, lest we should\nhereafter fall out by the way. Imagine the case of a man who is standing and\nalso moving his hands and his head, and suppose a person to say that one and\nthe same person is in motion and at rest at the same moment\u0026mdash;to such a\nmode of speech we should object, and should rather say that one part of him is\nin motion while another is at rest.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery true.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd suppose the objector to refine still further, and to draw the nice\ndistinction that not only parts of tops, but whole tops, when they spin round\nwith their pegs fixed on the spot, are at rest and in motion at the same time\n(and he may say the same of anything which revolves in the same spot), his\nobjection would not be admitted by us, because in such cases things are not at\nrest and in motion in the same parts of themselves; we should rather say that\nthey have both an axis and a circumference, and that the axis stands still, for\nthere is no deviation from the perpendicular; and that the circumference goes\nround. But if, while revolving, the axis inclines either to the right or left,\nforwards or backwards, then in no point of view can they be at rest.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat is the correct mode of describing them, he replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen none of these objections will confuse us, or incline us to believe that\nthe same thing at the same time, in the same part or in relation to the same\nthing, can act or be acted upon in contrary ways.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly not, according to my way of thinking.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYet, I said, that we may not be compelled to examine all such objections, and\nprove at length that they are untrue, let us assume their absurdity, and go\nforward on the understanding that hereafter, if this assumption turn out to be\nuntrue, all the consequences which follow shall be withdrawn.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said, that will be the best way.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWell, I said, would you not allow that assent and dissent, desire and aversion,\nattraction and repulsion, are all of them opposites, whether they are regarded\nas active or passive (for that makes no difference in the fact of their\nopposition)?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said, they are opposites.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWell, I said, and hunger and thirst, and the desires in general, and again\nwilling and wishing,\u0026mdash;all these you would refer to the classes already\nmentioned. You would say\u0026mdash;would you not?\u0026mdash;that the soul of him who\ndesires is seeking after the object of his desire; or that he is drawing to\nhimself the thing which he wishes to possess: or again, when a person wants\nanything to be given him, his mind, longing for the realization of his desire,\nintimates his wish to have it by a nod of assent, as if he had been asked a\nquestion?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery true.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd what would you say of unwillingness and dislike and the absence of desire;\nshould not these be referred to the opposite class of repulsion and rejection?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAdmitting this to be true of desire generally, let us suppose a particular\nclass of desires, and out of these we will select hunger and thirst, as they\nare termed, which are the most obvious of them?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nLet us take that class, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe object of one is food, and of the other drink?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd here comes the point: is not thirst the desire which the soul has of drink,\nand of drink only; not of drink qualified by anything else; for example, warm\nor cold, or much or little, or, in a word, drink of any particular sort: but if\nthe thirst be accompanied by heat, then the desire is of cold drink; or, if\naccompanied by cold, then of warm drink; or, if the thirst be excessive, then\nthe drink which is desired will be excessive; or, if not great, the quantity of\ndrink will also be small: but thirst pure and simple will desire drink pure and\nsimple, which is the natural satisfaction of thirst, as food is of hunger?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said; the simple desire is, as you say, in every case of the simple\nobject, and the qualified desire of the qualified object.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut here a confusion may arise; and I should wish to guard against an opponent\nstarting up and saying that no man desires drink only, but good drink, or food\nonly, but good food; for good is the universal object of desire, and thirst\nbeing a desire, will necessarily be thirst after good drink; and the same is\ntrue of every other desire.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he replied, the opponent might have something to say.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNevertheless I should still maintain, that of relatives some have a quality\nattached to either term of the relation; others are simple and have their\ncorrelatives simple.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI do not know what you mean.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWell, you know of course that the greater is relative to the less?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd the much greater to the much less?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd the sometime greater to the sometime less, and the greater that is to be to\nthe less that is to be?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd so of more and less, and of other correlative terms, such as the double and\nthe half, or again, the heavier and the lighter, the swifter and the slower;\nand of hot and cold, and of any other relatives;\u0026mdash;is not this true of all\nof them?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd does not the same principle hold in the sciences? The object of science is\nknowledge (assuming that to be the true definition), but the object of a\nparticular science is a particular kind of knowledge; I mean, for example, that\nthe science of house-building is a kind of knowledge which is defined and\ndistinguished from other kinds and is therefore termed architecture.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBecause it has a particular quality which no other has?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd it has this particular quality because it has an object of a particular\nkind; and this is true of the other arts and sciences?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNow, then, if I have made myself clear, you will understand my original meaning\nin what I said about relatives. My meaning was, that if one term of a relation\nis taken alone, the other is taken alone; if one term is qualified, the other\nis also qualified. I do not mean to say that relatives may not be disparate, or\nthat the science of health is healthy, or of disease necessarily diseased, or\nthat the sciences of good and evil are therefore good and evil; but only that,\nwhen the term science is no longer used absolutely, but has a qualified object\nwhich in this case is the nature of health and disease, it becomes defined, and\nis hence called not merely science, but the science of medicine.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI quite understand, and I think as you do.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWould you not say that thirst is one of these essentially relative terms,\nhaving clearly a relation\u0026mdash;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, thirst is relative to drink.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd a certain kind of thirst is relative to a certain kind of drink; but thirst\ntaken alone is neither of much nor little, nor of good nor bad, nor of any\nparticular kind of drink, but of drink only?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen the soul of the thirsty one, in so far as he is thirsty, desires only\ndrink; for this he yearns and tries to obtain it?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat is plain.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd if you suppose something which pulls a thirsty soul away from drink, that\nmust be different from the thirsty principle which draws him like a beast to\ndrink; for, as we were saying, the same thing cannot at the same time with the\nsame part of itself act in contrary ways about the same.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nImpossible.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNo more than you can say that the hands of the archer push and pull the bow at\nthe same time, but what you say is that one hand pushes and the other pulls.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nExactly so, he replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd might a man be thirsty, and yet unwilling to drink?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said, it constantly happens.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd in such a case what is one to say? Would you not say that there was\nsomething in the soul bidding a man to drink, and something else forbidding\nhim, which is other and stronger than the principle which bids him?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI should say so.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd the forbidding principle is derived from reason, and that which bids and\nattracts proceeds from passion and disease?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nClearly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen we may fairly assume that they are two, and that they differ from one\nanother; the one with which a man reasons, we may call the rational principle\nof the soul, the other, with which he loves and hungers and thirsts and feels\nthe flutterings of any other desire, may be termed the irrational or\nappetitive, the ally of sundry pleasures and satisfactions?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said, we may fairly assume them to be different.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen let us finally determine that there are two principles existing in the\nsoul. And what of passion, or spirit? Is it a third, or akin to one of the\npreceding?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI should be inclined to say\u0026mdash;akin to desire.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWell, I said, there is a story which I remember to have heard, and in which I\nput faith. The story is, that Leontius, the son of Aglaion, coming up one day\nfrom the Piraeus, under the north wall on the outside, observed some dead\nbodies lying on the ground at the place of execution. He felt a desire to see\nthem, and also a dread and abhorrence of them; for a time he struggled and\ncovered his eyes, but at length the desire got the better of him; and forcing\nthem open, he ran up to the dead bodies, saying, Look, ye wretches, take your\nfill of the fair sight.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI have heard the story myself, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe moral of the tale is, that anger at times goes to war with desire, as\nthough they were two distinct things.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes; that is the meaning, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd are there not many other cases in which we observe that when a man\u0026rsquo;s\ndesires violently prevail over his reason, he reviles himself, and is angry at\nthe violence within him, and that in this struggle, which is like the struggle\nof factions in a State, his spirit is on the side of his reason;\u0026mdash;but for\nthe passionate or spirited element to take part with the desires when reason\ndecides that she should not be opposed, is a sort of thing which I believe that\nyou never observed occurring in yourself, nor, as I should imagine, in any one\nelse?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly not.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nSuppose that a man thinks he has done a wrong to another, the nobler he is the\nless able is he to feel indignant at any suffering, such as hunger, or cold, or\nany other pain which the injured person may inflict upon him\u0026mdash;these he\ndeems to be just, and, as I say, his anger refuses to be excited by them.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut when he thinks that he is the sufferer of the wrong, then he boils and\nchafes, and is on the side of what he believes to be justice; and because he\nsuffers hunger or cold or other pain he is only the more determined to\npersevere and conquer. His noble spirit will not be quelled until he either\nslays or is slain; or until he hears the voice of the shepherd, that is,\nreason, bidding his dog bark no more.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe illustration is perfect, he replied; and in our State, as we were saying,\nthe auxiliaries were to be dogs, and to hear the voice of the rulers, who are\ntheir shepherds.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI perceive, I said, that you quite understand me; there is, however, a further\npoint which I wish you to consider.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat point?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYou remember that passion or spirit appeared at first sight to be a kind of\ndesire, but now we should say quite the contrary; for in the conflict of the\nsoul spirit is arrayed on the side of the rational principle.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nMost assuredly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut a further question arises: Is passion different from reason also, or only a\nkind of reason; in which latter case, instead of three principles in the soul,\nthere will only be two, the rational and the concupiscent; or rather, as the\nState was composed of three classes, traders, auxiliaries, counsellors, so may\nthere not be in the individual soul a third element which is passion or spirit,\nand when not corrupted by bad education is the natural auxiliary of reason?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said, there must be a third.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, I replied, if passion, which has already been shown to be different from\ndesire, turn out also to be different from reason.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut that is easily proved:\u0026mdash;We may observe even in young children that\nthey are full of spirit almost as soon as they are born, whereas some of them\nnever seem to attain to the use of reason, and most of them late enough.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nExcellent, I said, and you may see passion equally in brute animals, which is a\nfurther proof of the truth of what you are saying. And we may once more appeal\nto the words of Homer, which have been already quoted by us,\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n\u0026lsquo;He smote his breast, and thus rebuked his soul,\u0026rsquo;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nfor in this verse Homer has clearly supposed the power which reasons about the\nbetter and worse to be different from the unreasoning anger which is rebuked by\nit.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery true, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd so, after much tossing, we have reached land, and are fairly agreed that\nthe same principles which exist in the State exist also in the individual, and\nthat they are three in number.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nExactly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nMust we not then infer that the individual is wise in the same way, and in\nvirtue of the same quality which makes the State wise?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAlso that the same quality which constitutes courage in the State constitutes\ncourage in the individual, and that both the State and the individual bear the\nsame relation to all the other virtues?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAssuredly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd the individual will be acknowledged by us to be just in the same way in\nwhich the State is just?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat follows, of course.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWe cannot but remember that the justice of the State consisted in each of the\nthree classes doing the work of its own class?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWe are not very likely to have forgotten, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWe must recollect that the individual in whom the several qualities of his\nnature do their own work will be just, and will do his own work?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said, we must remember that too.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd ought not the rational principle, which is wise, and has the care of the\nwhole soul, to rule, and the passionate or spirited principle to be the subject\nand ally?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd, as we were saying, the united influence of music and gymnastic will bring\nthem into accord, nerving and sustaining the reason with noble words and\nlessons, and moderating and soothing and civilizing the wildness of passion by\nharmony and rhythm?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nQuite true, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd these two, thus nurtured and educated, and having learned truly to know\ntheir own functions, will rule over the concupiscent, which in each of us is\nthe largest part of the soul and by nature most insatiable of gain; over this\nthey will keep guard, lest, waxing great and strong with the fulness of bodily\npleasures, as they are termed, the concupiscent soul, no longer confined to her\nown sphere, should attempt to enslave and rule those who are not her\nnatural-born subjects, and overturn the whole life of man?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery true, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBoth together will they not be the best defenders of the whole soul and the\nwhole body against attacks from without; the one counselling, and the other\nfighting under his leader, and courageously executing his commands and\ncounsels?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd he is to be deemed courageous whose spirit retains in pleasure and in pain\nthe commands of reason about what he ought or ought not to fear?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nRight, he replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd him we call wise who has in him that little part which rules, and which\nproclaims these commands; that part too being supposed to have a knowledge of\nwhat is for the interest of each of the three parts and of the whole?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAssuredly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd would you not say that he is temperate who has these same elements in\nfriendly harmony, in whom the one ruling principle of reason, and the two\nsubject ones of spirit and desire are equally agreed that reason ought to rule,\nand do not rebel?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly, he said, that is the true account of temperance whether in the State\nor individual.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd surely, I said, we have explained again and again how and by virtue of what\nquality a man will be just.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat is very certain.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd is justice dimmer in the individual, and is her form different, or is she\nthe same which we found her to be in the State?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThere is no difference in my opinion, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBecause, if any doubt is still lingering in our minds, a few commonplace\ninstances will satisfy us of the truth of what I am saying.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat sort of instances do you mean?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIf the case is put to us, must we not admit that the just State, or the man who\nis trained in the principles of such a State, will be less likely than the\nunjust to make away with a deposit of gold or silver? Would any one deny this?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNo one, he replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWill the just man or citizen ever be guilty of sacrilege or theft, or treachery\neither to his friends or to his country?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNever.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNeither will he ever break faith where there have been oaths or agreements?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nImpossible.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNo one will be less likely to commit adultery, or to dishonour his father and\nmother, or to fail in his religious duties?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNo one.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd the reason is that each part of him is doing its own business, whether in\nruling or being ruled?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nExactly so.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAre you satisfied then that the quality which makes such men and such states is\njustice, or do you hope to discover some other?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNot I, indeed.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen our dream has been realized; and the suspicion which we entertained at the\nbeginning of our work of construction, that some divine power must have\nconducted us to a primary form of justice, has now been verified?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, certainly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd the division of labour which required the carpenter and the shoemaker and\nthe rest of the citizens to be doing each his own business, and not\nanother\u0026rsquo;s, was a shadow of justice, and for that reason it was of use?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nClearly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut in reality justice was such as we were describing, being concerned however,\nnot with the outward man, but with the inward, which is the true self and\nconcernment of man: for the just man does not permit the several elements\nwithin him to interfere with one another, or any of them to do the work of\nothers,\u0026mdash;he sets in order his own inner life, and is his own master and\nhis own law, and at peace with himself; and when he has bound together the\nthree principles within him, which may be compared to the higher, lower, and\nmiddle notes of the scale, and the intermediate intervals\u0026mdash;when he has\nbound all these together, and is no longer many, but has become one entirely\ntemperate and perfectly adjusted nature, then he proceeds to act, if he has to\nact, whether in a matter of property, or in the treatment of the body, or in\nsome affair of politics or private business; always thinking and calling that\nwhich preserves and co-operates with this harmonious condition, just and good\naction, and the knowledge which presides over it, wisdom, and that which at any\ntime impairs this condition, he will call unjust action, and the opinion which\npresides over it ignorance.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYou have said the exact truth, Socrates.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery good; and if we were to affirm that we had discovered the just man and the\njust State, and the nature of justice in each of them, we should not be telling\na falsehood?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nMost certainly not.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nMay we say so, then?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nLet us say so.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd now, I said, injustice has to be considered.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nClearly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nMust not injustice be a strife which arises among the three principles\u0026mdash;a\nmeddlesomeness, and interference, and rising up of a part of the soul against\nthe whole, an assertion of unlawful authority, which is made by a rebellious\nsubject against a true prince, of whom he is the natural vassal,\u0026mdash;what is\nall this confusion and delusion but injustice, and intemperance and cowardice\nand ignorance, and every form of vice?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nExactly so.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd if the nature of justice and injustice be known, then the meaning of acting\nunjustly and being unjust, or, again, of acting justly, will also be perfectly\nclear?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat do you mean? he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhy, I said, they are like disease and health; being in the soul just what\ndisease and health are in the body.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHow so? he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhy, I said, that which is healthy causes health, and that which is unhealthy\ncauses disease.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd just actions cause justice, and unjust actions cause injustice?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat is certain.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd the creation of health is the institution of a natural order and government\nof one by another in the parts of the body; and the creation of disease is the\nproduction of a state of things at variance with this natural order?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd is not the creation of justice the institution of a natural order and\ngovernment of one by another in the parts of the soul, and the creation of\ninjustice the production of a state of things at variance with the natural\norder?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nExactly so, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen virtue is the health and beauty and well-being of the soul, and vice the\ndisease and weakness and deformity of the same?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd do not good practices lead to virtue, and evil practices to vice?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAssuredly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nStill our old question of the comparative advantage of justice and injustice\nhas not been answered: Which is the more profitable, to be just and act justly\nand practise virtue, whether seen or unseen of gods and men, or to be unjust\nand act unjustly, if only unpunished and unreformed?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIn my judgment, Socrates, the question has now become ridiculous. We know that,\nwhen the bodily constitution is gone, life is no longer endurable, though\npampered with all kinds of meats and drinks, and having all wealth and all\npower; and shall we be told that when the very essence of the vital principle\nis undermined and corrupted, life is still worth having to a man, if only he be\nallowed to do whatever he likes with the single exception that he is not to\nacquire justice and virtue, or to escape from injustice and vice; assuming them\nboth to be such as we have described?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, I said, the question is, as you say, ridiculous. Still, as we are near the\nspot at which we may see the truth in the clearest manner with our own eyes,\nlet us not faint by the way.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly not, he replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCome up hither, I said, and behold the various forms of vice, those of them, I\nmean, which are worth looking at.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI am following you, he replied: proceed.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI said, The argument seems to have reached a height from which, as from some\ntower of speculation, a man may look down and see that virtue is one, but that\nthe forms of vice are innumerable; there being four special ones which are\ndeserving of note.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat do you mean? he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI mean, I replied, that there appear to be as many forms of the soul as there\nare distinct forms of the State.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHow many?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThere are five of the State, and five of the soul, I said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat are they?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe first, I said, is that which we have been describing, and which may be said\nto have two names, monarchy and aristocracy, accordingly as rule is exercised\nby one distinguished man or by many.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue, he replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut I regard the two names as describing one form only; for whether the\ngovernment is in the hands of one or many, if the governors have been trained\nin the manner which we have supposed, the fundamental laws of the State will be\nmaintained.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat is true, he replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003c!–end chapter–\u003e\n\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\n\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca id=\"link2H_4_0008\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e BOOK V.\u003c/h2\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nSuch is the good and true City or State, and the good and true man is of the\nsame pattern; and if this is right every other is wrong; and the evil is one\nwhich affects not only the ordering of the State, but also the regulation of\nthe individual soul, and is exhibited in four forms.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat are they? he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI was proceeding to tell the order in which the four evil forms appeared to me\nto succeed one another, when Polemarchus, who was sitting a little way off,\njust beyond Adeimantus, began to whisper to him: stretching forth his hand, he\ntook hold of the upper part of his coat by the shoulder, and drew him towards\nhim, leaning forward himself so as to be quite close and saying something in\nhis ear, of which I only caught the words, \u0026lsquo;Shall we let him off, or what\nshall we do?\u0026rsquo;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly not, said Adeimantus, raising his voice.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWho is it, I said, whom you are refusing to let off?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYou, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI repeated, Why am I especially not to be let off?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhy, he said, we think that you are lazy, and mean to cheat us out of a whole\nchapter which is a very important part of the story; and you fancy that we\nshall not notice your airy way of proceeding; as if it were self-evident to\neverybody, that in the matter of women and children \u0026lsquo;friends have all\nthings in common.\u0026rsquo;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd was I not right, Adeimantus?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said; but what is right in this particular case, like everything else,\nrequires to be explained; for community may be of many kinds. Please,\ntherefore, to say what sort of community you mean. We have been long expecting\nthat you would tell us something about the family life of your\ncitizens\u0026mdash;how they will bring children into the world, and rear them when\nthey have arrived, and, in general, what is the nature of this community of\nwomen and children\u0026mdash;for we are of opinion that the right or wrong\nmanagement of such matters will have a great and paramount influence on the\nState for good or for evil. And now, since the question is still undetermined,\nand you are taking in hand another State, we have resolved, as you heard, not\nto let you go until you give an account of all this.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTo that resolution, said Glaucon, you may regard me as saying Agreed.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd without more ado, said Thrasymachus, you may consider us all to be equally\nagreed.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI said, You know not what you are doing in thus assailing me: What an argument\nare you raising about the State! Just as I thought that I had finished, and was\nonly too glad that I had laid this question to sleep, and was reflecting how\nfortunate I was in your acceptance of what I then said, you ask me to begin\nagain at the very foundation, ignorant of what a hornet\u0026rsquo;s nest of words\nyou are stirring. Now I foresaw this gathering trouble, and avoided it.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nFor what purpose do you conceive that we have come here, said\nThrasymachus,\u0026mdash;to look for gold, or to hear discourse?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, but discourse should have a limit.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, Socrates, said Glaucon, and the whole of life is the only limit which wise\nmen assign to the hearing of such discourses. But never mind about us; take\nheart yourself and answer the question in your own way: What sort of community\nof women and children is this which is to prevail among our guardians? and how\nshall we manage the period between birth and education, which seems to require\nthe greatest care? Tell us how these things will be.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, my simple friend, but the answer is the reverse of easy; many more doubts\narise about this than about our previous conclusions. For the practicability of\nwhat is said may be doubted; and looked at in another point of view, whether\nthe scheme, if ever so practicable, would be for the best, is also doubtful.\nHence I feel a reluctance to approach the subject, lest our aspiration, my dear\nfriend, should turn out to be a dream only.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nFear not, he replied, for your audience will not be hard upon you; they are not\nsceptical or hostile.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI said: My good friend, I suppose that you mean to encourage me by these words.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen let me tell you that you are doing just the reverse; the encouragement\nwhich you offer would have been all very well had I myself believed that I knew\nwhat I was talking about: to declare the truth about matters of high interest\nwhich a man honours and loves among wise men who love him need occasion no fear\nor faltering in his mind; but to carry on an argument when you are yourself\nonly a hesitating enquirer, which is my condition, is a dangerous and slippery\nthing; and the danger is not that I shall be laughed at (of which the fear\nwould be childish), but that I shall miss the truth where I have most need to\nbe sure of my footing, and drag my friends after me in my fall. And I pray\nNemesis not to visit upon me the words which I am going to utter. For I do\nindeed believe that to be an involuntary homicide is a less crime than to be a\ndeceiver about beauty or goodness or justice in the matter of laws. And that is\na risk which I would rather run among enemies than among friends, and therefore\nyou do well to encourage me.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nGlaucon laughed and said: Well then, Socrates, in case you and your argument do\nus any serious injury you shall be acquitted beforehand of the homicide, and\nshall not be held to be a deceiver; take courage then and speak.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWell, I said, the law says that when a man is acquitted he is free from guilt,\nand what holds at law may hold in argument.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen why should you mind?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWell, I replied, I suppose that I must retrace my steps and say what I perhaps\nought to have said before in the proper place. The part of the men has been\nplayed out, and now properly enough comes the turn of the women. Of them I will\nproceed to speak, and the more readily since I am invited by you.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nFor men born and educated like our citizens, the only way, in my opinion, of\narriving at a right conclusion about the possession and use of women and\nchildren is to follow the path on which we originally started, when we said\nthat the men were to be the guardians and watchdogs of the herd.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nLet us further suppose the birth and education of our women to be subject to\nsimilar or nearly similar regulations; then we shall see whether the result\naccords with our design.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat do you mean?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat I mean may be put into the form of a question, I said: Are dogs divided\ninto hes and shes, or do they both share equally in hunting and in keeping\nwatch and in the other duties of dogs? or do we entrust to the males the entire\nand exclusive care of the flocks, while we leave the females at home, under the\nidea that the bearing and suckling their puppies is labour enough for them?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNo, he said, they share alike; the only difference between them is that the\nmales are stronger and the females weaker.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut can you use different animals for the same purpose, unless they are bred\nand fed in the same way?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYou cannot.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen, if women are to have the same duties as men, they must have the same\nnurture and education?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe education which was assigned to the men was music and gymnastic.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen women must be taught music and gymnastic and also the art of war, which\nthey must practise like the men?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat is the inference, I suppose.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI should rather expect, I said, that several of our proposals, if they are\ncarried out, being unusual, may appear ridiculous.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNo doubt of it.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, and the most ridiculous thing of all will be the sight of women naked in\nthe palaestra, exercising with the men, especially when they are no longer\nyoung; they certainly will not be a vision of beauty, any more than the\nenthusiastic old men who in spite of wrinkles and ugliness continue to frequent\nthe gymnasia.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, indeed, he said: according to present notions the proposal would be\nthought ridiculous.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut then, I said, as we have determined to speak our minds, we must not fear\nthe jests of the wits which will be directed against this sort of innovation;\nhow they will talk of women\u0026rsquo;s attainments both in music and gymnastic,\nand above all about their wearing armour and riding upon horseback!\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery true, he replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYet having begun we must go forward to the rough places of the law; at the same\ntime begging of these gentlemen for once in their life to be serious. Not long\nago, as we shall remind them, the Hellenes were of the opinion, which is still\ngenerally received among the barbarians, that the sight of a naked man was\nridiculous and improper; and when first the Cretans and then the Lacedaemonians\nintroduced the custom, the wits of that day might equally have ridiculed the\ninnovation.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNo doubt.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut when experience showed that to let all things be uncovered was far better\nthan to cover them up, and the ludicrous effect to the outward eye vanished\nbefore the better principle which reason asserted, then the man was perceived\nto be a fool who directs the shafts of his ridicule at any other sight but that\nof folly and vice, or seriously inclines to weigh the beautiful by any other\nstandard but that of the good.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery true, he replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nFirst, then, whether the question is to be put in jest or in earnest, let us\ncome to an understanding about the nature of woman: Is she capable of sharing\neither wholly or partially in the actions of men, or not at all? And is the art\nof war one of those arts in which she can or can not share? That will be the\nbest way of commencing the enquiry, and will probably lead to the fairest\nconclusion.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat will be much the best way.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nShall we take the other side first and begin by arguing against ourselves; in\nthis manner the adversary\u0026rsquo;s position will not be undefended.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhy not? he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen let us put a speech into the mouths of our opponents. They will say:\n\u0026lsquo;Socrates and Glaucon, no adversary need convict you, for you yourselves,\nat the first foundation of the State, admitted the principle that everybody was\nto do the one work suited to his own nature.\u0026rsquo; And certainly, if I am not\nmistaken, such an admission was made by us. \u0026lsquo;And do not the natures of\nmen and women differ very much indeed?\u0026rsquo; And we shall reply: Of course\nthey do. Then we shall be asked, \u0026lsquo;Whether the tasks assigned to men and\nto women should not be different, and such as are agreeable to their different\nnatures?\u0026rsquo; Certainly they should. \u0026lsquo;But if so, have you not fallen\ninto a serious inconsistency in saying that men and women, whose natures are so\nentirely different, ought to perform the same actions?\u0026rsquo;\u0026mdash;What\ndefence will you make for us, my good Sir, against any one who offers these\nobjections?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat is not an easy question to answer when asked suddenly; and I shall and I\ndo beg of you to draw out the case on our side.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThese are the objections, Glaucon, and there are many others of a like kind,\nwhich I foresaw long ago; they made me afraid and reluctant to take in hand any\nlaw about the possession and nurture of women and children.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBy Zeus, he said, the problem to be solved is anything but easy.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhy yes, I said, but the fact is that when a man is out of his depth, whether\nhe has fallen into a little swimming bath or into mid ocean, he has to swim all\nthe same.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery true.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd must not we swim and try to reach the shore: we will hope that\nArion\u0026rsquo;s dolphin or some other miraculous help may save us?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI suppose so, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWell then, let us see if any way of escape can be found. We\nacknowledged\u0026mdash;did we not? that different natures ought to have different\npursuits, and that men\u0026rsquo;s and women\u0026rsquo;s natures are different. And now\nwhat are we saying?\u0026mdash;that different natures ought to have the same\npursuits,\u0026mdash;this is the inconsistency which is charged upon us.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nPrecisely.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVerily, Glaucon, I said, glorious is the power of the art of contradiction!\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhy do you say so?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBecause I think that many a man falls into the practice against his will. When\nhe thinks that he is reasoning he is really disputing, just because he cannot\ndefine and divide, and so know that of which he is speaking; and he will pursue\na merely verbal opposition in the spirit of contention and not of fair\ndiscussion.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he replied, such is very often the case; but what has that to do with us\nand our argument?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nA great deal; for there is certainly a danger of our getting unintentionally\ninto a verbal opposition.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIn what way?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhy we valiantly and pugnaciously insist upon the verbal truth, that different\nnatures ought to have different pursuits, but we never considered at all what\nwas the meaning of sameness or difference of nature, or why we distinguished\nthem when we assigned different pursuits to different natures and the same to\nthe same natures.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhy, no, he said, that was never considered by us.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI said: Suppose that by way of illustration we were to ask the question whether\nthere is not an opposition in nature between bald men and hairy men; and if\nthis is admitted by us, then, if bald men are cobblers, we should forbid the\nhairy men to be cobblers, and conversely?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat would be a jest, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, I said, a jest; and why? because we never meant when we constructed the\nState, that the opposition of natures should extend to every difference, but\nonly to those differences which affected the pursuit in which the individual is\nengaged; we should have argued, for example, that a physician and one who is in\nmind a physician may be said to have the same nature.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhereas the physician and the carpenter have different natures?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd if, I said, the male and female sex appear to differ in their fitness for\nany art or pursuit, we should say that such pursuit or art ought to be assigned\nto one or the other of them; but if the difference consists only in women\nbearing and men begetting children, this does not amount to a proof that a\nwoman differs from a man in respect of the sort of education she should\nreceive; and we shall therefore continue to maintain that our guardians and\ntheir wives ought to have the same pursuits.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery true, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNext, we shall ask our opponent how, in reference to any of the pursuits or\narts of civic life, the nature of a woman differs from that of a man?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat will be quite fair.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd perhaps he, like yourself, will reply that to give a sufficient answer on\nthe instant is not easy; but after a little reflection there is no difficulty.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, perhaps.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nSuppose then that we invite him to accompany us in the argument, and then we\nmay hope to show him that there is nothing peculiar in the constitution of\nwomen which would affect them in the administration of the State.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBy all means.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nLet us say to him: Come now, and we will ask you a question:\u0026mdash;when you\nspoke of a nature gifted or not gifted in any respect, did you mean to say that\none man will acquire a thing easily, another with difficulty; a little learning\nwill lead the one to discover a great deal; whereas the other, after much study\nand application, no sooner learns than he forgets; or again, did you mean, that\nthe one has a body which is a good servant to his mind, while the body of the\nother is a hindrance to him?\u0026mdash;would not these be the sort of differences\nwhich distinguish the man gifted by nature from the one who is ungifted?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNo one will deny that.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd can you mention any pursuit of mankind in which the male sex has not all\nthese gifts and qualities in a higher degree than the female? Need I waste time\nin speaking of the art of weaving, and the management of pancakes and\npreserves, in which womankind does really appear to be great, and in which for\nher to be beaten by a man is of all things the most absurd?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYou are quite right, he replied, in maintaining the general inferiority of the\nfemale sex: although many women are in many things superior to many men, yet on\nthe whole what you say is true.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd if so, my friend, I said, there is no special faculty of administration in\na state which a woman has because she is a woman, or which a man has by virtue\nof his sex, but the gifts of nature are alike diffused in both; all the\npursuits of men are the pursuits of women also, but in all of them a woman is\ninferior to a man.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery true.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen are we to impose all our enactments on men and none of them on women?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat will never do.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nOne woman has a gift of healing, another not; one is a musician, and another\nhas no music in her nature?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery true.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd one woman has a turn for gymnastic and military exercises, and another is\nunwarlike and hates gymnastics?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd one woman is a philosopher, and another is an enemy of philosophy; one has\nspirit, and another is without spirit?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat is also true.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen one woman will have the temper of a guardian, and another not. Was not the\nselection of the male guardians determined by differences of this sort?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nMen and women alike possess the qualities which make a guardian; they differ\nonly in their comparative strength or weakness.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nObviously.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd those women who have such qualities are to be selected as the companions\nand colleagues of men who have similar qualities and whom they resemble in\ncapacity and in character?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery true.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd ought not the same natures to have the same pursuits?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThey ought.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen, as we were saying before, there is nothing unnatural in assigning music\nand gymnastic to the wives of the guardians\u0026mdash;to that point we come round\nagain.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly not.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe law which we then enacted was agreeable to nature, and therefore not an\nimpossibility or mere aspiration; and the contrary practice, which prevails at\npresent, is in reality a violation of nature.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat appears to be true.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWe had to consider, first, whether our proposals were possible, and secondly\nwhether they were the most beneficial?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd the possibility has been acknowledged?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe very great benefit has next to be established?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nQuite so.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYou will admit that the same education which makes a man a good guardian will\nmake a woman a good guardian; for their original nature is the same?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI should like to ask you a question.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat is it?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWould you say that all men are equal in excellence, or is one man better than\nanother?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe latter.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd in the commonwealth which we were founding do you conceive the guardians\nwho have been brought up on our model system to be more perfect men, or the\ncobblers whose education has been cobbling?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat a ridiculous question!\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYou have answered me, I replied: Well, and may we not further say that our\nguardians are the best of our citizens?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBy far the best.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd will not their wives be the best women?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, by far the best.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd can there be anything better for the interests of the State than that the\nmen and women of a State should be as good as possible?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThere can be nothing better.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd this is what the arts of music and gymnastic, when present in such manner\nas we have described, will accomplish?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen we have made an enactment not only possible but in the highest degree\nbeneficial to the State?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen let the wives of our guardians strip, for their virtue will be their robe,\nand let them share in the toils of war and the defence of their country; only\nin the distribution of labours the lighter are to be assigned to the women, who\nare the weaker natures, but in other respects their duties are to be the same.\nAnd as for the man who laughs at naked women exercising their bodies from the\nbest of motives, in his laughter he is plucking\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n\u0026lsquo;A fruit of unripe wisdom,\u0026rsquo;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nand he himself is ignorant of what he is laughing at, or what he is\nabout;\u0026mdash;for that is, and ever will be, the best of sayings, That the\nuseful is the noble and the hurtful is the base.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery true.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHere, then, is one difficulty in our law about women, which we may say that we\nhave now escaped; the wave has not swallowed us up alive for enacting that the\nguardians of either sex should have all their pursuits in common; to the\nutility and also to the possibility of this arrangement the consistency of the\nargument with itself bears witness.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, that was a mighty wave which you have escaped.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, I said, but a greater is coming; you will not think much of this when you\nsee the next.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nGo on; let me see.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe law, I said, which is the sequel of this and of all that has preceded, is\nto the following effect,\u0026mdash;\u0026lsquo;that the wives of our guardians are to be\ncommon, and their children are to be common, and no parent is to know his own\nchild, nor any child his parent.\u0026rsquo;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said, that is a much greater wave than the other; and the possibility\nas well as the utility of such a law are far more questionable.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI do not think, I said, that there can be any dispute about the very great\nutility of having wives and children in common; the possibility is quite\nanother matter, and will be very much disputed.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI think that a good many doubts may be raised about both.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYou imply that the two questions must be combined, I replied. Now I meant that\nyou should admit the utility; and in this way, as I thought, I should escape\nfrom one of them, and then there would remain only the possibility.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut that little attempt is detected, and therefore you will please to give a\ndefence of both.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWell, I said, I submit to my fate. Yet grant me a little favour: let me feast\nmy mind with the dream as day dreamers are in the habit of feasting themselves\nwhen they are walking alone; for before they have discovered any means of\neffecting their wishes\u0026mdash;that is a matter which never troubles\nthem\u0026mdash;they would rather not tire themselves by thinking about\npossibilities; but assuming that what they desire is already granted to them,\nthey proceed with their plan, and delight in detailing what they mean to do\nwhen their wish has come true\u0026mdash;that is a way which they have of not doing\nmuch good to a capacity which was never good for much. Now I myself am\nbeginning to lose heart, and I should like, with your permission, to pass over\nthe question of possibility at present. Assuming therefore the possibility of\nthe proposal, I shall now proceed to enquire how the rulers will carry out\nthese arrangements, and I shall demonstrate that our plan, if executed, will be\nof the greatest benefit to the State and to the guardians. First of all, then,\nif you have no objection, I will endeavour with your help to consider the\nadvantages of the measure; and hereafter the question of possibility.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI have no objection; proceed.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nFirst, I think that if our rulers and their auxiliaries are to be worthy of the\nname which they bear, there must be willingness to obey in the one and the\npower of command in the other; the guardians must themselves obey the laws, and\nthey must also imitate the spirit of them in any details which are entrusted to\ntheir care.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat is right, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYou, I said, who are their legislator, having selected the men, will now select\nthe women and give them to them;\u0026mdash;they must be as far as possible of like\nnatures with them; and they must live in common houses and meet at common\nmeals. None of them will have anything specially his or her own; they will be\ntogether, and will be brought up together, and will associate at gymnastic\nexercises. And so they will be drawn by a necessity of their natures to have\nintercourse with each other\u0026mdash;necessity is not too strong a word, I think?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said;\u0026mdash;necessity, not geometrical, but another sort of necessity\nwhich lovers know, and which is far more convincing and constraining to the\nmass of mankind.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue, I said; and this, Glaucon, like all the rest, must proceed after an\norderly fashion; in a city of the blessed, licentiousness is an unholy thing\nwhich the rulers will forbid.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said, and it ought not to be permitted.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen clearly the next thing will be to make matrimony sacred in the highest\ndegree, and what is most beneficial will be deemed sacred?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nExactly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd how can marriages be made most beneficial?\u0026mdash;that is a question which I\nput to you, because I see in your house dogs for hunting, and of the nobler\nsort of birds not a few. Now, I beseech you, do tell me, have you ever attended\nto their pairing and breeding?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIn what particulars?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhy, in the first place, although they are all of a good sort, are not some\nbetter than others?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd do you breed from them all indifferently, or do you take care to breed from\nthe best only?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nFrom the best.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd do you take the oldest or the youngest, or only those of ripe age?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI choose only those of ripe age.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd if care was not taken in the breeding, your dogs and birds would greatly\ndeteriorate?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd the same of horses and animals in general?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nUndoubtedly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nGood heavens! my dear friend, I said, what consummate skill will our rulers\nneed if the same principle holds of the human species!\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly, the same principle holds; but why does this involve any particular\nskill?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBecause, I said, our rulers will often have to practise upon the body corporate\nwith medicines. Now you know that when patients do not require medicines, but\nhave only to be put under a regimen, the inferior sort of practitioner is\ndeemed to be good enough; but when medicine has to be given, then the doctor\nshould be more of a man.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat is quite true, he said; but to what are you alluding?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI mean, I replied, that our rulers will find a considerable dose of falsehood\nand deceit necessary for the good of their subjects: we were saying that the\nuse of all these things regarded as medicines might be of advantage.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd we were very right.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd this lawful use of them seems likely to be often needed in the regulations\nof marriages and births.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHow so?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhy, I said, the principle has been already laid down that the best of either\nsex should be united with the best as often, and the inferior with the\ninferior, as seldom as possible; and that they should rear the offspring of the\none sort of union, but not of the other, if the flock is to be maintained in\nfirst-rate condition. Now these goings on must be a secret which the rulers\nonly know, or there will be a further danger of our herd, as the guardians may\nbe termed, breaking out into rebellion.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery true.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHad we not better appoint certain festivals at which we will bring together the\nbrides and bridegrooms, and sacrifices will be offered and suitable hymeneal\nsongs composed by our poets: the number of weddings is a matter which must be\nleft to the discretion of the rulers, whose aim will be to preserve the average\nof population? There are many other things which they will have to consider,\nsuch as the effects of wars and diseases and any similar agencies, in order as\nfar as this is possible to prevent the State from becoming either too large or\ntoo small.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly, he replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWe shall have to invent some ingenious kind of lots which the less worthy may\ndraw on each occasion of our bringing them together, and then they will accuse\ntheir own ill-luck and not the rulers.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTo be sure, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd I think that our braver and better youth, besides their other honours and\nrewards, might have greater facilities of intercourse with women given them;\ntheir bravery will be a reason, and such fathers ought to have as many sons as\npossible.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd the proper officers, whether male or female or both, for offices are to be\nheld by women as well as by men\u0026mdash;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes\u0026mdash;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe proper officers will take the offspring of the good parents to the pen or\nfold, and there they will deposit them with certain nurses who dwell in a\nseparate quarter; but the offspring of the inferior, or of the better when they\nchance to be deformed, will be put away in some mysterious, unknown place, as\nthey should be.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said, that must be done if the breed of the guardians is to be kept\npure.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThey will provide for their nurture, and will bring the mothers to the fold\nwhen they are full of milk, taking the greatest possible care that no mother\nrecognises her own child; and other wet-nurses may be engaged if more are\nrequired. Care will also be taken that the process of suckling shall not be\nprotracted too long; and the mothers will have no getting up at night or other\ntrouble, but will hand over all this sort of thing to the nurses and\nattendants.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYou suppose the wives of our guardians to have a fine easy time of it when they\nare having children.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhy, said I, and so they ought. Let us, however, proceed with our scheme. We\nwere saying that the parents should be in the prime of life?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery true.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd what is the prime of life? May it not be defined as a period of about\ntwenty years in a woman\u0026rsquo;s life, and thirty in a man\u0026rsquo;s?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhich years do you mean to include?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nA woman, I said, at twenty years of age may begin to bear children to the\nState, and continue to bear them until forty; a man may begin at\nfive-and-twenty, when he has passed the point at which the pulse of life beats\nquickest, and continue to beget children until he be fifty-five.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly, he said, both in men and women those years are the prime of physical\nas well as of intellectual vigour.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAny one above or below the prescribed ages who takes part in the public\nhymeneals shall be said to have done an unholy and unrighteous thing; the child\nof which he is the father, if it steals into life, will have been conceived\nunder auspices very unlike the sacrifices and prayers, which at each hymeneal\npriestesses and priest and the whole city will offer, that the new generation\nmay be better and more useful than their good and useful parents, whereas his\nchild will be the offspring of darkness and strange lust.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery true, he replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd the same law will apply to any one of those within the prescribed age who\nforms a connection with any woman in the prime of life without the sanction of\nthe rulers; for we shall say that he is raising up a bastard to the State,\nuncertified and unconsecrated.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery true, he replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThis applies, however, only to those who are within the specified age: after\nthat we allow them to range at will, except that a man may not marry his\ndaughter or his daughter\u0026rsquo;s daughter, or his mother or his mother\u0026rsquo;s\nmother; and women, on the other hand, are prohibited from marrying their sons\nor fathers, or son\u0026rsquo;s son or father\u0026rsquo;s father, and so on in either\ndirection. And we grant all this, accompanying the permission with strict\norders to prevent any embryo which may come into being from seeing the light;\nand if any force a way to the birth, the parents must understand that the\noffspring of such an union cannot be maintained, and arrange accordingly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat also, he said, is a reasonable proposition. But how will they know who are\nfathers and daughters, and so on?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThey will never know. The way will be this:\u0026mdash;dating from the day of the\nhymeneal, the bridegroom who was then married will call all the male children\nwho are born in the seventh and tenth month afterwards his sons, and the female\nchildren his daughters, and they will call him father, and he will call their\nchildren his grandchildren, and they will call the elder generation\ngrandfathers and grandmothers. All who were begotten at the time when their\nfathers and mothers came together will be called their brothers and sisters,\nand these, as I was saying, will be forbidden to inter-marry. This, however, is\nnot to be understood as an absolute prohibition of the marriage of brothers and\nsisters; if the lot favours them, and they receive the sanction of the Pythian\noracle, the law will allow them.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nQuite right, he replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nSuch is the scheme, Glaucon, according to which the guardians of our State are\nto have their wives and families in common. And now you would have the argument\nshow that this community is consistent with the rest of our polity, and also\nthat nothing can be better\u0026mdash;would you not?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, certainly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nShall we try to find a common basis by asking of ourselves what ought to be the\nchief aim of the legislator in making laws and in the organization of a\nState,\u0026mdash;what is the greatest good, and what is the greatest evil, and then\nconsider whether our previous description has the stamp of the good or of the\nevil?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBy all means.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCan there be any greater evil than discord and distraction and plurality where\nunity ought to reign? or any greater good than the bond of unity?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThere cannot.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd there is unity where there is community of pleasures and pains\u0026mdash;where\nall the citizens are glad or grieved on the same occasions of joy and sorrow?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNo doubt.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes; and where there is no common but only private feeling a State is\ndisorganized\u0026mdash;when you have one half of the world triumphing and the other\nplunged in grief at the same events happening to the city or the citizens?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nSuch differences commonly originate in a disagreement about the use of the\nterms \u0026lsquo;mine\u0026rsquo; and \u0026lsquo;not mine,\u0026rsquo; \u0026lsquo;his\u0026rsquo; and\n\u0026lsquo;not his.\u0026rsquo;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nExactly so.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd is not that the best-ordered State in which the greatest number of persons\napply the terms \u0026lsquo;mine\u0026rsquo; and \u0026lsquo;not mine\u0026rsquo; in the same way\nto the same thing?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nQuite true.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nOr that again which most nearly approaches to the condition of the\nindividual\u0026mdash;as in the body, when but a finger of one of us is hurt, the\nwhole frame, drawn towards the soul as a centre and forming one kingdom under\nthe ruling power therein, feels the hurt and sympathizes all together with the\npart affected, and we say that the man has a pain in his finger; and the same\nexpression is used about any other part of the body, which has a sensation of\npain at suffering or of pleasure at the alleviation of suffering.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery true, he replied; and I agree with you that in the best-ordered State\nthere is the nearest approach to this common feeling which you describe.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen when any one of the citizens experiences any good or evil, the whole State\nwill make his case their own, and will either rejoice or sorrow with him?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said, that is what will happen in a well-ordered State.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIt will now be time, I said, for us to return to our State and see whether this\nor some other form is most in accordance with these fundamental principles.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery good.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nOur State like every other has rulers and subjects?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAll of whom will call one another citizens?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nOf course.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut is there not another name which people give to their rulers in other\nStates?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nGenerally they call them masters, but in democratic States they simply call\nthem rulers.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd in our State what other name besides that of citizens do the people give\nthe rulers?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThey are called saviours and helpers, he replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd what do the rulers call the people?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTheir maintainers and foster-fathers.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd what do they call them in other States?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nSlaves.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd what do the rulers call one another in other States?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nFellow-rulers.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd what in ours?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nFellow-guardians.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nDid you ever know an example in any other State of a ruler who would speak of\none of his colleagues as his friend and of another as not being his friend?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, very often.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd the friend he regards and describes as one in whom he has an interest, and\nthe other as a stranger in whom he has no interest?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nExactly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut would any of your guardians think or speak of any other guardian as a\nstranger?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly he would not; for every one whom they meet will be regarded by them\neither as a brother or sister, or father or mother, or son or daughter, or as\nthe child or parent of those who are thus connected with him.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCapital, I said; but let me ask you once more: Shall they be a family in name\nonly; or shall they in all their actions be true to the name? For example, in\nthe use of the word \u0026lsquo;father,\u0026rsquo; would the care of a father be implied\nand the filial reverence and duty and obedience to him which the law commands;\nand is the violator of these duties to be regarded as an impious and\nunrighteous person who is not likely to receive much good either at the hands\nof God or of man? Are these to be or not to be the strains which the children\nwill hear repeated in their ears by all the citizens about those who are\nintimated to them to be their parents and the rest of their kinsfolk?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThese, he said, and none other; for what can be more ridiculous than for them\nto utter the names of family ties with the lips only and not to act in the\nspirit of them?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen in our city the language of harmony and concord will be more often heard\nthan in any other. As I was describing before, when any one is well or ill, the\nuniversal word will be \u0026lsquo;with me it is well\u0026rsquo; or \u0026lsquo;it is\nill.\u0026rsquo;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nMost true.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd agreeably to this mode of thinking and speaking, were we not saying that\nthey will have their pleasures and pains in common?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, and so they will.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd they will have a common interest in the same thing which they will alike\ncall \u0026lsquo;my own,\u0026rsquo; and having this common interest they will have a\ncommon feeling of pleasure and pain?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, far more so than in other States.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd the reason of this, over and above the general constitution of the State,\nwill be that the guardians will have a community of women and children?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat will be the chief reason.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd this unity of feeling we admitted to be the greatest good, as was implied\nin our own comparison of a well-ordered State to the relation of the body and\nthe members, when affected by pleasure or pain?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat we acknowledged, and very rightly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen the community of wives and children among our citizens is clearly the\nsource of the greatest good to the State?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd this agrees with the other principle which we were affirming,\u0026mdash;that\nthe guardians were not to have houses or lands or any other property; their pay\nwas to be their food, which they were to receive from the other citizens, and\nthey were to have no private expenses; for we intended them to preserve their\ntrue character of guardians.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nRight, he replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBoth the community of property and the community of families, as I am saying,\ntend to make them more truly guardians; they will not tear the city in pieces\nby differing about \u0026lsquo;mine\u0026rsquo; and \u0026lsquo;not mine;\u0026rsquo; each man\ndragging any acquisition which he has made into a separate house of his own,\nwhere he has a separate wife and children and private pleasures and pains; but\nall will be affected as far as may be by the same pleasures and pains because\nthey are all of one opinion about what is near and dear to them, and therefore\nthey all tend towards a common end.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly, he replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd as they have nothing but their persons which they can call their own, suits\nand complaints will have no existence among them; they will be delivered from\nall those quarrels of which money or children or relations are the occasion.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nOf course they will.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNeither will trials for assault or insult ever be likely to occur among them.\nFor that equals should defend themselves against equals we shall maintain to be\nhonourable and right; we shall make the protection of the person a matter of\nnecessity.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat is good, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes; and there is a further good in the law; viz. that if a man has a quarrel\nwith another he will satisfy his resentment then and there, and not proceed to\nmore dangerous lengths.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTo the elder shall be assigned the duty of ruling and chastising the younger.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nClearly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNor can there be a doubt that the younger will not strike or do any other\nviolence to an elder, unless the magistrates command him; nor will he slight\nhim in any way. For there are two guardians, shame and fear, mighty to prevent\nhim: shame, which makes men refrain from laying hands on those who are to them\nin the relation of parents; fear, that the injured one will be succoured by the\nothers who are his brothers, sons, fathers.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat is true, he replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen in every way the laws will help the citizens to keep the peace with one\nanother?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, there will be no want of peace.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd as the guardians will never quarrel among themselves there will be no\ndanger of the rest of the city being divided either against them or against one\nanother.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNone whatever.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI hardly like even to mention the little meannesses of which they will be rid,\nfor they are beneath notice: such, for example, as the flattery of the rich by\nthe poor, and all the pains and pangs which men experience in bringing up a\nfamily, and in finding money to buy necessaries for their household, borrowing\nand then repudiating, getting how they can, and giving the money into the hands\nof women and slaves to keep\u0026mdash;the many evils of so many kinds which people\nsuffer in this way are mean enough and obvious enough, and not worth speaking\nof.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said, a man has no need of eyes in order to perceive that.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd from all these evils they will be delivered, and their life will be blessed\nas the life of Olympic victors and yet more blessed.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHow so?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe Olympic victor, I said, is deemed happy in receiving a part only of the\nblessedness which is secured to our citizens, who have won a more glorious\nvictory and have a more complete maintenance at the public cost. For the\nvictory which they have won is the salvation of the whole State; and the crown\nwith which they and their children are crowned is the fulness of all that life\nneeds; they receive rewards from the hands of their country while living, and\nafter death have an honourable burial.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said, and glorious rewards they are.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nDo you remember, I said, how in the course of the previous discussion some one\nwho shall be nameless accused us of making our guardians unhappy\u0026mdash;they had\nnothing and might have possessed all things\u0026mdash;to whom we replied that, if\nan occasion offered, we might perhaps hereafter consider this question, but\nthat, as at present advised, we would make our guardians truly guardians, and\nthat we were fashioning the State with a view to the greatest happiness, not of\nany particular class, but of the whole?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, I remember.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd what do you say, now that the life of our protectors is made out to be far\nbetter and nobler than that of Olympic victors\u0026mdash;is the life of shoemakers,\nor any other artisans, or of husbandmen, to be compared with it?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly not.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAt the same time I ought here to repeat what I have said elsewhere, that if any\nof our guardians shall try to be happy in such a manner that he will cease to\nbe a guardian, and is not content with this safe and harmonious life, which, in\nour judgment, is of all lives the best, but infatuated by some youthful conceit\nof happiness which gets up into his head shall seek to appropriate the whole\nstate to himself, then he will have to learn how wisely Hesiod spoke, when he\nsaid, \u0026lsquo;half is more than the whole.\u0026rsquo;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIf he were to consult me, I should say to him: Stay where you are, when you\nhave the offer of such a life.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYou agree then, I said, that men and women are to have a common way of life\nsuch as we have described\u0026mdash;common education, common children; and they are\nto watch over the citizens in common whether abiding in the city or going out\nto war; they are to keep watch together, and to hunt together like dogs; and\nalways and in all things, as far as they are able, women are to share with the\nmen? And in so doing they will do what is best, and will not violate, but\npreserve the natural relation of the sexes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI agree with you, he replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe enquiry, I said, has yet to be made, whether such a community be found\npossible\u0026mdash;as among other animals, so also among men\u0026mdash;and if possible,\nin what way possible?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYou have anticipated the question which I was about to suggest.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThere is no difficulty, I said, in seeing how war will be carried on by them.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHow?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhy, of course they will go on expeditions together; and will take with them\nany of their children who are strong enough, that, after the manner of the\nartisan\u0026rsquo;s child, they may look on at the work which they will have to do\nwhen they are grown up; and besides looking on they will have to help and be of\nuse in war, and to wait upon their fathers and mothers. Did you never observe\nin the arts how the potters\u0026rsquo; boys look on and help, long before they\ntouch the wheel?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, I have.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd shall potters be more careful in educating their children and in giving\nthem the opportunity of seeing and practising their duties than our guardians\nwill be?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe idea is ridiculous, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThere is also the effect on the parents, with whom, as with other animals, the\npresence of their young ones will be the greatest incentive to valour.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat is quite true, Socrates; and yet if they are defeated, which may often\nhappen in war, how great the danger is! the children will be lost as well as\ntheir parents, and the State will never recover.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue, I said; but would you never allow them to run any risk?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI am far from saying that.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWell, but if they are ever to run a risk should they not do so on some occasion\nwhen, if they escape disaster, they will be the better for it?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nClearly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhether the future soldiers do or do not see war in the days of their youth is\na very important matter, for the sake of which some risk may fairly be\nincurred.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, very important.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThis then must be our first step,\u0026mdash;to make our children spectators of war;\nbut we must also contrive that they shall be secured against danger; then all\nwill be well.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTheir parents may be supposed not to be blind to the risks of war, but to know,\nas far as human foresight can, what expeditions are safe and what dangerous?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat may be assumed.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd they will take them on the safe expeditions and be cautious about the\ndangerous ones?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd they will place them under the command of experienced veterans who will be\ntheir leaders and teachers?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery properly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nStill, the dangers of war cannot be always foreseen; there is a good deal of\nchance about them?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen against such chances the children must be at once furnished with wings, in\norder that in the hour of need they may fly away and escape.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat do you mean? he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI mean that we must mount them on horses in their earliest youth, and when they\nhave learnt to ride, take them on horseback to see war: the horses must not be\nspirited and warlike, but the most tractable and yet the swiftest that can be\nhad. In this way they will get an excellent view of what is hereafter to be\ntheir own business; and if there is danger they have only to follow their elder\nleaders and escape.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI believe that you are right, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNext, as to war; what are to be the relations of your soldiers to one another\nand to their enemies? I should be inclined to propose that the soldier who\nleaves his rank or throws away his arms, or is guilty of any other act of\ncowardice, should be degraded into the rank of a husbandman or artisan. What do\nyou think?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBy all means, I should say.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd he who allows himself to be taken prisoner may as well be made a present of\nto his enemies; he is their lawful prey, and let them do what they like with\nhim.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut the hero who has distinguished himself, what shall be done to him? In the\nfirst place, he shall receive honour in the army from his youthful comrades;\nevery one of them in succession shall crown him. What do you say?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI approve.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd what do you say to his receiving the right hand of fellowship?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTo that too, I agree.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut you will hardly agree to my next proposal.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat is your proposal?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat he should kiss and be kissed by them.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nMost certainly, and I should be disposed to go further, and say: Let no one\nwhom he has a mind to kiss refuse to be kissed by him while the expedition\nlasts. So that if there be a lover in the army, whether his love be youth or\nmaiden, he may be more eager to win the prize of valour.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCapital, I said. That the brave man is to have more wives than others has been\nalready determined: and he is to have first choices in such matters more than\nothers, in order that he may have as many children as possible?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAgreed.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAgain, there is another manner in which, according to Homer, brave youths\nshould be honoured; for he tells how Ajax, after he had distinguished himself\nin battle, was rewarded with long chines, which seems to be a compliment\nappropriate to a hero in the flower of his age, being not only a tribute of\nhonour but also a very strengthening thing.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nMost true, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen in this, I said, Homer shall be our teacher; and we too, at sacrifices and\non the like occasions, will honour the brave according to the measure of their\nvalour, whether men or women, with hymns and those other distinctions which we\nwere mentioning; also with\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n\u0026lsquo;seats of precedence, and meats and full cups;\u0026rsquo;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nand in honouring them, we shall be at the same time training them.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat, he replied, is excellent.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, I said; and when a man dies gloriously in war shall we not say, in the\nfirst place, that he is of the golden race?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTo be sure.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNay, have we not the authority of Hesiod for affirming that when they are dead\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n\u0026lsquo;They are holy angels upon the earth, authors of good, averters of evil,\nthe guardians of speech-gifted men\u0026rsquo;?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes; and we accept his authority.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWe must learn of the god how we are to order the sepulture of divine and heroic\npersonages, and what is to be their special distinction; and we must do as he\nbids?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBy all means.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd in ages to come we will reverence them and kneel before their sepulchres as\nat the graves of heroes. And not only they but any who are deemed pre-eminently\ngood, whether they die from age, or in any other way, shall be admitted to the\nsame honours.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat is very right, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNext, how shall our soldiers treat their enemies? What about this?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIn what respect do you mean?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nFirst of all, in regard to slavery? Do you think it right that Hellenes should\nenslave Hellenic States, or allow others to enslave them, if they can help?\nShould not their custom be to spare them, considering the danger which there is\nthat the whole race may one day fall under the yoke of the barbarians?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTo spare them is infinitely better.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen no Hellene should be owned by them as a slave; that is a rule which they\nwill observe and advise the other Hellenes to observe.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly, he said; they will in this way be united against the barbarians and\nwill keep their hands off one another.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNext as to the slain; ought the conquerors, I said, to take anything but their\narmour? Does not the practice of despoiling an enemy afford an excuse for not\nfacing the battle? Cowards skulk about the dead, pretending that they are\nfulfilling a duty, and many an army before now has been lost from this love of\nplunder.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery true.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd is there not illiberality and avarice in robbing a corpse, and also a\ndegree of meanness and womanishness in making an enemy of the dead body when\nthe real enemy has flown away and left only his fighting gear behind\nhim,\u0026mdash;is not this rather like a dog who cannot get at his assailant,\nquarrelling with the stones which strike him instead?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery like a dog, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen we must abstain from spoiling the dead or hindering their burial?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he replied, we most certainly must.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNeither shall we offer up arms at the temples of the gods, least of all the\narms of Hellenes, if we care to maintain good feeling with other Hellenes; and,\nindeed, we have reason to fear that the offering of spoils taken from kinsmen\nmay be a pollution unless commanded by the god himself?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery true.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAgain, as to the devastation of Hellenic territory or the burning of houses,\nwhat is to be the practice?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nMay I have the pleasure, he said, of hearing your opinion?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBoth should be forbidden, in my judgment; I would take the annual produce and\nno more. Shall I tell you why?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nPray do.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhy, you see, there is a difference in the names \u0026lsquo;discord\u0026rsquo; and\n\u0026lsquo;war,\u0026rsquo; and I imagine that there is also a difference in their\nnatures; the one is expressive of what is internal and domestic, the other of\nwhat is external and foreign; and the first of the two is termed discord, and\nonly the second, war.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat is a very proper distinction, he replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd may I not observe with equal propriety that the Hellenic race is all united\ntogether by ties of blood and friendship, and alien and strange to the\nbarbarians?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery good, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd therefore when Hellenes fight with barbarians and barbarians with Hellenes,\nthey will be described by us as being at war when they fight, and by nature\nenemies, and this kind of antagonism should be called war; but when Hellenes\nfight with one another we shall say that Hellas is then in a state of disorder\nand discord, they being by nature friends; and such enmity is to be called\ndiscord.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI agree.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nConsider then, I said, when that which we have acknowledged to be discord\noccurs, and a city is divided, if both parties destroy the lands and burn the\nhouses of one another, how wicked does the strife appear! No true lover of his\ncountry would bring himself to tear in pieces his own nurse and mother: There\nmight be reason in the conqueror depriving the conquered of their harvest, but\nstill they would have the idea of peace in their hearts and would not mean to\ngo on fighting for ever.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said, that is a better temper than the other.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd will not the city, which you are founding, be an Hellenic city?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIt ought to be, he replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen will not the citizens be good and civilized?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, very civilized.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd will they not be lovers of Hellas, and think of Hellas as their own land,\nand share in the common temples?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nMost certainly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd any difference which arises among them will be regarded by them as discord\nonly\u0026mdash;a quarrel among friends, which is not to be called a war?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly not.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen they will quarrel as those who intend some day to be reconciled?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThey will use friendly correction, but will not enslave or destroy their\nopponents; they will be correctors, not enemies?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nJust so.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd as they are Hellenes themselves they will not devastate Hellas, nor will\nthey burn houses, nor ever suppose that the whole population of a\ncity\u0026mdash;men, women, and children\u0026mdash;are equally their enemies, for they\nknow that the guilt of war is always confined to a few persons and that the\nmany are their friends. And for all these reasons they will be unwilling to\nwaste their lands and rase their houses; their enmity to them will only last\nuntil the many innocent sufferers have compelled the guilty few to give\nsatisfaction?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI agree, he said, that our citizens should thus deal with their Hellenic\nenemies; and with barbarians as the Hellenes now deal with one another.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen let us enact this law also for our guardians:\u0026mdash;that they are neither\nto devastate the lands of Hellenes nor to burn their houses.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAgreed; and we may agree also in thinking that these, like all our previous\nenactments, are very good.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut still I must say, Socrates, that if you are allowed to go on in this way\nyou will entirely forget the other question which at the commencement of this\ndiscussion you thrust aside:\u0026mdash;Is such an order of things possible, and\nhow, if at all? For I am quite ready to acknowledge that the plan which you\npropose, if only feasible, would do all sorts of good to the State. I will add,\nwhat you have omitted, that your citizens will be the bravest of warriors, and\nwill never leave their ranks, for they will all know one another, and each will\ncall the other father, brother, son; and if you suppose the women to join their\narmies, whether in the same rank or in the rear, either as a terror to the\nenemy, or as auxiliaries in case of need, I know that they will then be\nabsolutely invincible; and there are many domestic advantages which might also\nbe mentioned and which I also fully acknowledge: but, as I admit all these\nadvantages and as many more as you please, if only this State of yours were to\ncome into existence, we need say no more about them; assuming then the\nexistence of the State, let us now turn to the question of possibility and ways\nand means\u0026mdash;the rest may be left.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIf I loiter for a moment, you instantly make a raid upon me, I said, and have\nno mercy; I have hardly escaped the first and second waves, and you seem not to\nbe aware that you are now bringing upon me the third, which is the greatest and\nheaviest. When you have seen and heard the third wave, I think you will be more\nconsiderate and will acknowledge that some fear and hesitation was natural\nrespecting a proposal so extraordinary as that which I have now to state and\ninvestigate.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe more appeals of this sort which you make, he said, the more determined are\nwe that you shall tell us how such a State is possible: speak out and at once.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nLet me begin by reminding you that we found our way hither in the search after\njustice and injustice.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue, he replied; but what of that?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI was only going to ask whether, if we have discovered them, we are to require\nthat the just man should in nothing fail of absolute justice; or may we be\nsatisfied with an approximation, and the attainment in him of a higher degree\nof justice than is to be found in other men?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe approximation will be enough.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWe were enquiring into the nature of absolute justice and into the character of\nthe perfectly just, and into injustice and the perfectly unjust, that we might\nhave an ideal. We were to look at these in order that we might judge of our own\nhappiness and unhappiness according to the standard which they exhibited and\nthe degree in which we resembled them, but not with any view of showing that\nthey could exist in fact.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWould a painter be any the worse because, after having delineated with\nconsummate art an ideal of a perfectly beautiful man, he was unable to show\nthat any such man could ever have existed?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHe would be none the worse.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWell, and were we not creating an ideal of a perfect State?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTo be sure.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd is our theory a worse theory because we are unable to prove the possibility\nof a city being ordered in the manner described?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nSurely not, he replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat is the truth, I said. But if, at your request, I am to try and show how\nand under what conditions the possibility is highest, I must ask you, having\nthis in view, to repeat your former admissions.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat admissions?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI want to know whether ideals are ever fully realized in language? Does not the\nword express more than the fact, and must not the actual, whatever a man may\nthink, always, in the nature of things, fall short of the truth? What do you\nsay?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI agree.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen you must not insist on my proving that the actual State will in every\nrespect coincide with the ideal: if we are only able to discover how a city may\nbe governed nearly as we proposed, you will admit that we have discovered the\npossibility which you demand; and will be contented. I am sure that I should be\ncontented\u0026mdash;will not you?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, I will.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nLet me next endeavour to show what is that fault in States which is the cause\nof their present maladministration, and what is the least change which will\nenable a State to pass into the truer form; and let the change, if possible, be\nof one thing only, or, if not, of two; at any rate, let the changes be as few\nand slight as possible.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly, he replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI think, I said, that there might be a reform of the State if only one change\nwere made, which is not a slight or easy though still a possible one.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat is it? he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNow then, I said, I go to meet that which I liken to the greatest of the waves;\nyet shall the word be spoken, even though the wave break and drown me in\nlaughter and dishonour; and do you mark my words.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nProceed.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI said: \u0026lsquo;Until philosophers are kings, or the kings and princes of this\nworld have the spirit and power of philosophy, and political greatness and\nwisdom meet in one, and those commoner natures who pursue either to the\nexclusion of the other are compelled to stand aside, cities will never have\nrest from their evils,\u0026mdash;nor the human race, as I believe,\u0026mdash;and then\nonly will this our State have a possibility of life and behold the light of\nday.\u0026rsquo; Such was the thought, my dear Glaucon, which I would fain have\nuttered if it had not seemed too extravagant; for to be convinced that in no\nother State can there be happiness private or public is indeed a hard thing.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nSocrates, what do you mean? I would have you consider that the word which you\nhave uttered is one at which numerous persons, and very respectable persons\ntoo, in a figure pulling off their coats all in a moment, and seizing any\nweapon that comes to hand, will run at you might and main, before you know\nwhere you are, intending to do heaven knows what; and if you don\u0026rsquo;t\nprepare an answer, and put yourself in motion, you will be \u0026lsquo;pared by\ntheir fine wits,\u0026rsquo; and no mistake.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYou got me into the scrape, I said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd I was quite right; however, I will do all I can to get you out of it; but I\ncan only give you good-will and good advice, and, perhaps, I may be able to fit\nanswers to your questions better than another\u0026mdash;that is all. And now,\nhaving such an auxiliary, you must do your best to show the unbelievers that\nyou are right.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI ought to try, I said, since you offer me such invaluable assistance. And I\nthink that, if there is to be a chance of our escaping, we must explain to them\nwhom we mean when we say that philosophers are to rule in the State; then we\nshall be able to defend ourselves: There will be discovered to be some natures\nwho ought to study philosophy and to be leaders in the State; and others who\nare not born to be philosophers, and are meant to be followers rather than\nleaders.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen now for a definition, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nFollow me, I said, and I hope that I may in some way or other be able to give\nyou a satisfactory explanation.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nProceed.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI dare say that you remember, and therefore I need not remind you, that a\nlover, if he is worthy of the name, ought to show his love, not to some one\npart of that which he loves, but to the whole.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI really do not understand, and therefore beg of you to assist my memory.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnother person, I said, might fairly reply as you do; but a man of pleasure\nlike yourself ought to know that all who are in the flower of youth do somehow\nor other raise a pang or emotion in a lover\u0026rsquo;s breast, and are thought by\nhim to be worthy of his affectionate regards. Is not this a way which you have\nwith the fair: one has a snub nose, and you praise his charming face; the\nhook-nose of another has, you say, a royal look; while he who is neither snub\nnor hooked has the grace of regularity: the dark visage is manly, the fair are\nchildren of the gods; and as to the sweet \u0026lsquo;honey pale,\u0026rsquo; as they are\ncalled, what is the very name but the invention of a lover who talks in\ndiminutives, and is not averse to paleness if appearing on the cheek of youth?\nIn a word, there is no excuse which you will not make, and nothing which you\nwill not say, in order not to lose a single flower that blooms in the\nspring-time of youth.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIf you make me an authority in matters of love, for the sake of the argument, I\nassent.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd what do you say of lovers of wine? Do you not see them doing the same? They\nare glad of any pretext of drinking any wine.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery good.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd the same is true of ambitious men; if they cannot command an army, they are\nwilling to command a file; and if they cannot be honoured by really great and\nimportant persons, they are glad to be honoured by lesser and meaner\npeople,\u0026mdash;but honour of some kind they must have.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nExactly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nOnce more let me ask: Does he who desires any class of goods, desire the whole\nclass or a part only?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe whole.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd may we not say of the philosopher that he is a lover, not of a part of\nwisdom only, but of the whole?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, of the whole.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd he who dislikes learning, especially in youth, when he has no power of\njudging what is good and what is not, such an one we maintain not to be a\nphilosopher or a lover of knowledge, just as he who refuses his food is not\nhungry, and may be said to have a bad appetite and not a good one?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery true, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhereas he who has a taste for every sort of knowledge and who is curious to\nlearn and is never satisfied, may be justly termed a philosopher? Am I not\nright?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nGlaucon said: If curiosity makes a philosopher, you will find many a strange\nbeing will have a title to the name. All the lovers of sights have a delight in\nlearning, and must therefore be included. Musical amateurs, too, are a folk\nstrangely out of place among philosophers, for they are the last persons in the\nworld who would come to anything like a philosophical discussion, if they could\nhelp, while they run about at the Dionysiac festivals as if they had let out\ntheir ears to hear every chorus; whether the performance is in town or\ncountry\u0026mdash;that makes no difference\u0026mdash;they are there. Now are we to\nmaintain that all these and any who have similar tastes, as well as the\nprofessors of quite minor arts, are philosophers?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly not, I replied; they are only an imitation.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHe said: Who then are the true philosophers?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThose, I said, who are lovers of the vision of truth.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat is also good, he said; but I should like to know what you mean?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTo another, I replied, I might have a difficulty in explaining; but I am sure\nthat you will admit a proposition which I am about to make.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat is the proposition?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat since beauty is the opposite of ugliness, they are two?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd inasmuch as they are two, each of them is one?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue again.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd of just and unjust, good and evil, and of every other class, the same\nremark holds: taken singly, each of them is one; but from the various\ncombinations of them with actions and things and with one another, they are\nseen in all sorts of lights and appear many?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery true.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd this is the distinction which I draw between the sight-loving, art-loving,\npractical class and those of whom I am speaking, and who are alone worthy of\nthe name of philosophers.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHow do you distinguish them? he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe lovers of sounds and sights, I replied, are, as I conceive, fond of fine\ntones and colours and forms and all the artificial products that are made out\nof them, but their mind is incapable of seeing or loving absolute beauty.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue, he replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nFew are they who are able to attain to the sight of this.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery true.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd he who, having a sense of beautiful things has no sense of absolute beauty,\nor who, if another lead him to a knowledge of that beauty is unable to\nfollow\u0026mdash;of such an one I ask, Is he awake or in a dream only? Reflect: is\nnot the dreamer, sleeping or waking, one who likens dissimilar things, who puts\nthe copy in the place of the real object?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI should certainly say that such an one was dreaming.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut take the case of the other, who recognises the existence of absolute beauty\nand is able to distinguish the idea from the objects which participate in the\nidea, neither putting the objects in the place of the idea nor the idea in the\nplace of the objects\u0026mdash;is he a dreamer, or is he awake?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHe is wide awake.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd may we not say that the mind of the one who knows has knowledge, and that\nthe mind of the other, who opines only, has opinion?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut suppose that the latter should quarrel with us and dispute our statement,\ncan we administer any soothing cordial or advice to him, without revealing to\nhim that there is sad disorder in his wits?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWe must certainly offer him some good advice, he replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCome, then, and let us think of something to say to him. Shall we begin by\nassuring him that he is welcome to any knowledge which he may have, and that we\nare rejoiced at his having it? But we should like to ask him a question: Does\nhe who has knowledge know something or nothing? (You must answer for him.)\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI answer that he knows something.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nSomething that is or is not?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nSomething that is; for how can that which is not ever be known?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd are we assured, after looking at the matter from many points of view, that\nabsolute being is or may be absolutely known, but that the utterly non-existent\nis utterly unknown?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNothing can be more certain.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nGood. But if there be anything which is of such a nature as to be and not to\nbe, that will have a place intermediate between pure being and the absolute\nnegation of being?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, between them.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd, as knowledge corresponded to being and ignorance of necessity to\nnot-being, for that intermediate between being and not-being there has to be\ndiscovered a corresponding intermediate between ignorance and knowledge, if\nthere be such?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nDo we admit the existence of opinion?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nUndoubtedly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAs being the same with knowledge, or another faculty?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnother faculty.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen opinion and knowledge have to do with different kinds of matter\ncorresponding to this difference of faculties?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd knowledge is relative to being and knows being. But before I proceed\nfurther I will make a division.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat division?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI will begin by placing faculties in a class by themselves: they are powers in\nus, and in all other things, by which we do as we do. Sight and hearing, for\nexample, I should call faculties. Have I clearly explained the class which I\nmean?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, I quite understand.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen let me tell you my view about them. I do not see them, and therefore the\ndistinctions of figure, colour, and the like, which enable me to discern the\ndifferences of some things, do not apply to them. In speaking of a faculty I\nthink only of its sphere and its result; and that which has the same sphere and\nthe same result I call the same faculty, but that which has another sphere and\nanother result I call different. Would that be your way of speaking?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd will you be so very good as to answer one more question? Would you say that\nknowledge is a faculty, or in what class would you place it?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly knowledge is a faculty, and the mightiest of all faculties.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd is opinion also a faculty?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly, he said; for opinion is that with which we are able to form an\nopinion.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd yet you were acknowledging a little while ago that knowledge is not the\nsame as opinion?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhy, yes, he said: how can any reasonable being ever identify that which is\ninfallible with that which errs?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAn excellent answer, proving, I said, that we are quite conscious of a\ndistinction between them.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen knowledge and opinion having distinct powers have also distinct spheres or\nsubject-matters?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat is certain.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBeing is the sphere or subject-matter of knowledge, and knowledge is to know\nthe nature of being?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd opinion is to have an opinion?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd do we know what we opine? or is the subject-matter of opinion the same as\nthe subject-matter of knowledge?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNay, he replied, that has been already disproven; if difference in faculty\nimplies difference in the sphere or subject-matter, and if, as we were saying,\nopinion and knowledge are distinct faculties, then the sphere of knowledge and\nof opinion cannot be the same.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen if being is the subject-matter of knowledge, something else must be the\nsubject-matter of opinion?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, something else.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWell then, is not-being the subject-matter of opinion? or, rather, how can\nthere be an opinion at all about not-being? Reflect: when a man has an opinion,\nhas he not an opinion about something? Can he have an opinion which is an\nopinion about nothing?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nImpossible.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHe who has an opinion has an opinion about some one thing?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd not-being is not one thing but, properly speaking, nothing?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nOf not-being, ignorance was assumed to be the necessary correlative; of being,\nknowledge?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen opinion is not concerned either with being or with not-being?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNot with either.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd can therefore neither be ignorance nor knowledge?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat seems to be true.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut is opinion to be sought without and beyond either of them, in a greater\nclearness than knowledge, or in a greater darkness than ignorance?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIn neither.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen I suppose that opinion appears to you to be darker than knowledge, but\nlighter than ignorance?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBoth; and in no small degree.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd also to be within and between them?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen you would infer that opinion is intermediate?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNo question.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut were we not saying before, that if anything appeared to be of a sort which\nis and is not at the same time, that sort of thing would appear also to lie in\nthe interval between pure being and absolute not-being; and that the\ncorresponding faculty is neither knowledge nor ignorance, but will be found in\nthe interval between them?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd in that interval there has now been discovered something which we call\nopinion?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThere has.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen what remains to be discovered is the object which partakes equally of the\nnature of being and not-being, and cannot rightly be termed either, pure and\nsimple; this unknown term, when discovered, we may truly call the subject of\nopinion, and assign each to their proper faculty,\u0026mdash;the extremes to the\nfaculties of the extremes and the mean to the faculty of the mean.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThis being premised, I would ask the gentleman who is of opinion that there is\nno absolute or unchangeable idea of beauty\u0026mdash;in whose opinion the beautiful\nis the manifold\u0026mdash;he, I say, your lover of beautiful sights, who cannot\nbear to be told that the beautiful is one, and the just is one, or that\nanything is one\u0026mdash;to him I would appeal, saying, Will you be so very kind,\nsir, as to tell us whether, of all these beautiful things, there is one which\nwill not be found ugly; or of the just, which will not be found unjust; or of\nthe holy, which will not also be unholy?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNo, he replied; the beautiful will in some point of view be found ugly; and the\nsame is true of the rest.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd may not the many which are doubles be also halves?\u0026mdash;doubles, that is,\nof one thing, and halves of another?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nQuite true.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd things great and small, heavy and light, as they are termed, will not be\ndenoted by these any more than by the opposite names?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue; both these and the opposite names will always attach to all of them.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd can any one of those many things which are called by particular names be\nsaid to be this rather than not to be this?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHe replied: They are like the punning riddles which are asked at feasts or the\nchildren\u0026rsquo;s puzzle about the eunuch aiming at the bat, with what he hit\nhim, as they say in the puzzle, and upon what the bat was sitting. The\nindividual objects of which I am speaking are also a riddle, and have a double\nsense: nor can you fix them in your mind, either as being or not-being, or\nboth, or neither.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen what will you do with them? I said. Can they have a better place than\nbetween being and not-being? For they are clearly not in greater darkness or\nnegation than not-being, or more full of light and existence than being.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat is quite true, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThus then we seem to have discovered that the many ideas which the multitude\nentertain about the beautiful and about all other things are tossing about in\nsome region which is half-way between pure being and pure not-being?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWe have.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes; and we had before agreed that anything of this kind which we might find\nwas to be described as matter of opinion, and not as matter of knowledge; being\nthe intermediate flux which is caught and detained by the intermediate faculty.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nQuite true.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen those who see the many beautiful, and who yet neither see absolute beauty,\nnor can follow any guide who points the way thither; who see the many just, and\nnot absolute justice, and the like,\u0026mdash;such persons may be said to have\nopinion but not knowledge?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat is certain.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut those who see the absolute and eternal and immutable may be said to know,\nand not to have opinion only?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNeither can that be denied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe one love and embrace the subjects of knowledge, the other those of opinion?\nThe latter are the same, as I dare say you will remember, who listened to sweet\nsounds and gazed upon fair colours, but would not tolerate the existence of\nabsolute beauty.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, I remember.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nShall we then be guilty of any impropriety in calling them lovers of opinion\nrather than lovers of wisdom, and will they be very angry with us for thus\ndescribing them?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI shall tell them not to be angry; no man should be angry at what is true.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut those who love the truth in each thing are to be called lovers of wisdom\nand not lovers of opinion.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAssuredly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003c!–end chapter–\u003e\n\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\n\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca id=\"link2H_4_0009\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e BOOK VI.\u003c/h2\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd thus, Glaucon, after the argument has gone a weary way, the true and the\nfalse philosophers have at length appeared in view.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI do not think, he said, that the way could have been shortened.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI suppose not, I said; and yet I believe that we might have had a better view\nof both of them if the discussion could have been confined to this one subject\nand if there were not many other questions awaiting us, which he who desires to\nsee in what respect the life of the just differs from that of the unjust must\nconsider.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd what is the next question? he asked.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nSurely, I said, the one which follows next in order. Inasmuch as philosophers\nonly are able to grasp the eternal and unchangeable, and those who wander in\nthe region of the many and variable are not philosophers, I must ask you which\nof the two classes should be the rulers of our State?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd how can we rightly answer that question?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhichever of the two are best able to guard the laws and institutions of our\nState\u0026mdash;let them be our guardians.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery good.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNeither, I said, can there be any question that the guardian who is to keep\nanything should have eyes rather than no eyes?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThere can be no question of that.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd are not those who are verily and indeed wanting in the knowledge of the\ntrue being of each thing, and who have in their souls no clear pattern, and are\nunable as with a painter\u0026rsquo;s eye to look at the absolute truth and to that\noriginal to repair, and having perfect vision of the other world to order the\nlaws about beauty, goodness, justice in this, if not already ordered, and to\nguard and preserve the order of them\u0026mdash;are not such persons, I ask, simply\nblind?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTruly, he replied, they are much in that condition.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd shall they be our guardians when there are others who, besides being their\nequals in experience and falling short of them in no particular of virtue, also\nknow the very truth of each thing?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThere can be no reason, he said, for rejecting those who have this greatest of\nall great qualities; they must always have the first place unless they fail in\nsome other respect.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nSuppose then, I said, that we determine how far they can unite this and the\nother excellences.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBy all means.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIn the first place, as we began by observing, the nature of the philosopher has\nto be ascertained. We must come to an understanding about him, and, when we\nhave done so, then, if I am not mistaken, we shall also acknowledge that such\nan union of qualities is possible, and that those in whom they are united, and\nthose only, should be rulers in the State.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat do you mean?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nLet us suppose that philosophical minds always love knowledge of a sort which\nshows them the eternal nature not varying from generation and corruption.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAgreed.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd further, I said, let us agree that they are lovers of all true being; there\nis no part whether greater or less, or more or less honourable, which they are\nwilling to renounce; as we said before of the lover and the man of ambition.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd if they are to be what we were describing, is there not another quality\nwhich they should also possess?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat quality?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTruthfulness: they will never intentionally receive into their mind falsehood,\nwhich is their detestation, and they will love the truth.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, that may be safely affirmed of them.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n\u0026lsquo;May be,\u0026rsquo; my friend, I replied, is not the word; say rather\n\u0026lsquo;must be affirmed:\u0026rsquo; for he whose nature is amorous of anything\ncannot help loving all that belongs or is akin to the object of his affections.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nRight, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd is there anything more akin to wisdom than truth?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHow can there be?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCan the same nature be a lover of wisdom and a lover of falsehood?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNever.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe true lover of learning then must from his earliest youth, as far as in him\nlies, desire all truth?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAssuredly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut then again, as we know by experience, he whose desires are strong in one\ndirection will have them weaker in others; they will be like a stream which has\nbeen drawn off into another channel.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHe whose desires are drawn towards knowledge in every form will be absorbed in\nthe pleasures of the soul, and will hardly feel bodily pleasure\u0026mdash;I mean,\nif he be a true philosopher and not a sham one.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat is most certain.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nSuch an one is sure to be temperate and the reverse of covetous; for the\nmotives which make another man desirous of having and spending, have no place\nin his character.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery true.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnother criterion of the philosophical nature has also to be considered.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat is that?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThere should be no secret corner of illiberality; nothing can be more\nantagonistic than meanness to a soul which is ever longing after the whole of\nthings both divine and human.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nMost true, he replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen how can he who has magnificence of mind and is the spectator of all time\nand all existence, think much of human life?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHe cannot.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nOr can such an one account death fearful?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNo indeed.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen the cowardly and mean nature has no part in true philosophy?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly not.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nOr again: can he who is harmoniously constituted, who is not covetous or mean,\nor a boaster, or a coward\u0026mdash;can he, I say, ever be unjust or hard in his\ndealings?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nImpossible.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen you will soon observe whether a man is just and gentle, or rude and\nunsociable; these are the signs which distinguish even in youth the\nphilosophical nature from the unphilosophical.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThere is another point which should be remarked.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat point?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhether he has or has not a pleasure in learning; for no one will love that\nwhich gives him pain, and in which after much toil he makes little progress.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly not.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd again, if he is forgetful and retains nothing of what he learns, will he\nnot be an empty vessel?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat is certain.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nLabouring in vain, he must end in hating himself and his fruitless occupation?\nYes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen a soul which forgets cannot be ranked among genuine philosophic natures;\nwe must insist that the philosopher should have a good memory?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd once more, the inharmonious and unseemly nature can only tend to\ndisproportion?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nUndoubtedly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd do you consider truth to be akin to proportion or to disproportion?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTo proportion.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen, besides other qualities, we must try to find a naturally\nwell-proportioned and gracious mind, which will move spontaneously towards the\ntrue being of everything.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWell, and do not all these qualities, which we have been enumerating, go\ntogether, and are they not, in a manner, necessary to a soul, which is to have\na full and perfect participation of being?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThey are absolutely necessary, he replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd must not that be a blameless study which he only can pursue who has the\ngift of a good memory, and is quick to learn,\u0026mdash;noble, gracious, the friend\nof truth, justice, courage, temperance, who are his kindred?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe god of jealousy himself, he said, could find no fault with such a study.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd to men like him, I said, when perfected by years and education, and to\nthese only you will entrust the State.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHere Adeimantus interposed and said: To these statements, Socrates, no one can\noffer a reply; but when you talk in this way, a strange feeling passes over the\nminds of your hearers: They fancy that they are led astray a little at each\nstep in the argument, owing to their own want of skill in asking and answering\nquestions; these littles accumulate, and at the end of the discussion they are\nfound to have sustained a mighty overthrow and all their former notions appear\nto be turned upside down. And as unskilful players of draughts are at last shut\nup by their more skilful adversaries and have no piece to move, so they too\nfind themselves shut up at last; for they have nothing to say in this new game\nof which words are the counters; and yet all the time they are in the right.\nThe observation is suggested to me by what is now occurring. For any one of us\nmight say, that although in words he is not able to meet you at each step of\nthe argument, he sees as a fact that the votaries of philosophy, when they\ncarry on the study, not only in youth as a part of education, but as the\npursuit of their maturer years, most of them become strange monsters, not to\nsay utter rogues, and that those who may be considered the best of them are\nmade useless to the world by the very study which you extol.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWell, and do you think that those who say so are wrong?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI cannot tell, he replied; but I should like to know what is your opinion.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHear my answer; I am of opinion that they are quite right.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen how can you be justified in saying that cities will not cease from evil\nuntil philosophers rule in them, when philosophers are acknowledged by us to be\nof no use to them?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYou ask a question, I said, to which a reply can only be given in a parable.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, Socrates; and that is a way of speaking to which you are not at all\naccustomed, I suppose.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI perceive, I said, that you are vastly amused at having plunged me into such a\nhopeless discussion; but now hear the parable, and then you will be still more\namused at the meagreness of my imagination: for the manner in which the best\nmen are treated in their own States is so grievous that no single thing on\nearth is comparable to it; and therefore, if I am to plead their cause, I must\nhave recourse to fiction, and put together a figure made up of many things,\nlike the fabulous unions of goats and stags which are found in pictures.\nImagine then a fleet or a ship in which there is a captain who is taller and\nstronger than any of the crew, but he is a little deaf and has a similar\ninfirmity in sight, and his knowledge of navigation is not much better. The\nsailors are quarrelling with one another about the steering\u0026mdash;every one is\nof opinion that he has a right to steer, though he has never learned the art of\nnavigation and cannot tell who taught him or when he learned, and will further\nassert that it cannot be taught, and they are ready to cut in pieces any one\nwho says the contrary. They throng about the captain, begging and praying him\nto commit the helm to them; and if at any time they do not prevail, but others\nare preferred to them, they kill the others or throw them overboard, and having\nfirst chained up the noble captain\u0026rsquo;s senses with drink or some narcotic\ndrug, they mutiny and take possession of the ship and make free with the\nstores; thus, eating and drinking, they proceed on their voyage in such manner\nas might be expected of them. Him who is their partisan and cleverly aids them\nin their plot for getting the ship out of the captain\u0026rsquo;s hands into their\nown whether by force or persuasion, they compliment with the name of sailor,\npilot, able seaman, and abuse the other sort of man, whom they call a\ngood-for-nothing; but that the true pilot must pay attention to the year and\nseasons and sky and stars and winds, and whatever else belongs to his art, if\nhe intends to be really qualified for the command of a ship, and that he must\nand will be the steerer, whether other people like or not\u0026mdash;the possibility\nof this union of authority with the steerer\u0026rsquo;s art has never seriously\nentered into their thoughts or been made part of their calling. Now in vessels\nwhich are in a state of mutiny and by sailors who are mutineers, how will the\ntrue pilot be regarded? Will he not be called by them a prater, a star-gazer, a\ngood-for-nothing?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nOf course, said Adeimantus.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen you will hardly need, I said, to hear the interpretation of the figure,\nwhich describes the true philosopher in his relation to the State; for you\nunderstand already.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen suppose you now take this parable to the gentleman who is surprised at\nfinding that philosophers have no honour in their cities; explain it to him and\ntry to convince him that their having honour would be far more extraordinary.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI will.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nSay to him, that, in deeming the best votaries of philosophy to be useless to\nthe rest of the world, he is right; but also tell him to attribute their\nuselessness to the fault of those who will not use them, and not to themselves.\nThe pilot should not humbly beg the sailors to be commanded by him\u0026mdash;that\nis not the order of nature; neither are \u0026lsquo;the wise to go to the doors of\nthe rich\u0026rsquo;\u0026mdash;the ingenious author of this saying told a lie\u0026mdash;but\nthe truth is, that, when a man is ill, whether he be rich or poor, to the\nphysician he must go, and he who wants to be governed, to him who is able to\ngovern. The ruler who is good for anything ought not to beg his subjects to be\nruled by him; although the present governors of mankind are of a different\nstamp; they may be justly compared to the mutinous sailors, and the true\nhelmsmen to those who are called by them good-for-nothings and star-gazers.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nPrecisely so, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nFor these reasons, and among men like these, philosophy, the noblest pursuit of\nall, is not likely to be much esteemed by those of the opposite faction; not\nthat the greatest and most lasting injury is done to her by her opponents, but\nby her own professing followers, the same of whom you suppose the accuser to\nsay, that the greater number of them are arrant rogues, and the best are\nuseless; in which opinion I agreed.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd the reason why the good are useless has now been explained?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen shall we proceed to show that the corruption of the majority is also\nunavoidable, and that this is not to be laid to the charge of philosophy any\nmore than the other?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBy all means.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd let us ask and answer in turn, first going back to the description of the\ngentle and noble nature. Truth, as you will remember, was his leader, whom he\nfollowed always and in all things; failing in this, he was an impostor, and had\nno part or lot in true philosophy.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, that was said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWell, and is not this one quality, to mention no others, greatly at variance\nwith present notions of him?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd have we not a right to say in his defence, that the true lover of knowledge\nis always striving after being\u0026mdash;that is his nature; he will not rest in\nthe multiplicity of individuals which is an appearance only, but will go\non\u0026mdash;the keen edge will not be blunted, nor the force of his desire abate\nuntil he have attained the knowledge of the true nature of every essence by a\nsympathetic and kindred power in the soul, and by that power drawing near and\nmingling and becoming incorporate with very being, having begotten mind and\ntruth, he will have knowledge and will live and grow truly, and then, and not\ntill then, will he cease from his travail.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNothing, he said, can be more just than such a description of him.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd will the love of a lie be any part of a philosopher\u0026rsquo;s nature? Will he\nnot utterly hate a lie?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHe will.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd when truth is the captain, we cannot suspect any evil of the band which he\nleads?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nImpossible.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nJustice and health of mind will be of the company, and temperance will follow\nafter?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue, he replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNeither is there any reason why I should again set in array the\nphilosopher\u0026rsquo;s virtues, as you will doubtless remember that courage,\nmagnificence, apprehension, memory, were his natural gifts. And you objected\nthat, although no one could deny what I then said, still, if you leave words\nand look at facts, the persons who are thus described are some of them\nmanifestly useless, and the greater number utterly depraved; we were then led\nto enquire into the grounds of these accusations, and have now arrived at the\npoint of asking why are the majority bad, which question of necessity brought\nus back to the examination and definition of the true philosopher.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nExactly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd we have next to consider the corruptions of the philosophic nature, why so\nmany are spoiled and so few escape spoiling\u0026mdash;I am speaking of those who\nwere said to be useless but not wicked\u0026mdash;and, when we have done with them,\nwe will speak of the imitators of philosophy, what manner of men are they who\naspire after a profession which is above them and of which they are unworthy,\nand then, by their manifold inconsistencies, bring upon philosophy, and upon\nall philosophers, that universal reprobation of which we speak.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat are these corruptions? he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI will see if I can explain them to you. Every one will admit that a nature\nhaving in perfection all the qualities which we required in a philosopher, is a\nrare plant which is seldom seen among men.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nRare indeed.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd what numberless and powerful causes tend to destroy these rare natures!\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat causes?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIn the first place there are their own virtues, their courage, temperance, and\nthe rest of them, every one of which praiseworthy qualities (and this is a most\nsingular circumstance) destroys and distracts from philosophy the soul which is\nthe possessor of them.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat is very singular, he replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen there are all the ordinary goods of life\u0026mdash;beauty, wealth, strength,\nrank, and great connections in the State\u0026mdash;you understand the sort of\nthings\u0026mdash;these also have a corrupting and distracting effect.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI understand; but I should like to know more precisely what you mean about\nthem.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nGrasp the truth as a whole, I said, and in the right way; you will then have no\ndifficulty in apprehending the preceding remarks, and they will no longer\nappear strange to you.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd how am I to do so? he asked.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhy, I said, we know that all germs or seeds, whether vegetable or animal, when\nthey fail to meet with proper nutriment or climate or soil, in proportion to\ntheir vigour, are all the more sensitive to the want of a suitable environment,\nfor evil is a greater enemy to what is good than to what is not.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery true.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThere is reason in supposing that the finest natures, when under alien\nconditions, receive more injury than the inferior, because the contrast is\ngreater.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd may we not say, Adeimantus, that the most gifted minds, when they are\nill-educated, become pre-eminently bad? Do not great crimes and the spirit of\npure evil spring out of a fulness of nature ruined by education rather than\nfrom any inferiority, whereas weak natures are scarcely capable of any very\ngreat good or very great evil?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThere I think that you are right.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd our philosopher follows the same analogy\u0026mdash;he is like a plant which,\nhaving proper nurture, must necessarily grow and mature into all virtue, but,\nif sown and planted in an alien soil, becomes the most noxious of all weeds,\nunless he be preserved by some divine power. Do you really think, as people so\noften say, that our youth are corrupted by Sophists, or that private teachers\nof the art corrupt them in any degree worth speaking of? Are not the public who\nsay these things the greatest of all Sophists? And do they not educate to\nperfection young and old, men and women alike, and fashion them after their own\nhearts?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhen is this accomplished? he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhen they meet together, and the world sits down at an assembly, or in a court\nof law, or a theatre, or a camp, or in any other popular resort, and there is a\ngreat uproar, and they praise some things which are being said or done, and\nblame other things, equally exaggerating both, shouting and clapping their\nhands, and the echo of the rocks and the place in which they are assembled\nredoubles the sound of the praise or blame\u0026mdash;at such a time will not a\nyoung man\u0026rsquo;s heart, as they say, leap within him? Will any private\ntraining enable him to stand firm against the overwhelming flood of popular\nopinion? or will he be carried away by the stream? Will he not have the notions\nof good and evil which the public in general have\u0026mdash;he will do as they do,\nand as they are, such will he be?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, Socrates; necessity will compel him.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd yet, I said, there is a still greater necessity, which has not been\nmentioned.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat is that?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe gentle force of attainder or confiscation or death, which, as you are\naware, these new Sophists and educators, who are the public, apply when their\nwords are powerless.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIndeed they do; and in right good earnest.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNow what opinion of any other Sophist, or of any private person, can be\nexpected to overcome in such an unequal contest?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNone, he replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNo, indeed, I said, even to make the attempt is a great piece of folly; there\nneither is, nor has been, nor is ever likely to be, any different type of\ncharacter which has had no other training in virtue but that which is supplied\nby public opinion\u0026mdash;I speak, my friend, of human virtue only; what is more\nthan human, as the proverb says, is not included: for I would not have you\nignorant that, in the present evil state of governments, whatever is saved and\ncomes to good is saved by the power of God, as we may truly say.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI quite assent, he replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen let me crave your assent also to a further observation.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat are you going to say?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhy, that all those mercenary individuals, whom the many call Sophists and whom\nthey deem to be their adversaries, do, in fact, teach nothing but the opinion\nof the many, that is to say, the opinions of their assemblies; and this is\ntheir wisdom. I might compare them to a man who should study the tempers and\ndesires of a mighty strong beast who is fed by him\u0026mdash;he would learn how to\napproach and handle him, also at what times and from what causes he is\ndangerous or the reverse, and what is the meaning of his several cries, and by\nwhat sounds, when another utters them, he is soothed or infuriated; and you may\nsuppose further, that when, by continually attending upon him, he has become\nperfect in all this, he calls his knowledge wisdom, and makes of it a system or\nart, which he proceeds to teach, although he has no real notion of what he\nmeans by the principles or passions of which he is speaking, but calls this\nhonourable and that dishonourable, or good or evil, or just or unjust, all in\naccordance with the tastes and tempers of the great brute. Good he pronounces\nto be that in which the beast delights and evil to be that which he dislikes;\nand he can give no other account of them except that the just and noble are the\nnecessary, having never himself seen, and having no power of explaining to\nothers the nature of either, or the difference between them, which is immense.\nBy heaven, would not such an one be a rare educator?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIndeed he would.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd in what way does he who thinks that wisdom is the discernment of the\ntempers and tastes of the motley multitude, whether in painting or music, or,\nfinally, in politics, differ from him whom I have been describing? For when a\nman consorts with the many, and exhibits to them his poem or other work of art\nor the service which he has done the State, making them his judges when he is\nnot obliged, the so-called necessity of Diomede will oblige him to produce\nwhatever they praise. And yet the reasons are utterly ludicrous which they give\nin confirmation of their own notions about the honourable and good. Did you\never hear any of them which were not?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNo, nor am I likely to hear.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYou recognise the truth of what I have been saying? Then let me ask you to\nconsider further whether the world will ever be induced to believe in the\nexistence of absolute beauty rather than of the many beautiful, or of the\nabsolute in each kind rather than of the many in each kind?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly not.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen the world cannot possibly be a philosopher?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nImpossible.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd therefore philosophers must inevitably fall under the censure of the world?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThey must.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd of individuals who consort with the mob and seek to please them?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat is evident.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen, do you see any way in which the philosopher can be preserved in his\ncalling to the end? and remember what we were saying of him, that he was to\nhave quickness and memory and courage and magnificence\u0026mdash;these were\nadmitted by us to be the true philosopher\u0026rsquo;s gifts.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWill not such an one from his early childhood be in all things first among all,\nespecially if his bodily endowments are like his mental ones?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd his friends and fellow-citizens will want to use him as he gets older for\ntheir own purposes?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNo question.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nFalling at his feet, they will make requests to him and do him honour and\nflatter him, because they want to get into their hands now, the power which he\nwill one day possess.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat often happens, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd what will a man such as he is be likely to do under such circumstances,\nespecially if he be a citizen of a great city, rich and noble, and a tall\nproper youth? Will he not be full of boundless aspirations, and fancy himself\nable to manage the affairs of Hellenes and of barbarians, and having got such\nnotions into his head will he not dilate and elevate himself in the fulness of\nvain pomp and senseless pride?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTo be sure he will.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNow, when he is in this state of mind, if some one gently comes to him and\ntells him that he is a fool and must get understanding, which can only be got\nby slaving for it, do you think that, under such adverse circumstances, he will\nbe easily induced to listen?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nFar otherwise.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd even if there be some one who through inherent goodness or natural\nreasonableness has had his eyes opened a little and is humbled and taken\ncaptive by philosophy, how will his friends behave when they think that they\nare likely to lose the advantage which they were hoping to reap from his\ncompanionship? Will they not do and say anything to prevent him from yielding\nto his better nature and to render his teacher powerless, using to this end\nprivate intrigues as well as public prosecutions?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThere can be no doubt of it.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd how can one who is thus circumstanced ever become a philosopher?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nImpossible.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen were we not right in saying that even the very qualities which make a man\na philosopher may, if he be ill-educated, divert him from philosophy, no less\nthan riches and their accompaniments and the other so-called goods of life?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWe were quite right.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThus, my excellent friend, is brought about all that ruin and failure which I\nhave been describing of the natures best adapted to the best of all pursuits;\nthey are natures which we maintain to be rare at any time; this being the class\nout of which come the men who are the authors of the greatest evil to States\nand individuals; and also of the greatest good when the tide carries them in\nthat direction; but a small man never was the doer of any great thing either to\nindividuals or to States.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat is most true, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd so philosophy is left desolate, with her marriage rite incomplete: for her\nown have fallen away and forsaken her, and while they are leading a false and\nunbecoming life, other unworthy persons, seeing that she has no kinsmen to be\nher protectors, enter in and dishonour her; and fasten upon her the reproaches\nwhich, as you say, her reprovers utter, who affirm of her votaries that some\nare good for nothing, and that the greater number deserve the severest\npunishment.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat is certainly what people say.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes; and what else would you expect, I said, when you think of the puny\ncreatures who, seeing this land open to them\u0026mdash;a land well stocked with\nfair names and showy titles\u0026mdash;like prisoners running out of prison into a\nsanctuary, take a leap out of their trades into philosophy; those who do so\nbeing probably the cleverest hands at their own miserable crafts? For, although\nphilosophy be in this evil case, still there remains a dignity about her which\nis not to be found in the arts. And many are thus attracted by her whose\nnatures are imperfect and whose souls are maimed and disfigured by their\nmeannesses, as their bodies are by their trades and crafts. Is not this\nunavoidable?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAre they not exactly like a bald little tinker who has just got out of durance\nand come into a fortune; he takes a bath and puts on a new coat, and is decked\nout as a bridegroom going to marry his master\u0026rsquo;s daughter, who is left\npoor and desolate?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nA most exact parallel.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat will be the issue of such marriages? Will they not be vile and bastard?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThere can be no question of it.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd when persons who are unworthy of education approach philosophy and make an\nalliance with her who is in a rank above them what sort of ideas and opinions\nare likely to be generated? Will they not be sophisms captivating to the ear,\nhaving nothing in them genuine, or worthy of or akin to true wisdom?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNo doubt, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen, Adeimantus, I said, the worthy disciples of philosophy will be but a\nsmall remnant: perchance some noble and well-educated person, detained by exile\nin her service, who in the absence of corrupting influences remains devoted to\nher; or some lofty soul born in a mean city, the politics of which he contemns\nand neglects; and there may be a gifted few who leave the arts, which they\njustly despise, and come to her;\u0026mdash;or peradventure there are some who are\nrestrained by our friend Theages\u0026rsquo; bridle; for everything in the life of\nTheages conspired to divert him from philosophy; but ill-health kept him away\nfrom politics. My own case of the internal sign is hardly worth mentioning, for\nrarely, if ever, has such a monitor been given to any other man. Those who\nbelong to this small class have tasted how sweet and blessed a possession\nphilosophy is, and have also seen enough of the madness of the multitude; and\nthey know that no politician is honest, nor is there any champion of justice at\nwhose side they may fight and be saved. Such an one may be compared to a man\nwho has fallen among wild beasts\u0026mdash;he will not join in the wickedness of\nhis fellows, but neither is he able singly to resist all their fierce natures,\nand therefore seeing that he would be of no use to the State or to his friends,\nand reflecting that he would have to throw away his life without doing any good\neither to himself or others, he holds his peace, and goes his own way. He is\nlike one who, in the storm of dust and sleet which the driving wind hurries\nalong, retires under the shelter of a wall; and seeing the rest of mankind full\nof wickedness, he is content, if only he can live his own life and be pure from\nevil or unrighteousness, and depart in peace and good-will, with bright hopes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said, and he will have done a great work before he departs.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nA great work\u0026mdash;yes; but not the greatest, unless he find a State suitable\nto him; for in a State which is suitable to him, he will have a larger growth\nand be the saviour of his country, as well as of himself.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe causes why philosophy is in such an evil name have now been sufficiently\nexplained: the injustice of the charges against her has been shown\u0026mdash;is\nthere anything more which you wish to say?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNothing more on that subject, he replied; but I should like to know which of\nthe governments now existing is in your opinion the one adapted to her.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNot any of them, I said; and that is precisely the accusation which I bring\nagainst them\u0026mdash;not one of them is worthy of the philosophic nature, and\nhence that nature is warped and estranged;\u0026mdash;as the exotic seed which is\nsown in a foreign land becomes denaturalized, and is wont to be overpowered and\nto lose itself in the new soil, even so this growth of philosophy, instead of\npersisting, degenerates and receives another character. But if philosophy ever\nfinds in the State that perfection which she herself is, then will be seen that\nshe is in truth divine, and that all other things, whether natures of men or\ninstitutions, are but human;\u0026mdash;and now, I know, that you are going to ask,\nWhat that State is:\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNo, he said; there you are wrong, for I was going to ask another\nquestion\u0026mdash;whether it is the State of which we are the founders and\ninventors, or some other?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, I replied, ours in most respects; but you may remember my saying before,\nthat some living authority would always be required in the State having the\nsame idea of the constitution which guided you when as legislator you were\nlaying down the laws.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat was said, he replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, but not in a satisfactory manner; you frightened us by interposing\nobjections, which certainly showed that the discussion would be long and\ndifficult; and what still remains is the reverse of easy.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat is there remaining?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe question how the study of philosophy may be so ordered as not to be the\nruin of the State: All great attempts are attended with risk; \u0026lsquo;hard is\nthe good,\u0026rsquo; as men say.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nStill, he said, let the point be cleared up, and the enquiry will then be\ncomplete.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI shall not be hindered, I said, by any want of will, but, if at all, by a want\nof power: my zeal you may see for yourselves; and please to remark in what I am\nabout to say how boldly and unhesitatingly I declare that States should pursue\nphilosophy, not as they do now, but in a different spirit.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIn what manner?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAt present, I said, the students of philosophy are quite young; beginning when\nthey are hardly past childhood, they devote only the time saved from\nmoneymaking and housekeeping to such pursuits; and even those of them who are\nreputed to have most of the philosophic spirit, when they come within sight of\nthe great difficulty of the subject, I mean dialectic, take themselves off. In\nafter life when invited by some one else, they may, perhaps, go and hear a\nlecture, and about this they make much ado, for philosophy is not considered by\nthem to be their proper business: at last, when they grow old, in most cases\nthey are extinguished more truly than Heracleitus\u0026rsquo; sun, inasmuch as they\nnever light up again. (Heraclitus said that the sun was extinguished every\nevening and relighted every morning.)\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut what ought to be their course?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nJust the opposite. In childhood and youth their study, and what philosophy they\nlearn, should be suited to their tender years: during this period while they\nare growing up towards manhood, the chief and special care should be given to\ntheir bodies that they may have them to use in the service of philosophy; as\nlife advances and the intellect begins to mature, let them increase the\ngymnastics of the soul; but when the strength of our citizens fails and is past\ncivil and military duties, then let them range at will and engage in no serious\nlabour, as we intend them to live happily here, and to crown this life with a\nsimilar happiness in another.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHow truly in earnest you are, Socrates! he said; I am sure of that; and yet\nmost of your hearers, if I am not mistaken, are likely to be still more earnest\nin their opposition to you, and will never be convinced; Thrasymachus least of\nall.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nDo not make a quarrel, I said, between Thrasymachus and me, who have recently\nbecome friends, although, indeed, we were never enemies; for I shall go on\nstriving to the utmost until I either convert him and other men, or do\nsomething which may profit them against the day when they live again, and hold\nthe like discourse in another state of existence.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYou are speaking of a time which is not very near.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nRather, I replied, of a time which is as nothing in comparison with eternity.\nNevertheless, I do not wonder that the many refuse to believe; for they have\nnever seen that of which we are now speaking realized; they have seen only a\nconventional imitation of philosophy, consisting of words artificially brought\ntogether, not like these of ours having a natural unity. But a human being who\nin word and work is perfectly moulded, as far as he can be, into the proportion\nand likeness of virtue\u0026mdash;such a man ruling in a city which bears the same\nimage, they have never yet seen, neither one nor many of them\u0026mdash;do you\nthink that they ever did?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNo indeed.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNo, my friend, and they have seldom, if ever, heard free and noble sentiments;\nsuch as men utter when they are earnestly and by every means in their power\nseeking after truth for the sake of knowledge, while they look coldly on the\nsubtleties of controversy, of which the end is opinion and strife, whether they\nmeet with them in the courts of law or in society.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThey are strangers, he said, to the words of which you speak.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd this was what we foresaw, and this was the reason why truth forced us to\nadmit, not without fear and hesitation, that neither cities nor States nor\nindividuals will ever attain perfection until the small class of philosophers\nwhom we termed useless but not corrupt are providentially compelled, whether\nthey will or not, to take care of the State, and until a like necessity be laid\non the State to obey them; or until kings, or if not kings, the sons of kings\nor princes, are divinely inspired with a true love of true philosophy. That\neither or both of these alternatives are impossible, I see no reason to affirm:\nif they were so, we might indeed be justly ridiculed as dreamers and\nvisionaries. Am I not right?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nQuite right.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIf then, in the countless ages of the past, or at the present hour in some\nforeign clime which is far away and beyond our ken, the perfected philosopher\nis or has been or hereafter shall be compelled by a superior power to have the\ncharge of the State, we are ready to assert to the death, that this our\nconstitution has been, and is\u0026mdash;yea, and will be whenever the Muse of\nPhilosophy is queen. There is no impossibility in all this; that there is a\ndifficulty, we acknowledge ourselves.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nMy opinion agrees with yours, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut do you mean to say that this is not the opinion of the multitude?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI should imagine not, he replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nO my friend, I said, do not attack the multitude: they will change their minds,\nif, not in an aggressive spirit, but gently and with the view of soothing them\nand removing their dislike of over-education, you show them your philosophers\nas they really are and describe as you were just now doing their character and\nprofession, and then mankind will see that he of whom you are speaking is not\nsuch as they supposed\u0026mdash;if they view him in this new light, they will\nsurely change their notion of him, and answer in another strain. Who can be at\nenmity with one who loves them, who that is himself gentle and free from envy\nwill be jealous of one in whom there is no jealousy? Nay, let me answer for\nyou, that in a few this harsh temper may be found but not in the majority of\nmankind.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI quite agree with you, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd do you not also think, as I do, that the harsh feeling which the many\nentertain towards philosophy originates in the pretenders, who rush in\nuninvited, and are always abusing them, and finding fault with them, who make\npersons instead of things the theme of their conversation? and nothing can be\nmore unbecoming in philosophers than this.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIt is most unbecoming.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nFor he, Adeimantus, whose mind is fixed upon true being, has surely no time to\nlook down upon the affairs of earth, or to be filled with malice and envy,\ncontending against men; his eye is ever directed towards things fixed and\nimmutable, which he sees neither injuring nor injured by one another, but all\nin order moving according to reason; these he imitates, and to these he will,\nas far as he can, conform himself. Can a man help imitating that with which he\nholds reverential converse?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nImpossible.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd the philosopher holding converse with the divine order, becomes orderly and\ndivine, as far as the nature of man allows; but like every one else, he will\nsuffer from detraction.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nOf course.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd if a necessity be laid upon him of fashioning, not only himself, but human\nnature generally, whether in States or individuals, into that which he beholds\nelsewhere, will he, think you, be an unskilful artificer of justice,\ntemperance, and every civil virtue?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnything but unskilful.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd if the world perceives that what we are saying about him is the truth, will\nthey be angry with philosophy? Will they disbelieve us, when we tell them that\nno State can be happy which is not designed by artists who imitate the heavenly\npattern?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThey will not be angry if they understand, he said. But how will they draw out\nthe plan of which you are speaking?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThey will begin by taking the State and the manners of men, from which, as from\na tablet, they will rub out the picture, and leave a clean surface. This is no\neasy task. But whether easy or not, herein will lie the difference between them\nand every other legislator,\u0026mdash;they will have nothing to do either with\nindividual or State, and will inscribe no laws, until they have either found,\nor themselves made, a clean surface.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThey will be very right, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHaving effected this, they will proceed to trace an outline of the\nconstitution?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNo doubt.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd when they are filling in the work, as I conceive, they will often turn\ntheir eyes upwards and downwards: I mean that they will first look at absolute\njustice and beauty and temperance, and again at the human copy; and will mingle\nand temper the various elements of life into the image of a man; and this they\nwill conceive according to that other image, which, when existing among men,\nHomer calls the form and likeness of God.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery true, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd one feature they will erase, and another they will put in, until they have\nmade the ways of men, as far as possible, agreeable to the ways of God?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIndeed, he said, in no way could they make a fairer picture.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd now, I said, are we beginning to persuade those whom you described as\nrushing at us with might and main, that the painter of constitutions is such an\none as we are praising; at whom they were so very indignant because to his\nhands we committed the State; and are they growing a little calmer at what they\nhave just heard?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nMuch calmer, if there is any sense in them.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhy, where can they still find any ground for objection? Will they doubt that\nthe philosopher is a lover of truth and being?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThey would not be so unreasonable.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nOr that his nature, being such as we have delineated, is akin to the highest\ngood?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNeither can they doubt this.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut again, will they tell us that such a nature, placed under favourable\ncircumstances, will not be perfectly good and wise if any ever was? Or will\nthey prefer those whom we have rejected?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nSurely not.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen will they still be angry at our saying, that, until philosophers bear\nrule, States and individuals will have no rest from evil, nor will this our\nimaginary State ever be realized?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI think that they will be less angry.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nShall we assume that they are not only less angry but quite gentle, and that\nthey have been converted and for very shame, if for no other reason, cannot\nrefuse to come to terms?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBy all means, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen let us suppose that the reconciliation has been effected. Will any one\ndeny the other point, that there may be sons of kings or princes who are by\nnature philosophers?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nSurely no man, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd when they have come into being will any one say that they must of necessity\nbe destroyed; that they can hardly be saved is not denied even by us; but that\nin the whole course of ages no single one of them can escape\u0026mdash;who will\nventure to affirm this?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWho indeed!\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut, said I, one is enough; let there be one man who has a city obedient to his\nwill, and he might bring into existence the ideal polity about which the world\nis so incredulous.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, one is enough.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe ruler may impose the laws and institutions which we have been describing,\nand the citizens may possibly be willing to obey them?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd that others should approve, of what we approve, is no miracle or\nimpossibility?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI think not.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut we have sufficiently shown, in what has preceded, that all this, if only\npossible, is assuredly for the best.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWe have.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd now we say not only that our laws, if they could be enacted, would be for\nthe best, but also that the enactment of them, though difficult, is not\nimpossible.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery good.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd so with pain and toil we have reached the end of one subject, but more\nremains to be discussed;\u0026mdash;how and by what studies and pursuits will the\nsaviours of the constitution be created, and at what ages are they to apply\nthemselves to their several studies?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI omitted the troublesome business of the possession of women, and the\nprocreation of children, and the appointment of the rulers, because I knew that\nthe perfect State would be eyed with jealousy and was difficult of attainment;\nbut that piece of cleverness was not of much service to me, for I had to\ndiscuss them all the same. The women and children are now disposed of, but the\nother question of the rulers must be investigated from the very beginning. We\nwere saying, as you will remember, that they were to be lovers of their\ncountry, tried by the test of pleasures and pains, and neither in hardships,\nnor in dangers, nor at any other critical moment were to lose their\npatriotism\u0026mdash;he was to be rejected who failed, but he who always came forth\npure, like gold tried in the refiner\u0026rsquo;s fire, was to be made a ruler, and\nto receive honours and rewards in life and after death. This was the sort of\nthing which was being said, and then the argument turned aside and veiled her\nface; not liking to stir the question which has now arisen.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI perfectly remember, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, my friend, I said, and I then shrank from hazarding the bold word; but now\nlet me dare to say\u0026mdash;that the perfect guardian must be a philosopher.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said, let that be affirmed.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd do not suppose that there will be many of them; for the gifts which were\ndeemed by us to be essential rarely grow together; they are mostly found in\nshreds and patches.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat do you mean? he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYou are aware, I replied, that quick intelligence, memory, sagacity,\ncleverness, and similar qualities, do not often grow together, and that persons\nwho possess them and are at the same time high-spirited and magnanimous are not\nso constituted by nature as to live orderly and in a peaceful and settled\nmanner; they are driven any way by their impulses, and all solid principle goes\nout of them.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery true, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nOn the other hand, those steadfast natures which can better be depended upon,\nwhich in a battle are impregnable to fear and immovable, are equally immovable\nwhen there is anything to be learned; they are always in a torpid state, and\nare apt to yawn and go to sleep over any intellectual toil.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nQuite true.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd yet we were saying that both qualities were necessary in those to whom the\nhigher education is to be imparted, and who are to share in any office or\ncommand.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd will they be a class which is rarely found?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, indeed.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen the aspirant must not only be tested in those labours and dangers and\npleasures which we mentioned before, but there is another kind of probation\nwhich we did not mention\u0026mdash;he must be exercised also in many kinds of\nknowledge, to see whether the soul will be able to endure the highest of all,\nor will faint under them, as in any other studies and exercises.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said, you are quite right in testing him. But what do you mean by the\nhighest of all knowledge?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYou may remember, I said, that we divided the soul into three parts; and\ndistinguished the several natures of justice, temperance, courage, and wisdom?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIndeed, he said, if I had forgotten, I should not deserve to hear more.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd do you remember the word of caution which preceded the discussion of them?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTo what do you refer?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWe were saying, if I am not mistaken, that he who wanted to see them in their\nperfect beauty must take a longer and more circuitous way, at the end of which\nthey would appear; but that we could add on a popular exposition of them on a\nlevel with the discussion which had preceded. And you replied that such an\nexposition would be enough for you, and so the enquiry was continued in what to\nme seemed to be a very inaccurate manner; whether you were satisfied or not, it\nis for you to say.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said, I thought and the others thought that you gave us a fair measure\nof truth.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut, my friend, I said, a measure of such things which in any degree falls\nshort of the whole truth is not fair measure; for nothing imperfect is the\nmeasure of anything, although persons are too apt to be contented and think\nthat they need search no further.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNot an uncommon case when people are indolent.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, I said; and there cannot be any worse fault in a guardian of the State and\nof the laws.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe guardian then, I said, must be required to take the longer circuit, and\ntoil at learning as well as at gymnastics, or he will never reach the highest\nknowledge of all which, as we were just now saying, is his proper calling.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat, he said, is there a knowledge still higher than this\u0026mdash;higher than\njustice and the other virtues?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, I said, there is. And of the virtues too we must behold not the outline\nmerely, as at present\u0026mdash;nothing short of the most finished picture should\nsatisfy us. When little things are elaborated with an infinity of pains, in\norder that they may appear in their full beauty and utmost clearness, how\nridiculous that we should not think the highest truths worthy of attaining the\nhighest accuracy!\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nA right noble thought; but do you suppose that we shall refrain from asking you\nwhat is this highest knowledge?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNay, I said, ask if you will; but I am certain that you have heard the answer\nmany times, and now you either do not understand me or, as I rather think, you\nare disposed to be troublesome; for you have often been told that the idea of\ngood is the highest knowledge, and that all other things become useful and\nadvantageous only by their use of this. You can hardly be ignorant that of this\nI was about to speak, concerning which, as you have often heard me say, we know\nso little; and, without which, any other knowledge or possession of any kind\nwill profit us nothing. Do you think that the possession of all other things is\nof any value if we do not possess the good? or the knowledge of all other\nthings if we have no knowledge of beauty and goodness?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAssuredly not.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYou are further aware that most people affirm pleasure to be the good, but the\nfiner sort of wits say it is knowledge?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd you are aware too that the latter cannot explain what they mean by\nknowledge, but are obliged after all to say knowledge of the good?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHow ridiculous!\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, I said, that they should begin by reproaching us with our ignorance of the\ngood, and then presume our knowledge of it\u0026mdash;for the good they define to be\nknowledge of the good, just as if we understood them when they use the term\n\u0026lsquo;good\u0026rsquo;\u0026mdash;this is of course ridiculous.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nMost true, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd those who make pleasure their good are in equal perplexity; for they are\ncompelled to admit that there are bad pleasures as well as good.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd therefore to acknowledge that bad and good are the same?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThere can be no doubt about the numerous difficulties in which this question is\ninvolved.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThere can be none.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nFurther, do we not see that many are willing to do or to have or to seem to be\nwhat is just and honourable without the reality; but no one is satisfied with\nthe appearance of good\u0026mdash;the reality is what they seek; in the case of the\ngood, appearance is despised by every one.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery true, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nOf this then, which every soul of man pursues and makes the end of all his\nactions, having a presentiment that there is such an end, and yet hesitating\nbecause neither knowing the nature nor having the same assurance of this as of\nother things, and therefore losing whatever good there is in other\nthings,\u0026mdash;of a principle such and so great as this ought the best men in\nour State, to whom everything is entrusted, to be in the darkness of ignorance?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly not, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI am sure, I said, that he who does not know how the beautiful and the just are\nlikewise good will be but a sorry guardian of them; and I suspect that no one\nwho is ignorant of the good will have a true knowledge of them.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat, he said, is a shrewd suspicion of yours.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd if we only have a guardian who has this knowledge our State will be\nperfectly ordered?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nOf course, he replied; but I wish that you would tell me whether you conceive\nthis supreme principle of the good to be knowledge or pleasure, or different\nfrom either?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAye, I said, I knew all along that a fastidious gentleman like you would not be\ncontented with the thoughts of other people about these matters.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue, Socrates; but I must say that one who like you has passed a lifetime in\nthe study of philosophy should not be always repeating the opinions of others,\nand never telling his own.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWell, but has any one a right to say positively what he does not know?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNot, he said, with the assurance of positive certainty; he has no right to do\nthat: but he may say what he thinks, as a matter of opinion.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd do you not know, I said, that all mere opinions are bad, and the best of\nthem blind? You would not deny that those who have any true notion without\nintelligence are only like blind men who feel their way along the road?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery true.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd do you wish to behold what is blind and crooked and base, when others will\ntell you of brightness and beauty?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nStill, I must implore you, Socrates, said Glaucon, not to turn away just as you\nare reaching the goal; if you will only give such an explanation of the good as\nyou have already given of justice and temperance and the other virtues, we\nshall be satisfied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, my friend, and I shall be at least equally satisfied, but I cannot help\nfearing that I shall fail, and that my indiscreet zeal will bring ridicule upon\nme. No, sweet sirs, let us not at present ask what is the actual nature of the\ngood, for to reach what is now in my thoughts would be an effort too great for\nme. But of the child of the good who is likest him, I would fain speak, if I\ncould be sure that you wished to hear\u0026mdash;otherwise, not.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBy all means, he said, tell us about the child, and you shall remain in our\ndebt for the account of the parent.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI do indeed wish, I replied, that I could pay, and you receive, the account of\nthe parent, and not, as now, of the offspring only; take, however, this latter\nby way of interest, and at the same time have a care that I do not render a\nfalse account, although I have no intention of deceiving you.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, we will take all the care that we can: proceed.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, I said, but I must first come to an understanding with you, and remind you\nof what I have mentioned in the course of this discussion, and at many other\ntimes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe old story, that there is a many beautiful and a many good, and so of other\nthings which we describe and define; to all of them the term \u0026lsquo;many\u0026rsquo;\nis applied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd there is an absolute beauty and an absolute good, and of other things to\nwhich the term \u0026lsquo;many\u0026rsquo; is applied there is an absolute; for they may\nbe brought under a single idea, which is called the essence of each.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery true.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe many, as we say, are seen but not known, and the ideas are known but not\nseen.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nExactly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd what is the organ with which we see the visible things?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe sight, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd with the hearing, I said, we hear, and with the other senses perceive the\nother objects of sense?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut have you remarked that sight is by far the most costly and complex piece of\nworkmanship which the artificer of the senses ever contrived?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNo, I never have, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen reflect; has the ear or voice need of any third or additional nature in\norder that the one may be able to hear and the other to be heard?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNothing of the sort.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNo, indeed, I replied; and the same is true of most, if not all, the other\nsenses\u0026mdash;you would not say that any of them requires such an addition?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly not.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut you see that without the addition of some other nature there is no seeing\nor being seen?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHow do you mean?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nSight being, as I conceive, in the eyes, and he who has eyes wanting to see;\ncolour being also present in them, still unless there be a third nature\nspecially adapted to the purpose, the owner of the eyes will see nothing and\nthe colours will be invisible.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nOf what nature are you speaking?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nOf that which you term light, I replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNoble, then, is the bond which links together sight and visibility, and great\nbeyond other bonds by no small difference of nature; for light is their bond,\nand light is no ignoble thing?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNay, he said, the reverse of ignoble.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd which, I said, of the gods in heaven would you say was the lord of this\nelement? Whose is that light which makes the eye to see perfectly and the\nvisible to appear?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYou mean the sun, as you and all mankind say.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nMay not the relation of sight to this deity be described as follows?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHow?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNeither sight nor the eye in which sight resides is the sun?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNo.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYet of all the organs of sense the eye is the most like the sun?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBy far the most like.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd the power which the eye possesses is a sort of effluence which is dispensed\nfrom the sun?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nExactly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen the sun is not sight, but the author of sight who is recognised by sight?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd this is he whom I call the child of the good, whom the good begat in his\nown likeness, to be in the visible world, in relation to sight and the things\nof sight, what the good is in the intellectual world in relation to mind and\nthe things of mind:\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWill you be a little more explicit? he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhy, you know, I said, that the eyes, when a person directs them towards\nobjects on which the light of day is no longer shining, but the moon and stars\nonly, see dimly, and are nearly blind; they seem to have no clearness of vision\nin them?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery true.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut when they are directed towards objects on which the sun shines, they see\nclearly and there is sight in them?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd the soul is like the eye: when resting upon that on which truth and being\nshine, the soul perceives and understands, and is radiant with intelligence;\nbut when turned towards the twilight of becoming and perishing, then she has\nopinion only, and goes blinking about, and is first of one opinion and then of\nanother, and seems to have no intelligence?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nJust so.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNow, that which imparts truth to the known and the power of knowing to the\nknower is what I would have you term the idea of good, and this you will deem\nto be the cause of science, and of truth in so far as the latter becomes the\nsubject of knowledge; beautiful too, as are both truth and knowledge, you will\nbe right in esteeming this other nature as more beautiful than either; and, as\nin the previous instance, light and sight may be truly said to be like the sun,\nand yet not to be the sun, so in this other sphere, science and truth may be\ndeemed to be like the good, but not the good; the good has a place of honour\nyet higher.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat a wonder of beauty that must be, he said, which is the author of science\nand truth, and yet surpasses them in beauty; for you surely cannot mean to say\nthat pleasure is the good?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nGod forbid, I replied; but may I ask you to consider the image in another point\nof view?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIn what point of view?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYou would say, would you not, that the sun is not only the author of visibility\nin all visible things, but of generation and nourishment and growth, though he\nhimself is not generation?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIn like manner the good may be said to be not only the author of knowledge to\nall things known, but of their being and essence, and yet the good is not\nessence, but far exceeds essence in dignity and power.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nGlaucon said, with a ludicrous earnestness: By the light of heaven, how\namazing!\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, I said, and the exaggeration may be set down to you; for you made me utter\nmy fancies.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd pray continue to utter them; at any rate let us hear if there is anything\nmore to be said about the similitude of the sun.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, I said, there is a great deal more.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen omit nothing, however slight.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI will do my best, I said; but I should think that a great deal will have to be\nomitted.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI hope not, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYou have to imagine, then, that there are two ruling powers, and that one of\nthem is set over the intellectual world, the other over the visible. I do not\nsay heaven, lest you should fancy that I am playing upon the name\n(\u0026lsquo;ourhanoz, orhatoz\u0026rsquo;). May I suppose that you have this distinction\nof the visible and intelligible fixed in your mind?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI have.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNow take a line which has been cut into two unequal parts, and divide each of\nthem again in the same proportion, and suppose the two main divisions to\nanswer, one to the visible and the other to the intelligible, and then compare\nthe subdivisions in respect of their clearness and want of clearness, and you\nwill find that the first section in the sphere of the visible consists of\nimages. And by images I mean, in the first place, shadows, and in the second\nplace, reflections in water and in solid, smooth and polished bodies and the\nlike: Do you understand?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, I understand.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nImagine, now, the other section, of which this is only the resemblance, to\ninclude the animals which we see, and everything that grows or is made.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery good.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWould you not admit that both the sections of this division have different\ndegrees of truth, and that the copy is to the original as the sphere of opinion\nis to the sphere of knowledge?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nMost undoubtedly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNext proceed to consider the manner in which the sphere of the intellectual is\nto be divided.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIn what manner?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThus:\u0026mdash;There are two subdivisions, in the lower of which the soul uses the\nfigures given by the former division as images; the enquiry can only be\nhypothetical, and instead of going upwards to a principle descends to the other\nend; in the higher of the two, the soul passes out of hypotheses, and goes up\nto a principle which is above hypotheses, making no use of images as in the\nformer case, but proceeding only in and through the ideas themselves.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI do not quite understand your meaning, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen I will try again; you will understand me better when I have made some\npreliminary remarks. You are aware that students of geometry, arithmetic, and\nthe kindred sciences assume the odd and the even and the figures and three\nkinds of angles and the like in their several branches of science; these are\ntheir hypotheses, which they and every body are supposed to know, and therefore\nthey do not deign to give any account of them either to themselves or others;\nbut they begin with them, and go on until they arrive at last, and in a\nconsistent manner, at their conclusion?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said, I know.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd do you not know also that although they make use of the visible forms and\nreason about them, they are thinking not of these, but of the ideals which they\nresemble; not of the figures which they draw, but of the absolute square and\nthe absolute diameter, and so on\u0026mdash;the forms which they draw or make, and\nwhich have shadows and reflections in water of their own, are converted by them\ninto images, but they are really seeking to behold the things themselves, which\ncan only be seen with the eye of the mind?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat is true.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd of this kind I spoke as the intelligible, although in the search after it\nthe soul is compelled to use hypotheses; not ascending to a first principle,\nbecause she is unable to rise above the region of hypothesis, but employing the\nobjects of which the shadows below are resemblances in their turn as images,\nthey having in relation to the shadows and reflections of them a greater\ndistinctness, and therefore a higher value.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI understand, he said, that you are speaking of the province of geometry and\nthe sister arts.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd when I speak of the other division of the intelligible, you will understand\nme to speak of that other sort of knowledge which reason herself attains by the\npower of dialectic, using the hypotheses not as first principles, but only as\nhypotheses\u0026mdash;that is to say, as steps and points of departure into a world\nwhich is above hypotheses, in order that she may soar beyond them to the first\nprinciple of the whole; and clinging to this and then to that which depends on\nthis, by successive steps she descends again without the aid of any sensible\nobject, from ideas, through ideas, and in ideas she ends.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI understand you, he replied; not perfectly, for you seem to me to be\ndescribing a task which is really tremendous; but, at any rate, I understand\nyou to say that knowledge and being, which the science of dialectic\ncontemplates, are clearer than the notions of the arts, as they are termed,\nwhich proceed from hypotheses only: these are also contemplated by the\nunderstanding, and not by the senses: yet, because they start from hypotheses\nand do not ascend to a principle, those who contemplate them appear to you not\nto exercise the higher reason upon them, although when a first principle is\nadded to them they are cognizable by the higher reason. And the habit which is\nconcerned with geometry and the cognate sciences I suppose that you would term\nunderstanding and not reason, as being intermediate between opinion and reason.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYou have quite conceived my meaning, I said; and now, corresponding to these\nfour divisions, let there be four faculties in the soul\u0026mdash;reason answering\nto the highest, understanding to the second, faith (or conviction) to the\nthird, and perception of shadows to the last\u0026mdash;and let there be a scale of\nthem, and let us suppose that the several faculties have clearness in the same\ndegree that their objects have truth.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI understand, he replied, and give my assent, and accept your arrangement.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003c!–end chapter–\u003e\n\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\n\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca id=\"link2H_4_0010\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e BOOK VII.\u003c/h2\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd now, I said, let me show in a figure how far our nature is enlightened or\nunenlightened:\u0026mdash;Behold! human beings living in a underground den, which\nhas a mouth open towards the light and reaching all along the den; here they\nhave been from their childhood, and have their legs and necks chained so that\nthey cannot move, and can only see before them, being prevented by the chains\nfrom turning round their heads. Above and behind them a fire is blazing at a\ndistance, and between the fire and the prisoners there is a raised way; and you\nwill see, if you look, a low wall built along the way, like the screen which\nmarionette players have in front of them, over which they show the puppets.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI see.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd do you see, I said, men passing along the wall carrying all sorts of\nvessels, and statues and figures of animals made of wood and stone and various\nmaterials, which appear over the wall? Some of them are talking, others silent.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYou have shown me a strange image, and they are strange prisoners.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nLike ourselves, I replied; and they see only their own shadows, or the shadows\nof one another, which the fire throws on the opposite wall of the cave?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue, he said; how could they see anything but the shadows if they were never\nallowed to move their heads?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd of the objects which are being carried in like manner they would only see\nthe shadows?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd if they were able to converse with one another, would they not suppose that\nthey were naming what was actually before them?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery true.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd suppose further that the prison had an echo which came from the other side,\nwould they not be sure to fancy when one of the passers-by spoke that the voice\nwhich they heard came from the passing shadow?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNo question, he replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTo them, I said, the truth would be literally nothing but the shadows of the\nimages.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat is certain.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd now look again, and see what will naturally follow if the prisoners are\nreleased and disabused of their error. At first, when any of them is liberated\nand compelled suddenly to stand up and turn his neck round and walk and look\ntowards the light, he will suffer sharp pains; the glare will distress him, and\nhe will be unable to see the realities of which in his former state he had seen\nthe shadows; and then conceive some one saying to him, that what he saw before\nwas an illusion, but that now, when he is approaching nearer to being and his\neye is turned towards more real existence, he has a clearer vision,\u0026mdash;what\nwill be his reply? And you may further imagine that his instructor is pointing\nto the objects as they pass and requiring him to name them,\u0026mdash;will he not\nbe perplexed? Will he not fancy that the shadows which he formerly saw are\ntruer than the objects which are now shown to him?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nFar truer.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd if he is compelled to look straight at the light, will he not have a pain\nin his eyes which will make him turn away to take refuge in the objects of\nvision which he can see, and which he will conceive to be in reality clearer\nthan the things which are now being shown to him?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd suppose once more, that he is reluctantly dragged up a steep and rugged\nascent, and held fast until he is forced into the presence of the sun himself,\nis he not likely to be pained and irritated? When he approaches the light his\neyes will be dazzled, and he will not be able to see anything at all of what\nare now called realities.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNot all in a moment, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHe will require to grow accustomed to the sight of the upper world. And first\nhe will see the shadows best, next the reflections of men and other objects in\nthe water, and then the objects themselves; then he will gaze upon the light of\nthe moon and the stars and the spangled heaven; and he will see the sky and the\nstars by night better than the sun or the light of the sun by day?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nLast of all he will be able to see the sun, and not mere reflections of him in\nthe water, but he will see him in his own proper place, and not in another; and\nhe will contemplate him as he is.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHe will then proceed to argue that this is he who gives the season and the\nyears, and is the guardian of all that is in the visible world, and in a\ncertain way the cause of all things which he and his fellows have been\naccustomed to behold?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nClearly, he said, he would first see the sun and then reason about him.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd when he remembered his old habitation, and the wisdom of the den and his\nfellow-prisoners, do you not suppose that he would felicitate himself on the\nchange, and pity them?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly, he would.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd if they were in the habit of conferring honours among themselves on those\nwho were quickest to observe the passing shadows and to remark which of them\nwent before, and which followed after, and which were together; and who were\ntherefore best able to draw conclusions as to the future, do you think that he\nwould care for such honours and glories, or envy the possessors of them? Would\nhe not say with Homer,\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n\u0026lsquo;Better to be the poor servant of a poor master,\u0026rsquo;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nand to endure anything, rather than think as they do and live after their\nmanner?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said, I think that he would rather suffer anything than entertain these\nfalse notions and live in this miserable manner.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nImagine once more, I said, such an one coming suddenly out of the sun to be\nreplaced in his old situation; would he not be certain to have his eyes full of\ndarkness?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTo be sure, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd if there were a contest, and he had to compete in measuring the shadows\nwith the prisoners who had never moved out of the den, while his sight was\nstill weak, and before his eyes had become steady (and the time which would be\nneeded to acquire this new habit of sight might be very considerable), would he\nnot be ridiculous? Men would say of him that up he went and down he came\nwithout his eyes; and that it was better not even to think of ascending; and if\nany one tried to loose another and lead him up to the light, let them only\ncatch the offender, and they would put him to death.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNo question, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThis entire allegory, I said, you may now append, dear Glaucon, to the previous\nargument; the prison-house is the world of sight, the light of the fire is the\nsun, and you will not misapprehend me if you interpret the journey upwards to\nbe the ascent of the soul into the intellectual world according to my poor\nbelief, which, at your desire, I have expressed\u0026mdash;whether rightly or\nwrongly God knows. But, whether true or false, my opinion is that in the world\nof knowledge the idea of good appears last of all, and is seen only with an\neffort; and, when seen, is also inferred to be the universal author of all\nthings beautiful and right, parent of light and of the lord of light in this\nvisible world, and the immediate source of reason and truth in the\nintellectual; and that this is the power upon which he who would act rationally\neither in public or private life must have his eye fixed.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI agree, he said, as far as I am able to understand you.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nMoreover, I said, you must not wonder that those who attain to this beatific\nvision are unwilling to descend to human affairs; for their souls are ever\nhastening into the upper world where they desire to dwell; which desire of\ntheirs is very natural, if our allegory may be trusted.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, very natural.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd is there anything surprising in one who passes from divine contemplations\nto the evil state of man, misbehaving himself in a ridiculous manner; if, while\nhis eyes are blinking and before he has become accustomed to the surrounding\ndarkness, he is compelled to fight in courts of law, or in other places, about\nthe images or the shadows of images of justice, and is endeavouring to meet the\nconceptions of those who have never yet seen absolute justice?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnything but surprising, he replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAny one who has common sense will remember that the bewilderments of the eyes\nare of two kinds, and arise from two causes, either from coming out of the\nlight or from going into the light, which is true of the mind\u0026rsquo;s eye,\nquite as much as of the bodily eye; and he who remembers this when he sees any\none whose vision is perplexed and weak, will not be too ready to laugh; he will\nfirst ask whether that soul of man has come out of the brighter life, and is\nunable to see because unaccustomed to the dark, or having turned from darkness\nto the day is dazzled by excess of light. And he will count the one happy in\nhis condition and state of being, and he will pity the other; or, if he have a\nmind to laugh at the soul which comes from below into the light, there will be\nmore reason in this than in the laugh which greets him who returns from above\nout of the light into the den.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat, he said, is a very just distinction.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut then, if I am right, certain professors of education must be wrong when\nthey say that they can put a knowledge into the soul which was not there\nbefore, like sight into blind eyes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThey undoubtedly say this, he replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhereas, our argument shows that the power and capacity of learning exists in\nthe soul already; and that just as the eye was unable to turn from darkness to\nlight without the whole body, so too the instrument of knowledge can only by\nthe movement of the whole soul be turned from the world of becoming into that\nof being, and learn by degrees to endure the sight of being, and of the\nbrightest and best of being, or in other words, of the good.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery true.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd must there not be some art which will effect conversion in the easiest and\nquickest manner; not implanting the faculty of sight, for that exists already,\nbut has been turned in the wrong direction, and is looking away from the truth?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said, such an art may be presumed.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd whereas the other so-called virtues of the soul seem to be akin to bodily\nqualities, for even when they are not originally innate they can be implanted\nlater by habit and exercise, the virtue of wisdom more than anything else\ncontains a divine element which always remains, and by this conversion is\nrendered useful and profitable; or, on the other hand, hurtful and useless. Did\nyou never observe the narrow intelligence flashing from the keen eye of a\nclever rogue\u0026mdash;how eager he is, how clearly his paltry soul sees the way to\nhis end; he is the reverse of blind, but his keen eye-sight is forced into the\nservice of evil, and he is mischievous in proportion to his cleverness?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery true, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut what if there had been a circumcision of such natures in the days of their\nyouth; and they had been severed from those sensual pleasures, such as eating\nand drinking, which, like leaden weights, were attached to them at their birth,\nand which drag them down and turn the vision of their souls upon the things\nthat are below\u0026mdash;if, I say, they had been released from these impediments\nand turned in the opposite direction, the very same faculty in them would have\nseen the truth as keenly as they see what their eyes are turned to now.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery likely.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, I said; and there is another thing which is likely, or rather a necessary\ninference from what has preceded, that neither the uneducated and uninformed of\nthe truth, nor yet those who never make an end of their education, will be able\nministers of State; not the former, because they have no single aim of duty\nwhich is the rule of all their actions, private as well as public; nor the\nlatter, because they will not act at all except upon compulsion, fancying that\nthey are already dwelling apart in the islands of the blest.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery true, he replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen, I said, the business of us who are the founders of the State will be to\ncompel the best minds to attain that knowledge which we have already shown to\nbe the greatest of all\u0026mdash;they must continue to ascend until they arrive at\nthe good; but when they have ascended and seen enough we must not allow them to\ndo as they do now.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat do you mean?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI mean that they remain in the upper world: but this must not be allowed; they\nmust be made to descend again among the prisoners in the den, and partake of\ntheir labours and honours, whether they are worth having or not.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut is not this unjust? he said; ought we to give them a worse life, when they\nmight have a better?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYou have again forgotten, my friend, I said, the intention of the legislator,\nwho did not aim at making any one class in the State happy above the rest; the\nhappiness was to be in the whole State, and he held the citizens together by\npersuasion and necessity, making them benefactors of the State, and therefore\nbenefactors of one another; to this end he created them, not to please\nthemselves, but to be his instruments in binding up the State.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue, he said, I had forgotten.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nObserve, Glaucon, that there will be no injustice in compelling our\nphilosophers to have a care and providence of others; we shall explain to them\nthat in other States, men of their class are not obliged to share in the toils\nof politics: and this is reasonable, for they grow up at their own sweet will,\nand the government would rather not have them. Being self-taught, they cannot\nbe expected to show any gratitude for a culture which they have never received.\nBut we have brought you into the world to be rulers of the hive, kings of\nyourselves and of the other citizens, and have educated you far better and more\nperfectly than they have been educated, and you are better able to share in the\ndouble duty. Wherefore each of you, when his turn comes, must go down to the\ngeneral underground abode, and get the habit of seeing in the dark. When you\nhave acquired the habit, you will see ten thousand times better than the\ninhabitants of the den, and you will know what the several images are, and what\nthey represent, because you have seen the beautiful and just and good in their\ntruth. And thus our State, which is also yours, will be a reality, and not a\ndream only, and will be administered in a spirit unlike that of other States,\nin which men fight with one another about shadows only and are distracted in\nthe struggle for power, which in their eyes is a great good. Whereas the truth\nis that the State in which the rulers are most reluctant to govern is always\nthe best and most quietly governed, and the State in which they are most eager,\nthe worst.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nQuite true, he replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd will our pupils, when they hear this, refuse to take their turn at the\ntoils of State, when they are allowed to spend the greater part of their time\nwith one another in the heavenly light?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nImpossible, he answered; for they are just men, and the commands which we\nimpose upon them are just; there can be no doubt that every one of them will\ntake office as a stern necessity, and not after the fashion of our present\nrulers of State.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, my friend, I said; and there lies the point. You must contrive for your\nfuture rulers another and a better life than that of a ruler, and then you may\nhave a well-ordered State; for only in the State which offers this, will they\nrule who are truly rich, not in silver and gold, but in virtue and wisdom,\nwhich are the true blessings of life. Whereas if they go to the administration\nof public affairs, poor and hungering after their own private advantage,\nthinking that hence they are to snatch the chief good, order there can never\nbe; for they will be fighting about office, and the civil and domestic broils\nwhich thus arise will be the ruin of the rulers themselves and of the whole\nState.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nMost true, he replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd the only life which looks down upon the life of political ambition is that\nof true philosophy. Do you know of any other?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIndeed, I do not, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd those who govern ought not to be lovers of the task? For, if they are,\nthere will be rival lovers, and they will fight.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNo question.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWho then are those whom we shall compel to be guardians? Surely they will be\nthe men who are wisest about affairs of State, and by whom the State is best\nadministered, and who at the same time have other honours and another and a\nbetter life than that of politics?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThey are the men, and I will choose them, he replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd now shall we consider in what way such guardians will be produced, and how\nthey are to be brought from darkness to light,\u0026mdash;as some are said to have\nascended from the world below to the gods?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBy all means, he replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe process, I said, is not the turning over of an oyster-shell (In allusion to\na game in which two parties fled or pursued according as an oyster-shell which\nwas thrown into the air fell with the dark or light side uppermost.), but the\nturning round of a soul passing from a day which is little better than night to\nthe true day of being, that is, the ascent from below, which we affirm to be\ntrue philosophy?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nQuite so.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd should we not enquire what sort of knowledge has the power of effecting\nsuch a change?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat sort of knowledge is there which would draw the soul from becoming to\nbeing? And another consideration has just occurred to me: You will remember\nthat our young men are to be warrior athletes?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, that was said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen this new kind of knowledge must have an additional quality?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat quality?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nUsefulness in war.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, if possible.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThere were two parts in our former scheme of education, were there not?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nJust so.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThere was gymnastic which presided over the growth and decay of the body, and\nmay therefore be regarded as having to do with generation and corruption?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen that is not the knowledge which we are seeking to discover?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNo.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut what do you say of music, which also entered to a certain extent into our\nformer scheme?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nMusic, he said, as you will remember, was the counterpart of gymnastic, and\ntrained the guardians by the influences of habit, by harmony making them\nharmonious, by rhythm rhythmical, but not giving them science; and the words,\nwhether fabulous or possibly true, had kindred elements of rhythm and harmony\nin them. But in music there was nothing which tended to that good which you are\nnow seeking.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYou are most accurate, I said, in your recollection; in music there certainly\nwas nothing of the kind. But what branch of knowledge is there, my dear\nGlaucon, which is of the desired nature; since all the useful arts were\nreckoned mean by us?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nUndoubtedly; and yet if music and gymnastic are excluded, and the arts are also\nexcluded, what remains?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWell, I said, there may be nothing left of our special subjects; and then we\nshall have to take something which is not special, but of universal\napplication.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat may that be?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nA something which all arts and sciences and intelligences use in common, and\nwhich every one first has to learn among the elements of education.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat is that?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe little matter of distinguishing one, two, and three\u0026mdash;in a word, number\nand calculation:\u0026mdash;do not all arts and sciences necessarily partake of\nthem?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen the art of war partakes of them?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTo be sure.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen Palamedes, whenever he appears in tragedy, proves Agamemnon ridiculously\nunfit to be a general. Did you never remark how he declares that he had\ninvented number, and had numbered the ships and set in array the ranks of the\narmy at Troy; which implies that they had never been numbered before, and\nAgamemnon must be supposed literally to have been incapable of counting his own\nfeet\u0026mdash;how could he if he was ignorant of number? And if that is true, what\nsort of general must he have been?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI should say a very strange one, if this was as you say.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCan we deny that a warrior should have a knowledge of arithmetic?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly he should, if he is to have the smallest understanding of military\ntactics, or indeed, I should rather say, if he is to be a man at all.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI should like to know whether you have the same notion which I have of this\nstudy?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat is your notion?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIt appears to me to be a study of the kind which we are seeking, and which\nleads naturally to reflection, but never to have been rightly used; for the\ntrue use of it is simply to draw the soul towards being.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWill you explain your meaning? he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI will try, I said; and I wish you would share the enquiry with me, and say\n\u0026lsquo;yes\u0026rsquo; or \u0026lsquo;no\u0026rsquo; when I attempt to distinguish in my own\nmind what branches of knowledge have this attracting power, in order that we\nmay have clearer proof that arithmetic is, as I suspect, one of them.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nExplain, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI mean to say that objects of sense are of two kinds; some of them do not\ninvite thought because the sense is an adequate judge of them; while in the\ncase of other objects sense is so untrustworthy that further enquiry is\nimperatively demanded.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYou are clearly referring, he said, to the manner in which the senses are\nimposed upon by distance, and by painting in light and shade.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNo, I said, that is not at all my meaning.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen what is your meaning?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhen speaking of uninviting objects, I mean those which do not pass from one\nsensation to the opposite; inviting objects are those which do; in this latter\ncase the sense coming upon the object, whether at a distance or near, gives no\nmore vivid idea of anything in particular than of its opposite. An illustration\nwill make my meaning clearer:\u0026mdash;here are three fingers\u0026mdash;a little\nfinger, a second finger, and a middle finger.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery good.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYou may suppose that they are seen quite close: And here comes the point.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat is it?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nEach of them equally appears a finger, whether seen in the middle or at the\nextremity, whether white or black, or thick or thin\u0026mdash;it makes no\ndifference; a finger is a finger all the same. In these cases a man is not\ncompelled to ask of thought the question what is a finger? for the sight never\nintimates to the mind that a finger is other than a finger.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd therefore, I said, as we might expect, there is nothing here which invites\nor excites intelligence.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThere is not, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut is this equally true of the greatness and smallness of the fingers? Can\nsight adequately perceive them? and is no difference made by the circumstance\nthat one of the fingers is in the middle and another at the extremity? And in\nlike manner does the touch adequately perceive the qualities of thickness or\nthinness, of softness or hardness? And so of the other senses; do they give\nperfect intimations of such matters? Is not their mode of operation on this\nwise\u0026mdash;the sense which is concerned with the quality of hardness is\nnecessarily concerned also with the quality of softness, and only intimates to\nthe soul that the same thing is felt to be both hard and soft?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYou are quite right, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd must not the soul be perplexed at this intimation which the sense gives of\na hard which is also soft? What, again, is the meaning of light and heavy, if\nthat which is light is also heavy, and that which is heavy, light?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said, these intimations which the soul receives are very curious and\nrequire to be explained.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, I said, and in these perplexities the soul naturally summons to her aid\ncalculation and intelligence, that she may see whether the several objects\nannounced to her are one or two.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd if they turn out to be two, is not each of them one and different?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd if each is one, and both are two, she will conceive the two as in a state\nof division, for if there were undivided they could only be conceived of as\none?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe eye certainly did see both small and great, but only in a confused manner;\nthey were not distinguished.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhereas the thinking mind, intending to light up the chaos, was compelled to\nreverse the process, and look at small and great as separate and not confused.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery true.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWas not this the beginning of the enquiry \u0026lsquo;What is great?\u0026rsquo; and\n\u0026lsquo;What is small?\u0026rsquo;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nExactly so.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd thus arose the distinction of the visible and the intelligible.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nMost true.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThis was what I meant when I spoke of impressions which invited the intellect,\nor the reverse\u0026mdash;those which are simultaneous with opposite impressions,\ninvite thought; those which are not simultaneous do not.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI understand, he said, and agree with you.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd to which class do unity and number belong?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI do not know, he replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThink a little and you will see that what has preceded will supply the answer;\nfor if simple unity could be adequately perceived by the sight or by any other\nsense, then, as we were saying in the case of the finger, there would be\nnothing to attract towards being; but when there is some contradiction always\npresent, and one is the reverse of one and involves the conception of\nplurality, then thought begins to be aroused within us, and the soul perplexed\nand wanting to arrive at a decision asks \u0026lsquo;What is absolute unity?\u0026rsquo;\nThis is the way in which the study of the one has a power of drawing and\nconverting the mind to the contemplation of true being.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd surely, he said, this occurs notably in the case of one; for we see the\nsame thing to be both one and infinite in multitude?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, I said; and this being true of one must be equally true of all number?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd all arithmetic and calculation have to do with number?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd they appear to lead the mind towards truth?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, in a very remarkable manner.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen this is knowledge of the kind for which we are seeking, having a double\nuse, military and philosophical; for the man of war must learn the art of\nnumber or he will not know how to array his troops, and the philosopher also,\nbecause he has to rise out of the sea of change and lay hold of true being, and\ntherefore he must be an arithmetician.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat is true.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd our guardian is both warrior and philosopher?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen this is a kind of knowledge which legislation may fitly prescribe; and we\nmust endeavour to persuade those who are to be the principal men of our State\nto go and learn arithmetic, not as amateurs, but they must carry on the study\nuntil they see the nature of numbers with the mind only; nor again, like\nmerchants or retail-traders, with a view to buying or selling, but for the sake\nof their military use, and of the soul herself; and because this will be the\neasiest way for her to pass from becoming to truth and being.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat is excellent, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, I said, and now having spoken of it, I must add how charming the science\nis! and in how many ways it conduces to our desired end, if pursued in the\nspirit of a philosopher, and not of a shopkeeper!\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHow do you mean?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI mean, as I was saying, that arithmetic has a very great and elevating effect,\ncompelling the soul to reason about abstract number, and rebelling against the\nintroduction of visible or tangible objects into the argument. You know how\nsteadily the masters of the art repel and ridicule any one who attempts to\ndivide absolute unity when he is calculating, and if you divide, they multiply\n(Meaning either (1) that they integrate the number because they deny the\npossibility of fractions; or (2) that division is regarded by them as a process\nof multiplication, for the fractions of one continue to be units.), taking care\nthat one shall continue one and not become lost in fractions.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat is very true.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNow, suppose a person were to say to them: O my friends, what are these\nwonderful numbers about which you are reasoning, in which, as you say, there is\na unity such as you demand, and each unit is equal, invariable,\nindivisible,\u0026mdash;what would they answer?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThey would answer, as I should conceive, that they were speaking of those\nnumbers which can only be realized in thought.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen you see that this knowledge may be truly called necessary, necessitating\nas it clearly does the use of the pure intelligence in the attainment of pure\ntruth?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes; that is a marked characteristic of it.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd have you further observed, that those who have a natural talent for\ncalculation are generally quick at every other kind of knowledge; and even the\ndull, if they have had an arithmetical training, although they may derive no\nother advantage from it, always become much quicker than they would otherwise\nhave been.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery true, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd indeed, you will not easily find a more difficult study, and not many as\ndifficult.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYou will not.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd, for all these reasons, arithmetic is a kind of knowledge in which the best\nnatures should be trained, and which must not be given up.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI agree.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nLet this then be made one of our subjects of education. And next, shall we\nenquire whether the kindred science also concerns us?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYou mean geometry?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nExactly so.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nClearly, he said, we are concerned with that part of geometry which relates to\nwar; for in pitching a camp, or taking up a position, or closing or extending\nthe lines of an army, or any other military manoeuvre, whether in actual battle\nor on a march, it will make all the difference whether a general is or is not a\ngeometrician.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, I said, but for that purpose a very little of either geometry or\ncalculation will be enough; the question relates rather to the greater and more\nadvanced part of geometry\u0026mdash;whether that tends in any degree to make more\neasy the vision of the idea of good; and thither, as I was saying, all things\ntend which compel the soul to turn her gaze towards that place, where is the\nfull perfection of being, which she ought, by all means, to behold.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen if geometry compels us to view being, it concerns us; if becoming only, it\ndoes not concern us?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, that is what we assert.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYet anybody who has the least acquaintance with geometry will not deny that\nsuch a conception of the science is in flat contradiction to the ordinary\nlanguage of geometricians.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHow so?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThey have in view practice only, and are always speaking, in a narrow and\nridiculous manner, of squaring and extending and applying and the\nlike\u0026mdash;they confuse the necessities of geometry with those of daily life;\nwhereas knowledge is the real object of the whole science.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen must not a further admission be made?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat admission?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat the knowledge at which geometry aims is knowledge of the eternal, and not\nof aught perishing and transient.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat, he replied, may be readily allowed, and is true.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen, my noble friend, geometry will draw the soul towards truth, and create\nthe spirit of philosophy, and raise up that which is now unhappily allowed to\nfall down.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNothing will be more likely to have such an effect.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen nothing should be more sternly laid down than that the inhabitants of your\nfair city should by all means learn geometry. Moreover the science has indirect\neffects, which are not small.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nOf what kind? he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThere are the military advantages of which you spoke, I said; and in all\ndepartments of knowledge, as experience proves, any one who has studied\ngeometry is infinitely quicker of apprehension than one who has not.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes indeed, he said, there is an infinite difference between them.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen shall we propose this as a second branch of knowledge which our youth will\nstudy?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nLet us do so, he replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd suppose we make astronomy the third\u0026mdash;what do you say?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI am strongly inclined to it, he said; the observation of the seasons and of\nmonths and years is as essential to the general as it is to the farmer or\nsailor.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI am amused, I said, at your fear of the world, which makes you guard against\nthe appearance of insisting upon useless studies; and I quite admit the\ndifficulty of believing that in every man there is an eye of the soul which,\nwhen by other pursuits lost and dimmed, is by these purified and re-illumined;\nand is more precious far than ten thousand bodily eyes, for by it alone is\ntruth seen. Now there are two classes of persons: one class of those who will\nagree with you and will take your words as a revelation; another class to whom\nthey will be utterly unmeaning, and who will naturally deem them to be idle\ntales, for they see no sort of profit which is to be obtained from them. And\ntherefore you had better decide at once with which of the two you are proposing\nto argue. You will very likely say with neither, and that your chief aim in\ncarrying on the argument is your own improvement; at the same time you do not\ngrudge to others any benefit which they may receive.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI think that I should prefer to carry on the argument mainly on my own behalf.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen take a step backward, for we have gone wrong in the order of the sciences.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat was the mistake? he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAfter plane geometry, I said, we proceeded at once to solids in revolution,\ninstead of taking solids in themselves; whereas after the second dimension the\nthird, which is concerned with cubes and dimensions of depth, ought to have\nfollowed.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat is true, Socrates; but so little seems to be known as yet about these\nsubjects.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhy, yes, I said, and for two reasons:\u0026mdash;in the first place, no government\npatronises them; this leads to a want of energy in the pursuit of them, and\nthey are difficult; in the second place, students cannot learn them unless they\nhave a director. But then a director can hardly be found, and even if he could,\nas matters now stand, the students, who are very conceited, would not attend to\nhim. That, however, would be otherwise if the whole State became the director\nof these studies and gave honour to them; then disciples would want to come,\nand there would be continuous and earnest search, and discoveries would be\nmade; since even now, disregarded as they are by the world, and maimed of their\nfair proportions, and although none of their votaries can tell the use of them,\nstill these studies force their way by their natural charm, and very likely, if\nthey had the help of the State, they would some day emerge into light.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said, there is a remarkable charm in them. But I do not clearly\nunderstand the change in the order. First you began with a geometry of plane\nsurfaces?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, I said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd you placed astronomy next, and then you made a step backward?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, and I have delayed you by my hurry; the ludicrous state of solid geometry,\nwhich, in natural order, should have followed, made me pass over this branch\nand go on to astronomy, or motion of solids.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen assuming that the science now omitted would come into existence if\nencouraged by the State, let us go on to astronomy, which will be fourth.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe right order, he replied. And now, Socrates, as you rebuked the vulgar\nmanner in which I praised astronomy before, my praise shall be given in your\nown spirit. For every one, as I think, must see that astronomy compels the soul\nto look upwards and leads us from this world to another.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nEvery one but myself, I said; to every one else this may be clear, but not to\nme.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd what then would you say?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI should rather say that those who elevate astronomy into philosophy appear to\nme to make us look downwards and not upwards.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat do you mean? he asked.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYou, I replied, have in your mind a truly sublime conception of our knowledge\nof the things above. And I dare say that if a person were to throw his head\nback and study the fretted ceiling, you would still think that his mind was the\npercipient, and not his eyes. And you are very likely right, and I may be a\nsimpleton: but, in my opinion, that knowledge only which is of being and of the\nunseen can make the soul look upwards, and whether a man gapes at the heavens\nor blinks on the ground, seeking to learn some particular of sense, I would\ndeny that he can learn, for nothing of that sort is matter of science; his soul\nis looking downwards, not upwards, whether his way to knowledge is by water or\nby land, whether he floats, or only lies on his back.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI acknowledge, he said, the justice of your rebuke. Still, I should like to\nascertain how astronomy can be learned in any manner more conducive to that\nknowledge of which we are speaking?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI will tell you, I said: The starry heaven which we behold is wrought upon a\nvisible ground, and therefore, although the fairest and most perfect of visible\nthings, must necessarily be deemed inferior far to the true motions of absolute\nswiftness and absolute slowness, which are relative to each other, and carry\nwith them that which is contained in them, in the true number and in every true\nfigure. Now, these are to be apprehended by reason and intelligence, but not by\nsight.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue, he replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe spangled heavens should be used as a pattern and with a view to that higher\nknowledge; their beauty is like the beauty of figures or pictures excellently\nwrought by the hand of Daedalus, or some other great artist, which we may\nchance to behold; any geometrician who saw them would appreciate the\nexquisiteness of their workmanship, but he would never dream of thinking that\nin them he could find the true equal or the true double, or the truth of any\nother proportion.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNo, he replied, such an idea would be ridiculous.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd will not a true astronomer have the same feeling when he looks at the\nmovements of the stars? Will he not think that heaven and the things in heaven\nare framed by the Creator of them in the most perfect manner? But he will never\nimagine that the proportions of night and day, or of both to the month, or of\nthe month to the year, or of the stars to these and to one another, and any\nother things that are material and visible can also be eternal and subject to\nno deviation\u0026mdash;that would be absurd; and it is equally absurd to take so\nmuch pains in investigating their exact truth.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI quite agree, though I never thought of this before.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen, I said, in astronomy, as in geometry, we should employ problems, and let\nthe heavens alone if we would approach the subject in the right way and so make\nthe natural gift of reason to be of any real use.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat, he said, is a work infinitely beyond our present astronomers.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, I said; and there are many other things which must also have a similar\nextension given to them, if our legislation is to be of any value. But can you\ntell me of any other suitable study?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNo, he said, not without thinking.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nMotion, I said, has many forms, and not one only; two of them are obvious\nenough even to wits no better than ours; and there are others, as I imagine,\nwhich may be left to wiser persons.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut where are the two?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThere is a second, I said, which is the counterpart of the one already named.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd what may that be?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe second, I said, would seem relatively to the ears to be what the first is\nto the eyes; for I conceive that as the eyes are designed to look up at the\nstars, so are the ears to hear harmonious motions; and these are sister\nsciences\u0026mdash;as the Pythagoreans say, and we, Glaucon, agree with them?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut this, I said, is a laborious study, and therefore we had better go and\nlearn of them; and they will tell us whether there are any other applications\nof these sciences. At the same time, we must not lose sight of our own higher\nobject.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat is that?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThere is a perfection which all knowledge ought to reach, and which our pupils\nought also to attain, and not to fall short of, as I was saying that they did\nin astronomy. For in the science of harmony, as you probably know, the same\nthing happens. The teachers of harmony compare the sounds and consonances which\nare heard only, and their labour, like that of the astronomers, is in vain.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, by heaven! he said; and \u0026rsquo;tis as good as a play to hear them talking\nabout their condensed notes, as they call them; they put their ears close\nalongside of the strings like persons catching a sound from their\nneighbour\u0026rsquo;s wall\u0026mdash;one set of them declaring that they distinguish an\nintermediate note and have found the least interval which should be the unit of\nmeasurement; the others insisting that the two sounds have passed into the\nsame\u0026mdash;either party setting their ears before their understanding.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYou mean, I said, those gentlemen who tease and torture the strings and rack\nthem on the pegs of the instrument: I might carry on the metaphor and speak\nafter their manner of the blows which the plectrum gives, and make accusations\nagainst the strings, both of backwardness and forwardness to sound; but this\nwould be tedious, and therefore I will only say that these are not the men, and\nthat I am referring to the Pythagoreans, of whom I was just now proposing to\nenquire about harmony. For they too are in error, like the astronomers; they\ninvestigate the numbers of the harmonies which are heard, but they never attain\nto problems\u0026mdash;that is to say, they never reach the natural harmonies of\nnumber, or reflect why some numbers are harmonious and others not.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat, he said, is a thing of more than mortal knowledge.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nA thing, I replied, which I would rather call useful; that is, if sought after\nwith a view to the beautiful and good; but if pursued in any other spirit,\nuseless.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery true, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNow, when all these studies reach the point of inter-communion and connection\nwith one another, and come to be considered in their mutual affinities, then, I\nthink, but not till then, will the pursuit of them have a value for our\nobjects; otherwise there is no profit in them.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI suspect so; but you are speaking, Socrates, of a vast work.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat do you mean? I said; the prelude or what? Do you not know that all this is\nbut the prelude to the actual strain which we have to learn? For you surely\nwould not regard the skilled mathematician as a dialectician?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAssuredly not, he said; I have hardly ever known a mathematician who was\ncapable of reasoning.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut do you imagine that men who are unable to give and take a reason will have\nthe knowledge which we require of them?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNeither can this be supposed.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd so, Glaucon, I said, we have at last arrived at the hymn of dialectic. This\nis that strain which is of the intellect only, but which the faculty of sight\nwill nevertheless be found to imitate; for sight, as you may remember, was\nimagined by us after a while to behold the real animals and stars, and last of\nall the sun himself. And so with dialectic; when a person starts on the\ndiscovery of the absolute by the light of reason only, and without any\nassistance of sense, and perseveres until by pure intelligence he arrives at\nthe perception of the absolute good, he at last finds himself at the end of the\nintellectual world, as in the case of sight at the end of the visible.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nExactly, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen this is the progress which you call dialectic?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut the release of the prisoners from chains, and their translation from the\nshadows to the images and to the light, and the ascent from the underground den\nto the sun, while in his presence they are vainly trying to look on animals and\nplants and the light of the sun, but are able to perceive even with their weak\neyes the images in the water (which are divine), and are the shadows of true\nexistence (not shadows of images cast by a light of fire, which compared with\nthe sun is only an image)\u0026mdash;this power of elevating the highest principle\nin the soul to the contemplation of that which is best in existence, with which\nwe may compare the raising of that faculty which is the very light of the body\nto the sight of that which is brightest in the material and visible\nworld\u0026mdash;this power is given, as I was saying, by all that study and pursuit\nof the arts which has been described.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI agree in what you are saying, he replied, which may be hard to believe, yet,\nfrom another point of view, is harder still to deny. This, however, is not a\ntheme to be treated of in passing only, but will have to be discussed again and\nagain. And so, whether our conclusion be true or false, let us assume all this,\nand proceed at once from the prelude or preamble to the chief strain (A play\nupon the Greek word, which means both \u0026lsquo;law\u0026rsquo; and\n\u0026lsquo;strain.\u0026rsquo;), and describe that in like manner. Say, then, what is\nthe nature and what are the divisions of dialectic, and what are the paths\nwhich lead thither; for these paths will also lead to our final rest.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nDear Glaucon, I said, you will not be able to follow me here, though I would do\nmy best, and you should behold not an image only but the absolute truth,\naccording to my notion. Whether what I told you would or would not have been a\nreality I cannot venture to say; but you would have seen something like\nreality; of that I am confident.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nDoubtless, he replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut I must also remind you, that the power of dialectic alone can reveal this,\nand only to one who is a disciple of the previous sciences.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nOf that assertion you may be as confident as of the last.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd assuredly no one will argue that there is any other method of comprehending\nby any regular process all true existence or of ascertaining what each thing is\nin its own nature; for the arts in general are concerned with the desires or\nopinions of men, or are cultivated with a view to production and construction,\nor for the preservation of such productions and constructions; and as to the\nmathematical sciences which, as we were saying, have some apprehension of true\nbeing\u0026mdash;geometry and the like\u0026mdash;they only dream about being, but never\ncan they behold the waking reality so long as they leave the hypotheses which\nthey use unexamined, and are unable to give an account of them. For when a man\nknows not his own first principle, and when the conclusion and intermediate\nsteps are also constructed out of he knows not what, how can he imagine that\nsuch a fabric of convention can ever become science?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nImpossible, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen dialectic, and dialectic alone, goes directly to the first principle and\nis the only science which does away with hypotheses in order to make her ground\nsecure; the eye of the soul, which is literally buried in an outlandish slough,\nis by her gentle aid lifted upwards; and she uses as handmaids and helpers in\nthe work of conversion, the sciences which we have been discussing. Custom\nterms them sciences, but they ought to have some other name, implying greater\nclearness than opinion and less clearness than science: and this, in our\nprevious sketch, was called understanding. But why should we dispute about\nnames when we have realities of such importance to consider?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhy indeed, he said, when any name will do which expresses the thought of the\nmind with clearness?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAt any rate, we are satisfied, as before, to have four divisions; two for\nintellect and two for opinion, and to call the first division science, the\nsecond understanding, the third belief, and the fourth perception of shadows,\nopinion being concerned with becoming, and intellect with being; and so to make\na proportion:\u0026mdash;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAs being is to becoming, so is pure intellect to opinion. And as intellect is\nto opinion, so is science to belief, and understanding to the perception of\nshadows.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut let us defer the further correlation and subdivision of the subjects of\nopinion and of intellect, for it will be a long enquiry, many times longer than\nthis has been.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAs far as I understand, he said, I agree.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd do you also agree, I said, in describing the dialectician as one who\nattains a conception of the essence of each thing? And he who does not possess\nand is therefore unable to impart this conception, in whatever degree he fails,\nmay in that degree also be said to fail in intelligence? Will you admit so\nmuch?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said; how can I deny it?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd you would say the same of the conception of the good? Until the person is\nable to abstract and define rationally the idea of good, and unless he can run\nthe gauntlet of all objections, and is ready to disprove them, not by appeals\nto opinion, but to absolute truth, never faltering at any step of the\nargument\u0026mdash;unless he can do all this, you would say that he knows neither\nthe idea of good nor any other good; he apprehends only a shadow, if anything\nat all, which is given by opinion and not by science;\u0026mdash;dreaming and\nslumbering in this life, before he is well awake here, he arrives at the world\nbelow, and has his final quietus.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIn all that I should most certainly agree with you.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd surely you would not have the children of your ideal State, whom you are\nnurturing and educating\u0026mdash;if the ideal ever becomes a reality\u0026mdash;you\nwould not allow the future rulers to be like posts (Literally\n\u0026lsquo;lines,\u0026rsquo; probably the starting-point of a race-course.), having no\nreason in them, and yet to be set in authority over the highest matters?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly not.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen you will make a law that they shall have such an education as will enable\nthem to attain the greatest skill in asking and answering questions?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said, you and I together will make it.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nDialectic, then, as you will agree, is the coping-stone of the sciences, and is\nset over them; no other science can be placed higher\u0026mdash;the nature of\nknowledge can no further go?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI agree, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut to whom we are to assign these studies, and in what way they are to be\nassigned, are questions which remain to be considered.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, clearly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYou remember, I said, how the rulers were chosen before?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe same natures must still be chosen, and the preference again given to the\nsurest and the bravest, and, if possible, to the fairest; and, having noble and\ngenerous tempers, they should also have the natural gifts which will facilitate\ntheir education.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd what are these?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nSuch gifts as keenness and ready powers of acquisition; for the mind more often\nfaints from the severity of study than from the severity of gymnastics: the\ntoil is more entirely the mind\u0026rsquo;s own, and is not shared with the body.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery true, he replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nFurther, he of whom we are in search should have a good memory, and be an\nunwearied solid man who is a lover of labour in any line; or he will never be\nable to endure the great amount of bodily exercise and to go through all the\nintellectual discipline and study which we require of him.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly, he said; he must have natural gifts.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe mistake at present is, that those who study philosophy have no vocation,\nand this, as I was before saying, is the reason why she has fallen into\ndisrepute: her true sons should take her by the hand and not bastards.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat do you mean?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIn the first place, her votary should not have a lame or halting\nindustry\u0026mdash;I mean, that he should not be half industrious and half idle:\nas, for example, when a man is a lover of gymnastic and hunting, and all other\nbodily exercises, but a hater rather than a lover of the labour of learning or\nlistening or enquiring. Or the occupation to which he devotes himself may be of\nan opposite kind, and he may have the other sort of lameness.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd as to truth, I said, is not a soul equally to be deemed halt and lame which\nhates voluntary falsehood and is extremely indignant at herself and others when\nthey tell lies, but is patient of involuntary falsehood, and does not mind\nwallowing like a swinish beast in the mire of ignorance, and has no shame at\nbeing detected?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTo be sure.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd, again, in respect of temperance, courage, magnificence, and every other\nvirtue, should we not carefully distinguish between the true son and the\nbastard? for where there is no discernment of such qualities states and\nindividuals unconsciously err; and the state makes a ruler, and the individual\na friend, of one who, being defective in some part of virtue, is in a figure\nlame or a bastard.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat is very true, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAll these things, then, will have to be carefully considered by us; and if only\nthose whom we introduce to this vast system of education and training are sound\nin body and mind, justice herself will have nothing to say against us, and we\nshall be the saviours of the constitution and of the State; but, if our pupils\nare men of another stamp, the reverse will happen, and we shall pour a still\ngreater flood of ridicule on philosophy than she has to endure at present.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat would not be creditable.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly not, I said; and yet perhaps, in thus turning jest into earnest I am\nequally ridiculous.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIn what respect?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI had forgotten, I said, that we were not serious, and spoke with too much\nexcitement. For when I saw philosophy so undeservedly trampled under foot of\nmen I could not help feeling a sort of indignation at the authors of her\ndisgrace: and my anger made me too vehement.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIndeed! I was listening, and did not think so.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut I, who am the speaker, felt that I was. And now let me remind you that,\nalthough in our former selection we chose old men, we must not do so in this.\nSolon was under a delusion when he said that a man when he grows old may learn\nmany things\u0026mdash;for he can no more learn much than he can run much; youth is\nthe time for any extraordinary toil.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nOf course.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd, therefore, calculation and geometry and all the other elements of\ninstruction, which are a preparation for dialectic, should be presented to the\nmind in childhood; not, however, under any notion of forcing our system of\neducation.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhy not?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBecause a freeman ought not to be a slave in the acquisition of knowledge of\nany kind. Bodily exercise, when compulsory, does no harm to the body; but\nknowledge which is acquired under compulsion obtains no hold on the mind.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery true.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen, my good friend, I said, do not use compulsion, but let early education be\na sort of amusement; you will then be better able to find out the natural bent.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat is a very rational notion, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nDo you remember that the children, too, were to be taken to see the battle on\nhorseback; and that if there were no danger they were to be brought close up\nand, like young hounds, have a taste of blood given them?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, I remember.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe same practice may be followed, I said, in all these things\u0026mdash;labours,\nlessons, dangers\u0026mdash;and he who is most at home in all of them ought to be\nenrolled in a select number.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAt what age?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAt the age when the necessary gymnastics are over: the period whether of two or\nthree years which passes in this sort of training is useless for any other\npurpose; for sleep and exercise are unpropitious to learning; and the trial of\nwho is first in gymnastic exercises is one of the most important tests to which\nour youth are subjected.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly, he replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAfter that time those who are selected from the class of twenty years old will\nbe promoted to higher honour, and the sciences which they learned without any\norder in their early education will now be brought together, and they will be\nable to see the natural relationship of them to one another and to true being.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said, that is the only kind of knowledge which takes lasting root.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, I said; and the capacity for such knowledge is the great criterion of\ndialectical talent: the comprehensive mind is always the dialectical.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI agree with you, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThese, I said, are the points which you must consider; and those who have most\nof this comprehension, and who are most steadfast in their learning, and in\ntheir military and other appointed duties, when they have arrived at the age of\nthirty have to be chosen by you out of the select class, and elevated to higher\nhonour; and you will have to prove them by the help of dialectic, in order to\nlearn which of them is able to give up the use of sight and the other senses,\nand in company with truth to attain absolute being: And here, my friend, great\ncaution is required.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhy great caution?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nDo you not remark, I said, how great is the evil which dialectic has\nintroduced?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat evil? he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe students of the art are filled with lawlessness.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nQuite true, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nDo you think that there is anything so very unnatural or inexcusable in their\ncase? or will you make allowance for them?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIn what way make allowance?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI want you, I said, by way of parallel, to imagine a supposititious son who is\nbrought up in great wealth; he is one of a great and numerous family, and has\nmany flatterers. When he grows up to manhood, he learns that his alleged are\nnot his real parents; but who the real are he is unable to discover. Can you\nguess how he will be likely to behave towards his flatterers and his supposed\nparents, first of all during the period when he is ignorant of the false\nrelation, and then again when he knows? Or shall I guess for you?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIf you please.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen I should say, that while he is ignorant of the truth he will be likely to\nhonour his father and his mother and his supposed relations more than the\nflatterers; he will be less inclined to neglect them when in need, or to do or\nsay anything against them; and he will be less willing to disobey them in any\nimportant matter.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHe will.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut when he has made the discovery, I should imagine that he would diminish his\nhonour and regard for them, and would become more devoted to the flatterers;\ntheir influence over him would greatly increase; he would now live after their\nways, and openly associate with them, and, unless he were of an unusually good\ndisposition, he would trouble himself no more about his supposed parents or\nother relations.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWell, all that is very probable. But how is the image applicable to the\ndisciples of philosophy?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIn this way: you know that there are certain principles about justice and\nhonour, which were taught us in childhood, and under their parental authority\nwe have been brought up, obeying and honouring them.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat is true.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThere are also opposite maxims and habits of pleasure which flatter and attract\nthe soul, but do not influence those of us who have any sense of right, and\nthey continue to obey and honour the maxims of their fathers.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNow, when a man is in this state, and the questioning spirit asks what is fair\nor honourable, and he answers as the legislator has taught him, and then\narguments many and diverse refute his words, until he is driven into believing\nthat nothing is honourable any more than dishonourable, or just and good any\nmore than the reverse, and so of all the notions which he most valued, do you\nthink that he will still honour and obey them as before?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nImpossible.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd when he ceases to think them honourable and natural as heretofore, and he\nfails to discover the true, can he be expected to pursue any life other than\nthat which flatters his desires?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHe cannot.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd from being a keeper of the law he is converted into a breaker of it?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nUnquestionably.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNow all this is very natural in students of philosophy such as I have\ndescribed, and also, as I was just now saying, most excusable.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said; and, I may add, pitiable.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTherefore, that your feelings may not be moved to pity about our citizens who\nare now thirty years of age, every care must be taken in introducing them to\ndialectic.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThere is a danger lest they should taste the dear delight too early; for\nyoungsters, as you may have observed, when they first get the taste in their\nmouths, argue for amusement, and are always contradicting and refuting others\nin imitation of those who refute them; like puppy-dogs, they rejoice in pulling\nand tearing at all who come near them.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said, there is nothing which they like better.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd when they have made many conquests and received defeats at the hands of\nmany, they violently and speedily get into a way of not believing anything\nwhich they believed before, and hence, not only they, but philosophy and all\nthat relates to it is apt to have a bad name with the rest of the world.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nToo true, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut when a man begins to get older, he will no longer be guilty of such\ninsanity; he will imitate the dialectician who is seeking for truth, and not\nthe eristic, who is contradicting for the sake of amusement; and the greater\nmoderation of his character will increase instead of diminishing the honour of\nthe pursuit.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery true, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd did we not make special provision for this, when we said that the disciples\nof philosophy were to be orderly and steadfast, not, as now, any chance\naspirant or intruder?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery true.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nSuppose, I said, the study of philosophy to take the place of gymnastics and to\nbe continued diligently and earnestly and exclusively for twice the number of\nyears which were passed in bodily exercise\u0026mdash;will that be enough?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWould you say six or four years? he asked.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nSay five years, I replied; at the end of the time they must be sent down again\ninto the den and compelled to hold any military or other office which young men\nare qualified to hold: in this way they will get their experience of life, and\nthere will be an opportunity of trying whether, when they are drawn all manner\nof ways by temptation, they will stand firm or flinch.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd how long is this stage of their lives to last?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nFifteen years, I answered; and when they have reached fifty years of age, then\nlet those who still survive and have distinguished themselves in every action\nof their lives and in every branch of knowledge come at last to their\nconsummation: the time has now arrived at which they must raise the eye of the\nsoul to the universal light which lightens all things, and behold the absolute\ngood; for that is the pattern according to which they are to order the State\nand the lives of individuals, and the remainder of their own lives also; making\nphilosophy their chief pursuit, but, when their turn comes, toiling also at\npolitics and ruling for the public good, not as though they were performing\nsome heroic action, but simply as a matter of duty; and when they have brought\nup in each generation others like themselves and left them in their place to be\ngovernors of the State, then they will depart to the Islands of the Blest and\ndwell there; and the city will give them public memorials and sacrifices and\nhonour them, if the Pythian oracle consent, as demigods, but if not, as in any\ncase blessed and divine.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYou are a sculptor, Socrates, and have made statues of our governors faultless\nin beauty.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, I said, Glaucon, and of our governesses too; for you must not suppose that\nwhat I have been saying applies to men only and not to women as far as their\nnatures can go.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThere you are right, he said, since we have made them to share in all things\nlike the men.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWell, I said, and you would agree (would you not?) that what has been said\nabout the State and the government is not a mere dream, and although difficult\nnot impossible, but only possible in the way which has been supposed; that is\nto say, when the true philosopher kings are born in a State, one or more of\nthem, despising the honours of this present world which they deem mean and\nworthless, esteeming above all things right and the honour that springs from\nright, and regarding justice as the greatest and most necessary of all things,\nwhose ministers they are, and whose principles will be exalted by them when\nthey set in order their own city?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHow will they proceed?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThey will begin by sending out into the country all the inhabitants of the city\nwho are more than ten years old, and will take possession of their children,\nwho will be unaffected by the habits of their parents; these they will train in\ntheir own habits and laws, I mean in the laws which we have given them: and in\nthis way the State and constitution of which we were speaking will soonest and\nmost easily attain happiness, and the nation which has such a constitution will\ngain most.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, that will be the best way. And I think, Socrates, that you have very well\ndescribed how, if ever, such a constitution might come into being.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nEnough then of the perfect State, and of the man who bears its\nimage\u0026mdash;there is no difficulty in seeing how we shall describe him.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThere is no difficulty, he replied; and I agree with you in thinking that\nnothing more need be said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003c!–end chapter–\u003e\n\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\n\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca id=\"link2H_4_0011\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e BOOK VIII.\u003c/h2\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd so, Glaucon, we have arrived at the conclusion that in the perfect State\nwives and children are to be in common; and that all education and the pursuits\nof war and peace are also to be common, and the best philosophers and the\nbravest warriors are to be their kings?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat, replied Glaucon, has been acknowledged.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, I said; and we have further acknowledged that the governors, when\nappointed themselves, will take their soldiers and place them in houses such as\nwe were describing, which are common to all, and contain nothing private, or\nindividual; and about their property, you remember what we agreed?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, I remember that no one was to have any of the ordinary possessions of\nmankind; they were to be warrior athletes and guardians, receiving from the\nother citizens, in lieu of annual payment, only their maintenance, and they\nwere to take care of themselves and of the whole State.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue, I said; and now that this division of our task is concluded, let us find\nthe point at which we digressed, that we may return into the old path.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThere is no difficulty in returning; you implied, then as now, that you had\nfinished the description of the State: you said that such a State was good, and\nthat the man was good who answered to it, although, as now appears, you had\nmore excellent things to relate both of State and man. And you said further,\nthat if this was the true form, then the others were false; and of the false\nforms, you said, as I remember, that there were four principal ones, and that\ntheir defects, and the defects of the individuals corresponding to them, were\nworth examining. When we had seen all the individuals, and finally agreed as to\nwho was the best and who was the worst of them, we were to consider whether the\nbest was not also the happiest, and the worst the most miserable. I asked you\nwhat were the four forms of government of which you spoke, and then Polemarchus\nand Adeimantus put in their word; and you began again, and have found your way\nto the point at which we have now arrived.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYour recollection, I said, is most exact.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen, like a wrestler, he replied, you must put yourself again in the same\nposition; and let me ask the same questions, and do you give me the same answer\nwhich you were about to give me then.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, if I can, I will, I said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI shall particularly wish to hear what were the four constitutions of which you\nwere speaking.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat question, I said, is easily answered: the four governments of which I\nspoke, so far as they have distinct names, are, first, those of Crete and\nSparta, which are generally applauded; what is termed oligarchy comes next;\nthis is not equally approved, and is a form of government which teems with\nevils: thirdly, democracy, which naturally follows oligarchy, although very\ndifferent: and lastly comes tyranny, great and famous, which differs from them\nall, and is the fourth and worst disorder of a State. I do not know, do you? of\nany other constitution which can be said to have a distinct character. There\nare lordships and principalities which are bought and sold, and some other\nintermediate forms of government. But these are nondescripts and may be found\nequally among Hellenes and among barbarians.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he replied, we certainly hear of many curious forms of government which\nexist among them.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nDo you know, I said, that governments vary as the dispositions of men vary, and\nthat there must be as many of the one as there are of the other? For we cannot\nsuppose that States are made of \u0026lsquo;oak and rock,\u0026rsquo; and not out of the\nhuman natures which are in them, and which in a figure turn the scale and draw\nother things after them?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said, the States are as the men are; they grow out of human characters.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen if the constitutions of States are five, the dispositions of individual\nminds will also be five?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHim who answers to aristocracy, and whom we rightly call just and good, we have\nalready described.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWe have.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen let us now proceed to describe the inferior sort of natures, being the\ncontentious and ambitious, who answer to the Spartan polity; also the\noligarchical, democratical, and tyrannical. Let us place the most just by the\nside of the most unjust, and when we see them we shall be able to compare the\nrelative happiness or unhappiness of him who leads a life of pure justice or\npure injustice. The enquiry will then be completed. And we shall know whether\nwe ought to pursue injustice, as Thrasymachus advises, or in accordance with\nthe conclusions of the argument to prefer justice.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly, he replied, we must do as you say.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nShall we follow our old plan, which we adopted with a view to clearness, of\ntaking the State first and then proceeding to the individual, and begin with\nthe government of honour?\u0026mdash;I know of no name for such a government other\nthan timocracy, or perhaps timarchy. We will compare with this the like\ncharacter in the individual; and, after that, consider oligarchy and the\noligarchical man; and then again we will turn our attention to democracy and\nthe democratical man; and lastly, we will go and view the city of tyranny, and\nonce more take a look into the tyrant\u0026rsquo;s soul, and try to arrive at a\nsatisfactory decision.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat way of viewing and judging of the matter will be very suitable.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nFirst, then, I said, let us enquire how timocracy (the government of honour)\narises out of aristocracy (the government of the best). Clearly, all political\nchanges originate in divisions of the actual governing power; a government\nwhich is united, however small, cannot be moved.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery true, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIn what way, then, will our city be moved, and in what manner will the two\nclasses of auxiliaries and rulers disagree among themselves or with one\nanother? Shall we, after the manner of Homer, pray the Muses to tell us\n\u0026lsquo;how discord first arose\u0026rsquo;? Shall we imagine them in solemn mockery,\nto play and jest with us as if we were children, and to address us in a lofty\ntragic vein, making believe to be in earnest?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHow would they address us?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAfter this manner:\u0026mdash;A city which is thus constituted can hardly be shaken;\nbut, seeing that everything which has a beginning has also an end, even a\nconstitution such as yours will not last for ever, but will in time be\ndissolved. And this is the dissolution:\u0026mdash;In plants that grow in the earth,\nas well as in animals that move on the earth\u0026rsquo;s surface, fertility and\nsterility of soul and body occur when the circumferences of the circles of each\nare completed, which in short-lived existences pass over a short space, and in\nlong-lived ones over a long space. But to the knowledge of human fecundity and\nsterility all the wisdom and education of your rulers will not attain; the laws\nwhich regulate them will not be discovered by an intelligence which is alloyed\nwith sense, but will escape them, and they will bring children into the world\nwhen they ought not. Now that which is of divine birth has a period which is\ncontained in a perfect number (i.e. a cyclical number, such as 6, which is\nequal to the sum of its divisors 1, 2, 3, so that when the circle or time\nrepresented by 6 is completed, the lesser times or rotations represented by 1,\n2, 3 are also completed.), but the period of human birth is comprehended in a\nnumber in which first increments by involution and evolution (or squared and\ncubed) obtaining three intervals and four terms of like and unlike, waxing and\nwaning numbers, make all the terms commensurable and agreeable to one another.\n(Probably the numbers 3, 4, 5, 6 of which the three first = the sides of the\nPythagorean triangle. The terms will then be 3 cubed, 4 cubed, 5 cubed, which\ntogether = 6 cubed = 216.) The base of these (3) with a third added (4) when\ncombined with five (20) and raised to the third power furnishes two harmonies;\nthe first a square which is a hundred times as great (400 = 4 x 100) (Or the\nfirst a square which is 100 x 100 = 10,000. The whole number will then be\n17,500 = a square of 100, and an oblong of 100 by 75.), and the other a figure\nhaving one side equal to the former, but oblong, consisting of a hundred\nnumbers squared upon rational diameters of a square (i.e. omitting fractions),\nthe side of which is five (7 x 7 = 49 x 100 = 4900), each of them being less by\none (than the perfect square which includes the fractions, sc. 50) or less by\n(Or, \u0026lsquo;consisting of two numbers squared upon irrational diameters,\u0026rsquo;\netc. = 100. For other explanations of the passage see Introduction.) two\nperfect squares of irrational diameters (of a square the side of which is five\n= 50 + 50 = 100); and a hundred cubes of three (27 x 100 = 2700 + 4900 + 400 =\n8000). Now this number represents a geometrical figure which has control over\nthe good and evil of births. For when your guardians are ignorant of the law of\nbirths, and unite bride and bridegroom out of season, the children will not be\ngoodly or fortunate. And though only the best of them will be appointed by\ntheir predecessors, still they will be unworthy to hold their fathers\u0026rsquo;\nplaces, and when they come into power as guardians, they will soon be found to\nfail in taking care of us, the Muses, first by under-valuing music; which\nneglect will soon extend to gymnastic; and hence the young men of your State\nwill be less cultivated. In the succeeding generation rulers will be appointed\nwho have lost the guardian power of testing the metal of your different races,\nwhich, like Hesiod\u0026rsquo;s, are of gold and silver and brass and iron. And so\niron will be mingled with silver, and brass with gold, and hence there will\narise dissimilarity and inequality and irregularity, which always and in all\nplaces are causes of hatred and war. This the Muses affirm to be the stock from\nwhich discord has sprung, wherever arising; and this is their answer to us.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, and we may assume that they answer truly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhy, yes, I said, of course they answer truly; how can the Muses speak falsely?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd what do the Muses say next?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhen discord arose, then the two races were drawn different ways: the iron and\nbrass fell to acquiring money and land and houses and gold and silver; but the\ngold and silver races, not wanting money but having the true riches in their\nown nature, inclined towards virtue and the ancient order of things. There was\na battle between them, and at last they agreed to distribute their land and\nhouses among individual owners; and they enslaved their friends and\nmaintainers, whom they had formerly protected in the condition of freemen, and\nmade of them subjects and servants; and they themselves were engaged in war and\nin keeping a watch against them.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI believe that you have rightly conceived the origin of the change.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd the new government which thus arises will be of a form intermediate between\noligarchy and aristocracy?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery true.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nSuch will be the change, and after the change has been made, how will they\nproceed? Clearly, the new State, being in a mean between oligarchy and the\nperfect State, will partly follow one and partly the other, and will also have\nsome peculiarities.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIn the honour given to rulers, in the abstinence of the warrior class from\nagriculture, handicrafts, and trade in general, in the institution of common\nmeals, and in the attention paid to gymnastics and military training\u0026mdash;in\nall these respects this State will resemble the former.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut in the fear of admitting philosophers to power, because they are no longer\nto be had simple and earnest, but are made up of mixed elements; and in turning\nfrom them to passionate and less complex characters, who are by nature fitted\nfor war rather than peace; and in the value set by them upon military\nstratagems and contrivances, and in the waging of everlasting wars\u0026mdash;this\nState will be for the most part peculiar.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, I said; and men of this stamp will be covetous of money, like those who\nlive in oligarchies; they will have, a fierce secret longing after gold and\nsilver, which they will hoard in dark places, having magazines and treasuries\nof their own for the deposit and concealment of them; also castles which are\njust nests for their eggs, and in which they will spend large sums on their\nwives, or on any others whom they please.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat is most true, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd they are miserly because they have no means of openly acquiring the money\nwhich they prize; they will spend that which is another man\u0026rsquo;s on the\ngratification of their desires, stealing their pleasures and running away like\nchildren from the law, their father: they have been schooled not by gentle\ninfluences but by force, for they have neglected her who is the true Muse, the\ncompanion of reason and philosophy, and have honoured gymnastic more than\nmusic.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nUndoubtedly, he said, the form of government which you describe is a mixture of\ngood and evil.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhy, there is a mixture, I said; but one thing, and one thing only, is\npredominantly seen,\u0026mdash;the spirit of contention and ambition; and these are\ndue to the prevalence of the passionate or spirited element.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAssuredly, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nSuch is the origin and such the character of this State, which has been\ndescribed in outline only; the more perfect execution was not required, for a\nsketch is enough to show the type of the most perfectly just and most perfectly\nunjust; and to go through all the States and all the characters of men,\nomitting none of them, would be an interminable labour.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery true, he replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNow what man answers to this form of government-how did he come into being, and\nwhat is he like?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI think, said Adeimantus, that in the spirit of contention which characterises\nhim, he is not unlike our friend Glaucon.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nPerhaps, I said, he may be like him in that one point; but there are other\nrespects in which he is very different.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIn what respects?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHe should have more of self-assertion and be less cultivated, and yet a friend\nof culture; and he should be a good listener, but no speaker. Such a person is\napt to be rough with slaves, unlike the educated man, who is too proud for\nthat; and he will also be courteous to freemen, and remarkably obedient to\nauthority; he is a lover of power and a lover of honour; claiming to be a\nruler, not because he is eloquent, or on any ground of that sort, but because\nhe is a soldier and has performed feats of arms; he is also a lover of\ngymnastic exercises and of the chase.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, that is the type of character which answers to timocracy.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nSuch an one will despise riches only when he is young; but as he gets older he\nwill be more and more attracted to them, because he has a piece of the\navaricious nature in him, and is not single-minded towards virtue, having lost\nhis best guardian.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWho was that? said Adeimantus.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nPhilosophy, I said, tempered with music, who comes and takes up her abode in a\nman, and is the only saviour of his virtue throughout life.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nGood, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nSuch, I said, is the timocratical youth, and he is like the timocratical State.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nExactly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHis origin is as follows:\u0026mdash;He is often the young son of a brave father,\nwho dwells in an ill-governed city, of which he declines the honours and\noffices, and will not go to law, or exert himself in any way, but is ready to\nwaive his rights in order that he may escape trouble.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd how does the son come into being?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe character of the son begins to develope when he hears his mother\ncomplaining that her husband has no place in the government, of which the\nconsequence is that she has no precedence among other women. Further, when she\nsees her husband not very eager about money, and instead of battling and\nrailing in the law courts or assembly, taking whatever happens to him quietly;\nand when she observes that his thoughts always centre in himself, while he\ntreats her with very considerable indifference, she is annoyed, and says to her\nson that his father is only half a man and far too easy-going: adding all the\nother complaints about her own ill-treatment which women are so fond of\nrehearsing.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, said Adeimantus, they give us plenty of them, and their complaints are so\nlike themselves.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd you know, I said, that the old servants also, who are supposed to be\nattached to the family, from time to time talk privately in the same strain to\nthe son; and if they see any one who owes money to his father, or is wronging\nhim in any way, and he fails to prosecute them, they tell the youth that when\nhe grows up he must retaliate upon people of this sort, and be more of a man\nthan his father. He has only to walk abroad and he hears and sees the same sort\nof thing: those who do their own business in the city are called simpletons,\nand held in no esteem, while the busy-bodies are honoured and applauded. The\nresult is that the young man, hearing and seeing all these\nthings\u0026mdash;hearing, too, the words of his father, and having a nearer view of\nhis way of life, and making comparisons of him and others\u0026mdash;is drawn\nopposite ways: while his father is watering and nourishing the rational\nprinciple in his soul, the others are encouraging the passionate and\nappetitive; and he being not originally of a bad nature, but having kept bad\ncompany, is at last brought by their joint influence to a middle point, and\ngives up the kingdom which is within him to the middle principle of\ncontentiousness and passion, and becomes arrogant and ambitious.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYou seem to me to have described his origin perfectly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen we have now, I said, the second form of government and the second type of\ncharacter?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWe have.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNext, let us look at another man who, as Aeschylus says,\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n\u0026lsquo;Is set over against another State;\u0026rsquo;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nor rather, as our plan requires, begin with the State.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBy all means.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI believe that oligarchy follows next in order.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd what manner of government do you term oligarchy?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nA government resting on a valuation of property, in which the rich have power\nand the poor man is deprived of it.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI understand, he replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nOught I not to begin by describing how the change from timocracy to oligarchy\narises?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWell, I said, no eyes are required in order to see how the one passes into the\nother.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHow?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe accumulation of gold in the treasury of private individuals is the ruin of\ntimocracy; they invent illegal modes of expenditure; for what do they or their\nwives care about the law?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, indeed.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd then one, seeing another grow rich, seeks to rival him, and thus the great\nmass of the citizens become lovers of money.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nLikely enough.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd so they grow richer and richer, and the more they think of making a fortune\nthe less they think of virtue; for when riches and virtue are placed together\nin the scales of the balance, the one always rises as the other falls.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd in proportion as riches and rich men are honoured in the State, virtue and\nthe virtuous are dishonoured.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nClearly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd what is honoured is cultivated, and that which has no honour is neglected.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat is obvious.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd so at last, instead of loving contention and glory, men become lovers of\ntrade and money; they honour and look up to the rich man, and make a ruler of\nhim, and dishonour the poor man.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThey do so.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThey next proceed to make a law which fixes a sum of money as the qualification\nof citizenship; the sum is higher in one place and lower in another, as the\noligarchy is more or less exclusive; and they allow no one whose property falls\nbelow the amount fixed to have any share in the government. These changes in\nthe constitution they effect by force of arms, if intimidation has not already\ndone their work.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery true.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd this, speaking generally, is the way in which oligarchy is established.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said; but what are the characteristics of this form of government, and\nwhat are the defects of which we were speaking?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nFirst of all, I said, consider the nature of the qualification. Just think what\nwould happen if pilots were to be chosen according to their property, and a\npoor man were refused permission to steer, even though he were a better pilot?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYou mean that they would shipwreck?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes; and is not this true of the government of anything?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI should imagine so.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nExcept a city?\u0026mdash;or would you include a city?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNay, he said, the case of a city is the strongest of all, inasmuch as the rule\nof a city is the greatest and most difficult of all.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThis, then, will be the first great defect of oligarchy?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nClearly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd here is another defect which is quite as bad.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat defect?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe inevitable division: such a State is not one, but two States, the one of\npoor, the other of rich men; and they are living on the same spot and always\nconspiring against one another.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat, surely, is at least as bad.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnother discreditable feature is, that, for a like reason, they are incapable\nof carrying on any war. Either they arm the multitude, and then they are more\nafraid of them than of the enemy; or, if they do not call them out in the hour\nof battle, they are oligarchs indeed, few to fight as they are few to rule. And\nat the same time their fondness for money makes them unwilling to pay taxes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHow discreditable!\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd, as we said before, under such a constitution the same persons have too\nmany callings\u0026mdash;they are husbandmen, tradesmen, warriors, all in one. Does\nthat look well?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnything but well.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThere is another evil which is, perhaps, the greatest of all, and to which this\nState first begins to be liable.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat evil?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nA man may sell all that he has, and another may acquire his property; yet after\nthe sale he may dwell in the city of which he is no longer a part, being\nneither trader, nor artisan, nor horseman, nor hoplite, but only a poor,\nhelpless creature.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, that is an evil which also first begins in this State.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe evil is certainly not prevented there; for oligarchies have both the\nextremes of great wealth and utter poverty.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut think again: In his wealthy days, while he was spending his money, was a\nman of this sort a whit more good to the State for the purposes of citizenship?\nOr did he only seem to be a member of the ruling body, although in truth he was\nneither ruler nor subject, but just a spendthrift?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAs you say, he seemed to be a ruler, but was only a spendthrift.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nMay we not say that this is the drone in the house who is like the drone in the\nhoneycomb, and that the one is the plague of the city as the other is of the\nhive?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nJust so, Socrates.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd God has made the flying drones, Adeimantus, all without stings, whereas of\nthe walking drones he has made some without stings but others have dreadful\nstings; of the stingless class are those who in their old age end as paupers;\nof the stingers come all the criminal class, as they are termed.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nMost true, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nClearly then, whenever you see paupers in a State, somewhere in that\nneighborhood there are hidden away thieves, and cut-purses and robbers of\ntemples, and all sorts of malefactors.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nClearly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWell, I said, and in oligarchical States do you not find paupers?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said; nearly everybody is a pauper who is not a ruler.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd may we be so bold as to affirm that there are also many criminals to be\nfound in them, rogues who have stings, and whom the authorities are careful to\nrestrain by force?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly, we may be so bold.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe existence of such persons is to be attributed to want of education,\nill-training, and an evil constitution of the State?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nSuch, then, is the form and such are the evils of oligarchy; and there may be\nmany other evils.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery likely.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen oligarchy, or the form of government in which the rulers are elected for\ntheir wealth, may now be dismissed. Let us next proceed to consider the nature\nand origin of the individual who answers to this State.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBy all means.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nDoes not the timocratical man change into the oligarchical on this wise?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHow?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nA time arrives when the representative of timocracy has a son: at first he\nbegins by emulating his father and walking in his footsteps, but presently he\nsees him of a sudden foundering against the State as upon a sunken reef, and he\nand all that he has is lost; he may have been a general or some other high\nofficer who is brought to trial under a prejudice raised by informers, and\neither put to death, or exiled, or deprived of the privileges of a citizen, and\nall his property taken from him.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNothing more likely.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd the son has seen and known all this\u0026mdash;he is a ruined man, and his fear\nhas taught him to knock ambition and passion headforemost from his\nbosom\u0026rsquo;s throne; humbled by poverty he takes to money-making and by mean\nand miserly savings and hard work gets a fortune together. Is not such an one\nlikely to seat the concupiscent and covetous element on the vacant throne and\nto suffer it to play the great king within him, girt with tiara and chain and\nscimitar?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nMost true, he replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd when he has made reason and spirit sit down on the ground obediently on\neither side of their sovereign, and taught them to know their place, he compels\nthe one to think only of how lesser sums may be turned into larger ones, and\nwill not allow the other to worship and admire anything but riches and rich\nmen, or to be ambitious of anything so much as the acquisition of wealth and\nthe means of acquiring it.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nOf all changes, he said, there is none so speedy or so sure as the conversion\nof the ambitious youth into the avaricious one.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd the avaricious, I said, is the oligarchical youth?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said; at any rate the individual out of whom he came is like the State\nout of which oligarchy came.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nLet us then consider whether there is any likeness between them.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery good.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nFirst, then, they resemble one another in the value which they set upon wealth?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAlso in their penurious, laborious character; the individual only satisfies his\nnecessary appetites, and confines his expenditure to them; his other desires he\nsubdues, under the idea that they are unprofitable.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHe is a shabby fellow, who saves something out of everything and makes a purse\nfor himself; and this is the sort of man whom the vulgar applaud. Is he not a\ntrue image of the State which he represents?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHe appears to me to be so; at any rate money is highly valued by him as well as\nby the State.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYou see that he is not a man of cultivation, I said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI imagine not, he said; had he been educated he would never have made a blind\ngod director of his chorus, or given him chief honour.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nExcellent! I said. Yet consider: Must we not further admit that owing to this\nwant of cultivation there will be found in him dronelike desires as of pauper\nand rogue, which are forcibly kept down by his general habit of life?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nDo you know where you will have to look if you want to discover his rogueries?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhere must I look?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYou should see him where he has some great opportunity of acting dishonestly,\nas in the guardianship of an orphan.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAye.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIt will be clear enough then that in his ordinary dealings which give him a\nreputation for honesty he coerces his bad passions by an enforced virtue; not\nmaking them see that they are wrong, or taming them by reason, but by necessity\nand fear constraining them, and because he trembles for his possessions.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTo be sure.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, indeed, my dear friend, but you will find that the natural desires of the\ndrone commonly exist in him all the same whenever he has to spend what is not\nhis own.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, and they will be strong in him too.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe man, then, will be at war with himself; he will be two men, and not one;\nbut, in general, his better desires will be found to prevail over his inferior\nones.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nFor these reasons such an one will be more respectable than most people; yet\nthe true virtue of a unanimous and harmonious soul will flee far away and never\ncome near him.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI should expect so.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd surely, the miser individually will be an ignoble competitor in a State for\nany prize of victory, or other object of honourable ambition; he will not spend\nhis money in the contest for glory; so afraid is he of awakening his expensive\nappetites and inviting them to help and join in the struggle; in true\noligarchical fashion he fights with a small part only of his resources, and the\nresult commonly is that he loses the prize and saves his money.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery true.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCan we any longer doubt, then, that the miser and money-maker answers to the\noligarchical State?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThere can be no doubt.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNext comes democracy; of this the origin and nature have still to be considered\nby us; and then we will enquire into the ways of the democratic man, and bring\nhim up for judgment.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat, he said, is our method.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWell, I said, and how does the change from oligarchy into democracy arise? Is\nit not on this wise?\u0026mdash;The good at which such a State aims is to become as\nrich as possible, a desire which is insatiable?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat then?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe rulers, being aware that their power rests upon their wealth, refuse to\ncurtail by law the extravagance of the spendthrift youth because they gain by\ntheir ruin; they take interest from them and buy up their estates and thus\nincrease their own wealth and importance?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTo be sure.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThere can be no doubt that the love of wealth and the spirit of moderation\ncannot exist together in citizens of the same state to any considerable extent;\none or the other will be disregarded.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat is tolerably clear.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd in oligarchical States, from the general spread of carelessness and\nextravagance, men of good family have often been reduced to beggary?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, often.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd still they remain in the city; there they are, ready to sting and fully\narmed, and some of them owe money, some have forfeited their citizenship; a\nthird class are in both predicaments; and they hate and conspire against those\nwho have got their property, and against everybody else, and are eager for\nrevolution.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat is true.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nOn the other hand, the men of business, stooping as they walk, and pretending\nnot even to see those whom they have already ruined, insert their\nsting\u0026mdash;that is, their money\u0026mdash;into some one else who is not on his\nguard against them, and recover the parent sum many times over multiplied into\na family of children: and so they make drone and pauper to abound in the State.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said, there are plenty of them\u0026mdash;that is certain.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe evil blazes up like a fire; and they will not extinguish it, either by\nrestricting a man\u0026rsquo;s use of his own property, or by another remedy:\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat other?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nOne which is the next best, and has the advantage of compelling the citizens to\nlook to their characters:\u0026mdash;Let there be a general rule that every one\nshall enter into voluntary contracts at his own risk, and there will be less of\nthis scandalous money-making, and the evils of which we were speaking will be\ngreatly lessened in the State.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, they will be greatly lessened.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAt present the governors, induced by the motives which I have named, treat\ntheir subjects badly; while they and their adherents, especially the young men\nof the governing class, are habituated to lead a life of luxury and idleness\nboth of body and mind; they do nothing, and are incapable of resisting either\npleasure or pain.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery true.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThey themselves care only for making money, and are as indifferent as the\npauper to the cultivation of virtue.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, quite as indifferent.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nSuch is the state of affairs which prevails among them. And often rulers and\ntheir subjects may come in one another\u0026rsquo;s way, whether on a journey or on\nsome other occasion of meeting, on a pilgrimage or a march, as fellow-soldiers\nor fellow-sailors; aye and they may observe the behaviour of each other in the\nvery moment of danger\u0026mdash;for where danger is, there is no fear that the poor\nwill be despised by the rich\u0026mdash;and very likely the wiry sunburnt poor man\nmay be placed in battle at the side of a wealthy one who has never spoilt his\ncomplexion and has plenty of superfluous flesh\u0026mdash;when he sees such an one\npuffing and at his wits\u0026rsquo;-end, how can he avoid drawing the conclusion\nthat men like him are only rich because no one has the courage to despoil them?\nAnd when they meet in private will not people be saying to one another\n\u0026lsquo;Our warriors are not good for much\u0026rsquo;?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said, I am quite aware that this is their way of talking.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd, as in a body which is diseased the addition of a touch from without may\nbring on illness, and sometimes even when there is no external provocation a\ncommotion may arise within\u0026mdash;in the same way wherever there is weakness in\nthe State there is also likely to be illness, of which the occasion may be very\nslight, the one party introducing from without their oligarchical, the other\ntheir democratical allies, and then the State falls sick, and is at war with\nherself; and may be at times distracted, even when there is no external cause.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, surely.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd then democracy comes into being after the poor have conquered their\nopponents, slaughtering some and banishing some, while to the remainder they\ngive an equal share of freedom and power; and this is the form of government in\nwhich the magistrates are commonly elected by lot.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said, that is the nature of democracy, whether the revolution has been\neffected by arms, or whether fear has caused the opposite party to withdraw.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd now what is their manner of life, and what sort of a government have they?\nfor as the government is, such will be the man.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nClearly, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIn the first place, are they not free; and is not the city full of freedom and\nfrankness\u0026mdash;a man may say and do what he likes?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n\u0026rsquo;Tis said so, he replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd where freedom is, the individual is clearly able to order for himself his\nown life as he pleases?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nClearly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen in this kind of State there will be the greatest variety of human natures?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThere will.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThis, then, seems likely to be the fairest of States, being like an embroidered\nrobe which is spangled with every sort of flower. And just as women and\nchildren think a variety of colours to be of all things most charming, so there\nare many men to whom this State, which is spangled with the manners and\ncharacters of mankind, will appear to be the fairest of States.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, my good Sir, and there will be no better in which to look for a\ngovernment.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhy?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBecause of the liberty which reigns there\u0026mdash;they have a complete assortment\nof constitutions; and he who has a mind to establish a State, as we have been\ndoing, must go to a democracy as he would to a bazaar at which they sell them,\nand pick out the one that suits him; then, when he has made his choice, he may\nfound his State.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHe will be sure to have patterns enough.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd there being no necessity, I said, for you to govern in this State, even if\nyou have the capacity, or to be governed, unless you like, or go to war when\nthe rest go to war, or to be at peace when others are at peace, unless you are\nso disposed\u0026mdash;there being no necessity also, because some law forbids you\nto hold office or be a dicast, that you should not hold office or be a dicast,\nif you have a fancy\u0026mdash;is not this a way of life which for the moment is\nsupremely delightful?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nFor the moment, yes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd is not their humanity to the condemned in some cases quite charming? Have\nyou not observed how, in a democracy, many persons, although they have been\nsentenced to death or exile, just stay where they are and walk about the\nworld\u0026mdash;the gentleman parades like a hero, and nobody sees or cares?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he replied, many and many a one.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nSee too, I said, the forgiving spirit of democracy, and the \u0026lsquo;don\u0026rsquo;t\ncare\u0026rsquo; about trifles, and the disregard which she shows of all the fine\nprinciples which we solemnly laid down at the foundation of the city\u0026mdash;as\nwhen we said that, except in the case of some rarely gifted nature, there never\nwill be a good man who has not from his childhood been used to play amid things\nof beauty and make of them a joy and a study\u0026mdash;how grandly does she trample\nall these fine notions of ours under her feet, never giving a thought to the\npursuits which make a statesman, and promoting to honour any one who professes\nto be the people\u0026rsquo;s friend.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, she is of a noble spirit.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThese and other kindred characteristics are proper to democracy, which is a\ncharming form of government, full of variety and disorder, and dispensing a\nsort of equality to equals and unequals alike.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWe know her well.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nConsider now, I said, what manner of man the individual is, or rather consider,\nas in the case of the State, how he comes into being.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery good, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIs not this the way\u0026mdash;he is the son of the miserly and oligarchical father\nwho has trained him in his own habits?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nExactly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd, like his father, he keeps under by force the pleasures which are of the\nspending and not of the getting sort, being those which are called unnecessary?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nObviously.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWould you like, for the sake of clearness, to distinguish which are the\nnecessary and which are the unnecessary pleasures?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI should.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAre not necessary pleasures those of which we cannot get rid, and of which the\nsatisfaction is a benefit to us? And they are rightly called so, because we are\nframed by nature to desire both what is beneficial and what is necessary, and\ncannot help it.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWe are not wrong therefore in calling them necessary?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWe are not.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd the desires of which a man may get rid, if he takes pains from his youth\nupwards\u0026mdash;of which the presence, moreover, does no good, and in some cases\nthe reverse of good\u0026mdash;shall we not be right in saying that all these are\nunnecessary?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, certainly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nSuppose we select an example of either kind, in order that we may have a\ngeneral notion of them?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery good.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWill not the desire of eating, that is, of simple food and condiments, in so\nfar as they are required for health and strength, be of the necessary class?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat is what I should suppose.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe pleasure of eating is necessary in two ways; it does us good and it is\nessential to the continuance of life?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut the condiments are only necessary in so far as they are good for health?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd the desire which goes beyond this, of more delicate food, or other\nluxuries, which might generally be got rid of, if controlled and trained in\nyouth, and is hurtful to the body, and hurtful to the soul in the pursuit of\nwisdom and virtue, may be rightly called unnecessary?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery true.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nMay we not say that these desires spend, and that the others make money because\nthey conduce to production?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd of the pleasures of love, and all other pleasures, the same holds good?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd the drone of whom we spoke was he who was surfeited in pleasures and\ndesires of this sort, and was the slave of the unnecessary desires, whereas he\nwho was subject to the necessary only was miserly and oligarchical?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery true.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAgain, let us see how the democratical man grows out of the oligarchical: the\nfollowing, as I suspect, is commonly the process.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat is the process?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhen a young man who has been brought up as we were just now describing, in a\nvulgar and miserly way, has tasted drones\u0026rsquo; honey and has come to\nassociate with fierce and crafty natures who are able to provide for him all\nsorts of refinements and varieties of pleasure\u0026mdash;then, as you may imagine,\nthe change will begin of the oligarchical principle within him into the\ndemocratical?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nInevitably.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd as in the city like was helping like, and the change was effected by an\nalliance from without assisting one division of the citizens, so too the young\nman is changed by a class of desires coming from without to assist the desires\nwithin him, that which is akin and alike again helping that which is akin and\nalike?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd if there be any ally which aids the oligarchical principle within him,\nwhether the influence of a father or of kindred, advising or rebuking him, then\nthere arises in his soul a faction and an opposite faction, and he goes to war\nwith himself.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIt must be so.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd there are times when the democratical principle gives way to the\noligarchical, and some of his desires die, and others are banished; a spirit of\nreverence enters into the young man\u0026rsquo;s soul and order is restored.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said, that sometimes happens.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd then, again, after the old desires have been driven out, fresh ones spring\nup, which are akin to them, and because he their father does not know how to\neducate them, wax fierce and numerous.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said, that is apt to be the way.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThey draw him to his old associates, and holding secret intercourse with them,\nbreed and multiply in him.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery true.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAt length they seize upon the citadel of the young man\u0026rsquo;s soul, which they\nperceive to be void of all accomplishments and fair pursuits and true words,\nwhich make their abode in the minds of men who are dear to the gods, and are\ntheir best guardians and sentinels.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNone better.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nFalse and boastful conceits and phrases mount upwards and take their place.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThey are certain to do so.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd so the young man returns into the country of the lotus-eaters, and takes up\nhis dwelling there in the face of all men; and if any help be sent by his\nfriends to the oligarchical part of him, the aforesaid vain conceits shut the\ngate of the king\u0026rsquo;s fastness; and they will neither allow the embassy\nitself to enter, nor if private advisers offer the fatherly counsel of the aged\nwill they listen to them or receive them. There is a battle and they gain the\nday, and then modesty, which they call silliness, is ignominiously thrust into\nexile by them, and temperance, which they nickname unmanliness, is trampled in\nthe mire and cast forth; they persuade men that moderation and orderly\nexpenditure are vulgarity and meanness, and so, by the help of a rabble of evil\nappetites, they drive them beyond the border.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, with a will.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd when they have emptied and swept clean the soul of him who is now in their\npower and who is being initiated by them in great mysteries, the next thing is\nto bring back to their house insolence and anarchy and waste and impudence in\nbright array having garlands on their heads, and a great company with them,\nhymning their praises and calling them by sweet names; insolence they term\nbreeding, and anarchy liberty, and waste magnificence, and impudence courage.\nAnd so the young man passes out of his original nature, which was trained in\nthe school of necessity, into the freedom and libertinism of useless and\nunnecessary pleasures.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said, the change in him is visible enough.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAfter this he lives on, spending his money and labour and time on unnecessary\npleasures quite as much as on necessary ones; but if he be fortunate, and is\nnot too much disordered in his wits, when years have elapsed, and the heyday of\npassion is over\u0026mdash;supposing that he then re-admits into the city some part\nof the exiled virtues, and does not wholly give himself up to their\nsuccessors\u0026mdash;in that case he balances his pleasures and lives in a sort of\nequilibrium, putting the government of himself into the hands of the one which\ncomes first and wins the turn; and when he has had enough of that, then into\nthe hands of another; he despises none of them but encourages them all equally.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery true, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNeither does he receive or let pass into the fortress any true word of advice;\nif any one says to him that some pleasures are the satisfactions of good and\nnoble desires, and others of evil desires, and that he ought to use and honour\nsome and chastise and master the others\u0026mdash;whenever this is repeated to him\nhe shakes his head and says that they are all alike, and that one is as good as\nanother.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said; that is the way with him.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, I said, he lives from day to day indulging the appetite of the hour; and\nsometimes he is lapped in drink and strains of the flute; then he becomes a\nwater-drinker, and tries to get thin; then he takes a turn at gymnastics;\nsometimes idling and neglecting everything, then once more living the life of a\nphilosopher; often he is busy with politics, and starts to his feet and says\nand does whatever comes into his head; and, if he is emulous of any one who is\na warrior, off he is in that direction, or of men of business, once more in\nthat. His life has neither law nor order; and this distracted existence he\nterms joy and bliss and freedom; and so he goes on.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he replied, he is all liberty and equality.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, I said; his life is motley and manifold and an epitome of the lives of\nmany;\u0026mdash;he answers to the State which we described as fair and spangled.\nAnd many a man and many a woman will take him for their pattern, and many a\nconstitution and many an example of manners is contained in him.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nJust so.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nLet him then be set over against democracy; he may truly be called the\ndemocratic man.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nLet that be his place, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nLast of all comes the most beautiful of all, man and State alike, tyranny and\nthe tyrant; these we have now to consider.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nQuite true, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nSay then, my friend, In what manner does tyranny arise?\u0026mdash;that it has a\ndemocratic origin is evident.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nClearly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd does not tyranny spring from democracy in the same manner as democracy from\noligarchy\u0026mdash;I mean, after a sort?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHow?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe good which oligarchy proposed to itself and the means by which it was\nmaintained was excess of wealth\u0026mdash;am I not right?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd the insatiable desire of wealth and the neglect of all other things for the\nsake of money-getting was also the ruin of oligarchy?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd democracy has her own good, of which the insatiable desire brings her to\ndissolution?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat good?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nFreedom, I replied; which, as they tell you in a democracy, is the glory of the\nState\u0026mdash;and that therefore in a democracy alone will the freeman of nature\ndeign to dwell.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes; the saying is in every body\u0026rsquo;s mouth.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI was going to observe, that the insatiable desire of this and the neglect of\nother things introduces the change in democracy, which occasions a demand for\ntyranny.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHow so?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhen a democracy which is thirsting for freedom has evil cup-bearers presiding\nover the feast, and has drunk too deeply of the strong wine of freedom, then,\nunless her rulers are very amenable and give a plentiful draught, she calls\nthem to account and punishes them, and says that they are cursed oligarchs.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he replied, a very common occurrence.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, I said; and loyal citizens are insultingly termed by her slaves who hug\ntheir chains and men of naught; she would have subjects who are like rulers,\nand rulers who are like subjects: these are men after her own heart, whom she\npraises and honours both in private and public. Now, in such a State, can\nliberty have any limit?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly not.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBy degrees the anarchy finds a way into private houses, and ends by getting\namong the animals and infecting them.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHow do you mean?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI mean that the father grows accustomed to descend to the level of his sons and\nto fear them, and the son is on a level with his father, he having no respect\nor reverence for either of his parents; and this is his freedom, and the metic\nis equal with the citizen and the citizen with the metic, and the stranger is\nquite as good as either.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said, that is the way.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd these are not the only evils, I said\u0026mdash;there are several lesser ones:\nIn such a state of society the master fears and flatters his scholars, and the\nscholars despise their masters and tutors; young and old are all alike; and the\nyoung man is on a level with the old, and is ready to compete with him in word\nor deed; and old men condescend to the young and are full of pleasantry and\ngaiety; they are loth to be thought morose and authoritative, and therefore\nthey adopt the manners of the young.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nQuite true, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe last extreme of popular liberty is when the slave bought with money,\nwhether male or female, is just as free as his or her purchaser; nor must I\nforget to tell of the liberty and equality of the two sexes in relation to each\nother.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhy not, as Aeschylus says, utter the word which rises to our lips?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat is what I am doing, I replied; and I must add that no one who does not\nknow would believe, how much greater is the liberty which the animals who are\nunder the dominion of man have in a democracy than in any other State: for\ntruly, the she-dogs, as the proverb says, are as good as their she-mistresses,\nand the horses and asses have a way of marching along with all the rights and\ndignities of freemen; and they will run at any body who comes in their way if\nhe does not leave the road clear for them: and all things are just ready to\nburst with liberty.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhen I take a country walk, he said, I often experience what you describe. You\nand I have dreamed the same thing.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd above all, I said, and as the result of all, see how sensitive the citizens\nbecome; they chafe impatiently at the least touch of authority, and at length,\nas you know, they cease to care even for the laws, written or unwritten; they\nwill have no one over them.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said, I know it too well.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nSuch, my friend, I said, is the fair and glorious beginning out of which\nsprings tyranny.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nGlorious indeed, he said. But what is the next step?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe ruin of oligarchy is the ruin of democracy; the same disease magnified and\nintensified by liberty overmasters democracy\u0026mdash;the truth being that the\nexcessive increase of anything often causes a reaction in the opposite\ndirection; and this is the case not only in the seasons and in vegetable and\nanimal life, but above all in forms of government.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe excess of liberty, whether in States or individuals, seems only to pass\ninto excess of slavery.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, the natural order.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd so tyranny naturally arises out of democracy, and the most aggravated form\nof tyranny and slavery out of the most extreme form of liberty?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAs we might expect.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat, however, was not, as I believe, your question\u0026mdash;you rather desired to\nknow what is that disorder which is generated alike in oligarchy and democracy,\nand is the ruin of both?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nJust so, he replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWell, I said, I meant to refer to the class of idle spendthrifts, of whom the\nmore courageous are the leaders and the more timid the followers, the same whom\nwe were comparing to drones, some stingless, and others having stings.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nA very just comparison.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThese two classes are the plagues of every city in which they are generated,\nbeing what phlegm and bile are to the body. And the good physician and lawgiver\nof the State ought, like the wise bee-master, to keep them at a distance and\nprevent, if possible, their ever coming in; and if they have anyhow found a way\nin, then he should have them and their cells cut out as speedily as possible.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, by all means, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen, in order that we may see clearly what we are doing, let us imagine\ndemocracy to be divided, as indeed it is, into three classes; for in the first\nplace freedom creates rather more drones in the democratic than there were in\nthe oligarchical State.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat is true.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd in the democracy they are certainly more intensified.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHow so?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBecause in the oligarchical State they are disqualified and driven from office,\nand therefore they cannot train or gather strength; whereas in a democracy they\nare almost the entire ruling power, and while the keener sort speak and act,\nthe rest keep buzzing about the bema and do not suffer a word to be said on the\nother side; hence in democracies almost everything is managed by the drones.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery true, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen there is another class which is always being severed from the mass.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat is that?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThey are the orderly class, which in a nation of traders is sure to be the\nrichest.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNaturally so.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThey are the most squeezable persons and yield the largest amount of honey to\nthe drones.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhy, he said, there is little to be squeezed out of people who have little.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd this is called the wealthy class, and the drones feed upon them.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat is pretty much the case, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe people are a third class, consisting of those who work with their own\nhands; they are not politicians, and have not much to live upon. This, when\nassembled, is the largest and most powerful class in a democracy.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue, he said; but then the multitude is seldom willing to congregate unless\nthey get a little honey.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd do they not share? I said. Do not their leaders deprive the rich of their\nestates and distribute them among the people; at the same time taking care to\nreserve the larger part for themselves?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhy, yes, he said, to that extent the people do share.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd the persons whose property is taken from them are compelled to defend\nthemselves before the people as they best can?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat else can they do?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd then, although they may have no desire of change, the others charge them\nwith plotting against the people and being friends of oligarchy?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd the end is that when they see the people, not of their own accord, but\nthrough ignorance, and because they are deceived by informers, seeking to do\nthem wrong, then at last they are forced to become oligarchs in reality; they\ndo not wish to be, but the sting of the drones torments them and breeds\nrevolution in them.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat is exactly the truth.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen come impeachments and judgments and trials of one another.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe people have always some champion whom they set over them and nurse into\ngreatness.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, that is their way.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThis and no other is the root from which a tyrant springs; when he first\nappears above ground he is a protector.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, that is quite clear.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHow then does a protector begin to change into a tyrant? Clearly when he does\nwhat the man is said to do in the tale of the Arcadian temple of Lycaean Zeus.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat tale?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe tale is that he who has tasted the entrails of a single human victim minced\nup with the entrails of other victims is destined to become a wolf. Did you\nnever hear it?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nOh, yes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd the protector of the people is like him; having a mob entirely at his\ndisposal, he is not restrained from shedding the blood of kinsmen; by the\nfavourite method of false accusation he brings them into court and murders\nthem, making the life of man to disappear, and with unholy tongue and lips\ntasting the blood of his fellow citizens; some he kills and others he banishes,\nat the same time hinting at the abolition of debts and partition of lands: and\nafter this, what will be his destiny? Must he not either perish at the hands of\nhis enemies, or from being a man become a wolf\u0026mdash;that is, a tyrant?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nInevitably.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThis, I said, is he who begins to make a party against the rich?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe same.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAfter a while he is driven out, but comes back, in spite of his enemies, a\ntyrant full grown.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat is clear.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd if they are unable to expel him, or to get him condemned to death by a\npublic accusation, they conspire to assassinate him.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said, that is their usual way.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen comes the famous request for a body-guard, which is the device of all\nthose who have got thus far in their tyrannical career\u0026mdash;\u0026lsquo;Let not the\npeople\u0026rsquo;s friend,\u0026rsquo; as they say, \u0026lsquo;be lost to them.\u0026rsquo;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nExactly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe people readily assent; all their fears are for him\u0026mdash;they have none for\nthemselves.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery true.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd when a man who is wealthy and is also accused of being an enemy of the\npeople sees this, then, my friend, as the oracle said to Croesus,\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n\u0026lsquo;By pebbly Hermus\u0026rsquo; shore he flees and rests not, and is not ashamed\nto be a coward.\u0026rsquo;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd quite right too, said he, for if he were, he would never be ashamed again.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut if he is caught he dies.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nOf course.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd he, the protector of whom we spoke, is to be seen, not \u0026lsquo;larding the\nplain\u0026rsquo; with his bulk, but himself the overthrower of many, standing up in\nthe chariot of State with the reins in his hand, no longer protector, but\ntyrant absolute.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNo doubt, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd now let us consider the happiness of the man, and also of the State in\nwhich a creature like him is generated.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said, let us consider that.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAt first, in the early days of his power, he is full of smiles, and he salutes\nevery one whom he meets;\u0026mdash;he to be called a tyrant, who is making promises\nin public and also in private! liberating debtors, and distributing land to the\npeople and his followers, and wanting to be so kind and good to every one!\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nOf course, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut when he has disposed of foreign enemies by conquest or treaty, and there is\nnothing to fear from them, then he is always stirring up some war or other, in\norder that the people may require a leader.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTo be sure.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHas he not also another object, which is that they may be impoverished by\npayment of taxes, and thus compelled to devote themselves to their daily wants\nand therefore less likely to conspire against him?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nClearly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd if any of them are suspected by him of having notions of freedom, and of\nresistance to his authority, he will have a good pretext for destroying them by\nplacing them at the mercy of the enemy; and for all these reasons the tyrant\nmust be always getting up a war.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHe must.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNow he begins to grow unpopular.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nA necessary result.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen some of those who joined in setting him up, and who are in power, speak\ntheir minds to him and to one another, and the more courageous of them cast in\nhis teeth what is being done.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, that may be expected.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd the tyrant, if he means to rule, must get rid of them; he cannot stop while\nhe has a friend or an enemy who is good for anything.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHe cannot.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd therefore he must look about him and see who is valiant, who is\nhigh-minded, who is wise, who is wealthy; happy man, he is the enemy of them\nall, and must seek occasion against them whether he will or no, until he has\nmade a purgation of the State.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said, and a rare purgation.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, I said, not the sort of purgation which the physicians make of the body;\nfor they take away the worse and leave the better part, but he does the\nreverse.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIf he is to rule, I suppose that he cannot help himself.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat a blessed alternative, I said:\u0026mdash;to be compelled to dwell only with\nthe many bad, and to be by them hated, or not to live at all!\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, that is the alternative.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd the more detestable his actions are to the citizens the more satellites and\nthe greater devotion in them will he require?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd who are the devoted band, and where will he procure them?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThey will flock to him, he said, of their own accord, if he pays them.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBy the dog! I said, here are more drones, of every sort and from every land.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said, there are.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut will he not desire to get them on the spot?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHow do you mean?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHe will rob the citizens of their slaves; he will then set them free and enrol\nthem in his body-guard.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTo be sure, he said; and he will be able to trust them best of all.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat a blessed creature, I said, must this tyrant be; he has put to death the\nothers and has these for his trusted friends.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said; they are quite of his sort.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, I said, and these are the new citizens whom he has called into existence,\nwho admire him and are his companions, while the good hate and avoid him.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nOf course.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVerily, then, tragedy is a wise thing and Euripides a great tragedian.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhy so?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhy, because he is the author of the pregnant saying,\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n\u0026lsquo;Tyrants are wise by living with the wise;\u0026rsquo;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nand he clearly meant to say that they are the wise whom the tyrant makes his\ncompanions.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said, and he also praises tyranny as godlike; and many other things of\nthe same kind are said by him and by the other poets.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd therefore, I said, the tragic poets being wise men will forgive us and any\nothers who live after our manner if we do not receive them into our State,\nbecause they are the eulogists of tyranny.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said, those who have the wit will doubtless forgive us.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut they will continue to go to other cities and attract mobs, and hire voices\nfair and loud and persuasive, and draw the cities over to tyrannies and\ndemocracies.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery true.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nMoreover, they are paid for this and receive honour\u0026mdash;the greatest honour,\nas might be expected, from tyrants, and the next greatest from democracies; but\nthe higher they ascend our constitution hill, the more their reputation fails,\nand seems unable from shortness of breath to proceed further.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut we are wandering from the subject: Let us therefore return and enquire how\nthe tyrant will maintain that fair and numerous and various and ever-changing\narmy of his.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIf, he said, there are sacred treasures in the city, he will confiscate and\nspend them; and in so far as the fortunes of attainted persons may suffice, he\nwill be able to diminish the taxes which he would otherwise have to impose upon\nthe people.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd when these fail?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhy, clearly, he said, then he and his boon companions, whether male or female,\nwill be maintained out of his father\u0026rsquo;s estate.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYou mean to say that the people, from whom he has derived his being, will\nmaintain him and his companions?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said; they cannot help themselves.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut what if the people fly into a passion, and aver that a grown-up son ought\nnot to be supported by his father, but that the father should be supported by\nthe son? The father did not bring him into being, or settle him in life, in\norder that when his son became a man he should himself be the servant of his\nown servants and should support him and his rabble of slaves and companions;\nbut that his son should protect him, and that by his help he might be\nemancipated from the government of the rich and aristocratic, as they are\ntermed. And so he bids him and his companions depart, just as any other father\nmight drive out of the house a riotous son and his undesirable associates.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBy heaven, he said, then the parent will discover what a monster he has been\nfostering in his bosom; and, when he wants to drive him out, he will find that\nhe is weak and his son strong.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhy, you do not mean to say that the tyrant will use violence? What! beat his\nfather if he opposes him?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he will, having first disarmed him.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen he is a parricide, and a cruel guardian of an aged parent; and this is\nreal tyranny, about which there can be no longer a mistake: as the saying is,\nthe people who would escape the smoke which is the slavery of freemen, has\nfallen into the fire which is the tyranny of slaves. Thus liberty, getting out\nof all order and reason, passes into the harshest and bitterest form of\nslavery.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery well; and may we not rightly say that we have sufficiently discussed the\nnature of tyranny, and the manner of the transition from democracy to tyranny?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, quite enough, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003c!–end chapter–\u003e\n\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\n\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca id=\"link2H_4_0012\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e BOOK IX.\u003c/h2\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nLast of all comes the tyrannical man; about whom we have once more to ask, how\nis he formed out of the democratical? and how does he live, in happiness or in\nmisery?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said, he is the only one remaining.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThere is, however, I said, a previous question which remains unanswered.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat question?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI do not think that we have adequately determined the nature and number of the\nappetites, and until this is accomplished the enquiry will always be confused.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWell, he said, it is not too late to supply the omission.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery true, I said; and observe the point which I want to understand: Certain of\nthe unnecessary pleasures and appetites I conceive to be unlawful; every one\nappears to have them, but in some persons they are controlled by the laws and\nby reason, and the better desires prevail over them\u0026mdash;either they are\nwholly banished or they become few and weak; while in the case of others they\nare stronger, and there are more of them.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhich appetites do you mean?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI mean those which are awake when the reasoning and human and ruling power is\nasleep; then the wild beast within us, gorged with meat or drink, starts up and\nhaving shaken off sleep, goes forth to satisfy his desires; and there is no\nconceivable folly or crime\u0026mdash;not excepting incest or any other unnatural\nunion, or parricide, or the eating of forbidden food\u0026mdash;which at such a\ntime, when he has parted company with all shame and sense, a man may not be\nready to commit.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nMost true, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut when a man\u0026rsquo;s pulse is healthy and temperate, and when before going to\nsleep he has awakened his rational powers, and fed them on noble thoughts and\nenquiries, collecting himself in meditation; after having first indulged his\nappetites neither too much nor too little, but just enough to lay them to\nsleep, and prevent them and their enjoyments and pains from interfering with\nthe higher principle\u0026mdash;which he leaves in the solitude of pure abstraction,\nfree to contemplate and aspire to the knowledge of the unknown, whether in\npast, present, or future: when again he has allayed the passionate element, if\nhe has a quarrel against any one\u0026mdash;I say, when, after pacifying the two\nirrational principles, he rouses up the third, which is reason, before he takes\nhis rest, then, as you know, he attains truth most nearly, and is least likely\nto be the sport of fantastic and lawless visions.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI quite agree.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIn saying this I have been running into a digression; but the point which I\ndesire to note is that in all of us, even in good men, there is a lawless\nwild-beast nature, which peers out in sleep. Pray, consider whether I am right,\nand you agree with me.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, I agree.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd now remember the character which we attributed to the democratic man. He\nwas supposed from his youth upwards to have been trained under a miserly\nparent, who encouraged the saving appetites in him, but discountenanced the\nunnecessary, which aim only at amusement and ornament?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd then he got into the company of a more refined, licentious sort of people,\nand taking to all their wanton ways rushed into the opposite extreme from an\nabhorrence of his father\u0026rsquo;s meanness. At last, being a better man than his\ncorruptors, he was drawn in both directions until he halted midway and led a\nlife, not of vulgar and slavish passion, but of what he deemed moderate\nindulgence in various pleasures. After this manner the democrat was generated\nout of the oligarch?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said; that was our view of him, and is so still.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd now, I said, years will have passed away, and you must conceive this man,\nsuch as he is, to have a son, who is brought up in his father\u0026rsquo;s\nprinciples.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI can imagine him.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen you must further imagine the same thing to happen to the son which has\nalready happened to the father:\u0026mdash;he is drawn into a perfectly lawless\nlife, which by his seducers is termed perfect liberty; and his father and\nfriends take part with his moderate desires, and the opposite party assist the\nopposite ones. As soon as these dire magicians and tyrant-makers find that they\nare losing their hold on him, they contrive to implant in him a master passion,\nto be lord over his idle and spendthrift lusts\u0026mdash;a sort of monstrous winged\ndrone\u0026mdash;that is the only image which will adequately describe him.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said, that is the only adequate image of him.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd when his other lusts, amid clouds of incense and perfumes and garlands and\nwines, and all the pleasures of a dissolute life, now let loose, come buzzing\naround him, nourishing to the utmost the sting of desire which they implant in\nhis drone-like nature, then at last this lord of the soul, having Madness for\nthe captain of his guard, breaks out into a frenzy: and if he finds in himself\nany good opinions or appetites in process of formation, and there is in him any\nsense of shame remaining, to these better principles he puts an end, and casts\nthem forth until he has purged away temperance and brought in madness to the\nfull.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said, that is the way in which the tyrannical man is generated.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd is not this the reason why of old love has been called a tyrant?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI should not wonder.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nFurther, I said, has not a drunken man also the spirit of a tyrant?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHe has.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd you know that a man who is deranged and not right in his mind, will fancy\nthat he is able to rule, not only over men, but also over the gods?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat he will.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd the tyrannical man in the true sense of the word comes into being when,\neither under the influence of nature, or habit, or both, he becomes drunken,\nlustful, passionate? O my friend, is not that so?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAssuredly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nSuch is the man and such is his origin. And next, how does he live?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nSuppose, as people facetiously say, you were to tell me.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI imagine, I said, at the next step in his progress, that there will be feasts\nand carousals and revellings and courtezans, and all that sort of thing; Love\nis the lord of the house within him, and orders all the concerns of his soul.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat is certain.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes; and every day and every night desires grow up many and formidable, and\ntheir demands are many.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThey are indeed, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHis revenues, if he has any, are soon spent.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen comes debt and the cutting down of his property.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nOf course.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhen he has nothing left, must not his desires, crowding in the nest like young\nravens, be crying aloud for food; and he, goaded on by them, and especially by\nlove himself, who is in a manner the captain of them, is in a frenzy, and would\nfain discover whom he can defraud or despoil of his property, in order that he\nmay gratify them?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, that is sure to be the case.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHe must have money, no matter how, if he is to escape horrid pains and pangs.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHe must.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd as in himself there was a succession of pleasures, and the new got the\nbetter of the old and took away their rights, so he being younger will claim to\nhave more than his father and his mother, and if he has spent his own share of\nthe property, he will take a slice of theirs.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNo doubt he will.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd if his parents will not give way, then he will try first of all to cheat\nand deceive them.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery true.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd if he fails, then he will use force and plunder them.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, probably.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd if the old man and woman fight for their own, what then, my friend? Will\nthe creature feel any compunction at tyrannizing over them?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNay, he said, I should not feel at all comfortable about his parents.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut, O heavens! Adeimantus, on account of some new-fangled love of a harlot,\nwho is anything but a necessary connection, can you believe that he would\nstrike the mother who is his ancient friend and necessary to his very\nexistence, and would place her under the authority of the other, when she is\nbrought under the same roof with her; or that, under like circumstances, he\nwould do the same to his withered old father, first and most indispensable of\nfriends, for the sake of some newly-found blooming youth who is the reverse of\nindispensable?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, indeed, he said; I believe that he would.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTruly, then, I said, a tyrannical son is a blessing to his father and mother.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHe is indeed, he replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHe first takes their property, and when that fails, and pleasures are beginning\nto swarm in the hive of his soul, then he breaks into a house, or steals the\ngarments of some nightly wayfarer; next he proceeds to clear a temple.\nMeanwhile the old opinions which he had when a child, and which gave judgment\nabout good and evil, are overthrown by those others which have just been\nemancipated, and are now the body-guard of love and share his empire. These in\nhis democratic days, when he was still subject to the laws and to his father,\nwere only let loose in the dreams of sleep. But now that he is under the\ndominion of love, he becomes always and in waking reality what he was then very\nrarely and in a dream only; he will commit the foulest murder, or eat forbidden\nfood, or be guilty of any other horrid act. Love is his tyrant, and lives\nlordly in him and lawlessly, and being himself a king, leads him on, as a\ntyrant leads a State, to the performance of any reckless deed by which he can\nmaintain himself and the rabble of his associates, whether those whom evil\ncommunications have brought in from without, or those whom he himself has\nallowed to break loose within him by reason of a similar evil nature in\nhimself. Have we not here a picture of his way of life?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, indeed, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd if there are only a few of them in the State, and the rest of the people\nare well disposed, they go away and become the body-guard or mercenary soldiers\nof some other tyrant who may probably want them for a war; and if there is no\nwar, they stay at home and do many little pieces of mischief in the city.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat sort of mischief?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nFor example, they are the thieves, burglars, cut-purses, foot-pads, robbers of\ntemples, man-stealers of the community; or if they are able to speak they turn\ninformers, and bear false witness, and take bribes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nA small catalogue of evils, even if the perpetrators of them are few in number.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, I said; but small and great are comparative terms, and all these things,\nin the misery and evil which they inflict upon a State, do not come within a\nthousand miles of the tyrant; when this noxious class and their followers grow\nnumerous and become conscious of their strength, assisted by the infatuation of\nthe people, they choose from among themselves the one who has most of the\ntyrant in his own soul, and him they create their tyrant.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said, and he will be the most fit to be a tyrant.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIf the people yield, well and good; but if they resist him, as he began by\nbeating his own father and mother, so now, if he has the power, he beats them,\nand will keep his dear old fatherland or motherland, as the Cretans say, in\nsubjection to his young retainers whom he has introduced to be their rulers and\nmasters. This is the end of his passions and desires.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nExactly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhen such men are only private individuals and before they get power, this is\ntheir character; they associate entirely with their own flatterers or ready\ntools; or if they want anything from anybody, they in their turn are equally\nready to bow down before them: they profess every sort of affection for them;\nbut when they have gained their point they know them no more.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, truly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThey are always either the masters or servants and never the friends of\nanybody; the tyrant never tastes of true freedom or friendship.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly not.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd may we not rightly call such men treacherous?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNo question.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAlso they are utterly unjust, if we were right in our notion of justice?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said, and we were perfectly right.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nLet us then sum up in a word, I said, the character of the worst man: he is the\nwaking reality of what we dreamed.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nMost true.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd this is he who being by nature most of a tyrant bears rule, and the longer\nhe lives the more of a tyrant he becomes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat is certain, said Glaucon, taking his turn to answer.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd will not he who has been shown to be the wickedest, be also the most\nmiserable? and he who has tyrannized longest and most, most continually and\ntruly miserable; although this may not be the opinion of men in general?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said, inevitably.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd must not the tyrannical man be like the tyrannical State, and the\ndemocratical man like the democratical State; and the same of the others?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd as State is to State in virtue and happiness, so is man in relation to man?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTo be sure.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen comparing our original city, which was under a king, and the city which is\nunder a tyrant, how do they stand as to virtue?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThey are the opposite extremes, he said, for one is the very best and the other\nis the very worst.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThere can be no mistake, I said, as to which is which, and therefore I will at\nonce enquire whether you would arrive at a similar decision about their\nrelative happiness and misery. And here we must not allow ourselves to be\npanic-stricken at the apparition of the tyrant, who is only a unit and may\nperhaps have a few retainers about him; but let us go as we ought into every\ncorner of the city and look all about, and then we will give our opinion.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nA fair invitation, he replied; and I see, as every one must, that a tyranny is\nthe wretchedest form of government, and the rule of a king the happiest.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd in estimating the men too, may I not fairly make a like request, that I\nshould have a judge whose mind can enter into and see through human nature? he\nmust not be like a child who looks at the outside and is dazzled at the pompous\naspect which the tyrannical nature assumes to the beholder, but let him be one\nwho has a clear insight. May I suppose that the judgment is given in the\nhearing of us all by one who is able to judge, and has dwelt in the same place\nwith him, and been present at his dally life and known him in his family\nrelations, where he may be seen stripped of his tragedy attire, and again in\nthe hour of public danger\u0026mdash;he shall tell us about the happiness and misery\nof the tyrant when compared with other men?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat again, he said, is a very fair proposal.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nShall I assume that we ourselves are able and experienced judges and have\nbefore now met with such a person? We shall then have some one who will answer\nour enquiries.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBy all means.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nLet me ask you not to forget the parallel of the individual and the State;\nbearing this in mind, and glancing in turn from one to the other of them, will\nyou tell me their respective conditions?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat do you mean? he asked.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBeginning with the State, I replied, would you say that a city which is\ngoverned by a tyrant is free or enslaved?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNo city, he said, can be more completely enslaved.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd yet, as you see, there are freemen as well as masters in such a State?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said, I see that there are\u0026mdash;a few; but the people, speaking\ngenerally, and the best of them are miserably degraded and enslaved.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen if the man is like the State, I said, must not the same rule prevail? his\nsoul is full of meanness and vulgarity\u0026mdash;the best elements in him are\nenslaved; and there is a small ruling part, which is also the worst and\nmaddest.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nInevitably.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd would you say that the soul of such an one is the soul of a freeman, or of\na slave?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHe has the soul of a slave, in my opinion.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd the State which is enslaved under a tyrant is utterly incapable of acting\nvoluntarily?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nUtterly incapable.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd also the soul which is under a tyrant (I am speaking of the soul taken as a\nwhole) is least capable of doing what she desires; there is a gadfly which\ngoads her, and she is full of trouble and remorse?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd is the city which is under a tyrant rich or poor?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nPoor.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd the tyrannical soul must be always poor and insatiable?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd must not such a State and such a man be always full of fear?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, indeed.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIs there any State in which you will find more of lamentation and sorrow and\ngroaning and pain?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly not.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd is there any man in whom you will find more of this sort of misery than in\nthe tyrannical man, who is in a fury of passions and desires?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nImpossible.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nReflecting upon these and similar evils, you held the tyrannical State to be\nthe most miserable of States?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd I was right, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly, I said. And when you see the same evils in the tyrannical man, what\ndo you say of him?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI say that he is by far the most miserable of all men.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThere, I said, I think that you are beginning to go wrong.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat do you mean?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI do not think that he has as yet reached the utmost extreme of misery.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen who is more miserable?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nOne of whom I am about to speak.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWho is that?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHe who is of a tyrannical nature, and instead of leading a private life has\nbeen cursed with the further misfortune of being a public tyrant.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nFrom what has been said, I gather that you are right.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, I replied, but in this high argument you should be a little more certain,\nand should not conjecture only; for of all questions, this respecting good and\nevil is the greatest.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery true, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nLet me then offer you an illustration, which may, I think, throw a light upon\nthis subject.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat is your illustration?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe case of rich individuals in cities who possess many slaves: from them you\nmay form an idea of the tyrant\u0026rsquo;s condition, for they both have slaves;\nthe only difference is that he has more slaves.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, that is the difference.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYou know that they live securely and have nothing to apprehend from their\nservants?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat should they fear?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNothing. But do you observe the reason of this?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes; the reason is, that the whole city is leagued together for the protection\nof each individual.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery true, I said. But imagine one of these owners, the master say of some\nfifty slaves, together with his family and property and slaves, carried off by\na god into the wilderness, where there are no freemen to help him\u0026mdash;will he\nnot be in an agony of fear lest he and his wife and children should be put to\ndeath by his slaves?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said, he will be in the utmost fear.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe time has arrived when he will be compelled to flatter divers of his slaves,\nand make many promises to them of freedom and other things, much against his\nwill\u0026mdash;he will have to cajole his own servants.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said, that will be the only way of saving himself.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd suppose the same god, who carried him away, to surround him with neighbours\nwho will not suffer one man to be the master of another, and who, if they could\ncatch the offender, would take his life?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHis case will be still worse, if you suppose him to be everywhere surrounded\nand watched by enemies.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd is not this the sort of prison in which the tyrant will be bound\u0026mdash;he\nwho being by nature such as we have described, is full of all sorts of fears\nand lusts? His soul is dainty and greedy, and yet alone, of all men in the\ncity, he is never allowed to go on a journey, or to see the things which other\nfreemen desire to see, but he lives in his hole like a woman hidden in the\nhouse, and is jealous of any other citizen who goes into foreign parts and sees\nanything of interest.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery true, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd amid evils such as these will not he who is ill-governed in his own\nperson\u0026mdash;the tyrannical man, I mean\u0026mdash;whom you just now decided to be\nthe most miserable of all\u0026mdash;will not he be yet more miserable when, instead\nof leading a private life, he is constrained by fortune to be a public tyrant?\nHe has to be master of others when he is not master of himself: he is like a\ndiseased or paralytic man who is compelled to pass his life, not in retirement,\nbut fighting and combating with other men.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said, the similitude is most exact.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIs not his case utterly miserable? and does not the actual tyrant lead a worse\nlife than he whose life you determined to be the worst?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHe who is the real tyrant, whatever men may think, is the real slave, and is\nobliged to practise the greatest adulation and servility, and to be the\nflatterer of the vilest of mankind. He has desires which he is utterly unable\nto satisfy, and has more wants than any one, and is truly poor, if you know how\nto inspect the whole soul of him: all his life long he is beset with fear and\nis full of convulsions and distractions, even as the State which he resembles:\nand surely the resemblance holds?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery true, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nMoreover, as we were saying before, he grows worse from having power: he\nbecomes and is of necessity more jealous, more faithless, more unjust, more\nfriendless, more impious, than he was at first; he is the purveyor and\ncherisher of every sort of vice, and the consequence is that he is supremely\nmiserable, and that he makes everybody else as miserable as himself.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNo man of any sense will dispute your words.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCome then, I said, and as the general umpire in theatrical contests proclaims\nthe result, do you also decide who in your opinion is first in the scale of\nhappiness, and who second, and in what order the others follow: there are five\nof them in all\u0026mdash;they are the royal, timocratical, oligarchical,\ndemocratical, tyrannical.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe decision will be easily given, he replied; they shall be choruses coming on\nthe stage, and I must judge them in the order in which they enter, by the\ncriterion of virtue and vice, happiness and misery.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNeed we hire a herald, or shall I announce, that the son of Ariston (the best)\nhas decided that the best and justest is also the happiest, and that this is he\nwho is the most royal man and king over himself; and that the worst and most\nunjust man is also the most miserable, and that this is he who being the\ngreatest tyrant of himself is also the greatest tyrant of his State?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nMake the proclamation yourself, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd shall I add, \u0026lsquo;whether seen or unseen by gods and men\u0026rsquo;?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nLet the words be added.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen this, I said, will be our first proof; and there is another, which may\nalso have some weight.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat is that?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe second proof is derived from the nature of the soul: seeing that the\nindividual soul, like the State, has been divided by us into three principles,\nthe division may, I think, furnish a new demonstration.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nOf what nature?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIt seems to me that to these three principles three pleasures correspond; also\nthree desires and governing powers.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHow do you mean? he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThere is one principle with which, as we were saying, a man learns, another\nwith which he is angry; the third, having many forms, has no special name, but\nis denoted by the general term appetitive, from the extraordinary strength and\nvehemence of the desires of eating and drinking and the other sensual appetites\nwhich are the main elements of it; also money-loving, because such desires are\ngenerally satisfied by the help of money.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat is true, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIf we were to say that the loves and pleasures of this third part were\nconcerned with gain, we should then be able to fall back on a single notion;\nand might truly and intelligibly describe this part of the soul as loving gain\nor money.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI agree with you.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAgain, is not the passionate element wholly set on ruling and conquering and\ngetting fame?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nSuppose we call it the contentious or ambitious\u0026mdash;would the term be\nsuitable?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nExtremely suitable.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nOn the other hand, every one sees that the principle of knowledge is wholly\ndirected to the truth, and cares less than either of the others for gain or\nfame.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nFar less.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\n\u0026lsquo;Lover of wisdom,\u0026rsquo; \u0026lsquo;lover of knowledge,\u0026rsquo; are titles\nwhich we may fitly apply to that part of the soul?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nOne principle prevails in the souls of one class of men, another in others, as\nmay happen?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen we may begin by assuming that there are three classes of men\u0026mdash;lovers\nof wisdom, lovers of honour, lovers of gain?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nExactly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd there are three kinds of pleasure, which are their several objects?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery true.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNow, if you examine the three classes of men, and ask of them in turn which of\ntheir lives is pleasantest, each will be found praising his own and\ndepreciating that of others: the money-maker will contrast the vanity of honour\nor of learning if they bring no money with the solid advantages of gold and\nsilver?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd the lover of honour\u0026mdash;what will be his opinion? Will he not think that\nthe pleasure of riches is vulgar, while the pleasure of learning, if it brings\nno distinction, is all smoke and nonsense to him?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery true.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd are we to suppose, I said, that the philosopher sets any value on other\npleasures in comparison with the pleasure of knowing the truth, and in that\npursuit abiding, ever learning, not so far indeed from the heaven of pleasure?\nDoes he not call the other pleasures necessary, under the idea that if there\nwere no necessity for them, he would rather not have them?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThere can be no doubt of that, he replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nSince, then, the pleasures of each class and the life of each are in dispute,\nand the question is not which life is more or less honourable, or better or\nworse, but which is the more pleasant or painless\u0026mdash;how shall we know who\nspeaks truly?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI cannot myself tell, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWell, but what ought to be the criterion? Is any better than experience and\nwisdom and reason?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThere cannot be a better, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen, I said, reflect. Of the three individuals, which has the greatest\nexperience of all the pleasures which we enumerated? Has the lover of gain, in\nlearning the nature of essential truth, greater experience of the pleasure of\nknowledge than the philosopher has of the pleasure of gain?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe philosopher, he replied, has greatly the advantage; for he has of necessity\nalways known the taste of the other pleasures from his childhood upwards: but\nthe lover of gain in all his experience has not of necessity tasted\u0026mdash;or, I\nshould rather say, even had he desired, could hardly have tasted\u0026mdash;the\nsweetness of learning and knowing truth.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen the lover of wisdom has a great advantage over the lover of gain, for he\nhas a double experience?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, very great.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAgain, has he greater experience of the pleasures of honour, or the lover of\nhonour of the pleasures of wisdom?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNay, he said, all three are honoured in proportion as they attain their object;\nfor the rich man and the brave man and the wise man alike have their crowd of\nadmirers, and as they all receive honour they all have experience of the\npleasures of honour; but the delight which is to be found in the knowledge of\ntrue being is known to the philosopher only.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHis experience, then, will enable him to judge better than any one?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nFar better.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd he is the only one who has wisdom as well as experience?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nFurther, the very faculty which is the instrument of judgment is not possessed\nby the covetous or ambitious man, but only by the philosopher?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat faculty?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nReason, with whom, as we were saying, the decision ought to rest.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd reasoning is peculiarly his instrument?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIf wealth and gain were the criterion, then the praise or blame of the lover of\ngain would surely be the most trustworthy?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAssuredly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nOr if honour or victory or courage, in that case the judgment of the ambitious\nor pugnacious would be the truest?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nClearly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut since experience and wisdom and reason are the judges\u0026mdash;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe only inference possible, he replied, is that pleasures which are approved\nby the lover of wisdom and reason are the truest.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd so we arrive at the result, that the pleasure of the intelligent part of\nthe soul is the pleasantest of the three, and that he of us in whom this is the\nruling principle has the pleasantest life.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nUnquestionably, he said, the wise man speaks with authority when he approves of\nhis own life.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd what does the judge affirm to be the life which is next, and the pleasure\nwhich is next?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nClearly that of the soldier and lover of honour; who is nearer to himself than\nthe money-maker.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nLast comes the lover of gain?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery true, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTwice in succession, then, has the just man overthrown the unjust in this\nconflict; and now comes the third trial, which is dedicated to Olympian Zeus\nthe saviour: a sage whispers in my ear that no pleasure except that of the wise\nis quite true and pure\u0026mdash;all others are a shadow only; and surely this will\nprove the greatest and most decisive of falls?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, the greatest; but will you explain yourself?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI will work out the subject and you shall answer my questions.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nProceed.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nSay, then, is not pleasure opposed to pain?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd there is a neutral state which is neither pleasure nor pain?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThere is.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nA state which is intermediate, and a sort of repose of the soul about\neither\u0026mdash;that is what you mean?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYou remember what people say when they are sick?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat do they say?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat after all nothing is pleasanter than health. But then they never knew this\nto be the greatest of pleasures until they were ill.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, I know, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd when persons are suffering from acute pain, you must have heard them say\nthat there is nothing pleasanter than to get rid of their pain?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI have.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd there are many other cases of suffering in which the mere rest and\ncessation of pain, and not any positive enjoyment, is extolled by them as the\ngreatest pleasure?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said; at the time they are pleased and well content to be at rest.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAgain, when pleasure ceases, that sort of rest or cessation will be painful?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nDoubtless, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen the intermediate state of rest will be pleasure and will also be pain?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nSo it would seem.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut can that which is neither become both?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI should say not.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd both pleasure and pain are motions of the soul, are they not?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut that which is neither was just now shown to be rest and not motion, and in\na mean between them?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHow, then, can we be right in supposing that the absence of pain is pleasure,\nor that the absence of pleasure is pain?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nImpossible.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThis then is an appearance only and not a reality; that is to say, the rest is\npleasure at the moment and in comparison of what is painful, and painful in\ncomparison of what is pleasant; but all these representations, when tried by\nthe test of true pleasure, are not real but a sort of imposition?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat is the inference.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nLook at the other class of pleasures which have no antecedent pains and you\nwill no longer suppose, as you perhaps may at present, that pleasure is only\nthe cessation of pain, or pain of pleasure.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat are they, he said, and where shall I find them?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThere are many of them: take as an example the pleasures of smell, which are\nvery great and have no antecedent pains; they come in a moment, and when they\ndepart leave no pain behind them.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nMost true, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nLet us not, then, be induced to believe that pure pleasure is the cessation of\npain, or pain of pleasure.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNo.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nStill, the more numerous and violent pleasures which reach the soul through the\nbody are generally of this sort\u0026mdash;they are reliefs of pain.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat is true.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd the anticipations of future pleasures and pains are of a like nature?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nShall I give you an illustration of them?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nLet me hear.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYou would allow, I said, that there is in nature an upper and lower and middle\nregion?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI should.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd if a person were to go from the lower to the middle region, would he not\nimagine that he is going up; and he who is standing in the middle and sees\nwhence he has come, would imagine that he is already in the upper region, if he\nhas never seen the true upper world?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTo be sure, he said; how can he think otherwise?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut if he were taken back again he would imagine, and truly imagine, that he\nwas descending?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNo doubt.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAll that would arise out of his ignorance of the true upper and middle and\nlower regions?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen can you wonder that persons who are inexperienced in the truth, as they\nhave wrong ideas about many other things, should also have wrong ideas about\npleasure and pain and the intermediate state; so that when they are only being\ndrawn towards the painful they feel pain and think the pain which they\nexperience to be real, and in like manner, when drawn away from pain to the\nneutral or intermediate state, they firmly believe that they have reached the\ngoal of satiety and pleasure; they, not knowing pleasure, err in contrasting\npain with the absence of pain, which is like contrasting black with grey\ninstead of white\u0026mdash;can you wonder, I say, at this?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNo, indeed; I should be much more disposed to wonder at the opposite.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nLook at the matter thus:\u0026mdash;Hunger, thirst, and the like, are inanitions of\nthe bodily state?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd ignorance and folly are inanitions of the soul?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd food and wisdom are the corresponding satisfactions of either?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd is the satisfaction derived from that which has less or from that which has\nmore existence the truer?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nClearly, from that which has more.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat classes of things have a greater share of pure existence in your\njudgment\u0026mdash;those of which food and drink and condiments and all kinds of\nsustenance are examples, or the class which contains true opinion and knowledge\nand mind and all the different kinds of virtue? Put the question in this\nway:\u0026mdash;Which has a more pure being\u0026mdash;that which is concerned with the\ninvariable, the immortal, and the true, and is of such a nature, and is found\nin such natures; or that which is concerned with and found in the variable and\nmortal, and is itself variable and mortal?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nFar purer, he replied, is the being of that which is concerned with the\ninvariable.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd does the essence of the invariable partake of knowledge in the same degree\nas of essence?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, of knowledge in the same degree.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd of truth in the same degree?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd, conversely, that which has less of truth will also have less of essence?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNecessarily.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen, in general, those kinds of things which are in the service of the body\nhave less of truth and essence than those which are in the service of the soul?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nFar less.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd has not the body itself less of truth and essence than the soul?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat is filled with more real existence, and actually has a more real\nexistence, is more really filled than that which is filled with less real\nexistence and is less real?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nOf course.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd if there be a pleasure in being filled with that which is according to\nnature, that which is more really filled with more real being will more really\nand truly enjoy true pleasure; whereas that which participates in less real\nbeing will be less truly and surely satisfied, and will participate in an\nillusory and less real pleasure?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nUnquestionably.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThose then who know not wisdom and virtue, and are always busy with gluttony\nand sensuality, go down and up again as far as the mean; and in this region\nthey move at random throughout life, but they never pass into the true upper\nworld; thither they neither look, nor do they ever find their way, neither are\nthey truly filled with true being, nor do they taste of pure and abiding\npleasure. Like cattle, with their eyes always looking down and their heads\nstooping to the earth, that is, to the dining-table, they fatten and feed and\nbreed, and, in their excessive love of these delights, they kick and butt at\none another with horns and hoofs which are made of iron; and they kill one\nanother by reason of their insatiable lust. For they fill themselves with that\nwhich is not substantial, and the part of themselves which they fill is also\nunsubstantial and incontinent.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVerily, Socrates, said Glaucon, you describe the life of the many like an\noracle.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTheir pleasures are mixed with pains\u0026mdash;how can they be otherwise? For they\nare mere shadows and pictures of the true, and are coloured by contrast, which\nexaggerates both light and shade, and so they implant in the minds of fools\ninsane desires of themselves; and they are fought about as Stesichorus says\nthat the Greeks fought about the shadow of Helen at Troy in ignorance of the\ntruth.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nSomething of that sort must inevitably happen.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd must not the like happen with the spirited or passionate element of the\nsoul? Will not the passionate man who carries his passion into action, be in\nthe like case, whether he is envious and ambitious, or violent and contentious,\nor angry and discontented, if he be seeking to attain honour and victory and\nthe satisfaction of his anger without reason or sense?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said, the same will happen with the spirited element also.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen may we not confidently assert that the lovers of money and honour, when\nthey seek their pleasures under the guidance and in the company of reason and\nknowledge, and pursue after and win the pleasures which wisdom shows them, will\nalso have the truest pleasures in the highest degree which is attainable to\nthem, inasmuch as they follow truth; and they will have the pleasures which are\nnatural to them, if that which is best for each one is also most natural to\nhim?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, certainly; the best is the most natural.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd when the whole soul follows the philosophical principle, and there is no\ndivision, the several parts are just, and do each of them their own business,\nand enjoy severally the best and truest pleasures of which they are capable?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nExactly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut when either of the two other principles prevails, it fails in attaining its\nown pleasure, and compels the rest to pursue after a pleasure which is a shadow\nonly and which is not their own?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd the greater the interval which separates them from philosophy and reason,\nthe more strange and illusive will be the pleasure?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd is not that farthest from reason which is at the greatest distance from law\nand order?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nClearly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd the lustful and tyrannical desires are, as we saw, at the greatest\ndistance? Yes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd the royal and orderly desires are nearest?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen the tyrant will live at the greatest distance from true or natural\npleasure, and the king at the least?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut if so, the tyrant will live most unpleasantly, and the king most\npleasantly?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nInevitably.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWould you know the measure of the interval which separates them?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWill you tell me?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThere appear to be three pleasures, one genuine and two spurious: now the\ntransgression of the tyrant reaches a point beyond the spurious; he has run\naway from the region of law and reason, and taken up his abode with certain\nslave pleasures which are his satellites, and the measure of his inferiority\ncan only be expressed in a figure.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHow do you mean?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI assume, I said, that the tyrant is in the third place from the oligarch; the\ndemocrat was in the middle?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd if there is truth in what has preceded, he will be wedded to an image of\npleasure which is thrice removed as to truth from the pleasure of the oligarch?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHe will.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd the oligarch is third from the royal; since we count as one royal and\naristocratical?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he is third.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen the tyrant is removed from true pleasure by the space of a number which is\nthree times three?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nManifestly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe shadow then of tyrannical pleasure determined by the number of length will\nbe a plane figure.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd if you raise the power and make the plane a solid, there is no difficulty\nin seeing how vast is the interval by which the tyrant is parted from the king.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes; the arithmetician will easily do the sum.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nOr if some person begins at the other end and measures the interval by which\nthe king is parted from the tyrant in truth of pleasure, he will find him, when\nthe multiplication is completed, living 729 times more pleasantly, and the\ntyrant more painfully by this same interval.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat a wonderful calculation! And how enormous is the distance which separates\nthe just from the unjust in regard to pleasure and pain!\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYet a true calculation, I said, and a number which nearly concerns human life,\nif human beings are concerned with days and nights and months and years. (729\nNEARLY equals the number of days and nights in the year.)\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said, human life is certainly concerned with them.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen if the good and just man be thus superior in pleasure to the evil and\nunjust, his superiority will be infinitely greater in propriety of life and in\nbeauty and virtue?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nImmeasurably greater.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWell, I said, and now having arrived at this stage of the argument, we may\nrevert to the words which brought us hither: Was not some one saying that\ninjustice was a gain to the perfectly unjust who was reputed to be just?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, that was said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNow then, having determined the power and quality of justice and injustice, let\nus have a little conversation with him.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat shall we say to him?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nLet us make an image of the soul, that he may have his own words presented\nbefore his eyes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nOf what sort?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAn ideal image of the soul, like the composite creations of ancient mythology,\nsuch as the Chimera or Scylla or Cerberus, and there are many others in which\ntwo or more different natures are said to grow into one.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThere are said of have been such unions.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen do you now model the form of a multitudinous, many-headed monster, having\na ring of heads of all manner of beasts, tame and wild, which he is able to\ngenerate and metamorphose at will.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYou suppose marvellous powers in the artist; but, as language is more pliable\nthan wax or any similar substance, let there be such a model as you propose.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nSuppose now that you make a second form as of a lion, and a third of a man, the\nsecond smaller than the first, and the third smaller than the second.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat, he said, is an easier task; and I have made them as you say.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd now join them, and let the three grow into one.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat has been accomplished.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNext fashion the outside of them into a single image, as of a man, so that he\nwho is not able to look within, and sees only the outer hull, may believe the\nbeast to be a single human creature.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI have done so, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd now, to him who maintains that it is profitable for the human creature to\nbe unjust, and unprofitable to be just, let us reply that, if he be right, it\nis profitable for this creature to feast the multitudinous monster and\nstrengthen the lion and the lion-like qualities, but to starve and weaken the\nman, who is consequently liable to be dragged about at the mercy of either of\nthe other two; and he is not to attempt to familiarize or harmonize them with\none another\u0026mdash;he ought rather to suffer them to fight and bite and devour\none another.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly, he said; that is what the approver of injustice says.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTo him the supporter of justice makes answer that he should ever so speak and\nact as to give the man within him in some way or other the most complete\nmastery over the entire human creature. He should watch over the many-headed\nmonster like a good husbandman, fostering and cultivating the gentle qualities,\nand preventing the wild ones from growing; he should be making the lion-heart\nhis ally, and in common care of them all should be uniting the several parts\nwith one another and with himself.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said, that is quite what the maintainer of justice say.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd so from every point of view, whether of pleasure, honour, or advantage, the\napprover of justice is right and speaks the truth, and the disapprover is wrong\nand false and ignorant?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, from every point of view.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCome, now, and let us gently reason with the unjust, who is not intentionally\nin error. \u0026lsquo;Sweet Sir,\u0026rsquo; we will say to him, \u0026lsquo;what think you of\nthings esteemed noble and ignoble? Is not the noble that which subjects the\nbeast to the man, or rather to the god in man; and the ignoble that which\nsubjects the man to the beast?\u0026rsquo; He can hardly avoid saying Yes\u0026mdash;can\nhe now?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNot if he has any regard for my opinion.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut, if he agree so far, we may ask him to answer another question: \u0026lsquo;Then\nhow would a man profit if he received gold and silver on the condition that he\nwas to enslave the noblest part of him to the worst? Who can imagine that a man\nwho sold his son or daughter into slavery for money, especially if he sold them\ninto the hands of fierce and evil men, would be the gainer, however large might\nbe the sum which he received? And will any one say that he is not a miserable\ncaitiff who remorselessly sells his own divine being to that which is most\ngodless and detestable? Eriphyle took the necklace as the price of her\nhusband\u0026rsquo;s life, but he is taking a bribe in order to compass a worse\nruin.\u0026rsquo;\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, said Glaucon, far worse\u0026mdash;I will answer for him.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHas not the intemperate been censured of old, because in him the huge multiform\nmonster is allowed to be too much at large?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nClearly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd men are blamed for pride and bad temper when the lion and serpent element\nin them disproportionately grows and gains strength?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd luxury and softness are blamed, because they relax and weaken this same\ncreature, and make a coward of him?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery true.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd is not a man reproached for flattery and meanness who subordinates the\nspirited animal to the unruly monster, and, for the sake of money, of which he\ncan never have enough, habituates him in the days of his youth to be trampled\nin the mire, and from being a lion to become a monkey?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd why are mean employments and manual arts a reproach? Only because they\nimply a natural weakness of the higher principle; the individual is unable to\ncontrol the creatures within him, but has to court them, and his great study is\nhow to flatter them.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nSuch appears to be the reason.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd therefore, being desirous of placing him under a rule like that of the\nbest, we say that he ought to be the servant of the best, in whom the Divine\nrules; not, as Thrasymachus supposed, to the injury of the servant, but because\nevery one had better be ruled by divine wisdom dwelling within him; or, if this\nbe impossible, then by an external authority, in order that we may be all, as\nfar as possible, under the same government, friends and equals.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd this is clearly seen to be the intention of the law, which is the ally of\nthe whole city; and is seen also in the authority which we exercise over\nchildren, and the refusal to let them be free until we have established in them\na principle analogous to the constitution of a state, and by cultivation of\nthis higher element have set up in their hearts a guardian and ruler like our\nown, and when this is done they may go their ways.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said, the purpose of the law is manifest.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nFrom what point of view, then, and on what ground can we say that a man is\nprofited by injustice or intemperance or other baseness, which will make him a\nworse man, even though he acquire money or power by his wickedness?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nFrom no point of view at all.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat shall he profit, if his injustice be undetected and unpunished? He who is\nundetected only gets worse, whereas he who is detected and punished has the\nbrutal part of his nature silenced and humanized; the gentler element in him is\nliberated, and his whole soul is perfected and ennobled by the acquirement of\njustice and temperance and wisdom, more than the body ever is by receiving\ngifts of beauty, strength and health, in proportion as the soul is more\nhonourable than the body.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTo this nobler purpose the man of understanding will devote the energies of his\nlife. And in the first place, he will honour studies which impress these\nqualities on his soul and will disregard others?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nClearly, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIn the next place, he will regulate his bodily habit and training, and so far\nwill he be from yielding to brutal and irrational pleasures, that he will\nregard even health as quite a secondary matter; his first object will be not\nthat he may be fair or strong or well, unless he is likely thereby to gain\ntemperance, but he will always desire so to attemper the body as to preserve\nthe harmony of the soul?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly he will, if he has true music in him.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd in the acquisition of wealth there is a principle of order and harmony\nwhich he will also observe; he will not allow himself to be dazzled by the\nfoolish applause of the world, and heap up riches to his own infinite harm?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly not, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHe will look at the city which is within him, and take heed that no disorder\noccur in it, such as might arise either from superfluity or from want; and upon\nthis principle he will regulate his property and gain or spend according to his\nmeans.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery true.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd, for the same reason, he will gladly accept and enjoy such honours as he\ndeems likely to make him a better man; but those, whether private or public,\nwhich are likely to disorder his life, he will avoid?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen, if that is his motive, he will not be a statesman.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBy the dog of Egypt, he will! in the city which is his own he certainly will,\nthough in the land of his birth perhaps not, unless he have a divine call.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI understand; you mean that he will be a ruler in the city of which we are the\nfounders, and which exists in idea only; for I do not believe that there is\nsuch an one anywhere on earth?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIn heaven, I replied, there is laid up a pattern of it, methinks, which he who\ndesires may behold, and beholding, may set his own house in order. But whether\nsuch an one exists, or ever will exist in fact, is no matter; for he will live\nafter the manner of that city, having nothing to do with any other.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI think so, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003c!–end chapter–\u003e\n\n\u003cdiv class=\"chapter\"\u003e\n\n\u003ch2\u003e\u003ca id=\"link2H_4_0013\"\u003e\u003c/a\u003e BOOK X.\u003c/h2\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nOf the many excellences which I perceive in the order of our State, there is\nnone which upon reflection pleases me better than the rule about poetry.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTo what do you refer?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTo the rejection of imitative poetry, which certainly ought not to be received;\nas I see far more clearly now that the parts of the soul have been\ndistinguished.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat do you mean?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nSpeaking in confidence, for I should not like to have my words repeated to the\ntragedians and the rest of the imitative tribe\u0026mdash;but I do not mind saying\nto you, that all poetical imitations are ruinous to the understanding of the\nhearers, and that the knowledge of their true nature is the only antidote to\nthem.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nExplain the purport of your remark.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWell, I will tell you, although I have always from my earliest youth had an awe\nand love of Homer, which even now makes the words falter on my lips, for he is\nthe great captain and teacher of the whole of that charming tragic company; but\na man is not to be reverenced more than the truth, and therefore I will speak\nout.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery good, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nListen to me then, or rather, answer me.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nPut your question.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCan you tell me what imitation is? for I really do not know.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nA likely thing, then, that I should know.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhy not? for the duller eye may often see a thing sooner than the keener.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery true, he said; but in your presence, even if I had any faint notion, I\ncould not muster courage to utter it. Will you enquire yourself?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWell then, shall we begin the enquiry in our usual manner: Whenever a number of\nindividuals have a common name, we assume them to have also a corresponding\nidea or form:\u0026mdash;do you understand me?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI do.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nLet us take any common instance; there are beds and tables in the\nworld\u0026mdash;plenty of them, are there not?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut there are only two ideas or forms of them\u0026mdash;one the idea of a bed, the\nother of a table.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd the maker of either of them makes a bed or he makes a table for our use, in\naccordance with the idea\u0026mdash;that is our way of speaking in this and similar\ninstances\u0026mdash;but no artificer makes the ideas themselves: how could he?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nImpossible.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd there is another artist,\u0026mdash;I should like to know what you would say of\nhim.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWho is he?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nOne who is the maker of all the works of all other workmen.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat an extraordinary man!\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWait a little, and there will be more reason for your saying so. For this is he\nwho is able to make not only vessels of every kind, but plants and animals,\nhimself and all other things\u0026mdash;the earth and heaven, and the things which\nare in heaven or under the earth; he makes the gods also.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHe must be a wizard and no mistake.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nOh! you are incredulous, are you? Do you mean that there is no such maker or\ncreator, or that in one sense there might be a maker of all these things but in\nanother not? Do you see that there is a way in which you could make them all\nyourself?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat way?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAn easy way enough; or rather, there are many ways in which the feat might be\nquickly and easily accomplished, none quicker than that of turning a mirror\nround and round\u0026mdash;you would soon enough make the sun and the heavens, and\nthe earth and yourself, and other animals and plants, and all the other things\nof which we were just now speaking, in the mirror.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said; but they would be appearances only.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery good, I said, you are coming to the point now. And the painter too is, as\nI conceive, just such another\u0026mdash;a creator of appearances, is he not?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nOf course.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut then I suppose you will say that what he creates is untrue. And yet there\nis a sense in which the painter also creates a bed?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said, but not a real bed.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd what of the maker of the bed? were you not saying that he too makes, not\nthe idea which, according to our view, is the essence of the bed, but only a\nparticular bed?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, I did.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen if he does not make that which exists he cannot make true existence, but\nonly some semblance of existence; and if any one were to say that the work of\nthe maker of the bed, or of any other workman, has real existence, he could\nhardly be supposed to be speaking the truth.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAt any rate, he replied, philosophers would say that he was not speaking the\ntruth.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNo wonder, then, that his work too is an indistinct expression of truth.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNo wonder.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nSuppose now that by the light of the examples just offered we enquire who this\nimitator is?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIf you please.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWell then, here are three beds: one existing in nature, which is made by God,\nas I think that we may say\u0026mdash;for no one else can be the maker?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNo.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThere is another which is the work of the carpenter?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd the work of the painter is a third?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBeds, then, are of three kinds, and there are three artists who superintend\nthem: God, the maker of the bed, and the painter?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, there are three of them.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nGod, whether from choice or from necessity, made one bed in nature and one\nonly; two or more such ideal beds neither ever have been nor ever will be made\nby God.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhy is that?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBecause even if He had made but two, a third would still appear behind them\nwhich both of them would have for their idea, and that would be the ideal bed\nand not the two others.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery true, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nGod knew this, and He desired to be the real maker of a real bed, not a\nparticular maker of a particular bed, and therefore He created a bed which is\nessentially and by nature one only.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nSo we believe.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nShall we, then, speak of Him as the natural author or maker of the bed?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he replied; inasmuch as by the natural process of creation He is the\nauthor of this and of all other things.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd what shall we say of the carpenter\u0026mdash;is not he also the maker of the\nbed?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut would you call the painter a creator and maker?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly not.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYet if he is not the maker, what is he in relation to the bed?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI think, he said, that we may fairly designate him as the imitator of that\nwhich the others make.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nGood, I said; then you call him who is third in the descent from nature an\nimitator?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd the tragic poet is an imitator, and therefore, like all other imitators, he\nis thrice removed from the king and from the truth?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat appears to be so.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen about the imitator we are agreed. And what about the painter?\u0026mdash;I\nwould like to know whether he may be thought to imitate that which originally\nexists in nature, or only the creations of artists?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe latter.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAs they are or as they appear? you have still to determine this.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat do you mean?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI mean, that you may look at a bed from different points of view, obliquely or\ndirectly or from any other point of view, and the bed will appear different,\nbut there is no difference in reality. And the same of all things.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said, the difference is only apparent.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNow let me ask you another question: Which is the art of painting designed to\nbe\u0026mdash;an imitation of things as they are, or as they appear\u0026mdash;of\nappearance or of reality?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nOf appearance.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen the imitator, I said, is a long way off the truth, and can do all things\nbecause he lightly touches on a small part of them, and that part an image. For\nexample: A painter will paint a cobbler, carpenter, or any other artist, though\nhe knows nothing of their arts; and, if he is a good artist, he may deceive\nchildren or simple persons, when he shows them his picture of a carpenter from\na distance, and they will fancy that they are looking at a real carpenter.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd whenever any one informs us that he has found a man who knows all the arts,\nand all things else that anybody knows, and every single thing with a higher\ndegree of accuracy than any other man\u0026mdash;whoever tells us this, I think that\nwe can only imagine him to be a simple creature who is likely to have been\ndeceived by some wizard or actor whom he met, and whom he thought all-knowing,\nbecause he himself was unable to analyse the nature of knowledge and ignorance\nand imitation.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nMost true.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd so, when we hear persons saying that the tragedians, and Homer, who is at\ntheir head, know all the arts and all things human, virtue as well as vice, and\ndivine things too, for that the good poet cannot compose well unless he knows\nhis subject, and that he who has not this knowledge can never be a poet, we\nought to consider whether here also there may not be a similar illusion.\nPerhaps they may have come across imitators and been deceived by them; they may\nnot have remembered when they saw their works that these were but imitations\nthrice removed from the truth, and could easily be made without any knowledge\nof the truth, because they are appearances only and not realities? Or, after\nall, they may be in the right, and poets do really know the things about which\nthey seem to the many to speak so well?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe question, he said, should by all means be considered.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNow do you suppose that if a person were able to make the original as well as\nthe image, he would seriously devote himself to the image-making branch? Would\nhe allow imitation to be the ruling principle of his life, as if he had nothing\nhigher in him?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI should say not.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe real artist, who knew what he was imitating, would be interested in\nrealities and not in imitations; and would desire to leave as memorials of\nhimself works many and fair; and, instead of being the author of encomiums, he\nwould prefer to be the theme of them.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said, that would be to him a source of much greater honour and profit.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen, I said, we must put a question to Homer; not about medicine, or any of\nthe arts to which his poems only incidentally refer: we are not going to ask\nhim, or any other poet, whether he has cured patients like Asclepius, or left\nbehind him a school of medicine such as the Asclepiads were, or whether he only\ntalks about medicine and other arts at second-hand; but we have a right to know\nrespecting military tactics, politics, education, which are the chiefest and\nnoblest subjects of his poems, and we may fairly ask him about them.\n\u0026lsquo;Friend Homer,\u0026rsquo; then we say to him, \u0026lsquo;if you are only in the\nsecond remove from truth in what you say of virtue, and not in the\nthird\u0026mdash;not an image maker or imitator\u0026mdash;and if you are able to discern\nwhat pursuits make men better or worse in private or public life, tell us what\nState was ever better governed by your help? The good order of Lacedaemon is\ndue to Lycurgus, and many other cities great and small have been similarly\nbenefited by others; but who says that you have been a good legislator to them\nand have done them any good? Italy and Sicily boast of Charondas, and there is\nSolon who is renowned among us; but what city has anything to say about\nyou?\u0026rsquo; Is there any city which he might name?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI think not, said Glaucon; not even the Homerids themselves pretend that he was\na legislator.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWell, but is there any war on record which was carried on successfully by him,\nor aided by his counsels, when he was alive?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThere is not.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nOr is there any invention of his, applicable to the arts or to human life, such\nas Thales the Milesian or Anacharsis the Scythian, and other ingenious men have\nconceived, which is attributed to him?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThere is absolutely nothing of the kind.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut, if Homer never did any public service, was he privately a guide or teacher\nof any? Had he in his lifetime friends who loved to associate with him, and who\nhanded down to posterity an Homeric way of life, such as was established by\nPythagoras who was so greatly beloved for his wisdom, and whose followers are\nto this day quite celebrated for the order which was named after him?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNothing of the kind is recorded of him. For surely, Socrates, Creophylus, the\ncompanion of Homer, that child of flesh, whose name always makes us laugh,\nmight be more justly ridiculed for his stupidity, if, as is said, Homer was\ngreatly neglected by him and others in his own day when he was alive?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, I replied, that is the tradition. But can you imagine, Glaucon, that if\nHomer had really been able to educate and improve mankind\u0026mdash;if he had\npossessed knowledge and not been a mere imitator\u0026mdash;can you imagine, I say,\nthat he would not have had many followers, and been honoured and loved by them?\nProtagoras of Abdera, and Prodicus of Ceos, and a host of others, have only to\nwhisper to their contemporaries: \u0026lsquo;You will never be able to manage either\nyour own house or your own State until you appoint us to be your ministers of\neducation\u0026rsquo;\u0026mdash;and this ingenious device of theirs has such an effect\nin making men love them that their companions all but carry them about on their\nshoulders. And is it conceivable that the contemporaries of Homer, or again of\nHesiod, would have allowed either of them to go about as rhapsodists, if they\nhad really been able to make mankind virtuous? Would they not have been as\nunwilling to part with them as with gold, and have compelled them to stay at\nhome with them? Or, if the master would not stay, then the disciples would have\nfollowed him about everywhere, until they had got education enough?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, Socrates, that, I think, is quite true.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen must we not infer that all these poetical individuals, beginning with\nHomer, are only imitators; they copy images of virtue and the like, but the\ntruth they never reach? The poet is like a painter who, as we have already\nobserved, will make a likeness of a cobbler though he understands nothing of\ncobbling; and his picture is good enough for those who know no more than he\ndoes, and judge only by colours and figures.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nQuite so.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIn like manner the poet with his words and phrases may be said to lay on the\ncolours of the several arts, himself understanding their nature only enough to\nimitate them; and other people, who are as ignorant as he is, and judge only\nfrom his words, imagine that if he speaks of cobbling, or of military tactics,\nor of anything else, in metre and harmony and rhythm, he speaks very\nwell\u0026mdash;such is the sweet influence which melody and rhythm by nature have.\nAnd I think that you must have observed again and again what a poor appearance\nthe tales of poets make when stripped of the colours which music puts upon\nthem, and recited in simple prose.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThey are like faces which were never really beautiful, but only blooming; and\nnow the bloom of youth has passed away from them?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nExactly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHere is another point: The imitator or maker of the image knows nothing of true\nexistence; he knows appearances only. Am I not right?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen let us have a clear understanding, and not be satisfied with half an\nexplanation.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nProceed.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nOf the painter we say that he will paint reins, and he will paint a bit?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd the worker in leather and brass will make them?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut does the painter know the right form of the bit and reins? Nay, hardly even\nthe workers in brass and leather who make them; only the horseman who knows how\nto use them\u0026mdash;he knows their right form.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nMost true.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd may we not say the same of all things?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat there are three arts which are concerned with all things: one which uses,\nanother which makes, a third which imitates them?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd the excellence or beauty or truth of every structure, animate or inanimate,\nand of every action of man, is relative to the use for which nature or the\nartist has intended them.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen the user of them must have the greatest experience of them, and he must\nindicate to the maker the good or bad qualities which develop themselves in\nuse; for example, the flute-player will tell the flute-maker which of his\nflutes is satisfactory to the performer; he will tell him how he ought to make\nthem, and the other will attend to his instructions?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nOf course.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe one knows and therefore speaks with authority about the goodness and\nbadness of flutes, while the other, confiding in him, will do what he is told\nby him?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe instrument is the same, but about the excellence or badness of it the maker\nwill only attain to a correct belief; and this he will gain from him who knows,\nby talking to him and being compelled to hear what he has to say, whereas the\nuser will have knowledge?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut will the imitator have either? Will he know from use whether or no his\ndrawing is correct or beautiful? or will he have right opinion from being\ncompelled to associate with another who knows and gives him instructions about\nwhat he should draw?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNeither.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen he will no more have true opinion than he will have knowledge about the\ngoodness or badness of his imitations?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI suppose not.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe imitative artist will be in a brilliant state of intelligence about his own\ncreations?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNay, very much the reverse.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd still he will go on imitating without knowing what makes a thing good or\nbad, and may be expected therefore to imitate only that which appears to be\ngood to the ignorant multitude?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nJust so.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThus far then we are pretty well agreed that the imitator has no knowledge\nworth mentioning of what he imitates. Imitation is only a kind of play or\nsport, and the tragic poets, whether they write in Iambic or in Heroic verse,\nare imitators in the highest degree?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery true.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd now tell me, I conjure you, has not imitation been shown by us to be\nconcerned with that which is thrice removed from the truth?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd what is the faculty in man to which imitation is addressed?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat do you mean?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI will explain: The body which is large when seen near, appears small when seen\nat a distance?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd the same object appears straight when looked at out of the water, and\ncrooked when in the water; and the concave becomes convex, owing to the\nillusion about colours to which the sight is liable. Thus every sort of\nconfusion is revealed within us; and this is that weakness of the human mind on\nwhich the art of conjuring and of deceiving by light and shadow and other\ningenious devices imposes, having an effect upon us like magic.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd the arts of measuring and numbering and weighing come to the rescue of the\nhuman understanding\u0026mdash;there is the beauty of them\u0026mdash;and the apparent\ngreater or less, or more or heavier, no longer have the mastery over us, but\ngive way before calculation and measure and weight?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nMost true.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd this, surely, must be the work of the calculating and rational principle in\nthe soul?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTo be sure.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd when this principle measures and certifies that some things are equal, or\nthat some are greater or less than others, there occurs an apparent\ncontradiction?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut were we not saying that such a contradiction is impossible\u0026mdash;the same\nfaculty cannot have contrary opinions at the same time about the same thing?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery true.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen that part of the soul which has an opinion contrary to measure is not the\nsame with that which has an opinion in accordance with measure?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd the better part of the soul is likely to be that which trusts to measure\nand calculation?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd that which is opposed to them is one of the inferior principles of the\nsoul?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNo doubt.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThis was the conclusion at which I was seeking to arrive when I said that\npainting or drawing, and imitation in general, when doing their own proper\nwork, are far removed from truth, and the companions and friends and associates\nof a principle within us which is equally removed from reason, and that they\nhave no true or healthy aim.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nExactly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe imitative art is an inferior who marries an inferior, and has inferior\noffspring.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery true.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd is this confined to the sight only, or does it extend to the hearing also,\nrelating in fact to what we term poetry?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nProbably the same would be true of poetry.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nDo not rely, I said, on a probability derived from the analogy of painting; but\nlet us examine further and see whether the faculty with which poetical\nimitation is concerned is good or bad.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBy all means.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWe may state the question thus:\u0026mdash;Imitation imitates the actions of men,\nwhether voluntary or involuntary, on which, as they imagine, a good or bad\nresult has ensued, and they rejoice or sorrow accordingly. Is there anything\nmore?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNo, there is nothing else.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut in all this variety of circumstances is the man at unity with\nhimself\u0026mdash;or rather, as in the instance of sight there was confusion and\nopposition in his opinions about the same things, so here also is there not\nstrife and inconsistency in his life? Though I need hardly raise the question\nagain, for I remember that all this has been already admitted; and the soul has\nbeen acknowledged by us to be full of these and ten thousand similar\noppositions occurring at the same moment?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd we were right, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, I said, thus far we were right; but there was an omission which must now\nbe supplied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat was the omission?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWere we not saying that a good man, who has the misfortune to lose his son or\nanything else which is most dear to him, will bear the loss with more\nequanimity than another?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut will he have no sorrow, or shall we say that although he cannot help\nsorrowing, he will moderate his sorrow?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe latter, he said, is the truer statement.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTell me: will he be more likely to struggle and hold out against his sorrow\nwhen he is seen by his equals, or when he is alone?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIt will make a great difference whether he is seen or not.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhen he is by himself he will not mind saying or doing many things which he\nwould be ashamed of any one hearing or seeing him do?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThere is a principle of law and reason in him which bids him resist, as well as\na feeling of his misfortune which is forcing him to indulge his sorrow?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut when a man is drawn in two opposite directions, to and from the same\nobject, this, as we affirm, necessarily implies two distinct principles in him?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nOne of them is ready to follow the guidance of the law?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHow do you mean?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe law would say that to be patient under suffering is best, and that we\nshould not give way to impatience, as there is no knowing whether such things\nare good or evil; and nothing is gained by impatience; also, because no human\nthing is of serious importance, and grief stands in the way of that which at\nthe moment is most required.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat is most required? he asked.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat we should take counsel about what has happened, and when the dice have\nbeen thrown order our affairs in the way which reason deems best; not, like\nchildren who have had a fall, keeping hold of the part struck and wasting time\nin setting up a howl, but always accustoming the soul forthwith to apply a\nremedy, raising up that which is sickly and fallen, banishing the cry of sorrow\nby the healing art.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said, that is the true way of meeting the attacks of fortune.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, I said; and the higher principle is ready to follow this suggestion of\nreason?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nClearly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd the other principle, which inclines us to recollection of our troubles and\nto lamentation, and can never have enough of them, we may call irrational,\nuseless, and cowardly?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIndeed, we may.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd does not the latter\u0026mdash;I mean the rebellious principle\u0026mdash;furnish a\ngreat variety of materials for imitation? Whereas the wise and calm\ntemperament, being always nearly equable, is not easy to imitate or to\nappreciate when imitated, especially at a public festival when a promiscuous\ncrowd is assembled in a theatre. For the feeling represented is one to which\nthey are strangers.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen the imitative poet who aims at being popular is not by nature made, nor is\nhis art intended, to please or to affect the rational principle in the soul;\nbut he will prefer the passionate and fitful temper, which is easily imitated?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nClearly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd now we may fairly take him and place him by the side of the painter, for he\nis like him in two ways: first, inasmuch as his creations have an inferior\ndegree of truth\u0026mdash;in this, I say, he is like him; and he is also like him\nin being concerned with an inferior part of the soul; and therefore we shall be\nright in refusing to admit him into a well-ordered State, because he awakens\nand nourishes and strengthens the feelings and impairs the reason. As in a city\nwhen the evil are permitted to have authority and the good are put out of the\nway, so in the soul of man, as we maintain, the imitative poet implants an evil\nconstitution, for he indulges the irrational nature which has no discernment of\ngreater and less, but thinks the same thing at one time great and at another\nsmall\u0026mdash;he is a manufacturer of images and is very far removed from the\ntruth.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nExactly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut we have not yet brought forward the heaviest count in our\naccusation:\u0026mdash;the power which poetry has of harming even the good (and\nthere are very few who are not harmed), is surely an awful thing?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, certainly, if the effect is what you say.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHear and judge: The best of us, as I conceive, when we listen to a passage of\nHomer, or one of the tragedians, in which he represents some pitiful hero who\nis drawling out his sorrows in a long oration, or weeping, and smiting his\nbreast\u0026mdash;the best of us, you know, delight in giving way to sympathy, and\nare in raptures at the excellence of the poet who stirs our feelings most.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, of course I know.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut when any sorrow of our own happens to us, then you may observe that we\npride ourselves on the opposite quality\u0026mdash;we would fain be quiet and\npatient; this is the manly part, and the other which delighted us in the\nrecitation is now deemed to be the part of a woman.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery true, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNow can we be right in praising and admiring another who is doing that which\nany one of us would abominate and be ashamed of in his own person?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNo, he said, that is certainly not reasonable.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNay, I said, quite reasonable from one point of view.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat point of view?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIf you consider, I said, that when in misfortune we feel a natural hunger and\ndesire to relieve our sorrow by weeping and lamentation, and that this feeling\nwhich is kept under control in our own calamities is satisfied and delighted by\nthe poets;\u0026mdash;the better nature in each of us, not having been sufficiently\ntrained by reason or habit, allows the sympathetic element to break loose\nbecause the sorrow is another\u0026rsquo;s; and the spectator fancies that there can\nbe no disgrace to himself in praising and pitying any one who comes telling him\nwhat a good man he is, and making a fuss about his troubles; he thinks that the\npleasure is a gain, and why should he be supercilious and lose this and the\npoem too? Few persons ever reflect, as I should imagine, that from the evil of\nother men something of evil is communicated to themselves. And so the feeling\nof sorrow which has gathered strength at the sight of the misfortunes of others\nis with difficulty repressed in our own.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHow very true!\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd does not the same hold also of the ridiculous? There are jests which you\nwould be ashamed to make yourself, and yet on the comic stage, or indeed in\nprivate, when you hear them, you are greatly amused by them, and are not at all\ndisgusted at their unseemliness;\u0026mdash;the case of pity is\nrepeated;\u0026mdash;there is a principle in human nature which is disposed to raise\na laugh, and this which you once restrained by reason, because you were afraid\nof being thought a buffoon, is now let out again; and having stimulated the\nrisible faculty at the theatre, you are betrayed unconsciously to yourself into\nplaying the comic poet at home.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nQuite true, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd the same may be said of lust and anger and all the other affections, of\ndesire and pain and pleasure, which are held to be inseparable from every\naction\u0026mdash;in all of them poetry feeds and waters the passions instead of\ndrying them up; she lets them rule, although they ought to be controlled, if\nmankind are ever to increase in happiness and virtue.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI cannot deny it.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTherefore, Glaucon, I said, whenever you meet with any of the eulogists of\nHomer declaring that he has been the educator of Hellas, and that he is\nprofitable for education and for the ordering of human things, and that you\nshould take him up again and again and get to know him and regulate your whole\nlife according to him, we may love and honour those who say these\nthings\u0026mdash;they are excellent people, as far as their lights extend; and we\nare ready to acknowledge that Homer is the greatest of poets and first of\ntragedy writers; but we must remain firm in our conviction that hymns to the\ngods and praises of famous men are the only poetry which ought to be admitted\ninto our State. For if you go beyond this and allow the honeyed muse to enter,\neither in epic or lyric verse, not law and the reason of mankind, which by\ncommon consent have ever been deemed best, but pleasure and pain will be the\nrulers in our State.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat is most true, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd now since we have reverted to the subject of poetry, let this our defence\nserve to show the reasonableness of our former judgment in sending away out of\nour State an art having the tendencies which we have described; for reason\nconstrained us. But that she may not impute to us any harshness or want of\npoliteness, let us tell her that there is an ancient quarrel between philosophy\nand poetry; of which there are many proofs, such as the saying of \u0026lsquo;the\nyelping hound howling at her lord,\u0026rsquo; or of one \u0026lsquo;mighty in the vain\ntalk of fools,\u0026rsquo; and \u0026lsquo;the mob of sages circumventing Zeus,\u0026rsquo;\nand the \u0026lsquo;subtle thinkers who are beggars after all\u0026rsquo;; and there are\ninnumerable other signs of ancient enmity between them. Notwithstanding this,\nlet us assure our sweet friend and the sister arts of imitation, that if she\nwill only prove her title to exist in a well-ordered State we shall be\ndelighted to receive her\u0026mdash;we are very conscious of her charms; but we may\nnot on that account betray the truth. I dare say, Glaucon, that you are as much\ncharmed by her as I am, especially when she appears in Homer?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, indeed, I am greatly charmed.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nShall I propose, then, that she be allowed to return from exile, but upon this\ncondition only\u0026mdash;that she make a defence of herself in lyrical or some\nother metre?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd we may further grant to those of her defenders who are lovers of poetry and\nyet not poets the permission to speak in prose on her behalf: let them show not\nonly that she is pleasant but also useful to States and to human life, and we\nwill listen in a kindly spirit; for if this can be proved we shall surely be\nthe gainers\u0026mdash;I mean, if there is a use in poetry as well as a delight?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly, he said, we shall be the gainers.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIf her defence fails, then, my dear friend, like other persons who are\nenamoured of something, but put a restraint upon themselves when they think\ntheir desires are opposed to their interests, so too must we after the manner\nof lovers give her up, though not without a struggle. We too are inspired by\nthat love of poetry which the education of noble States has implanted in us,\nand therefore we would have her appear at her best and truest; but so long as\nshe is unable to make good her defence, this argument of ours shall be a charm\nto us, which we will repeat to ourselves while we listen to her strains; that\nwe may not fall away into the childish love of her which captivates the many.\nAt all events we are well aware that poetry being such as we have described is\nnot to be regarded seriously as attaining to the truth; and he who listens to\nher, fearing for the safety of the city which is within him, should be on his\nguard against her seductions and make our words his law.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said, I quite agree with you.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, I said, my dear Glaucon, for great is the issue at stake, greater than\nappears, whether a man is to be good or bad. And what will any one be profited\nif under the influence of honour or money or power, aye, or under the\nexcitement of poetry, he neglect justice and virtue?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said; I have been convinced by the argument, as I believe that any one\nelse would have been.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd yet no mention has been made of the greatest prizes and rewards which await\nvirtue.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat, are there any greater still? If there are, they must be of an\ninconceivable greatness.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhy, I said, what was ever great in a short time? The whole period of three\nscore years and ten is surely but a little thing in comparison with eternity?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nSay rather \u0026lsquo;nothing,\u0026rsquo; he replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd should an immortal being seriously think of this little space rather than\nof the whole?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nOf the whole, certainly. But why do you ask?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAre you not aware, I said, that the soul of man is immortal and imperishable?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHe looked at me in astonishment, and said: No, by heaven: And are you really\nprepared to maintain this?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, I said, I ought to be, and you too\u0026mdash;there is no difficulty in proving\nit.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI see a great difficulty; but I should like to hear you state this argument of\nwhich you make so light.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nListen then.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI am attending.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThere is a thing which you call good and another which you call evil?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWould you agree with me in thinking that the corrupting and destroying element\nis the evil, and the saving and improving element the good?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd you admit that every thing has a good and also an evil; as ophthalmia is\nthe evil of the eyes and disease of the whole body; as mildew is of corn, and\nrot of timber, or rust of copper and iron: in everything, or in almost\neverything, there is an inherent evil and disease?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd anything which is infected by any of these evils is made evil, and at last\nwholly dissolves and dies?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe vice and evil which is inherent in each is the destruction of each; and if\nthis does not destroy them there is nothing else that will; for good certainly\nwill not destroy them, nor again, that which is neither good nor evil.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly not.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIf, then, we find any nature which having this inherent corruption cannot be\ndissolved or destroyed, we may be certain that of such a nature there is no\ndestruction?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat may be assumed.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWell, I said, and is there no evil which corrupts the soul?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said, there are all the evils which we were just now passing in review:\nunrighteousness, intemperance, cowardice, ignorance.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut does any of these dissolve or destroy her?\u0026mdash;and here do not let us\nfall into the error of supposing that the unjust and foolish man, when he is\ndetected, perishes through his own injustice, which is an evil of the soul.\nTake the analogy of the body: The evil of the body is a disease which wastes\nand reduces and annihilates the body; and all the things of which we were just\nnow speaking come to annihilation through their own corruption attaching to\nthem and inhering in them and so destroying them. Is not this true?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nConsider the soul in like manner. Does the injustice or other evil which exists\nin the soul waste and consume her? Do they by attaching to the soul and\ninhering in her at last bring her to death, and so separate her from the body?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly not.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd yet, I said, it is unreasonable to suppose that anything can perish from\nwithout through affection of external evil which could not be destroyed from\nwithin by a corruption of its own?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIt is, he replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nConsider, I said, Glaucon, that even the badness of food, whether staleness,\ndecomposition, or any other bad quality, when confined to the actual food, is\nnot supposed to destroy the body; although, if the badness of food communicates\ncorruption to the body, then we should say that the body has been destroyed by\na corruption of itself, which is disease, brought on by this; but that the\nbody, being one thing, can be destroyed by the badness of food, which is\nanother, and which does not engender any natural infection\u0026mdash;this we shall\nabsolutely deny?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery true.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd, on the same principle, unless some bodily evil can produce an evil of the\nsoul, we must not suppose that the soul, which is one thing, can be dissolved\nby any merely external evil which belongs to another?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said, there is reason in that.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nEither, then, let us refute this conclusion, or, while it remains unrefuted,\nlet us never say that fever, or any other disease, or the knife put to the\nthroat, or even the cutting up of the whole body into the minutest pieces, can\ndestroy the soul, until she herself is proved to become more unholy or\nunrighteous in consequence of these things being done to the body; but that the\nsoul, or anything else if not destroyed by an internal evil, can be destroyed\nby an external one, is not to be affirmed by any man.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd surely, he replied, no one will ever prove that the souls of men become\nmore unjust in consequence of death.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut if some one who would rather not admit the immortality of the soul boldly\ndenies this, and says that the dying do really become more evil and\nunrighteous, then, if the speaker is right, I suppose that injustice, like\ndisease, must be assumed to be fatal to the unjust, and that those who take\nthis disorder die by the natural inherent power of destruction which evil has,\nand which kills them sooner or later, but in quite another way from that in\nwhich, at present, the wicked receive death at the hands of others as the\npenalty of their deeds?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNay, he said, in that case injustice, if fatal to the unjust, will not be so\nvery terrible to him, for he will be delivered from evil. But I rather suspect\nthe opposite to be the truth, and that injustice which, if it have the power,\nwill murder others, keeps the murderer alive\u0026mdash;aye, and well awake too; so\nfar removed is her dwelling-place from being a house of death.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue, I said; if the inherent natural vice or evil of the soul is unable to\nkill or destroy her, hardly will that which is appointed to be the destruction\nof some other body, destroy a soul or anything else except that of which it was\nappointed to be the destruction.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, that can hardly be.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut the soul which cannot be destroyed by an evil, whether inherent or\nexternal, must exist for ever, and if existing for ever, must be immortal?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat is the conclusion, I said; and, if a true conclusion, then the souls must\nalways be the same, for if none be destroyed they will not diminish in number.\nNeither will they increase, for the increase of the immortal natures must come\nfrom something mortal, and all things would thus end in immortality.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery true.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nBut this we cannot believe\u0026mdash;reason will not allow us\u0026mdash;any more than\nwe can believe the soul, in her truest nature, to be full of variety and\ndifference and dissimilarity.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat do you mean? he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe soul, I said, being, as is now proven, immortal, must be the fairest of\ncompositions and cannot be compounded of many elements?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly not.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nHer immortality is demonstrated by the previous argument, and there are many\nother proofs; but to see her as she really is, not as we now behold her, marred\nby communion with the body and other miseries, you must contemplate her with\nthe eye of reason, in her original purity; and then her beauty will be\nrevealed, and justice and injustice and all the things which we have described\nwill be manifested more clearly. Thus far, we have spoken the truth concerning\nher as she appears at present, but we must remember also that we have seen her\nonly in a condition which may be compared to that of the sea-god Glaucus, whose\noriginal image can hardly be discerned because his natural members are broken\noff and crushed and damaged by the waves in all sorts of ways, and\nincrustations have grown over them of seaweed and shells and stones, so that he\nis more like some monster than he is to his own natural form. And the soul\nwhich we behold is in a similar condition, disfigured by ten thousand ills. But\nnot there, Glaucon, not there must we look.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhere then?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAt her love of wisdom. Let us see whom she affects, and what society and\nconverse she seeks in virtue of her near kindred with the immortal and eternal\nand divine; also how different she would become if wholly following this\nsuperior principle, and borne by a divine impulse out of the ocean in which she\nnow is, and disengaged from the stones and shells and things of earth and rock\nwhich in wild variety spring up around her because she feeds upon earth, and is\novergrown by the good things of this life as they are termed: then you would\nsee her as she is, and know whether she have one shape only or many, or what\nher nature is. Of her affections and of the forms which she takes in this\npresent life I think that we have now said enough.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue, he replied.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd thus, I said, we have fulfilled the conditions of the argument; we have not\nintroduced the rewards and glories of justice, which, as you were saying, are\nto be found in Homer and Hesiod; but justice in her own nature has been shown\nto be best for the soul in her own nature. Let a man do what is just, whether\nhe have the ring of Gyges or not, and even if in addition to the ring of Gyges\nhe put on the helmet of Hades.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nVery true.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd now, Glaucon, there will be no harm in further enumerating how many and how\ngreat are the rewards which justice and the other virtues procure to the soul\nfrom gods and men, both in life and after death.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly not, he said.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWill you repay me, then, what you borrowed in the argument?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhat did I borrow?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe assumption that the just man should appear unjust and the unjust just: for\nyou were of opinion that even if the true state of the case could not possibly\nescape the eyes of gods and men, still this admission ought to be made for the\nsake of the argument, in order that pure justice might be weighed against pure\ninjustice. Do you remember?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nI should be much to blame if I had forgotten.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen, as the cause is decided, I demand on behalf of justice that the\nestimation in which she is held by gods and men and which we acknowledge to be\nher due should now be restored to her by us; since she has been shown to confer\nreality, and not to deceive those who truly possess her, let what has been\ntaken from her be given back, that so she may win that palm of appearance which\nis hers also, and which she gives to her own.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThe demand, he said, is just.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nIn the first place, I said\u0026mdash;and this is the first thing which you will\nhave to give back\u0026mdash;the nature both of the just and unjust is truly known\nto the gods.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nGranted.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd if they are both known to them, one must be the friend and the other the\nenemy of the gods, as we admitted from the beginning?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd the friend of the gods may be supposed to receive from them all things at\ntheir best, excepting only such evil as is the necessary consequence of former\nsins?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThen this must be our notion of the just man, that even when he is in poverty\nor sickness, or any other seeming misfortune, all things will in the end work\ntogether for good to him in life and death: for the gods have a care of any one\nwhose desire is to become just and to be like God, as far as man can attain the\ndivine likeness, by the pursuit of virtue?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said; if he is like God he will surely not be neglected by him.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd of the unjust may not the opposite be supposed?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nSuch, then, are the palms of victory which the gods give the just?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThat is my conviction.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd what do they receive of men? Look at things as they really are, and you\nwill see that the clever unjust are in the case of runners, who run well from\nthe starting-place to the goal but not back again from the goal: they go off at\na great pace, but in the end only look foolish, slinking away with their ears\ndraggling on their shoulders, and without a crown; but the true runner comes to\nthe finish and receives the prize and is crowned. And this is the way with the\njust; he who endures to the end of every action and occasion of his entire life\nhas a good report and carries off the prize which men have to bestow.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nTrue.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd now you must allow me to repeat of the just the blessings which you were\nattributing to the fortunate unjust. I shall say of them, what you were saying\nof the others, that as they grow older, they become rulers in their own city if\nthey care to be; they marry whom they like and give in marriage to whom they\nwill; all that you said of the others I now say of these. And, on the other\nhand, of the unjust I say that the greater number, even though they escape in\ntheir youth, are found out at last and look foolish at the end of their course,\nand when they come to be old and miserable are flouted alike by stranger and\ncitizen; they are beaten and then come those things unfit for ears polite, as\nyou truly term them; they will be racked and have their eyes burned out, as you\nwere saying. And you may suppose that I have repeated the remainder of your\ntale of horrors. But will you let me assume, without reciting them, that these\nthings are true?\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nCertainly, he said, what you say is true.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nThese, then, are the prizes and rewards and gifts which are bestowed upon the\njust by gods and men in this present life, in addition to the other good things\nwhich justice of herself provides.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nYes, he said; and they are fair and lasting.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd yet, I said, all these are as nothing either in number or greatness in\ncomparison with those other recompenses which await both just and unjust after\ndeath. And you ought to hear them, and then both just and unjust will have\nreceived from us a full payment of the debt which the argument owes to them.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nSpeak, he said; there are few things which I would more gladly hear.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWell, I said, I will tell you a tale; not one of the tales which Odysseus tells\nto the hero Alcinous, yet this too is a tale of a hero, Er the son of Armenius,\na Pamphylian by birth. He was slain in battle, and ten days afterwards, when\nthe bodies of the dead were taken up already in a state of corruption, his body\nwas found unaffected by decay, and carried away home to be buried. And on the\ntwelfth day, as he was lying on the funeral pile, he returned to life and told\nthem what he had seen in the other world. He said that when his soul left the\nbody he went on a journey with a great company, and that they came to a\nmysterious place at which there were two openings in the earth; they were near\ntogether, and over against them were two other openings in the heaven above. In\nthe intermediate space there were judges seated, who commanded the just, after\nthey had given judgment on them and had bound their sentences in front of them,\nto ascend by the heavenly way on the right hand; and in like manner the unjust\nwere bidden by them to descend by the lower way on the left hand; these also\nbore the symbols of their deeds, but fastened on their backs. He drew near, and\nthey told him that he was to be the messenger who would carry the report of the\nother world to men, and they bade him hear and see all that was to be heard and\nseen in that place. Then he beheld and saw on one side the souls departing at\neither opening of heaven and earth when sentence had been given on them; and at\nthe two other openings other souls, some ascending out of the earth dusty and\nworn with travel, some descending out of heaven clean and bright. And arriving\never and anon they seemed to have come from a long journey, and they went forth\nwith gladness into the meadow, where they encamped as at a festival; and those\nwho knew one another embraced and conversed, the souls which came from earth\ncuriously enquiring about the things above, and the souls which came from\nheaven about the things beneath. And they told one another of what had happened\nby the way, those from below weeping and sorrowing at the remembrance of the\nthings which they had endured and seen in their journey beneath the earth (now\nthe journey lasted a thousand years), while those from above were describing\nheavenly delights and visions of inconceivable beauty. The story, Glaucon,\nwould take too long to tell; but the sum was this:\u0026mdash;He said that for every\nwrong which they had done to any one they suffered tenfold; or once in a\nhundred years\u0026mdash;such being reckoned to be the length of man\u0026rsquo;s life,\nand the penalty being thus paid ten times in a thousand years. If, for example,\nthere were any who had been the cause of many deaths, or had betrayed or\nenslaved cities or armies, or been guilty of any other evil behaviour, for each\nand all of their offences they received punishment ten times over, and the\nrewards of beneficence and justice and holiness were in the same proportion. I\nneed hardly repeat what he said concerning young children dying almost as soon\nas they were born. Of piety and impiety to gods and parents, and of murderers,\nthere were retributions other and greater far which he described. He mentioned\nthat he was present when one of the spirits asked another, \u0026lsquo;Where is\nArdiaeus the Great?\u0026rsquo; (Now this Ardiaeus lived a thousand years before the\ntime of Er: he had been the tyrant of some city of Pamphylia, and had murdered\nhis aged father and his elder brother, and was said to have committed many\nother abominable crimes.) The answer of the other spirit was: \u0026lsquo;He comes\nnot hither and will never come. And this,\u0026rsquo; said he, \u0026lsquo;was one of the\ndreadful sights which we ourselves witnessed. We were at the mouth of the\ncavern, and, having completed all our experiences, were about to reascend, when\nof a sudden Ardiaeus appeared and several others, most of whom were tyrants;\nand there were also besides the tyrants private individuals who had been great\ncriminals: they were just, as they fancied, about to return into the upper\nworld, but the mouth, instead of admitting them, gave a roar, whenever any of\nthese incurable sinners or some one who had not been sufficiently punished\ntried to ascend; and then wild men of fiery aspect, who were standing by and\nheard the sound, seized and carried them off; and Ardiaeus and others they\nbound head and foot and hand, and threw them down and flayed them with\nscourges, and dragged them along the road at the side, carding them on thorns\nlike wool, and declaring to the passers-by what were their crimes, and that\nthey were being taken away to be cast into hell.\u0026rsquo; And of all the many\nterrors which they had endured, he said that there was none like the terror\nwhich each of them felt at that moment, lest they should hear the voice; and\nwhen there was silence, one by one they ascended with exceeding joy. These,\nsaid Er, were the penalties and retributions, and there were blessings as\ngreat.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nNow when the spirits which were in the meadow had tarried seven days, on the\neighth they were obliged to proceed on their journey, and, on the fourth day\nafter, he said that they came to a place where they could see from above a line\nof light, straight as a column, extending right through the whole heaven and\nthrough the earth, in colour resembling the rainbow, only brighter and purer;\nanother day\u0026rsquo;s journey brought them to the place, and there, in the midst\nof the light, they saw the ends of the chains of heaven let down from above:\nfor this light is the belt of heaven, and holds together the circle of the\nuniverse, like the under-girders of a trireme. From these ends is extended the\nspindle of Necessity, on which all the revolutions turn. The shaft and hook of\nthis spindle are made of steel, and the whorl is made partly of steel and also\npartly of other materials. Now the whorl is in form like the whorl used on\nearth; and the description of it implied that there is one large hollow whorl\nwhich is quite scooped out, and into this is fitted another lesser one, and\nanother, and another, and four others, making eight in all, like vessels which\nfit into one another; the whorls show their edges on the upper side, and on\ntheir lower side all together form one continuous whorl. This is pierced by the\nspindle, which is driven home through the centre of the eighth. The first and\noutermost whorl has the rim broadest, and the seven inner whorls are narrower,\nin the following proportions\u0026mdash;the sixth is next to the first in size, the\nfourth next to the sixth; then comes the eighth; the seventh is fifth, the\nfifth is sixth, the third is seventh, last and eighth comes the second. The\nlargest (or fixed stars) is spangled, and the seventh (or sun) is brightest;\nthe eighth (or moon) coloured by the reflected light of the seventh; the second\nand fifth (Saturn and Mercury) are in colour like one another, and yellower\nthan the preceding; the third (Venus) has the whitest light; the fourth (Mars)\nis reddish; the sixth (Jupiter) is in whiteness second. Now the whole spindle\nhas the same motion; but, as the whole revolves in one direction, the seven\ninner circles move slowly in the other, and of these the swiftest is the\neighth; next in swiftness are the seventh, sixth, and fifth, which move\ntogether; third in swiftness appeared to move according to the law of this\nreversed motion the fourth; the third appeared fourth and the second fifth. The\nspindle turns on the knees of Necessity; and on the upper surface of each\ncircle is a siren, who goes round with them, hymning a single tone or note. The\neight together form one harmony; and round about, at equal intervals, there is\nanother band, three in number, each sitting upon her throne: these are the\nFates, daughters of Necessity, who are clothed in white robes and have chaplets\nupon their heads, Lachesis and Clotho and Atropos, who accompany with their\nvoices the harmony of the sirens\u0026mdash;Lachesis singing of the past, Clotho of\nthe present, Atropos of the future; Clotho from time to time assisting with a\ntouch of her right hand the revolution of the outer circle of the whorl or\nspindle, and Atropos with her left hand touching and guiding the inner ones,\nand Lachesis laying hold of either in turn, first with one hand and then with\nthe other.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nWhen Er and the spirits arrived, their duty was to go at once to Lachesis; but\nfirst of all there came a prophet who arranged them in order; then he took from\nthe knees of Lachesis lots and samples of lives, and having mounted a high\npulpit, spoke as follows: \u0026lsquo;Hear the word of Lachesis, the daughter of\nNecessity. Mortal souls, behold a new cycle of life and mortality. Your genius\nwill not be allotted to you, but you will choose your genius; and let him who\ndraws the first lot have the first choice, and the life which he chooses shall\nbe his destiny. Virtue is free, and as a man honours or dishonours her he will\nhave more or less of her; the responsibility is with the chooser\u0026mdash;God is\njustified.\u0026rsquo; When the Interpreter had thus spoken he scattered lots\nindifferently among them all, and each of them took up the lot which fell near\nhim, all but Er himself (he was not allowed), and each as he took his lot\nperceived the number which he had obtained. Then the Interpreter placed on the\nground before them the samples of lives; and there were many more lives than\nthe souls present, and they were of all sorts. There were lives of every animal\nand of man in every condition. And there were tyrannies among them, some\nlasting out the tyrant\u0026rsquo;s life, others which broke off in the middle and\ncame to an end in poverty and exile and beggary; and there were lives of famous\nmen, some who were famous for their form and beauty as well as for their\nstrength and success in games, or, again, for their birth and the qualities of\ntheir ancestors; and some who were the reverse of famous for the opposite\nqualities. And of women likewise; there was not, however, any definite\ncharacter in them, because the soul, when choosing a new life, must of\nnecessity become different. But there was every other quality, and the all\nmingled with one another, and also with elements of wealth and poverty, and\ndisease and health; and there were mean states also. And here, my dear Glaucon,\nis the supreme peril of our human state; and therefore the utmost care should\nbe taken. Let each one of us leave every other kind of knowledge and seek and\nfollow one thing only, if peradventure he may be able to learn and may find\nsome one who will make him able to learn and discern between good and evil, and\nso to choose always and everywhere the better life as he has opportunity. He\nshould consider the bearing of all these things which have been mentioned\nseverally and collectively upon virtue; he should know what the effect of\nbeauty is when combined with poverty or wealth in a particular soul, and what\nare the good and evil consequences of noble and humble birth, of private and\npublic station, of strength and weakness, of cleverness and dullness, and of\nall the natural and acquired gifts of the soul, and the operation of them when\nconjoined; he will then look at the nature of the soul, and from the\nconsideration of all these qualities he will be able to determine which is the\nbetter and which is the worse; and so he will choose, giving the name of evil\nto the life which will make his soul more unjust, and good to the life which\nwill make his soul more just; all else he will disregard. For we have seen and\nknow that this is the best choice both in life and after death. A man must take\nwith him into the world below an adamantine faith in truth and right, that\nthere too he may be undazzled by the desire of wealth or the other allurements\nof evil, lest, coming upon tyrannies and similar villainies, he do irremediable\nwrongs to others and suffer yet worse himself; but let him know how to choose\nthe mean and avoid the extremes on either side, as far as possible, not only in\nthis life but in all that which is to come. For this is the way of happiness.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd according to the report of the messenger from the other world this was what\nthe prophet said at the time: \u0026lsquo;Even for the last comer, if he chooses\nwisely and will live diligently, there is appointed a happy and not undesirable\nexistence. Let not him who chooses first be careless, and let not the last\ndespair.\u0026rsquo; And when he had spoken, he who had the first choice came\nforward and in a moment chose the greatest tyranny; his mind having been\ndarkened by folly and sensuality, he had not thought out the whole matter\nbefore he chose, and did not at first sight perceive that he was fated, among\nother evils, to devour his own children. But when he had time to reflect, and\nsaw what was in the lot, he began to beat his breast and lament over his\nchoice, forgetting the proclamation of the prophet; for, instead of throwing\nthe blame of his misfortune on himself, he accused chance and the gods, and\neverything rather than himself. Now he was one of those who came from heaven,\nand in a former life had dwelt in a well-ordered State, but his virtue was a\nmatter of habit only, and he had no philosophy. And it was true of others who\nwere similarly overtaken, that the greater number of them came from heaven and\ntherefore they had never been schooled by trial, whereas the pilgrims who came\nfrom earth having themselves suffered and seen others suffer, were not in a\nhurry to choose. And owing to this inexperience of theirs, and also because the\nlot was a chance, many of the souls exchanged a good destiny for an evil or an\nevil for a good. For if a man had always on his arrival in this world dedicated\nhimself from the first to sound philosophy, and had been moderately fortunate\nin the number of the lot, he might, as the messenger reported, be happy here,\nand also his journey to another life and return to this, instead of being rough\nand underground, would be smooth and heavenly. Most curious, he said, was the\nspectacle\u0026mdash;sad and laughable and strange; for the choice of the souls was\nin most cases based on their experience of a previous life. There he saw the\nsoul which had once been Orpheus choosing the life of a swan out of enmity to\nthe race of women, hating to be born of a woman because they had been his\nmurderers; he beheld also the soul of Thamyras choosing the life of a\nnightingale; birds, on the other hand, like the swan and other musicians,\nwanting to be men. The soul which obtained the twentieth lot chose the life of\na lion, and this was the soul of Ajax the son of Telamon, who would not be a\nman, remembering the injustice which was done him in the judgment about the\narms. The next was Agamemnon, who took the life of an eagle, because, like\nAjax, he hated human nature by reason of his sufferings. About the middle came\nthe lot of Atalanta; she, seeing the great fame of an athlete, was unable to\nresist the temptation: and after her there followed the soul of Epeus the son\nof Panopeus passing into the nature of a woman cunning in the arts; and far\naway among the last who chose, the soul of the jester Thersites was putting on\nthe form of a monkey. There came also the soul of Odysseus having yet to make a\nchoice, and his lot happened to be the last of them all. Now the recollection\nof former toils had disenchanted him of ambition, and he went about for a\nconsiderable time in search of the life of a private man who had no cares; he\nhad some difficulty in finding this, which was lying about and had been\nneglected by everybody else; and when he saw it, he said that he would have\ndone the same had his lot been first instead of last, and that he was delighted\nto have it. And not only did men pass into animals, but I must also mention\nthat there were animals tame and wild who changed into one another and into\ncorresponding human natures\u0026mdash;the good into the gentle and the evil into\nthe savage, in all sorts of combinations.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAll the souls had now chosen their lives, and they went in the order of their\nchoice to Lachesis, who sent with them the genius whom they had severally\nchosen, to be the guardian of their lives and the fulfiller of the choice: this\ngenius led the souls first to Clotho, and drew them within the revolution of\nthe spindle impelled by her hand, thus ratifying the destiny of each; and then,\nwhen they were fastened to this, carried them to Atropos, who spun the threads\nand made them irreversible, whence without turning round they passed beneath\nthe throne of Necessity; and when they had all passed, they marched on in a\nscorching heat to the plain of Forgetfulness, which was a barren waste\ndestitute of trees and verdure; and then towards evening they encamped by the\nriver of Unmindfulness, whose water no vessel can hold; of this they were all\nobliged to drink a certain quantity, and those who were not saved by wisdom\ndrank more than was necessary; and each one as he drank forgot all things. Now\nafter they had gone to rest, about the middle of the night there was a\nthunderstorm and earthquake, and then in an instant they were driven upwards in\nall manner of ways to their birth, like stars shooting. He himself was hindered\nfrom drinking the water. But in what manner or by what means he returned to the\nbody he could not say; only, in the morning, awaking suddenly, he found himself\nlying on the pyre.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003cp\u003e\nAnd thus, Glaucon, the tale has been saved and has not perished, and will save\nus if we are obedient to the word spoken; and we shall pass safely over the\nriver of Forgetfulness and our soul will not be defiled. Wherefore my counsel\nis, that we hold fast ever to the heavenly way and follow after justice and\nvirtue always, considering that the soul is immortal and able to endure every\nsort of good and every sort of evil. Thus shall we live dear to one another and\nto the gods, both while remaining here and when, like conquerors in the games\nwho go round to gather gifts, we receive our reward. And it shall be well with\nus both in this life and in the pilgrimage of a thousand years which we have\nbeen describing.\n\u003c/p\u003e\n\n\u003c/div\u003e\u003c!–end chapter–\u003e\r\n\u003c/article\u003e"}],"SectionSequence":["Back Link","Work Title","Deck","Author","Period","Era","Composition","Date Note","Region","Terra Avita","Terra Avita Region","Modern Country","Original Title","Language","Primary Discipline","Secondary Discipline","Tradition","Full Versions","Core Thesis","Classification","Arguments","Influence","Significance","Evidence Note","Full Text"],"Counts":{"ContextCards":3,"GeoCards":4,"DisciplineCards":2,"Links":11,"Sections":25,"Styles":3,"Scripts":1}}